



# MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THREE COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM PROJECTS

FEBRUARY 22, 2013

This publication was produced by the QED Group, LLC for the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Jeffrey Swedberg (QED), Evaluation Team Lead; and Lainie Reisman (QED Consultant), under PDQ II TO#75. Data collection services provided by IPSOS Synovate, Kenya; and Data and Research Solutions, Somaliland and Somalia.

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## Executive Summary

Beneficiaries of USAID's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) projects in East Africa have a demonstrated advantage over comparison groups on a host of variables known to be drivers of violent extremism. In a survey of almost 1,500 ethnic Somali youths in Somalia and Kenya administered in November and December 2012, full beneficiaries of three USAID CVE projects were compared to similar numbers of partial beneficiaries (mostly program drop outs or less involved participants) and a comparison group of non-beneficiaries. This quantitative data forms the core of the evaluation.

In Kenya, the programs evaluated included the Kenya Transition Initiative – Eastleigh (KTI-E), administered in the Somali enclave of Nairobi of Eastleigh; and the Garissa Youth project (G-Youth), administered in the predominantly Somali city of Garissa in Kenya's North Eastern Province. In Somalia, the evaluation focused on the Somali Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP), with data collected in Hargeisa, Bosaso and Mogadishu. Survey questions were grouped into thematic areas representing factors that push or pull individuals into violent extremism as identified by USAID (see Figure i).

The five survey thematic areas, referred to in short form as *engagement*, *efficacy*, *youth associations*, *identity* and *violence*, are the primary organizing principles behind the data analyzed in this evaluation. The development hypothesis of the CVE programs is that a decreased risk of extremism will result when the enabling environment for extremism is reduced, as measured by these thematic areas (or core indicators). While the three programs evaluated here have different emphases and are at different phases of implementation, it can be stated that USAID CVE programs are showing results in those areas, namely *engagement*, and to a lesser degree *efficacy*, *support for youth associations* and *identity*, where evidence shows there is the greatest need. The results were not noticeable with regard to *violence in the name of Islam*, a thematic area in which the need, at least as measured in this survey, is not as great.

### Findings

**Full beneficiaries scored higher than comparison groups in most areas, particularly *engagement*.** The evaluation team found that, in aggregate, full beneficiary strata had significantly higher levels of *engagement* with local authorities with moderate levels of advantage in the areas of *efficacy*, *identity* and *belief in the power of youth associations* over the

Figure i: Survey Thematic Areas

1. **Level of civic engagement:** measured by response regarding attendance at community meetings; issues raised with authorities; and participation in decision-making.
2. **Level of efficacy:** measured by response regarding satisfaction with local government decision making; and attitude towards how much an ordinary person can do to solve community problems.
3. **Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations:** measured by response regarding belief that youth associations make a positive contribution; belief that youth were respected by local leaders; and felt supported by youth organizations.
4. **Level of individual's sense of identity:** measured by response regarding the level to which a survey respondent felt prepared to enter the job market; felt optimism about a better future; and believed education and training were more important than family connections in finding a job.
5. **Level of support for use of violence in the name of Islam:** measured by response regarding the level to which a survey respondent: believed using violence in the name of Islam was not justified; and believed violent activities are not permitted under Islamic law.

comparison group. There was no substantial difference between the two strata on rejection of *violence in the name of Islam*. The difference between full and partial beneficiaries, while often noticeable in the aggregate in favor of full beneficiaries, was usually not statistically significant.

The primary unit of analysis for measuring achievement is the average or “mean” difference between the strata. Two mean difference numbers are tracked and subjected to the t test for statistical significance. The first is between the full beneficiaries (stratum 1) and the comparison group (stratum 3). The second mean difference is between the full beneficiaries (stratum 1) and partial beneficiaries (stratum 2).

For the purpose of this evaluation, special attention is paid to statistically significant mean differences – mostly between strata 1 and 3. There were 36 of these significant mean differences between full beneficiaries and the comparison group, many of which were in the *engagement* area. This indicates that USAID CVE programs are showing results in getting youth to engage with their local government officials, attend community meetings and participate in decision-making. Other statistically significant differences were found in the areas of *efficacy*, *youth associations* and *identity*. Mean differences between full beneficiaries and partial beneficiaries - those who dropped out of a program or, in the case of Eastleigh, participated in programs at lower level than full

beneficiaries, - were not, for the most part, statistically significant, although full beneficiaries usually scored higher than partial ones<sup>1</sup>.

**Qualitative Survey Findings** The evaluation team triangulated the quantitative results with focus groups that further explored these issue areas with youth in the surveyed communities.

Figure ii Average Mean Difference between Full Beneficiaries and Comparison Group (1-5)




Figure iii Average Aggregate Score (1-5) by Issue Area



<sup>1</sup> The small, but usually consistent, difference between the full and partial beneficiaries, offers some evidence that the difference between full beneficiaries and the comparison group was not simply a result of selection bias.

Focus groups revealed that full and partial beneficiaries of USAID's CVE programs in East Africa were highly engaged in their communities, attending community meetings and advocating for specific issues. Much of this *engagement* is occurring through youth associations, of which project beneficiaries have joined in large numbers. However, this high level of *engagement* is not always matched by a corresponding sense of *efficacy*, i.e. a feeling that this engagement was productive. In the area of *identity*, measured by the degree to which youth were optimistic about their job prospects and a meritocratic future, beneficiaries were very positive, particularly in Somalia and Garissa where these elements were emphasized. Attitudes on the subject of *violence in the name of Islam* were universal – both beneficiaries and youth in the comparison groups condemn it. However, quantitative data suggests that, in the aggregate, most ethnic Somali youth in East Africa believe the U.S. is engaged in the region to fight Islam rather than to fight terrorism.

**Recommendations** The contrasting results between high levels of *engagement* and low levels of *efficacy* indicate that more emphasis needs to be placed on working with authorities to be more responsive to youth priorities and open improved channels of communication and dialogue. In Hargeisa especially, it was clear from focus groups that youth who are *engaged*, but have a low sense of *efficacy*, were frustrated and possibly vulnerable to extremist attitudes. This deficit of responsiveness of authorities to take youth voices and opinions into account should be addressed with adjustments to programs *to emphasize projects addressing youth voice and influence*.

Other program areas to consider based on quantitative data include a *media messaging project* to address low perceptions of youth efficacy. A media project could also ensure the commonly held belief that violence and Islam are not compatible finds a voice on the airwaves that can compete with more extremist messages already being broadcast. Finally, a media messaging project could dispel the widely held belief that the U.S. is engaged in a war on Islam. In the Sahel, USAID's CVE media interventions have shown results and could be emulated.

*More refined beneficiary targeting* should also be emphasized so that a broader representation of youth are exposed to programming, not simply those that have the skills, knowledge and attitude to self-select into program activities. Such targeting needs to adapt to locally changing conditions and mechanisms need to be built into programs to enable rapid response to opportunities. Programs need to undertake a strategic analysis to identify the youth most at-risk in the implementation areas. For example, the United States has officially recognized the Government of Somalia for the first time in over 20 years, due in part to security improvements. USAID should capitalize on this development to expand programs into underserved areas (i.e. South Central Somalia) where, focus group evidence shows, there is significant "conflict fatigue" and renewed optimism toward the future rather than focusing on areas that have already shown significant improvement (i.e. Somaliland).

Improved targeting can be informed by a greater emphasis *on broad stakeholder engagement* to reduce the enabling environment for extremism (as opposed to individual training provision), which could also lead to improvements in community relationships and build support for youth in traditionally elder dominated decision-making structures. The lack of involvement of parents/caregivers in any of the programs is a critical oversight, particularly given the very positive views of parents as expressed in the focus group discussions. USAID might also consider more direct support to established community organizations, coupled with the necessary institutional capacity building support for community organizations and NGOs alike. Such an approach is supported by the USAID Forward goals, which emphasize local sustainability and partnerships.



Programs might also consider a more direct approach in *working in madrasas*. There are several precedents for such an approach (and some work has been done in this regards in G-Youth). Given the almost universal participation of youth in some form of Islamic education, and the role of extremist religious leaders in recruitment, a program offering neutral skills (i.e. English language) would likely be welcomed.

One of the biggest challenges to the implementation of all projects has been the low capacity of grantees. *Capacity building should be integrated into all grant programs* and the establishment of direct relationships with community groups should be considered. Capacity building for local NGOs is also one of the key principles of the USAID Forward initiative. Depending on local conditions, future CVE programming could focus more on community support by providing in-kind support (as is the case in KTI-E) rather than channeling resources through NGOs, although this requires much more staff and oversight and does not guarantee specific outcomes.

USAID could also consider *establishing common metrics* for the programs, both in terms of outputs and outcomes, and regularly assess changes over time. For example, the same or slightly modified survey questions can be re-administered on an annual basis.

Finally, findings and conclusions from interviews suggest that future CVE programming should consider expanding activities in the areas of *countering the rise of youth gangs, implementing prevention-oriented programs with a younger cohort of children and continued innovative use of information communications technology*.

## Acronym and Abbreviation List

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BAC	Business Advisory Council
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
EDC	Education Development Center
G-Youth	Garissa Youth Program
HAVYOCO	Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee
ICG	International Crisis Group
IYO	Interim Youth Organization
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KMYA	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance
KTI	Kenya Transition Initiative
KTI-E	Kenya Transition Initiative - Eastleigh
MOYAS	Kenyan Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports
MP	Member of Parliament
NEP	North Eastern Province
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
SDS	Sustainable Development Solutions (Kenyan NGO)
SMS	Short Message Service (text messaging service component of phone)
SONYO	Somaliland National Youth Organization
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
SYLP	Somali Youth Livelihoods Program
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)
USAID/AFR	United States Agency for International Development/Africa Bureau
USG	United States Government
VE	Violent Extremism

## Introduction:

This mid-term evaluative study of USAID's counter-extremism programming in the East Africa region was commissioned by USAID/East Africa in 2012. The evaluation looks at three USAID-funded youth empowerment programs operating in East Africa targeted at ethnic Somali youth in Somalia and Kenya: the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) Eastleigh Program (August 2011-June 2014); the Garissa Youth Program, (October 2008-January 2013, extended as North Eastern Province Yes Youth Can Program, February 2013-February 2016); and the Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program (March 2008-December 2011). The programs are separately administered and have varying activities, but all have a common countering violent extremism (CVE) purpose – to foster and promote a positive sense of identity for youth vulnerable to recruitment by extremist elements in a region with a substantial Al-Shabab presence and a history of Al-Qaeda actions.

All three programs' designs applied the principles in the USAID *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* and the *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming*, but adopted distinct approaches to empower youth in the given contexts. The Somalia program emphasized livelihood training and job placement with a limited emphasis on messaging and the role of youth in the community. While also having a priority focus on youth livelihoods, the Garissa program focuses more on enhancing the role of youth in the community and providing messages about positive behavior and personal choice. The KTI-Eastleigh program has a primary emphasis on messaging and the role of youth in the community, with youth livelihood a secondary component of the program.

This study is not intended as a performance evaluation of any of the three examined projects, but as an overarching evaluation of the comparative results the projects have produced regarding youth resistance to extremist recruitment. Recognizing that the three projects were designed for slightly different target populations facing different circumstances, this study examines the relative differences in youth attitudes in ethnic Somali populations. These populations are targeted by programs along an activity continuum, ranging from a preponderance of livelihood activities to a primary focus on a positive youth sense of identity.

CVE programming is an important component in the US Government (USG) response to terrorism in Africa. Implementation of USAID CVE programming through development assistance has been evolving since 2006. This evaluation seeks to build upon experience to-date and identify lessons learned to inform ongoing and future implementation, utilizing tools that have proven effective in measuring such activity in the past. The methodology builds on that used in the USAID/AFR-commissioned impact evaluation of USAID's CVE programming in the Sahel region of Africa (Chad, Niger and Mali) in 2011. The Sahel evaluation utilized common mini-surveys of attitudes, administered in three countries, and compared the results along a 1 to 5 Likert Scale. It was reinforced by focus groups and key informant interviews.

This East Africa CVE evaluation utilized similar methods to the Sahel impact evaluation, but refines the methodology. It uses the same common survey on the Likert Scale, but increases the sample sizes to increase statistical significance. Unlike the usual impact evaluation, this study focuses on three populations – full program beneficiaries, partial beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Therefore, it has similarities to a tracer study in that individual youth beneficiaries had to be identified and surveyed rather than relying on randomized household surveys.

The findings of this evaluation will contribute to furthering USAID's expertise in the field of CVE by influencing the next phases of program design. It will advance CVE program monitoring and evaluation efforts, while also informing the implementation of USAID's new policy<sup>2</sup> on the CVE development approach.

## Background:

**East Africa Context** This evaluation looks at data on Somali populations collected at sites with different histories and circumstances. A common ingredient in all data collection sites – Eastleigh and Garissa in Kenya; Hargeisa in the self-declared independent republic of Somaliland; Bosaso in the autonomous Somali region of Puntland; and Mogadishu in south central Somalia – is the presence of protracted, violent local conflicts and a history of internal struggles. According to the 2009 Drivers guide to Violent Extremism, Kenya is at the “medium” level of the threat continuum, higher than Niger, Mauritania or even (at the time) Mali. Somalia is listed at the highest level of the VE continuum (along with Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan), with an active insurgency and regular deployment of terrorist tactics. Another defining feature of these areas is the constantly changing dynamic at the community level, whether it is the increased level of attacks in both Eastleigh and Garissa, or the impact of local elections in Hargeisa.

**Somalia** Despite some modest security improvements over the past year, Somalia is still one of the most terrorist-affected countries in the world. According to the most recent report by the National Counterterrorism Center, Somalia ranked first worldwide in the number of kidnappings in 2011 with 2,527, more than the next seven ranked countries combined. Somalia ranked fourth in the number of deaths (1,101) due to terrorist attacks in 2011, less only than Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Terrorist attacks in Somalia are not confined only to the south central region. On December 5, 2012, during the fieldwork phase of this evaluation, an Al-Shabab attack killed or wounded 31 people in Puntland, an area increasingly infiltrated by Al-Shabab fighters driven out of the south. There is a fear that Puntland based militants may try and forge closer ties with counterparts in Yemen, separated from Somalia by only a narrow stretch of water. In Somaliland, relative prosperity and stability prevail, although a sense of vulnerability also exists, particularly with Al-Shabab incursions outside of its traditional strongholds in Mogadishu and Kismayo on the rise. This has resulted from the increasingly underground nature of the insurgency following the fall of formal Al-Shabab rule in the south.

Somalia's terrorism problems date to the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and the subsequent absence of a functioning central government. Since 2006, the preeminent threat from Somalia has come from the emergence of Al-Shabab, whose name means ‘the youth’ in Arabic. Al-Shabab leaders have become increasingly close to Al-Qaeda, deploying suicide bombers and attracting jihadists from around the world. Al-Shabab's links to Al-Qaeda – along with those of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region of Africa and Boko


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<sup>2</sup> USAID released *The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency* in September 2011: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACS400.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACS400.pdf).

Haram in northern Nigeria — have generated fears of an overarching jihadist alliance capable of coordinating attacks on the United States and Western interests.<sup>3</sup>

Al-Shabab emerged after the Islamic Courts regime that had briefly united Somalia was overthrown in an Ethiopian invasion as a new front in the global war on terrorism. Al-Shabab generated support from many Somalis who saw the Ethiopian incursion as a Christian crusade into a Muslim land and were outraged at reports of Ethiopian troops raping Somali women, looting mosques and killing civilians. In its online propaganda, Al-Shabab conflated nationalist sentiments with religious ideology, following a tactic honed by Al-Qaeda. After Ethiopian troops withdrew, Al-Shabab advanced, and by early 2009 controlled most of southern Somalia. Initial support for Al-Shabab was significant, as the group did provide some security as well as support for community development. However, as Al-Shabab began to impose a strict form of Sharia law, this level of support dwindled to the point where communities simply tolerated (or discreetly opposed) their leadership.

Throughout the late 2000s, African Union peacekeepers in Somalia were largely confined to parts of Mogadishu and offered little resistance to Al-Shabab. The AU mandate was expanded, however, after the 2010 Al-Shabab suicide bombs that killed over 70 in the Ugandan capital of Kampala. In October 2011, a coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against Al-Shabab. Kenya agreed subsequently to subsume its forces under the AMISOM general command. By September 2012, the Kenyan military took Kismayo, the last remaining large Al-Shabab-held city. For Al-Shabab, which was driven out of Mogadishu the year before, losing Kismayo was a major blow. The port of Kismayo had allowed the militants to bring in weapons and raise money for operations by imposing fees.



<sup>3</sup> Indeed, Al-Shabab has extended its reach to the United States, where it has recruited young fighters. Most came from Somali refugee families and settled in gang-ridden enclaves of Minneapolis from the frustrated ranks of Somali immigrants. In October 2008, Shirwa Ahmed, became the first confirmed American suicide bomber, when he drove a car full of explosives into a compound in Puntland after being trained by Al-Shabab. Over 20 young Somali Americans are known to have joined Al-Shabab.

At the end of 2012, Al-Shabab had an estimated 3,000 hard-core fighters and 2,000 allied gunmen, many from the Hawiye clan. While Al-Shabab is considerably weakened, its terrorist attacks in Somalia have continued, some in parts of the country previously unaffected.

**Kenya** While not suffering from terrorism at the rate of its neighbor Somalia, Kenya has been the site of some of the largest and most significant terrorist attacks of the last several decades. In 1998 an Al-Qaeda bomb at the US Embassy in Nairobi killed 224, including 12 US citizens, and wounded 5,000. In 2002, the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa was bombed by Al-Qaeda, killing 15 and wounding 40. In 2012, Kenya has suffered a less publicized and dramatic series of terrorist attacks, focused primarily on Somali areas of the country.

Kenya, historically known for its non-belligerent foreign policy, is one of the few nations in East Africa that has never been led by the military. However, Kenya's North Eastern Province (NEP), one of the least developed areas of the country, and largely populated by Somalis and other pastoralist ethnic groups, has a history of conflict going back to the beginning of independent Kenya.

**Shifita War** From 1963-67 around 2,000 mostly-ethnic Somali Kenyans, identified by the Kenyan authorities as "shifita" (bandits) were killed in a low-intensity war.<sup>4</sup> The ethnic Somali regions of Kenya, making up 20 percent of its land area, had received little development during colonial times. Ethnic Somalis in the Horn of Africa were dispersed across Italian and British Somaliland (which united to form Somalia in 1960), Ethiopia, French Somaliland (now Djibouti) and Kenya. The new nation of Somalia, which had aspirations for a "greater Somalia," provided a limited supply of small arms, which were used to launch isolated attacks on the Kenyan armed forces, police officers and administrative officials.

One tactic successfully used by the Kenyan military, with assistance from British trainers, was the "villagization" of around 10 percent of the population of the Somali-populated areas of northeastern Kenya. Under villagization, often nomadic ethnic Somalis were forcibly settled into newly constructed villages built around police posts, thereby denying shifita units easy access to food supplies and intelligence.<sup>5</sup> The war was concluded in 1967 when a peace deal with Somalia ended support to shifita rebels, most of whom took advantage of a Kenyan government offer of amnesty.

**Effect of Conflict in Somalia** In recent years, ethnic Somalis have become a politically significant minority in Kenya. Somali professionals are increasingly appointed to important government positions. Ethnic Somali Members of Parliament, such as Yusuf Hassan of Eastleigh and Garissa MP Adan Duale, have become influential party leaders. The coalition Kenyan government has created a ministry to spearhead development in NEP and other arid regions and a modest affirmative action policy is opening opportunities in higher education and state employment. However, the cumulative effect of two decades of conflict in neighboring Somalia has begun to strain the relationship between the Kenyan Government and Kenyan Somalis once again. The long and porous border is impossible for Kenya to police effectively. Small arms flow across the border, creating a cycle of demand that fuels armed criminality and encourages clans to rearm. According the International Crisis Group (ICG), Somali clan-identity politics, animosities and jingoism frequently spill over into North Eastern Province, poisoning its politics, undermining cohesion and triggering violent clashes. The stream of refugees into overflowing camps (the Dadab refugee camp on the Somali border is one of the largest in world with over half a million residents) has resulted in a spillover into urban centers, such as Garissa

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<sup>4</sup> Branch, Daniel; Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011, Yale University Press, 2011, p 27

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p 32

and Nairobi's Eastleigh neighborhood, competing with other Kenyans for jobs and business opportunities.<sup>6</sup> Nairobi, the commercial hub of East Africa, (and more specifically Eastleigh), has reportedly become a logistical center for Al-Shabab operations.

The rise of Al-Shabab along the Kenyan border areas, coupled with increasingly bold criminal activity by Somali gangs inside Kenya, brought a new level of crisis in 2011. The Kenyan Army, which is trained by British and American advisers, began providing covert aid to Somali militias along the border in an effort to push back Al-Shabab and create a buffer zone along the border. In October 2011, under the Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) umbrella, Kenya invaded Somalia after a number of attacks on Westerners in Eastern Kenya.<sup>7</sup> Known as Operation Linda Nchi (Swahili for Protect the Country), the conflict was further fueled by historical tensions between Kenya and Somalia and long-standing clan politics.

### **The Terrorism Backlash**

Since the Kenyan incursion into Somalia and the occupation of Kismayo, terrorism in Kenya has become a frequent occurrence. During the period of the evaluation field work (November 11 – December 16), multiple attacks occurred in Garissa and Eastleigh – the primary Kenyan foci of this study. (See Figure 2)

Despite the focus on terrorism by ethnic

Somalis, it is estimated that up to 600 non-Somali Kenyans are currently fighting with Al-Shabab, many of them recent converts.<sup>8</sup>

According to the ICG, there is great disaffection with the “official” Muslim leaders, many of whom are widely viewed as elitist and self-serving; their integrity sullied through ties with the regime or foreign interests; and disconnected from harsh community realities. This trust and credibility deficit compounds the leadership crisis and undermines community cohesion. Radical organizations have emerged in the last decade to challenge the “official” leadership and institutions. Their political activism and radical anti-establishment politics are attractive to many youths, disillusioned with what they see as timid, pragmatist and moderate political views and

#### **Figure 2 - Violence in Garissa and Eastleigh during the Five-Week Evaluation Fieldwork**

**November 18, 2012** – Ten people were killed and 25 injured when an explosive went off on a mini-bus in Eastleigh. Looting and destruction of Somali-owned homes and shops by angry mobs of young Kenyans ensued.

**November 19, 2012** - Three Kenyan soldiers changing a tire in Garissa were killed by gunmen. One woman was shot and hundreds of shops were burned to the ground as the Kenyan army responded to the killings.

**December 5, 2012** - An improvised explosive device exploded in Eastleigh, killing one and injuring six others near the Joska supermarket.

**December 8, 2012** – Five people were killed and 35 wounded when a grenade was thrown outside a mosque in Eastleigh. Among those seriously injured was Eastleigh's MP Yusuf Hassan. Following the attack, police arrested 300 in a “general swoop.”

**December 9, 2012** – A Kenyan army sergeant on vacation and a civilian were killed in Garissa by gunmen.

<sup>6</sup> The Somali population of Eastleigh, originally an Asian neighborhood, is now estimated at over 100,000 (ICG, 2012)

<sup>7</sup> In October 2011, Somali gunmen kidnapped two female European employees of Doctors without Borders who were traveling through the Dadab refugee camp in Kenya. A month earlier, Somali gunmen attacked the Kiwayu Safari Village beach resort in Kenya, killing a British tourist and kidnapping his wife. In another incident, a disabled French tourist was abducted from a beachside bungalow on Manda Island off Kenya's Indian Ocean coast. Despite the Kenyan Government's assertion, it is not clear if there was an Al-Shabab connection to these attacks.

<sup>8</sup> Reuters, May 20 2012; <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/30/us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530>

style of the established institutions, particularly the lack of tangible results and dividends provided by the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

**USAID CVE Theory** USAID's response to this extremist challenge has consisted of programming based on countering violent extremism (CVE) theory. USAID has been refining its approach to CVE activities for several years. As of 2013, there are three primary documents that guide program design. Two documents from 2009 – the *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*; and *Development Assistance and Counter Extremism: A Guide to Programming* – have provided the framework for understanding the driving factors behind VE and the broad approaches for designing a development response. In 2011, USAID released a policy: the *Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency*. Under the 2011 policy, USAID operating units contemplating CVE programs are directed to identify and prioritize CVE drivers, set clear objectives, design a focused set of interventions and systematically evaluate related measures of progress and impact. While the design of these three evaluated programs predated the 2011 strategy, USAID thinking on CVE, as reflected in the Drivers and Programming Guides, influenced the program design in Kenya and Somalia.

The literature of CVE distinguishes between push and pull factors. “Push” factors include underlying grievances such as marginalization, frustrated expectations and unmet basic needs. “Pull” factors are associated with the personal rewards that membership in a VE movement provide, such as access to material resources, social status and respect from peers; a sense of belonging, adventure and self-esteem; or the prospect of achieving glory and fame. USAID has found that pull factors are necessary for push factors to have a direct influence on individual level radicalization and recruitment. Therefore, USAID CVE programs address both push and pull factors, consisting of vocational and technical training, life skills, employment search support and civic engagement with a main focus on youth empowerment.

**VE Drivers** When looking at the threat of CVE in East Africa, multiple drivers can be identified. For the purpose of this evaluation they are categorized into five categories: lack of *civic engagement*; perception that legitimate engagement has no *efficacy*; lack of belief in legitimate avenues for youth identity and engagement, such as *youth associations*; a distorted sense of *identity*; and a belief that *violence* is permitted or even encouraged by Islam to address grievances. The activities implemented to address these VE drivers are measured in this evaluation.

**Engagement** To varying degrees, the evaluated programs operate in poorly governed areas with a history of local conflicts going back years. Youth in such environments are less likely to become engaged in a positive way with local governments. Moreover, local conflicts have created chaos, incapacitated government institutions and resulted in a power vacuum that has been exploited by VE organizations. VE groups such as Al-Shabab have had some success in co-opting this conflict and imposing their transnational agenda on local dynamics.

**Perception of Efficacy** Most recent research has found that it is not poverty but the acute form of social exclusion by the government and society that elicits support for VE.<sup>9</sup> People, especially youth, that feel excluded or marginalized will feel they, and others like them, have no ability to impact decision making. USAID-sponsored research has found that perceptions of social exclusion and marginality are particularly prevalent among peri-urban/slum youth and in environments where family structures have eroded and normal social comparisons no longer

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<sup>9</sup> See USAID's Guide to the Drivers of Violence Extremism, 2009 for a fuller discussion as well as bibliography that informs this observation.



check behavior. VE groups may exploit this isolation by offering an escape, a sense of purpose and inclusion in a collective movement.

This phenomenon is more pronounced when associated with the presence of repressive regimes that are widely viewed by segments of their populations as illegitimate and politically bankrupt. In the case of Somali enclaves in Kenya, a perception of a lack of political rights and civil liberties has instilled a belief in some that violence is the only means for political change. In the case of South Central Somalia in particular, whereby the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) held largely symbolic control over parts of Mogadishu only, the lack of state structures to provide services and ad hoc local decision making processes, dominated by clan elders, may have contributed to some youth finding Al-Shabab an appealing option.

**Value of Youth Associations** As the USAID Drivers Guide explains, social marginality may also operate as a powerful driver not so much directly (because individuals resent being socially excluded) but indirectly as it results in young people having too much time on their hands. Boredom and idleness are significant drivers of VE among the youth. *Youth associations* offer an alternative to idleness, focused on positive, peaceful, rather than extremist or violent activities.

Research on VE pull factors has found that social networks and group dynamics may be among the most important drivers of radicalization and recruitment. Individuals may drift into VE groups with friends or as a result of the influence of relatives, neighbors or a charismatic local preacher. Therefore, it is critical that alternative networks be established and/or encouraged.

**Identity** Increasingly, research on CVE cites issues of “*identity*” as critical drivers for VE. It has been noted that spokespersons for VE movements seldom mention underlying social and economic conditions, but are more concerned with issues of identity, existential threats, perceived humiliation, cultural domination and oppression. This is critical in ethnic Somali areas of East Africa. The quest for dignity, recognition and respect (not only for oneself, but also for one’s community and one’s culture), and the perception that one is being denied all of that at both collective and personal levels, often is a critical driver of VE. That is particularly true in societies in which the sense of collective humiliation on the one hand, and the sense of direct, immediate threat to personal honor and integrity are closely intertwined.

One of the most important VE drivers consists of personal relationships, social bonds and group dynamics. Empirical evidence suggests this factor often trumps all alleged push factors combined. Youth at risk for VE in East Africa often come from peri-urban areas characterized by high levels of social fragmentation and isolation and anomie. They are prone to involvement in petty crime and illicit activities (smuggling, drug dealing, theft) prior to their involvement in extremism. The path from marginality to VE is exacerbated by the weakening of traditional checks on deviant behavior. Across East Africa, urbanization of recent years has shattered centuries-old mechanisms of social regulation (those once associated with the nomadic or rural lifestyle or those that used to exist in tightly integrated urban quarters). Youth susceptibility to the lures of VE organizations increases where family-, clan- and ethnic-based structures that used to constrain anti-social or violent behavior have frayed or disappeared. In particular, previous assessments have found that family authority is declining in Garissa.

When youth begin to adopt extremist mindsets within a community, there is a risk that this can spread to the community at large. Exposure to harsh and indiscriminate government repression in reaction to isolated acts of VE not only may push individuals into VE organizations, but enhances the likelihood of community support and complicity for the actions of those organizations. Violence is seen as a form of revenge for the violence done to the community

by those in power. VE leaders benefit when their actions prompt governments into over-reacting. Over-reaction supports recruitment efforts; creates community support and enables VE organizations to present their violence as a form of reciprocal (and therefore legitimate) brutality.

***Rejection of Violence in the Name of Islam*** The dynamics of Islam as a motivating force for violence vary considerably depending on the program location. In Kenya, where an ethnic Somali population has existed at the margins of Kenyan society for decades, there is a perceived historical legacy of foreign domination, oppression, subjugation and interference. In Somalia, events of the past two decades have resulted in multiple foreign interventions from predominantly non-Muslim militaries. These legacies make it easier for “victimization narratives” to take hold. A perception exists among some ethnic Somalis in both Somalia and Kenya that current events represent a continuation of these much older historical patterns of foreign oppression, domination and/or interference. According to the Drivers of VE Guide, a very important part of the appeal of the Salafi jihadist worldview stems from its ability to blend past and present victimization into a single, simple, but internally coherent narrative. In that narrative, the memory of past oppressions provides the primary lens through which current forms of victimization are being apprehended; in turn, current oppression (real or perceived) plays a key role in nurturing the memory of past wrongs inflicted on entire societies and cultures.<sup>10</sup>

Al-Shabab has been able to tap into notions of community honor, dignity and self-respect, and/or into nationalist feelings, in order to legitimize the resort to violent tactics. In parts of Somalia, they have altered previous societal norms, such as the moral and ethical inadmissibility of suicide bombings. As an Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabab has sought to turn the perception of suicide bombing from a sin into a virtue, and from a shameful deed into a demonstration of bravery and selflessness.

Justice is a critical value in Islam. The perception of cruel, degrading treatment to an individual at the hands of the police or security forces, especially among non-Muslims, can lead to a desire for revenge. The harsher and more widespread the brutality, the greater the spur to VE activities and the more support VE may garner from the local communities. In places like Kenya, where Muslims are a minority, socio-economic and/or political discrimination may be perceived as linked to disrespect for Islam and Muslims, provoking further radicalization.

Suspicion on the part of the Muslim community in Kenya is longstanding. In a 2008 pilot assessment, USAID noted a tendency of the Muslim population to believe that the US Government was interested in them only because of its concern about extremism.

**The USAID Response** USAID’s targeted response to this dynamic in East Africa began in 2008 with CVE activities in Somalia, then early 2009 in the town of Garissa in northeast Kenya, and finally 2011 in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi, Kenya. These programs have been operating during different time periods, in different community contexts, and were informed by different levels of analysis. The Garissa and Eastleigh programs were based upon a violent extremism (VE) risk assessment, while the Somali program was based upon a broader country-level counterterrorism imperative. However, all three programs applied the principles found in the USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism and the Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism Programming Guide.

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<sup>10</sup> Historic marginalization and resentment in Kenya has been alleviated by the existence of democratic channels for addressing grievances and a concerted effort by the government to provide increasing resources to the area.

*Somali Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP)* Branded in Somali as Shaqodoon (Job Seeker), SYLP initiated activities in 2008 and, during its four-year duration, trained over 10,900 young people throughout Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia. Partners and trainees were spread throughout the regions with offices in Hargeisa, Bosaso, Las Anood, Garoowe, Gaalkayo and Mogadishu. The program focused almost exclusively on technical skills training, ranging from traditional vocational and technical training areas (for example plumbing, carpentry and tailoring) to non-traditional market niches (such as market research, water filter production and media/journalism). Unique to the Shaqodoon program was a firm emphasis on placements following the training, with 78 percent of youth placed in jobs, internships, apprenticeships or supported in micro-business development.

While the initial project design was meant to focus on the areas of highest instability (i.e. Mogadishu and other parts of South-Central Somalia), security concerns soon resulted in a program based in Hargeisa and later extending to other areas in Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia. In 2011, program activities in South Central Somalia shifted from Mogadishu to the semi-autonomous regions of Galmudug, Heeb and Himaan. Thus the activities in Somaliland were implemented over a three year period, with repeat grants given to groups that performed well. In most areas of Puntland and South Central Somalia, implementation on the ground was limited to roughly 12 months. SYLP targeted a wide range of youth based on levels of education, training and literacy. Gender balance was promoted with 41 percent of the total trainees being women.<sup>11</sup>

The program was implemented largely through sub-grants to a total of 58 mostly local partners. As local NGO capacity was low, additional elements focused on institutional strengthening, particularly in grants management, were incorporated into the program after the pilot period. In later years, SYLP increased its emphasis on the pedagogical aspects of skills training (e.g. curriculum design, lesson planning and evaluation) and instructor quality.

In a notable innovation, all trainees were registered into and used the computer and cellular-phone based “InfoMatch” System. InfoMatch enabled employers to post opportunities and recruit candidates through an electronic system and trainees were able to upload mini-CVs and receive messages about openings for which they were qualified. This allowed employers and trainees alike to identify opportunities and matches based on qualifications and skills, not family connections, as has typically been the case in Somalia. In addition to InfoMatch, the program recorded and delivered a series of interactive radio instruction programs in financial literacy and entrepreneurship (that were later adapted for use in Garissa and Eastleigh).

SYLP forged strong ties with government officials and private sector representatives. A large portion of the grants were issued to private businesses, an innovation lauded by the government and the private sector alike.

*Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth)* The Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth) is a localized intervention that focuses on a combination of livelihoods/skills training as well as civic engagement in the Garissa Municipality of Kenya's North Eastern Province. Almost all of the program participants are ethnic Somali youth. G-Youth has four primary pillars of intervention: Youth Action, Youth Education, Youth Work and Youth Civics. After completion of a three-week intensive work readiness program, Garissa youth can apply for entry into specialized programs, for example IT training through CISCO systems, market research training provided by Intermedia, or radio production and training provided by EDC. The G-Youth program has also established a youth radio program broadcast on the Kenyan StarFM channel that reaches youth

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<sup>11</sup> See [Somali Youth Livelihoods Program Final Report](#) for more details.

throughout the North East Province and beyond. G-Youth has provided educational scholarships for hundreds of youth and placed hundreds more in internship opportunities with local businesses.

In addition to providing direct support to selected youth in the community of Garissa, G-Youth has provided programs and services that all youth can benefit from in the area. In conjunction with the National Library Service, G-Youth has rehabilitated the local library structure, creating and staffing a career-counseling center with a specific youth wing open to all young people. G-Youth also sponsored two Youth Summits, bringing together youth (and elders) from the broader community to learn about opportunities and helped design a youth action plan with ongoing positive messaging and information provided through radio programs. G-Youth provides support for cultural and recreational activities as prioritized by the youth.

Many of G-Youth's successes can be attributed to the relationships it developed with local government authorities (notably the Member of Parliament), religious leaders (including the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) and clan leaders. While initially viewed with some skepticism, G-Youth is now widely appreciated in Garissa as a rare program dedicated to this often neglected part of the country. The program is poised to expand its activities to youth in Wajir and Mandera, two other under-served regions in North Eastern Province.

*Kenya Transition Initiative – Eastleigh (KTI-E)* As part of the larger Kenya Transition Initiatives (KTI) program in Kenya, operated by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and implemented by Chemonics, the Eastleigh portion of the program initiated activities in July 2011. Eastleigh is a transient neighborhood, with people coming and going to/from parts of Somalia as well as other regions of Kenya and beyond.

The KTI-E program recognized the importance of promoting stability, tolerance and peace in this community inhabited by many promoting extremist views. KTI-E's overall objective is to build moderation, foster identity and self-confidence in at-risk youth in Eastleigh to help them reject extremism. KTI-E provides grants (both direct and in-kind) to a wide range of Eastleigh based actors for programs that fall into one of three primary lines of action: 1) building capacity among youth and community for moderation and non-violence; 2) empowering the local youth; and 3) livelihood support for youth.

As of July 2012, KTI-E had funded 36 distinct activities in Eastleigh. Areas of action include sponsoring public debates on issues related to extremism, inter-faith dialogue, training for youth in financial literacy and entrepreneurship, support for local government town-hall style meetings and support to the Ministry of Youth to bridge the gaps in services for Somali youth. The KTI-E program has also renovated the Eastleigh Fellowship Center, one of the few community centers in the highly congested community. While some youth participate in intensive training activities (i.e. the debaters or the entrepreneurship trainees) thousands participate in the events (i.e. football matches or televised debates) and are exposed to messages of moderation and peace. At a community-wide level, a network of youth organizations has been formed with KTI-E's help.

Most programs are of a relatively short duration (i.e. days, weeks, or at most months) and new organizations are brought on board on a regular basis. The program is attempting to upgrade its monitoring and evaluation systems so as to be able to better track and communicate with beneficiaries. Officials in the Eastleigh community (who are not of Somali descent) seem particularly appreciative of the support to enable them to better engage with the Somali youth.

***Comparing and contrasting the three program interventions:*** USAID has been piloting different approaches in the three programs studied as part of this evaluation. SYLP was

launched prior to USAID's analytical work on countering violence extremism with an explicit focus on livelihoods, skills training and economic opportunities for youth. The development hypothesis for this program was that, by ensuring youth had more positive opportunities, there would be less likelihood of engagement with extremist groups. The G-Youth Program, launched about six months later, did initially have a strong focus on livelihoods and skills training, although over time incorporated many other elements of programming focused on building youth associations, advocacy, civic engagement, and community projects. G-Youth was certainly influenced by the developing Kenya Yes Youth Can Program (managed by the same USAID Education Office), which emphasizes a youth-owned and youth-led approach encompassing economic, social and civic engagement. The KTI-E Program, established several years later and operated by OTI, emphasizes positive messaging, dialogue and information sharing along with some discreet support for job and skills training opportunities.

It is critically important to ensure that CVE programming addresses a multitude of drivers, including both livelihood opportunities as well as civic engagement. Thus the G-Youth model, with a limited geographic scope of intervention anchored around the establishment of strong community relationships over time, offers the most "holistic" approach.

## Findings and Conclusions:


### **Question 1 What have been the achievements to date of the KTI-Eastleigh, Garissa Youth and Somali Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP) projects in promoting a positive identity in youth?**

For each program, this question was evaluated using five core indicators: 1. *Level of civic engagement*: measured by response to questions on the level to which a survey respondent: attended community meetings; raised issues with authorities; and participated in decision-making. 2. *Efficacy*: measured by response to questions on the level to which a survey respondent; expressed satisfaction with local government decision making; and was positive on the question of how much an ordinary person can do to solve community problems. 3. *Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations*: measured by response to questions on the level to which a survey respondent: believed youth associations make a positive contribution; believed youth were respected by local leaders; and felt supported by youth organizations. 4. *Identity*: measured by response to questions on the level to which a survey respondent; felt prepared to enter the job market; felt optimism about a better future; and believed education and training were more important than family connections in finding a job. 5. *Violence in the name of Islam*: measured by response to questions on the level to which a survey respondent; believed using violence in the name of Islam was not justified; and believed violent activities are not permitted under Islamic law.

The survey was administered to 1,446 youths in five cities – Nairobi/ Eastleigh, Garissa, Hargeisa, Bosaso and Mogadishu – divided into three strata. Figure 3 shows the aggregated results. Each bar represents an average score on the survey questions that make up the core indicator for one of three strata – full beneficiaries (red); partial beneficiaries (blue); and comparison group (black). The higher the bar is, the more favorable the score. As Figure 3 indicates, the lowest scores on the 1-5 scale are in *engagement*, with the highest being on opposition to *violence in the name of Islam*. Lower overall scores tend to correspond with a

greater mean difference between the different strata, indicating programs may be having a desired effect in the areas most in need.

The primary unit of analysis for measuring “achievement” is the average or “mean” difference between the strata. Two mean difference numbers are tracked here. The first is between the full beneficiaries (stratum 1) and the comparison group (stratum 3) – the



comparison made in most impact evaluations. The second mean difference is between the full beneficiaries (stratum 1) and partial beneficiaries (stratum 2), a less common evaluative comparison. A benefit for the “strata 1 to 2” comparison is that it helps control for any selection bias inherent in looking only at a comparison between a self-selecting group of USAID beneficiaries (individuals who might be more inclined to score well on several of these indicators) and a comparison group. Stratum 1 responses were higher in most instances than stratum 2 responses, although usually by levels that were not statistically significant. By contrast, there were 36 survey questions in which there were statistically significant mean differences between stratum 1 and stratum 3. In 34 of these mean differences there was an advantage for the stratum 1 full beneficiaries over the stratum 3 comparison group. In two of 36 cases, there was a negative mean difference, meaning the comparison group had a statistically significant advantage (See Figure 32). Statistical significance was determined by the t test. Statistically significant mean differences are in bold font in the tables that follow.<sup>12</sup>

Comparison of full beneficiaries to a comparison group does raise issues of selection bias – a phenomenon that arises when participants in a program are systematically different from non-participants (even before they enter the program). It is true that program participants are different from non-participants by the very fact of their participation. To fully avoid selection bias in the evaluation it would have been necessary for USAID and its implementers to randomly assign some people and not others to a CVE program at its inception, something that was not done. However, the evaluation team sought to mitigate any selection bias by randomly sampling from a comparison group that matched the beneficiaries closely in terms of location, socio-economic status, age and (only Somali) ethnicity.

<sup>12</sup> The t test assesses whether the means of two groups are *statistically* different from each other. The formula takes the difference between the means, along with the standard error of the difference. Under this significance test, there is a 95% confidence level, meaning that if the evaluation were conducted 100 times, it would have the same result 95 times.


The following is a program-by-program analysis based on survey results. Quantitative data for core indicators is triangulated with qualitative data gathered through focus groups and key informant interviews to provide for greater understanding of the results. Focus group and interview data triangulates the surveys and adds depth to their findings, but cannot be statistically analyzed.<sup>13</sup>

**Radar Graphs** The five core indicators (or thematic areas), measured through 13 survey questions are examined in the following radar graphs and tables. Each of the points of the graph represents an average score on a survey question for one of three strata – full beneficiaries

(red); partial beneficiaries (blue); and comparison group (black). For the purpose of quantitative analysis, a key measure will be the mean difference between full beneficiaries and the comparison group score on the 1-5 scale. The same questions and methodology are used for all programs to the extent possible. Broadly speaking, full beneficiaries are individuals who have completed a training program offered by

USAID partners (e.g. youth who have finished a course in carpentry or women who have regularly attended courses on entrepreneurship). Partial beneficiaries are individuals who applied for programs but did not enter them, or entered the programs but did not complete them.<sup>14</sup> The comparison group included individuals who did not participate in USAID sponsored programs in these communities.

### KTI-Eastleigh



<sup>13</sup> "Focus group interviews generate relevant qualitative information, but no quantitative data from which generalizations can be made for a whole population". (USAID TIPS) "Care should be taken in recording agreement within a focus group: for example, never report that 30% of the group "said...", because not all participants in a group respond to every question." *International Program for Development Evaluation Training*.

<sup>14</sup> In the case of KTI Eastleigh, the nature of the project and its records did not support this methodology. Instead, partial beneficiaries came from lists of individuals only attending recreational, sporting and cultural events. (See methodology section for more information).



## Quantitative Findings for Engagement in Eastleigh/Nairobi<sup>15</sup>

Figures 4 and 5 show the results of surveys in Eastleigh and nearby comparison communities in Nairobi. The KTI-E results show an average mean difference between Strata 1 and 3 beneficiaries of 1.23 – the highest such mean difference

in this evaluation – indicating that full beneficiaries are considerably more engaged in their community in comparison to the comparison group. Figure 5 summarizes.<sup>16</sup> Far more full beneficiaries attended community meetings, raised issues with authorities, and felt that they participated in decision making than their counterparts in the comparison group. Many KTI-E activities focused on such *engagement* activities. The comparison group of youth in Somali communities around Eastleigh had remarkably low *engagement* scores – the lowest of any strata surveyed by this five-city study.

**Qualitative Findings for Engagement in KTI-Eastleigh/Nairobi** Focus Group results found that many beneficiaries, full and partial, had attended community meetings – not surprising since community meetings are a major focus of the KTI-E program.

The evaluation team attended a community meeting and met with some of the KTI-E grant recipients. One such interview was with the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS), which benefits from the YO! Youth Opportunities Project. The grant to MOYAs supports an awareness campaign, including workshops for youth on entrepreneurship and grants writing, with an emphasis on MOYAS programs available to Somali youth in Eastleigh. The goal of the grant is to repair the mistrust between local youth

Figure 5 <i>Engagement in Eastleigh/Nairobi</i> n=302 1 to 5 Scores	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean Difference between Strata 1 and 3 (Bolded text indicates statistical significance)
During the past year, have you attended a community meeting?	3.4	1.9	<b>1.50</b>
During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities?	2.8	1.8	<b>1.00</b>
Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	3	1.8	<b>1.20</b>
<b>Level of Civic Engagement Average</b>	3.1	1.8	<b>1.23</b>



Figure 6 – Evaluators (right) with MOYAS Youth Officers (center) and community resident (left) in front of MOYAS Eastleigh HQ

<sup>15</sup> References to Eastleigh/Nairobi reflect the fact that comparison data was collected in Nairobi neighborhoods technically outside of Eastleigh.



and government agents. MOYAS Youth Officers Mercy Kumenia and Irene Odindo, pictured in Figure 6, claim that Somali youth are now coming to their office in Eastleigh, overcoming “their mistrust of Kenyan officials” to find out how to register as a youth group and qualify for assistance. Ten such groups have now done so. This interaction results in the sharing of important information “about gangs and terror groups, like the (Somali) Superpowers.”

Figure 7 <i>Efficacy in Eastleigh/Nairobi</i> n=302			
1 to 5 Scores	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
What is your level of satisfaction with how local government decisions are made in your community?	3.3	2.7	0.60
When there are problems within your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?	3.3	2.5	0.80
<i>Level of Efficacy Average</i>	3.3	2.7	0.70

**Quantitative Findings for *Efficacy in Eastleigh/Nairobi*** Survey results in Eastleigh also revealed statistically significant mean differences in the area of efficacy - Figure 7 summarizes. The KTI-E program, which has several activities focusing on working with local government, is giving beneficiaries a higher sense of *efficacy* than their non-beneficiary counterparts.




Figure 8 Eastleigh North Chief Kamwara, with KTI-financed Advocacy Officer Ayuma and equipment.

**Qualitative Findings for *Efficacy in Eastleigh/Nairobi*** Youths in Eastleigh-based focus groups expressed mixed feelings regarding their satisfaction with local decision-making. Some participants perceived marginalization of Somali youth by authorities, with much frustration focused on the Kenyan police. In an effort to promote a belief in the *efficacy* of engaging with local authorities, KTI-E supports local government outreach forums through the Chiefs Office in Eastleigh, the local administration level that serves as the first point of contact between the local

community and the government. Eastleigh is served by nine Chiefs (none of whom are Somali). As part of their mandate, Chiefs are expected to hold local grassroots level gatherings, called “barazas”, where local government authorities inform the community on new regulations and listen to their concerns. KTI-E feels that barazas provide a ready-made opportunity to educate the local community on issues pertaining to countering extremism and promote dialogue. Julia Kamwara, the Chief of Eastleigh North, is an active member of the KTI-E advisory council and is currently holding two monthly barazas supported by KTI-E (See Figure 8). In an interview in her Eastleigh office, Chief Kamwara noted that KTI-E is the first group of its kind “coming to the grassroots level.” She was especially pleased that KTI-E provided water for the baraza participants. Since local baraza participants had been asked by previous Chiefs to contribute

funds for meeting refreshments, this small donation increased the participation level. KTI-E funds provide the salary for an Advocacy Officer, Vincent Ayuma, who helps coordinate the youth outreach for the barazas. Neither Chief Kamwara nor Ayuma are Somali, a noticeable pattern the evaluators saw with all officials they met in Eastleigh. Chief Kamwara showed some of the pictures she had taken with a new KTI-E-provided camera – primarily

Figure 9 <i>Support for youth associations in Eastleigh/Nairobi</i> n=302	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
1-5 score			
Do youth associations make a positive contribution to your community?	3.4	2.7	0.70
How are youth viewed by leaders within the community?	3.8	3.4	0.40
To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations?	3.5	2.7	0.80
<b>A: Level of Support for Youth Associations Average</b>	3.6	2.9	0.63

used to document illicit activity in the community, such as illegal structures, moonshine manufacture and buildings suspected of being occupied by the Superpowers youth gang.<sup>17</sup> Focus group comments on the subject showed a wariness of the Chiefs. One female partial beneficiary said “I’m 40 percent convinced the chiefs [will listen to us]. There is a communication barrier because [Eastleigh] youths are viewed negatively.” Chief Kamwara’s observed focus on criminality in Eastleigh, indicates there may be some truth to this perception of negative attitude.

**Quantitative Findings for *Support for Youth Associations in Eastleigh/Nairobi*** There are relatively high levels of mean difference on this issue. Figure 9 summarizes the level of support and belief in the *power of youth associations* in Eastleigh. Several KTI-E activities focus on youth associations, which correspond to a significantly higher level of support for them.

**Qualitative Findings for *Support for Youth Associations in Eastleigh/Nairobi*** Youth association members were heavily represented among full beneficiary focus group participants. Groups mentioned included the Yes Somali Youth




Figure 10 - KTI-sponsored Peace March through Eastleigh


<sup>17</sup> Chief Kamwara portrayed the Superpowers gang as a rival government structure in Eastleigh. They are recruiting rapidly and there are many street-based chapters of the gang. Some people report crimes to the gang instead of the authorities in the expectation that the Superpowers will execute a kind of street justice. They also served as a self-styled neighborhood protection force in the anti-Somali riots that followed the bus bombing in Eastleigh in November 2012. According to Kamwara, much of the gang’s funding comes from relatives in the United States.

Coalition (SYC), Somali African Nation Association (SANA), Somali Association Reunion Organization (SAREO), Eastleigh Youth Concrum (EYC), Young Muslim association (YMA), Waayaha Cusub, Nadab Doon, etc. These “positive” associations, often subsidized by KTI-E, are counterbalanced by “negative” associations, such as youth gangs. As one focus group participant put it: “gang associations, for example Superpowers, Sitaki Kujua (I don’t want to know), Amka Twende (stand up and lets go) and many others, commit violence and robbery within the community. However, during inter-ethnic fighting they protect us, so to that extent we can also say that they help the community.” Higher scores for KTI-E in this area are not surprising, since a number of their activities are targeted at youth associations. For instance, the “Connecting Eastleigh Youth to Action” activity, implemented by a local Kenyan NGO, Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS), established a youth network of 320 member organizations. The evaluation team was present at the November 29, 2012 handover ceremony in Eastleigh from SDS to the new network Kamakunji Youth Network, which was intended to create a greater sense of *efficacy* and *engagement*. The new network, which organized a peace march down the central street in Eastleigh, is organized around thematic groups, allowing member groups to collectively address pertinent issues and includes both Somali and non-Somali youth group members. With SDS capacity-building assistance, the network now has a constitution and elected leadership. The network is based on a mapping exercise done for Eastleigh that found most youth groups active in the area are poorly structured, lack capacity in terms of internal governance, with membership often based on clan dynamics.

According to Executive Director Mohamed Noor, SDS used its KTI-E cash grant to build the network’s capacity over three months. It introduced ideas such as leadership elections through SMS cell phone technology. Noor feels the time is right for the network: “two to three years ago, messages against violence would have been unimaginable. People would have been scared [to express such views].” Chief Kamwara concurs, noting the important role being played by the newly established Kamakunji Youth as the “beginning of everything,” and expressed her intention to maintain a strong relationship with the Board moving forward.

**Quantitative Findings for *Identity* in Eastleigh/Nairobi** The KTI-E program has one large mean difference, with regard to respondents’ feelings of preparedness for the job market. Figure 11 summarizes scores for the level of positive youth *identity* in Eastleigh/Nairobi. The mean difference on preparation for the job market is statistically significant, although differences for the other two *identity* questions are not. Optimism scores in the highest possible range for both full beneficiaries and comparison group, a finding consistent in all areas surveyed. Interestingly, the scores were relatively lower (under 4.0) for all strata in Nairobi on the question contrasting education and training to family connections. Aggregate scores in all other locations –Garissa and Somalia – were higher (over 4.0). One explanation is that Somali clans are more evenly distributed in Nairobi than in other areas surveyed, possibly heightening awareness of clan dynamics and their influence on the employment market (see clan analysis section).

**Figure 12 - Answers to Eastleigh-Specific Survey Questions (Focus on *Identity*)**



In Eastleigh, where *identity* is a primary component of the KTI-E program, enumerators also asked a number of specific questions of beneficiaries. The results are shown in Figure 12.<sup>18</sup> The findings indicate that Eastleigh youth beneficiaries have positive attitudes towards their mentors, counselors, teachers and trainers. Over sixty percent felt they received a “great deal” of support from their family, indicating family ties remain very strong, at least among beneficiaries in Eastleigh.

**Qualitative Findings for Support for *Identity* in Eastleigh/Nairobi** The positive results on the KTI identity survey questions were supported by the focus group participants, who were vocal in their optimism for their future. However, moments of frustration were apparent from some participants. For instance, one male partial beneficiary said, “if [others] can say that all Somalis are Al-Shabab then it’s all right to say that all Kikuyus are Mungikis<sup>19</sup> and all Luos are stone throwers.”

One set of activities aimed at youth *identity* were the youth debates implemented by the Nabadoon (peace seeking) Youth Alliance.

Abdurahman Abdullani of Nabadoon, explained how KTI-E provided the in-kind support behind the idea of organizing debates. KTI-E provided trained moderators and covered the cost of hall rental. The first phase of the activity included eight debates in the classic

Figure 11 <i>Identity</i> in Eastleigh/Nairobi n=302	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
1-5 score			
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field?	4.6	4.1	0.50
How optimistic are you about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future?	4.9	4.8	0.10
What is most important to finding a job - education and training or family connections?	3.9	3.5	0.40
<i>Identity Average</i>	4.5	4.1	0.33

<sup>18</sup> Aggregated results are for full and partial beneficiaries, which had similar scores. Comparison group data is unavailable.

<sup>19</sup> A predominantly Kikuyu tribe criminal organization

point/counterpoint style – including one debater who espoused the Al-Shabab viewpoint. Once word-of-mouth of the debates reached the necessary threshold, the debates generated significant interest. One resulted in an audience of 268, received coverage on the “Somali” television channel and was uploaded onto YouTube. The lively first phase debates generated interest among the at-risk youth in Eastleigh, even attracting members of the Superpowers youth gang. About the Superpowers, Abdullani noted “even though they are gang members, they are also individuals and have been participating from time to time.” Ultimately, Nabadoon abandoned the point/counterpoint format of their debates in favor of a panel discussion format that involved less confrontation.

Under the second phase format, Nabadoon invited community leaders to address the audience. Recently this included the Minister of Trade for Somalia.

The debates are intended to provide an outlet for youth to engage in peaceful dialogue and debate on key issues and current events. The program theory is that lack of

constructive exposure to diverse or alternate belief systems and perspectives contributes to an environment where youth in Eastleigh are susceptible to extremist views that, in the worst case, encourage violence towards others who do not share these views. According to Abdullani of Nabadoon, the debates have helped inspire a positive sense of “unity” among the youth of Eastleigh. Moving forward, Nabadoon would like to focus on increasing access to information for youth.

### Quantitative Findings for Opposition to *Violence in the Name of Islam* in


**Eastleigh/Nairobi** Figure 13 summarizes scores for the level of opposition to *violence in the name of Islam* in Eastleigh/Nairobi. As in most cities where this question was asked, respondents – beneficiaries and comparison group alike - overwhelmingly reported opposition to violence.

Figure 14 shows the answer to a question on the attitude of youth in Eastleigh to the U.S. war on terrorism. Of all the groups asked this question, Eastleigh respondents had the largest percentage difference between beneficiaries and the comparison group. Full beneficiaries from the KTI-E program were the most “pro-American” cohort in the evaluation, when measured by this question.<sup>20</sup>

Figure 13 <i>Violence in the Name of Islam</i> in Eastleigh/Nairobi n=302	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
1-5 score			
Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is ever justified?	4.8	4.7	0.10
Do you agree or disagree that extremist group violent activities are permitted under Islamic law?	4.9	4.9	0.00
<i>Violence in the Name of Islam</i> Average	4.85	4.8	0.05

<sup>20</sup> This question has been separated out of the Violence in the Name of Islam indicator area for two reasons. First, support or opposition to U.S. foreign policy is a value neutral question not related to USAID's CVE program

**Answer to Question – Some say the US is engaged in countries around the world to fight terrorism. Others say that the US is engaged to fight Islam. Which is closer to your view?**




**Figure 14 – Eastleigh/Nairobi survey results on perception of U.S. Counter Terrorism Activities**

### Qualitative Findings for Violence in the Name of Islam in Eastleigh/Nairobi

The quantitative data indicates almost universal rejection of *violence in the name of Islam*. In the words of a male participant in the full beneficiary focus group, “Al-Shabab activities are not justifiable; they are heinous and should not be supported. I completely disagree with their ideology.” However, there were more nuanced discussions during the focus groups and key informant interviews, indicating the complexity of this issue for many Somali youth. For example, another male participant said “[violence] is somehow justified in the case of the Superpowers because they have been forced by circumstances [such as unemployment] to join criminal gangs.” Such statements suggest some youth believe that violence is accepted as a legitimate defense against perceived aggression.

In an interview with the leader of the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA), which represents the youth voices of Muslims throughout the country, including Somalis, many issues came up related to the radicalization of young Somali and non-Somali Muslims. According to KMYA Executive Director Hassan Ole Naado, “Islam plays a big role in neutralizing both clan tensions as well as radicalization within the Somali community.” Many of



objectives. Secondly, this question was not asked on the 1-5 Likert scale, and is, therefore, less comparable to other questions.



their programs use a combination of youth outreach workers and Islamic scholars to reach the most at-risk youth, which Ole Naado characterizes as the “new converts to Islam.”<sup>21</sup> KMYA has been involved in several attempts to mediate conflict, including the recent violence in Garissa and Eastleigh, by engaging youth, religious leaders, and clan elders in closed door sessions. According to KMYA (and also alluded to in other interviews, for example with Chief Kamwara and MOYAS representatives), the violence is being propagated not by Al-Shabab per se, but by young, desperate youth largely motivated by money.

### Garissa Youth Program

The radar graph in Figure 15 shows the results from survey recipients in Garissa. The shape of the graph indicates higher scores on average than the other cities surveyed. It shows a relatively high level of scores in all questions as compared to other program results. This could result from the relative influence a program like G-Youth can have in relatively small city (around 70,000 in population). While

Figure 16 <i>Engagement in Garissa</i> n=299	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
1-5 score			
During the past year, have you attended a community meeting?	3.9	3.1	0.80
During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities?	3.8	3.1	0.70
Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	3.9	3.3	0.60
<i>Level of Civic Engagement Average</i>	3.9	3.2	0.70

the level of mean difference is lower than is seen in the KTI-E program, primarily due to the higher comparison group scores, there are some notable areas of mean difference, especially between beneficiaries and the comparison group in the area of *engagement*. There are a number of smaller, but still statistically significant mean differences in the *efficacy*, *youth associations* and *identity* areas as well.

**Quantitative Findings for Engagement in Garissa** Figure 16 summarizes scores for *engagement* in Garissa. Both full and partial program beneficiaries have attended more meetings, raised more issues with authorities and participate in decision making at much higher levels than do their counterparts in the comparison group. As in other cities surveyed, “*engagement*,” the only survey area that measured actions as opposed to attitudes, showed the largest mean differences. Given the focus of the G-Youth program on civic engagement activities, this is not a surprising result.

**Qualitative Findings for Engagement in Garissa** Focus Group participants, both full and partial beneficiaries, were nearly unanimous in having attended community meetings of some kind. The youth cited a wide range of involvement, including meetings addressing issues

<sup>21</sup> Many of the recent terrorist attacks in Kenya have been conducted by Kenyan, non-Somali, new converts to Islam.

around clan dynamics, peace processes, drug abuse, HIV/AIDS awareness, early marriage, female circumcision and conflict mediation. One female participant went so far as to say “I was involved on the issue of identification cards for those under 18. The final decision made was to give every Kenyan the right to get an identity card and due to this everyone got their identity cards and all problems were settled down and there have been no more crises on that issue.”<sup>22</sup> While there are still many issues surrounding the issuance of ID cards, the optimism expressed by this young woman regarding her role in helping Garissan youth obtain ID cards is striking. Given the significantly lower levels of responses from the comparison group, G-Youth participants are more active in their communities and are able to articulate youth issues before the broader community, likely due to the experience, knowledge and exposure gained by being involved in the program.

**Quantitative Findings for *Efficacy* in Garissa** Figure 17 summarizes the level of *efficacy* in Garissa. There are significant mean differences between full beneficiaries and other strata on the question of how much an ordinary person can do to improve a situation as well as the overall satisfaction level with local government. This indicates that the actions measured in the *engagement* area are translating into results in the attitudes about *efficacy*.

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<sup>22</sup> The issue of identity cards in Kenya is very controversial, with allegations made that ethnic Somalis are being denied cards, restricting their movement and threatening their acceptance as Kenyan citizens.



**Qualitative Findings for *Efficacy* in Garissa** Most youth during focus groups expressed negative sentiments about local government. This was not surprising since the Kenyan military had burned down the central market of the city a couple weeks earlier in reprisal for the killing of three of its soldiers by terrorists. As a female beneficiary said, “they burnt people’s property with no reason or justification. Although they promised to compensate people’s losses, up to now there has been no positive outcome.”

Figure 17 <i>Efficacy</i> in Garissa n=299 1-5 score	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
What is your level of satisfaction with how local government decisions are made in your community?	3.8	3.4	0.40
When there are problems within your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?	4.1	3.6	0.50
<b>Level of Efficacy Average</b>	4.0	3.5	0.45

While the quantitative data indicates decent results on *efficacy*, particularly from full beneficiaries, the views expressed during the focus group discussions are more nuanced, with participants stating both positive and negative responses regarding local government. Parents, by contrast, were almost universally negative. Both mothers and fathers felt that local government representatives do not take youth into account. As one parent said, “the local government doesn’t listen to the views of youth. They patronize the youth and view them as useless, inferior people.” Based on the qualitative findings for both the *engagement* and *efficacy* questions, it can be concluded that G-Youth has had a significant impact on youth *efficacy*, but this has not fully translated into the desired relationships and outcomes with local government structures.

**Quantitative Findings Support for Youth Associations in Garissa** Figure 18 summarizes the *level of support and belief in the power of youth associations* in

Figure 18 <i>Support for youth associations</i> in Garissa n=299 1-5 score	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
Do youth associations make a positive contribution to your community?	4.3	4.0	0.30
How are youth viewed by leaders within the community?	3.9	4.1	-0.20
To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations?	4.1	3.8	0.30
<b>A: Level of Support for Youth Associations Average</b>	4.1	4.0	0.13

Garissa. Full beneficiaries had a small but statistically significant advantage over the comparison group on two questions regarding attitudes towards youth associations, possibly reflecting G-Youth's work with youth associations. However, results were less positive on the question of how youth are viewed by leaders within the community, where there was a statistically insignificant mean difference between full beneficiaries and the comparison group. This is consistent with the focus group results cited above, reflecting a negative relationship between Garissan youth and local authorities.

**Qualitative Findings for Support for Youth Associations in Garissa** Male focus group discussants seemed more involved in youth associations in Garissa than their female counterparts, with almost all beneficiary youth interviewed stating their affiliations in diverse groups such as Barak, Iftin Miliman, Iskadm and Muftah Youth Groups. Activities involved planting trees, garbage collection and peace building initiatives. Female focus group discussants, by contrast, were largely not involved with youth associations, citing issues ranging from culture to poor leadership and lack of finance. Despite the low-level of affiliation, female focus group respondents were largely optimistic about the value of well-run youth associations, suggesting that future emphasis should be given to helping to form female youth groups in Garissa.

**Quantitative Findings for Identity in Garissa** Figure 19 summarizes scores for the *level of positive youth identity* in Garissa. Scores for full beneficiaries were almost at the highest range possible. The mean differences between the full beneficiary stratum and comparison group on all three questions are not large but are statistically significant, an important finding given the already high comparison group scores.

**Qualitative Findings for Identity in Garissa** Focus group participants were positive in their optimism about the future. For one male full beneficiary, this optimism took on a religious tone:

"I am very optimistic about my ability to work towards a better future in my community because I believe that God and Islam teach us to think positively." More than one participant gave credit to the new constitution. One father of a beneficiary said the document gives him "high hopes for our children to have a better future."<sup>23</sup> A

Figure 19 <i>Identity in Garissa</i> n=299 1-5 score	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group) <sup>1</sup>	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field?	4.9	4.6	0.30
How optimistic are you about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future?	4.9	4.6	0.30
What is most important to finding a job - education and training or family connections?	4.8	4.4	0.40
<i>Identity Average</i>	4.9	4.5	0.33

<sup>23</sup> Several provisions of the 2010 constitution could strengthen protection and increase empowerment of indigenous groups characterized as "marginalized communities." In the Bill of Rights, Article 56 specifically calls for affirmative action to promote participation of minorities in all spheres of national life. (Freedom House 2012)

mother of one beneficiary, however, raised concern over drug abuse, saying “I am not optimistic because [my son] keeps bad company [with whom] he consumes Miraa (Khat).”

**Quantitative Findings for Opposition to Violence in the Name of Islam in Garissa** Figure 20 summarizes scores for the level of opposition to *violence in the name of Islam* in Garissa. Scores among all strata were very high on this set of questions, with no statistically significant differences – as was the case with most other areas surveyed.

Figure 21 shows the answer to a question on the attitude of youth in Garissa to the U.S. war on terrorism. Of all the groups asked this question, Garissa respondents had the most “pro-American” opinion. The homogeneity of responses, reflecting a strong plurality view among all strata that would please U.S. public diplomacy professionals, is interesting for a city increasingly plagued by terrorist acts and heavy-handed Kenyan military responses.

Figure 20 <i>Violence in the Name of Islam</i> in Garissa n=299 1-5 score	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is ever justified?	4.7	4.4	0.26
Do you agree or disagree that extremist group violent activities are permitted under Islamic law?	4.7	4.6	0.10
<i>Violence in the Name of Islam</i> Average	4.7	4.5	0.18

**Answer to Question – Some say the US is engaged in countries around the world to fight terrorism. Others say that the US is engaged to fight Islam. Which is closer to your view?**



Figure 21


**Qualitative Findings for Opposition to Violence in the Name of Islam in Garissa** Most focus group participants expressed opposition to *violence*, with Islam often cited as the reason for opposition. A male full beneficiary said “according to Islam violence is never justified; Islam promotes peace. As Kenyans we should be involved in peace.”

Although quantitative data show that the non-beneficiary comparison group was similarly against violence, some stakeholders interviewed emphasized the importance of reaching out to those youth who have not yet been influenced by the G-Youth program, the so-called *Lomaa oyiaan* (those who are not cried for), who are easily manipulated and serve as hired guns.

### **Somali Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP)**

Figure 22 shows the results from survey recipients in Somalia. The radar graph represents an average of three separate scores – Hargeisa, Bosaso and Mogadishu. In the aggregate, beneficiaries of the SYLP program had some mean difference with the comparison group. Most

of this mean difference is attributable to the results from Mogadishu and Hargeisa. There is little mean difference between the strata in Bosaso. The primary areas of mean difference are in *engagement, efficacy and value of youth organizations*. Mean difference is minimal in the areas of *identity and violence in the name of Islam*.



**Quantitative Findings for Engagement in Somalia** Figure 23 summarizes scores for *engagement* in three cities in Somalia.<sup>24</sup> The biggest mean differences in this area are found in the Hargeisa data. Far more full beneficiaries have attended community meetings, raised issues with authorities or participated in decision making than in the comparison group.

Bosaso registers no significant mean differences on *engagement*, primarily because of the relatively high scores of the comparison group. Given the size and importance of both Hargeisa and Mogadishu compared to Bosaso, it is not surprising that there are lower levels of overall

*engagement*. Also, there were a smaller number of grantees dispersed throughout the greater Bosaso area, several of which were private sector entities rather than NGOs. This contrasts with Hargeisa, in which there were over 20 interventions over a period of several years, implemented largely through established NGOs. In Mogadishu, the program concentrated its resources on three strong local NGOs, which are well recognized community groups offering a broad range of benefits to youth.

Figure 23 <i>Engagement in Somalia</i> n= 845 1-5 score	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
During the past year, have you attended a community meeting? Total	2.9	2.2	0.61
Hargeisa	2.8	1.9	0.98
Bosaso	2.9	2.6	0.32
Mogadishu	2.8	2.3	0.5
During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities? Total	2.5	2.1	0.46
Hargeisa	2.7	1.7	0.98
Bosaso	2.4	2.5	-0.09
Mogadishu	2.5	2.0	0.5
Do you participate in decision-making in your community? - Total	2.6	2.2	0.48
Hargeisa	3.2	2.1	1.18
Bosaso	2.5	2.4	0.10
Mogadishu	2.2	2.0	0.2
<b>A: Level of Civic Engagement Average</b>	2.7	2.2	0.52
Hargeisa	2.9	1.9	1.05
Bosaso	2.6	2.5	0.11
Mogadishu	2.5	2.1	0.4

<sup>24</sup> It should be noted that none of the SYLP programs focused explicitly on engagement, other than with private sector representatives.

### **Qualitative Findings for *Engagement* in Somalia**

A focus group in Hargeisa among female full beneficiaries illustrated the occasional disconnect between *engagement* and *efficacy*. When asked about attendance at a community meeting, one participant said “yes, I and other girls in our neighborhood tried to form an association to get help from the local government. We raised a couple of issues with the officials during the last presidential election. They listened and promised to address the issues and even help our association. But we never got any results after that.” A second participant said “yes, we arranged a meeting with local government to help train girls who did not attend schools in our community. We formed a local NGO to do this training but never got any help from the government.”



Figure 24 Hussein Jiciir, Mayor of Hargeisa,

The Shaqodoon (SYLP) program did not have an explicit civic engagement component. However, meetings with key informants in Hargeisa indicated increased levels of *engagement* resulting from the program. According to Hussein Jiciir, Mayor of Hargeisa, one of the most important contributions of the program was “keeping youth busy.” Regarding the need to keep youth engaged, he stated “we are in a big fire,” meaning that youth, like fire, could be useful when controlled and damaging when not. Unoccupied youth are often tempted, he said, to join the pirates or Al-Shabab.

The Mayor admired the technological savvy of youth and felt that those with developed technology skills had the highest value in Hargeisa. The Mayor’s office took in 30 young Shaqodoon graduates as interns and hired some of them permanently. They were initially employed as statisticians, but many provided existing staff with training in computer literacy. Mayor Jiciir particularly liked the SMS component of SYLP and noted how it helped youth in interacting, sharing information and integrating young people from outside Hargeisa. He lamented the closing of the program – “We have missed it. Why has it been stopped?”

Also noteworthy in Hargeisa was the recent passage of revised electoral legislation, enabling youth to stand for local government seats. While SYLP did not advocate specifically for this piece of legislation, it did support the local NGO that led the effort (SONYO) and can claim to have helped raise the profile of youth in Somaliland.

**Quantitative Findings for *Efficacy* in Somalia** Aggregate findings on *efficacy* in Somalia are generally disappointing with regard to mean difference. In Hargeisa, there is a notable advantage for the comparison group on the question of satisfaction with local government decision making. There are numerous, less dramatic examples of negative mean differences as well. The high rates of beneficiary *engagement* are not translating into a corresponding level of *efficacy* in Bosaso or Hargeisa. (See Figure 25) Mogadishu, however, is another matter, with statistically significant mean differences for both *efficacy* questions.



## Qualitative Findings for Efficacy in Somalia

Mogadishu focus group participants were the most charitable on the subject of local government. One said, “I am satisfied [with local government decision making] because they promote the security of our district and we are in peace. We can walk at night in our district which was not possible for us before this time.” A male partial beneficiary said: “I am satisfied with them because they removed militia checkpoints from the city and organized police forces.” This attitude was in contrast with the near universal dismissal of local governments’

interest in youth found in the more secure cities of Bosaso and Hargeisa, which have seen less salient change recently. A male participant in the full beneficiary focus group in Hargeisa said, “I am not satisfied at all because local government officials don’t even come back to their local community after the election. I wrote many times to my local MP’s. I never got any response.”<sup>25</sup> Multiple examples were given of attempts to raise issues that were later ignored. With youth in Hargeisa and Bosaso having higher expectations regarding government relationships vis-à-vis youth, and these expectations remaining unfulfilled, there is a potential for frustration leading to conflict in the future if local government remains remote.

**Figure 25 Efficacy in Somalia n= 845**

1-5 score	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
What is your level of satisfaction with how local government decisions are made in your community? Total	3.7	3.7	0.04
Hargeisa	3.2	3.5	-0.31
Bosaso	3.8	3.8	-0.01
Mogadishu	4.2	3.7	0.5
When there are problems within your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?- Total	4.2	3.9	0.27
Hargeisa	3.9	3.8	0.15
Bosaso	4.3	4.4	-0.13
Mogadishu	4.3	3.5	0.8
<b>A: Level of efficacy Average - Total</b>	3.9	3.8	0.16
Hargeisa	3.6	3.7	-0.08
Bosaso	4.0	4.1	-0.07
Mogadishu	4.2	3.6	0.6

<sup>25</sup> Similar comments were made by all the focus groups in Hargeisa, which was in the midst of a local election campaign.

**Quantitative Findings for *Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations in Somalia***

Figure 26 summarizes scores for attitudes about youth associations in three cities in Somalia. While the scores from all strata are fairly high on these questions, there is little aggregate mean difference between the strata. However, there was a higher level of mean difference in Hargeisa and Mogadishu than in Bosaso.

**Qualitative Findings for *Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations in Somalia***

Focus group discussions in Hargeisa produced some surprisingly negative commentary on *youth associations*, given the positive quantitative results.

For example, Shaqodoon male

beneficiaries noted, “youth associations are inefficient; they are run by individuals and they are not for social purposes. “Youth associations here lack the capacity and the means to organize and contribute to society.” Female attitudes were similar, with none of the full beneficiaries being a member of a youth organization, most extremely skeptical, and only a few expressing any positive expectation. This contradiction could also be a definitional one. In Hargeisa, there is an umbrella of youth groups known as SONYO. Respondents may be thinking of this umbrella group (which anecdotally has been criticized for not being truly representative) rather than local youth groups. Parents in Hargeisa, particularly mothers, were strongly positive

Figure 26 <i>Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations</i> n= 845	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
1-5 score			
Do youth associations make a positive contribution to your community? - Total	3.8	3.7	0.14
Hargeisa	3.8	3.4	0.38
Bosaso	3.7	3.9	-0.20
Mogadishu	4.1	3.8	0.3
How are youth viewed by leaders within the community? Total	4.3	4.1	0.13
Hargeisa	4.1	4.1	0.01
Bosaso	4.2	4.1	0.06
Mogadishu	4.5	4.2	0.3
To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations?- Total	4.3	4.0	0.29
Hargeisa	4.2	3.8	0.41
Bosaso	4.2	4.2	0.01
Mogadishu	4.4	4.0	0.4
<i>Support and belief in the power of youth associations</i> Average	4.1	3.9	0.19
Hargeisa	4.0	3.8	0.27
Bosaso	4.0	4.1	-0.04
Mogadishu	4.3	4.0	0.3



regarding youth associations, noting “they have a positive role in the community and do many things such as training, skills, awareness and helping poor people.” Nonetheless, most parents said their children were not members. This optimism by parents, with no distrust mentioned, speaks well to parental support and involvement in youth association activities. In Bosaso, most focus group participants were members of youth associations – the Puntland Students Association was mentioned often – and were strongly positive about such organizations. In Mogadishu, the response to youth associations was positive (SOYAD, a youth medical association, and SYL 2 were mentioned). One male partial beneficiary approvingly spoke about how they provided free “primary education to the IDP Camps.”

According to SONYO, the Hargeisa-based Somaliland youth umbrella NGO, youth associations are gaining acceptance and credibility in Somaliland. Before they were viewed as “puppets of the West,” but now people are more open. SONYO grew from 29 organizations in 2010 to 54 in 2012 and there are many new organizations seeking membership. Youth associations focus on child protection, counseling and youth centers. They provide services to international organizations and are distinct from youth wings of political parties. SONYO head Saeed Mohammed Ahmed felt that youth associations are steadily gaining credibility amongst youth and elders alike.

## Quantitative Findings for *Identity* in Somalia

Results on *identity* in Somalia were mixed. On the question of how prepared respondents felt to enter the job market, there were large mean differences between full beneficiaries and the comparison group both in Hargeisa and especially Mogadishu. The program helped youth obtain livelihood opportunities and provided skills, increasing their confidence. Bosaso again shows lower differences between comparison and full beneficiaries, possibly due to the short implementation period and limited services discussed previously. Regarding optimism for the future, mean differences were less, primarily because of the very high comparison group scores. Overall, youth in all areas scored high in the belief that educational opportunities were more important than

family connections in finding a job, with minimal differences between the beneficiary and comparison groups. This finding is somewhat surprising given that the initial SYLP assessment found a strong perception that family connections were the most important factor in finding work. It is possible that this belief has changed, suggesting a cultural shift on this question (see Figure 27).

Figure 27 <i>Identity</i> in Somalia n= 845	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries)	Stratum 3 (Comparison group)	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3
1-5 score			
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field? Total	4.9	4.1	0.77
Hargeisa	4.9	4.1	0.79
Bosaso	4.8	4.5	0.28
Mogadishu	4.9	3.7	1.3
How optimistic are you about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future? Total	4.9	4.7	0.14
Hargeisa	4.9	4.8	0.08
Bosaso	4.8	4.7	0.05
Mogadishu	5.0	4.7	0.3
What is most important to finding a job - education and training or family connections?- Total	4.3	4.3	0.06
Hargeisa	4.4	4.5	-0.04
Bosaso	4.1	4.1	-0.03
Mogadishu	4.4	4.2	0.2
<i>Identity</i> Average	4.7	4.4	0.32
Hargeisa	4.7	4.5	0.28
Bosaso	4.5	4.4	0.10
Mogadishu	4.8	4.2	0.6

**Qualitative Findings for Identity in Somalia:** In focus groups, youth in Hargeisa felt strongly optimistic regarding their future, noting many positive social and economic developments in Somaliland and that things are “getting better year after year.” Full beneficiary focus group respondents mostly expressed strong optimism for the future “because we believe in education and hard work to reach a better future” and “because my country has peace, development and I can get everything here.” Partial beneficiaries were slightly more reserved, noting a perceived lack of opportunities and the government’s inability to provide jobs. Optimism ran high among all focus group participants in Bosaso. One female partial beneficiary said “I am very optimistic about the future because people are tired of violence and we will get peace and investment in our country after the violence.” A frequent refrain in Bosaso was excitement about increased corporate investment. As one male full beneficiary put it, “I am optimistic because things are changing for the better; we can participate in the political system and more private companies are investing here, like African Oil.” In Mogadishu, there was a similar level of optimism, tempered by occasional doubts. As one Mogadishu mother put it, “I worry about the future of my children. In Mogadishu, there is no peace, security, or order at all. All the time, I have to [decide if where they are going is safe] before they go to work.” In interviews in Hargeisa, multiple informants discussed how well known Shaqodoon was in Somaliland and how the program created a sense of identity for Shaqodoon youth. This branding likely went a long way in terms of influencing youth participants’ sense of positive identity and outlook. Private sector representatives for Telesom and Nationlink said they were much more likely to employ a “Shaqodoon youth,” noting that they displayed higher levels of skills, self-confidence and leadership. According to a representative of the University of Hargeisa, Shaqodoon youth “learn how to sell themselves.” Others noted Shaqodoon youth are “smarter and more enlightened.” According to Jimale Yousuf Magan, Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee (HAVYOCO) Project Manager, “Shaqodoon graduates can get internships and placements when even University graduates cannot.” He believes this is a result of the strict emphasis on, and technical support for, job placements – a Shaqodoon concept now integrated into all HAVYOCO programs. Yousuf Magan also recommends that future programs need to



Figure 28 - Male Full Beneficiaries – Bosaso Focus Group



Figure 29 Mothers of Full Beneficiaries - Mogadishu Focus Group

incorporate “youth voices as there are no formal structures for youth participation, not even at the University level.”


### Quantitative Findings for *Opposition to use of violence in the name of Islam* – SYLP

There were more negative than positive mean differences in the scores between beneficiaries and the comparison group on the questions of supporting *violence in the name of Islam* – although the mean differences were too small to be significant. Beneficiaries and comparison group respondents alike strongly rejected the concept of *violence in the name of Islam* (See Figure 30). Interestingly, there was a greater variance in Bosaso than other areas with the comparison group scoring higher than beneficiaries. This could be due to geography, as several of the Bosaso projects operated in peri-urban and more rural settings while the comparison group came from Bosaso town.

The more interesting question for Somalia is illustrated in Figure 31. The survey asked whether U.S. counter-terrorism activity is seen as fighting Islam or fighting terrorism. Hargeisa respondents of all strata overwhelmingly saw US activity as fighting Islam, with Bosaso

showing similar, if not quite so pronounced results. The results were more “pro-American” in Mogadishu, with full beneficiaries especially more likely to believe the U.S. was fighting terrorism, perhaps because of Mogadishu’s own direct experience of being subjugated by a Al-Shabab.

Figure 30 <i>Violence in the name of Islam in Somalia</i> n= 845	Stratum 1 (Full beneficiaries) 1-5 score	Stratum 3 (Comparison group) 1-5 score	Mean difference between Strata 1 and 3 1-5 score
Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is ever justified? Total	4.3	4.5	-0.15
Hargeisa	4.2	4.1	0.07
Bosaso	4.4	4.9	<b>-0.45</b>
Mogadishu	4.4	4.5	-0.1
Do you agree or disagree that extremist group violent activities are permitted under Islamic law? Total	4.6	4.7	-0.10
Hargeisa	4.7	4.8	-0.14
Bosaso	4.5	4.9	-0.35
Mogadishu	4.6	4.4	0.2
Violence average - Total	4.5	4.6	-0.12
Hargeisa	4.4	4.5	-0.03
Bosaso	4.5	4.9	<b>-0.40</b>
Mogadishu	4.5	4.5	0.1



**Qualitative for *Opposition to use of violence in the name of Islam* – SYLP** In Hargeisa focus group discussions, most youth felt violence was not justified, although some noted “sometimes it is the only way to achieve your cause, like independence or defending your religion if attacked.” Some in Hargeisa said “[violence] is okay in self-defense” or in cases of “occupation and aggression.” These voiced exceptions to the standard “no violence” answer came up more often in Hargeisa than in any other city. Opposition to violence for a cause was nearly universal in the Bosaso and Mogadishu focus groups – comprised of people who had experienced war much more closely than in Hargeisa. As one female full beneficiary from Mogadishu put it, “Mogadishu people have been in war and we are experienced in destruction.”

Most informants in Hargeisa tended to shy away from discussions about Al-Shabab and extremist activities, saying that this was a problem in other areas, but not Somaliland. The only interviewee to engage in this discussion was the Mayor, who believed that unless Somaliland youth were kept busy (he supports labor-intensive construction programs for youth) there would be increased risk of youth getting involved in Al-Shabab, piracy or illegal immigration.

**Disaggregated Analysis between three SYLP sites** - Three data collection sites were selected for this report, one from each of the three regions (Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia). In total, there were over 10 different intervention areas each of which displayed unique characteristics. While the program initiated activities in Hargeisa, thus having a longer engagement in this region and the highest total number of beneficiaries, the concentration of beneficiaries was highest in Mogadishu where three local partners reached over 2,700 youth. The data points out a significantly lower mean difference in Bosaso than the other two sites, likely related to the fact that the implementing partners were dispersed and often operating in peri-urban and rural areas. Mogadishu respondents, who scored higher than those from other areas in all questions (with the exception of engagement) are likely reflecting the

overall positive outlook in the region with the election of a democratic government, ousting of Al-Shabaab, return of investment and resumption of normal daily life.

## Findings and Conclusion

In all, this quantitative analysis looked at answers to 13 survey questions in five locations. For each of the resulting 65 answers to survey questions, the evaluators calculated the mean difference between full beneficiaries (stratum 1) and the comparison group (stratum 3). Figure 32 lists the 36 questions that have statistically significant mean differences between strata 1 and 3.

**Figure 32 Statistically Significant Mean Differences; 36 out of 65 total questions; 34 positive – 2 negative**

Nairobi - Eastleigh ( Full Beneficiaries and Comparison Group)	
Question Statements	Mean Difference
During the past year, have you attended a community meeting?	1.5
During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities?	1.0
Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	1.2
What is your level of satisfaction with how local government decisions are made in your community?	0.6
When there are problems within your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?	0.8
Do youth associations make a positive contribution to your community?	0.7
How are youth viewed by leaders within the community?	0.4
To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations?	0.8
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field?	0.5
Garissa ( Full Beneficiaries and Comparison Group)	
Question Statements	Mean Difference
During the past year, have you attended a community meeting?	0.8
During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities?	0.7
Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	0.6
What is your level of satisfaction with how local government decisions are made in your community?	0.4
When there are problems within your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?	0.5
Do youth associations make a positive contribution to your community?	0.3
To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations?	0.3
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field?	0.3
How optimistic are you about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future?	0.3
What is most important to finding a job - education and training or family connections?	0.4
Hargeisa ( Full Beneficiaries and Comparison Group)	
Question Statements	Mean Difference
During the past year, have you attended a community meeting?	1.0
During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities?	1.0
Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	1.2



Do youth associations make a positive contribution to your community?	0.4
To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations?	0.4
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field?	0.8
<b>Bosaso ( Full Beneficiaries and Comparison Group)</b>	
<b>Question Statements</b>	<b>Mean Difference</b>
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field?	0.3
Some people have used Islam as a justification for violence. Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is ever justified?	-0.5
Do you agree or disagree that extremist groups violent activities are permitted under Islamic law?	-0.4
<b>Mogadishu ( Full Beneficiaries and Comparison Group)</b>	
<b>Question Statements</b>	<b>Mean Difference</b>
During the past year, have you attended a community meeting?	0.5
During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities?	0.5
What is your level of satisfaction with how local government decisions are made in your community?	0.5
When there are problems within your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?	0.8
How are youth viewed by leaders within the community?	0.3
To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations?	0.4
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field?	1.3
How optimistic are you about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future?	0.3

Figure 33 shows the distribution of the 34 statistically significant positive mean differences in Figure 32, sorted by indicator area. The largest numbers (11) are in the area of *engagement*.

These are followed by *youth associations* (9), *identity* (8) and *efficacy* (6). There were no statistically positive mean differences under *violence in the name of Islam*, although there were two negative mean differences in Bosaso.





Figure 34 analyzes the distribution of the 34 positive statistically significant strata 1-3 mean differences by city surveyed. Garissa had the most with 10, followed by Eastleigh with 9, Mogadishu with 8, Hargeisa with 6 and Bosaso with 1.

In summary, there was a relatively even distribution of statistically significant mean differences among all areas but one— *violence in the name of Islam* - and in all locations but one – Bosaso. The lack of significant differences between strata in the *violence in the name of Islam* area is attributable primarily to the very high scores in all strata on these questions, indicating almost no overt support for jihadist violence among Somali youth in the surveyed communities. While this is a positive finding on its face, the Islamist violence that continues to plague the Somali communities of East Africa show the two survey questions that make up this area to be of limited value. The outlier status of the Bosaso data is more problematic to explain. The data show the explanation lies more with the higher relative scores of the comparison group than in scores of the beneficiaries. Bosaso full beneficiaries had comparable scores to their beneficiary counterparts in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. However, in the engagement, efficacy and youth association areas, the comparison group in Bosaso had higher scores than either of the comparison groups in Hargeisa or Mogadishu.



## Disaggregation by demographic variables


Along with answers to the survey questions, the evaluators also gathered demographic data, the more salient points of which are analyzed here. The point of the analysis here is not to focus on every data point, but to highlight consistent patterns in the demographic data that are relevant to program recommendations

**Gender** In four out of the six communities surveyed, women had consistently lower scores in the *engagement* area. In all communities but Bosaso, female respondents were less likely to have attended a community meeting, gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities or felt that they participated in decision-making in their community.<sup>26</sup>


<sup>26</sup> Once again, Bosaso is the outlier, with very little difference on these questions between female and male respondents. The ratio of males to females in the sample was 142/139 – a somewhat higher sampling of females than in the other communities.



Figure 35 shows the difference between the usually higher male score and the corresponding female score on the three engagement questions. Females score consistently lower on these questions in all communities but Bosaso. This is likely due to both the culture of exclusion of women from traditional decision-making as well as the lack of female Somali role models in government, business and leadership positions. Given the patriarchal nature of Somali society, these results are not surprising. However, they do point to an inequity in *engagement* between the genders and serve as reminder that decision-making in Somali society is male-dominated. As Steven Pinker of Harvard University writes, “societies that empower their women are less likely to end up with large cohorts of rootless young men, with their penchant for making trouble.”<sup>27</sup> In the other surveyed areas, there were no patterns of difference between male and female respondents.




**Age** The survey results can be disaggregated by age cohort. Respondents were asked whether they were 14-18, 19-25, 26-29 or 30-34. The most salient patterns in the results were the significantly lower scores of the 14-18 year old cohort in comparison with their older peers in the area of *engagement* (See Figure 36). Given their lack of life experience, it is not surprising that teenagers were less likely to have attended a community meeting, gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities or felt that they participated in decision-making in their community than their older contemporaries.




<sup>27</sup> Pinker, Steven, *The Better Angels of our Nature, Why Violence Has Declined*, 2011, Penguin Books, p 528

There is no discernible pattern in comparing the responses to the individual *engagement* questions. However, it is clear that Somali teenagers, who make up a disproportionately large portion of the population (see Figure 37), have a measurable gap in their engagement with local authorities compared to the rest of the population.

Figure 37<sup>28</sup> -



**Education** The most interesting findings on education were also in the *engagement* area. Survey respondents were asked to list their level of education – ranging from graduated university to dropped-out of primary school. In Somalia respondents could respond that they were either enrolled, had graduated or dropped out of a madrasa (Islamic school).<sup>29</sup> Figure 38 shows the results when the scores of those either in or having completed a madrasa, were subtracted from the total of aggregated non-madrasa students in each community surveyed. Once again, the area in which a pattern could be consistently established was *engagement*. Madrasa students and graduates had lower scores than those with secular education by an average of over a full point on a one to five scale. While the pattern was not as clear, it is worth pointing out some interesting findings in the *identity* area. In response to the question, “how prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field?” madrasa students had scores 1.4 points lower on average than their non-madrasa counterparts. In Mogadishu, this difference was 1.5. Also in Mogadishu, madrasa respondents scored below non-madrasa respondents by 1.25 out of 5.0 on the question, “how




<sup>28</sup> Kenya Open Data <https://opendata.go.ke/facet/counties/Garissa>

<sup>29</sup> Data was unintentionally omitted for Kenya

optimistic are you about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future?” While the number of self-identified madrasa students and graduates in this study was small (around ten in each of the cities surveyed) the disparities shown here with regard to the non-madrasa population are stark, at least on these particular questions.


**Clan** The survey asked respondents to identify their clan. The Somali people are organized into clan groupings, which are important social units in Somali culture and politics. Clans are patrilineal and are typically divided into sub-clans, sometimes with many sub-divisions.

**Eastleigh/Nairobi** Eastleigh, and the nearby Nairobi neighborhoods surveyed as part of the comparison group, are unique among those areas surveyed in that respondents were widely distributed among the large clan groupings: Darood, Hawiye, Dir, Digil/Mirifle and Isack. While Darood and Hawiye are the largest groupings, the Eastleigh area has representation from most of the major Somali clans (see Figure 39).



This may be a factor in the relatively low aggregate score the Eastleigh area registered (3.72) on the question “what is most important to finding a job - education and training or family connections?” This result compares to the aggregate scores in Garissa (4.67), Hargeisa (4.45), Bosaso (4.10) and Mogadishu (4.2) – all communities that have much higher clan homogeneity.


**Garissa** Most respondents in Garissa identified themselves with one of the sub-clans of the Ogaden, which itself is a sub-clan of Darood (see Figure 40). A third of all respondents identified themselves as “Abudwaq,” which is not considered a clan, but rather a border region of Ethiopia and Somalia, north of the Shebelle River in an area dominated by the Marehan clan. Five percent refused to answer. Three percent were Degodia, a sub-clan of Hawiye.




Worldwide, members of the Ogaden clan primarily live on the central Ogaden plateau of Ethiopia (Somali Region), the North Eastern Province of Kenya, and the

Jubaland region of Southern Somalia. According to Human Rights Watch, the Ogaden is the largest Darod clan in Ethiopia's Somali Region, and may account for 40 to 50 percent of the Somali population in Ethiopia.

**Hargeisa** Most respondents in Hargeisa identified themselves as members of sub-clans of the Isak clan.<sup>30</sup> Only one percent identified themselves as Darood and one percent as Gadabuursi, a Dir sub-clan. Only one percent of respondents refused to identify their clan (see Figure 41). The Isak is one of the main Somali clans. Its members principally live in Somaliland and the Somali Region of Ethiopia. The Isak clan is closely identified with the breakaway region of Somaliland, having signed treaties with the British in the 1880s that resulted in the separate territory of British Somaliland.<sup>31</sup>




**Bosaso** The vast majority of survey respondents from Bosaso are members of the Darood clan, mostly from the Harti sub-clan. Traditionally, the Darood population has been concentrated in the northern and northeastern cities on the Gulf of Aden and upper Indian Ocean coast in the Horn of Africa, including Bosaso (see Figure 42). Six percent of respondents refused to identify a clan. No one sub-clan was identified by more than 16 percent of respondents, but the dominance of the Harti Darood in Bosaso is clear. Bosaso is the capital of the autonomous Puntland region of Somalia. While not declaring independence like Somaliland, Puntland is a separate entity from the rest of Somalia.



<sup>30</sup> Arab refers to an Isak sub-clan.

<sup>31</sup> I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali*, fourth edition (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), p. 22

**Mogadishu** Most survey respondents in Mogadishu identified with sub-clans of the Hiwaye clan, although the major clans of Darood and Rahanweyn were each represented with about seven percent (see Figure 43). The Hawiye, along with the Darood, make up the two largest Somali clans worldwide. Although most Al-Shabab are said to be Hawiye clan members, the Hawiye respondents of Mogadishu appeared to have little publicly-stated sympathy for that group or its ideology.



**Question 2 What are the common outcome metrics for each of the three programs? How have the different operational strategies (methods) influenced the results to-date based upon those metrics?**

### **Indicators**

Outcome metrics are indicators that measure higher level results, as opposed to output metrics that measure lower level results. Good common outcome metrics for CVE would enable policy makers to compare similar programs and make informed judgments on respective results. The three CVE programs evaluated here have a few isolated common output metrics, but next to no common outcome metrics. Figure 44 shows two categories of indicators for each evaluated program. First (in the grey rows) are the common indicators from the F indicator<sup>32</sup> list. The only ones in common (noted in bold font) are for the KTI Eastleigh and Garissa Youth programs – “number of people from ‘at-risk’ groups reached through USG-supported conflict mitigation activities;” and “number of public information campaigns conducted by USG programs.” The F indicators are intended to allow the “roll up” of indicators across programs. However, even when the programs have similar objectives, as do the East Africa CVE programs, few of the F indicators tend to overlap. The F indicators are also very output-oriented and cannot usually be considered “common outcome metrics.”

The second category of indicators (in white rows) is closer to being a collection of real outcome metrics. These are labeled here in the USAID vernacular as “custom outcome indicators.” They are designed as unique indicators of individual programs, often measured through some form of beneficiary survey. However, there is no real overlap on these indicators from one CVE program to the next. Even if indicators seem to be measuring a similar phenomenon, e.g. KTI-E’s indicator “percentage increase of youth envisioning and working towards a better future,”

<sup>32</sup> A set of standard indicators jointly developed by USAID and Department of State to consolidate results and provide a comprehensive picture of impacts achieved with foreign assistance resources.

and G-Youth's "percent of youth feeling better prepared to enter job market," the differences between both the wording and methodologies of measurement are too great for them to be easily compared.

<b>Figure 44</b>
<b>KTI Eastleigh</b>
<b>F Indicators</b>
<b>Number of people from 'at-risk' groups reached through USG-supported conflict mitigation activities</b>
<b>Number of public information campaigns conducted by USG programs</b>
Number of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs directly related to US Government CVE objectives implemented in country by civil society and partner governments
<b>Custom Outcome Indicator</b>
Percentage increase of community members perceiving violence as illegitimate means for social change
Percentage increase of moderate imams confident and well trained to disseminate message of nonviolence, moderation & tolerance
Percentage increase of radical imams more predispose to disseminate message of nonviolence and tolerance
Percentage increase of youth organization membership base
Percentage increase of community members having a stronger sense of identity
Percentage increase of youth envisioning and working towards a better future
Number of youth reporting better supported and represented by youth organization
Percentage increase of community members claiming that mentoring and counseling were crucial in helping them overcome personal issues
Percentage increase of youth seeing center as a focal point for civic life
Percentage increase of youth with improved attitude towards meritocratic works
<b>Garissa Youth</b>
<b>F Indicators</b>
<b>Number of people from 'at-risk groups' reached through USG-supported conflict mitigation activities</b>
<b>Number of public information campaigns completed by USG programs</b>
Number of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials provided with USG assistance
Number of learners enrolled in USG-supported primary schools or equivalent non-school-based settings
Number of learners enrolled in USG supported secondary schools or equivalent non-school-based settings
Number of adult learners enrolled in USG-supported schools or equivalent non-school-based settings
Number of teachers/educators trained with USG support
Number of administrators and officials trained
Amount of financing mobilized through public-private partnerships
Number of curricula created or modified to include focus on Human Rights with USG Support
<b>Custom Outcome Indicators</b>
Increased level of civic awareness among participating upper primary school youth
Percent of youth reporting feeling better supported and represented by YSO
Percent of youth reporting improved relationships with the community
Percent of participating youth feeling capable of leading other youth
Number of youth employed through income-generating opportunities
Percent of youth feeling better prepared to enter job market
Percent of youth with improved perceptions of the project activities and awareness of opportunities offered through the project
Percent of participating Madrassa students with improved English language competency ESL test administered at the end of the ESL training
Percent of Garissa Form III and IV students who view technical education offered by NEP TTI as a desirable career track
<b>SYLP</b>
<b>F Indicators</b>
Number of persons participating in USG-funded workforce development programs
Number of persons completing USG-funded workforce development programs.
Number of persons from at-risk groups reached through USG supported conflict mitigation activities.
Number of non-governmental constituencies built or strengthened with USG assistance
Number of USG-supported activities that demonstrate the positive impact of a peace process through the demonstration of tangible, practical benefits
Number of youth participating in training programs
Number of trainees enrolled in USG funded workforce development programs
Number of trainees completing USG funded workforce development programs
Number of trainees who drop out of USG-funded workforce development programs
Number of workforce development initiatives created through USG assisted public-private partnerships
Number of trainees whose livelihood opportunities are improved as a result of participation in SYLP training, within 3 months of completion of training
Number of trainees transitioning to further education and training from participation in USG funded workforce development

## **Data Collection**

All three programs have employed survey mechanisms to generate program feedback. KTI-E uses an SMS system to track participation at sponsored events and sends micro-survey questions to the participants before and after the events. KTI-E also uses SenseMaker by Cognitive Edge, a qualitative analysis tool intended to process thousands of narratives collected by scribes and compare attitudes and perceptions of various cohorts. Chemonics has signed with a local firm to enter data collected into the Cognitive Edge website. Data for SenseMaker are collected at periodic workshops. KTI-E's outcome indicators are measured through a quarterly youth survey carried out by Infotrak, a Kenyan firm. Infotrak conducts key informant interviews and focus groups and surveys a representative sample of youths by conducting 1,800 interviews.

Garissa Youth carries out two surveys of youth: one of a sample of the general youth population in Garissa, and one of a sample of project participants. The survey of the general youth population is conducted in conjunction with the community needs assessment via face-to-face interviews. There is also a survey of randomly sampled project participants conducted by phone. Additionally, the entire population of youth who received work readiness training is surveyed to document changes in their employment status.

SYLP carried out a Tracer Study of youth participants, their parents and work experience providers in 2011. This tracer study's goal was to obtain descriptive data on the perceived effects of the program on targeted youth. While non-experimental in design, the study collected data from various sources, including youth themselves, their parents and their employers, to allow for triangulation of data and thus improve validity and reliability of the findings. The questions asked were: 1. What were the immediate effects of the training and the placement activities of the project on participating youth and their families (including access to job opportunities, preparedness for work, etc)?; and 2. Were participants, their families and their employers satisfied with the program? The Tracer Study found that nearly all study participants attributed their current employment to either SYLP training or job placement services provided by SYLP.

Around 90 percent of respondents said they felt their chances for better job opportunities with a higher salary improved as a result of skills training and job placement provided by SYLP. The percentage of participants who reported no income decreased from 88.7 percent prior to participating in the program, to 14.6 percent after the program. The mean income reported by study participants before SYLP was US\$12.2, while the mean income reported by study participants after SYLP was US\$146.4. Ninety six percent of parents interviewed agreed that job placement of youth resulted in a significant increase in the financial support to the family provided by youth.

The recommendations section will discuss how to better address the lack of any common outcome metrics.

**Question 3 Regarding each program's experience in collaborating with local authorities and key influencers in the community, what has worked and what has not worked?**

All three programs being evaluated have made significant efforts to invest in relationships with local authorities, including local and national government officials, community leaders, private sector representatives and religious leaders. The investment of time in these relationships, which was stressed differently by different projects, was important to program implementation.

**KTI-E** The KTI-E program has made efforts to establish relationships with Eastleigh community leaders and established an Advisory Board. However, Board Members are juggling multiple commitments and seem unable to dedicate the necessary time to the project. For example, a project that attempted to interview business leaders for audio interviews on financial literacy was unable to interview a single Board Member, even with the direct engagement of the KTI-E officer.

One effective technique undertaken by KTI-E has been the provision of small grants to government structures (i.e. Ministry of Youth, Chiefs), which has engendered a sense of appreciation and support from local government officials. Nonetheless, given the limited Somali representation in government (elected or appointed), there remains a gap between the local government and the largely Somali populace. The evaluation team was not able to clearly identify what specific support has been provided by the Advisory Council.

**G-Youth** Operating in a localized geographic territory, G-Youth maintained strong relationships with a variety of officials, notably the local Member of Parliament, Adan Duale. Both the MP and the project benefited from the relationship, with the MP "increasing [his] access and support among the Garissan youth" while helping to foster relationships between the project and the community. G-Youth also invested significant effort in building a strong working relationship with the Supreme Council of Muslims (SUPKEM), although it sometimes relied on the support of MP Duale to negotiate complicated discussions regarding the program and its adherence to Islamic principles.

G-Youth, by conducting multiple outreach programs, including youth summits, promoted transparency in its dealings with the community. This was critically important in an unstable environment such as Garissa, where USG funded projects are often viewed suspiciously. Also, by employing staff from Garissa, G-Youth further facilitated strong relationships with the community. This proved complicated at times given that senior staff had demands and expectations placed upon them in their roles as community leaders.

**SYLP** Significant time and resources were invested by SYLP in establishing relationships with private sector officials through the establishment of Business Advisory Councils (BACs) in each of the seven project sites. Engaging the private sector in development work was a relatively new concept in all of the Somali regions. Interviews with private sector leaders indicated that this relationship was valued by private sector representatives, many of whom benefitted from trained youth to help in their business endeavors. In turn, the private sector provided jobs and internships for participating youth. However, the BAC model was not without shortcomings. Some members expressed concern that the BACs had no clear mandate and were uncertain as to what was expected of them. For example, feedback from a Djibouti conference on youth employment indicated little direct impact or follow-up after the activity concluded. Moreover, there is little evidence that the BACs will be sustainable upon project completion.



Moving forward, the BAC model needs to be strengthened with clarified objectives, outcomes, roles and responsibilities. For example, ongoing dialogue between BACs, youth and training providers would help ensure that skills training meets private sector demand and considers youth interests. Opportunities for BAC members to be exposed to global networks and new industry specialties would also be important. Any new programming should design a more sustainable strategy to engage the private sector and keep it engaged over time. Furthermore, efforts should be made to forge relationships between private sector representatives and other sectors including the government (i.e. Ministry of Labor), NGOs, training providers and youth.

SYLP program officers in all sites maintained relationships with local government officials. The Mayor of Hargeisa was particularly well-informed regarding the project, praising it and noting his hiring of several program graduates to help his office better use technology. One challenge for SYLP was a lack of clarity regarding government counterparts, such as those in Somaliland, Puntland, South-Central and the semi-autonomous regions of Heeb, Himaan and Galmudug. Representatives of the Ministries of Education, Labor, Gender and others often had conflicting “claims” over the need to be informed and consulted. For example, certification by government officials varied from site to site depending on who the most involved authority was, e.g. a ministry official or a local or national government officer. Given the limited government capacity in most Somali regions, this inconsistency presented challenges for project staff that had to mediate between different ministry interests without receiving significant support from any of them. SYLP did not invest heavily in relationships with parents and community leaders at the local level, which could have had important project impact.

**Comparative Conclusions** SYLP focused much attention on business leaders, G-Youth on the relationship with the MP and religious leaders, and KTI-E with an emphasis on local government officials and community leaders. The respective emphasis for each project was based on local circumstances. For example, G-Youth required the approval of community and religious leaders in order to operate. All projects need a clear stakeholder strategy that focuses on both what the stakeholders can contribute as well how they can benefit. Missing in all cases is a clear strategy to engage parents, an important consideration moving forward. At different points in time, each program relied on these relationships to facilitate activities at the community level.

#### **Question 4 What are the significant challenges faced by the projects? What has the project done to address these challenges, and with what results?**

Despite the unique role of CVE programming in USAID development, many of the challenges noted here resemble those encountered by more conventional interventions. Like other programs working through local NGOs, CVE programs evaluated here suffered from grantee capacity problems, unrealistic expectations from partners, staff turnover and slow procurement mechanisms.

#### **KTI-E**

**Grantee Capacity** Perhaps KTI-E’s biggest challenge is the working relationship with grantees possessing little or no capacity. Grantees require time-consuming support from KTI-E staff, especially in report writing, procurement procedures and grant management. Many grantees are intimidated by the complexity of reporting. Grantees also complain about what they see as the short time period for grant implementation – usually ranging from one to six months – exacerbating their frustration with administrative issues. Where possible, KTI-E provides in-kind

support (meaning they cover costs directly rather than issuing grants) that minimizes management responsibility on the part of the grantee. They also endeavor to provide some assistance in the area of grant management and reporting to their grantees. However, significant work remains in the effort to help grantees understand the grant. With new grantees entering on an ongoing basis, KTI-E would benefit from a clear orientation program for new and prospective grantees.

**Anti-Americanism** Working in Eastleigh, with its political and religious tensions, poses a challenge. KTI reports indicate that some beneficiaries or activity participants feel used by the United States in an effort to sabotage Islam. As a result of this view, KTI-E uses its own corporate branding rather than that of USAID, keeping a low USG profile in an area that largely distrusts the United States. The result of this branding strategy has been mixed. While the program activities are indeed seen as being independent, the tight-knit community is well aware that many of these activities are sponsored by the USG. In the absence of clarity, distrust and rumors can spread easily. For instance, one youth said he thought the CIA was behind the program. Some youth are unwilling to give their phone numbers and identifying data, allegedly because some think they are being tracked. KTI-E should balance the benefits of not branding, with the risks of improper assumptions being made in the absence of clarity regarding the donor and its intentions.

**Activity Participant Relations** The relationship between grantees and attendees is not always smooth. Grantees take attendance at their events for reporting purposes. Some participants perceive that grantees are using their participation to make money and occasionally demand compensation for their attendance. Al-Shabab is known to provide monetary incentives to youth it recruits, adding to the pressure to do the same. Given the shadowy role Al-Shabab plays in the community, some participants are reluctant to share information given the insecure environment of Eastleigh. This may be part of the reason that KTI-E's records on participation at its events are sketchy and not always reliable. KTI-E is in the process of putting together a more robust M&E system to register participants and track involvement.

## **G-Youth**

**Expectations of Payment** Issues of monetary compensation have been problematic in Garissa. Misunderstandings of the amount of money available developed at one point when the U.S. Ambassador visited the region and announced, accompanied by a large visual check, a donation of \$800,000 to youth in the region. G-Youth, which was in the process of standing-up its Interim Youth Organization (IYO), discovered many in Garissa believed that youth who served on the IYO would receive large salaries. G-Youth countered these misperceptions with messages and a written letter disclaiming the myths and explaining that IYO positions would not make them rich financially, but rich in the opportunity to serve the community and other youth. Nonetheless, once the youth leaders joined IYO, a movement began to demand paid stipends for serving the organization. At first, G-Youth refused to pay youth for attending trainings or participating in leadership activities despite repeated demands. However, numerous other NGOs in the region were paying youth stipends to attend training or to participate in activities. Eventually G-Youth acquiesced and agreed to pay the IYO a monthly stipend of 6,000 KSH to cover the cost of their travel and mobile phone airtime related to their IYO work – a decision some in the organization regretted for perpetuating the 'hand out mentality' becoming prevalent in East Africa. After delivering their first training for other youth in their clusters, IYO members requested an increase in their stipends from 6,000 KSH to 30,000 KSH per month. When G-Youth addressed the unbalanced expectations, half of the IYO leaders walked out in protest. G-Youth then stopped the stipends altogether. Subsequent to the stipend issue, G-Youth spent significant time and resources in order to support the development of a youth umbrella

association with clear expectations being discussed from the beginning. The umbrella is relatively new and it is unclear how it will develop.

**Grantee Capacity** Many G-Youth grantees submitted poorly developed financial reports and demonstrated poor management of funds and program activities. Providing adequate monitoring and support to the youth groups has been a challenge for the project. At least two youth groups were terminated due to mismanagement of funds. Most youth groups required coaching and mentorship to ensure activities were implemented consistent with their work plans and budgets. This limited capacity resulted in slower disbursements, slower spending under the youth fund and slower start-up of the youth groups' activities. As a result, G-Youth began providing additional capacity building on financial management for the problematic groups. G-Youth also allocated more staff to the grants program, developed a monitoring schedule to track partners and provided additional program support. Staff indicated that the grant system, managed by the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) according to strict standards and protocols, while time consuming, has contributed to increasing capacity and knowledge of local groups.

**Slow Procurement** Putting systems in place to fund activities by youth organizations took longer than anticipated. The slowness of the procurement process delayed arrival of furnishings and equipment for some projects. The delays in funding "tangible" activities, (e.g. grants for recreational facilities or youth centers) are frustrating to youth anxious to start projects. G-Youth has tried to ensure mechanisms for funding youth projects and related capacity building are organized and in place as soon as possible. They have taken steps to involve youth in setting up funding mechanisms, partnerships and procurement procedures, allowing young people to give input and share with their peers reasons delays may arise

## **SYLP**

**Shifting Regional Targeting** SYLP faced significant challenges as a result of changing security and operational situations and USG policies. This was seen most clearly in 2011/2012 when USAID first encouraged a stronger emphasis be placed in activities in Mogadishu, only to suspend activities in Mogadishu a few months later and refocus resources on the autonomous regions of Heeb and Himaan and Galmuduug. As a result, the program had to enter new regions, hire new staff, and establish new community relationships, all within a very short time period. While these changes were implemented quickly and efficiently, the staff had to invest significant time in building new relationships, explaining USG priorities and responding to complaints from Mogadishu grantees. Given the importance placed on developing long-term positive relationships with communities and grantees, these directional challenges were difficult to respond to for an ongoing development program. In the future, the allocation of a rapid-response fund could enable new activities to be undertaken without risking ongoing ones.

**Challenges in specifying a clear role for the private sector -** SYLP invested significant time and resources in establishing strong working relationships with the private sector. At times, however, this effort did not lead to anticipated outcomes given the lack of clarity on what was being asked of the private sector aside from job placements for youth. For example, while BAC members did provide internships and jobs, they did not directly interact with training providers and youth. Also, the team invested significantly in a relationship with the newly established Coca-Cola bottling plant in Hargeisa, which likewise yielded little in the way of tangible results as the project did not have enough time to solidify the relationship. If USAID programs are to engage proactively with the private sector, flexibility must be built in to do so, allowing for ideas such as scarce-skills funds.

**Staffing Structure** The initial SYLP field staffing structure did not support either the volume of sub-awarding or the required technical work of the project. In 2009, EDC hired the core local staff for the project just as the first cohort proposals were received. The role of core staff in selecting and managing sub-awardees was time consuming and restricted their ability to focus on their technical roles. During the 2010 expansion phase, EDC hired a sub-award team with representation in Somaliland, Puntland, South Central Somalia and later Galmudug. It shifted the majority of selection and revision processes to this team, and conducted more site visits to support them. A funding mechanism with two staff members in Nairobi was created in order to promote higher award amounts. EDC also instituted a rolling submission and selection process, which added some flexibility.

**Grantee Capacity** Deficits in sub-awardees' capacity in the areas of finance, reporting, compliance and training methodology were evident through the application, revision and implementation stages. EDC attempted to support capacity building of sub-awardees while maintaining quality standards and compliance. EDC local and home office staff worked with selected partners to revise their budgets and scopes of work before issuing awards. They worked closely with them during the period of performance to ensure accurate financial reporting, as there were often delays in invoicing or payment of advances. Capacity-building options for partners included a mandatory post-award orientation that required submission of monthly cost projections for the life of the project; review of M&E tools and expectations for technical and financial reporting; "in-service" training in select capacities such as finance, M&E, InfoMatch, mentoring, training methodology; and syllabus creation and implementation. Based on historical delays of grantees not finishing on time and needing multiple extensions to complete final training and placement efforts, EDC facilitated regional "finishing strong" workshops with remaining partners in 2011, transitioning partners to focused weekly planning, projections and monitoring. As a result of such efforts, SYLP managed to reduce its significant burn-rate and conclude all activities within the grant period.

#### **Question 5 How has each program integrated formal and informal media and messaging into their activities?**

KTI-E, G-Youth and SYLP all have or had media and messaging components, although they vary significantly. Unlike USAID's West African CVE programs under the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), where media components played a prominent role in disseminating a message of moderation, East African CVE program media activities primarily fall under the rubric of other training and youth projects. An important distinction is that TSCTP activities were intended to influence the enabling environment for extremism, while the East Africa activities are primarily focused on discouraging recruitment into CVE organizations – an emphasis less appropriate for large-scale media projects.

**KTI-E** The Eastleigh project has supported several grants focusing on messages of peace, tolerance, and violence prevention and mitigation. Whether delivering messages at sporting events, hosting debates (sometimes televised) on key issues for the Somali community, or sponsoring interfaith dialogue, KTI-E has promoted multiple channels of communication and messaging. While not branded, and therefore not as well known in the community as other CVE projects, this multitude of messages targeting the Somali community has likely helped change attitudes and beliefs. For example, during the launch of the KTI-E-supported Kamikunji Youth Network, representatives spoke clearly of the need for cohesion, unity, non-violence and

tolerance, which, as expressed to the evaluation team, “would have never been spoken about publicly in the past.”

**G-Youth** With a much more explicit focus on media and messaging, G-Youth undertook several relevant activities, including the training of journalists and market researchers. The program also established its own independent Garissa youth radio station. In collaboration with the Somali language station StarFM, G-Youth developed a broad reach for its messaging to the Somali community. The program developed and delivered civic engagement programs geared to Somali youth. It also emphasized issues such as how to obtain Kenyan identification cards, voter registration, and information on the 2012 Constitution. The strong branding of G-Youth and the relatively small intervention area of Garissa municipality resulted in widespread recognition of the program and its activities throughout the community.

**SYLP** The primary messaging for SYLP was done through the InfoMatch cellular phone-based system. Through this system over 10,000 program beneficiaries were registered, as were youth in other regions of Somalia. The system was primarily used for the JobMatch service, where beneficiaries could upload mini-CVs and search the database for job and internship opportunities posted by employers. In addition, the system offered an easy way to send messages on relevant activities and opportunities through SMS blasts. The primary weakness of the system was that it was closed, meaning only registered youth could send and receive messages, limiting broader community-wide impact. Another limitation was the absence of established tracking systems to measure youth employment over time, tracking how many youth remained employed, earned better incomes, etc. The technology existed, but was never used for robust tracking due to limitations in time and M&E staff. Since the SYLP project termination, and with the establishment of the independent Shaqodoon NGO, the system and technology have been adapted for broader use, including electoral monitoring and survey delivery. In addition to InfoMatch, SYLP supported several programs that trained print, TV and radio journalists, technicians and market researchers, improving the technical capacity in these traditionally underdeveloped fields. Finally, the branding of the name “Shaqodoon,” meaning job-seeker in Somali, resulted in widespread knowledge and awareness of the program in target communities.

As the recommendations section will detail, future CVE programming in East Africa should include a more robust media focus that looks more specifically at influencing the enabling environment.

## Essential Components / Recommendations for Future Directions

Findings and conclusions from the evaluation questions and answers inform the recommendations from this study. A summary of the quantitative data (see Figure 33) showed statistically significant evidence that full beneficiaries had advantages over a comparison group in the areas of *engagement*, *efficacy*, *belief in youth associations* and *identity*. These advantages, measured in mean differences between strata, held consistently in four out of the five cities studied – Nairobi, Garissa, Hargeisa and Mogadishu. In a fifth city, Bosaso, these advantages were not evident, primarily because of relatively higher scores for the comparison group. Acknowledging an unavoidable level of selection bias, the survey shows that USAID CVE programs seem to be having results in all areas with the exception of attitudes to *violence in the name of Islam*, where attitudes were universally opposed to violence.

Given the evidence for beneficiary advantages in four out of the five areas, one can conclude that all three programs have demonstrated results. Figure 3 highlights the areas of continued greatest need in order – engagement, efficacy and youth associations - areas in which CVE programs also seem to have the most positive results. Recommendations flowing from this analysis include the following:

**Emphasize Projects Addressing Youth Voice and Influence:** In Hargeisa especially, it was clear from focus groups that youth who are *engaged*, but have a low sense of *efficacy*, were frustrated and possibly vulnerable to extremist attitudes. To address this phenomenon, future CVE programs should address ways to increase youth voice and influence, particularly by encouraging more avenues for *engagement* with authorities. CVE programs should be designed with linkages to civil society, NGO, media and local government programs. Such linkages would provide for an environment more conducive to youth voice and influence. For instance, USAID could establish a separate program that provides direct support to local government officials, enabling them to better implement their mandates and respond to community and youth needs. Linkages to such a program would be critical to ensure that youth feel their voices are being heard. Under a separate local government program for example, support could be provided to establish youth consultation boards within a framework of transparency and accountability.

**Future CVE programming should be subjected to a gender assessment:** CVE programs usually focus primarily on males, the gender of most terrorists and extremists. However, a number of arguments have been made for the inclusion of females in CVE programming. Even in patriarchal societies, women and girls can have a pacifistic influence on family members should they choose to exercise it. Also, there are instances, although rare in Africa, of women and girls being directly recruited into extremist organizations. The survey conducted for this evaluation did not find any salient findings regarding gender, with one exception. Survey data show that females across East Africa have lower *engagement* scores than their male counterparts. This *engagement* gender gap is most pronounced in Eastleigh. Females score consistently lower on these questions, likely due to both the culture of exclusion of women from traditional decision-making as well as the lack of female Somali role models in government, business or leadership positions. Future programs, particularly in Islamic cultures, should design specific gender strategies and programs by which female mentorship, leadership and guidance is explored. For example, successful “big sister” programs have been implemented that focus on mentorship and positive role models for emerging young female leaders. There are many female Somali businesswomen who could be engaged in such activities. Both SYLP and G-Youth endeavored to support such activities and encourage gender inclusion. However, this was done in an ad hoc rather than in an integrated strategic fashion. Future programs should establish an independent gender component to provide more substantive support for young women while more directly engaging mothers.

**Establish a broader media messaging program to address the enabling environment:** Analysis of survey data provides several indicators regarding messaging on a moderate interpretation of Islam. First, the overwhelming majority of respondents (beneficiaries and comparison group alike) rejected the acceptability of *violence in the name of Islam*, with scores over 4.5 out of 5.0 for all three strata (see Figure 3). This finding, which was echoed in most focus groups, may reflect a degree of social desirability bias.<sup>33</sup> Nonetheless, it is significant that

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<sup>33</sup> Social desirability bias is the tendency of respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed favorably by others. It can take the form of over-reporting "good behavior or attitudes" or under-reporting "bad," or undesirable behavior and attitudes.

almost no one in any of the areas surveyed is willing to take the position that *violence in the name of Islam* is acceptable. Answers to the question whether the U.S. was engaged in a war on terrorism or a war on Islam were more interesting. From the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, the large number of those who believed the U.S. was at war with Islam indicates the need for a messaging effort. Media catering to extremist views already exists in Kenya. The Muslim community operates a number of media outlets officially to propagate Islam, but also to disseminate political ideas. Radio Iqra<sup>45</sup> and Radio Rehema<sup>46</sup> are the two most important electronic outlets.

Secondly, the relatively low scores in *efficacy* indicate that additional means are necessary to make target-youth, prone to alienation, feel as though their *engagement* with local government is worthwhile. Media offers a means for youth to participate in the civic dialogue with a large audience and have their voice heard. Training in media production provides both job skills and a platform for expression.

While the G-Youth and KTI-E programs contain some media messaging, none of the East Africa CVE programs has a sustained radio messaging program that can deliver a consistent message of tolerance and moderation to community youth. Implicit in all three programs (to a lesser degree in Eastleigh) is an emphasis on reducing the enabling environment that permits extremism to flourish.

A 2011 evaluation conducted of CVE programs in the Sahel found that radio programming with a peace and tolerance message was one of the most effective activities in shaping attitudes toward moderation. The radio programs in Mali, Chad and Niger were popular with populations where radio was a primary source of information, and radio production was a marketable skill set for youthful program beneficiaries. Development of media skills have already shown potential through the SYLP program. In Hargeisa, for instance, SONYO Executive Director Saeed Mohamed Ahmed noted that SYLP-beneficiary youth involved in media “are now able to influence broader discussions and debate, and that by having a core of trained youth, they are able to insert their viewpoints in an area traditionally dominated by older professionals.” Ali Farah, head of Bulsho TV in Hargiesia, noted that Shaqodoon enabled youth to obtain media skills, provided important content for newly blossoming TV channels and suggested much more could be done in community radio, if the government were to open the airwaves.<sup>34</sup>

While all CVE programs evaluated here had elements of messaging and media incorporated into their activities, the impact on the broader community is unclear. A community radio program would provide for ongoing community engagement and messaging rather than limiting media programs to beneficiaries. In addition to reaching more at-risk youth (that might be reluctant to enroll in more intensive programming), such messaging could also help ensure the critically important community support required to operate in these challenging contexts.

**Improve Targeting** To be truly impactful, USAID CVE programs should target the youth most at-risk for engaging in extremist activities. Who these youth actually are (age, gender, education levels, income levels, etc.) varies greatly depending on local conditions as well as the identified sites for recruitment. For example, in Kenya, there is some evidence that new recruits to Islam from non-Somali communities are committing *violent acts in the name of Islam*. In Puntland and South Central Somalia, economic exclusion is a major issue fueling both piracy and the appeal of Al-Shabab. Extremism is often linked to ideological issues and beliefs held by highly-educated elites. Therefore, prior to initiating any activities at a local level, a youth risk

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
<sup>34</sup> Currently in Somaliland, the government comparisons all radio

profile for the community should be developed that identifies the characteristics of the most at-risk youth and their pathways of influence (i.e. through parents, elders, imams, peers, etc.) Such information is well understood by the community itself, and youth members of local NGOs can provide information as well as a safeguard against extremism. As several key informants noted, it is important to target those outside of what might be called the “elite” youth. All of the projects, particularly SYLP and G-Youth, rely on a degree of self-selection. Only youth who are inclined to take advantage of an opportunity provided by a USG project will enroll and meet selection criteria. By partnering with non-traditional organizations (i.e. mosques) and offering services in high demand (i.e. English skills or recreation), relationships can be built and program content adapted for to accomplish broader messaging. KTI-E’s programming is the closest example, whereby its recreational and cultural events are attractive to a wide range of community members and do not require specific criteria for involvement.

Targeting can also be done geographically. For instance, in Nairobi, the Majengo and Ziwani neighborhoods are considered recruitment grounds for Al-Shabab according to key informant interviews and KTI-E staff. In Somalia, communities recently freed from Al-Shabab rule, or those where Al-Shabab are known to be seeking refuge, should be targeted. Attitudes in Mogadishu, long under the Al-Shabab shadow, were considerably more moderate than those in Hargeisa, which has had relative peace for 20 years. Focus group findings in Mogadishu, and to a lesser extent in Bosaso, indicated that this longing for peace might be a manifestation of “conflict fatigue,” a phenomenon that has helped bring peace to the Balkans and Central America after decades of war. This may be an opportune time to work with youth in South Central Somalia. After decades of limited resources provided to both South Central Somalia, and to a lesser extent Puntland, these areas should be a focus of future support.

**Emphasize broad stakeholder engagement to reduce the enabling environment, particularly inclusive of parents.** Improved targeting can be informed by a greater emphasis on broad stakeholder engagement to reduce the enabling environment for extremism (as opposed to individual training provision). This could also lead to improvements in community relationships and build support for youth in traditionally elder dominated decision-making structures. The lack of involvement of parents/caregivers in any of the programs is a critical oversight, particularly given the very positive views of parents as expressed in the focus group discussions. USAID should also consider more direct support to established community organizations, coupled with the necessary institutional capacity building support for community organizations and NGOs alike. Such an approach is supported by the USAID Forward goals.

**Consider a madrassa-based activity** In Kenya the social conservatism and intolerance fostered by decades of Wahhabi proselytization in Eastleigh and North Eastern Province has intensified. Wahhabi mosques and





madrasas are dominant and most moderate Sufi madrasas have closed.<sup>35</sup> In Kenya, with no effective counter-movement to Wahhabism, there is need for increased effort by Muslim leaders and authorities to de-radicalize their followers and engage in more effective counter-radicalization.<sup>36</sup> Figure 45 shows the results of a survey question on how a respondent identified his or herself.<sup>37</sup> Across all evaluated communities, religion (Islam) was the overwhelming answer. The data on the influence of madrassas on Somali youth is mixed. In Eastleigh, only 23 percent of those surveyed indicated they had never been enrolled in a madrassa, while in Garissa the number was 55 percent. Nonetheless, madrassas play an undeniably large role in the education of Somali youth and offer both a threat and opportunity. According to Abdullahi Salat, the chairman of Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) in Garissa, English language skills in Kenyan madrassas are very low – aggravating the communication barrier between the youth in madrassas and secular youth with formal education. According to Adan Duale, Member of Parliament for Garissa and a supporter of the G Youth program, USAID should invest in teaching English in madrassas as a way of gaining access to this important institution and moderating some of the more extremist elements of the curricula. There is precedent, since much of the USAID CVE programming in West Africa has included work with madrassas, which complements efforts of other USG entities such as the Department of State.

**Integrate capacity building to all grant programs and establish direct relationships with community groups.** Interviews with implementers and a review of project documents have emphasized the need to strengthen capacity of local NGO partners. Even the most experienced of partners – across all the evaluated programs - required significant ongoing support in financial management, administrative and programming issues. This can be partly attributed to the high turnover in staffing in Somali NGOs as well as limited educational opportunities in the region. A mandate and adequate resources devoted to capacity building would strengthen the sector as well as individual providers. Greater management capacity of grantees would also free up technical and management staff to concentrate on the strategic objectives of their programs. Capacity building for local NGOs is also one of the key principles of the USAID Forward initiative. Furthermore, depending on local conditions, future CVE programming could focus more on community support by providing in-kind support (i.e. KTI-E) rather than channeling resources through NGOs, although this requires much more staff and oversight and does not guarantee specific outcomes.

**Standardize Monitoring and Evaluation of CVE Programs** The lack of any common outcome indicators makes it difficult to compare results of different CVE programs. A review of the program indicators for the three projects (Question 2) found only two output F indicators in common. Outcome indicators are best designed around a regular survey instrument. All CVE programs in East Africa should use a common survey on an annual basis to produce shared metrics that can be tracked over time. The survey should be designed to allow higher level measurement across CVE programs, since at lower levels these programs have diverse objectives and measures.

Output metrics should also be standardized to a greater degree. The KTI-E program in particular should gather participant information in a database that is better able to track and cross reference all beneficiaries. The data base should make it possible to determine what individuals have participated in multiple activities and how often, without being double counted. At the same time, monitoring and evaluation tools should be designed in an uncomplicated

<sup>35</sup> Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation, ICG Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°8525 January 2012

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Choices were my religion; my clan; my country; my gender; and my age

fashion to encourage broad use and allow the system to be adopted by new personnel in the advent of staff turnover. Local NGOs face capacity challenges to create monitoring and evaluation systems. Simple tools and a straightforward system should be created for locally useful information such as enrollment, skill sets and training graduation. These are the basic data that will ensure that core baseline and training activity information is collected.

**Expand use of ICT training and applications** The innate technological ability of youth should be fully exploited. When the evaluators interviewed the Mayor of Hargeisa, he spoke admiringly of Shaqodoon's use of cellular phone technology connecting young people to job openings. He picked up his cellular phone at one point in the interview saying "I liked it. I liked what they did." USAID should expand use of technology to facilitate youth communication and information sharing. While the SYLP InfoMatch system focused mainly on matching youth with opportunities, the system could be enhanced to form a strong system of youth communication and information sharing between youth in different regions as well as different countries. Mobile phone technology, so widespread in Somalia and throughout East Africa, could be used to strengthen youth dialogue and civil society participation.

**Develop programs to address the phenomenon of youth gangs** Qualitative research in Eastleigh consistently encountered multiple references to violent youth gangs. In interviews and focus groups in Eastleigh the predominant name encountered was Superpowers, but Sitaki Kujua and others were mentioned as well. The Drivers Guide to Violent Extremism details the recent phenomenon of recruitment of violent criminals into Islamic extremist organizations, often through prison. It is logical that violent criminal gangs such as the Superpowers, which is sometimes seen as a neighborhood defender from the police and other outsiders, might serve as a gateway to violent extremism in a community with such a strong Al-Shabab presence.

Members of youth gangs are often well under the age of 18. Therefore, activities should also target at-risk youth under 18 as a preventive measure. Focus group discussions from a previous evaluation in Eastleigh found that most of the gangs had members as young as 10 years old. Since poor parenting has been cited as one of the factors driving youth into criminal gangs, there is also a need to engage and involve parents in empowering youth.

**Develop prevention-oriented programs, perhaps school or madrasa based, to reach younger children.** All of the programs surveyed worked with youth, most frequently those between the ages of 18 and 24. As evidenced by data showing that over 50 percent of the population is under the age of 20 and 25 percent under the age of 10, it is important to consider programming to reach the younger cohorts of youth. This outreach should be in a school setting that provides a more equitable (i.e. non-self selecting) access to all youth in the community. Such a program could also be a way to target parents.

## Conclusion

USAID's CVE programs focused on Somali youth in Somalia and Kenya have demonstrated results when the views of beneficiaries are contrasted with comparison groups. However, improvement on an attitudinal survey, while important, does not represent behavior change. As the positive results from Eastleigh and Garissa were being confirmed through the fieldwork in late 2012, the evaluators watched as those communities suffered terrorist attacks and associated communal unrest on a more than weekly basis.

A January 2013 study by Mercy Corps in Somalia, found that youth who are involved in civic engagement initiatives are less likely to *endorse* political violence, but are more likely to have *engaged* in such violence.<sup>38</sup> This counterintuitive finding shows positive attitudes expressed in a survey may not translate, at least immediately, to less violent behavior.

USAID's programming in CVE should continue, but it should be tempered by an understanding that working with Somali youth, a demographic cohort that has come of age in a culture consumed by 20 years of violence, will continue to be challenge. USAID's CVE programs can point to demonstrated results in improving youths' attitudes in the areas of *engagement*, *efficacy*, *belief in the power of youth associations*, and *identity* in several communities. However, these demonstrated *outcomes* have yet to translate into the *impact* of a reduction in terrorism and youth violence. Current monitoring and evaluation literature (e.g. Morra Immas and Rist (2009); Bamberger, Rugh and Mabry (2012)) finds that impact in development programs often cannot be demonstrated until seven to ten years after the beginning of an intervention. As can be seen in a review of the 2011 evaluation of the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership and the violent events that have since transpired in the Sahel, USAID interventions in CVE are only one factor in addressing a complex problem that continues to confound the best efforts of Western governments. Violent extremism in Africa has its roots in interconnected drivers that have existed for years, and a solution to the problem of VE will not happen quickly.

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<sup>38</sup> Examining the Links between Youth Economic Opportunity, Civic Engagement, and Conflict: Evidence from Mercy Corps' Somali Youth Leaders Initiative, January 2013

# Annexes

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## Annex 1 - Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation used a mixed methodology – employing both qualitative and quantitative methods to answer the evaluation questions. In keeping with the scope of work, the quantitative method was based on a stratified sampling survey. The qualitative methods included focus groups and key informant interviews. The quantitative method was based on a survey using stratified sampling. Stratification is the process of dividing members of the population into homogeneous subgroups before sampling. For this evaluation, the three strata included the population segments described below. Analysis of the quantitative survey data was used to answer some of the “what” questions in the scope of work. Data from the focus groups and interviews were directed at the “why” questions and attempted to provide a deeper examination of the data uncovered by the survey.

**Quantitative Methodology** In keeping with the evaluation scope of work, the evaluation team employed surveys in five communities across East Africa. In each community, the survey sampled three segments or “strata” of the population. 1) Full Beneficiaries: individuals who completed the training program offered by USAID partners (e.g. youth who have finished a course in carpentry or women who have regularly attended courses on entrepreneurship); 2) Partial Beneficiaries: individuals who engaged with the program, but to a lesser extent; 3) Comparison Group: Individuals who did not participate in USAID sponsored programs in these communities.

In each community where the survey was administered, the evaluators developed a sampling frame - the source material or device from which a sample was drawn. Since this evaluation measured the views of individual project beneficiaries in segments 1 and 2, the sampling frame was based on lists of beneficiaries. Working with EDC and Chemonics, the implementers of the evaluated programs, the team acquired lists of the individuals who composed Strata 1 and 2. For the EDC programs in Somalia and Garissa, Strata 1 included individuals who completed the training program; while Stratum 2 included those who applied for and did not enter programs or entered and did not complete them. Stratum 3 were those who had no contact with the USAID programs and were not identified from beneficiary lists, as opposed to the case of Strata 1 and 2.<sup>1</sup>

In the case of the Chemomix KT-E program in Eastleigh, the sampling frame for Strata 1 and 2 had to be developed differently. The KT-E-Eastleigh program puts a greater emphasis on messaging and the role of youth in the community than the EDC programs. With a list of over 50 activities ranging from professional training, to debates, to peace messaging at athletic and cultural events, it was not possible to generate comparable lists to those used for the sampling frames in the EDC programs. Therefore, Stratum 1 (or full beneficiaries) was defined as the

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<sup>1</sup> There is an unavoidable level in this study of selection bias – a condition created when a group of people that self-selects into a program is compared with a group of people that did not. Some distortion of evidence has to be acknowledged due to possible systematic differences between people who received the intervention (those signing up for a USAID-sponsored program) and those that did not. To the extent possible, the evaluators controlled for selection bias by employing random sampling for all three strata being surveyed, meaning that every person in each of the three sampling frames had an equal chance of being selected.

graduates of training programs or other high level participants in KTI programs, such as debate participants. Since these high-level activities made up only a limited portion of KTI programs, there were too few of these full beneficiaries to generate a separate sampling frame for drop-outs or unsuccessful applications to these programs. Instead, Stratum 2 (or partial) beneficiaries were identified from sign-in lists of audience members in the lower-level activities, such as debate audience members, or audiences at KTI-sponsored athletic or cultural events. The sampling frame for Stratum 3 in KTI, however, was generated in the same way as for the EDC programs; i.e. by randomly sampling 100 youths in a neighborhood demographically similar to those in which the program was predominantly implemented, but where implementation was not occurring, or to a lesser degree.

**Data Collection in Hargeisa** Data in Hargeisa was collected by the local firm Data and Research Solutions (DARS), which also translated the survey instrument from Somali into English. The survey was reviewed by Somali-speaking staff with the USAID Embassy in Nairobi and finalized. On November 19, the QED team trained a team of Somali enumerators on the survey. On November 20, enumerators field- tested the survey in Hargeisa, which they began administering the next day.

For Strata 1 and 2, lists of full and partial beneficiaries with phone numbers were provided by Shaqadoon, the Hargeisa-based NGO that inherited the name and some of the activities of the now-closed SYLP. Ultimately, full beneficiaries were defined as program graduates (list of 1,746), and partial beneficiaries as program drop outs (list of 253). DARS randomized the two lists and called people accordingly, asking them to come to one of three survey collection points. Ultimately, the entire list of partial beneficiaries had to be used given the large non-response rate. Those who agreed to an interview went to the closest collection point and answered the survey questions. Those who expressed reluctance to travel to the collection point would be contacted



by a DARS enumerator who would travel to their home and administer the survey there. In this way, DARS was able to interview over five days 100 full beneficiaries, but only 80 partial beneficiaries due to the limited number of unsuccessful applicants and drop outs on the list.

DARS collected control data for an additional 100 respondents through a randomized household survey. SYLP was implemented throughout the entire municipality of Hargeisa – a city with well defined boundaries. There are no nearby communities where no implementation took place in which control data could have been collected. Therefore, control data was gathered through household interviews in six districts of Hargeisa: Ahmed Dhagah, Ahmed Harun, Ga'an Libah, June, Koodbuur, and M. Haybe. DARS randomly selected two sub-districts per district. Primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected from the listing of polling stations, the central point of the sampling unit. From there, each of the four enumerators in each PSU began walking either

north, east, south and west. DARS used a skip pattern to select the household, skipping a number of households equal to a code generated that day. Within the household, the enumerator would compile the eligible household members in ascending order of their age and select a member randomly by using the KISH Grid method for interview. In this way 100 control group interviews were conducted, screening out any possible full or partial beneficiaries in the SYLP program.

Following data collection, DARS entered the survey responses into SPSS to clean the data, removing duplicates, data entry errors and any other problems that would interfere with the integrity of the data. The data was provided to the evaluators in both Excel and SPSS format.

Five DARS supervisors, who were trained in the data collection methodology by the QED evaluators in Hargeisa, traveled back to Bosaso and Mogadishu to collect data during the week of December 9.

**Data Collection in Bosaso and Mogadishu** Security concerns prevented the evaluation team from visiting these locations. Therefore, DARS supervisors from Bosaso and Mogadishu attended the training in Hargeisa in November. In December, using the same methodology as in Hargeisa, DARS teams conducted surveys and focus groups in Bosaso and Mogadishu amongst the full and partial beneficiaries.

The comparison group respondents in Bosaso were randomly selected as follows: Bosaso town is divided into 14 sub-locations or neighborhoods (xaafad). Two sub-locations, located in the business district, were deemed as impractical as there were too few residents. The remaining 12 sub-locations were selected. Known landmarks within each location (schools, mosques or prominent buildings) were used as primary sampling unit PSU. After arriving at the PSU, members of the four-person enumerator teams would split up, heading north, south, west, and east. A skip pattern was used to select the household. Enumerators would skip the number of households equal to a randomly chosen daily code. To select a respondent from the selected household, the enumerator listed the eligible household members in ascending order of their age and selected a member randomly by using the KISH GRID method for interview.

The comparison group in Mogadishu was also chosen using random sampling methodology. For security reasons, three out of 16 districts of Mogadishu (Yaqshiid, Dayniile, and Heliwaa) were not sampled. Out of the remaining 13 districts, six districts were randomly selected through a coin toss: Abdiaziz, Waberi, Hodan, Shibis, Bondheere, and Dharkeynley. Two sub-districts were again randomly selected from each district. On the morning of fieldwork, security concerns in Dharkeynley resulted in it being by Wardhiigley, an earlier-selected standby district. Within each sub-district a Ward (Laan in Somali) was selected to be the primary sampling unit (PSU).

**Data Collection in Nairobi** QED sub-contracted with the firm IPSOS-Synovate to carry out the data collection in Kenya. On November 27, QED and IPSOS conducted a day-long training for 15 enumerators at IPSOS headquarters in Nairobi. The enumerators were ethnic Somali Kenyans from Nairobi, most of whom had survey experience. Also present was a supervisor charged with leading a similar team of 11 enumerators in Garissa. The training covered survey ethics and interviewing technique. It involved a detailed review of the survey questions and the reasons behind the survey. Most of the translation of the survey had been completed earlier in Hargeisa, although a number of Kenya-specific questions were translated by Somali-speaking IPSOS staff. The enumerators rehearsed the survey in pairs and went over the Somali-English translation. The pretest was conducted in Nairobi on November 28.




The comparison data (Stratum 3) in Nairobi was collected on November 30. Eleven enumerators divided into two teams gathered 100 surveys from the predominantly ethnic-Somali communities of Mlango Kubwa and Pangani, communities that adjoin but are not part of Eastleigh. Screening questions found no full or partial beneficiaries, minimizing the program spill-over effect. For the household survey of the comparison group, the team would divide up, with each person assigned a separate street. The enumerator would walk on the left side of the street from a landmark starting point. The enumerator would interview the person within the designated age bracket that was most willing to talk. If interview was successful, the interviewer would skip five houses and knock on that door. If the interview was not successful (no youth in the designated age bracket was willing to talk) the enumerator would go to next house. In the case of there being more than 50 units in an apartment building, the enumerators would only skip one house.

Data collection for the full and partial beneficiaries in Eastleigh began on December 1. QED and IPSOS went through all available paper sign-in lists provided by the Chemonics-KTI-E program. In order to compile lists of the full and partial beneficiary lists, the QED evaluators reviewed the full list of the over 50 activities associated with KTI E. After sorting the activities according to the level of participant commitment and involvement, beneficiaries were assigned to stratum 1 (full beneficiaries) if they attended training programs; and to stratum 2 (partial beneficiaries) if they had participated in activities such as recreational or cultural events that included KTI messaging. IPSOS scanned the relevant sign-in sheets and generated lists for strata.

Once the lists were generated, IPSOS staff called the beneficiaries from the two lists and arranged for interviews. Enumerators interviewed strata 1 and 2 beneficiaries at the Nomad Hotel in Eastleigh over December 2-3. Focus groups were held concurrently.

**Data Collection in Garissa** The evaluation team had originally planned to travel to Garissa to conduct the evaluation. However, these plans were cancelled after the outbreak of violence that followed a terrorist attack killing three Kenyan soldiers on November 19 and 20. Instead, two IPSOS staff members from Garissa were trained in Nairobi, along with the Eastleigh data collectors. The two then travelled to Garissa where they trained 12 Garissa-based enumerators.<sup>2</sup> Data collection in Garissa was conducted from December 2-5, with a pretest conducted on December 1.

The lists of full and partial beneficiaries were provided by EDC. IPSOS randomized the lists, called beneficiaries, and scheduled interviews. Respondents were interviewed at the Nomad Hotel in Garissa. Incentive was 200 sh



<sup>2</sup> Twelve enumerators were, eight of whom trained as data collectors.

transportation benefit and refreshment.

In Garissa municipality, there is an estimated 31,000 youth population age 15-29. Of this population, there are approximately 4,000 youths in the G Youth system. A portion of this 4,000 can be determined to belong to Stratum 1 – having received a certificate of readiness, a scholarship or completed an activity in full. Another portion can be considered to belong to Stratum 2 – having finished no full G Youth Activity. The comparison group – Stratum 3 – was taken from a random survey of 100 youth interviewed in the Medina location – an area with the least number of program beneficiaries. The same methodology as in Eastleigh was used for the comparison group.

**Qualitative data collection** The evaluation team employed the following instruments for collecting qualitative data:

- a. Key informant interviews were used to gather qualitative data using structured questionnaire guides. Due to security-related movement restrictions, the expat evaluation team conducted interviews only in Hargeisa and Nairobi. However, interviews were also conducted by IPSOS and DARS in areas the team was unable to visit. Interviews, primarily with implementers, local partners, US and Kenyan government officials, are listed in the annexes.
- b. The evaluation team trained DARS and IPSOS to conduct focus groups in all five cities in which data was collected. The focus group questions (see annex) closely tracked the questions from the survey. During the training for the Somali-speaking focus group facilitators and note takers, the QED evaluation team emphasized that the focus groups were intended to answer the “why” question that would complement the “what” questions that were answered by the survey. The focus group teams put together highlight reports, but did not compile transcripts. Focus groups were comprised of 6-10 individuals, including males from Stratum 1; females from Stratum 1; males from Stratum 2; females from Stratum 2; fathers of Stratum 1 beneficiaries; and mothers of Stratum 1 beneficiaries.

## **Annex 2 – Scope of Work**

### **PDQII IQC TO#75 Statement of Work for Mid-Term Evaluation of three Countering Violent Extremism Projects, November/December 2012**

**Period of performance- October 22, 2012 – February 15, 2013**

USAID/East Africa (EA) seeks to conduct a mid-term evaluative study of USAID’s counter-terrorism programming in the East Africa region, including the Garissa Youth Program, the KTI Eastleigh Program and the Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program.

The **Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth)** is organized around four main components -- youth action, youth work, youth education and youth civics – aimed at providing a variety of mechanisms that work separately and together to reach the overall project goal of youth empowerment. G-Youth is implemented by Education Development Center (EDC) under Cooperative Agreement Number 623-A-00-03-000010-00. The program began in October 2008 with a funding of \$6.9 million, the current agreement ends in October 2012 and will be followed with a new agreement for an additional three years with a budget of \$4.0 million.

The **KTI-Eastleigh (KTI-E) Program** aims to build moderation and foster identity and self-confidence in at risk youth in Eastleigh in order to enable them to reject extremism. The program has three major focus areas: 1) building capacity among youth and community for moderation and non-violence; 2) empowering local youth; and 3) livelihood support for youth. KTI-E is funded through USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives and has been implemented by Chemonics since August 2011. The program is expected to last until June 2014 with a budget of approximately \$4 million.

Through the **Somali Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP)**, USAID aims to provide Somali youth with increased education, economic and civic participation opportunities with the aim of increasing stability in targeted areas, particularly Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug. SYLP was a nearly four-year (March 2008 to December 2011) program funded by USAID East Africa at \$10.2 million and implemented by Education Development Center (EDC) under Cooperative Agreement Number 623-A-00-08-00053-00.

#### **I. BACKGROUND**

## General Background

Counter-terrorism, specifically countering violent extremism (CVE) programming, is a relatively new area for USAID. The first programs began in 2006 as small pilot activities in West Africa as part of the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Programming in East Africa started a few years later in 2008, also as pilot activities, first in Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland), then in the town of Garissa in northeast Kenya and finally in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi, Kenya. These programs operate in different community contexts and also had somewhat different levels of analysis informing program design and implementation. For example, the Garissa and Eastleigh programs were based upon a violent extremism (VE) risk assessment, while the Somali program was based upon a broader country-level counter terrorism (CT) imperative. Nevertheless, all programs applied the principles found in the USAID *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* and the *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism Programming Guide*.

These differences are manifested in the variety of program characteristics in what are all essentially youth empowerment programs. For example, while all three programs offer vulnerable youth viable alternatives to mitigate the attraction of extremist organizations, the Somalia program strongly emphasizes livelihood training and job placement with limited emphasis on messaging and the role of youth in the community. The Garissa program, while also having a priority focus on youth livelihood training, puts significant effort in enhancing the role of youth in the community and providing messages about positive behavior and personal choice. The KTI-Eastleigh program puts a greater emphasis on messaging and the role of youth in the community with youth livelihood a secondary component of the program. In effect, these three programs are on a continuum ranging from the preponderance of activities providing livelihood training in the Somalia based programs to less than a third of the activities in the Eastleigh program providing linkages to skills-based training and financing.

As to be expected, the metrics for these programs reflect the different program targets and their mix of activities. However, they all have a common CVE effect, namely fostering or promoting a positive sense of identity for youth vulnerable to recruitment. According to the USAID *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*, this search for identity is a manifestation at the individual level of multiple pull factors and, as reflected in the Factor Tree in RAND's *Social Science for Counterterrorism* study, is a key characteristic of several "routes" to radicalization.

Additionally, USAID managers have adjusted all three programs over the course of implementation to reflect this emphasis on youths' sense of identity. The follow on program to the SYLP called SYLi and latest phase of the Garissa Youth serve as longer running programs and have sought to enhance the role of youth in the community. They seek to create a positive sense of identity as they begin the second phase of the programs. The use of media, radio or in

the case of KTI-Eastleigh, television, also is becoming a more integral part of all three programs, often as a linked activity implemented through a separate award.

### **Rationale for the Evaluation**

The risk of terrorism continues to be a major area of concern in Africa, and the U.S. is committed to continuing its important work to combat violent extremism. As the implementation of CVE programming through development assistance evolves, it is important to build upon our experience to-date and use lessons learned to inform ongoing and future implementation, as well as to continue to develop innovative programming approaches.

USAID/AFR commissioned an impact evaluation of USAID's CVE programming in the Sahel region of Africa (Chad, Niger, and Mali) in late 2010, and the results and learning from that effort have been extremely valuable, not only within USAID but also the interagency and outside, as very few such studies of CVE program impact have been done. The evaluation has also informed the next phases of CVE programming in the Sahel. Given the considerable value of the Sahel evaluation, both as a measurement and learning tool, USAID/EA will conduct a similar evaluation to measure the impact of CVE programming in the East Africa region. This evaluation will aim to complement the West Africa study to provide a more complete picture of the impact of USAID's CVE work in Africa to date and serve as a learning tool to further these efforts in Africa.

### **Development Hypothesis**



*Development Hypothesis:* A decreased risk of extremism will result when the enabling environment for extremism is reduced. Where development assistance can have the greatest discernable impact on the drivers of extremism is in increasing resiliencies at the community and individual levels. For example, supporting youth associations, listening clubs, and sports groups offer positive alternatives for youth. The tangible benefits of such activities are the foundation for building resiliencies and serve as a linkage to other more traditional development programs. The balance among the four activity areas varies by program, but each program's results framework embodies this common theory of change. Assessing the impact of program interventions -- i.e., that community and individual resiliencies have increased, thereby decreasing the risk of extremism -- is achieved through measuring the results related to

the development gains of such activities as well as measuring community perceptions of change.

## **II. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION**

The purpose of this evaluation is to:

- a. Measure the results and impact to date, based upon common metrics, of three separate programs focused on countering violent extremism through reducing risk of recruitment by creating a positive identity in youth.
- b. Identify and broadly share good practices and lessons learned in monitoring and measuring CVE-related programming.
- c. Inform current and future CVE-related programming, particularly for USAID/Kenya, USAID/Somalia, and USAID/EA.
- d. Generate high quality data that can be further analyzed at a level appropriate for publication in peer-reviewed academic journals, such as Terrorism and Political Violence, the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis, the Journal of Terrorism Research, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and so on.

### **Audience and Intended Users**

The audiences for the evaluation report will be both external and internal and will include:

- USAID/EA mission, specifically the Regional Conflict Management and Governance Office (RCMG), USAID/Somalia, USAID/Kenya, USAID/Washington's Africa Bureau, USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and the USAID Violent Extremism and Insurgency (VE/I) Steering Committee
- U.S. Embassy, U.S. Government bureaus, and offices involved in CVE related programming, not limited to U.S. Embassy in Kenya, Somalia Unit, Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs and Bureau of Counterterrorism, Department of Defense Mobile Information Support Teams, etc.
- Current implementing partners as well as those in related programs, such as Education Development Corporation, Chemonics, PACT, and IOM.
- Bilateral and Multi-national partners, such as the United Kingdom's FCO, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, IGAD, etc.

### **Key Evaluation Questions**

Based on several past CVE evaluations and ongoing Afrobarometer and AFRICOM surveys, the specific questions to be addressed by this evaluation will include:

1. What have been the achievements to date of the SYLP, Garissa Youth and KTI-Eastleigh projects in promoting a positive identity, in youth? This question will be evaluated using five core indicators:
  - a. Level of civic engagement
  - b. Level of efficacy (belief that the individual has power to alter policy)
  - c. Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations
  - d. Level of support for use of violence in the name of Islam
  - e. Level of individual's self-confidence and/or sense of identity

These data will be collected alongside demographic data (age, sex, educational level, etc.) from multiple segments within the communities of interest.

2. What are the common outcome metrics for each of the three programs? How have the different operational strategies (methods) influenced the results to-date based upon those metrics??
3. Regarding each program's experience in collaborating with local authorities and key influencers in the community, what has worked and what has not worked?
4. What are the significant challenges faced by the projects? What has the project done to address these challenges? With what results?
5. How has each program integrated formal and informal media and messaging into their activities?
6. What aspects of the projects are essential components for future CVE related programs that target youth?

### **III. Existing Data**

Extensive monitoring and evaluative reporting and data for the G-Youth, KTI-E, and SYLP projects are available as sources of data to inform the evaluation (see Annex 3). These include country risk assessments, sector assessments, technical applications, project assessment and design documents, activity approval documents, performance monitoring plans, data collection plans, quarterly and annual reports, final project reports, success stories, and final evaluations.

For example, the *KTI-E One-Year Evaluation* found that, at the activity level it is fairly conclusive that the intended outcomes are being met, however at the program level this is not as clear. These conclusions should be further explored in this evaluation. The *SYLP Final Evaluation* concluded that the project achieved its objective "To establish systems that bridge supply and demand with necessary support to young people and employers," and contributed to the goal



“To provide Somali youth with a greater opportunity to access work opportunities.” Its findings are being used to inform the follow-on Somali Youth Leadership Initiative (SYLI).

Additional potential external sources of data include the biannual Afrobarometer national public attitudes surveys for Kenya that have measured perceptions of democracy and governance in the country since 2002, and the annual Public Opinion Survey in Kenya by Opinion Research Business that is commissioned by AFRICOM (see Annex 4).

#### **IV. Evaluation Design and METHODOLOGY**

##### **A. Evaluation Design**

The evaluation will utilize both qualitative and quantitative methods and will include the activities suggested below. The evaluation team is however encouraged to make inputs to these suggestions and discuss with the Task Order Contracting Officer Representative (TOCOR) the most appropriate methods for the evaluation.

##### **B. Data Collection Methods**

###### **1. Desk Review**

The desk review will entail a review of situational analysis and other assessment reports, project documents and quarterly progress reports, training materials, completed evaluations, sectoral studies (including by other donors and multi-lateral institutions), that will be made available by USAID/EA/Somali, USAID/Kenya, USAID/Kenya-OTI, EDC, and Chemonics staff (see annexed list of selected documents). The additional documents and relevant background materials of USAID counter-extremism programs and projects in African countries will be provide by USAID/AFR.

###### **2. Quantitative data collection**

The institutional partner will utilize equal-shares, choice-based stratified sampling in the communities of interest to ensure the collection of high quality data on three segments of the population. The first group to be surveyed consists of individuals who have completed the training program offered by USAID partners (e.g. youth who have finished a course in carpentry or women who have regularly attended courses on entrepreneurship). The second group consists of individuals who applied for programs but did not enter them, or entered the programs but did not complete them. The third and final group will consist of individuals who did not participate in USAID sponsored programs in these communities. The partner will ensure at least 80 to 100 respondents from each of the three groups, for a minimum of 240 respondents per program surveyed in each location. Given the need for stratified sampling, partners will have to use initial polling questions to reject (or accept) potential interviewees during the process. Therefore if enumerators seek women who have not completed the USAID

program, and have already fulfilled their quota for the other segments, they may need to start interviewing and then end interviews with women who do not meet the necessary characteristics.

Along with a Likert-scale framework for the five indicators named above, partners are requested to collect demographic data on the population, with a minimum of age, sex, and education level. Given the difficulties in establishing an exact age for many respondents across Africa, age groups (18-25, 26-34, and so on) can also be used.

### 3. Qualitative data collection

- a. *Key informant interviews* will be used to gather qualitative data using structured questionnaire guides with the groups listed below. Every effort will be made to conduct face-to-face interviews. However, where these are not possible, the interview team may conduct telephone or Skype-based interviews.
- b. *Focus group discussions* will be held with key groups involved in the project -, women's groups, youth groups, community theatre groups, community elders, local leaders, local project staff, etc. Focus group discussions will be conducted in Somali in Somalia, and in Somali, Kiswahili or English in Kenya.

### 4. Site selection/survey location

As mentioned, the partner will collect data from three populations for each program of interest. Data will be drawn from the primary target communities for each of the respective programs, for SYLP in Somalia there will be two locations, Hargeysa in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland. In Kenya, the surveys on the Garissa Youth program will be carried out in Garissa and for KTI in the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi.

### C. Data Analysis Methods

For each of the methods used, USAID will require a detailed plan on how data was collected and analyzed. This plan may include tables produced in analyzing the data collected. In addition, USAID will require clarification of data collected but not used (e.g. how many respondents were initially interviewed but did not meet the sampling requirements).

Data should be disaggregated by location, age, sex, educational level, and other factors as agreed with the TOCOR.

To ensure the integrity of the evaluation results, USAID data quality standards must be applied to the collection and analysis of the evaluation data.

The evaluation team must return all documents and questionnaires to the TOCOR at the end of the evaluation. This may be easier if partners utilize electronic survey techniques, such as iPads, smart phones, or SMS text-based polling, for data acquisition and storage.

### **Limitations of the design and methodology**

The proposed methodology for the evaluation has limitations. These include:

- **Security:** Due to the poor security situation and logistical challenges in parts of Somalia, the evaluation team may not be able to conduct the field work directly. The implementing partner (EDC) will work closely with the USAID/Somali program manager and with the evaluation team to determine the minimal level of proxy field work conducted through a local organization without direct participation of the key personnel.
- **Language:** Translation of tools, questions and responses from Somali and/or Kiswahili to English and vice versa may affect the quality of the information. Every effort will be made to engage a local consultant from the region who speaks English, Somali and/or Kiswahili. Where necessary, the team will also engage the services of local translators to assist with translations. The evaluation team will conduct a one day team of the translators to familiarize them with the evaluation objectives and the data collection tools.
- **Difficulty in establishing a baseline.** These programs are already underway, and hence collecting baseline data on the participating residents and affected communities may not be possible. Because of these challenges, and as a longitudinal study may not be possible, the evaluator will use a side-by-side comparison involving three groups of varying degrees of involvement, as detailed above.

### **IV. V. DELIVERABLES**

USAID anticipates, as a deliverable for this evaluation, a report, describing the results and impact to-date of the SYLP, Garissa Youth and KTI-Eastleigh projects in reaching vulnerable youth and promoting a positive identity among these youth, along with key findings, lessons learned, and recommendations for USAID/EA and USAID/Kenya to inform future programming decisions.

The Evaluation Team will produce the following deliverables during the period of this evaluation:

- i. Work plan with timeline (**two weeks after start of contract**)

- ii. A detailed outline of the design and methodology for the evaluation **(two weeks after start of contract)**
- iii. Data collection tools, including questionnaires and interview guides **(two weeks after start of contract)**
- iv. PowerPoint presentation or oral de-briefing write-up of presentation of initial findings, conclusions and recommendations to USAID/EA mission, specifically the RCMG office, USAID/Somalia, USAID/Kenya and relevant U.S. Embassy/Kenya staff at the conclusion of the visits. **(7 - 10 days after completion of data collection)**
- v. Draft Evaluation report (not exceeding 25 pages) **(7 - 10 days after completion of data collection)**
- vi. Final evaluation report (25 pages, excluding annexes), with inputs from USAID/EA/RCMG. **(7-10 days after USAID completes review of draft report).**

If the final report is deemed to include sensitive information, USAID may provide editing direction to the contractor for the production of a public version.

The report must meet the USAID evaluation policy requirements (Annex 1), and should include photographs and/or other relevant media, which may be provided in electronic format. The format for the evaluation report should include the following:

1. Executive Summary
2. Table of Contents
3. List of Acronyms
4. Introduction
5. Background
6. Methodology
7. Findings/ Conclusions/ Recommendations
8. Issues
9. Future Directions
10. References
11. Annexes, including scope of work, documents consulted, individuals and organizations consulted and interviewed, evaluation plan and schedule, and survey instruments.

## **V. VI. TEAM COMPOSITION**

The Evaluation Team will consist of a team leader and with substantial USAID and evaluation experience and a technical expert in youth and peace and security issues. The team will need to be approved by the TOCOR.

1. **Team Leader/ Senior Evaluation Specialist** should have a postgraduate degree in, international development or related subject. S/he should have at least 15 years of

experience implementing and monitoring/evaluating development programs, preferably in Africa, including some experience with USAID-related activities. S/he should have extensive experience in conducting quantitative and qualitative evaluations/ assessments, solid competence applying USAID's Evaluation Policy principles, and strong familiarity with the peace and security sector. Excellent oral and written skills are required. Copies of evaluation work required. Knowledge of Somali and Kiswahili an advantage. Experience in leading evaluation teams and preparing high quality documents.

S/he will provide leadership for the team, finalize the evaluation design, coordinate activities, arrange periodic meetings, consolidate individual input from team members, and coordinate the process of assembling the final findings and recommendations into a high quality document. S/he will write the final report. S/he will also lead the preparation and presentation of the key evaluation findings and recommendations to the USAID/EA team and other major partners. Experts from the region are encouraged to apply.

## **2. Technical Expert Youth Technical Advisor.**

At a minimum, the technical expert on the evaluation team must possess the following:

- An advanced degree in international development, youth development, peace and security, or related subject
- A comprehensive understanding of a broad range of experience including conflict mitigation, counterterrorism or counter-extremism, community development, education, and youth, as well as experience monitoring such programming.
- Full knowledge of USAID's development objectives, operational principles, and peace and security and youth sector priorities.
- Substantial experience working in Africa, preferably East Africa.
- Experience in working in conflict, post-conflict or insecure environment
- Excellent oral and written communication skills.
- Knowledge of Somali or Swahili desirable.

The use of local experts including the addition of a senior level local expert as a third technical advisor is strongly encouraged.

## **VI. VII. TIMELINE, LEVEL OF EFFORT, AND LOGISTICS**

**Timeline:** Work is to be carried out over a period of eight to twelve weeks, including three to four weeks of field work. Preferred start date: on or about November 15, 2012. Preferred end dates: on or about February 15, 2013. Note that the Kenyan national election is scheduled for March 4, 2013, making work in Kenya and travel through Kenya difficult after January.

Below is an illustrative timeline and level of effort (LOE) for the proposed evaluation.

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>LOE<sup>3</sup> Team Leader</b>	<b>LOE Youth Expert</b>
1. Review background documents and preparation work		2 days	2 days
2. Travel to Nairobi, Kenya		2 days	2 days
3. Team Briefings/ Consultations with USAID/ EA/ RCMG team to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– conduct consultations with EA program managers</li> <li>– refine methodology for evaluation</li> <li>– refine data collection tools including survey and focus group questionnaires and interview guides</li> <li>– finalize work plan</li> <li>– provide briefing to USAID/EA leadership on plan</li> </ul>	Detailed Outline of Evaluation Methodology  Data Collection Tools  Final Work Plan  In-brief Presentation	5 days	5 days
4. Travel from Nairobi to Garissa		1 day	1 day
5. Evaluate Garissa youth program: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Monitor surveys conducted by sub-partner</li> <li>– Conduct focus groups and key informant interviews</li> <li>– Conduct consultations with program staff</li> <li>– Collect additional information and data as necessary</li> </ul>		7 days	7 days
6. Travel from Garissa to Nairobi		1 day	1 day
7. Debrief and consult with COR and team		2 days	2 days
8. Evaluate KTI Eastleigh program: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Monitor surveys conducted by sub-partner</li> <li>– Conduct focus groups and key informant interviews</li> <li>– Conduct consultations with program staff</li> <li>– Collect additional information and data as necessary</li> </ul>		7 days	7 days
9. Travel to Somalia (Hargeysa in Somaliland, Bosaso in Puntland)		2 days	2 days
10. Evaluate Somalia Youth Leadership program: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Monitor surveys conducted by sub-partner</li> <li>– Conduct focus groups and key informant interviews</li> <li>– Conduct consultations with program staff</li> <li>– Collect additional information and data as necessary</li> </ul>		8 days	8 days
11. Travel from Somalia to Nairobi		1day	1day
12. Analyze data		5 days	5 days

<sup>3</sup> Estimated Duration/ Level of Effort (LOE)

13. Debrief USAID/EA leadership and other key stakeholders on preliminary findings	Debrief Presentation	1day	1day
14. Travel from Nairobi to home country		2days	2days
15. Draft report, with PowerPoint presentation (VCT or in-person) of initial evaluation findings, lessons and recommendations to USAID/EA	Draft Evaluation Report	10 days	3 days
	PowerPoint Presentation		
16. Finalize report with all inputs and submit final to USAID/EA	Final Evaluation Report	5 days	1 day
17. Produce final report and disseminate via rollout presentation to USAID/Washington	Soft and hard copies of report	3 days	
	PowerPoint Presentation		
18. Upload report to Department Experience Clearing (DEC) house	Report uploaded		
<b>Total Estimated LOE</b>		<b>64 days</b>	<b>50 days</b>

### Evaluation Logistics and Management

The TO COR for the Task Order will be based in USAID/East Africa providing direct guidance to the contactor and will be primary point of contact for the evaluation team during the field work. USAID Africa Bureau Senior Counterterrorism Advisor in Washington will provide technical input as needed.



## **USAID Evaluation Policy Requirements**


- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.
- The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an Annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.

Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

## Project Background

### Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth)

The G-Youth project is organized around four main components: Youth Action, Youth Work, Youth Education and Youth Civics. The four components are viewed as providing a variety of mechanisms that work separately and together to reach the overall project goal of youth empowerment. Project activities are integrated within and across these four components into an “opportunities menu” that local youth access in ways that meet their specific needs and career paths. The menu includes livelihood skill-building opportunities, entrepreneurship opportunities, opportunities to engage in a community development project or become certified as a civic education leader, access to scholarships, opportunities to participate in project management roles, and other options. Through the program, local youth are empowered to play leadership roles in each of the project’s four components and across the project as a whole.



The pilot program for G-Youth started in 2008, and the current program is building capacity through several major components, including creation of a Career Resource Center; building up a major technical/vocational training center in Garissa; and a small grants component enabling Garissan NGOs to strengthen the livelihood and employment skills of Garissa youth.

Expected key results and associated indicators:

**Intermediate Result 1: Increased engagement of youth in their communities**

Sub IR 1.1: Improved capacity of youth to participate in community affairs

- Number of youth participating in youth summits
- Number of youth accessing the youth Fund
- Number of public information campaigns conducted
- Number of youth summits conducted
- Mentorship curriculum/guide; leadership training curriculum
- Number of community projects implemented by youth
- Number of hours of community service served by youth

Sub IR 1.2: Increased awareness of youth of civic matters

- Number of IRI curriculum modules developed for grades 6, 7 and 8
- Number of upper primary students reached through IRI Civic education program
- Number of youth reached through radio civic education programming
- Number of 15 to 20 minute IRI programs in English for 6, 7 and 8 grade developed
- Number of IRI teacher training guides developed
- Number of MP3 players provided for IRI classes
- Number of 30 mins youth led and produced civic education radio programs
- Increased level of civic awareness among participating upper primary school youth

**Intermediate Result 2: Increased leadership capacity of youth**

Sub IR 2.1: Establishment of District-Wide Youth Organization to promote youth interests

- Number of youth clubs established

Sub IR 2.2: Promotion of youth leadership in all aspects of program implementation

- Number of youth who have completed leadership training
- Number of youth participating in project design, implementation and M&E activities
- Percent of participating youth feeling capable of leading other youth
- Number of youth and adults who attended mentor workshops

**Intermediate Result 3: Improved capacity of youth to pursue employment or livelihoods**

Sub IR 3.1: Improved skills & attitudes for work & livelihoods among youth

- Number of youth trained in work readiness program
- Number of youth gaining internships
- Number of youth employed through income-generating opportunities
- Percent of youth feeling better prepared to enter job market

Sub IR 3.2: Improved linkages to financing & support for entrepreneurship

- Number of partnerships with local businesses
- Number of youth accessing business loans through Youth Fund

**Intermediate Result 4: Improved education opportunities for youth**

Sub IR 4.1: Strengthened quality and access of formal secondary and post-secondary school education

- Number of youth receiving scholarships to continue education through the Youth Fund (10% of the Fund)
- Number of students enrolled in Cisco Networking Academy at NEP-TTI

- Number of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials provided to secondary school teachers
- Number of various computer equipment provided to NEP-TTI

**Sub IR 4.2: Improved Madrassas' students access to work and education through improved English skills**

- Number of Madrassa students receiving English language instruction
- Number of textbooks and other teacher learning materials provided to Madrassa teachers
- Percent of participating Madrassa students with improved English language competency

**Intermediate Result 5: Improved capacity of youth-serving organizations (YSO) and institutions in youth development**

**Sub IR 5.1: Improved capacity of youth serving organizations to meet youth needs**

- Amount of financing mobilized through public-private partnership
- Number of youth action partnerships established
- Percent of youth reporting feeling better supported and represented by YSO
- Percent of youth reporting improved youth's relationships with the community

**Sub IR 5.2: Improved capacity of education institutions to meet youth needs**

- Number of Madrassa teachers trained to deliver ESL curriculum
- Number of secondary school career counselors and head teachers trained
- Number of NEP-TTI teachers trained for Cisco Academy
- Number of administrators and officials trained
- Number of out of school civic mentors trained
- Number of in-school civic mentors trained

**KTI Eastleigh (KTI-E) Program**

An extremism risk assessment conducted by USAID in early 2010 identified areas in Kenya most at risk for influence by extremist organizations, highlighting Eastleigh, a predominantly ethnic-Somali community in the capital of Nairobi where an estimated 20-30 percent of male youth are former al-Shabaab (a Somalia-based al Qaeda affiliate) members. A pilot study identified the key factors facing youth that would put them at risk; sought to fully understand the processes of radicalization and recruitment of youth to participate in violence; identified existing organizations and programs in Eastleigh that are addressing some of these factors; and identified gaps in programming.

As a result, the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) added a programming component to its overall program in July 2011, focused on youth empowerment in Nairobi's Eastleigh neighborhood and its surroundings. Youth form 60% of Eastleigh's total population and lack access to health facilities, education and youth employment opportunities. This component, referred to as KTI-Eastleigh (or KTI-E), seeks to mitigate the push and pull factors which make youth vulnerable and easily susceptible or prone to extremism. To achieve this KTI-E works with a broad spectrum of local based organizations particularly within Eastleigh.

The KTI-E program has three major focus areas: 1) building capacity among youth and community for moderation and non-violence; 2) empowering local youth; and 3) livelihood support for youth. These focus areas contribute to achieve the program's main objective, which is to build moderation and foster identity and self-confidence in at risk youth in Eastleigh in order to enable them to reject extremism.

Past and ongoing activities include the following:

- *Promoting livelihoods* – Dynamic Business Startup, a local NGO based in Nairobi, with support from KTI conducted training for youth in Eastleigh aimed at providing them with necessary skills to engage in business. The training encouraged and equipped participants to venture into self-employment as a mechanism for livelihood.
- *Fostering cultural and recreational identity* –KTI supports two Eastleigh-based grantees, Youth United for Social Mobilization (YUSOM), and Somali Youth Spotlight (SYS). YUSOM organized an unprecedented women's basketball tournament in Eastleigh that included interactive discussions on themes such as good citizenship and gender rights during breaks. SYS organized a series of football matches for Somali youth living in Eastleigh that were highly successful. Youth participated actively in the discussions on current issues such as the increased presence of Al-Shabaab in Eastleigh.
- *Mapping Eastleigh Actors*- KTI has facilitated a stakeholder mapping exercise in order to provide a better understanding of the various institutions in Eastleigh and the work they do. The mapping exercise is currently being used by the KTI Advisory Committee and KTI-E staff to inform programming.

Expected key results and associated indicators:

**IR-1:** Build Capacity among youth and community for moderation and non-violence.

IR 1.1: Policy Forums

IR 1.2. : Media

IR 1.3: Moderate Voices

**IR-2:** Empower local youth

IR 2.1: Cultural and Recreational Activities

IR 2.2. : Leadership Development

IR 2.3: Capacity Building of a Youth Organizations Network

IR 2.4: Counseling and Mentoring

IR 2.5: Youth Empowerment Center

**IR-3:** Support Livelihoods for youth

IR 3.1: Skills

IR 3.2. : Work Attitudes

IR 3.3: Linkages to Finance

#### Indicators:

- Number of public information campaigns conducted
- Number of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs directly related to US Government CVE objectives implemented in country by civil society and partner governments
- Number of youth accessing government and other financing
- Number of dialogues/events with GOK
- Percentage of youth reporting less frustrated with and more trustful of government entities
- Number of leaders trained (advocacy, capacity, NGO management, leadership, etc)
- Number of community facilitators trained (desegregated by gender)
- Number of youth organization/CBOs supported to improve organizational capacity
- Number of youth reporting feeling better supported and represented by youth organization in Eastleigh
- Percent of youth trained in work readiness program and working
- Number of youth using youth centers as a focal point of civic life
- Number of dialogue forums held on key issues
- Number of Assessments or Studies conducted
- Number of respected leaders addressing topic of violent extremism
- Percentage increase of youth organizations membership base
- Percent reporting satisfaction with social, cultural or economic opportunities for youth
- Percentage of youth feeling better prepared to enter job market

#### **Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP)**

In Somalia, youth lack basic education, employment opportunities and connectedness to civil society. This fuels the common perception that an increasing youth population is a potentially destabilizing force. In order for youth to transition to adults, and to have a positive alternative to negative groups, they need education, employment, and social support.

USAID has been supporting primary education in Somalia since 2004. Based on planning discussions and analytical evidence, it was determined that USAID should shift its focus to secondary education, workforce development for youth and civic participation to address some gaps and to have a greater impact on stability.

Through the Somali Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP), known locally at *Shaqodoon* (or job seeker in Somali), USAID has been providing quick-impact, market-driven skills training and employment opportunities for youth. Through these increased opportunities, SYLP aims to increase stability in targeted areas, particularly Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug. The program aims to achieve the following results:

- 1) Somali youth, community members and education officials have improved secondary education services that are perceived as more fair and equitable;
- 2) Youth are better able to be economically self-reliant with supportive systems; and

### 3) Youth participate and contribute more positively and productively to society.

Key indicators used to measure these results:

Peace and Security – Conflict Mitigation and Resolution:

- Number of people from “at risk” groups reached through USG-supported conflict mitigation activities
- Number of youth participating in training programs
- Number of youth completing training programs
- Number of non-governmental constituencies built or strengthened with USG assistance
- Number of USG-supported activities that demonstrate the positive impact of a peace process through the demonstration of tangible, practical benefits

Economic Growth -- Workforce Development:

- Number of trainees enrolled in USG-supported workforce development programs
- Number of trainees completing USG-supported workforce development programs
- Number of trainees who drop out of USG-supported workforce development programs
- Number of people transitioning to further education and training from participation in USG funded workforce development programs
- Number of trainees whose livelihood opportunities are improved as a result of participation in SYLP training, within 3 months of completion of training
- Number of people gaining employment or more remunerative employment as a result of participation in USG-funded workforce development programs
- Number of workforce development initiatives created through USG assisted public-private partnerships

Results-based project-level Education and Training indicators:

- Number of youth who complete the training programs
- Number of youth participating in IAI programs
- Number of education and training programs that match employers’ needs
- Number of private sector persons participating in program activities



## **Annex 3 Documents Consulted**

### **Kenya Transition Initiative-Eastleigh (KTI-E)**

**Final Report for One Year Evaluation of the Kenya Transition Initiative-Eastleigh Component,** August 13 to September 4, 2012, USAID Kenya

**Proposal for Consultancy to Conduct a Quarterly Survey on KTI-Eastleigh,** InfoTrak Research and Consulting, 2012

**Comments on KTI-E Monitoring and Indicators,** Management Systems International, August 2012

**Kenya/Eastleigh Quarterly Report – April 1 to June 30, 2012,** SBU, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

**Kenya/Eastleigh Quarterly Report – January 1 to March 31, 2012,** SBU, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

**Kenya/Eastleigh Quarterly Report – September 15 to December 31, 2011,** SBU, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

**Information Memorandum: Update on Eastleigh Youth Engagement Activity Approval Document** (new name is Kenya Transition Initiative-Eastleigh, KTI-E), USAID Kenya, December 30, 2011

**Kenya Transition Initiative-Eastleigh Rolling Assessment Report,** October 25-27, 2011, USAID Kenya

**Eastleigh Youth Engagement Project: Activity Approval Document** (SBU Draft for Program Office), USAID Kenya, January 17, 2011

**Kenya Transition Initiative-Eastleigh: Data Collection Plan**

**Eastleigh Youth Engagement Project Assessment and Design,** DAI, December 3, 2010

**Kenya Transition Initiative-Eastleigh Youth Empowerment Project (KTI-E), Fact Sheet,** SBU, April 5, 2012

### **Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP)**

**Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP) Final Evaluation**, International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc., February 17, 2012

**Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP) Final Report**, Education Development Center, March 2012

**Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP) Annual Summary Report 2010-2011**, Education Development Center

**Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP) Quarterly Report, July 1 to September 30, 2011**, Education Development Center

**Request for Applications: Somali Youth Leaders Initiative**, USAID East Africa, June 2011

**Activity Approval Document: Cost Amendment to Education Development Center Associate Cooperative Agreement Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP)**, FY 2010-2011, USAID East Africa, July 2010

**Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP): Stakeholders Workshop and Planning Session, June 21-22, 2010**, Education Development Center

**Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP) Quarterly Report, January 1 to March 31, 2010**, Education Development Center

**Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP): Performance Monitoring Plan**, Education Development Center, January 2010

**Somalia Youth Livelihood Program (SYLP) Proposed Program Description & Assessment Findings**, Education Development Center, November 25, 2008

#### Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project Quarterly Report – April 1 to June 30, 2012**, Education Development Center, August 1, 2012

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project: Performance Monitoring Plan**, Education Development Center, Revised July 2012

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project Quarterly Report – January 1 to March 31, 2012**, Education Development Center, May 1, 2012

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project Annual Report** – October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2011, Education Development Center, October 31, 2011

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project Annual Report** – October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010, Education Development Center, January 31, 2011

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project: Performance Monitoring Plan**, Education Development Center, January 2011

**Summary from Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project Quarterly Report – January 1 to March 31, 2010**, Education Development Center, June 28, 2010

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project: Technical Application**, Education Development Center, Revision August 2010

**Garissa Youth Project (G-Youth) Activity Description: Expansion and Extension - June 1, 2010 to October 2012**, USAID Kenya, February 4, 2010

**Kenya Basic Education Sector Assessment**, JBS International, Inc., April 26, 2010

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project Quarterly Report – July 1 to September 30, 2009**, Education Development Center, November 1, 2009

**Garissa Youth (G-Youth) Project: Project Assessment and Design**, Education Development Center, Revision January 2009

**Statement of Work for Youth Opportunities in the Garissa Area of Kenya (1207 Funding)**, USAID Kenya, July 8, 2008

#### **Additional Reference Documents**

**Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism**, USAID, February 2009

**Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Programming Guide**, USAID, 2009

**Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID's Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa**, QED/AMEX, February 2011

**Risk Assessment: Violent Religious Extremism and the Muslim Population in Kenya**, MSI/USIP/U. of Nairobi, January 2010

**Public Opinion Survey in Kenya: Topline Results**, SBU, Opinion Research Business (annual)

**Summary of Factors Affecting Violent Extremism**, USAID/MSI

**Social Science for Counterterrorism**, RAND, 2009

**Africa's Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism**, ACSS, August 2010

**Preventing Terrorism: Developing Comprehensive Solutions to the Challenges of Radicalization**, ACSS, April 2011

**Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response**, Lauren Ploch, November 2010

Counterterrorism Key Issues, Africa- Performance Plan Reports, USAID, FYs 2007-2012

Counterterrorism Key Issues, Africa- Operational Plans, USAID, FYs 2007-2012

**Afrobarometer** National Public Attitudes Surveys: <http://www.afrobarometer.org/>.

## **Annex 4 Individuals and Organizations Consulted and Interviewed**

Abdiyusuf Abdullahi, Grants; Kenya Transition Initiative; Project Development; Nairobi, Kenya

Deqa Abshir; Kenya Transition Initiative; Project Development; Nairobi, Kenya

Ibrahim H. Ahmed, CEO; DARS Research, Hargeisa, Somaliland

Saeed Mohammed Ahmed; Head; Somaliland National Youth Organization; SONYO

Fauziya Ali; Kenya Transition Initiative; Project Development; Nairobi, Kenya

Kellie Burk; USAID, Bureau for Africa

Adan Duale; Member of Kenyan Parliament, representing Garissa

Liban Egal DARS Research; Nairobi, Kenya

Ali Farah; Owner and Manager, Bulsho TV; Hargeisa, Somaliland

Tye Ferrell, Senior Regional Conflict, Democracy, and Governance Advisor; USAID/East Africa; Regional Conflict Management and Governance Office; Nairobi, Kenya

Holly Flood; Chief of Party; Kenya Transition Initiative; Nairobi, Kenya

Jacqueline Glin, Former Chief of Party; Garissa Youth Program, Nairobi, Kenya

Robert Grossman-Vermaas; International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc

Yousuf Harir; DARS Research, Hargeisa, Somaliland

Abdiweli Hassan; DARS Research; Bossaso, Puntland, Somalia

Mohamed Hiraabe; DARS Research; Mogadishu, Somalia

Amina Issa, Chief of Party; Garissa Youth Program, Nairobi, Kenya

Mudane Xuseen Mohamoud Jiciir; Mayor of Hargeisa, Somaliland

George Kaburu; Operations Controller ; Ipsos Synovate Kenya

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Sahal Muhamed; G-Youth Coordinator; Nairobi, Kenya

Samuel Muthoka; Director, Public Affairs; Ipsos Synovate; Kenya

Hassan Ole Naado; Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance, Nairobi, Kenya

Kent Noel, Education Development Center, Nairobi, Kenya

Mohamed Hassan Nur; Shaqodoon; Hargeisa, Somaliland

Irene Odindo; Youth Officer; Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports; Eastleigh, Nairobi, Kenya

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Ismail Shaiye, USAID Nairobi, Kenya

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# **Mid-term Evaluative Study of USAID's Counterterrorism Programming in the East Africa Region – Work Plan**

Submitted November 16, 2012



## **I. Rationale and Background for Evaluation**

USAID/East Africa (EA) has asked for a mid-term evaluative study of USAID's counterterrorism programming in the East Africa region, including the Garissa Youth Program, the KTI Eastleigh Program and the Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program. The three programs are on a continuum ranging from the preponderance of activities providing livelihood training in the Somalia based programs to less than a third of the activities in the Eastleigh program providing linkages to skills-based training and financing. All have a common CVE effect, namely fostering or promoting a positive sense of identity for youth vulnerable to recruitment. According to the USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism, this search for identity is a key characteristic of several "routes" to radicalization.

The Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth), implemented by Education Development Center (EDC), is organized around four main components – youth action, youth work, youth education and youth civics – has an overall project goal of youth empowerment. The Garissa program, while also having a priority focus on youth livelihood training, puts significant effort in enhancing the role of youth in the community and providing messages about positive behavior and personal choice.

The KTI-Eastleigh (KTI-E) Program works with risk youth in Eastleigh, encouraging them to reject extremism. KTI-E has three major focus areas: 1) building capacity among youth and community for moderation and non-violence; 2) empowering local youth; and 3) livelihood support for youth. Funded through USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, KTI-E is implemented by Chemonics. The KTI-Eastleigh program puts a greater emphasis on messaging and the role of youth in the community with youth livelihood a secondary component of the program.

Through the Somali Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP), USAID aimed to provide Somali youth with increased education, economic and civic participation opportunities with the aim of increasing stability in targeted areas, particularly Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug. SYLP ended in December 2011 and was implemented by EDC. The Somalia program strongly emphasizes livelihood training and job placement with limited emphasis on messaging and the role of youth in the community.

## **II. Purpose of the Evaluation**

Counter-terrorism, specifically countering violent extremism (CVE) programming, is a relatively new area for USAID, dating only from 2008 in East Africa. Programs operate in different community contexts and also had different levels of analysis informing program design and implementation. The Garissa and Eastleigh programs were based upon a violent extremism (VE) risk assessment, while the Somali program was based upon a broader country-level counter terrorism (CT) imperative. All of these youth empowerment programs applied the principles

found in the USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism and the Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism Programming Guide.

This evaluation will aim to complement the 2011 West Africa study to provide a more complete picture of the impact of USAID's CVE work in Africa to date and serve as a learning tool to further these efforts in Africa.

The purpose of this evaluation is to:

- a. Measure the impact to date, based upon common metrics, of three separate programs focused on countering violent extremism through reducing risk of recruitment by creating a positive identity in youth.
- b. Identify and broadly share good practices and lessons learned in monitoring and measuring CVE-related programming.
- c. Inform current and future CVE-related programming, particularly for USAID/Kenya, USAID/Somalia, and USAID/EA.
- d. Generate high quality data that can be further analyzed at a level appropriate for publication in peer-reviewed academic journals.

### **III. Evaluation Questions**

The specific questions to be addressed by this evaluation will include:

1. What have been the achievements to date of the SYLP, Garissa Youth and KTI-Eastleigh projects in reaching vulnerable youth to promote a positive identity? This question will be evaluated using five core indicators:
  - a. Level of civic engagement
  - b. Level of efficacy (belief that the individual has power to alter policy)
  - c. Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations
  - d. Level of support for use of violence in the name of Islam
  - e. Level of individual's self-confidence and/or sense of identity

The four core indicators will be measured by a common survey. It will contain 15 questions organized into five core indicator categories as seen in Annex 3.

Other evaluation questions include:

2. What are the common outcome metrics for each of the three programs? How have the different operational strategies (methods) influenced the results to-date based upon those metrics?
3. Regarding each program's experience in collaborating with local authorities and key influencers in the community, what has worked and what has not worked?

4. What are the significant challenges faced by the projects? What has the project done to address these challenges and with what results?
5. How has each program integrated formal and informal media and messaging into their activities?
6. What aspects of the projects are essential components for future CVE related programs that target youth?

These questions will provide the core structure for the key informant interviews (See Annex 4)

#### IV. Evaluation Framework

The framework evaluation will be focused on answering the six questions highlighted above, with a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. The final report will comply with the USAID Evaluation Policy and ensure that all recommendations are linked to conclusions, which will be linked to findings supported explicitly by empirical data gathered during the evaluation.

**Timeline** - The estimated period of performance for this task order is from November 1, 2012 – February 28, 2013. It will have three phases, desk review, field work, and report preparation. Annex I to this document shows time line graphically.

**Stage 1 - Document Review** – The evaluators began by conducting a review of relevant documents so as to inform the fieldwork design and implementation. Documents to be reviewed include

- Completed evaluations,
- Assessments,
- Sector studies (including by other donors and multi-lateral institutions),
- Contractors' reports,
- Project-related documents,
- Mission Performance Reports
- Background materials of USAID counter-extremism programs and projects in African countries.
- Any custom indicators, including baseline and quarterly data
- Polling data used to gauge general attitudes and support for violent extremist organizations.
- Analyses of the Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (Drivers Guide) and the companion Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Programming Guide (Programming Guide).

Some documents, including Quarterly Reports, are considered sensitive but unclassified (SBU) and will reviewed at the USAID Mission in Nairobi.

The Stage 1 Document Review should enable the team to begin drafting some sections of the evaluation. Existing documentation is expected to be useful in providing evaluation findings data for a number of questions, including: Question 2 on program metrics for each of the three programs; Question 3 on collaborating with local authorities and key influencers in the

community; Question 4 on significant challenges faced by the project; and Question 5 on the integration of formal and informal media.

***Stage 2 - Field Work*** Field work began on November 12 with the arrival of the evaluation team in Nairobi. QED has subcontracted with IPSOS-Kenya, which is providing facilitation and other services to the team.

*Preliminary Work in Nairobi* The QED team has been meeting with the USAID Mission during the week of November 12-16 to finalize the work plan, survey questions and interview scripts. The team will meet with the Regional Security Office and get clearance and guidance for travel outside of Nairobi. The evaluators have begun meetings with representative groups of stakeholders (project contractors, grantees, implementing partners in government, civil society, beneficiary groups, women's organizations, local leaders, USAID officers and staff, U.S. Embassy Country Team officers, other donors and organizations working in the selected countries).

*Somalia* On Sunday, November 18, the QED team will travel to Hargeisa, Somaliland. One day will be allocated for travel; three days of work; and another day to travel back to Nairobi. The team will be provided security services by the firm Drum Cussac, budgeted for a maximum of five days. Drum Cussac will provide transportation within Hargeisa, ensure that lodging arrangements for the team are secure and provide regular updates during field work regarding changes in the security situation in the region.

From the technical side, the evaluation team will receive assistance from Data and Research Solutions (DARS) – a Somaliland-based survey team that will also provide facilitation. DARS will have been given the final survey prior to the arrival of the QED team and will have the opportunity to translate it into Somali and back-translate it for quality control. On November 19, QED and DARS will conduct training for enumerators in Hargeisa. Supervisors from Bosaso, Puntland will participate. On November 20, enumerators will participate in a test pilot of the survey. On November 21, the third day of the evaluation team's visit, enumerators will begin administering the survey. Due to the poor security situation and logistical challenges in parts of Somalia, the evaluation team will not conduct the field work directly in Bosaso.

In addition to overseeing the enumerator training and first day of data collection during their three days in Hargeisa, the evaluation team will conduct focus groups and key informant interviews. Facilitation and translation services for these meetings will be provided by DARS.

On November 22, the team will travel back to Nairobi. Most of DARS data collection will take place after the team has left Hargeisa. Ten enumerators will be deployed in Hargeisa and 10 in Bosaso, Puntland. Data collection is anticipated to last four days in each location. Oversight of the enumerators in each location will be provided by one field manager and four supervisors. Supervisors will:

- Assist with the training of enumerators (Supervisors in Bosaso will independently conduct the training after attending the training in Hargeisa)
- Oversee that data is properly collected and recorded and ensure quality control

- Oversee data entry as needed and packaging/shipment of paper surveys

DARS will also provide data processing over a period of five days. Surveying will be done using paper surveys. DARS will enter the data into an Excel Spreadsheet and email the data to the evaluation team. The raw survey documents will be scanned and sent to QED in a separate document.

DARS will also provide facilitation and translation for a number of focus groups and in-depth interviews. DARS translators will translate preparatory documents, including survey and training materials, as well as provide simultaneous translation of focus groups and key informant interviews.

On November 22, the evaluation team will return to Nairobi. On November 23-25, they will analyze available data from the Somalia fieldwork and prepare a presentation for the USAID Mission. With USAID approval, the briefing will tentatively take place on November 26. It will be a graphic PowerPoint presentation illustrating preliminary findings from the Somaliland field work and explaining the methodology employed.

*Kenya Survey Work* During the November 23-26 period, the evaluation team will also reengage IPSOS regarding the Kenya data collection. IPSOS will already have been involved in advance work in Garissa along with EDC to organize survey centers (see methodology section). On November 27 and 28, the evaluation team will begin two days of training in Nairobi. The training will be for 20 Somali-speaking enumerators, mostly recruited from Nairobi universities, for quantitative and qualitative collection in both Garissa and Eastleigh. Training will be conducted for all enumerators in Nairobi, including for the four supervisors per location. Day two of the training will include a field test of the survey.

*Eastleigh-Nairobi* Beginning on December 3, the field work will begin in Eastleigh-Nairobi, concluding around December 6. The evaluation team will monitor the data collection and conduct focus groups and interviews, with the assistance of IPSOS. IPSOS will compile the data collected in an Excel spreadsheet, scan it, and provide it to the evaluation team.

*Mogadishu* - On December 2, a two-person team of trained local partner evaluators will fly to Mogadishu – either from IPSOS or DARS – and conduct focus groups there. They will compile notes in English and return to Nairobi on December 4.

*Garissa* On December 5, a team of trained IPSOS evaluators will drive to Garissa. The IPSOS team will administer the survey and conduct focus groups. Since the security situation in Garissa has become too unpredictable in recent days for the expat evaluation team to travel there, QED will supervise this activity from Nairobi, staying in cell phone and email contact with IPSOS. IPSOS will also facilitate focus groups in Garissa. The Garissa field work will take place from December 5-8.. The QED and IPSOS teams will analyze the Garissa, Eastleigh and Mogadishu data from December 8-13 work on the report.

*Analysis and Debrief* From December 11 through 12, the evaluation team will finalize analyze the available data and prepare a briefing for the USAID Mission on December 14. The team will leave for the United States on December 16.

***Stage 3 – Report Writing*** Based on the results of the first two stages, the evaluation team will: Analyze and synthesize review findings and fieldwork data in order to describe, quantify and assess the impacts of USAID’s programs on target beneficiaries. The report will follow the scope and deliverables schedule of the Task Order.

## **V. Evaluation Methodology**

This mixed method evaluation will use both qualitative and quantitative methods.

***Quantitative data collection*** The surveys will be the primary source of quantitative data. The evaluators will use equal-shares, choice-based stratified sampling of three segments of the population. 1) Individuals who have completed the training program offered by USAID partners (e.g. youth who have finished a course in carpentry or women who have regularly attended courses on entrepreneurship); 2) Individuals who applied for programs but did not enter them, or entered the programs but did not complete them; 3) Individuals who did not participate in USAID sponsored programs in these communities.

Stratification is the process of dividing members of the population into homogeneous subgroups before sampling. For this evaluation, the three strata include the segments described above. The first step will be to develop a sampling frame - the source material or device from which a sample will be drawn. Since this evaluation is measuring the views of individual project beneficiaries in segments 1 and 2, the sampling frame will need to be based on lists of beneficiaries. The evaluators will acquire lists of the individuals who compose the strata of segments 1 and 2: individuals who have completed the training program; and those who applied for and did not enter programs or entered and did not complete them. Strata 3 are those who had no contact with the USAID programs and will not be identified from beneficiary lists, as opposed to the case of Strata 1 and 2.

The evaluation team will take the beneficiary list -based sampling frame and reduce it to produce a representative sample of 150 people drawn at random for both Strata 1 and 2, an oversampling that should guarantee at least 100 respondents per strata. The enumerators will call the randomly-chosen respondents and invite them to a central location for interviews, which should take around 10 to 15 minutes each.

In Garissa municipality, for instance, there is an estimated 31,000 youth population age 15-29. Of this population, there are approximately 4,000 youths in the G Youth system. A portion of this 4,000 can be determined to belong to Strata 1 – having received a certificate of readiness, a scholarship or completed an activity in full. Another portion can be considered to belong to Strata 2 – having finished no full G Youth Activity. The control group – Strata 3 – will be taken

from a random survey of 100 youth interviewed in the Medina location – an area with the least program beneficiaries.

The oversample of 150 youths from Strata 2 and 150 from Strata 2 will be asked to report to one of six Garissa municipality “locations” where they will be provided with soft drinks and a light meal in exchange for their participation. This will result in about 50 youths being invited to each location. From these interviewees, the enumerators will identify a number who will be asked to participate in focus groups.

As called for in the Task Order, the evaluators will need target at least 80 to 100 respondents from each of the three groups, for a minimum of 240 respondents per program surveyed in each location. However, the goal will be 300 in each of the four locations if possible, for total of 1,200 interviews. QED understands that standard format baseline data on the participating residents and affected communities is not available. Along with a Likert-scale framework for the four indicators named above, the team will collect demographic data on the population, with a minimum of age, sex, and education level. Given the difficulties in establishing an exact age for many respondents across Africa, age ranges will be used.

***Qualitative data collection*** The evaluation team will employ the following instruments for collecting qualitative data:

a. Key informant interviews will be used to gather qualitative data using structured questionnaire guides with the groups listed below. Every effort will be made to conduct face-to-face interviews. However, where these are not possible, the interview team may conduct telephone or Skype-based interviews. Interviews will be used primarily with implementers, US and Kenyan government officials. (See Annex 4)

b. In all, the evaluation team will attempt to recruit a total of seven focus groups for each program in which they, or their local partners, are present (Somaliland, Puntland, Garissa, Eastleigh and Mogadishu). Each group of 6-10 individuals will include males from Strata 1; females from Strata 1; males from Strata 2; females from Strata 2; fathers of Strata 1 beneficiaries; mothers of Strata 1 beneficiaries; and employers of youth beneficiaries. Focus groups will be asked the same questions as in the survey, and asked to expand upon the reasons for their answers. The local partner (IPSOS and DARS) will provide a Somali-speaking facilitator and an English-speaking note taker who will take detailed notes in English. All notes will be scanned and provided to the evaluation team for analysis. (See Annex 5)

## Proposed Timeline and Deliverables to Conduct the Counter-Extremism Evaluation

Activities	Nov 1-7	Nov 8-14	Nov 15-21	Nov 22-28	Nov 29-Dec 5	Dec 6-12	Dec 13-19	Dec 20-26	Dec 27-Jan 2	Jan 3 -9	Jan 10-16	Jan 17-23	Jan 24-30	Jan 31-Feb 6	Feb 7-13	Feb 14-20	Feb 21-28	Deliverables
Review background documents and preparation work	x	x																Draft Work Plan (Will be followed by periodic progress reports as agreed to with USAID)
Team Planning Meetings in Washington, DC		x																Evaluation design and travel schedule agreed upon and approved by USAID
Travel to Nairobi		x																
Team Briefings/ Consultations with USAID/ EA/ RCMG team to refine methodology, data collection tools, finalize work plan		x	x															Detailed Outline of Evaluation Methodology Data Collection Tools Final Work Plan In-brief Presentation
Provide briefing to USAID/EA leadership on plan			x															
Travel from Nairobi to Somaliland			x															
Evaluate Somalia Youth Leadership program:  - Train DARS enumerators  - Monitor surveys conducted by DARS in Somaliland and			x															



Activities	Nov 1-7	Nov 8-14	Nov 15-21	Nov 22-28	Nov 29-Dec 5	Dec 6-12	Dec 13-19	Dec 20-26	Dec 27-Jan 2	Jan 3 -9	Jan 10-16	Jan 17-23	Jan 24-30	Jan 31-Feb 6	Feb 7-13	Feb 14-20	Feb 21-28	Deliverables
Puntland  - Focus groups and interviews in Somaliland  - Consultations with program staff																		
Travel from Somaliland to Nairobi			x															
Debrief and consult with COR and team				x														
Evaluate KTI program:  - Train IPSOS enumerators  - Monitor surveys conducted by IPSOS  - Focus groups and interviews  - Consultations with program staff				x	x													
Evaluate KTI Garissa program:  - Monitor surveys conducted by IPSOS  - Focus groups and						x												

Activities	Nov 1-7	Nov 8-14	Nov 15-21	Nov 22-28	Nov 29-Dec 5	Dec 6-12	Dec 13-19	Dec 20-26	Dec 27-Jan 2	Jan 3 -9	Jan 10-16	Jan 17-23	Jan 24-30	Jan 31-Feb 6	Feb 7-13	Feb 14-20	Feb 21-28	Deliverables
interviews  - Consultations with program staff																		
Analyze data						x	x											
Debrief USAID/EA leadership and other key stakeholders on preliminary findings							x											Debrief Presentation
Travel from Nairobi to Washington							x											
Write Draft Report (Includes holiday break)							x	x	x	x								Draft Evaluation Report PowerPoint Presentation
Finalize report with all inputs and submit final to USAID/EA												x	x	x	x			Final Evaluation Report
Produce final report and disseminate via rollout presentation to USAID/Washington																x	x	Soft and hard copies of report PowerPoint Presentation

## Field Work Calendar **November 2012**

<b>Sun</b>	<b>Mon</b>	<b>Tues</b>	<b>Wed</b>	<b>Thu</b>	<b>Fri</b>	<b>Sat</b>
<b>11</b> Swedberg arrives in Nairobi	<b>12</b> Team Planning, Meet with IPSOS	<b>13</b> Meet with USAID	<b>14</b> Work Plan Submitted	<b>15</b> Meet with USAID	<b>16</b> Meet with KTI	<b>17</b> Key Informant Interviews
		Met with EDC			Meet with USAID	
<b>18</b> Leave for Hargeisa	<b>19</b> Training	<b>20</b> Training	<b>21</b> Data collection in Hargeisa	<b>22</b> Return to Nairobi	<b>23</b> Analyze and display data.	<b>24</b> Analyze and display data.
Leave for Hargiesa		Pretest in Hargeisa		Return to Nairobi		
<b>25</b> Analyze and display data.  Draft Interviewer instruction 1 pager	<b>26</b>  Brief Mission.	<b>27</b> 8:30 arrive  9:00 Kenya enumerator training	<b>28</b>  Kenya enumerator training [	<b>29</b>  Key informant interviews - Nairobi	<b>30</b>  Key informant interviews - Nairobi	

			Pretest in Eastleigh  Focus group training	Advance team to Garissa	Advance team	
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## December 2012

Sun	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						<b>Data collection in Garissa1</b>
<b>2</b>  Local partners travel to Mogadishu to conduct focus groups	<b>3</b>  QED and IPSOS Administer Survey, focus groups in Eastleigh  Local partners conduct focus groups in Mogadishu	<b>4</b>  QED and IPSOS Administer Survey, focus groups in Eastleigh  Local partners return from Mogadishu	<b>5</b>  IPSOS team travels to Garissa. Administer Survey, focus groups. QED and IPSOS continue data collection in Eastleigh	<b>6</b>  Data collection in Eastleigh and Garissa.	<b>7</b>  Analyze Eastleigh and Mogadishu Data. Data collection in Garissa	<b>8</b>  Analyze Eastleigh Data. Data collection in Garissa
<b>9</b>  Data collection in Garissa	<b>10</b>  IPSOS team returns from Garissa.	<b>11</b>  Analyze Total Data	<b>12</b>  Analyze Total Data	<b>13</b>  Analyze Total Data	<b>14</b>  Brief USAID Mission	<b>15</b>
<b>16</b>  Depart Nairobi	<b>17</b>  Arrive US	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>

# Questionnaire

## Screening Questions

Have you participated in the KTI – E Youth Program

Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_

If yes:

Did you graduate from the program?, Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_

Respondent is in

Strata 1 \_\_\_\_\_; Strata 2 \_\_\_\_\_; Strata 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Were you born in Kenya? Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_

## Demographic Questions

Sex

Male \_\_\_\_\_ Female \_\_\_\_\_

Age

14-18 \_\_\_\_\_; 19-25 \_\_\_\_\_; 26-29; \_\_\_\_30-34 \_\_\_\_\_; 35 or older – no interview

Education Level

Primary: Dropped Out \_\_\_\_\_; Completed \_\_\_\_\_;

Secondary: Enrolled \_\_\_\_\_; Dropped Out \_\_\_\_\_; Completed \_\_\_\_\_

University: Enrolled \_\_\_\_\_; Dropped Out \_\_\_\_\_; Completed \_\_\_\_\_

Vocational School: Enrolled \_\_\_\_\_; Dropped Out \_\_\_\_\_; Completed \_\_\_\_\_

Madrasa Enrolled \_\_\_\_\_; Dropped Out \_\_\_\_\_; Completed \_\_\_\_\_

O Which Clan are you a member?

------(Open Ended. To be coded).

Questionnaire	5	4	3	2	1
<b>Level of civic engagement</b>					
During the past year, have you attended a community meeting?	Often	Several times	Once or twice	No, but would if had the chance	Never
During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities? (	Often	Several times	Once or twice	No, but would if had the chance	Never
Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	All the time	Often	Occasionally	Seldom	Never
<b>Level of efficacy</b>					
What is your level of satisfaction with how local government decisions are made in your community?	Very Good	Good	Fair	Bad	Very Bad
When there are problems in your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?	A great deal	some	Not sure	little	None
How likely is it you could get together with others and make your local government listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not sure	Not very likely	Not at all likely

Questionnaire	5	4	3	2	1
community					
<b>Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations</b>					
Do youth associations make a positive contribution to your community?	All the time	Often	Occasionally	Seldom	Never
How are youth viewed by leaders within the community? (Leaders include elders, sheiks, imams, parents)	Very Positively	Positively	Fair	Negatively	Very Negatively
To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations	A lot	Well	Fair	Not Well	Not at All
<b>Level of support for use of violence in the name of Islam</b>					
Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is ever justified?	Never justified	Rarely Justified	Not Sure	Sometimes Justified	Always Justified
Do you agree or disagree that Al Shabab's violent activities are permitted under Islamic law? (Followed up in focus group)	Completely disagree	Somewhat disagree	Not Sure	Somewhat agree	Completely agree
Some say the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight terrorism. Others say that the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight Islam. Which is closer to your view?	Fight Terrorism		Not Sure		Fight Islam
<b>Level of individual's self-confidence and/or sense of identity</b>					
How prepared do you feel to enter the job market?	Very prepared	Somewhat prepared	Not sure	Somewhat unprepared	Very unprepared
How optimistic are you about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future?	Very optimistic	Somewhat optimistic	Not sure	Somewhat pessimistic	Very pessimistic
What is most important to finding a job - education and training or family connections?	Education much more important	Education somewhat more important	Not sure	Family connections somewhat more important	Family connections much more important
What is the one single most important way that you identify yourself? (Leave open ended. Enumerator will assign category.)	My Gender	My Country	My age	My clan	My religion
<b>KTI Eastleigh Specific Questions</b>					
To what extent do you feel you have support from your family?	A great deal	Some	Neutral	Not much	None
To what extent do you feel you have support from teachers, trainers, youth counselors?	A great deal	Some	Neutral	Not much	None
To what extent has mentoring and counseling helped you overcome problems in your life?	A great deal	Some	Neutral (has no mentoring or counseling)	Not much	None
<b>G-YOUTH Specific Questions</b>					
To what extent do you think that all Garissan youth have benefitted from the G-Youth program?	A great deal	Some	Neutral	Not much	None
Do you think that family and neighbors respect and support young people in the community?	A great deal	Some	Neutral	Not much	None
How much pride do you feel as a Garissan youth?	A great deal	Some	Neutral	Not much	None
<b>SYLP Specific Questions</b>					
Many people say that there are lots of new business opportunities in Hargeisa (Bossaso). Do you think you have the skills/knowledge to take advantage of these opportunities?	A great deal	Some	Neutral	Not much	None
Do you think that your life would be better if you were to leave Hargeisa (Bossaso)?	Yes, much better	Probably better	Neutral	Not much better	Worse
Do you feel you have more or less opportunities now than you did a year ago (education, job, etc.)?	Yes, many more	Yes, some	No change	No, less	No, much less

## **Proposed Interview Guide for Implementers and Local Partners:**

**Name**  
**Position**  
**Location**  
**Date**

1. What do you see as the achievements to date of the program? Be specific as to achievements (or lack thereof) in these areas.
  - a. Level of civic engagement
  - b. Level of efficacy (belief that the individual has power to alter policy)
  - c. Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations
  - d. Level of support for use of violence in the name of Islam
  - e. Level of individual's self-confidence and/or sense of identity
2. What are the outcome metrics for the program? How have the program methods influenced the results to-date based upon those metrics?
3. Regarding your experience in collaborating with local authorities and key influencers in the community, what has worked and what has not worked?
4. What are the significant challenges faced by the projects? What has the project done to address these challenges and with what results?
5. How has the program integrated formal and informal media and messaging into their activities?
6. What aspects of this project do you see as essential for future CVE related programs that target youth?

## **Focus Group Guide**

### **Level of civic engagement**

1. Tell us about your involvement in the community over the past year, have you attended a community meetings, been involved in advocacy or participated in decision making in some way?

### **Level of efficacy**

2. Whether or not you were personally involved, how satisfied are you with how local government decisions are made in your community? Will the local government listen to people (youth) like you?

### **Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations**

3. Are you members of youth associations? Which ones? Do you think this association is making a positive contribution to society? Why?

### **Level of support for use of violence in the name of Islam**

4. Do you feel that using violence to support a cause is ever is justified? Why or why not? Probe for specific reasoning. Are the cited reasons religious, national, tribe based, personal, etc.?

### **Level of individual's self-confidence and/or sense of identity**

5. Are you optimistic about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future as a youth in your community? Why?



## Annex 6 - Survey Instruments

### Qiimaynta Barnaamijka SHAQO-DOON (Hargiesa/Bosasso/Mogadishu)

Xog-ururintani waxay weydienaysaa xoogaa su'aalo ah dadka magaaladan oo ku saabsan dareenka iyo shucuurka ay ka qabaan mawduucyo muhiim ah, kuwaasoo caawinaya inay hubinayaan waxtarka wakhti xaadirkan iyo mustaqbalka ee mashruucyada hormurinta ee calaamiga ah. Dadka ka qayb qaadanaya xog-urintani waxay noqonayaan kuwo aan la shaacin. Raali ma ka tahay inaad ka qayb gasho xog-ururintan? Haddii jawaabtu **Haa** tahay, weydii su'aalaha oo gobaab jawaabaha.

#### Qaybta Mamuulka xogta:

<b>Lambarka Xog-doonka</b>				
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<b>Lambarka Xog-qaadaha</b>			
<b>Lambarka Kormeeraha</b>			

Magaca Xog-qaadaha	
Magaca Kormeeraha	

Taariikhda waraysiga (MM/BB/SS):	/ /
Waqtiga waraysigu bilaabmay (U qor qaabka 24 saacadood) : (SS:DD):	:

Magaca Xog-bixiyaha	
Ciwaanka Xog-bixiyaha	

#### Goobta

Hargeisa	1
Bosaso	2

#### Su'aalaha Xulida xog-bixiyaha

SC1. Ma ka qayb gashay barnaamijka dhalinyarta ee Shaqo-doon- SYLP ?

Haa	1
Maya	2

**SC2.** Haddii jawaabto **Haa tahay**, Ma dhamaysatay barnaamijkaa?

Haa	1
Maya	2

**SC3.** Xog-bixiyuhu wuxuu ka mid yahay

Dhamaystay1 \_\_\_\_\_; Ma dhamaysan2 \_\_\_\_\_; Kamuu qayb galin3 \_\_\_\_\_

### **Astaamaha Xog-bixiyaha**

**D1.** Jinsiga (HAA WEYDIN):

Lab	1
Dhedig	2

**D2.** Da'da

14-18	5
19-25	4
26-29	3
30-34	2
35 ama ka weyn – Lama waraysanayo	1

**D3.** Heerka waxbarashada ee xog-bixiyaha

Dugsi hoose/dhexe(Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out	1
Dugsi hoose/dhexe dhamaystay	2
Dugsi sare ku jira	3
Dugsi sare(Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out	4
Dugsi sare dhamaystay	5
Jaamacadda ku jira	6
Jaamacad (Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out	7
Jaamacad dhamaystay	8
Dugsi tababar ku jira	9
Dugsi tababar(Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out	10
Dugsi tababar dhamaystay	11
Madarasad ku jira	12
Madarasad(Ma dhamaysan)-Dropped Out	13
Madrassa dhamaystay	14

### **A. Heerka ku lug-lahanta arrimaha bulshada**

**Q1.** Sannadkii la soo dhaafay, ma ka qayb gashay kulamo bulsho?

In badan	5
Dhawr jeer	4
Mar ama laba	3
Maya, laakin hadaan fursad u heli lahaa	2
Marnaba	1

**Q2.** Sanadkii la soo dhaafay, ma isu tagteen adiga iyo dhalinyaro kale si aad arrin ugu soo jeedisaan maamulka?

In badan	5
Dhawr jeer	4
Mar ama laba	3
Maya, laakin hadaan fursad u heli lahaa	2
Marnaba	1

**Q3.** Ma ka qayb qaadata go'aaminta go'aamada saameeya bulshadaada?

Mar kasta	5
Inta badan	4
Mar mar	3
Mar mar iyo dhif	2
Marnaba	1

### **B. Heerka waxtarka/waxqabadka**

**Q4.** Intee in leeg ayaad ku qanacsantay sida go'aamada ay u gaadhaaan maamulka dawladda hoose?

Waa mid aad u wanagsan	5
Waa mid wanagsan	4
Waa dhex dhexaad	3
Waa mid xun	2
Waa aad u xun	1

**Q5.** Marka ay jiraan dhibaatooyin bulshadaada haysta, intee in leeg ayuu qofka caadiga ahi wax ka qaban kara xalaada?

Wax badan	5
Waxoogaa	4
Ma hubo	3
Wax yar	2
Waxba	1

**Q6.** Ma dhacda intaad isu tagtaan in ay maamulka dawladda hoose idinka dhagaysato cabasho arrin muhiim u ah bulshadaada?

Marar badan ayey dhacdaa	5
Mar mar ayey dhacdaa	4
Ma hubo	3
Inta badan ma dhacdo	2
Marnaba ma dhacdo	1

### C. Heerka tageerada iyo rumaysnaanta awooda ururada dhalinyarada

**Q7.** Ururada dhalinyaradu wax fiican ma u qabtaan/ku taraan bulshadaada?

Markasta	5
Inta badan	4
Mar mar	3
Mar mar iyo dhif	2
Marnaba	1

**Q8.** Sidee ayay hogaamiyayaasha bulshadu u arkaan ururada dhalinyarada? (Hogaamiyayaasha: Odayada, Sheekhyada, Imaamada, Walidiinta)

Sida aad u wanaagsan	5
Si iska wanaagsan	4
Si dhexdhexaada	3
Si xun	2
Si aad xun	1

**Q9.** Ilaa intee in leeg ayaad dareensantay inaad ka hesho tageero iyo inay ku matalaan ururada dhalinyarada ee maxaliga ah?

In aad u fiican	5
In fiican	4
In dhexdhexaad ah	3

In hoose	2
Marnaba ma dareensani	1

#### **D. Heerka isku kalsoonida shaqsiga ah iyo dareenka aqoonsigiisa**

**Q10.** Sideed ugu diyaarsantahay inaad ku shaqo tagto xirfadda aad baratay?

Inaan aad isu diyaariyey	5
Inaan isu yara diyaariyey	4
Ma hubo	3
Inaan isu yara diyaarin	2
Inaan aad isu diyaarin	1

**Q11.** Sided ugu rajo weyntay awooda aad u leedahay inaad gadho mustaqbal wanaagsan?

Aad ugu rajo weynay	5
Ku yara rajo weynay	4
Ma hubo	3
Kuma rajo weyni	2
Aad uguma rajo weyni	1

**Q12.** Waa maxay shayga ugu muhiimsan helitaanka shaqada- waxbarasho iyo tababar mise garab iyo waji?

Waxbarashada ayaa aad ugu muhiimsan	5
Waxbarashadaa yara muhiim u ah	4
Ma hubo	3
Xidhiidhka qoyska ayaa muhiim u ah	2
Xidhiidhada qoyska ayaa aad muhiim ugu ah	1

**Q13.** Waa maxay habka kaliya ee ugu muhiimsan ee aad ku salaysid cidaad tahay?

Diintayda	5
Wadankayga	4
Da,dayda	3
Qabiilkayga	2
Jinsigayga(Lab/dhedig)	1
Kuwo kale(cayin.....)	6

## E . Heerka tageeridda dagaalka/burburka ee loo adeegsado magaca Islaamka

**Q14.** Makula tahay in marnaba isticmaalka dagalka iyo burburka loo helikaro qiil/marmarsiyo iyadoo la adeegsanayo magaca Islaamka?

Marnaba marmarsiyo looma heli karo	5
Mar mar iyo dhif marmarsiyo loo helo karo	4
Ma hubo	3
mar mar marmarsiyo loo heli karo	2
Markasta marmarsiyo loo helo	1

**Q15.** Miyaad taageersantahay mise waad ka soo hor jeeda hawlaha kooxaha xag-jirka ah ee burburka/dagaalka ku dhisan in uu ogolyahay sharciga Islaamku?

Waan ka soo horjeedaa gabi ahaanba	5
Waan ka soo yara horjeeda	4
Ma hubo	3
Waan yara raacsanay	2
Gebi ahaan ba waan racsanay	1

**Q16.** Dadba sheega in Maraykanku ku hawlanyahay wadamada aduunka si uu ula dagaalamo argagixisada. Kuwo kale ayaa sheega in Maraykanku ku hawlanyahay wadamada aduunka si uu ula dagaalamo Islaamka. Keeba bay u dhawday adiga aragtidaada?

Inuu argagixisada la dagaalamo	5
Ma hubo	3
Inuu Islaamka la dagaalamo	1

## F. Su'aalo ku saabsan barnamijka Shaqodoon (SYLP)

**Q17.** Dad badan ayaa sheega in ay jiran fursado cusub oo ganacsi oo ka jira Hargeisa(Bosaaso). Ma kula tahay in aad leedahay xirfad/aqoon aad kaga faa'iidsato fursadahan?

Wax badan	5
Waxooga	4
Dhexdhexaad	3
Wax yar	2
Waxba	1

**Q18.** Ma is leedahay noloshadu way ka fiincaan lahayd haddii aad Hargeisa(Bosaaso) ka tagi lahayd?

Haa, aad bay uga fiincaan lahayd	5
Way ka fiincaan lahayd	4

Iska dhexdhexaad bay ahaan lahayd	3
Maya, aad ugamay fiicnateen	2
Way Ka dari lahayd	1

**Q19.** Ma dareemaysa in aad haysato fursado ka badan ama ka yar iminka marka loo eego sanadkii hore (Sida; Waxbarashada, shaqada iwm.)?

Haa, fursad aad uga badan	5
Haa, fursado ka yara badan	4
Ismay badalin	3
Maya, fursadu way ka yar yihiin	2
Maya, fursadu aad bay uga yar yihiin	1

**D4.** Qolama ayaad tahay?

Arab	1
Cidagale	2
Sacad muuse	3
Habar yoonis	4
Ciise muuse	5
Ayuub	6
Habarjeclo	7
Ttoljeclo	8
Gadabuursi	9
Dhulbahante	10
Warsan-gali	
Others (sheeg.).....	11

<b>Wakhtiga waraysigu dhamaaday (SS:DD) (24 Sacadood)</b>	:
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Serial number; 

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Field Serial No/*Lambarka Xog-doonka*:

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QED EVALUATION SURVEY

Enumerator's Name/*Magaca Xog-qaadaha*;

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Enumerator's ID/*Lambarka Xog-qaadaha*;

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Supervisor's Name/*Magaca Kormeeraha*

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Supervisor ID/ *Lambarka Kormeeraha*;

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Date (DD/MM/YY)/ *Taariikhda waraysiga (MM/BB/SS)*:

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**Started time in 24 hours format (HH:MM)/ *Wagtiga waraysigu bilaabmay (U qor qaabka 24 saacadood): (SS:DD):***

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This survey asks a small number of questions of citizens of this city regarding their feelings and attitudes on important issues. It will help ensure the effectiveness of current and future international development programs. Survey recipients will be anonymous.

Would you agree to take part in this survey? If yes, ask questions and tick answers:

Xog-ururintani waxay weydienaysaa xoogaa su'aalo ah dadka magaaladan oo ku saabsan dareenka iyo shucuurka ay ka qabaan mawduucyo muhiim ah, kuwaasoo caawinaya inay hubinayaan waxtarka wakhti xaadirkan iyo mustaqbalka ee mashruucyada hormurinta ee calaamiga ah. Dadka ka qayb qaadanaya xog-urintani waxay noqonayaan kuwo aan la shaacin. Raali ma ka tahay inaad ka qayb gasho xog-ururintan?

Haddii jawaabtu **Haa** tahay, weydii su'aalaha oo gobaab jawaabaha.

**Respondent's Name/*Magaca Xog-bixiyaha;***

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**Address of Respondent/*Ciwaanka Xog-bixiyaha;***

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**Location/ *Goobta;***

☐ 1. Hargeisa

☐ 2. Bosaso

Screening Questions/ *Su'aalaha Xulida xog-bixiyaha*

**SC1** Have you \participated in the SYLP– Youth Program/ *Ma ka qayb gashay barnaamijkii dhalinyarta ee Shaqo-doon- SYLP?*

☐ 1. Yes/ *Haa*

☐ 2. No/ *Maya*

**SC2** If **yes:** Did you graduate from the program? / *Haddii jawaabto **Haa tahay**, Ma dhamaysatay barnaamijkaa?*

☐ 1. Yes/ *Haa*

☐ 2. No/ *Maya*

**SC3** Respondent is in?/ *Xog-bixiyuhu wuxuu ka mid yahay;*

<input type="checkbox"/>	Strata1/ <i>Dhamaystay 1;</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Strata 2/ <i>Ma dhamaysan 2 ;</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Strata 3/ <i>Kamuu qayb galin 3;</i>

Demographic Questions / *Astaamaha Xog-bixiyaha*

**D1** Respondent's sex (**Don't ask**)/ *Jinsiga (**HAA WEYDIN**):*

☐ 1. Male/ *Lab*

☐ 2. Female/ *Dhedig*

**D2** *Age/ Da'da;*

☐ 1. 14-18

☐ 4. 30-34

☐ 2. 19-25

☐ 5. 35 or older – no interview/ *35 ama ka weyn – Lama waraysanayo*

☐ 3. 26-29

**D3** Education Level/ *Heerka waxbarashada ee xog-bixiyaha;*

<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Primary; Dropped Out/ <i>Dugsi hoose/dhexe(Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	2. Primary; Completed/ <i>Dugsi hoose/dhexe dhamaystay</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	3. Secondary: Enrolled/ <i>Dugsi sare ku jira</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	4. Secondary: Dropped Out/ <i>Dugsi sare(Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	5. Secondary: Completed/ <i>Dugsi sare dhamaystay</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	6. University: Enrolled/ <i>Jaamacadda ku jira</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	7. University: Dropped Out/ <i>Jaamacad (Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	8. University: Completed/ <i>Jaamacad dhamaystay</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	9. Vocational School: Enrolled/ <i>Dugsi tababar ku jira</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	10. Vocational School: Dropped Out/ <i>Dugsi tababar(Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	11. Vocational School: Completed/ <i>Dugsi tababar dhamaystay</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	12. Madrasa Enrolled/ <i>Madarasad ku jira</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	13. Madrasa Dropped Out/ <i>Madarasad(Ma dhamaysan)- Dropped Out</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	14. Madrasa Completed/ <i>Madrasa dhamaystay</i>

**A. Level of civic engagement / A. Heerka ku lug-lahanta arrimaha bulshada**

**Q1** During the past year, have you attended a community meeting? / *Sannadkii la soo dhaafay, ma ka qayb gashay kulamo bulsho?*

<input type="checkbox"/>	5. Often/ <i>In badan</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	2. No, but would if had the chance/ <i>Maya, laakin hadaan fursad u heli lahaa</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	4. Several times/ <i>Dhawr jeer</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Never/ <i>Marnaba</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	3. Once or twice/ <i>Mar ama laba</i>		

**Q2** During the past year, have you gotten together with other youths to raise an issue with authorities? / *Sanadkii la soo dhaafay, ma isu tagteen adiga iyo dhalinyaro kale si aad arrin ugu soo jeedisaan maamulka?*

<input type="checkbox"/>	5. Often/ <i>In badan</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	2. No, but would if had the chance/ <i>Maya, laakin hadaan fursad u heli lahaa</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	4. Several times/ <i>Dhawr jeer</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Never/ <i>Marnaba</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	3. Once or twice/ <i>Mar ama laba</i>		

**Q3** Do you participate in decision-making in your community? / *Ma ka qayb qaadata go'aaminta go'aamada saameeya bulshadaada?*

<input type="checkbox"/> 5. All the time/ <i>Mar kasta</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Seldom/ <i>Mar mar iyo dhif</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Often/ <i>Inta badan</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Never/ <i>Marnaba</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Occasionally/ <i>Mar mar</i>	

**B. Level of efficacy / *Heerka waxtarka/waxqabadka***

**Q4** What is your level of satisfaction with how local government decisions are made in your community? / *Intee in leeg ayaad ku qanacsantay sida go'aamada ay u gaadhaan maamulka dawladda hoose?*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Very Good/ <i>Waa mid aad u wanagsan</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Bad/ <i>Waa mid xun</i>        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Good/ <i>Waa mid wanagsan</i>            | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Very Bad/ <i>Waa aad u xun</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Fair/ <i>Waa dhex dhexaad</i>            |  |

**Q5** When there are problems within your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation? / *Marka ay jiraan dhibaatooyin bulshadaada haysta, intee in leeg ayuu qofka caadiga ahi wax ka qaban kara xalaada?*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. A great deal/ <i>Wax badan</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Little/ <i>Wax yar</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Some/ <i>Waxoogaa</i>          | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. None/ <i>Waxba</i>     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Not sure/ <i>Ma hubo</i>       |  |

**Q6** How likely is it you could get together with others and make your local government listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community? / *Ma dhacda intaad isu tagtaan in ay maamulka dawladda hoose idinka dhagaysato cabasho arrin muhiim u ah bulshadaada?*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Very likely/ <i>Marar badan ayey dhacdaa</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Not very likely/ <i>Inta badan ma dhacdo</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Somewhat likely/ <i>Mar mar ayey dhacdaa</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Not at all likely/ <i>Marnaba ma dhacdo</i>  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Not sure/ <i>Ma hubo</i>                     |  |

**C. Level of support and belief in the power of youth associations/ *Heerka tageerada iyo rumaysnaanta awooda ururada dhalinyarada***

**Q7** Do youth associations make a positive contribution to your community? / *Ururada dhalinyaradu wax fiican ma u qabtaan/ku taraan bulshadaada?*

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. All the time/<br><i>Markasta</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Seldom/ <i>Mar mar iyo dhif</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Often/ <i>Inta badan</i>         | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Never/ <i>Marnaba</i>           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Occasionally/ <i>Mar mar</i>     |   |

**Q8** How are youth viewed by leaders within the community? (**Leaders include elders, sheiks, imams, parents**)/ *Sidee ayay hogaamiyayaasha bulshadu u arkaan ururada dhalinyarada? (Hogaamiyayaasha: Odayada, Sheekhyada, Imaamada, Walidiinta)*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Very Positively/ <i>Sida aad u wanaagsan</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Negatively/ <i>Si xun</i>          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Positively/ <i>Si iska wanaagsan</i>         | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Very Negatively/ <i>Si aad xun</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Fair/ <i>Si dhexdhexaada</i>                 |  |

**Q9** To what extent do you feel supported and represented by local youth organizations? / *Ilaa intee in leeg ayaad dareensantay inaad ka hesho tageero iyo inay ku matalaan ururada dhalinyarada ee maxaliga ah?*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. A lot/ <i>In aad u fiican</i>  | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Not Well/ <i>In hoose</i>                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Well/ <i>In fiican</i>         | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Not at All/ <i>Marnaba ma dareensani</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Fair/ <i>In dhexdhexaad ah</i> |  |

**D. Level of individual's self-confidence and/or sense of identity/ *Heerka isku kalsoonida shaqsiga ah iyo dareenka aqoonsigiisa.***

**Q10** How prepared do you feel to enter the job market and your chosen field? / *Sideed ugu diyaarsantahay inaad ku shaqo tagto xirfadda aad baratay?*

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Very prepared/ <i>Inaan aad isu diyaariyey</i>      | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Somewhat unprepared/ <i>Inaan isu yara diyaarin</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Somewhat prepared/ <i>Inaan isu yara diyaariyey</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Very unprepared/ <i>Inaan aad isu diyaarin</i>      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Not sure/ <i>Ma hubo</i>                            |   |

**Q11** How optimistic are you about your ability to work toward/achieve a better future? / *Sided ugu rajo weyntay awooda aad u leedahay inaad gadho mustaqbal wanaagsan?*

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Very optimistic/ <i>Aad ugu rajo weynay</i>     | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Somewhat pessimistic/ <i>Kuma rajo weyni</i>  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Somewhat optimistic/ <i>Ku yara rajo weynay</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Very pessimistic/ <i>Aad uguma rajo weyni</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Not sure/ <i>Ma hubo</i>                        |   |

**Q12** What is most important to finding a job - education and training or family connections? / *Waa maxay shayga ugu muhiimsan helitaanka shaqada- waxbarasho iyo tababar mise garab iyo waji?*

<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Education much more important/ <i>Waxbarashada ayaa aad ugu muhiimsan</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Family connections somewhat more important/ <i>Xidhiidhka qoyska ayaa muhiim u ah</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Education somewhat more important/ <i>Waxbarashadaa yara muhiim u ah</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Family connections much more important/ <i>Xidhiidhada qoyska ayaa aad muhiim ugu ah</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Not sure/ <i>Ma hubo</i>	

**Q13** What is the one single most important way that you identify yourself? **(Leave open ended. Enumerator will assign category.)** / *Waa maxay habka kaliya ee ugu muhiimsan ee aad ku salaysid cidaad tahay?*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. My religion/<br><i>Diintayda</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. My clan/ <i>Qabiilkayga</i>                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. My Country/<br><i>Wadankayga</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. My Gender/ <i>Jinsigayga (Lab/dhedig)</i>                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. My age/ <i>Da,dayda</i>          | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Others (Specify) in the space below/<br><i>Kuwo kale (cayin)</i> |

**Please record other (specify) for the above question/** *Kuwo kale(cayin;*

**G. Level of support for use of violence in the name of Islam /** *Heerka tageeridda dagaalka/burburka ee loo adeegsado magaca Islaamka*

**Q14** Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is ever justified? / *Makula tahay in marnaba isticmaalka dagalka iyo burburka loo helikaro qiil/marmarsiyo iyadoo la adeegsanayo magaca Islaamka?*

<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Never justified/ <i>Marnaba marmarsiyo looma heli karo</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Sometimes Justified/ <i>Mar mar marmarsiyo loo heli karo</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Rarely Justified/ <i>Mar mar iyo dhif marmarsiyo loo helo karo</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Always Justified/ <i>Markasta marmarsiyo loo helo</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Not Sure/ <i>Ma hubo</i>	



**Q15** Do you agree or disagree that extremist groups violent activities are permitted under Islamic law?/ *Miyaad taageersantahay mise waad ka soo hor jeeda hawlaha kooxaha xag-jirka ah ee burburka/dagaalka ku dhisan in uu ogolyahay sharciga Islaamku?*

<input type="checkbox"/>	5. Completely disagree/ <i>Waan ka soo horjeedaa gabi ahaanba</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	2. Somewhat agree/ <i>Waan yara raacsanay</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	4. Somewhat disagree/ <i>Waan ka soo yara horjeeda</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Completely agree/ <i>Gebi ahaan ba waan racsanay</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	3. Not Sure/ <i>Ma hubo</i>		

**Q16** Some say the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight terrorism. Others say that the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight Islam. Which is closer to your view?/ *Dadba sheega in Maraykanku ku hawlanyahay wadamada aduunka si uu ula dagaalamo argagixisada. Kuwo kale ayaa sheega in Maraykanku ku hawlanyahay wadamada aduunka si uu ula dagaalamo Islaamka. Keeba bay u dhawday adiga aragtidaada?*

<input type="checkbox"/>	5. Fight Terrorism/ <i>Inuu argagixisada la dagaalamo</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	3. Not Sure/ <i>Ma hubo</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Fight Islam/ <i>Inuu Islaamka la dagaalamo</i>

**F. SYLP Specific Questions/Su'aalo ku saabsan barnamijka Shaqodoon (SYLP)**

**Q17** Many people say that there are lots of new business opportunities in Hargeisa (Bossaso). Do you think you have the skills/knowledge to take advantage of these opportunities? / *Dad badan ayaa sheega in ay jiran fursado cusub oo ganacsi oo ka jira Hargeisa (Bosaaso). Ma kula tahay in aad leedahay xirfad/aqoon aad kaga faa'iidayso fursadahan?*

<input type="checkbox"/> 5. A great deal/ <i>Wax badan</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Not much/ <i>Wax yar</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Some/ <i>Waxooga</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. None/ <i>Waxba</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Neutral/ <i>Dhexdhexaad</i>	

**Q18** Do you think that your life would be better if you were to leave Hargeisa (Bossaso)? / *Ma is leedahay noloshadu way ka fiincaan lahayd haddii aad Hargeisa(Bosaaso) ka tagi lahayd?*

<input type="checkbox"/>	5. Life would be much better in Hargaisa/ <i>Haa, aad bay uga fiicnaan lahayd</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	2. Life would be somewhat worse in Hargaisa/ <i>Maya, aad ugamay fiicnateen</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	4. Life would be somewhat better in Hargaisa/ <i>Way ka fiicnaan lahayd</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Life would be much worse in Hargaisa/ <i>Way Ka dari lahayd</i>
<input type="checkbox"/>	3. It would be the same elsewhere/ <i>Iska dhexdhexaad bay ahaan lahayd</i>		

**Q19** Do you feel you have more or less opportunities now than you did a year ago (education, job, etc.)?/ *Ma dareemaysa in aad haysato fursado ka badan ama ka yar iminka marka loo eego sanadkii hore (Sida; Waxbarashada, shaqada iwm.)?*

<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Yes, many more/ <i>Haa, fursad aad uga badan</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. No, less/ <i>Maya, fursadu way ka yar yihiin</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Yes, some/ <i>Haa, fursado ka yara badan</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. No, much less/ <i>Maya, fursadu aad bay uga yar yihiin</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. No change/ <i>Ismay badalin</i>	

**D4** Which Clan are you a member? / *Qolama ayaad tahay?*

<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Arab	<input type="checkbox"/> 7. Habarjeclo
<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Cidagale	<input type="checkbox"/> 8. Habar toljeclo
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Sacad muuse	<input type="checkbox"/> 9. Gadabuursi
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Habar yoonis	<input type="checkbox"/> 10. Darood/ <i>Dhulbahante</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Ciise muuse	<input type="checkbox"/> 11. Others ( <i>Sheeg</i> )
<input type="checkbox"/> 6. Ayuub	<input type="checkbox"/> 98. Refused to Answered/ <i>Warsan-gali</i>

Please record other specify for the question above/(*Sheeg.*);

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End Time (HH:MM) (24 hr Clock)/ *Wakhtiga waraysigu dhamaaday (SS:DD) (24 Sacadood)*

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THANK THE RESPONDENT AND CLOSE THE INTERVIEW
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## Annex 7 - Signed No-Conflict of Interest Statements

Non-Personal Services Contractor Agreement, Version 1.0  
 Locus Release, PDQ II  
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### Annex 3

#### Disclosure of Real or Potential Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluations

##### Instructions:

Evaluations of USAID projects will be undertaken so that they are not subject to the perception or reality of biased measurement or reporting due to conflict of interest. For external evaluations, all evaluation team members will provide a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest or disclosing any existing conflict of interest relative to the project being evaluated.<sup>1</sup>

Evaluations of USAID projects have a responsibility to maintain independence in their opinions, conclusions, judgments, and recommendations with the impartial and will be viewed as impartial by third parties. Evaluators and evaluation team members are to disclose all relevant facts regarding real or potential conflicts of interest that could lead reasonable third parties with knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances to conclude that the evaluator or evaluation team member is not able to maintain independence and, thus, is not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues associated with conducting and reporting the work. Operating Unit leadership, in close consultation with the Contracting Officer, will determine whether the real or potential conflict of interest is one that should disqualify an individual from the evaluation team or require recusal by that individual from evaluating certain aspects of the project(s).

In addition, if evaluation team members gain access to proprietary information of other companies in the process of conducting the evaluation, then they must agree with the other companies to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.<sup>2</sup>

Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:

1. Immediate family or close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant material though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.
3. Current or previous direct or significant material though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.

#### Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Kathie Reisman
Title	Technical Expert
Organization	INDEPENDENT
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (Domestic or other assignment)	G456-NPSC-2-12-00-075

<sup>1</sup> USAID Evaluation Policy (p. 8); USAID Contract Administration Bulletin 00-17; and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 27.5, Organizational Conflicts of Interest, and Subpart 2.10, Contractor Code of Ethics.  
<sup>2</sup> USAID Evaluation Policy (p. 11).  
<sup>3</sup> FAR 9.505-2(g).

USAID Project(s) Evaluated (include project name(s), implementing agency(ies) and contract number(s), if applicable)	Mid-Term Evaluation of GYE Programs QED-6455NBSL-2012-001-075
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If you answered above, I disclose the following facts:</p> <p>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit administering the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) unless shown to be not being a relative.</li> <li>2. Financial interest that is direct, or is approached through indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</li> <li>3. Current or previous direct or indirect employment relationship with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous execution of the project.</li> <li>4. Current or previous work experience as a consulting employee with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor in the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>6. Financial interest toward individual, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular project(s) and organization(s) being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</li> </ol>	<p>I worked on the Somali Youth Livelihood Program as a part-time employee of EOL from 2008-2012, and provided sporadic technical assistance to the G-Youth program.</p>

I certify that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and I will update this disclosure if my personal or relevant circumstances change. If I am a sole proprietor, partner, officer, director, or other company officer, I agree to prohibit my company from unauthorized use of this information for any purpose other than for which it was provided and refrain from using this information for any purpose other than for which it was provided.

Signature	Laurie Reisman
Date	12/11/12