

Final Evaluation of OTI's Programs in Bosnia and Croatia

**An Evaluation Prepared for the Office of Transition Initiatives
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BHR	Bureau for Humanitarian Response, USAID/Washington
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CJA	Croatian Journalist Association
ENI	Europe and the New Independent States
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--Serbia and Montenegro
FSN	Foreign Service National
GONG	Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections (Croatia)
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Community, a political party in Croatia
HRT	State-run Croatian Radio and Television
IEBL	Inter-entity Border Line
IREX	International Research and Exchanges Board (ProMedia)
KHF	Know-How-Fund
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OBN	Open Broadcast Network (Bosnia)
OHR	Office of the High Representative (Bosnia)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
OTV	Omladinska Television (Croatia)
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RS	Republika Srpska
SRT	State-run Television and Radio in Republika Srpska
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VOA	Voice of America
ZOS	Zone of Separation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

The OTI Balkans program supported the Dayton Peace Agreement. OTI Bosnia opened in 1996 and OTI Croatia was initiated in July 1997. Both offices closed by May 2000. This report is an assessment of the OTI programs in Croatia and Bosnia. It reports on the successes of the programs and outlines suggestions for future OTI programs.¹

OTI Croatia

The Croatia Transition Initiative (1997-2000) included the following objectives:

- (1) Increasing access to balanced, objective information;
- (2) Promoting and supporting greater popular participation in elections and public policy decision making;
- (3) Improving the transparency and accountability of the government and government institutions.

The impact of these objectives includes the following:

Impact #1: Increased Access to Balanced and Objective Information

OTI Croatia devoted its resources to creating news and programming content. This was a good decision and allowed OTI to support some of the most provocative information and political content in Croatia. OTI Croatia's impact on the availability of balanced information has been positive. Many media outlets openly admit that it was due to OTI, in both financial and strategic support, that they have been able to continue to function. Many independent media outlets would have failed if it were not for OTI support.

Impact #2: Alternative Programming Enters the Mainstream Media

Television and radio shows that were once rejected or censored from the national media have been absorbed into the media mainstream and are now available for the public. The recent public and professional acceptance of OTI media grantees shows that the public desire for objective and balanced news information is growing.

¹ The scope of work that guided this evaluation can be found in Appendix A.

Impact #3: Disseminating Balanced Information about Elections

OTI committed extensive human and financial resources to the parliamentary election campaign. International partners, NGOs, and media in Croatia all agree that without support from organizations such as OTI, many voters in Croatia would not have had enough objective information to participate in the elections.

Impact #4: Developing Key NGOs

Croatia had no history of an active NGO or volunteer community. When one began to emerge after the war, it appeared to be dominated by elites. However, today OTI Croatia leaves a network of grass roots NGOs that will be able to work for the improvement of the nation. High impact NGOs such as GONG are on their way to sustainability.

Impact #5: Supporting Transparency in Government

The objective of transparency builds on OTI's first two objectives: a balanced media and an active civil society community. Together, these two sectors have the potential to identify key issues, create public awareness, and motivate people to hold their government accountable. OTI supported NGOs and media have been successful in keeping the issues of legal reform, media freedom, public participation, and government responsibility as important topics of public debate.

Conclusion of OTI Croatia Impact

OTI Croatia was flexible in its strategic objectives during its three years of operation. Issues of return, civil society and media development always remained important activities for OTI. When presented with the opportunity to support NGOs and media efforts to participate in the parliamentary election, the office was able to quickly work with grantees to manage the pre-election campaign and mobilize resources to support NGOs and media for the elections. The speed at which it was able to fully mobilize its grantees is an outcome of the effort it dedicated to their development earlier in the initiative.

OTI Bosnia

The OTI Bosnia Transition Initiative began in 1996 with three objectives;

1. The creation of independent media,
2. Civil society development,
3. Community impact projects.

The objectives during the latter half of the program (1998-2000) focused primarily on the creation and maintenance of an independent media that would increase access to balanced and objective information. Civil society organizations continued to be an important part of the OTI program, but support for these organizations was incorporated, when possible, into the media emphasis.

The impact of these objectives includes the following:

Impact #1 Breakthrough in Media Development in the Republika Srpska

OTI has had a positive impact on media development in the RS. Its efforts were first successful in the Western RS and then during the second half of the OTI Bosnia program, it was able to breakthrough into the Eastern RS region. OTI was the first organization to initiate contact and offer support to radio stations in this region. Today, there are four radio stations in the Eastern RS that are communicating objective and balanced information to some of the most hard line areas of BiH.

Impact 2: Penetration of the Herzegovina region

OTI has been successful in supporting several grantees that are making a difference in the Herzegovina region. In Mostar, Studio 88, serves both sides of the city. In Livno, Radio N, is communicating balanced and objective information to people in a wide geographic region. To ensure the continuing role that these media play in the integration of Herzegovina into the future of Bosnia, both Studio 88 and Radio N will become IREX grantees during the year 2000. The OHR has identified these media outlets as two of the most significant contributors to peace in the region.

Impact #3: Regional Approach Influences Yugoslavia

The original goal of the Balkans Transition Initiative was to influence Bosnia by bringing in moderate voices from Croatia and Serbia. However, as the OTI regional program progressed, it became clear that OTI Bosnia could actually influence political developments in Serbia. OTI has supported dissemination of RS based alternative media throughout Serbia and Montenegro.

Impact #4: Key Information at Key Times

The impact of key information at key times is clear: in many volatile locations, OTI media grantees have offered the only balanced and objective information to the public. This information no doubt minimized violence and helped key communities continue on the path to reconciliation.

Conclusion of OTI Impact in Bosnia

The OTI program in Bosnia was successful in fostering an alternative media in the region. It leaves a network of print and electronic outlets that will play an important role in building peace and moderating nationalistic voices.

Lessons Learned: OTI Croatia and OTI Bosnia

1. The OTI mechanism – direct funding, frequent contact, rapid response for high impact, low cost projects and leveraging media and NGO activities – allows OTI to identify and develop some of the best media outlets and civic leaders in a region.
2. There has been some discussion about the question of direct versus indirect funding of media development. After evaluating both OTI programs, it is concluded that direct funding to alternative media is an effective way to encourage provocative and political content in the beginning of a transition. However, if OTI extends beyond its two year mandate then it should adapt its funding mechanism for media to better prepare them for sustainability.
3. Media and civil society NGOs must work together during all phases of a transition to create the momentum for political change. Connecting these two sectors will enhance impact. Waiting too long to connect the media and NGOs may have detrimental effects on NGO development.
4. OTI should continue to improve its coordination with the USAID country Missions to complement the USG objectives. Improved communication and cooperation are needed at all levels of the OTI/USAID relationship.
5. Media development in each nation needs to be flexible. In Bosnia, the development of media outlets was crucial for OTI to achieve its mission. In Croatia, support for political content in existing media outlets was most important. However, a focus on content can be concurrent in the initial stages of media creation and development.
6. A clear exit strategy is needed to ensure the continued impact of key grantees after the closure of the country programs. Without a clear exit strategy, many of the accomplishments of the OTI program may be negated.

Recommendations for Future OTI Programs

The OTI Croatia and OTI Bosnia programs were quite different yet the findings of the evaluation point to several areas that may inform future OTI efforts.

- OTI should work to improve communication and coordination between OTI country programs and USAID missions. OTI Washington should work with its USAID counterparts to clarify the OTI role in USG policy. Frequent communication and information sharing should be encouraged.
- OTI should create processes for increased oversight at all levels of the OTI program. Increased oversight is not meant to imply more report writing; rather, increased oversight is suggested as a way to better coordinate regional and global programs. Monitoring at all levels of OTI (Washington, grants, grantees, FSNs and offices) should be improved.
- OTI should create a consistent set of impact assessment measures throughout its international programs. OTI needs to identify, as part of a country entrance strategy, its measures for success. Qualitative and quantitative measures of impact would help OTI to better monitor its grantees and their accomplishments. Baseline data should be collected in any new nation of operation within 6 months of entry. Impact assessments should be collected semi-annually and used to allocate resources. OTI should conduct its final country evaluations while the country offices are still open to facilitate the evaluation process.
- If OTI decides to stay in a nation for more than its two-year mandate, it should reconsider/modify some of its mechanisms. There are concerns that OTI's rapid funding mechanism may actually impede long-term development. Thus, if the organization operates for a third year it should work closely with other partners to better prepare its grantees for the next phase of transition – sustainable development.
- OTI hires the best and brightest FSNs in its countries of operations. It should provide training to these future leaders. FSN training should include impact assessment, conflict resolution, first contact with potential grantees (especially in difficult areas), and media training. If OTI has a regional strategy, then FSNs should be given opportunities to meet and share knowledge with their regional counterparts. Moreover, placement for the best FSNs should be part of the exit strategy.
- OTI should carefully consider the costs and benefits associated with high-risk activities. OTI is one part of a larger USG mission in areas of operation. OTI's desire to create change during a transition is its mandate; however, its actions must complement the USAID mission.

- If OTI has a significant media component in its transition plan, then it should hire local or international staff with expertise in media. The media business is much different than the NGO sphere and one expert per a nation who is available to all OTI offices and RONCO may help expedite media development. In future RONCO/USAID/OTI partnerships, increased communication about the technical needs of grantees should be worked out at the local, regional and national levels.
- NGOs and media must be linked together at the earliest stages of a transition in a collaborative effort. The media are a one way communication medium. Although useful for communicating balanced information, research shows that information alone is not enough to change opinion or actions. NGOs are the interpersonal link needed for people to learn about an issue and then be able to act on it. OTI should maximize its efforts by creating partnerships between its best NGOs and its media grantees.
- OTI must work to create better measures to evaluate NGO impact. Key message dissemination is one part of the impact of NGOs. OTI should work early on with NGOs to help them create key messages and then encourage them to pursue these key messages in all organizational activities.

I. BACKGROUND ON OTI/CROATIA

OTI's Croatia program was an extension of the OTI program developed for Bosnia-Herzegovina. To support the Dayton Peace Agreement, OTI Croatia was initiated in July 1997. Offices were co-located with the USAID Mission in Zagreb and satellite offices in Split and Osijek served the regions of Dalmatia and Eastern Slavonia.

OTI/Croatia made over 236 grants valued in excess of \$3,614,402 to over 89 civic organizations. Grantees included election monitoring organizations, women's groups, environmental groups, and NGOs dedicated to the issues of refugees and return. OTI/Croatia also made over 80 grants to independent media outlets and organizations. This assistance totaled over \$1,516,731.

During the three year transition initiative, OTI's overall plan was to keep the independent media alive in Croatia so that when the time came (for instance, the elections), there would be an outlet for voices for change. Moreover, through the development of civil society organizations, OTI nurtured a culture of activism and contributed to a public belief that the system could change.

The first two years of the program focused on issues of return, refugees, alternative media and NGOS. In early 1999, the Croatia program shifted its focus to concentrate almost exclusively on the parliamentary elections. OTI grants focused on Get Out the Vote and election monitoring activities. In keeping with the short OTI mandate, all OTI offices closed by May 2000.

II. OTI STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN CROATIA

OTI's objective was to find the parts of Croatian society that would help to build democracy. In Croatia, OTI attempted to broaden participation, ensure balanced information during the elections, and encourage reform through efforts to make government processes transparent. The goals of the Croatian transition were part of a larger, regional approach that served the Balkans.

In support of the Dayton Peace Agreement, OTI efforts attempted to influence attitudes, perceptions, and expectations of the members of Croatian society. According to OTI documents, the Croatia program was based on five objectives:

- To increase public access to complete, objective and accurate information, fundamental to an informed and engaged citizenry;

- To promote and support greater popular participation in public policy decision making, and social debate on critical social, economic and political issues;
- To improve the transparency and accountability of government and public institutions;
- To contribute to the return and reintegration of displaced persons and refugees;
- To foster post-conflict reconciliation.²

III. METHODOLOGY OF THE CROATIAN EVALUATION

The evaluation team consisted of a trained social scientist, a translator, and a former OTI Croatia Foreign Service National (FSN). The original plan was to include a 30-day research evaluation, however, due to budget constraints; the team spent 20 days in Croatia. It conducted research throughout the different regions of the country. This assessment is based on the following information sources:

1. Interviews with OTI staff and USAID partners,
2. Interviews with international donors and granting partners,
3. Interviews with media outlets and NGO/civil society grantees,
4. Focus groups (n=5),
5. Surveys of randomly selected citizens (n= 1039).

To find the impact of OTI's efforts, three types of data were collected. First, interviews with OTI staff (Washington and Croatia), USAID partners, and international donors and granting partners were conducted. These interviews provided the background to OTI's activities in Croatia and the list of people interviewed can be found in Appendix B. Questions are found in Appendix C.

Second, five focus groups were convened to understand the public perceptions of the alternative media and NGOs. See Appendix D for locations and demographics of the focus group meetings.³ Participants were selected with the

² From 1999 OTI Croatia Country report.

³ The data, with one exception, were collected in areas with a significant OTI grantee presence. The exception, Varazdin, is located about 90 kilometers from Zagreb. It was not damaged during the war and thus has no international NGOs

help of a leading national NGO. To minimize bias in favor of participants, who already support NGOs and alternative media, efforts were made to bring in common citizens. Appendix E offers a list of general questions that guided the focus groups. The trained moderator, fluent in both English and Croatian, facilitated the focus groups. Translations were then provided to the researcher for review and clarification. Because their answers offer a snap shot of the political, social, media and ethnic situation in Croatia, every effort was made to capture the spirit and tone of the participants in the transcribing process.

The interviews and the focus groups offer mostly anecdotal evidence of OTI impact. Therefore, the team also collected generalizable data. Over 1000 Croatians were questioned through a national survey. See Appendix F for locations and number of respondents in each location. Surveys were distributed in the regions of Zagreb, Pula, Split, Vukovar, and Varazdin. Random citizens were asked to rate the credibility of state and independent media, to identify how these media serve the public interest, and to assess the value of these outlets for making personal and political decisions. Questions about NGOs and the parliamentary elections were also asked. A copy of the survey can be found in Appendix G. The questions tap into the public acceptance NGOs, alternative media outlets, and the saliency of grantee messages.

Together, the interviews, focus groups, and surveys were used to assess the impact of the Croatia Transition Initiative. This multiple method approach collected qualitative and quantitative data in Croatia from the following OTI regions: Split, Zagreb, Vukovar, Pula, and Varazdin. Each town represents a different region and experience in Croatia. The towns selected for this evaluation represent the regions where OTI was most active in support NGOs and media development. The next section reports the findings of the three-part study.

1. RESEARCH FINDINGS

OTI's Contributions to the USG Mission in Croatia

In-country coordination with USAID Mission-- OTI Croatia was co-located with USAID and contributed to the overall USAID mission in Croatia in a variety of ways. OTI worked with the USAID to coordinate media efforts, NGO development, and on the issue of return. USAID staff, including the Mission Director, agreed that OTI has been very successful in strengthening the roots of

assisting in its development. Varazdin was identified as a control site as a means of comparison to see what types of issues, attitudes, and media development have occurred in regions without international assistance.

democracy in the region. Moreover, OTI's success in its media projects and overall strategy during the 2000 elections has been recognized. OTI grantees, including Glas 99 and GONG, were consistently identified by USAID members as exemplars of how OTI helped to organize, support, and evolve NGOs in the mission of civil society.

The USAID Mission appreciated the way that OTI could move quickly to fund a project and how the project officers in the Zagreb, Split, and Osijek offices could develop NGO and media potential. They acknowledged OTI's mandate--to operate in a fast, coordinated effort--was especially useful for the elections. Because no one knew when the elections would be called, or how often they would be postponed, USAID needed a way to operate in a small window of opportunity. OTI maximized this window.

USAID representatives in Croatia also noted the professionalism of the staff, both American and FSNs. The two country directors, Mr. Jason Aplon (1997-1999) and Ms. Angela Martin (1999-close) were identified as very knowledgeable about the political and social situation in the country and able to coordinate ideas and objectives for both media and NGO activities. As a testament to the quality of the OTI FSNs, some have been hired permanently by USAID to work within the Mission.

There were, however, some concerns raised by USAID Mission staff about the working relationship between OTI and USAID. Because OTI operates from different objectives than traditional USAID programs, Mission members noted that it took a while for them to really understand the OTI mechanism. OTI's mechanism of fast-paced grants, FSNs with significant authority, as well as the perception of flexible management, may have initially constrained the USAID/OTI relationship. However, with time and understanding, both organizations appeared to have coordinated their efforts to maximize their activities.

A second Mission concern is with the identity of OTI as a free standing organization. In Croatia, OTI staff were criticized for being OTI first, and USAID second. Although this strong allegiance and commitment to the OTI mission does not appear to have negatively impacted the overall cooperation within the Mission, it operated under a "separateness" in both mechanism and objective that USAID felt created tensions at times.

A final area of concern about the OTI/Croatia program was its lack of exit strategy. All USAID members (as well as OTI staff) realized that the strategic plan for OTI could have been improved with a blue print for closing the OTI offices. Plans for the hand-off of key grantees, cooperation about media projects,

and positions for the most qualified staff, would have helped to solidify the accomplishments of OTI/Croatia.

The grantees with the greatest impact and potential have been linked up with other donors. For instance, certain media grantees will now be handled by USAID/IREX, and GONG will work with USAID NGO development officers. However, the process was not as well organized or as smooth as it could have been. Future OTI country programs should identify exit strategies when identifying objectives.

U.S. Embassy--OTI/Croatia also worked very closely with the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Montgomery, has taken an active role in participating in Croatia's transition into democracy. The Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs believed that OTI was needed as part of the country team in planning and implementation of USG goals. Indeed, the Embassy noted that they would often send grantees to OTI if they believed that OTI could help them more than the Embassy. This cooperation, especially during the election time, helped OTI build NGO capacity in Croatia. The 2000 parliamentary election stands as an example of how OTI's previous efforts contributed to the democratic process. The groundwork created through two years of civil society and media initiatives culminated in a democratic election of moderate leaders. Moreover, cross-border activities, as part of OTI's regional approach, have contributed to peace.

Likewise, the Embassy's Public Affairs Officer agreed that there might not be any active, successful NGOs in Croatia without OTI mentoring and support. OTI's strength, from the Embassy perspective, rests in its ability to act quickly to support urgent projects in both the media and civil society sectors. Key examples of OTI support that led to real change in Croatia include Radio 101, issues of return, the GONG election monitoring coalition, and the creation of a mentality of volunteerism and activism in the nation.

The end of the OTI/Croatia program may limit the Embassy's ability to quickly help organizations that need support. There are concerns that OTI is leaving the region too early and that the elections created a new transition, equally important to the transition from war, that requires OTI expertise. The U.S. Embassy has respected OTI's actions. The loss of its knowledge and capacity will leave a vacuum for the USG in Croatia. An improved exit strategy would have helped to ensure that this vacuum does not negatively impact USG policy in Croatia.

International Partners--An important implementing partner for OTI/Croatia is **IREX**-International Research and Exchanges Board. This organization, active throughout much of Eastern Europe, assists in the development of independent

media outlets. Through its Professional Media Program, IREX seeks to build a sustainable media that is professional and financially independent. Furthermore, it seeks to increase the dissemination of objective information through the creation of professional journalist associations, legal defense funds, and journalism education. IREX has an office in Zagreb and employs both American and local journalists to help media outlets create sustainable business plans. Collaboration began in May 1998 in Eastern Slavonia and it continues today as USAID/IREX has agreed to support a few of the OTI media grantees. There was considerable cooperation between IREX and OTI, especially during the election. Again, OTI's ability to fund media projects quickly was an asset to media development in the region.

IREX representatives credited OTI's greatest media impact as the election campaign. IREX is an expert on sustainable media development and operations. It considers its organization as an authority and believed that USAID and OTI would have increased their impact if there had been increased cooperation between OTI and IREX on media grants.

It must be noted that OTI and IREX have different objectives. Whereas OTI is a fast response to media problems, IREX sees its objective as creating a sustainable media that can survive long after the last international donors leave. It is here that the two organizations can improve their relationship. First, IREX felt pressured to take OTI grantees at the close of the country project and did not have the resources to do so. Second, representatives also noted that increased cooperation with OTI, especially in funding programming for television, would have helped to create a truly sustainable media in Croatia. IREX was especially critical of the OTI funding mechanism that allowed media to get fast money without thinking about long term financial planning. Thirdly, IREX noted that a clear exit strategy about the hand-off of OTI media grantees would have helped both organizations achieve their respective objectives.

Continued cooperation with other international donor organizations that deal with media should be a focus of any transition that involves a media component. OTI/Croatia did not have any experienced media people on staff (either American or FSNs) and budgetary considerations will probably not allow such a specialization in future initiatives. However, to increase the effectiveness of OTI's mission, it must seek out media experts and work with them to maximize the impact of media grants. Cooperation, with other media organizations, not competition, is the key to leveraging USG funds.

OTI also worked closely with the **European Commission** and **Freedom House** during the pre-election campaign. Both organizations reported good relations

with OTI and praised the organization for its effort to help NGOs and media prepare for a successful election.

One of the newest OTI partners on the ground in Croatia is **The Civil Society Initiatives Fund** (Formerly: British Know How Fund). This organization, founded in 1999, is part of a larger structure of British support for the transition to democracy and civil society. OTI/Croatia has served as a role model for this organization. OTI helped the new organization to learn what “civil society” should be, how to structure its funding, and how to monitor and evaluate results. OTI served as a link between USAID and the KHF. That is, by working closely with OTI, KNF has created a long-term relationship with the USAID mission and is currently cooperating on media and return issues. The KNF credits the time spent with OTI as the foundation of its own program and recognizes that there will be a vacuum in Croatia when OTI leaves. Indeed, the KHF raised the important point (along with U.S. Embassy staff) that OTI is leaving too early. They noted that the real transition to democracy may actually be the time following the 2000 election. KHF staff made it very clear that they feel that the new Croatian government, future local elections, and the continued success of the ideal of civil society needs more organizations like OTI.

Only one international partner was critical of OTI Croatia efforts. Throughout much of Eastern Europe the **Open Society Institute (OSI)**, funded by the Soros Foundation, contributes to media development and democracy. In Croatia, the OSI was founded in 1997 and it worked to promote democratic forces and media freedom. OTI Croatia worked with OSI intensively during the pre-election campaign. Both agencies initially supported Glas 99. However, internal problems within the Glas 99 coalition created tensions in the NGO and media community. The NGO coalition split in factions during December 1999 and many NGOs reported that they felt pressured to “take sides – either Soros or OTI.” Some NGOs continued to work with OTI on the campaign efforts while other NGOs worked within the Glas coalition. This was an unfortunate instance and OTI staff, especially FSNS, needed to open up communication between its grantees and OSI to accomplish the most important objectives – free and fair elections.

Overall, OTI was a respected member of the USG and international community’s efforts to help support the Dayton Peace Agreement and bring democracy to Croatia. It was recognized for its leadership in the Croatian transition. What was the outcome of OTI grants for the Croatian people? The next section of this report looks at the actual impact of OTI grants in Croatia.

Analysis of Data Collected in Croatia

The OTI staff, USAID Mission, Embassy and international partners all believed that OTI was successful in the Croatia Transition Initiative. To measure the impact of OTI grants to media and civil society organizations, quantitative and qualitative data were collected. Based on the OTI/Croatia objectives and the Scope of Work that guided this evaluation, three objectives were studied:

1. Increased access to balanced, objective information;
2. Greater popular participation in elections and public participation;
3. Improved transparency and accountability of the government and government institutions.

The impact of these objectives will be addressed below.

Impact #1: Fostering the Development of Alternative Media --OTI political transition grants supported the dissemination of balanced and objective information in Croatia. For many years, state controlled media set the agenda for Croatian politics. The ruling party, HDZ, had a monopoly over information. The basis of a civil society is an aware and informed people. The development of an independent media that disseminated objective information was a foundation for OTI Croatia to accomplish its later goals.

Croatia entered its transition with a fairly sophisticated media environment. Multiple newspapers, radio stations, and television networks were operating when OTI opened in 1997. An analysis of the media environment showed that the people of Croatia did not need more media outlets. Rather, the public needed more informative and balanced programming. OTI Croatia decided not to create new media outlets (an expensive and time consuming process) and instead devoted its resources to creating news and programming content. This was a good decision and allowed OTI to support some of the most provocative informative programming content in Croatia.

Citizens now have access to multiple outlets and enjoy the newfound voices of the alternative media. One focus group participant noted:

I read all newspapers and in my opinion media are to be credited for bringing the change in Croatia. The media was a deciding factor; it set up the base. The media market has now received media with different points of view, broad vision, they have opened up to views of other people. As said before, in last three years the media started to write differently and started to compete for its place on the market.

To further understand the importance of balanced and objective information, a national survey was conducted to ascertain media usage in Croatia. The data provide some insight into the role of media in the lives of people in Croatia.

First, it must be noted that Croatians are cautious media users. They continue to be suspicious of all media outlets and all media messages. This is no doubt an outcome of the media monopoly under communism and the decade of HDZ propaganda. People are using the media for information. For instance, 56% of those surveyed use the media for information. However, only 26% actually believe that the media are realistic in their dissemination of accurate news and information. Perhaps because of this, only 13% of respondents reported that they use the media to make important decisions in their lives.

These data point to the paradox of Croatians looking to the media for information but at the same time knowing that they must be cautious and critical of all media messages.

Some media outlets are more respected and trusted than others. In a comparison of attitudes about state-controlled media and alternative media in the capital of Zagreb, it was discovered that an OTI grantee, Radio101, rated significantly more favorably than state controlled HRT.

<u>HRT (state-controlled radio and tv)</u>	<u>Percentage Agreement</u>
Important as a source of information	33%
Objective	25%
Serves the public interest	24%

<u>Radio 101 (OTI Grantee)</u>	<u>Percentage Agreement</u>
Important as a source of information	61%
Objective	57%
Serves the public interest	63%

This is an important finding because it shows that an OTI grantee consistently rates higher than the state-controlled competition on all evaluation measures.

OTI Croatia's impact on the availability of balanced information has been positive. Many media outlets openly admit that it was due to OTI, in both financial and strategic support, that they have been able to continue to function. Many independent media outlets would have failed if it were not for OTI support. Therefore, the continued existence and positive influence of several independent media outlets in Croatia can be attributed to key grants at key times by OTI.

Impact #2: Alternative Programming Enters the Mainstream Media--In the last year, the content of the alternative media has entered into the mainstream of Croatian society. In the first two years of operation, many of OTI's media grantees were often perceived as radical or dangerous voices by both the state media and the public. However, several media projects have recently been given contracts by the mainstream media (OTV, HRT). These programs are now finally recognized as providing important news content.

For instance, the television show 5 to 12, a provocative news show patterned after 60 minutes, at first had trouble finding television stations willing to broadcast its shows. It could not find a television station in Zagreb, the largest media market, willing to air its weekly show. However, recently, 5 to 12 has been given a contract to create new programs for the popular Zagreb-based and nationally networked OTV.

Survey respondents in Zagreb were asked about the value and credibility of media programming in the capital. Two OTI grantees, "5 to 12", and the "Week Report" scored equal to or higher than HRT's general programming.

<u>5 to 12 (OTI Grantee)</u>	<u>Percentage Agreement⁴</u>
Important as a source of information	22%
Objective	22%
Serves the public interest	23%

<u>Week Report (OTI Grantee)</u>	<u>Percentage Agreement</u>
Important as a source of information	50%
Objective	54%
Serves the public interest	55%

Another example is the media production company, Fade In, that focuses on NGO issues. It has been given a contract on HRT (a network that used to call NGOs and alternative media the enemies of the state) to create 50 shows to demystify the actions of Croatian NGOs. The recent public and professional acceptance of OTI media production grantees shows that the public desire for objective and balanced news information is growing. This is a sign of impact.

⁴ For a variety of reasons, the news show 5 to 12 stopped airing shows immediately following the parliamentary elections. This low score may be a function of its absence from the airwaves more than a pronouncement of its quality.

Impact #3: Disseminating Balanced Information about Elections--The alternative media were also crucial for communicating information about the elections. An informative picture of media uses and attitudes emerged from the national survey.⁵ The data show that 45% of those surveyed had enough information during the elections. This is very high considering that the HDZ did everything in its power to stop information about opposition candidates as well as the discussion of important issues from reaching the public.

Nationally, the following sources were used for information during the elections

Press	64%
Radio	44%
Internet	19%
Personal Contacts	50%
Television	70%

It appears that both television and print have a slight advantage over radio. This type of information would have been valuable for OTI Croatia to collect before the pre-elections in order to better allocate its resources.

One of OTI's strategic objectives was to support organizations, both NGOs and media outlets, in communicating information in the pre-election campaign. When asked about the availability of information concerning the elections, almost half of the respondents agreed that they had enough information during the elections to make their decisions. This number shows that significant progress was made in opening up information about elections.

International partners, NGOs, and media in Croatia all agree that without support from organizations such as OTI, many voters in Croatia would not have had enough objective information to participate in the elections. At the most basic level, these data suggest that the impact of OTI is that it has supported media that allow the public to recognize and appreciate the difference between state-controlled media and independent news and information.

Impact #4: Development of Key NGOs--For years, the political process in Croatia has been limited in part due to a persistent and overwhelming belief that there was little that common citizens could do to improve the political situation. Decades of frustration and a worsening economic situation finally created a desire on the part of the public to mobilize for social and political change. To

⁵ A break down of the data collected in each town can be found in Appendix G.

improve public participation in decision making and create a civil society base, OTI Croatia helped create and support some of the most successful NGOs in Croatia.

Since 1997, OTI Croatia funded over 150 NGOs and civil society organizations that worked to improve the situation in the nation. These groups were often focused around social issues including women's rights, youth issues, refugee return, and the environment. However, during the parliamentary elections, for the first time in Croatian history, over 120 NGOs joined together in various coalitions to encourage public participation in the elections. Non-partisan efforts included Glas 99, Get Out the Vote (GOVT), Final Shot, and a highly organized network of 7000 GONG election monitors. NGO information was intended to be non-partisan in nature. Information communicated to the public included how to register, where to vote, the platforms of the different parties, rights, and responsibilities of citizens and political parties.

The national survey inquired about public acceptance of the concept of civil society and the role of NGOs. Volunteerism is a problem in Croatia. People have a variety of reasons for not participating – work, family, time, money, fear and most often, a belief that no matter what they do, they cannot change the situation. However, the results show that there has been some movement toward the development of an acceptance of “civil society” and the NGOs that advocate for it. For instance,

39% of respondents claimed that they wanted to personally help participate in improving the situation in Croatia.

63% agreed that civil society organizations are important to help improve the situation in Croatia.

53% agreed that NGOs helped in getting important information out to the public during the elections.

A woman who runs a NGO in Vukovar succinctly summarized the perception of the growing value of NGOs and civil society:

In the beginning, no one understood what NGOs did. When we opened the INFOCLUB parents would come with their college aged children to make sure it was alright. Then, after a while, everyone started coming. Young adults come after school, their teacher told me, and now even parents come in to read the newspapers, use the computers, or just talk. Even though people are not working, they come and ask if we need volunteers. This is really a breakthrough in a place like Vukovar.

The impact of increased public participation in the political process can be measured by the prevalence of balanced and objective information, the creation of organized civil society groups; an increase in the percentage of voter turn out (especially in youth interest and participation), the selection of candidates with moderate perspectives, and finally, media engagement with political and social issues. OTI Croatia leaves a network of NGOs that will be able to work for the improvement of the nation.

Impact #5: Supporting Transparency in Government--One of the major obstacles to the development of a civil society in Croatia is the mystification of the public policy process. For years, citizens were not informed about the ways in which the government makes decisions and creates laws. Croatia requires a transparent political system that so that citizens know how to change policies that hinder democracy.

There is a growing appreciate for the role that NGOs can play in the development of civil society. For instance, 73 % of survey respondents believe that NGOs and the government should cooperate to improve the situation in Croatia. This is important and this realization has reached to the top of the Croatian government. In 1999 the government established the Office of Government and NGO Cooperation.

Several OTI grantees have had significant impact on improving transparency. Examples include:

GONG, an OTI supported NGO, was able to lobby the government to allow for citizen monitoring of Election Day activities.

The STINA News Agency devotes significant resources to disseminate information about changes to the Croatian legal system to a variety of media outlets in the former Yugoslavia.

During the pre-election campaign, GLAS 99 brought politicians together to explain their stands on issues. These public discussions were well-attended. Moreover, the events received media coverage to amplify their impact and extend the messages to other audiences.

SAN, a legal advice organization, exposed a law that was on the books limiting public gatherings of more than 20 people. Through a cooperative effort with media and other NGOs, SAN helped to repeal this law in the Daruvar municipality.

One CJA project during summer 1999 was a tour around the towns on the Adriatic seacoast. In an attempt to show transparency of the media, this project used a sophisticated traveling media center to show the public how media images and sounds could be easily manipulated. This form of media literacy is important and its impact can be ascertained because negotiations are underway to have this type of program appear on national television.

One goal of OTI is to help create an informed the public that is more aware of the different types of media manipulation. Transparency of media, government, and NGOs is important for building trust and fostering a responsible government and respected media.

Transparency is the most difficult of the OTI objectives to quantify. It can be said, however, that people do have more information than before. The new government, although still trying to find its way out of its predecessor's shadow, seems willing to listen to demands for legal and political reforms. However, so much of what has happened over the last 10 years has been hidden. While uncovering the mistakes of the past is important during this next transition to democracy, ensuring future transparency is the key to a civil society in Croatia.

The objective of transparency builds on OTI's first two objectives: a balanced media and an active civil society community. Together, these two sectors have the potential to identify key issues, create public awareness, and motivate people to hold government accountable. A vibrant media that is able to write freely about important and sensitive issues, plus a tight network of organizations that can pressure government is the best way to ensure transparency in Croatian government and government institutions.

V. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OTI CROATIA

- **Alternative media now serve many regions of Croatia.** All over the country, media outlets compete with state controlled media for public attention and respect. Although OTI has not funded every one of these alternative outlets, OTI support for programming and news content has helped many of these independent stations provide balanced and fair information during crucial times. The public enjoys having access to the alternative media. During the last three years people have noticed a difference in media coverage of political news. There are now adequate media outlets and programming for those people who seek alternative perspectives.
- **Several very strong and motivated NGOs are on their way to sustainability.** Their impact is clear because they keep important political and social issues in the public attention. This is key to improving the situation in Croatia.

Their actions during the pre-election campaign were crucial for informing citizens that political change was possible.

- The government has hindered media through a combination of legal court cases, high taxes, and when necessary, intimidation. To support journalists and media outlets, continued support from USG should be given to the Croatian Journalists Legal Support Fund. This organization is working to demystify the media, foster **transparency in government**, and protect journalists who disseminate objective information. Fair press laws and freedom of speech are the basis of a civil society and necessary for future improvements in media professionalism.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED IN CROATIA

1. It is a good practice to connect NGO grantees with media grantees to amplify impact.
2. In some situations, media content and programming are more important to focus on than creating new media outlets
3. The transferring of complex terms such as “civil society” needs to be carefully throughout before they become a part of the initiative. In Croatia, the term is popularly understood as, “not military”. Although people use the term and claim to hear it often through the media, there is still a vague understanding of it. Focus group participants clearly were confused about the term and had difficulty identifying the components of a civil society.
4. NGOs must learn how to work with the government in order fully create a cooperative society. People are beginning to see the value of NGOs as important actors that can help improve the nation. However, the public is still unclear about the differences between NGOs and government services. NGOs must learn to better explain their role in a civil society to both the public and government.

VIII. MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

OTI Croatia closed in May 2000 and the usefulness of Croatia specific management and operational recommendations would be minimal. Please turn to the conclusion of the report (p. 35) for a combined discussion of the

management and operational recommendations learned from the Bosnia and Croatia programs.

Summary of OTI Croatia Impact

OTI Croatia was flexible in its strategic objectives during its three years of operation. Issues of return, civil society and media development always remained important activities for OTI. When presented with the opportunity to support NGOs and media efforts to participate in the parliamentary election, the office was able to quickly work with grantees to manage the pre-election campaign and mobilize resources to support NGOs and media for the elections. The speed at which it was able to fully mobilize its grantees is a testament to the amount of time and effort it dedicated to their development earlier in the project.

By all official accounts, the OTI Croatia program benefited from strong leadership from each of its country directors. In addition, a highly motivated local staff was given the flexibility to act quickly on key decisions. OTI was considered a leader in the international community. Other donors including the British Embassy, European Commission, U.S. Embassy, and Freedom House reported favorably about their working relationship with OTI. Many noted that OTI fulfilled a crucial role before, during, and after the parliamentary election. There is agreement that OTI's presence, in both financial and strategic support, will be missed.

The OTI mandate for country operations is usually two years. OTI Croatia operated for three years. Its impact on the region can be most easily found in the vibrant media and active NGO community that it has left behind. Today, in Croatia, there are balanced media messages. There also exists an NGO community that has experience mobilizing for an issue or event. Given that many of these organizations were OTI grantees in early 1997 and 1998, it can be argued that OTI helped mentor and support the future of the country.

I. BACKGROUND ON OTI/BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In 1995, OTI started funding small grants out of the USAID Mission and in 1996 it expanded its activities to support the Dayton Peace Agreement. Regional offices were created in the Federation (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica) and in the Republika Srpska (Banja Luka). OTI's strategic objectives were firmly grounded in addressing the issues that contributed to the violence in the early 1990s. OTI Bosnia operated for 4 years and it closed out its country program in May 2000. This report is a final assessment of its impact on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

II. OTI STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

USAID and OTI were some of the first humanitarian organizations on the ground in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Agreement. OTI's stated objectives for the Bosnia Transition Program included:

- Reduce community tensions;
- Cultivate democracy;
- Promote basic political freedoms;
- Promote alternative media to negate nationalist voices;
- Empower citizens;
- Encourage political participation.⁶

To achieve these objectives, OTI identified three inter-related project areas:

- **Alternative Media:** fostering new, independent media that report objective, factual information; creating home grown media monitors to watch media coverage; facilitating relationships between NGOs and the media to increase the reach of political activism;
- **Civil Society Building:** supporting non-governmental organizations at local, regional and national levels that will focus on political development;
- **Community Impact:** supporting community improvement projects that lead toward democracy and peace;

An evaluation conducted in 1998 examined the impact of OTI Political Transition

⁶ 1998 OTI Bosnia document.

Grants in Bosnia. This current evaluation is a follow-up that will update the impact of OTI grants and offer conclusions and recommendations learned from OTI Bosnia to improve future OTI efforts. Specific recommendations based on both the Bosnia and Croatia programs will be made in the last section of the report.

III. METHODOLOGY OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation team consisted of a trained social scientist, a translator/research associate, and a former OTI Bosnia FSN. The original statement of work included a 20-day research evaluation, however, due to budget constraints, the team spent 13 days in Bosnia. The OTI program closed in May 2000 and the goal of this evaluation is to look at the long-term impact of OTI political transition grants. This evaluation reports on the progress of OTI media transition grants in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1998 to 2000.⁷

This assessment is based on the following data sources:

1. Interviews with OTI Bosnia staff and USAID partners,
2. Interviews with U.S. and international partners,
3. Interviews with media and NGO grantees,
4. Focus groups (n=5)⁸
5. Surveys of randomly selected citizens (n= 1032).⁹

A multiple method approach collected qualitative and quantitative data from the following OTI regions of action: Banja Luka, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Brcko, Trebejne, Mostar, Livno, and Sarajevo. The town of Bihac, in northwest Bosnia, was added as a control site.

This research provides an update on the impact of the Bosnian Transition Initiative (1996-2000). This longitudinal method allows for a trend study that will show the changes, both positive and negative, in the development of OTI fostered independent media in Bosnia.

Although the 1996 OTI Bosnian Transition Initiative began with three objectives – creation of independent media, civil society building, and

⁷ The list of people interviewed can be found in Appendix I.

⁸ The focus group locations and demographics can be found in Appendix J and the questions in Appendix K.

⁹ The questions on the survey can be found in Appendix L.

community impact projects – the objectives during the latter half of the program (1998-2000) focused primarily on the creation and maintenance of an independent media that would increase access to balanced and objective information. Civil society organizations continued to be an important part of the OTI program, but support for these organizations was incorporated when possible into the media emphasis. Accordingly, the results reported in this evaluation will focus primarily on media impact.

IV. FINDINGS

The focus of OTI Bosnia shifted throughout the 4 years of operation. OTI Bosnia was able to be flexible and adaptable to a dynamic political situation. It was able to identify new media outlets, further develop successful outlets, and end support for organizations that were not willing or able to meet OTI's agreed upon objectives. Four areas in particular illustrate OTI Bosnia's flexible management.

OTI Bosnia Adapted to the Situation

The **first** change was that after careful analysis, OTI Bosnia decided to shift resources from an almost equal split of grants between media and NGO grantees to a more media-centered effort. Concerns from both Bosnian and Washington OTI staff felt that many NGOs were not having the intended impact on the Bosnian political scene. Interviews with Project Officers involved in the grant process identified two reasons for this operational decision. First, there was a belief that a "professional NGO" mentality had emerged and that civil society NGOs were not willing to take the next step to being political agents. Another related reason identified by OTI staff noted that many NGO leaders did not feel that it was safe in their cities to become political. There are several examples of NGO activists being threatened and having their offices vandalized. Regardless of the reasons, significant resources were shifted to the media, allowing some existing media grantees to flourish and allowing new media grantees to be identified and supported.

A **second** related management change occurred in the later part of the initiative--more energy and resources were devoted to media outlets in Herzegovina and the Eastern RS. A shift in geographic region of emphasis occurred when OTI began to find new partners in some of the most hard line areas in the country -- Herzegovina and Eastern RS. The opening-up of these two strategic areas allowed OTI to extend its influence and contributed to peace in the region.

A **third** change occurred during and after the NATO actions in Serbia. OTI Bosnia was presented with both opportunities and challenges during the NATO campaign in Kosovo. Media and political development in the Republika Srpska were significantly interrupted during the Spring 1999 bombings of Serbia. On the positive side, it allowed OTI grantees to show their success in moderating nationalistic voices and communicating balanced information. OTI was able to count on many of its grantees to offer balanced and honest information. ATV Banja Luka offered television viewers a balanced report from Macedonia that showed the Albanian refugees. Some radio stations scheduled contact programs to allow citizens to vent their fears and frustrations. Extremists in the Eastern RS

have been weakened by the troubles in Serbia and alternative media have played an important role in mitigating the Kosovo crisis. There were, however, negative outcomes. The OTI office was vandalized and staff were forced to work from their homes until the offices were repaired. More importantly, much of the goodwill that had been built between USAID and the Bosnian Serbs over the last three years was threatened.

A **fourth** change was in the intended audiences of OTI media grantees. OTI initially funded radio stations that would have a wide audience – youth and adults. To attract these target audiences, many stations played popular rock songs and would then read short news programs over upbeat music. This combination of pop music and news reached a significant part of the public. However, it missed the people in the rural regions who prefer to listen to folk music. Recognizing this gap in programming, several OTI media grantees have created a second channel for folk music. The goal of these second channels is to reach groups who are identified as traditionally nationalistic in their political approach. By airing the same news programming as on the popular urban stations, rural people now have access to balanced and objective information. This extends the reach of OTI resources.

The Impact of OTI Political Transition Grants

Impact #1: Fostering a Credible Media in the Bosnia and Herzegovina – All over Bosnia independent media continue to communicate objective and balanced information. The last two years have witnessed some shifts in the public acceptance of the independent media. Some outlets have grown strong and are well on their way to becoming sustainable, independent voices. Other OTI outlets have not been able to live up to their expectations. The evaluation team conducted a national survey to follow-up the 1998 evaluation.¹⁰ In a comparison of state media to independent media on a variety of measures, it appears that independent media in Sarajevo, the nation’s largest and most sophisticated media market are doing well. For instance, OTI has supported OBN and Dani Magazine. The data (n= 410) show that they are equal to or more important and credible than the state sources.

Importance as an Information Source¹¹

	<u>1998</u>	<u>2000</u>
TV and Radio BiH (S)	55%	66%

¹⁰ S-denotes a state-controlled media outlet, I–denotes an OTI supported, independent media outlet.

OBN	(I)	65%	56%
Vecernje Novine	(S)	52%	39%
Dani Magazine	(I)	60%	50%

¹¹ Percentage of agreement as to the level of importance as a source of information.

Credibility of News Source¹²

	1998	2000
TV and Radio BiH (S)	43.17	47.00
OBN (I)	48.14	53.00
Vecernje Novine (S)	37.00	31.20
Dani Magazine (I)	35.71	39.40

During 1998-2000, OTI grants helped to strengthen existing media in the RS, including **Nezavisne Novine, Reporter Magazine, ATV-Banja Luka, PAN Radio, PANAROMA Magazine, Ekstra Magazine, Radio Jungle, and Radio NES**. OTI leaves behind a well-developed media in this region that is on its way to self-sustainability.

The data collected in Banja Luka (n = 291) show an increased appeal in the state controlled media messages. It appears that there have been significant gains by the state media in the areas of level of importance as a news source as well as in credibility ratings. Given the volatile political situation in Banja Luka it seems plausible that alternative media are suffering from a down turn in public support. There have been, however, modest gains for alternative, especially Reporter Magazine.

BANJA LUKA

	Importance ¹³		Credibility ¹⁴	
	1998	2000	1998	2000
SRT (S)	36%	57%	35.4	42.40
Srpski Glas (S)	36%	47%	not avail	39.00
Radio NES (I)	37%	39%	36.00	32.80
Reporter Magazine(I)	not avail	42%	31.28	41.40

¹² Mean of agreement as the level of credibility of news and information.

¹³ Percentage of agreement as to the level of importance as a source of information.

¹⁴ Mean of agreement as the level of credibility of news and information.

Nezavisne Novine (I)	42%	42%	36.85	35.20
ATV (I)	32%	37%	27.71	30.80

The data (n = 102) collected in Bijeljina show that independent media continue to show that they are equal to or more important and credible than the state sources. It is especially important to note that in Bijeljina that both SRT and Srpski Glas are losing credibility in the minds of the people.

BIJELJINA

	Importance		Credibility	
	1998	2000	1998	2000
SRT (S)	73%	70%	47.42	44.40
Srpski Glas (S)	63%	33%	not avail	20.00
Radio PAN (I)	54%	46%	44.42	45.00
Ekstra Magazine (I)	not avail	27%	not avail	26.40
Radio Jungle (I)	41%	33%	30.00	29.20
Panorama (I)	not avail	21%	26.28	24.40

The shifts in scores may point to a related following negative impact.

Impact #2: The Close Relationship between Independent Media and RS Government May Hinder Critical Journalism

OTI media outlets in the RS worked for the first part of the initiative (1996-1998) to open up dialogue on political issues in the RS. The media took a critical look at the existing government and provided opposition candidates a forum for their views. It is commonly accepted that an important impact of the alternative media in RS was that it helped defeat an unpopular government. In 1998, a new government was elected in the RS that appeared more willing to engage in important issues for the future of the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina. Parts of this government are still in power today. However, the role of the independent media appears to have progressed from a critical, opposition stance to a more passive stance to the current government. In other words, some of the highest

profile grantees may have become a part of the political structure, rather than critically reporting on it.

Interviews with OTI media grantees as well as focus group participants suggest that the media have in many ways ceased to be critical of the government and now act in some ways like the previous state-controlled media. During the 1998 evaluation, focus group participants doubted the independence of the OTI supported media. However, when comparing the focus group answers from 1998 to 2000, there appears to be a much stronger criticism of the alternative media. In 1998, people were still unsure about the role of the alternative media. Today, their criticisms are grounded with recent and clear examples. This raises an important question that OTI needs to consider about the long-term impact of media outlets that are first aligned with the opposition, and then aligned with the new governments.

Impact #3: Breakthrough in Media Development in the Eastern Republika

Srpska-- The second related accomplishment of the second half of the OTI Bosnia program was the breakthrough into the Eastern RS region. First through the efforts of the Banja Luka office, and then through the efforts of the Tuzla office, OTI has helped create and support some of the most provocative media in the region.

OTI was the first organization to initiate contact and offer support to radio stations in this region. Since 1998 four independent media outlets, **Radio Pegaz** in Trebinje, **Radio Osvit** in Zvornik, **Radio Magic** in Milici, and **Radio Palma** in Bratunac have aired informative programming and, more importantly, offered moderate perspectives to citizens living in some of the most hard-line areas of the region.

While the continuing presence of these stations is in itself a sign of OTI impact, their content is also having a positive effect on the area. Each radio station, in conjunction with Reporter Magazine, airs a weekly radio show where the news anchorperson takes the most provocative article of the week and reads it on the air. Callers are given an opportunity to discuss important issues and people have a venue to engage in a dialogue about political topics. The importance of these four new media outlets cannot be underscored. They operate in difficult environments and have been able to bring objective information into this region. Moreover, the geographic location of these stations, on the border with Serbia, offer OTI an opportunity to extend its influence into Western parts of Serbia. This relationship has been good for **Reporter Magazine**. The magazine seems to be enjoying a renaissance with these weekly radio programs dedicated to its most provocative article. It is especially popular in the Eastern RS because of the

weakening of the Milosevic regime. Sales of Reporter Magazine have increased in the Eastern RS.

Impact 4: Penetration of the Herzegovina Region--The 1998 OTI media evaluation recommended that OTI continue its efforts in the Herzegovina region. In the last two years, OTI has been successful in supporting several grantees that are making a difference in the region. In Mostar, **Studio 88**, serves both sides of the city. Its news and information reaches a large public and it offers perspectives different than the popular Radio HercegBosna. The OHR office in Mostar identified Studio 88 as one of the best actions for the city and people of Mostar. The data (n =232) show that the public continues to mistrust many media messages.

<u>MOSTAR</u>	Credibility ¹⁵	
	1998	2000
Radio and TV BiH (S)	48.42	28.8
Radio and TV HRT (S)	47.00	39.00
Radio Herceg-Bosna (S)	44.57	36.00
Feral Tribune (I)	42.85	36.00
Radio Studio 88 (I)	not avail	33.00

The data show that the state-controlled media are losing support from the public in Mostar. This could be a sign that Studio 88 may be challenging people to think more critically about media messages and allowing people to see how nationalistic the two major outlets are in their programming.

In Livno, **Radio N**, is communicating balanced and objective information to people in a wide geographic region. Working closely with Radio N is the **Citizens Civic Initiative** (CCI) that addresses a variety of legal, educational, and community impact projects. These two OTI grantees have been able to effect change in their community. As one NGO leader in Livno recounted, it is now possible to have different viewpoints through alternative media:

I have to say that when we started getting in these newspapers people started coming in [to the center]to read them. That helped to make a media break through and have dailies and weeklies from Bosnia and Herzegovina present. Now we have some of the independent media [Radio N] and from RS.

Municipal officials in both of these towns have attempted to obstruct the efforts of these organizations. However, the OHR has recently “replaced” several of the municipal officials who have been impeding reform and threatening the radio stations. The OHR in Mostar sees these two radio stations as having an enormous impact on the political development of the region.

¹⁵ Mean of agreement as the level of credibility of news and information.

In recognition of the important role that these media play in the integration of Herzegovina into the future of Bosnia, both Studio 88 and Radio N will become IREX grantees during the year 2000.

Impact #5: The Regional Approach --A Balkan regional approach is a goal of OTI Washington. The benefit of this approach is to influence Bosnia through OTI efforts in Croatia and Serbia. Although OTI FSNs in Zagreb, Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Tuzla had a difficult time identifying specific projects with regional impact, many grantees could immediately identify projects that had cross border impact. For example,

The Serb Democratic Forum, based in Croatia, serves refugees in Bosnia;

GONG election monitors have traveled to Bosnia to train monitors and work with Bosnian NGOs, Bosnian NGOs have traveled to Croatia to meet with GONG representatives;

Bosnian media outlets get newswire services from the Croatian-based STINA News Agency and add stories from these services to their news programs;

Glas 99 and Glas 2000 materials are used by youth centers in Banja Luka;

Reporter Magazine will begin a Croatian edition in July 2000;

The Bosnian manager of Studio N writes for Croatian daily newspapers;

Brcho-based Radio Valentino serves audiences into the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia.

The evaluation team was able to find examples of cross border relationships between media and NGO grantees. However, these examples are mostly anecdotal and limited evidence exists as to the impact of these relationships. In the future, there needs to be a much clearer focus of how to take the regional approach envisioned by Washington and have it enacted in the field.

Impact #6: Influencing Serbia-- As the OTI regional program progressed, it became clear that OTI Bosnia could actually influence political developments in Serbia. OTI has supported dissemination of alternative media throughout Serbia. Reporter Magazine, Ekstra Magazine, Nezavisne Novine and other print and electronic media have made their way into Yugoslavia and Montenegro.

With the help of a stronger transmitter, Radio Pan in Bijeljina reports that almost 50% of its callers live in Serbia. This unique opportunity allows OTI to increase the impact of its media grantees outside of Bosnia and help shape the evolving political scene in Serbia. For instance, the managing editor of Reporter Magazine explained how he is able to publish in Serbia with OTI's assistance:

OTI helped us to keep our office in Belgrade when we were in a very difficult situation. OTI financed our Internet edition and this help also included paying salaries to our journalists. If we did not have these resources the office would fall apart. We were twice closed down in Belgrade and forbidden to work. We started working in Yugoslavia during the war or as the Americans say during the air-campaign. We got the help to print out 5,000 more per issue for Serbia. We transported these issues over the river Drina or the river Una. The first time we distributed our newspaper through institutions, organizations, student bodies, political parties. Now we have wider distribution. That is how our newspaper started in Serbia.

However, it must be noted that there was some concern that the recent shift in focus to Serbia from Bosnia may jeopardize some of the gains of OTI Bosnia, especially in the RS. Several interviewees noted that OTI was using its base in the RS to engage in high risk operations to influence Serbia. More oversight from Washington may be needed to ensure that the efforts in the new region of operation complement the goals of OTI Bosnia and the USAID Mission.

Impact #7: Key Information at Key Times: Return, Refugees and the Brcko Decision--OTI Bosnia grantees, both media and NGOs, were successful in assisting in the issues of return, refugees, and the Brcko Arbitration Decision. On the issue of return and refugees, OTI grantees communicated important information to people who would not have had any access to this information. There is a consistent pattern of misinformation for the people who have been displaced by the war because the state-controlled media are often the only information sources available to these people. OTI has supported media and NGOs that specifically serve in areas with these marginalized publics. Without OTI supported media, these people would have no objective information sources upon which to make decisions.

OTI grantees were instrumental in creating a sense of calm during the final Brcko Arbitration decision that named the town of Brcko as an independent district with special rules and rights. Brcko is a volatile place.¹⁶ All ethnic

¹⁶ The town of Brcko is subject to frequent outbursts of interethnic intolerance. Just one day before the evaluation team arrived in the city, the Yugoslavian soccer team won a game in the

groups have been waiting to see which entity would have governance over the city. The city, once 64% Bosniak, 24% Croat, and 7% Serb, is now almost entirely populated by Serbs. Brcko is viewed by Serbs as the link between Eastern and Western RS. Their fear was that if Brcko was assigned to Federation control, then the RS would be split into two isolated and weakened parts.

In the previous Brcko decision in 1998, the authorities decided to postpone the final decision. Riots threatened the city. This time three independent radio stations, one affiliated with Bosniaks (Radio BET), one affiliated with Serbs (Radio HIT), and one affiliated with Croats (Radio Valentino), worked together on programming, contact shows, and key messages to call for calm. The advance preparation of these three OTI grantees served to minimize the violence and helped to show all sides of the situation.

People in the region appreciated the information and one focus group participant from Brcho noted:

Independent media need to be enforced because that is what is going to make a change and a progress. It is big thing that on these independent media the offensive names for certain groups are not used. That is what by itself made a change. A name that was used for a certain group or a military was irritating to the civil society. The change did happen under the pressure of the international community, true, but it did help to free people and have them make free decisions. With the wish to do so, many people have returned despite the obvious danger and lack of the freedom of movement.

Another noted,

Independent media have news in their program from Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and other worldwide radio stations that are reported in our languages. Automatically the reporters are different, their nationality is different and they realistically speak on the condition in our country, on the political issues and other events. They say if there is a manipulation going on with citizens or material means and if there is a fraud and so on. It helps a person to make a better decision as he can not hear from one nationalistically oriented radio everything that he is interested in.

Not only OTI radio stations contributed to stabilizing public response to the Brcko decision. ATV Banja Luka created a short 5-minute documentary that was

European Championship. In celebration, groups shouted obscenities and ethnic slurs and broke many of the windows in the section of town that is home to returning Bosniaks.

given to multiple television stations in the RS and Federation to be shown during this time. It featured a panel of respected experts who explained in clear terms why the Arbitration decision was not a threat to Serbs.

The impact of key information at key times is clear: in many volatile locations, OTI media grantees have offered the only balanced and objective information to the public. This information no doubt minimized violence and helped key communities continue on the path to reconciliation.

V. CONCLUSIONS OTI BOSNIA

Conclusion #1: OTI Leaves Alternative Media On Its Way to Sustainability

OTI assistance fostered a sustainable and credible alternative media. To this end, OTI has allocated substantial financial and human resources to create commercially viable, alternative media. At the close of the OTI Bosnia program there were dozens of media grantees in the RS and BiH. Without OTI assistance many of the smaller radio and print outlets would not exist. OTI reached out to various regions and outlets that no other international organization was able or willing to serve. OTI support kept objective, alternative information flowing throughout the region. Without OTI support, freedom of information and increased political discussion could not occur in many regions of BiH and RS.

Conclusion # 2: Media Outlets Created Opportunities for Political Dialogue

OTI grants have contributed to political dialogue through the creation of a variety of contact programs on radio and television. OTI funded media contributed to political dialogue by publicizing political activities. This is especially the case in highly volatile areas. Alternative media offer the opportunity for opposition candidates and NGOs to voice their opinions about important issues.

Conclusion # 3: Alternative Media Equal the State Media in Importance and Credibility

The data show that OTI-supported media outlets have scored on average as highly as state-controlled media in terms of their importance as information resources and as credible sources of information. This is an important finding and the longitudinal data suggest that as time, professionalism, and a focus on content issues continues, the independent media may eventually become the dominant information source in BiH. Many of these outlets specifically credit OTI support during the last four years as the reason behind their success.

Conclusion # 4: OTI Needed to Create a Plan for Politicizing NGOs

NGOs and media must be a collaborative effort. The media are a one-way communication medium. Although useful for communicating balanced information, research shows that information alone is not enough to change opinion or actions. NGOs are the interpersonal link needed for people to learn about an issue and then be able to act on it. In Bosnia, NGOs were not able to achieve the goal of contributing to political change. OTI Bosnia needed to maximize its efforts by creating partnerships between its best NGOs and its media grantees. Moreover, it needed to better prepare the NGOs for such a role in building civil society.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTI BOSNIA

1. OTI Should Move Quickly to Politicize NGOs

OTI Bosnia minimized its obligations to NGOs during the last two years of operation when it finally realized that the NGOs were unable or unwilling to achieve larger, more political goals. In future country programs, OTI should set up clear and specific criteria to decide when NGO funding is still productive to the overall goals of the country objectives.

2. Incorporate Media Outlet Development with Programming Development

OTI first concentrated on creating and fostering alternative media outlets. It focused much of its grant and human resources on materials, distribution, and salaries for media outlets. Helping media outlets develop key messages was a second priority until the end of the initiative. OTI learned that it can concurrently foster media outlets while at the same time working with these outlets on programming and content.

Report Summary

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE OTI CROATIA AND BOSNIA PROGRAMS

1. OTI Needs Continued and Improved Communication with USAID and the Embassy (Croatia and Bosnia)

For OTI to reach its objectives, it must communicate and coordinate its efforts with the USAID Mission and U.S. Embassy. OTI Washington should work with its USAID counterparts to clarify the OTI role in USG policy. Frequent communication and information sharing should be encouraged. Concerns were raised that OTI's management and operational style complemented the Embassy's objectives rather than with USAID's objectives.

2. OTI Needs to Create Impact Assessment Measures at Beginning of Transitions (Croatia and Bosnia)

OTI needed to create a consistent set of impact assessment measures throughout its international programs. OTI needs to identify, as part of a country entrance strategy, its measures for success. Qualitative and quantitative measures of impact would help OTI to better monitor its grantees and their accomplishments. Baseline data should be collected in new nations of operation within six months of entry. Impact assessments should be collected semi-annually and used to allocate resources. Final evaluations should be conducted no later than three months before closing country offices. Without baseline data, the true impact of OTI programs is difficult to accurately assess.

3. OTI Needs to Examine High-risk and High-impact Activities (Bosnia)

OTI needed to carefully consider the costs and benefits associated with high-risk activities. OTI is one part of a larger USG mission in areas of operation. OTI's

desire to create change during a transition is its mandate; however, its actions must complement the USAID mission. High risk activities may pose a threat to the overall USAID mission, OTI staff, and grantees. Even if OTI Washington accepts the risk involved in its actions as part of its mandate, it needs to coordinate these activities to the larger USG mission.

4. Incorporating Media Experts into OTI Team (Croatia and Bosnia)

If OTI has a significant media component in its transition plan, then it should hire local or international staff with media expertise. The media business is much different than the NGO sphere and having one expert per a nation who is available to all OTI offices and RONCO may help expedite media development and deliver a high quality product to its grantees.

5. Increased Coordination to the Regional Approach (Croatia and Bosnia)

More cooperation with other regional OTI offices would leverage resources and truly achieve the regional approach desired by OTI Washington. Country programs should increase regular communication between FSNs, satellite offices, and country directors. Improved communication could be in the form of workshops, retreats, and meetings.

6. Media Content Should Be Concurrent with Media Development (Bosnia)

OTI needed to focus concurrently on a mix of media development and media content. While the initial need may be to actually create new media outlets, OTI should simultaneously spend time and energy on developing a program of provocative media programming for these newly established outlets.

MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS

1. Strategic Co-ordination with USAID and Embassy

OTI should work at all levels to identify in advance its contributions to USG policy in a country of operation. Frequent collaboration and information sharing should be institutionalized.

2. Increased Oversight From Washington and the Country Directors

There was a consistent message from the field that there was minimal oversight from Washington to OTI country offices. Two specific areas for oversight improvement include:

Continuation of PTGs to low impact organizations;

Guidance on how to deal with USAID mission and Embassy.

Satellite offices would have also benefited from more direction, increased management, and clear and specific objectives for actions and grants. For example, OTI Croatia had field offices in Osijek and Split. While these offices offered OTI regular communication with undeserved areas, improved communication and management could have better utilized these offices and further leveraged impact.

OTI should create processes for increased oversight at all levels of the OTI program. Increased oversight is not meant to imply more report writing; rather, increased oversight is suggested as a way to better coordinate regional and global programs. Monitoring at all levels of OTI (Washington, grants, grantees, FSNs and offices) should be instituted.

The first way to ensure oversight is to have clear and specific objectives for the transition. If OTI Washington has clear objectives, then field offices can be evaluated by how they are reaching their specific goals.

The second way to improve oversight is to have a clear vision of how to measure these objectives. Before any program begins, OTI Washington in conjunction with USAID needs to identify what outcomes will be accepted as "success" and it should identify how it will be measured. Measurement may include any combination of public opinion, public actions, government actions, media coverage/agenda setting, etc.

A third way to improve oversight is to communicate regularly with USAID Washington counterparts about issues of convergence. Good working relations between Washington offices will no doubt encourage good working relations in the field.

3. Change the Funding Mechanism if OTI Extends Past 2 Year Mandate

If OTI decides to stay in a nation for more than its two-year mandate, it should reconsider/modify some of its mechanisms. There are concerns that OTI's rapid funding mechanism may actually impede long-term development. Thus, if the organization operates for a third year it should work closely with other partners to better prepare its grantees for the next phase of transition – sustainable development.

4. Training for FSNs

It is commonly accepted that OTI hires some of the best FSNs in its countries of operation. However, many of the FSNs feel that they would have benefited from specific training. Topics most often mentioned include:

Several OTI FSNs attended the Best Practices Workshop in Washington DC in 1999. Those who attended felt the experience was worthwhile and would have liked to attend one dedicated to the Balkans region. Regional workshops or retreats may help leverage the knowledge in a region and keep FSNs and country directors aware of the most successful practices. This would also help ensure that the regional approach to the Balkans, created in Washington, is enacted in the field. OTI should strive for bi-annual meetings for regional staff. To better train program officers, OTI should solicit workshop ideas from the staff. The staff know best what information and training that they lack. Initial training workshops should always focus on topics including:

- learning about the media as a business;
- dealing with conflict in a professional manner;
- initiating relationships with potential grantees in volatile regions;
- defining and measuring impact of grantees, specific grants and offices;
- motivating grantees for extending their reach;

There should also be a placement for the best FSNs should be part of the exit strategy. Several of OTI's best people have found other employment because they were uncertain how long OTI would stay in their country. A policy of placement for the best FSNs would keep many FSNs with OTI until the end of the country program.

5. OTI Needs Improved Strategies for NGO Development

OTI should work early on with NGOs to help them create key messages and then encourage them to pursue these key messages in all organizational activities. However, OTI should strive to balance its need to direct grantees to achieve maximum impact while minimizing control over grantee actions and messages. Many grantees felt that OTI Croatia staff, especially during the pre-election campaign, was too directive, too controlling and too involved in the NGO and media efforts. The organizations funded by OTI have important roles to play in building civil society but their impact will be limited if the public believes that they are merely puppets of the USG.

6. Improved Guidelines for Working with RONCO

OTI should mandate RONCO workshops for grantees. The booklets provided to grantees were not precise enough for many inexperienced NGOs. Another RONOC concern was about the specificity of the media equipment. Both OTI Croatia and Bosnia dedicated a significant amount of their financial and human resources to media programming and development. However, very few OTI staff had any experience in the media. Moreover, no RONCO implementing agent had experience ordering this type of technical equipment. Media equipment is a very specialized and technical area of expertise. Although OTI and RONCO staff quickly learned about this area, one local expert (perhaps paid by retainer) will facilitate media development and ensure high quality service.

7. A Comprehensive Method to Measure OTI Impact

Every OTI office had a different method of evaluating impact. OTI needs to standardize its evaluation procedures for each country of operation and set clear and measurable outcome objectives. OTI missed several opportunities to collect impact assessments. It often funded NGOs to conduct public opinion surveys but it did not use this opportunity to gather data for any assessment of its own or its grantees' impact. In the future, OTI should make it a policy to have one of the first PTGs written in a new country of operation fund the collection of baseline data through which the measurement of future OTI impact can be ascertained. Steps to follow include:

1. Identify the objectives of the grant, organization, or event;
1. Define what counts as impact;
2. Identify the ways (method) in which impact will be measured;
3. Identify the baseline before the action of the grant;
4. Toward the end of the activity, evaluate the grant using the impact criteria;
5. Compare findings with objectives stated in grant/database;
6. Grants that have achieved the objectives should be re-funded and given new impact objectives.

8. Creating Clear Exit Strategies for Future Transitions

OTI's entry strategy is clear – a quantity of grants in the beginning and then a gradual process of quality over quantity. A clear exit strategy needs to be developed and implemented at the beginning of any new country plan. The exit strategy should include clear, specific objectives, guidelines for assessing grantee performance and potential, a formal review process for ending grants, a written statement for grantees, frequent meetings with other international donors to discuss the progress of best grantees, and a timeline for exiting.

The staff in each country did the best they could to help key grantees find alternative funding and many of the best OTI grantees did find support from other sources. However, the hand-off occurred not so much out of a clear exit strategy but more because OTI staff understood the importance of the survival of these key organizations.

It appears that exit strategies have been already instituted in other OTI nations. OTI Croatia and Bosnia may be the exceptions to the practice of clear exit strategies for OTI countries of operation.

Because of OTI's short mandate, it may leave a region before the full transition to democracy has occurred. Indeed, there will always be flash point areas that will still need some type of assistance. In highly volatile areas, such as Brcho, OTI should prepare special arrangements, either with other USG agencies or international donors, to support key grantees during difficult times. OTI should mandate that after the first 6 months of operation, a plan for an exit strategy should be articulated and consensus with partners should be reached. These plans can be modified (every six months) during the course of the transition. The goal should be to have written cooperation from USAID and international partners about the hand off of key grantees.

9. Improving the PTG Database For Future Transitions

The OTI PTG database was intended to archive all of Bosnia and Croatia's grants, proposals, decisions, and knowledge about grantees. The database is intended to provide a variety of data for staff on the ground and in Washington. After extensive review by the evaluation team, the PTG database was found to be wholly inadequate as a tool to communicate to any user the impact of the OTI grants. The database should be significantly improved to achieve its intended goal of leveraging experiences from the field. In future transitions, the PTG database should be a part of every FSN's responsibilities and its use should be incorporated into any evaluation process. The database should be a part of every PTG and project officers input every PTG into the database. At the very minimum, the database should contain:

1) Information about expected impact. For instance, 5000 brochures printed and successfully distributed by a certain data and an increased awareness by citizens about this issue;

2) Specific standards as to how the process and outcome indicators will be measured (counted, surveys, anecdotal evidence, media coverage, government response);

- 3) Key messages or themes that will be enacted by the PTGs;
- 4) Identification of how this PTG fits into the OTI country program;
- 5) The standards for how funding will be continued or discontinued.

Summary of the Recommendations

The aforementioned management and operational recommendations provide guidance on how OTI can maximize its impact, improve its efficiency, and better serve the people experiencing a transition. At the core of these suggestions is the fact that clear, specific, and measurable objectives are the key to increased accountability and organizational effectiveness.

OTI plays an important role in USG policy and with a set of more systematic measures for evaluation, OTI will be able to prove the effectiveness of its approach and mechanism to the humanitarian community.

APPENDIX A:

SCOPE OF WORK

I. OTI Background

The USAID Administrator created the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) to assist priority countries to make successful transitions from crisis to recovery and stability. The volatile political and economic nature of transitioning countries requires fast, emergency-type responses with immediate, visible and positive impacts.

Countries experiencing complex crises resulting from internal conflict and civil war have special needs that are not addressed by traditional emergency assistance programs. Fledgling governments in newly established democracies often need direct, targeted assistance to adequately identify and address the tremendous political and economic challenges facing them. Likewise, other sectors and segments of society within new democracies require positive engagement and managed assistance.

OTI's strategic objectives are based on the premise that fast, direct, and overt political development assistance is needed as a catalyst to move countries beyond the threat of crisis to stability. With increasing percentages of U.S. foreign aid going to relieve the humanitarian emergencies that are being caused by civil strife, OTI is unique among development agencies and International Organizations as being one of the first offices to specifically address the gap between relief and development.

When a crisis occurs in a priority country, OTI designs a country program to address the fundamental constraints that inhibit governance and economic functioning. Each country program has a set of objectives, a set of program performance indicators, an implementation strategy for accomplishing the program objectives, an approved budget, a plan for periodic program reviews and an exit strategy.

II. Evaluation Background

This evaluation will gather lessons learned and recommendations based on OTI's programs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that are closing in March and May 2000 respectively. Sixty percent of the evaluation's in-country activities will focus on Croatia's programs, while forty percent will focus on

Bosnia's programs, particularly alternative media activities since April 1999 and civil society activities.

OTI was active in Croatia from July 1997 to March 2000 with the initial goal of "fostering democratic participation." Activities included:

- Increasing access to objective, balanced information;
- Promoting and supporting greater popular participation in elections and public policy decision making; and,
- Improving the transparency and accountability of the government and public institutions.

OTI/Croatia made over 236 grants valued in excess of \$3,614,402 to over 89 civic organizations. Media development grants totaled 80 with an estimated value of \$1,516,731; civic organizations received a total of 156 grants with an estimated value of \$2,097,671.

Over time, the Croatia program shifted to allocate the majority of time and resources to the parliamentary elections, which were seen as a pivotal event in promoting stability and democratic change in Croatia. With the changing political situation that resulted from the protracted illness and death of President Tudjman, the subsequent weakening of the HDZ, and the increasing desire for change among Croatians, OTI seized the window of opportunity for change. Building on media activities and grants made prior to this opening, OTI focused on Get Out the Vote and election monitoring activities.

In **Bosnia**, OTI's stated objective was to "support moderate voices to change attitudes and behaviors." From February 1996 to May 2000, OTI has:

- Supported civil society organizations to promote democratic practices.
- Sponsored production of independent radio and television broadcasts and print media, and provided organizational and legal advice to media outlets.

In FY 1999, OTI made a total of 443 grants totaling \$2,211,490: 377 for media (\$1,970,165) and 66 for civil society groups (\$241,325). In FY 2000, OTI made a total of 158 media grants and 7 civil society organization grants totaling \$910,362. A total of 1,757 grants were made over the life of the project with a value of \$13,972,283: 1,041 media grants (\$9,453,689) and 616 civil society grants (\$4,585,882).

In April 1999, an evaluation of media transition grants highlighted the positive impact that OTI funding of alternative media has had on the social and political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly within the Republika Srpska.

The current evaluation will follow-up on the lessons learned from the previous evaluation, and will look at OTI/Bosnia's funding of civil society organizations, and the regional interactions and impacts between the Bosnia and Croatia programs.

III. Objective of the Evaluation

As programs close in both Croatia and Bosnia in FY 2000, this evaluation will examine OTI/Croatia's work with the media and civil society organizations, OTI's continued work with alternative media in Bosnia and a limited number of civil society organizations, and the links between the two country programs. The evaluation will also focus on OTI's country/regional management structure and its relationship to overall program implementation. The evaluation will focus on:

- OTI's ability to change its strategic objectives and activities in each country in response to evolving political environments.
- Lessons learned in Croatia and Bosnia and examples of successes/failures
- Regional lessons learned from the links between programs in Bosnia and Croatia.
- Programmatic and management recommendations for USAID/OTI's on-going work in other countries in transition.
- Hand-off strategies, relations with the USAID Missions, donors, other partnerships.

IV. Methodology

The evaluation team will be responsible for developing a work plan with appropriate methodology, to include, but not be limited to the following:

- Structured interviews with OTI local staff, grantees (including grantees that OTI cut off funding), implementing partners (Ronco), USAID and the US Embassy, and other international organizations.
- Focus group interviews with grantees, NGO volunteers, government officials in Croatia and Bosnia (in the Federation, as well as both eastern and western Republika Srpska).
- Case studies from the two country programs.
- Surveys to quantify the impact of OTI's programs.

V. Timing

The evaluation team shall work a total of 30 days in the field: 20 days in Croatia and 10 days in Bosnia.

Washington, DC: Review OTI documents, interview relevant staff (OTI, ENE, DG), other partners (NDI, IFES, IREX), and Ronco.

Croatia: 20 days of fieldwork to include 1 day in Zagreb to meet with USAID Mission staff, key US Embassy staff, in-country donors (Open Society Institute, European Union, British Know How Fund, Norwegian Government, and the Mott Foundation), local partners (GONG, Glas, Radio 101, Croatian Journalist Association) and OTI's implementing partner, Ronco.

Bosnia: 10 days of fieldwork to include 1 day in Sarajevo to meet with USAID Mission staff, key US Embassy staff, other international partners (IMC, OHR, OSCE), and local partners.

Washington, DC: Report writing and debriefing to USAID and OTI/Washington staff.

VI. Deliverables

- A proposed evaluation plan will be finalized by the team leader prior to departure, and cleared by the Balkans Team (in Washington DC and the field) and the Program Development Team.
- A 5 - 10 page draft evaluation report with major findings and recommendations will be prepared in the field with possible debriefing to US Embassy and USAID/OTI.
- A preliminary debriefing to OTI staff in Washington upon return to the US.
- A final report no later than September 30, 2000 and a debriefing to the USAID Tuesday Group.

VII. Final Report

The final report will be no longer than fifty pages and comprised of the following sections:

- Executive summary
- Introduction and background
- Summary of evaluation objectives and methodology
- Key successes/challenges

- Lessons learned: programmatic and management (for Croatia, Bosnia, and the region)
- Recommendations for future USAID/OTI programs

VIII. Team Composition

The evaluation team shall consist of three people over a 30-day period. The team leader should have extensive experience designing and conducting evaluations. With OTI offices closed in both Bosnia and Croatia, the two other members of the evaluation team shall be hired locally to provide translation, logistic, and facilitation support to the international evaluator for the focus groups, national surveys, and meetings with grantees. The team will be expected to make a number of field visits, to be determined, within Croatia and Bosnia.

The team should demonstrate the following experience and skills:

- Evaluation research – academic experience in the social sciences evaluating programs, particularly with media and civil society organizations, in countries in transition.
- Rapid appraisal techniques – academic training and experience with rapid appraisal techniques (survey development, direct observation, focus group interviews, community interviews, key informant interviews.)
- Survey and statistical analysis – academic preparation and experience in survey research methods (survey design, sampling techniques, statistical computer applications.)
- Political science – academic training and experience relevant to media, civil society, and democracy and governance.
- Knowledge of the Balkans political, social, economic, and culture environment.
- Knowledge of both USAID’s and OTI’s mandates and strategies.
- Demonstrated knowledge of Serbian/Bosnian/Croatian language.

I. Cost

Total cost associated with this evaluation shall not exceed \$30,000.

APPENDIX B: People Interviewed About OTI Croatia

State Department

Allen L. Docal, Public Affairs Officer, Croatia

Kathleen M. Redgate, Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs, Croatia

USAID

Charles R. Aanenson, USAID Mission Director

David Costello, OTI Balkans Team Leader

Peter Graves, Media Specialist, ENI, Washington

Chuck Howell, Program Officer, USAID

Arsen Juric, OTI Project Officer, Split

Ines Krauth, Project Officer, OTI Zagreb

Angela Martin, OTI Croatia Country Director

Marialisa Miller, Regional Director, RONCO Implementing Agent

Chris Phillips, OTI Director Washington

Chuck Rogers, USAID/IREX, Zagreb

Dimitrije Todorovic, OTI Project Officer, Osijek

Rada Vujovic, Project Officer, OTI, Zagreb

Implementing Partners

Zorica Benci, Project Coordinator, Civil Society Initiatives Fund (DFID)

Jill Benderly, Regional Director, The STAR Network in Southeastern Europe

Alex Budden, British Embassy

Davor Glavas, Advisor, ProMedia, IREX

Jon Newstrom, Resident Advisor, ProMedia, IREX

Charles M. Northrip, Network Operations Manager, ProMedia, IREX

Cvjetana Plavsa-Matic, Head, Office for Cooperation with NGOs, Zagreb

Drago Vrucinic, Director, OSI (Open Society Institute), Zagreb

Walter Veer, Freedom House, Prague

OTI Grantees

Dijana Antunovic-Lazic, Pres., Citizens Democratic Initiative Project, Vukovar

Mirela Alagic, Project Coordinator, Info Club

Zrinka Badric, Journalist, Media Team, Glas 99, Zagreb

Dario Dusper, President of the Board, Radio 101, Zagreb

Tin Gazivoda, President, Glas 99, Zagreb

Milenija Krusinski, Legal Advisor, SAN Daruvar

Aleksandra Kuratko, GONG, Zagreb

Suzana Jasic GONG, Zagreb

Alen Linardon, President, Bad Taste, Pazin
Bojan Lalic, Center for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights, Osijek
Ljubo Manojlovic, Secretary, Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF), Zagreb
Biserka Milosevic, Director, Center for Peace, Nonviolence, Human Rights, Osijek
Igor Mirkovic, Producer, "5 to 12" Zagreb
Ankica Mikic, President, Center for Peace and Legal Advice, Vukovar
Karolina Pajo, President and Program Coordinator, SAN Daruvar
Ancica Petrusic, General Secretary, Diaspora Homeland Association, Zagreb
Stojan Obradovic, Editor-in Chief, STINA news agency, Split
Anela Resanovic, GONG, Zagreb
Miso Rogosic, Transition to Democracy, Split
Elizabeta Rudic, Mediteraneo, Rijeka
Radojka Tomasevic, Project Leader, Stope Nade Footsteps of Hope, Split
Toni Vidan, Coordinator, Green Action, Zagreb
Sonja Vukicevic, Radio Dunav, Vukovar
Sanja Vukcevic, Journalist, STINA, Split

APPENDIX C: QUESTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

Describe first impressions of OTI.

How did your impression of it change over the course of your experience with them?

What do you see as the strengths of the OTI approach?

Any weaknesses?

What would you identify as their most significant accomplishments?

Please describe your working relationship with OTI staff.

What were your impressions of the FSNs on the OTI staff?

What did you learn by watching OTI operate in the region?

Please describe OTI's long term impact on Bosnia/Croatia.

Questions for OTI Grantees

Please describe your organization's goals.

How have your goals changed in the last years? Did OTI help you in this change?

Who are your target publics?

Please describe the impact that you have had on target public.

Accomplishments.

What support (in a broad sense, not just money) have you had from other donors. Who gave it to you? How was your relationship different with these donors than with OTI?

Please describe your relationships with other NGOs.

Please describe your relationships with alternative media.

Please describe your working relationship with OTI. Who did you work with most?

Please describe your relationships with RONCO.

How did OTI help you to achieve your goals?

What else could they have done to help you?

Did OTI's management style affect your activities? Too much direction?
Too little direction? Exit strategy? Most valuable lessons learned?

Does your organization have Internet access? How? Where? Easy access?
How often do you use it?

In what ways do you use it?

Please describe your experiences, good and bad, about how it helps you achieve goals.

Is Email a valuable communication tool for your organization? Why?

APPENDIX D: FOCUS GROUP LOCATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHICS OF PARTICIPANTS

VARAZDIN

Varazdin is situated north of Zagreb. It covers the area of 74 square kilometers and its population is almost 50,000 inhabitants. Only 20,000 are employed. No international organizations operate in this area. The focus group participants were pensioners.

VUKOVAR

Once one of the richest counties in Croatia, Vukovar was totally destroyed during the break up of the former Yugoslavia. Part of the county became a part of the UN Protected Area in 1995, and in 1997, it was peacefully reintegrated with Croatia. There is high unemployment and many of the inhabitants are Serbian. The focus group participants were young, male Serbs.

ZAGREB

Zagreb is the capital of the Republic of Croatia. It has nearly 1,000,000 inhabitants and it is the largest city in Croatia. It is the nation's economic, social and political center. The focus group participants were social activists and people who work in independent media. The group was mixed in gender and age.

PULA

The city of Pula is in Istria on the west of Croatia. In Istria there is the largest concentration of Italians living in Croatia. Istria is known for its liberal perspectives and has never supported the HDZ. The focus group participants were middle aged women.

SPLIT

Split is the economic and administrative center of Middle Dalmatia, with about 200,000 inhabitants. It is a center for tourism and trade. The focus group participants were young, males.

APPENDIX E: CROATIA: FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS

A. Guidelines

1. No right or wrong answers. Here to learn from you.
2. Everyone needs to speak. Not on every issue but when you feel strongly about something that is being said.
3. Here to represent people I cannot speak to; need to share your views with me.
4. I will leave the session and Sanela will stay with you to facilitate discussion. You will feel more comfortable.
5. Audio-taping the session to have Sanela translate the conversation for me to see.
6. Understand that the language is changing ...trying to capture key concepts. If something feels wrong to you, please ask questions.
7. This session is confidential. It will not be published or broadcast.

B. Introduce non-participants in the room. Explain their role.

C. Ask if everyone is comfortable with guidelines.

D. Ask them to introduce themselves and tell about what they do.

E. Focus group sample questions:

What can you tell me about the concept of a civil society? Use block paper to write down ideas.

- Parts or components of it
- Importance and what it can accomplish in Croatia
- Concrete examples of how it works
- Who participates? What stops people from volunteering?
- Role of NGOs, Problems with NGOs
- How will civil society help to change the political situation?
- Did NGOs help disseminate important information about elections?

Please describe your impressions about the state media and alternative (independent -get agreement) media?

- How do you use the media?
- Differences between state and alternative media?
- Trust or belief in media?
- Would what you like to see change?

Did media provide enough objective information during the elections?

Did information received affect the way you voted?

What issues are important to you as citizens that have not been conveyed?

APPENDIX F: SURVEY DATA FOR CROATIA

Locations of Surveys (n=1039)

Zagreb	n= 410
Split	n= 205
Pula	n= 198
Vukovar	n= 106
Varazdin	n= 120

APPENDIX G: SURVEY QUESTIONS IN CROATIA

This survey is trying to explain and describe the public's attitude toward media and NGOs in Republic of Croatia.

Instructions: Please circle the number between each pair of words and phrases (with opposite meanings) that best represents how you feel about that media as a source of information and news.

Name of Newspapers

Very important	5	4	3	2	1	Not important at all
Objective	5	4	3	2	1	Not objective
Serves public interest	5	4	3	2	1	Doesn't serve public interest

Name of Broadcast television

Very important	5	4	3	2	1	Not important at all
Objective	5	4	3	2	1	Not objective
Serve public interest	5	4	3	2	1	Doesn't serve public interest

Name of Radio

Very important	5	4	3	2	1	Not important at all
Objective	5	4	3	2	1	Not objective
Serves the public interest	5	4	3	2	1	Doesn't serve public interest

Name of Program

Very important	5	4	3	2	1	Not important at all
Objective	5	4	3	2	1	Not objective
Serves the public interest	5	4	3	2	1	Doesn't serve public interest

Media Scale

Instructions: Here is the list of statements that people made about media. Next to each statement are numbers. Please circle the number that describes the best the level of importance of each statement to you. Numbers are on scale of 1 to 5, with 5 meaning you fully agree with the statement and the number 1 meaning you fully disagree with the statement.

1. Television presents things as they really are in life.

5 4 3 2 1

2. If I see something on TV, I can't be sure it really is that way.

3. Television lets me really see how other people live.

4. TV does not show life as it really is.
5. Television lets me see what happens in other places as if I was really there.
6. I use media to obtain information.
7. Media helps me make important decisions in life.
8. I use media for entertainment.
9. I use media to obtain information so I can pass it to others.
10. I use media because I like to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.

The questions about the civil society and elections:

1. Civil society organizations are very important for improving the situation in Croatia.

5	4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---	---
2. I want to participate in the Croatian society (as a member of NGO, a member of civil society, or through elections).
3. NGOs should cooperate with the government in order to improve the situation in Croatia.
4. I had enough objective information during the elections to make decisions about candidates.
5. NGOs helped in disseminating important information during the elections.
6. I used the following news sources for information during the election.

Press	5	4	3	2	1
Radio	5	4	3	2	1
Internet	5	4	3	2	1
Personal Contacts	5	4	3	2	1
Television	5	4	3	2	1

1. I am familiar with the civil society campaign for free and fair elections.

5 4 3 2 1

**APPENDIX H:
SURVEY DATA FROM EACH TOWN**

PULA

<u>I. Credibility</u>	(a) Important as a	(b) Objective	(c) Serves the source of information public interest
HRT (radio and TV)	44%	22%	27%
Radio Maestral (OTI Grantee)	26%	32%	31%
Istria Television	29%	35%	39%
Glas Istria (newspaper)	58%	54%	53%

II. Media uses

Entertainment	28%
News and information	29%
Decision making	8%
Comparing ideas	28%

III. Civil Society Questions

Civil society organizations are important	60%
I want to participate in a civil society	40%
NGOs should cooperate with the government	67%
I had enough objective information during the elections	44%
NGOs helped in disseminating important information during the election.	53%

IV. News Sources

I used the following news sources for information during the election

Press	59%
Radio	37%
Internet	15%
Personal Contacts	58%
Television	59%

SPLIT

<u>I. Credibility</u>	(a) Important as a	(b) Objective	(c) Serves the
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			source of information public interest
HRT (TV and radio)	60%	19%	37%
Radio KL Eurodom (OTI)	23%	38%	37%
ATV (OTI grantee)	51%	52%	56%
Feral Tribune	33%	33%	35%

II. Media uses

Entertainment	69%
News and information	77%
Decision making	8%
Comparing ideas	28%

III. Civil Society

Civil society organizations are important	60%
I want to participate in a civil society	34%
NGOs should cooperate with the government	70%
I had enough objective information during the elections	45%
NGOs helped in disseminating important information during the elections	53%

IV. News Sources

I use the following news sources for information

Press	67%
Radio	28%
Internet	15%
Personal Contacts	46%
Television	81%

VARAZDIN

<u>I. Credibility</u>	(a) Important as a	(b) Objective	(c) Serves the source of information public interest
HRT (TV and radio)	64%	27%	34%

VTV Varazdin	37%	38%	48%
Radio 042	32%	25%	29%
Varazdin Vijesti (newspaper)	62%	50%	66%

II. Media uses

Entertainment	49%
News and information	27%
Decision making	23%
Comparing ideas	41%

III. Civil Society

Civil society organizations are important	62%
I want to participate in a civil society	38%
NGOs should cooperate with the government	73%
I had enough objective information during the elections	60%
NGOs helped in disseminating important information during the elections	63%

IV. News Sources

I use the following news sources for information

Press	68%
Radio	44%
Internet	25%
Personal Contacts	53%
Television	82%

VUKOVAR

<u>I. Credibility</u>	(a) Important as a	(b) Objective	(c) Serves the source of information public interest
HRT (TV and radio)	23%	8%	18%
Radio Dunav	37%	48%	45%
Radio Vukovar	18%	11%	19%
Slavonska TV	11%	16%	10%

II. Media uses

Entertainment	49%
News and information	34%

Decision making	20%
Comparing ideas	20%

III. Civil Society

Civil society organizations are important	69%
I want to participate in a civil society	54%
NGOs should cooperate with the government	74%
I had enough objective information during the elections	48%
NGOs helped in disseminating important information during the elections	71%

IV. News Sources

I use the following news sources for information

Press	41%
Radio	27%
Internet	13%
Personal Contacts	36%
Television	58%

ZAGREB

<u>I. Credibility</u>	(a) Important as a	(b) Objective	(c) Serves the source of information public interest
HRT (radio and TV)	33%	25%	24%
5 to 12 (OTI Grantee)	22%	22%	23%
Radio 101	61%	57%	63%
Week Report	50%	54%	55%
<u>II. Media uses</u>			
Entertainment	26%		
News and information	22%		
Decision making	24%		
Comparing ideas	33%		
<u>III. Civil Society</u>			
Civil society organizations are important			60%
I want to participate in a civil society			34%
NGOs should cooperate with the government			70%
I had enough objective information during the elections			45%
NGOs helped in disseminating important information during the election			53%
<u>IV. News Sources</u>			
I use the following news sources for information during the election.			
Press	64%		
Radio	56%		
Internet	21%		
Personal Contacts	43%		
Television	65%		

Appendix I:

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED ABOUT OTI BOSNIA

State Department, Washington

Michael Adler, Political Officer, Sarajevo
Martha Deutscher, Democracy Officer, Washington

USAID

Pavle Banjac, Project Officer, OTI Banja Luka
Mirela Begic, Former Project Officer, OTI Sarajevo
David Costello, OTI Balkans Team Leader
Clay Epperson, OTI Banja Luka
Peter Graves, Senior Media Advisor, ENI
Dragica Karadzin, Former Project Officer, OTI Tuzla
Dragan Kesic, Former Project Officer, OTI Banja Luka
Susan Kosinski, Sr. Elections Advisor
Angela Martin, OTI Croatia Country Director
Chris Phillips, OTI Director
Marinko Sakic, Former Project Officer, OTI Sarajevo
Patrick Wingate, OTI Bosnia Country Director
William Yeager, USAID Democracy Office, Sarajevo
Jasna Kilalic, USAID Democracy Officer, Sarajevo

Implementing Partners, Bosnia and Herzegovina

David Betts, IMC, Sarajevo
Kristina Conic, Office of the High Representative, Mostar
Bob Gillette, Director IREX, Sarajevo
Trisha Marlow, OSCE, Sarajevo

Grantees

Resid Ahmetovic, Owner and Editor-in-Chief, Radio Bet, Brcho
Darko Aleksic, Marketing Director, Alternative Television-Banja Luka
Zulka Baljak, Co-Executive Director, Center for Civic Cooperation, Livno
Tihomir Bijelic, Project Leader, Family Radio Valentino, Brcho
Milan Cvetinovic, Co-Director, Radio Pan and Panorama, Bijeljina
Sonja Garic, Co-Executive Director, Center for Civic Cooperation, Livno
Mienko Grbic, IDIS, Trebinje
Dragomir Grubac, Director/Editor-in-Chief, Radio Pegaz, Trebenje
Zoran Kalinic, Director, NTV Baja Luka
Zeljko Kopanja, Director, Nezavisne Novine, Banja Luka
Zeljka Mihaljevic, Director, Radio N, Livno
Mladen Pandurevic, The Forum of Democratic Alternatives, Sarajevo

Djuka Panic, Director of Marketing, Hit Radio, Brcho
Jovica Petkovic, Editor, Ekstra Magazine, Bijeljina
Zorana Petkovic, Director, Radio Osvit, Zvornik
Dragan Prlja, Executive Director, Gradjanski Glas, Banja Luka
Amna Popovac, Business Manager, Radio Studio 88, Mostar
Amela Rebac, Program Director, Radio Studio 88, Mostar
Zoran Sarenac, Director, Radio Milici, Milici
Natasa Tesanovic, Director, Alternative Television, Banja Luka
Branko Todorovic, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Bijeljina
Perica Vucinic, Publisher, Reporter Magazine, Banja Luka
Radmila Zigic, Co-Director, Radio Pan and Panorama, Bijeljina
Aleksandar Zivanovic, Director, Radio Palma, Bratunac

APPENDIX J: FOCUS GROUP LOCATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHICS OF PARTICIPANTS

Location of Focus Groups Bosnia

BANJA LUKA

Banja Luka is located in the Western RS. It is home to several independent media outlets including Nezavisne Novine, Reporter Magazine, and a local OBN affiliate, ATV. OTI had an office in Banja Luka for 4 years and supported various NGOs and media. The participants of this focus group were young women who had not received any assistance from OTI.

LIVNO

Livno is located in the Herzegovina region. Its population identifies more with Croatia than with Bosnia. Livno has one very active NGO, the Center for Civic Initiatives, and one independent radio station, Radio N. The participants of this focus group were middle aged women with some exposure to civil society.

BIJELJINA

This town is located in Eastern RS. It is a very hard line area but it has several OTI grantees including Radio PAN, Panarama Magazine, Ekstra, and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. The participants of this focus group were young men who had not received any assistance from OTI.

BRCHO

This town is one of the most controversial places in all of BiH. Once home to Bosniaks, today it is dominated by Serbs. Through UN efforts some of the Bosniaks are returning to their town but not yet to their homes. The participants of this focus group were middle-aged men who had not received any assistance from OTI.

BIHAC

Bihac is located in the northwest region of BiH. OTI was not very active in this region and the focus group conducted here was intended to ascertain the experiences of people who did not have daily contact with the international community. Participants of this focus group were older women who had not received any assistance from OTI.

APPENDIX K: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS

A. Guidelines

1. No right or wrong answers. Here to learn from you.
2. Everyone needs to speak. Not on every issue but when you feel strongly about something that is being said.
3. Here to represent people I cannot speak to; need to share your views with me.
4. I will leave the session and Sanela will stay with you to facilitate discussion. You will feel more comfortable.
5. Audio-taping the session to have Sanela translate the conversation for me to see.
6. Understand that the language is changing ...trying to capture key concepts. If something feels wrong to you, please ask questions.
7. This session is confidential. It will not be published or broadcast.

8. Introduce non-participants in the room. Explain their role.

9. Ask if everyone is comfortable with guidelines.

10. Ask them to introduce themselves and tell a little about what they do.

11. Focus group sample questions:
 12. The role of media
 13. How do you use the media?
 14. Differences between state and alternative media?
 15. Trust or belief in media?
 16. Would what you like to see change?
 17. How did situation change over the time information wise: better, not?
 18. The media relationship with NGOs
 19. Can media help to change the political and societal situation?
 20. Concrete examples.
 21. Did media provide enough objective information during the elections?
 22. Did information received affect the way you voted?

 23. What does it mean to live in your town/area?
 24. How did situation change over the time information wise?
 25. Did better access to information improve the life standard?

APPENDIX L: SURVEY ON THE PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE ABOUT MEDIA IN BOSNIA

This survey is trying to explain and describe the public's attitude toward media in BiH.

Instructions: Please circle the number between each pair of words and phrases (with opposite meanings) that best represents how you feel about that media as a source of information and news.

Newspapers

Very important	5	4	3	2	1	Not important at all
Is Fair	5	4	3	2	1	Is unfair
Is biased	5	4	3	2	1	Is unbiased
Tells the whole story	5	4	3	2	1	Doesn't tell the whole story
Is accurate	5	4	3	2	1	Is inaccurate
Can be trusted	5	4	3	2	1	Cannot be trusted

Broadcast television

Very important	5	4	3	2	1	Not important at all
Is Fair	5	4	3	2	1	Is unfair
Is biased	5	4	3	2	1	Is unbiased
Tells the whole story	5	4	3	2	1	Doesn't tell the whole story
Is accurate	5	4	3	2	1	Is inaccurate
Can be trusted	5	4	3	2	1	Cannot be trusted

Radio

Very important	5	4	3	2	1	Not important at all
Is Fair	5	4	3	2	1	Is unfair
Is biased	5	4	3	2	1	Is unbiased
Tells the whole story	5	4	3	2	1	Doesn't tell the whole story
Is accurate	5	4	3	2	1	Is inaccurate
Can be trusted	5	4	3	2	1	Cannot be trusted

Magazines

Very important	5	4	3	2	1	Not important at all
Is Fair	5	4	3	2	1	Is unfair
Is biased	5	4	3	2	1	Is unbiased
Tells the whole story	5	4	3	2	1	Doesn't tell the whole story
Is accurate	5	4	3	2	1	Is inaccurate
Can be trusted	5	4	3	2	1	Cannot be trusted

Media Scales

Instructions: Here is the list of statements that people made about media. Next to each statement are numbers. Please circle the number that describes the best the level of importance of each statement to you. Numbers are on scale of 1 to 5, with 5 meaning you fully agree with the statement and the number 1 meaning you fully disagree with the statement.

1. Television presents things as they really are in life.
5 4 3 2 1
2. If I see something on TV, I can't be sure it really is that way.
5 4 3 2 1
3. Television lets me really see how other people live.
4. TV does not show life as it really is.
5. Television lets me see what happens in other places as if I was really there.
6. I use media to obtain information.
7. Media helps me make important decisions in life.
8. I use media for entertainment.
9. I use media to obtain information so I can pass it to others.
10. I use media because I like to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.

Demographic Data

1. Sex? Male____ Female____
2. Age? _____ .