INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS:

A SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT EVALUATIONS

by

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1. INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the Agency for International Development (AID) has done little impact analysis of integrated rural development (IRD) projects. In spite of this, the apparent concensus in AID is that IRD projects "do not work". This paper reviews a series of impact evaluations done between 1980 and 1984 that together provide a preliminary assessment of this conclusion. Overall, the evidence from these evaluations indicates that IRD projects have frequently met their articulated purposes while providing other associated benefits. Furthermore, IRD emerges from the review as a developmental strategy that responds appropriately to the multifaceted constraints of particular developmental contexts.

The Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) has been conducting evaluations to assess the impact of AID projects on beneficiaries since 1979. Evaluations were grouped by topic for greater specificity and comparability. A series of irrigation evaluations, one of the early topics identified, was conducted and completed in 1983. In the process, we came to the realization that many of the irrigation projects were more than that--they included a whole range of tangentially related activities.

Because of the broader nature of these projects, a decision was made in the Center to address "area development" as a topic separate from irrigation. Aware that our area development topic overlapped with a type of project known as "integrated rural development", we made the distinction that area development might or might not be integrated. This allowed us to include projects of both types. We considered "unintegrated" area development to be a series of projects that AID carried out in an area without specifically attempting to integrate them.

In 1983, we assessed what had been learned from the area development evaluations. As we had never been able to identify any examples of unintegrated area development, we renamed the topic "integrated rural development", the name more familiar in the Agency. (Table 1 lists the studies included in the topic.)

We decided on a definition of IRD that included the projects already evaluated and similar projects in the Agency. Considerable variation was apparent in both groups.

When we chose projects to be evaluated in this series, we consistently select projects that were <u>multicomponent and multisectoral in a rural area</u> rather than trying for some

TABLE 1. Reports in the Impact Evaluation Series on Integrated Rural Development Projects

Impact Evaluations

Sri Lanka - Ceylon Tobacco Company

Ecuador - Agricultural Cooperative

Burkina Faso - Seguenega and Dori PVOs

Bolivia: IRD in a Colonization Setting

Area Development in Liberia, 6/84

Haiti: HACHO Rural Community Development, 11/83

Egypt: The Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service, 4/83

Sudan: The Rahad Irrigation Project, 3/82

Philippines: BICOL Integrated Area Development, 1/82

Special Studies

The Helmand Valley Project in Afghanistan, 12/83

The Vicos Experiment: A Study of the Impacts of the Cornell-Peru Project in a Highland Community, 4/82

Discussion Paper

The Development Potential of New Lands Settlement in the Tropics and Subtropics, 9/84

Working Paper

Lam Nam Oon: An Irrigation and Area Development Project Thailand, 9/82

Jordan: Irrigation and Area Development in the Valley, 2/81

The Central Tunisia Rural Development Project, 11/83

fuller reflection of integration. This distinguished IRD projects from other rural projects by drawing a line on this hypothetical continuum:

IRD projects

Single component, single sector project	Multicomponent, single sector project	Multicomponent multisector project.

By component, we meant an activity such as delivering agricultural inputs or building roads. A "sector" in development parlance was a broad category of activity related to a generic field of endeavor, e.g. agriculture, transport, health and education. It was closely related to the budgetary categories of host governments and donors. A discrete set of activities within a sector such as agriculture has sometimes been designated as a sector as well, for example irrigation.

The second important aspect of our minimalist definition was "in a rural area." By this, we meant a village, county or province, but not the entire rural area of a country. In trying to describe this in the report we refer to locale, area-specific, etc.

Choosing projects with these two characteristics distinguished them from the many single sector projects that have some form of integration, e.g. interagency integration, spatial integration, interproject integration, etc.

1.1 Why do multisector projects in rural areas?

IRD projects were developed as a response to the fact that there are numerous constraints to development in any specific geographic area. Development professionals had observed that frequently the constraints to achieving the intended impact from development projects derived from problems beyond the scope of their projects.

For example, in a 1980 impact evaluation of a rural roads project in Kenya, CDIE reported on a very well-organized, well-managed project using labor-based construction methods to build roads with appropriately low standard. It was a very effective project, but, the team found no impact: there was virtually no traffic on the roads. In this very poor rural area, inadequate roads were not alone in constraining development and change. The roads were built, but did not have an immediate impact.

The AID mission had proposed a companion rural market centers project at the time the roads project was proposed but the former had not been approved in Washington. Because of the

need to obligate money in AID, the mission went ahead with the roads project alone, recognizing that it could not achieve its impact as quickly. In spite of the delay in the rural market centers project there has been considerable investment in agriculture in those districts in Kenya by AID, the Government of Kenya and other donors. If the project's roads have continued to be maintained until the agriculture efforts matured, traffic may have increased and the roads will eventually have achieved their impact. If the roads have not been maintained, which is likely if they had scant interaction between the two activities was missed.

It was this kind of situation that the multisector project was intended to overcome. Delaying one activity was considered an adequate trade-off for the potential benefits fom the interaction between several. situations like this, AID's project designers in the 1970s conceptualized more comprehensive projects. What we have found in reviewing this series of evaluations was that some of the projects were quite comprehensive including more than a dozen components. We found that the projects had a broad range of multi-sector components in contrast to their narrow purpose of increasing income. Apparently, projects were narrowed somewhere between the conceptualization and implementation stages. Part of the

confusion over the definition of integrated rural development arose from the differences between their conceptualizations and their on-the-ground applications.

The evidence in Section 2 indicates that they had success in their narrower applications. Unfortunately, the projects have continued to be judged on their broader conceptualizations. A few thoughts on the development philosophy underlying IRD projects should make this distinction clearer.

The most significant early conceptualization of the IRD project approach was A.T. Mosher's in Thinking About Rural Development, The Agricultural Development Council, 1976. (See Figure 1).

Mosher proposed IRD projects for purposes of increasing agricultural production or increasing the satisfactions of rural living. To address the agricultural production purpose, he included integrated agricultural projects--multicomponent, single sector on the continuum above. His theory allowed for multicomponent, multisector projects that were agricultural or nonagricultural. In practice, however, the origins of these efforts were agricultural and all of the projects evaluated in this series have an agricultural base.

In the half decade before Mosher's conceptualization, development's ideological pendulum had been swinging away from the "trickle-down" approach, the urban industrial growth model

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

Figure 1. *Elements in various integrated programmes of agricultural or rural development.*
Source: Mosher (1976), p. 54.

FIGURE 1. Elements in various integrated programmes of agricultural or rural development.

A Overall agricultural development	B Project Activities	C Types of Integrated Projects
I. Research	Agricultural 1. Markets for farm products 2. Retail outlets for farm inputs 3. Production credit 4. Extension education 5. Local verification trials 6. Farm-to-market roads	1. Agricultural development projects
II. Producing or importing farm inputs		2. Rural development projects with an agricultural component (selections from among B1-13)
III. Rural agri-support activities	Nonagricultural 7. Rural industries 8. Rural public works 9. Community development construction 10. Group activities recreational, cultural 11. Home live improvement extension services 12. Health facilities 13. Family planning programmes 14. Schools 15. Local government 16. Religious Activities.	3. Rural development projects without an agricultural component (selections from among B7-13)
IV. Production incentives		
V. Land development		
VI. Training agricultural technicians		

Source: Mosher (1976), p. 54

of the sixties. Recognition that 60 percent of the Third World's population was rural and the belief that "trickle-down" was quite possibly exacerbating rural inequality led to the reemphasis on rural development. For AID, this was embodied in the New Directions Legislation of 1973. It reflected acceptance of agriculture-led development (Todaro, 1977, p.205) and the important role that small farmers could play in that development (Mellor 1966, Johnston and Kilby 1975).

The IRD project conceptualization became tied up in this reformulation of development strategy. For some, particularly AID proponents of "basic human needs" and authors such as Kotter, the emphasis on agriculture-led development was less salient in IRD projects than the hopes for this approach as a response to rural inequality. The two have continued to be closely tied as threads of each can be identified in most of our IRD projects evaluated.

The essential difference was between: 1) what IRD projects were intended to accomplish, and 2) to what broader objectives they were intended to contribute. In the jargon of AID's Logical Framework planning scheme (logframe), the "purpose" is what the project purports to achieve. The project contributes to the broader "goal", but is insufficient (and not

intended) to achieve it alone.

AID's IRD projects had articulated goals of improving the quality of life in the rural areas. Their goals related to the Basic-Human-Needs focus on poverty in rural areas as stated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Their purposes, by contrast, were defined much more narrowly, in spite of their putative focus on quality of life. In most cases, the articulated purpose, or immediate objective, of the AID project was to increase incomes through increased productivity. In a tightly designed IRD project, nonagricultural components were included to directly support the purpose of increasing income through productivity not, for example, to provide the basic need of healthcare.

The quality of life components (other than increased income) included in these projects tended to be activities that would yield results in the long-term, e.g. primary education. It would be at least a generation before primary education had much effect on the projects' putative purpose of increasing agricultural production and income. The increased agricultural production could yield results in the short-term, but the benefits from it must be sustained into the future to have any beneficial interaction with the primary education.

Unfortunately, the name, the goals (as opposed to their purposes), the multisectoral nature and the era in which many of the IRD projects began inflated expectations of what they

could accomplish. This contrasted with their relatively narrow and straightforward purpose of increasing farmers' incomes through increased productivity.

1.2 Approaches to Development of the Area

Most of the projects we evaluated have this narrow purpose of increasing incomes, but include other, associated components, particularly delivery of social services. We refer to these as classic IRD projects (see Table 2 for brief project descriptions):

Bolivia

Burkina Faso I

Egypt

Liberia

Philippines

Sri Lanka I

Like most of AID's IRD projects, the classics emphasize delivering goods and services rather than building local capacity. They are based on agricultural production but

include social service and infrastructure components. Agricultural production was planned to yield benefits in the short-term that were sustained into the future.

The Liberia project was the most narrowly focused. Its two nonagricultural components (farm-to-market roads and a health unit to prevent schistosomiasis, an irrigation-related disease) were both directly linked to supporting the immediate results from the agricultural components. The nonagricultural components of the other classic IRD projects shifted some of the effort beyond the immediate purpose achievement to the long-term investments in the area. These projects in fact pursued their purpose and their goal at the same time by giving priority to increased income through productivity (the purpose), but at the same time including social service activities that were directed towards longer-term goal achievement. Classic IRD projects combined short-term economic and long-term economic and social approaches to development in the project areas.

In the way that Classic IRD projects combined economic and social approaches, we identified two other combinations: social and institutional, economic and institutional. Figure 2 presents a scheme of these combined approaches (the unshaded areas) to achieving IRD projects' goal of improving the quality

of life in a geographic area. This figure was developed as a way to characterize the experience presented in the evaluations

and therefore some distortion has occurred. Aspects of each approach can be found in all the projects but the emphasis is different in each group.

Two projects fell into the overlap between economic and institutional approaches by combining of agricultural production and building local institutional capacity.

Ecuador -- cooperatives.
Sri Lanka II -- Combination of public institution and local private sector implementation

Both introduced new institutions to improve agriculture in the areas: Ecuador created cooperatives and Sri Lanka II relied on a local private company for implementation of the agricultural services. With their institutional emphasis, these two projects attempted long-term sustainability for the short-term changes from agriculture. Each can be evaluated in terms of what we have defined as purpose achievement, i.e. increasing incomes.

By contrast, the third group emphasized improvement in quality of life as their "purpose" and made little direct attempt to improve income.

Burkina Faso II (Dori)

Haiti

Although this third group of projects may well have set out to be Classic IRD projects, in retrospect, they were more similar to the "Community Development" projects of the 1950s and 1960s. Community Development was a project approach that a) involves people on a community basis in the solution of their common problems; b) teaches and insists upon the use of democratic processes in the joint solution of community problems, and c) activates and/or facilitates the transfer of technology to the people of a community for a more effective solution of their common problems. (Holdcroft p. 10)

Both the Burkina Faso II and Haiti projects followed an approach similar to the Community Development approach outlined. Specifically, they emphasized the process of building capacity to identify and deal with problems at the local level. Although economic activities and agriculture certainly would have fit under the third characteristic listed, one of the main criticisms of the Community Development approach was that it "ignored agricultural production" (Holdcroft, p. 24) In spite of small agricultural activities included in each of the two projects we evaluated, they appear, in the hindsight of impact evaluation, to have placed

considerably more emphasis on the long-term institutional and social approaches to development that characterized the old Community Development programs.

TABLE 2. The Projects Evaluated

Country	Sites	
Bolivia	San Julian	Resettlement project in lowland jungles managed by a local PVO.
Burkina Faso I	Seguenega	AFRICARE managed project in the Seguenega region in Sahelian Burkina Faso.
Burkina Faso II	Dori	Save the Children project in several villages in Dori region in Sahelian Burkina Faso with short interval of AID Input.
Ecuador	17 coops	Projects to develop cooperative federations to assist land acquisition cooperatives... Cooperatives later served as vehicle to acquire services for members in agriculture as well as other sectors.
Egypt	Abis Desert sites	Land reclaimation efforts under the Point IV program in the 1950's and 1960's.
Haiti	Northwest Region	Development and relief project managed by a local (health-oriented) PVO.
Liberia	Lofa County	Tightly designed IRD project managed by a project management unit (PMU).
Philippines	Bicol River	Comprehensive program to develop the Bicol River Basin watershed.
Sri Lanka I	Mahiyangana	Private company, Ceylon Tobacco Company, implemented a small, very intensive resettlement project to win government favor.
Sri Lanka II	Mahaweli Section H-9	Private company, CTC, attempted to work more collboratively with the Government of Sri Lanka's Mahaweli Authority (MASL).
Sudan	Rahad	Resettlement project to promote cotton exports. Farmers were tenants of Rahad Corporation.

FIGURE 2
DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES FOR
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF THE AREA



FIGURE 2. Development Approaches for Improving the Quality of Life in the Area

One of the projects we evaluated did not fit into this conceptualization: the Rahad project in Sudan. Although it could be evaluated as a Classic IRD project because it included economic and social activities, the team made clear that its predominant objectives were not directed at developing the area but increasing production of cotton for export. The national goal took precedence over development for the people that lived in the area. This brings up the issue of conflicting goals--a common affliction of development projects. The conflict between the national goal of increased cotton production and the local goal of improved quality of life in the area had a very clear effect on the project in Sudan, as will be seen. One cause of the conflicting goals was the number of actors involved. In the previous section, we discussed purposes and goals as they were outlined by AID, labelling them "goals for the area." These were, however, bilateral projects and the host governments sometimes emphasized their own set of objectives, as in Sudan.

There are several reasons that this report will continue to be primarily concerned with AID's goals and purposes. This series of evaluations was carried out to learn about AID's experience with IRD projects (we including the two non-AID cases for comparison). We evaluated each of the as projects

and in terms of what they intended to accomplish. This allowed us to focus on AID policy issues and what this experience can teach us about them.

By limiting ourselves to the experience from the evaluations, we have avoided the impossible task of dealing with the vast literature on rural development. [Footnote: For reviews of other donor experience with integrated rural development, see: European Development Fund, Integrated Rural development projects carried out in Black Africa with EDF aid; Evaluation and outlook for the future, Development Series of Commission of the European Communities, 1979; Maxime Crener, et al., Integrated Rural Development; State of the Art Review (for Canadian International Development Agency), 1982/83; Richard L. J. Lacroix, Integrated Rural Devin Latin America: an assessment; AMEC for World Bank, Arlington, Mass. 1983.] This does, however, make the paper incomplete. The host government and recipient perspectives must be considered in order to understand a project; this report touches on them in only the most tangential way. The individual impact evaluation reports include discussions in much greater depth and provide a wealth of material beyond the scope of this paper.

Also beyond the scope of this paper was the context of each individual project that is so important in understanding

the outcome. It is essential to keep in mind that each area is unique and each project is unique. This paper looks at what they may have had in common in an effort to learn from the wealth of experience.

2. IMPACT

2.1 Assessment of Benefits

This series of evaluations was undertaken to assess the impact of integrated rural development projects. Because of the diversity within this group of projects, a single, simple assessment of impact was not possible. Distilling the various options yielded two:

1) the common denominator of the projects' intended impact was increased agricultural production to increase incomes;

2) a more comprehensive assessment of quality of life was based on access to social services, creation of infrastructure, endowing farmers with land, and improved participants' perceptions.

Institutional impact is conspicuous by its absence. Institutions are at once impact and effectiveness. These projects defined institutions both as ends and as means to an

end. For example the creation of the coops was the Ecuador project's major end product. The project accomplished this with a fair degree of success. In our context, cooperatives, and institutions in general, were created to assist in increasing incomes and improving quality of life.

Although institutions were defined as end products by several of these projects, and were particularly important to the Community Development and IRD/institutional projects, we do not include them directly in the discussion of impact. This is inherently unfair to these two approaches, and somewhat artificial, but it does allow us greater comparability between approaches. Having defined institutions for this paper as means to ends, they will be considered in detail in the section on management issues.

One additional point must be clarified before discussing benefits and that is who the intended beneficiaries were. Most of these projects intended to increase "the farmer's" income. "The farmer" is an oversimplification of beneficiaries employed even by this author.

Because farmers farm and improvements in farming were central to most of these projects, "farmers" were considered the primary beneficiaries. Familial and community trickle down

were assumed, although this was no more successful here than in the traditional sense.

For example, the Bolivia project assumed single, male "farmers" and was designed accordingly. Separations, hardships and considerable continuing burdens were placed on female family members. Their prior source's of income were curtailed by the changing circumstances. Some women returned to the highlands. As land and agricultural production were monopolized by the elders, young men sought other opportunities, most often in the cities. This put more burden on women and led to the aging of the rural population.

The benefits provided must be considered in this with this issue in mind.

2.2 Benefits from the Classic IRD projects

Teams reported increases in income in five of the six Classic IRD projects. (See table 3 for a summary of the findings). Only the Philippines team reported no increase and this was because most of the irrigation infrastructure had not been completed at the the time of the evaluation.

The most dramatic increases in income were in Egypt.

During the project, irrigation led to increases in yields of grain, rice, and horticultural crops. At the largest of the three sites, income continued to be at a high level after 15 years although yields for most crops were equivalent to the national averages. The two much smaller sites in the desert were equally successful in increasing yields and incomes as well. (The tables in this report reflect only the largest site as it represented 75 percent of the people and area included in the evaluation.) Similar results occurred in the very small Sri Lanka I project where the private company's strength in supporting agricultural production and marketing led to relatively high yields of paddy and substantially increased incomes.

Moderate increases in income occurred in Bolivia and Liberia. The Liberia team reported increased farm incomes but only when farmers "informally" modified the production package. Alterations in the types and amounts of crops and inputs as well as "stretching out" repayment schedules made the otherwise-unprofitable package profitable.

The Sahelian drought made assessing the Burkina Faso projects more difficult. The team reported some increases in income when there was access to water. In Burkina Faso I, vegetable production and sheepbreeding increased, but the

drought allowed little change for rice.

TABLE 3. Increases in Agricultural Production and Income for the Classic IRD Projects

COUNTRY	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION	INCOMES
Bolivia (San Julian)	New lands brought under production. Substantial increases although weed and insect problems are serious at the older site.	Increased
Burkina Faso I	Vegetable production and sheep breeding increased but little change for rice.	Increased somewhat
Egypt	New land brought under cultivation - Grain fields originally increased but are now equivalent of national averages - rice, onions exceed averages - Horticulture crops are also a significant source of income.	Increased dramatically (on largest site); desert sites had water reliability problems.
Liberia	Ag. production increased for rice, coffee, cocoa (although the team found that the traditional cultivation approach was economically preferable for cocoa.	Increased but only if farmers "informally" stretch out credit repayment schedules.
Philippines	Not yet but former expectations & the team's economic analysis suggest significant future production gain in irrigated areas.	Not yet but were expected to increase depending on the levels of water users fees, input costs, and farmgate paddy prices.

COUNTRY	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION	INCOMES
Sri Lanka I	New lands bought under cultivation -- Relatively high yield of paddy until transition to MASL left most settlers without water; Yields have decreased.	Increased substantially under CTC; no input for most families during transition to MASL; incomes reestablished but lower than they had been under CTC because services weren't firmly reestablished.

Quantifying these increases was mostly beyond the scope of the data from these evaluations. Based on the teams' knowledge of the areas and professional judgement, we conclude that the evidence indicates that incomes increased due to increased production in the project areas for the Classic IRD projects.

Having successfully achieved their purposes, were they equally successful in achieving impact in the goal-level quality-of-life aspects of the project? To assess this, several criteria were added:

-- Did access to social services increase and were these services used?
-- Was infrastructure created?
-- Did farmers receive land?
-- Did perceptions improve?

Table 4 summarizes the changes reported by the teams.

Only Sri Lanka I created substantial change in access to social services. Services provided by the private company were so comprehensive that the team cited this as one source of settler dependency. Bolivia, Burkina Faso I, Egypt and Liberia all reported some increased access to health services but

little else. For example, schistosomiasis (a water-borne disease) was recognized as a problem with swamp rice production in the project area. Assessment, diagnosis, and treatment were being carried out under the project with good results. No attention was given to other health problems. The team considered this a lost opportunity but it did keep the health activities to a manageable scale directly related to other project activities.

Several teams reported improved access to education. In Bolivia, settlers built schools and the Government provided teachers. The Burkina Faso team reported a strong beginning in literacy. Beyond providing access to health and education services, none of the teams was able to measure and report actual impacts from the social services provided.

Other social service components were less successful even in improving access. In Burkina Faso I, a young farmer training component was included but the team did not report any changes from it. Hygiene in Egypt did not improve in spite of project efforts and schools were reported to have deteriorated. The wells and latrines built under the Liberia project were not used or properly maintained. Overall, access to social services increased somewhat but it was not a very strong showing.

Beyond changes in income, access to land may have been the most significant change these projects brought about. Bolivia, Egypt and Sri Lanka I endowed the farmers with this valuable

TABLE 4

CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF LIFE ASPECTS
OF THE CLASIC IRD PROJECTS

COUNTRY	ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES	INFRASTRUCTURE	FARMERS RECEIVED LAND UNDER PROJECT	PARTICIPANTS PERCEPTIONS
Bolivia	Self help services Schools & govt provided teachers	Some roads	Yes	Very Positive
Burkina Faso I	Good for health	Roads Wells	--	Fair - Overshadowed by drought
_Egypt	Good for health not for hygiene Schools built but deteriorated	Roads Irrigation Housing Electricity	Yes	Positive
Liberia	Some improvement from schisto unit not for wells and latrines.	Roads	--	Moderately Positive
Philippines	Just beginning	Irrigation Roads	--	Not very positive
Sri Lanka I but dependent	Very comprehensive set of services School Health care Day care Household water supply Household electricity	Irrigation Roads (tertiary)	Yes	Positive

resource. The Sri Lanka team characterized land as an "asset of lifelong value". This was reflected in the strongly positive perceptions the participants had of the project.

On the other hand, it should not be considered a shortcoming of the other projects that they did not provide land. In Burkina Faso, for example, the farmers had land but needed other types of assistance. Moreover, projects that provided land often had an entire set of complications associated with that--e.g. creating new "communities" under resettlement projects.

Each of these projects created infrastructure that provided the opportunity for long-term benefit, but the teams reported mixed success in exploiting that opportunity. Although some roads were built under the Bolivia project, transportation was still a considerable constraint in this isolated region. Roads within the Burkina Faso I project area have had a positive impact on circulation in the area. While roads in Liberia have facilitated agriculture and other activities, they had the negative effect of stimulating land speculation in the project area.

Twenty years after the Egypt project ended the team

reported that the infrastructure was deteriorating:

> electricity lines are down, roads are rough, water supplies are inadequate or systems have broken down altogether. (p. 18)

On the other hand, individuals were maintaining the housing and even making improvements. Irrigation infrastructure created in the Egypt and Sri Lanka I projects facilitated the increases in incomes that were clearly the most significant impacts of these and the other Classic IRD projects.

In sum, the classic IRD projects achieved their purposes of increasing incomes, but made more tentative forays into the quality-of-life aspects of the projects. Health services and schools were provided by most of the projects but the impact evaluation teams were not able to attribute any impact to them.

However, we must reiterate that in these IRD projects, social service activities and infrastructure were largely intended as long-term investments. Theoretically, a healthy, educated child would grow up to be a more successful farmer. Impact evaluations were carried out too soon and fieldwork was too brief (in most cases) to assess the actual impact of the

social aspects of these projects.

2.3 Benefits for IRD Projects that Combined Economic and Institutional Approaches

Like the Classic IRD projects, both of the IRD/institutional projects increased incomes through increased production, although the findings for the cooperatives in Ecuador were somewhat mixed (see table 5).

The Ecuador project assisted farmers in getting land. Perceptions were so positive that the teams reported that the increased sense of control cooperative members felt over their lives led them, through the cooperatives, to seek access to social services (see table 6). They have been particularly successful with education which is a high government priority.

It was never clarified whether improvements in social services were not planned in Sri Lanka II. The team concluded that it was probably the government's responsibility but the government apparently expected the private company to provide them. Regardless, the company was criticized by the government and the farmers for not providing them.

2.4 Benefits from the Community Development Projects

The Community Development style IRD projects focused heavily on the social components with much less emphasis on the short-term agricultural impacts. Accordingly, they had little impact on production or incomes. Therefore, one looks for impact in the components these projects emphasized. Both had health components but neither achieved the level of impact that might have been expected. Health activities undertaken at Burkina Faso II were so limited that it would be hard to say that there was any real change in access to health services. Some change in access to health and nutrition was reported by the HACHO team. The greatest impact in these two projects came from the relief activities. The developmental impact, both social and economic, seemed quite limited. The HACHO team reported that the mixing of relief and developmental goals was a source of difficulty for the developmental components.

2.5 Benefits from the IRD Project with National Goals

At the time of the evaluation, the Sudan project was not successful in achieving its national production goals for

cotton or for increasing income for farmers. Social services actually declined in some areas.

TABLE 5

INCREASED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND INCOME
FOR IRD VARIATIONS

COUNTRY	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION	INCOME
	IRD Projects with Institutional Emphasis	
Ecuador	7 coops increased production significantly 5 making progress 5 getting low yields	Increased significantly in 7 Coops 5 coops making progress 5 coops in financial difficulty
Sri Lanka II	Increased with CTC services	Increased while CTC managed
	Community Development	
Burkina Faso II	Vegetable production increased	Some increase for a small number of people
Haiti	No	No
	National Goals	
Sudan	Cotton Yields declined	Farmers were losing money on cotton growing Scheme was losing money

TABLE 6

CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF LIFE ASPECTS
OF IRD VARIATIONS

COUNTRY	ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES	INFRASTRUCTURE	LAND	IMPROVED PERCEPTIONS
IRD Institutional				
Ecuador	Some added but not planned	Roads Housing Irrigation	Yes	Very positive - Sense of Control over lives increased
Sri Lanka II	Fill through the cracks of the informal agreement	Irrigation	No	OK
Community Development				
Burkina Faso II	Very limited health	No	No	Fair - Overshadowed by drought
Haiti	Some health and nutrition	Roads	No	Positive for health
National Goals				
Sudan	Decreased in some places	Massive irrigation Roads	Use of land	Poor - perceived less control over lives

2.6 Conclusion

The classic IRD projects and the IRD/Institutional projects succeeded in their purpose of increasing incomes. The Community Development projects and the Sudan project did not, because this was not their primary purpose. AID's impressions of projects like these may have generated the conclusion that IRD projects "do not work." The fact that seven of the ten projects we evaluated led to increased incomes suggests they have made significant accomplishments.

This is tempered by the weaker findings on the quality of life aspects even though the projects did provide associated benefits including access to social services, creation of infrastructure, endowments of land, and relief activities.

3. COST COMPARISON

3.1 Project Costs

These positive impacts must be considered in the context of project costs. Assigning numbers to costs, numbers of beneficiaries, and even the duration of some of these projects was very difficult. Because the cost context was essential, we tried to get a very rough sense of the costs in relation to the benefits reported by the teams, in spite of the limitations of the data.

The difficult accounting led us to establish nominal categories for costs, number of beneficiaries, and cost/ beneficiary/year. Table 7 summarizes the information with the categories defined at the bottom of the table. We have attempted to include all (at least major) sources of funds in assessing costs and have not limited ourselves to AID. AID was the primary donor for all of the projects except Burkina Faso II and Sudan. (There was no donor in the ususal sense for either of the Sri Lanka projects--the outside influence was CTC, the private company. The team reported that CTC could be considered the donor in Sri Lanka I, and CTC and the government joint donors in Sri Lanka II.) The categories in Table 7 were designed to represent these projects, and therefore, they are not inclusive. Projects are not inherently large or small; we only break them into these groups to get a sense of their costs in relation to the number of beneficiaries.

TABLE 7. Rough Scopes & Magnitudes of Project Costs
Nominal Categories

COUNTRY	YEARS	COST	NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES	COST/BENEFICIARY/ YEAR
		Classic IRD Projects		
BOLIVIA	1974-1983*	Medium	Medium	Medium
BURKINA FASO I	1978-1984*	Small	Large	Low
EGYPT	1952-1963	Medium	Medium	High
LIBERIA	1976-1981	Medium	Large	Medium
PHILIPPINES	1975-1981*	Large	Very Large	Low
SRI LANKA I	1966-1980	Small	Very Small	High
		IRD/Institutional		
ECUADOR	1969-1977	Small	Medium	Low
SRI LANKA II	1979-1983	Very Small	Medium	Low
		Community Development		
BURKINA FASO II	1978-1980	Small	Medium	Medium
HAITI	1966-1979	Small	Large	Low
		National Goals		
SUDAN	1972-1979*	Large	Medium	Very High
		Large $100 Million	Very Large $2 Million	Very High $400
		Medium $15-50 Million	Large $100,000-1 Million	High $100-400
		Small $1-10 Million	Medium 15,000-100,000	Medium $30-90
		Very Small $1 Million	Very Small 1,000	Low $10

*Year of the evaluation--project continued after data cited.

3.2 Classic IRD Projects

Looking at the cost/beneficiary/year in the context of what each project accomplished suggested a fairly strong relationship. The two "large" ratios, for Egypt and Sri Lanka I, were also the two projects that teams reported had the greatest impact on incomes. Both classic IRD projects with "large" ratios included irrigation infrastructure that is very expensive and increased the cost ratios. However, the potential benefit of harnessing water is great and in these instances, Table 2 reports that it was realized. Table 3 indicates that these projects also had some positive change in access to social services, provided land and were positively perceived. In these two cases, the costs were relatively high but the benefits were high as well.

With medium cost/beneficiary/year ratios, the Bolivia and Liberia projects also had significant increases in production, increased incomes, and improved access to social services. Neither was an irrigation project and that helped keep costs down, but Bolivia did have costs associated with opening new lands for cultivation. Both projects solidly increased production and increased incomes. They both provided some roads

infrastructure, but only Bolivia provided land or led to positive perceptions. Each had more limited changes in the access to social services than the two projects with higher ratios. Bolivia seems to have had considerable positive change from a medium cost/beneficiary/year ratio. Liberia had moderate change from a medium ratio.

Burkina Faso I and Philippines had low ratios for large projects. AID's funding and personnel constraints would make projects with these characteristics appealing if positive change occurred. Unfortunately, it was difficult to assess change in both instances. In the Philippines, it is too early to assess change. In Burkina Faso I, it is also somewhat early, but, more significantly, the drougnt overshadowed what change may nave occurred.

3.3 Costs of IRD/Institutional Projects

The two IRD projects that combined economic and institutional approaches also had low cost/beneficiary/year ratios. Both Sri Lanka II and Ecuador increased production and income, although the picture was less clear in the latter case because Ecuador had some cooperatives where farmers were not doing well.

Although social services were not the focus of either project, Ecuador's strong cooporatives successfully acquired them. The

Table II-3
Rough Scopes & Magnitudes of Project Costs
Nominal Categories

COUNTRY	YEARS	COST	NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES	COST/BENEFICIARY/ YEAR
		Classic IRD Projects		
BOLIVIA	1974-1983*	Medium	Medium	Medium
BURKINA FASO I	1978-1984*	Small	Large	Small
EGYPT	1952-1963	Medium	Medium	Large
LIBERIA	1976-1981	Medium	Large	Medium
PHILIPPINES	1975-1981*	Large	Very Large	Low
SRI LANKA I	1966-1980	Small	Very Small	High
		IRD/Institutional		
ECUADOR	1969-1977	Small	Medium	Low
SRI LANKA II	1979-1983	Very Small	Medium	Low
		Community Development		
BURKINA FASO II	1978-1980	Small	Medium	Medium
HAITI	1966-1979	Small	Large	Low
		National Goals		
SUDAN	1972-1979*	Large	Medium	Very High
		Large $100 Million Medium $15-50 Million Small $1-10 Million Very Small $1 Million	Very Large 2 Million Large 100,000-1Million Medium 15,000-100,000 Very Small 1,000	Very High $400 High $100-400 Medium $30-90 Low $10

* Some of the evaluations or projects continued after date cited.

TABLE 7. Rough Scopes & Magnitudes of Project Cos

Nominal Categories

COUNTRY	YEARS	COST	NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES	CC
		Classic IRD Projects		
BOLIVIA	1974-1983*	Medium	Medium	Me
BURKINA FASO I Low		1978-1984*	Small	La
EGYPT	1952-1963	Medium	Medium	Hi
LIBERIA	1976-1981	Medium	Large	Me
PHILIPPINES	1975-1981*	Large	Very Large	Lo
SRI LANKA I	1966-1980	Small	Very Small	H
		IRD/Institutional		

ECUADOR	1969-1977	Small	Medium	Lo
SRI LANKA II	1979-1983	Very Small	Medium	Lo

Community Development

BURKINA FASO II	1978-1980	Small		Me
Medium				
HAITI	1966-1979	Small	Large	Lo

National Goals

SUDAN	1972-1979*	Large	Medium	Ve

	Large	$100 Million	Very Large $2 Million
Very High $400			
	Medium	$15-50 Million	Large $100,000-1 Mill.
High $100-400			
	Small	$1-10 Million	Medium 15,000-100,000
Medium $30-90			
	Very Small	$1 Million	V.
Low $10			

*Year of the evaluation--project continued after data cited.

experience of these projects suggests that combining economic components with appropriate institutional components can be a comparatively low-cost approach to achieving substantial impact.

3.4 Costs for Community Development Projects

The Burkina Faso II and Haiti projects had medium and low ratios respectively. Neither team reported much developmental change but the very difficult environment of each of these projects had led to the mixing of relief and development objectives. Therefore, although their costs were low, they do not suggest a model for cost effective development.

4. SUSTAINABILITY

IRD projects gained popularity precisely because they were intended to overcome the sustainability difficulties experienced by single sector projects, reflecting the broader outlook of the Basic Human Need perspective. This led to an

increase in the number of these projects being initiated in the early to middle seventies. Therefore, it would be too soon to assess sustainability in over half of the projects evaluated.

Of the five projects that had been completed prior to the evaluations, three were sustainable but not always at the same levels achieved during the project. In Egypt and Ecuador, the level of benefits was increasing at the times of the evaluations, but decreases were reported by the Sri Lanka team.

In Egypt, benefits were sustained at Abis, the largest site. The project emphasized leadership development . The local leadership formed cooperatives after the project, mobilized its own resources and pressured government entities to obtain services. This sustained benefits through and after the difficult transition period at the project's end when its special status and outside source of funds were lost.

[Footnote?: By contrast, the two desert sites in Egypt were undermined by their own success. Their success in increasing yields and incomes had a significant demonstration effect and considerable spontaneous settlement occurred upstream. After the end of their special project status, the sites' water rights were not protected and their water supply dwindled to virtually nothing. The team reported a fairly

desperate situation.]

In Ecuador, benefits were continuing for most of the cooperatives. The coops themselves were continuing in most cases and many were acquiring social services that were beyond

the original scope of the effort. Overall, the institutions were sustained and, therefore, benefits were sustained and social services were actually increasing at the time of the evaluation.

In Sri Lanka I, CTC provided such a high level of social and agricultural services that they were prohibitively expensive and, therefore, unsustainable. Precisely because of the expense, CTC severed its relationship to the area that then came under the responsibility of the Mahaweli Authority.

The benefits of increased income were interrupted when the Mahaweli Authority discontinued the very expensive lift irrigation system. By 1983, the MASL gravity-fed system was complete and the farmers again had access to water. Unsure of the timeliness and adequacy of the amount of water, farmers cautiously followed a strategy of broadcast planting and low levels of inputs. Nonetheless, the team projected that the physical and technical resources the farmers had received from CTC's involvement would lead to sustained benefits from agricultural production but considerably diminished benefits in other areas.

By contrast the Haiti and Liberia teams questioned the

likelihood of benefits being sustained. Haiti's relief efforts were inherently unsustainable and even the institution was not sustained after the project ended. In Liberia, cooperatives were planned to provide the services needed to support agricultural production after the project was over. Very little progress had been made on developing the cooperatives causing concern about the sustainability of services and benefits.

In sum, there is not adequate evidence from these impact evaluations to defend the thesis that IRD projects can have more success with sustainability. The early indications suggest that the increases in incomes were sustained, but sustainability of benefits in other areas was less clear. Few of the impact evaluations were carried out adequately long after the project's end to assess benefits in the long-term investments. In addition, fieldwork was too brief to fully assess the nonagricultural efforts even in the few cases where it might have been possible. Future evaluations should be designed to address these issues.

5. ARE IRD PROJECTS MANAGEABLE?

IRD projects are commonly criticized as difficult to manage--more difficult than single sector projects. Although this series of evaluations did not include single sector projects for comparison, there are indications that this is true. Common sense would suggest that multicomponent projects are more difficult to manage than single component projects, and spreading the components across sectors is unlikely to make things easier. In addition, there are a number of infamous cases where crippling managerial difficulties occurred. On the other hand, the fact that this series of evaluations found evidence of impact suggests that IRD projects can be "manageable."

[Footnote: For a more thorough discussion of the management of IRD projects, see George Honadle and Jerry VanSant, Organizing and Managing Integrated Rural Development: Lessons from Field Experience, DAI, Washington, D.C. December 1984. This work is based on practical experience as well as the literature.]

The types of organizations and management issues and

strategies highlighted by the impact evaluations begin to provide an explanation for this.

6. INTEGRATION IN PLANNING OR IMPLEMENTATION?

Planning and implementation can each be integrated with very different degrees of difficulty.

6.1 Integration in Planning.

Designing complementary activities allows each to reinforce the benefits of the other--such as building roads to facilitate transport of agricultural inputs to the farm and produce to the markets. It is probably the inherent complementarity of roads which makes them the next most likely component to be included in IRD projects after the agricultural activities.

For example the Bolivia team reported that the settlers' major complaint about healthcare was that the road was not good enough to get people to the hospital in an emergency.

Rudimentary health services had been initiated by the project, but serious cases needed to be taken to the hospital over the inadequate road. Roads had been built at the isolated project site but roads and transport continued to be problems.

Links between activities were equally apparent in the Sudan project, but with more negative consequences for the project. Lack of funds kept the Rahad Corporation from providing the promised social services to more than half the villages. Settlers arrived at new villages that did not have the services they had expected--many had moved from villages where services were available.

> For many (farmers), frustrated expectations for a reasonable quality of life reinforced already low commitment and discontent with the Project as a way of life. More than anyone, the Corporation is aware of the relationship between tenant dissatisfaction with services and agricultural efficiency. (p16)

Here the relationship between activities was a serious problem for the project because dissatisfaction in one area amplified dissatisfaction in others. Concentration of activities in an area requires adequate resources.

Expectations are, however, an important variable. Settlers in Bolivia arrived at jungle sites with lower expectations for services. Settlers were not happy with rudimentary services developed, but their dissatisfaction did

not have a corresponding negative effect on the other project activities.

The Upper Volta evaluation emphasized complimentary activities within a sector:

> Equally successful in Burkina Faso I, and less evident in Burkina Faso II, has been "vertical" integration of activities. In health, for example, AFRICARE assisted the Departmental Medical Center at Seguenega town in enlarging physical facilities, including provision of an ambulance for evacuations and of a training center. It also supplied a mobile army surgical hospital to the Regional Hospital at Ouahigouya to help it provide support to Seguenega, and developed a curriculum and conducted training for Village Health Teams at the Seguenega Medical Center. This multilevel assistance, and the linkages established appears important to continuity of the impact made. (p44)

The team concluded that the concentration of resources in the health sector was significant in project achievements.

The cooperatives in the Ecuador project played the important role of identifying inputs that were complementary to

what the coop members already had.

"Through ag coops, many communities were able to express their demand for certain types of services, and with

varying degrees of success, were able to acquire those services. The ranges of services which coop members sought to obtain were multisectoral, covering the basic needs of most coop members." (p.19)

Seeking services from the government, however, the coops were constrained by the nature of government resources and priorities over which they had minimal control.

Integrated planning provided the opportunity to make maximum use of resources by addressing related constraints between and within sectors. However adequate concentration of resources was required to support the strategy.

6.2 Integrated Implementation

Integrated implementation is often equated with coordination. Siffin refers to coordination as the "venerable prayerword of administration":

"When people call for coordination, they usually mean that they need support which they cannot command. This

typically leads to bargaining and bargaining usually bends policy in some way. Coordination means getting what you do not have." (p.23)

The Lofa team reported that rural and agricultural development efforts should not be compartmentalized. Compartmentalization requires coordination rather than concentrated responsibility for the various activities. In Liberia, the project management unit was made responsible for all aspects of the project. Although they had responsibility, they still lacked sufficient control. The staff was modifying input packages to the extent possible to better reflect participants' interests, but

> there have been basic project parameters beyond their jurisdiction to change. The loan repayment schedules, the levels of management by financial support for cooperatives transportation requirements and the extent and focus of ongoing agricultural research and experimentation programs are among the elements over which project management units have little real control. (p.16)

Although one organization had been created to avoid coordination problems, inability to coordinate between bureaucratic levels undermined the potential advantages of

management by a single organization.

Governments, almost by definition, are compartmentalized and the Philippine project design took this into account. Committees were established at all bureaucratic levels to create links for coordination. Incentives were provided for personnel who cooperated with other agencies.

> The Bicol program may not constitute a thoroughly integrated process by which various development services are combined into one coherent effort, but it is integrated to the extent that, through the Program Office, concerned sectoral departments and local elected officials communicate, cooperate and coordinate with one another to ensure project acceptability, overcome obstacles and facilitate implementation. (p.13-14).

But the team went on to say that "'integrated implementation' is a larger bite than most systems can chew. Instructions have recently been issued to the Bula Project Office to focus primary attention on completion of the main irrigation infrastructure, postponing 'integration' to the future." (p.16) The conclusion the team drew was that integration was more appropriate for planning than implementation. We concluded that integrated planning was easier to accomplish than integrated implementation. In Bicol

however, the integrated planning was supported by an adequate level of resources that under other circumstances limited the successful accomplishment of objectives.

7. TYPE OF MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

These projects experimented with various types of organizations in attempting to deal with the challenges of integrated planning and implementation. We chose projects for this series to span the range of organizational diversity. Attempting to summarize the organizations responsible for managing the activities in each project, we grouped their primary organizations into three categories:

-- Host Government Agencies: line ministries, regional and local government

-- Redundant Organizations: parastatals and project management units

-- Private Sector: cooperatives, companies and PVOs.

Although the characteristics of these organizations will be discussed below, one point needs immediate clarification: "redundant" is not inherently negative--in some circumstances it was the best and indeed the only possible solution. The name is used because it highlights an important characteristic

these organizations have in common. The implication of this characteristic will be discussed below. [Footnote: Honadle and VanSant discuss each of these in detail with the exceptions of the cooperatives and the private companies.]

The "Approaches" outlined in section I do not correspond with the types of organizations. Indeed, the Classic IRD projects include two PVOs, one parastatal, and two PMU, one private company, and two projects where responsibility was shared. Therefore we will not break the projects into their approaches in discussing the types of organizations.

Table 7 shows our attempt to characterize each project's management organizations. It quickly became clear that numerous organizations took part in the management of the IRD projects. Although this is true of single sector projects as well, we notice some distinct trends in the multisector area projects.

7.1 Shared Authority for Integrated Management

Most single-sector AID projects are implemented through host government agencies. By contrast, none of our projects

was primarily managed by a host government agency. One of the

TABLE 7. Types of Organizations

COUNTRY	HOST GOVERNMENT			REDUNDANT			PRIVATE SECTOR	
	LINE MINISTRIES	REGIONAL GOVERNMENT	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	PARASTATAL	PMUs	COOPERATIVES	PRIVATE COMPANIES	PVOs
Bolivia	INC (2 parts private)			CIAT				FIDES (Local)
Burkina FASO I	Coordination groups if needed	Development Agency						APRO CARE (Int'l)
Burkina FASO II								Save the Children Federation (Int'l)
Ecuador	Min Ag Implemented					Coops through Coop Federations		
Egypt	Got Contracts from EARIS			EARIS				
Haiti								HACHO (Local) CARE
Liberia					Project Management Unit	District Coops as heirs		

	HOST GOVERNMENT			REDUNDANT			PRIVATE SECTOR	
COUNTRY	LINE MINISTRIES	REGIONAL GOVERNMENT	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	PARASTATAL	PMUs	COOPERATIVES	PRIVATE COMPANIES	PVOs
Philippines	Lead-line for Implementation	BRB Coordinating Committee-- provincial governors regional directors of line agencies	Area Development Teams		BRBDPO Planning		Private Advisory Committee	
Sudan				Rahad Corp.				
Sri Lanka I						Multi purpose Cooperative Society	Ceylon Tobacco Company	
Sri Lanka II	Mahaweli Authority Under the Minister of Mahaweli Development						Ceylon Tobacco Company	

Key:

Denotes responsibility

Denotes shared responsibility

reasons that project designers opted for IRD projects was precisely because the government agencies were not doing an adequate job of delivering a range of services to the project areas in the first place. More often than not, the projects evaluated were located in poor isolated parts of the countries. Particularly under these circumstances, project designers were reluctant to rely on the existing agencies. Where this was attempted in the Bolivia project, for example, the government agency never fulfilled its responsibilty for building roads.

Although none of our projects was primarily managed by a host government agency alone, there were three cases where managerial authority was shared by host government agencies and another type of organization. The only cases where management was shared were these three involving host government agencies:

Sri Lanka II. The Mahaweli Authority (MASL), part of a Sri Lankan ministry, entered into an informal understanding with CTC, a private company, as a management agent. No agreement delineated their responsibilities but CTC thought it was responsible for ag extension, input delivery, credit and marketing. Because MASL did not carry out their normal

community development activities in that area, CTC started to pick those up as well. Difficulty and confusion arose and no one was very happy with the arrangement. There was positive impact, but it is not likely to be sustained.

Philippines. The Bicol River Basin Development Program Office was responsible for planning and promotion of the scheme. Individual ministries took the lead in implementing activities in their scope of responsibility but coordinated with other ministries where appropriate. There was an advisory committee for private sector involvement, a coordinating committee for provincial governors and regional directors of line agencies. At the local level, there were Area Development Teams with mayors, representatives of the line agency staffs, city legislative councils and BRBDP staff. With this much opportunity for coordination, momentum was bound to be impeded. High political commitment got it moving early on--but momentum has slowed by the elaborate institutional arrangements.

Burkina Faso I. AFRICARE shared managerial responsibility with the regional development authority to build local capacity. The project office was shared by staff from both as well as local representatives from the national credit and road building authorities. The team reported two factors that made

it possible for AFRICARE to overcome the usual problems encountered when responsibility is shared:

> AFRICARE was strongly committed to building institutional capacity and,

-- the regional development authority had great autonomy from the central government.

A successful tactic AFRICARE used for achieving more willing coordination with the road-building authority was turning the equipment over to the authority after the roads were built. This provided a considerable incentive for coordination and may have given the authority's local representative more leverage with his Ougadougou office.

Although sharing responsibility led to serious difficulties in several situations, Burkina Faso I was making the strategy manageable. The experience with the redundent organizations suggests why it may have been worth the effort.

7.2 Redundant Organizations--the trade off between results and sustainability

In Sri Lanka II and Philippines, host governments at least shared major responsibility for the projects. The rest of the projects we evaluated used redundant or private forms of management. To some extent, the prevalence of use

nongovernmental forms of management was amplified by the biases of our selections, but it does reflect the trend in IRD project management.

Rather than attempting to augment a half dozen agencies in order to meet the needs of one region, designers in three of our cases planned redundant organizations. Redundant organizations were created for independence from the ministries in order to have greater control over project activities--more than would have been possible in working through the ministries.

For example, the fiscal independence provided by US funding, coupled with a high level of political commitment, allowed the parastal EARIS considerable flexibility and autonomy back in the 60's. The organization achieved substantial impact.

The Liberia project was managed by a project management unit (PMU). PMUs were modeled after engineering projects where an independent organization was created at the site to supervise a construction job, and later dismantled when the job was complete. The PMUs reflected the American bias of going in and getting the "job" done. And the job was getting done, although not quite as planned. The PMU staff's rather limited authority did not allow them to totally renovate the input

packages, but they were flexible in allowing farmers to make benefical changes in the package. The improvements resulted in increased production and income.

Both projects demonstrate positive results from redundant organizations, but, it would be premature to abandon any role for government agencies. The agencies were more

likely to remain after the project than a project-created organization, no matter how permanent it was intended to be. For example, as political priorities shifted in Egypt, the project ended and the organization was dismantled. As a result, much of the momentum in project areas was lost. For the two desert sites this led after 15 years to a situation that the team characterized as "dire straits". Much of the positive benefits that were sustained at the larger site did so because of factors external to the project (such as proximity to Alexandria).

Sustaining services and benefits is a difficult issue for the redundant organizations. The PMU in Liberia was planned to end with the project. Because the Liberian Government was extremely unlikely to successfully sustain activities and services at the end of the project, the PMU was mandated to set up cooperatives to take over their functions. Apparently, the demands of project activities and bureaucratic disincentives to working their way out of a job have kept that from happening. This seriously questioned the sustainability of this effort as well.

The evidence led us to conclude that positive impact can be achieved with redundant organizations at the cost of

sustainability. In the IRD projects that combine short- and long-term expected results, this can be a particularly serious problem. Services may not even be sustained until they have fully matured and therefore they may neither achieve their intended impact nor have the expected beneficial effect on other activities.

7.3 Comparison of Private Types of Management Organizations

Three private types of organization were included in this series of evaluations. The type AID has used most often in its IRD projects was the private and voluntary organization both locally based and international. The cooperative project in Ecuador and the private sector cases in Sri Lanka were not IRD projects carried out by AID. We included them to try to learn more about AID's IRD projects through comparison to these private approaches. Reviewing the evidence from each group days the basis for considering what can be applied to AID's projects.

Common to all the private and voluntary organization (PVO) efforts in these evaluations was an emphasis on the process of developmental change--working with people, changing attitudes,

developing groups. For example, Save the Children Federation (SCF) was using its Community Based IRD approach to develop the self-help process in villages in Burkina Faso II, FIDES in

Bolivia employed innovative orientation techniques; and in Haiti, HACHO followed animation rurale techniques. This was apparently both a strengh and a weakness of the PVO style. Both SCF's and HACHO's efforts were limited by the resources available to support their process work. Where there were fairly substantial resources for service delivery and infrastructure creation in the Bolivia and Burkina Faso I projects, attention to process seemed to have been a very important additional dimension of the effort.

As nongovernmental organizations, PVOs can be independent of the government without having to wait for the government to "decentralize" authority to them, as they would to a local government. In Haiti and Burkina Faso II, the PVOs replaced government agencies as the service providers to a much greater degree than in any of the other cases. Although the governments had jurisdiction in the areas, the PVOs were virtually the only sources of services and resources. They played the same type of role that PMU and parastatals (which are partially governmental) sometimes do. This made them fairly independent and increased their flexibility.

In Haiti, by contrast, had too much flexibility. One of the major problems they faced was in defining their role--were

they a relief organization or a development organization? This seriously hampered their ability to have any developmental impact.

Long-term commitment and greater permanence in the area have been characteristics that the development community associated with PVOs. SCF served as the intermediary organization and service provider in the Burkina Faso II project. They have been working in the Dori area for a number of years using a combination of their own funds, funds from AID, and from other donors. This gave them independence because their commitment to the area was not tied to a particular source of funds.

On the other hand, AFRICARE's work in Burkina Faso I (the Seguenega area) was tied to AID funding. Although it would be unfair to suggest that their commitment was limited to that, AFRICARE would be unable to sustain services on the same level without AID. Pursuing their usual concern for process development in a time-limited AID project, AFRICARE made institution building in government agencies a high priority. The intent was that the agencies would sustain the services when the project ends. This limited CARE's independence and flexibility somewhat. It may, however, help to avoid the problems, disruptions in service and benefits that Egypt and

Sri Lanka I experienced when their independent organizations bowed out of the picture. We conclude that there is a trade-off between, on the one hand, the independence and

flexibility that helped achieve the organizations created by the projects the best results and on the other, working with permanent organizations (particularly governmental) that can sustain services when the project ends.

The private sector coopratives in the Ecuador project provides an interesting comparison on the issue of creating new organizations and sustainability.

The project was successful in achieving its purpose of creating cooperatives as a first step. Because of the desire for land and the requirement of cooperative membership to get it, the members had a strong incentive to participate. Tendler considers this basis of self-interest a necessary foundation. (FN Tendler) Individual interests sustain the cooperatives because they provide services the individual members wanted and needed.

In the strongest cooperatives, leaders emerged from the members. The team reported that good communication between leaders and members was essential. This suggested that the leaders operated more on the basis of coordination than authority. The private nature of the cooperatives provides a certain amount of independence, but the benefits were offset

somewhat by the limited management and financial skills of the local leadership.

Independence notwithstanding, the cooperatives still had to rely on the government as a provider of services. For example, the cooperatives had been quite successful in acquiring education, a service cooperative members valued highly. The success was a result of the high priority and equally high level of resources that the government had given to education.

Independence made the cooperatives sustainable to the extent they could meet members' needs. They will likely continue to have the most success when they can match members' needs with government policies and priorities.

One of the two Sri Lanka projects that were implemented by the private company, had even greater independence. CTC began its first IRD effort, the Sri Lanka I project at Mahiyangana, for the purpose of public relations--building good will with a government pursuing a policy of nationalization. As a private company working on its own, it was totally independent,

However, their total flexibility was a source of difficulty because it was untempered by experience--a private

company trying to be a development organization. Although CTC intended for the settlers in the area to become independent, they provided an unmatchable level of services creating

significant dependency. Their independence and flexibility allowed them to recognize and meet the settlers needs successfully, removing many constraints to development. But, at the same time, it created the new constraint of farmers depending on them in an unsustainable way.

CTC went into a small area in a big way with tremendous commitment, but little experience. The enormous resources they lavished on this relatively small group of people did lead to positive impact but also total dependency. This one-sided dependency drained CTC's resources at an unsustainable rate.

One hypothesis put for before the evaluation was that the private sector's management practices would lead them to more success in achieving their purposes and goals. The discipline of pursuing profit did seem to have had some effect. In the Sri Lanka II project, CTC was responsible for the agricultural inputs in one section of the enormous area under the Mahaweli Authority. Although pursuing good relations with the government was one of their goals, they wanted to break even, if not profit. Their experience with agricultural inputs distribution, extension, and marketing led them to very successfully fulfill the agricultural support functions.

Unfortunately, CTC ignored the basic business practice of requiring a contract with the Mahaweli Authority and difficulties arose over the division of responsibilities with the Government. The Government did not provide all the services it routinely provided in other parts of the scheme, but it was not clear that CTC was supposed to provide them either. CTC did go somewhat beyond what it considered its original mandate and was successful in the areas directly related to its expertise. Other aspects suffered--the government blamed CTC and the arrangement was terminated.

It is most instructive to compare the two CTC cases with a third case in India that was not part of the series:

Hindustani Lever, a subsidiary of Unilever Corp, had a dairy in Etah District of Uttar Pradesh that was running at about one third capacity and losing money. Although they were planning to close down, the local government prevailed on them to try again. Hindustani Lever's study of what was required to increase milk production concluded that the general underdevelopment of the area was limiting milk production. Their aim was to make the dairy profitable again by assisting farmers to increase milk production, yielding enough milk to bring the dairy up to capacity. They undertook an integrated rural development project in coordination with the government.

In the short period of several years, the dairy was up to full production and farmers' incomes had increased. Their interdependence serves them both and therefore was intended as

a permanent two-way relationship. This constrasts with the one-way, temporary relationship developed in the Sri Lanka I project.

In comparing all three types of private management organizations, we concluded that they shared characteristics of independence and flexibility. Sometimes this resulted in too much of a good thing, but in the right circumstances, it achieved significant results. PVOs seemed particularly suited to situations requiring considerable emphasis on process development and institution-building. Cooperatives can provide a sustainable focus for group decision making and acquiring services when the cooperative is based on a foundation of members' self-interest.

Although a local company can provide the managerial skill that is so often scarce, there are several clear limitations. Their activities should be limited to those where they have experience, moving carefully beyond their demonstrated expertise. The activities should be of benefit to them as well as the "participants" to facilitate sustainability.

8. TIMING ISSUES AND IMPLEMENTATION

8.1 Patterns of IRD Project Implementation.

Most classic IRD projects' designs have given equal priority to all activities. This left the timing decisions to the project managers. Decisions were apparently made to simplify a very difficult management task rather than to enhance impact or sustainability.

The incentives for AID managers were to begin with the building of physical infrastructure--money would be expended and physical progress could be seen. Roads were often considered prerequisites to other activities. Agriculture production activities also receive high priority, particularly irrigation. This meant that social service components were delayed, even in spite of the best intentions, until time and money were short. Activities such as preventive healthcare and the development of cooperatives were time consuming and suffered accordingly. When success in other areas of the project truly depended on these activities, the entire effort was undermined. Although only Rahad fell into that pattern,

other timing issues were apparent in several of the other projects as well.

Having started with intensive planning and attracting funds to the area, the Philippines project fairly quickly followed with roads and irrigation. This reflected the sequence of priorities established. The evaluation team pointed out that the Program Office lost momentum after the emphasis shifted to construction. The project risked losing the integration functions the Program Office provided and undermining the success of the entire effort. There may be successes in creating infrastructure, but the project could begin to look like Rahad where physical infrastructure was completed first and momentum for social services was lost--frustrating the raised expectations of the people in the area.

In Liberia, the evaluation team criticized the project for not adequately testing the agricultural package before disseminating and endorsing it. The PMU tried to move to quick impact with a weak package and encountered considerable resistance from farmers. Through skill and dedication, the PMU staff was ameliorating the difficulties, but progress could have been much smoother had they taken the initial step of testing the package rather than having farmers "test" it for them. The latter approach harmed their credibility and may

have undermined future activity.

8.2 Sequencing.

This need for the careful timing of activities in a project has led to the concept of sequencing: deciding during planning and design what activities must be initiated at the very beginning of a project and what activities could be initiated part of the way into the implementation process without detracting from the others. We found distinctions between working on process activities, agricultural production, infrastructure , and social services. The Ecuador project provides an interesting example.

The Ecuador project was not purposefully sequenced; it did not even begin as a multisectoral project. It began as an effort to encourage a process: develop coops through which peasants could acquire land.

Access to land and agricultural knowlege were identified as the key constraints to development in these areas, and therefore, were addressed first. As evidence of the significance of the latter, the Ecuador team pointed out that the quality of agricultural technical assistance the coops received was a determining factor in their success.

Additional activities were sought later as the members saw they were successful in acquiring land. The coops in Ecuador that were still having difficulties improving agriculture did not branch out into other activities. Compared to the other projects evaluated in the series, the individual cooperatives have acquired less outside support than many of the others. On the other hand, they have better prospects for sustainability:

> The coops' approach of encouraging local leadership and participation for commonly held objectives may be slower to get started, but it also bears more fruit in the long term. (Page)

Consolidating the success of initial activities and capitalizing on their demonstration effect created a positive base for the developmental process. To do so, project designers must be able to identify key constraints and establish priorities for project implementation.

9. PARTICIPATION

In reviewing the evaluations, we were able to see a relationship between how active the farmers were during a

project and related to the likelihood of the project's sustainability. In Liberia, for example, the farmers were very

active in modifying the production packages to achieve profitable combinations. This type of farmer participation was not part of the projects' design, but it was what made the packages viable and increased the likelihood of sustainability. The team reported that The PMU was attempting to support this direct form of sustainability.

By contrast, the farmers' "participated" so passively in Sri Lanka I that it contradicted that active verb. "CTC planned, organized and orchestrated the settlers' activities in a way they had probably not known since being very young children. " (p. 14) Tremendous dependency was created from CTC's well-meaning attentiveness to their every need: from trips to town for movies to laundering children's school uniforms.

This type of dependency undercut the sustainability of positive impacts. Passive recipients of project goods and services do not rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of completed projects to sustain and maintain services.

In addition to the role participation played in sustainability, in several cases it eased implementation. Although the Philippines' project was not as participatory as

it might have been, it does provide another example of how useful farmer participation can be in project implementation. In some instances, technicians and farmers

> "verify and validate the lay of the land, the farm boundaries, existing structures and facilities, and acceptability and appropriateness of the new structures. Since the smaller minor waterways (ditches and tertiary canals) are considered tentative and negotiable, this procedure has led to an early and speedy resolution of rights-of-way issues." (p.F6)

Verifying and validating each detail in the philippines was time consuming but so were the problems that arose without it in Afghanistan's Helmand Valley Development Project. A mosque stood squarely in the planned path of an irrigation canal. This had only become clear to people as construction approached it. Work was delayed while the problem was resolved, and tremendous ill will was generated. Participation can be time-consuming but so can the problems that arise without it.

If people's participation was useful but time consuming, what strategies are there for dealing with this? Bicol tried representation: mayors represented their "constituents" at Area Development Team meetings. Unfortunately the mayors did not

seem to have an intimate understanding of their constituents' concerns. The team found little correlation between "the

issues raised in the minutes of Area Development Team meetings with the issues raised by farmers in their conversations with us." p.17.

As a strategy for participation, representation was limited by the quality of the communication between the representatives and their constituents. Probably the most common strategy relied on working with groups of farmers. In Bolivia, settlers came to new lands from the highlands where there were century-old traditions of social organization. This helps in the communication and cooperation essential to working together towards shared goals. Traditions vary amongst the ethnic groups involved in the two Burkina Faso projects. The effectiveness of the governments' " Village Developmment Committees" clearly reflected the strength of each group's tradition of community action indicating that a tradition of community action was an important factor in determining whether group activities were successful.

The Philippines project area had a tradition of comunity action, but sadly missed an opportunity for building on already established groups. Pre-existing community goups were by-passed and often dismantled in favor

"of new and larger ones established from above...Indeed, several government ministries have mandates to set up their own individual farmer associations, leading to the further problem of imposing undue burdens on farmer's time." (p14)

The Ecuador team stressed the importance of the cooperative as a group in achieving project impact. By comparison, the Ecuador project began by developing the land acquisition cooperatives as groups for participation and diversified to activities in other sectors later. The team concluded:

"The primary reason for the difference in impact on both agricultural development and multi-sectoral development is the central role of participation and capacity-building in cooperative development. Coops are organizations operated by and on behalf of the membership. Thus, coop members develop a sense of ability to influence their environment. If they become landowners together, why should they not be able to acquire schooling, health services, credit and other necessary things together? A sense of power to change one's life is fundamental to development: this view is essential to initiate activities, as well as to sustain them. (p.21)

The team made two important points about the different

cooperatives. First their purpose was to acquire land which gave people a very strong incentive for participating. Second, communication played a key role in the coops' sustainability.

"Some of the coops which have experienced extreme difficulties seemed to work well as groups because of strong ties between leaders and members. Other coops failed because there was not adequate communication, which can result in mistrust and accountability problems." (p.20)

When successful, the coops were organizations that took the lead in identifiying and expressing members' needs as well as looking for ways to meet them.

Participation to facilitate communication played an important role in project sustainability as well as facilitating implementation. The quality and timeliness of the communication affected its usefulness.

A tradition of community action affected project success with a group strategy when project managers recognized and built upon this past experience.

Traditions of community action range from area to area. We concluded that this was one factor to be considered in choosing the area. Before addressing other criteria, it is necessary to consider why particular areas are selected.

10. CHOOSING THE AREA

There were two reasons for targeting specific areas:

1) the area had inherent potential to exploit;

2) The area had little or no inherent potential and needed assistance--frequently the area was remote from the capitol city.

The majority of these projects were located in poor, isolated areas. One development observer, William Siffin, commented that:

> "....because they favored regions which were by definition generally marginalized and which were poorly endowed with natural resources IRD projects often operated contrary to the classical theory of comparative advantage" (p.12)

For example, the Northwest of Haiti was a poor area, remote from Port-au-Prince. Through AID's HACHO project, the Government was able to indirectly increase services in this remote area.

In the Egypt project, the remoteness of the desert sites led to unexpected pitfalls. Productive lands were created by introducing irrigated agriculture. The success in these areas led after the project ended, to spontaneous settlements upstream that robbed the sites of their water supplies. Government commitment having shifted away from these areas, nothing was done and the quality of life significantly deteriorated.

This illustrates one of the major problems with concentrating considerable resources on a particular area--other areas want the same attention. This frequently caused political repercussions and led to sustainability problems.

Projects ended. When they did the pressures on the government to invest funds in other areas mounted. This was exactly what happened to the Egypt project.

> "In part, the decline in services can be attributed to increasing demand throughout rural Egypt and the inability of the ministries with limited resources, to keep up with the demand of a rapidly growing population." (p.20)

Furthermore, there were often bureaucratic pressures to

dismantle the organization and capture its resources. Egypt also serves as a good example of that. In countries with

growing populations where land was in short supply, even jungle and desert had some potential. One goal of the Egypt project was to solve the problems of population pressure on limited land. The team estimated, however that a new settlement of similar scope would have to be constructed every 22 days to absorb Egypt's current population growth.

Several of the areas the IRD projects we evaluated were in did have resources and potential and were designed to take advantage of the areas' comparative advantage. The Sudan project was the clearest case. The parastatal managing the project made decisions based on exploiting the high agricultural potential. They missed, however, the opportunities and necessities of smallholder agriculture, and, therefore, also missed much of the comparative advantage.

Inherent potential was usually economic but occasionally political as well. The Lam Nam Oon project (one of the special studies) was in Northeastern Thailand--an area where the government wanted to increase its presence for security reasons. The areas targetted for security reasons like Northeastern Thailand tended to be remote. They also tended to be marginal and in need of the same developmental assistance that IRD projects have provided in the other poor remote

areas. This could lead to the same problem of conflicting goals found in the Sudan project.

A political corollary to targetting areas was that it provided host governments with a form of donor management. The Liberian government allotted Lofa County for American aid efforts. [Footnote: Bong County as well--the team compared it to Lofa in the impact evaluation.] This resulted in concentration of AID resources in the county, with the PMU to provide coordination.

11. THE EFFECT OF POLICY ON IRD PROJECTS

Although we can identify two major reasons for choosing specific areas, it is difficult to come to such conclusions about policy. The importance of the policy environment was the major generalizable policy conclusion, a point made by the Liveria team:

> "A development project is, by definition, a resource-limited, time-bounded intervention. It is dependent for success on a combination of factors, some of which it can control or do something about, but many of

which are beyond its ability to exert influence. IRD projects are particularly sensitive to these external factors because of their mandate to intervene on several

sectoral fronts, either in sequence or simultaneously. Macro level constraints--such as agricultural pricing policies, and host government regional priorities--need to be taken into account in project selection, design, and implementation." (p.51-52)

Perhaps, the most important recurring policy issue was the government's commitment to the project. Getting it was difficult--keeping it was more difficult. For example, in Egypt:

> It proved unwise to ignore the social, political, and economic realities which pattern the regular distribution of resources and services in Egypt, favoring urban areas over the rural, villages over hamlets and the fifty acre owner over the holder of five." (p.21)

The special circumstances at the largest site allowed for success over time but the two smaller projects were victims of discontinued government commitment.

Since loosing government commitment was the norm, projects should be planned accordingly. Most of these projects were too small in terms of AID resources to allow any leverage for

changing government policies. Sometimes IRD projects might benefit from ongoing policy dialogue between AID and the host governments. Generally, they should be planned within the context of the ongoing current policy environment and not undertaken if it is too unfavorable.

12. NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Introducing a new activity, technology or product to an area, with or without a favorable policy environment, offers opportunities but also risks. Comparing the success of the vegetable garden component in the Burkina Faso I project with the failure of the village demonstration poultry flocks, the team concluded that:

> "Project impact has been much greater in activities with which villagers are already familiar...Activities requiring participants to alter materially their traditional ways risk failure." (p. 45)

One positive characteristic of familiarity was an awareness of the associated risks--an awareness of the consequences of failure as well as success.

The Liberian farmers that were quick to try the new agricultural packages ventured, lost, and paid the price. The package had not been adequately tested and tailored for their

specific circumstances. After the farmers modified the packages by growing more cocoa rather than the labor-intensive coffee or swamp rice, they were left with the responsibility to repay loans for the early unprofitable seasons. By stretching out repayment schedules, they brought this burden down to a manageable level.

Farmers did not have this kind of flexibility in the Sudan project and it contributed to the project's problems. Neither did the project allow for the diversity that could have augumented the flexibility. For a time, at least, farmers were required to grow only cotton allowing no authorized opportunity for farmers to modify and improve their situations as the Liberian farmers had.

In the same vein, the Egypt team concluded:

> "Area development on a narrow agricultural base is vulnerable to crop failure, fluctuations in marketing and availability of key agricultural inputs. The design of area development projects needs to incorporate ways to foster economic diversity" (p.25)

In an earlier effort, the Boliva project's implementing

organization, FIDES, had found that their strategy was vulnerable but had some advantages.

> "When things worked out, farmers did very well indeed....Like the proverbial gambler who, when playing blackjack, puts all his winnings back on the table everytime, he can increase his assets very fast if he is lucky, but when his luck turns he loses everything.... There were very few big successes among the original settlers and a great many failures." (p.14)

In response, they had developed a five step plan to self capitalization that balanced the need for investment capital against the need for subsistence.

> "The crux of FIDES' agricultural support effort was a strategy the encouraged insurance against the harmful effects outside that settlers' control--weather, market access, crop prices and the availability of inputs." (p.11)

This was "no quick road to wealth" (p.11), but probably no quick road to poverty either.

In reviewing this group of projects, it became apparent that new and/or innovative technologies appeared often in the

agricultural production components, sometimes in infrastructure components, (particularly irrigation but also road construction) and rarely in social services. We interpreted

this as another indication that the production components were the actual purposes of these projects. These purposes were best served by adequately tested, broadbased agricultural strategies.

13. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

13.1 IRD projects as implemented by AID were narrower than they appeared

Although we distinguished several types of projects, the primary purpose for almost 75 percent of all the types was to increase incomes. We concluded this after reviewing their articulated purposes, innovations, and actual achievements.

13.2 The projects combined activities with both long and short term expected benefits

Production components were expected to achieve results in

the short term and sutatin them into the future. Many of the social service and infrastructure components were expected to fully mature over the longer term.

13.3 Benefits

All of the Classic IRD projects and the IRD projects that combined economic and institutional approaches succeeded in their purpose of increasing incomes. The Community Development projects and the Sudan project did not, partially because this was not their primary purpose. The fact that seven of the eleven projects evaluated led to increased incomes suggests that the group as a whole has achieved significant accomplishments.

The teams also reported noneconomic quality-of-life benefits including improvements in access to social services, creation of infrastructure, endowments of land and relief activities.They were not able to report actual impacts from the provision of these goods and services because the evaluations (as a group) were too early and too brief to assess impacts that might have been caused by them.

13.4 Project Costs

Although our information limitations led us to very rough estimations of costs and benefits, we found some relationship between them. This did not, however, lead us to the conclusion that higher cost projects were desirable because the most expensive project, in the Sudan, had the most serious problems. IRD projects that combined economic and institutional approaches suggested that combining economic components with appropriate institutional components can be a comparatively low-cost approach to achieving impact.

13.5 Sustainability

There was not adequate evidence from these impact evaluations to defend the thesis that IRD projects can have more success with sustainability. The early indications suggested that, on balance, the increased imcomes were sustained, but sustainability of benefits in other areas was less clear. Future evaluations should be designed to address the sustainability of IRD projects with particular attention to

the interaction between the short-term economic impacts that were sustained and the impacts from activities that matured more slowly.

13.6 Manageability

Manageability was and will continue to be the challenge of multicomponent area projects. The impact reported by the teams that conducted this series of evaluations suggests that IRD projects can be manageable.

13.7 Management Organizations

The number of organizations involved did not have as strong an effect on the outcome as the importance of a single organization being primarily responsible. These projects were characterized by the creation of nongovernmental organizations for management, although government agencies played roles of varying strength in most of them. We concluded that this reflected the reluctance of project designers to rely on the existing agencies, particularly since it would have been

necessary to work with a number of agencies in most cases. None of the cases where management authority was shared had positive results.

New organizations were more likely to reach objectives than the existing government agencies but even the new organizations that were intended to be permanent were likely to have sustainability problems. Even if the organization continued to exist, its access to resources and momentum were frequently lost. Newly created, redundant organizations were not inherently bad. In a situation such as Liberia, this may have been the only way to accomplish anything. But in cases such as this, it is absolutely essential to plan a strategy for sustainability; otherwise project accomplishments will be short lived.

The private management organizations demonstrated independence and flexibility. Sometimes this resulted in too much of a good thing, but in the right circumstances, it achieved significant results. PVOs seemed particularly suited to situations requiring considerable emphasis on process development and institution building. Cooperatives can provide a sustainable focus for group decision-making and acquiring services when the cooperative is based on a foundation of members' self interest.

Although a local private company can augment scarce managerial skill, activities should be matched to their experience and self interest.

13.8 The timing of the implementation of activities should be planned with impact in mind; otherwise decisions will be made on the principles of simplifying management and getting money obligated.

The pattern followed by these projects was to emphasize infrastructure activities first, agriculture was a high priority, and social services were generally initiated later in the project.

13.9 A participation strategy building on local traditions should be developed to facilitate communication.

Participation to facilitate communication played an important role in project sustainability as well as implementation. The quality and timeliness of the communication affected its usefulness. A tradition of community action affected project success with a group participation strategy when the tradition was recognized and built upon.

13.10 Areas should be chosen to reflect the objectives for the project.

The project that placed higher priority on export production than benefits for the farmers in the area suffered serious difficulties from these conflicting goals. Most of these projects were chosen from the Basic Human Needs perspective in poor, remote areas that were contrary to the theory of comparative advantage. This made their accomplishments seem even greater.

13.11 IRD projects should be planned within the context of the current government policy environment and not undertaken if it is too unfavorable.

Projects implemented in unfavorable policy environments did not meet with success.

13.12 New technologies should be fully tested and provide for diversity.

New or innovative technologies appeared often in the agricultural production components, sometimes in the infrastructrue components and rarely in social services. We interpretted this as another indication that the production components reflected the actual purposes of these projects. These purposes were best served by adequately tested, broadbased agricultural strategies.

13.13 Some activities are so clearly interdependent that they will be included in the same project. Until we have fully tested the thesis that combining multiple short and long term activities will improve sustainability, AID should emphasize multisector area projects that have a limited number of tightly interrelated activities. Such as the schistosomiasis unit in the Liberia project.

APPENDIX A

A NOTE ON PROJECT SELECTION AND METHODS

Using AID's automated data system as well as manually searching AID records, we identified projects that were:

-- multisectoral (having components in more than one sector)

-- located in a specific rural area; not the entire rural area of the country.

We decided touse these two basic criteria to identify projects because, on the one hand, it was practical, but on the other, more inclusive than only using projects named IRD. The decentralized AID project design system makes it difficult to identify straightforward activities like road-building; it is, therefore, nearly impossible to identify a complex set of activities like IRD that lacks conceptual concensus in the Agency.

The two criteria chosen were fairly easily identifiable from information available in Washington. However, they

comprise a broader group than would have emerged using only projects with that name. Choosing projects with these two characteristics also distinguishes them from the many single sector projects that have some form of integration, e.g., interagency integration, spatial integration, interproject integration.

From the group, we identified projects which had been completed for several years. We discovered that many "IRD projects" are actually series of projects, reflecting AID administrative and bureaucratic limitations on length and size of project. Therefore, we also chose some projects near completion or with substantial periods of implementation.

Impact evaluations as carried out by CDIE, follow a consistent set of methods:

-- reports are authored by multidisciplinary teams of 3-5 people

-- teams spend 3-4 weeks in the field with at least two weeks visiting the project site(s)

-- preparatory workshop for the team to develop project-specific scope of work

-- CDIE reviews scope prior to fieldwork and reports after fieldwork.

In addition to the impact evaluations, this report draws on several special studies as well. These studies, listed in table 1 of the main text, reviewed projects where either access to the country precluded a field visit or so much information was available in Washington that a desk study was considered more cost effective. In one instance fieldwork was conducted, but circumstances caused the methods to diverge so greatly from the norm that that particular report was considered a special study. This review uses the findings from these studies but does not include them in the impact analysis in section 2. Each individual author's discretion determined the data collection and sources used in the special studies.

APPENDIX C

LIST OF AID's
INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS*

Africa Bureau

Chad	6770001	Lake Chad Irrigation	77/81
Zambia	6110204	Chama Area Development	81/84
Botswana	6330077	Rural Development	80/85
Cen. Afr. Rep.	6760015	Rural Development	82/85
Liberia	6690139	Upper Bong County Rural Development	78/84
Liberia	6690142	Lofa County Rural Development	75/81
Mauritania	6820201	Guidimaka IRD	75/82
Mauritania	6820207	Integrated Development of Oases	80/85
Niger	6830205	Niamey Dept. Rural Development	77/81
Niger	6830240	Niamey Dept. Development II	81/86
Sahel Reg.	6250012	Gambia River Basin Development	81/86
Senegal	6850205	Casamance Regional Development	78/85
Senegal	6850239	Village Development Program	79/82
Tanzania	6210143	Arusha Area Development	78/83
Sudan	6500026	Wadi Halfa Community Development	78/82
Sudan	6500018	Blue Nile Agricultural Development	78/85
Sudan	6500025	Abyei IRD	78/81
Sudan	6500100	Sudan - Rahad Irrigation	73/79
Upper Volta	6860201	Eastern ORD IRD	74/81
Upper Volta	6860220	Dori Community Development	76/80
Upper Volta	6860231	Seguenega IRD	78/83
Zaire	6600059	North Shaba Rural Development	76/86
Zaire	6600082	Imeloko IRD	78/81
Zaire	6600093	Community Health - IRD	81/84
Kenya	6150147	Vihiga Rural Development	71/78
C&W Afr. Reg.	6250926	Sahel Development Program	76/83
Algeria	6380002	Rural Development	63/67
Somalia	6490103	Kurtunwaare Settlement	79/82
Somalia	6490113	Bay Region Development	80/85
Somalia	6490054	Chismaio Area Development	66/68

*"IRD projects" were defined as multisectoral in a specific geographic area. See Appendix A for further discussion.

Asia Bureau

India	3860464	Gujarat Irrigation	78/84
India	3860467	Rajasthan Irrigation	80/85
India	3860482	Rajasthan Area Development	83/84
Indonesia	4970245	Citanduy Basin Development	76/84
Indonesia	4970281	Citanduy II	80/86
Indonesia	4970264	Provincial Area Development	78/88
Indonesia	4970276	Provincial Area Development II	79/89
Indonesia	4970244	Luwu Area and Transmigration	75/83
Indonesia	4970240	Rural Works	75/80
Indonesia	4970285	Rural Works II	79/84
Indonesia	4970252	Sederhana Irrigation II	78/83
Nepal	3670129	Rural Area Development - Rapti Zone	80/85
Afghanistan	3060090	Helmand Valley	54/77
Pakistan	3910471	Tribal Area Development	82/87
Pakistan	3910485	Gadoon - Amazai Development	83/88
Philippines	4920303	BICOL IRD	78/83
Philippines	4920310	BICOL IRD II	78/84
Philippines	4920289	BICOL IRD III	79/85
Philippines	4920236	Provincial Development	68/77
Philippines	4920275	Libmanan/Cabusao IRD I	75/82
Sri Lanka	3830041	Mahaweli Ganga Irrigation	77/82
Sri Lanka	3830073	Mahaweli Basin Development II	81/86
Thailand	4930272	Lam Nam Oon On-Farm Development	77/85
Thailand	4930289	Land Settlements	79/84
Thailand	4930294	Highland Area Development (Mae Cham)	80/87
Thailand	4930163	Accelerated IRD	64/71
Thailand	4930308	Northeast IRD	81/88

LAC Bureau

Haiti	5210061	HACHO Community Development	66/79
Haiti	5210142	Gros Morne IRD II	80/83
Haiti	5210081	Gros Morne Rural Development	77/80
Haiti	5210073	Small Farmer Development	74/81
Bolivia	5110050	Sub-Tropical Lands Development	75/81
Bolivia	5110499	Village Development	78/85
Bolivia	5110543	Chapare Regional Development	83/88
Bolivia	5110514	FIDES Colonization	79/84
Ecuador	5180012	IRD	80/84
Ecuador	5180008	Yarqui Coop and Community Development	79/82
Ecuador	5180021	Integrated Community Development	82/85
Ecuador	5180028	Colonization - Sto. Domingo	64
Guatemala	5200233	Small Farmer Development	76/84
Guatemala	5200274	Highlands Agricultural Development	83/88
Guatemala	5200272	San Marcos IRD	80/84
Guatemala	Proposed	IRD II	87
Guatemala	5200249	Integrated Area Development	78/82
Guatemala	5200204	Rural Development	70/76
Guatemala	5200272	IRD	80/84
Honduras	5220227	Small Farmer Agricultural Development	83/86
Honduras	5220128	Pespire Valley IRD	76/80
Jamaica	5320046	Integrated Regional Rural Development	77/84
Panama	5250186	IRD	77/85
Panama	5250200	Guaymi Area Development	79/83
Peru	5270163	Development of Sub-Tropical Lands	78/83
Peru	5270244	Upper huallaga Agricultural Development	81/88
Peru	5270207	CEDRU IRD	79/80
Peru	5270178	IRD	79/85
Costa Rica	5150158	Rural Development II	79/81
Costa Rica	5150129	IRD	
Guyana	5040075	Small Farmer Development	78/85
El Salvador	5190209	IRD	79/82

Colombia	5140201	San Gil IRD	76/80
Colombia	5140210	IRD	
Colombia	5140203	Small Farmer Development	76/80
Carib. Reg.	5380004	IRD	72/82
Carib. Reg.	5380007	Integrated Agricultural Development	72/82

Near East Bureau

Egypt	2630021	Development Decentralization	78/87
Egypt	2630103	Basic Village Services	80/85
Tunisia	6640285	Rural Development	76/81
Tunisia	6640121	Medjerda Valley Development	59/70
Tunisia	6640312	Central Tunisia Rural Development	79/86
Tunisia	6640307	IRD - Siliana	77/84
Jordan	2780205	Jordan Valley Village Development II	78/82
Jordan	2780221	Jordan Valley Village Development III	79/83
Morocco	6080127	Doukkala Irrigation	76/84
Yemen	2790031	Rural Development	77/81
NE Reg.	2980143	Rural Development in Gaza Strip	76/81
NE Reg.	2980166	Rural and Community Development	81/85

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