WEST AFRICA: CIVIL SOCIETY STRENGTHENING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION STUDY

Anglophone Civil Society Organization Assessment: Ghana and Nigeria Synthesis Report

Prepared for
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
GONGO	Government (created) NGO
IGO	International Governmental Organization
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
QUANGO	Quasi-Governmental Organization
VAT	Value-Added Tax

Nigerian CSOs

ACF	Arewa Consultative Forum
AFRIGOV	African Center for Governance and Democracy
AFSTRAG	African Strategic and Peace Research Group
ALF	Africa Leadership Forum
ASUU	Academic Staff Union of Universities
BAOBAB	BAOBAB for Women's Human Rights
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CAPP	Community Action For Popular Participation
CENPED	Center for Peace Education and Development
CEPID	Center for Peace Initiatives and Development
CFCR	Citizens' Forum for Constitutional Reform
CLEEN	Center for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria
CLO	Civil Liberties Organization
CNVE	Community Network for Voter Education
CPA	Center for Peace in Africa
CPDA	Center for Peace and Development Action
CRESNET	Conflict Resolution Stakeholders' Network
CRP	Constitutional Rights Project
EDP	Even Development Project
ERN	Election Reform Network
FOMWAN	Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Nigeria
GPM	Global Peace Movement
HRVIC	Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission
IFMC	Interfaith Mediation Center
JDPC	Justice Development and Peace Commission
JNI	*Jama'atu Nasril Islam*
LASER	Lawyers for Socioeconomic Rights
LRRDC	Law Research and Resource Documentation Center
MCDF	Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MPM	Middle-Belt Progressive Movement
MRA	Media Rights Agenda

MWA   Market Women's Association
NACWYCA   National Center for Women, Youth and Community Action
NCVAW   National Coalition on Violence Against Women
NCWS   National Council of Women Societies
N-CAN   Northern Christian Association of Nigeria
NBA   Nigerian Bar Association
NLC   Nigeria Labor Congress
PSPIC   Plateau State Peace Initiative Coalition
SA   Social Alert
SEMA   Strategic Empowerment Mediation Agency
SERAC   Social and Economic Rights Action Center
SOKAPU   Southern-Kaduna Peoples' Union
SRI   Shelter Rights Initiative
TMG   Transition Monitoring Group
UAD   United Alliance for Democracy
VOP   Visions of Peace
WLDCN   Women's Law and Development Center
WOLF   Women Opinion Leaders' Forum
Yaba SU   Yaba Student Union
Y-CAN   Youth Christian Association of Nigeria

Ghanian CSOs

ADP   African Development Program
ASDR   African Security Dialogue and Research
AWDF   African Women's Development Front
BADECC   Business Advisory and Development Consulting Center
CCG   Christian Council of Ghana
CODEYAC   Community Development and Youth Advisory Center
FIDA   *Federation Internacional de Abogadas*
FOMWAG   Federation of Moslem Women Association of Ghana
FOSDA   Foundation for Security and Development
GAPVOD   Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organizations
GAWE   Ghana Association of Women Entrepreneurs
ICDHS   Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services
IDEG   Institute for Democratic Governance
ISODEC   Integrated Social Development Centre
LECIA   Legon Center for International Affairs
LRC   Legal Resource Center
MFWA   Media Foundation for West Africa
NCCE   National Commission for Civic Education
N-CCG   Northern Christian Council of Ghana
NDC   National Democratic Congress
NDPC   National Development Planning Committee
NGND   Northern Ghana Network for Development
NORYDA   Northern Region Youth Development Association

NPP   National Patriotic Party
NVI   Nonviolence International
PNDC   Party of the National Democratic Congress
RCC   Coordination Council
TUC   Trade Union Congress
TWN   Third World Network
WANEP   West Africa Network for Peace Building
WARN   Warning and Response Network

International Organizations and Donors, Regional Organizations and International NGOs

CDD   Center for Democracy and Development
CIDA   Canadian International Development Agency
CPM   Conflict Prevention Mechanism (of ECOWAS)
DFID   Department for International Development
EU   European Union
ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG   ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWATCH   ECOWAS Conflict Monitoring Mechanism
FEWER   Forum for Early Warning and Response
OAU   Organization of African Unity
OSIWA   Open Society Initiative for West Africa
OTI   Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
RUF   Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
UNDP   United Nations Development Program
USAID   United States Agency for International Development
USIS   United States Information Service

Nigeria Institutional

AD   Alliance for Democracy
BRA   Bureau for Religious Affairs
CAC   Corporate Affairs Commission
CPRCR   Center for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution
CPSCM   Center for Peace Studies and Conflict Management
FCDA   Federal Capital Development Authority
FCT   Federal Capital Territory
INEC   Independent National Electoral Commission
IPCR   Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
LGC   Local Government Council
NASS   National Assembly
NJI   National Judicial Institute
NWC   National War College

I.   Introduction and Overview

This synthesis report covers the assessment of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ghana and Nigeria and their capacity to undertake conflict prevention and management functions. The overall assessment examined CSO conflict resolution capacity at three levels, that is, (a) the local community level, (b) around issues of a national scope, and (c) those conflicts that had a "cross-border" or subregional dimension. This assessment is one of two assessment studies (the other being an assessment of Francophone countries) conducted for the West Africa Regional Program of USAID as part of a broader study entitled "West Africa: Civil Society Strengthening for Conflict Prevention."

For each country (Ghana and Nigeria) a team of three consultants — two nationals and an international team leader — conducted the assessment over a period of three weeks in August and September of 2001. The purpose of the study was to assess the capacities of CSOs to engage in civic activity, particularly in conflict prevention and management work.

The study was guided by several key hypotheses that oriented the research. First, it was hypothesized that the type of CSO would make a considerable difference in their degree of capacity and actual experience in conflict prevention and mitigation. For the purpose of this study, CSOs were classified as either *primary-level CSOs* including traditional community-based organizations (CBOs)*; intermediary CSOs* including classic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as associations of CBOs (e.g., unions, cooperatives and other federated bodies); and *tertiary CSOs* — national-level apex or umbrella associations and associations offering specialized services such as training to CSOs nationally. We thought that this distinction was important because we hypothesized that different types of CSOs would be likely to engage in different types of conflict management tasks.

A second hypothesis was that CSOs that are better developed in terms of their formal structure, and are more democratic, accountable and participatory in their working methods would have more capacity to successfully engage in civic action. It was further hypothesized that those associations with more overall capacity to engage in civic action would have more capacity to engage in conflict prevention and management work.[1]

Third, the study hypothesized that the nature of the enabling environment for CSO work and for its linkage to governmental institutions would be important in the kinds of capacity that had emerged and the range of conflict activities already undertaken. Since this study was conducted mainly by interviewing CSO respondents, it emphasizes not so much a legal or institutional analysis of the enabling environment as the perceptions of CSO leaders of the nature of the legal, policy and regulatory environment and whether they believed that it favored CSO participation or not in such "public" acts as conflict prevention and management of that environment. This perceptual data is, however, complemented by interviews with key informants in government and political parties and in the media to get a somewhat more objective image.

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1 For a full explanation of the definitions employed and the items used to collect particular information on capacity and civic action experience, see the Assessment Methodology Instrument developed for use in both the Francophone and Anglophone country-level assessments, labeled as Annexes 1 and 2 of this report.

Finally, the study hypothesized that the kind and degree of conflict management work noted would be a function of the stage in the development of particular conflicts. We classified the phases of conflict as *pre-violence*, *ongoing violence*, *and post violence*, and hypothesized that the predominant types of conflict work — *conflict prevention*, *mitigation* or *escalation prevention*, and *resolution* or *post-conflict prevention* — observed would be conditioned by the phase of the conflict. Of course, for the capacity assessment studies, we were not focused on a single conflict as we were in the Casamance and in the Mano River Union states. In fact, we were able to identify a number of different conflicts within each country and among the national actors, so that a number of different kinds of conflict management work could be going on simultaneously as CSOs got involved in different kinds of disputes. These different conflicts and the different roles that CSOs were able to play are developed in the "mini-case studies" found in Annex 4 of this report. In addition, we give a number of much briefer "anecdotes" drawn from the interviews conducted with the CSOs in both countries. These are useful, we think, in giving a sense not only of the broad range of issues in which CSOs can and do attempt to play roles in preventing and mitigating conflict, but begin to offer a list of "best practices" from their experiences. These anecdotes are found in Annex 5.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows:

- Section II explores the concept of conflict resolution and prevention and serves as a common conceptual section for all the other assessment studies.

- Section III presents an overall discussion of the nature of conflict in Nigeria and in Ghana.

- Section IV provides an analysis of the enabling environmental factors—the legal, policy and regulatory conditions pertaining in Nigeria and Ghana and the degree to which they encourage or discourage CSO participation in such public acts as conflict prevention and management.

- Section V examines the types of CSOs that the team found in both societies.

- Section VI examines the three dimensions of CSO capacity: internal democratic governance, internal management, and civic action (including conflict resolution work) in the CSOs studied in Ghana and Nigeria.

- Section VII discusses the role that Ghanaian and Nigerian CSOs can and do play in conflicts outside their national frontiers and in the region.

- Section VIII offers some conclusions on the capacity of CSOs in Ghana and Nigeria to participate in reducing the intensity and helping to resolve variety of kinds of conflicts, and a perspective on how conflict prevention work might best by furthered in both societies.

II.   Conflict Resolution and Prevention: Operationalizing the Terms

Our assessments cover four of the most important countries in West Africa (Nigeria, Ghana, Mali and Cote d'Ivoire) in terms of their geographical size, abundance of resources and military strength. In this sense, they give direction to regional peace, security and development priorities. The conflict and security situation differs considerably from one country to the next. Ghana is considered to be one of the most peaceful countries in West Africa. Nigeria, on the other hand, struggles with many types of internal conflict. After a long period of internal peace and stability, Côte d'Ivoire has now joined the list of countries where internal conflicts seriously affect internal order and present a potential threat to the subregion. Mali, having resolved its long and fratricidal civil war, is among the more successful countries for the maintenance of internal peace. At the same time, several of these countries, notably Mali and Nigeria, have played leading roles in the management of subregional and civil conflicts in West Africa, through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN). All of the countries studied here have experienced recent transitions to democratic regimes, and not without difficulties. Ghana's transition has been the most peaceful. Côte d'Ivoire is still struggling to work out its new regime in terms of identity politics. Nigeria's long night of military rule did little to prepare it for civil conflict management and violence is still employed all too commonly. These transition histories, coupled with different colonial pasts, have profound implications for the roles and functions of CSOs. While in the Anglophone countries, CSOs are much denser and broadly organized, they are not necessarily better equipped to deal with conflict.

In all four societies, conflict resolution is a relatively new function for CSOs and none are yet well equipped with material resources. Perhaps more importantly, all function in an environment in which states have yet to fully appreciate and support the value of "Track II" citizen-based diplomacy. This is particularly ironic given the fact that many observers have noted the growth in capacity of communities to govern themselves, including dealing with potentially violent conflicts in the face of reduced capacity of central states to play that role.

This study takes a comprehensive, dynamic conception of both the causes of conflict, and the means to resolve and prevent it. Specifically, conflicts have multiple sources at *intra*-national levels, such as: 1) structural factors, i.e., social hierarchies and cleavages; 2) economic factors, i.e., control of resources; 3) institutional factors, i.e., specifically illegitimate, authoritarian regimes and civilian control over the military institutions; and 4) cultural and identity factors, i.e., dominant and oppositional value systems. Manifestations of the same sources of *inter*national conflict might include: 1) the dominance of some states of the region over others; 2) growth and pattern in the flow of goods and labor within the region and the integration of the regional economy with the international system; 3) competitive support of some actors in the region by powerful external actors; and 4) competitive appeal of values and culture, such as religion and ethnicity.

To resolve conflict or build peace thus requires addressing multiple sources of conflict, and is best done through a variety of methods. This is particularly the case in transitional, developing countries where there are many competing, critical national priorities, and thus the potential for

conflict to erupt is much greater. In societies with faltering or failing economies, for example, the problem is made much more severe as high levels of unemployment leave youth idle and susceptible to joining groups engaging in crime or violence.

The concept of CSO employed in this study is also very broad, including many different types of actors and groups employing many different types of strategies. The concept employed for this study, however, involved the following elements: voluntary organization, significant autonomy from the state, and the pursuit of "public purposes" including the prevention or resolution of conflict on behalf of a broader public. Organizations that seem to fit these criteria included groups whose primary purposes involved conflict resolution/peace, democracy, development, human rights, women/gender, youth, as well as the pursuit of professional interests.

Conflict prevention is also understood in this study in a broad manner to include:

- **Conflict prevention:** preventing violent disputes from arising between parties either by structural, institutional, economic, or cultural remedies;

- **Escalation prevention:** preventing both vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive means of warfare and to involve additional actors;

- **Post-conflict prevention:** preventing the reemergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the war-torn society.[2]

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[2] Leatherman, et al, 1999.

III.   The Nature of the Conflicts

A.   Nigeria

Nigeria's transition from two decades of military rule began in June 1998, and political power was handed over to civilian rule in May 1999. A comprehensive study recently undertaken by USAID/ARD, *Future Directions for USAID Support to Conflict Mitigation in Nigeria*, noted:

> *The array of conflicts is bewildering; the intensity of the violence often stunning. In the short space of two years since a democratically elected civilian administration took power, armed confrontations have erupted throughout the country over such issues as:*
>
> - *religion;*
> - *economic power and opportunities;*
> - *political power and offices;*
> - *division of wealth (known colloquially as "the federal cake") delivered from subsurface nonrenewable resources — principally petroleum in the Niger Delta and neighboring areas — and controlled by the federal government;*
> - *land;*
> - *renewable natural resources, including livestock forage, wood stocks, and fisheries;*
> - *environmental damage;*
> - *labor-management relations;*
> - *urban "turf" disputes among youth gangs;*
> - *disputes among youth of rural communities; and*
> - *police-related violence.*

In the two and one-half years of civilian rule, around 7000 people have died in short, sudden bursts of communal violence. In the past several months alone, severe conflicts have occurred which reveal the intractability of particular conflict issues, as well as the inter-linkages of many of these factors. In September (during the time of the research) 500 people were killed in Jos. While this is being referred to as religious or ethnic, it was more complicated, incorporating historical issues rooted in colonialism. Who, for example, is a 'settler' and who is an 'indigene'? In June and July, 200 more people died in Nasarawa state in violent and unregulated conflict. This outburst was related to chieftaincy disputes and contests for political power — left over from colonial rule.

The causes for Nigeria's conflicts are numerous, and debatable depending on the philosophical outlook one employs. In addition to the legacy of colonialism, interacting contemporary conflict causes include:

- diversity of identities and values, in particular with reference to ethnicity and religion (120 million people and 200 ethnic groups);

- immense natural resources, oil in particular, that is profoundly inequitably distributed, with particular adversity to the communities that reside in its terrain;

- the control of those natural resources, and the economy in general, by the federal government;

- twenty years of military misrule, and the continuing pervasiveness of military and police violence and abuse;

- tensions between traditional and modern practices (i.e., in Katsina state between nomads and farmers) and between residents and development projects (i.e., in Mina state involving the displacement of communities); and

- the perception by northerners that the federal government is dominated by southerners and Middle-Belt people, and by easterners that are virtually excluded from power in central government.

B.   Ghana

With a history of military and authoritarian rule, Ghana is nevertheless considered one of the most stable countries in Africa. In 1992, President Rawlings followed the trends toward democracy and held an election, drafted a constitution and allowed a referendum to take place, and lifted the ten-year ban on political parties. Since his victory and the birth of the Fourth Republic, Ghana has experienced a measure of democracy and stability. Unlike many of the states in the West African subregion, Ghana can lay claim to a decade of relative peace. The relatively few cases of conflict that have arisen have been confined to small areas in different parts of the country.

With the exception of interethnic violence in the run up to independence and the secessionist movement in the Ewe-dominated Volta region in the 1970s, Ghana is often considered a model of inter-ethnic harmony. Since independence, the leaders in high office have been elected based on the popularity and strength of their parties rather than their ethnic origin.

This is not to say that ethnic tensions do not exist. While the Rawlings government played down ethnic differences, his opponents claimed that the Ewe ethnic group from the eastern part of the country dominated the government. Ironically, the Ewe-dominated Volta region remains one of the most underdeveloped in the country. A 1997 survey found that 25 percent of the respondents believed they had experienced discrimination due to their tribal origins.[3] In the 2000 elections, political parties went to great lengths to push the ethnic question on the political agenda — ethnically balancing their presidential teams in all-out efforts to illustrate their inclusiveness. Election-related violence is still a concern, however. Some analysts believe that tensions are rising between President Kufuor's National Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), party of former President Rawlings.

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[3]   US Department of State, Ghana Human Rights Report, 2000.

The most severe violent conflict of the last decade was the intercommunal "Guinea Fowl War" in the north. It began in 1994 and had a mixture of causes that included resource inequity, land and chieftaincy rights. Several different ethnic groups were involved including on one side the Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba and on the other the Konkomba. Over 2000 people died in this conflict, and a good deal of property was destroyed. Other intercommunal conflicts in the north have erupted over similar issues; timely government and CSO intervention have enabled conflicting parties to come to agreement short of large-scale violence.[4]

As in Nigeria, there is north-south tension. Muslim northerners claim that the underdevelopment of the north in comparison to the Christian-dominated south (particularly the Ashanti region and the Greater Accra area) is a result of discriminatory government decisions. Other developmental conflicts center around the mining sector, which some are referring to as Ghana's Niger Delta. To deal with these growing tensions, some CSOs are advocating for increased participation of communities in decisions affecting the economic development of their communities.

The football stadium riot earlier this year also had undertones of the north-south tension. Nima youth made this claim when they discovered that a majority killed were from their neighborhood of Accra where many northerners live. A follow-on conflict nearly ensued but was quelled by police and various CSOs.

As in much of West Africa, wider issues of arms proliferation affect Ghana. In 1994 during the intercommunal conflict in the north between the Nanumba and Konkomba, referred to above, the violence was compounded by the smuggling of small arms from Burkina Faso and Togo.

Despite these internal tensions, however, Ghana has sought to play an active role in resolving conflicts in the West Africa subregion. Along with Nigeria, Ghana has been at the forefront of efforts for peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Ghanaian peacekeepers are prevalent in these conflicts and farther away in Rwanda, Lebanon and Cambodia. Ghana has allowed a significant number of refugees to immigrate, particularly from West Africa, and is also a key player in the processes of economic integration within the ECOWAS region. During the Rawlings era, however, relations with neighboring countries, particularly with Togo, were strained as Togo's President Eyadéma accused Rawlings of supporting armed excursions by Ghana-based Togolese dissidents who were from Rawlings' Ewe ethnic group.

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[4] These ethnic conflicts include the conflict between the Jabus and the Bosorrors, who are both Anufo clans in the Saboba/Chereponi district in the northern region; the conflict between the Temoungs and the Pulis; and the conflict between the Ga traditionalists and Christians in the Greater Accra region.

IV.   Enabling Environment for CSOs

A.   Nigeria

The operating environment for CSOs in Nigeria is mixed. Following fifteen years of uninterrupted military dictatorship, the major restrictions to CSO activities have been removed and there is relative freedom and greater cooperation from government departments and agencies. Underlying this newly acquired freedom, however, are resentments and efforts to discourage CSO activities, and often to question the motives of CSO personnel. This is at a time when CSOs themselves are at crossroads. With the end of military rule and the installation of democracy, CSO programming needs to change from public advocacy against human rights abuses to practical engagement with government and its agencies on policy formulation and reforms in governmental institutions, procedures and practices. Many CSOs have yet to respond to this need and are finding it difficult to attract grants or get media attention. This has created a sense of bewilderment and frustration in the CSO community and made CSO activity lose focus, steam and some public appeal. In response we can see in the "Consolidated Table" for Nigeria in Annex 2 that Nigerian CSO respondents have a very mixed view of the enabling environment. While 70 percent of those responding stated that they thought the institutional environment was favorable, only 57 percent believe that the policy environment is favorable.

1.   Laws, Policies and Regulations

The 1999 Nigerian Constitution guarantees freedom of association, assembly and movement and there are no rules as such that inhibit the registration and performance of CSOs. The registration procedure for CSOs is fairly uniform. For professional associations, they are free to register as charities or request a government charter (i.e., government legislation regulating the practice of that profession). Labor unions face a different set of requirements. They are registered by an act which defines membership and objectives of the union, and which requires unions to submit their accounts to the registrar of trade unions for scrutiny. This act strictly forbids unions from using their funds for political purposes. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), as part of this procedure for processing applications for registration of CSOs, requires security clearance from the state security service. To clear a CSO for registration, the proposed trustees are screened to ensure that they do not constitute security risks. One interviewee pointed out that "the requirements for registration are very stiff for the poor and illiterate. To register you are required to hire a lawyer, advertise in three national dailies and pay various fees to the Corporate Affairs Commission. This has stopped many CSOs from registering."

The Electoral Bill, currently in the National Assembly (NASS), forbids CSOs from canvassing for votes for any candidate. Months ago, the chair of the Human Rights Committee of the Nigerian Senate introduced a CSO Bill to the House, which if passed, will regulate the activities of CSOs by requiring them to inform a government-established commission of the receipt of any foreign funding. The CSO commission would also have the power to "sanitize" erring CSOs. When the Senate presented the bill for public hearing, the overwhelming opposition from CSOs and members of the public buried the bill, for now.

2.   Institutional Implementation and CSO Responses

The laws and policies apart, CSOs in Nigeria operate with a number of constraints. Although the registration procedure is fair, implementation of rules varies. CSOs that are interested in human rights issues face stringent application of the rules. The reason for this is a mindset, carried over from military regimes. Human rights-focused CSO's interests are perceived to be antithetical to government's interests. Right from the moment when preliminary enquiries are made at the local office of the CAC, to the eventual completion at CAC Abuja, human rights groups contend with diffidence, reluctance and at times hostility of officials. For any group, the registration process involves a lot of bureaucracy, which makes the process open to abuse by officials.

Increasingly, though not in the rules, applicants for CSO registration are required to present land deeds as guaranty. Should a CSO decide, however, not to register, it suffers no special restrictions on its activities. As for traditional CBOs, most are not legally registered at the national level; rather they register with the state government or local council where they operate. Securing registration is one thing. Exercising the rights that registration bestows on the CSO is another. To associate and assemble in practice, you require a police permit, which is rarely given. Demonstrations, rallies and processions are often disallowed. When they do take place, they are usually described by the police as illegal. In some instances, conferences sponsored by CSOs are disallowed in the name of national security. For instance, the president disallowed the Revenue Mobilization Commission, a government agency that wished to have a conference in collaboration with a number of CSOs (e.g., Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People [MOSOP], Ijaw National Congress, etc). President Obasanjo has made it known that now democracy has been installed, human rights CSOs should close shop, as they have no more relevance. This was in response to the campaign against the role that the president was playing in intervening in the affairs of the NASS.

There are other factors that inhibit CSO operations. Government officials, perhaps out of ignorance or mischief, insist that CSOs, especially the fairly well-established NGOs, pay the same standard rates that business and corporate organizations pay for utilities. Value-added tax (VAT) assessments, signboard levies, and water rates are some of the demands made on them. Some that sought government patronage at some point confront situations in which a parastatal or agency insists on fresh registration with that agency before any consideration can be given. Labor unions are still routinely harassed or are under surveillance by security operatives. In some cases, union leaders and activists lose their jobs.

The media, who used to treat CSOs with respect and regarded them as genuine voices of the people during the military era, is becoming more critical. A year ago, *The Guardian* newspapers (one of Nigeria's most credible) ran stories that portrayed leading CSO personalities as financial parasites who have enriched themselves under cover of struggling for human rights. Stories about CSOs are becoming less and less visible on the front pages. Even in the inner pages, they have to compete for space. At the same time, there is a general public outcry against media sensationalism and corruption.

The media itself, though relatively free from legal restriction, suffers from lack of access to government information as a result of the Official Secrets Act of 1962 that prohibits publication

of government information without clearance. There is also the Press Council Act of 1992 that requires every publishing company to register with the council each year, provided it has been of good conduct. Another obstacle to free media is the dominance of national broadcast spectrum by the federal government and regulation of the broadcast media by the National Broadcasting Commission. The commission can close down a station if its broadcasts are considered a threat to national security, offends religion or ethnic sensitivity, or has more than 40 percent foreign content. In response to these restrictions, the media and media groups have launched campaigns for a Freedom of Information Act and amendment of all laws that restrict access of journalists to information. At the same time, a Media Bill is in the pipeline, aimed at reforming the legal environment and general climate for media to operate more openly and effectively. It seeks to collect all media legislation and place it under one bill to make media regulations and guidelines for operations more coherent and transparent.

3. Socioeconomic Context and the Role of Donors

It is clear that lack of funding is stunting CSO productivity. Since the return to electoral democracy in Nigeria, CSOs have not seen an increase in donor interest in funding them for civic work. Domestic donors are practically nonexistent. Individual and corporate bodies that give grants to CSOs do not enjoy any special concessions when it comes to payment of taxes. Moreover, because of the relative underdevelopment of the economy, a great majority of individuals and corporate businesses depend on government for major contracts. Such groups are easy targets for reprisals if they should give grants to organizations that have the remotest connection with human rights issues.

The state of the communications infrastructure is a perennial problem. Electronic correspondence is completely at the mercy of the erratic metropolitan electricity supply. The phones are also unpredictable. When this is placed within the context of a weak social infrastructure, communications are exceedingly expensive in terms of time and money, and appointments and deadlines become difficult to keep.

B. Ghana

The movement towards democratic rule in Ghana in 1992, followed by a changeover in government in January 2001, greatly improved the operating environment for CSOs. Increasingly, there have been collaborative efforts between CSOs and the government, where CSOs are called upon to put their expertise at the services of the government. Even though collaboration is still at the level of discussion rather than CSO participation in decision making, the mere fact that CSOs are invited to the table, a situation that was nearly impossible a decade ago, is worth noting. The leading role that CSOs played in the creation of the Freedom of Information Act and in the elimination of the NGO Bill illustrates the potential of Ghanaian CSOs to impact policy and generate a positive enabling environment for their work.

1. Laws, Policies and Regulations

Freedom of association and assembly are enshrined in the Ghanaian Constitution of 1992. As such, there are no laws restricting the establishment and operation of CSOs in Ghana. The

process can, however, be very slow and it requires a lot of information. The Certificate of Incorporation, which identifies the CSO as a registered organization in the country, is granted by the Registrar Generals Department. The second step is to acquire a Certificate of Recognition from the Department of Social Welfare. Tax exemption on certain imports is granted to CSOs that have this certificate.

To register as an "NGO with limited guarantee" is very easy but again, takes time. Regional organizations with non-Ghanaian staff, such as the West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP), have to register as a charitable organization, which gives staff work permits and allows them to bring in goods, i.e., cars and equipment, on a tax exemption basis. This process took WANEP two years. A CSO must apply, have their offices examined, and undergo a six-month process of being investigated. Particular limitations exist for charitable organizations, i.e., if they liquidate, their property must go to other NGOs in the country. All staff must pay taxes in Ghana.

In 1995, President Rawlings tried to create an NGO Bill to regulate NGOs, which restricted the roles and rights of CSO existence. At the heart of the bill were restrictions on freedom of expression and association. This became a serious conflict, as NGOs resisted strongly. NGOs insisted that the Constitution gave them rights to exist without such restrictions. One CSO — the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) — brought together NGOs and government through a series of workshops, and prepared an issues paper that was the basis for dialogue. While at first this was highly contentious, IDEG carried the dialogue through. Both government and civil society unanimously accepted of the document. This is now a basis of a new relationship between government and civil society and the foundation of a new law.

From a perceptual point of view, Ghanaian CSOs are somewhat positive about the environment in which they operate. Over half of those that responded thought that the policy environmental was favorable.

2.   Institutional Implementation and CSO Responses

In the area of peacemaking, both the Rawlings government and the new government have created space for civil society working in the area of peacemaking to operate. During the northern regional conflict in 1994-1995, the government increasingly realized the value of civil society contributions to the peacemaking and peace building efforts, and progressively incorporated them into the peace process.

This story of openness to CSOs is not one that includes private media practitioners. Prior to the changeover in government this year, they suffered quite seriously at the hands of the government, which did all in its power to subject them to fear and intimidation so that they would be mindful of the kinds of criticism that they leveled against the government in power. In 2000, there were at least five arbitrary arrests of journalists for crimes ranging from investigating alleged fraudulent deals at a sugar factory to making libelous remarks about the president on radio. Media houses, however, refused to succumb to the intimidation of the state machinery. Despite the real potential of having to pay a price for expressing themselves, they persevered against the odds, investigating and documenting stories about corruption and social injustices in

the country. Today, however, the situation is greatly improved. The present government is committed to the freedom of expression. The Minister for Media Relations, who was herself once a reporter for the nation's largest newspaper, has been appointed to ensure that the media has access to the presidency and that above all, there is a cordial relationship between the media and state.

From a perceptual point of view, CSOs are not nearly as positive about the institutional development as might be expected. About 75 percent of those responding still characterized the institutional environment as unfavorable, reflecting a persistence of mistrust in the government from the past.

3.   Socioeconomic Context

The major challenge facing CSOs in Ghana has to do with funding. Many CSOs are handicapped due to lack of funding. These are usually termed "pocket NGOs", who only thrive on individual contributions and more often than not, do not last.

Communication is a serious problem, making correspondence very difficult and very costly. Delays on a daily basis in telephone line access, even in the most developed CSOs, affect programmatic deadlines. One can make 50 attempts to get one phone call through, on any given day. Internet access is also very temperamental, and extremely costly for the average user.

V.   Types of CSOs

A.   Nigeria

In typical Nigerian cities, primary CSOs, that is traditional organizations or CBOs, are an integral part of active social and political life. Associations dealing with grade, gender, art and clans coexist with modern CSOs and various quasi-governmental institutions that coordinate social activities. These CSOs have different types of capacities and capabilities. The traditional type of CBO participates in community development activities in addition to assuring social welfare for its members. Typically, classic or intermediary NGOs make use of the CBOs to reach the grassroots. Quasi-governmental institutions typically work with both CBOs and classic intermediary CSOs. The relationship between these CSOs, government and the donor community varies from partnership to clientelism.

In the past, primary-level CBOs had quite different functions. In most cases they were used for initiating young men and women into adulthood, while others managed security, healthcare and various crafts that were essential for smooth community life. All participated in community development and community democracy. With colonialism, however, these CBOs became welfare associations concerned mainly with the well-being of their members and their families. Presently, they are being drawn into donor-sponsored activities either directly by the donors themselves or through intermediary CSOs.

Since political power was handed over to civilians in 1999, international CSOs have come in big numbers and prefer working with CBOs, often modern CBOs created to fulfill a particular function, such as healthcare or education in a locality. The problem here is that frequently these CBOs often just implement programs and have little opportunity to really participate in the design or the rules for implementing the program. Even intermediary CSOs, like the Market Women's Association (MWA), have difficulty getting funding from donors to support their own projects. Another problem is that the CBOs have little if any relationship with each other and this hinders the exchange of information or experience and limits their ability to generate any autonomous power.

Classical CSOs, intermediary organizations that are generally registered and guided by a written constitution, emerged during the struggle against colonialism. With independence they faded away only to reappear in force when military dictatorship became unbearable in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When the June 12,1993 presidential election was annulled, the floodgate was opened for hundreds more CSOs to emerge.

A third type of CSO also can be found in substantial numbers in Nigeria. These are the tertiary or specialized organizations that focus on a particular issue and group intermediary CSOs, often from all over the country. They provide specialized services, such as training, legal and communication support, often to intermediary CSOs that are focused on a particular issue.

In our study, we found that three types of CSOs have become dominant in Nigeria today:

1. ***Intermediate membership CSOs***: Sometimes these are genuine membership organizations with their own mass membership, but more often they are variants on classic NGOs in which board members and a limited number of others are formally considered as members. More CSOs are becoming "membership" organizations in order to gain more public legitimacy. Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) are examples of membership intermediary CSOs. Normally, all groups of this type have a formal structure with written by-laws and legal registration. During military regimes, these CSOs did most of the practical work of mobilizing opposition to authoritarianism, distributing leaflets, organizing demonstrations and monitoring elections. Today they continue to receive substantial foreign donor support, often developing considerable capacity for advocacy, training, research and outreach, operating branches in several cities. They also have capacity to engage government and other social and economic institutions in dialogues and collaborative work. True membership CSOs have a social base that may be difficult to destroy or undermine. To the extent that they can mobilize support from their members, they also have capacity to engage government and other social and economic institutions in dialogues and collaborative work.

   The problem with these CSOs is that many of them have had to change focus whenever there has been a change in donor funding priorities, which makes them seem unreliable in the eye of the public. Now that international CSOs are opening offices in the country and working directly with CBOs, the long-term survival of this model is doubtful. Those that survive the next few years may become consultancies. Donors, however, may prefer to work through intermediary membership CSOs. Some groups of this type are beginning to establish contractual relationships with international CSOs that will qualify them for subcontracts or full contracts in the near future. Some of these CSOs have working relations with government ministries and agencies. For instance, the CLO has a long-standing collaborative relationship with the National Judicial Institute (NJI) through which they have jointly trained lower court judges. CAPP has been working with the Public Complaints Commission for more than five years. Today, most of them are focused on issues like conflict resolution, accountability and transparency in governance, local government performance, constitutional and other institutional reforms, human rights, gender equality, social and economic well-being of citizens and the environment.

2. ***Non-Membership Classic Intermediary CSOs:*** CLO started just like this, but was later forced by public criticism to admit members and adopt a constitution that limits the term of office of elected officials. Groups that broke away from CLO, like the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), Center for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN) and Media Rights Agenda (MRA) simply dispense with any form of membership. One of the key characteristics of these CSOs is the dominant role of the founder/executive director. Many of these CSOs seem to have been formed with the encouragement of donor agencies. Some are of the pro-democracy type like the United Alliance for Democracy (UAD) and the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), while others are issue-based coalitions like the Citizen's Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR), the Community Network for Voter Education (CNVE), the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) and the National Coalition on Violence Against Women (NCVAW). This type of CSO is currently in vogue and may be able to attract considerable foreign donor support. As democracy is consolidated, these

groups increasingly stress more specific issues using their networks and federal structures to accomplish collectively what none of them can do alone. Presently, these groups work on voter education, electoral violence, free and fair elections, violence against women, constitutional reforms, penal reforms, police reforms, etc. Many have established constructive relations with different arms of governments like TMG with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), NCVAW with the Women's Ministry, and the Election Reform Network (ERN) with INEC and the NASS committees on elections. Some evolve into tertiary CSOs, operating at the national level for specific issues.

3.   *Specialized Issue-Oriented Tertiary CSOs:* The last category is comprised of two sorts of groups. The first are national-level federations of intermediary CSOs that work on a specific issue, such as police reforms, human rights, media reforms, conflict management and prevention, free speech and women in politics. The second are specialized CSOs that support issue-oriented intermediary CSOs with training and other resources to help them achieve their programmatic objectives. These professional CSOs often work with government agencies relevant to their area of focus. CLEEN, for example, has good working relations with the police, CRP with the office of the Deputy Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives, and the Interfaith Mediation Center (IFMC) is effectively working with the Kaduna state government in managing conflicts in that state. This category includes umbrella organizations like the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC), the National Council of Women Societies (NCWS) and the Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) or quasi-governmental institutions like the Cooperative Federation of Nigeria. At times it is difficult to determine whether these are really part of civil society or have connections so close to government that they lack sufficient autonomy to qualify. Some, for example, operate from government buildings and are funded from government budgets and receive annual grants from government. But they may also receive grants from foreign donors and be recognized as NGOs. As national federations or umbrella organizations they have capacity to do programs and reach broad sections of the population. To the extent that they are closely linked to government, however, their programming is often dictated by government priorities, and there is reason to think that they are not really CSOs. Presently such organizations are actively involved in government programs like poverty alleviation, the National Basic Education program, the National Program on Immunization, AIDS campaigns, trafficking in women and children, and campaigns against negative cultural practices on women.

B.   Ghana

During the Rawlings era, quasi-governmental organizations (QUANGOs) were common. These included the People's and Workers' Defense Committees, the Mobisquads of the National Mobilization Program, the pro-PNDC June 4 Movement and the 31st December Women's Organization. With financial support from international donors, accompanied by donor pressure on the government, some democratic space opened which allowed CSOs to emerge and play a critical role in catalyzing the transition to democracy. Various independent-minded pro-democracy CSOs such as the Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC) and the Ghana Committee on Human and People's Rights began to challenge Rawlings, forcing him to comply with the terms of the very constitution he gave birth to.

Today in Ghana, intermediary and tertiary CSOs are most prevalent in conflict work. They have flourished by addressing specific issues and needs of society. Intermediary CSOs generally focus on developmental and peace building issues such as human rights; conflict issues; provision of social amenities; women's, children's, and youth issues; democracy; civil-military relations; and voter education. These CSOs often collaborate in the organization of workshops and seminars, in an effort to tackle issues collectively. If there are governmental policies that these groups deem work against the public interest, they come together to develop a common course of action. There are many networks and coalitions that bring CSOs together, particularly at the intermediate level, to tackle Ghana's problems.

Ghana's comparative advantage in the area of conflict prevention and resolution may lie in its academic and research base, with its tertiary organizations that focus on development issues, but take a particular interest in the peace and security aspects of the problem. CDD, the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), the Foundation for Security and Development (FOSDA), African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) and the Legon Center for International Affairs (LECIA) are all tertiary specialized CSOs that provide research and stimulate dialogue at the societal level and between society and government actors. Others, like the Third World Network (TWN) and the Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC) continue to play a strong critical research role with an economic justice slant, connecting Ghana's poor to the rest of the world through a focus on impacts of globalization. At the same time, there are CSOs that do conflict resolution and prevention training. Most of these do not work transnationally. One exception is WANEP, a tertiary CSO with local branches throughout the region, perhaps the most well known "peace" CSO with the most developed program.

In the north of Ghana, CSOs that deal with peace building and conflict prevention are more likely to be intermediary organizations. In the context of the northern conflicts, CSOs have come together, forming networks for their own peace building processes, while they work in tandem with government agencies. These include the Ghana Association for Private Voluntary Organization in Development (GAPVOD), the Northern Ghana Network for Development (NGND-the "Network"), the Community Development and Youth Advisory Center (CODEYAC), and the Northern Region Youth and Development Association (NORYDA). They tend to focus on issues like youth idleness, poverty and small arms proliferation as catalyst agents for violent conflict. Unlike their Accra counterparts, these groups have localized hands-on experience, and focus more on interventions and dialogue than on research. Although these groups are intermediary level and work only in northern Ghana, youth-based networks such as NORYDA are particularly important because they demonstrate that youth can play a central role in securing and maintaining peace. The lessons they learn and can teach, therefore, are potentially important for much of West Africa.

In general, Ghanaian intermediary CSOs have a cordial relationship with government, international government organizations (IGOs), and donors. Having won government's attention and confidence through their contribution to nation building, CSOs are sometimes called upon to serve on committees and work on various bills that would affect the populace.

VI.   CSO Capacity Assessment

Although this study hypothesized that all three levels of CSOs could be important in conflict prevention, the limited amount of time to conduct fieldwork meant that very little attention was paid to primary associations and particularly to less formal, often traditionally based associations. A total of 37 CSOs were studied in Nigeria only two were classified as primary, while 17 were intermediary and 18 were tertiary. Twenty-five CSOs were studied in Ghana. None were primary, 15 were intermediary, and 10 were tertiary. Therefore, what we have to say about CSO capability is restricted to intermediary- and tertiary-level CSOs. While this is theoretically problematic, it is much less serious a constraint in the context of the current study since external funding agencies are generally unable to work with CBOs directly, particularly in conflict work.

The assessment of CSO capacity, then, focuses on three dimensions of intermediary and tertiary CSOs:

1. Internal governance,

2. Internal management, and

3. Civic action including advocacy and conflict resolution.

A.   Internal Democratic Governance

Our analysis of CSO internal democratic governance practices was designed to assess internal democratic governance effectiveness with the following in mind.

❑ *The strengths and weaknesses of these CSOs in terms of their internal organization and functioning in the areas of: 1) broad-based participation in the making and implementation organizational decisions, and 2) transparency in the selection of decisions and leaders, and 3) accountability and responsiveness of leaders to their members; and*

❑ *The degree to which women are integrated into the structure and function of CSOs in meaningful ways.*

1.   Principle Findings in Nigeria

a.   *Strengths/Weaknesses*

- The vast majority are registered (a couple are in process) and voluntarily formed (only the NLC was not).

- All have Boards of Directors, 27 of which have regularly held annual meetings, and 30 of which have women and minorities represented on their boards. All are over 33 percent literate. Most are entirely literate. Many actually have very active boards, where their members are the specialists called upon for various activities.

- A substantial number of the intermediate types call themselves membership organizations, although few really have a mass membership base. Membership, however, seems to be a respected and desirable path — a route to greater legitimacy. Some of the bigger membership organizations are CAPP with 8,000, and the Global Peace Movement (GPM) with 600,000+, many of whom are dues-paying students.

- One aspect of the CSOs studied that is not highly conducive to internal democracy and participation is the fact that many, particularly the classic intermediary non-membership CSOs, are dominated by a single director. The staff that does exist is often simply insufficient in numbers and levels of training, and rarely takes initiative. This is also true in specialized tertiary CSOs that deal with conflict issues. In such organizations formal training in conflict work is usually limited to the directors (Strategic Empowerment Mediation Agency [SEMA]; CRP; Women Opinion Leaders' Forum [WOLF]; African Strategic and Peace Research Group [AFSTRAG]).

- All organizations claim that they work primarily through consensus, but most resort to voting if they must. Several emphasized the "like-mindedness" of their board and staff members, reportedly resulting in few disagreements.

- Coordination can be a problem, and can adversely affect democratic practice in large membership organizations, and in networks (i.e., CNVE, Conflict Resolution Stakeholders' Network [CRESNET], NLC). This is understandable, considering it is also difficult in the north, where telecommunications and financial obstacles are much less of an issue.

- Overall, a substantial number of the organizations studied in Nigeria can be said to have very strong internal governance practices. This is true of CDD, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the Law Research and Resource Documentation Center [LRRDC], MRA, the Nigerian Bar Association [NBA], Social Alert [SA], TMG, CRESNET, EDP, IFMC, the Southern-Kaduna People's Union (SOKAPU), SEMA, JNI, the Center for Peace Initiatives and Development (CEPID), the Middle-Belt Progressive Movement (MPM), CAPP, CNVE, WOLF, and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU).

b. *Women's Participation*

- Women's CSOs tend, not surprisingly, to be comprised of female employees who primarily focus on women's empowerment issues. The Women's Law and Development Center (WLDCN) seems to be an exception. Fifty percent of its board members are men and WLDCN espouses the belief that the empowerment of women comes through partnership and dialogue with men.

- Women are generally well recognized in faith-based CSOs, but often have separate but equal treatment. In the north, the same thing is true. Women's empowerment is done through women's committees and women's wings (SOKAPU, MPM). Such groups work on issues like attending to the material

needs of the refugees, and providing psychological support to women and children (MPM).

- Professional associations and unions do not seem strong on women's participation or in covering women's issues (i.e., ASUU, NBA, NLC, Yaba Student Union [SU]). They seem to assume that if women want to, they can and do form their own separate organizations.

2.   Principle Conclusions in Nigeria

Internal democratic practice is probably not as strong as the data on these indicators suggest. Where our researchers knew these organizations more intimately, they got somewhat more nuanced answers, reflecting a more complex social reality in the workplace.

At the same time, there is high degree of consciousness about the principles of democratic governance and the need to incorporate such principles, particularly women's empowerment, into the workplace.

3.   Principle Findings in Ghana

a.   Strengths/Weaknesses

- All are registered and voluntarily formed.

- All have Boards of Directors, 19 of which have regular annual meetings, and 22 (plus two partial) of which have women and minorities represented on their boards. Nearly all have boards that are entirely or most constituted by literate members. The Northern Ghana House of Chiefs is the exception.

- Minority representation on Boards of Directors is not considered important by any of the CSO officials interviewed. In fact, some expressed the view that making an issue of ethnicity enhances divisions and conflict. Interestingly they didn't have this view about women. ISODEC has a strong policy on this, and a strong northerner staff ratio.

- Ethnicity, however, is acknowledged by some groups (Legon Student Union) to be an important issue in CSO internal dynamics. During the student leader elections, campaigners use the ethnicity to secure votes.

- Eighteen of the 25 CSOs surveyed call themselves membership organizations, but this is not an accurate description given the fact that 10 of the 25 are clearly specialized tertiary CSOs that rarely are membership groups, and many others are classic intermediary CSOs. The fact that so many feel compelled to label themselves membership groups is in itself interesting.

- In organizations with many offices, maintaining genuine democratic processes can be slow and cumbersome, though it is nevertheless a goal (ISODEC).

- The great majority work though consensus, resorting to voting if necessary (Nonviolence International [NVI] makes decisions by voting).

- Overall, according to the data collected, most of the organizations surveyed have very strong internal democratic governance.

b.   *Women's Participation*

- Women's CSOs tend to have all female board members (*Federation Internacional de Abogadas* [FIDA], Ghana Association of Women Entrepreneurs [GAWE]).

- Women are generally not well integrated or prominent in faith-based CSOs (Christian Council of Ghana [CCG], Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services [ICDHS]). In the Northern Ghana House of Chiefs there are no women.

- Women's participation is substantially curtailed in professional associations and unions. Most state that they are open to women in leadership roles but have made little effort to attract women to positions of responsibility. The exception is the Trade Union Congress (TUC), which has an affirmative action program that ensures that a quarter of the people in decision making positions are women.

4. Principle Conclusions in Ghana

As with Nigeria, there is reason to doubt that, on average, these CSOs are managed in as democratic a fashion as the survey data reports. On the other hand, as in Nigeria, there is high degree of consciousness about the principles of democratic governance, and the need to incorporate such principles, particularly women's empowerment, into the workplace.

The study found little evidence of the use of ethnicity in structuring CSO governance, or in a commitment to ethnic affirmation action to ensure ethnic minority representation.

B.   Sound and Effective Internal Management

The establishment of internal democratic governance practice provides the rules and institutional framework for sound and effective management. It does not ensure it. A range of skills, experience, systems and procedures are required to achieve organizational objectives and results. The following were considered:

- ❑ *The success of fund-raising efforts for different types of projects, and the ability to diversify their support strategies to ensure their sustainability;*

- ❑ *The degree and quality of systems in place that can ensure good planning and the effective utilization of resources; and*

- ❑ *The use and quality of evaluation systems to assess program impact.*

1.   Principal Findings in Nigeria

a.   Systems in Place

- The CSOs interviewed, in general, have fairly strong internal management systems. Twenty-two have strategic plans in place, with another five partial. Twenty-three have monitoring and evaluation systems, with another three partial. Most evaluation is project based, although many organizations have weekly meetings with their staff to review the status of work.

- Generally the CSOs seemed very organized, and people were busy with clear direction regarding what they do. Most CSOs have staffs of around 10 people, with quite a few in the four to seven employee range (i.e., African Center for Governance and Democracy [AFRIGOV], AFSTRAG, CEPID), the big ones being CAPP with 17, the Africa Leadership Forum (ALF) with 30, and MRA with 37. Twenty-six CSOs have well-defined staff job descriptions, with another five partial.

- Staff commonly complained about the lack of training opportunities, despite the fact that 21 CSOs said they have had at least some training for their staff. With regard to conflict management/prevention training, at least half of the CSOs spoke of being trained through USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and others have been trained by International Alert (interfaith training in the north). Most CSOs expressed great interest in receiving further training, primarily in the area of conflict prevention/management but also in fund-raising. When staff members are trained they tend to pass on skills learned and information acquired to other staff and leaders. Many CSOs have policies stating that people who attend such workshops must come back and share their knowledge with their colleagues.

- While the data shows that 30 of the 37 CSOs surveyed have infrastructure, it is often a "minimal level of infrastructure." Many noted that this prevents expansion and desired new initiatives from being undertaken.

- Most seemed to have clear financial management and accounting procedures in place. Twenty-nine are clearly financially managed and three partial; 28 are audited, the great majority of which are externally audited.

b.   Funding

- Financial resources are a constraint for virtually all of the CSOs, despite the fact that the survey found that a good many clearly have success in raising money for their work. Twenty-four CSOs, and another three partial, claimed they have a diversified funding base.

- Some CSOs have board members or directors who must pay for their activities out of personal pockets (CEPID, WLDCN).

- Several CBOs expressed the view that they have particular difficulty in raising money (MWA, Yaba SU).

- Many CSOs depend heavily (up to 70 percent of their revenues) on international donors. Another 20 to 25 percent comes from consultancies or board members, and the rest from membership or publications sales or other activities (EDP, IFMC, CEPID, AFRIGOV, CRP). CAPP gets 90 percent from donors.

2. Principal Findings in Ghana

a. Systems in Place

- The CSOs interviewed, in general, have strong internal management systems. All claim to have strategic plans and monitoring and evaluation systems in place. Most evaluation is project-based, although many organizations have weekly meetings with their staff to review status of work.

- Generally the CSOs surveyed seemed very organized. All claim to have well defined staff job descriptions, and people were busy with clear direction regarding what they do.

- Most CSOs expressed great interest in receiving further training, primarily in the area of conflict prevention/management. Most (15 of 25) report that they have had at least some training for their staff., Some have received training from USIS and from other CSOs, such as ActionAid Ghana, WANEP, Oxfam, and BADECC.

- While the data shows 22 CSOs have infrastructure, it is often a "minimal level of infrastructure." Many noted that this prevents expansion and desired new initiatives from being undertaken.

- All claim to have clear financial management and accounting procedures in place.

b. Funding

- While there were many CSOs that clearly have considerable success in raising money for their work, many expressed difficulties in getting enough funding to maintain and expand their work (FOSDA, GAPVOD, IDEG, African Development Program [ADP], CODEYAC, NVI, NGND, NORYDA). Nonetheless nearly all of the CSOs surveyed (24 out of 25) claimed to have a diversified funding base.

- For many, funds are derived solely from contributions of members of the governing council (FOSDA), or from members dues (TUC, FOMWAG, GAWE).

- One CSO, ICDHS, is funded by grants from Arab governments such as the United Arab Emirates.

- Increasingly, CSOs are funding their activities by having their staff undertake consultancies.

- Other CSOs raise revenue by developing business and training programs. (ISODEC, WANEP, BADECC, CDD).

C.   Civic Action: Conflict Prevention and Management

This study focused on the following issues:

❑ *The scope of past and current activities involving conflict prevention and mitigation locally, nationally and regionally.*

❑ *The capacities of these CSOs to communicate with other CSOs working on conflict issues, to form networks and coalitions for the purposes of advocacy, mediation and other activities that may be relevant to affecting conflict;*

❑ *The capacities of these CSOs to communicate with authorities at various levels of government (local, national, regional) and to advocate their views and be involved in policy processes; and*

❑ *The potential for, and value of, CSOs working in different areas such as human rights, development, and democratic reform to work in the area of conflict prevention and management and to make a valuable contribution.*

1.   Principal Findings in Nigeria

a.   *Conflict Management/Prevention*

- A surprising number of CSOs have this experience, considering that of the 37 interviewed, only 10 specifically bill themselves as conflict/peace organizations. Thirty (and four partial) have the ability to analyze the origins of conflicts; 29 (and four partial) have mediation, facilitation and/or negotiation skills; 26 (and seven partial) have the capacity to implement a conflict prevention/management strategy, and 32 (and three partial) have the ability to forge alliances and build networks in this area.

- Many CSOs (or one or two staff members within them) have been trained, but do not have much experience. Many also may not have the mediation, negotiation and other skills on their staff, but nevertheless incorporate these into their workshops on wider issues, bringing in experts (Arewa Consultative Forum [ACF], MRA, WLDCN, TMG).

b.   *Types of Activities Considered Conflict Prevention by Different CSOs*

- peace education (SEMA);

- women's empowerment (Justice Development and Peace Commission [JDPC], WOLF, WLDCN, BAOBAB, MWA);

- empowerment/dialogue/advocacy of intercommunal conflicts, (i.e., herders and farmer conflicts in the north) or where communities have grievances with

businesses (i.e., mining companies in the north or oil companies in the Delta region) or government over resource-based issues (CAPP);

- creation of public dialogue/ complaints forums, i.e., the creation of the Public Complaints Commission and town hall meetings, for people to voice their concerns (CAPP);

- good governance as conflict mitigation (WOLF), voter and civic education (WLDCN, TMG, CNVE);

- strengthening linkages between peace building/democracy and development, through research, workshops and training (CDD);

- human rights and legal education — to prevent the abuse of state power (LRRDC); and social, economic and cultural rights (NBA, Shelter Rights Initiative [SRI], Social and Economic Rights Action Center [SERAC], Lawyers for Socioeconomic Rights [LASER], TMG, CNVE); and

- conflict and human rights sensitive reporting (MRA).

c. ***Types of Activities Undertaken as Conflict Resolution (also prevention of escalation)***

- rapid response: i.e., GPM has an astonishing capacity to respond to local conflicts with vast numbers of people, using methods that often suit the local context, given that their local presence contains so many dues-paying members who are on constant watch for potential conflicts — an extremely decentralized early warning system. Organizations, however, that respond rapidly to conflicts are generally not funded for these projects by donors. The work of OTI in facilitating CSOs to respond fairly rapidly was an exception, although OTI is no longer in place.

- media campaigns: i.e., CEPID's media campaign in Joss (see Annex 5) seeks to encourage dialogue and peaceful coexistence by promoting moderate voices an explaining the religious basis of tolerance and peaceful coexistence.

- training people and communities in conflict prevention and resolution (Center for Peace in Africa [CPA], CRESNET, Visions of Peace [VOP]); and

- alternative dispute resolution (ADR), mediation, dialogue (NBA, unions, CRESNET, GPM, CEPID, IFMC, WOLF, JDPC).

d. ***Advocacy and coalitions/networks (also a part of conflict prevention/management)***

- Surprising all of the CSOs surveyed are involved in advocacy activities and appear to have the ability (for three of them it is partial) to analyze power relationships. Nearly all have policy research, analysis, formulation and advocacy skills, and knowledge and skills to mount an advocacy campaign at least to some degree. This is a remarkable level of capability in the conflict prevention area.

- Most of the CSOs are involved in coalitions and other networks that work on public advocacy. These are nearly all domestic coalitions and networks, however. In general these coalitions are platforms for the development and sharing of ideas and best practices in conflict resolution. Most of these networks are domestic but there are some regional linkages as well (see section below on regional links).

- CSOs, nonetheless, often conduct advocacy vis-à-vis the government and other actors unilaterally. This is an interesting finding, worth further exploration in order to understand the motivations to do so (i.e., different agendas, difficulties in getting funding for collaborative advocacy, etc.).

- Some coalitions and networks suffer from internal political, ideological, or tactical differences that weakens their effectiveness. Plateau State Peace Initiative Coalition (PSPIC) and CRESNET, another conflict resolution coalition, have encountered problems related to attempts by some coalition partners to manipulate issues by using religious and ethnic bias.

e. Relations with Government

- In general, CSOs seem to have good working relationships with government agencies and officials. Often CSOs train government officials (WLDCN, CRP, CEPID). In the north there appears to be a lot of collaboration between local governments and CSOs, as well as with chiefs (EDP, IFMC, CDD). WOLF's national president is a special advisor to President Obasanjo, and gets involved in high-level mediations.

- Some CSOs have a fair amount of influence with the government, or at least are not in conflict with them despite monitoring them (MRA), or pressuring them as is the case for some unions (ASUU, NLC). The current Attorney General in Lagos state brought Social Alert to Nigeria and the administration he works in has been "rights sensitive."

- Some CSOs have good relations with governments in one region, but not in others. Some northern CSOs, for example, have good relations with northern governments to whom they offer constructive advice, but not with the federal government whom they attempt to pressure.

- Some specialized tertiary CSOs develop good relations with particular government agencies such as INEC, the House of Representatives, NJI, and the Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (HRVIC).

2. Principle Conclusions in Nigeria

The extraordinary level of advocacy skills reported by CSOs may overstate the degree to which these CSOs can actually carry out effective advocacy campaigns. A few reasons for this conclusion that were suggested in the interview data are:

- the difference between having the skills, and putting them into practice;

- that only one or two people in a CSO have such skills, but it may not be a focus of their work;

- that in interfaith contact the focus is generally limited to the top leadership with little contact at the lower organizational levels; and

- there may be different interpretations of advocacy.

There are clearly advocacy successes (see Annex 4). A few examples:

- *SOKAPU*: Over the last decade, it has been sending memoranda to the government over the grievances of their people who were under the traditional authority of the Emir of Zaria. This campaign for self-determination has partly been successful, since all communities in southern Kaduna have now been given their own chiefdom.

- *CAPP*: At local levels, success may be due to long-term commitment to people on ground, and membership-based approach.

- *GPM*: Direct action, or the threat of, has been a powerful deterrent to the government in several instances — i.e., in resisting hiking telephone rates, in support of pensioners protest to get back pay.

In sum, the 37 CSOs surveyed in Nigeria have strong capacity in all three areas. While internal governance is somewhat difficult to measure in one interview, these organizations appeared to have generally committed, contented staff and internal processes for accountability, transparency, and participation. As far as internal management is concerned, most CSOs had systems in place for project management and accounting, and are fairly successful with fund-raising. At the same time, there are severe capacity constraints. With regard to conflict resolution and prevention capacity, it seems that strong foundations have been built, but need further financial and training support to ensure developing CSO capacity to excel in this area.

3. Principal Findings in Ghana

a. Conflict Management/Prevention

- A good number of CSOs have some kind of experience in this area. Out of the 25 CSOs surveyed (see Consolidated Chart in Annex 2) only five of the CSOs specifically bill themselves as conflict/peace organizations, and only one has peace/conflict in the name of the organization — WANEP. Many others have "security," "democracy," "development," "youth," and "women."

- The level of capacity reported is substantial. Thirteen (and three partial) have the ability to analyze the origins of conflicts; 16 (and three partial) have mediation, facilitation and/or negotiation skills; 14 (and one partial) have the capacity to implement a conflict prevention/management strategy, and 19 (and one partial) have the ability to forge alliances and build networks in this area.

- Many CSO staff (or one or two members within them) have been trained, but do not have much experience in actual conflict prevention/resolution interventions.

b. ***Types of Activities Considered Conflict Prevention and Escalation Prevention by Different CSOs***

- peace education (Alliance for Democracy [AD], WANEP, CODEYAC, NGND);

- women's empowerment: microenterprise (ADP, ISODEC) In the north — ISODEC has taken over a small bank and are holding a majority of shares in trust for women, while building their capacity to own the bank ("credit with empowerment");

- early warning: ISODEC is trying to put into place a cross-border early warning system. This would entail a system of surveillance, measuring environmental factors such rainfall and drought. If there is a drought in Burkina Faso, cattle would come into Ghana. The program would involve information sharing about dangers. As the lead agency for West Africa in the global Forum for Early Warning and Response (FEWER) network, WANEP is developing WARN — the Early Warning and Response Network. This was established during a five-day training of trainers workshop in Accra. In developing WARN, each West African country is doing a country profile, including a risk assessment, and developing indicators for monitoring and conflict prevention. The Mano River countries have been targeted first, and the rest will follow. Fifteen trainers were brought from the Mano River countries for the first WARN training. The WARN training includes dialogue, negotiation, conflict analysis, and concrete intervention skills. NGND does training workshops in early warning;

- research/seminars/policy dialogues on security related issues (CDD, IDEG, FOSDA);

- good governance as conflict mitigation: at national levels (IDEG), voter and civic education (GAWE, IDEG, N-CCG, CODEYAC); and building capacity of local governance structures (ADP, NGND);

- human rights and legal education — economic justice and human rights (ISODEC, TWN, CODEYAC); rewriting of the National Reconciliation Bill in language accessible to laymen so all citizens can participate knowledgeably in the dialogue (LRC); civil society role in policymaking (IDEG); and gender rights (Legal Resource Center [LRC]); and

- media: ISODEC also has a newspaper, "Public Agenda" which articulates the rights and concerns of the poor and marginalized, while promoting good governance and democracy; Expanding freedom of expression and analyzing media laws (MFWA); teaching civic education and human rights through the media (CODEYAC).

c.   ***Types of Activities Undertaken as Conflict Prevention, Escalation Prevention and Conflict Resolution***

- working with traditional processes and traditional leaders on conflict resolution, i.e., early warning reconciliation efforts and efforts to integrate them into education and health programs (NGND, WANEP);

- joint community strategizing and advocacy (also prevention) (ISODEC);

- working with the Chief Iman of Ghana in support of conflict work by the Federation of Moslems in Ghana, the political arm of Moslems. Individual Muslim CSOs work through this network rather than becoming engaged in conflict work directly themselves;

- training people and communities in conflict prevention and resolution (WANEP, LECIA, BADECC, N-CCG, The Network/NGND);

- ADR, mediation, dialogue (LRC, LECIA, NVI, TUC, WANEP, N-CCG, CODEYAC, NGHC for chieftaincy and land disputes); and

- mediating policy conflicts between government and civil society, and building dialogue between civil society, government and the business community (IDEG).

d.   ***Advocacy and Coalitions/Networks (also a part of conflict prevention/management)***

Most of the CSOs surveys have an active advocacy agenda. Twenty-one (and one partial) say they have the ability to analyze power relationships; 22 have policy research, analysis, formulation and advocacy skills; 16 (and one partial) say they have knowledge and skills to mount an advocacy campaign; and 23 participate in other networks and advocacy coalitions.

e.   ***Relations with Government***

- In general, CSOs seem to have good working relationships with government agencies and officials. Often CSOs train government officials (LRC, LECIA, CDD). The more academic/think tank organizations often have governmental officials participating in their workshops and seminars (ASDR, CDD).

- Particular government agencies/offices that CSOs seem to have good/working relations with include the Ministries of Education and Agriculture, the Committees of Mines and Energy, Defense and Interior, and Environment, Science and Technology, National Development Planning Committee (NDPC), Emergency Social Relief, Education and Environment.

- Cooperation is also happening through the relief process. In the north, CSOs cooperate with government through the Inter-NGO Consortium for Relief and Rehabilitation.

- Relations between student organizations and the government are not good. While the student union does have influence and access with the government, student leaders feel that the government has really sought to conquer and divide them.

4.   Principle Conclusions in Ghana

- The field of conflict resolution and prevention is not nearly as well developed in Ghana as it is in Nigeria. Nonetheless, the level of capability reported in the CSOs surveyed is considerable, and there seems to be a good deal of interest in this and in building further capacity, particularly in the north. This is likely due to the engagement of local and international conflict resolution organizations and practitioners, and the exposure to this field that they have brought with them, during the past conflicts in the northern region.

- The actual level of experience with conflict prevention and resolution in Ghana is not very high:

  ➢   Attending training sessions or workshops and even having some skills does not mean that the CSO actually works in the area.
  ➢   Skills in this area are generally restricted to one or two people within the CSO.

- The amount of advocacy skills and advocacy activities may also be overstated by the Ghana data. While two-thirds of the CSOs surveyed report that they have the skills to mount an advocacy campaign, this does not mean that they actually have done so. Supplemental data suggests that the level of actual advocacy campaigns in Ghana is much lower than for Nigeria.

- The special strength of Ghanaian CSOs in the conflict field seems to be in research. There are many think tank type organizations, research institutes, and academic-oriented CSOs (i.e., ASDR, CDD, IDEG, FOSDA, ISODEC, TWN — all located in Accra). The key issue on which many of Ghana's CSOs are focusing is civil-military relations. Other important issues of concern to these research-oriented groups are economic development, the institutionalization of democracy, natural resource security issues, and small arms proliferation.

- There are clearly advocacy successes (see Annex 4). A few examples are:

  ➢   Legon University Student Union's campaign against cost-sharing in education; and
  ➢   the campaign to reject the NGO Bill, and the successful campaign (led by IDEG) to propose alternative legislation.

In sum, the 27 CSOs interviewed have considerably strong capacity in all three areas, although they are less sensitized to the field of conflict prevention/resolution then their Nigerian counterparts. This is likely due to the fact that Ghana is far more at peace within. It is also due to the lower level of exposure to international and bilateral organizations funding and conducting training in this area. Although there is some reason to question the highly optimistic self-reporting of these CSOs on their internal governance, it is also clear that these organizations function well, with generally committed, contented staff and internal processes for accountability, transparency and participation. As far as internal management is concerned, most

CSOs have systems in place for project management and accounting, and are fairly successful with fund-raising. They share with their Nigerian counterparts, however, the limitations of having inadequate infrastructure and funding to acquire improved capacity in this area.

Some foundations for direct conflict prevention/management activities have been built in Ghana. Clearly, however, more support is needed, particularly for training. At the same time, Ghana's comparative advantage in research should also be recognized and shared. Ghana also seems to have a strong and constructive involvement of youth in conflict prevention/resolution activities, particularly in the north.

VII. The Role of Nigerian and Ghanaian CSOs in Regional Conflicts: Linkages and Actions

What role can and do West African CSOs play in dealing with conflict across national frontiers and in the region? This issue is addressed more fully in a brief synthesis paper that summarizes the findings from all of our studies (the desk study, the two conflict case studies, and the two assessments). Here we will treat only the aspects that emerge from the field work conducted for the Anglophone CSO Assessment.

The field studies summarized here have demonstrated without any question that there is a considerable capacity for becoming involved in conflict prevention and management work in the countries surveyed. What is also clear, however, is that few of the organizations have begun to think about their roles in cross-border disputes or to set as one of their major purposes conflicts at this level. Most tertiary CSOs are completely involved in national issues. Intermediary CSOs are even more involved in localized disputes working through their members and through community-based groups. The press of dealing with national issues is so great in Nigeria that few CSOs have even had the time or attention to give to the broader conflict issues in the region. In addition, for the most part they lack the resources to do so. Until very recently, donors have not promoted and funded this kind of work, focusing instead of critical national-level issues.

There are major exceptions, however. The survey work and case studies reveal that several CSOs in each of these countries self-consciously get involved across national boundaries and in regional conflicts. Probably the most important of these has been WANEP, which has supported CSOs in the Mano River area (see *Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in the Mano River Union: Civil Society and its Role*, as well as the mini-cases in Annexes 4 and 5 of this report). A second is CDD, who is an example of an international NGO that has established operations in both Ghana and Nigeria. With the support of its British partner, it can develop strategies and bring research to bear across national lines. The actual chapters, however, have yet to do this directly. They coordinate their efforts through planning sessions grouping the leadership of the entire organization. A third type of actor is GPM, who is a massive membership organization with over 600,000 members in a number of countries, but primarily draws its support from Nigerians. Given its organizational strength, GPM has been able to attempt conflict resolution work outside of Nigeria, again in the Mano River area. Because it has not coordinated its efforts closely with other regional actors or with domestic CSOs in the Mano River states, its interventions thus far have met with limited success. Given the GPM's resources and capacities in conflict resolution, however, the potential for such groups to be more effective in the region is certainly there. Another such CSO is the Nigerian Open Society Institute for West Africa (OSIWA). It, too, is working on conflict prevention and resolution in the Mano River Union states. The thrust of its activities is in peace building, particularly with women. This group also makes use of radio as a major instrument for its work.

Another type of actor that has become involved in cross-border issues are the CSOs working on a variety of issues in areas close to international borders. Usually such organizations do not have conflict prevention as their primary objective. Rather they are often more focused on development, or even on trade and commerce. They get involved in issues such as ethnic

violence, cross-border arms smuggling, which feeds ethnic and other forms of violence, and in problems associated with the movement of cattle and immigrants across borders, particular in times of environmental stress. These problems threaten the peace and development of areas like northern Ghana, as was demonstrated in 1994, when an internal ethnic conflict was made worse by arms smuggling from Burkina Faso and Togo. The work of the Ghanaian CSO, ISODEC, in trying to organize an early warning system for arms, cattle and refugees crossing the Burkina Faso border is an example of this type of activity.

The issue of crime and violence associated with the proliferation of small arms in West Africa is another potential focal point for West African regional CSO cooperation. Several CSOs surveyed in these assessments have become involved in trying to reinforce the Small Arms Moratorium (FOSDA). The key question for them has been how these efforts on the part of CSOs are going to be connected to the ECOWAS early warning conflict monitoring mechanism (ECOWATCH) on the one hand and to the National Commissions on the Moratorium on Small Arms on the other. Unfortunately, these studies offer few hints. Of course a number of CSOs from Ghana and Nigeria have participated in conferences (Accra, June 2001; Abuja, September 2001; OAU, June 2001) that have tried to deal with regional security issues and arms trafficking. What is unclear, to date, is the degree to which these organizations are going to form an effective network to combat this problem collectively, and to what degree governments in the region are going to be willing to share power with genuinely autonomous associations and not just with GONGOs (Government [created] NGOs). Several Nigerian and Ghanaian CSOs (AFSTRAG, CDD, and ASDR) have been playing leading roles in organizing meetings of other CSOs from the region to discuss these issues. Given the strong research capacity in Ghana in institutions like ASDR and the interest that has been manifested by other CSOs in attending these meetings, it is likely that the potential is there for forming functioning coalitions for advocacy and action in this area.

VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations

CSOs in both Ghana and Nigeria have strong foundational capacity to undertake conflict prevention and resolution activities in the West African subregion. As both Ghana and Nigeria move toward the increasing institutionalization of democratic rule, CSOs that spearheaded this move reflect democratic traditions in their work. While in general they appear to have strong management systems in place, *capacity* — in terms of infrastructure, money for projects, and professional training — remains a central challenge.

A main assumption of the assessment methodology is that to be effective in conflict prevention and resolution work, the CSOs must first be internally sound in both its governance arrangements and in its management. This ensures, amongst other things, that an organization's strength does not lie in one person — a relatively common phenomenon, particularly in Nigeria. This is likely due to the specialized nature of conflict prevention/resolution work, where the opportunities for accessing training and capacity building are not so common. When they do arise, inevitably those who have some skills are chosen to acquire more.

Limitations aside, Nigerian and Ghanaian CSOs have a great deal to bring to the prevention and resolution of conflicts in the subregion. Their actual and potential roles are being recognized by governments, IGOs, and donors. At the same time, there is a great need to strengthen CSO capacity to fulfill these roles — in particular, more training and more financing of their infrastructures and programs. Another problem is the limitation of resources available for CSOs when they want to undertake direct interventions into conflicts — a critically important area. In Nigeria, USAID/OTI did offer some solution to this problem, but this rapid response mechanism is no longer in place, and it is unclear who will fill the gap. In Ghana, no such mechanism ever existed.

What then, are the most appropriate conflict prevention and conflict resolution roles for CSOs in Ghana and Nigeria, and what is needed to build their capacity to undertake these roles? This assessment prioritized both conflict prevention and resolution skills and analysis, as well as advocacy, as key substantive ingredients for CSOs to undertake conflict prevention and management work.

Advocacy is often viewed, somewhat contradictorily, as both a conflict prevention tool, and a conflict-instigating tool. Awareness must first be raised, before negotiation and or mediation can bring sustainable resolutions that adequately address structural violence. Coalition building is a particularly important aspect of conflict prevention for various reasons. Where there are factions and high potential for conflict, it can serve to unite people and organizations towards a common cause, which has an aggregate and systems effect in building peace and preventing future conflict.

Conflict prevention and resolution or management activities are understood and practiced differently by CSOs in Ghana and Nigeria. In our interviews, CSO interviewees appeared visibly relieved when researchers explained that they were conceiving of conflict prevention broadly to include activities of development, democracy, media, human rights and other activities. This

seemed to open doors for them to discuss the wider ways in which their work contributes to deescalating tensions at various levels, and in promoting just outcomes and processes which have a long-term effect on conflict prevention and resolution. As elicited from the CSO assessment findings and conclusions earlier, activities being undertaken by CSOs that contribute to conflict prevention and resolution include:

- peace and civic education;

- research and information sharing;

- empowerment/advocacy;

- advocacy for the protection and promotion of civil and political, as well as social, economic and cultural rights;

- building of relationships and fostering of dialogue between stakeholders;

- creation of public complaints forums and public dialogue fora;

- training/capacity building in peace building training/capacity building, conflict resolution and prevention for all sectors of society;

- work with traditional leaders and traditional processes of conflict resolution;

- development of early warning and rapid response mechanisms;

- promotion of good governance and the forming of coalitions around elections to ensure the integrity of the process, before during and after, to consolidate and deepen democracy;

- the fostering of community and human development; and

- creation of mechanisms for civil society participation in policymaking.

There are also very specific roles that CSOs can play in terms of conflict prevention and resolution activities, and security in general, in the subregion. These include:

- assisting the security agencies, particularly the military, to redefine security to include the principle of collective responsibility;

- collecting and channeling information to governments and IGOs, in particular ECOWAS, for early action;

- facilitating societal and Track II peace building processes that work with and feed into Track I processes;

- training and sensitizing the media in conflict-sensitive reporting;

- encouraging, assisting in the drafting of, publicizing, and monitoring protocols and moratoriums; lobbying governments to legislate protocols into national laws;

- retrieving small arms; and

- supporting humanitarian intervention.

Given this perspective and the fact that specialized conflict prevention CSOs are likely fairly uncommon outside of Nigeria, this study suggests that a multitrack approach should guide any understanding of who can and should participate in conflict resolution work. Below is a list of some of the actors that might be involved and that might otherwise be neglected if the focus on conflict prevention is too narrow.

- **Religious organizations:** Generally they garner a good deal of respect from both government institutions and the media. In both countries they play strong roles in civil society peacemaking and peace building efforts — particularly where religious-based conflicts are concerned.

- **Students:** Student unions do not have a great deal of capacity to be an active force in conflict prevention activities, and in both Ghana and Nigeria they appear to be somewhat disempowered by factionalism and lack of purpose. At the same time, there is a strong tradition of student activism and leadership in ousting political dictators and in demanding new democratic political dispensations in West Africa. Today's students are tomorrow's leaders, and they remain a critical stakeholder and should be trained in conflict resolution, and involved in conflict prevention activities. Some sharing of experiences across West African countries might be a constructive strategy to get them collaboratively working together on wider issues, downplaying the more petty issues that divide them.

- **Youth:** Idle youth, poverty, and availability of small arms in the region is a destructive mixture feeding into, or catalyzing conflicts throughout West Africa. Particularly in the north of Ghana, strong youth organizations have played a critical role in building peace within their communities and region. Their noteworthy experiences should be shared more widely through the subregion.

- **Media:** Also a critical stakeholder, and there are organizations in the region doing excellent work in tracking and highlighting the ways in which the media is used to perpetuate conflict. With a bit more capacity, i.e., money for training or to enable them to hire an extra staff person in conflict resolution, their efforts could be greatly enhanced.

- **Labor:** Though lacking capacity to varying degrees in each of the three areas assessed, labor is an important sector of society to involve in conflict prevention efforts. This is in part due to their propensity to get involved in politics, particularly in countries where the government has not been historically democratic (i.e., Zambia, Zimbabwe). The NLC recently participated in a workshop with labor unions and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change — the labor-based opposition party in Zimbabwe, to discuss the role of labor in politics. They also play critical roles in preventing and mediating labor disputes—a common phenomenon in liberalizing economies.

- **Market women:** Big markets are often flashpoints for clashes, especially in a multiethnic setting. Market women wield much power with the food they sell. Enhancing their conflict management capacity will go a long way to douse tensions and prevent eruptions.

- **Chiefs:** As traditional segments of society encounter conflict, or come into conflict with modernizing trends, the role of traditional leaders is paramount, given the high degree of legitimacy they hold with the bulk of their communities. Many chiefs have undertaken

conflict prevention and resolution training in both Ghana and Nigeria, and are employing these skills to avert conflict in their regions. There is much more that can be done here, and many CSOs that can support this effort.

- **Military and police:** In both Ghana and Nigeria, both the police and the military do not have the best reputations, and still are known to react to provocation or perceived security threats with excessive violence. While many CSOs are engaging this sector from an academic and policy dialogue perspective, training in conflict resolution at all levels seems necessary to transfer skills, rather than simply ideas.

- **Development workers and policymakers:** The link between conflict and particular development strategies and policies is becoming well recognized and understood. In addition to equipping development workers with skills to manage conflicts when they arise in situations where they are located, both international and local people involved in humanitarian aid and development work, *and* those who make policy — at all levels — need to be educated about and sensitized to the tendencies of particular development approaches in causing conflict and structural violence.[5]

Another general issue is the question of how the link between governments and CSOs can be strengthened to make conflict prevention work more effective. CSOs are, by and large, far ahead of the government in terms of their comprehension of the issue and their skill levels.

In Nigeria, government most frequently looks at conflict issues as matters of law enforcement, and here the problem is that government has limited capacity both to promote conflict prevention and to enforce the law once so many conflicts are viewed as criminal matters.

In some instances governments, like the municipal government of Lagos, works with an intermediation committee that comes together to address conflicts, and involves tribal leaders. The primary forms of collaboration between government and CSOs are information sharing, and training. Most frequently it is the CSO that does the training of government personnel. These trainings seemed to be very well received by governmental participants and there is a desire for more. A second conflict prevention strategy of the government appears to be the development of research/policy/think tanks, several in academic institutions in the area of conflict resolution and prevention. A fairly new Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Abuja is attempting to consolidate much of this work, and is in desperate need of capacity building.

In Ghana, the capacity of government is limited by its understanding of conflict, and its relative lack of awareness of prevention, while CSOs are much more aware of the issues. In the north, the police work is learning to work with opinion leaders, assemblymen, chiefs as well as religious leaders. In general, they are respected and have influence in the community. They have good working relationships with CSOs and have undertaken conflict prevention training by them and would like more, and this kind of collaboration is helpful and should be encouraged.

This assessment leads to the conclusion that there is ample capacity for CSOs to play constructive roles in conflict prevention and resolution, but that they are neither strong enough nor authoritative enough to play this role by themselves. A multitracked approach that will involve both a variety of civil society actors, including some not typically thought of as having a key stake in this kind of work, and government at various levels is needed.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1   West Africa Regional CSO Assessment Study: CSO Capacity Building Assessment Tool: Questionnaire and Guide

[See separate file.]

Annex 2   Consolidated Country Tables for Nigeria and Ghana

CONSOLIDATED CSO CAPACITY BUILDING ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE: NIGERIA

CSO Name	P	I	T	Policy	Instit'l	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	A1	A2	A3	A4	C1	C2	C3	C4
	\<CSO Type\>			\<Enabling Environment\>		\<Internal Democratic Governance\>								\<Sound and Effective Internal Management\>										\<Civic Action: Advocacy\>				\<Civic Action: Conflict\>			
*Kaduna																															
ACF		X				Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	NA	NA	N	Y	P	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
CRESNET			X			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
EDP		X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
IFMC		X		F		Y	Y	Y	NA	Y	Y	Y	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		N	Y	Y	Y
JNI		X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	P	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
N-CAN			X	F	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	P	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	P	Y
SOKAPU		X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y
SEMA			X	F	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
*Joss			X	F	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
CEPID		X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
MPM			X	F	F	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
*Abuja																															
AFRIGOV			X			Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CAPP		X		F	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	P	Y	Y
CNVE		X		F	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
CRP		X		U	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	P	Y	N	Y
WOLF		X		U	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	P	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
LAGOS																															
ASUU		X		U		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
AFSTRAG			X	F	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	P	Y	P	Y	P	P	P	Y
ALF			X	F	F	Y	N	N	Y	NA	Y	Y	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	P	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
BAOBAB		X				Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CDD			X			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

CONSOLIDATED CSO CAPACITY BUILDING ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE: NIGERIA																																
CPA			X	U		U	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CAN			X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	N	N	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	P	P	NA	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	P	P	Y
GMP		X					Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	P	N	N	Y	N	P	P	Y	N	N	Y	P	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	P
LRDC		X					Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MRA			X	U		U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
NBA			X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NLC		X	X	U		F	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
SRI			X				Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SA			X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	X	Y	N	N	P	X	X	X	X	X	X	P	X
TMG			X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	P	P	X	X	P	P	P	P
WLDCN			X				Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Yaba SU	X						Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	P	N	N	Y	N	N	P	P
*Other																																
CENPED		X					Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	P	Y	P	P	Y	P	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
JDPC		X					Y	Y	P	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MWA	X						Y	P	P	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	P	P	Y	P	P	N	P	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N
VOP		X					Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Totals	2	17	18				3	32	28	25	26	29	37	20	23	24	30	30	22	30	27	29	25	24	33	33	29	20	30	29	26	32

Y= YES, N=No, NA= Not Applicable. TOTALS FOR DATA ARE FOR "Y"

CONSOLIDATED CSO CAPACITY BUILDING ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE: GHANA

CSO Name	CSO Type			Enabling Environment		Internal Democratic Governance								Sound and Effective Internal Management										Civic Action — Advocacy				Conflict			
	P	I	T	Policy	Instit'l	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
ADP		X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	N	N	N	P	X	N	P	N	Y
ASDR			X	F	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
CDD			X	F		Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A	P	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
CCG		X		F		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
FIDA		X				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FOSDA			X	F		Y	Y	Y	N	N	N/A	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
GAWE		X		F	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	P
GAPVOD			X			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ISODEC			X			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
IDEG			X	U	F	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A	Y	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
IRC		X		F		Y	Y	Y	N	N/A	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
LECIA			X	F		Y	Y	Y	N	N/A	Y	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MFWA			X	F		Y	Y	Y	N	N/A	Y	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
NVI		X		F		Y	Y	Y	N	N/A	Y	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
TWN			X			N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
TUC			X	F		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
BADECC		X		U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CCG-N		X		U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CODEYAC		X		U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

CONSOLIDATED CSO CAPACITY BUILDING ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE: GHANA																															
FOMWAG	X		U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	P	P	N	Y
IRDC	X		U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	P	P	P	Y
NGND	X		U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NGHC	X		U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NORYDA	X		U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Totals	15	10	U=9 F=10	U=9 F=3	25	25	25	19	17	21	24	15	25	25	25	25	15	22	24	25	22	22	18	21	16	21	13	17	14	20

Y= YES, N=No NA= Not Applicable

Annex 3   Groups Contacted

Nigeria

Lagos and surrounding areas

Category	Organization	Contact Person	Location
	Africa Leadership Forum (ALF)	Ayodele Aderinwale Executive Director	ALF Plaza 1 The Bells drive Benja Village Km9, Idiroko Rd. PO BOX 776 Ota Tel: 234 39 722730-3 Fax: 234 39 722742 Email: aderinwale@africaleadership.org www.africaleadership.com
Peace Building/Conflict Resolution	African Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG)	Ishola Williams (Retired General)	302, Iju Water Works Road, Agege, Lagos 01-4925535
	Global Peace Movement (GPM)	Mike Uyi	Mini-Shop 5, Tafawa Balewa Shopping Complex, Onikan, Lagos 080-330186635
	Visions of Peace (VOP)	Akin Akinteye	5, Lebanon Street, Ibadan, Oyo State 02-8106009
	Center for Peace and Development Education	Kunle Afolabi	53, Obafemi Awolowo Way, Ibara, Abeokuta, Ogun State
	VWG Mediation and Dispute Resolution Services Limited	Rotimi Vaughan	11, Mabuike Street, South West Ikoyi, Lagos, 01-2695084;682081
	Center for Peace and Development Action	Mike Ntuem	147 Eket/Oron Road, Eket, Akwa Ibom State, 085-701702
	Negotiation and Conflict Management Group	Segun Ogunyanwo	8, Boyle Street, Onikan, Lagos 01-2632688-9
Democracy	Civil Liberties Organization (CLO)	Titus Mann Vice President.	13, Soji Adepegba Close, off Allen Avenue, Ikeja, Lagos. Tel: 01-493 9424-5/0-774 6694. E-mail: clo@clo.org.ng, Website:http://www.clo.org.ng
	Transition Monitoring Group (TMG)	Aderoju Lamilisa Accountant	5 Abiona Close, Off Falolu Rd. PO Box 4447 Surulere, Lagos. Email: tmg-nig@beta.linkserve.com www.crp.org.ng
Development	Justice, Peace and Development Commission	Ireti Disu	Bishop Emeritus Compund, Erunwon Road, Ijebu Ode, Ogun State, 037-432268, 430702
	Shelter Rights Initiative (SRI)	Eze Onyekpere	6, Adisa Basuwa Street, Surulere, 01-4705626;835078
	Center for Democracy and Development (CDD)	Otive Igbuzor	2, Olabode Close, Ilu-peju , Lagos 01-4934420; 8043221
Human Rights	Social Alert (SA)	Sola Akinbode	386, Murtala Mohammed Way, Yaba, Lagos
	SERAC		
	Center for Law Enforcement Education	Chijioke Odom	1,Afolabi Aina Street, Ikeja, Lagos 01-497-4124; 4710328

Category	Organization	Contact Person	Location
Human Rights	Legal Research and Documentation Center (LRRDC)	Bankole Olubamise	386, Murtala Mohammed Way, Yaba, Lagos
Gender	BAOBAB for Women's Human Rights	Kemi Oyelakin	232, Muri Okunola Street, Victoria Island, Lagos 01-2626267; 3200484
	Gender and Development Action	Ada Agina-Ude	14, Adesola Street, Surulere, Lagos 01-5840371
Religion	Christian Association Of Nigeria (CAN)	C.O. Williams	1, Babatunde Street, Surulere, Lagos
Professional Associations	Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU)	Tony lOlusanya	Lagos State University, Ojoo, Lagos
	Nigerian Bar Association (NBA)	Olalekan Yusuf	The Bar Center, High Court of Justice, Ikeja, Lagos
	Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC)	John Odah, General Secretary	29, Olajuwon Street, Yaba, Lagos. Tel: 01-584 0288
Community-Based Organization	Oyo State Market Women Association	Yomi Ashaolu	Bodija Market, Bodija, Ibadan, Oyo State
Government Representatives	Deputy Chief Whip, Oyo State House of Assembly	O. Ajibola	Oyo State Government Secretariat, Ibadan, Oyo State
	Amuwo Odofin Local Government	Y. O. Giwa	Amuwo-Odofin Local Government Secrete-Riat, Amuwo-Odofin, Lagos 015890372
Individual		Isaac Albert	Center for Peace and [Conflict Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Oyo State

Abuja, Joss and Northern Region

Category	Organization	Contact Person	Location
Conflict Resolution / Peace	Conflict Resolution Stakeholders' Network (CRESNET)	Samie Ihejirika, National Coordinator	Plot C17, Habib Nigeria Bank Building (2nd Floor), Kachia Road, Kaduna. Tel:062-232 673/234 821
	Strategic Empowerment Mediation Center (SEMA)	Samie Ihejirika, Executive Director	Plot C17, Habib Nigeria Bank Building (2nd Floor), Kachia Road, Kaduna. Tel:062-232 673.E-mail: sema@rcl.ng.com
	Even Development Project (EDP)	Bashir Isyaku, Director	Suite UF 81,Turaki Ali House (4th Floor), 3, Kanta Road, Kaduna. Tel: 062-249 606 e-MAIL: barira@infoweb.abs.net
	Center for Peace Initiatives and Development (CEPID)	Imran Abdurahman, Executive Director	7, Pump Street, Jos. Tel: 073-452191/3 E-mail: imrana@unijos.edu.ng
Faith Based	Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)	Rev. Saidu Dogo Secretary, Northern CAN	14, Ibrahim Taiwa Road, Opposite St. Michael Cathedral. Tel: 062-236 225 (R) & 062-217 722 (O)
	Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI)	Alhaji S. Balarabe	41, Ali Akilu, P.O.Box 96, Kaduna.

Category	Organization	Contact Person	Location
Faith Based	Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum (Interfaith Mediation Center [MCDF])	Nuradyn Ashafa and James Wuye, Co-Coordinators	3rd Floor, Suite 20 xx12, Daura Road by Ibadan Street, Kaduna. Tel: 062-321 260 Fax: 062-241 048. E-mail: mcdf@kaduna.nipost.com.ng
Democracy/Human Rights	Community Network for Voter Education (CNVE)	Emeka Ononumadu	7, Postiskum Crescent, Area 2, Garki-Abuja Tel: 09-234 9646.
	African Center for Governance & Democracy (AFRIGOV)	Jonathan Aderomu Director Of Research	Crescent 12, Flat 93, Kado Housing Estate, Abuja. Tel: 09-521 2101
	Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC)	Joy Jimoke	16 Awori Crescent Ilupeju, Lagos PO Box 13616 Ikeja Lagos Tel: 234 1 4968605 Fax: 234 1 4968606 serac@linkserve.com.ng
	Constitutional Rights Project (CRP)	Godwin Odo (Program Manager)	Plot 750, Panama Crescent, Ministers' Hill-Maitama, Abuja. Tel: 09-413 5804/5 E-Mail: crpabuja@crp.org.ng. Website: www.crp.org.ng
Donor Agencies	United Nations Development Program-Nigeria (UNDP)	Pof. Geoarges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Senior Governance Advisor.	Aguiyi Ironsi Way, Maitama. Tel:09-413 5673/413 2089 ext. 207 E-mail: georges.nzongola @undpabuja.org
	Department for International Development (DFID)	Kate Dawson, Deputy Program Manager	607, Bobo Street, Maitama-Abuja. Tel:413 7710-19, E-mail:k-dawson@dfid.gov.uk
	Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)	Roger Laloupo & Halima Ahmed, Director & Deputy Director, Legal Affairs.	60, Yakubu Gowon Crescent, Asokoro Distict, Abuja. Tel: 09-314 7432/314 7640. E-mail: rlaloupo@ecowasmail.net
	Open Society Initiative in West Africa (OSIWA)	Dr. Nana Tanko Executive Director	2, Ontaria Crescent, Off Mississippi Street, Maitama A6, Abuja. Tel: 09-413 7289. E-mail:osiwa@osiwaabuja.org
Gender	National Council of Women Societies (NCWS)	Mrs. Lahor Director of Admin	Area 11, Garki, Abuja.
	Women Opinion Leaders' Forum (WOLF)	Dr. Habiba Muda-Lawal, Nat. Program Coordinator.	1058, Kolda Link, Wuse 2, Abuja. Tel: 09-523 8680/523 0446
Development NGOs	Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP)	Joseph Mamman Executive Director	556A, Borno Street, Area 10, Garki, Abuja. Tel: 09-234 7593. E-Mail: capp@cocapp.org. Website: www.kabissa.com/capp
	National Center for Women, Youth and Community Action (NACWYCA)	Nawani Aboki, Executive Director	NACWYCA House,Shendam Road, Lafia, Nasarawa State. Tel: 047-21412 E-mail: nacwyca@linkserve.com
Government	Bureau for Islamic Affairs	Balarabe Jigo, Permanent Secretary	Kaduna State Secretariat, Independence Way, Kaduna.

Category	Organization	Contact Person	Location
	Bureau for Christian Affairs	Elisha Buba Yero, Permanent Secretary	Kaduna State Secretariat, Independence Way, Kaduna.
Government	Nasarawa Eggon Local Council	Chris Abashi, Chairman	Lafia Road, Nasarawa Eggon, Nasarawa State.
Traditional Associations	Southern Kaduna Peoples' Union	Danladi M.Yerima National Secretary	
	Middle-Belt Progressive Movement (MPM)	Tar Ukoh (Plateau State Chair)	C/o League for Human Rights 4, Grey Garden, Tafawa Balewa Street, Jos
Academic Government	Center for Peace Studies and Conflict Management, University of Jos	Imran Abdurahman	University of Jos, Bauchi Road, Jos
	Center for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution of the National War College	Dr. Stefanus Zabade, Director of Research	National War College, Herbert Macauley Way, Garki-Abuja Tel: 09-234 7606
	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR)	Ambassador Ferguson O. Iheme, Director	Plot 496, Constitution Avenue, Independence Way, Central Business District, Garki-Abuja. Tel: 09-523 9353

GHANA

Category	Organization	Contact Person	Location
Conflict Resolution/ Peace	African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)	Eboe Hutchful Executive Director	P.O. Box LG 347 Legon, Accra Tel : 233-21-510515/513747 E-mail: asdr@africaonline.com.gh eboehutchful@aol.com amos@mail.h-net.msu.edu www.africansecurity.org
	Foundation for Security and Development (FOSDA)	Afi Yakubu Executive Director	P.O. Box CT3140 Cantonments, Accra Tel: 233-21-811291 233-21-811322 E-mail: FOSDA@Afri-canus.net
	Legon Center for International Affairs (LECIA)	Kofi Kumado Acting Executive Director	P. O. Box LG 25, Legon, Accra Tel: 233-21-501025 Fax: 233-21-501311 Email: Lecia@ug.edu.gh
	Nonviolence International (NVI)	Mr. John Oduro-Poku Director	Box DK 348 Darkuman, Accra Tel: 233-21-229454 Fax: 233-21-412418 E-mail: nonviolence15 @hotmail.com

Category	Organization	Contact Person	Location
	West African Network for Peace building (WANEP)	Samuel Gbaydee Doe Executive Director Emmanuel Bombande Program Director	P.O. Box CT 4434 Cantonments, Accra Tel: 233 21 221318/221388 Fax: 233 21 221735 Email: wanep@wanep.org Website: www.wanep.org
Democracy	Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)	Dr. Emmanuel O. Akwetey Director	P.O. Box CT 5767 Cantonments, Accra, Ghana Tel: 233 21 7011762 Fax: 233 21 768516 E-mail: dranie@africaonline .co.gh; ideg@its.com.gh
Development	African Development Programme (ADP)	Charles Abbey Executive Director	P.O. Box CT 3918 Cantonments, Accra, Ghana Tel: 233 21 306345/ Res: 244102 Fax: 233 21 662035/306345 Email: chasadp@africaonline .com.gh
	Center for Democratic Development (CDD)	Prof. E. Gyimah-Boadi Executive Director	P.O. Box 404 Legon, Accra, Ghana Tel: 233 21-776142/763029 Fax:233-21-763028 E-mail: cdd@ghana.com Website: www.CDD-GHANA.org
	Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organizations in Development (GAPVOD)	Yao Dogbe Administrative Assistant	P. O. Box A17, LA, Accra. Tel: 233-21-254670 Fax: NA Email: gapvod@ghana.com
	Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC)		4th Sakumo Link, Laterbiokoshie PO Box AN19452 Accra-North Tel: +233-21-306069/302103 Fax: 311687
	Third World Network (TWN)	Yao Graham. Ph.D. Coordinator	9 Ollennu St. East Legon P.O.Box AN 19452 Accra, Ghana Tel: 233 21 503669/500419/511189 Fax: 233 21 511188 Email: twnafrica@ghana.com; yaograham@yahoo.com
Faith Based	Christian Council of Ghana (CCG)	Mr. Christian Akomea Head of Relief and Rehabilitation	P.O. Box 919 Accra, Ghana Tel: 233-21-776678/773429 E-mail: ccg@Africa-online.com.gh

Category	Organization	Contact Person	Location
	Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services (ICDHS)	Mr. Alhaji Alhassan Abdulai Media Practitioner/Executive Director	P.O. Box 17070 Accra-North Tel: 233-21-236147/223518/224313 Fax: 233-21-22149 E-mail: icodehs @africaonline.com.gh
Human Rights	Legal Resource Center (LRC)	Mr. Mohamed Abdulai Executive Director	P.O. Box 9543 KIA Accra Tel: 233-21-253199 Fax: NA E-mail: lrc@ghana.com
Women/Gender	Federation Internacional de Abogadas (FIDA)	Mrs. Ernestina Hagan President	P.O. Box KA 9578 Accra-Ghana Tel: 233-21-502903/4 233-21-225479 Fax: 233-21-230035 E-mail: fidagh@ghana.com
Professional Associations	Ghana Association of Women Entrepreneurs (GAWE)	Mrs. Lucia Quachey (National President)	P.O. Box AN 7600 Accra-North Tel: 233-21-225300/222459 Fax: 233-21-222535 E-mail: gawe@hotmail.com gawe@ighmail.com Website: www.ghanaclassifieds.com/gawe
	Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA)	Kwame Karikari Executive Director	P. O. Box LG 730, Legon Tel: 233-21-242470 Fax: 233-21-221084 Email: mfwa @africaonline.com.gh
	Trade Union Congress (TUC)	Kwesi Adu-Amankwah Secretary General Mr. Kofi Asamoah Deputy Secretary General Operations	P. O. Box 701, Accra Tel: 233-21-662568/669649/669675/666803 Fax: 233-21-667161 Email: tuc@ighmail.com tuc@ncs.com.gh
Government	Ministry of Youth and Sports	Hon. Paapa Owusu-Ankomah Minister	P.O. Box M252 Accra-Ghana Tel: 233-21-665630 Fax: 233-21-660344
Donors	African Women's Development Fund (AWDF)	Bisi Adeleye-Fayemi Executive Director	Aviation House, Aviation Rd. P.O.Box 1539 Accra, Ghana Tel/Fax : 233 21 782502 Email : bisi90@hotmail.com; awdf@awdf.org Webpage : www.awdf.org
	Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)	Pat Oxley Young	P. O. Box 1639, Accra Tel : 233-21-7011728/9 Fax :233-21-772349 Email : civsock@cidapsu.org

Northern Ghana

NO	Organization	Contact Person	Contact Address
1.	Northern Region House of Chiefs	Mr. J.S. Babina Ag. Registrar	Post Office Box 178, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-22314
2.	Federation of Moslem Women Association of Ghana (FOMWAG)	Hajia Fulera Goodman President – Northern Region	Post Office Box 52, Tamale Tel. No. 071-23147
3	Christian Council of Ghana (Northern Sector)	Madam Janet Adama Mohammed Director	Post Office Box 391, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-22991/23278
4	Business Advisory and Development Consultancy Center (BADECC)	Mr. Issahaku Jesiwuni Executive Director (BADECC)	Post Office Box 656, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-22817
5	Community Development and Youth Advisory Center (CODEYAC)	Mr. Hussein Zakaria Executive Director	Post Office Box 599, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-24540
6	Northern Region Network for Development (The Network)	Mr. Issahaku Jesiwuni Ag. Executive Director	Post Office Box 1736, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-22817
7	Inter-Religious Dialogue Commission	Sister Marie-Renee Wyseur Coordinator	Post Office Box 163, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-22425
8	Northern Region Youth and Development Association (NORYDA)	Mr. Adam Baba Issifu Organizing Secretary	Post Office Box 1484, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-24796
9	National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE)	Mr. Issah Abdulai Nasagri Regional Director N/R	Post Office Box 744, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-22060
10	The Ghana Police Service	H. Yali Chief Superintendent of Police N/Region	Regional Police Headquarter, Tamale. Tel. No. 071-22227
DONORS			
11	ActionAid Ghana	Mr. Isaac Osei Coordinator – Peace and Reconciliation	Post Office Box 1057,Tamale. Tel. No. 071-22740 Email: aatamale@africaonline.com.gh
12	Oxfam GB	Mrs. Nafi Chinery Capacity Building Officer	Post Office Box Tamale. Tel. No./Fax (233) 71-22849 Email: Oxfam@africaonline.com.gh

Annex 4 Mini-Case Studies for Nigeria and Ghana

Ghana-Nigeria Cases

G1. RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE – THE GA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND CHRISTIANS: THE ROLE OF LECIA AND THE CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF GHANA

In June each year the Ga Adangbes, an ethnic group in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana, are expected to undergo a solemn reflection as part of the preparatory rites for the Homowo Festival. The Ga Traditional Council imposes a ban on drumming and any form of noisemaking in public. It insists that everyone adheres to this ban regardless of one's personal beliefs. Christians argue that the ban is tantamount to an infringement on their rights to freedom of worship as enshrined in the 1992 constitution of the 4th Republic. Over the last five years, there have been violent clashes between Christians and members of the Ga Traditional Council on this issue. These conflicts stem from conflicts between modern rites of citizenship versus traditional rights and obligations associated with particular societies within the modern nation-state.

Role and Strategy of CSOs

In 1999, the Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECIA) was instrumental in resolving conflict that erupted due to the ban on drumming. LECIA is a conflict resolution and training center based at the University of Legon, utilized by students and the wider community. Their method consisted of holding a series of interviews in marketplaces, truck stops, and public places in general with different groups to get their views on the issue. They held meetings with representatives of the Christian churches and the leaders of the traditional Ga society. Finally, they brought the two parties together to dialogue. As a result of these meetings the problem was resolved.

The following year, the government-appointed mediation committee invited a CSO network of Christian churches, the Christian Council of Ghana (CCG) to get involved. Before the ban was imposed in the year 2000, the CCG met with a number of religious associations to discuss the issue. Being mindful of the need and benefits of dialogue in the attempt to maintain an appreciation for Ghanaian culture while allowing for the peaceful coexistence of traditional religion and Christianity, CCG recommended the formation of a standing committee to monitor and manage misunderstandings arising out of differences between the practice of Christianity and customary religion. The CCG agreed that all churches should confine crusades and other outdoor programs to church buildings and that in the interest of peace and harmony they should avoid excessive noise during the period of the ban.

At the beginning of 2001, the Christian Council of Ghana reminded the Ga Traditional Council and all concerned Christians of the commitment that each side had taken prior to the ban being imposed. Regardless, the Ga traditionalists vandalized churches that they felt were not acceding to their wishes. One of these was the headquarters of the Christ Apostolic Church located in Osu. This church was located in a predominantly Ga community whose chiefs play a key role in enforcing the ban. Clashes followed, resulting in a number of injuries on both sides. Timely police intervention managed to avert another tragedy just one month after 126 people had died in the May 9 Stadium Disaster. Still the issue was unresolved. The two sides remained deadlocked

until the government set up an ad hoc mediation committee led by the Head of the Political Science Department of the University of Ghana.

Intervention by a CSO regarded as a party to the dispute (the CCG) failed. Many hope that by getting a neutral third party (the Ad Hoc Mediation Committee) involved the parties will respect the agreements more readily and fully. In this case the results will not be clear until the next ban goes into effect in June 2002.

G2.   THE BIMBAGU CRISIS AND PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN GHANA

Background and History of the Conflict

Conflict between the Tamoungs and the Pulis erupted in March 2000, over cultural practices and land ownership. The conflict was locally based in scope, without visible external involvement, but involved other Bimoba clans (about seven in all) who took sides with the main disputants.

The Tamoungs and Pulis are two distinct clans of the Bimoba tribe who live in the East Mamprusi district of the northern region. The two clans have lived together for many years at Bimbagu. By Bimoba custom and tradition, inter-clan marriage is a taboo and must be avoided at all costs. Over the years, however, there has been much intermarriage between members of these two clans.

The two are not status equals in Bimoba society. The Pulis are considered by the Tamoungs to be settlers and not owners of the Bimbagu land. The Tamoung chief, on the other hand, is known as the Bimbagu-rana — the owner of Bimbagu. It is widely understood that the land on which the Pulis live in an around Bimbagu belongs to the Tamoungs, and is under the authority of the Bimbagu-rana.

At the same time it is the Pulis who have been gaining political power in the modern political system. Since 1992, a Puli has been the Member of Parliament (MP) for this area and the power of the MP began to overshadow that of the Tamoung chief. As a result of their feelings of empowerment, the Pulis broke a long-standing norm of having their chief be invested by the Bimbagu-rana, the Tamoung chief. Instead they went to the Kambagu-rana (the owner of Kambagu), the big chief of the Pulis who lives far away from Bimbagu, to have their local Bimbagu chief invested. Conflict ensued as the Bimbagu-rana reacted. The MP is alleged to have made the problem worse by arming the Pulis and by encouraging them to fight the Tamoung. Attacks by both sides followed in March 2000. The Tamoungs burnt down many Puli settlements, and two young men from the Tamoung side lost their lives at the hands of some Pulis.

The CSO, Its Role and Strategy in Resolving the Conflict

A number of CSOs became involved in this dispute. NORYDA, an umbrella youth association representing about seventeen different ethnic youth associations in the northern region, took the lead. Among their members is the Bimoba tribal youth group. Given their limited capacity both in infrastructure and in mediation and negotiation skills, however, they called on the help of other CSOs WANEP, ActionAid Ghana, and BADECC.

The result of their intervention was that the parties recognized that the root cause of the conflict was a land dispute. They resolved to resolve all outstanding issues related to land and chieftaincy through the process of regular dialogues through established traditional mechanisms. They also got all parties to condemn the use of violence as a means of solving problems and/or settling scores and take it upon themselves to educate their youth both within and outside the Bimoba communities to appreciate nonviolent approaches and dialogue as a way of resolving their differences. They agreed that, in accordance with the laws of Ghana, violators of these norms would be viewed as individuals and not as clans or tribes.

As a result of this settlement, NORDYA was recognized as the organization representing all ethnic youth associations in the northern region. In recognition of the accelerating problem of ethnic violence and of the role that youth are playing in it, a number of organizations, specifically the Coordinating Council (RCC), district assembly, NGOs, religious bodies, and the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) in the northern region agreed to assist NORDYA in their efforts to work for sustainable peace in the Bimoba communities.

In addition, the case demonstrated the value of securing the involvement of intermediary and tertiary CSOs with deeper experience and more capacity. In this instance WANEP, the Northern Ghana Peace Project, the Inter-NGO Consortium, ActionAid Ghana, and the Northern Region Directorate of NCCE became involved.

Nigeria

N1.   MULTIPLE CONFLICTS IN NASARAWA STATE, NIGERIA CSO INTERVENTION: CENTER FOR PEACE INITIATIVES AND DEVELOPMENT

Background and History of Conflict

Nasarawa state is one of the six states that make up Nigeria's north central region. Created in 1996 from Plateau state, its strategic importance lies in the fact that it is a gateway to the southeast and south from the north and is one of the key food basket states in the country. As is the case with the north central region, also known as the Middle-Belt, the state hosts several ethnic groups from the Hausa, Fulani, Eggon, Kanuri, Tiv, Arrago and many more. During colonial indirect rule, Kanuri/Hausa/Fulani members of the northern Islamic caliphate constituted the local ruling class, dominating the indigenous groups. Until the 1980s, government recognized only traditional rulers from the three Muslim ethnic groups as first class chiefs. During Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-1983), first class chiefs were appointed for all indigenous groups. This both angered the Kanuri/Hausa/Fulani and set off a number of conflicts in the state.

Conflict here has predominantly been caused by land and chieftaincy disputes and contest for political power. The Tiv, who are Christians and very active farmers from neighboring Benue state, have been migrating to the southern part of Nasarawa state in search of land. This was tolerable until they became politically active and got four Cabinet positions. At this point the Tiv came to be perceived as a threat to the previously dominant Muslim ethnic groups.

The Igbura, who are also Muslims and have been allied with the Hausa, controlled the politics of the Toto area until 1997, when the Bassa became politically active and for the first time elected one of their own people to chair the local council chair. This further fueled conflict in the area. One of these conflicts is between the Bassa and Igburra groups over the control of the Toto local council. Research of CEPID revealed that the conflict was a result of a century-long practice of using the Igburra minority to rule the majority Bassa. When in 1997, the Bassa used their majority population to elect a Bassa man as local council chair for the first time, violent conflict broke out. The cause of the conflict was attributed to Christian Tiv farmers from neighboring Benue state encroaching on land in Nasarawa state. The various intervention workshops revealed, however, that the Kanuri/Hausa/Fulani elite were threatened by the rising political profile of the Tiv in Nasarawa state. The current governor of the state has supported the Tiv, largely because they constitute an important electoral block and can be critical to his reelection. The Kanuri/Hausa/Fulani groups, on the other hand, are intent on replacing the current governor with one of their own and they have been angered by his decision to court the Tiv.

The Tiv are involved in another conflict, this time pitting them directly against the Kanuri/ Hausa/Fulani elites. This conflict, however, reveals how the struggle between ethnic groups is not determined solely by their religious affiliation. The Christian Tiv and the Muslim Kanuri/ Hausa/Fulani have lived together for over a century, but never intermarried or created any bond of friendship. In 1997 the Igburra, a Muslim group, defeated the Bassa with the help of mercenaries from Tivland in neighboring Benue state. Over 200,000 Bassa were dislocated and forced into exile in neighbouring states and communities. In 2000, with funds from the Switzerland Embassy, the Nasarawa government negotiated a return of these people to camps in Toto. It was in the process of this resettlement that in June the southern senatorial district of the state exploded into communal violence, pitting the Tiv on one side and the Muslim Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri and other minor groups on the other. The Muslim Igburra though not affected, sent fighters to support the Tiv, which further complicated the situation.

CEPID's Role and Strategy

The Center for Peace Initiatives and Development (CEPID) is a classical CSO that in Nigeria is called a "staff organization." It was established in Jos in 1999 and registered in 2000 as a conflict mediating and management CSO to operate in Nigeria's Middle-Belt and northeast regions. CEPID was assessing the Bassa/Igburra conflict for possible intervention before the June 2001 violence exploded. It had already conducted advocacy visits to the two communities, the local council and the Nasarawa state government and secured a grant for intervention from USAID/OTI. The plan was for facilitated mediation efforts to initiate dialogue between the Igburra and Bassa leaders for the dislocated Bassa population who were then living in camps and waiting to be resettled in their original villages. With the outbreak of violence, CEPID reviewed its intervention plan. It started a media campaign using radio jingles calling for calm and dialogue and providing information about how people could help victims of the conflict. It followed this with a participatory workshop for top civil servants, business people, community and religious leaders, and youth and women leaders from the conflict-affected areas. These activities, which were undertaken even as the fighting raged on, were directed at improving the enabling environment for this and other forms of interventions by creating peace constituencies.

As violence receded in mid-July, CEPID began providing conflict management skills to security and police personnel operating in the conflict areas. It targeted this group because only security personnel had access to the area at the time. It also facilitated workshops in August 2001, targeting the Bassa and Igburra to prepare them for negotiation and reconciliation. Next, it began working with the government-created Peace and Reconciliation Committee to provide them with the mediation and negotiation skills needed to intervene and get parties to the negotiation table. Finally, it held a statewide workshop in September 2001 on mapping conflict and formulating conflict resolution strategies. These brought all parties to the conflict together.

The OTI grant has now been exhausted and CEPID has applied for another grant from DFID. To keep the momentum of peace building, CEPID has scheduled joint meetings between the various parties for November 18, 2001 to explore ways of further transforming the conflicts.

The violence has since ended and the Peace and Reconciliation Committee, trained and guided by CEPID, is negotiating with the different groups for final settlement. The federal authorities have also been approached to look into complaints about boundary disputes that were partly responsible for the conflict. To aid the process of reconciliation, CEPID is continuing private efforts with its own resources to host exploratory meetings between the parties, particularly in the Bassa/Igburra conflict.

The role of government in conflict prevention and resolution, however, has not always been constructive or positive. Security personnel and police officers complain of "orders from above" forestalling preventive action in both of the conflicts. CEPID also found that conflict parties, even while publicly antagonistic, are always ready to explore peace. "Rogue" operations by actors with vested interests, however, often frustrate efforts to end conflicts by provoking revenge.

N2.   ABUJA LEGISLATIVE DIALOGUE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY ACTION FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION

Background and History of Conflict

The law that established the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in 1976 vests control of all lands in the federal government and provides that the original inhabitants should be resettled and compensated for their land. In implementing the law, there have been policy changes that have tended to instigate conflict. In 1978, the government reviewed the cost of resettlement estimated at N2.8 billion and decided it was too high. It then decided to modify the resettlement plan by scaling down the number of people to be resettled. The new policy provided for resettlement of only those whose lands were needed for immediate development while others were given the option to be resettled or remain where they were. The political elite at the time campaigned for the people to remain where they were so as to give them the numbers to control the politics of the territory.

With the seat of government moving from Lagos to the territory in 1991, there was further change to the resettlement policy. Without formal change in the law, lands being occupied by the original settlers were awarded to individuals and legal entities for use. The other settlements that were yet to be covered by the existing phase of the development plan were denied infrastructural

development as a means of forcing the people to leave. This fuelled the disgruntlement of the original settlers, yet the government claimed that the law gave it power over all land in the territory.

The new democratic government, on coming to office, promised to implement the original master plan for the development of the territory, which it claimed had been bastardized by the military. New conflicts arose, as lands earlier allocated by traditional rulers and local council officials were not covered by the master plan. The original settlers also complained that since the FCT was treated as "no-mans land", they were denied the rights and privileges enjoyed by other Nigerians who as citizens of states, enjoyed quotas in education and employment. New problems arose with the influx of more people into the territory. With no adequate provision for affordable housing and markets and motor garages, illegal construction of these became rampant. Dislocated and abandoned native communities, and new settler communities grew up, stranded in shantytowns that lack social facilities. The government response was regular demolition of these structures, demolition that was sometimes met with violent opposition by owners. Worse still, the Nigeria Federal Court of Appeals ruled that all land in the FCT belonged to the government and the latter is the only authority to allocate such land. The implication of this ruling was that about 80 percent of all land allocated in the FCT was void and that both the indigenes and new settlers who occupy these lands were illegal squatters. This fuelled the tension in the FCT with the minister threatening to enforce the judgment, and the youth from both the indigenous and settler communities preparing for violence. In fact, the indigenous youth declared the minister *persona non grata* in all their communities.

At the time of the intervention, the following conflicts were at the escalation stage, particularly with the Abuja Indigenes Youth Forum engaged in forms of insurgency, demonstrations and press conferences, and the new settlers organized in various mobilizational groups:

1.   Indigenes vs. federal government over lack of provision of social infrastructure in their old or new settlements, education and employment quotas, poor compensation for land or non-resettlement;
2.   Indigenes vs. new settlers over indigenes rights and privileges, contested by the new settlers; and
3.   Indigenes and settlers vs. government over demolition of so-called illegal structures and lack of provision for market stalls for middle and low-income earners.

CAPP's Role and Strategy

The Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), though a national CSO, has its roots in Abuja where it was founded and has its head office. Its other offices are in Kano, Jos, Minna and Zaria. Its focus is community empowerment and good governance. CAPP had been in touch with the various parties in the FCT conflict for a long time. It had jointly organized public hearings on problems of the FCT with the Abuja Indigenes Youth Forum, and had participated in a review of the Abuja Master Plan with the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) — the body established to facilitate development of the territory. CAPP was thus well position to facilitate a program of consultation and mediation of the conflict. For this, CAPP received a grant from USAID/OTI.

CAPP's intervention aimed at providing youth in the FCT with skills in conflict management and nonviolent community organizing, at bridging the communication gap between Abuja residents and their legislators, and at developing a legislative action plan that would meet the aspiration of the residents. CAPP also hoped to form an FCT peace forum for managing conflicts and sustaining peace in the FCT. The intervention was in the form of facilitative mediation, to ensure that while imparting skills, relationships between participants were strengthened so that they could network and collaboratively solve conflict in the future.

The first phase of the intervention was comprised of three workshops on nonviolent community organizing for the indigenous youth, migrant communities of squatter settlements, and entrepreneurs and professional groups in the FCT. The second phase was a policy/legislative dialogue between representatives of the groups already trained and officials of FCDA and the legislators representing the FCT in the National Assembly. Training was directed at changing negative perceptions to positive ones through interactive brainstorming sessions. In this phase, a dialogue session was facilitated between the trained groups and officials of the FCDA, a member of the Senate and members of the House of Representatives from Abuja. Participants were called upon to identify conflict issues. During the interactive sessions, guided dialogue on these issues traced conflict roots to misunderstanding and lack of information on the part of the indigenes. These were clarified, and the groups shared feelings and made suggestions on possible policy changes.

The intervention was a great success. The training that predated the dialogue prepared participants and disposed them towards a constructive approach to disagreements and created an environment conducive to the dialogue. When the Presidential review committee on the FCT crisis submitted its recommendations calling for parts of the territory to be excised and used to resettle the indigenes, the indigenous youth objected. This time rather than take to the streets, they lodged complaints in the appropriate plan — the FCDA. The dialogue was able to bridge the information gap between the parties and the indigenes about quotas on education and employment. The dialogue also prompted the government to set up a committee to review the way the FCT was being administered. At the National Assembly level, a bill has been introduced to review the law establishing the FCT. Also, a solid base for sustainable relationship between the government and the other stakeholders in the FCT has been established with the formation of the Abuja Youth Network for Peace Building and Democratic Consolidation. The intervention thus succeeded in reducing tension and establishing a conflict prevention and management infrastructure in the FCT.

N3.   INTERFAITH MEDIATION IN NIGER STATE
CSO INTERVENTION: WOMEN OPINION LEADERS' FORUM

Background and History of Conflict

Niger state is in the north central region and serves as a major gateway to Lagos from the north. The state has a relatively large number of Muslims, but with a significantly larger population of Christian and non-Muslims. Created in 1976, the state is host to the famous Kainji Dam and all the major hydroelectric power stations in the country. In January 2000, the newly elected civilian government legislated Sharia law and banned the production, sale and consumption of alcoholic drinks, among other restrictions. Public pressure from the Christian Association of Nigeria

(CAN) and other groups that felt Sharia would infringe on their rights. Some of the protest turned violent, compelling the government to review the scope of application and punishment prescribed by the law.

WOLF's Role and Strategy

The Women Opinion Leaders' Forum (WOLF) was founded as a membership organization in 1998 to increase women's role in public affairs, and to defend the right of women living under Islamic law. It has offices in 23 Nigerian states, and a head office in Abuja. WOLF conducted workshops on political education, interfaith mediation and conflict management skills for women in Kaduna after the religious riots that took place in 2000. One of its strategies is to strengthen opposition voices in states under Sharia law, and to moderate the application of the law and particularly its oppressive provisions on women.

Selecting Niger state as its first test case for such work, WOLF conducted research to identify groups that entertained fears about the legislation of Sharia. It then conducted advocacy visits to Niger government representatives and key traditional and religious leaders to sensitize them and solicit their support for an intervention program. With a grant from USAID/OTI, WOLF held an interfaith mediation program to encourage religious tolerance, dialogue and consultation. Working with the Kaduna-based Interfaith Mediation Center, three workshops over three weeks were held with key groups in the state in May 2001. Participants included both Christian and Muslim groups, youth and women leaders, traditional and opinion leaders, journalists, security personnel and representatives of labor unions. A media campaign was simultaneously held, using both radio and television jingles and discussion programs to explore various contentious issues and to project moderate views on both sides of the divide. WOLF concluded the program with a policy dialogue on Sharia law in June 2001. The dialogue was attended by representatives of the trained groups, the secretary to the state government, the area commander of the police, the local council chair and a representative of the chair of the traditional council of chiefs in the state. During the dialogue, both the Christians and non-Muslims expressed their views about the law and made recommendations on possible amendments. The police explained their difficulties in enforcing the law and the forum jointly debated possible areas of amendment. They agreed on creating a forum for regular consultation on Sharia and related issues as a means of preventing conflict in the state.

WOLF was able to facilitate a process of dialogue and consultation between religious and community leaders without anyone raising a religious objection. It feels a sense of triumph that with the victory in Niger, they can do more to curb religious intolerance and communal conflicts in other Sharia states. Its media campaign and workshops in Senatorial districts were successful in creating more public consciousness about the need for tolerance and dialogue over disagreements. The use of both Christian and Islamic examples and authorities to make a case for tolerance discouraged the use of religion to incite conflict. At the same time it was able to build bridges between grassroots voices and government through the policy dialogue and thereby get government to be more involved in a conflict prevention mechanism that would have the support of the people.

N4.   MANAGING RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN KADUNA: A GOVERNMENTAL AND CSO COLLABORATIVE MECHANISM

Background and History of Conflict

Kaduna is one of Nigeria's most volatile states. In January 2000, the Muslim-dominated House of Assembly introduced a bill to establish Sharia law in the state. On February 21 and May 20, 2000, religious riots broke out in the state. Composed of a multiplicity of ethnic groups, the state's population has a religious divide that is about 50:50 in population. The southern part is made up of several groups that are predominantly Christian. These autonomous groups had successfully resisted the Fulani Jihad in the Nineteenth Century only to be place under caliphate rule by the British colonialists. Independence did not change the situation here as the northern regional government dominated by the Hausa/Fulani maintained the status quo by placing Christian and non-Muslim groups under the political and economic control of the Hausa/Fulani. The bitterness of these minority groups overflow from time to time leading to very violent conflicts. In the northern part of the state are the Hausa/Fulani organized under the Zaria Emirate who are predominantly Muslim and still administratively control the south. As a result of this, every disagreement in the state easily takes religious coloration and a high propensity to turn violent. Over the past one and a half decades, the state has witnessed no less than a dozen communal and religious conflicts that left hundreds of people of dead and billions of naira worth of property destroyed.

Government and CSO Collaboration: Roles and Strategies

When the controversy over the introduction of Sharia law became hot and the different religious contenders started to sponsor street demonstrations, the state government established a Bureau for Religious Affairs (BRA) with a unit for Christians and another for Muslims, each headed by a permanent secretary reporting directly to the governor. Barely three weeks after the establishment of the two bureaus, the February 2000 religious violence broke out. This was followed by a repeat of the violence in May of the same year. Undaunted, the government added teeth to the bureaus by setting up a Religious Peace and Reconciliation Committee composed by an equal number of Christians and Muslims to investigate the root causes of the conflict and to work with the bureaus to create a conflict prevention/mechanism mechanism for the state.

The bureaus started work by registering all organized religious groups and associations in the state and followed this with media sensitization programs. The bureaus then solicited the assistance of conflict resolution CSOs, the Muslim/Christian Dialogue Forum (MCDF) and Even Development Project (EDP) to conduct a series of both interfaith and conflict resolution skills training for religious leaders in the state. Another CSO, the Strategic Empowerment Mediation Agency (SEMA) conducted the "Voices of Kaduna Children" media programs, using voices of children to send messages to the public. The MCDF also organized trauma counseling for women and children. Yet another CSO, WOLF, conducted conflict management programs for women. All these programs were funded by USAID/OTI. Cumulatively, these programs led to negotiations between the Muslim and Christian leaders. Assessing the workshops, a staff of the bureau remarked "Everyone who attended left as a peacemaker…People were armed with tools for resolving conflicts. Armed with these tools we have carried the message and that has contributed to peace."

To consolidate the peace and prevent future reoccurrence, the Kaduna state government created independent chiefdoms for the various ethnic groups in southern Kaduna and freed them from the control of the Zaria Emirate. It has also collaborated with EDP to train senior traditional chiefs in conflict resolution and conflict prevention skills. The same program is planned for junior chiefs later in the year. Currently, due to threatening conflicts in Birnin Gwari and Saminaka local councils and parts of Kaduna town, the government is funding an interfaith media program on both radio and television. The program also has a training program for vigilante groups that are known to take sides during violent conflicts. The government is also funding a mediation program for the various local councils to be facilitated by the MCDF.

Violence has not been completely erased from Kaduna, but a conflict management and prevention mechanism has been created and is being consolidated in this state. Just as importantly, the state government has taken over a program that was initially funded by a foreign donor. In addition, a strong relationship has developed between the state government and CSOs. The two now reinforce and support each other in tackling the various challenges that the delicate situation in Kaduna poses. CSOs now monitor conflicts and report to the government, and then the two develop a plan of action and implementation. This model is being proposed to the other northern states where Sharia has been introduced.

N5.   THE GLOBAL PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR: REGIONAL CSO INTERVENTION

Elsewhere we have discussed the origins of the civil wars in the Mano River states, and the efforts on the part of CSOs in the subregion to deal with the Sierra Leonean civil war. This case study discusses the efforts of a Nigerian-based international NGO to deal with this conflict.

The Global Peace Movement (GPM) is best considered a social movement, with members in many countries around the world, and its base in Nigeria, with approximately 600,000 members. It has intervened in other international conflicts, i.e., Liberia, and many Nigerian conflicts, including the Modakeke/Ife intercommunal crisis. Its strengths lie in its ability to respond quickly and directly in conflict, as it does not work from donor funds and thus is not held back by time or other constraints. It has three sub-committees for this purpose: the negotiation team, the 'surprise and attack team', and the team on spontaneous resolution.

Its involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war was motivated by a concern for peace in the West African subregion. The GPM first sent an observer mission led by its President General, Mike Uyi, to Sierra Leone in November 1998. It then followed with a more action-oriented program. Since it was not tied to any of the parties to the conflict, it had the advantage of having a neutral image. GPM intervened at the crisis stage. Its role was largely that of a public educator and then as a facilitator. Its educational programs involved press releases and leaflets on the virtues of peace, on the need for tolerance, and on the inevitability of conflicts. Because it made use of speakers of local languages it was able to reach a wide audience. As a facilitator, it counseled the warring factions on the need to try other approaches, and then helped broker a dialogue for ceasefire amongst different societal actors. It was able to do this mainly by working through two specific contacts it had with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. During the course of its interventions, GPM was unable to forge relationships with other professional conflict

management groups, or with the government of Sierra Leone. Nor was it able to interest the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in its program.

GPM achieved modest success in these efforts. It was able to bring about a deescalation in the conflict between October and December of 1999, probably because at that time the RUF saw it in its interest to pursue alternatives to violence in pursuit of their goals. Ultimately, however, the peace process deteriorated and the process of continuing the peace initiative became too risky for the GPM and it withdrew.

N6.   IFE: MODAKEKE CONFLICT AND CRESNET IN SOUTHWEST NIGERIA

Background and History of Conflict

The Modakeke/Ife conflict is of long standing between two communities who live within a geographically contiguous setting — Ile Ife, in the west of Nigeria. These communities have had centuries of interaction in nearly all facets of existence. At the heart of the conflict are issues of land tenancy and self-determination. Over the years, however, other issues have emerged, such as the agitation for creation of a separate council by the Modakeke, and respect for communal values and institutions. Between the 1980s and 2000 the conflict raged out of control, costing human lives and laying waste to valuable property.

The central parties to the conflict include the Modakeke and Ife communities, the citizens of the two communities domiciled in other places, and the local councils of Ife Central, Ife West, Ife East and Ife North. Over the years various actors including the federal government, the Oyo State government, and the Nigeria police have tried to broker peace.

In 2000, after one of the bloodiest expressions of this conflict occurred, Southwest CRESNET (SW CRESNET) got involved. SW CRESNET is a regional branch of the national CRESNET, an association grouping of experienced, competent professional conflict managers and academics with specialization in intervention design and security studies. It was determined to be proactive in dealing with this regional conflict. Its key strategies in dealing with the conflict included conflict management education, media advocacy and collaboration, and facilitative negotiation. The program was implemented in two-month interval phases, with each phase of the program lasting two weeks. Phase I was devoted to the acquisition of peacemaking skills phase, rounded off with a discussion of the issues in dispute by each side. Phase II, a program on reconciliation, broke important ground. In it, participants became convinced that mercy, truth and justice had to be pursued together to achieve peace.

CRESNET's program was largely successful. Since the parties to the dispute were the source of the solutions tried, there was no disagreement over these solutions. Because local participants felt empowered, they were able to resolve many problems at this level. Moreover, there is evidence that changes in behaviors and attitudes also occurred. Now the dialogue is ongoing, and violence has been drastically reduced. Unfortunately, since funding for the CRESNET program ended, there has been no ongoing follow-up to monitor the dialogue process or to initiate further dialogue with the appropriate local parties, and the issue of creating local governments is not something that local participants can do. Only government can play this role, and to do so, it must act in a way that will be perceived as neutral.

N7.   THE LAGOS ABATTOIR: THE INTERVENTION OF SW CRESNET

Background and History of Conflict

The Lagos abattoir conflict was primarily a business conflict that carried undercurrents of the "national question." The abattoir is an N800m ($6.3m US) project by the Lagos state government equipped with modern facilities to service the beef needs of the entire state, generate revenue and ensure high hygienic standards. About 10,000 people do business daily at the abattoir. Two major ethnic groups, the Yoruba (west) and the Hausa (north) dominate cattle rearing and butchering — the mainstay of the abattoir business. Hausa dominate cattle rearing and Yoruba dominate butchering

People from the Yoruba ethnic group dominate Lagos. The abattoir management is run by a northerner and the previous military government of Nigeria that arranged for this management contract was headed by a northerner. In September 1999, the new civilian administration in Lagos halted the project because of perceived unfairness in the awarding of the management contract. The abattoir management obtained a court injunction and relations deteriorated. From late 1999, there were violent clashes of interethnic character all over the country that also had political undertones. The multiethnic nature of the abattoir population made it attractive to the ethnic activists and in October 2000, there was a violent clash in the precincts. Butchers and cattle rearers divided along ethnic lines, participating in the clashes. These clashes were violent, involving the use of traditional and modern weapons. There were no official figures on the number of deaths but it was generally estimated to be in the scores.

The host community, Oko Oba, and the local government tried to broker peace. The government ordered business to close at 6:00 p.m., evicted the squatters at the cattle market and set a deadline for the relocation of the cattle market to Imota, another part of the state. The reason given for the move was to provide more space for grazing. It was perceived, however, as a spiteful measure, given the fact that the Lagos government had lost its court case. The move created new problems for the host community and the butchering business.

SW CRESNET got involved in 2001 when there were signs of potential violent clashes. SW CRESNET's strategy is one of empowerment through conflict management education and facilitation towards an acceptable solution to the problems by participants themselves. Through the conflict analysis process, CRESNET trainers were able to help participants identify their fears (health, loss of political power, loss of social standing) and their needs tied to the project (essentially economic). They then turned to addressing the fears. Participants realized that the Ogun state government, Lagos' neighbor to the north, has an accessible cattle market. They agreed that everyone could benefit from a relocation to this market. This agreement allowed for further cooperation. Each side shared ideas about how the abattoir could be run profitably. Negotiations commenced on other demands, and the Peace Advocacy Committee was set up, charged with the implementation of these agreements. Within one month of being established the committee was able to facilitate interaction between the different parties and to work out some solutions.

The actual intervention succeeded because all of the stakeholders, including the community, the local council, and the state government were involved. Peace advocacy committees can succeed when their members are highly motivated and committed, and it appears that this was the case here. In addition, the program was successful, actually beginning to shift the participants' behavior and attitudes, empowering them to generate acceptable solutions to their problems. There are, however, issues that the committee cannot resolve, notably the legal issues around the contract itself. Had this aspect of the problem been dealt with by the participants, it is possible that the interethnic violence could have been avoided in the first place. The committee is now dealing with this problem by working around the law and promoting out-of-court settlements in all the other cases that are still before the court involving various parties to the abattoir dispute.

Annex 5   Anecdotes/Best Practices for Nigeria and Ghana

NIGERIA

NA1. ASSOCIATING TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES IN CALMING INTERETHNIC VIOLENCE

In Kaduna state, the governor is now working with a CSO (the Even Development Project [EDP]) to sensitize traditional authorities to the dangers of inciting and mobilizing people along religious and ethnic lines. There, the EDP collaborated with the Kaduna state government to organize a four-day retreat for all 31 chiefs in the state. At the retreat, the chiefs reviewed their statutory responsibilities and worked out ways to respond to conflicts in a proactive manner. The retreat also enabled the chiefs to socialize and understand each other more intimately. This was important because of the cultural and religious differences between the Muslim and Christian parts of the state — differences that have been the source of violent conflict from time to time. As a result of the retreat, chiefs and government officials have been able to develop a conflict early warning and management system. This system requires chiefs to report threats to peace directly to a senior official in the governor's office. The information is then analyzed by the staff of the Bureau for Religious Affairs, a government agency.

NA2. BUILDING NETWORKS AND COALITIONS OF CSOS/CBOS FOR PEACE

CSOs can be encouraged to form linkages that not only enhance their skills and analytic tools but enable them to produce joint action plans for dealing with potentially violent conflict. One such effort took place in Nigeria, in Imo state in the southeast zone, in March 2001. There, the Center for Peace in Africa (CPA), supported by a British NGO and British government funding, was able to conduct a five-day workshop with Nigerian CSOs on transforming conflict at the political, social and organizational levels. It also examined methods to help increase the effectiveness of local NGOs and CBOs. As a result of this workshop, participants produced a "Three-year Democracy and Conflict Resolution Program for Civil Society Groups in Nigeria," and a "Three-year Program: Towards Elections 2003 — A Civil Society Agenda." Five additional workshops are planned for Nigeria.

NA3. INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS - THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY ACTION FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION (CAPP)

Each year, during the months of November and May, herdsmen come to the Katsina province of Nigeria from Niger to graze their animals, as much of Niger's grasslands are dry during these months. The ensuing conflicts between herders and farmers result in seasonal destruction of lives and property, as well as cross-border issues. Conflict results from the fact that over time, farmers encroach on grazing land due to increasing land pressure occasioned by desertification. In response, CAPP, an intermediary membership NGO that works on environmental issues, developed a community theater group, "Bayajjida" to suggest alternatives to violence in managing community conflicts. The use of participatory drama methods encourages the herdsmen and farmer audiences to step in to correct a story or add a fact during presentation of the drama. Apart from sensitizing parties to the conflict about the consequences of reoccurring violence, the dramas have helped to expose the corrupt practices of traditional rulers who often cashed in on the ignorance of the parties to extort money. As a result of CAPP's work with community drama groups and its wider campaign for the rights of herdsmen, the state

government decided to carve out grazing areas and cattle routes as a means of managing the conflict. This decision has been replicated by other northern governments and has gone a long way to reduce such conflicts.

NA4. CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ACTION (CPDA): BUILDING PEACE IN THE NIGER DELTA

In May 2001, CPDA organized conflict management training for seven communities in Akwa Ibom state. The components of the training included negotiation, mediation, relationship building and advocacy. The workshops noted two major problems of peace work in the Niger Delta area: the role of government bureaucracy and partisan politics, and the reluctance of multinational companies such as Mobil and Shell to sit down at a roundtable with their host communities. The workshop broke new ground in several major respects. It provided the platform for an inaugural dialogue between Ebron and Eket communities, who had been at loggerheads for some time. It was also able to bridge the differing perceptions between the youths and the traditional rulers in the communities and encourage decision making as a complementary process. Most importantly, the workshop provided the platform for the formation of a network of peace work enthusiasts (made up primarily of youths) and setting up mediation committees for the different communities. The network will be active in conflict management. This youth peace network takes on particular importance, given the propensity towards violence by youth in the region. At the same time, there are young lawyers and other professionals in the network, and they are collaborating effectively with traditional leaders.

Ghana

GA1. FOUNDATION FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (FOSDA)

In West Africa, small arms have facilitated the destruction of more human lives than any disease. Recognizing this fact, and the havoc that easy access to guns can create as is evident in the rampant armed robberies in Ghana, FOSDA works closely with other CSOs in its role as an advocate for small arms regulations. They are leading a subregional campaign calling on all civil society groups, governments, donors and the eminent persons group on small arms to support a call for the renewal of the ECOWAS Moratorium on small arms. To this end, they have conducted research to map out the regions of small arms manufacture in the country, trade routes and sales patterns, as well as an assessment of the efficacy of the Ghanaian legal framework governing the licensing of firearms. This year, they participated in the UN conference on illicit trade in small arms. They also requested that the president of Ghana conduct a symbolic destruction of small arms on the opening day of the conference. The president acceded to their wishes. FOSCA publishes a quarterly bulletin, "FOCUS on Small Arms in West Africa."

GA2. ACTIONAID GHANA, NORTHERN REGION

From July 16 to 19, 2000, ActionAid Ghana organized and funded a workshop on conflict prevention and resolution for women's groups within the Tamale municipality. It was the first of its kind to be organized by an NGO exclusively for women's groups. The objectives of the workshop were to sensitize women on the positive role they can play in peace building; to give women the required skills and attitudes they need to be able to become effective peacemakers;

and to encourage more women to get involved in peace building activities. Participants were selected from the Ghana police service, the immigration service, the fire service, hair and dressmakers associations, the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Ghana and the Nurses Association. Topics the workshop focused on were early warning/early response to conflict, tools for conflict resolution, understanding conflict, and understanding reconciliation. The participants participated fully in the workshop, and alliances between the various women groups were promoted in the process. These women are now institutionalizing the group for ongoing work.