MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE RESPONSIVE GOVERNANCE PROJECT (RGP)

FINAL REPORT

August 4, 2012
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FINAL REPORT
AUGUST 4, 2012

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Yemen Monitoring and Evaluation Project

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Evaluation Methodology</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Findings and Conclusions</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Recommendations</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Background and Historical Narrative</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Scope of Work and Methodology</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Purpose and Key Questions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evaluation Methods</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Program Results: Findings and Conclusions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Assistance Area 1: Policy Formulation &amp; Implementation Capacity of ROYG</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Assistance Area 2: Strengthening the Transparency of the ROYG</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Assistance Area 3: Participation of Civil Society in ROYG Processes &amp; Decisions</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Cross-cutting Theme: Participation of women</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Cross-cutting Theme: Participation of youth</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Management, Financial Procedures &amp; Reporting</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Review of M&amp;E System &amp; Reporting Capacity</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Management, Design and Staffing Issues</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Financial Analysis of RGP Operations</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Project Relevance and Country Priorities</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Country Priorities</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 RGP and USAID Approach Issues</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Summary of Findings and Conclusions</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Program Results</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Management, Financial Procedures &amp; Reporting</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Project Relevance, Country Priorities</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Recommendations</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Program Results</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Management, Financial Procedures and Reporting</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Project Relevance, Country Priorities and USG Approach</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex I – Scope of Work</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex II – Selected Documents Reviewed, References &amp; Bibliography</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex III – List of Interviewees</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex IV - Sample RGP Workplan</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex V – January 31, 2012 Memorandum of Meeting</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex VI – Letter from Counterpart International to USAID June 4, 2012</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex VII – RGP Outcomes ............................................................................................................77
Annex VIII – RGP Chief of Party Turnover Data ............................................................................90
Annex IX – Email Exchanges Regarding USAID Dissatisfaction with RGP .................................91
ACRONYMS

AG  All Girls Association
AO  Assistance Objective
AOTR Agreement Officer Technical Representative
ATI  Access to Information
CBA Centre for Business Administration – Sana’a University
CoAg Cooperative Agreement
COCA Central Organization for Control and Auditing
COP Chief of Party
CPI Counterpart International
DCOP Deputy Chief of Party
DM Deputy Minister
FMIS Financial Management Information System
DQA Data Quality Assessment
EmOC Emergency Obstetrics Care
FACTS Foreign Assistance Coordinating and Tracking System
FGD Focus Group Discussions
FY Fiscal Year
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GCCI Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative
GPC General People’s Congress Party
GCM Global Change Makers
GIZ Gesellschaft für Inernationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany’s aid agency)
GOTV Get Out the Vote
HTAC High Authority for Tender Control
HTB High Tender Board
IBTCI International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc.
IP Implementing Partner
IR Intermediate Result
IS Institutional Strengthening
KEQ Key Evaluation Questions
KMP-MIS Knowledge Management Portal – Management Information System
M-TEVT Ministry of Technical Education and Training
M&E Monitoring & Evaluation
MAI Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
MCYD Ministerial Committee for Youth Dialogue
MD Mission Director
MIS Management Information System
MNCH Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
MOE Ministry of Education
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOH Ministry of Health
MOIT Ministry of Industry and Trade
MOLA Ministry of Local Administration
MOPHP Ministry of Public Health & Population
MOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MOWE Ministry of Water and Environment
MOYS Ministry of Youth and Sports
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MYCD</td>
<td>Ministerial Committee for Youth Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACS</td>
<td>National Anti-Corruption Strategy</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Integrity System</td>
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<td>NSMA</td>
<td>National Safe Motherhoods Alliance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
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<td>PAE</td>
<td>Program Area-Elements</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Presidential Contact Committee</td>
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<td>PHP</td>
<td>Public Health and Population</td>
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<td>PIRS</td>
<td>Performance Indicator Reference Sheets</td>
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<td>PLMP</td>
<td>Peer Learning and Mentoring Program</td>
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<td>PMIS</td>
<td>Project Management Information System</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<td>PMP</td>
<td>Performance Management Plan</td>
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<td>PODA</td>
<td>Participatory Organizational Development Assessment</td>
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<td>PPR</td>
<td>Performance Plan Reports</td>
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<td>PWG</td>
<td>Policy Working Group</td>
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<td>Q</td>
<td>Quarter</td>
</tr>
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<td>RGP</td>
<td>Responsive Governance Project</td>
</tr>
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<td>RFA</td>
<td>Request for Application</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROYG</td>
<td>Republic of Yemen Government</td>
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<td>RTI</td>
<td>Research Triangle International</td>
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<td>SCER</td>
<td>Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Social Democratic Forum</td>
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<td>SEMC</td>
<td>Studies Economic Media Centre</td>
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<td>SNACC</td>
<td>Supreme National Authority for Combatting Corruption</td>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>Strategic Objective</td>
</tr>
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<td>TPSD</td>
<td>Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for the Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
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<td>STTA</td>
<td>Short Term Technical Advisor</td>
</tr>
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<td>TDY</td>
<td>Temporary Duty (USAID staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMP</td>
<td>Third Party Monitoring</td>
</tr>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
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<td>WIDSC</td>
<td>Women and International Development Studies Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNC</td>
<td>Women’s National Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEMN</td>
<td>Yemen Elections Monitoring Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YFCA</td>
<td>Yemeni Family Care Association</td>
</tr>
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<td>YMEP</td>
<td>Yemen Monitoring and Evaluation Project</td>
</tr>
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<td>YPC</td>
<td>Yemen Polling Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of the USAID/Yemen, the Yemen Monitoring and Evaluation Project (YMEP) implemented by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI) mobilized an international evaluation team to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the Responsive Governance Project (RGP) in Yemen.

The purpose of this mid-term performance evaluation was to assess the implementation, effectiveness, and progress of the RGP in Yemen. The findings of this evaluation will be used to inform USAID whether the program is on track to achieving programmatic goals, fiscal goals, and targets. Furthermore, the evaluation will be used to assess whether the implementation of the project had been supportive of the initial overarching USAID strategy in Yemen of positively impacting stabilization in key areas, and subsequently its support for the GCC Initiative and Transition.\(^1\) Intended users of the evaluation will be the USAID/Yemen Mission, the implementing partner and YMEP. (See Scope of Work in Annex I)

RGP is a five-year $43M project implemented by a consortium led by Counterpart International (CPI) as the prime contractor, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Research Triangle Institute (RTI). RGP began in May 2010 with an initial obligated budget of US$2,467,971.25 funded by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under Cooperative Agreement #279-A-00-10-00028-00.

1.1 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team relied on a comprehensive document review (see Annex II), and conducted data collection and analysis through interviews with RGP staff from all three program components (legislative, executive/parliament, and civil society), interviews with current and former USAID Yemen staff, interviews and discussion with Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) Counterparts, civil society organizations (CSOs) and other key project informants. The evaluation also assessed the project’s relevance to current country priorities through conducting a series of interviews with key informants including international donor representatives, senior government officials, and senior Yemenis in the business and development sectors who are well placed to provide perspective on the country’s processes (see Interviewee list in Annex III).

The evaluation team relied on the project’s own M&E system to assess progress towards results, in addition to collecting data on a sample of seven outcomes identified by the project as representative of their achievements towards the three program areas. The outcomes analyzed were further triangulated by various project stakeholders to provide critical feedback on the project’s performance to date.

1.2 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1.2.1 Project Results

The project’s strongest results to date are in the area of government policy making. RGP had an effective mechanism for contributing to passage of legislation with citizen input. Three activities, Access to Information, Safe Motherhood, and Health Insurance, illustrate how the three RGP program components worked together to support the executive branch and legislative offices of the ROYG, and CSOs consult and advocate with the various stakeholders that ultimately resulted in the passage of legislation. This

\(^1\) 2010-2012 USAID Yemen Strategy, which was prepared before the uprising in 2011, and was under review as this evaluation was underway
synergy was critical to the RGP’s success in this area. As testimony to RGP’s role as a capacity builder, the governmental players and CSOs used the training and technical support to carry out their policy formulation and legislative roles, resulting in legislation that reflects the input of civil society.

As this reliance on civil society input into the legislative process in Yemen was still quite new, RGP continued to facilitate collaboration between champions from Ministries, parliament and civil society. Parliamentary hearings provided an important forum for representatives from Ministries, civil society and parliament to shape legislation through discussion and deliberation. Key steps in institutionalization of the hearings remain to be taken – specifically, formal ratification of the rules and procedures for public hearings and inclusion of hearings in the budget of the parliament.

Information from Parliamentarians and CSOs indicated that RGP’s civic education and Get Out The Vote activities, carried out by NDI’s Legislative team, were relevant and effective. In the area of anti-corruption, the project had some results with its Peer Learning and Mentoring Program (PLMP), but ROYG officials reported that SNACC’s initial leadership of its new Coordination Unit seems to have stalled.

In contrast, RGP activities carried out by Counterpart in support of ROYG’s operational capacity, including the Project Management Information System (PMIS), seemed unlikely to lead to systemic change in the Ministries and seemed less relevant in light of current priorities. Counterpart’s relatively new PMIS system was still untested, while the major emphasis on M&E in the country’s new Transition Plan was being supported by UNDP and other donors.

CSOs played an important role in the success of RGP objectives related to policy formulation. They also played a role in conducting focus group discussions, implementing Quick Impact Response activities, and supporting RGP youth activities. But in general, RGP did not have a systematic means for incorporating CSOs into the work of the legislative and executive program components. Additionally, two years after the project was awarded RGP still had not implemented a system to measure project outcomes related to capacity building for CSOs. The CSO component was largely operating as if CSO-strengthening was an end in and of itself.

RGP’s engagement with women’s issues has been primarily centered on the gender analysis of policies, drafting the National Women’s Platform, and the promotion of legislation reflecting women’s priorities, most notably the Safe Motherhood Law. Because of its role in the National Women’s Platform, and its success in the passage of legislation, RGP was well positioned to promote legislation that reflects the priorities identified in the National Women’s Platform.

Current programming was likely to give youth a voice and connect them to policy making. However, RGP programming with youth did not address the underlying causes of youth frustration in Yemen which require comprehensive, long-term ROYG solutions, such as job creation, higher quality education and options for vocational training.

1.2.2 Management, Financial Procedures & Reporting

The project seemed to have an inadequate grasp of Yemen’s key transition needs, as it reportedly focused on peripheral rather than core governance and capacity development issues² (see sample 2011-2012

² The so-called “Pivot Document” – an email to R. Wilson (Mission Director) from M. Chorev (USAID Democracy and Governance Advisor) May 26, 2012, suggests a way to “…significantly focus RGP’s scope to provide more direct and relevant transition programming… Key drivers of instability identified in USAID’s strategy include: weak governance, corruption, political marginalization, and unemployment.”
Work Plan in Annex III). This appears to stem from the project’s lack of a working understanding of how to identify, address and support a fragile state’s governance capacity building needs.3 The framework could have included focusing the project on developing core governance capacities such as distribution of natural resource revenues, job creation, support for the private sector, program design and implementation, absorptive capacity, budget execution and carefully-prepared strategic public communications – all well-known components of fragile state reconstruction programming.4

There have been significant staffing issues within the first two years of RGP. The high turnover of four RGP Chiefs of Party (COPs) within less than two years is considered unusually high in development projects. Counterpart seemed to have limited capacity to rapidly recruit, deploy, support and retain competent senior managers for complex governance projects in fragile conflict-affected states.

Although at the beginning of the project, USAID was concerned that RGP was not spending project funds at sufficient levels, the evaluation found that it has been operating at close to the projected average burn rate of about $716K a month. This indicates it is on track to meet the fiscal goals of the project.

RGP contends that it has experienced difficulties due to errors in USAID’s financial management system. In a January 31, 2012 memorandum (see Annex V), USAID Yemen’s Program Office acknowledged that their Contract Office in Cairo made accounting errors that hampered project operations.5 Furthermore, in June 2012 the project had spent over 90% of obligated funds, which the RGP COP advised brought Counterpart to the brink of initiating shut-down procedures three times in the space of two weeks (see sample in Annex VI). Later discussions with USAID Program Managers indicated there appeared to be insufficient readily-accessible funds in the USAID financial “pipeline”6 to support the project’s original budget in a timely manner. These challenges within USAID caused the project to suspend or curtail some activities, especially in 2012.

RGP’s newly-arrived COP (April 2012) reported to the evaluators that the project’s finances had not been well-managed, and many RGP activities had been initiated without prior costing and confirmation of funds before implementation began. As a result, the new COP said he had difficulty in being certain of the project’s financial status in terms of cash flow, projected expenditures, etc. Counterpart’s Home Office, on the other hand, reported being pleased with the project’s financial management, indicating a marked difference in views on this important issue. For example, the COP advised the evaluation team that the project had spent more than it had available. Counterpart’s home office told the evaluation team that it was operating at the limit of its line of credit and could not sustain the program under current circumstances. These problems resulted in the project suspending or curtailing some operations. These indicate the project appeared to have financial management and reporting problems.

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3 Email from R. Wilson to A. K. Alaug and others December 20, 2011: “The country needs electricity, water, health, education services, jobs, etc. What does that tell us? We need to support the public sector capacity to do (establish policies, plan, organize, execute, supervise) those things in partnership with CSOs and the private sector.”


5 For instance, the USAID Cairo office had erroneously assigned costs to Program Area-Element categories in sequence, zeroing-out several accounts including Governance, saying there were no funds available for this core RGP activity so it should stop. It took considerable administrative time and efforts to rectify these problems, which were on-going as this report was being written.

6 Evidence from interviews with USAID program staff, and an email from R. Wilson to E. Scott Thomas and M. Karim, October 11, 2011 which expressed a concern about insufficient funds in the “pipelines” associated with USAID projects.
RGP financial staff said the project has been reporting expenditures in conformity with the traditional budget categories stipulated in the CoAg as well as the more recent USAID Program Area-Element (PAE) categories. USAID Program Managers expressed concerns about the accuracy of PAE allocations which may present problems if the project is audited.

The evaluation SOW requested an analysis of RGP’s cost effectiveness. Interviews with RGP and USAID Program Managers reported it was not possible to accurately determine cost effectiveness of project activities and outcomes because the financial data was not sufficiently discrete to directly link costs to specific measurable results, and some outcomes were the product of multiple inputs. These managers also expressed the opinion that the operating cost of running a combined multi-level governance project with three collaborating contractors would likely be higher than operating three separate projects – there would be time and effort costs associated with managing the consortium that may not be present when running three separate smaller stand-alone projects. The evaluation team did not receive comparative data from USAID to confirm these views.

1.2.3 Project Relevance, Country Priorities

Since the uprising in early 2011, RGP had been operating in a rapidly changing environment that required considerable flexibility. Although the Mission Director reported asking the project to make major adjustments to these new circumstances and national strategies, USAID expressed frustration that RGP did not seem to be relating its design and operations to the US government’s strategy for Yemen, which was based on the GCC Agreement and the country’s new Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (TPSD), or on the new government’s key priorities, which were similar to those in most fragile conflict-afflicted states (security, economic development, civil service reform, private sector strengthening, job creation, legitimacy, etc.).

A review of the TPSD and consultations with ROYG representatives and informed observers highlighted the strengthening of central government agencies and public communications as key transition priorities. Neither of these areas was represented in RGP work plans or proposals for future activities. The Deputy Ministers said that strengthening the central ROYG agencies, such as the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Ministry of Industry and Trade etc., would enable them to strengthen service delivery Ministries such as Health, Education and Agriculture. They said that without strong central agencies the service Ministries would likely remain ineffective.

In addition to gaps in alignment with transition priorities, the project was also criticized for a lack of focus and coordination with other important development initiatives. The project’s activities were seen by several ROYG and CSO stakeholders as being ad-hoc and lacking a comprehensive and consistent strategy. RGP’s activities seemed to be spread over too broad a scope and to have been inconsistent even where they had been making progress. This reflected the lack of a stable, comprehensive approach to nation building of fragile states. An RGP Manager described the project as operating in a “strategic vacuum” as a broader development framework was missing.

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7 Email from R. Wilson to E. Scott Thomas, December 08, 2011: “The political situation here is changing so fast that all previous plans need to be revisited. There will be priorities identified by the new government that might require different approaches to our work than previously planned.”

8 See sample 2011-2012 RGP Workplan in Annex IV. Overall, the project engages twelve ministries and government agencies, and parliament and various CSOs, in activities across three project components which often do not integrate to contribute to higher project level outcomes.

9 Comment to YMEP evaluators during draft evaluation presentation to RGP July 8, 2012.
RGP’s annual budget of slightly over $8M is relatively small to achieve the broad goals and objectives designed for this five-year complex multi-layered governance project in a conflict-affected country. Similar projects in Iraq and Afghanistan that dealt with single level governance interventions (national, provincial, or municipal/local, etc.) had three-year budgets in the hundreds of millions of dollars.\footnote{The Iraq Mission’s Tatweer and Local Governance Project each had budgets of about $100M a year. A proposed World Bank sponsored public sector reform project in Afghanistan had a budget of $400M for 5 years.} A modest civil service reform project alone could easily absorb double RGP’s budget if it expected to have any meaningful impact on the over 1.7M employees\footnote{ROYG civil service employment figure provided by the Deputy Minister of Finance.} in Yemen’s public sector\footnote{A Pay and Grading project in the Afghan civil service (with about 330,000 employees) had a budget of approximately $10M a year, and that was one of several projects working on strengthening the civil service.}. This would indicate that given the current RGP budget, the project’s impact would be greatest if it were highly focused on a few key sectors, and if it worked in coordination with complementary efforts by other international donors such as the World Bank, the United Nations, DFID, GIZ and others. The evaluation team received no indications from interviews with USAID, RGP personnel or from other donors that any such meaningful coordination was taking place.

1.2.4 Project and USAID Approach Issues

RGP’s efforts to respond to the Mission Director’s requests for changes were reportedly hampered by the project’s design, which was described by both Mission and RGP Managers as being too complex and its budget categories too restrictive to enable the project to operate in a truly flexible and responsive manner. Although USAID’s 2010-2012 Strategy and RGP project documentation mentions a “seamless” coordination of USAID’s several project initiatives in Yemen, the weekly management meetings of USAID and Implementing Partner COPs that started in 2010 were not continued following the change of Mission leadership in mid-2011. This seems to have resulted in a diminished collaboration and synergy among USAID projects in the country, with RGP operating in relative isolation with little ongoing contact with other USAID supported projects. The previous coordination arrangement where the Mission called weekly meetings of all projects’ senior managers was described as beneficial to all involved. RGP no longer had that level of benefit and mutual support for its operations.

1.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

1.3.1 Project Results

Continue activities related to the formulation and passage of legislation. Focus these efforts on the policy priorities of youth and women, as well as transition policies. The Minister of Human Rights, Dr. Hooria Mashoor urges RGP to “follow up on the recommendations of the National Women Conference to ensure full adaptation from the National Dialogue and the constitutional amendments...and continue support to the Women’s National Committee.”\footnote{Interview with Minister of Human Rights, Dr. Hooria Mashoor, July 4, 2012.} This recommendation was echoed by the RGP-commissioned evaluation on the National Women’s Dialogue: “Strategic technical support from RGP is more necessary now than ever.”\footnote{Yemeni Women’s Platform and Agenda, p.9} The evaluation report outlines a number of specific recommendations that define roles for both the Women’s National Committee and RGP, including the development of a public communication strategy and an evaluation of the implementation of the Women’s Platform in early 2013. Minister Hooria requested training courses for the women representatives, support in developing technical proposals, an advocacy program, and media campaign.

10 A modest civil service reform project alone could easily absorb double RGP’s budget if it expected to have any meaningful impact on the over 1.7M employees in Yemen’s public sector. This would indicate that given the current RGP budget, the project’s impact would be greatest if it were highly focused on a few key sectors, and if it worked in coordination with complementary efforts by other international donors such as the World Bank, the United Nations, DFID, GIZ and others. The evaluation team received no indications from interviews with USAID, RGP personnel or from other donors that any such meaningful coordination was taking place.

11 ROYG civil service employment figure provided by the Deputy Minister of Finance.

12 A Pay and Grading project in the Afghan civil service (with about 330,000 employees) had a budget of approximately $10M a year, and that was one of several projects working on strengthening the civil service.

13 Interview with Minister of Human Rights, Dr. Hooria Mashoor, July 4, 2012.

14 Yemeni Women’s Platform and Agenda, p.9
Cancel RGP activities related to the development of service delivery standards. Although setting measurable service delivery standards is normal practice in most governments, it presumes a relatively stable environment with a moderately competent legislative and policy framework supported by a functioning public sector – none of which were present as Yemen proceeded with the aftermath of its revolution in late 2011. There were higher priorities in a country that was going through the changes being experienced by Yemen, such as the ability to design and implement even the most basic public sector operations required to improve absorptive capacity and budget execution.

In the area of anti-corruption activities, coordinate with SNACC to build on the initial successes of the PLMP including:

- Training for senior ministry staff addressing both financial and administrative corruption. A comprehensive program should include aspects related to relationships between junior and senior staff in reaching similar aims in complex environments.
- Ongoing training for peers with possible accreditation; continue to monitor the online community of practice to ensure that it remains an enlivened arena for engagement.
- Include CSOs in activities and trainings with government officials to allow for cross-pollination of ideas; according to the evaluation, CSOs are doing some of the most innovative work.
- Document case studies of anti-corruption success.

In the area of PMIS and M&E, RGP should align its support to the ROYG with other donor inputs related to the Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development. The proposed M&E system in MOPIC is likely to produce useful information over time, but a more rapid feedback and planning process is required in the interim. RGP should be encouraged to establish an external advisory group of knowledgeable individuals from diverse backgrounds in Yemen who can act as a sounding board for its planning processes.

Support the institutionalization of parliamentary public hearings to ensure the sustainability of results. Specifically, promote formal ratification of the rules and procedures for public hearings and inclusion of hearings in the budget of the parliament. Assess the need for additional technical assistance and training to reach more parliamentarians and CSOs.

Continue civic education, voter campaigns and similar activities in support of Yemen’s transition objectives and in preparation for the 2014 elections. The project’s original intent, to foster a more responsive government and increase the public’s engagement with the state, is still valid. However, after over 30 years of not having an effective voice, the public has a limited ability to participate constructively in the governance process. The energy that was manifested during the 2011 uprising needs to find constructive and legitimate outlets. The public’s engagement with democratic processes and their desire to participate in elections needs considerable support.

Continue with the advanced capacity building to the nine selected CSOs, on the condition that the project provides a plan for how the graduating CSOs will be integrated into future activities. The project seems to have considered CSO development as an end it itself rather than creating a multi-layered institutional framework for public participation in the affairs of state. The project needs to do more to institutionalize CSO engagement in the broader governance process in the country.

Build on successes to-date to continue to provide youth programming in four areas: the National Dialogue; policy formulation; elections; and anti-corruption.

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15 Opening eyes and Embracing Integrity: Peer Learning and Mentorship Program (PLMP) on Anticorruption, May 12, 2012, p. 23-24
Mid-Term Evaluation of the Responsive Governance Project (RGP)

- **National Dialogue**: Provide leadership and civic education training to youth NGOs, engagement of youth in the National Dialogue and in policy formulation more generally. Support to youth NGOs to participate in development is also consistent with recommendations emerging from the YMEP Assessment of Youth and Gender Program Priorities in Yemen.

- **Policy formulation**: Use the RGP approach to move forward legislation consistent with policy priorities identified by youth, including economic development and job creation. The RGP approach (CSO advocacy, parliamentary hearings, and support to Ministries) has been successful in contributing to the passage of legislation.

- **Preparation for elections**: Engage youth CSOs in activities in preparation for the elections, including civic education, and a Get out the Vote campaign.

- **Anti-corruption**: Continue to engage youth in anti-corruption activities with partners such as SNACC. The PLMP is one promising model.

Engage youth in a broader transition communication strategy. During the April 2011 consultation, youth requested technical assistance from the project to conduct “awareness-raising efforts which would include the production of simplified materials to increase public awareness about youth visions, demands and aspirations; and support youth efforts to coordinate with civil society organizations in conducting awareness programs that will cover the issues advocated by the youth groups”.

1.3.2 Management, Financial Procedures & Reporting

In the area of RGP’s M&E and reporting, the project should focus on the basics, such as accurate documentation and sound reporting practices which start from the project teams and build up to the M&E Unit. RGP leadership should consider hiring local staff with better M&E qualifications, and Counterpart should prioritize recruitment of the M&E Director and provide more support in terms of good system design and implementation. Counterpart brought in a 3-month STTA to address critical M&E issues within the project and is actively recruiting for an M&E Director. However, the project remains vulnerable to poor performance in monitoring and reporting until the position is filled.

1.3.2.1 Management, Design and Staffing Issues

RGP and the Mission should conduct a discussion to clearly identify the sources of dissatisfaction and reconfigure the project to resolve key outstanding issues regarding project design and operations. RGP should set up a project operating protocol and reporting system that satisfies the Mission’s expectations.

To improve its grasp of transition needs, the project should recruit international staff who are able to fill the “strategic vacuum”. Counterpart should properly staff positions such as the RGP Chief of Party of and the M&E Director.

1.3.2.2 Financial Analysis of RGP Operations

RGP reported it was submitting invoices in USAID Program Area Element categories, but there were questions from USAID about the accuracy with which project costs were being assigned to these categories. It is recommended that USAID financial staff analyze samples of the financial records used by Implementing Partners to distribute project expenses to PAE categories to verify compliance with USAID financial regulations and to see if they could withstand a comprehensive audit.

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16 Yemen Youth and Gender Assessment, YMEP, September 19, 2011.
17 Refer to recommendations in RGP Evaluation, section 8.4.1
18 Refer to recommendations in RGP Evaluation, section 8.4.1
19 RGP Draft Youth Strategy, March 2012, p.3
RGP’s operations were negatively impacted by significant problems with USAID’s financial system serving the project – this was acknowledged by USAID Project Managers. A review of the operations of USAID’s financial management system is recommended to identify and remedy the causes of such errors to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of the problems experienced by the project.

The project is reportedly facing a budget reduction that will require curtailing some activities. Once the available budget is determined by USAID, RGP should reconfigure the project to optimize performance and impact, and make an orderly transition to the new project configuration.

1.3.3 Project Relevance and Country Transition Plan Priorities

USAID staff and ROYG representatives commented on the lack of alignment of project activities with the priorities of Yemen as it recovers from turmoil and moves into the political transition. The project should put more emphasis on identifying the country’s and Ministries’ transition priorities and align its activities accordingly. Given its present budget and inputs, USAID should assess its options and encourage the project to reconfigure and focus its activities in a targeted way to achieve optimum sustainable impact given the scale of available resources. To have the greatest synergy and impact in Yemen, the project should coordinate its activities with other donor funded governance activities wherever possible.

Yemen has prepared a Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (May 2012) with the assistance of the donor community. RGP should identify and focus its support on high priority transition objectives, including relevant support to economic development, job creation and strengthening the private sector.

While policy development and legislative strengthening are essential in any fragile state, the ability to respond to the public’s needs depends on having a functioning civil service. Yemen’s public sector was described to the evaluators by various ROYG officials as performing at a very low level. Wherever possible, the project should support the current phase of Yemen’s civil service reform program, including increasing its capacity for program conceptualization, design, implementation and assessment, with a primary focus on increasing absorptive capacity and improving budget execution. Without this capability, donor funds will not be effectively translated into services for the population.

A key factor in any governance, security or stabilization program in a post-conflict fragile state is an effective public communications program. RGP should collaborate with the relevant ROYG departments to support an extensive well-designed multi-faceted public education focused strategic communications program.

1.3.4 Project and USAID Approach Issues

One of the challenges faced by the project was difficulty in responding to requests from the Mission because of constraints posed by its operating framework and budget structures. It is recommended that USAID review RGP’s operating plan to make it more flexible: this could entail consolidating key activities into three or four clusters, each with its own larger budget category.
2. **INTRODUCTION**

At the request of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Yemen, the Yemen Monitoring and Evaluation Project (YMEP), implemented by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI), mobilized an international evaluation team to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the Responsive Governance Project (RGP) in Yemen. RGP is a five-year $43 million project implemented by a consortium led by Counterpart International (Counterpart) as the prime contractor, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Research Triangle Institute (RTI). RGP began in May 2010 with a budget of US$2,467,971.25 funded by USAID under Cooperative Agreement (CoAg) #279-A-00-10-00028-00.

Per the USAID/Yemen Country Strategy for 2010 – 2010, the overall USAID/Yemen Assistance Goal is “Yemen’s stability increased through targeted interventions in highly vulnerable areas.” The Assistance Objectives (AOs) of the strategy are: 1) **livelihoods in vulnerable communities improved**; and 2) **governance capacities to mitigate drivers of instability improved**. For the purposes of USAID/Yemen’s 2010-2012 Strategy and the Mission’s implementation program, the drivers of instability are as follows: (i) large youth bulge and rapidly growing population, (ii) unequal development, political marginalization and repression of the disaffected, (iii) corruption, (iv) weak state institutions, (v) declining government revenues, (vi) growing natural resource scarcity, and (vii) violent Islamist extremism.

RGP was designed to strengthen government institutions at the national and local levels to help them improve the delivery of public services while encouraging more citizen participation in the political process. The program is also intended to facilitate more equitable socioeconomic development by strengthening public policies and institutions that will contribute to helping to mitigate key drivers of instability in Yemen. This is expected to result in a more equitable, representative, transparent, accountable, responsive and reliable Yemeni government that meets the needs of its citizens and especially its most vulnerable citizens. In working at the central government level, the project is to increase the ability of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) to address the causes of discontent in underserved areas of the country, including USAID’s eight targeted vulnerable governorates: Amran, Al Jawf, Marib, Shabwah, Abyan, Al Dhale‘e, Lahj, and Aden.²⁰

The overall development hypothesis for RGP is that progress will be achieved towards mitigating the drivers of instability noted in the 2010-2012 USAID/Yemen Strategy by improving the capacity of the ROYG to:

- provide basic services to its most vulnerable citizens;
- analyze, develop and implement laws and policies;
- become a more accountable and transparent government; and
- reform key service delivery institutions.

Following is RGP’s results framework from the 2011 approved RGP Performance Management Plan:

Strategic Objective (SO): To facilitate more equitable socio-economic development by strengthening public policies and institutions that will contribute to mitigating the drivers of instability in Yemen.

**OBJECTIVE ONE: Strengthened Government Policy Formulation and Implementation Capacity**

- Activity 1.1: Increase Operational Capacity of Government Ministries
- Activity 1.2: Improve Government Policymaking and Implementation Capacity

²⁰ Adapted from: RGP Mid-Term Evaluation Scope of Work; USAID 2010-2012 Yemen Country Strategy; USAID-Counterpart International Cooperative Agreement No. 279-A-00-10-00028-00 April 29, 2010
OBJECTIVE TWO: Enhanced Representative Government and Competitive Political Processes
- Activity 2.2: Increase Political Party Platform and Policy Development Capacity
- Activity 2.1: Legislative and Public Engagement Capacity of Parliament Strengthened

OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Civil Society Participation in Policy Development and Implementation.
- Activity 3.1: Strengthen the Capacity and Sustainability of Yemeni Sector-specific Advocacy Coalition Leads
- Activity 3.2: Support Civil Society Policy Advocacy and Good Governance Initiative
- Activity 3.3: Improve and Increase Civil Society Outreach to New and Existing Constituencies

2.1 BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

The modern history of South Arabia and Yemen began in 1918 when Yemen gained independence from the Ottoman Empire following its collapse at the end of World War I. Between 1918 and 1962, Yemen was a monarchy ruled by the Hamidaddin family. There was a brief revolution in 1947-48, in which Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din was killed. A rival sayyid family, the Alwazirs, seized power for several weeks. Backed by the al-Saud family of Saudi Arabia, the Hamid ed-Din family restored their rule until 1962–1970 during the North Yemen Civil War. In 1962, North Yemen saw a republic rivaling the Imams with Egyptian Occupiers assistance, but Britain still had a protective area around the South Arabia port of Aden, which it had created in the 19th century. Britain withdrew in 1967 and the area became South Yemen. In 1970, the southern government adopted a Communist governmental system. The two countries were formally united as the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990.

From April 27 to July 7, 1994, a civil war between the former North and former South Yemen ended with the conquest of the southern capital, Aden. The dissatisfaction of the people in the South with the government of Sana’a led finally to an uprising in the South in 2007. Very soon the Southern Peaceful Movement (South Yemen Movement) was established in the same year to unify all southern activists. The demands on equality of treatment which was ignored by Sana’a developed very soon into a movement for the revival of the southern state.

The 2011–2012 Yemen revolution followed the initial stages of the Tunisian Revolution and occurred simultaneously with the Egyptian Revolution and other mass protests in the Arab world in early 201121 – these more recent events are discussed more fully below.

This background has relevance for governance programming in the country. Not only does Yemen have a history of factionalism and violence, its administrative structures and processes were heavily influenced first by the Ottoman system, and later by the centralized communist regime in the south, which was supported by Nasser in Egypt. During the more than 30 years of the Saleh government rule, with what was essentially a dominant one-party system, the civil service was seen as a source of income security and patronage, staffed largely by people (approximately 1.7 million in mid-2012) who had learned to survive in that environment. During the political transition process following the 2011 uprisings in Yemen, half of the new ROYG Ministers were appointed from the opposition – however, the administrative systems they oversaw were heavily influenced by their history and a corporate culture that was established by the previous regime. This presents a significant challenge for these new ministers and foreign technical advisors who are committed to improving the performance of the government.

21 From Wikipedia, accessed 19 July 2012
2.1.1 Recent Events in Yemen

RGP was operating before, during and after the uprising in 2011 and adapted itself as best as it could to the rapidly-changing conditions in the country. This included periods when expatriate staff were evacuated, but the project maintained some level of operations using locally-hired personnel who worked from their homes using mobile phones and mobile wireless internet when necessary. As the situation stabilized RGP was able to resume full operations more rapidly than other donors which had shut down completely during the turmoil. More specific effects of the turmoil on the project’s operations and RGP’s response are detailed in the narrative describing the three project components and cross-cutting themes (women and youth). The major events of the Arab Spring in Yemen are outlined as follows:

In January 2011, seven months following the start of RGP, the Arab Spring uprising began with modest demonstrations in the capital city. Following the President of Egypt’s resignation on February 11, the protests in Yemen gained momentum and grew from scheduled events to spontaneous sit-ins drawing from a broad demographic. By the end of February, several demonstrators had been killed in clashes with pro-government representatives.

A turning point in the Yemeni uprising came on March 18, 2011 when security forces and government supporters opened fire on demonstrators in Sana’a in a failed and bloody attempt to break the protests. The day of El Karameh, as it was later termed, resulted in the death of 52 people and injury to more than 100. On March 21, 2011 five army commanders and one of the country’s most important tribal leaders threw their support behind the protesters. This event was followed by a stream of resignations of Yemeni officials from the government, including the mayor of the restive southern city of Aden, a provincial governor and at least one of the country’s ambassadors.

Secession within the army and shifts in Saleh’s tribal support ultimately led to fighting within the capital city Sana’a between Sheikh Al Ahmar’s supporters and government security forces loyal to President Saleh. Despite numerous mediation agreements for a cease fire, heavy artillery clashes continued for several weeks in Sana’a causing major damage to infrastructure and households and the displacement of hundreds of families.

Demonstrations and aggressive government repression were even more pronounced in the south where many southerners feel marginalized politically, economically and socially by the northern government and many groups were calling for secession. To complicate matters even further, a security vacuum in the country allowed an Al Qaeda affiliate, Ansar Al Shariah, to grow stronger and to take over large areas in the southern governorate of Abyan.

In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stepped in to negotiate a transfer of power, but Saleh continued to vacillate about signing the agreement. In May, Saleh announced that he would not agree to the transition plan, thus sparking an outbreak of intense fighting between government forces and tribal groups in the northern suburbs of Sana’a. On June 3, 2011, Saleh was wounded in an assassination attempt in the Presidential compound and was evacuated to Saudi Arabia for intensive medical treatment for the wounds he sustained in the attack. Pro-government elements of the security forces and troops of General Ali Mohsen were locked in a stand-off in the capital.

In a surprise move, Saleh returned to the country on September 23, 2011 but continued to put off pressures to sign the GCC Pact until November 23, 2011 in Riyadh. Once signed, the pact immediately

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23 Named after a town in Jordan that was a battleground in one of the main events in the history of the Palestinian movement.
transferred power to the Vice President, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Under the terms of the agreement, Saleh was allowed to retain his title and certain privileges until the Presidential elections in February 2012. During the two-year transition period, a national unity government, consisting of members of the Yemeni opposition and the current ruling party, was formed, along with a military commission to restructure the country’s badly fractured armed forces.

In January 2012, Parliament granted President Saleh full immunity in the face of objections from thousands of street protesters, and the President traveled to New York for medical treatment. On February 21, 2012, Vice President Hadi was elected as the new President to lead Yemen’s transitional government for a two-year period in uncontested elections. Saleh retained leadership of the General People’s Congress party (GPC) and continued to exert influence through GPC affiliated elites that operate largely in the background.

Yemen is just beginning to assess and deal with the damage to the economy and the social fabric after a nearly a year-long public uprising against Mr. Saleh, who governed the country for more than three decades, during which much of the country’s declining oil wealth was squandered rather than being applied to improve social and economic conditions in the country.

2.1.2 Broader socio-political changes

The recent changes in the country have taken place against a backdrop of socio-economic transformations that began in the 1990s. At that time Yemen’s weak economy was bolstered significantly by remittances from Yemenis working in the Gulf States. This source of income was suddenly cut off when Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait following Yemen’s abstention in the 1990 UN Security Council vote authorizing action against Iraq. Yemen also lost its US$70 million foreign aid as a result of the Security Council abstention. The loss of foreign remittances and aid was accompanied by rising inflation.

The Yemeni economy was buffered somewhat against the negative impact of these losses by income from oil exports which replaced remittances. However, unlike remittances which were distributed among the population, oil revenues were concentrated in the state. During this period, economic control shifted to the state and allowed the Saleh regime to create a patronage system that supported his rule.

In recent years, the shrinking pool of patronage money has fed fractures in the elites supporting Saleh’s regime. Fears that power and wealth would be concentrated in Saleh’s immediate family members fueled infighting. For example, Hamid al-Ahmar, the son of a once prominent tribal sheikh and ally of Saleh, began to act more independently and openly criticized Saleh after his father’s death in 2007. In May 2011, he fought against government forces in clashes in Sana’a.

Yemen’s fragile economy has been teetering on the brink of crisis for some time. Some reports estimate that nearly 40 percent of the country — 10 million people — lack regular access to food and 1 million children under the age of 5 suffer from acute malnutrition. More than half a million Yemenis have fled their homes because of increased violence, and the country is coping with nearly 300,000 refugees from Somalia and the Horn of Africa. In May 2012, a group of seven charities warned that the food crisis in the country is reaching “catastrophic proportions.”

Saudi Arabia hosted a Friends of Yemen meeting on May 23, 2012 in Riyadh where Arab and Western donors promised more than US$4 billion to support development projects and stabilization efforts in

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24 http://www.yemenpeaceproject.org/wordpress/?p=458
25 (http://www.economist.com/node/18988886?frsc=dg%7Ca)
Yemen. Government officials contacted during the course of this evaluation stated that the country’s administration has limited capacity to translate that aid into services to improve conditions for the population – hence the importance of increasing the effectiveness of government operations, which is the focus of RGP.26

3. SCOPE OF WORK AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 PURPOSE AND KEY QUESTIONS

The purpose of this mid-term performance evaluation is to assess the implementation, effectiveness, and progress of the Responsive Governance Project (RGP) in Yemen. The findings of this evaluation will be used to inform USAID whether the program is on track to achieving programmatic goals, fiscal goals, and targets. Further, has the implementation of the project been supportive of the overarching USAID strategy in Yemen of positively impacting stabilization in key areas.\(^{27}\) Intended users of the evaluation will be the USAID/Yemen Mission, the implementing partner and YMEP.

The RGP mid-term evaluation prioritized the following four key evaluation questions (KEQs) in the evaluation SOW:

1. Is the RGP implementation approach of supporting the policy formulation and implementation capacity of the ROYG, strengthening the transparency of the ROYG and participation of civil society in ROYG processes and decisions and ensuring that citizens are engaged in every phase of program implementation an effective strategy for achieving the contracted program results? What progress has been achieved in each of these areas at this point in the program?
2. Have the efforts to include women and youth in the program achieved expected results to date or has there been significant progress made toward achieving these results? What are these efforts and the resulting verifiable levels of participation of women and youth?
3. Has the program achieved all of the other expected RGP results by this program midpoint i.e. end of March 2012?
4. Do RGP’s current financial procedures and reporting allow USAID to match actual spending against the type of funds provided, program areas and program elements? How cost effective has RGP’s spending been from program inception through March 2012?

To address these four KEQs, the evaluation explored implementation and results across the three-part program strategy and two cross-cutting themes:

- Assistance Area 1: Policy Formulation & Implementation Capacity of ROYG
- Assistance Area 2: Strengthening the Transparency of the ROYG
- Assistance Area 3: Participation of Civil Society in ROYG Process & Decisions
- Cross-cutting Theme: Participation of women
- Cross-cutting Theme: Participation of youth

In addition, the evaluation assessed the project’s management, financial procedures and reporting. The project’s relevance in light of country priorities and the USG country approach was also considered. Recommendations were drawn from the findings in these areas. (See Annex 1 for the full SOW.)

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\(^{27}\) See 2010-2012 USAID Yemen Country Strategy.
3.2 EVALUATION METHODS

The evaluation began with a desk review of key documentation and interviews with senior Counterpart and NDI staff at their headquarters in Washington, D.C. This initial information informed the evaluation design which was drafted while the evaluation team was conducting interviews and the desk review at IBTCl’s headquarters before departing for Yemen at the end of May 2012. The document review also included a review of reports of evaluations conducted by RGP-consultants and YMEP, and other resources such as USAID documents, project work plans and reports, and scholarly studies of Yemen’s culture, history and its formal and informal governance systems (see sample References in Annex II).

The evaluation team conducted interviews with RGP staff and key project stakeholders including ROYG Ministries and agencies and civil society organization (CSO) partners. The project’s relevance to current country priorities and context gained importance during the course of the evaluation. To address this issue, the evaluation team conducted interviews with a snow-ball sample of key informants including donors’ representatives, senior government officials, and other Yemenis with perspective on the country’s processes (see Interviewee list in Annex III).

The evaluation team relied on the project’s own M&E data in assessing progress towards results. The evaluation SOW also included a thorough assessment of the project’s M&E system. In general, the M&E system was found to be weak and error-prone, so considerable care had to be taken to check records and determine the accuracy of data. Over the life of the project, RGP has been reporting against two performance management plans (PMPs) – effectively two related, but distinct, sets of results. To provide a comprehensive picture of the project’s achievements, this evaluation reviewed results under both PMPs (the first PMP was submitted to USAID on March 16, 2011) with an emphasis on results recorded under the revised PMP (in operation since March 29, 2012, but formally approved by USAID on May 13, 2012).

In addition, the evaluation team collected data on a sample of seven outcomes identified by the project as representative of their achievements towards the three program areas. These outcomes represented changes in partners’ skills, behaviors and relationships. They were selected by the project as examples of improved working relationships between CSOs and the government. The sample outcomes provided a more in-depth view of progress while indicators provided information on the scale of the progress achieved to date. The outcomes selected were triangulated by various stakeholders to provide critical feedback on the project’s perspective.

1. Parliament conducts a public hearing on the Health Insurance Law.
2. Safe Motherhood bill is approved by the parliamentary committee for Public Health and Population (PHP).
3. Supreme National Authority for Combatting Corruption (SNACC) establishes an anti-corruption coordination unit.
4. The All Girls CSO conducts a Back to School Campaign for the Ministry of Education (MoE).
5. Social Democratic Forum (SDF) consolidates a damage assessment for the Prime Minister’s Office.
6. The Studies Economic Media Centre (SEMC) advocates successfully for the Access to Information law.
7. Graduates of the Youth Civics Education Academy conduct grassroots initiatives.

The level of effort for this evaluation was 53 days for each team member. In addition, a local data collector was hired for 12 days. The data collection, analysis and reporting took place between May 21 to July 27, 2012 (the evaluation team was in-country from June 3 to July 11, 2012).
4. PROGRAM RESULTS: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 ASSISTANCE AREA 1: POLICY FORMULATION & IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY OF ROYG

4.1.1 Original Design & Early Implementation

Under the project’s Objective One, led by RTI, efforts in policy formulation were to be integrated with increased capacity in the Ministries to implement those priority policies, and tracking the service delivery against standards for each policy. The original CoAg states: “In addition to providing capacity building for key Ministries for developing policies that address priority issues, we will work with each ministry to evaluate the implementation options and requirements of those policies. The Ministries will develop plans for each priority policy that considers implementation options, modalities, gaps and risks and will include the budget, policy performance targets and measures.” (CoAg, pp. 25-26)

The CoAg also explains the emphasis on strengthening data collection and analysis functions in Ministries: “sound policy-making and evaluation require accurate data, [which is] currently lacking in Yemen” (p. 25). The original intent was to work with each ministry to establish minimum service delivery standards and implement a system for monitoring service performance for the purpose of achieving the overall objective of strengthened and equitable service delivery. Anti-corruption was included as an essential element in improved operational capacity.

Subsequent revisions to the project in CoAg modification #3 (August 22, 2011) maintained the integration of policy formulation and implementation capacity building but a number of elements of the original design were omitted from subsequent RGP work plans, including:

- Proof-of Concept or Demonstration Pilots
- Support to councils and community groups to monitor district and governorate level performance
- Strengthen decentralization policy and implementation capacity: Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA)
- Develop University public administration degree programs
- Improve performance and utilization of the National Institute of Administrative Services

The revised PMP (in operation since March 29, 2012, but formally approved on May 13, 2012) outlines three activities which contribute to this objective:

Activity 1.1: Increase Operational Capacity of Government Ministries
Activity 1.2: Improve Government Policymaking and Implementation Capacity
Activity 1.3: Support Adoption of Decentralization Policy and Practice

These are described in the following sections.

4.1.2 Assessments and Policy Working Groups

[28] The CoAg modification #3 (August 22, 2011) proposes a major reorientation of its decentralization support because no national consensus exists on the matter. “The decentralization process in Yemen is currently at a standstill.” (p. 11). Nevertheless, the activity and corresponding indicator (F 2.2.3-1) is included in the revised PMP. The project reports that by the end of Q2 2012, 68 out of a life of project target of 110 individuals received USG-assisted training, including management skills and fiscal management, to strengthen local government and/or decentralization.
Proceeding according to the original CoAg, work in the Executive component began with a comprehensive set of assessments that were intended to identify policy priorities and operational gaps. These assessments were to inform planning of the policy formulation and implementation interventions. In Year 1 (through April 2011), the project deployed 19 short-term technical assistants (STTA) to carry out these assessments alongside RGP’s technical staff. The following assessments began during October 1 to December 31, 2010 and were completed in February 2011:

- Sectoral Policy Capacity Assessments (health, education, economic growth, and water)
- Institutional Mapping of Key and Line Ministries
- Anti-Corruption Capacity Assessment
- Decentralization Assessment
- Information and Data Gathering Capacity Assessment
- Policy-based Communication Strategy
- Institutional mapping of key line Ministries

Within the same quarter (October-December 2010), RGP launched its first policy working group (PWG) on health.

During the second quarter of 2011, RGP finalized the assessment reports in collaboration with government officials, and shared all findings and recommendations through several Dissemination Workshops. As explained in the January –March 2011 RGP quarterly report, “Using these assessment findings, government officials from each sector developed action plans with specific interventions to address the identified policy priorities. The process of analyzing the assessment briefings and developing action plans demonstrated not only a commitment on the part of government officials to seriously address public policy issues, but also an increase in the capacity of these officials to prioritize critical policies and identify interventions to implement these policies.” In September 2011, RGP reported that 12 Ministries or institutions had appointed a policy focal point, one more than RGP’s annual target of 11.

The project provided technical assistance to MoLA and the National Program for Local Government Committee throughout the process of drafting the Strategy for the National Program for Local Governance. The 2011 Yemen Arab Spring demonstrations interrupted plans for consultation in the Governorates and finalization before sending it to the Cabinet for approval.

In the third quarter of 2011 (April –June 2011), RGP activated the sectoral policy working groups. These working groups were attended by academics, government officials, members of parliament (MPs) and parliament staff, representatives from CSOs, local councilors, tribal sheiks and other relevant sector experts. The groups were tasked with conducting policy analysis, providing recommendations and practical approaches to policy development, and monitoring and evaluating government performance on policy implementation. RGP compiled the recommendations made on the policy priorities of the respective Ministries into reports for both the Health Policy Working Group and the Agricultural Policy Working Group. Throughout the quarter, the policy working groups refined their recommendations and presented them to the respective Ministries and civil society. In September 2011, RGP reported that eight policy issues-based meetings had been conducted by these PWGs which matched RGP’s annual target of eight in this regard.

In summary, RGP outputs in the area of government policy making (Activity 1.2) are contributing to outcomes. Training and technical analysis is effectively supporting the drafting and revision of legislation. Success in this area also rests on the foundational work of the assessments and identification of policy priorities in collaboration with the Ministries.
4.1.3 Policy Formulation

In Quarter 2 of 2011, RGP laid the groundwork for later wins in legislation. The project provided training to 123 public officials and CSO representatives on “The Importance of Advocacy in Policy Formulation and Implementation” which helped to create a common understanding among the two sectors of their respective roles in the policy formulation cycle. During Quarter 4 of 2011, RGP provided advocacy grants for CSOs to implement national level advocacy campaigns in support of policy priorities. The executive component team also provided technical assistance on gender analysis methodology for policies to 223 (59 women) MPs, parliament staff, ministry representatives and partner CSOs.

RGP’s policy formulation work gained momentum around Safe Motherhood legislation. In Quarter 1 of 2012 (October to December 2011), RGP worked in close coordination with Ministry of Public Health and Population, to provide two Training of Trainers (TOT) workshops on the implementation of the Free Delivery and Free Family Planning Decrees and family planning decision-making tools. For more practical, hands-on training, the second TOT workshop, attended by 17 midwives, took place at Al-Sabae’en Hospital. The trainings were conducted in support of policy formulation for Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC) in order to improve maternal, newborn, child health (MNCH) and reproductive health services.

When Saleh stepped down, and the transitional government was installed, most of the Ministers that RGP was working with changed. RGP introduced the project to the new ministers and to review the priorities that were previously identified. They confirmed these priorities, and in some cases added new ones.

In Quarters 1 and 2 of 2012, RGP conducted a review of the Safe Motherhood Law, and the Free Family Planning and Delivery decrees, the outcome of which is included in Annex VII of this evaluation report. Stakeholders in the review process included technical and legal experts, the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP), donors, and civil society. As a result of the review, EmOC was included as a service within the draft of the Safe Motherhood law, and the Free Delivery and Family Planning decrees were also integrated. Preparations were being made to present it to Parliament as early as mid-July.

In addition to the Safe Motherhood Law, RGP began analysis and presentation of findings to stakeholders on the laws regulating to pesticides and water, and the private education law during Quarter 1 of 2012. The following quarter RGP provided technical analysis on the “One Stop Shop” policy with the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI). During Quarter 3 of 2012 (June-July 2012), while this RGP evaluation was on-going, RGP contributed to the technical analysis of two additional draft policies:

1. The Pesticides Residue Legislature
2. Access to Information Law

During Quarter 2 of 2012, RGP organized a series of workshops with the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) intended to better understand gaps in the implementation of the Microfinance Law, especially for underserved populations such as women and youth. Among the recommendations is the use of mobile banking which would enhance access to financial services, making savings and lending more accessible to citizens in approximately 130,000 villages of Yemen.

Review of the evidence indicates that RGP has an effective mechanism for contributing to the passage of legislation. The case studies (Access to Information, Safe Motherhood, and Health Insurance) illustrate how the three RGP program components (integrated strategic support to the executive branch and

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29 The “One-Stop Shop” policy is intended to streamline the process at the MAI for registering products and obtaining business permits for exporting agricultural products.
legislative offices of the ROYG and support to CSOs) help the various stakeholders to promote the passage of legislation. This synergy is critical to the RGP’s success in this area. As testimony to RGP’s role as a capacity builder, the government players and CSOs use the training and technical support to carry out their policy formulation and legislative roles, resulting in legislation that reflects the input of civil society.

- Ministries use technical analysis provided by RGP to revise/draft bills
- Parliament conducts public hearings & consultations with Ministries and CSOs based on the training and technical assistance provided by RGP
- CSOs (recipients of advocacy grants and technical support) advocate and consult

As this reliance on civil society input into the legislative process in Yemen is still quite new, RGP continues to facilitate collaboration between champions from Ministries, parliament and civil society.

4.1.4 Service Delivery Standards and PMIS

Efforts in the area of Ministerial operational capacity in the most recent quarters (from Quarter 4 of 2011 through Quarter 2 of 2012) were focused on developing and rolling-out service delivery standards together with performance management systems for MoE, MoPHP, MAI, MOLA, and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Based on the assessments carried out in Q1 2011, the RGP and policy working groups identified 18 service delivery standards (the revised PMP lists a target of 11 by FY15, but the Quarter 2 of 2012 quarterly report lists 18). The roll-out of 18 service delivery standards is a significant undertaking and not scheduled to be completed until the end of the project; the 2012 annual target is three service delivery standards. By Quarter 2 of 2012, no service delivery standards had been developed and/or implemented by key Ministries/entities with RGP support (Indicator 1.1.1).

Representatives of RGP staff underscore the necessary link between the performance standards, M&E, and improved capacity of the ROYG for effective service delivery to citizens. The rationale behind these activities is that by developing performance standards and improving ministerial management information systems (MIS) will ensure the collection and analysis of data in support of quality and access to public service delivery. “The goal of the M&E series is to help select Ministries (MOE, MoPHP, MAI, MoPIC and PMO) monitor the implementation of government policies during and after the two-year transition period” (Quarter 2 of 2012 Report).

The Information and Data Gathering Capacity Assessment implemented in the first year of the project determined that the various Ministries were using different PMIS systems. The project considered a number of options and determined these to be unfeasibly expensive. Off-the-shelf systems are often expensive or require an annual license fee and on-going technical support. For example, UNDP invested a significant amount of funds to develop a database for MOPIC that has not been functional since the time the database development was completed in 2009; as MOPIC has not been able to pay the database’s annual maintenance and license fee.30

RGP proposed that the PMIS currently under development internally for the RGP be adapted for use in the PMO and the other key sector Ministries until the UN DevInfo31 software application has been fully rolled out at MoPIC (expected within two years). The PMIS was considered a cost-effective option because it was being developed from open-source software and, therefore, requires no annual license fee.

30 RGP DCOP correspondence, July 19, 2012.
31 DevInfo is a database system developed by the United Nations Development Group for monitoring human development.
This was agreed to by the PMO and included in RGP’s December 2011 work plan. The project’s PMIS was not operational within the project at the time that it was proposed for roll-out in the ROYG\textsuperscript{32}.

During April-June 2012, RGP agreed to address the PMIS equipment and training needs of the following ROYG ministries and agencies:

- Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
- Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)
- Ministry of Public Health & Population (MOPHP)
- Ministry of Education (MOE)
- Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA)
- Supreme National Authority for Combatting Corruption (SNACC)
- Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA)
- Ministry of Water and Environment (MOWE)
- Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT)
- Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS)
- Ministry of Technical Education and Training (M-TEVT)
- Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI) including One-Stop Shop (OSS).

RGP provided training for nearly 20 staff from the PMO, MOPIC, MOPHP, MOE, and the MAI in the fundamentals of M&E, performance indicators and reference sheets, and M&E planning. The overall objective of these ongoing series of M&E capacity building meetings is to strengthen the M&E capacity within select ROYG Ministries to monitor the implementation of government policies. The PMIS was introduced to trainees at that time.

YMEP monitors report\textsuperscript{33} that following the training, ROYG participants were well prepared to draft their specific ROYG Ministry M&E plan. However, participants noted several barriers to application of the PMIS system in the Ministries (ibid, pp. 3-4):

1. ROYG’s limited M&E budget allocated for data collection, verification and management.
2. RGP or the ROYG trainees must provide follow up training of lower level Ministry staff i.e. those who would be responsible to actually implement the M&E system, specifically those staff involved in data collection and data reports. Without these staff also receiving training in use of the M&E and PMIS system, there is a possibility that the comprehensive M&E system will not be fully rolled out throughout the Ministry.
3. ROYG commitment: One participant described the topic of ROYG’s commitment to M&E systems in the Ministries as “sensitive.”
4. Coordination with other international donors: Several of the international donors engaged with these Ministries have their own indicators to collect and measure outputs and outcomes of their funded activities, and these indicators are not always consistent across the donors – even though the activities are often the same. This makes it difficult for the ROYG to consolidate and compare the data being collected across multiple service deliveries.

As a component of this support to ROYG M&E, RGP distributed the following equipment during April-May 2012: five computers, five uninterrupted power supply units to allow the computers to function during power outages, printer, server, internet router and switch, and internet service for one year. Before the PMIS software can be installed and be operational, the performance indicators from each

\textsuperscript{32} RGP expects that the PMIS will be fully operational and able to produce reports by the end of September 2012.

\textsuperscript{33} YMEP Third Party Monitoring Report of RGP Activities: Follow-up of M&E Training with 21 ROYG officials that took place April 3, 2012, p. 2.
ministry/entity must be finalized in coordination with the relevant entities. There have been delays between the delivery of the equipment and the completion and installation of the PMIS software. At the time of the evaluation in July 2012, the PMO reports that the computer equipment has been sitting non-operational in their office for two months. Installation of the software must be accompanied by training of the staff designated to use it. RGP plans to complete the installation and training for all the above mentioned Ministries/entities by the end of September 2012. The 2012 target for key Ministries/entities with approved M&E plans and adequate M&E systems for service delivery is 1 (Indicator 1.1.2). By the end of Quarter 3 of 2012 no M&E systems were operational.

At the time of this evaluation, the RGP-developed PMIS was not operational in either the project or the Ministries. RGP’s efforts in this area are not aligned with those of the ROYG’s Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development. M&E is a major part of the government's new two-year Transition Program and a system will be incorporated in MOPIC's operations. This matter is receiving considerable support from the donor community (UNDP is a major actor) but will also include CSO stakeholders.

4.1.5 Anti-corruption

RGP efforts to improve the implementation capacity of the government include two main activities addressing anti-corruption – establishing a Coordination Unit in the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC), and conducting a training course for young professionals working for the government and CSOs.

In Quarter 3 of 2011, RGP began work with the SNACC to assist the institution in establishing the National Anti-Corruption Strategy Implementation Unit in SNACC. Working closely with its Vice-Chair, RGP collaborated with SNACC to complete a proposal on establishing and operating the unit by creating a Terms of Reference and agreeing on the next steps to hire a consultant. In the following quarter, RGP continued to provide support by assisting in drafting a comprehensive plan for establishing the Coordination Unit that will be in charge of facilitating the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS).

These efforts came to fruition on October 22, 2011, when the SNACC issued a decree to establish the NACS Coordination Unit within SNACC and initiated its operation to strengthen coordination and cooperation among partners of the National Integrity System (NIS).

Since the establishment of the Coordination Unit, RGP has engaged in discussions with SNACC regarding further support to SNACC. SNACC reports that they are unable achieve the mandate of the Coordination Unit without continued support. Specifically, they request a national consultant to help “steer” the unit through the early stages and assist in fundraising to support the unit’s planned activities. However, RGP reports that the Coordination Unit has carried out the following activities since its establishment:

1. Facilitating coordination between SNACC and donors
2. Revising TOR for National Consultant to steer and run the coordination unit
3. Drafting Project Proposals on capacity building and awareness raising
4. Drafting TORs for legal consultations
5. Coordinating with CSOs on organizing discussion sessions and workshops to pass Anticorruption-supporting laws

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34 RGP expects that the PMIS will be fully operational and able to produce reports by the end of September 2012.
35 The evaluators were informed that the PMIS had been installed in the Ministry of Education on July 18, 2012.
36 ROYG Transition Plan document Annex 4: Towards a Results Based M&E.
6. Participating in designing and implementing two phases of RGP-supported Peer Learning and Mentoring Program (PLMP)
7. Providing SNACC board of Members with technical advice and consultation as required

Although these efforts were consistent with program objectives, there were indications that they would not be sustainable without provision of additional support and assumption of ownership of the program by SNACC. Progress on this initiative has essentially stalled.

The Peer Learning & Mentoring Program (PLMP) provided a 17-day training course in January 2012 on combating corruption, enhancing transparency, and protecting public funds to 134 participants. Participants were primarily junior public servants (112) from five Ministries – Education, Health, Water, Agriculture and Local Administration; representatives from 22 CSOs also participated. Oversight institutions (SNACC, COCA, HATC and HTB) provided 16 experienced trainers.

Participants reported gains in knowledge and understanding. Three participants reported\(^{37}\) taking concrete actions to highlight corruption issues in their workplaces before the end of the training:

1. A participant from the MAI demanded all the pending financial advances quickly and began encouraging colleagues to “raise issues of corruption without fear.”
2. A participant from the Family Association for Social Development took steps to protect two employees who reported possible corruption in her organization by developing a project to monitor retribution against whistleblowers. She began to follow up these two cases with complaints to SNACC.
3. A participant from the All Girls Society for Development established a page on Facebook to disseminate the course training materials; she is planning to establish a network for good governance inside her organization and write a manual on reporting corruption for CSOs.

The RGP-commissioned evaluation of this activity also reported good initial results in terms of application of learning in the workplace. Peers interviewed exhibited values of civic nationalism in protecting funds and fighting corruption, some reported cases to oversight institutions and senior management, cite anti-corruption laws in the workplace (no numbers provided). Peers have also continued to engage with each other through an online community of practice on Facebook. The evaluation also reported challenges related to the pervasive and systemic nature of corruption and pointed to more work need to sustain gains (see Recommendations).

During fiscal year 2012, RGP has contributed to the adoption of three anti-corruption measures (Indicator 1.4; F indicator 2.2.4-7):

1. The establishment of the SNACC anti-corruption coordination unit (Quarter 1, 2012)
2. The peer network to promote anti-corruption established by the PLMP (Quarter 2, 2012)
3. Passage of the Access to Information Law which was promoted in part through advocacy conducted by an RGP grantee and SNACC (Quarter 3, 2012)

In addition, RGP reported CSO engagement in anti-corruption activities: four CSOs conducted public campaigns and monitored public procurement (RGP annual target is two); 10 CSOs participated in anti-corruptions public campaigns (RGP annual target is five); four CSOs received anti-corruption grants; 55 people affiliated with non-governmental organizations received anti-corruption training (RGP annual target is 34).

To summarize: RGP succeeded in establishing a Coordination Unit in SNACC, but the sustainability of these efforts is questionable if SNACC does not express ownership of the unit’s mandate and with the possibility that the current SNACC board may be replaced in the near future. There is initial evidence that graduates of the PLMP are applying learning in their workplaces, but given the widespread nature of corruption in the country, more work is required to sustain these initial results.

4.1.6 Evaluation Conclusions regarding RGP Program Results for Assistance Area 1: Policy Formulation & Implementation Capacity of the ROYG

1. RGP activities in support of ROYG operational capacity seem unlikely to lead to systemic change in the Ministries. Trainee satisfaction is generally high and achievement of learning objectives is good. However, there is also evidence of insufficient RGP attention to address barriers that trainees face in application of learning in their workplaces (such as budget allocation, ROYG commitment, competing M&E and reporting requirements from multiple donors). There are currently no mechanisms in place within RGP for measuring organizational capacity improvements attributable to RGP activities. The evaluators see a proliferation of plans for long-term objectives, but no evidence of actual outcomes. There are no RGP indicators capturing the percentage of policy priorities being implemented through either ministry initiatives or project activities. Without a robust M&E system, that can document intermediate results at either the ministry/sector level or towards higher-level project results, the project is vulnerable to a loss of direction. This is especially true when considering the scope and duration of the project.

2. It is also unclear how possible gains in ROYG operational capacity contribute to higher level project results. There are no higher level indicators which capture these contributions. Efforts at improving operational capacity seem de-coupled from other components in the project, and thereby, not contributing to overall synergy in the project.

3. The project’s emphasis on long-term goals for improving policy implementation capacity is likely to be eclipsed by more immediate needs during the 2012-2014 transition period. Considerable changes have taken place in the country since the original assessments of policy formulation and implementation capacity were conducted. Perhaps the project component concerned with ministerial capacity has been overtaken by events in Yemen in a more complete way than other RGP components. The uprising and transition provided renewed focus and sense of relevance for work with youth, women and CSOs. With regard to the institutional capacity of the government partners, the gaps identified in the RGP assessments have not been filled. They have, however, been superseded by more urgent demands for government responsiveness and dialogue with its citizens. The frustrations of the Yemeni people have brought the timeline forward. Both donors and the government realize the urgent need to achieve results in terms of government responsiveness in the short-term. This component has not been able to articulate a compelling vision of how to achieve such quick wins while continuing to contribute to a foundation of increased capacity. In Quarter 4 of 2011, while pro-government and anti-government forces were locked in a stand-off in the capital, RGP renewed its commitment to the development and implementation of the long-term work with service delivery standards. While setting service delivery standards may be relevant in a relatively stable environment, it is difficult to see how this could remain a project priority in the midst of the Yemen revolution when there undoubtedly were other more urgent issues to be addressed.
4.2 Assistance Area 2: Strengthening the Transparency of the ROYG

Efforts towards this Objective Two were led by NDI and are focused on work with the Yemeni parliament and with political parties:
- Activity 2.1: Legislative and Public Engagement Capacity of Parliament Strengthened
- Activity 2.2: Increase Political Party Platform and Policy Development Capacity

In addition, the Legislative team has carried out two quick impact response activities:
- Youth Civic Education Academies
- Get Out the Vote campaign

As of Quarter 1 of 2012, NDI ceased to conduct and report on regularly planned RGP activities due to the project’s financial difficulties. NDI continued to track some outcome level indicators (see Annex VII).

Activity 2.1: Legislative and Public Engagement Capacity of Parliament Strengthened

NDI’s work with the Yemeni parliament regarding public hearings on legislation at the committee level began prior to the inception of the RGP project. Starting in June 2009, NDI engaged in a series of meetings and workshops to assess with the Deputy Speaker and members of parliament to discuss mechanisms of oversight and public engagement. Parliamentary committees reported that they relied on external experts to draft legislation; CSOs, media and public figures have never effectively cooperated with committees on legislation.38

RGP’s contribution39 worked with seven parliamentary committees. The Committee for Public Health and Population (PHP) has been especially active. In October 2010, RGP provided training to seven selected parliamentary committees in public hearing rules and procedures. The participating committees conducted a mock hearing with RGP technical assistance. The project provided technical assistance to draft rules for public hearings. Subsequently, several parliamentary committees used the final draft version of the rules and procedures to conduct the following hearings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Public Hearings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 2010 (PMP v.1)</td>
<td>1. Health Insurance (Sana’a, Dec 13, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 2011</td>
<td>2. Women’s quota in Parliament (Sana’a, January 17, 2011)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Constitutional amendment (Sana’a, January 18, 2011)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Constitutional amendment to allow President Saleh to stand for election one more time (Sana’a, January 19, 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q3 2011</td>
<td>5. Private Health Institutes bill (Aden, May 14, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Pesticide bill (Hodeidah, May 15, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The project has also provided training to CSOs to enable them to participate in the public hearings. In Q4 2011 (July to September 2011) and Q1 2012 (October to December 2011), RGP conducted workshops for CSOs and civil society activists on how parliament plans and holds public hearings, rules and regulations that guide the conduct of hearings and how civil society organizations can add value to parliamentary proceedings. The project intended to build CSO capacity in leveraging parliament’s formal engagement

38 Interview with Essam Saleh, Secretary of Committee of Public Health and Population, July 1, 2012; and RGP Report on Public Hearings Procedures Consultation Session.
39 See Annex VII for more details.
processes to conduct legislative advocacy and improve their ability to offer relevant testimony that will contribute overall to more effective legislation and oversight.

At least one parliamentary committee, the PHP committee, prepares CSOs to participate in the hearings it convenes. The PHP assembled the CSOs working on issues related to the bill under discussion and gave them guidance on how to testify according to the draft rules and procedures. Thirty-one CSOs are reported to have participated in the public hearing on the Health Insurance bill.

Public hearings are an effective means for channeling public input into legislation. 30% of the text of the Health Insurance law was revised as a result of the public hearing. Similarly, important articles (including access to free emergency obstetrics care) were included in the Safe Motherhood law following the public hearing. 40 RGP reports that seven bills or amendments have been drafted reflecting public input and/or legislative analysis. These processes bear fruit in terms of legislation passed that reflects the input of CSOs, such as the Health Insurance bill (Q1 2010), the Safe Motherhood bill41 (Q3 2012), and the Access to Information bill (Q3 2012).

However, public hearings are just one element of a comprehensive approach which includes technical assistance to the Ministries and CSO advocacy. As noted in Objective One, the passage of legislation reflecting public input is an example of all three program components working together synergistically to produce results. While acknowledging the role of CSOs and their engagement with the committee, informants also noted the important role of RGP and other international organizations, especially in the case of legislation concerning sensitive topics. “Without the support of international organizations, I do not believe that the Safe Motherhood law would be passed” (ibid).

At this time, the rules for public hearings have not been formally adopted by the parliament. Once passed, public hearings would be institutionalized; certain draft legislation, such as that “relevant to public affairs” would require public hearings. Both RGP and an active parliamentary source recommend continued support of this activity until public hearings are included in the budget for the new fiscal year. They note motivation on the part of a several champions of the process (Chair of the PHP committee and Chair of the Labor Force committee), but also a need for further training for both parliamentarians and CSOs.

4.2.2 Activity 2.2: Increase Political Party Platform and Policy Development Capacity

As youth protests continued throughout the country in the spring of 2011, RGP continued work with political parties. In Q3 2011 (April-June 2011), RGP provided training to 18 members of the Ray Party to assist participants to define policy platforms for political parties, the policy cycle, party policy content, political ideology as it relates to party policy development, party policy development processes, articulation of effective messages based on policy principles as well as the relationship between effective policies and electoral competitiveness. Workshops and consultations with political party activists continued in Q1 2012 (October-December 2011). RGP provided training to 483 (128 women) participants on policy development, party communication, political organizing and youth engagement for political party activists.

By Q4 2011, RGP reported that political parties had been involved in social and democratic policy reforms eight times (RGP annual target four); this is the only KPI related to activities with political parties included in PMP v.1. Outcome indicators included in PMP v.2 include the following:

40 Interview with Essam Saleh, Secretary of Committee of Public Health and Population, July 1, 2012.
41 This bill received significant CSO input through workshops and negotiations, rather than a public hearing.
Mid-Term Evaluation of the Responsive Governance Project (RGP)

- Number of revised and/or new party platforms developed by political parties and political groupings as a result of RGP assistance (Indicator 2.2.1, 2012 target 3).
- Number of political parties that engage branch membership in developing policies or platforms (Indicator 2.2.2, 2012 target 3).
- Number of initiatives that parties implement to communicate policies and platforms to members and voters (Indicator 2.2.3, 2012 target 3).

Due to financial constraints within RGP, NDI was not carrying out activities related to these outcomes during Q2 2012, when the new PMP went into effect. NDI reports that political parties were primarily engaged in elections during that period. However, they do report one outcome – the Wattan Party announced that it will be reformed as a political party (Indicator 2.2.3). NDI continued to track progress on these indicators in Q3 2012, which is outside the scope of this evaluation.

4.2.3 Quick Impact Response Activities

In the first two quarters of 2012, the efforts of the Legislative team were concentrated on two quick impact response activities related to the transition: Youth Civic Education Academy and the Get Out the Vote (GOTV) Campaign in support of the Presidential election in February 2012.

**Youth Civic Education Academy:** During the transition, RGP responded quickly to the emerging needs on the ground and with only two weeks of preparation hosted two sessions in November and December 2011 of Youth Civic Education Academy for CSO representatives and activists who had no previous experience in civic engagement.

RGP trained the 118 participants youth in political and electoral systems, the roles of the three branches of government (executive, judiciary, legislature), means of democratic participation, including the role of CSOs and political parties, as well as how to train trainers.

RGP has followed up closely with academy graduates and documented the ways they have used the training. 28 graduates conducted 36 activities which reached approximately 2270 individuals (420 women). The grassroots initiatives included trainings, focus group discussions, seminars, and the use of Facebook to spread civic education materials. Members of one CSO met with parliamentarians to discuss the issue of President Saleh’s immunity and reported back to Change Square.

**Get Out The Vote (GOTV) Campaign activities in support of the 2012 Presidential election:** RGP printed and distributed nearly 1.2 million promotional pieces, including posters, voter education leaflets, banners and GOTV cards, to civic activists and organizations from all of Yemen’s 21 governorates. An exhibition was held for 110 guests representing CSOs, governors, international donors and implementers and members of parliament to view participating civic actors’ GOTV efforts. RGP released a GOTV final report detailing findings from the pre-election discussion groups, listing all GOTV sessions conducted and examining lessons learned. The project trained 16 Yemen Elections Monitoring Network (YEMN) members (one woman) and 266 CSO members (89 women) on voter education and voter mobilization. Additionally, RGP supported YEMN in drafting a report on discussion group findings before the Presidential election to share with the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda (SCER), political parties and the international community.

4.2.4 Evaluation Conclusions regarding RGP Program Results for Assistance Area 2: “Strengthening the Transparency of the ROYG”

42 See Annex VII for Outcome Description on how one graduate, head of the Global Change Makers, provided a three-day training based on the academy.
1. Parliamentary hearings have played a vital role in the passage of legislation with input from CSOs. The hearings provide an important forum for representatives from Ministries, civil society and parliament to shape legislation through discussion and deliberation. While several champions are encouraged to initiate and conduct parliamentary hearings, key steps in institutionalization the hearings remain to be taken – specifically, formal ratification of the rules and procedures for public hearings and inclusion of hearings in the budget of the parliament. Proponents also note a need for training more parliamentarians and CSOs.

2. RGP’s civic education and GOTV activities are relevant and effective.

### 4.3 Assistance Area 3: Participation of Civil Society in ROYG Processes & Decisions

The original CoAg states that RGP will competitively select 10 CSOs representing Sana’a and the eight target governorates (one each from Amran, Jawf, Marib, Shabwah, Abyan, Dali’, Lahj and Aden plus two from Sana’a). RGP would provide these CSOs “institutional strengthening and support them to form a national network of CSOs focused on improving governance, policy and transparency.” They in turn would “be responsible for building the capacity of other CSOs in their region. (CoAg, p 17)

During Quarter 4 of 2010, RGP selected partner CSOs using a three stage process. After advertising broadly for letters of interest, three committees reviewed applications from 94 CSOs from the eight target governorates. The committees scored the applicants in terms of strategic management, financial and program management, external relations and human resources. Registration permits were also reviewed. 22 CSOs were shortlisted and the RGP Institutional Strengthening team conducted rapid assessments on-site of these applicants.

In October 2011 an independent panel reviewed applications and recommendations from the rapid assessment teams to make the final selection of 13 CSO partners. While the project had originally planned to select 10 CSOs as per the original CoAg, the RGP Institutional Strengthening team recommended three strong candidates from Sana’a. Also, during the field assessment, RGP had become aware of the strong feeling in southern Yemen that international organizations were centralizing efforts in the capital. The project determined that it wanted to send the message that RGP stands with all of Yemen; therefore the decision was reached to select an equivalent number of CSOs from Sana’a and Aden. These decisions resulted in the selection of 13, rather than 10, CSO partners.

Each selected CSO took part in a participatory organizational development assessment (PODA) to determine their capacity needs which were documented in technical assistance plans. In Quarter 1 2011, RGP conducted the first CSO training workshop and in February 2011 (Quarter 2), the project signed agreements with eight of the selected CSOs.

Soon after signing agreements with their CSO partners, the project revised its approach to conducting institutional strengthening (IS) for CSOs. In reviewing the results of the PODAs, project staff determined that four to five years of capacity building would be required for these CSOs to be strong enough to be IS

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43 The review panel was comprised of representatives from CLP, NDI, Oxfam and as well as RGP staff from the executive and legislative components. USAID was invited to observe.

44 An agreement was signed with an Aden-based Institutional Strengthening grantee in December 2011.
providers in their governorates. The expectation for RGP’s role with regard to CSOs underwent a modification at that time. For the remainder of Quarter 2 2011, the project still considered CSOs a viable means to engage with citizens, especially around identification of policy priorities. As the uprising in Yemen began to gather momentum in the early 2011, CSO partners continued to hold focus group discussions. For example, in March 2011, RGP CSO partner Youth Modern Society organized focus group discussions on health and economic growth in Shabwah. CSO partner Alyusr Organization in the governorate of Abyan organized four focus group discussions on topics related to education, health, water and economic growth in the Zinjabar (the capital of the Abyan Governorate) and the Ja’ar districts. As youth protests continued throughout the country (April – June 2011), RGP organized a workshop for representatives from over 27 youth protest groups and coalitions to solicit their feedback on the potential role RGP could play to support youth under the current situation (please see below for a full discussion of this meeting and RGP’s programming response).

RGP renewed its grant making to CSOs in Quarter 4 of 2012, when it recruited CSOs to carry out advocacy campaigns or implement quick impact response activities in partnership with ROYG. Eight CSOs received grants to advocacy campaigns representing RGP’s policy priorities, including a minimum quota for female teachers, the formulation of a draft law to protect whistleblowers in corruption cases, improving maternal health, among others. The following quarter, these grantees received advocacy training and launched advocacy campaigns in support of Improved Safe Motherhood, Anti-Corruption, Female Quota in Parliament, and Implementation of the Microfinance Law. The advocacy campaigns were developed with the participation of key stakeholders including CSOs, Ministries, academics, officials, and activists. As described in the policy formulation section of Program Area One, CSO advocacy campaigns played an important role in shaping legislation and promoting its passage. Members of parliamentary committees also support this conclusion.

During Quarter 1 of 2012, RGP entered into an agreement with Center for Business Administration (CBA) at Sana’a University to establish the CSO Management Unit to provide capacity building to RGP’s CSO partners. RGP has supplemented the existing business administration curriculum with modules specifically developed for CSOs. RGP underwrites the CSO Management Unit through sponsorship of CSOs and a grant directly to CBA. The aim is to institutionalize a CSO capacity building program within CBA to ensure continuous and sustainable long-term development of CSOs. RGP hopes that the CSO Management Unit will become self-sustaining through recruiting the sponsorship of other international donors who will send their CSO partners and grantees from Yemen and the region for capacity building.

In Quarter 1 of 2012, RGP enrolled its CSO grantees in the basic training course at CBA. The basic training included organizational development, advocacy/outreach and gender mainstreaming. From those 26 graduates, RGP selected nine CSOs to receive the advanced training. These nine were selected based on their performance in the PODA and in the training. A CSO was selected for each of the key sectors plus youth, gender and governance. Following the advanced training, these nine will provide capacity building to other CSOs in their respective sectors. In the past, RGP has recruited partner CSOs to implement Quick Impact Response activities; the project foresees engaging CSOs in the same way as needed in the future.

Alongside this more formal training program, the project also provided training and capacity building to a broader range of CSOs to facilitate their engagement with policy formulation. In Quarter 1 of 2011, RGP

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45 The project reports 38 FDGs were held in various districts by September 2011.
46 Refer Annex VII for Case Study on the Access to Information Law, as an example.
47 26 grantees plus four youth CSOs are active with the project.
48 A list of the selected CSOs was requested from the Institutional Strengthening Manager on July 7, 2012. It had not been received when this report was being written.
supported civic education programs reaching 165 CSOs. In Quarter 4 of 2011, RGP conducted a workshop for civil society activists to familiarize them with processes in parliament so they are better equipped to access and engage parliamentary leadership, committees and members to promote their advocacy initiatives and inform legislative efforts that advance citizen policy and political priorities. During that same quarter, RGP also held a consultation with civic and political activists emphasizing information sharing and raising awareness to ensure that future debate on political processes and national reconciliation is informed and issue-based.

Progress in institutional strengthening of CSOs cannot be verified through the project’s assessment tool at this time. In the original CoAg, RGP planned to assess progress in institutional capacity by administering a PODA baseline and annually thereafter. The Technical Assistance Plan for each CSO would be developed and revised annually based on PODA scores. RGP administered the PODA to 24 of the 26 CSO grantees\(^{49}\), but did not conduct a post assessment since then to determine progress against the initial CSO baselines.

4.3.1 Evaluation Conclusions regarding RGP Progress for Assistance Area 3: Participation of Civil Society in ROYG Processes & Decisions

1. CSO partners generally report a positive experience working with RGP, describing the relationship as “a real partnership.”

2. CSO partners report capacity building through both training and technical assistance that includes close follow-up and mentoring. Anecdotal reports of capacity building for CSO grantees cannot be verified through the project’s organizational development assessment tool at this time. RGP conducted pre-assessment baselines but have not subsequently conducted post-assessments of each CSO to determine progress based on RGP institutional strengthening activities. This lack of follow up to measure progress is apparently due to the fact that the full training course has not yet been delivered.

3. With the exception of the passage of legislation, RGP does not have a plan that guarantees the IS investment in CSOs will be integrated into the work of the legislative and executive components of the project in order to contribute to higher-level objectives of the project. “We don’t know what activities we are preparing CSOs to participate in.”\(^{50}\) A CSO partner who received IS and carried out a number of RGP activities described their involvement with the project since the cancellation of the 2-year capacity building course early in the project: “These new activities are not integrated. RGP is operating in an ad hoc manner, as if these new ideas are parachuting in.” The CSO component is largely operating as if CSO strengthening is an end in and of itself. According to the current RGP Chief of Party (COP), linking CSO capacity building into the higher-level results is not possible without changing the project objectives. USAID regulations stipulate that RGP cannot select CSOs for IS based on their intention or ability to achieve specific project objectives. “We have to open the application from institutional strengthening grants to all CSOs.”\(^{51}\)

4. CSOs play an important role in the success of RGP objectives related to policy formulation. CSOs act as citizen representatives when they consult with executive and legislative branches and undertake advocacy campaigns on behalf of policy priorities.

\(^{49}\) The PODA must be administered in the CSO offices because it involves reviewing files and other organizational systems. Due to the security situation, RGP was unable to assess the two CSOs based in Aden.

\(^{50}\) Interview with Lamar Cravens, RGP COP, July 8, 2012.

\(^{51}\) Interview with Lamar Cravens, RGP COP, July 8, 2012.
5. CSOs play a similarly vital role in RGP’s work with youth and women in transition activities. For example, youth CSOs are engaged in reviewing the National Strategy for Children and Youth and in forming a coalition to engage in policy formulation with the Ministry of Youth and Sports. CSOs participated enthusiastically in the Youth Civic Education Academy and have been actively conducting civic education events with their constituencies. A proposal from Watan, a Women’s Rights CSO, catalyzed RGP’s involvement with the National Women’s Dialogue. Both the national dialogue processes and election preparation are relevant and timely arenas for engagement during the Transition period.

6. CSOs played a role in responding to ROYG requests for assistance during the 2011 Yemen uprising and 2012 political transition period. For example, the All Girls Association assisted the MOE in the implementation of a national Back to School campaign (July to December 2011), and the Social Democratic Forum (SDF) consolidated the damage assessment for the PMO (December 2011 to May 2012). These ROYG requests for assistance were accommodated by the project as Quick Impact Response activities. Although the ROYG partners acknowledged that the CSOs carried out their work effectively, the ROYG partners express some resistance to the use of CSOs to provide services to the government and resentment that funds and technical assistance are going directly to CSOs and not to the ROYG.

7. The need for CSO partners in development contributes to a market for CSO capacity building. There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the sustainability of this model, but a more definitive conclusion can only be reached through review of a business plan developed by CBA.

4.4 CROSS-CUTTING THEME: PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN

As a cross-cutting theme the participation of women was originally conceived of as inclusion of gender analysis and the priorities of women in policy formulation. However, RGP also seized the opportunity for women’s increased political participation in the development of the National Women’s Platform.

4.4.1 Gender Policy Assessment

One of the project’s earliest gender-related activities was the Gender Policy Assessment (published January 12, 2011), one of ten assessments conducted to inform the project’s work in policy formulation and implementation capacity of the ROYG (Program Area One). The objectives of the assessment were to provide an overview of the current role of women in decision making, review the government’s gender policies and identify possible areas for intervention to empower women and enable them to participate in community-based planning and implementation. The report identified sector specific recommendations in labor and economy, agriculture and water, health and education, and concluded that RGP should “make gender analysis a core approach when determining project priorities and implementing interventions in all sectors” (p.11).

The Gender Policy Assessment was intended to set the stage for future gender relevant work in policy formulation and implementation, but the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 (which coincided with completion of the assessment) brought new emphasis to the engagement of women in the project. Women’s engagement in the political process gained in urgency and prominence during the uprising and the transition period.
4.4.2 National Women’s Platform

In March 2011, as women and youth began to engage in the demonstrations, RGP entered into negotiations with Watan, a network of women’s organizations, about working on a women’s rights program. The initial proposal evolved into plans to shape a political platform for women in Yemen. Jointly, Watan and RGP convened a series of high-level meetings with women from across the political spectrum. The Women’s National Committee (WNC) was soon involved in preparations. Committees were formed to review national strategies and identify policy priorities across six sectors. Efforts culminated in a National Women’s Conference (March 19-20, 2012) which engaged more than 900 activists, civic leaders and high-ranking officials to ratify a cohesive women’s platform consisting of twelve policy priorities for improving the status of women in Yemen.

Yemeni National Women’s Platform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Policy Priorities for Improving the Status of Women in Yemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>- Enhance employment of rural female teachers through 30% quota public education sector jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Passing law on compulsory basic education and implementation of executive mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>- Increase access of mothers to rights-based maternity health services to reduce maternal mortality rates through adequate funding of obstetric emergency services and employment of female midwives in rural areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase utilization of adequate and modern family planning methods to reduce total fertility rates of women-only in reproductive age through support to family planning commodities and community awareness programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/political</td>
<td>- Ensure 30% quota for women participation in all executive committees under the GCC initiative implementation mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Introduce constitutional amendments that ensure 30% quota for women in all appointed and elected positions in legislative, judiciary and executive realms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic empowerment</td>
<td>- Take measures that assist women to own and manage income generating projects in the private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mainstream women’s empowerment activities and budget in government general budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict</td>
<td>- Support a reliable and accurate database on number and nature of affect afflicted by armed conflict on women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Execute immediate response interventions responding to displaced women as well as implement plans that ensure return of the displaced communities to their homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth (from gender</td>
<td>- Ensure youth representation in all political decision-making processes in general and ensure equitable representation of youth in all committees of the executive mechanism of GCC initiative in specific.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perspective)</td>
<td>- Support to urgent and effective interventions that facilitate access of youth to decision making positions taking gender equality into consideration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.3 Gender in Policy Formulation

In at least one instance, the project’s work on policy formulation was consistent with the policy priorities identified by the National Women’s Platform i.e. the Safe Motherhood law which RGP promoted from October 2011 to June 2012. RGP also brought a gender perspective to its other policy priorities. In Quarter 1 of 2012, RGP provided technical assistance on gender analysis methodology for other policies to 223 members of parliament, parliament staff, ministry representatives and partner CSOs. RGP conducted analysis and presented findings to stakeholders on the draft safe motherhood law, the laws regulating pesticides and water, and the private education law. During Quarter 2 of 2012, the project organized a series of workshops with the Ministry of Industry and Trade intended to better understand gaps in the implementation of the Microfinance Law, especially for underserved populations such as
women and youth. RGP included a recommendation for expansion of mobile banking to provide financial services to rural areas.

As a cross-cutting issue, the project’s gender approach is generally adopted by spreading gender analysis tools and the inclusion of women in all RGP activities. For example, gender mainstreaming was included in the institutional strengthening program provided by the CBA to 30 CSO partners in Quarter 2 of 2012. As part of its nation-wide voter education and mobilization campaign for the February 2012 Presidential Election, RGP highlighted women’s participation. The project trained 16 members (one woman) of YEMN and 266 CSO members (89 women) on voter education and voter mobilization. However, to date, the project does not have a strategy for gender issues and women’s programming strategy. A strategy has been “under development” since March 2012.

4.4.4 Evaluation Conclusions regarding RGP’s Cross-cutting Theme: Participation of Women

1. RGP’s engagement with women’s issues has been primarily centered on the gender analysis of policies, drafting the National Women’s Platform, and the promotion of legislation reflecting women’s priorities, most notably the Safe Motherhood Law.

2. RGP played a key contributing role to the National Women’s Platform, according to the Minister of Human Rights, Dr. Hooria Mashoor and the assessment commissioned by Counterpart (see Outcome Description in Annex VII). Because of its role in the National Women’s Platform, and its success in the passage of legislation, RGP is well positioned to promote legislation that reflects the priorities identified in the National Women’s Platform.

3. The RGP-commissioned evaluation found: “A lack of clarity on roles/responsibilities at RGP left others outside RGP confused and sometimes frustrated. Some respondents felt that systems were too bureaucratic and that there was not a cohesive team responding to what was needed at any given time, particularly when there were urgent needs and decisions that needed to be made. There were some feelings internally that more support from other departments were not forthcoming, such as communication or M&E.” Similar remarks were made by two other CSOs engaged with RGP in different activities and interviewed as part of the mid-term evaluation, but an independent assessment of this comment was not made.

4.5 CROSS-CUTTING THEME: PARTICIPATION OF YOUTH

Prior to the Yemen uprisings which began in January 2011, there is no evidence of a significant RGP focus on youth. The project did not specifically target youth through activities, and only two activities are described engaging youth CSOs to carry out activities in the project work plan. From January to March 2011, one set of the project’s Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) on policy priorities in the areas of health and economic growth was conducted in Shabwah by a youth CSO, Youth Modern Society. During the same quarter, Youth Radio participated in a workshop focused on enhancing the role of radio in covering social issues/policy and communicating citizen’s priorities and needs.

In April 2011, during the youth protests, RGP organized a workshop for representatives from over 27 youth protest groups and coalitions to solicit their feedback on the potential role RGP could play to support youth under the current situation. Based on the feedback received during this workshop, and

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52 Yemeni Women’s Platform and Agenda, p. 9
informed by earlier findings from assessments and FGDs, the project developed a youth strategy, that was still in draft form when this report was being written.

The activities outlined in the proposed RGP youth strategy are largely consistent with the priorities emerging from the April 2011 consultation with youth groups. In the legislative arena, youth activists requested training related to governmental decision making and advocacy. The Civic Education Academies, and activities engaging youth in policy formulation described below, took these suggestions further in the active and empowering role they provide youth. Youth also suggested the formulation of a legal team that would help draft constitutional amendments from the results of the upcoming National Dialogue. The project does not seem to have taken this suggestion forward.

Another recommendation that emerged from the April 2011 consultation was the formulation of a coordination council which would include representation from all major groups of the coalition and provide technical and logistical support for the coordination council’s activities. RGP is undertaking the formulation of a more modest coalition of NGOs to participate in policy formulation with the Ministry of Youth and Sports.

Finally, youth activists suggested that RGP provide technical support for the implementation of an information dissemination program which includes the creation of a website for youth i.e. awareness-raising efforts which would include the production of simplified materials to increase public awareness about youth visions, demands and aspirations; and support youth efforts to coordinate with civil society organizations in conducting awareness programs that will cover the issues advocated by the youth groups.

During the Yemen uprising (2011) and transition (2012), the project responded quickly to engage youth directly through both quick impact response and on-going activities. Examples include promoting youth engagement in the National Youth Dialogue, and the Civic Education Academies. During this period, the project continued to promote youth participation in its activities.

4.5.1 Civic Education Academies

The Civic Youth Academies were RGP’s first significant programmatic response focused on youth. From November to December 2011, RGP trained 118 participants in two Youth Civic Education Academy sessions. 28 graduates conducted 36 activities which reached approximately 2,270 individuals (420 women). The grassroots initiatives included trainings, FGDs, seminars, and the use of Facebook to spread civic education materials. Members of one CSO met with parliamentarians to discuss the issue of President Saleh’s immunity and reported back to Change Square.

Since the academies, RGP has developed a number of activities directly targeting youth.

1. Youth Forums contributing to the National Youth Dialogue
2. Build a youth coalition to participate in policy formulation
3. Engage youth in policy formulation through reviewing the National Strategy for Children and Youth
4. Build the capacity of youth from different governorates to develop and implement local action plans (grant canceled)

It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of these activities.

4.5.2 Youth Forums contributing to the National Youth Dialogue:

Based on the GCC Agreement and Security Council Resolution No. 2014, the Prime Minister issued a Decree No. 30 on April 12, 2012 to form a Ministerial Committee for Youth Dialogue (MCYD) from all
of the “Change Squares”. The MCYD operates at the cabinet level and is headed by the Minister of Human Rights, Dr. Hooria Mashoor.

On May 13, 2012, RGP signed an MOU with the MCYD. The MOU states the RGP is responsible for conducting 10 youth forums in five governorates (Sana’a, Aden, Taiz, Hodeidah and Hadramout) through CSOs. RGP and MCYD will participate in selecting the CSOs in each governorate. RGP will provide technical and financial assistance to the selected youth CSOs to carry out the forums. RGP will also provide a national consultant to provide technical support to the youth sessions. Following the regional youth forums, RPG will provide technical and logistical support to the National Youth Conference where the output of the regional youth forums will be consolidated and agreed upon to be produced as the Youth Platform. The Youth National Conference is tentatively planned for December 2012.

Subsequently, the President convened a second committee, the Presidential Contact Committee (PCC), which has also been tasked with organizing youth participation in the national dialogue process. The MCYD is headed by a member of the opposition. The PCC is headed by a member of the former ruling party. The roles of the two committees are not clear, and the relationship between them is marked by a degree of competition. Only recently, it was determined that MCYD is now only supposed to coordinate with youth from the Square(s), and the PCC will work with youth outside the Squares.

The MYCD and PCC have nominated fifteen youth to participate in the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue. The Preparatory Committee will include representation of youth, women, and political parties. The number of seats for each is still to be determined; youth may get six seats. The President will select the representatives from the list of nominees.

A core technical group, headed by UNDP, has been formed to coordinate donor support for the National Youth Dialogue. RGP is a member of this group. The core group recently proposed that the forums be conducted by consultants under the oversight of the MCYD, rather than through local youth CSOs as stated in the MOU between RGP and the MCYD. RGP’s position is that CSOs have more credibility with youth; however, the project will adopt the core group’s suggestion due to timeline and budget limitations. RGP will provide technical and financial support to the consultants and youth forums in the five governorates (Sana’a, Aden, Hodeidah, Taiz and Hadramout).

In an interview with the evaluators in early July 2012, Minister Hooria complained that RGP has been slow in implementing the agreement. She blames the delays on the imposition by RGP of asking CSOs to conduct the forums.

“Although the agreement was signed three months ago, RGP has spent three months selecting the CSOs in the three governorates of Sana’a, Hadramout and Taiz. CSOs in other two governorates, Aden and Al-Hodeidah, have not been selected yet.” She went on to say that RGP’s work plan contradicts the GCC timeframe and implementation plan. The Minister claimed that “governmental agencies are more capable than CSOs to conduct the RGP activities.”

The MCYD’s resistance to working with CSOs is consistent with that of other governmental partners interviewed for this evaluation. ROYG partners state that the government is better equipped or more appropriate to carry out the activities. RGP reports that government partners request budget support to carry out activities rather than engage CSOs. Participation in a high-profile and politically sensitive activity such as the National Youth Dialogue will require efficient implementation and strong leadership from the project.

53 The date will be determined by the Ministerial Committee for Youth Dialogue.
4.5.3 Grants to Youth Organizations
RGP provided grants to youth organizations to support a number of initiatives:

**Build a youth coalition to participate in policy formulation.** RGP is providing a grant (February - September 2012) to the local CSO, Impact, for the purpose of building a youth coalition to participate in policy formulation. The coalition includes five youth CSOs and five youth initiatives. Through the grant, Impact will provide training to approximately 20 youth who will work with consultants to develop a sustainable structure and operating mechanism which will be documented in the by-laws. RGP facilitated linkages with the Ministry of Youth and Sports so that the coalition will serve as a member of the Ministry’s consultation board to provide a unified voice for youth.

**Engage youth in policy formulation through reviewing the National Strategy for Children and Youth.** RGP is providing a grant (February – June 2012 with an extension to October 2012) to the local CSO, Tamkeen for Rural Youth, for the purpose of engaging youth in policy formulation through reviewing the National Strategy for Children and Youth. The original National Strategy was not drafted through consultations with youth. Tamkeen will provide training in policy formulation and analysis, data analysis and basic M&E for twenty youth from nine governorates. Participants conducted a survey with youth in Change Square and in universities in their own governorates to define youth priorities, and then they analyzed the survey results. The youth will also conduct FGDs with approximately 400 youth to provide feedback on proposed amendments to the National Strategy. The youth will present priorities for the purpose of proposing amendments to the policy at a final workshop with all main stakeholders. RGP linked this activity with the Ministry of Youth and Sports.

**Build the capacity of youth from different governorates to develop and implement local action plans.** RGP provided a grant (March – June 2012) to the Aden-based CSO, House of Light, for the purpose of building the capacity of youth from different governorates to develop and implement local action plans According to the terms of the grant, House of Light would train 20 youth in leadership skills, skills in negotiation, communication, gender equality, and the role of youth in the civil society; youth would share these skills in their own communities. In early July 2012, RGP conducted a field visit and determined that the House of Light lacked sufficient financial management systems. The grant was terminated due to financial mismanagement.

In addition to the youth-focused activities inspired by the transition, the project has continued to integrate youth participation into a number of other activities that include:

1. Peer Learning and Mentorship Program on Anti-corruption (PLMP)
2. Get Out the Vote
3. Microfinance Law (mobile banking)
4. Youth engagement in political parties

The Peer Learning & Mentoring Program (PLMP) provided a 17-day training course in January 2012 on combating corruption, enhancing transparency, and protecting public funds to 134 participants. RGP supported the participation of women and youth in the February 21, 2012 Presidential election through a voter education and “Get Out the Vote” campaign. During this same period, the project organized a series of workshops with the Ministry of Industry and Trade intended to better understand gaps in the implementation of the Microfinance Law, especially for underserved populations such as women and youth. RGP included a recommendation for expansion of mobile banking to provide financial services to rural areas.

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54 Refer to RGP Evaluation section 8.4.1 for a more detailed discussion.
4.5.4 Evaluation Conclusions regarding RGP’s Cross-cutting Theme: Participation of Youth

1. Prior to the Yemen uprisings which began in January 2011, the project lacked a strong focus on youth. Prior to the transition, RGP included youth in its regular programming, but its reach was shallow. It’s not clear how these early efforts would have contributed to higher level outcomes.

2. During the uprising, RGP responded quickly to engage youth. In April 2011, RGP consulted with youth protest groups and they mobilized their partner CSOs to reach out to youth. By its own account, SDF was one of the first organizations to meet with youth in the squares. The Civic Education Academies were another successful initiative that reached youth activists and CSOs.

3. RGP’s current youth programming is consistent with the transition priorities as documented in the GCC Agreement and Security Resolution No. 2012. RGP is working with the MCYD to conduct youth forums. Additional activities include creation of a youth coalition to participate in policy formulation, youth engagement in reviewing the National Strategy for Children and Youth, investing in youth leadership, and civic education.

4. It is still early to reach conclusions on the effectiveness of the current youth programming, but initial indications are good. According to data provided by the RGP Legislative team, 28 out of 118 graduates of the Civic Education Youth Academies conducted 36 activities which reached approximately 2270 individuals. The evaluation of the Peer Learning and Mentorship Program (PLMP), which trained junior government and CSO staff in anti-corruption skills, also reported good results in terms of learning and application. SNACC, one of the main ROYG partners for PLMP, concurred that the PLMP is a successful activity.
5. MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL PROCEDURES & REPORTING

5.1 REVIEW OF M&E SYSTEM & REPORTING CAPACITY

5.1.1 Overview of Results Reported by the RGP M&E System

The following table outlines which PMP was in effect for each quarter covered in this evaluation, and which data was reported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YR Q</th>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
<th>PMP</th>
<th>Data &amp; Report Submitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010 Q3</td>
<td>May 1 – June 30, 2010</td>
<td>v.1</td>
<td>Quarterly report: 29 KPIs results against 2011 targets;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Q4</td>
<td>July 1 – September 30, 2010</td>
<td>v.1</td>
<td>Quarterly report: 29 KPI results against 2011 targets;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Q1</td>
<td>October 1 – December 31, 2010</td>
<td>v.2</td>
<td>Quarterly report: 29 KPI results against 2011 targets;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Q2</td>
<td>January 1 – March 31, 2011</td>
<td>v.1</td>
<td>Quarterly report: 29 KPIs results against 2011 targets;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Q3</td>
<td>April 1 – June 30, 2011</td>
<td>v.1</td>
<td>Quarterly Report: 29 KPI results against 2011 targets;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Q4</td>
<td>July 1 – September 30, 2011</td>
<td>v.2</td>
<td>Quarterly Report: 29 KPI results against 2011 targets;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Q1</td>
<td>October 1 – December 31, 2011</td>
<td>v.1</td>
<td>Reported on 26 KPIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Q2</td>
<td>January 1 - March 31 2012</td>
<td>v.2</td>
<td>Reported on 28 KPIs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2010 Q3 – 2011 Q1: No PMP
For the first three quarters, the project was operating without a PMP. The delay between project start-up and completion of the first PMP was reportedly due to the fact that the Mission PMP was approved on February 12, 2011. RGP’s PMP was designed to be in alignment with the Mission’s plan. Therefore, for the first three quarters, no data on RGP PMP indicators is available. Project “impacts” were detailed in quarterly reports.

2011 Q2 – 2012 Q1: PMP version 1
The project’s first PMP was submitted to USAID on March 16, 2011. Data for PMP version 1 (PMP v.1) is available for Q2 - Q4 2011 and for Q1 of 2012. PMP v.1 was a large and unwieldy plan which included approximately 81 F stability and custom indicators. The project tracked data on all these and reported on them in two main ways. The project reported on PMP indicators to the YMEP Clearinghouse. The project also reported data on a select number of the indicators referred to as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in quarterly reports. The number of KPIs ranged from 26-29. The KPIs include a mix of F, stability and custom indicators. They include enough outcome level indicators to seem to represent achievement beyond delivering outputs.

What can we tell about progress towards results under RGP’s PMP version 1?
Because indicator targets are set only annually and not disaggregated quarterly, an accurate comparison of results achieved versus targets is only possible at one point over the life of the project to date - at the end of Q4 (September 30, 2011)\(^56\).

F-indicators in the USAID Yemen Clearinghouse Database. At the start of this evaluation, all seven RGP F-indicators showed 100% achievement of annual targets as of September 30, 2011. At first glance this seemed odd and unlikely to be accurate, because the annual targets were very precise numbers (such as 43

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\(^55\) F indicators are Standard Foreign Assistance Indicators jointly developed by the Department of State and USAID to measure both what is being accomplished with U.S. Government foreign assistance funds and the collective impact of foreign and host-government efforts to advance country development.

\(^56\) Q1 2012 (October 1 – December 31, 2011) is effectively “orphaned.” It is not included under PMP v.2 and is not included in a review of achievements versus targets because targets are only set annually.
or 127). While not impossible, it is improbable that the project staff would be able to predict exact attendance in trainings several quarters earlier. Indeed, a quick check of the project’s own records of the data revealed errors and gaps in documentation. When the evaluator advised RGP of these data errors, the RGP DCOP immediately called for a data review of the F-indicators. For the majority of the evaluation period, accurate data on these indicators was not available to the evaluation team.

**KPIs in Quarterly Reports.** The RGP KPIs are not organized according to the three main program areas, or according to causal logic making it difficult to compare progress in one component versus another, or to tell how outputs are contributing to higher level outcomes. Nevertheless, a review of the 28 KPIs included in the Q4 2011 report indicates reasonable progress towards targets. RGP reports 100% or higher achievement for 20 indicators. Four indicators reported achievement as low as 50%. Given the context of political upheaval in the country during a period of approximately eight months in 2011, one could reasonably conclude that the project was doing well.

2012 Q2 onwards: PMP version 2
RGP submitted PMP version 2 to USAID on March 29, 2012; USAID approved it on May 13, 2012. The project was effectively reporting on those indicators from January 1, 2012. Data on the full PMP was reported in the Quarter 2 report and is available in the USAID Clearinghouse Database (Clearinghouse).

The evaluation team requested permission from the Mission to focus measurement of outcomes under the new PMP because the original PMP is now defunct. The Mission agreed that this would be more productive.

PMP version 2 represented a significant improvement over the original version. First, the plan has been streamlined to a total of 34 indicators. The indicators included nine F-indicators, but no stability indicators. Six indicators are included for tracking grants. Also, an indicator has been added to report the number of Quick Impact Response Indicators carried out by the project.

Unlike the indicators in PMP version 1, the indicators in PMP version 2 are organized according to program area and objective, thereby facilitating analysis of causal contribution of outputs to outcomes.

**F-indicators reported to the USAID Yemen Clearinghouse Database.** The project currently reports on the seven F-indicators previously populated in the Clearinghouse, plus an additional two F-indicators. As noted earlier, errors were found in values reported for these indicators under PMP version 1. The M&E unit undertook a review process and consulted original documentation to check the numbers (Annex VII). The evaluation team has more confidence in these numbers, with the following two exceptions. First, these indicators remain vulnerable to double-counting. Second, at this time it is not possible to reconstruct the targets for 2011 because of the many changes to those targets in the documentation; therefore it is not possible to compare achievements to targets in a meaningful way. RGP reports the corrected data will be submitted to the Clearinghouse in the near future.

**PMP version 2 Summary of Progress towards Outcomes**
The revised PMP includes a total of 14 outcome level indicators, seven of which show at least one outcome.

5.1.2 Assessment of the M&E & Reporting System
YMEP’s February 2012 Third Party Monitoring report of RGP Activities highlighted the need for a thorough assessment of the project’s M&E system:
“Based on challenges encountered with RGP being able to access and provide the YMEP monitors with some key requested documentation for TMP and similar shortcomings identified during YMEP’s Data Quality Assessment (December 2011) of RGP PPR indicators, USAID should consider including a comprehensive assessment of RGP’s M&E and documentation systems in the upcoming mid-term evaluation in order to assess strengths and weaknesses in the area and identify potential suggestions for improvement.” (February 2012, p. viii)

The YMEP Data Quality Assessment (DQA) conducted on behalf of the Yemen Mission in December 2011 found data quality for RGP’s F indicators “acceptable”, but pointed to several gaps. To determine the M&E system’s capacity to accurately and effectively measure and report on outputs and outcomes, the evaluation team began with a review the DQA and YMEP Third Party Monitoring findings and any subsequent corrective action taken by the project to address these. In addition, the evaluation team conducted further assessments of the M&E and reporting system.

**Summary findings:** RGP’s M&E system has been weak and error-prone due to lack of leadership and skills. Significant improvements are in progress under the leadership of a STTA (May – early August 2012). These improvements are unlikely to be sustainable without the direction of a competent M&E Director because the system remains vulnerable to the same factors that undermined it initially.

**RGP addressed findings from the DQA and TPM**

The DQA reviewed the USAID PPR indicators which include: Standard “F” indicators - FY 2010 and 2011 Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS) list, and custom indicators. Because the new PMP went into effect the following quarter, only the F indicators remain relevant.

At the start of the DQA “the project lacked any written indicator definitions or guidance from RGP’s M&E unit on standardized approaches to data collection and reporting on the indicators. Once this gap was identified, the M&E team immediately convened a review of the indicators and reported data with support from YMEP, resulting in the creation and circulation of the first Performance Indicator Reference Sheets (PIRS) for the F-indicators.” Once the PIRS were completed, the DQA determined that all indicators are “acceptable,” however a number of weaknesses remained. Under the leadership of the STTA M&E and Communications Specialist, the project has taken satisfactory steps to address these weaknesses.58

The only remaining DQA finding that has not been satisfactorily addressed is the issue of double-counting. YMEP’s recommendation, which is consistent with USAID guidance on this issue, was that RGP establish a database providing each trainee a unique identifying number. On June 18, 2012 the evaluation team advised RGP management and the RGP M&E Unit that the project is non-compliant with USAID guidance on measurement of these indicators, and recommended that they consider adding a

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57 In the guidance for the Performance Plan & Report (PPR) for FY 2011, USAID requires that each indicator reported to Washington in the PPR must have had a Data Quality Assessment (DQA) completed within the last three years. DQAs are systematic reviews of data reported for each indicator, based on the following five data quality standards used both for the PPR and identified in USAID’s ADS 203.3.5.1:

- Validity – Do data clearly and directly measure what is intended?
- Reliability - Using the same measurement procedures, can the same results be obtained repeatedly?
- Timeliness – Are data sufficiently current and available frequently enough to inform management decision making at the appropriate levels?
- Precision – What is the acceptable margin of error given the likely management decisions to be affected?
- Integrity – Are mechanisms in place to reduce the possibility that data are manipulated for any reason?

58 Please note that the YMEP December 2011 DQA did not find the errors in values reported for F indicators. This is a mid-term evaluation finding and is addressed separately in this report.
field(s) to record how many times individuals receive multiple trainings/services\(^5\). Pending action from Counterpart, the STTA has devised an interim solution. The M&E Unit developed excel tools to assist each project team in summarizing their training attendance lists while eliminating double-counting. The STTA also commissioned the RGP Programming Specialist to write up a 1-2 page proposal for an Access “Trainee Database”, which would assign unique codes to each individual trained by RGP. These proposed solutions were sent by RGP’s M&E STTA to Counterpart on June 24, 2012.

The YMEP Third Party Monitoring Report of RGP Activities also identified potential limitations in RGP’s activity documentation: “The project does not appear to have a unified project database or procedures for tracking activities in a standardized way across the three implementing partners” (YMEP, February 2012, p. 3). Specifically, there was evidence of:

- Confusion over who within the RGP team has specific documents,
- Confusion over where those documents are stored within the RGP office

Under the leadership of the M&E STTA, the project has taken steps to address these issues. First, establish a paper-based activity documentation system. Documents are physically located in the office of the team/department assigned to carry out or provide oversight to those activities. Each activity included in work plan years 1 and 2 was assigned a code denoting the project team/department where documentation of that activity is located. Each team or department has a corresponding list of work plan activities with all key documentation. The evaluation team conducted a “spot-check” of the paper-based documentation system. Activity documentation is uneven. Some project activity files were missing documents. Documents can only be accessed with the assistance of the responsible staff person. Adding to the complexity, activities that involve a number of teams/departments will be documented in the offices of the various sector point persons. A few documents are available in soft copy, but most often these are stored on the computer of the responsible staff rather than located on the shared drive.

The project is also taking steps to create a digital library on the RGP shared drive. Counterpart has also communicated to the project office that it is a priority to digitalize key documentation and upload them to the Counterpart Knowledge Management Portal. To achieve this goal, two temporary database assistants have been hired to scan documentation, and the project plans to purchase a new internet line. M&E Unit provided staff refresher training on the KMP to encourage them to populate the KMP databases. At the time of the evaluation, uploading a single document into the KMP could take up to three hours.

Both the YMEP DQA and the YMEP Third Party Monitoring Report noted that the RGP M&E Unit was not providing leadership to the staff in the area of data quality and reporting. The third party monitoring noted: “Confusion about the role of the M&E Unit in ensuring basic data quality and standardization. Additional concerns about documentation of reported results and M&E Unit oversight of reporting and data quality were identified by YMEP during the DQA in Dec 2011.” (February, 2012). Counterpart has taken responsibility for failures to provide adequate leadership for the M&E Unit.\(^6\) Counterpart has also brought in a 3-month STTA to address critical issues and is actively recruiting for an M&E Director. However, the project remains vulnerable to poor performance in monitoring & reporting until the M&E Director position is permanently filled.

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\(^5\) Communication with the project referenced the Data Quality Assurance Tool for Program-Level Indicators (pages 27 -35), especially Worksheet 3.1 (Guidance on How to Avoid Double Counting).

\(^6\) Evaluation interview with Counterpart HQ M&E Technical Advisor, May 25, 2012
5.1.3 M&E System, Data Quality & Reporting: Additional Findings

In addition to following-up on the DQA and third party monitoring findings, the evaluation carried out its own assessment of the project’s capacity to measure, document and report on results.

- As of this evaluation, only data on seven F-indicators for the period of Quarter 2 of 2011 to Quarter 2 of 2012 is available in the Clearinghouse. Errors were found in this data. During the evaluation period, the project undertook a review of the data and revised data was presented to the evaluation team and YMEP staff responsible for working on the Clearinghouse. RGP’s M&E Unit assures the evaluators that corrected data will be provided officially to the Clearinghouse in the near future. YMEP Clearinghouse staff provided evidence that some figures provided by the project on sex disaggregation are estimates. Thus, there is limited access to information on progress towards results. This should be resolved soon when the project will report on all PMP indicators as of Quarter 2 of 2012.
- Ability to compare achievements against targets is limited, as RGP targets are only set annually and therefore only possible at the end of Q4 each year. Quarterly targets are more useful for providing input into management decisions. However, RGP staff report that it is difficult to set realistic targets given the frequent changes in work plans requested by the Mission.
- The evaluation found that the project lacked standard tools for aggregating data within RGP teams/departments. The evaluation also found errors in the process for aggregating data from the teams in the M&E Unit. These calculations are made manually, require coordination among a number of sources, and are subject to frequent adjustments which all contribute to error. The M&E STTA is in the process of developing and introducing tools for teams and reviewing the process of compiling the data in the M&E Unit.
- The in-country project staff and Counterpart HQ staff do not share a common understanding on how key components of the M&E system work. Specifically, there is not an agreement on the roles of the project-based PMIS and Counterpart’s headquarter-based KMP.

5.1.4 RGP Reporting

In addition to the quarterly reports required by the CoAg, the project is reporting weekly and monthly to USAID-Yemen. Since November 27, 2010, the project submits a Weekly Report to the Mission Director and a Weekly Impact Report to YMEP. The project also submits a Monthly Report to the Mission Director. The project also reports quarterly on PMP indicators to the Clearinghouse.

RGP quarterly reports are poorly organized for determining how activities contribute to higher-level results. Information on activities is reported according to sector. Reports do not link activities to project objectives. No information is provided which describes how activities contribute to outcomes related to the project objectives or for the sector.

RGP data on values reported for indicators is insufficient or difficult to find. The details concerning achievement on indicators are not provided in an easily accessible manner in the quarterly reports. For example, in order to find out which policies or plans are being reported for indicator 1.1, one must consult with project staff. Quarterly reports do not consistently include information detailing and supporting the values reported for indicators.

5.1.5 Under-reporting Outcomes

The RGP M&E system is vulnerable to under-reporting outcomes in two instances. First, the project is not reporting outcomes that took place before the PMP went into effect on January 1, 2011. For example,
the indicator value for parliamentary hearings does not include Yemen’s first ever parliamentary public hearing which occurred December 13, 2010.

The second instance of under-reporting is related to counting outputs but not the resulting outcomes. Quick Impact Response activities are particularly vulnerable to this type of under-reporting. For example, 36 Graduates of the Youth Civics Education Academy (a quick impact response activity) conducted grassroots initiatives reaching approximately 2,274 people.

Similarly, the civil society component does not have outcome level indicators. CSO contributions to policy and executive outcomes are only captured anecdotally. In several cases, CSOs have demonstrated improved capacity through successful implementation of quick impact response activities. For example, the All Girls’ Association assisted the MOE with its Back to School Campaign, and the SDF provided assistance in compiling the damage assessment for the PMO.

Even in instances where outcomes are documented systematically (as the executive team has done with outcomes of the Youth Civic Education Academy), no indicator summarizes the contributions to higher-level results.

Counterpart’s current solution to capturing outcomes is to hire an international consultant to evaluate and document important outcomes, such as the National Women’s Platform and the PLMP. This solution is expensive and limited in scope.

The RGP M&E system does not have a mechanism for measuring unintended outcomes which may be significant in a continually changing program environment and changes in program direction.

5.1.6 Possible Double-counting in Grants

In addition to double-counting in F-indicators related primarily to RGP trainings, the evaluation found evidence of possible double-counting in grants, as well. Specifically, grants are counted for each year they are open. The RGP Grants Department reports on two F-indicators:

- 2.4.1-2 Number of CSOs using USG assistance to promote political participation.
- 2.4.1-3 Number of CSO advocacy campaigns supported by USG.

In reporting on indicator 2.4.1-2, the project counted grants each year they are open. Currently, 26 CSOs have a grant from RGP. Eleven of those grants were awarded in project year 2011; they remain active. Fifteen more grants were awarded in project year 2012. The project reported 11 CSOs in 2011 and 25 CSOs in 2012. Those grants that were awarded in 2011 and remained active in 2012 are counted in both 2011 and in 2012. The PIRS definition does not specify whether this indicator is counted annually or over the life of the project. Presumably, this could also be the case for advocacy campaigns that take more than a year to complete (indicator 2.3.1-3).

RGP seems unclear on the definition of these F indicators and how best to report the project’s accomplishments to avoid double-counting.

5.2 MANAGEMENT, DESIGN AND STAFFING ISSUES

USAID Mission staff expressed concerns about the appropriateness of RGP’s implementation approach given the country’s circumstances, Counterpart’s grasp of the strategic needs of Yemen’s transition, as
well as the adequacy of Counterpart’s support for the project, and its ability to effectively address staffing
gaps. Substantive issues concerning the project’s relevance to the country’s needs and transition priorities
will be discussed in Section 6. This section examines Counterpart’s ability to provide leadership in this
situation.

5.2.1 USAID Dissatisfaction with Project Design and Implementation – Counterpart’s Response

RGP’s relevance and responsiveness to the country’s emerging circumstances was the subject of
considerable discussion between the Mission and the project, but reportedly were not well known to
Counterpart’s Home Office managers responsible for the program. When Counterpart’s Home Office
representative was asked on June 30, 2012 how long she had known that USAID was unhappy with the
project, the evaluators were told that she first became aware that USAID was dissatisfied with RGP only
after the mid-June 2012 visit of Administrator Shah to Yemen, and that requests for project changes were
a result of his feedback to the Mission. This view did not appear to be consistent with the evidence.
USAID had expressed concerns about the project on numerous occasions during the previous year, as
noted in communications between the Mission and the project – a few examples are in Annex IX.

RGP staff reported receiving multiple verbal requests from the Mission to make changes in the project,
some of which were seen to be outside the framework of their CoAg and as such were declined. They
reported having to make frequent changes to their work plan in response to the USAID requests they
could legitimately accommodate. RGP reported there were inconsistencies in the guidance from the
Mission, much of which was delivered verbally. Written evidence of this was an emphatic direction from
the Mission in an email June 14, 2011 to not proceed with supporting constitutional reform work; this
direction was reversed in an email on December 20, 2011, which asked that this matter become one of the
areas of project focus. RGP reported that there were a number of these inconsistencies and changes that
had a negative impact on their operations, but which they accommodated to the best of their ability.

USAID’s concerns seemed to persist in spite of RGP’s efforts. In several meetings with USAID during
the field work for this evaluation in June 2012, the evaluation team noted multiple comments from the
Mission Director and other USAID program staff expressing continued frustration with RGP, to the effect
that the project was not being sufficiently creative and responsive to the rapidly changing needs of the
country.

The Mission’s views of the desired direction for the project were expressed in an email May 26, 2012,
from Matan Chorev, USAID Yemen TDY Democracy and Governance Advisor, to the Mission Director
to “Suggest a way to significantly focus RGP’s scope to provide more direct and relevant transition
programming.”

Given these frequent exchanges over much of the previous year, it is difficult to see how Counterpart’s
Home Office representative could say on June 30, 2012 that she was not aware that USAID had long-
standing concerns about the project and attributed its dissatisfaction with RGP primarily to the
Administrator’s visit earlier that month. This is particularly difficult to understand when Counterpart’s
Home Office management had been copied on most of the year-long exchange of related

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61 For instance: in an email June 14, 2011 to Dana Stinson, the Mission Director emphatically ordered the project to
not proceed with electoral or constitutional reform work. In a later email, October 13, 2011 he encouraged the
project to become involved in elections, and on December 20, 2011 to support elections and constitutional reform.
62 Titled: “Pivoting the Support to Yemen’s Transition” – known informally as the “Pivot” document.
63 Some of which is noted in Annex IX of this evaluation.
Furthermore, the Mission noted that US policy in Yemen was to support the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Transition Agreement, a document prepared in late 2011 by the GCC Initiative, and regarded as the foundation of a two-year transition process that would culminate in ratification of a new constitution and elections for the leaders of the new government. Counterpart’s Home Office representative told the evaluation team that she was aware of the GCC Agreement document but had not read it, so was unfamiliar with its contents and as such could not guide the strategic aspects of the project accordingly.

This reflects poorly on the quality of Counterpart’s Home Office understanding of the scope of the challenges within RGP, USAID’s priorities in the country, and their ability to provide appropriate levels of support and administration for the project. This inadequate support from Counterpart’s Home Office was described in an email from a previous COP as the main reason for his premature departure from the project (see 5.2.3 Staffing Issues below).

5.2.2 Adequacy of Counterpart’s Grasp of Transition Needs

The evaluation team also noted concerns about the adequacy of Counterpart’s grasp of the needs of the turbulent and rapidly changing transition situation in which Yemen found itself. Critiques of RGP by USAID and Ministry representatives questioned the relevance of the project’s activities to the needs of the country while it was going through a period of turmoil as it transitioned to a new political and governance framework.

The needs of fragile states in transition have been well documented in publications by agencies such as the World Bank and OECD and others. For example, the World Bank’s recent World Development Report focuses on transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice and jobs while a recent OECD publication has a similar theme.

High priority needs identified in interviews with four ROYG Deputy Ministers (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry and Trade) all reflected similar concerns – these are discussed further in Section 6.

The evaluation team did not see much evidence of these priorities and other well-known broad nation-building perspectives in RGP’s underlying conceptual framework or operations. For example, the project’s Annual Work Plan and Activity Based Budget for October 2011 – September 2012 lists 38 activities in 11 major areas – all of which seem worthwhile. However, the work plan does not clearly reflect awareness of an approach or priorities that are consistent with global best practices in fragile state reconstruction as outlined in relevant OECD and World Bank publications and the works of recognized experts such as Paul Collier. (See selected references and bibliography in Annex III).

The Mission also stated that they expected RGP to take the initiative and propose an appropriate framework for the project given Yemen’s changing context. This was not provided by the project to the Mission’s satisfaction, and was reported to be one of the factors that prompted the Mission Director to exercise more direct control and make multiple suggestions for specific changes in the project’s work plans.

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64 Refer to RGP Evaluation, Annex III for a bibliography of relevant documents.
67 Refer to RGP Evaluation, Annex IV.
5.2.3 Staffing Issues

Project staffing is another area of Mission concern, since RGP has had four Chiefs of Party in the space of 18 months with as much as six month gaps between incumbents. 69 This is highly unusual and was a problem, part of which was related to how Counterpart managed and supported the project. An email from a former RGP COP to the Mission Director provides a view of the reasons for his premature departure:

“...I have been frustrated for some time with the level of support I have received from HQ. For weeks I have asked for very specific assistance (recruitment of STTA, trainers, etc.) and gotten next to nothing. No amount of requesting, cajoling and ultimately bullying got me anything. Each week I had to keep telling USAID we hadn’t started this or that and were still recruiting. Finally last Saturday I received an e-mail that essentially said I was on my own. The things I was asking for (for 8 weeks) were a field responsibility. I went apoplectic and threatened to resign to the Counterpart President. Over the next several days nothing changed and I feel like they really didn’t try to change my mind. I was fed up and submitted my resignation... 

All of these factors decided that I am not the right person for RGP-Yemen. I simply don’t see a way to make RGP successful under these conditions. Counterpart, I’m afraid, simply lacks the capacity to make it work in the new environment. … Maybe they can with someone else [as COP].” 70

Counterpart staff attributed some of the turnover to difficulties in finding suitable candidates who would be willing to live and work in an area as unstable and insecure as Yemen. However, the COP mentioned above who left after only five months on the job relocated immediately to a COP role in Afghanistan, a location arguably more unstable and insecure than Yemen. The newly-arrived fourth COP had considerable fragile state experience in Iraq and speaks Arabic – however, he was identified as a potential COP by the Mission, not Counterpart.

Counterpart had difficulty recruiting and retaining suitable senior staff who can work in fragile conflict-affected states and who have considerable experience with governance projects in these environments. The evaluation team saw no evidence that Counterpart responded to the unusually high turnover of COPs with a frank internal examination of its recruitment and project support and management processes.

5.3 Financial Analysis of RGP Operations

This section analyzes the financial aspects of RGP operations. It addresses a number of questions in the evaluation’s Statement of Work (see Annex I), and also financial management by USAID and Counterpart International.

5.3.1 Financial Analysis Elements in Statement of Work

The financial components of the SOW required the evaluation to examine the following:

- Program fiscal goals and burn rate
- Project financial procedures and reporting
- Cost-effectiveness

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69 Refer to RGP Evaluation, Annex VII.
70 E-mail, Barry Reed to Robert Wilson, May 14, 2011.
5.3.2 Program Fiscal Goals and Burn Rate

The project’s fiscal goals are linked to its overall budget and monthly burn rate. The project’s total estimated budget is $43 million over a five-year term, and as such the average monthly burn rate (over 60 months) would be $716,666.

For most of the first 18 months of the project, the average burn rate was considerably lower than the average noted above. However, while this might have been a concern in the early stages of the project, at the time of evaluation it was not a major issue. If anything, the burn rate had risen above the average figure of $716K/month. Relevant figures from RGP financial reports\(^7\) are shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Burn/Month</th>
<th>Monthly Burn Rate in relation to expected average ($716K/month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May-10</td>
<td>$25,743</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-10</td>
<td>$237,572</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-10</td>
<td>$551,713</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug-10</td>
<td>$136,905</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-10</td>
<td>$416,496</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-10</td>
<td>$418,418</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-10</td>
<td>$649,008</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-10</td>
<td>$586,929</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-11</td>
<td>$618,353</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-11</td>
<td>$288,620</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-11</td>
<td>$714,925</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-11</td>
<td>$368,714</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-11</td>
<td>$298,314</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-11</td>
<td>$421,856</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-11</td>
<td>$430,589</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug-11</td>
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<td>Sep-11</td>
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<td>Oct-11</td>
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<td>67%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov-11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan-12</td>
<td>$1,303,730</td>
<td>182%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-12</td>
<td>$1,039,625</td>
<td>145%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-12</td>
<td>$575,196</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-12</td>
<td>$1,258,755</td>
<td>176%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-12</td>
<td>$1,579,054</td>
<td>220%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project Average** | 86%

Given these figures and a 86% average monthly burn rate there does not appear to be cause to be overly concerned about the project’s fiscal goals and low burn rate levels, especially considering the turmoil the country experienced in 2011 and its significant effect on limiting the project’s activities.

5.3.3 Project Financial Procedures and Reporting

The evaluation examined project-related financial procedures within RGP. An analysis of the project’s operations in this area has several components:

1. The CoAg requires RGP to report its finances in traditional project budget categories (salaries, fringe benefits, etc.)
2. Although the CoAg lists nine Program Area-Elements (PAE), the requirement to report expenditures in PAE categories was not seen by Counterpart as part of the original agreement. However, in a Meeting Memorandum from January 31, 2012 RGP states they received verbal instructions from USAID to do so. This memorandum was the only document received by the evaluation team on this issue (in addition to the CoAg).
3. In Counterpart’s requests, their Home Office Financial Director referred to a section in the CoAg, Item 6 (Notices) in the Mandatory Standard Provisions for U.S. Nongovernmental Recipients, included as Attachment C in the CoAg that states: “Any notice given by USAID to the recipient shall be sufficient only if in writing and delivered in person, mailed, or cabled…” This reportedly did not have the desired result.
4. Counterpart’s project staff stated in the January 2012 memo that they were preparing to submit financial reports to USAID showing expenditures in both sets of categories. In May 2012 Counterpart’s Home Office Finance Director advised the evaluators that this was being done, and that Counterpart’s financial reports and vouchers consolidated data from their two subs, RTI and NDI.
5. RTI reported that their field-level financial system had been capable of reporting in both traditional and PAE categories since the beginning of the project, and that they regularly submitted their invoices to Counterpart in both.
6. NDI staff said their financial system disaggregates expenditures into PAE categories in their home office before forwarding invoices to Counterpart.
7. USAID program staff expressed concern about the accuracy with which project expenditures were being reported in PAE categories, and that there may be problems if the project were to be audited.

In early June 2012, RGP’s recently-arrived fourth COP advised the evaluation team that the project was approximately $500K in the red, due in part to RGP’s practice of initiating activities without costing them, and making program decisions without due concern for the business side of their operations. The COP said that due to the incompetence of the former DCOP for Finance and Administration he did not have the information required to determine the extent of the project’s over-spending. The Mission also said that the DCOP did not meet USAID’s reporting requirements. Counterpart’s Home Office representative, on the other hand, reported being pleased with the DCOP’s performance and stated there were no concerns regarding the accuracy and reliability of his financial reporting.

The evaluation team was not able to obtain the information needed for a detailed analysis of RGP’s financial reports to assess the degree of their conformity with USAID’s requirements to determine the quality of the former DCOP’s work. However, this divergence of opinion regarding Counterpart’s field-

72 Refer to RGP Evaluation, Annex V.
73 Chuck Swagman, AOTR, communication to evaluation team, July 10, 2012.
level financial management of RGP is a key finding on the issue of the effectiveness of RGP’s financial management and the quality of relationships between the field and home office.

5.3.4 Impacts of USAID’s Financial Management on RGP

RGP experienced administrative difficulties arising from errors made by USAID’s Contracts Office in Cairo. The January 31, 2012 Meeting Memorandum states that USAID erroneously attributed RGP project expenses to PAE line items in sequence beginning with the first on the list, with the result that: “… several line items had been drawn down to zero. The Phoenix line items that have been drawn down to zero are those for good governance, political competition and consensus-building, civil society, as well as sub-line items for family planning and reproductive health, one of two sub-line items for basic education and a sub-line item for higher education.” The memo also noted there was no linkage to Counterpart financial reporting.

These zeroed-out line items constituted a major portion of RGP activity, which no longer had available funds in the project budget. At the end of June 2012 USAID advised the evaluators that they were taking steps to correct the erroneous allocation of costs to the PAE categories.

There were also problems with the level of obligated funds. In a June 4, 2012 letter from the CEO of Counterpart to the head of USAID’s Regional Office of Procurement, the Counterpart states that due to a “lack of obligated funding” the project would be “forced to commence close-down procedures on June 4, 2012 if additional obligations had not yet been received.”

In early June 2012 RGP’s Chief of Party reported that he had received three such “initiate shut-down procedures” orders from Counterpart over a two-week period in May and June that were aborted following last-minute assurances from the Mission that adequate funds would be made available. A Counterpart report of project accruals for the period April 1 – June 30, 2012 notes that by July, 2012, when this report was being written, the project expected to have reached 99% of obligated funds, fully exhausting these resources.

In mid-June 2012 Counterpart was advised by USAID they had an additional $1.7M in obligated funds, and were also advised that USAID was preparing an additional $1.1M to provide the project, pending processing in Washington D.C.

Starting in Quarter 2 of 2012, a number of project activities were delayed or canceled due to USAID funding reductions. These funding problems were described to the evaluators as having a profoundly negative impact on the morale of RGP personnel, many of whom were reportedly seeking more stable employment elsewhere.

5.3.5 Cost-Effectiveness

Although the evaluation SOW requires an assessment of the project’s cost effectiveness, the evaluation team had difficulty accurately determining cost effectiveness of project activities. This is due in part to the manner in which the project reported its expenditures, and the nature of cost effectiveness assessment processes.

In a discussion with USAID Program Managers it was determined that carrying out a reasonably accurate assessment of cost-effectiveness would normally require three bodies of information:

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74 Refer to RGP Evaluation, Annex VI.
- Measurable outcomes of a discrete set of activities
- Costs associated with carrying out these activities
- A relative standard of value of the typical results of such activities

RGP project operations and record keeping did not have the required degree of precision in linkages between costs, results and standards to accurately determine cost effectiveness.

As noted above, RGP has been able to report costs by Program Area Elements. However, they often combined the costs of several activities in each area – the “health” PAE category, for example, included several health-related initiatives. While it was possible to measure some discrete outcomes related to these initiatives, the costing information was not similarly broken down to the same activity and result level. Also, these outcomes did not necessarily correspond to PAE categories.

Furthermore, activities paid for from funds from several PAE categories were often used to move toward a single measurable result, one example is support for the passage of Safe Motherhood legislation. The civil participation category was used to strengthen several CSOs, one of which lobbied for passage of the legislation; funds from another PAE category were used to increase the policy formulation capacity of the Health Ministry itself (executive branch) and yet another was used at the legislative level to provide capacity development support to Parliament for conducting public hearings.

These three sets of inputs contributed to moving the Safe Motherhood legislation forward, and also to other types of supports in their respective parts of the project’s input to the government and participating CSOs. This example describes challenges in associating a particular outcome to a clearly defined input and its associated funds as there were multiple inputs involved, each of which was working on several fronts at the same time, supporting passage of the law in question being one of several.

The third requirement for determining cost-effectiveness, a generally accepted relative standard value of a measurable result, was also absent. The cost associated with supporting the passage of a particular piece of health related legislation is not a generally known figure, so it is difficult to determine whether RGP’s costs were too high or relatively low. There was no external standard against which such a judgment could be made.

Given the three requirements noted above and the nature of RGP activity, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine the cost-effectiveness of RGP’s outcomes in a rigorous manner within the scope of this evaluation.

5.3.6 Synergy and Project Cost Effectiveness

The question of RGP’s cost-effectiveness can be answered in part through assessing the degree to which it achieved synergy amongst its three program components and implementers (and lower overall cost per outcome). A reason for designing and implementing a complex multi-level, cross-sector program was the possibility for synergy among the various components (Legislative, Executive and Civil Society) that would make possible sustainable, higher level results that were not so readily achievable through discrete single sector programs. This mid-term program evaluation of RGP determined that there have been mixed results with regard to the synergy of the project’s three components.

The strongest example of synergy in project outcomes to date has been RGP’s ability to contribute to the passage of legislation. Successful passage of legislation depends on contributions in policy formulation, technical assistance to support parliamentary public hearings, and CSO institutional strengthening and advocacy. As noted earlier in this report, this was achieved in some instances.
However, the project seems to have missed a number of other opportunities for synergy. As shown earlier in the report, there is little evidence that investments in operational capacity of the Ministries resulted in sustainable gains or contributed to efforts of other components. Similarly, while gains in CSO capacity may have been somewhat higher, they were not systematically integrated with activities under other objectives.

A complex, multi-level, cross-sector program requires considerable management resources (time, expertise, systems, etc.) to steer it effectively. Such an approach only makes sense if the various components are integrated to achieve outcomes. The few instances of synergy to date among RGP’s components make it difficult to justify a single multi-component program approach over an approach with three more narrowly focused projects.
6. **PROJECT RELEVANCE AND COUNTRY PRIORITIES**

The findings in this section were derived from document reviews and interviews with senior officials of major donor agencies (World Bank, the European Union, Netherlands, etc.) and ROYG Deputy Ministers and senior officials in Yemen’s Ministries of Finance, Education, Planning & International Cooperation, and Industry & Trade, as well as the Minister of Human Rights, and knowledgeable Yemenis not in the government who were well aware of the country’s needs.

6.1 **COUNTRY PRIORITIES**

As noted earlier, Yemen’s transition process is based on an Agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative (GCCI), and defined in their 2011 *Agreement on the Implementation of the Transitional Process in Yemen*. The GCCI Agreement was later supplemented by a much broader plan, *Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (TPSD) – 2012-2014*, prepared by Yemen’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.75

The TPSD lists Yemen’s immediate priorities as having security, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions, which are defined in considerable detail in the 41-page main report and its four annexes. The Plan advises the international community as follows: “Donors and development partners are encouraged to focus on one or a few of these issues with the government and continue doing so beyond transition.”76

The Plan recognizes that the government’s overriding concern with security has both military and socio-economic dimensions, and both need to be pursued to achieve sustainable progress in the country.

While RGP’s general intent seems to be consistent with this plan in that improved governance and public participation are priorities, these recently-released national strategic documents provide a clear framework for selecting and focusing RGP inputs to achieve the maximum desired positive effect.

6.1.2 **Relative Scale of Impact, Relevance, Economic Development Needs**

While relevance is a key factor in any governance project, it is also essential to consider the scale of a project’s input in relation to what else is taking place in the country. RGP’s original budget of $43 million over five years breaks down to a bit more than $8 million a year. This is a relatively small sum for a large-scale multi-level governance project, especially when comparable USAID governance projects in Iraq and Afghanistan (as noted earlier in this report) were more narrowly focused than RGP and have budgets well over $100 million. RGP’s situation calls for a carefully targeted and collaborative approach that makes maximum use of available funds – elements that were not evident in the project’s program interventions to date. The Mission’s recent “Pivot Document” noted earlier calls for this more relevant and focused approach.

RGP did not appear to be aligning its activities to support high-priority issues facing the country, such as economic development and strengthening the private sector. These major problems, which occur in most fragile and transition states, were identified in interviews with senior government personnel and donor representatives. While RGP could not be expected to address these large-scale issues on its own, as key factors in the country’s Transition one would expect them to have formed a part of RGP’s planning process. There was, however, little evidence that this was the case.

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75 Republic of Yemen (May 2012) – *Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (TPSD)*
76 TPSD, p. 35
The Deputy Minister of Finance reported that the country was facing a major cash flow crisis as oil exports have been reduced due to insurgent activity and the price of oil per barrel had decreased in June 2012. At the same time, the ROYG civil service was expanded by approximately 50,000 positions to over 1.7 million employees, and social welfare rolls increased by half a million. He also noted that it would be impossible to set Yemen on a path to recovery without improving the performance of the civil service, discussed more fully below.

The Deputy Minister of Finance also said that much of the economy had collapsed since the turmoil over the past year, unemployment had soared, especially among the youth, and there was an urgent need to strengthen the private sector as a major engine of growth. The pressures that brought youth onto the streets the previous year were still present, and he feared a resurgence of violence if there were no obvious signs of improvement soon. Economic development, job creation and strengthening the private sector were described as key factors in addressing this situation.

6.1.3 Project Activities seen as ad-hoc, No Comprehensive Strategy

Informants from within and outside RGP reported their impression of the project’s efforts as being ad-hoc, and not obviously linked to a comprehensive strategy. Some initiatives seemed to have been based on the personal preferences of RGP staff, and ceased when these staff left the project.

A member of a CSO reported:

“These new activities are not integrated. RGP is operating in an ad hoc manner, as if these new ideas are parachuting in. The staff working in RGP are very competent and qualified, but even the staff don’t know the whole plan of where the project is going. They understand just their small part for the next short period. It’s a good project, but they need a clear and comprehensive plan.”

In general, CSOs reported a good experience with RGP. As noted earlier in this report, the project had the capacity to work closely and collaboratively with CSOs, provide capacity building and support their success, and CSOs report “a real partnership” with RGP. However, there were a few concerns. One CSO (All Girls Association) reported receiving capacity building and “continuous follow-up” from RGP. But they also reported continuing changes to the action plan, and “different instructions from the technical and financial officers in RGP, which confused our team and caused delays.”

The evaluation consultant assessing RGP’s work with CSO and government partners collaborating on the Yemeni Women’s Platform found that a “…lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities at RGP left others outside RGP confused and sometimes frustrated. Some respondents felt that systems were too bureaucratic and that there was not a cohesive team responding to what was needed at any given time, particularly when there were urgent needs and decisions needed to be made. There were some feelings internally that more support from other departments was not forthcoming, such as from communications or M&E.”

It was not clear to what extent these frequent changes in project direction were due to shifts in guidance received from the Mission or an inherent part of how RGP managed its own affairs. Either way, the effect was that Yemenis with whom the project worked perceived RGP as lacking coherence and consistency in its strategic direction and operations.

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77 For example, a Rule of Law emphasis reportedly began and ended with the period of employment of an Advisor who had an interest in that area. (Interview with Leigh Catherine Miles, NDI Home Office Director, 22 May 2012.)
78 Yemeni Women’s Platform and Agenda, p. 9
6.1.4 ROYG leadership has political will but low management capacity – seeking Western donor support for “soft” governance requirements

Interviews with Deputy Ministers and donor representatives indicated there was political will among the country’s new leadership to address the capacity gaps and performance problems facing the government. Due to the lack of interest in these so-called “soft” governance requirements on the part of major donors such as the Saudis and the Gulf States, other donors were being approached to address these issues.

The Deputy Minister of Finance was particularly clear on the need to improve the civil service, which he recognized as requiring a long-term effort. He was surprised, however when he was told that in most countries these initiatives take a generation to bear fruit. He said that a twin-track approach was required, one that produced short-term visible improvements in public sector performance, while the other track addressed the deeper issues that required long-term consistent efforts to address.

The Deputy Minister of Finance noted that he has made several unsuccessful attempts to improve the public service, including identifying a group of 100 senior managers to become a type of Senior Executive Service who would energize key parts of the bureaucracy and improve its performance. He had not analyzed the reasons for the failure of these attempts nor incorporated any lessons learned in well-crafted subsequent efforts.

6.1.5 Focus on Central ROYG Agencies to strengthen the absorptive capacity and performance of Service Ministries

The Deputy Ministers were clear that capacity supports were needed in the central agencies before the service delivery Ministries such as Health and Education could improve. They identified the PMO, Ministry of Finance, MoPIC and MOIT as key agencies to support, noting that as their performance improved they would in turn strengthen the service delivery Ministries such as health, education, agriculture etc.

One of the key issues identified by the ROYG Deputy Ministers was budget execution – they said that even if the Saudis or other donors were to provide large sums to the government, the current ROYG systems did not have the capacity to absorb those funds and translate them into improved services at the community level.

This is consistent with well-known challenges facing fragile post-conflict states in other parts of the world, and as noted earlier, RGP’s operations did not seem to have incorporated these elements in the project’s underlying frameworks or strategic approach.

6.1.6 Public needs to feel hope, a belief in a better future – effective ROYG public communication strategy needed

Senior government officials and donor representatives noted that the Yemen public needed a sense of hope that the future would be better than the present, and that tangible steps were being taken to improve conditions in the country. This is a frequent component of transition programming in fragile states – people would accept to sacrifice today if they have a sense that tomorrow would be better. Conversations with ROYG officials and donor representatives indicated that existing ROYG public communications efforts were seen as ineffective in conveying a message of hope to the population, even though the transition process was making some headway. The government did not seem to have a coherent and well-supported strategic public communications strategy that could provide reliable and culturally appropriate information to the population.
ROYG officials said this would be an important and low-cost but effective development intervention. USAID also noted to the evaluators that this would be a relatively easy activity that could be supported by RGP, and expressed frustration that the project itself had not anticipated and proposed such strategic interventions, based on their technical experience of key initiatives such as this with governance programs in fragile states elsewhere.

6.2 RGP AND USAID APPROACH ISSUES

6.2.1 Project complexity and flexibility issues

As noted above, RGP Managers reported receiving frequent requests from the Mission Director (usually verbally and often on a weekly basis) to make changes in the project. Their ability to respond to these requests was sometimes limited by the terms of their CoAg and its associated budget constraints. When requests from the Mission could be accommodated, by using strategies such as terming the provision of funds for re-equipping looted Ministry offices “capacity building”, these activities were incorporated in project operations.

However, RGP and Mission staff were of one mind in identifying the issue of the complexity of the project’s design as a problem. Both stated that it would have been easier to respond to unforeseen requirements if the project had fewer but broader main categories of activity, and if the budget were likewise simplified into as few as two or three major line items. The evaluation team did not address the issue of the feasibility of making such a change in the structure of the CoAg and RGP work plans part-way through the project.

6.2.2 Coordination with other USAID Projects – CLP, YMEP, OTI etc.

The project’s CoAg and this evaluation’s SOW mention close collaboration between RGP and CLP, the term “seamless” was used to describe the intent of this relationship. While the YMEP COP and RGP’s DCOP reported that there had been close and beneficial collaboration among USAID projects during RGP’s first year of operations, the weekly USAID and COP coordination meetings stopped in mid-2011, with the result that the regular exchange of information among USAID projects was significantly reduced.

6.2.3 Shift in RGP Focus – From Fostering Responsive Governance to Responding to the Government

Recent changes in Yemen’s political situation were reflected in a shift in the focus of RGP itself. While the project maintained its initial objective of addressing key drivers of instability in Yemen, it shifted some of its activities from being primarily concerned with increasing the responsiveness of the government to the needs of the people, to being responsive to the government itself, particularly as the country moved from reconstruction and into its transition process. One example was the support provided to Ministries to help with re-equipping offices that had been looted during the riots in 2011.

79 Evaluation SOW: “RGP’s Cooperative Agreement ... notes that collaborative relationships between RGP and CLP are expected to support seamless integration of the activities, objectives and approaches of the two programs, thus enhancing the overall program outcomes. USAID/Yemen views a close working relationship as absolutely key to the success of both RGP and CLP as their goals, objectives and approaches are strategically integrated.” “Collaborative relationships will support seamless integration of the activities, objectives and approaches of the two programs, enhancing outcomes in both.” (RGP Collaborative Agreement April 29, 2010, p. 14)
7. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 PROGRAM RESULTS

RGP has had mixed results. While its support for policy making has produced some good results, its efforts to introduce PMIS and increase ministries’ operational capacity are unlikely to lead to systemic change and may be somewhat irrelevant given the country’s needs at this point in its Transition. RGP’s anti-corruption efforts were initially successful but seemed to have stalled, due in part to insufficient sense of ownership within ROYG.

A major project achievement was supporting the first ever parliamentary public hearings in Yemen, which brought CSOs together with parliamentarians to support passage of important health legislation. However, these initial efforts at fostering open government and increasing voter participation have not been institutionalized so they are unlikely to become permanent features of how the country operates.

The project’s work with CSOs, particularly the Quick Impact Response activities such as the Back to School campaign have been effective, but the CSOs have not become sustainable and institutionalized participants in the legislative process. It seemed the project considered strengthening CSOs as an end itself, and the work was not done within a broader fragile state nation-building framework.

RGP’s efforts to promote the advancement of women have been successful on several fronts, most notably in supporting passage of the Safe Motherhood Law and strengthening the National Women’s Platform. Its work with youth has helped them have a more coherent and effective voice in the political process, but it has not addressed underlying issues such as unemployment and inadequate access to educational opportunities.

7.2 MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL PROCEDURES & REPORTING

The project had management problems, among them being an M&E system that was weak and error-prone. A STTA helped remedy this but the gains are not likely to be sustainable unless better qualified local staff and a permanent M&E Director are hired to do this work.

The Mission Director has long been concerned about the RGP’s inadequate relevance and its seeming inability to focus on high priority transition needs, and has established weekly meetings to supervise the project, which reported receiving inconsistent and occasionally contradictory guidance – this makes operations difficult. Part of the problem was that the project seemed to lack an operational awareness of nation building strategies in conflict-affected fragile states, resulting in ad-hoc initiatives that were without an obvious higher order strategic framework. This was exacerbated by an unusually high turnover of COPs - four in the project’s first 18 months - which indicated staffing problems within Counterpart.

The project’s burn rate and financial reporting processes seemed acceptable, but financial problems and accounting errors within USAID caused difficulties for RGP that were being resolved as this report was being written. There were concerns about the project’s internal financial management processes that needed to be resolved. The project’s current operating framework was seen as too complex and limiting its ability to be flexible and responsive to changing requirements. Its original focus on helping the government be responsive to the population was being be supplemented by a need to be responsive to the government itself.
The project may be facing a significant budget reduction, requiring scaling back and focusing of activities. The Mission questioned the project’s cost effectiveness, including the relative costs and benefits of operating a three-partner consortium or three separate projects. It was not possible within the scope of this evaluation to provide accurate evidence on this matter.

7.3 PROJECT RELEVANCE, COUNTRY PRIORITIES

The project seemed to have difficulty fully aligning itself with Yemen’s priorities outlined in the GCCI agreement and in its new Transition Program for Stabilization and Development, and in recognizing that its relatively modest project resources may have greater impact if it collaborated with other donors in responding to the country’s high priority public sector capacity development and budget execution needs. These efforts would complement the much larger supports being provided by the Saudis and other Gulf states.

The country’s new leadership has the political will to improve the government’s performance, but its main instrument, the civil service, has been sadly neglected and lacks the capacity to translate donor funds into effective services at the community level. Central agencies as well as the service ministries have serious capacity gaps – calling for a major long-term undertaking. The country does not have an effective strategic public communications mechanism which can help instill hope in the population and reduce the likelihood of a resurgence of violence.

In spite of these challenges and shortcomings, the project has been achieving positive results and is well positioned to focus its efforts on key areas to further the progress of the government of Yemen.
8. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

8.1 **PROGRAM RESULTS**

8.1.1 Policy Formulation and Implementation Capacity of ROYG – Objective One

- Continue activities related to the formulation and passage of legislation. Focus on these efforts on the policy priorities of youth and women, as well as transition policies.
- Cancel project activities related to the development of service delivery standards and general operational capacity. Further capacity building for the ROYG should focus on urgent priorities of central Ministries in meeting the transition challenges.
- In the area of anti-corruption activities, coordinate with SNACC to build on the initial successes of the PLMP including:
  - Training for senior ministry staff addressing both financial and administrative corruption. A comprehensive program should include aspects related to relationships between junior and senior staff in reaching similar aims in complex environments.
  - Ongoing training for peers with possible accreditation; continue to monitor the online community of practice to ensure that it remains an enlivened arena for engagement.
  - Include CSOs in activities and trainings with government officials to allow for cross-pollination of ideas; according to the evaluation, CSOs are doing some of the most innovative work.
  - Document case studies of anti-corruption success.
- In the area of PMIS and M&E, RGP should align its support to the government Ministries and agencies with other related donor inputs related to the Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (TPSD).
- The proposed M&E system in MOPIC is likely to produce useful information over time, but a more rapid feedback and planning process is required in the interim. The government should be encouraged to establish an advisory group of knowledgeable individuals from diverse backgrounds who can act as a sounding board for its planning processes. This group could quickly provide useful information that can supplement the more elaborate M&E system's inputs as it becomes fully operational.

8.1.2 Strengthening Transparency of ROYG

- Support the institutionalization of parliamentary public hearings to ensure the sustainability of results. Specifically, promote formal ratification of the rules and procedures for public hearings and inclusion of hearings in the budget of the parliament. Assess the need for additional technical assistance and training to reach more parliamentarians and CSOs.
- Continue civic education, voter campaigns and similar activities in support of transition objectives and in preparation for the 2014 elections.

8.1.3 Participation of Civil Society in ROYG Processes and Decisions

- Continue with the advanced training to the nine selected CSOs, on the condition that the project provides a plan for how the graduating CSOs will be integrated into future activities. The COP suggests that CSOs that successfully complete the advanced training would be eligible to apply

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80 More details available in the YMEP Third Party Monitoring Report of RGP, February 2012 and in RGP-commissioned evaluation, “Opening Eyes and Embracing Integrity”.
for a sub-sub-contract (similar to an IQC) to carry out tasks related to project objectives such as advocacy and participation in policy formulation.

- Assist the CSO Management Unit at the CBA, Sana’a University, to develop a sustainable business model and expand its services to other countries in the region.

8.1.4 Participation of Women

- Minister Hooria urges RGP to “follow up on the recommendations of the National Women Conference to ensure full adaptation from the National Dialogue and the constitutional amendments ... and continue support to the Women’s National Committee” (Interview, July 4, 2012). This recommendation is echoed by the RGP-commissioned evaluation on the National Women’s Dialogue: “Strategic technical support from RGP is now more necessary than ever.” (Yemeni Women’s Platform and Agenda, p.9) The evaluation report outlines a number of specific recommendations that outline roles for both the Women’s National Committee and RGP but include development of a communication strategy, and an evaluation of the implementation of the Women’s Platform in early 2013. Minister Hooria requests Training courses for the women representatives, support in developing technical proposals, an advocacy program, and media campaign.

- As noted elsewhere, RGP has been successful in promoting the passage of legislation that reflects citizen input. Building on these success, promote legislative reforms that reflect women’s priorities as documented in the Women’s National Platform, such as:
  - 30% quota for female teachers
  - 30% quota for women in Parliament

8.1.5 Participation of Youth

- Build on successes to-date to continue to provide youth programming in four areas: the National Dialogue; policy formulation; elections; and anti-corruption. Engagement in these areas was also recognized as youth priorities in the April 2011 consultation.
  - **National Dialogue**: Provide leadership and civic education training to youth NGOs, engagement of youth in the National Dialogue and in policy formulation more generally. Support to youth NGOs to participate in development is also consistent with recommendations emerging from the YMEP report, Assessing Youth and Gender Programming in Yemen.81 “USAID IPs can identify new emerging youth NGOs in urban centers that are committed to increasing the participation of youth in the development dynamics of the country. IPs would provide technical support and training to the organizations and their leaders in a range of organizational development skills such as advocacy and lobbying, strategic planning, management and establishing networks with other NGOs to create constituencies around particular objectives.” (p. x)

- **Policy formulation**: Use the RGP approach to move forward legislation consistent with policy priorities identified by youth, including economic development and job creation. The RGP approach (CSO advocacy, parliamentary hearings, and support to Ministries) has been successful in contributing to the passage of legislation.

- **Preparation for elections**: Engage youth CSOs in activities in preparation for the elections, including civic education, and a Get out the Vote campaign.

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81 Yemen Youth and Gender Assessment, YMEP, September 19, 2011.
- **Anti-corruption.** Continue to engage youth in anti-corruption activities with partners such as SNACC. The PLMP is one promising model.
  - Engage youth in a broader transition communication strategy. During the April 2011 consultation, youth requested technical assistance from the project to conduct “awareness-raising efforts which would include the production of simplified materials to increase public awareness about youth visions, demands and aspirations; and support youth efforts to coordinate with civil society organizations in conducting awareness programs that will cover the issues advocated by the youth groups”.

### 8.2 Management, Financial Procedures and Reporting

8.2.1 Review RGP’s M&E System and Reporting capacity

Focus on the basics of M&E. RGP’s M&E STTA began instituting (May-Aug 2012) sound documentation and reporting practices which start from the team and build up to the M&E Unit. A number of gaps have been identified through this evaluation and solutions proposed. It seems that the project has been distracted from the foundations of good M&E by development of the PMIS and reporting to Counterpart’s global Knowledge Management Portal. Given the likelihood that the project will be restructured and streamlined, it may be best to rely on the current system of Excel sheets and reduce/eliminate the burden of reporting into the Counterpart KMP-MIS which requires extra staff and long internet upload times. The weaknesses of the M&E system are manageable with capable staff and good leadership. RGP leadership should consider hiring better qualified local staff, and Counterpart should prioritize recruitment of an M&E Director and provide more support in terms of good system design and implementation.

8.2.2 Management, Implementation and Staffing Issues

- **8.2.2.1. Resolve USAID’s Dissatisfaction with Project Design and Implementation Approach**
  USAID staff frequently expressed frustration with RGP’s design and implementation, focusing mainly on issues of relevance and responsiveness in light of the country’s instability and Transition process. The parties should conduct a frank and open discussion to clearly identify the sources of dissatisfaction and reconfigure the project to resolve key outstanding issues.

- **8.2.2.2. Satisfy Mission expectations and Reduce Mission Director’s Management of Project**
  The Mission Director established weekly meetings to manage the project, during which verbal changes in direction were given to RGP managers, who report that they sometimes receive contradictory requests from one meeting to the next. This made RGP implementation difficult. The parties should set up a project operating protocol and reporting system that satisfies the Mission Director’s requirements so he can reduce the need for frequent inputs to project operations.

- **8.2.2.3. Improve the Project’s Grasp of Transition Needs**
  Although the project was providing services to the government, there were questions about the extent to which these were consistent with the priority needs of an unstable country emerging from a revolution and in the midst of a hopefully peaceful transition to a new political framework. These needs are well known among governance specialists with fragile state experience. The project should recruit staff who are able to fill the “strategic vacuum” in which the project has been operating.

82 RGP Youth Strategy, p.3.
8.2.2.4. Strengthen Counterpart’s Recruitment System
The fact the project had four COPs in 18 months indicates weaknesses in Counterpart International’s ability to recruit and retain appropriately qualified senior project personnel. Counterpart should examine its senior level recruitment system and institute improvements to properly staff positions such as the COP of RGP.

8.2.3 Financial Analysis of RGP Operations

8.2.3.1 Review allocation of expenditures to PAE categories
RGP reported it was submitting invoices in Program Area Element categories, but the Mission had questions about the accuracy with which project costs were being assigned to these categories. USAID financial staff should analyze samples of the financial records used by Implementing Partners to distribute project expenses to PAE categories to verify they could withstand an audit.

8.2.3.2 Strengthen Capacity of USAID’s Financial Management System
There were significant problems with USAID’s financial system serving RGP. In June 2012 the project was at over 90% of obligated funds, which prompted Counterpart several times to consider shutting down procedures. Also, vouchers were erroneously assigned to PAE accounts in sequence, drawing them down to zero, without reference to the categories on Counterpart’s invoices. There should be a review of the operations of USAID’s financial management system serving RGP to identify and remedy the causes of errors to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of the problems experienced by the project.

8.2.3.3 Review and Strengthen Counterpart’s Field Level Financial Management System
The financial management system within RGP was not costing project activities before they were launched, and the incoming COP said he did not have an accurate picture of the project’s financial situation. However, Counterpart’s Home Office reported no difficulties with the project’s financial reporting system. Counterpart should analyze RGP’s financial management information system and remedy any shortcomings.

8.2.3.4 Reconfigure Project to Fit Available Budget
The project is reportedly facing a budget reduction that will require curtailing some activities. Once the available budget has been determined by USAID, RGP should reconfigure the project to optimize performance, and make an orderly transition to the new configuration.

8.2.3.5 Identify or Create Sample Activities to Measure Cost Effectiveness
It can be difficult to measure cost effectiveness in a complex governance project with multiple lines of action and few direct links between measurable outcomes and identifiable costs. The project should identify sample activities that could be used to measure cost effectiveness, and conduct operations with discrete outcomes and costing information to generate required data.

8.2.3.6 Assess Relative Costs of Consortia or Parallel Projects
There is a perception among some USAID Managers that a three-party consortium is more costly than three stand-alone projects, and that these costs override any benefits from potential synergies in these consortia. USAID should analyze RGP operations to determine the relative costs and benefits of multi-IP consortia versus parallel stand-alone projects.
8.3 PROJECT RELEVANCE, COUNTRY PRIORITIES AND USG APPROACH

8.3.1 Project Relevance and Country Priorities

8.3.1.1. Align with Country and Ministry Priorities
USAID staff and government representatives commented on the lack of alignment of project activity with the priorities of the country as it recovers from turmoil and moves into Transition. The project should put more emphasis on identifying the country’s and Ministries’ transition priorities and align its activities accordingly.

8.3.1.2 Adjust and Focus Activities to Match Project Scale
RGP is a relatively modest project, especially when compared to the billions that the Saudis and other Gulf States are pouring into the country. USAID should assess its options and encourage the project to reconfigure and focus its activities to achieve optimum sustainable impact given the scale of available resources, and collaborate with other donors as appropriate.

8.3.1.3 Systematize Project Activities and Objectives
The evaluators received frequent comments to the effect that the project was operating in a scattered, ad-hoc manner that seemed to lack a clear strategic direction. USAID should help the project ensure its activities are coherent, well aligned and logically related to higher order strategic goals.

8.3.1.4 Support Transition and Stabilization Related Priorities
The country has prepared a Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (TPSD) with the assistance of the donor community – the project should identify and focus on high priority Transition objectives, including economic development, job creation and strengthening the private sector.

8.3.1.5 Complement Saudi Supports with Capacity Development
The project should collaborate with other donors to complement the large anticipated Saudi inputs to Yemen with support for capacity development and system development that is not a priority focus for the Saudi investment in Yemen. The project should identify and strengthen potential Yemeni capacity development institutions to provide these services in a sustainable and contextually-appropriate manner.

8.3.1.6 Strengthen Civil Service Programming and Budget Execution Ability
While policy development and legislative strengthening are essential in any fragile state, the ability to respond to the public’s needs depends on having a functioning civil service. Yemen’s public sector was described as performing at a very low level. Wherever possible, the project should support the current phase of Yemen’s civil service reform program, including increasing its capacity for program conceptualization, design, implementation and assessment, with a primary focus on increasing absorptive capacity and improving budget execution. Without this capability donor funds will not be effectively translated into services for the population.

8.3.1.7 Focus on Central Agencies
While there is a tendency to provide supports for line Ministries such as Health, Agriculture and Education, there is also a need to focus efforts on central agencies – PMO, MOF, MOPIC, and MOIT – these will in turn strengthen line service Ministries. Line Ministries cannot function properly without being supported by effective central agencies.
8.3.1.8 Support Extensive Strategic Public Communication Program
A key factor in any governance, security or stabilization program in a post-conflict fragile state is an effective public communications program. The project should collaborate with other agencies to support an extensive well-designed multi-faceted public education focused strategic communications program.

8.4 Project and USAID Approach Issues

8.4.1. Redesign RGP with Fewer Activities and Budget Categories
One of the challenges faced by the project was difficulty in responding to requests from the Mission because of constraints posed by its operating framework and budget structures. USAID should review RGP’s operating plan to consider ways to make it more flexible, if possible consolidating key activities into 3 or 4 clusters, each with its own larger budget category.

8.4.2. Clarify RGP Focus
RGP was initially designed to operate in a context that has changed markedly over the past year. USAID should review the validity of RGP’s original objective of increasing responsiveness of the government to the people, and determine to what extent the project should re-orient itself to be responsive to the needs of the government itself in light of the current political transition.
ANNEX I – SCOPE OF WORK

USAID YEMEN, RGP MID-TERM EVALUATION
FINAL SCOPE OF WORK
March 31, 2012

I. Evaluation Use and Purpose

The purpose of this mid-term performance evaluation is to assess the implementation, effectiveness, and progress of the Responsive Governance Project (RGP) in Yemen. The findings of this evaluation will be used to inform USAID whether the program is on track to achieving programmatic goals, fiscal goals, and targets. Further, has the implementation of the project been supportive of the overarching USAID strategy in Yemen of positively impacting stabilization in key areas.35 Intended users of the evaluation will be the USAID/Yemen Mission, the implementing partner and YMEP.

The initial RGP project approach and design was based on the 2010-2012 USAID Yemen Country Strategy “to increase Yemen’s stability through targeted interventions in vulnerable areas.” As the strategy describes, this goal mandated localized, integrated development programming to address drivers of instability in specific areas of the country and to respond directly to the articulated community needs while, at the same time, improving governance capacities to mitigate the drivers of instability. Political instability and operational security challenges have resulted in delays in activity implementation as it limited mobility of the RGP staff to travel within Sana’a and only a few governorates.

The development hypothesis of the 2010-2012 USAID/Yemen strategy, which guides RGP’s Cooperative Agreement and therefore implementation, is that facilitating more equitable socio-economic development by strengthening public policies and institutions will contribute to the mitigation of key drivers of instability in Yemen. The overall result will be a more equitable, representative, transparent, responsive and reliable Yemeni government that meets the needs of its most vulnerable citizens to minimize behaviors that create instability, such as extremism, tribal conflict and violence. This hypothesis has not yet been fully tested but remains the aim of the current USAID strategy in Yemen which is valid through September 2012.

USAID’s assistance, including RGP, is specifically designed to provide support in areas where the Yemeni government does not have sufficient resources or expertise to execute, organize or manage such activities. To successfully implement the mission strategy, close collaboration with the Republic of Yemen was envisioned in order to improve the capacity of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) to provide basic services to its most vulnerable citizens; analyze, develop, and implement laws and policies, make government more accountable and transparent, and reform key service delivery institutions – all with the goal to mitigating the drivers of instability.

Development progress in Yemen is a major foreign policy priority for the US Government. Over the past few years and particularly as a result of the protracted Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, Yemen has

suffered from a struggling economy, limited opportunities for a large youth population, a rapidly growing population, unequal development, declining government revenues, growing natural resource scarcity, tribal and regional conflict, and violent extremism.

It is well recognized that many of the factors contributing to the current destabilized state of Yemen and the unexpected political and socio-economic changes of 2011 are beyond the capacity of USAID and the Implementing Partners to control and have had a significant impact on the implementation of USAID programs in Yemen.

Description of program to be evaluated: RGP, which started in May 2010, is a US$43,000,000 five-year project implemented by Counterpart International (Counterpart) as the prime contractor in a consortium that includes the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Research Triangle Institute (RTI). The program is designed to strengthen government institutions at the national and local levels in order to help them to improve the delivery of public services while encouraging more citizen participation in the political process. The program is also intended to facilitate more equitable socioeconomic development by strengthening public policies and institutions that will contribute to helping to mitigate key drivers of instability in Yemen. This is expected to result in a more equitable, representative, transparent, accountable, responsive and reliable Yemeni government that meets the needs of its citizens and especially its most vulnerable citizens.

Counterpart’s program approach to achieve the program goal and address the drivers of instability, as outlined in their Cooperative Agreement, entails strengthening policy formulation and implementation capacity at national, governorate and local levels; increasing transparency of and participation in ROYG processes and decisions; and promoting civil society participation in policy development and implementation. In implementing the program approach, RGP builds on the credibility that RGP’s implementers had established with the government prior to the award as well as ensures sustained, results-based capacity building in all of the activities they implement. The approach also focuses on increasing public participation in governance by offering constructive solutions and placing citizens at the center of the policy making process. Additionally, the approach focuses on engaging non-traditional actors (as described in the RGP Cooperative Agreement), namely youth and women, in all phases of program design, implementation and evaluations. Finally, the RGP approach emphasizes close collaboration with the USAID Community Livelihoods Project (CLP) as well as other USAID and non-USAID initiatives.

RGP is a key part of the Mission’s implementation program under the 2010-2012 USAID/Yemen Strategy and was structured to be technically complementary to the Community Livelihoods Program (CLP) that is implemented by Creative Associates. RGP’s Cooperative Agreement (page 13 in particular and throughout other sections) notes that collaborative relationships between RGP and CLP are expected to support seamless integration of the activities, objectives and approaches of the two programs, thus enhancing the overall program outcomes. USAID/Yemen views a close working relationship as absolutely key to the success of both RGP and CLP as their goals, objectives and approaches are strategically integrated. Further, RGP is responsible for monitoring outputs and measuring project impact, with verification of results and accomplishments conducted by USAID’s Yemen Monitoring and Evaluation Project (YMEP).

The overall USAID/Yemen Assistance Goal is “Yemen’s stability increased through targeted interventions in highly vulnerable areas.” The Assistance Objectives (AOs) of the strategy are: 1) livelihoods in vulnerable communities improved; and 2) governance capacities to mitigate drivers of instability improved.
The Intermediate Results (IRs) of these objectives that the RGP is responsible to achieve include the following:

IR 2.1 Public Policies and institutions facilitate more equitable socio-economic development
IR 2.2 Local governance and capacity for basic service provision improved
IR 2.3 Community-based institutions and mechanisms to ensure active participation in governance and locally driven solutions strengthened

Per the RGP RFA, the project also encompasses the following project objectives and areas from the US Government foreign assistance framework: governing justly and democratically, i.e. rule of law/human rights, good governance, and civil society; investing in people, health and education; and economic growth, financial sector, infrastructure, agriculture, private sector competitiveness, and economic opportunity.

The overall development hypothesis for RGP is that by improving the capacity of the ROYG
- to provide basic services to its most vulnerable citizens;
- to analyze, develop and implement laws and policies;
- to become a more accountable and transparent government; and
- to reform key service delivery institutions
progress will be achieved towards mitigating the drivers of instability noted in the 2010-2012 USAID/Yemen Strategy.

Following is RGP’s results framework from the 2011 approved RGP Performance Management Plan:

RGP Strategic Goal: Public policies and institutions strengthened to mitigate the drivers of instability in Yemen.

RGP AO 1: Policy formulation and implementation capacity strengthened
RGP IR 1.1: Government/civil society engagement infrastructure strengthened
RGP IR 1.2: Government policy formulation capacity strengthened
RGP IR 1.3: Government policy implementation design and planning capacity strengthened.

RGP AO 2: Transparency of and participation in ROYG processes and decisions increased
RGP IR 2.1: Financial accountability, tracking and disclosure promoted
RGP IR 2.2: Civil society engagement in transparency and anti-corruption initiatives promoted

RGP AO 3: Citizen participation in policy development and implementation increased
RGP IR 3.1: CSOs demonstrate increased institutional and advocacy capacity
RGP IR 3.2: Opportunities for cooperation between CSOs and the government improved
RGP IR 3.3: Increased media coverage of policy reform, service delivery and government accountability
II. Evaluation Questions

This mid-term performance evaluation will measure and analyze the accomplishments and/or progress to date toward achieving the RGP AO and IR results and ultimately the program goal. Given Mission concern with the burn rate, the evaluation will also examine and analyze the challenges (both internal and external) that have been confronted programmatically and financially (if any), highlight any aspects of the program that have proved successful and document why other aspects have not been successful. The primary evaluation questions are as follows:

- Is the RGP implementation approach of supporting the policy formulation and implementation capacity of the ROYG, strengthening the transparency of the ROYG and participation of civil society in ROYG processes and decisions and ensuring that citizens are engaged in every phase of program implementation an effective strategy for achieving the contracted program results? What progress has been achieved in each of these areas at this point in the program?
- Have the efforts to include women and youth in the program achieved expected results to date or has there been significant progress made toward achieving these results? What are these efforts and the resulting verifiable levels of participation of women and youth?
- Has the program achieved all of the other expected RGP results by this program midpoint i.e. end of March 2012?
- Do RGP’s current financial procedures and reporting allow USAID to match actual spending against the type of funds provided, program areas and program elements? How cost effective has RGP’s spending been from program inception through March 2012?

III. Data Collection and Analysis Methods

Evaluators are encouraged to use the following data collection and analysis methods: a review of data collected thus far with respect to the program; interviews with participants at all levels of the program (implementers, grantees, sub-grantees beneficiaries and the ROYG); interview with other major stakeholder (ROYG officials, donors and nontraditional actors at the local community level); and interviews, surveys and/or focus groups composed of a broad sample of beneficiaries of the RGP program.

A. Review of Data and M&E Systems

Evaluators will first put together an accurate historical narrative of the award from the signing of the award up to March 31 2012. This will include all challenges faced, stoppages or blockages of the work and reasons why, how problems were overcome, and what other steps were taken to correct or change the work flow. Also evaluators will summarize in the narrative expected program achievements, what factors made them successful, and overall progress vis-à-vis implementation along with any results or impact achieved by the project at this stage. The evaluators will also include a detailed explanation of the reasons why the project may not have made progress towards achieving certain expected results, as relevant.

In sum, the evaluators should analyze the program design and approach vis-à-vis each objective to determine their effectiveness by comparing outcomes/outputs to date against the work plan and the PMP, and determine whether the PMP and work plan are effectively linked and whether the data they include is detailed enough to establish causal links to the IRs and targets by number, quarter, year, sector, across sectors, geographical locations, and governorate/district. This analysis will help determine how successful the program has been thus far.
Taking into account quality and consistency, evaluators will determine whether program reporting has met USAID standards and whether sufficient baseline data was collected at the beginning of program implementation to support ongoing assessment of RGP achievements against these baselines.

Related to the above paragraphs, the evaluators will analyze the project’s M&E systems to assess if these are sufficient and appropriate to effectively document needed information to track and confirm project progress against anticipated output and outcome results.

B. Key Informant Interviews

Evaluators will conduct key informant interviews to examine the roles and program observations of Counterpart’s major partners including Research Triangle Institute (RTI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI); select parliament and legislative government officials, key agencies and local organizations, namely those that have received sub grants/advocacy grants.

The key Yemeni agencies and organizations include: Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC); Central Organization for Control and Audit (COCA); Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC); Yemeni CSOs including the Women and International Development Studies Center (WIDSC), the Yemeni Business Club, Yemen Polling Center (YPC), other local consulting groups, the University of Sana’a; selected members of parliament; the Democracy School; Youth Shurra Council; Youth Parliament; the Women’s Shadow Parliament; Ministry of Legal Affairs; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Local Administration; Ministry of Water and the Environment; Ministry of Public Health; Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation; Ministry of Finance; Lawyers’ Syndicate; the Women’s National Committee and Women’s Union, Teacher’s Syndicate, the General Yemeni Labor Union, the Agricultural Cooperative Syndicate; Yemeni Journalist Syndicate; High Tender Board; High Authority for Tender Control (HATC); and Yemen Coalition for Transparency and Anti-Corruption; reform leaders in the government (which are listed on page 37 of the Cooperative Agreement).

Interviews will also explore the following: how the political turmoil and transition in Yemen has impacted (either positively or negatively) the implementation and effectiveness of RGP achievements to date; how the current political reality unfolding in Yemen may impact the focus of RGP activities in 2012 and 2013, how security considerations have impacted implementation of the project and what mitigation measures RGP has taken to minimize security constraints on program implementation; whether RGP is using an integrated, participatory and inclusive approach to its interventions; whether RGP conducted adequate needs assessments of the parliament and legislative offices of the ROYG and CSOs to determine appropriate project interventions; whether RGP programming has been informed by and developed in response to these assessments; whether RGP has worked closely with the CLP to strengthen the overall integration of activities and coordination between these two USAID Yemen flagship projects, whether RGP has been able to successfully target beneficiaries for the interventions.

Since a large component of the program is focused on building capacity and strengthening government institutions to improve the delivery of public services while encouraging more citizen participation in the political process, interviews will also focus on how effective this has been, how effective creating government partnerships have been, whether the efforts to increase citizen involvement have been successful, if public policies and institutions have begun to be strengthened, and if the public has seen a difference in the actions of the ROYG in terms an increase in equality, transparency, responsiveness and reliability to meet the needs of Yemen’s most vulnerable citizens, as a result of RGP’s interventions.
**C. Beneficiary Interviews, Surveys and/or Focus Groups**

Interviews, surveys and/or focus groups with project beneficiaries will explore the questions of how youth and gender has been considered in reaching the program objectives; how involved the ROYG, Yemeni citizens and organizations have been in project identification, project prioritization and activity implementation; how aware the ROYG is of USAID’s RGP activities, explore how RGP trainings and capacity building events have positively impacted movement of ROYG policies to date, how the project is perceived and valued by the stakeholders (i.e. ROYG officials, beneficiaries, civil society, and other donors); citizen opinions of how the ROYG is doing in terms of service delivery and meeting the needs of vulnerable citizens; and whether the program incorporates an understanding of the national context and USAID’s 2010-2012 strategy in addressing targeted grievances driving instability.

**D. Program Results and Impact**

The evaluation will include a review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the RGP activities to determine whether the various activities funded to date contribute significantly to achieving program goals and helping to resolve or address key drivers of conflict/instability; and whether they are designed with relevant attention to the various social, political, and economic forces at play in Yemen. These analyses will help to determine if program activities have been sufficient to make a real impact, even at this mid-term stage, whether there any lessons learned from the first half of the program that can be applied to the remaining time and whether the program activities/components link to and reinforce each other.

**IV. The Evaluation Team**

1. **Team Leader:** One senior-level evaluation methodologist with extensive experience designing and conducting evaluations in fragile states as well as experience in evaluating USAID governance programs. The senior level evaluation methodologist will serve as team leader and be responsible for the document review, field work, interviews, analysis, the draft and final evaluation reports, and the debriefs in the field.
2. **Sector Expert:** A senior-level governance specialist who can evaluate the civil society, anticorruption support, and parliament and legislative office technical support. The senior level sector expert will work closely with the team leader and in all areas of document review, field work, interviews, analysis, the draft and final evaluation reports, and the debriefs in the field.
3. **Two local YMEP research assistants/evaluators.**

**V. Stakeholder Participation and Local Capacity**

The evaluation will utilize local research assistants/evaluators who will conduct focus group discussions, interviews or other means of project evaluation with program interlocutors and beneficiaries. Given the primary locus of RGP activities in Sana’a, the expatriate evaluation team members will be based in Sana’a during this evaluation review.

**VI. Evaluation Timeline and Logistics**

Team Leader: Total of approximately 53 days (based on 6 day work week) – 5 days for preparation, 36 days in field, 4 travel days, 5 days for first draft report writing, 3 days for revisions and final report preparation after comments received from USAID.
Team Member: approximately 53 days (based on 6 day work week) – 5 days for preparation, 36 days in field, 4 travel days, 5 days for first draft report writing, 3 days for revisions and final report preparation after comments received from USAID.

The Contractor is responsible for providing the required logistical support to undertake the evaluation. Prior to the launch of the evaluation, the Contractor will specify its main point of contact for the evaluation.

Final Evaluation Tasks

1. Desk Review
   a. Documents USAID and/or RGP will provide for desk review include:
      i. RGP RFA
      ii. RFP Cooperative Agreement and modifications
      iii. RGP PMP
      iv. Yemen Mission PMP
      v. RGP annual work plans
      vi. RGP Quarterly Program reports
      vii. RGP Weekly Reports
      viii. List of all RGP trainings completed or ongoing from June 2010-March 2012, in addition to summary of objective(s) for each training, participant names, participant titles and training dates
      ix. USAID Yemen country strategy
      x. YMEP’s Third Party Monitoring Report draft of RGP activities, Jan-Mar 2012
      xi. Other relevant RGP documents (success stories, articles, M&E procedures and protocols etc.)
      xii. RGP staffing organizational chart from June 2010 through end of March 2012 (noting changes and rationale that have been made to the staff and staffing/team structure of RGP).

2. Develop an appropriate methodology for the evaluation including data collection tools.

3. Prepare a field and HQ work plan, including interview plan (both current and former RGP and USAID staff responsible for RGP).

4. Field work with data gathering and analysis

5. Write a draft evaluation report with findings, lessons learned, conclusions, and recommendations

VII. Evaluation Deliverables

The contractor shall provide the following deliverables:

1. Brief outline of methodological approach for evaluation before departure for Yemen and a detailed evaluation budget.

2. A proposed itinerary, schedule for interviews, and list of all logistical support needs for the field visit based on desk review of documents and grants database, interview lists, and initial conversation with implementing partner staff regarding RGP. This deliverable shall ideally be submitted to the YMEP COTR and RGP AOTR prior to departure to Yemen; however, it can be adjusted within the first few days in on-ground in Yemen during the in-brief with USAID/Yemen.
3. Mid-field visit briefing to inform USAID of progress and any major issues encountered (date TBD with YMEP COTR)
4. Debrief with USAID Yemen 4 working days prior to departure to allow for Mission feedback and any additional field work, if needed
5. Draft of the evaluation report submitted to YMEP COP and IBTCI HQ two working days prior to departure from Yemen
6. Draft of the evaluation report submitted to USAID Yemen, seven days following departure from Yemen
7. Final evaluation report in English, deliverable no later than two weeks after receipt of all comments from USAID on first draft.

The USAID debrief and report must include recommendations by the evaluators that capture the best practices of the project thus far but also identify any shortcomings so that they can be addressed and a mid-course correction can be implemented as necessary. For example:

1. Recommendations for moving forward with regard to enhanced support to the new transition government;
2. Recommendations for working with ROYG to ensure their engagement and to enhance ROYG effectiveness;
3. Recommendations for improving the selection of advocacy and other sub-grant recipients;
4. Recommendations for increasing citizen participation with government issues; and
5. Recommendations to improve RGP’s financial processes and procedures with regard to overall program implementation and fiscal disbursements.
6. Recommendations to strengthen the integration/coordination with other flagship projects in Yemen to achieve the overall goals of the USAID Mission in Yemen.
ANNEX II – SELECTED DOCUMENTS REVIEWED, REFERENCES & BIBLIOGRAPHY


USAID. (2009). *Preliminary Background Papers for the Workshop to Produce and Inter-Agency Conflict Assessment of Yemen.* Washington: USAID.


USAID. (2010). *Cooperative Agreement for Responsive Governance Project awarded to Counterpart International: USAID*


ANNEX III – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization/Project</th>
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<td>+967-1-250116</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mabbasi@mpic.gov.ye">mabbasi@mpic.gov.ye</a></td>
<td>7/04/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Member of Parliament; Chair, Committee on Public Health &amp; Population</td>
<td>Parliament, Government of Yemen</td>
<td>Parliament, Sana’a</td>
<td>713743105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emtinan Al-Medhwahi</td>
<td>Institutional Strengthening Manager</td>
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<td>RGP</td>
<td>736777960</td>
<td><a href="mailto:emidwahi@rgpyemen.org">emidwahi@rgpyemen.org</a></td>
<td>6/12/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Secretary, Committee on</td>
<td>Parliament, Government of Yemen</td>
<td>Parliament, Sana’a</td>
<td>777-274-935</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Esam.krada@gmail.com">Esam.krada@gmail.com</a></td>
<td>7/01/12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Location</td>
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<td>Date First Contact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Essam Abdullah Al-Halali</td>
<td>Member Head of International Cooperation</td>
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<td>SNACC, Sana’a</td>
<td>711611511</td>
<td><a href="mailto:essam@snaccyemen.org">essam@snaccyemen.org</a></td>
<td>6/26/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisal Al-Magidi</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Yemeni Bar Syndicate</td>
<td>telephone</td>
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<td>6/30/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatma Uqba</td>
<td>Advocacy Manager</td>
<td>RGP</td>
<td>RGP Office, Sana’a</td>
<td></td>
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<td>6/10/12</td>
</tr>
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<td><a href="mailto:htherrien@ndi.org">htherrien@ndi.org</a></td>
<td>6/05/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatma Uqba</td>
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<td>RGP Office, Sana’a</td>
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<td>6/10/12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hussein Alwady</td>
<td>Communication &amp; Outreach Manager</td>
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<td>735200261</td>
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<td>6/12/12</td>
</tr>
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<td>Responsive Governance Program</td>
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<td>6/26/12</td>
</tr>
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<td>All Girls Association</td>
<td>All Girls Assoc</td>
<td>733277110</td>
<td><a href="mailto:intadhi@gmail.com">intadhi@gmail.com</a> <a href="mailto:allgirls1@gmail.com">allgirls1@gmail.com</a></td>
<td>6/30/12</td>
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<td>7/08/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>287518 73321023</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Ishraqm5@yahoo.com">Ishraqm5@yahoo.com</a></td>
<td>6/27/12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6/06/12</td>
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<td>Deputy Minister</td>
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<td>7/07/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>+967-711-003-</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jthomson@ibtci.com">jthomson@ibtci.com</a></td>
<td>5/23/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
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<td>Phone</td>
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<td>YMEP Project</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5/24/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Al- Hussaini</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>6/05/12</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>6/05/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>5/24/12</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>736 777 949</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Sheikh Senan Al-Aji</td>
<td>Member of Parliament; Report of Law &amp; Constitutional Committee</td>
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<td>RGP</td>
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<td>7/07/12</td>
</tr>
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<td>7/03/12</td>
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### ANNEX IV - SAMPLE RGP WORKPLAN

**RGP ANNUAL WORK PLAN**

**OCTOBER 01, 2011 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2012**

**LAST UPDATED: AUGUST 15, 2011**

**Program Component and Deliverable Area**

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<th>Activity</th>
<th>Outputs and Milestones</th>
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<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Review a Policy on Accelerated Learning for Grades 7 to 9</td>
<td>Accelerated Learning Policy for Grades 7 to 9 formulated</td>
<td>$200,000 $150,000 $350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure the implementation of the Female Teacher Quota (30%) in the recruitment of teachers</td>
<td>Increase in the number of female teachers recruited</td>
<td>$200,000 $350,000 $550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve MOE’s Information and Performance Management System</td>
<td>MOE’s Information and Performance Management System installed and staff trained</td>
<td>$200,000 $200,000 $400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of Free Delivery and Free Family Planning Decrease</td>
<td>Free Delivery and Free Family Planning Policy Decrease implemented</td>
<td>$200,000 $185,000 $385,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulate Policy for Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC)</td>
<td>EmOC Policy formulated and Passed through legislation</td>
<td>$200,000 $220,000 $420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Safe Motherhood and Personal Status Law Analysis</td>
<td>Public hearings on child marriage held</td>
<td>$300,000 $275,000 $575,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve MoPHP’s Information system including Reproductive Health Management and Information System (RHMIS) and Supervision</td>
<td>RHMIS installed and staff trained</td>
<td>$200,000 $190,000 $390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Support the establishment and implementation of the “One-Stop Shop” (including a shop for women) for registration and permits for export</td>
<td>One-Stop Shop Established</td>
<td>$275,000 $200,000 $475,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the establishment of a Complaints Unit in the MAI to serve as a central clearinghouse for receiving and addressing complaints from stakeholders such as communities and CSOs</td>
<td>Complaints Unit in the MAI established and staff trained</td>
<td>$200,000 $150,000 $350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review Existing Laws and Regulations on Pesticides and the use of other Agricultural Chemicals</td>
<td>Report on existing Laws and Regulations on pesticides completed</td>
<td>$100,000 $175,000 $275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve Coordination between the Different Departments of the MAI to Avoid Redundancy</td>
<td>Coordination between the different Departments of the MAI improved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review existing laws, decrees and regulations for water with a focus on responsible drilling</td>
<td>Report on laws, decrees and regulations for water with a focus on responsible drilling completed</td>
<td>$150,000 $200,000 $350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the establishment of a Technical Committee within the Ministry of Water and Environment (MoWE) and National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) in MAI</td>
<td>Technical Committee within MoWE and NWRA/MAI Established</td>
<td>$75,000 $125,000 $200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Growth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MISME) Charter</td>
<td>MISMEs Charter Established</td>
<td>$275,000 $300,000 $575,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the implementation of the Microfinance Law</td>
<td>System established for monitoring the implementation of the Microfinance Law</td>
<td>$250,000 $250,000 $500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct an assessment on the current economic situation in Yemen</td>
<td>Assessment and recommendations for the economic situation in Yemen completed</td>
<td>$150,000 $150,000 $300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Component and Deliverable Area</td>
<td>Outputs and Milestones</td>
<td>Budget by Activity (US$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen linkages between the private sector and the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (MoTEVT)</td>
<td>Report outlining potential areas for collaboration between the Private Sector and MoTVET</td>
<td>Oct-Mar: $50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and Anti-Corruption</td>
<td>Comprehensive plan for establishing and running the Coordination Unit within Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC) approved</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build capacity of government employees on enhancing transparency, protecting public funds and combating corruption</td>
<td>Government employees trained on effective implementation and application of transparency and anticorruption measures</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop an effective legislative framework to strengthen accountability and prevent corruption</td>
<td>Legislative amendments are finalized and draft amendments are placed on the Parliament’s Agenda</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen complaints and data collection systems of anticorruption institutions</td>
<td>Complaints and data collection systems for anticorruption institutions established</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for the Passing of the Access to Information Law</td>
<td>Increase Awareness about the Access to Information Law</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization and Local Governance</td>
<td>Performance Management Standards Developed for MOLA</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>National Policy Conference Held</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build the capacity of Civil Society In Policy Engagement and Advocacy</td>
<td>CSOs receive capacity building In Policy Engagement and Advocacy</td>
<td>$35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidate NGO Law and Hold Public Hearing</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations Coalesce around the NGO Law</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Policy documents and platforms reviewed and revised</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Policy Origination for Emerging Political Parties</td>
<td>Emerging entities registered as Political Parties</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Civic Education</td>
<td>Informed debate on political reform conducted</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate Civil Society and Legislative Engagement</td>
<td>Information sessions completed by the C50 department to familiarize committees and legislative stakeholders of the role of the department</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Cutting Issues</td>
<td>Public hearing on Freedom of the Press Held</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the Professionalization of Yemen Journalists</td>
<td>Journalists receive training and write articles about the impact of policies on constituents</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Youth Development and Engagement</td>
<td>Youth Coalitions established and actively engaged</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Women’s Empowerment</td>
<td>Report on Gender Analysis of Policies and Legislation completed with each legislation reviewed by the project</td>
<td>$345,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## RGP Annual Work Plan July 01, 2011 - September 30, 2012 with Activity Budgeting

### Quick Impact Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Component and Deliverable Area</th>
<th>Outputs and Milestones</th>
<th>Budget by Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Exams Campaign for MOE</td>
<td>80% Attendance in the National Exams Achieved</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back to School Campaign for MOE</td>
<td>600,000 Returning Students and 500,000 New Students</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide assistance to Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)</td>
<td>Ministries Damage Assessment Report consolidated and presented to core donor group</td>
<td>$30,000 $30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to the IDP Coordination Unit in streamlining registration process</td>
<td>IDP Registration System Established at the IDP Coordination Unit</td>
<td>$30,000 $30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$60,000 $60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Budget Oct 2011 - Sept 2012**: $4,535,000 $4,591,000 $9,126,000
ANNEX V – JANUARY 31, 2012 MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

31 January 2012
MEETING MEMORANDUM
TO: FILES

Meeting Participants:
Neal P. Cohen, USAID Program Officer
Evan Scott Thomas, RGP Chief of Party, Operations
Ismail Mansour, RGP Deputy Chief of Party, Operations
Melooloo Karlim, RGP Director, Communications and M&E
Sibel Berzeg, Counterpart International Vice President
Stephanie Baric, Director of Yemen Programs

A meeting held on January 24, 2012 was requested by Neal Cohen to discuss reconciliation of RGP expenses to date against USAID attributions of Federal Letter of Credit (FLOC) draw-downs in USAID's Phoenix database with the desired result of correctly attributing expenditures against USAID's Program Elements. This memorandum serves as a record of that preliminary discussion, and not agreement by either party on final steps to be taken.

Neal Cohen stated that disbursements from our FLOC have been attributed as Phoenix database line items in USAID/W, but that this was done without any guidance from the Mission and that as a result several line items had been drawn down to zero. The total amount disbursed from our FLOC as of January 17, 2012 was $11,407,487. The Phoenix line items that have been drawn down to zero are those for good governance, political competition and consensus-building, civil society, as well as sub-line items for family planning and reproductive health, one of two sub-line items for basic education, and a sub-line item for higher education. There was no linkage to Counterpart financial reporting.

Neal also stated that according to pp. 2-3 of USAID's cooperative agreement with Counterpart International, funding sources were explicitly listed, and it was USAID's expectation that RGP would track project expenses by funding source when reporting expenses to USAID/W, in addition to accounting for expenses according to the line items in the budget of the cooperative agreement, and the amended cooperative agreement, as has been RGP's practice to date. RGP participants explained that there is no such reporting requirement in the Agreement, and as such we have been reporting expenses according to our approved budget.

As things currently stand, there are no funds remaining in the program elements referenced above. But since expenditures by Program Element are not currently tracked in Phoenix, Counterpart may continue to make expenditures according to the budget line items in RGP's Cooperative Agreement until reconciliation is made between what USAID is currently reporting to Phoenix as RGP's expenditures by Program Element and RGP's "good faith" estimates by Program Element.
MEMORANDUM OF MEETING
January 31, 2012

Counterpart participants agreed that we need to proceed with revising our accounting systems so as to reflect expenses by USAID/Yemen’s program element starting as of January 1, 2012 and to continue to collect this data. Vouchers will continue to be submitted as in the past until a reconciliation can be made.

And, in order to address and correct the zeroed-out line items, meeting participants agreed that a good faith effort would be made by Counterpart to estimate all costs incurred by the project since project inception through December 31, 2011, according to the line items in the Phoenix database; noting that we cannot verify those figures since we had not previously received instructions from USAID to account for expenditures in that manner. Neal stated that when USAID submits the proposed realignment of the RGP costs in Phoenix, we should include a Memo to the files explaining the situation, and formally request USAID (at that time) to accept our best estimates in lieu of accounting records for that period.

Neal has required that as of January 1, 2012, Counterpart must initiate an accounting process that classifies all project expenses both according to line items in the project’s budget in RGP’s cooperative agreement; and according to USAID database program elements, on a quarterly basis. The reporting by program elements ought not be sent to Cairo until reconciliation has been completed. Counterpart took that instruction under advisement, but noted that we would need to discuss any proposed changes to RGP expense reporting with our VP for Finance and Compliance. We also noted that we still have not received any written guidance from USAID, explicitly stating this requirement - thus the need for this memorandum.

RGP staff noted that we believe that reporting by program element will likely require a Budget Modification that reflects the new budget allocations. It was further discussed that the revised budget will involve using predetermined formulas to share out management, administrative, operations and security costs to each of the Phoenix database line items. It is expected by USAID that the revised budget allocation of overhead will follow standard accounting procedures.

The signatories below concur that this was the general understanding of the meeting:

Evan Scott Thomas, RGP Chief of Party
Neal Cohen, USAID Program Officer
ANNEX VI – LETTER FROM COUNTERPART INTERNATIONAL TO USAID JUNE 4, 2012

June 4, 2012

Harvey Eichenfeld
USAID, Regional Office of Procurement,
1A Ahmed Kamel Street,
New Maadi, Cairo - Egypt

Dear Mr. Eichenfeld,

I am writing to inform you that due to the lack of obligated funding for the Yemen Responsive Governance Project (279-A-00-10-00028-00), that we have commenced close down procedures for the project and plan to close the office, terminate all local staff and redeploy all expatriate positions within 30 days. Please note that as per standard protocol, the AID office was officially informed on March 19, 2012 that the project was at 75% of obligated funds, and was again informed on May 30, 2012 that the project had reached over 95% of its obligated funding. In the May 30, 2012 correspondence, we noted that we would be forced to commence close-down procedures on June 4, 2012 if additional obligations had not yet been received.

As per Article II of our agreement, Counterpart has implemented the program in accordance with the agreed upon workplan. However, due to lack of adequate obligated funding, we have no choice but to treat this as an unanticipated de-funding action and commence close-out procedures. We of course assume that, as in the case of an actual termination, USAID will reimburse our allowable and reasonable phase-down costs.

Please note that in order for us to execute a responsible close out of the program, the following will occur:
- June 6, 2012 at 10:00 a.m. Sanaa time, staff will receive their 30 day notice.
- By June 8, 2012 all local grantees will be informed of project termination.
- Any equipment and unused supplies over $5,000 will be transferred to the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a or, if approved, to program beneficiaries.

Given the devastating effect this will cause on the progress of the program as well as the staff stability, it is our hope that your office will obligate funds in a timely way so that we can avoid these actions.

Sincerely,

Joan Parker
CEO
Counterpart International

Cc: Charles Swagman, AOTR, SwagmanCF@state.gov, CSwagman@usaid.gov
ANNEX VII – RGP OUTCOMES

RGP Outcome Description
SEMC Advocates Successfully for the Access to Information (ATI) Law

Outcome Description: On April 24, 2012, parliament passed the right of Access to Information law. The Studies Economic Media Center (SEMC) advocated for the Access to Information Law from January 2012 until its passage in April.

Significance: Yemen is rated 164 on the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2011). The Access to Information Law gives citizens the right to request information from the government unless the information falls into certain categories. The law will help combat corruption and enhance transparency in Yemen by protecting the rights of Yemeni citizen to participate in monitoring government performance and services delivery.

RGP’s contribution to the outcome: The Access to Information bill was stalled in the process to become a bill for more than four years. Prior to RGP, the Studies Economic Media Center (SEMC) had convened the Access to Information Coalition, with the support of NDI, but the work had stopped. On August 8-10, 2011, RGP conducted a workshop on RGP Policy Orientation and Proposal Writing to CSOs. During that workshop, SEMC selected chose to work on the ATI and submitted proposal to do so. In December 2011, RGP awarded SEMC a grant to activate the 25-member coalition representing CSOs, SNACC, Ministry of Human Rights, Ministry of Legal Affairs, journalists, lawyers, women and youth.

SEMC provided 15 days of advocacy training to the coalition. Following the training, the coalition launched a coordinated campaign with many letters and informal meetings with members of parliament.

On January 30, RGP hosted a lunch to provide relationship opportunities between SEMC and two Ministers who are champions for the anti-corruption laws. The next day the Minister of Human Rights Hooria Mashoor and Dr. Belquis Abo Osba, Vice-Chairwoman of SNACC, formally opened an RGP-sponsored workshop speaking in favor of the Access to Information law and the Whistle-Blowers Protection law. The session drew more than 140 people, including representatives from six government Ministries, members of Parliament, journalists and activists. During the workshop, SEMC obtained approximately 100 signatures from those pledging their support for the ATI law.

During the campaign, RGP staff provided continuous motivation and consultation urging SEMC to work closely with other key stakeholders such as the Supreme National Committee for Combating Corruption (SNACC) and Central Organization for Control and Audit (COCA).

When the bill was put on the agenda, Mr. Mustafa Nasr, Director of SEMC, stood at the door of the parliament chamber and pressed upon every member the importance of passing the law as they entered.
RGP Outcome Description
The All Girls Association conducts a Back to School Campaign for the Ministry of Education

Outcome: The All Girls Association (AG) and the Ministry of Education demonstrate the capacity to conduct public outreach campaigns to citizens through implementing a Back to School Campaign from July to December 2011.

Significance: The percentage of school enrollment in Yemen is quite low, and the armed conflict in 2011 discouraged parents from sending their children back to school. Because at least 10 Yemeni governorates were facing different kind of armed conflict, the Ministry of Education felt that it was crucial to inform parents of the registration period for the coming academic year and mobilize parents and communities to register children.

RGP’s contribution: The Ministry of Education (MoE) requested assistance from RGP to implement a Back to School Campaign; an agreement was signed between RGP and the MoE on 23 July 2011.

RGP enhanced All Girls’ capacity in writing outreach campaign proposals through training workshops and close supervision for the development of the proposals. Then RGP provided All Girls with a sub-grant to design and implement the outreach campaign and planning began in July 2011. In addition, RGP hosted relationship-building meetings between the association and the Ministry to help establish a strong partnership between them. RGP also helped to build bridges between the two main partners (AG and the Ministry) and other international donors who supported the production of the campaign communication materials. During the four months of the campaign, RGP provided technical assistance to AG and the Ministry in the development of campaign plans, identification of the target audience and the production of high quality communication materials. RGP remained in constant contact through meetings, follow-up emails and phone calls. The project assisted in the processes of drafting and revising the communication materials, as well as scheduling distribution.

The campaign began publication of newspaper announcements and broadcast of television public service announcements two weeks before registration for the academic year, which began on 15 September. The academic year started on 24 September, but registration continued through 15 October (in some governorates through November). The campaign continued through the end of school registration.
RGP Outcome Description
SDF consolidates damage assessments for the Prime Minister’s Office

**Outcome:** From December 2011 to May 2012, the Social Democratic Forum (SDF), worked with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to document the urgent needs of the government facilities that had been damaged. SDF employed SPSS decision management software to compile all relevant data and documentation concerning the repair needs of 21 government entities (of 34) and generated an analysis of findings and a set of recommendations.

**Significance:** Damages suffered during the political uprisings in 2011 prevented the normal functioning of 34 Ministries and governmental agencies in the Al-Hasba Zone of the capital city. The damage assessment report assisted the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) in systematically seeking international support for repairs so that government entities can return to functioning effectively. The constructive role played by SDF provides an example of a collaborative working relationship between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and civil society during this critical transition period. Previously, the PMO had never worked in such a coordinated manner with civil society, as it had in this activity.

**RGP’s contribution to the outcome:** The Former Vice President (the current President) issued a decree to the Former Prime Minister to gather damage assessment reports from Ministries. This resulted in a subsequent cabinet decree, requesting assessments be conducted for all government entities affected by the conflict in the Al-Hasabah area.

The PMO approached RGP for support in the implementation of this task. A series of meetings between the PMO and RGP resulted in a Ministerial decree to create a joint taskforce between the PMO and RGP. The mandate of the task-force was to closely coordinate efforts in collecting and analyzing the damage reports, as well as coordinating the process for other governmental institutions, particularly MOPIC.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between PMO and RGP was signed, which clarified the roles and responsibilities of the PMO, RGP and its partner, SDF, in gathering the damage assessment reports from the Ministries. As the cabinet decree instructed, each Ministry assigned a technical team to assess and report on damages to the PMO. Ministries submitted costing information directly to MOPIC.

The role of SDF, supported by RGP, was to consolidate and analyze the assessment reports. SDF held two consultative meetings with 21 governmental entities. The first was to develop the needs assessment template and identify the information required to complete their report. The second consultative meeting was to present the final template and report, for review and approval from the governmental entities. These two key sessions were held in coordination and with RGP and the PMO. There was no discussion regarding the potential source of funding for the affected Ministries to implement the repairs. The MOU stated that SDF will assist MOPIC in organizing a donor conference which is still pending.

The PMO then submitted a letter to MOPIC to inform them of the completion of the assessment and requesting MOPIC to continue the work in coordinating with International donors to address the needs.
RGP Outcome Description
Graduates of the Youth Civics Education Academy conduct grassroots initiatives

Outcome: In February 2012, the Global Change Makers (GCM) youth initiative conducted civic education training for 75 youth activists (45 men & 30 women) in democratic processes, the political and electoral systems, and role of CSOs in political participation at the Future University in Sana’a, Yemen.

Significance: Most Yemenis have little civic engagement knowledge or experience. Basic civic education will equip citizens to engage with their government and take part in democratic processes during this critical time of transition.

RGP’s contribution: During the transition, RGP responded quickly to the emerging needs on the ground and with only two weeks of preparation hosted a 3-week Civic Education Academy for CSO representatives and activists who had no previous experience in civic engagement.

RGP trained the youth in political and electoral systems, the roles of the three branches of government (executive, judiciary, legislature), means of democratic participation, including the role of CSOs and political parties, as well as and how to train trainers. RGP also provided the training materials that Global Change Makers used in their civic education training.

In total, RGP trained 118 participants in two Civic Education Youth Academies. 28 graduates conducted 36 activities which reached approximately 2270 individuals (420 women). The grassroots initiatives included trainings, focus group discussions, seminars, and the use of Facebook to spread civic education materials. Members of one CSO met with parliamentarians to discuss the issue of President Saleh’s immunity and reported back to Change Square. Journalists were also invited to the academy with the goal that they would be able to write more informed articles on the situation.
RGP Outcome Description
Parliament Conducts a Public Hearing on the Health Insurance Law

Outcome: On December 13, 2010, two parliamentary committees -- the Public Health and Population Committee and the Committee on Labor and Social Affairs -- held a public hearing. The two committees utilized citizen testimony provided in the hearing to revise the draft Health Insurance Law. Citizen witnesses, consisting primarily of representatives from 31 CSOs provided testimony according to the public hearing rules.

Significance: This was the first public hearing in the history of Yemen’s parliament. Parliamentary committees do not generally rely on external experts in drafting legislation. The Health Insurance bill was stalled in the process of becoming a law. The public hearing provided an opportunity for large-scale involvement of citizens, CSOs and the media in the process of legislation, which in turn, resulted in a draft law that more closely represents the interests of the citizens.

RGP’s contribution: The Public Health and Population (PHP) committee was one of seven parliamentary committees selected by RGP in keeping with the project’s sectoral foci.

In October early 2010, RGP selected 5 CSOs working in the health arena and facilitated a relationship-building meeting between PHP committee and the CSOs to discuss ways of working together. RGP facilitated access to the Parliament building for CSOs; many of these CSOs had never entered the parliament before.

On October 27-30, RGP trained all seven selected parliamentary committees in public hearing rules and procedures. The participating committees conducted a mock hearing with RGP technical assistance (TA). The RGP consultant (George Crawford) met with the Parliamentary Presidium to discuss the public hearing process. The Presidium appointed a Public Hearing Task Force to draft rules for public hearings. Mr. Crawford provided TA to the Task Force and revised the draft produced by the Task Force. The public hearing rules were finalized by the Task Force in consultation with Mr. Crawford. Several parliamentary committees have used the final draft version of the rules and procedures to conduct a number of hearings (approximately 7).

The PHP committee elected to hold a public hearing on the Health Insurance law. To prepare for the public hearing, the PHP committee sent written invitations to testify to the list of registered CSOs working on issues related to the law. The PHP also convened the selected CSOs and gave them guidance on how to testify according to the draft rules and procedures. The PHP also invited media to attend the hearing. CSOs demonstrated respect for the rules by submitting their testimony in writing before the hearing, and keeping their remarks within the allotted time. The hearing ran smoothly and efficiently, demonstrating the effective preparations by committee staff and a clear understanding by all parties of the purpose of a public hearing and their roles in the process.
RGP Outcome Description

The Safe Motherhood bill is approved by the parliamentary committee for Public Health and Population (PHP)

Outcome Description: In June 2012, the Safe Motherhood bill was approved by the parliamentary committee for Public Health and Population (PHP). The bill will be presented to the Islamic Shariah Committee; if approved, it is expected to be presented for a vote in Parliament in the second week of July. The amended version of the law represents the collaborative efforts of the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP), the parliamentary committee for Public Health and Population (PHP), and two CSOs advocating for the law – the Yemeni Family Care Association (YFCA) and the National Safe Motherhood Alliance (NSMA).

Significance: The maternal mortality rate in Yemen is still one of the highest in the world and this reflects the low quantity and quality of maternal services. The Safe Motherhood Law establishes standards for Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC), free delivery services and free birth planning and provides a basis for the MoPHP to request increased resources to provide better standard services.

RGP’s contribution: The MoPHP prioritized passage of the bill which had been stalled in the parliamentary process since 2008 due to sensitive religious issues. Dr. Jamilah Al-Rabie, Deputy Minister of Health, took an active role in revising the law. RGP supported the MoPHP by hiring a team of technical and legal experts who reviewed the original version of the bill to identify gaps and suggest amendments. The expert team conducted discussions and negotiations with the various stakeholders, including government officials, experts, donors, CSOs and parliament. Progress on the bill was made through relationship-building and negotiation processes.

Parallel to its support to the MoPHP, RGP provided training and a grant to YFCA and NSMA to conduct advocacy activities in support of the bill including, meetings with the parliamentarians and decision makers, producing relevant studies and materials, and contributing to discussions regarding the amendments and revisions.

The PHP committee played a significant role in revising the language of the key amendments presented to them by Dr. Jamilah. The PHP committee conducted two discussion meetings, during which time they consulted CSOs including YFCA to get the right definition of EMOC. The PHP committee will have big role supporting the bill through passage in the parliament.

The negotiations on the bill culminated in a workshop attended by nearly 70 stakeholders. The workshop participants reached consensus on the bill which was then finalized by the MoPHP. The MoPHP and the head of the PHP committee submitted the bill jointly to the PHP committee for approval.
RGP Outcome Description

SNACC Establishes an Anti-Corruption Coordination Unit

**Outcome:** On October 22, 2011, the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC) issued a decree to establish the National Anticorruption Strategy (NACS) Coordination Unit within SNACC and initiated its operation to strengthen coordination and cooperation among partners of the National Integrity System (NIS).

**Significance:** Yemen is rated 166 in the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2011). Corruption diverts the country’s limited resources, contributes to instability and ultimately hinders development and prosperity of the nation. The NACS Coordination Unit is inspired to strengthen coordination and cooperation among NIS partners to implement the NACS action plan to fight corruption.

**RGP’s contribution:** In July 2010, SNACC launched a National Anticorruption Strategy (NACS) aiming at mitigating corruption in Yemen and assigning partners of National Integrity System (NIS) to implement its action plan 2010-2014. Unfortunately, NACS was inadequately implemented because of poor coordination within partners. To address this issue, RGP deployed a national governance consultant in July 2011 to work with SNACC for two months who coordinated with the SNACC board and technical staff from one side and key officials representing opposing NIS partners from the other side and through a series of relationship-building and negotiation processes, the consultant drafted a “Project Proposal” on establishing and running NACS Coordination Unit. The draft proposal was discussed in a workshop with NIS partners and was ultimately accepted by SNACC.

**Data on Outcome Indicators for Each Program Assistance Area**

**Outcomes in Assistance Area 1: Policy Formulation & Implementation Capacity of ROYG**
The table below summarizes the data on progress towards outcomes in policy formulation and implementation capacity as of Q2 2012. A few discrepancies were found between various data sources within the project (indicator 1.1). As noted in the section on the M&E system, tools should be developed for aggregating data on indicators at the team level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Q2 2012 Achieved</th>
<th>2012* Target</th>
<th>Case Studies (Outcome Harvest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Number of policies or plans adopted or implemented by the government that demonstrate input from women and youth</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>10 Revised to 17</td>
<td>National Women’s Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(USAID/Yemen) Number of draft policies accompanied by technical analysis funded with USG assistance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Access to Information (Q3 2012) Safe Motherhood (Q3 2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Number of USG- supported anti-corruption measures and procedures adopted. (2.2.4-7)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SNACC Coordination Unit (Q1 2012) Access to Information (Q3 2012) PLMP Phase 1 (Q2 2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*84 Unless otherwise noted, figures reflect the PMP submitted to USAID on March 29, 2011.*
### 1.1 Number of policies or plans adopted or implemented by the government that demonstrate input from women and youth.

- Approximate number of 12-14 reported for Q2.
- Prior to Q2, only one other policy of plan had been adopted – the SNACC Coordination Unit on October 22, 2011.
- Data quality issues: Names and numbers reported by staff varied. It is difficult to justify two “undefined” women’s priorities.
- Finding: To date, the policies or plans demonstrate more input from women than from youth. 8-10 of the policies were generated by the National Women’s Dialogue conference in March 2012.

#### Details (Policies/plans 5 – 14 are associated with the Yemeni Women’s National Agenda)

1. Safe Motherhood law (Ministry of Public Health and Population)
2. One Stop Shop (Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation)
3. Access to Information law
4. Pesticide residue legislature (this law was not included in the calculations of Program Policy Director)
5. Ensure 30% quota for women’s participation in all executives committees under the GCC initiative implementation mechanism
6. Introduce constitutional amendments that ensure 30% quota for women in all appointed and elected positions in legislative, judiciary and executive realms
7. Take measures that assist women to own and manage income generating projects in the private sector
8. Mainstream women’s empowerment activities and budget in government general budget,
9. Increase access of mothers to right based maternity health services to reduce maternal mortality rates through adequate funding of emergency obstetric services, and support to enhance quality of care through increased employment of female midwives in rural areas.
10. Increase utilization of adequate and modern family planning methods to reduce total fertility rates of women in reproductive age through support to family planning commodities and community awareness programming.
11. Passing a law on Compulsory Basic Education and implementation of its executive mechanism,
12. Enhance Employment of rural female teachers through 30%quota of public education sector jobs.
13. As yet undefined women’s priority
14. As yet undefined women’s priority

In addition, three laws have been drafted and are under discussion within the Ministry of Education:

- Private Education Law
- Quality General Directorate
- Female Teachers Recruitment

#### Indicator 1.3: (USAID/Yemen) Number of draft policies accompanied by technical analysis funded with USG assistance.

RGP reported one achievement for this the period – technical analysis on the One Stop Shop policy with the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MoAI). During Quarter 3, while the evaluation was on-going, RGP contributed to the technical analysis of three additional draft policies:

3. The Pesticides Residue Legislation
4. Access to Information Law
5. Safe Motherhood bill

1.4 Number of USG- supported anti-corruption measures and procedures adopted. (2.2.4-7)
   The project reports one anti-corruption measure for Q2 2012; the specific measure adopted was not reported. The evaluation collected data on two examples, and the PLMP was covered in the (Outcome Harvests) to report here.
   4. SNACC establishes anti-corruption coordination unit (Quarter 1 2012)
   5. YOHR does advocacy with SNACC for the Access to Information legislation (Q3 2012)
   6. PLMP Phase 1 (Q2 2012)

1.1.1 Number of service delivery standards developed and/or implemented by key ministries/entities with RGP support
   Conflicting information regarding this information was provided in the quarterly report. The indicator value provided was (1). However, the narrative stated that work with the MOE to develop performance standards for service delivery in primary education had stalled (p. 16). Staff confirmed that correct value for this indicator is zero for Q2.

Outcomes in Assistance Area 2: Strengthening the Transparency of the RYOG

Overview of Outcome Indicators Assistance Area 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2012 Target</th>
<th>Q2 2012 Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>Number of bills or amendments drafted that reflect public input and/or legislative analysis.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>Number of times the Parliament summons ministers for policy, legislative or regulatory questioning.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>Number of public hearings conducted by the Parliament to seek public input on legislative issues</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Number of revised and/or new party platforms developed by political parties and political groupings as a result of RGP assistance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>Number of political parties that engage branch membership in developing policies or platforms</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3</td>
<td>Number of initiatives that parties implement to communicate policies and platforms to members and voters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.1 Number of bills or amendments drafted that reflect public input and/or legislative analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Questioning</th>
<th>Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 3, 2012</td>
<td>The House of Representatives approved the interpellation of the ministers of interior and defense to clarify the security violations that took place in the capital of Sana’a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 7, 2012</td>
<td>The Presidium of the Parliament sends a letter of interpellation to the government to be present in order to clarify the level of implementation of the recommendations of the parliament.</td>
<td>Amendment of the article (50) of the law (5) of 2011 about the regulation and protection of the livestock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 8, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 17, 2012</td>
<td>The Parliament approved the interpellation of the reconciliation government to question them on the control of Rada’a City by Al</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2.1.2 Number of times the Parliament summons ministers for policy, legislative or regulatory questioning.

1. MP Al-Hajri requests interpellation of Minister of Information on fulfillment of neutrality of the official media: Jan 1st, 2012
2. Parliamentarian demands for interpellation of the Military Committee on the level of their achievement of its tasks stated in the Implementation Mechanism of the GCC Agreement: Jan 2nd, 2012
4. Interpellation of the reconciliation government on the level of achievement of the commitments made before the parliament in the vote-of-confidence session held last week: Jan 7th, 2012
5. Investigating the Ministers of Information and Human Rights on the legal justification of suspending Al-Ayam Newspaper. The Parliament approved information of the Endowment and Religious Affairs Minister to attend the Parliament tomorrow in order to discuss the report and the commitments to the recommendations: Jan 18, 2012

## Indicator 2.1.3 Number of public hearings conducted by the Parliament to seek public input on legislative issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Public Hearings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 2010 (PMP v.1)</td>
<td>8. Health Insurance (Sana’a, 13 Dec 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Constitutional amendment (Sana’a, 18 January 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Constitutional amendment to allow President Saleh to stand for election one more time (Sana’a, 19 January 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2011</td>
<td>12. Private Health Institutes bill (Aden, 14 May 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Water Bill (Hodeidah, 15 May 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Indicator 2.2.3 Number of initiatives that parties implement to communicate policies and platforms to members and voters

1. During Q2 2102: The Wattan Party announced that it will be reformed as a political party (Indicator 2.2.3). NDI continued to track progress on these indicators in Q3 2012, which is outside the scope of this evaluation.
**Outcomes in Assistance Area 3: Participation of Civil Society in ROYG Process & Decisions**

There are no outcome level indicators on the role of CSOs in PMP v.2.
### Revised Figures for Seven F-Indicators Reported to USAID Clearinghouse Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>LOP</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Q2 (Jan-Mar)</th>
<th>Q3 (Apr-Jun)</th>
<th>Q4 (Jul-Sep)</th>
<th>Total Achievement 2011</th>
<th>% Change of Value After Data Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(2.2.2-1)</td>
<td>Number of Executive Branch Personnel Trained with USG Assistance.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>365</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value After Data Verification</td>
<td>2,680</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(2.2.3-1)</td>
<td>Number of Individuals Who Received USG-Assisted Training, including management skills and Fiscal Management, to Strengthen Local Government and/or Decentralization.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value After Data Verification</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(2.2.4-2)</td>
<td>Number of government officials receiving USG-supported anti-corruption training (including accounting, auditing, public financial management, and procurement).</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value After Data Verification</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(2.2.4-5)</td>
<td>Number of people affiliated with non-governmental organizations receiving USG supported anti-corruption training (including accounting, auditing, public financial management, and procurement)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>-17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value After Data Verification</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(2.4.1-2)</td>
<td>Number of CSOs using USG assistance to promote political</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation &amp; Value After Data Verification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Value After Data Verification</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of CSO Advocacy campaigns supported by USG.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Value After Data Verification</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Value After Data Verification (Media)</strong></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of journalists trained with USG assistance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Value After Data Verification (NDI)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-94.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Value After Data Verification (Total)</strong></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-51.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
ANNEX VIII – RGP CHIEF OF PARTY TURNOVER DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COP Name</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Yusuf Abueljedian</td>
<td>Jun. 2010</td>
<td>Sep. 2010</td>
<td>4 Months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Reed</td>
<td>Jan. 2011</td>
<td>May 2011</td>
<td>5 Months</td>
<td>4 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Thomas</td>
<td>Nov. 2011</td>
<td>Feb. 2012</td>
<td>4 Months</td>
<td>6 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamar Cravens</td>
<td>Apr. 2012</td>
<td>current COP</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data provided by RGP Logistics Officer, June 17, 2012
ANNEX IX – EMAIL EXCHANGES REGARDING USAID DISSATISFACTION WITH RGP

Sample emails illustrating communication between the Mission and Counterpart or RGP Management regarding dissatisfaction with the project.

June 14, 2011 – email from Dana Stinson (USAID Yemen Project Manager) to Sibel Berzeg (Counterpart Vice President):

“USAID is also sincerely concerned about the actual focus and delivery of the project generally. USAID is concerned if RGP does not focus its mission and deliverables that the project may never achieve its potential or any tangible results … USAID (does) not like the few results we are seeing to date. RGP has too many partners who are unfocused and there is not a real sense that any results will be achieved in the near or long term future with this part of the project.”

September 4, 2011 – email from Robert Wilson (USAID Mission Director) to Stephanie Baric (Counterpart Home Office, Director of Yemen Programs) and Mehboob Karim (Acting COP) with copies to Sibel Berzeg and others:

“…people want to know if the activities in (RGP’s workplan) are relevant to the most pressing transition needs or pre-transition needs; and/or are the activities addressing the most immediate crisis-driven needs of the country right now … the issue is whether the focus is on the most relevant issues of today… What activities, beyond the back to school campaigns, are critical for MOE at this point? In the event of a transition, one would assume there would be a renewed focus on improving educational services? (sic) What would be the priorities, the targets, the costs, the capacity constraints etc. Do we know how we would help the education sector governance in the event of a transition? Believe me, there will be a lot of pressure on the project to help, but the (new workplan) does not anticipate that scenario.”

Note: this query from the Mission Director on September 4, 2011 was consistent with information provided to the evaluation team in an interview with the Deputy Minister of Education in June, 2012, in which he said that “RGP’s activities are not consistent with the Ministry’s strategies, they do not seem well-focused, and the project had not responded to a direct request for capacity development supports for the Ministry’s Technical Office” – the core of its governance operations.

The Mission Director’s email continued:

“As in health and education, (the) agriculture (part of the work plan) has multiple activities that are “good”, but the question is how critical are they to the current circumstances….reports we hear point to farmer concerns over drought, diesel, internal marketing, and security. Again, the question …will be why you have chosen these (other) specific policy topics, and how relevant are they to the current circumstances … to the need for visible and meaningful improvements in services for farmers?”

October 6, 2011 – email from Robert Wilson to Mehboob Karim:

“On first glance, it seems that we could be doing much more to support capacity development, training and support for the Ministries and task forces working on policy issues.”

RGP attempted to respond constructively to this criticism, as noted in an email October 13, 2011, from the RGP Acting Chief of Party, Mehboob Karim, to the Mission Director:

“I am happy to point out that our current Work Plan FY11-12 addresses to mitigate (sic) most of the issues which you have pointed out i.e. lack of opportunities for youth, weak government and dissatisfaction with the service delivery. RGP’s Plan has specific activities to address these issues. You may rest assured that at RGP we are fully aware of the challenges and our team fully appreciates the urgency of grabbing hold of critical components of the RGP work plan and moving them forward rapidly, effectively and with visible impacts this quarter and throughout the year … To accelerate this further, we are deploying Sibel Berzeg to
Yemen again in late October to help finalize a ramp-up plan for RGP performance, deliverables and burn rate…”