

Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global

Edited by
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
Brig (R) Muneer Mahmud
Mustansar Billah



Islamabad Policy Research Institute

IPRI

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This volume is based on the papers presented at the two-day seminar on "Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global" held on 27-28 March 2007 in Islamabad. The seminar was organised on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee jointly by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and the USAID Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project under the aegis of Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services (PIPS) Islamabad. Most of the papers included in this publication have been revised and updated by the authors.

The editors express their profound gratitude to the honourable Parliamentarians, scholars and experts of Pakistan Study Centres, Area Study Centres and Universities who accepted our invitation to participate in the seminar. Almost, all of them have been closely associated, in one capacity or the other, with the issues relating to internal and external dynamics of Pakistan. We are grateful to the Chairman Senate of Pakistan, Mohammedman Soomro for his participation as the Chief Guest in the seminar. We are also grateful to the chairpersons of sessions, who through expert time management made the proceedings of the seminar productive. Our thanks are also owed to the learned and highly informed members of the audience for their positive contributions by taking keen interest and actively participating in the question-answer sessions.

We express our thanks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for allowing us to organise the seminar on their behalf. We are deeply indebted to its versatile chairman, Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed who through his hectic efforts made the holding of seminar a reality. Our special thanks are owed to USAID Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project under the aegis of PIPS for bearing the expenses of the seminar. We are also grateful to Ms Eleanor Valentine, Project Director of USAID Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project and members of the project for providing necessary help in organising the seminar.

The editors also acknowledge with gratitude the contributions made by the members of IPRI administrative staff in making this seminar a success by providing logistic support and making excellent arrangements. We would also like to acknowledge the splendid effort of Col (Retd) Ghulam Sarwar, whose energies made this a far more readable and engaging work.

Finally, our thanks are for all those whom it would not be possible to name and thank individually, but made important contributions to ensure the success of the seminar. The failings are, however, our own.



INTRODUCTION

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Brigadier Muneer Mahmud (Retired)

Pakistan is located in one of the most turbulent regions of the world. All the super powers of the past, present and future, have an interest in the region. The global scenario is also evolving fresh. The dynamics of globalisation is reshaping the International Order which after a brief interlude of unipolarity is paving way to multipolarity. Monumental changes are taking place in the distant and adjacent regions all over the globe. The first two wars of the 21st century in the Middle East were primarily ideological. Afghan and Iraq Wars were not in pursuit of territory but in pursuit of certain policy objectives of the United States. Since 2001, the region has been turned into an ideological battleground with global ambitions. The war on terror has also created multiple and potentially explosive fault lines – religious, economic, political and geographical. In Iraq, the sole super power, in the words of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, has been ‘trapped’ which has its own ramifications. On the other end of spectrum, rapid rise of China based on economic strength has increased her global and regional reach manifold. The United States is endeavouring to make India a major power. Russia is reasserting itself. Africa and Latin America are also reflecting signs of change, some positive and some not so positive. In short, there are major developments taking place around the globe affecting Pakistan and the region. On the internal front, there are various social, cultural and security issues confronting Pakistan. The dynamics of globalisation are also having an impact offering both challenges and opportunities. There is a need to engage in real human security and hence socio-economic development on sustainable basis. Pakistan desires a stable, peaceful and prosperous region which at the moment faces many challenges. Due to its geo-strategic location, it has a stake in the regional stability and desires to promote regional cooperation to accelerate development and prosperity in Pakistan and the region.

Taking into cognisance the need for an open but expert discussion on the issues confronting Pakistan, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), in collaboration with the USAID Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project under the aegis of Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services (PIPS), jointly organised a two-day National Seminar on “Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global” on 27-28 March 2007 in Islamabad on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The aim of the National Conference was to deliberate on the internal and external dynamics of Pakistan in an academic seminar enmeshing the inputs of scholars in Pakistan Study Centres, Area

Study Centres and some universities with a view to working out options for Pakistan in the evolving environments. Finally, the seminar also aimed at developing an interface between academia on the one hand, and legislators, policy and decision makers on the other, to evolve a cohesive internal and external policy. Under globalisation, there is a need to ensure human security and socio-economic development on sustainable basis. Therefore, Pakistan desires a stable, peaceful and prosperous region around its borders and shores.

This volume contains the papers presented in the seminar which was divided into the following six sessions, each under a specific theme and sub-themes:

Session I	Educational Dynamics of Pakistan
Session II	Economic Progress
Session III	Constitutional Dynamics
Session IV	Emerging Regional Environment
Session V	Evolving Global Dynamics
Session VI	Options for Pakistan

Inaugural and Sessions I, II, and III were held on the first day (27 March 2007), while Sessions IV, V, and VI were held on the second day (28 March 2007). Session VI was the Concluding Session of the Seminar.

Chairman Senate of Pakistan, Honourable Mohammedmian Soomro, made the Inaugural Address.

The following Six people acted as Chairpersons for respective Sessions of the Seminar:

1. Ms Anisa Zaib Tahir-Keli, Minister of State for Education
2. Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, President, Islamabad Policy Research Institute
3. Senator S. M. Zafar
4. Mr Gohar Ayub Khan, former Speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan and Minister for Foreign Affairs
5. Dr Shireen M. Mazari, Director-General, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad
6. Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, Secretary-General Pakistan Muslim League, and Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Senate, Honourable Mohammedmian Soomro, in his Inaugural Address, said that 'the world has endured drastic events in the past decades whose immediate impact is being borne across the world'. The region around Pakistan 'has been the focus of some major happenings and the resultant fallout is unfolding an access to security problems', Chairman Soomro noted. He further pointed out that 'nations have been able to manage the changing scenarios on short-term and adhoc basis, as reactive

actions to cope with the exigencies, yet the pace of change demands proactive orientation by seeking pragmatic adjustment to the realities'. Focusing on nuclear policy and relations with India, Chairman Soomro stated that 'we will continue to pursue a policy of restraint and responsibility in nuclear matters. India continues to reject the concept of strategic restraint in South Asia. We hope that they would eventually see the merit of this proposal'.

Earlier, in his Welcome Address, Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, President, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, said that the 'demise of the Cold War has generated two major trends such as the simultaneous emergence of disintegrative and integrative tendencies and the ascendancy of the economic imperatives'. He noted that 'the ascendancy of economic factors becomes more pronounced' unlike the Cold War period when political considerations have dominated the agenda. He further went on to maintain that 'the post 9/11 period experienced the assertive policy pursuits of the sole super power and the emergence of non-state actors along with the initiation of war against terrorism'. He deplored the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq which have weakened the United Nations; it gave a serious blow to the non-proliferation regime, particularly after the signing of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal in March 2006. He concluded by saying that such radical changes and transformations lead policymakers towards rethinking and readjustment of their policy pursuits.

Dr Noor ul Haq presented his paper on "Education in Pakistan: Historical Perspective". He gave a resume of various education policies since independence. Generally, these policies aimed at universal primary education, technical and professional education, quality education, gender equality, Islamic values and national unity. However, the goals set for the integration of madrasa education with the main stream education outlined in 1947, the removal of class barrier between those who study in English medium and those enrolled in Urdu medium schools as decided in 1970, free and universal education up to secondary level desired in 1972, the demand for gender parity and bridging the gap between rural and urban areas, and above all, achievement of one hundred percent literacy stressed from the beginning are yet to be achieved.

Dr Tariq Rehman spoke on "Quality of Education". He said that 'knowledge is power' and 'violence can only be reduced through education' because 'knowledge is peace-oriented'. He pointed that British had left a colonial structure of education in the Indian Sub-continent and Pakistan inherited that colonial educational structure and values after independence. He stated that the primary purpose of British colonial educational system was intended to stop the spread of universal education at mass level. He deplored that unfortunately Pakistan retained that colonial education system after independence, which is a class-based educational system. He said that Pakistan's educational system has been characterised by modernisation, vernacularisation, privatisation and ideological socialisation. He said that in

addition to class-based education, privatisation and religious education, there is also militarisation of education as army made huge inroads in education in the country from primary to university level. He also said that bias and prejudice also prevail in school textbooks. He said that literacy and non-formal education is a major challenge in education in the country. He said the mushroom growth of private educational schools, colleges and universities cannot find answer to the problems of education. While discussing educational reforms, he suggested the need to establish at least two world-class universities in the country instead of too many tiny and sub-standard public and private universities, to compete with the world.

Dr Rukhsana Qamber in her paper on "Pedagogy and Public Policy in American Studies", said that 'the primary task of research institutions like the Area Studies Centres in Pakistan is to add to existing knowledge in their respective specialisation by making research their top priority and teaching their second priority. She further mentioned that the Area Study Centers in Pakistan could perform a great task by eliminating wrong and stereotype perceptions about different cultures and peoples across the globe.

Ms Anisa Zaib Tahir-Kheli, in her remarks, explained the development of education in Pakistan in detail. She said that 'implementation and financial resources are missing in education in Pakistan'. She told that educational reforms were introduced and the quality of education was made relatively better. Public schools in Islamabad, for example, are doing better than similar schools in the country, she mentioned. She also talked about the diverse and mass affect of privatisation, Islamisation, and democratisation on education in Pakistan and said that the dynamics of education are fast changing and the country is on the right track. By referring to the 1973 Constitution, she said that the State was responsible to provide basic education to its people as soon as possible but unfortunately this mission has not been accomplished as yet. She pointed out that finances were not only the problem but the capacity to utilise them was another issue. She told that, for instance, only Rs 7 billion were hardly utilised after 2001, out of Rs 25 billion allocated for education in 5 years, while the Provinces even could not utilise Rs 3 billion as yet. She told the audience that even then, the present Government went to increase the amount of allocation for education under the Education Sector Reforms (ESR) up to Rs 100 billion with a focus on literacy, adult education, non-formal, and technical education. Free education including stipends and books were also provided for the lower segments of the society. She told that gender parity is improving, particularly at the primary education level. She told that Government is trying to increase the allocation for education up to 4 per cent of GDP and the target would go up to Rs 250 billion as the GDP is growing. Ms Tahir-Kheli told that over 1.5 million students are enrolled at *Madaris* in the country and these *Madaris* are the largest NGOs in Pakistan without asking any financial assistance from the Government. She made it

clear that these *Madaris* are not nurseries of terrorism as reported in Western media. She told that *Wafaq-ul-Madaris* could act as Directorate for *Madaris*. About higher education, she mentioned the number of foreign and indigenous scholarships have been increased manifold over the last few years.

Dr Fazal-ur-Rehim Marwat made his presentation on “The *Jehadi* Curriculum - A Prelude to Talibanisation in Pakistan (A Case Study of Afghan Refugees)” and talked about the images, perceptions and thoughts concerning the Afghan War. He said that ‘the Marxist Revolution in Afghanistan (1978) and Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) jolted the entire region politically and accelerated the process of political confrontation into ideological polarisation’. He examined the root causes of Talibanisation in Pakistan from an historical perspective, the interaction between internal and external variables to transform Afghan refugees into holy warriors or *Mujahideen* and how the *Jehadi* curriculum was introduced in schools and *Madaris* by the secret agencies of Pakistan and the United States. He said *Jihadi* culture became a common norm in Pakistani textbooks, press, and advertisements during and even after the Afghan War. ‘De-secularisation, de-liberalisation, Kalashnikovisation, and Talibanisation slowly crept into Pakistani and Afghan society, and developed into a monster to be reckoned with’, Dr Marwat pointed out. He said that these developments have greatly damaged the developments of Pakistan and wrongly promoted the *Jihadi* culture within the society that became the reasons for sectarian violence and ultimate terrorism in the country.

Mr Rizwan Ullah Kokab gave his presentation on “Globalisation and Pakistan Economy”. He said that Pakistan has transformed from the most backward area of British India in 1947 into a vibrant economy of South Asia by now. He said that globalisation presents brilliant opportunities to Pakistan particularly in the textile sector, *albeit* of various other obstacles in the way. He also suggested measures that can be taken to overcome such obstacles.

Prof. Lal Bakhsh Jiskani gave his talk on “Constitutional Dynamics: Historical Perspective - The Case for Provincial Autonomy”. He traced the ancient and modern history of the Indian sub-continent and constitutional reforms introduced by the British in India. He said that Sindh was the first province in British India that adopted a resolution for the creation of an independent Muslim State in the Indian Sub-continent at the All-India Muslim League Conference held at Karachi on 8 October 1938 under the Chair of Quaid-i-Azam. Professor Jiskani pointed out that after the League’s 1938 Resolution, various constitutional schemes were framed. He said that in the League’s Lahore session that was held on 21-23 March 1940, a 19-member delegation from Sindh participated, including Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ayub Khuro, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi and G. M. Syed. Prof Jiskani went to note that the Sindh Legislative Assembly tabled the Pakistan Resolution (of 23 March 1940) under G. M. Syed on 3 March 1943. It was in the light of Sindh Assembly’s Resolution that the League passed Pakistan Resolution in Delhi on

7 March 1943. Professor Jiskani pointed out that *Hasba* Bill, *Hadood* Ordinance, and Blasphemy Laws are in contravention of Quaid-i-Azam's 'liberal, moderate, secular and progressive thought'. Prof Jiskani maintained that the present Constitution of Pakistan has been mutilated, altered and re-altered to suit the ambitions of Pakistan's ruling elites'. He went to deplore that the 1973 Constitution could not save the life of the first popularly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Senator S. M. Zafar, in his remarks, said that civil society should be strengthened. He quoted a saying that 'when slaves start thinking, slavery dies'. He said that the 1973 Constitution was an agreement between the Centre and the smaller provinces. He suggested that Concurrent List of the 1973 Constitution should be reviewed by now as provinces have gained strength and are capable of handling subjects related to railways and big enterprises, for instance. He said that education is the only solution for any nation to stand on its feet to face and tackle the challenges. He stressed that the political process of the government has shown a visible and free progress for all. He said that 'decentralisation is the best and only way for grassroots development', adding that 'this development can only be achieved through educational reforms in line with the modern needs'.

Dr Sadiq Ali Gill, while talking on "Human Trafficking in South Asia and the Indian Factor," said that human trafficking in South Asia is not a new phenomenon where it has been source of income for centuries. He said human trafficking has been recognised as a menace in recent years. He said that human 'trafficking provides workers for the sex industry and the cheap labour. India, Bangladesh and Nepal are the main countries of origin for trafficking, while Pakistan is the transit passage. Traffickers lure their victims by false promises of high paying jobs and fraudulent marriages in foreign countries. Trafficking is linked to poverty and it is a need for low-cost labour. The governments of this region are now starting to control this menace by providing protection to the potential victims through laws to monitor and control trafficking', Dr Gill pointed out.

Dr Munir Ahmed Baloch, in his paper on "Pak-Iran Relations in the Changing World Scenario", said that the strategic and geo-political locations of the two countries had made them permanent partners. He opined that Pakistan can play a vital role in decreasing tension between Iran and the US. With its close relations with US, Pakistan is well placed to use its good offices for rapprochements between the two. There must be realisation on the part of the leadership of both countries (Pakistan and Iran), that in the emerging strategic environment of the region, the security concerns of both are mutually indivisibly interlinked. Since 9/11, on one hand new problems and challenges coupled with new conditions have emerged; on the other hand the new realities have also provided an opportunity for an increased cooperation between Iran and Pakistan, said Dr Baloch.

Dr Musarrat Jabeen gave her presentation on “Economic Stress on Pakistan in Changing Regional Political Economy”. Her hypothesis narrated that ‘If the external perspective of Pakistan economy is taken care of, then the probability of future economic instability may be reduced’. She said that economic stress stems from internal, regional and global sources. She strongly held regional environment of Pakistan responsible for underdevelopment and economic stress.

Mr Luftur Rehman made a presentation on “Durand Line: A Pakistani Perspective”. He traced a brief history of the Durand Line Agreement. He said the Durand Line Agreement that was signed in 1893 at Kabul, was perhaps the only agreement in the world, which is ‘so widely misquoted and distorted’. He said that Durand Line Agreement is even valid today but a propaganda campaign is going against it because people are not aware of facts of the Agreement or they have vested interests. He pointed out that Pakistan’s case is even much stronger than the so-called Afghanistan’s claim as British had surrendered parts of Frontier Province to Afghanistan under the Agreement. He said that at the will of King Amir Abdul Rahman of Afghanistan, Durand Line Agreement was signed, when British Foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, visited Kabul on the invitation of the Amir in 1893. After hectic deliberations that lasted for long 40 days, the Agreement was signed on 12 November 1893. The Amir celebrated the Agreement at a grand *Darbar* (Court) next day and thanked the British Government. ‘The Amir was quite contented because he gained more than his expectations’, Luftur Rehman maintained.

Gohar Ayub Khan, in his remarks, said that human trafficking is taking place in many countries all over the world. In South Asia, India and Bangladesh are the largest sources of human trafficking. Pakistan also faces this menace. Thailand and China are also part of human trafficking in spite of the rise of China, especially Macao and Hong Kong had been attractive places for Chinese human trafficking. Latin American countries also face the same menace, as United States is an attractive destination. Regarding Pakistan’s economy, Mr Gohar Ayub said that Pakistan’s economy grew quite faster in the 1950s because of the Korean War boom. Lack of consistency and governance, however, resulted in the weakening of the economy. He also said that after the completion of Tarbella Dam, Pakistan should have constructed at least a couple of dams to advance the cause of development. He stressed the urgent need for importing gas from Turkmenistan, as gas from Iran would become difficult because of UN, US, and EU’s economic sanctions against Iran. He also stressed the need to get gas and electricity from Uzbekistan. He said that government has to make these arrangements, otherwise economic progress would not be possible in the near future. East Asian countries developed their economies as export and import substitute based. However, Pakistan could become an export led and import substitution economy. Even

Turkey and Bangladesh are doing better in textile than Pakistan, he mentioned. About relations with Afghanistan, he said that border fencing is taking place in many countries within South Asian region.

Ms Uzma Shakeel in her presentation on “Shaping up the Global Milieu: Role of the West,” said that President George W. Bush’s grand strategy after September 11, was the result of a pattern of strategic adjustment in the aftermath of crisis situations that have occurred repeatedly and predictably in American history’. She said that ‘such situations have generated shocks and pressures creating an opening for new strategic ideas. She was of the opinion that ‘leading state’ officials have taken the opportunity to put forward their preferred approach largely based on their perceptions of national interest’.


Dr Shireen Mazari said that in complex world political system, modern needs and political interpretations are playing very important role to define the state behaviour. Along with that energy security is emerging as the major issue. The politicisation of issues towards economic interests of states are also promoting and violating state interests, where terrorism has emerged as the alternative security threat, which changed the meaning of deterrence, Dr Mazari remarked.

Dr Abdul Latif Tunio made a presentation on “Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global”. He said that security and development are interconnected and no development can take place without a congenial security atmosphere. He also argued that security alone cannot ensure integrity of a State. Development is the most paramount pillar of security, he opined. He further pointed out that ‘Pakistan’s vulnerability to non-military threats is on the rise and most of them are internal consequent of economic disparity and social disharmony’. He further argued that the development of two big economies (China and India) on the frontier of Pakistan is causing a capability gap in Pakistan’s security management and the question in front of the country is how to address security challenges at internal and external level.

Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, in his concluding remarks, stated that ‘political parties, human rights, provincial autonomy, rule of law, education, and new emerging political concerns can better define national security’. He further added that ‘military concept of national security was conventional but now nuclear weapons are playing very important role in foreign and defence policies of several states’. The birth of a new multi-polar world order is providing new opportunities towards energy and economy with regard to new organisations such as EU, ASEAN and SCO, which are now playing the changed role of political and economic relations. Senator Mushahid further said that there is a need of intellectual gatherings so as to give feedback to the policymakers in Pakistan. He proposed that this interaction should be organised twice a year. He also told the audience that there would be a Conference to celebrate the War of Independence of 1857 in May this year

and interested people among the audience may take part in the conference. He told that the very purpose of this seminar was designed for the same purpose. He also told the audience that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has prepared a Report on Afghanistan and the copies of the Report were distributed among the participants. Senator Mushahid stated that there is no difference between the Taliban in Kabul and neo-conservatives in Washington. Both of them are extremists. He pointed out that US biggest power is its 'soft power' and not 'military power' as it exercises in Third world countries. He said that people in Pakistan greatly admire US 'soft power'. He also said that the process of dialogue and intellectual debate should be promoted.

Dr Azmat Hayat Khan, Dr Muhammad Islam and Dr Syed Jaffar Ahmad also participated in the seminar but did not submit their papers in written form. Therefore this volume does not contain their papers. ■



WELCOME ADDRESS

Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

Honourable Chief Guest, Chairman Senate of Pakistan,
Senator Mushahid Hussain, Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Ms. Eleanor Valentine, Project Director,
Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project
Senators, Members National Assembly
Excellencies
Respected Participants,
Ladies and Gentlemen

Let me at the outset welcome you with all the enthusiasm one can muster and express my deep gratitude and profound thanks to all of you for sparing your precious time and joining us for deliberations on this very important subject: 'Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global'.

At the global level, two major developments of far reaching consequences have transformed the bipolar world and given birth to what is frequently referred as the uni-polar world. These developments included the death of the Cold War and the tragic events of 9/11. The demise of the Cold War generated two major trends, such as the simultaneous emergence of disintegrative and integrative tendencies and the ascendancy of the economic imperatives.

The immediate post-Cold War era witnessed disintegration of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, along with the emergence of integrative processes as manifested by strengthening of European Union and ASEAN. New actors emerged on the global scene.

The ascendancy of economic factors became more pronounced. During Cold War, the relations among nations, were primarily governed by the political considerations and economic considerations played a secondary role whereas in the post Cold War era the economic factors acquired the deserving primacy. The market forces began to assert themselves. However, this does not mean that political considerations were not contributing towards the formulation of foreign policies but were only relegated to secondary position.

The post Cold War era saw the emergence of globalisation and the World Trade Organization.

The tragic events of 9/11 and consequential developments further impacted upon the international system. The post 9/11 period saw the assertive policy pursuits of the sole super power and the emergence of non-state actors along with the initiation of war against terrorism. Not only had this era seen the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, but also the weakening of the United Nations.

In addition, the policy pursuits of the sole super power also saw the weakening of Non-Proliferation regime, especially after the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal.

Given the transformed nature of the international environment, nations are compelled to adjust themselves to new realities. Changes on the global level, often radically impact upon the regional realities. Invariably, radical changes cause rethinking and readjustment of foreign policy pursuits.

The main aim of this national seminar is to assess the nature of impact on Pakistan and the possible remedial measures that could be undertaken with a view to minimize the adverse impact and secure smooth and beneficial adjustments. I am confident that the deliberations in this august gathering would provide us new interpretations of the changed environment with constructive suggestions. I am keenly looking forward to a rich input by this galaxy of scholars.

In addition, the interaction of law, policy and decision makers with intelligentsia and scholars from Area Study and Pakistan Study Centres is deemed desirable. In this connection, one has to appreciate greatly the role played by the Pakistan Institute of Parliamentary Services which is supported by the US Aid in facilitating this particular effort. This is gesture indeed commendable and hence deeply appreciated. I do earnestly hope that opportunities of this kind of interaction are frequently made available.

Let me once again welcome you here in Islamabad and do earnestly hope that you enjoy your stay as well as the national seminar in Islamabad. Good luck and God bless you all. ■

INAUGURAL ADDRESS

Mohammedmian Soomro
Chairman, Senate of Pakistan

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Asalam-o-Alaikum!

I feel privileged to address such an august gathering of erudite thinkers and practitioners of the art of diplomacy and International Relations. This indeed is the most befitting setting for sharing my thoughts with you. National Conferences such as this, provide an important mechanism to forge cooperation among diverse segments of society. Such forums provide us an opportunity to exchange ideas and learn from each other's experiences for our collective benefit.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

The world has endured drastic events in the past few decades and its immediate impact is being borne across the world. Our region, in particular, has been the focus of some major happenings and the resultant fallout is unfolding an access to security problems in the region and beyond. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, followed by its break-up, Civil War in Afghanistan and rise of Taliban, Iraq's invasion of Iran, invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf War of 1991, the 9/11 tragic events which changed the course of history, US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and Kashmir War of Liberation, which left in its trail colossal death and destruction; all that happened too fast, too soon. Nations, however, have been able to manage the changing scenario on short term and adhoc basis, as reactive actions to cope with the exigencies, yet the pace of change demands proactive orientation, by seeking pragmatic adjustment to the emerging realities.

Harmony and integration and not dependence pave the way to creating a genuine global community. Many countries, the developed and developing, have already become members of the regional trading arrangements, which is a healthy trend, because, as nations agree on goals and perceptions, multilateralism moves towards a concrete shape. The emerging geo-economic world order is facing formidable challenges, such as unilateral tendencies, a dangerous security paradigm, reluctance to accept the Muslim World in the mainstream political and economic world order, and the tendency to gain hegemony and domination through military means. On the positive side, there is a strong desire for peace to create a genuine global community to move from mere interdependence to integration, to a community that has shared responsibilities, shared benefits and shared values.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Our unique geography lends us a distinct strategic importance. Pakistan is the hub of South, Central and West Asia. We are ideally placed to be a force for peace in these regions. We also have the potential to become the inter-regional trading hub. Pakistan has positioned itself to offer trade and energy corridors to the Central Asian states. However, at the same time, our location places rather excessive demands on us in the domain of security. But beyond security concerns, mutual economic stakes are likely to play a more pivotal role in mutually beneficial relations in the future. Economic interests have always been and will continue to be the foundation for the relations between Pakistan and the South-Central Asian states.

We will continue to pursue a policy of restraint and responsibility in nuclear matters. India continues to reject the concept of Strategic Restraint in South Asia. We hope that they would eventually see the merit of this proposal. We are sincere in our efforts for peace in the region and we want peace with honour, dignity and sovereign equality, as is the right of all nations.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Pakistan is also reaching out to its wider Asian neighbourhood. We have joined the ASEAN Regional Forum; are upgrading links with ASEAN and East Asia: seeking membership of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; and the Asia Europe Summit Meetings (AESM). As a progressive Islamic state of 160 million, Pakistan has endeavoured to promote peace and stability in the Islamic world and discourage the polarization between the world of Islam and the west.

The President of Pakistan has propounded the concept of “Enlightened Moderation” to the world, which envisages a two-pronged strategy — to curb militancy and terrorism, and establish constructive and cooperative relations between the Muslim countries and the West. The first precept of the concept calls on the Muslim countries to vigorously undertake internal reforms of their societies, ensuring socio-political and economic progress of their populations. The West, on its part, should assist them in these endeavours through material resources, and help them in resolution of the disputes that have become breeding grounds of terrorism. This, in our view, may be the only way forward to prove the prophets of doom that predict a clash of civilizations, misinformed and wrong.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Leading think tanks of the country must play their due role in research and national policy formulation. Social scientists’ role is imperative for the resolution of key social and economic issues. Think tanks provide policy-makers with venues in which to build shared understanding, if not consensus, on policy options. Such unofficial initiatives are delicate undertakings. But they

have great potential to build peace and reconciliation in conflict-prone regions and war-torn societies. In the darkest corners of the world, they can serve as the eyes, the ears, and even the conscience of Pakistan and the international community.

In this regard the Conference ‘Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global’ will build understanding between strategic thinkers in the academic centres with those directly involved in policy formulation at the national level. It is not insignificant that this first-ever meeting of such importance is taking place at the interim facility of the ‘Pakistan Institute of Parliamentary Services’. This Institute is meant to build the capacity of the parliament as an institution and to enhance the ability of individual members to meet their legislative and representational roles. The Institute will support members with training, research and informational support and each one of you has a contribution to make towards that effort.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

The community that sits in this room today is one that is greatly respected in Pakistan and beyond its borders. You are all valuable assets for this nation and without your expertise, the country will not be able to articulate its vision at the level required.

This conference is providing a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas on a broad range of themes including educational development, economic progress, constitutional dynamics and various facets of the emerging regional geopolitical environment. It is important that the conference will also contribute to looking at Pakistan’s historical role in maintaining stability and ensuring peace in the region. But it is not enough to look at the past; we must also look towards the future in an objective manner to identify the opportunities that stand before us.

Though this is the first time that such a large number of luminaries from the academic world have an opportunity to meet in Islamabad and interact with key parliamentary leaders to brainstorm on the range of issues that Pakistan faces today, I am sure this will not be the last such opportunity.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

As the ‘Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services’ becomes fully operational in the months ahead, I am confident that more such critically important meetings of the minds will take place and that this will become a regular feature of the institute, ultimately enabling a more constructive and mutually beneficial dialogue between the parliament and the knowledge community.

In the future, institutional mechanisms will provide stronger linkages, both formal and informal between strategic thinkers, academic centres and parliamentarians. This will offer an established source of expertise and range

of opinions in policy deliberations.

I am grateful to Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, colleagues at IPRI, PIPS and USAID PLSP for making immaculate arrangements for this mutually productive interaction. We hope that as we work together, to conquer the extraordinary challenges posed by our times, we are able to seize upon the unparalleled opportunities and leave a better world to live in. ■

CHAPTER I

EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Dr Noor ul Haq

Dr Noor ul Haq

Introduction

Education is an essential pre-requisite for change and progress. Realizing the drawbacks of the colonial education policy prevalent in the subcontinent, the vision for education in Pakistan was initially conceived and outlined by the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Thereafter, a number of education policies were framed from time to time and introduced in the country. The present government is also in the process of finalizing a revised policy. The main objectives of all policies have been to achieve literacy, and place emphasis on scientific, technical and professional education, and to have quality education at all levels. This paper is divided into four parts: Quaid-i-Azam's views on education; a brief review of various education policies; financing in education and current data and educational attainment.

Quaid-i-Azam and Education

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, from the very beginning of his political life spread over about half a century, was concerned about the general and technical education of the people of the subcontinent.¹ Throughout the period of British rule, he has been emphasising and supporting the cause of education for all Indians, irrespective of their ethnicity, caste or creed. His keen involvement in the education of Muslims is highlighted by the generous

¹ Quaid-i-Azam's official political career started when he was elected to Bombay Corporation on March 10, 1904. On April 12, 1905, he supported a resolution tantamount to remonstrate the British Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, for his bias against Gokhale over Universities Validating Bill. Sharif al Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam and His Times: A Compendium, Vol. I, 1876-1937* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1990), p. 7. On March 23, 1910, Quaid-i-Azam displayed his keen and farsighted interest in technical education and its value when, as a member of the Indian Legislative Council, he spoke effectively in support of the Resolution moved by Rao Bahadur R.N. Mudholkar on elementary compulsory education, and technical education in the country stressing the need for the establishment of a Polytechnic College, *ibid.*, p. 12; S.M. Zaman, *Quaid-i-Azam and Education* (National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1995), pp. 1-6.

gifts donated by him to a number of educational institutions all over the subcontinent, such as, Anjuman-i-Islam School Bombay, University of Bombay, Arabic College Delhi, Muslim University Aligarh, Islamia College Peshawar, and Sind Madrassatul Islam, Karachi.²

After the passage of All-India Muslim League's (AIML) Lahore Resolution of 1940, and before independence, Quaid-i-Azam advised Muslims to have general awareness, and laid emphasis on female education, Islamic ideals and character building.

General Awareness

At the First Session of the Balochistan Muslim Students Federation held at Islamia High School, Quetta, on 4 July 1943, he said:

It is your primary duty to engage in the pursuit of education, and to persuade your parents, your neighbours and the entire nation to give due attention to education. Value your time because time once lost can never be regained. By education I do not mean that you should become a book-worm for 24 hours and concentrate only on acquiring degrees. The object of education is also keeping ourselves abreast of the developments and the ups and downs of the world and taking interest in the internal and external politics. Do not believe in hearsay [and] rumours, and survey the events on your own and obtain details. Study carefully the order and administration in the national sphere, and if you find anything wrong, present your suggestions for redressing the wrong and then abide by the verdict of the majority.³

Female Education

While addressing a meeting of the Muslim University Muslim League at Aligarh on 10 March 1944, Quaid said:

It is a crime against humanity that our women are shut up within the four walls of the house as prisoners. I do not mean that we should imitate the evils of Western life. But let us try to raise the status of our women according to our own Islamic ideas and standards.⁴

² Zaman, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

³ Mukhtar Zaman, *Students' Role in the Pakistan Movement* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1978), p. 87 quoting Shamsul Hasan Collection, cited in Zaman, op. cit., p. 313.

⁴ Sarfraz Hussain Mirza, *Muslim Students and Pakistan Movement, Selected Documents (1937-47), Vol. II*, pp. 175-78; Jamil-u-Din Ahmad (ed.), *Speeches and Writing of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II* (Lahore: Sh Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), pp. 15-18, cited in Zaman, op. cit., p. 337.

Islamic Ideals

Quaid, in a message dated 12 June 1945, for the 1945 annual session of the Muslim Students Federation, NWFP, wrote:

... we can create the strength and the support of our people to not only achieve our freedom but be able to maintain it and live according to Islamic ideals and principles. Pakistan not only means freedom and independence but Islamic ideology which has to be preserved and which has come to us as a precious gift and a treasure.⁵

Character Building

While addressing the 1946 annual convocation of Islamia College, Lahore, on 24 March 1946, he said:

Character means a bundle of virtues, the highest sense of honour and integrity and that you will not sell your principles for anything in the world, however tempting it may be. These are the characteristics which go to make a nation. When a test comes, a crisis comes, if you live up to these virtues, no one on the surface of the earth can defeat you.⁶

After the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, he reiterated his emphasis on character building, in addition to right type of education, scientific, technical and professional education, as well as students' duty to the state.⁷

Right Type of Education

In his message to the first All Pakistan Educational Conference on 27 November – 1st December 1947, Quaid-i-Azam emphasized that:

... the importance of education and the right type of education cannot be over emphasized. Under foreign rule, for over a century, in the very nature of things, I regret, sufficient attention has not been paid to the education of our people, and if we are to make any real, speedy and substantial progress, we must earnestly tackle this question and bring our education policy and programme on the lines suited to the genius of our people, consonant with our history and culture, and having regard to the

⁵ NIHCR: Shamsul Hasan Collection, Students II, 57-58.

⁶ Yusufi, *Rare Speeches*, pp. 171-72 quoting *Eastern Times*, March 25, 1946, cited by Zaman, op. cit., p. 415.

⁷ Message to All Pakistan Education Conference in 1947, *Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan 1947-48* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), pp. 36-37.

modern conditions and vast developments that have taken place all over the world.⁸

Scientific, Technical and Professional Education

In his address, at the convocation of Dacca University on 24 March 1948, Quaid observed:

...the main object of the old system of education and the system of Government existing, hitherto, was really to have well-trained, well-equipped clerks. ... the whole principle was to create a mentality, a psychology, a state of mind, that an average man, when he passed his B.A. or M.A. was to look for some job in the Government. If he had it, he thought he had reached his height. ... Now I want you to get out of that rut and that mentality and specially now that we are in Pakistan. ... There is an immense scope in technical education ... new industries are being started, new banks, new insurance companies, new commercial firms are opening and they will grow as you go on.⁹

Earlier, in his message to the first All Pakistan Educational Conference, he had emphasized that:

There is immediate and urgent need for training our people in the scientific and technical education in order to build up our economic life, and we should see that our people undertake scientific, commerce, trade and, particularly, well-planned industries. But do not forget that we have to compete with the world which is moving very fast in this direction. ... and we have to see that they are fully qualified or equipped to play their part in the various branches of economic life in a manner which will do honour to Pakistan.¹⁰

Duty to the State

Addressing the students of Islamia College, Peshawar, on 12 April 1948, Quaid said:

Now that we have achieved our national goal, you will expect me to give you a bit of advice regarding the manner in which we can put our shoulders behind the most difficult and important task of building up our new State into what we all wish it to be; namely one of the greatest States in the world. ... The duties required of you are: develop a sound sense of discipline, character, initiative and a solid academic background. You must

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 92-98.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

devote yourself whole-heartedly to your studies, for that is your first obligation to yourselves, your parents and to the State. You must learn to obey for only then you can learn to command. In your criticism of the Government you must learn to be constructive. ... Our duty to the State comes first; our duty to our province, to our district, to our town and to our village and ourselves comes next. Remember we are building up a State which is going to play its full part in the destinies of the whole Islamic World.¹¹

Review of Education Policies

Accordingly, since independence, successive governments have made efforts to develop education in accordance with national, social, ideological and economic needs. Some of the landmark policies in the history of educational development are:

- Report of the All Pakistan Education Conference (1947)
- Report of the Second Education Conference (1951)
- Report of the Commission on National Education (1959)
- Report of the Commission on Student Problems and Welfare (1966)
- The New Education Policy (1970)
- The Education Policy (1972-80)
- National Education Policy (1978)
- National Education Policy (1992)
- National Education Policy (1998-2010)

All these efforts addressed the educational needs of the people. Each policy highlighted its aims and objectives and discussed various facets of education – literacy, non-formal, elementary, secondary, technical, vocational, special, higher and physical education; sports and military training, medium of instruction, textbooks, teachers' training and their service condition, education for women, religious education and Islam, national unity, financing and private sector in education. The policy goals were set high and the success was less than desired. There was no monitoring to ensure implementation of policy goals. Except for 1947 and 1951 Conferences and the 1959 report on National Education, the rest of the efforts were also tainted by "politico-ideological considerations."¹² The salient features of the past education policies are as under:¹³

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 114-118.

¹² Javed Hasan Aly, *Education in Pakistan – A White Paper*, 2006.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 77-86; Parveen Shahid, *Comparative Analysis of Education Policies* (Islamabad: Academy of Educational Planning and Management, 1985); Government of

- 1) *Literacy and Non-Formal Education.* The 1947 Conference recognised illiteracy as a major problem and called for Adult Literacy Campaign and for provision of non-formal education in provincial languages. Subsequent policies continued to focus on this problem. The 1970 policy recognized that 90 percent of illiterates live in the rural areas and 10 percent in the urban areas. The 1972 policy proposed the establishment of National Literacy Corps. The 1978 policy proposed opening of 10,000 literacy centres. The 1992 policy estimated literacy around 34 percent which was the lowest in the region and aimed to achieve 100 percent universal primary education by 2002. The 1998 policy estimated literacy level as 48.9 percent, 50 percent males and 27 percent females. They emphasised the need for massive non-formal education and launched Quranic Literacy Programme, National Literacy Programme and National Literacy Movement. Asian Development Bank sponsored women education. The literacy goal to be achieved was 70 percent till 2010.¹⁴ The present literacy rate is estimated at 54.5 percent. However, the gulf between education in the rural and urban areas is continuing and needs to be bridged. However, the progress of literacy province-wise is as under:¹⁵

Year	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balochistan	Overall
1951 ¹⁶	7.3	6.1 ¹⁷	5.2	3.9	18
1961	16.1	21.0	13.8	9.8	16.7
1972	20.7	30.2	14.5	10.1	21.7
1981	27.4	31.4	16.7	10.3	26.2

Pakistan, *Report of the Commission on National Education* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1961); Government of Pakistan, *The New Education Policy of the Government of Pakistan* (Islamabad, 1970); Government of Pakistan, *The Education Policy 1972-78* (Islamabad, 1972); Government of Pakistan, *National Education Policy - Salient Features* (Islamabad: 1978); Ministry of Education, *Education Policy 1992: Presentation by the Education Minister* (Islamabad: 1992); Government of Pakistan, *National Education Policy 1998-2010* (Islamabad: 1998).

¹⁴ Government of Pakistan, *National Education Policy 1998-2010* (Islamabad: University Grants Commission, 1998), p. 21.

¹⁵ Government of Pakistan, *Economic Surveys; Census of Pakistan 1951 and 1998.*

¹⁶ Government of Pakistan, *Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. 1*, (Karachi: Census Publications n.d.), p. 77.

¹⁷ The figures do not include Karachi. The percentage for federal area Karachi was 18.4. See *Census of Pakistan 1951*, op. cit., p. 77.

¹⁸ The literacy rate of West Pakistan is not shown, but the literacy rate of Muslim population of East Pakistan is shown as 13.4 percent. *Census of Pakistan*, ibid.

1998 ¹⁹	46.6	47.3	35.4	24.8	43.9
2004	55	56	45	37	53
2005-06	-	-	-	-	54.5 ²⁰

- 2) *Primary/Secondary Education.* Primary education is the base on which subsequent stages are built. Under 1947 policy, there was a promise for free and compulsory primary education up to Class V to be extended to class VIII. The 1959 Commission laid down the target 'to achieve five years' compulsory schooling within a period of 10 years, and eight years compulsory schooling within a total period of 15 years. The 1972 Education Policy announced 'free and universal education up to Class X for all children throughout the country'. Article 37(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan directs that 'the State shall remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education within minimum possible period'. The 1979 policy criticized Western model and laid emphasis on Mosque schools. Although, international donors are helpful in the promotion of primary and secondary education, the goal for free and compulsory education up to secondary level for all children throughout the country, as laid down in 1972 policy and the Constitution of Pakistan, is yet to be achieved.
- 3) *Higher Education.* Higher and university education was initially required to produce an 'elite class' that will determine and ensure that quality knowledge/learning is produced and protected in national life. The 1959 report linked promotion to merit and not seniority but remained silent on research and publications. They also recommended that the bachelor degree course should be extended from two to three years. The 1966 Commission created Vice Chancellors Committee and linked promotion of faculty to research and publications. The 1970 policy created centres of excellence in the Universities. The 1972 policy observed that 80 percent of students were in the arts programme and desired that there should be 10 per cent increase annually in enrolment in science subjects. It established Open University for distance and informal education. It created University Grants Commission,

¹⁹ Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, Demographic Indicators – 1998 Census. The figures do not include FATA with 17.4 and Islamabad with 72.4 percent literacy, http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/demographic_indicators98/demographic_indicators.html.

²⁰ Ministry of Education, Academy of Education Planning and Management, Literacy rate by age group 10+, 2005-06.

now renamed Higher Education Commission, for overall coordination and supervision. Without the concept of an elite class, as desired in 1947 conference, we must endeavour to have higher education and research of international standards.

- 4) *Technical, Vocational and Special Education.* The 1947 Conference established a Council of Technical Education and proposed a massive modernisation of technical and vocational schools to meet economic needs of the country. The 1959 Commission called for integration of technical/vocational and general education at secondary level. The 1966 Commission called for the revival and revitalisation of Councils of Technical Education. The 1970 policy proposed that 60 per cent students who leave elementary schools should be given opportunity to join the vocational/technical schools and provincial governments should provide scholarships to 75 per cent students who join vocational/technical institutions. The 1972 policy introduced three years diploma course and thereafter, if they attend one year of additional courses, they would obtain B. Tech degree. Secondly, it gave attention to handicapped children and a Handicapped Children's Committee was added to the provincial Education Councils. The 1978 policy continued with the theme of 1972 policy but laid greater emphasis on the education of handicapped children and teachers training institutes for the deaf, dumb and blind were opened. The 1992 policy introduced compulsory computer education at all levels for vocational/technical education. The 1998 policy criticized the poor state of technical/vocational education and called for strengthening and expansion of 194 existing vocational institutes in provinces. The present government also emphasizes scientific and technical education and has proposed opening of university campuses with the cooperation of advanced countries of the world.
- 5) *Medium of Instruction.* In 1947, Urdu was proposed to be compulsory language, but called for growth of provincial languages and culture. It was left to the provinces to decide about the primary school teaching. Thereafter, there has been a persistent controversy and change with regard to medium of instruction. The 1970 policy pointed out a barrier of class between those who study in English medium schools and those who do not and suggested to make conditions equitable for all. The 1972 Education Policy adopted a muted policy and made no reference to language. However, Article 28 of the Constitution of Pakistan says that 'any section of citizens having a distinct

- language, script or culture shall have the right to preserve and promote the same and, subject to law, establish institutions for that purpose. The 1978 policy called for strengthening Urdu as national language and as medium of instruction up to Secondary level, which meant elimination of English medium schools. This policy did not succeed and English medium schools persist.²¹ However, the class barrier between those who study in English medium schools and those who study in Urdu medium schools should be removed. Unless this is done, the country will continue to produce an elite class who would continue to monopolize power and prestige to the disadvantage of vast majority.
- 6) *Curriculum, Syllabi and Textbooks.* The successive governments were conscious about the need for revision and modernization of syllabi and textbooks. For secondary and university education, they proposed committees of experts for writing textbooks. Initially, in 1947, they were silent on the curriculum. The 1959 Commission called for ensuring the production of suitable quality textbooks. The 1966 Commission asked for updating the curriculum and Textbook Boards were required to prepare and publish the textbooks. The 1970 policy proposed standardization of syllabi and textbooks at national level and proposed Bureau of Curriculum Development in the provinces. The 1972 policy promised free reading material and textbooks at elementary level, and, like the 1970 policy, called for strengthening the National Curriculum Bureau and Curriculum Centres in the provinces. The 1998 policy asked for making the Quranic principles and Islamic practices an integral part of curricula, and to upgrade the quality of higher education by bringing teaching, learning and research process in line with international standards. There is a need that the textbooks in social sciences should be made interesting, so as to discourage rote-learning. The curricula should continue to be revised to match international standards.
- 7) *Private Education.* There are three phases with regard to private education.
- a. Phase 1 (1947-66). Initially, the 1947 Conference considered education at all levels a government responsibility but, realizing the economic constraints, encouraged private elementary education. The 1951 Conference and the 1959 Commission welcomed the opening of private schools.

²¹ Tahir Andrabi and others, *Religious School Enrolment in Pakistan: A Look At The Data*, World Bank, February 2005, http://econ.worldbank.org/files/41363_wps3521.pdf.

- b. Phase 2 (1966-78). The 1966 Commission objected to commercialization of quality education in private schools and the 1970 policy considered private schools a problem because of exorbitant fees, underpaid teachers and some other irregularities. The 1972 policy nationalized all private educational institutions.
 - c. Phase 3 (1978-to date). Reversing the 1972 policy, the 1978 policy allowed privatization of schools. The 1992 policy encouraged private education, as it called for 'promoting education industry in the private sector' and granted plots and interest free loans for opening of private schools. The 1998 policy also encouraged privatization and supported denationalization of educational institutions. The concept of public-private partnership was developed and is promoting the cause of education. However, the access to private quality institutions should be on merit and burden on the parents of poor students should be shared by the State.
- 8) *Religious Vision and Madrassa Education*. In 1947, there was an emphasis on universal principles of Islam, but any notion of a theocratic state was dispelled. It called for bringing religious/Madrassah teachings in line with existing education system. The 1959 education policy made religious education compulsory from Class I to VIII and optional thereafter. The 1970 policy made religious education compulsory up to Class X. It listed the existence of 700 Madrassah schools in West Pakistan. 'National aims of education stressing Islamic principles of life and commitment to the ideology of Pakistan' were adopted for the first time in the 1978 policy. It announced opening of 5000 mosque schools and gave recognition to Madrassah *Sanads*. The 1998 policy made Islamiyat compulsory from Class I to BA/BSc and professional colleges. Quran was taught from Class VI to XII with translation. Let me point out that contrary to the exaggerated reports in the international media, the students enrolled in Madaris are about 2.8 percent²² of all enrolment in the country and there is no evidence of an increase. The present Government, among other things, envisages that rituals must not overtake ethics derived from Quran and Sunnah, and desires to incorporate population management, hygiene and disease prevention, and environment in the curriculum, as well as making

²² Government of Pakistan, *National Education Census Highlights* (Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2006).

sports compulsory in all schools. However, the goal of the Education Policy of 1947 to bring religious madrassah teachings in line with existing education system, is yet to be achieved, though present government seems to be serious about it.

- 9) *Teacher Training and Service Conditions.* Right from the 1947 Conference, there was emphasis on teachers' training and a promise to give adequate salaries to school teachers. They announced establishment of first rate Teachers Training Institutes for Women teachers of nursery and primary classes. The policies of 1951, 1959, and 1966 further promoted the theme of 1947 conference. The 1970 policy criticised the bureaucratic control by the education department as a serious obstacle to the recruitment of quality teachers at all levels. The 1972 policy had a pro-teacher bias. It announced grade 17 for college/university teachers and also improved grades for school teachers. The policy proposed the creation of Education Councils at district, provincial, federal and institutional levels and promoted democratisation and input of the elected representatives, MNAs and MPAs in the Councils. It created the Academy of Educational Planning and Management which is still performing a commendable work. The 1978 policy laid categorical emphasis in proposing that teachers at all levels must possess and demonstrate 'strong commitment to the ideology of Pakistan'. The 1992 policy proposed to have an enhanced Islamic religious education component in the teachers' training curricula. The 1998 policy continued to emphasize teachers' education along Islamic and ideological lines. The Academy of Educational Planning and Management was tasked to offer short and long term courses to improve the professional skills of teachers. It is pointed that, in order to improve the quality of teaching, the strength of a class should normally not exceed 25 students.
- 10) *Gender and Education.* To facilitate girls' education, the 1947 Conference allowed coeducation at elementary level, but called for separate girls and boys schools at secondary level. Showing concern about adult literacy, 50% allocation of funds was given to women literacy centres. It encouraged the creation of industrial homes for vocational training of women. The 1970 policy felt that one of the reasons that only 20 per cent girls are enrolled at the primary level was because of coeducation and thus they proposed that more separate schools be opened. The 1972 policy asserted that there are only 30 per cent female teachers at primary level and recommended increase in the number of female primary teachers. The 1978 policy asserted that in an Islamic society male

and female education should be separate at all levels. Two women universities were proposed for the first time. It claimed that by 1992 universal primary female education would be achieved. The 1998 policy focused on enhancing the quality of primary school female teachers and proposed that in the newly established schools, 70 percent female teachers should be enrolled for both girls and boys schools. Although there is some progress in female education, yet greater efforts are required to achieve gender parity. The progressive increase in the number of female educational institutions is as under:²³

	1990-91		1995-96		2000-01		2004-05	
	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female
Primary (000)	114.1	31.1	1431.1	42.4	147.7	42.9	157.2	44.4
Middle (000)	8.7	3.4	13.3	5.7	25.5	5.9	30.4	7.0
High (000)	8.2	2.1	9.5	3.1	14.8	2.8	16.6	3.1
Colleges	612	222	715	276	916	380	1174	515
Professional Colleges	99	8	260	16	352	18	408	21
Universities/ Degree Awarding Institutions	22	-	25	-	26	1	50	3

(Note: Presently, there are 120 chartered universities/degree awarding institutions, 64 in public sector – 53 universities + 11 degree awarding institutions – and 56 in private sector - 39 universities + 17 degree awarding institutions. Of these, there are six women universities five in public sector – four universities and one degree awarding institution – and one university in private sector.)

The female enrolment in educational institutions has also progressively increased as under:²⁴

	1990-91		1995-96		2000-01		2004-05	
	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female
Primary (000)	10,837	3,675	14,527	5,702	17,135	6,893	21,333	9,092*
Middle (000)	2,821	842	3,605	1,270	3,759	1,455	4,551	1,863
High (000)	1,004	285	1,447	480	1,455	597	1,880	756
Colleges (000)	630	211	734	299	763	374	1,009	495
Professional Colleges	75,786	18,902	128,621	33,403	158,828	39,580	186,789	48,337
Universities	61,857	11,667	82,955	23,105	124,944	36,699	-	-

*In 1951-52, out of a total enrolment of 3,202,000 students in primary schools, 299,000, i.e., 9.3 per cent were girls, as against 42.6 percent in 2004-05 (Source: *Census of Pakistan, 1951, p.79*).

²³ Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Economic Survey 2005-06, Statistical Appendix, p. 97*.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Financing in Education

The share of education in GNP was less than one percent in early years of Pakistan before 1960 and is stagnating at about two percent of GNP for several years, and now it is little over two percent. The expenditure on Education will show the low priority given to education as under:²⁵

Years	Expenditure (Rs billion)	Percentage of GNP
1947-55	.1998	.919
1990-91	23.567	2.2
1995-96	54.503	2.44
2000-01	72.237	2.06
2004-05	127.759	2.2

(Note: Expenditure on education from 1947 till 2005-06 is given in Appendix)

Breakdown of Expenditure on Education in 2005:²⁶

Federal Government	36,281.589 million
Punjab	52,413.306 million
Sind	19,631.827 million
N.W.F.P	16,975.235 million
Balochistan	7,616.997 million
Total (Provinces)	96,637.365 million
Total (Federal + Provinces)	132,918.954 million
Private Sector	35,914.000 million
Total (Public + Private)	168,832.954 million

²⁵ Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Bureau of Education Planning and Management and Central Bureau of Education, Islamabad, n.d.; Mukhtar Ahmad Bhatti and others, *Report on Education for National Assembly Committee* (Islamabad: National Education Council, 1988), pp. 61-62; Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Economic Survey*, 1990-1991, p. 144, 1997-98, p. 122, 2005-06, p. 169.

²⁶ National Education Census Highlights, op. cit., p. 40.

A comparison of expenditure on education in some Asian countries is as under:

Country	Expenditure as percentage of GNP	
	1985 ²⁷	2005 ²⁸
India	6.8	4.2
Japan	5.7	3.6
Malaysia	7.5	7.9
Pakistan ²⁹	1.9	2.1
South Korea	5.1	4.9

(Note: The present government is proposing to spend 2.7 percent of GNP during 2006-07 and the Prime Minister has announced that the education budget for 2007-08, would be increased to four percent of the GDP.)

Latest Data

The latest data³⁰, as provided by National Education Census (NEC) carried out for the first time in 2005-06 covering 227,791 educational institutions. (151,744 public and 76,047 private institutions) has revealed following approximate data:

Total enrolment in public institutions	33.380 million
Total teaching staff in public institutions	1.357 million
Average student teacher ratio in public institutions	25.6: 1
Total enrolment in private institutions	21.258 million
Total teaching staff in private institutions	0.724 million
Average student teacher ratio in private institutions	29.4: 1
Total Public Institutions	67 percent
Total Private Institutions	33 percent
Institutions in Rural Areas	74 percent
Institutions in Urban Areas	26 percent
Boys Institutions	25 percent
Girls Institutions	21 percent
Mixed Institutions	53 percent
Enrolment in Rural Areas	57 percent
Enrolment in Urban Areas	43 percent
Enrolment of Boys	57 percent

²⁷ UNESCO Statistical Year Book 1985

²⁸ Global Competitiveness Report (2004-05)

²⁹ Government of Pakistan, Economic Surveys.

³⁰ Government of Pakistan, *National Education Census Highlights*, op. cit.

Enrolment of Girls	43 percent
Teachers in Rural Areas	51 percent
Teachers in Urban Areas	49 percent
Male Teachers	49 percent
Female Teachers	51 percent
Urdu medium institutions	64.6 percent
English medium institutions	10.4 percent
Sindhi medium institutions	15.5 percent
Pushto/Balochi/etc medium Institutions	9.5 percent
Number of deeni madaris	12,979
Total enrolment in deeni madaris	1,549,242
Teaching staff in deeni madaris	58,391
Average student-teacher ratio in deeni madaris	27.5: 1
Country percentage of students in deeni madaris	2.835 percent

Overall Education State

The UNESCO Institute for Statistics has calculated the overall education state of Pakistan for the year 2005-06 as under:³¹

Total population 10+	115,836,040	
No schooling	54,511,549	47 percent
Some primary	7,919,565	7 percent
Completed primary	19,621,619	17 percent
Completed lower secondary	11,984,319	10 percent
Completed upper secondary	17,241,818	15 percent
Completed tertiary	4,557,169	4 percent

Conclusion

After the passage of Lahore Resolution (1940), Quaid-i-Azam showed greater interest in the education of Muslims. He emphasized general awareness, character building, Islamic ideals and female education. After independence, he reiterated his emphasis on character building, in addition to education being in consonance with own history and culture, modern requirement of scientific, technical and professional education, as well students' responsibility for the state. Later, successive governments framed education policies from time to time. These policies aimed at addressing the educational needs of the people and the objectives of the governments. The common factors in almost all these policies were Islamic values, universal primary education, technical education, quality education, gender equality, and national unity. The education

³¹ UNESCO Institute of Statistics, Statistics on Population by Highest Level of Education (Educational Attainment) in Pakistan 2005-06.

policies, after the separation of East Pakistan, were also tainted by politico-religious considerations. Initially, soon after independence, education was considered a government responsibility, but, due to economic constraints, private sector was allowed to contribute to the cause of education. The socialist policies, in early 1970, resulted in the nationalization of all institutions. However, it was reversed in late seventies and denationalisation followed. The concept of public-private partnership was then developed and is now successfully functioning.

The policy goals were normally set high and success was less than desired. The goals set for the integration of madrassa education with the main stream education outlined in 1947, the removal of class barrier between those who study in English medium and those enrolled in Urdu medium schools as decided in 1970, free and universal education up to secondary level desired in 1972, the demand for gender parity and bridging the gap between rural and urban areas, and above all, achievement of one hundred percent literacy stressed from the beginning, are yet to be achieved. The existing gender, geographic and economic disparities and inequalities in our education system need to be removed. Although there is a quantum jump from a solitary university in 1947 to 120 universities and degree awarding institutions, but qualitatively, they are far from ranking among the top universities of the world.■

Appendix**Expenditure on Education**

Years	Expenditure (Rs billion)	Percentage of GNP
1947-55	.1998	.919
1955-60	.226	-
1960-65	.51324	1.446
1965-70	.57631	1.336
1972-73	.8557	1.3
1973-74	1.1533	1.3
1974-75	1.7754	1.6
1975-76	2.2754	1.7
1976-77	2.2996	1.5
1977-78	2.9655	1.6
1978-79	3.1122	1.5
1979-80	3.5027	1.4
1980-81	4.1916	1.4
1981-82	5.0013	1.4
1982-83	6.1545	1.5
1983-84	7.5229	1.6
1984-85	9.3507	1.8
1985-86	10.711	1.9
1986-87	14.8871	2.4
1987-88	17.1323	2.4
1988-89	19.4828	2.4
1989-90	20.8844	2.3
1990-91	23.5674	2.2
1991-92	27.49	2.2
1992-93	29.98	2.2
1993-94	34.80	2.2
1995-96	54.503	2.44
1996-97	58.30	2.5
1997-98	64.08	2.34
1998-99	68.60	2.22
1999-00	71.13	2.14
2000-01	72.237	2.06
2001-02	87.887	1.8
2002-03	101.827	1.9
2003-04	111.475	2.1
2004-05	127.759	2.2
2005-06	163.392	2.1

(Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Bureau of Educational Planning and Management and Central Bureau of Education, *Pakistan Education Statistics 1947-48 to 1972-73* (Islamabad, n.d.); and Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Economic Surveys*.)

QUALITY OF EDUCATION

Dr Tariq Rahman

The *National Educational Policy* (1998-2010) declared that the total expenditure on education will rise from 2.8% to 4% of the GNP. This, unfortunately, has not happened so far. The major orientation of previous policies — a class-based education system, divided into three major streams (*madrassas*, vernacular medium, English medium), corresponding to the rural and very poor, the lower-middle class; the middle and upper classes; using Islam to create nationalism, and allowing private entrepreneurs and the military to make huge profits — continues to this date.¹

This paper aims at suggesting policies and practices to enhance the quality of education at all levels. The term ‘quality’ is used in a special sense here, which is clarified below.

The Concept of Quality

Quality normally refers to the end-product of the educational process, the educated person, acquiring information and skills corresponding to those available in the most powerful countries in the world. This, in the words of Paulo Friere, is the ‘banking’ concept of education² (i.e., you put in concepts in an account and draw them out, generally in exchange for money). This view connects education with power and with the prevailing fashion. What counts for knowledge is that which certifying bodies, such as universities working for the ruling elite, call ‘knowledge’. The skills are those, which help in acquiring lucrative and powerful jobs in service of the elite.

In this paper, this meaning is modified. Quality refers to:

1. Acquiring values leading to peace, egalitarianism, tolerance, sensitiveness to human rights, women rights, animal rights and the preservation of bio-diversity, linguistic diversity and cultural diversity in Pakistan and the world.
2. Acquiring skills commensurate with sustainable development in Pakistani society.
3. Acquiring information, ideas and analytical skills commensurate with those acquired by the most educated members of highly developed post-industrial societies.

¹ For details see Tariq Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004).

² Paulo Friere, 2006, www.paulofreire.org.

The last criterion is not meant to be universal. Only a few individuals in the country's research universities need to come at par with the educated elite of the world. This is necessary and practicable; universalisation of such high-level knowledge and skills is neither necessary nor has ever been achieved by any society.

Definitions (1) and (2) given above are in line with the views of progressive thinkers on education. Here, for instance, is Henry Giroux's definition of good schooling:

If schools are to fulfil their obligations to educate students to assume the demands of social citizenship and democratic leadership while living in a global economy, educators need to redefine the meaning and purpose of schooling in ways that both strengthen the practice of critical education and energize representative democracy.³

What is to be Done?

If quality is defined in normative terms (points 1 and 2 above), we are committing ourselves to a moral slant in school and college education. Only in the universities—and that too in some of them—are we committing ourselves to the pursuit of the truth (with a small 't') even if that 'truth' is only temporary and provisional. Most societies, in fact, do rationalize their practices, however unjust these may be, by giving a moral slant to school education. During the British rule in India, the bounties of British rule formed part of the propaganda, the education system emphasised. In Pakistan — as a number of researchers have pointed out⁴ — propaganda has been to create a garrison-state mentality in schools so as to make it easier to get public support for militant policies against India. In India too, history denies the Muslim point of view about partition and ignores problem areas such as Kashmir.⁵ What then is so new about the policy, which this paper advocates?

³ Henry Giroux, "Redefining the Purpose and Meaning of Schooling", *EDucate*, (2003) vol. 2, no. 2, p. 14.

⁴ K.K. Aziz, *The Murder of History in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Press, 1993); Rubina Saigol, *Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan*, (Lahore: ASR Publications, 1995); Tariq Rahman, *Language, Ideology and Power: Language-Learning among the Muslims of Pakistan and North India*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 522-525; Tariq Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 26-32; A. H. Nayyar and A. Salim, (Eds.), *The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2003).

⁵ Krishna Kumar, *Prejudice and Pride: School Histories of the Freedom Struggle in India and Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2001).

The answer is that while general norm is to strengthen the ruling elite and the system of distribution of power and resources, the norms proposed here will strengthen the people and preserve our societies and save the world from conflicts and plunder of resources. The following measures are suggested about schools:

Schools

- (a) All schools will impart education highlighting the need for peace, tolerance, human rights, women's rights, animal rights etc. This means that the present textbooks shall have to be replaced by new ones. It also means fieldwork in deprived sectors of society, e.g., jails, hospitals etc.
- (b) All schools will begin by using the medium of instruction of the local people (unless it is a very small group) till class-3, when they will gradually shift to the Language of Wider Communication. The Educational Policy⁶ recommends that there should be uniform curricula for all private and public schools but this has never happened. The proposed policy will make this wish a reality.
- (c) English will be taught from class-1 as a subject in all schools. Films, games, songs, role-playing, drama and conversation will be used to teach it. Programmes, featuring the teaching of English, will be shown in all schools.
- (d) Students will be sensitized to injustices and inequalities in society through documentaries, dramas on social themes (the Ajoka Theatre comes to the mind) and presentations by human rights activists.
- (e) Elitist educational institutions, which happen to be English-medium, will have to be phased out. This is in contradiction to chapter-13 of the Educational Policy.⁷ Till the process of phasing them out is completed, they should be legally barred from taking more than 2% of the declared or estimated income of both parents of the pupil as tuition fees.
- (f) Schools should be headed by the senior-most teachers in rotation. The head-teacher should not stop teaching while completing his/her term as the administrative Head. The present practice of creating a separate administrative cadre, which is superior to the teaching faculty, downgrades the

⁶ *National Educational Policy 1998-2010*, (Islamabad: Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, 1998).

⁷ *Ibid.*

faculty and lowers the quality of teaching since the best teachers stop teaching after getting administrative slots.

In this context, let me quote Giroux who points out.

Progressive educators must strongly oppose those approaches to teachers' education and practice that regard teachers as mere technicians, and reinforce a technical, caste, and gendered division of labour. It is crucial that educators collectively organize and oppose current efforts throughout the world to de-skill teachers through the proliferation of management by objective schemes, testing schemes, and bureaucratic forms of accountability.⁸

Madrassas

There are examples of students specializing in religious education in many religious traditions, including the Roman Catholics, the fundamentalist Protestants, the Jewish community, the Daudi Bohra community and the Agha Khani community in Pakistan. Students gain specialized knowledge of religious texts as well as exposure to other fields of study. This presumably opens their minds to other points of view. However, past history shows us that this does not eliminate the possibility of strife and violence, as Karen Armstrong has brought out in several such cases.⁹

In my opinion, the violence attributed to *madrassas* comes from state policies of arming them and using them to fight proxy wars. As such, these kinds of policies have to be completely eliminated, if products of *madrassas* and religious parties are to become more inclined to peace.

However, in consultation with *madrassas* faculty, *madrassa* education can be modified so as to include research on Islam in the English language as well as in other subjects. It is pointless to include the present books on social studies, languages or history in *madrassa* syllabi since they are not conducive to producing either tolerance or the desire for peace. Nor does it augur well for promoting such virtues if the teaching is undertaken by fundamentalist lay persons appointed by the *madrassa* administration. As such, any half-baked scheme about including secular subjects in *madrassas* will be a failure.

Two things are possible: (1) winning the confidence of the *ulema*, who run the *madrassas* and persuading them to introduce new subjects taught through new books and methods (films etc); (2) establishing government

⁸ Henry Giroux, "Redefining the Purpose and Meaning of Schooling," *EDucate*, (2003) vol. 2, no. 2.

⁹ Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for GOD: A History of Fundamentalism* (New York: Random House, 2000).

madrassas (three such institutions called 'model *madrassas*' have since been established) and appointing their graduates to all mosques, schools, colleges, *auqaf* department etc. However, if the second measure creates unemployment, it will backfire. The government must eliminate or at least reduce poverty in a very realistic manner before poor students can be weaned away from them. Moreover, if globalisation makes the rich richer and spreads American culture in the name of market forces or structural adjustment, people will use the name of Islam to revolt against the miserable conditions of their life. Even more to the point, if the US persists in supporting policies which oppress the Palestinians; fights unjust wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; threatens other Muslim countries—then, the recruits for Islamic militancy will come forth whether from the *madrassas* or from other schools. No matter what is taught, people will want to react to violence with violence, whether they use the slogan of Islam or nationalism. As such, policies pursued in the world are a key factor in making the *madrassas* as well as other Pakistani institutions contribute to peace and tolerance rather than to war and intolerance.

The colleges should follow a four-year bachelor degree, examined by a College Education Board (CEB). Lecturers should be promoted on the basis of examination results. Syllabi for the B.A./BSc should also be determined and revised by the CEB. The CEB should run this function on the lines of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council.

Universities

These should be classified as (a) Research Universities (b) Teaching Universities.

- (a) Research Universities: Pakistan can afford to have at least two world class universities equipped with the best libraries, archives, laboratories and other facilities. These should be general universities with all subjects, including medicine, engineering and law. Initially, Karachi and Islamabad seem to be appropriate locations for them. These should be called Research Universities to distinguish them from the others. They should be completely autonomous with the HEC only acting as a conduit for funds for them. However, their standards for hiring and promotion of faculty should be very stringent. The faculty members must be paid very well but this high salary should be commensurate with their performance.
- (b) Teaching Universities: These should emphasize teaching and need not be completely autonomous. These should be affiliated to Universities Affiliating Board which should ensure that they do not compromise the quality of teaching in

the name of autonomy. Initially, these should not award Ph. D degrees. A university producing sufficient high quality research would be able to graduate to a research university but that would require a high capital outlay, so such a step would take a long time.

All private universities, too, must be affiliated to the University Affiliating Board. However, one-subject institutions—whether presently in the private or the public sectors—should be called university-colleges. Military academies and specialised institutions should not be called universities.

Above all, the role of the military in education must be curtailed. As civilians become employees of military entrepreneurs; the self-respect of academics is eroded. Moreover, liberal values are eroded in a military atmosphere. Similarly, the headships of universities must be in the hands of academics. Retired or serving bureaucrats and military officers should not be heads of academic institutions, least of all universities. This is an important point if pride is to be given to the academic profession and without which people, who will produce academic knowledge, will not enter into academia.

Promotion of Academics

The following model is suggested for research universities. Other universities can dilute and modify them as required.

Entry Qualifications and Promotion

University faculty members must begin their career as Teaching/Research Assistants. This appointment should be purely temporary and subject to their successful completion of Ph. D degree from an accredited and reputable university in an advanced country. After this they will be inducted as University Lecturers.

Box-1		
Proposed Emoluments and Qualifications for Entry and Promotion of Academics		
Rank	Salary	Minimum Qualification
Teaching Assistants	NPS-18 (Status of a major, NPS-18 civil servant).	M.A/M.S.C (first position or among the top ten candidates in the CSSP examination).
Lecturer	NPS-19 (Status of a Lt. Colonel, deputy secretary).	Ph. D (only from a recognized, highly regarded foreign university till such time that Pakistani universities become equally highly regarded)

Assistant Professor	NPS-20 (office facilities such as computer, phone, shared fax, research assistant when working on a project) (status of a brigadier, federal joint secretary).	200 points
Associate Professor	NPS-21 or TTS salaries (computer, phone, shared fax, research assistant when working on a project) (status of a major general, federal additional secretary).	400 points
Professor	TTS scale or MP-2 with chauffeur driven car + research assistant when required. Status of a Lt. General, federal secretary.	600 points (at least 150 points must be earned from research publications and 150 from citations)
National Distinguished Professor	MP-1 with chauffeur driven car + office with permanent staff + research assistant. Status of a minister of state.	800 points (at least 250 points must be earned from research publications and 250 from citations)
National Distinguished Professor Emeritus	A reasonable living allowance (such as Rs 50,000) for life + research assistant and office facilities if he chooses to work in a university	1000 points (at least 350 must be earned from research publications and 350 from citations)

The Point-Weightage System

In order to create quantifiable criteria for appointment and promotion a point-weightage system is proposed. This means that articles published in indexed

journals, courses taught, theses supervised, conferences attended, books published and edited etc and number of citations should all be given weightage in points. This may be as follows:

Publications

First, in the context of Pakistan let us take into consideration the categories of journals into which a Pakistani academic may publish.

- a. HEC Category 'W'
(Peer-reviewed, indexed journals from industrially advanced countries: USA, UK, Europe, Australia and Japan with indices given in brackets).
Publication in these will carry points provided the journal is on two or more indices. If the number of indices is TWO the number of points will be ONE. For every index above two there will be one point up to a maximum of 5 points.
- b. HEC Category 'X'
Indexed, abstracted, refereed and reviewed by at least one referee from an industrially advanced countries.
These should carry up to a maximum of TWO points.
- c. HEC Category 'Y'
Indexed but not reviewed by an expert from an industrially advanced country.
These should carry only ONE point.
- d. HEC Category 'Z'
Not abstracted or indexed. Acceptable by the HEC till June 2008 only. These should carry no point at all.

The points will be divided by the number of authors. This will mean that papers which are written by more than one person will carry less weightage than papers by single authors.. This is only fair as in the case of joint authors it is not clear how much each author has contributed. Moreover, even if they have contributed equally it is unjust to single authors to give as much credit for shared work as for individual effort.

Books/Monographs etc.

Books published by reputable publishing houses will carry 5 points upon publication. Every positive review in an indexed journal will carry additional 2 points. A positive review in a publication which is not indexed, including newspapers, will carry 1 point.

Monographs, if refereed, will carry 2 points. Each positive review in an indexed journal will carry 1 point while reviews in newspapers etc will carry 0.50 points.

Edited Books/Compilations etc.

Edited books and compilations will carry 1 point. Positive reviews in indexed journals will carry 1 point while reviews in newspapers etc will carry 0.50 points.

Book Reviews

Each book review in an indexed journal will carry 2 points. Reviews published in non-indexed publications will carry 0.50 points each.

Encyclopaedia Articles

To be given 5 points if the encyclopaedia is a well-known one but there will be no points for *Wikipedia* type of online publications.

Conferences*Presentation of Papers in a National Conference*

An invited paper presentation in a national conference will carry 0.50 points. If published in the proceedings of the conference it will carry 1 point.

Presentation of Papers in an International Conference

An invited paper will carry 1 point. A keynote address will carry 2 points. If published the points will be doubled (i.e. paper in proceedings of conference = 2; keynote address in proceedings = 4).

Citation

If one's work is cited it generally means it has had an impact on the field. Therefore, every citation should be rewarded as follows:

- a. Citation by others (from google.scholar.com or ISI index or Social Science Citation Index: 2 points for each citation
- b. Citation in books, journals or any other work including dissertations provided by the author: 1 point for each citation.
- c. Citation by self: 0.50 points per citation.

Teaching*Classroom Lecturing*

Every course taught to students may be evaluated with the consent and prior permission of the lecturer. It is important that nobody should be forced to be evaluated because self-respect is more important than efficiency. A person should be taken on the faculty after stringent evaluation by senior academics. However, one he or she is a colleague evaluation by students or colleagues should not be imposed upon him or her. Evaluation by students, even if a faculty

member agrees to it, should not be through a system of espionage i.e. students should not be asked about their teachers by word of mouth. Instead, it should be on a ten-point scale which should be given to the students at the end of the course. The students will fill it in without, however, giving their names on the evaluation sheet. Any teacher getting less than 50% average will get no points; 50% average will get 1 point while those with 90% average will get 2 points.

Those who exercise their option of not submitting to evaluation of teaching by students or that of their colleagues in the case of seminars will get no point for these activities. They will then have to get points through research to survive and rise in their academic career.

Open Lectures

Each lecture before one's peers, public lectures etc may be evaluated with his or her consent and prior permission. The evaluation will be done by the members of the audience on a ten-point scale. Anyone getting below 50% average will get no points. Those with an average of 50% and above will get 1 point while those with 90% average will get 2 points. The maximum number of lectures one can get evaluated by one's peer group is 06 per year.

All lecturers should have the option of not having their public lectures evaluated by their peers. In that case they will get no points for such lectures.

Supervision of Research

For the supervision of a Ph. D thesis the supervisor will get 2 points and for an M. Phil 1 point. However, the Ph. D thesis should have been sent for opinion to at least three experts on the subject two of whom should be teaching or doing research in a reputable university in an advanced country. Moreover, there should be at least one publication out of the work done for the doctorate.

Supervisors can gain 1 extra point for every article the student publishes in an indexed, refereed, abstracted journal provided it is based on the thesis which has been supervised by the supervisor who claims this extra point. The number of points thus gained should not exceed 3 no matter how many publications the student may obtain.

Hypothetical Career Patterns of Academics on the Point-Weightage System.

By way of example let us see how the point-weightage system will affect the careers of (1) Researchers (2) Teachers (3) Researchers + Teachers.

Researchers

Suppose a researcher manages to publish two papers per year in journals on 5 (or more) indices. (Category 'W'). The points are as follows:

Year – 1	$4 \times 5 = 20$ points
In 10 years	$10 \times 20 = 200$ points (University Assistant Professor)
In 20 years	400 points (University Associate Professor)
In 30 years	600 points (University Professor)

In short, an excellent researcher, publishing two articles per year in good journals can become a university professor in 30 years. In real life most people do not consistently publish an average of four research papers every year. They go to conferences, supervise research and get cited for their work. Thus, they will gain points and, if they are productive, they will rise in their academic career.

Teachers

Let us now take the case of someone who does not publish at all. Let us further assume that the person is a competent, hard working teacher and opts to be evaluated by students who grade him at 90% and above every time. Let us further assume that he/she is teaching 4 courses per year. Then the cumulative points one:

Years – 1	$4 \times 2 =$	8 points
In 10 years	$10 \times 8 =$	80 points
In 20 years		160 points
In 30 years		240 points

In short, only by teaching and not publishing nor attending conferences an academic cannot aspire to rise above the rank of assistant professor. However, it is possible to become an associate professor with some publications and a lot of good teaching.

Teachers + Researchers

Since faculty members are supposed to do both research and teaching, anyone who is competent in both stands to great advantage. Let us see what the cumulative points for such a person may be:

If the person gets two research publications in good journals and teaches two courses per year. Then, assuming excellent performance in both, the cumulative point-weightage is:

Research journals (4 articles of 5- point each)	=	20 points
Two evaluated courses	=	8 points
Total	=	28 points
In 10 years (28x10)	=	280 points

In 20 years	=	560 points
In 30 years	=	840 points

If the publications have any impact in the field they will be cited and points will come from there. Moreover, the academic will be invited to read out papers in conferences and points will come from there too. In short, a competent social scientist can qualify for the highest academic positions in 30 years or less by combining research and good teaching.

Conclusion

In this article, quality in schools is associated with becoming a sensitive and tolerant human being, along with the possession of knowledge and skills. Quality at the college level tends to be equated with the dissemination of the best available knowledge in all fields of human interest. Quality in the university tends to move forward from the mere dissemination of existing knowledge to the creation of new knowledge, new ideas, new analyses and insights.

Further, the unrealistic goal of having a single, universal criterion of quality is abandoned. Different educational levels are evaluated differently. While access, equity, and a just distribution of schooling facilities are emphasised in schools and colleges, the universities become unequal institutions. Research universities are given more resources and better facilities than ordinary, teaching universities. This seems so unfair and so inconsistent with the egalitarian stance of my writings that a word of explanation is in order.

I believe that the changes proposed here are already so costly that even if the ruling elite brings them about in its own long-term interest, it will simply not be able to afford to create about fifty research universities of a high standard. Two may be possible; more is not! Moreover, the number of really competent faculty is so limited that even staffing two universities may be too ambitious. Thus, our aims must be realistic if we are serious about creating quality higher education.

The teaching universities will create the bulk of our educated labour force and the state should ensure that they are accommodated in jobs commensurate with their skills. The products of the research universities should be drawn into academia and research, so as to create new ideas which we have lacked so far. This means that good education will mean a good, sensitive citizen at the school level; a modern, educated worker at the college level and a producer of idea — a real mover and shaker in the world of intellect — at the university level. This may appear to be unequal but it is not unjust. ■

PEDAGOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICAN STUDIES

Dr Rukhsana Qamber

Pedagogy is the science of teaching and the pedagogue not only critically imparts received knowledge but also vitally expands the frontiers of existing knowledge. In other words, academia, meaning the university and research organisations, are constantly engaged in generating and disseminating new knowledge. Thus, teaching and research go hand in hand, each reinforcing the other. While teaching requires sound pedagogic methods, it also needs a substantial pool of teaching materials, including text. In this context, it is research that expands the pool of teaching materials. The primary task of research institutions, like the Area Study Centres in Pakistan, is to add to existing knowledge in their respective fields of specialisation. Teaching, therefore, becomes a secondary yet essential endeavour, a sort of laboratory to test the theories and concepts developed in research as well as a means to generate fresh ideas, emanating from students and from the intellectual environment of the university graduate classroom.

The most active and prestigious activity at my Centre is its American Studies programme. The Centre defined as "American Studies" covers the whole American continent. The field of studies extends from Chile and Argentina in the south of the continent to Canada in the north, and includes Central America and the Caribbean region viewed from various disciplinary perspectives. The Centre has produced some good work for the understanding of the Americas, especially in the fields of history, politics, foreign policy and, to a lesser extent, understanding the people, their values, their behaviour and public policies from the perspectives of literature and bilateral trade.

Chicken and Egg Issue

When prioritising the issues of academics and public policy, we confront what could be termed as "chicken and egg problems," i.e., which comes first: research or policy options? Does, or should, academic research inform public policy, or vice versa and does public policy demand research? We are not talking about investigation for short-term goals, such as journalistic research and reporting, or research to manage crisis situations in the public sphere. Our concern is with long-term public policy formulation — that is only durable when based upon well-grounded research and sound guiding principles.

Seen in this perspective, American Studies is a vital field for research, especially in Pakistan. Based upon adequate research findings, public policy would be formulated on a durable basis, although it would also be able

to cater to situations requiring crisis management. Research should ideally not be targeted at policy alone. Its overall goal should be generation of new knowledge. New knowledge, when adequately marketed, becomes operational research that ideally informs policy and/or industry. In short, the so-called "business" of research and education should be the domain of academics alone.

The institutions of area studies research should not function in isolation. The work of our various Pakistan Study Centres should complement the research of the Area Study Centres because every country that the latter interact with, is in turn basically interested in corresponding issues in Pakistan. For instance, when I interact with El Colegio de Mexico, to find out about the situation in Mexico, its researchers are interested in what is happening in Pakistan. The target institutions would be the various think tanks at universities, in the public domain, those set up by NGOs, by political parties and other institutions, such as church organisations.

School of Occidental Studies

Area Studies for the Americas could vitally inform issues of current concern such as civilization or cultural dialogue. The American continent comprises what is also called the Western Hemisphere and, during most of the nineteenth century, American policy makers, such as James Monroe, sharply differentiated the continent from Europe. The newly independent nations, both in the north and south of the Western Hemisphere greatly valued their independence from European colonialism. They feared renewed dominance or interference, whether overtly by military invasion or covertly through economic domination. It was this concern for independence from invasion outside the hemisphere that caused the United States to intervene in Cuba in 1898 to help that country attain freedom from Spanish colonialism. So, my students and others ask: if the US loves the concept of national independence so much, why has it invaded its southern neighbours on innumerable occasions? The answer is that it was, in fact, the same line of thinking that compelled the United States to subsequently invade or intervene all over Latin America against what its policy makers perceived as Communist incursions emanating from outside the Western Hemisphere. In a Catch-22 like situation, the US curtailed the freedom of many of its southern neighbours with the purpose of protecting their freedom from extra-Hemispheric dominance.

Similarly, Pakistanis and Americans, from both the southern and northern parts of the Western Hemisphere, are usually the victims of wrong perceptions and negative stereotyping. For instance, many Pakistanis think that the American family does not exist and this myth is usually exploded when they go to the US. Also, most Pakistanis think that Americans abandon their elderly in old folks' homes but these homes, far from being Dickensian

orphanages, are modern, welcoming facilities and senior citizens from Pakistan usually enjoy going to them. Similarly, Pakistanis almost invariably think that Latin America is third world in ways comparable to Pakistan but almost at first exposure, they are easily won over to the Latin American way of enjoying life and the sophistication of thought on the street and among its intellectuals, writers, poets and musicians. While such perceptions may, more or less, be static, they should change over time: the US used to be secular but a sea change has occurred during the past decade and a half and today's USA is inundated with public manifestation of religious beliefs.

In other words, one could suggest that the field of American Studies may be considered as a kind of School of Occidental Studies. In fact, recently a query came from a North Korean academic centre that works on the United States whether Pakistan has a specialist who could help them develop their courses on American history. The presumption was that Pakistan, as a key Muslim country, would have an independent academic outlook that would be in keeping with its national and Islamic interests. It would, therefore, be useful to think in terms of basic values and key concepts in American Studies from the prism of cultural dialogue.

Concepts and Theory

The Americas gave the academic world some of its most thought provoking and exciting theories and concepts during the twentieth century. These theories include the fields of pedagogy, epistemology, theology, literary genres, development theory and many more. To merely touch upon the first two fields concerned with this paper, pedagogy and epistemology, we may quote the examples of John Dewey from the United States and Paulo Friere from Brazil. Interestingly, both philosophers have followers who have established institutes under their respective names and some of their writings and discussion of their works is available at their websites. One of the themes common to both academics, is their concern for educational development through democratic means.

John Dewey, (1859-1952), wrote several essays and books including *The School and Society* (1899), *How We Think* (1910; revised ed. 1933), an application of his theory of knowledge to education and *Democracy and Education* (1916) perhaps his most important work in the field.¹ Dewey entered into detailed discourse on the nature of knowledge and how research or academic inquiry is to be conducted. He examined the research problem from a critical angle and cautioned against hypothesis and assumptions colouring the investigation. He also looked at education as a sort of process in which the

¹ Mark K. Smith, "Paulo Friere," May 8, 1997, updated February 4, 2007, <http://www.infed.org/encyclopaedia.htm>;
<http://www.infed.org/archives/index.htm>; <http://www.infed.org/index.htm>.

teacher both gave out knowledge and received knowledge and ways of examining knowledge – research methodology – from the students. Thus, the teacher did not deliver a sermon but engaged in a dialogue with the students. However, the process was not to be undertaken facetiously but in a critical manner that aimed to erase the artificial hierarchal order of teacher-above-student. The end product of Dewey pedagogy was to uphold the quintessential American value of democracy.

Other late twentieth century thinkers have also been concerned about the issue of democracy and education, such as Neil Postman in his *Politics of Reading* and Ivan Illich in *Deschooling Society*.² They were concerned with the issue of literacy as a means of control, i.e., the state could wish for its citizens to be literate enough to follow its instructions but not educated enough to critique its policies. Noam Chomsky and others also articulated similar alarm at the power of the media to control the public imagination.³

The Brazilian thinker, Paulo Friere in the 1960s and 1970s was concerned with the issue of control, democratic pressured, non-hierarchal learning and the pressing that he faced to quickly educate an adult citizenry. Moved by ethical concerns, Friere's methods were deeply influenced by Catholic ethos that viewed the mission of religion as comprehensive social change. In other words, he was heavily influenced by the prevailing theology of liberation for which his fellow countrymen, leading Catholic theologians, such as Gustavo Gutiérrez, faced ex-communication by the Pope.⁴ Friere's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*⁵ and *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed*⁶ speak, for instance, of the importance of dialogue and praxis, a concept central to liberation theology. However, the concept is not, as it is often erroneously taken to imply by neoconservatives, that education is a bankable item that bears dividends after being invested. Friere went on to write about the necessity to make people conscious through practical experience.

Paulo Friere's work echoes other writers, such as Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, Rich Gibson accused him of coming very close to Hegel's "Phenomenology" and Paul Taylor almost accused him of plagiarism.⁷ Critics see Friere's work flawed because it implies a "banking" concept of education,

² Shahid Siddiqui, "The Politics of Education," *The News*, March 5, 2007.

³ Noam Chomsky, "Education is Ignorance" in *Class Warfare* (1995) 19-23 and 27-31 and Noam Chomsky, *Chomsky on Miseducation* (Lanham, Maryland: Roman and Littlefield, 2000).

⁴ Gustavo Gutierrez, Translated and edited by Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson, *A Theology of Liberation* (New York: Orbis, 1973), Chapter One "Theology: A Critical Reflection," and the concept of praxis, 1-20 and L. John Topel. *The Way to Peace* (New York: Orbis, 1979) "Towards a Liberation Theology," 148-156.

⁵ Paulo Friere, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).

⁶ Paulo Friere, *Pedagogy of Hope. Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1995).

⁷ Paul Taylor, *The Texts of Paulo Freire* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993).

in which the student is viewed as an empty pitcher to be filled by the teacher. Freire's work was instrumental in laying the foundations of critical pedagogy in which he expressed opposition to the teacher-student dichotomy. This dichotomy was also recognised by Rousseau and underlies the works of John Dewey. Freire comes close to insisting that the student-teacher dichotomy should be completely abolished. This is hard to imagine in absolute terms, since there must be some enactment of the teacher-student relationship in the parent-child relationship, but what Freire suggests is that a deep reciprocity be inscribed into our notions of teacher and student. Freire advocated the concepts of "teacher-student and student-teacher;" i.e., a teacher who learns and a learner who teaches. This non-hierarchical and dichotomy-free environment should, according to Freire, be the basic roles of classroom participation.

Freire's work is one of the few attempts anywhere to implement something like democracy as an educational method and not merely a goal of democratic education. Even Dewey, for whom democracy was a touchstone, did not integrate democratic practices fully into his methods, though this was in part a function of Dewey's attitudes towards individuality. In its strongest early form, this kind of classroom has been criticized on the grounds that it can mask rather than overcome the teacher's authority. In effect, both Dewey and Freire strongly argued against regimentation through static curricula and advocated thoughtfully exercised freedom for the teacher-cum-student and student-cum-teacher, to receive existing knowledge and develop new knowledge.

It is my contention that theory and fresh provocative concepts affect society more than the mundane concerns of foreign policy and public policy in general.⁸ Witness India's great contribution to academia in the development of Subaltern, theory that rapidly spread across the globe. Respect for Indian technology was to follow, fuelled by its tourist industry, etc. Once the Indians had captured the intellectuals' imagination, its other conquests followed. As a first step to critical inquiry, we could suggest rethinking currently fashionable but culturally inappropriate "buzz words" to Muslim populations, such as "diaspora," "holocaust" and "pogrom." The field of American Studies is ripe to develop critical concepts in the so-called cultural, civilisation or interfaith dialogue. But for that serious brain-storming would be needed. ■

⁸ Rukhsana Qamber, "At the Cutting Edge: Theory, Teaching, Research and Sources for American Studies," in Fakrul Alam, et. al., *Proceedings of the 1993 BAAS-USIS Regional American Studies Conference* (Dhaka: Bangladesh Association for American Studies & USIS, Dhaka, 1994).

CHAPTER II

THE *JEHADI* CURRICULUM - A PRELUDE TO *TALIBANISATION*
 IN PAKISTAN
 A CASE STUDY OF AFGHAN REFUGEES

Dr Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat

Introduction

In this paper, an attempt has been made to examine the roots of *Talibanisation* in Pakistan in the historical perspective. The interaction between internal and external variables to transform Afghan refugees into holy warriors or *Mujahideen*, and the technique by which the *Jehadi* curriculum was introduced in schools and *Madrassas* by secret agencies of Pakistan and the USA, has been examined at some length.

The Marxist Revolution in Afghanistan (1978) and Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), jolted the entire region politically and accelerated the process of political confrontation into ideological polarization. Both the Revolution and the *Jehad*, opened the gates of hell to swallow men and movements in Pakistan. These revolutions posed a serious threat to the entire Asian region, by encouraging state and non-state actors under the patronage of the then super powers to use the refugees for promoting their own malicious political gains and designs in South Asia.

Pakistan, along with CIA, manipulated this political and humanitarian problem of the Afghan refugees into an anti-Soviet resistance with Islamic ideological traits and trends by pushing innocent Muslim *Muhajireen* (refugees) towards the quagmire of militant religio-fundamentalism by establishing a chain of *Masajid* (Mosques), *Madrassas* (Religious Seminaries) and *Maktabas* (Schools) for raising *Mullahs*, *Mujahideen* and lastly, *Taliban* to counter Soviet and Afghan Marxists.

The cry for Islam and *Jehad* was raised; *Masjid*, *Madrassas*, *Maktabas* and drug Mafia were used to produce a militant creed to challenge the state laws and authority in Pakistan. Religious outfits like *Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws -TNSM), rejected Pakistani legal system and established its own courts, opposed female education, elections and democracy in Malakand area.

Islamic Revolution in Iran and *Taliban* regime in Afghanistan created consciousness among the *Mullahs* and religious students (*Taliban*) to gain political power, and with the backing of state agencies, the new alliance of six religious parties, MMA (*Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal*) established its government in two, out of four provinces of Pakistan.

The Labyrinth of War and Terrorism in Pakistan

The Afghan resistance movement and the influx of refugees in Pakistan made the game of General Zia simpler. In this new "Great Game", if the CIA and US, *inter-alia* were interested in punishing the Soviets in Afghanistan to avenge their defeat in Vietnam, Pakistan wanted to settle its own scores of historical enmity and grievances over Pashtunistan issue with Afghanistan.

Islamabad's political, economic and military involvement in the new Afghan gambit was so well planned, organised and institutionalised that almost all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan were trapped in their scheme. The main thrust of Pakistan's Afghan policy was basically aimed at the following three points:

- 1 Mobilising international support against Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan;
- 2 Assisting the people of Afghanistan in the *jihad* against the Soviet forces; and
3. Seeking a political-diplomatic solution of the crisis on the negotiating table.¹

Though the official policy of Islamabad towards Afghanistan was based on the concept of Islamic brotherhood, neighbourhood and humanitarianism, yet, its role in the conflict was determined by its secret policy with following objectives:

- to oust the Russians from Afghanistan;
- to topple the pro-Soviet Kabul government;
- to suppress and discourage Pashtun nationalism;
- to gain 'strategic depth', *vis-à-vis* the larger adversary: India;
- to destabilise Afghan state institutions;
- to modernise its own army with the Western assistance;
- to legitimize and prolong the rule of General Zia on the pretext of Afghan *jihad*;

¹ Ijaz Khan and Nasreen Ghufraan, eds., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy Regional Perspective: A Critique*. Conference Proceedings, organised jointly by Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar & Hanns Seidel Foundation Islamabad, May 10-11, 1999, p. 75.

- to divert public attention from domestic politics to external threats;
- and last but not the least, to reduce Afghanistan to the status of Pakistan's protégé, or at least, to let it be governed by its puppets.²

For the implementation of this scheme, Islamabad government undertook the following steps:

- 1 Afghan Cell: At the higher level, Pakistan created Special Afghan Cell for the Afghan affairs, over and above the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 2 Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees: For organisational set-up of the Afghan refugees Commissionerate with 12,000 personnel, was established in 1980 in Peshawar.
- 3 Afghan refugees were categorised into:
 - *Muhajerrin* or Refugees and
 - *Mujahideen* or holy warriors. The government's public explanation was that only refugees were living in settled areas of Pakistan while the *Mujahideen* were based in the tribal areas.
- 4 Islamabad recognised only seven parties of the Afghan *Mujahideen* to plan the entire resistance of the Afghans. The Peshawar-plan based, seven parties were the following:
 - The *Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
 - The *Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Maulvi Younas Khalis.
 - The *Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Prof. Burhan-ud Din Rabbani.
 - The *Ittehad-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Abdul Rabb Rasool Sayyaf.
 - The *Mahaz-e-Millie-e-Afghanistan* of Pir Ahmad Gillani.
 - The *Jabha-e-Nijat-e-Milli-e-Afghanistan* of Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddadi.
 - The *Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islam-e-Afghanistan* of Maulvi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi.
- 5 Allowing legal and illegal NGOs to tackle refugee issue.
- 6 Islamists *Jehadi* culture was introduced, encouraged and sustained.

Ziaul Haq's own lust for power and legitimisation of his own dictatorial rule exploited Islamic card, both internally and externally. Internally,

² Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, "Pakistan's Strategic Role in the Afghan Crisis", *Pakistan, Journal of Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar*, 1993, no. 27/28, p. 37.

he started the Islamization drive (1979-82), by gaining the support of Islamist parties like *Jama'at-e-Islami* and externally the "Jihad" cry was raised for liberation of Afghanistan and Kashmir. To provide new recruits to the "Jihad" fronts and for religious indoctrination, "Pakistan ideology" was reinterpreted by explaining the new role of Pakistan army: "Army's role is not only limited to defend Pakistan's geographical boundaries but rather to defend ideological frontier of the country."

The Red tides of Afghan revolution were moving towards Khyber Pass. Pakistan had neither power nor ability to roll-back the Soviet juggernaut openly. A war by proxy or "undeclared war" as the PDPA regime called it, was the only answer. The CIA and ISI prepared a grand plan to counter the Red menace in the region and to achieve its long cherished goals in Afghanistan. Zia himself confessed, in an interview with Selig Harrison, shortly before his death, that his goals, from the beginning of the war, were to destroy the Communist infrastructure, install a client regime, and bring about a "strategic alignment" in South Asia. "We have earned the right to have a friendly regime there", he declared. "We took risks as a frontline state, and we won't permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claim on our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, part of a Pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union, you will see."³

Akhtar A. Rahman, the Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) considered that if Zia were to covertly support the Afghan resistance in a massive guerrilla war, the Soviets could be halted, even rolled back. He believed that Afghanistan could be made into another Vietnam, with the Soviets in the shoes of the Americans. He urged Zia to take the military option.⁴ It would mean Pakistan secretly supporting the guerrillas with money, arms, ammunition, training and operational advice. Most importantly, it would entail offering the border areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan, as a sanctuary, both for the refugees and the guerrillas.

In the new grand plan, the CIA and ISI weaved a net with the golden threads of foreign aid and painted it with religious rhetoric to trap the innocent and desperate refugees in the *Jehadi* labyrinth and pushed them as a *Mujahid* or holy warrior into the quagmire of blood and death.

³ Diego Cordovez & Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside story of the Soviet withdrawal*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 92.

⁴ Mohammad Yousaf & Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story*, (Lahore: Jang Publisher, 1992), p. 25; In General Ziaul Haq's government, it was widely believed that through the Afghan *Mujahideen's* victory, Pakistan would gain "strategic depth". Commenting on this plan of Pakistan Eqbal Ahmad stated: "I first encountered this view in 1988, during a meeting with the late General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan. I argued then, as I would now, that this is a skewed idea, we are after a shadow which would lead us into unrelieved darkness." See his article "In Afghanistan, Cease Fire Please" in the daily Dawn, (Karachi), April 7, 1991.

The PDPA regime in Afghanistan was seen continuously and desperately levelling charges in national and international media against the US and Pakistani governments for their blatant interference in Afghanistan. Kabul also complained that Pakistani territory has been used as a sanctuary for guerrilla forces and was the major conduit for the arms flow. The CIA was charged with organising, arming, equipping and training Afghan counter-revolutionary gangs on the territory of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, one of the ring leaders of these bands, was a US citizen of Afghan nationality, Zia Nassry. He visited Washington in March 1979, on the very eve of anti-government riots in Herat. He had long discussions with high-ranking officials of the US State Department, including R. Lorton, who was in charge of the Afghan desk. He also met the representatives of US Senators, F. Church and J. Javits.⁵

In 1983, some 10,000 tons of arms and ammunition went through the pipeline to the Afghan resistance. By 1987, this amount had risen to 65,000 tons, all of it handled by 200 men from the Ministry of Defense Constabulary (MODC) with four fork-lift trucks, working seven days a week, month after month.⁶ However, in early April, 1988, a few days prior to the Geneva Accord, ISI lost the entire stock of arms and ammunition, meant for Afghan resistance at Ojhri Camp (Rawalpindi), followed by the US cutback of supplies to Pakistan for the Afghan resistance. By February, 1988, the Soviet Union lost 13,310 soldiers in Afghanistan while 35,478 wounded and 311 reportedly missing.⁷

“Peshawar Seven” and Arms

From 1980 until 1987, the Pakistan Army teams from the ISI went to Afghanistan to advise and assist the *Mujahideen* in their operations. All resistance commanders inside Afghanistan were required to join one of the Peshawar based “Seven *Tanzimat*” of the Afghans. As it was only through the Afghan *Tanzimat* (Parties) that arms were distributed, failure to join meant no weapons, which in turn, led to loss of power and prestige in the field. Even among the “Peshawar Seven,” some were closer to the Pakistan’s establishment. Some 70 per cent of the logistic support was given to the fundamentalist parties, but no single *Tanzim* got more than 20 percent.⁸

⁵ *Undeclared War*, Armed intervention and other forms of interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Information Department DRA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kabul, 1980, p. 25; See also, for US, Pakistan, China and Saudi Arabia’s blatant interference in Afghanistan, *The Truth about Afghanistan: Documents, Facts, Eyewitness Reports*, (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1980).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁷ Mohammad Yousaf, *Silent Soldier: The Man Behind the Afghan Jihad*, pp. 9, 10, 21; Yousaf & Mark Adkin, *op. cit.*, p.105.

⁸ Yousaf, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 10, 21; Yousaf & Mark Adkin *op. cit.*, p. 105.

More importantly, Pakistan military and the ISI high command shared their world view. General Akhtar like General Zia, saw the Afghan crisis as a way to achieve "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and a "strategic alignment", in which Afghanistan and Pakistan would be a part of an anti-Indian, Pan-Islamic regional bloc dominated by fundamentalist parties.⁹

According to US representative Wilson, "apart from their ideological affinity, by channelling weapons aid through the fundamentalists, the ISI consciously minimised support for local Pashtun tribal leaders, who were largely allied with non-fundamentalist groups. This anti-Pashtun bias was rooted in the historic Pakistani conflict with Kabul over Pashtun areas straddling the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But the ISI rationalized its denial of aid to groups linked with the Pashtun tribal structure in military terms."¹⁰

Nobody knows exactly how much foreign aid, both money and ammunition, was received by the party leaders in Peshawar. By 1986, one thousand tons of weapons per week were shifted from Pakistan to Afghanistan. It means that in one year alone, 52 thousand tons of weapons were handed over to the Afghan resistance leaders and commanders.

Many Pashtun tribesmen, along the Durand Line, were plying their traditional "double game" to have a foot in both camps. Thousands participated in the Afghan "Jihad" and supported the *Mujahideen*, but they had been also getting benefits from the Kabul regime. Local tribal *Maliks* demanded that members of any other tribe or band passing through their area would pay a tribute, usually in cash or weapons – an old practice in the area. The US diplomats and intelligence officers on the scene acknowledged that sometimes the actual fighters were lucky if they got even 50 out of 100 guns sent to the Afghans, through the ISI, by CIA and its allies.¹¹

The Afghan War provided the local people other additional ways and means to make money. One of these was the smuggling of food into Afghanistan for sale to the garrisons of border posts. Pulses, flour, cooking oil, rice and items such as petrol, diesel and kerosene for stoves or lamps were purchased by these isolated posts on a regular basis. They came to rely on this source of supply to survive. Even the concrete bunkers at some forts were constructed with cement and iron bars brought direct from Pakistan.

The Afghan Refugees' Educational System

Initially, the ARC, in collaboration with the UNHCR, launched a comprehensive programme for education — or in other words indoctrination — of the children of the Afghan refugees. An Educational Cell, headed by the

⁹ Diego Cordovez & Selig S. Harrison, op. cit., p. 162.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 162.

¹¹ John Cooley, op. cit., p. 55.

Additional Commissioner of the Afghan Refugees, was responsible for managing the education programme. The NGOs involved in the education of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan were:

Swiss Aid for Afghans	14 schools
Okenden International	84 schools
IRC Secondary Education	3 schools
GTZ schools	49 schools
IRC Home Schools	49 schools
IRC Female Schools	30 schools
Education Cell	81 schools
Afghan Institute for Learning	5 schools
GTZ Home School	9 schools
SAVE USA	48 schools
UNHCR	2000 schools ¹²

There were four types of educational institutions for Afghan refugees:

Camp Schools and Madrasas (Religious Seminaries):

These schools were run by the Education Cell of the ARC along with UNHCR. By December 1983, the total number of primary schools in this category for boys was 438. By May 2003, the total number of schools for boys and girls was 102. The syllabus was introduced by Pakistan with more stress on religious indoctrination, and not on national aspirations of the Afghans.

Maktabas (schools) and Madrasas (seminaries), run by the Afghan Refugees' Political Parties

These were of two types:

- (a) Modern schools with modern sciences and religion.
- (b) *Shari'at*, or religious schools.

The following were some of the religious institutions, established by refugee parties:

1. *Madrasa Hijrat wa Jihad* (Seminary of Emigration and Holy War)
2. *Da'wat wa Jihad Pohentoon* (University of Islamic Propagation & Holy War)
3. *Madrasa Abu Hanifa*.
4. Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani School.
5. *Dar-ul-Hufaṣṣ Madrasa* (for memorization of Holy Qur'an).
6. Ahmad Shah Abdali *Pohentoon*.
7. *Islami Pohentoon*.

¹² Record of Educational Divisional Officer, EDO, Peshawar.

8. *Uminat-ul-Mumineen* for female students.¹³*Pakistani Schools and Madrasas for Afghan Refugees:*

Special seats were reserved for Afghan Refugees in almost all educational institutions of NWFP. Some of the seats reserved in the professional colleges were as follows:

Medical colleges:	51 seats
Engineering colleges:	31 seats
Other colleges:	146 seats
Other schools:	340 seats
Islamic University, Islamabad:	78 seats
Vocational training Centres for boys:	5 seats
Technicians in the Community Centres:	150 seats
Carpet weaving Centres:	13 seats

There was a tremendous increase in the local Pakistani private schools with Islamic and Arabic names in the Peshawar District of NWFP. In 1976, the total number of registered private schools in Peshawar district was only 45, while in 1978, the figure reached 73, and in 1980, the total was 97. But the unregistered private schools were in hundreds. Some of the Islamic and Arabic names of the private schools include: the *Hira* Academy, the *Safa* Academy, *Al-Badar* Public School, *Al-Falah* Public School, *Almaaz* Public school, *Al-Safwaan* Children Centre, *Iqra* Children Academy, *Islamia* School, *Qurtaba* Public School, *Rauzat-ul-Atfaal* Academy, *Seena* Public School, *Al-Asar* Children Academy, etc.¹⁴

¹³ Prof. Dr. Mohammad Rahim Elham & Dr. Michael Hirth, *A Report of Afghan Refugees Islamic Madrasa in the Timergara Area, NWFP, Pakistan* (A Pilot Study), serial no II, Basic Education for Afghan Refugees, Peshawar, 1994, pp. 12-13. Therein are cited figures of some 19 to 26 *madrasas* in the Timergara area with students from 70 to 500 each, which had three goals:

- The students of particular ethnic groups had to be educated
- They had to be supported for their fight for the liberation of Afghanistan
- Those missionaries who were preaching the true Islamic rules and principles needed to be facilitated.

These *madrasas* were funded by the Saudi Red Crescent, the *Lajnat Al-Qatar* (LQO), and the Afghan political *Tanzimat*, or parties. The LQO for Orphans was an Islamic charity organisation which started a program for Afghanistan in 1991-92. LQO supported orphanages in the following areas:

- Jalalabad city Afghanistan: 750 orphans.
- Chawki District, Afghanistan: 150 orphans
- Munda Refugees Camp, Peshawar
- Kacha Gari Refugees Camp, Peshawar.

¹⁴ *Defence Journal*, Karachi, vol. xv: no: 8, 1989, p. 84; See also the *list of educational institutions established by GTZ/BEFARs (Primary Schools)*:

The Islamic nature of the Afghan resistance highlighted the close relationship of religion and politics, and encouraged both locals and refugees in the province by establishing approximately one thousand Islamic *madrasas* and *Dar-ul-Ulum*, with the aid of Middle Eastern countries, to provide an ideological base for the Afghan *Jihad*. The *Frontier Post* (Peshawar) reported on July 17, 1992, that Rs. 15,969 million had been distributed amongst forty-two *Deeni Madaris* alone, in the period from 1984-85 to 1990-91, out of the Provincial *Auqaf* Fund. Most of the Arab donors injected sectarian ideologies into the refugees, through these religious institutions to gain their own ends. In all Pakistani educational institutions, Pakistan Studies and Islamiyat were introduced as compulsory subjects to make the young generation more Islamic and Pakistani and "to defend the ideological frontiers" of Pakistan.

Educational Institutions established by Voluntary Organisations:

The *Idara Ahyah-ul-'Ulum /Jama'at-e-Islami Pakistan* schools numbered 425. The *Ahyah-ul-'Ulum /Jama'at-e-Islami* distributed 950,000 copies of the Holy Quran and other literature of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin in the refugee camps.¹⁵

In general, three types of text books were published under the Afghan refugee Educational Curriculum:

1. Text books published by the fundamentalist parties, which were highest in number and distribution.

Primary schools for boys:	190
Primary schools for girls:	75
Mixed schools (Co-education):	55
Total male students:	82489
Total female students:	29754
<i>Middle and Secondary Schools funded by ARC:</i>	
Middle school for boys:	64
Middle school for girls:	15
Secondary school for boys:	21
Secondary school for girls:	02
Total male students:	7447
Total female students:	543


¹⁵ According to Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, these copies of the Holy Quran were printed in Saudi Arabia and provided by the CIA to the Zia government for distributing what they called "subversive literature" in Central Asian Muslim States. See also the monthly *Qaumi Digest*, Lahore, October, 1981, p. 147; The years 1980-1990 saw a tremendous increase in the annual *Ijtima'*, or gathering, of *Tablighi Jama'at* in Raiwind, its headquarters in Lahore. Surprisingly, a majority of the participants were from NWFP, FATA and the Pashtun belt of Baluchistan. The membership of the *Jama'at-e-Islami, Pakistan* also increased in this period. If the *Tablighi Jama'at* was nourishing the people through its simple teachings, the *Jama'at-e-Islami* provided ground for the middle and intellectual class with justification of *jihad* and militancy in the anti-Soviet *jihad*.

2. Text books published by the Afghan Refugees Commissionerate with the assistance of UNHCR.
3. Text books published by NGOs

According to investigative reporters for the *Washington Post*, over the past 20 years, the US has spent millions of dollars producing fanatical schoolbooks, which were then distributed in Afghanistan. These books were developed in the early 1980s, under a US AID grant, to the University of Nebraska-Omaha, and its Center for Afghanistan Studies. "The primers, which were filled with talk of *jihad* and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then, as the Afghan school system's core curriculum. Even the Taliban used the American-produced books, though the radical movement scratched out human faces in keeping with its strict fundamentalist code." According to the paper, these violent Islamist schoolbooks, which "served ... as the Afghan school system's core curriculum" produced "unintended consequences".¹⁶

The books included unnecessary material, and were not written with the purpose of education in mind but rather were designed for ideological propaganda. At the primary level, the material in the mathematics books tended towards problems such as:

If out of 10 atheists, 5 were killed by 1 Muslim, 5 would be left.
 5 guns + 5 guns = 10 guns
 15 bullets - 10 bullets = 5 bullets, etc.



Generally, all these books were written with the purpose of keeping children apart from normal life activity and developments. The Dari and Pashto textbooks begin with *Hamd* (poems in praise of God) and *Na'at* (poems in praise of Prophet Muhammad), and end with the four orthodox

¹⁶ *Washington Post*, March 23, 2002.

Caliphs and their biographies, also mentioning, in the process topics such as *mujahid*, guns, bullets, atheism, martyrdom, and *ghazi*.¹⁷

Even the books of organic chemistry and zoology were inclined towards the subject of Islamic studies than towards science. Text books provided by NGOs were also much more suitable for *madrasas* (religious schools) than normal schools.

The text book of history for class three, published by ARC mentioned, in its chapter on world history, the story of the Ark of Hazrat Noah and the story of Habil (Abel) and Qabil (Cane). It has recounted the history of Afghanistan as:

Afghanistan is an Islamic country. The people of Afghanistan started believing in Islam about 1400 years back during the times of Hazrat Usman. And it is due to the blessings of Islam that the people of the country live peacefully since then. So, in the light of the Qur'an and the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), we must strive for the protection and development of our religion and country till the end of days, and must follow it to the last of our lives.¹⁸

With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, new books were published without pictures of living beings. The basic idea was that the picture of any living thing will ask for a spirit in the next world, and photos/pictures of living beings are *haram* (forbidden). In the Dari books of the primary classes, which again have been at the centre of these attacks, the letter "dal" ('d') is explained with the word "*dihqan*" (peasant) and a picture of headless peasant, working in the field along with his headless bull; the daughter bringing food for her father was also headless.¹⁹

Ideological Literature of PDPA and Afghan Refugees

The PDPA regime in Afghanistan produced ideological propaganda literature in Pashto with notions of 'class struggle', nationalism, and internationalism. The novels and stories of Noor Muhammad Taraki (the head of the new regime, and an eminent Pashto writer in his own right) were republished and distributed free on both sides of the Durand Line. The Kabul regime also tried to establish a 'Khalq' Party in the tribal areas, and made close contacts with the Mazdoor-Kisan (Worker and Peasant) Party of NWFP.²⁰ Along with these links, the fact of the settlement of Afghan refugees in the Frontier also contributed a great deal to the Pashto literature and journalism. A major

¹⁷ All such available text books were studied by the author; also speech of Fauzia Jehanian in a seminar of refugee school teachers in Peshawar on November 2, 2002.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Interview with Ajmal Khattak, dated December 7, 1989, Peshawar; and discussion with Afrasiyab Khattak, the eminent intellectual, writer, politician and human rights activist.

achievement was made in the field of a common Pashto script. It was due to the Afghan crisis that a Pashto service was started, both by the BBC and the VOA. Besides a few Pashto dailies, there were weeklies and numerous periodicals, published by both local and refugee organisations. During these years, more than 2500 books in Pashto and Dari, as well as a large number of anti-Soviet propaganda material, had been published by different organisations and institutions in Lower Pashtunkhwa, i.e., the NWFP and the Pashtun area of Baluchistan.²¹

From calligraphy to art, and from handicrafts to Pashto music, all improved and changed in style due to the arrival of Afghan artists, singers and musicians. With the arrival of refugees, the Pashto film industry and video-audio business increased manifold. In short, if the Afghan War politically damaged the cause of Pashtun political nationalism in Pashtunkhwa for the time being, it accelerated and regenerated the cultural nationalism, which will prove more effective than politics in future.

Some Major Characteristics of Afghan Refugee Literature

- Most of the literature was ideological, either Socialist or Islamic
- Ideological polarization was at the peak on both sides of the Durand Line.

²¹ The nationalist forces, which were either pro-Kabul or neutral, were sidelined by the Zia regime, and Islamic fundamentalist forces were encouraged to ally themselves with the Afghan *Mujahideen* in the name of Islam and Islamic brotherhood. Pashto dailies, weeklies, periodicals, and books were started from various places within the NWFP. The writings of Pashtun refugees were overwhelmingly anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and pro-*Mujahideen*, while the local Pashto publications were also ideologically pasted. But ironically, the Pashto literature produced during this period was more diversified in form and contents than at any other time previously. Some of the nationalist Pashtun refugees writers like Aziz-ur-Rahman Ulfat and Bahauddin Majrooh, were assassinated in Peshawar by unknown assailants and many others were forced to leave Pakistan.

Although the government tried to use its entire force in suppression of Pashtun nationalism on both sides of the Durand line with its calls of Islam and *jihad*, the nationalist, leftist and democratic forces tried to resist politically, and in literary circles as well, the government policies against peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis were resisted. But neither Islamabad nor the Afghan *Mujahideen* were ready for a political and peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis.

Among the positive fallout of the Afghan crisis were the cultural, economic, and ideological co-mingling of Afghan/Pashtun with other nationalities of Pakistan. Among the negative fallouts, one could underline the growing tendencies of *mullahism*, extremism, militancy, sectarianism, and drug Mafia, and the spreading of Kalashnikov culture in the entire country. Zia wanted to tame 'disloyal' writers, whom he declared as "equivalent to water logging and salinity" through the Academy of Letters (1979-88), but he failed to buy the conscience of the writers or to turn it into a tool of the government.

- Children were trained and indoctrinated in the narrow ideological parameters of Islamic fundamentalism and sectarianism, and not in Afghan/Pashtun nationalism.
- Schools up to the university level were opened, which were devoted to the *jehad* and resistance.
- The curriculum was war oriented, i.e., 2+2 = 4 Guns
- Kalashnikov and Heroin culture was developed and given a boost.

There were 11 other independent organisations of Afghans in Peshawar producing anti-Soviet literature, and some translations from old history books etc. During this period, 129 books in Pashto were produced for the *jehad* and resistance, containing themes of Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, *jehad*, revolution, and resistance.

Afghan Kids & Kalashnikovs



Children of War, or the War Generation

Inqilabi (Revolutionary) and *Jehadi* (Holy Warriors):

At the height of migration in the 1980s, children constituted nearly 50 per cent²² of the total Afghan refugee population in terms of numbers, and it was estimated that 90 per cent of the refugees were from rural areas.

It was tragic and unfortunate that schools and all other educational institutions were used by the ideological regimes of Kabul and Islamabad in the 1980s and 1990s, as bases for recruitment of youth for the war. In fact, one of the reasons why youth and adults alike left Afghanistan was the fear of

²² S. B. Ekanayake, *Education in Doldrums Afghan Tragedy*, 2000, p. 142.

conscription by any one of the groups, whether they were PDPA or *Mujahideen*. This had adverse effects on the minds of the youth, effects of which pervade even to this day. All objectives related to the development of the individual, were superseded by new objectives to wage war against each other. For instance, Hekmatyar's *Hezb-e-Islami* recruited members from where tribal structures had broken down, or which were characterised by a mixture of groups from different tribes. The boys who grew up in refugee camps did not represent any existing social group inside Afghanistan. Thus, refugee parties depended on the revolutionary Islamic schools in the refugee camps of Pakistan for their recruits. Among the "Peshawar Seven" Parties, the *Hezb* of Hekmatyar in particular, gained access to these camps and built a network of schools with the aim of recruiting refugee youth for the front.²³ On the other hand, the key source of recruitment within Afghanistan for troops to fight against the *jihadis* was the government tribal boarding schools in Kabul, which taught an official version of ideology, different from that of the popular culture.

It is also very disturbing that both armies were funded by foreign sources, running into billions of US dollars and Russian Rubles, and by whatever the country could export at that time. After effect of these wars was that the education of the country, both of Afghanistan proper and that of the Afghan refugees, suffered not only in terms of destruction of educational institutions, but also in terms of an orchestration of social evils in the minds of the children, spiriting corruption and turning their attention to '*jihad*' for solving political problems. Education in the camps was directed at developing skills and attitudes needed to fight *jihad*. The whole curriculum was directed at achieving these objectives, a state of affairs which remains unchanged to date. This is a serious and major flaw in the education of Afghan refugees, who could otherwise have played a far more constructive role in bringing about positive changes in the curriculum of schools in the refugee camps.²⁴

Thus, the two groups, one supporting the Soviets and the other opposed to their invasion, fell victim, through their struggles, to a catastrophic idealism: two types of fundamentalism, i.e., Marxism/Leninism on the one hand, and Islamic radicalism on the other. As a result, a large number of those who were fortunate enough to escape, took their cause to the lands where they found refuge, while considerable number of anti-PDPA regime conservatives were killed and imprisoned. The progressive elements faced the same fate during the *Mujahideen* government.

One could see a similar phenomenon at work during the same periods in the refugee camps in Pakistan. Here, schools in the refugee camps were used as centres to build up support to the cause of the resistance groups of the

²³ Ibid., p. 157.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 158.

Mujahideen in the same way the Communists did inside Afghan schools to propagate their ideology. The inclusion of the concept of *jehad* in the school curriculum linked to the University of Nebraska, Omaha, USA is a clear example of this trend. Both strategies combined to bring about a disaster, unprecedented in Afghan history, vis-à-vis the development of education in the country, aggravating the culture of war and resulting in an avalanche of refugees. In this debacle, the USA cannot absolve itself of its past sins of creating extremists, fundamentalists and Bin Ladens.²⁵

With the assistance of Pakistan, *jehadi* refugee parties had 250 schools with 43,000 students, involving 15,600 teachers and administrators. The graduates of these schools formed the core of Hekmatyar's force. Most of the *Hezb* leadership was the product of modern education, received at Afghan universities. It is very strange and pathetic to note that all these products of the educational system and schools of the Afghans fought against each other to destroy their own nation.²⁶

On the other hand, a number of private schools were established, and the number seems to be multiplying quickly, especially in the cities of Peshawar, Quetta and Islamabad. Although Islamabad had no refugee camps, nearly 30 private schools were functioning for Afghan children in that city, which is an indication of the number of refugees living outside the camps. This is also a reflection of the quality of life of the refugees, since they have to pay for the education of their children in these private schools. In addition, Afghans who were not in the refugee camps, attended local Pakistani public and private schools. The daily *Frontier Post*, Peshawar, has revealed that the Afghan refugees have acquired a deep acumen in English reading, writing, and speaking skills, through a large number of English Learning Centres established in rented houses. Afghans were interested in learning English in order to seek employment in the NGOs, or for going abroad; psychological reasons are also listed as a cause for this interest. Thus, both in the camps and outside, the level of interest and participation of the students in education has been much higher than those inside Afghanistan.²⁷

It is also of interest to note that children in schools inside Afghanistan were following traditional forms of learning, and that the number of schools either decreased or remained in a situation of no growth in all regions, whether controlled by the PDPA regime or by the *Mujahideen*. But educational opportunities on modern lines for refugee children increased and widened in NWFP. These included access to education in Computer Technology, English, Business Management, and other skills-development educational programmes.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

²⁷ *Frontier Post* (Peshawar), February 9, 1999.

Furthermore, accessibility of education for both sexes at all levels was another advantage the refugees enjoyed, with both positive and negative impacts on their attitudes. For many Afghan women, life in exile opened new horizons, through contacts with people and things previously unknown in Afghanistan.²⁸ Life in Pakistan, virtually opened up a world of knowledge to most of the refugees, and now, after the Bonn Conference, the Pakistani generation of the Afghans is playing a constructive role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.²⁹ Even though all children of refugees may not or cannot avail themselves of these opportunities, an awareness of the role of education, and an importance granted to education for both sexes has exerted a great influence and motivation in developing positive attitudes for behavioural change amongst adults.

Initially, funding for education from UNHCR, was confined to the camps, and limited to the primary cycle. However, since 1999, UNHCR has provided nearly US \$100,000 to the Afghan University, established in Peshawar. On the other hand, over the last few years, funding for refugees, currently amounting to around US \$700,000, of which a particularly large amount came from the government of Japan,³⁰ has declined, affecting the education programmes.

Militant Camaraderie

To provide new recruits to the '*jihad*' fronts and for religious indoctrination the 'Pakistan ideology' was reinterpreted by explaining the new role of Pakistan's army: "The Army's role is not only limited to defending Pakistan's geographical boundaries, but rather to defending the ideological frontier of the country as well". Zia-ul-Haq, in his Islamization drive, granted concessions to *madrasas* and religious institutions by taking following steps:

- 1) The degrees and certificates of religious schools and seminaries were made equivalent to those of secular institutions.
- 2) Islamic studies and Pakistan studies were made compulsory and introduced at all level in schools and colleges.
- 3) The students of religious seminaries were given the same concessions in the tickets [for journey in buses] as for the other students of the secular institutions.
- 4) Mosque primary schools were opened. It should be noted that in such backward areas like Malakand, there were 141 mosque

²⁸ Interview with Palwasha, Peshawar, June 12, 1999.


²⁹ Ekanayake op cit., p. 162. In post-Bonn Afghanistan, the more skilled and active lot of the youngsters is from Pakistan.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 162.

schools and 50 *madrasas* during 1981-91. In six *madrasas* out of 900 students, around 300 were Afghan refugees.³¹

- 5) All government employees were bound to pray during office time.

Class Three Book of Social Studies, Chapter “Pakistani Languages,” published by Text Book Board, Peshawar:



Zia's Islamisation drive did increase the Islamic content in all courses. In 1988, the Federal Ministry of Education (Pakistan), elicited the opinions of citizens about the changes to be made in educational policies. A large number of people, suggested more Islamisation and more inculcation of nationalism, and some advocated military training. Among the more radical views were:

- Music should not be taught in schools as a subject.
- Only Muslim teachers should be appointed, at least up to secondary level.
- Anti-Islamic teachers should be expelled from colleges.
- Lady teachers should not be allowed to have their hair cut.

³¹ Zafar Ali, *Deeni Madaris of Malakand Agency*, Unpublished MA thesis, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1999-2001, pp. 104,107,110,119,132, 143. In November 1994, in the Islamic *madrasa* of Maulvi Noor Muhammad in Wana, South Waziristan Agency, there were more than three hundred Central Asian students. Interview with Dr. Syed Wiqar Ali Shah Kaka Khel, Associate Professor, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, conducted at Peshawar, May 2, 2004.

- Islamic studies, Pakistan studies, economics, and military training should be compulsory subjects at college level.
- The concept of '*jihad*' should be given more emphasis in books of Islamiyat.
- Teachers should be disallowed to speak against the 'Pakistan Ideology' in the classroom.³²

The overall effect of Zia's dictatorial regime's educational and other policies was that:

1. they revived religious symbolism and lent legitimacy to religious groups;
2. they gave a new status to religious schools, which were allowed to award degrees; and
3. they provided funds to these schools.

Thus, the religious groups made a transition from the periphery to the mainstream in education and politics. In short, an articulate section of the middle class, probably brought up on ideological school courses, supported an ideology which used religion to create Pakistani nationalism and militarism in the society. And, although war is not a "biological necessity", as conceived by many, in the case of Afghanistan, it became a necessity of many, if not of all. Internal and external secret agencies created and propagated war-mongering in the name of *inqilab* (revolution), *jihad*, and even peace (in case of the *Taliban*).

In such a conducive Islamic religio-ideological atmosphere, life in Pakistan led to a militarisation of children, particularly rural refugee children of the camps. Ideological training of the refugee children in schools and *madrasas* created a new militant political culture among the refugees; one that was better suited to war than to peace.

It was reported that "the *Khudam-ud-Deen madrasa*' is training students from Burma, Nepal, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia and Kuwait. Out of 700 students at the *madrasa*, 127 are foreigners. Nearly half the student body at *Dar-ul-Ulum Haqqaniyah*" in Akora Khattak, was from Afghanistan, and a number of them were from Central Asia. It was reportedly expanding its capacity to house 500 foreign students.³³

³² Tariq Rahman, *Language, Education and Culture*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 81-83.

³³ Jessica Stern, *Pakistan Jihad Culture*, December, 2000, p. 4; "Between 1980 and 1981, Haqqaniyah expenditures increased by an astonishing 107 per cent, most of which came from the Provincial Zakat Council funds, and the number of enrolled Afghan students increased from 37 per cent to 60 per cent. This was about the time that ideology and history was consciously rewritten. *Al-Haq*, the monthly periodical of the Haqqaniyah *madrasa*, made barely any mention of *jihad* prior to 1979. The majority of articles dealt with various aspects of religious practice, with the occasional diatribe against the *Shias*. Come the Afghan War, and the magazine

Apart from 'refugee camp syndrome', economic hardships, a culture of non-education, and medical problems led to psychological problems among the Afghan refugee children. Most of the Afghan kids have no idea about society or their role therein. They were only trained to fight and to kill. Commenting on the fallout of the Afghan war, the Afghan Youth Organization, in the city of Quetta, reported: "The new generation is forgotten and their future is dark. Now, the two monsters of militarism and mafia have opened their mouths to swallow them. They are forced to feed only by means of war, but the majority of the Afghan youth themselves wishes to get education, so that they should have a good standing in the new world order."³⁴



In this overall process, refugee children developed a war psyche. The following true story from a classroom in a refugee camp in Pakistan depicts the picture.

The classroom was full of young Afghan boys armed with coloured pencils and empty sheets of paper. They were told to draw pictures about their future. So, from their memories and dreams, they began to depict the scenes they imagined. The expected images were revealed in the form of airplane pilots, helicopter gunship pilots, *mujahideen* with big guns, etc. However, in the

became a war reporting journal. Articles abounded on the primacy and necessity of *jehad*, and on the noble exploits of the *Mujahideen*, often making allusions to the victories of the early battles of Islam. It resurrected long forgotten heroes of the struggle against colonialism, tying their struggles with the *jehad* in Afghanistan. See an article "The *Jihad* Industry" in the daily *News*, Islamabad, March 21, 2004.

³⁴ Afghanistan Study Centre monthly *Bulletin on Human Rights Violation in Afghanistan*, vol. 1, March 1999, Peshawar, p. 5.

pile of papers, one had an image that was distinctly different from the others. It was a picture of bright flowers, some trees and a green garden. When the teacher began to talk with the children and looked through the pictures, he discovered that amidst this room full of future fighters, *mujahids*, and pilots, there was only one who would like to be a gardener. The question was asked. "How will you eat then, and where will you get your food?" The answer came back; "We have our rations."³⁵

Rural populations have become urbanised, in a sense, and urban populations had to give up a lot of advantages which they enjoyed in the cities and accept economic, social, and other restrictions enforced by the war.

The future generation has been burdened with strange cultures and social life in the host countries, has adopted others' cultures, languages and social aspects, which it has carried after repatriation. This is another cause for further fragmentation in the future.

A resolution which was adopted by an international hearing in Stockholm (1987) stated that "the children of Afghanistan are the forgotten ones in a war that has, by and large, been ignored. And yet, they are not only the principal victims, but also the future of the country... Their physical wounds may perhaps heal within a year or so; the emotional and psychological trauma of the war will remain with the Afghans for generations"³⁶

In a nutshell, the Afghan War brought about the decline of the traditional elite (the Pashtun aristocracy of tribal origin) and the rise of a new elite: Islamist intellectuals, *mullahs*, and small warlords, inside Afghanistan on the one hand, and neo-fundamentalist 'new intellectuals' among the emigrants to Pakistan on the other — all people who owe their emergence to the war and who, in some instances, have become 'war entrepreneurs', living from and by the war.³⁷ The goods that circulated — arms, subsidies, humanitarian aid — came from abroad or from the government and were allocated for political reasons. Thus, the new powers were made more secure by the internationalisation of the war and the distribution network.

The Afghan *Jehad* and Religious Extremism

In this new politico-ideological *Jehadi* backdrop, new socio-cultural trends and traits developed with extreme political or religious agendas, in the name of religion, sect or ethnicity in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian republics.

The unholy alliance of the CIA, ISI and Islamic fundamentalist parties, with the three Asian actors — Deng Xiaoping, Sadat and Zia at the

³⁵ Nassim Jawad, "Role of the International Community in Future Afghanistan", *Defence Journal*, Karachi, vol. xvii, no. 9, 1991.

³⁶ Bulletin on Human Rights, op cit, p. 5.

³⁷ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (London: I.B Tauris, 1994), p. 164.

forefront, opened the “Pandora’s Box” of extremism, fundamentalism and drug trafficking in combating the menace of Soviet Communism. By financing and training the Afghan *Mujahideen*, the United States created what it now regards a major threat to its own security. “Sensing its enormous opportunity, traders in guns and drugs became linked to the phenomenon, creating an informal but extraordinary cartel of vested interests in guns, gold, and god,” Eqbal Ahmad wrote in 1999. “The Soviet forces left Afghanistan in 1989 . . . but the idea of *Jehad* — an armed struggle of Muslim believers that had all but died out by the twentieth century — had been fully resuscitated.”³⁸

A month before his enforced seclusion, Najabullah had given one of his last interviews to a US reporter, in which he said:

We have common task — Afghanistan, the USA and the civilized world — to launch a joint struggle against fundamentalism. If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will continue for many years. Afghanistan will turn into a centre of world smuggling for narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a centre for terrorism.³⁹

More than 100,000 Islamic militants were reportedly trained in Pakistan between 1986 and 1992, in camps overseen by the CIA and Britain’s MI6, with the British SAS trained, future *al Qaeda* and *Taliban* fighters in bomb-making and other black arts. Their leaders were trained at a CIA camp in Virginia. This was called Operation Cyclone and continued long after the Soviets had withdrawn in 1989.⁴⁰

Selig Harrison, a leading US expert on South Asia, said in a conference on “Terrorism and Regional Security: Managing the Challenges in Asia”: “I warned them that we were creating a monster. . . . The CIA made a historic mistake in encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan.” The US provided \$3 billion for building up these Islamic groups, and it accepted Pakistan’s demand that they should decide how this money should be spent.⁴¹

Harrison also recalled a conversation, he had with the late General Zia-ul Haq of Pakistan. “Gen Zia spoke to me about expanding Pakistan’s

³⁸ *Dawn* (Karachi), January 31, 1999.

³⁹ Michael Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan*, (London: Pluto Press, 2001), p. 5 quoted from *International Herald Tribune*, March 11, 1992.

⁴⁰ John Pilger, *Guardian*, September 20, 2003.

⁴¹ Harrison, who has written five books on Asian affairs and US relations with Asia, has had extensive contact with the CIA and political leaders in South Asia. Harrison was a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1974 and 1996. John Pilger, *The Guardian*, September 20, 2003; See also an article of Sanjay Suri “CIA worked with Pak to create *Taliban*,” *India Abroad News Service*, March 6, 2001.

sphere of influence to control Afghanistan, then Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and then Iran and Turkey," Harrison said. "That design continues", he said. "Gen. Mohammed Aziz, who was involved in that Zia plan has been elevated now to a key position by Chief Executive, General Parvez Musharraf", Harrison said. He further stated: "The *Taliban* are not just recruits from 'Madrassas' but are on the payroll of the ISI". The *Taliban* are now "making a living out of terrorism...". The creation of the *Taliban* was central to Pakistan's "pan-Islamic vision," Harrison said. The creation of the *Taliban* had been "actively encouraged by the ISI and the CIA," and "Pakistan has been building up Afghan collaborators who will sustain Pakistan," he said.⁴²

In the 1990s, Washington started a new game of oil and gas companies in the region. The California based Oil Company, Unocal Corp, in partnership with Saudi Arabian Delta Oil Company, was trying to build a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, through Afghanistan. The US was encouraging the American Company to look carefully at the politics and the benefits, such a project would have, which would need to be shared with all the groups in Afghanistan. Asked about the reason for a heightened interest of Washington in Afghanistan at that time, Raphael said that a growing narcotics problem, military training camps inside Afghanistan with a potential of "exporting militants" to Kashmir, Egypt and Sudan, had collectively created this concern. For the US, at that time the "exporting militants" from Afghanistan to Xinjiang and Central Asian republics, was perhaps regional issue with the least interest, yet the 9/11 tragedy opened the eyes of all, by realizing that the terrorists have no religion and no country.

Almost all anti-government Islamists from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, were either in Afghanistan or Pakistan for training or other material aid. In 1994, coinciding with the presence of the so-called opposition leader of Tajikistan, some posters in Dari and Persian, were seen on the walls of the University town, Peshawar: *Ellan-i-fatheha* (Announcement for prayers of the deceased), with the list of *Shuhada-i-Tajikistan* (martyrs of Tajikistan). This meant *fatheha* for those Afghans who had died in Tajikistan.

A *Jehadi* culture made a way into the overall political and social structures of the Afghans, Pakistanis and Central Asians. Almost all religio-political parties of Pakistan and those of the Afghan refugees with varying names have their own militant armed wings. *Jehad* and smuggling of weapons has become big business fuelled largely by anti-Indian struggle in Kashmir, anti-American resistance in Afghanistan, Iraq and even in tribal areas of Pakistan.

Sectarian terrorists have killed or injured thousands of Pakistanis over the last ten years, even attempting to murder former Prime Minister Nawaz

⁴² Ibid.

Sharif and President General Parvez Musharraf.⁴³ The armed groups, many of them with battle-hardened *Taliban*, are in the vanguard of sectarian killings throughout Pakistan, which are on the increase; killings of members of rival sects, *Sunnis* against the *Shias*, Deobandi *Sunnis* against Barelvi *Sunnis* and so on. They have also begun to issue threats against the state itself and the society in Pakistan. Assassinations, machine-gun attacks on mosques and explosions have claimed 581 lives and over 1600 injured between 1990 and 1997.⁴⁴

In addition, the *Taliban* Islamic Movement set on course to consolidate power over Afghanistan provided the sectarian forces with a model to follow. For instance, the *Tebrik-e-Taliban-Zargari* (*Taliban* Movement of Zargari) of the religious students operated in the Orakzai Agency in tribal areas of Pakistan. In December, 1998, the leaders of the movement established a *Shariat* court and ordered the execution of a group that it found guilty of criminal activity. The executions were carried out in public and the houses of the executed were razed to the ground.⁴⁵ In January 1999, the *Tebrik* launched a movement on the *Taliban* model in Hangu district of NWFP, against television, dish antennae, music and unveiled women.⁴⁶

Even *Tebreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (Movement for the enforcement of Islamic laws) of Sufi Muhammad in Malakand, took its new form into a militant uprising under the shadow of *Taliban* regime in neighbouring Afghanistan. Sufi Muhammad declared *Jehad* against America and offered his services to *Amir ul-Momaneen* Mullah Umar. Sufi Muhammad and some of his followers were sentenced to three years imprisonment in November 2001 and his outfit (TNSM) and four other *Jehadi* organisations were banned by President Parvez Musharraf of Pakistan on January 12, 2002. Though legally TNSM is banned, yet unofficially it is still active in Malakand.⁴⁷


⁴³ Pakistan's most wanted sectarian terrorist, Riaz Basra has spent at least part of his time hiding out at an Afghan camp that trains *Mujabideen* for Kashmir, according to Pakistani officials. The sectarian terrorists arrested in connection with the plot to assassinate Nawaz Sharif had reportedly been trained at a camp at Khost, which the *Jehadi* group *Harkat-ul-Mujabideen* used to train *Mujabideen* for Kashmir.

⁴⁴ The *Economist*, May 10, 1997, p. 34; see also The *Herald*, Karachi, September, 1996, p. 78 ; Just in one incident, a five- day war between *Sunni* and *Shia* sects involving mortars, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles in Parachinar (Kurram Agency) in 1996, alone claimed hundreds of lives and many more injured. The monthly *Newsline*, Karachi, October, 1996, pp. 71-72.

⁴⁵ The *Herald*, Karachi, February, 1999, p. 60.

⁴⁶ Christopher Jaffrelot, *Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation?*, MANOHAR Centre De Sciences Humaines, (ZED Books Ltd, 2002), p. 125.

⁴⁷ The TNSM organised a protest procession in Mingora (Swat) in September, 2001 for raising a 'voluntary army' for anti-US *Jehad* in Afghanistan. While addressing the rally, the TNSM Chief Maulana Sufi Muhammad said that the US was the biggest terrorist country in the world that wanted to harm Islam on the pretext of Osama Bin Laden and the *Taliban*. On October 27, from Bajaur area about 10,000 armed cadres led by the TNSM chief, Sufi Mohammed, crossed the Pak-Afghan border



Last but not the least, the CIA and ISI, along with the Afghans, won the war at large but lost the peace in the region as well as in the world. Among the negative fallouts, one could underline the growing tendencies of *Mullahism*, extremism, militancy, sectarianism, drug Mafia and the spreading of Klashinkov culture in the entire country. The unholy alliance of the Islamic *jehadis*, a military dictator, and a secular opportunist West countering Soviet Communism by engaging in blind support for radical Islam as a Cold War tool, not only created problems for Pakistan but for the entire world. The CIA and ISI, in their all-out efforts against Moscow and Kabul, opened a Pandora's Box of proliferation of weapons, poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, gun running, fundamentalism, extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism in the entire region.

De-secularisation, de-liberalisation, Kalashnikovisation and Talibanisation slowly crept into Pakistani and Afghan society, and developed into a monster to be reckoned with. The religious seminaries, which had for centuries been places of learning and institutions of higher moral training in

followed by convoy comprising 300 vehicles. The TNSM had set up three FM radio stations in the Bajaur area bordering Afghanistan, to campaign for funds and volunteers to fight alongside the *Taliban* militia. These radio stations were also used to air TNSM leaders' addresses to pro-*Taliban* rallies. *The News* (Islamabad), April 23, 1995. Most of these *Jehadis* were either killed or arrested by anti-*Taliban* militias and detained in their own jails. Among these about 82 Pakistanis and round about 80 Afghan supporters of *Taliban* are in the Guantanamo Prison. *The Review Dawn* (Karachi), July 29-August 4, 2004, p. 7.

South and Central Asia, were turned into training camps under the covert patronage of the national and international intelligence agencies. Even some students of the regular educational (secular) institutions of Pakistan, participated in the Afghan and Kashmir war, and lost their lives. Ironically, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, these militant bands shifted to other places of the region, and the holy war developed into sectarian violence. ■

GLOBALISATION AND PAKISTAN ECONOMY

Rizwan Ullah Kokab

Globalisation has become the all-inclusive, all-enveloping catchword of our times. Almost all aspects of human life, political, social, economic, cultural and even, in some cases, religious, have some type of link with globalisation. Migration, refugee flows, "brain drain" from the developing world, spread of Western culture in the form of soap operas, music, fashion, and similar trends are often considered as consequences of globalisation.¹ Therefore, there is no aspect of modern life that is not being positively or negatively influenced by the concept of globalisation.

The original founding field of this concept is the field of economics, where globalisation may be termed as the process of the development and promotion of market-oriented practices across the globe, with similarity of concepts and applications that are irrespective of geographical or territorial confines.² The main focus of the movement for globalisation is free trade, which means three things: liberalisation of country's trade regime (progressively lowering tariff and non-tariff trade barriers), fair competition and transparency of trade policies and regulations. The principle of competition has two aspects: national treatment and most favoured nation treatment. The national treatment prohibits from discriminating between domestically produced goods and those imported from other countries with regard to application.

In short, consumerism, material values, corporate life styles with uniformity attire and approach, fast communications, private enterprises and total submission to market economy doctrines are a few references to globalisation.³ Economists generally agree that globalisation is driven by two forces: first, the developments in technology and second, the developments in policy. In technology, modern globalisation has been spurred by the rapid decline in the cost of communication and transport. In communication, the greatest single breakthrough was probably the telegraph, followed closely by

¹ Catarina Kinnvall, "Analysing the Global-local Nexus," *Globalization and Democratization in Asia*, edited by Catrina Kinnvall and Krist Kristina Jonson, (London: Routledge), p. 3.

² Noman Ahmad, "Heritage vs. Globalization" *Dawn*, September 1, 2002.

³ Ibid.

the telephone, satellite relays, the internet, the mobile telephone and the email.⁴

Globalisation is hardly a brilliant new idea. The highly industrialised and leading manufacturing countries have been desiring the freedom of world markets from political constraints since centuries. For two third of the 19th century, Britain being "workshop of the world" and therefore being able to produce efficiently the cheaper products became the leading proponent of free trade and used its colonial military might to enforce it. During the last one-third of the 19th and for the first half of the 20th century, the world turned doubtful about ideas of free market. This was the time that saw the Great Depression and the rise of Russian Bolshevism. The Communist and the Socialist models were being tried out. With the sad demise of these experiments, US has now reached the same stage as that of Britain in the 19th century and any restrictions on free trade, appear stifling to its entrepreneurs. This time, the US is not the only "workshop of the world" and secondly, it is not economically feasible and hence out of fashion to conquer countries, merely to sell manufactured goods. Today's economists and strategists have invented subtler ways to achieve the objectives of free trade.⁵

Multinational Corporations, international financial institutions like World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), business professionals and governments of developed countries, are seen as instruments and agents of globalisation. Most important of them is WTO. The history of WTO starts with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1945, to avoid catastrophe of mass slaughter, destruction, and disruption of free flow of trade on the trade front, the contracting parties agreed to create GATT with the objective to regulate the flow of goods at global level.⁶ Several rounds of tariff reductions initiated by GATT, resulted in reduction in industrial tariffs. Numerous other barriers to trade were also reduced or eliminated.⁷ The WTO came into existence as a single institution on January 1, 1995, on conclusion of the 8th round of the multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT. It was a set of agreements that applied to all the members in a package deal. The negotiated agreements include the agreements on agriculture, tariffs, textiles, services, intellectual properties, anti dumping duties, permissible limits of subsidies, safeguards on non-tariff barriers, settlement of trade disputes, issues related MFN,

⁴ Rahim Panjwani, "Globalization Balance Sheet," *Dawn - Economic & Business Review*, February 17, 2003, p. vi

⁵ Zia-ul-Islam, "Globalization Entering Pakistan's Backyard," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, September 3-9, 2001.

⁶ Muhammad Aslam Shad, "Textile and Clothing in the WTO Regime," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, September 27-October 3, 2004, p. vi

⁷ Faisal Usman Malik, "Institutional flaws of the WTO," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, October 13-19, 2003, p. iv.

environment, investment, competition, procurement, simpler procedures, electronic commerce, labour standards.⁸

The process of globalisation got momentum due to the disintegration of USSR, resulting in the unipolar world, the establishment of WTO and revolution in IT. The opposition to globalisation appeared when the Seattle Ministerial Conference of WTO (December 1999), followed by World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, witnessed unprecedented violent demonstrations by the opponents. A borderless global village and a free movement of workers across the borders, emerged as one of their principal demands. It shows that the opponents of the globalisation were not against globalisation but they opposed the partial usage of globalisation by the developed countries.

On the endorsement of G8 Summit, the important Doha round of talks started in Qatar in 2001, in order to work towards a system of trade rules that were fairer to poor nations. But it and even its subsequent 5th ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico (September 2003), failed. Agriculture, being the lifeblood of developing and least developed nations, was the stumbling block. The poor countries accused the developed nations of protecting their farmers through subsidies, usually funded by tax payers via governments or trade associations, and then dumping their goods on poor countries at knock down prices, undermining local farmers.

The subsidies made the farmers of developed nations more competitive and led to inefficient resource allocation. On the other hand, while trying to import their goods to developed nations; poor countries had to face an unfair competition, due to subsidies, which goes against the very concept of comparative advantage, the foundation stone of the WTO. The rules are so rigged that Washington collects as much in tariffs on Cambodian imports as it does from France, despite the goods and services it buys from France, being worth 15 times more. A new alliance of developing nations (G-22 later G-33) arose and refused to agree to the proposed agreement. Instead of slashing the \$330 billion subsidies lavished on their farmers, the rich countries have ramped up their support of the agriculture sector. The US alone has increased its support by \$175 billion over 10 years and European Union's Common Agricultural Policy, which swallows up nearly half of its budget, was maintained – any real cuts being put off until 2013.⁹ Moreover, the US, instead of dealing with the G-22 as a whole, in 2003, initiated measures to clinch regional free trade deals with small poor countries to woo them away from the G-22 bloc. Peru, Colombia left G-22 under pressure from US and due to trade

⁸ Syed Shahid Hussain, "WTO: Are We In Step?," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, August 4-10, 2003, p. 1.

⁹ Qaes Hussain, "WTO's Appearance and Reality," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, May 30-June 5, 2005, p. vi.

agreements with the US.¹⁰ Five years into the round, progress continues to be frustrated by a spat between the US and the EU, with each using the intransigence of the other, as an excuse to avoid concessions of farm programmes.¹¹

During the period of deadlock on the issues of subsidies in agriculture sector, the development on globalisation continued in other sectors. As the agreement on Textile and Clothing expired on December 31, 2004, the world witnessed quota free regime in textile sector. Moreover, the agreement in August 2004 recognized the need of free trade in services.¹² With the efforts to break the deadlock of the Doha trade round, on 27 January 2007, ministerial meeting of World Economic Forum (WEF) was held in Davos. The negotiations had left untouched the protective walls shielding sectors, such as farming, in which the poor world would otherwise have had a chance to compete.

Despite all these differences and disputes, the process of globalisation is going on and is inevitable. There are many reasons for this.

Firstly, the whole opposition, whether it is from NGOs or from poor governments, is not against the very idea of globalisation but against the partiality of the developed countries and among the comity of nations, there is some type of consensus on the implementation of globalisation. It is evident from the stand of the poor countries and NGOs. Poor countries want fair competition and NGOs demand the mobility of labour force, without any restriction. Both stands are fundamental elements of globalisation.

Secondly, all countries of the world, including Russia and China, have entered into the negotiations and proceedings of the WTO. Moscow has been involved for years in painstaking bilateral talks with WTO member states, all of which, except the US, have backed Moscow joining the world trade body.¹³ China has already become the member of world body and is taking steps for the globalisation.

Thirdly, the unipolar politics of the world has weakened the resistant blocs and efforts of the poor countries. Every country is making efforts to gain its own interests in proper conditions. Serious cracks have appeared in the resistant blocs. On the other hand, a lot of mediatory efforts is under way. Poor countries, led by the G-33, have articulated their position on SPs and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). Recent development shows that US and EU are about to make a deal on agriculture. If this happens, pressure would be built around poor countries and specifically on G-33 to step back from its

¹⁰ Ashfaq Bokhari, "Cracks Begin Appearing in G-22 Bloc," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, November 3-9, 2003, p. i.

¹¹ *The Guardian* (London), reprinted in *Dawn*, January 29, 2007.

¹² Qaes Hussain, op. cit.

¹³ *Dawn*, July 5, 2006.

position. Pakistan, in the hope of giving some balancing proposal, has made up its mind to relax its position on SPs in future negotiations on Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).¹⁴ Therefore, many countries, including Pakistan, are making efforts for reconciliation between the rival groups on subsidies issue. Whether under the pressure of US and EU, their views are accepted or there is some reconciliation between the rival parties, the result would be smooth march of globalisation.

Fourthly, regional blocs and Free Trade Agreements (FTA) are also paving the way for globalisation. Almost every country of the world, is indulging in signing agreements with other countries. For very few examples, there are the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA). Under SAPTA, SAARC member countries have granted tariff concessions to one another on as many as 4951 items in 2002.¹⁵ On bilateral grounds, the US finalised its FTA with Jordan, Morocco, Columbia, Peru, Bahrain etc., until 2004.¹⁶ Pakistan also is making efforts to conduct FTA with the US and China. Such efforts for FTA are under way on the platforms of Gulf Cooperation Council, ASEAN and ECO.¹⁷

Economy of Pakistan

Although for forty years, between 1950 and 1990, Pakistan was transformed from being, by far, the most backward area of what was once British India into the most prosperous and vibrant part of South Asia, yet it remained a poor and developing country. It relied chiefly upon the US aid and debt. According to State Bank of Pakistan, as of end-December 2001, Pakistan's total external debt and liabilities (EDL) were \$38 billion, which included \$33 billion debt and \$5 billion foreign exchange liabilities.¹⁸ If we have a look on the recent table of external debt and liabilities, issued by the State Bank of Pakistan, the total external debt of Pakistan on end of 2006, lies US\$ 36907 million increased from 35679 in June 2006 that was 34037 in June 2005, which was increased from US\$ 33307 million on June 2004.¹⁹ If weak economy means that a country is loaded with heavy debts but unable to generate its resources by

¹⁴ Tahir Hussain, "Proposals at WTO to Hit Local Farmers," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, January 29-February 4, 2007, p. iii

¹⁵ Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Tariff Relief Granted on 400 Items" *Dawn*, November 12, 2002

¹⁶ Pervaiz Ashfaq Rana, "US FTAs to damage Pakistan's interests," *Dawn* June 6, 2004.

¹⁷ Sultan Ahmad, "How Helpful are the Free Trade Deals?," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, July 3-9, 2006, p. vi.

¹⁸ <http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue2002/issue20-21/f&m2.htm>.

¹⁹ <http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/pakdebt.pdf>.

itself and cannot decrease the burden of debt by itself, then Pakistan may be called a weak economy.

Five developments during present regime were considered as a strong base for Pakistan's economy. These included introduction of professionalism in economic management, giving clear regulatory and supervisory authority to the SBP and SECP, over different segments of the financial sector, improvements that are palpable in the working of the financial system, devolution of power to the local level and some revival of foreign investment in the country.²⁰ It is claimed that on the basis of such developments, Pakistan's economy has delivered solid economic growth after September 11, with economic growth at 6.6 % in 2005-06. It has grown at an average rate of almost 7% per annum during last four years.

The success story, narrated in the Economic Survey of Pakistan, describes Pakistan as one of the fastest growing economies of the Asian region. The growth momentum is underpinned by dynamism in industry, agriculture and services, and the emergence of a new investment cycle, supported by strong credit growth. In the fiscal year 2005-06, the overall manufacturing sector continued to maintain its growth momentum with more vigour. Overall, manufacturing recorded an impressive and broad-based growth of 8.6 per cent and large-scale manufacturing registered an impressive growth of 9.0 per cent. The Survey further describes that the services sector continued to perform strongly at 8.8 per cent. Construction, too, continued to perform strong showing, partly helped by activity in private housing market, spending on physical infrastructure, and reconstruction activities in earthquake affected areas. Consumer spending remained strong and investment spending gained further traction. Moreover, during the fiscal year 2005-06, Pakistan's economic fundamentals have gained further strength. Fixed investment grew by 30.7 per cent, as against a sharp rise of 28.6 last year.

Despite these optimistic notes, there are definite problems in the economy of Pakistan, which have made it vulnerable and weaker side in the competition of globalisation.

- Overall manufacturing growth (8.6%) decreased from last year's growth of 12.6 per cent while growth in large scale manufacturing also decreased from last year's achievement of 15.6 per cent.
- Foreign direct investment witnessed an increase but it was not in the agriculture sector, which is the backbone of Pakistan's economy.
- Both the important components of the commodity producing sector, namely, agriculture and manufacturing performed less than their target.

²⁰ Shahid Javed Burki, "Reviving Economy Growth" *Dawn*, November 26, 2002.

- Agriculture is the mainstay of Pakistan's economy. Nearly twenty-two per cent of total output (GDP) and 44.8 per cent of total employment, is generated in agriculture. It also contributes substantially to Pakistan's exports and growth as a supplier of raw materials to industry as well as market for industrial products. Furthermore, 44.8 per cent of country's work force is employed in agriculture, but 65.9 per cent of country's population, living in rural areas is directly or indirectly linked with agriculture for their livelihood. Whatever happens to agriculture, is bound to affect not only the country's growth performance, but to a large segment of the country's population as well. But in fiscal year 2005-2006, the performance of agriculture remained poor and livestock had been the only saving grace. From 2000 to 2002, overall growth in agriculture turned negative. Next two years, it was positive but last year, it grew only by 2.5 per cent due to a relatively poor performance of major crops and forestry and weaker one of minor crops and fishery. Major crops even registered a decline of 3.6 per cent. The unsure situation and mixed trend in growth of agriculture is the most disturbing sign for the economy of Pakistan.
- The 9 per cent growth in manufacturing sector is also not due to agriculture related industry but mainly due to automobile group, pharmaceuticals, which are completely non-agricultural while agriculture based sugar and power looms exhibited negative growth. The growth in non-agriculture manufacturing, whether it is higher than the present, can not be considered as a happy augury because of the remoteness from the foundation of the economy-agriculture.
- Overall fiscal deficit of 261.6 billion or 3.4 per cent GDP, excluding earthquake effect is also a matter of concern for Pakistan's economy.
- Though the exports are up by 18.6 per cent, yet on the contrary, imports rose by 43.2 per cent in first 9 months and disturbing situation is that imports of wheat, sugar and pulses have risen by 93 per cent. In other words, what should have been exported, was imported. The result was that current account balance showed deficit.
- Security concerns, on both the eastern and western borders, have raised defence spending by a significant amount. The engineering industry has not been developed, which has not decreased the burden to import the heavy machinery. In agriculture, crops like

sunflower and canola have not been encouraged for cultivation to reduce imports of edible oil.²¹

Now, we come to the major components of the economy of Pakistan, which may be affected with the advent of globalisation. Foremost of them is poverty. In this area, Pakistan was lagging behind even during the days of boosting up of economy and nothing could be done in this regard. With the bulk of the population living on or less than \$ 2 a day, poverty is getting concentrated in backward regions of Pakistan. In fact, only Central Punjab and Urban Sindh together, are said to have been contributing as much as 95 per cent of GDP's growth.²² During the brief period of 1999-2001, seven million people were pushed below the poverty line. This represented the fastest growth in poverty in Pakistan's history.²³ In economic survey of 2006, Government claims that population, living under poverty line, is down from 32.1% in 2001. Yet, 25.4%, one fourth of the population living under poverty line is a bleak aspect and poses a great challenge for the policy makers in Islamabad.

One clear and incontrovertible reality resulting from globalisation is the phenomenon of rising poverty and vast inequalities in the distribution of world income. The gaps in the incomes, wealth and assets of the poor and those of the rich of the world, have widened by margins which are simply mind-boggling. The ratio of incomes of the world's poorest, one fifth population to the richest one fifth, had been estimated at 1:3 in 1820, which rose to 1:11 in 1913, 1:30 in 1970 and 1:59 in 1989. In quintile terms, in 1989 the poorest one fifth of the world had a share of only 1.4 per cent in the world GDP, while the richest one-fifth had a share of 82.7 percent. The shares of second, third and fourth quintiles of population in order of increasing poverty were 11.7 per cent, 2.3 percent and 1.9 per cent respectively. The distributional pyramid of the global income has been completely inverted with a weak and a narrow base of incomes of the poorest one fifth of world population and with the preponderantly heavy share of the richest one-fifth at the top.²⁴

In the presence of such phenomenon worldwide, the policies of using liberally the principles of free market and putting all eggs in the basket of the trickle down theory, according to which the poor get only the crumbs that would trickle down in consequence of rich becoming richer process, will only

²¹ The statistics in the discussion have been cited from "Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005-06: Executive Summary," *Dawn*, June 5, 2006.

²² M. Ziauddin, "Bright Sunshine and Dark Shadows," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, July 3-9, 2006 p. vi.

²³ Kaisar Bengali, "Whither Poverty Reduction," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, May 2-8, 2005 p. i.

²⁴ Aqdas Ali Kazmi, "Global Roots of Poverty," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, February 7-13, 2005 p. vi.

increase the poverty in Pakistan. Moreover, aristocracy that has granted 95 per cent land arable in the hands of 5 per cent of population, heavy defence budget and extra concessions to big business, have raised the level of threat to the poor, even more.²⁵

If Pakistan is to counter the globalisation and also take benefits from it, comprehensive plan to alleviate poverty will have to be launched. UNDP 2003 report's co-author David Stewart views the goals, set by the UN Millennium Summit to lift millions of people out of poverty by 2015. It can only be achieved if poor countries pursue wide ranging reform and wealthy nations respond with improved trade terms and increased aid. Instead of expecting the rich nations' support, Pakistan should do what poor countries will have to do by themselves. That is investment in industries and business that creates jobs, such as manufacturing and textiles, rather than industries that require large amounts of capital, such as oil exploration and production.²⁶ Merely allocating money will not alleviate poverty. Carrying adequate remunerations and enfranchising the consumer to become a participant in the process of sustained economic development is also necessary.²⁷ The consequences of free-for-all trade shall have to be constantly corrected and tempered by well-entrenched democratic regulatory mechanisms, in which the interests of the poorest are also safeguarded.

Trade is the most important component of the economy that would be directly affected by globalisation. Developing countries, as a whole, have increased their share of world trade from 19% in 1971 to 29% in 1999, whereas our contribution has decreased. A positive impact is made on the countries exporting manufactured goods while our traditional exports are comparable only with the price of raw material, used in these newly industrialized countries.²⁸ Pakistan has only 11 agriculture export products at the moment, of which more than 80 per cent go to developed country markets. We are rather losing market of mango and citrus in poor countries because of high cost of production, inadequate storage facilities and faulty trade facilitations. Similarly, the food import is already on the increase, many farmers are leaving their innate profession and hence, there are fewer chances that Pakistan will start growing huge surpluses in near future.²⁹

Pakistan's major exports lie in textile sector. Pakistan is the third largest cotton producer in the world after China and the US and it harvested a

²⁵ M. Ziauddin, op. cit.

²⁶ *Dawn*, July 17, 2003.

²⁷ Khawar M. Butt, "Food Industry and Challenges of Globalization," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, September 16-22, 2002, p. vi.

²⁸ Junaid Usman Akram, "Globalizing Agriculture," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, June 18-24, 2001 p. iii.

²⁹ Tahir Hussain, "Proposals at WTO to Hit Local Farmers" *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, January 29-February 4, 2007 p. iii.

record 14 million bales in 2004. The industry also has a workforce of trained textile workers — 40 % of the industrial employment in Pakistan — willing to work for low wages. In spite of the short sighted policies of different governments and the shocks experienced on the economic front, Pakistan's textile and clothing sector has done fairly well, withstanding the quota walls in transacting its business.³⁰ But after the open market, EU duties have hit worst the home textiles segment with some 40 factories shutting down and capacity utilisation sliding to 70% in the twelve months of 2004-05. If globalisation is to be benefited fully, the duties from EU must be abolished. The industrialists also will have to work harder to ensure better working conditions and environmentally safe plants to keep getting business from overseas. And to speed up the pace of growth, Pakistan will have to reduce its dependence on cotton, and in line with global trends, increase fibre consumption.³¹

In the free trade regime, Pakistan can enhance textile exports by:

- Providing the right legislative base for accession to WTO, which will be a key factor in determining not only the acceptability of Pakistani companies as trading partners but will also be critical in projecting Pakistan favourably to the international firms as an option for a production and sourcing base.
- Increasing the size of textile industry with the help of cotton production, investment, machinery and skilled labour growth.³²
- Zero rated taxation. Although there are no heavy taxes on textile exports after the abolition of sales tax on exports, yet there are a few small taxes like the 0.25 per cent withholding tax, 0.25 per cent exports development fund levy, 0.75-1.25 per cent income tax and the EBOI payments, which total about three per cent.
- Such arrangements in agriculture sector that the price and quality of raw material at home may be controlled not by disturbing the interests of farmers but providing them cheap fertilizers, seeds, machinery and water.
- Enhanced productivity and lower costs of production, including possibly through policy measures, such as lower energy surcharges.

³⁰ Muhammad Aslam Shad, "Textile and Clothing in the WTO Regime," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, September 27-October 3, 2004, p. vi.

³¹ Naweem A. Mangi, "Textile Battle in a Giant China, Post-Quota World," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, May 2-8, 2005, p. i.

³² Kamal Monnoo, "WTO: Challenges for the Textile Industry," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, October 3-10, 2004, p. i.

Globalisation, therefore, presents a potential opportunity for Pakistan's textile export sector. To realize the inherent potential, however, and compete with the likes of China and India, which also stand to gain Pakistan's manufacturing sector, needs to become substantially more efficient. Without the requisite gains in efficiency, the fate of Pakistan's textile sector, will likely depend upon transient fortuitous factors, such as an unusually good cotton crop.³³

All that where Pakistan needs to do foremost, which will also help in poverty alleviation and enhancement of textile industry and export is agriculture — the backbone of Pakistan's economy. This sector is really sick and no special attention has been paid to it. The infrastructure and the human resource development situations are poor and creating hurdles in the way to get ready for competition. Pakistan must use 10 per cent of the agricultural income, that comes to about 2.5 per cent of the GDP (agriculture contributes 24 per cent in the GDP), to get rid of these problems. On its part, the government of Pakistan should be focussing on building the infrastructure, the human resource development, quality enhancement and the research. The focus should be to invest in the infrastructure building, the disease control, the HRD, and the research to help the farmers in the WTO Regime.³⁴

Now, we have a look at some of the trends and issues of globalisation, which may cause some impact on the economy of Pakistan. Capital movement is one such trend. In the absence of barriers, the investors move and invest the capital to more profitable and secure place. Pakistan is a risky place for the investors, due to law and order situation and danger of terror attacks. The investment attracted even then has been concentrated in industrial sector or IT. Agriculture sector is deprived of it. The capital flow towards the country will have to be increased with special attention on agriculture sector.

The second trend is movement of people. Globalisation liberates the skilled experts, professionals and labour to move from one country to the other to find better employment. This transfer of human capital causes a dearth of skilled talent in the poor countries. Experts belonging to the scientific community, high class professionals, economists and doctorate level scholars and educationists, do not find proper salaries, environment, attitude of society and infrastructure in Pakistan, resulting in brain drain. In order to survive in the period of globalisation, the measures to stop brain drain will have to be adopted.

Third sector is globalisation of education which makes it easier for educational institutions to expand across border and for students to move

³³ Shaghil Ahmad and Iffat Ara, *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, January 31- February 6, 2005 p. vi.

³⁴ Irfan Shahzad, "WTO and the Challenges Facing Agriculture," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, November 25-December 1, 2002, p. iii.

more freely overseas to choose the institutions of their choice. This phenomenon is dangerous for poor countries because with the globalisation of education, it is the norms, values, scientific and knowledge products of the West that ultimately will prevail. In this regard, Pakistan is going to copy China which allows foreign universities to operate in the country, as long as they agree to be partner with a local university. Pakistan will have to adopt a careful policy in this regard, keeping equilibrium among the educational needs, ideological and national interest and economic necessities. Foreign universities excelling in providing scientific and technical education, must be attracted to establish their campuses or share with the institutions in Pakistan under some safeguards to economic and social issues. While in social studies where Pakistani scholars and institutions, can match the international standards, Pakistan should create the environment to export education.

There are many obstacles in the way. Pakistan faces many problems, such as debt and low commodity prices, and weak infrastructure and capacity to develop industrial exports. It also faces the threats of local firms and farmers being overrun by foreign products and companies as it liberalises. But to tackle the issue, there is no need either to support or oppose globalisation. It is a reality that will have to be dealt with all through lifetime. Therefore, the best course is to chart out a way, in which future can be made secure and comfortable. To face the challenges posed by globalisation following measures, as a whole, will have to be adopted.

- Macroeconomic stability to create the right condition for investment and saving. Investments are not attracted solely by debt relief or the foreign exchange reserves. Regional and domestic peace which is beyond the economic sphere also influences the investment. Moreover, investment should be in the form of a partnership in the development and expansion process and not neo-imperialistic in character.
- Outward-oriented policies to promote efficiency, through increased trade and investment.
- Structural reforms to encourage domestic competition. Cost of production in Pakistan is high, so is the cost of doing business. Excess of corruption and excessive doses of red tapism are the causes of such inflated costs. That will have to be controlled.
- Tremendous improvement of infrastructure and law and order has to be improved vastly. Strong institutions and good governance to promote socio-political stability are required. Balochistan be made truly peaceful and Gawadar elevated to the status of a well developed, modern port. The country has to have enough energy and water resources to meet the

current needs.

- Education, training and research to promote productivity.
- External debt management to ensure adequate resources for sustainable development.
- Increased opportunities to include issues of sustainable development, capacity building and environmental matter in the agenda.
- Provide unrestricted market access for all exports. In the past years, Pakistan produced more than enough cotton but its standard did not compete in the international market.
- In agriculture, the cooperatives must be encouraged. With the assistance of machines, the latest knowledge and quality inputs, private firms can increase the production and the general condition of the rural people. These firms will buy big land holding to practice mechanized farming. They must go for the non-traditional crops to increase the exports as well as employ the latest methods and adopt all the relevant variables with a view to increasing yield in respect of the traditional crops. These firms must have access to the new knowledge and must impart it to the people.³⁵

In short, a large scale of revolution in society, government and economy is the call of hour. Globalisation has brought us on a turn of history where we may either get a lot or lose everything. Under the principle of survival of the fittest, either we shall gain or lose. It depends upon our policies and efforts.■

³⁵ Junaid Usman Akram, "Globalizing Agriculture," *Dawn Economic & Business Review*, June 18-24, 2001 p. iii.

CHAPTER III

CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE THE CASE FOR PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY

Professor Lal Bakhsh Jiskani

The mighty Indus river, also known as Lion river, was in ancient times described as "the Sindhu" by Rig-Veda. This vedic name was retained by Sindh (now a province of Pakistan), and then gradually changed to Indus. This name was the given to the whole subcontinent. Indeed, it is one of the world's most dramatic rivers, breaking out of lofty mountains; it courses forward with a power that nothing could resist for long. Many millennia have passed but without ceasing, it flows continuously. It is beautiful, powerful, unpredictable and dangerous. But it is also gentle, calm and life giving. Here in the plains, the Indus is cradled as one of the three great civilizations of the world, a civilization nearly as old as those of the Nile, Euphrates and Tigris, more than four thousand years ago. It is noteworthy to say that while Sumer and Egypt had long emerged into civilized way of living at the time the Indus people built their remarkable cities. Egypt has been unified for seven centuries and Sumer's early dynastic period was four centuries old. Only China, the isolated centre of development in East Asia and Minoan Crete and Mycenaean Greece, the genesis of European cultural traditions, were late starters in the Old World. Yet, of these four main cradles of civilization, the Indus Valley was by far the largest in geographical area. It covered more than Egypt and Mesopotamia taken together and its frontiers reached well beyond the watershed of the Indus River. It was a powerful state or with strong but mysterious cultural movement which over all dominated and influenced a larger cultural area of about 1770 km from east to west and 1290 km from north to south.¹ To the archaeologists, the striking feature is its cultural uniformity and quite interestingly, the Indus people even outdid the Egyptians in their conservation and honesty. Thus, it was brilliant vision and sagacity of the Indus people who built such a strong social organization with a strong base of economy to establish a powerful kingdom with good governance. Their law of the land reflected culture and aspirations of its people which created respect for and obedience to the law throughout

¹ Arthur Cotterel, "The Indus Civilization," (ed.) *The Ancient Civilizations* (London: Rainbird Publishing Group, 1980), pp. 177-78.

society. The social and cultural freedom indicates strong link with material progress and prosperity of a nation which is a case in point.

We have brilliant visionaries in history of the Indo-Pak subcontinent like Chandragupta Maurya (322-298 BC) and his grandson Asoka, while with Chandragupta decentralising power of his Empire and transferring, dividing into the province, for the smooth running of the administration. The emperor usually worked according to the decision of the majority. Chandragupta Maurya had enjoined to look upon himself as a servant of the people and to regard the happiness of his subjects as his own happiness and their welfare as his own.² It was the genius of the Maurya Empire in Chandragupta's time that his efficient administration and concept of the welfare state can be seen almost modern, and enlightened in character. Asoka, his grandson, was undoubtedly the greatest ruler of the Maurya dynasty (273-232 BC) who had tried to promote the moral and material welfare of his subjects. The paternal aspect of his rule is well illustrated in the famous dictum of the Emperor "All subjects are my children". After the bloodshed of the Kalinga War (261 BC), he abolished huge army jousts of arms, believing in material progress of the people, preached and practised the virtues of concord, toleration and non-violence and he successfully, continued to rule over his vast empire of free India, comprising present day Pakistan and India and Afghanistan.³ Thus, the missions of King Asoka are among the greatest of civilizing influences in the history of the world and therefore, he occupies a unique place as a remarkable personality in Indian history, believing in religious tolerance and rationalizing ancient Indian society. Toleration

Much later after the advent of Islam, the Arabs invaded Sindh, taking in view the prosperity of the country and having economic interest in it. It is also evident from the original sources like al-Baldhuri and Chachnama that the main motive of the conquest was not entirely religious but economic and political. Islam did not spread with the efforts of Arab rulers, but socio-political and economic forces as factors worked to convert people. The striking feature of the Arab rule or the conquest of Sindh is that despite the occupation remaining a part of the Caliphate for 150 years, the Arabic language could not become the lingua-franca.⁴ Like Iran and Central Asia, Sindh also put up strong resistance and maintained its glorious traditions to keep alive its language and culture, which is deeply rooted in the Indus Civilization.

Over the years, much water has flowed down the Indus. Meanwhile, history has witnessed the Aryan immigration into the Indo-Pakistan sub-

² Majumdar, R.C. and others. *An Advance History of India*, vol. I, 3rd ed., (Delhi: Macmillan India, 1974), pp. 191-93.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 98.

⁴ Mubarak Ali, *Essays on History of Sindh*, (Lahore: Fiction House, 2005), pp. 135.

continent. The hordes of people belonging to various ethnic groups and racial varieties, the travellers, traders, invaders, plunderers and looters entered in this part of the world from Central Asia and through sea routes. The human variety, the Indian sub-continent presents with its teeming million, is described by A. V. Smith as an 'ethnological museum'.

The Delhi Sultanate was founded by Qutubuddin Aebak in 1206 and the Muslim power continued to expand until it reigned supreme over the entire subcontinent. Five Turkish/Afghan dynasties ruled Delhi till 1526. The Sultan himself was the chief executive; legislature and judiciary were in his hand. He administered justice both to Muslims and non-Muslims. The Hindus acquired the status of *dhimmies*, paid toll tax and were exempted from military service on payment. The limitless power of the Sultan and his whims and wishes were the law of the land. They divided the country into provinces (subas), run by governors (subedars). The courts of the Sultans were magnificent and luxurious reward for obedience, suppression of dissent, pious disposition, they instilled fear and awe in the hearts of the subjects rather than seeking the consent of the people. These were the chief traits of such a rule.⁵ The Turko-Afghan Muslim dynasties were succeeded by the Mughals. The period of its first six emperors (1526-1707) is known for the glory and power of the Mughals. Akbar the great was indeed the jewel in the crown among all the emperors. His secular and wise thoughts inaugurated a policy of universal toleration. In fact, he chalked out a rational path for any one who would aspire to the position of national ruler of India⁶. Akbar was indeed a man of enlightened vision and liberal ideas, thus he occupies a unique position in the history of undivided India.

The Mughal Empire quickly fell into decay after the death of Aurangzeb, for which he was himself responsible. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the British East India Company completely dominated the Indian sub-continent. The last attempt at throwing off the British yoke failed in 1857 when the Company's forces fought back and suppressed the mutiny, known as the War of Independence. Interestingly, no written constitutions are known to have existed during the Muslim rule of India from 1206 to 1857 AD⁷. Queen Elizabeth-I, granted a charter about the trade with India for importing spices on 31 December 1600, which was similar to the power of modern subordinate legislation. In 1757, the victory of Plassey by Lord Clive paved the way for British government for wars to regulate the affairs of the company in India. The acts followed by what is known as Pitt's India Act of

⁵ Mujumdar, R.C. and others, (Vol. I), op. cit., pp. 334-335.

⁶ Ibid. pp. 452-453.

⁷ Khan Hamid, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 5.

1784, which was followed by canal control system of Board of control and the Court of Directors. The Act of 1786 made Cornwallis Governor General of India as well as the Commander-in-chief of Indian Military with the powers to override his Council.⁸

Then the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act, 1858. It was a constitutional document for colonial India under a proclamation issued by Queen Victoria on first November 1858. The constitutional development took place between 1861 and 1909. The Act 1861 provided for the establishment of High courts in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras.

The Muslims of India not only lost their empire but bore the main brunt of defeat in the 1857 War of Independence. The British held the Muslims responsible for their role in the war. As a result, they suffered heavily in the following decades with illiteracy, ignorance and untold miseries. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's educational movement gave them not only hope but it changed their destinies with modern education, sciences and religious education which brought social, economic and political consciousness. During this period, the Indian National Congress was founded on the initiative of Allan Octavian Hume. With the passage of time, the Congress produced selfless leadership and it provided a platform of political training to the Indian youth who later worked for the partition of India. The partition of Bengal in 1905 embittered relations between Hindus and Muslims and the reason for partition was mainly administrative. The Muslims of Bengal welcomed partition, but the Hindus bitterly opposed it. Thus, the issue of partition of Bengal gave birth to political militancy which created fears among the Muslims of India and they were convinced that they should have their own political party. Therefore, some influential Muslim leaders formed the All India Muslim League in Dhaka in 1906, with the aim of protecting political and other rights of Indian Muslims. The All India Muslim League was later recognised as the political body, representing Indian Muslims which later led the Pakistan Movement. A favourable situation developed during this period, in which a delegation, led by Agha Khan, met with the Viceroy Lord Minto in 1906. The Muslims put a demand for a separate electorates in future reforms, which the Viceroy promised to give consideration.

The Indian Councils Act 1909 was known as Minto-Morley reforms. In this Act, the Muslims were given separate representation and were to be elected by Muslims alone. The demand for a separate electorate was thus accepted. Later, the inadequacy of the reforms of 1909 brought resentment and unrest among the Muslims; they were further annoyed by the reversal in 1911 of the 1905 partition of Bengal. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 settled the

⁸ The East India Company Act 1844, *Constitutional Documents (Pakistan)* vol. I, notes-8, p. 4.

proportionate election representative of Muslims and Hindus in provincial and all India legislatures. The Government of India Act of 1919 gave further hope to provide for increasing association of Indians in administration and for the gradual development of self-government in British India. The executive of provinces was divided into two parts. The departments such as, education, local self-government, public health, works known as transfer of subjects were allocated to the elected members of the provincial legislature.⁹ This system of diarchy remained effective from 1921 to 1937 in the provinces and had many drawbacks. Considering the general restlessness and discontent in post-war India, the Act was an experimental adventure in Indian constitutional history.

The period from 1919 to 1935, was considered the turbulent history from the view point of political and constitutional development in India. The All India National Congress in 1919 demanded a fully responsible government in India. The Rowatt Act, being suppressive, was bulldozed through the official majority despite strong opposition. Mohammed Ali Jinnah resigned from the Central Legislature in protest. Gandhi later launched a movement of Satyagrah against the Act. As a result, the worst incident of violence the Jalianwalla Bagh massacre occurred and Gandhi decided to call off Satyagrah. The Muslims in India were enraged by the events in which the Turkish Empire was divided and the Sultan was deprived of all his powers. Gandhi observing the unrest and resentment among the Muslims of India wanted to seize the opportunity to lead the Muslims in India and threatened to launch a non-cooperation movement. The Khilafat Movement, led by Ali Brothers, was founded in 1923 when Mustafa Kamal Pasha Atatürk expelled British and laid down the foundation of a secular and modern Turkey. In the Nagpur session of the Congress, the matter of non-cooperation was discussed, Jinnah opposed the resolution and was jeered at by a throng of Gandhi supporters at the meeting. He left the Congress after the Nagpur session.

The Central Assembly asked the British Government for making fundamental changes in the Indian Constitution, making the Government responsible, in 1925. The British Government appointed a commission composed entirely of the British. It was headed by Sir John Simon. The Commission was boycotted by Indian political parties. Its report was published in 1930. It considered the ultimate constitutional framework for the whole of India as a federation and the place of provinces in that setup. The report of the all parties' conference, known as the Nehru Report, was published in 1928. It proposed a responsible government at the centre and in the provinces. It proposed that the provinces be assigned enumerated functions. It was in 1929 that the Muslim League held a meeting in Delhi and Jinnah presented his Fourteen Points rejecting the Nehru Report. He demanded that a uniform measure of autonomy be granted to provinces, on their representation of

⁹ The Government of India Act 1919, Section-I.

Muslims in Central Legislature, in all cabinets, and Sindh should be separated from Bombay Presidency.

The Viceroy Lord Irvin, said in 1929 that the ultimate goal of India's constitutional progress was the attainment of dominion status. The Indians and British views differed on the issue, the Irvin-Gandhi talks failed, and the civil disobedience movement was launched in 1930. There seemed to be a complete breach between the Government and the nationalist movement in India.¹⁰ Gandhi withdrew the civil disobedience movement and the famous Gandhi-Irvin Pact was signed in 1931 after the failure of first Round Table Conference. The second and third Round Table Conferences did not bring any fruitful results. The purpose of the Communal Award was for the arrangements to be made for the representation of British Indian Communities in provincial legislature. The Government of India Act 1935, was a comprehensive written constitution given to the people of India. The broad principles on which the Act was based were the autonomy of the provinces and the powers of their legislatures to make the legislatures almost wholly elective to introduce the principles of a cabinet system at the provincial level and to enlarge participation of Indians in the Government at the Centre.¹¹ Thus, the Government of India Act 1935 established diarchy at the centre which was so unique that it provided provincial autonomy more than any other Constitutions of Pakistan including the existing one.

By 1931, Jinnah was so disgusted with the Indian politics that he decided to settle in England. He returned to India in 1936. Jinnah returned to India little before elections were held in 1937. He toured India, organized the Muslim League, and prepared Muslims for the forthcoming elections. Jinnah was asked to show his majority in provinces where Muslims were in a majority. The first Muslim premier was elected from the newly separated province of Sindh from Bombay presidency; while addressing the Assembly, Sir G.H. Hidayatullah said: "A new era is to dawn for Sindh within a few days, an era rich with promise for the future of this province; provincial autonomy is to be introduced in Sindh as in all other parts of India."¹²

The first Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference held in Karachi on October 7, 1938, was a significant event for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. "Sindh had given a lead to the whole of India on many occasions in the past. Similarly, at this juncture also, it was the first province to adopt the resolution for an independent Muslim state."¹³

¹⁰ Hamid Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹² M. Laiq Zardari, *History of Sindh Pakistan Movement*, vol. II, (Moro: Sindh Historical Society, N. Feroze, 2000), p. 54.

¹³ G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement History Document*, (Karachi: 1968), p. 193.

The Conference was chaired by Jinnah and attended by Sikandar Hayat, A.K. Fazal Haque and Allah Bakhsh Soomro. The meeting further recommended that: "All India Muslim League should devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence."¹⁴

It was, indeed, a most memorable and auspicious occasion for the Muslims of India that on March 21-23, 1940, the historic All India Muslim League session was held at Lahore, under the presidency of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, just before the annual session, the working committee in its meeting had appointed a committee with Quaid-i-Azam and Sikandar Hayat Khan as members to draft the resolution. Sir Abdullah Haroon claimed that the resolution was drafted in the light of an outline placed by him in the hands of Quaid-i-Azam in the shape of a small memorandum in February, 1940.¹⁵ The historic session was represented by a delegation of nineteen members from Sindh, including Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ayub Khuhro, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi and G.M. Syed, who were sitting on the dais with prominent leaders of All India Muslim League.¹⁶ The resolution in the form of a demand for a homeland for Indian Muslims was moved by Maulvi Fazal-ul-Haq. It said:

No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims, unless it is designed on the following basic principles, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States', in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign ... adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the Constitution for minorities ... for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights.

The Resolution is not free from ambiguity. The reference to "Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign", contains an element of self-contradiction. There is an evident incompatibility between 'Independent States', which would presumably possess full sovereign authority, and the autonomy or sovereignty assigned to their component units. The language of the resolution suggests that the new states would be governed under some sort of federation, although that term was nowhere used. The Resolution simply laid down the basic principle. The

¹⁴ Pirzada Sharifuddin, *The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session*, (Karachi: 1968).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

details were to be worked out by the Working Committee which was "to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles" and one of its tasks would no doubt, was to define more precisely the autonomy or sovereignty of the units to be included in the federation.

Supporting the resolution, Haji Abdullah Haroon said that it was a well-known fact that the Muslims came to India through Sindh. The Sindhi Muslims were the first to meet this question which was now before the League. In 1938, Sindh Muslim League passed a resolution for having independent states in the North Western and the Eastern Zones. Since then, various constitutional schemes had been framed and they were now being examined, and as for the present resolution, it was the duty of the Muslims to pass it without any hitch. He hoped that the proposal embodied in the resolution would be acceptable, both to the Hindus and the British, as there was no better solution of the thorny problem.¹⁷

The Sindh Legislative Assembly met on March 3, 1943, when G. M. Syed tabled the Pakistan Resolution that since Indian Muslims were a separate nation, their demand for a separate state was a proper demand and it must be accepted.

Sheikh Abdul Majeed Sindhi moved two verbal amendments to the Resolution introducing the words "with safeguards for the minorities" after the words "national states of their own" in the Resolution, and substituting the words "disastrous" for "in civil war with" at the end. He stated that Pakistan was the only solution of the tussle between the Congress and Muslim League. There were 27 members who attended the meeting. Twenty-four voted in favour of the Resolution whereas the only three who voted against it were Hindus.

In Delhi, the Resolution was passed by the All India Muslim League Council on March 7, 1943, in the light of the Sindh Assembly Resolution as: "This meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League approves the decision of the Sindh, the Pakistan scheme adopted by the Lahore Resolution of the All India Muslim League on March 23, 1940 and feels confident that before long the other Muslim majority provinces will follow suit."

Pakistan was created on 14 August 1947. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was moderate, secular and progressive in his thoughts and actions. Jinnah's August 11, 1947 speech to the then Constituent Assembly was intended to be an abiding promise to the non-Muslim minority that "religion would have nothing to do with the business of state", the very fundamental route to democratic governance in a pluralist society. The essence of Quaid's speech has been elaborated by the Supreme Court judgment on the NWFP "Hasba Bill":

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 341.

- a) State cannot enforce any religious obligations stipulated in Islam.
- b) Private life, personal thoughts and individual beliefs of citizens, cannot be allowed to be interfered with.
- c) Interfering in personal life, freedom of assembly, liberty, dignity and privacy is strictly prohibited in Islam.

Thus, Quaid idealised the progressive and forward looking Pakistan which needs to abolish Objectives Resolution, the Hudood Laws, the Blasphemy Laws and all other religion-based laws to keep pace with the modern world and in order to rationalise society for the elimination of fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism. While defining Constitution, Thomas Paine said,

A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government and government is only a creature of a constitution A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a government; and without a constitution is power without right.

The collection of principles of forming the frame for only political society is called its Constitution. The sanctity and priority to be accorded to constitution-making was demonstrated by the last Prophet of God himself, when he formulated the Charter of Medina, which contains 43 clauses. The establishment of the first Islamic state was followed by the formulation of the Charter of Medina and construction of the Masjid-i-Nabvi, in that order.¹⁸

Following the Charter of Medina, Quaid-i-Azam, the founder of the nation, reiterated the letter and spirit of Sunnah pertaining to Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947. Leaving the sacred task of Constitution making to the representatives of the people in the Constitution Assembly, Jinnah pledged equal national rights to all the citizens of Pakistan. Jinnah was a first rate constitutionist. He did not thrust his own version, yet he wanted the Constitution to be formulated by the peoples' representatives.

Keith B. Callard, an American political scientist said: "No one is willing to die for preservation of the Constitution of Pakistan." Interestingly enough, in twenty years, it has had three constitutions. The new born country adopted the Indian Act of 1935, as an interim constitution of the country through which it ran the Government from 1947 to 1956. The new constitution took nine years to be framed by two Assemblies but sadly enough, it remained in operation for only two and half years (23 March 1956 to 7 October 1958), when, following a period of martial law where the people lived under authoritarian rule for a period of about four years; a new constitution was promulgated by President Ayub Khan on 8 June 1962. The people of

¹⁸ Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 15.

Pakistan have always been subjected to suffer endlessly, overburdened by ideological clichés. They have always projected Almighty Allah's pleasure as the reason for every abortive constitutional system in Pakistan. In Pakistan, the adoptions of extra-constitutional methods were used for ulterior motives, suspension, and abrogation of Constitutions as mere pieces of paper to be easily scrapped. The biased and narrow interpretations of Islam and the Two-Nation Theory by the mullahs and the self-custodians of Pakistan, have an extremely negative impact not only on constitution making but national integration, democracy, equal rights of the people, living in the four provinces of Pakistan, and even on the future of Pakistan. The imposition of One-Unit in 1955, resulted in the suppression of rich languages and cultures of Sindhi, Balochi, Punjabi and Siraiki. Similarly, Sindhi being the most ancient language of the sub-continent, and its 5000 years old glorious cultural heritage which had its roots in the Indus Civilization, suffers heavily right from the creation of Pakistan. As a result, it is indeed sowing the seeds of separation. Culture and language are sensitive issues in Pakistan. The deteriorating economic conditions — the four million educated Sindhi youth are unemployed — abject poverty, deprivation and a sense of alienation are changing the minds of educated Sindhi youth which adds fuel to the flames. It reminds us of Carlyle's historical words, "Beware! Thinkers have arrived among your people." And Ingersoll warns us further, "When slaves begin to think, slavery begins to die." The 1956 Constitution was not a purely federal one, the executive and the legislative powers conferred in the federating units were much less than those exercised by the federal government.¹⁹ The 1962 Constitution was the "brainchild" of Ayub Khan, his imposition of a fully centralised administration and the abolition of provincial autonomy particularly in East Pakistan assumed extreme tendencies, approaching secessionism. Ayub had perhaps unwittingly caused irreparable damage to national politics, national political organizations, the prevailing political culture and the concept of Pakistan.²⁰

The inequality prevailing in the two wings of Pakistan gave rise to the feelings of separation. An unfortunate but real feeling developed in East Pakistan that their legitimate interests had not been properly handled by the centre. This was the root cause of discontent in East Pakistan. If the economic, language and cultural problems had been tackled with broad national perspective, things would not have taken the shape of a national disaster. The same situation is prevailing in the country today. Sindh remained in the forefront of its struggle against One-Unit along with other smaller provinces and finally the historical provinces were restored and One-Unit was

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁰ Max Beloff, quoted in Sharda Rath, *Federalism Today*, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1984), p. 1.

undone with the heroic struggle of the people of Sindh. The situation has not changed even today. It is an undeniable fact that Sindh had played a very significant role in the freedom movement. The creation of Pakistan had not been possible without separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency. If Punjab is considered heart of Pakistan, Sindh is soul of Pakistan.

Z. A. Bhutto deserves credit for giving the nation a unanimously evolved constitution but it could not provide provincial autonomy. The present constitution has been mutilated, altered and re-altered to suit the ambitions of Pakistan's ruling elites. The Constitution of 1973 could not save the life of the first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, the man who successfully brought the country out of the chaos, crises and the gloom of the break up of Pakistan and who ultimately ushered the country into a new era. He was sent to the gallows. The judiciary did ultimate favour to the martial law regime by legitimising it in Nusrat Bhutto's case, giving power to the CMLA to amend the Constitution without setting any date or deadline for holding the general election in written. The judiciary assumed to itself the power of judicial review over the acts and orders passed by the martial law authorities. By the verdict in Bhutto's case, the judiciary further obliged the regime and strengthened it by getting rid of its arch enemy.²¹ However, each successive martial law came under review before the Supreme Court, and it had to pronounce its verdict on such actions. The martial law of General Ayub was challenged in the case of Dosso, that of General Yahya case in that of Asma Jilani and General Zia in Begum Bhutto's case. A detailed analysis of the judgments reveals that the track record of the Supreme Court in these cases is uninspiring to say the least.²²

The people of Pakistan have always demanded full provincial autonomy in the light of the Pakistan Resolution in order to protect their socio-economic, political and cultural rights as it had been enshrined in the historical document, prepared unanimously by our distinguished elders. The right of provincial autonomy has been denied right from the inception of Pakistan, as a result, the tendencies prevailing in the country such as two tribal jirgas held in Balochistan had already signalled people's inclination towards separation, while in FATA also after return of law enforcing agencies, Taliban had established their virtual rule. The development and conditions prevailing in the country were a manifestation of the fact that the present system had failed to deliver. The situation was demanding a switchover to a system of multi-nationality, instead of centralization for which full autonomy to all provinces was a prerequisite to ensure national integration, cohesion and unity, prosperity, peace and tranquillity, as it was the dream of the founder of the nation.

²¹ Hamid Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 621.

²² Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

This was the famous two-nation theory, which aroused so much controversy but formed the basis of the Pakistan Resolution. No one can argue that the Lahore Resolution was a complete or coherent statement of Muslim demands. At no point between 1940 and the Cabinet Mission's arrival in 1946, did the League expand, revise, or make more specific this incomplete and contradictory statement, even when its position was ostensibly stronger, and the need for clarification was felt most urgent. This suggests that Jinnah was never in a position to confront his constituents in the majority provinces with the inwardness of his strategy. There were contradictions between Muslim interests in majority and minority provinces, and between an apparently separatist demand for autonomous Muslim states and the need for centre capable of ensuring the interests of Muslims in the rest of India. At no point was Jinnah able to reconcile these contradictions.²³ It appears on the face of it an incomplete and contradictory statement. Its flaws were eventually exploited by Mountbatten and the Congress to justify the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. It was also used as the basis of the Six-Point Programme, spelled out by Mujibur Rehman in 1966, which ultimately led to the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. It can, however, be said in defence of the Resolution that perhaps, it was the only statement on which Jinnah could get consensus of the Muslim community all over India.

Thus, a new constitution based on democratic and secular character for Pakistan is the need of the hour, taking in view the suffocating mindset of the masses of Pakistan. Full provincial autonomy should be guaranteed and no bifurcation of the provinces would be accepted in the name of provincial autonomy. The silence of Sindhis should not be mistaken for complacency and the rulers must learn a lesson from the gravity of the situation prevailing in Balochistan. To save the country from further disintegration, the demands of the smaller provinces, ranging from complete independence, a confederation to a federation based on the 1940 resolution should be fulfilled. The supremacy of the parliament should be established with equal representation from provinces. It is the strong desire of the people of Pakistan that a true federation must be created on the basis of the 1940 resolution with only foreign affairs, currency and defence being dealt by the federal government. Historically speaking, Pakistan is a multi-lingual and multi-cultural country, therefore, the five languages and main cultures of Pakistan should be given their proper place to be nourished and developed. Thus, Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi, Siraiki and Pashto should be given the status of the national languages of Pakistan. Drastic cuts must be made in the military expenditures. All the provinces should get equal representation in all the three forces and federal

²³ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 59-60.

departments. Provinces should be given powers of taxation and revenue collection and they should be owners of their resources. They should contribute to the federation proportionally. No dam or mega projects should be undertaken without the consent of the provinces and water should be distributed according to the 1945 Sindh-Punjab agreement.

It is also emphasised that priority rights of the indigenous people be guaranteed under the constitution. Illegal aliens should be repatriated to their countries and people of all the provinces should be provided employment and economic opportunities in their own provinces.

During the last sixty years, the leadership has failed to find viable solution to the problems. As a result, it persistently hinders normal growth and development, creating disharmony and unrest among the people of the smaller provinces. Thus, the cultural freedom and autonomy has a strong link with material progress and national integration.

Considering the current volatile domestic situations and ideological wars that are being fought in our surrounding, it has become absolutely imperative to have a new and secular constitution with a full autonomy for building a democratic, secular, progressive, forward looking egalitarian society, and a stronger Pakistan, as envisioned by the founder of the nation.

Shah Abdul Latif of Bhit, a poet of universal love and peace, thus, has provided us with a haven, a refuge, and an energizer, which resurrects peoples and nations to life and saves them in times of the wildest of crisis — the haven being the language and vitalism being the message. Let us therefore, take to the haven and hold fast and pay our heed to the message: the linguistic bond of support and unity, and equality among nations, the identity and peaceableness in the interests of justice and common good of all. Says Latif:

Oh God, let Sindh prosper!
Oh Gracious friend, let nations prosper!
So long you are the cup-bearer
Let the cup not be intercepted and held up
Your distribution, oh master of the tavern!
Is like that of the sun,
Take the cup of love and give it particularly
To those deprived and weak. ■

CHAPTER IV

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE INDIAN FACTOR

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Human trafficking in South Asia is not a new phenomenon. For centuries, kidnapped or bonded labour has existed and in some communities, has been a source of income besides subsistence agriculture. Hence human trafficking has been a part of the traditional economy within South Asia. It has only recently been recognised as a global concern as trafficked persons are found in a growing number of countries. Recent studies and analysis are demonstrating changes in the process and economy of trafficking in the South Asian, where it is becoming more integrated into transnational crimes and the demands for trafficked labour adjusts itself to global economic demands.¹

Trafficking is linked to the lack of secure livelihood. It forces people to leave their homes, in search of income to improve the lives of their families. South Asia has one-fifth of the world's population, of which over 500 million live in absolute poverty, with an income of less than a dollar a day. Various studies and researches show that children, especially girl children and women bear a disproportionately large burden of deprivation and exploitation resulting from poverty related issues.

South Asia is a region of various forms of inequities and disparities: economic, social or political. Within this region, several forms of socially sanctioned violations and practices related to issues of sex and sexuality reinforce discriminatory norms and values intensify stigma and marginalization. Such norms and practices further influence masculine and feminine identities and socialize men and women into specific gendered-roles that are crucial determinants in exacerbating the multiple vulnerabilities of women and men to a plethora of developmental challenges, including illegal migration, trafficking and HIV/AIDS.²

¹ Asian Development Bank, *Combating Trafficking of Women and Children in South Asia : Regional Synthesis Paper for Bangladesh, Nepal, and India*, 2003, p. 2.

² Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Poverty and Trafficking in Human Beings," <http://www.Sweden.gov.e/sb/d2207/a/1566/actionsearch/typ/simple?query=human+trafficking2001>.

The current globalisation processes are creating livelihood opportunities in urban areas and specific sectors are leading to diminishing choices in rural settings, thus prompting greater human mobility, driven by both 'push' and 'pull' factors. Such trends reflect underlying patterns of poverty, marginalization and disempowerment. Several economic liberalisation policies have entailed a progressive 'feminization of poverty', coupled with decreasing rural participation rates for both men and women are rising female-underemployment. The number of women living in poverty and the number of house holds headed by women and living below the poverty-line, have increased during the last decade, impacting significantly on the well being and human security of children, often leading to trafficking.³

Source and Destination

Many countries in this region act as source and destination countries, although India, being the largest destination country, with neighbouring Nepal and Bangladesh being the major source countries. A substantial number of women and children are trafficked to work in the sex industry, other victims of trafficking also end up in the domestic, construction, agriculture, and garment production industries, or as beggars and hawkers. Bangladeshis and Nepalese migrants use India as a transit country en-route Pakistan or the Middle East, and India itself acts as a country of origin for thousands of people who migrate to the Middle East and West. A large percentage of India's trafficking also occurs internally, with victims, usually children, being moved from poorer states to big cities, such as Kolkata, Delhi and Mumbai. Asian Development Bank (ADB) has asserted that:

Trafficking to provide workers for the sex industry or cheap labourers is on the rise in Asia. An estimated two million people are trafficked worldwide annually, including 150,000 from South Asia and 225,000 from Southeast Asia. The United Nations' estimate is that over the last 30 years, trafficking for sexual exploitation alone has victimized some 30 million people – mostly poor women and children.⁴

Other regional trends include trafficking from Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia to Pakistan. It was reported in 1991, that about 20,000 young girls and women of Bangladeshi origin between the ages of 12 and 30 were sold in Pakistan. In addition to internal and regional trafficking, many South Asian children have been trafficked beyond the region. There have been reports of Nepalese girls ending up in Hong Kong, and

³ Hina Shahid, "Trafficking of Women and Children in South Asia", in Musa Khan Jalalzai, (ed.), *Child Trafficking in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2003), p. 115.

⁴ Oman Nair, "Fighting Trafficking: Ending Agony," www.adbo.org.

thousands of boys, some as young as five, being trafficked to Dubai, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar to work as camel jockeys. Sri Lanka is also another primary source country for trafficking to the Gulf region — UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Bahrain — for work in exploitative conditions, which also makes them vulnerable to sexual abuse.⁵

According to Sustainable Development Policy institute, in Bangladesh women and children are falling victims to trafficking mainly for the purpose of prostitution, sexual abuse, forced labour, camel jockeying, cheap labour, bonded labour, domestic servitude, selling of organs and marriage.⁶ In case of women and girls, the destination is usually the sex-market both within the country and outside. In the case of boys, the destination is usually Middle Eastern countries where they are engaged as camel jockeys. In most cases the girls, who are trafficked abroad, are trafficked through India. In case of boys, India is usually treated as a country of transit to the Middle East. On the other hand, within the country, an alarming number of boys and girls are forcefully engaged in prostitution. The girls are engaged both in brothels and the street sex-market, while the boys are almost exclusively engaged in the street sex market.

Trafficking in South Asia is complex and multifaceted, and is both a development and a criminal problem. The main destination of people from South Asia is the Middle East; but many stay within India and Pakistan. There is extensive trafficking of women and girls from Bangladesh to India, Pakistan, Bahrain, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. UNICEF estimates that up to half a million Bangladeshis have been trafficked in recent years and up to 200,000 Nepali women and girls are working in India's sex industry. A small number of women and girls are trafficked through Bangladesh from Burma to India. Young boys from South Asia are trafficked to the UAE, Oman and Qatar and forced to work as camel jockeys.⁷ The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has highlighted prevalence of human trafficking in South Asia in the following words:

In South Asia, Bangladesh and Nepal are the main countries of origin for trafficking, while India and Pakistan are considered countries of destination. In all these countries, there is extensive


⁵ Frank Lazko and June J. H. Lee, "Developing Better Indicators of Human Trafficking for Asia," *Expert Group Meeting on Prevention of International Trafficking*, Seoul, Korea, September 22-23, 2003, IOM Research and Publications Division, Geneva.

⁶ Ishrat Shamim, "Forced Migration and Human Trafficking Women and Children Trafficking in South Asia : Myth and Realities," 6th *SDC Special Bulletin*, vol. 10, no. 6, Sustainable Policy Development Institute, November-December 2003.

⁷ United Nations Children's Fund "Poverty and Children: Lessons of the 90s for Least Developed Countries," www.unicef.org.

domestic movement. As in East and Southeast Asia, the reasons include prostitution, marriage, and sometimes fake marriages with unknown persons who could be traffickers. In some communities in India and Nepal, commercial sexual services have been falsely linked to religious and cultural practices, which make them deeply ingrained, complex and difficult for governments to tackle. Children represent a particularly large group of those being trafficked in the region; while in Sri Lanka most children transported for sexual services are likely to be boys.⁸

Asian Development Bank has found that in South Asia, Bangladesh and Nepal are the main countries of origin for trafficking, while India and Pakistan are countries of destination or transit to the Gulf States or Southeast Asia. Calcutta in India, is regarded as a major transit point for other destinations. However, large-scale trafficking in persons also takes place within these countries.



Source: Asian Development Bank, *Combating Trafficking of Women and Children in South Asia: Regional Synthesis Paper for Bangladesh, Nepal and India*, 2003.⁹

⁸ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.

⁹ Asian Development Bank, op. cit., p. 18.

Structural changes in the economics of South Asia have resulted in loss of livelihood for many subsistence farmers, through commercialization or declines in productivity/returns from certain crops. The proportion of casual workers has increased in the agriculture sector, thereby demanding flexibility and mobility from the labour force. For women, the decline in ... female labour increases vulnerability to trafficking. Landlessness is also increasing in some countries for varied reasons. Pressure from increasing population density, environmental erosion and natural disasters, without corresponding increases in employment opportunities in other sectors is also mounting. There have been substantial livelihood losses in areas where the demand for traditional skills is declining — for example for weavers in India. These conditions lead to increasing numbers of women and men moving in order to seek alternative livelihood options and hence become more vulnerable to being trafficked.

Modus Operandi of Traffickers

The modus operandi of traffickers includes luring their victims by means of attractive promises such as high-paying jobs, glamorous employment option, prosperity, and sometimes-fraudulent marriages. Parents and other family members are fooled or otherwise taken in by false promises and deceptions. It has been widely perceived that in many cases family members and other relatives play an important role in recruitment by colluding with the traffickers for which they may receive payment. In Nepal, this is particularly prevalent in regions where girls have traditionally been sent knowingly by families as entertainers or commercial sex workers, which is perceived as an important source of income for the families.¹⁰

Along the borders of Bangladesh-India, and Nepal-India, the enforcement officers and checkpoints are few in numbers and widely dispersed. Thus, it is hard to maintain strict vigilance of those crossing the border. Border security forces are well aware of the problems of illegal/irregular migrants and trafficking, but do not have facilities or resources to quickly distinguish between different types of migrants.

Enforcement officers sometimes resort to pushing back irregulars or illegal migrants, picked up during the day without distinguishing between trafficked persons and illegal migrants. Although governments are aware of loopholes at the border, they are unable to address the problem due to institutional, political and international influences. Those who have been trafficked remain at risk of being found again by the traffickers and sent back across the border, and are generally unable to return home anyway. In some instances, traffickers cross the border on fixed days of the week at fixed hours. It is said that this is common knowledge in surrounding communities, and

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 22.

NGOs find it difficult to believe that state enforcement agencies are unaware of such activities. It is the common perception that the networks of smugglers/agents are organised and protected.¹¹

Causes of Vulnerability to Trafficking

There are multiple factors that serve as causes of vulnerability to trafficking some of which are as under:

External Factor

A range of policies and environmental circumstances influence the incidence of poverty and vulnerability to risks, for migrants to being trafficked.

Impacts of Globalisation

Impacts of globalisation have included the spread of modernization with greater access to transport, media etc., but also for many, the disappearance of traditional income sources and rural employment, pushing the poor and unskilled to migrate to survive. Asia has also become a centre for low-cost, labour intensive manufacturing operations. Competition among countries in South Asia has driven the cost of labour further down encouraging some employers to use illegal practices (such as bounded labour) to access cheaper labour sources.

Conflicts and Natural Disasters

Conflicts and natural disasters that force communities to move, often en-mass to meet their basic needs. When individuals within those communities have no skills or education, and are exposed to health risks, their capacity to secure sustainable livelihood is limited, and their risk to trafficking heightened.

External Migration Policies

External migration policies that exclude many unskilled people, particularly women, from legal migration and are therefore forced to seek alternative livelihood options through illegal means. Human smugglers forge documents of transportation to other countries where they promise to link migrants with job opportunities. These are often the same smugglers who traffic labour, i.e., coerce migrants into certain types of work, create debt bondage conditions, or refuse migrants freedom to return home.

Those working in illegal situations are more susceptible to coercion by traffickers. It is anticipated that migration policies will continue to discourage migration of unskilled labour, or that labour movements will be confined within South Asia and to certain Southeast Asian countries and this situation

¹¹ International Organization for Migration, *Data and Research on Human Trafficking : A Global Survey*, 2005, p. 141.

will continue. These countries have poor records of protecting the rights of irregular and illegal migrants or trafficked persons, which perpetuate conditions that offer profits to opportunist traffickers. For example, there is currently no migration policy in Bangladesh to address the impacts of these trends, or to promote development benefits from safe migration.

Poverty

An examination of the highest source areas for trafficking of women and children points towards a need for those living in poverty to meet their basic needs, through whatever means available. For those at risk of, or already living in conditions of poverty, underemployment and unemployment remain high, and levels of functional landlessness are increasing because of population density, environmental erosion, or natural disasters without corresponding increase in employment opportunities in other sectors. In the industrialized sectors, the proportion of casual workers has increased, and structural change in many sectors is leading to dislocation and unemployment for thousands. These conditions lead to increasing numbers of women and men moving in order to seek alternative livelihood options and hence becoming more vulnerable to being trafficked.

According to US State Department, Trafficking in Persons is characterised by subjugation, submission and lack of freedom. The overwhelming majority of those trafficked are women and children. Traffickers often prey on individuals who are poor, unemployed or underemployed, and who lack access to social safety nets. Sometimes, the victims are lured with false promises of good job opportunities and better lives, but they are later exploited and forced to work under brutal and inhuman conditions.¹²

Poverty drives many to take “unthinkable” decisions and commit “undesirable” acts that include the handing over a child to another family member or even a stranger on the promise of offering a better life for them. These promises may also include the prospect of sending back remittances to help other family members. There are many cases in Bangladesh of families of young girls being trafficked to brothels in India, openly acknowledging that their daughters are living under difficult and harmful circumstances, but seeing no other option for their survival. Living under these conditions of extreme poverty also means that the promises of good jobs in places such as Mumbai and Delhi encourage people to migrate without a clear idea of what they will find outside their communities. As Hameeda Hussain has asserted that:

¹² United States, Department of Justice and Civil Rights Division, “*What is Trafficking in Persons?*”, www.usdoj.gov/trafficking.htm.

The site for recruitment [for trafficking] is usually a poor area marked by food insecurity and unemployment. For example, in the northern districts of Bangladesh women can find only seasonal work at very low wages. Thus, parents do not delay in accepting offers of marriage or employment for women and children particularly where there is promise of payment.¹³

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

IDPs are also highly vulnerable to being trafficked. The term IDP does not share a universally agreed definition by the international community. Conditions such as violence, human rights violations, environmental disaster, natural calamities, political unrest, and loss of land and property, all displace families, forcing them to search for places of refuge. As IDPs are generally without resources and without official government recognition, their status makes them more susceptible to adverse situations such as trafficking. Social disintegration and overall economic decline is intensifying the numbers of de facto IDPs. It is estimated that nearly one third of the total male labour force has migrated to India or other countries for menial jobs and mercenary services. The armed conflict is interrupting basic services, restricting development assistance, and breaching down family and community networks as men either join the conflict or migrate to seek employment elsewhere to support their families. This leaves many women in the affected districts looking after their children alone and scraping together an income under increasingly difficult circumstances. Women are also vulnerable to rape and sexual exploitation that are common features of conflict.

This type of suffering is leaving deep psychological wounds, which can severely undermine the capacity of both women and their communities to recover; and women are crucial to the recovery process of both their families and the wider community. Few services are available to these migrants and employment opportunities are very limited. These IDPs become a target for organised traffickers who easily recognise their desperation and lack of choices.

Social Attitudes and Practices

It is frequently stated that poverty in South Asia is characterized by social exclusion based on gender, ethnicity, and caste. These characteristics of social exclusion are reinforced by tradition and are institutionalized in politics, education, health and access to development resources.

¹³ Hameeda Hussain, "Proposal for a Plan of Action to Reduce Trafficking in Adolescent Girls and Young Women from Bangladesh," in Asian Development Bank, *Combating Trafficking of Women and Children in South Asia: Regional Synthesis Paper for Bangladesh, Nepal, and India* 2003, p. 53.

Gender

Social exclusion based on gender can be seen as a major contributing factor to the risks of being trafficked. Gender-based discriminations, as suffered by individual girls and women, is perpetuated and institutionalised in the family and community. Gender stereotypes are used to reinforce women's low status. Women are not encouraged to challenge control by men, and are expected to accept their position in life without complaint. These stereotypes also reinforce among young women a sense of helplessness and of being unprotected without a man. All these factors play into the hands of opportunistic traffickers who can easily control young women and break their spirit.

Rural society in South Asia is especially resistant to educating girls and women. Rural women tend to have more children, be poorer, and in their struggle to survive, have little or no time and energy to spare on adult literacy programmes even if they are available. Children of female-headed households in rural areas are often put to work in order to ensure the survival of the family rather than continue in school. In Nepal, even though over 50 per cent of rural children are enrolled in primary school, only 23 per cent of girls attend secondary school. Education is considered as a hindrance to marriage prospects for girls in many communities, as an educated woman is viewed as a potential threat to her husband and may upset the status quo within the family.

Ethnicity/Caste

Gender-based discrimination is reinforced through traditional social practices and builds on ethnicity and caste. In India, this can be well illustrated by the traditional Devadasi practices (illegal in India since 1988) in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, the Jogin in Andhra Pradesh and the Bhedias or Sansui in Madhya Pradesh.¹⁴ Parents from certain scheduled tribes (who are typically poor) marry girls to a deity or a temple. The marriage usually occurs before the girl reaches puberty and requires the girl to provide sexual services for upper-caste community members from the temple. Such girls are known as jogini. They are forbidden to enter into a real marriage. A study for the National Commission for Women (NCW) India, indicated that 62 per cent of women CSWs belong to the scheduled castes and 30 per cent to scheduled tribe groups. In many instances, traffickers recruit and send Devadasis to state or districts where there is less strict enforcement of the caste system.

In western Nepal where the trafficking of girls into sexual slavery has a long history, traditional customs like Deuki, Badi, Jari and Jhuma all have become synonymous with prostitution. According to the Deuki System, girl

¹⁴ K. K. Mukerjee, and Sutapa Mukerjee, A Study Report : Female Prostitutes and Their Children in City of Delhi, in New Delhi, Asian Development Bank, *Combating Trafficking of Women and Children in South Asia : Regional Synthesis Paper for Bangladesh, Nepal and India* 2003, p. 57.

children were dedicated to deities. Since these girls were neither educated nor had any resources or skills, prostitution was the only alternative for survival. Where these practices continue, they represent a highly exploited and socially ostracized class. Some "untouchable" Hindu castes, as the Badi in western Nepal, are also designated as sex workers. The Badi people were originally a musician caste being entertainers, doing sex work occasionally as a peripheral income source.¹⁵ During the past 50 years, modern media and technology have eliminated the demand for their singing and dancing, and hence these girls and women now rely entirely on CSW, as caste exclusion has denied them education or access to other forms of employment. Leading them to earn through sex work, had meant that girl children are valued among the Badi – "He's very rich, who has many daughters." Their families now routinely sell these girls to traffickers for work elsewhere in Nepal or India, without consideration of the harm this may cause them.

Women and Children: Especially Vulnerable

Trafficking in persons, especially in women and children is not new. However, it appears to be increasing and acquiring grave new dimensions in the recent context of globalisation. The recent re-emergence of trafficking of women and children is due to the exploitation by organised world-wide syndicates of the adverse socio-economic conditions of poor countries. Women and children in particular are bought and sold to cater to needs of sex slavery, prostitution, illegal marriages, bonded labour, camel jockeys, baby farms, and entertainment purposes. Instances of organ trade are also undertaken, although there are means of verification or substantiation of this.¹⁶

Women and children are more vulnerable to being trafficked because of the following factors:

Factors Contributing to Demand

- Women's perceived suitability for work in labour-intensive production and the growing informal sector which is characterised by low wages, casual employment, hazardous work conditions and the absence of collective bargaining mechanisms;
- The increasing demand for foreign workers for domestic and care-giving roles, and lack of adequate regulatory frameworks to support this;
- The growth of the billion-dollar sex and entertainment industry, tolerated as a 'necessary evil', while women in prostitution are

¹⁵ Asian Development Bank, op. cit., p. 36.

¹⁶ Lawyers for Human Rights Association, *Human Trafficking in South Asia*, (Karachi: Lawyers for Human Rights Association, 1997), p. 34.

- criminalised and discriminated against;
- The low risk-high profit nature of trafficking encouraged by a lack of will on the part of enforcement agencies to prosecute traffickers, which includes owners/managers of institutions into which persons are trafficked;
- The ease in controlling and manipulating vulnerable women;
- Lack of access to legal redress or remedies, for victims of traffickers; and
- Devaluation of women and children's human rights.

Factors Contributing to Supply

- Unequal access to education that limits women's opportunities to increase their earning in more skilled occupations;
- Lack of legitimate and fulfilling employment opportunities particularly in rural communities;
- Sex-selective migration policies and restrictive emigration policies/laws, instituted often as a "protective" measure, limit women's legitimate migration. Most legal channels of migration offer opportunities in typically male-dominated sectors, i.e., construction and agricultural work;
- Less access to information on migration/job opportunities, recruitment channels, and a greater lack of awareness of the risks of migration compared to men;
- Disruption of support systems due to natural and human created catastrophes; and
- Traditional community attitudes and practices, which tolerate violence against women.

Trafficking is, by and large, a gendered phenomenon, although trafficking of men is also taking place within and from the region. Since the last decade, evidence from major government and NGO sources indicates that the incidence of trafficking of women and children has escalated considerably. For example, the majority of trafficking in India, both trans-border and in-country, happens for the purpose of commercial sex work, and over 60 per cent of those trafficked into sex work are adolescent girls in the age group of 12-16 years. In South Asia, women are now reported to constitute up to 35 per cent of new HIV infections.¹⁷ A complex web of socio-cultural and macro-economic factors affect women's vulnerability to HIV including poverty, migration, urbanisation, gender inequalities compounded by women's lack of

¹⁷ United Nations Development Fund for Women, "Progress of the World's Women 2000: Biennial Report," www.unifem.org.

autonomy, abuse within and outside families, insufficient access to health care services, violence and ethnicity. Significantly, these factors also influence women's vulnerability to trafficking.

South Asia is witnessing an alarming trend of increasingly younger girls being trafficked into the sex trade; the average age of girls trafficked from Nepal into India has fallen over the past decade from 14-16 years to 10-14 years. In Mumbai and other Indian cities, girl children as young as eight or nine are sold at auctions. One common myth fuelling the demand for young girls in South Asia, is that sex with a virgin can cure sexually transmitted infections and even HIV/AIDS. The multiple vulnerabilities to trafficking and HIV/AIDS, faced by women and girl children in the region, are further reinforced by socially sanctioned forms of violence. These take various forms: rape, trafficking commercial sexual exploitation, dowry-related violence, female infanticide, domestic violence, and violence in conflict situations. The lives of millions of women in this region remain defined by traditional practices that enforce disempowerment and endorse unequal treatment.

Although difficult to be precise about the exact number of women and children trafficked, estimates based on the reports of law enforcement agencies, researchers and groups working with survivors and communities indicate that hundreds of thousands of women and children have been or are vulnerable to being trafficked from South Asia. Police estimate that more than 15,000 women and children are smuggled out of Bangladesh every year and NGOs estimate that 160,000-250,000 women and girls from Nepal are held in India's brothels; 35 per cent of them taken on the pretext of marriage or offers of lucrative jobs. NGOs report that the numbers are growing, and that trafficking is affecting communities where it was previously unknown.¹⁸

The overwhelming majority of children vulnerable to trafficking are those belonging to poor families with few or no skills or assets, often working as seasonal labourers or in factories or at construction sites. Those most at risk include:

- Children separated from their families or with disrupted family backgrounds, e.g., orphans, victims of abuse, unaccompanied children, children from single-parent families, or from families headed by children;
- Economically and socially deprived children — unemployed, poor, rural and those without access to education, vocational training, or a reasonable standard of living;
- Children from other marginalised groups, e.g., certain minorities, internally displaced persons and children from the conflict areas

¹⁸ United Nations Programmes on HIV/AIDS, "Stop Violence Against Women: Fight Aids" www.unaids.org.

themselves.

The demand for child labour is increasing. Employers prefer children because they are naïve, uncomplaining, easily controlled, vulnerable, desperate, and dispensable. The children's age ranges from 5 to 16 years with 13 years being the average age.¹⁹ Most of these children find jobs as porters, domestic servants, carpet weavers, transportation helpers, rag pickers and shoe shiners. Some of these children are trafficked into CSW, some are used for organ transplanting, and some find jobs in circus. In all these cases, the traffickers and employers are violating these children's basic rights.

Among street children in urban settings these vulnerabilities intensify other power relationships. For example, from the very beginning of street life, girl children are considered as "fallen", putting them at extreme risk of sexual abuse/assault from other boys and men. Children are also reluctant to leave abusive relationships that nonetheless provide them with some stability. Traffickers play upon this type of dependence and vulnerability in order to maintain control over these children. "From the very beginning of the street life, the girl children are considered as 'fallen'. ...For these children, the gender-based division of labour makes no other jobs as accessible as prostitution. Thus, there exists a social pressure, generated from male-charged sexist social moral values, which makes (street girls)... vulnerable to sexual abuse, reduces their choice of profession and thereby makes them highly vulnerable to prostitution".²⁰

Many children are moving around alone in the most vulnerable conditions to being trafficked. Even when they arrive with their parent(s), the pressure of urban life on new migrants can overcome their tenuous family ties and these children end up on the street alone. There are few facilities available that can serve as shelter or temporary homes for street children. While there are only limited and often substandard facilities available, many trafficked adults and children prefer the option of remaining in exploitative or abusive living conditions under the control of traffickers, or returning to life on the streets. Children without birth certificates not only represent recognition of a child's existence under the law. Traffickers find many of their victims in remote villages, where poverty is high and registration rates are low, knowing that girls without papers are less likely to run away from their perpetrators.

Trafficking of children could be for sex or cheap labour. Helpless in the stifling environment, young boys end up working 14 hours in hazardous occupations like tanning leather, or making explosive firecrackers, carpets, or garments. Repeated, monotonous activity, with little reward or monetary gain,

¹⁹ "Child Workers in Nepal," at www.cwin.org.

²⁰ Research and Services NGO (INCIDIN), *Misplaced Childhood: A Short Study on the Street Child Prostitutes in Dhaka City*, (Dhaka: Red Barnet, 1977), p. 19.

leaves the child physically and mentally spent and consequently powerless to resist physical or sexual abuse, should it happen. Young boys who run away from home in search of a better life, a future in films, or lured by older boys end up on the streets in the cities or are finally “sold” into labour. Others end up as sex workers in popular tourist destinations.²¹

India

India is a source, destination and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the bonded labour and commercial sexual exploitation. The large population of men, women and children, numbering in millions in debt bondage face involuntary servitude in brick kilns, rice mills, and zari embroidery factories. Some children endure involuntary servitude as domestic servants. Internal trafficking of women and girls for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced marriage also occur. The Ministry of Home Affairs estimates that 90 per cent of India’s sex trafficking is internal. India is also a destination for women and girls from Nepal and Bangladesh trafficked for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation.

In addition, boys from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh are trafficked through India to the Gulf States for involuntary servitude as child camel jockeys. Reportedly, Bangladeshi women are trafficked through India for sexual exploitation in Pakistan. Moreover, Indian men and women migrate willingly to the Gulf for work as domestic servants and low-skilled labourers, but some later find themselves in situations of involuntary servitude including extended working hours, non-payment of wages, restrictions on their movement by withholding of their passports or confinement to homes, and physical or sexual abuse. The Government of India does not fully comply with the minimum standards required for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. India is placed in Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year due to its failure to show evidence of increasing efforts to address trafficking in persons. India lacks a national law enforcement response to any form of trafficking, but took some preliminary measures to create a central law enforcement unit to do so. However, India did not take steps to address the huge issue of bonded labour and other forms of involuntary servitude. The Indian Government also did not take meaningful steps to address its sizeable trafficking-related corruption problem.

The government drafted, but had not yet introduced to parliament, amendments to the Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act (ITPA) that would afford greater protection to sex trafficking victims and stricter penalties for their traffickers and for clients of prostitution. The central government also further empowered the coordination office for anti-trafficking elevating the stature of the Department of Women and Child Development (DWCD) by

²¹ United Nations Children’s Fund, *op. cit.*

creating a Minister of State for Women and Child Development. India should consider designating and empowering a national law enforcement agency with investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction throughout the country to address its interstate and international trafficking problem. The government should similarly consider taking greater measures to rescue and protect victims of bonded labour and to prosecute their traffickers or employers, giving them sufficiently stringent punishments to deter and that adequately reflect the nature of the heinous crime of trafficking. It is particularly important to strengthen and enforce sentences applied to individuals convicted of exploiting bonded labourers. India should also improve its long-term protection of trafficking victims and institute nation-wide public awareness programmes to educate all segments of the population on the dangers of trafficking.

Prosecution

The Government of India last year sustained modest efforts to punish trafficking crimes. However, there were no significant improvements. The government's laws criminalising labour forms of trafficking such as bonded labour or forced child labour prescribe no more than three-year imprisonment. The government, at all levels, neither vigorously investigated nor prosecuted acts of any form of trafficking, nor did it report a significant number of convictions or sentences for acts of trafficking. Moreover, there were no reports of government efforts to investigate, prosecute, convict, or sentence public officials who participated in or facilitated trafficking in persons crimes.

Although India's ITPA adequately criminalizes and prescribes punishment for trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation, this law was generally not used for effective prosecutions of trafficking in most parts of the country. The central government has moved forward, however, with amendments to the ITPA aimed at increasing penalties for repeat traffickers and clients of prostitution and eliminating provisions used to punish victims of trafficking. In 2004, the Central Government reported 6,341 persons convicted under the ITPA, but it did not provide data as to how many of these were convictions of women in prostitution for the offence of solicitation. The Government of India did not provide comprehensive statistics for the number of investigations, arrests, prosecutions, or convictions during 2005, to punish traffickers for commercial sexual exploitation.

Independent sources report that the municipal government of Mumbai — India's largest city with concentration of victims of commercial sexual exploitation — arrested 13 suspected sex traffickers in 2005, but did not prosecute or convict any traffickers. Similarly, the city governments of Kolkata and Chennai registered 25 and 109 arrests of sex traffickers respectively, but provided no indication that these cases were ever prosecuted. The state of Maharashtra reported 82 prosecutions of trafficking offences and the

conviction of only eight traffickers, in 2004. During the current year, little progress was made in combating trafficking of persons for the purpose of labour exploitation. Despite estimates that millions of men, women, and children are victims of forced and bonded labour, the government provided no indication that the perpetrators of these crimes were seriously punished. The Bonded Labour Abolition Act of 1976 criminalises the use of the bonded labour system with penalties including up to three years in jail and 2,000 Indian Rupee (US\$45) in fines. International NGOs and the ILO estimate that there are 10 to 40 million bonded labourers in India; the Government of India did not provide an estimate. Moreover, it did not provide any data on prosecutions or convictions for bonded labour offences for the reporting period. Independent sources report some prosecutions and convictions in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, with punishments limited to fines.

The Child Labour and Juvenile Justice Acts prohibit the labour exploitation of children. Under the Child Labour Act, employers are subject to imprisonment of up to one year and a fine of at least 10,000 rupees (US\$227) for forced child labour. The Juvenile Justice Act mandates imprisonment of three years or less for forced or bonded labour of children. In November, Delhi police rescued 694 children caught in forced labour in zari embroidery factories and over 16,000 children, were rescued from workshops in Mumbai between June and September 2005. These local governments, however, provided no information regarding arrests or prosecutions of the factory owners exploiting these children.

In 2005 the Government of India took steps to implement nationwide police training programme on trafficking. The Bureau of Police Research and Development began preparing a national anti-trafficking training module for investigation officers, and it conducted seven training workshops around the country in 2005. This nascent training programme aimed to sensitise law enforcement officers to trafficking for sexual or labour exploitation will assist state and national level law enforcement authorities in preventing corruption and improving their capacity to combat trafficking. In addition, India should consider instituting a comprehensive database to compile state level statistics related to the rescue of victims of sex trafficking and forced or bonded labour, as well the arrest and prosecution of their traffickers or exploiters. Endemic corruption among law enforcement officials impedes India's ability to effectively combat trafficking in persons. In terms of trafficking for sexual exploitation, corrupt law enforcement authorities reportedly continue to facilitate the movement of trafficking victims, protect brothels that exploit victims, and protect traffickers and brothel keepers from arrest or other threats of enforcement. In the area of bonded labour and forced child labour, some corrupt police officials continue to protect businesses and managers who rely on forced labour and take bribes to stop enforcement or judicial action. During the reporting period, there were no reports concerning the

Government of India's steps to address official complicity in trafficking in persons.

Protection

The Government of India continues to provide inadequate and uneven assistance to the vast majority of trafficking victims. Existing national programmes to provide protection and rehabilitation to victims of sex trafficking, forced child labour, or bonded labour were not implemented effectively in some areas. Some of India's 28 states, however, showed resolve in addressing victims' needs. For example, the State of Tamil Nadu operates five shelters for women and girls, including victims of trafficking. The government of Andhra Pradesh state runs six similar homes. The state government Maharashtra is expanding the capacity of its existing Mumbai shelter. Government shelters are found in all major cities, but the quality of care they offer varies widely; allegations of victims further exploited in government shelters have been reported. The Government of India relies heavily on NGOs to provide services to assist victims. Child Welfare Committees operate in each district of each state to protect child victims of trafficking; they often refer such victims to local NGOs for care. The Government of India continues to provide funding to NGOs to build shelters for victims of trafficking under its Swadhar Scheme, although some NGOs have charged that the implementation of this programme has been marked by inefficiency and corruption.

Overall, protection for victims of trafficking is weak with regard to comprehensive care. Many shelters do not have the capacity to provide protection to trafficking victims for more than a few months, leaving some victims vulnerable to re-trafficking once they leave the shelters. In addition, victim witnesses rarely receive adequate protection to prevent retribution from the traffickers. For those trafficked from other countries, repatriation assistance is sparse. Anecdotal information suggests that victims are accompanied to the border without sufficient reintegration aid, rendering them susceptible to re-trafficking. Victims of bonded labour are provided 20,000 rupees (\$540) co-funded by the national and state governments upon their rescue, but this programme of rehabilitation is unevenly implemented across the country; it is unclear whether state or local governments afford other services to bonded labour victims.

The government can improve its protection efforts by instituting short or long-term care as appropriate for trafficking victims, as well as shelter facilities to assist them. The repatriation process should be improved to ensure that victims are sufficiently reintegrated and programmes to protect witnesses are established that will adequately safeguard victims from retribution. To protect Indian nationals trafficked abroad, Indian Government should

consider training overseas diplomatic officials in identifying and assisting trafficking victims caught in involuntary servitude.

India's efforts to prevent trafficking in persons were limited in the year 2006. To address the issue of bride trafficking, Indian government instituted public awareness programmes to educate parents on the laws against sex-selective abortions and infanticide causing gender imbalance in parts of India and driving the demand for purchased brides. The newly created MWCD has continued the past work of the DCWD in hosting quarterly meetings with other government agencies and local NGOs to share anti-trafficking ideas and facilitate cooperation on preventing trafficking in persons.

The government also aimed to prevent child labour by offering financial incentives to parents to keep their children in school. Nevertheless, the central government was unable to guard its long, porous borders with Bangladesh and Nepal through which several thousand trafficking victims reportedly enter India each year. The government does not take adequate measures to prevent internal trafficking for sexual exploitation or involuntary servitude despite the prevalence of such trafficking to major cities, and increasingly in smaller cities suburbs.

The Government of India also did not institute a broad public awareness campaign to notify the public of the consequences of engaging in trafficking crimes. India should increase awareness of trafficking issues in rural areas, where there is a high risk of trafficking. India should also better monitor its borders to interdict trafficking victims and trafficking rings. In addition, the government should also consider offering training for men and women travelling overseas for employment, to avoid situations of involuntary servitude abroad.■

PAK-IRAN RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING WORLD SCENARIO

Dr Munir Ahmed Baloch

Pakistan's relations with Iran enjoy a unique strategic significance. During the early days both the countries were seen having exemplary relations. The heritage that encompasses the whole spectrum of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious affinities dates back through centuries. Geographically, Iran and the area which now forms Pakistan had often in history, formed parts of the same empire.

After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, Iran was the first Muslim country which recognised Pakistan and backed Pakistan's entry in United Nations. Pakistan's political, strategic, economic as well as security needs brought it closer to Iran.¹

The strategic and geo-political locations of the two countries had made them constant partners. The convergence interests of the two countries had compelled them to select USA as the guarantor from the point of view of their securities. Both joined Baghdad Pact in 1955, later known as CENTO, which comprised Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Apart from their security reasons, both the countries wanted to bring unity among Muslims. During the Suez Crisis, for instance, Iran and Pakistan along with other Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact had condemned the Israeli, British and French aggression against Egypt. Again, during 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Pakistan and Iran supported Arabs inside and outside the United Nations. In 1956, both the countries settled their boundary disputes, which might, at any time, could become the source of friction between the two countries.²

A new phase of their relations started after the formation of Regional Cooperation for Development on 22nd July, 1964. The RCD was created because they were dissatisfied with CENTO over the Cyprus problem, Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute and Iran over the conflict with Iraq.³

The real test of Pak-Iran relations, however, came during the Indo-Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971.⁴ Iran's moral, political and diplomatic support for

1. Khalid Qureshi, "Pakistan and Iran: A Study in Neighbourly Diplomacy," *Pakistan Horizon*, Third Quarter 1968, p. 34.

2. Mujtaba Rizvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan*, (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971), p. 207.

3. Rouhalla Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), p. 354.

4. For detail account of the wars, see Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan - 1962-69*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

Pakistan, during and after the war, helped tremendously Pakistan's feeling of isolation which was the direct result of the neutral attitude of its Western allies.⁵ In early 1974, deterioration in Pak-Iran relations started, when Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, moved towards the Arab, especially to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as Iran's relations with these countries were strained. Iran opposed Pakistan's move in the Gulf. The Shah of Iran had reasons to believe that Bhutto was supporting the Arabs against Iran.⁶ Pakistan, on the other hand, was concerned with Iran's efforts to develop better relations with India.⁷

In February 1979, the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran. The Government and people of Pakistan whole heartedly welcomed the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Pakistan was the first country which recognised the revolutionary regime.⁸ Pakistan also announced that it would not be a party of any economic sanctions that its allies and the US would impose on Iran. The withdrawal of Pakistan from CENTO in 1979 was yet another decision, highly appreciated by the Iranian Leadership.⁹

Iran's foreign policy was the identification of USA as the principal enemy of Islamic Revolution, was not identical with the principle of Pakistan's foreign policy, which became more close and friendly to USA since 1979. Pakistan's close relations with USA, stood in the way of cordial Pak-Iran relations. Due to developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan had become a direct partner of USA to protect its vital interest as a 'Front Line State'. USA also provided huge economic assistance to Pakistan for furtherance of its global strategy. In 1984, the US Vice President George H W Bush came to Pakistan and before leaving, addressed a press conference in Lahore, in which he branded Iran as a 'Terrorist State'.¹⁰

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan towards the end of 1979, posed serious security, political, social and economic problems both for Iran and Pakistan.¹¹ Although, Iran did not play an active role in Afghanistan due

⁵ *Kayhan International*, December 13, 1971.

⁶ W. Howard Wriggins, "The Balancing Process in Pakistan Foreign Policy," William J. Barnds, Ralph J. D. Braibanti, W. Howard Wriggins, Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Long View*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), p. 334.

⁷ Rashiduudin Khan, "India and Iran: A Quest for Regional Cooperation," *Indian Foreign Review*, vol. II. no. 15, May 1974.

⁸ Dr. Salahuddin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Critical Analysis*, (Karachi: Comprehensive Book Service, 1996), p. 82.

⁹ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*, (Boulden: Westview Press, 1980), p. 244.

¹⁰ *Frontier Post* (Peshawar), November 30, 1988.

¹¹ M A Bhatti, "Refinding Ties with Iran," *Khyber Mail* (Peshawar), March 24, 2001.

to its internal problems, as well as its pre-occupation with Iran-Iraq War, which lasted till 1988.¹²

Preservation of peace and stability in Afghanistan became the main concern for Pakistan and Iran. The withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan resulted in the internal turmoil, which adversely affected these two neighbours. Until 1993, both the countries worked closely in order to bring complete peace and stability in Afghanistan.¹³

The relations between the two countries entered a rough and abnormal phase when Taliban emerged in Afghanistan, and within a short span of two years, became a leading political and military power, under the leadership of Mullah Umer, who took part in fight against the Soviet Union. It is generally believed that the United States masterminded the organisation of Taliban for serving its purpose in Afghanistan.¹⁴ Pakistan was supporting the cause of Taliban, while Iran was a staunch supporter of Anti-Taliban, the Northern Alliance. Their support for the opposite factions had made them natural rivals in the affairs of Afghanistan. The gulf between the two countries widened as Iranian government and media openly criticised Pakistan for creating Taliban.¹⁵

The sectarian problem is yet another area, which puts additional strains on Pak-Iran relations. Iran relations with India are yet another factor which created doubts and misunderstandings in Pak-Iran relations. In the eyes of India, the Taliban victory in Afghanistan would strengthen Pakistan economically, politically and strategically, which was contrary to her foreign policy objectives.¹⁶

The 9/11 is one of the most tragic events in international politics when the World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon in Washington D.C were attacked by terrorists. The terrorist attacks was condemned everywhere in the world, which had taken lives of thousands innocent people. The entire world felt the impact of 9/11 terrorist attacks but the region of Middle East became the specific target of American War of Terror. Pakistan and Iran, however, have different approaches and perceptions with regard to the US war

¹² Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti, "The Crisis in Triangle," *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 53, no. 2. April 5, 2000, pp. 97-98.

¹³ Shireen M. Mazari, "Soviet Disintegration and Challenges in Pak-Iran Relations," *Radiance Newsweek*, vol. xxvii, no. 18, February 1994, p. 23.

¹⁴ Richard Mackenzie, "The United States and Taliban," *The News* (Islamabad), October 31, 1995.

¹⁵ *Tehran Times*, October 15, 1998.

¹⁶ *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), August 21, 1998.

against terrorism. Pakistan was forced to relinquish its long standing support to Taliban. ... Pakistan once again assumed the role of frontline state.¹⁷

Pakistan joined American-led war against terrorism and decided to abandon Taliban and side with Washington. As General Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, said, "This decision was taken to avoid immense damage and loss that could occur to Pakistan if it did not cooperate with the US. The Pakistani nation, on the whole, has demonstrated the level of maturity in understanding the implications arising out of this serious situation and helped the government in accepting without any resistance, the policy option exercised by the government in the supreme interest of the country."¹⁸

The case of Iran was different. Unlike Pakistan, she followed active neutrality in war against international terrorism. The two countries (Pakistan and Iran) chose to behave, could have an impact on their mutual relationship. The only way in which misunderstanding can be averted is through dialogue and policy coordination.

Iran-US nuclear tension has become a big concern for all members of the family of nations; however, Pakistan may receive the immediate and direct effects of this tussle. Iran desires to continue with her nuclear programme declaring it as its sovereign right while US takes it against what she calls it against 'national interests.' The question arises would Pakistan allow its territory to be used for attack against Iran? If not, how would Pakistan deal with the military operation of the US? These issues have become central to the dynamics of new Pak-US relationship, and while there is a clear "No", the second question still has not been answered clearly. The US, after its occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, is now trying to launch an attack on Iran. Close Pak-US strategic collaboration also constrained Pakistan to support Iran's policy of the security of the Gulf by the Gulf Countries.

But Iran, instead of doubting Pakistan's relations with US would, instead, find it a very satisfying and encouraging statement by the President of Pakistan during his official visits to the US, the UK, Germany and France in mid 2003, "that it worried and concerned him a lot when a country like Iran (so important to Pakistan) is pointed at and placed in the axis of evil paradigm. It bothered him a lot when he heard about countries like Iran being targeted."¹⁹

¹⁷ Nazir Hussain, "Pak-Iran Relations in the Post 9/11 Period: Regional and Global Impact," *Regional Studies*, vol. xx, no. 4, Autumn 2002, p. 52.

¹⁸ Yu Bin, "Why Pakistan Side with US in War against Terrorism," *Pacific News Service*, September 21, 2001.

¹⁹ "Nuclear Option Last Resort, Musharraf," *The News* (Islamabad), June 20, 2003

Conclusion

On her part, Pakistan can play a vital role in decreasing tension between Iran and the US. With its close relations with US, Pakistan is well placed to use its good offices for rapprochements between the two and also there must be realization on the part of the leadership of both countries (Pakistan and Iran), that in the emerging strategic environment of the region, the security concerns of Pakistan and Iran are mutually indivisibly interlinked. As the American threatening posture against Iran which President Bush described as the part of an 'axis of evil', Pakistan should reiterate its strong concerns to the US against any move to coerce Iran which would be disastrous for the region. There is no evidence to link Iran to any sponsorship of terrorism.

However, both Pakistan and Iran must stand against the designs of all those external and internal elements, who try to damage their relations. Pakistan and Iran with their steadfastness, seriousness and mutual approach could foil all such designs, once and for all. Within this new environment, it suits both the countries to build a strong, closer relationship in order to meet the challenges of the time. Since 9/11, on one hand new problems and challenges, coupled with new conditions on the other hand have also provided an opportunity for an increased cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. ■

ECONOMIC STRESS ON PAKISTAN IN CHANGING REGIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Dr Musarrat Jabeen

International economic relations, managed by International Financial Institutions, spurred by Washington Consensus & WTO and postulated by UNDP intern politics establish the dichotomies that mean different things for different nation state systems.

The US trade and energy relations with India though based on liberal economic forces are supposed to strengthen the international hegemony of America and the regional hegemony of India. It will also affect the regional parity of South Asia, particularly of Pakistan.

The real politics of external perspective of Pakistan economy remained unevaluated as denominator to affect the economy of Pakistan. This realisation and the dynamic sense of self in nation-states leading to non subjugation behaviour sets forth the hypothesis for this paper, "If the external perspective of Pakistan economy is well taken care of ; then, the probability of future economic instability may be reduced."

The significance of this study stems from corroborated features of foreign aid and trade referred to regional and international political economy, deepening economic stress on Pakistan. The objective of the study is to manage economic stress on Pakistan posed by regional and international economic politics, with internal capacity building to face the contemporary challenges.

The paper is divided into five sections; following the introduction, section two gives system-wide view of Pakistan, section three elaborates economic stress on Pakistan, section four presents precautionary economic politics model, and section five gives the final resume.

Contemporary economic stress includes all explicitly and implicitly competitive/coercive relationships, involving human beings as individuals and as groups for economic gain, regardful of regional and international environment.


The study values systems thinking theory, while seeking implications of regional-international economic trends on Pakistan. Systems theory of international politics explores the structure of the system, and variations in it, affecting the interacting units and outcomes they produce. International

system emerges from the interaction of states: constraints them from taking certain actions, while propelling them towards others.¹

The prevailing economic trends may permeate the economic stress on Pakistan. The stress is likely to emerge through regimental system (see Figure 1).


The analytical perspective, chosen for this paper is international and regional economic trends, emphasising the economic stress on Pakistan. The question, here posed is; whether system level cause may permeate unit level effect? Or vice versa. The paper explores the linkages between international trends and economic stress on Pakistan (see Figure 2)

Figure 1



Note: Figures 1 and 2, and Table 1 have been developed by author.

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991). p. 21.

Figure 2**Specific Argument of This Paper**

When we talk about developed countries' economic actions towards less developed countries, these are foreign aid, foreign debt or foreign investment. In case of Pakistan, these factors are being compounded with recurrent conflict in Afghanistan and regional and international economic trends, which lead to economic stress.

Economic stress is existing in international political economy because of competition for meagre resources due to increase in demand, but it is specific to Pakistan as certain natural economic systems which may work are barred to work, e.g., Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline; such projects may bring economic prosperity not only to Pakistan but to the region as well.

System-Wide View of Pakistan

To have system wide view of Pakistan an index has been developed and elaborated in Table 1.

Table 1
Index for System Wide Valuation of Pakistan

Indicators	Factors
The size of the unit involved	Geo-strategic potential
The volume of interest of the unit involved	Depiction of internal capacity in external affairs.
The growth of units appearance size in the system	The amount of potential to gravitate the external elements.

Pakistan's topography provided bases to launch attacks against the Soviet-backed government. Pakistan provides a natural strategic base to fight against international terrorism. There are mineral resources, which are just about to be tapped. Thirty exploration companies, mostly British and American, are active in the region. Natural gas pipeline linking Iran with India via Pakistan, and the other linking Caspian Sea gas rich Turkmenistan with Pakistan via Afghanistan: these proposed pipelines, plus the development of Gwadar into deep 27-berth port that would accommodate both large tankers and military vessels.²

Economic Stress on Pakistan

This section makes us realise how Pakistan is screwed in regional-international economic system through the instrument of foreign aid, while India through foreign trade. The situation aggravates with recurrent conflict in Afghanistan and its fall out on Pakistan.

Economic inequality leads to economic stress. Economic inequality refers to disparities in the distribution of economic assets and income. The term typically refers to inequality among individuals and groups within a society, but can also refer to inequality among nations. There is a debate as to what equality should mean. Some think in terms of equality of opportunity³ and others in terms of equality of outcome.⁴ International economic trends have increased the economic stress on Pakistan. Following are the relevant factors:

² Asia Times, September 12, 2003, <http://www.atimes.com>.

³ Equal opportunity is a descriptive term to provide a certain environment in which the nation states are not excluded from international and regional economic activity.

⁴ Equality of outcome is a form of egalitarianism which seeks to reduce or eliminate difference in material conditions between nation state systems.

Pakistan is an index state, recipient of foreign aid, pegged to external doctrines. Recent foreign aid Pakistan is an extension of the same arena. With the government's commitment to, "try respecting human rights, fulfilling all international conventions, controlling problem of corruption, and bringing transparency", Department for International Development (DFID) plans to double its aid framework for Pakistan to GB Pound 480 million for the period 2008-2011.⁵ DFID will be revising its Country Assistance Plan (CAP) for Pakistan during 2007, based on the 10-year Development Partnership Arrangement, signed with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, reflecting DFID's new approach to conditionality and predictability. With an additional grant of \$20 million per year, DFID would make a difference in delivery of services through citizen community boards, initiative, new ideas, reforms and interventions in health and education.

The World Bank is actively considering a \$6.5 billion four-year support programme for Pakistan to assist this promising economy overcome the difficulties that deficient physical and human development infrastructure pose in its effort to accelerate the growth further in a way that benefit widest sections of the society.⁶

A high level session of the Pakistan-US Joint Committee on Science and Technology, was held on February 13-14, 2007 in Washington to deliberate on 11 major areas, including renewable energy and linking the two countries through cyber infrastructure. It underscored the importance that the two sides attach to expanding cooperation in diverse areas of science & technology and higher education. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan. The MoU aims cooperation between the two sides in areas such as animal science, agriculture, natural resources management, aquaculture and other additional fields as may mutually be agreed upon.⁷

Pakistan has opened up her economy and pursued a policy of deregulation and privatisation which helped it to promote foreign investment in the country. The United States has urged Pakistan to achieve political stability, ensure rule of law and promote transparency for consolidating political and economic relations between the two countries, as it is necessary to ensure foreign investment in Pakistan by Americans.

As Pakistan signed WTO in 1995, she has unilaterally liberalized her economy that she has not only lost the market abroad but also within her

⁵ Schezee Zaidi, "DFID to Double Pakistan's Aid Framework to Pound 480m," *The News* (Islamabad), February 16, 2007.

⁶ John W. Wall, "WB considers \$6.5-billion plan for Pakistan," *Gulf Today*, September 19, 2006.

⁷ Mariana Babar, "Pakistan US Discuss Prospects of Cyber Link," <http://www.eldis.org>.

borders as well. The effects of trade liberalisation on fiscal balance are very crucial to consider, as most of the under developed countries have budget deficit due to revenue constraint and rising trends in expenditure. Successful trade liberalisation implies that it should not have negative effects on the revenue generation.

Table 2
Tax Revenue by Type of Tax (%GDP)

Ratio to GDP	Developed countries	Developing countries
Total tax revenue	31.21	18.50
Income taxes	10.96	5.51
Domestic taxes	9.43	5.21
Foreign taxes	0.72	5.13
Social security	8.90	1.30
Wealth and property	1.11	0.45
Other	0.10	0.45

Sources: Burgess (1997), cited in Toye in 2000 p. 26, Table 1

Table 2 shows that the foreign tax to GDP ratio is 5.13% in the case of developing countries as compared to 0.72% in the case of developed countries. According to Toye, when there is trade liberalisation in any country, then there is a decrease in tax revenue from foreign taxes, due to the fall or elimination of tariff barriers. This increases the budget deficit which is a common problem in developing countries. It means that the negative implications of trade liberalisation are more severe for developing countries.⁸ For revenue generation, the government reduces public expenditure, which effects economic growth.

The United States sent the largest ever trade mission to India in November 2006 to explore possibilities for benefiting from the Indo-US nuclear deal. A delegation of 238 businessmen, representing 186 companies to business summit in Mumbai on November 28, was led by the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, Franklin Lavin. The Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Confederation of Indian Industry have jointly organised this summit for interacting with the chief executive officers of American companies and organisations engaged in nuclear trade. US companies will spend \$100 billion in Indian energy market as

⁸ Prometheus, "Fiscal Implications of Trade Liberalization", *Money Plus - The Nation* (Lahore), April 9, 2007, p. 14.

US senate approved the India nuclear deal overwhelmingly triggering a race for the lucrative Indian market. Ron Somer, President of the US-India Business Council, says that while American business will focus on nuclear energy, the deal goes far beyond nuclear reactors. Only two dozens of the 238 business leaders are participating in the Mumbai summit energy interests. Others are from across a range of sectors, from IT to manufacturing to entertainment. India's power generation capacity stands at 132,000 mw, but it is seeking to add 100,000 mw from conventional energy sources to sustain economic growth running 8% a year. Nuclear energy could provide a further 60,000 mw. US India-Business Council estimates that India will spend as much as \$500 billion over next decade on energy sector and related development. Besides providing energy to its domestic and industrial consumers, India will also need to build infrastructure crucial to boosting its industry. These include building and expanding ports, airports, roads, and railways.⁹

India will build 30 more reactors of 1,000 mw each to meet revised targets of nuclear power generation. India already has announced a plan to spend more than \$40 billion for this purpose. Government-run agencies are looking to mark out coastal sites for 1,000-1,650 mw reactors for the future. Every new site will have the potential to hold a cluster of reactors, producing a total of 6,000-10,000 mw. New Delhi is also working on amending the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate the private sector's participation in nuclear power production. Many Indian private companies, including Reliance and Tata, have also expressed interest in building nuclear plants.

Recurrent Conflict in Afghanistan

The economic agendas of involved states in Afghan plethora, and the inadequacy of international system to manage the conflict in Afghanistan to avoid its pernicious impact on Pakistan, support the recurrent conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan is trajectory of Afghan conflict, as the existing networks of Afghan conflict, are linked to rest of world system through Pakistan, whether it is hot pursuit of war, transit trade or opium politics. Following factors remain to permeate the Afghan Conflict:

Natural Resources at the Heart of Conflict

At least in three clear ways, natural resources lie at the heart of conflicts that hold the potential for mass violence through the deliberate manipulation of resource shortages for hostile purposes (for example, using food or water as a weapon); competing claims of sovereignty over resource endowments (such as rivers or oil and other fuel deposits); and the exacerbating role played by environmental degradation and resources depletion in areas characterized by political instability, rapid population growth, chronic economic deprivation,

⁹ "US Sending Largest Trade Team to India", *Dawn* (Karachi), November 26, 2006.

and societal stress. In 1980's, Soviet Union persisted in Afghanistan to approach hot waters of Arabian Sea but was resisted by the other countervailing force (United States of America) of Cold War. In 1990's the Central Asian oil has emerged as the point of strategic and economic attraction. In fact, the economic opportunities created because of collapse of Soviet Union have caused the rift among the competing antagonists specially the Jihad wagers once strengthened by American led coalition, deem themselves the righteous owners of natural bounties of Central Asia.

Uncertainty

This reality of international system, dominated by the loss of genuine loyalty: where the actors, whether they are individuals or entities with economic and political agendas or states are pursuing the material ends as the ultimate goal, distinctly embosses the element of uncertainty. The uncertainty is linked to strategic apprehensions, food insecurity, political instability, politics of foreign aid and incoherence in conflict management instruments.

Survival of human beings is at risk, because of food insecurity, which has been increased sharply in recent years and remains high throughout Afghanistan, despite massive relief work, a change of regime and the presence of foreign/peace keeping military forces. The situation reverts its impact on Pakistan.

The Cultural Identity

In existing international system, cultural identity has succeeded the animosity existed between two economic ideologies of Communism and Capitalism but the objectives are again the economic gains. The evolutionary process of present cultural identity has been entwined with global vision of the West, being the powerful and proactive.

The Afghan conflict is being gripped by the "Clash of Civilizations" philosophy. The factor which has supported the most Afghan conflict is the built up of Jihad spirit in 1980's, on the basis of Islam.

Devaluation of Justice and Peace Values

As recognised by UNESCO, justice and peace are public goods and values; the most devalued in international normative context, when applied on Afghan context.

The Geneva Convention explicitly states that civilians should not be objects of attack, and that acts that are designed to promote terror among civilians are prohibited. The war in Afghanistan has been in violation of the Geneva Convention.

Taliban by focusing their attacks on 'soft targets', such as aid workers and Afghan government employees, they have effectively halted the development work in one third of the country.

Precautionary Economic Politics Model

Here the objective is to manage economic stress on Pakistan vis-à-vis regional and international trade scenario. In this section, the basis of action means the *stimulating factors* and the *foundation* to act upon to avail the opportunities, and to cope up with the threats.

Bases of Action

- Without sustained efforts to build up productivity in Pakistan, there would be an increased risk of humanitarian crises and even civil conflict.
- Agriculture accounted for 70 per cent of the labour force in Pakistan in 2000-2003, but overall the decade 2000-2010, will be the first in which the economically active non-farming population would grow faster than its rural counterpart. Mostly Pakistan is unable to generate enough productive, off-farm jobs to escape the poverty trap. There is a need to translate growth into jobs and poverty reduction.
- The economy of Pakistan has undertaken rapid trade liberalisation. It has grown by an average of 5.9 per cent the rate which is the highest in two decades. The increase is associated with foreign aid and investment between 1999 and 2004.
- Also, crucial are high demand in Pakistan for oil and other natural resources. In 2005, the inflow of foreign investment (FDI) in Pakistan increased impressively up to 61 per cent; the country received \$445 million as foreign direct investment against \$277 million in previous year. Such capital is not known for creating a “virtuous circle” of widening economic activity and employment.

Managing Economic Stress at National Level

It is two-tier strategy comprising following components:

- a. Converting economic growth into human development
- b. Establishing Diverse Trade Abilities

Converting Economic Growth into Human Development

“There is a need to translate growth into jobs and poverty reduction.”

UNCTAD Chief Supachai Panitchpakdi, 2006

According to UNCTAD Report 2006, the LDCs could achieve growth rates of over 7.0 per cent if their labour forces were fully employed and

they exploited sources of improved productivity.¹⁰ Key steps would include improving infrastructure, particularly in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors.

I have found some artifacts of good governance and institutional examples in other countries; which may be tried in national and provincial institutional practices, as we have to save ourselves from self inflicted tyranny.

John Maynard Keynes had won the argument while much of the western world, as a result of government inaction, had become stuck in a deep depression. Looking at the misery wrought by government apathy and ineptitude, Keynes argued for action. He argued that the principles of economics should not be used to accept a low level equilibrium trap in which economies get stuck at high levels of unemployment, low levels of incomes, and correspondingly, low levels of output. These work on one another to perpetuate human misery. This was the case during the Great Depression in the 1930s. It was legitimate to pump public money into the economy as a dire necessity. Since without government intervention, the situation would continue to deteriorate, policy makers could not and should not act by increasing aggregate demand. This, they could do by increasing public expenditure, particularly in the activities that were labour intensive. President Roosevelt built his economic programme around proposed Keynesian remedies and brought his country out of depression.¹¹

Meles Zenawi was a man, who had led a seventeen-year guerilla war against the bloody Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. Meles' forces won in 1991 and then the government began the hard work of rebuilding the country. A doctor by training, Meles had formally studied economics because he knew that to bring his country out of poverty would require nothing less than economic transformation, and he demonstrated knowledge of economics. It dramatically cut back on military expenditure — remarkable for a government; which had come to power through military means — because it knew that funds spent on weapons were funds that could not be spent on fighting poverty.

Botswana is one of the success stories of development; it averaged a growth rate of more than 7.5 per cent from 1961 through 1997. She availed the services outside advisers, from a variety of public institutions and private organisations including the Ford Foundation. The advisers helped Botswana map out a programme for country's future.

China's is a classic case where equity was achieved first and consistently high growth later under Deng. China turned the "grow now, distribute later" slogan completely on the head with "equity first sprint later".

¹⁰ "Economic Growth Provides Little for the Poorest: UN (2006)," *UNCTAD Report*.

¹¹ Shahid Javed Burki, "More of Keynes, Again," *Dawn* (Karachi), November 28, 2006, <http://www.dawn.com/2006/11/28/op.htm>.

It is not that China was not growing as they were engaging their people in national development. Rather, they set their growth rate targets as per their own requirement and initial conditions. And they did achieve rates of growth as 19 per cent in the 1950s (1958), 13 per cent in 1960s (1966) and 13 per cent in the 1970s (1973), when the economy hit the peaks. However, priority under Mao was on integration of people in the process of development. Mao was developing mindsets, imparting a philosophy, trying to share a vision, articulating a mission, and converting revolutionary thoughts into action in real life. When the "humblest" were pronounced and believed as "most intelligent", they moved mountains literally and virtually. The United Nations commended the Chinese effort and success at providing basic needs for all its population.

Poland employed alternative strategies to those advocated by the Washington Consensus. Poland is the most successful of the Eastern European countries: Poland did emphasise things to which the IMF had paid insufficient attention — such as the importance of democratic support for the reforms, which entailed trying to keep unemployment low, providing benefits for those who were unemployed and adjusting pensions to inflation, and creating the institutional infrastructure, required to make a market economy function.

Bangladesh became a world leader in textile production because a Korean company invited 130 Bangladeshi workers to learn its production methods, in return for a percentage of the profits in future enterprises. Almost all of its workers went on to establish successful textile companies of their own. In fact, critical knowledge, the kind those Bangladeshi textile workers seized upon, is not easily identifiable in the abstract. First entrepreneurs must perceive an opportunity for profit; then a few opportunistic people will see what knowledge is required. And then more will. It is technology and the worker's knowledge of how to use it that really creates the growth, as Easterly shows, not the machinery per se.¹² Such artifacts may be replicated.

A research study compiled by the World Bank in 1993, "The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy," identified four major elements in the governance structures of these countries that enabled them to achieve rapid and sustained growth. These were the establishment of honest, competent and well-paid bureaucracies recruited on merit; the employment of technocrats for formulation and implementation of economic policy; the development of legal and regulatory systems; and the institution of formal and

¹² Bruce Bartlett, Senior Fellow, National Center for Policy Analysis, "The Hazards of Throwing Money at the Problem," review of William Easterly, "The Elusive Quest for Growth" (MIT, 2001), *Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 2001. For text <http://www.ncpa.org/oped/bartlett/bartlett01.html>.

informal mechanism of dialogue and partnership between the public and the private sector.

There should be a balanced view of the role of government, one which recognises both the limitations and failures of markets and government, but which sees the two as working together, in partnership, with the precise nature of that partnership differing among countries, depending on their stages of both political and economic development. But at whatever stage of political and economic development a country is, the government makes a difference. Weak governments and too-intrusive governments have both hurt stability and growth. The Asian financial crisis was brought on by a lack of adequate regulation of the financial sector. In some areas, markets fail to exist; governments have provided student loans, for instance, because the market, on its own, failed to provide funding for investments in human capital. And for a variety of reasons, markets are often not self-regulating — there are booms and busts — so the government has an important role in promoting economic stability.

Establishing Diverse Trade Abilities

Pakistan's bulk of exports tend to be primary products like textile and leather, the prices are highly unstable and tend to fall against the price of imports, increasing the deterioration of terms of trade. The trade abilities of energy and services may be emphasised. Pakistan should assert her status to manage the energy trade to and from the region.

Trade in Energy: World energy consumption is projected to expand at an average annual growth rate of 2.1% by 2020. About 70% of the increase would be accounted for by non OECD member economies, two thirds of which are from the Asian region.¹³ The development of energy trade system via Pakistan seems natural because of potential and availability of energy resources in and around Pakistan, the logic accents due to the projected demand of energy in Pakistan, India and China. Such development of energy trade is replete with challenges.

The Iran-Pakistan-India 2,600-kilometre gas pipeline is estimated to cost more than seven billion dollars. The White House is pushing against Iran for suspected "nuclear weapons programme". A multi billion planned pipeline sending Iranian gas through Pakistan to India is under threat. Not only would the scheme mean greater energy security for India and Pakistan, but it would give Islamabad, Delhi and Tehran stakes in regional stability. America intends to have comprehensive control on energy region while contending with European and Asian contestants.

¹³ "How Can Regional Cooperation Improve Energy Management in South Asia?" *Research Information System*, [www.http://:ris.org](http://:ris.org).

While the gas pipeline diplomacy was underway, the Bush administration conveyed its concern over the proposed deal to New Delhi and Islamabad. The US invoked the Iran-Lybia Sanctions Act, a domestic law that forbade any investment of \$40 million or more in any oil enterprise in Iran and Lybia. This is tantamount to exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction, especially when neither Iran nor Pakistan nor India had solicited any loan from the US. The threat did not work on Iran or India but it was bound to give Pakistan government anxious moments, given the nature of Pakistan-American relations.

India and Pakistan may jointly develop the hydrogen vision for South East Asia. If these two powers have broken the atom, surely hundreds of scientists and engineers of both countries can develop hydrogen fuel cell technology. As the price of fuel cells and accompanying appliances continues to plummet with new innovations and economics of scale, they will become far more broadly available just as the case with transistor radios, computers and cellular phones.

South Asia Infra-structure Fund (SAIF) is raised to deal with energy issues; the launch of a South Asia Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform through SAIF could lead to a long term South Asian Strategy for hydrogen and fuel cells to guide the transition to a Hydrogen Future in the next 15-20 years.

The hydrogen vision on which many countries are working is a vital area of co-operation worldwide. India and Pakistan in particular can create a future for the poor masses of South Asia.

Trade in Services: Pakistan needs to generate some 1.5 million to 2 million jobs a year. This is well beyond the capacity of the Pakistan economy, in which much of current growth is coming from the capital intensive or of knowledge intensive sectors. Employment abroad is inescapable need of the time.

Statistics related to trade in services are not properly recorded. State Bank of Pakistan intends to disaggregate the services trade figures from the balance of payments statistics, so there would be clarity of figures.

The services sector in India has grown 12 per cent while in Pakistan it is 6 per cent. As a result, the Indian economy relies much less on the agricultural sector and much on the knowledge-edge-intensive services sector, because of its better record in human development and investment in human capital. Pakistan continues to rely on its large agricultural sector while its industrial sector is much less diversified and its services sector consists largely of low skilled labour with low productivity.

The demand for networking skills in Pakistan will exceed supply by 45 per cent in the next three years and there will be a shortage of 20,600 skilled people required to help drive economic growth, unless urgent steps are taken to address the situation. The fact is related to demand for networking skills in

Middle East and Pakistan, part of a series of Cisco systems, the worldwide leader in networking.¹⁴

Financial surveillance was launched by the United States of America soon after 9/11 for close scrutiny of financial flows to countries such as Pakistan where external capital may help to finance Islamic extremists.¹⁵ In the UK and the USA, much of the illegal traffic is from South and Central America but of the estimated two million illegal immigrants from other parts of the world, Pakistanis are the largest. Gulf states expect an "irradiation of instability and extremism" from Pakistan and have placed severe restriction on the import of labour from Pakistan.¹⁶

In this predicament, services trade should be institutionalised through two pronged strategy. Our foreign offices abroad should become active to locate the markets of natural persons. Higher Education Commission of Pakistan and universities should be directed to produce the services according to the market demand.

Trade in Defence Products: The defence exports amounting to an additional \$275 million and services exports in three sectors are to the tune of \$392 million. The trade in this sector can be promoted. Even by putting our youth on martial training in directed way will boost the trade in services, as our armed human resource is reputed world wide.

Managing Economic Stress at Regional Level

"The man who has the time, the discrimination, and the sagacity to collect and comprehend the principal facts and the man who must act upon them must draw near to one another and feel that they are engaged in a common enterprise."

Woodrow Wilson, address to the American Political Science Association,
December 27, 1950

The idea to gear up with this strategy is to utilize the potential of the region as the European Union is doing. As far as the action required to move from insecurity to security is concerned, it is necessary to develop as wide and full range of partnerships as possible at regional level in order to strengthen a network of direct links. Secondly, it is necessary to develop specific regional and sub-regional cooperation, consolidate common structures and foster cooperation.

¹⁴ "Shortage of Networking Skill to Hamper Economic Growth," *Dawn* (Karachi), July 21, 2006.

¹⁵ Shahid Javed Burki, "Time to open up the Political System," *Dawn* (Karachi), July 19, 2006.

¹⁶ Najmuddin A. Shaikh, "Cost of an Extremist Image," *Dawn* (Karachi), November 22, 2006.

Both Pakistan and India are endowed with large populations, comprising of nearly 95 per cent of total population of South Asia. Nearly 400 million in India and 130-140 million in Pakistan now belong to the middle class with average purchasing power. As raw producing and semi industrialized countries, they have enough human material and sizeable managerial skills to export; besides they have capacity to absorb foreign investment and undertake joint ventures.

In the 2007 SAARC Conference the need for services chapter has been felt following growing opportunities in the field of the services owing to increased tradability of services in the recent past. Services have come to occupy between 40-55 per cent of GDP in the South Asian countries. The services sector is the second most important source of employment after agriculture in these countries, absorbing about 20-30 percent of the labour force. Certain sectors such as information technology (IT), business process outsourcing (BPO), tourism, construction, and energy services are important contributors to value-added employment, exports, and investment flows in these countries.¹⁷

Both Pakistan and India should overcome the 'vision deficit' because the issues that divide both the countries would be easier to solve if one had a common goal or purpose or vision of the sort of relationship that they wish to building the future. Indian Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon quoted in seminar on "Indo-Pakistan conflict and its Resolution" in April 2007 that Jinnah wished that Pakistan should be to India as Canada is to the USA.

Because of her geo-political situation, Pakistan should compound benefits from South Asia, Central Asia, and Middle East by building a task force at national level and networking abroad with already available diplomatic infrastructure.

Managing Economic Stress at International Level

"Develop a global partnership for Development---related to business community."

(8th goal of Millennium Development Goals)

The concept of international public economy may be promoted. The concept of international public economy is new: International public economics may include the global economic governance (DC's, UNO, IFI's, WTO) its policies affect the economy and societies across the globe. International public economy as to how considers the choices of the governing elite are made and how they can improve or hinder the economic efficiency. It also investigates the extent to which it is possible for the

¹⁷ Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Saarc Talks on Services Soon," *Dawn* (Karachi), April 15, 2007.

governing elite to influence the distribution of income and wealth. The powerful nation states practising their interests at transnational level must establish their legitimacy through the concept of public economy, as the nation states do within their boundaries.

The governments of developing countries should keep intact the systems or positive situations so as to promote their economic interests. They have to be highly aware of incoming conflict potential, as well as the general limitations posed by the situations. Today, there are over 225 multinational companies (MNC's), operating in Pakistan. There is an immense potential for greater cross-sector partnership between citizen's organisations and corporations for social development.

The international trading system must incorporate the basic norms of social justice and environmental sustainability rather than depend solely on the norms and outcomes of free trade. The purpose of development assistance should be to equip people and communities through financial and technical means to implement their own plans for just and sustainable development.

Fair trade may be promoted. Fair Trade is an alternative approach to conventional international trade. It is a trading partnership, which aims at sustainable development for excluded and disadvantaged producers. It seeks to do this by providing better trading conditions, by awareness raising and by campaigning. Fair Trade in Europe started as a grassroots movement over 40 years ago. The aim was to alleviate poverty in the "South" — Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean — by building direct, sustainable relationships with disadvantaged producers and providing fair access to markets in the "North".

A forum or consortium should be established with India, Iran, China, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan; all these states are playing their stakes in the development of energy system. They should be brought on table to bear the responsibility as well. Pakistan should take this initiative; she may also take the situation in Balochistan to this forum to manage the conflict related to energy. The level of conflict may go down in this way. In the present context, we should oppose any military action to deal with Iran's nuclear issue which must be resolved through peaceful means. While our relations with the US have their own unique importance, we should, to use an American term, "dehyphenate" them from our relations with Iran. The IPI gas pipeline project which is in the interest of all the three countries should be pursued vigorously.

Pakistan should try to make linkages with think tanks particularly working on energy politics to create a soft corner for Pakistan's energy supply which will finally serve the international conflict management strategies.

Conclusion

- The links exist between conflict, international economic system, trade systems, and economic stress on Pakistan.
- It may be seen, in particular, that there is a contrast between the geopolitical location of economic stress and location of the intervention capacities available to manage it.
- Economic stress caused by extra regional states must be accounted as it will cause system wide effect.
- Pakistan's vulnerability is increasing because of economic stress and pressure from forces such as population growth, resource depletion and poverty.
- Arresting economic stress on Pakistan depends squarely on internal management of foreign aid and foreign investment, international cooperation vis-à-vis conflict management strategies.
- It is found that the economic stress has not been taken into account while negotiating with donor agencies.
- Pakistan does not need foreign loans, it is the bureaucrats who make the government to opt for loans because of their personal interest and of course of donors' interests who want to make Pakistan a subjugated country.¹⁸

The Afghan conflict has broader impact on Pakistan. The conflict management strategies carried on through Pakistan towards Afghanistan have established war economic trade links, the effects of which Pakistan cannot escape on its socio-political structure. ■

¹⁸ Nadeem-ul-Haq, Director Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, personal interview.

DURAND LINE: A PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE

Lutfur Rehman

Durand Line is the name of about 2500 km long Pak-Afghan border, right from Wakhan to the Iranian border. This line was demarcated in the light of the Durand Agreement signed in November 1893 in Kabul. This is perhaps the only agreement of the world so widely misquoted and distorted. A well-organised campaign is going on in the North West Frontier Province to create confusion in the minds of general public regarding the Durand Line. Even highly educated people, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, are not clear about the nature of this accord. Some people, are involved in this propaganda due to ignorance while others are doing so to further their vested interests. Successive Afghan governments have also propagated that under this accord, a major portion of that country had gone into the control of Pakistan. This is the main hurdle in improvement of relations between the two countries right from partition till now. Similarly, Pakhtoon nationalists are of the opinion that the agreement was to stay in force for a period of a century. They argue that it expired in November 1993 and Pakistan is bound to return NWFP to Afghanistan.¹ They assert that NWFP is a disputed land which, rightfully and legally, belongs to Afghanistan. An Afghan writer, Madam Razia Naeemi claims that "under this accord, Bajour, Swat and Chitral were snatched from Afghanistan and merged with British India."² Other Afghan writers and scholars alleged that the document signed by the then Afghan ruler, Amir Abdur Rahman was in English. The Amir did not understand English language; therefore, the agreement is of suspicious nature or false documentation. To respond to these claims, we have to study in depth the history of Afghanistan as well as Swat, Bajour, Chitral and Dir. This will enable us to differentiate between facts and assumptions.

As is well-known, Afghans are living in the areas now called Afghanistan for thousands of years but they had no independent country till 1747. At the beginning of 18th century, Herat, Farah and Kandahar were in possession of Persia, Balkh was a part of Bokhara, while Kabul was included in the Mughal Empire of Delhi.³ Later on, Nadir Shah also conquered Kabul.

¹ Da Durand Karkha, (The Durand Line), compiled by Mr. Afzal Khan Lala, Peshawar 2004, p. 106.

² Ibid., p. 23.

³ J. Talboys Wheeler, Memorandum on Afghanistan Affairs from A.D. 1700, Calcutta, 1869, p. 5.

He then raised a contingent of sixteen thousand Afghans, twelve thousand from the Abdali and four thousand from the Ghilzai tribes. In 1747, Nadir Shah was assassinated and as a consequence, anarchy prevailed after his death; Persia gradually lost control over its northern provinces. Ahmad Shah Abdali, an officer in Persian army, got a chance to liberate some northern provinces from Persia. In this way, Afghanistan appeared on the globe as an independent and sovereign country. He assumed the title of Dur-e-Durran (Pearl of Pearls), from which the Abdali tribe became known as the Durranis. Five years later, Timoor Mirza, the son of Ahmad Shah Durrani, married a Mughal princess and she was given Punjab in dowry.⁴ After the murder of the Mughal king, Alamgir in 1760, the Marathas incited the Sikhs to revolt and seize the country, which was the appanage of the Mughal princess. Therefore, Ahmad Shah Abdali decided to punish the Marathas who assembled an army of two hundred thousand men to stop the advance of Ahmad Shah Abdali, but they were badly defeated on the plain of Panipat in January 1761. Next year, he defeated the Sikhs near Lahore and annexed Kashmir in his dominion. It was a Herculean task for Ahmad Shah Abdali to keep hold on such a vast empire. In 1767, he returned Central Punjab to the Sikhs, retaining Peshawar and northern Punjab under his control. In 1773, Ahmad Shah Abdali died and was succeeded by Timoor Mirza. After Ahmad Shah Abdali's death, his empire shrank with unexpected speed. His successors lost one by one all captured territories. Ranjeet Singh seized Multan in 1810, Kashmir in 1819 and Peshawar in 1822.⁵ Britain, Ranjeet Singh and Afghan ruler, Shah Shujah signed a tripartite treaty in 1838. Main purpose of the treaty was to contain growing influence of Russia. Under this accord, Shah Shujah ceded Peshawar and all other areas to Sikhs, which had been formerly in the possession of Afghanistan. Ranjeet Singh died in 1839 and ten years later, the British Government of India captured Peshawar.

During this period, Britain and Czarist Russia were expanding their borders in this region, the one advancing from the south and the other from the north. There was a real threat of armed conflict between the two powers. In order to avert this contingency, they mutually agreed to halt their onward march at a reasonable distance from one another. In this way, Afghanistan became a "buffer state" between the two powers. The difficulty confronted by Afghanistan in those days has been rightly described by Amir Abdur Rahman, a ruler of that country. The Amir says that "his country is like a poor goat on which both the lion (Britain) and the bear (Russia) had fixed their eyes."⁶ To protect territorial integrity of Afghanistan, Amir Abdur Rahman determined to

⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

⁵ Ibid., p. 60.

⁶ *Life of Amir Abdur Rahman*, translated by Prof. Aziz Muhammad Bugti, Quetta, 2006, p. 248.

define its clear-cut frontiers, which it did not have till the last quarter of the 19th century. With Russia, it demarcated its frontiers in 1873. To demarcate Indo-Afghan boundary, Amir Abdur Rahman asked the British Indian government to send a mission to Kabul. The Indian government appointed a mission, headed by its Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand. The mission arrived in Kabul on 2nd October 1893 and was given a red carpet welcome. A royal reception with 21 guns salute was arranged in its honour. After detailed discussion and deliberation for over forty days, both the parties arrived at an accord, known as "The Durand Agreement". Amir Abdur Rahman and Mortimer Durand signed the agreement in Kabul on 12 November 1893. Next day, a special Darbar was arranged to celebrate signing of the agreement. Leading Afghan elders and civil and military officers attended the Darbar.⁷ The Amir thanked Durand and members of his mission for visiting Kabul and signing of the agreement.⁸ The Amir was quite contented, because he had gained more than his expectations.

A special commission known as the Asmar Boundary Commission, was set up to demarcate the border in Chitral, Bajour and Dir. Commissioner Peshawar, Cunningham and Afghan Commander in Chief were also members of the Commission. The commission started its work on 2nd December 1894 and met at Asmar. It delimited the frontier in conjunction with the Durand Agreement. Amir Abdur Rahman died in 1901 and was succeeded by his son, Habibullah. Amir Habibullah signed a treaty with the British India on 21 March 1905, pledging to honour the Durand Agreement. In February 1919, Amir Habibullah was murdered and his son, Amanullah Khan took control of the country. His representative, Ali Ahmad Khan signed the treaty of Rawalpindi on 8 August 1919 vowing to honour the Indo-Afghan frontier as stipulated under the Durand Agreement. Then another accord was signed in Kabul on 6 February 1922, in which the Afghan government once again reaffirmed to abide by all the previous agreements with the British India. When Nadir Shah came into power, he exchanged a note with the British administration on 6 May 1930, announcing his determination to honour all the agreements with India. After partition, the Afghan ambassador to Pakistan, while addressing a reception arranged in his honour by Aligarh Old Boys Association in Karachi on 14 June 1948, declared that "Afghanistan has no claim on the Frontiers territory and even if there were any, they have been given up in favour of Pakistan."⁹ This statement of Afghan envoy, removed all sorts of misunderstandings regarding Pak-Afghan boundary line. Despite all

⁷ Ibid., p. 254.

⁸ Ibid., p. 60.

⁹ *Pakistan Times*, June 15, 1948.

this, propaganda against the Durand Line was accelerated, particularly during Zahir Shah era.

Let us now turn to the Durand Agreement itself. It comprises seven articles. Nothing has been mentioned anywhere in the agreement that it will remain intact for any specific period. Rather, its 2nd article says "His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this Line (Durand Line) on the side of India." Under this accord, the Amir also agreed, "he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajour or Chitral". In the past, Afghanistan used to interfere in affairs of these areas by sending its agents under fictitious names to put the local rulers in trouble.

Now a question arises whether Afghanistan ceded Dir, Swat, Bajour and Chitral to India under this agreement? The answer to this question is in the negative because these areas had never remained part of Afghanistan, throughout known history. When Alexander the Great attacked this region in 326 BC, he faced a stiff resistance in the Assakeni country, a strong and prosperous state, which had Massaga as its capital. This kingdom was ruled by Askenos. The kingdom included Bajour, Dir, Swat, Buner as well as valleys in north and all the tribes, as far as Indus, recognized Askenos as their chief.¹⁰ The Askenos, had a well organized army of thirty-two thousand men. Askenos himself had taken command at Massaga. His organisation for defence included an alliance with the King of the Abhisara, a country beyond the Indus, who sent contingents to his support.¹¹ "The ruler of Massaga had also 7,000 Indian mercenaries."¹² The Alexander army besieged a hill fortress, which was in fact, the palace of Askenos. Remains of the palace can still be seen in Talash area of Lower Dir. The city resisted for four days, the most vigorous onslaughts of the Greeks. At last, Alexander stormed the palace, which resulted in a fierce battle between the rival armies. Inhabitants of the city surrendered after Askenos had been killed. Alexander himself was wounded in the leg. He was so much impressed by the bravery of local people that he laid mild conditions for surrender of the enemy.

Bajour, Dir and Swat were parts of Gandahara civilization with its capital at Pushkalavati, the modern city of Charsadda. This civilization also included areas on this side of the mighty Indus. Ashoka, the grandson of Chandra Gupta, who came to power in 267 BC, played prominent role in the promotion of Buddhism and Gandahara civilization.¹³ He first became a Buddhist layman and then a monk, who spent his life in spreading teachings of Buddha. Under his directives, stupas were constructed everywhere in

¹⁰ E.J. Rapson, *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. 1, (New Delhi: 1987), p. 316.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

¹² Agnes Savill, *Alexander the Great and his Time*, (New York: 1990), p. 95.

¹³ Lt. General Sir George MacMunn, *The Martial Races of India*, (Quetta: 1977), p. 53.

Gandahara. Monasteries were also built for monks. During his reign, Buddhism became practically the state religion and pilgrims started pouring into Gandahara. He constructed one thousand four hundred monasteries on the bank of Swat River, where eighteen thousand monks were busy in meditation.¹⁴ In 7th and 8th century, Buddhism declined and was replaced by Hinduism. This religion flourished unchecked for several centuries. In 1021 A.D., Mehmood of Ghazani led an expedition in Bajour, Dir and Swat and Hinduism received its death blow in these areas. At that time, Swat was ruled by Raja Gira.¹⁵ Mehmood of Ghazani defeated the army of Raja Gira near Odigram. Remains of Raja Gira palace are still standing on a hill top in Odigram.

Majority of people now living in Swat and Dir belong to Yousfzai tribe. The assassination of leading men of Yousfzai tribe, by Mirza Uleg Beg, the paternal uncle of Babar, in 1485 had far reaching implications not only on the Yousfzais themselves but also on Swat, Buner, Shangla and Dir.¹⁶ Malik Sultan Shah and his young nephew, Malik Ahmad Khan supported by Sheikh Mali, afterwards raised the tribe to its zenith. The Yousfzais under leadership of Malik Ahmad Khan came eastward from Kabul and took possession of Peshawar and Charsadda by expelling the local tribe, Dalazak across the Indus. The Yousfzais victory after victory went ahead to reach their cherished destination of Swat, which was ruled by Sultan Owais. The Swatis put up stiff resistance at Pali but they could not withstand the invading tribe from the Malakand side. The Swati were utterly defeated and relatives of Sultan Owais were slaughtered brutally.¹⁷ After their defeat, the Swatis left their areas and moved eastward across the Indus and settled in Alai, Battagram, Balakot, Ghari Habibullah and Mansehra. Tarkani, a sister tribe of the Yousfzai, also moved in and occupied Bajour. Before their arrival in Bajour, there lived people who were known by the name of Arabs and their chief was the Hakim or ruler of Bajour. The Arabs were paying allegiance to India.¹⁸ The Tarkani tribe emerged victorious in successive actions and completely cleared Bajour of Arabs, and took possession of the area.¹⁹ In this way, the Yousfzai and Tarkani tribes settled in Swat, Dir and Bajour.

Swat, Bajour, Dir and Chitral never became part of Mughal Empire. Babar once tried to bring these areas under his control and marched with his army on Bajour-Chakdara route. He entered Bajour through Hinduraj pass on

¹⁴ Sir Aurel Stein, *On Alexander's Track to the Indus*, (New York: 1972), p. 14-15.

¹⁵ Sir Wolselay Haig, *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. III, (New Delhi, 1987), p. 22.

¹⁶ Akbar S. Ahmad, *Millennium and Charisma among Pathans*, (London: 1976), p. xv.

¹⁷ Muhammad Akhtar, *Tajak Swati Wa Mumlikat Geer Tareekh kay Ayieenay May Karachi*, 2002, p. 367.

¹⁸ Major Raverty, *Notes on Afghanistan and Parts of Baluchistan*, (London: 1888), p. 114.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

3 January 1519 and over-ran Gibari, the capital of Bajour after bloody war with local people. Babar killed the ruling chief or Sultan named Mir Haider Ali with greater part of his family, and put to death about three thousand of his ill-fated subjects.²⁰ However, an armed conflict between the Youfzai and Mughal was averted when Babar married Bibi Mubaraka, the daughter of Shah Mansur, a leader of Youfzai tribe.²¹ In this way, Babar entered into alliance with Yousfzais besides taking a contingent of twelve thousand of its men as an addition to his army. Since onwards, Babar refrained from advancing into the Yousfzai area of Swat. 66 years later, the era of Mughal-Yousfzai cordial relations once again ended when in December 1585, Akbar sent an expedition, led by General Zain Khan, against the tribe. When Zain Khan failed to subdue the Yousfzais, Akbar sent him reinforcement under the command of Birbal, the court wit, and Hakim Abdul Fath, the physician. But the Yousfzais inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy with great losses. Birbal and 500 other prominent figures were also killed in action.²² After this great blow, the Mughal decided not to try the hills of Swat again and avoided direct confrontation with the Yousfzai tribe. The Mughal learnt the tactics of hill fighting from the Yousfzais.²³ In 1738, Nadir Shah summoned Nazoh Khan, the Yousfzai chief to tender the fealty of his tribe but the later flatly refused to do so. In order to punish the tribe, Nadir Shah sent a force but it was driven back with loss near Ambillah. The Yousfzais pursued the retreating enemy as far as the Kalpani Nallah near Mardan.²⁴

Afghan writers in their articles term Swat, Dir and Bajour as Yagistan or "Land of the Unruly" but they forget that the Yousfzai and Tarkani tribes had established their well-organized governments in 17th century in Dir and Bajour, respectively. The Akhund Khel dynasty of Dir remained in power from 17th century to 1969. Similarly, the Tarkani tribe set up its own independent government under the leadership Mast Khan Baba. The Mast Khel, a sub-section of Tarkani, ruled over Bajour upto 1895. People of Swat did not set up their government, as they were not facing any threat because Swat has no direct border with Afghanistan. However, the arrival of British forces on Mardan-Swat border in 1849, opened the eyes of Swat chiefs to the possibility of a British force one day visiting their own country. It was under these circumstances, that Sayyed Akbar Shah of Sitana was made king of Swat.²⁵ Ghazan Khan who ruled over Dir for more than fifty years up to 1864, has been termed by Lt. Colonel, Mac Gregor, as "the most powerful ruler in

²⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

²¹ Ahmad Hassan Dani, *Peshawar, the Historical City of the Frontier*, (Lahore: 2002), p. 96.

²² Major Raverty, op. cit., p. 203.

²³ Ahmad Hasan Dani, op. cit., p. 103.

²⁴ H.W. Bellow, *A General Report on the Yousfzais*, (Lahore: 2001), p. 75.

²⁵ *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*, (Quetta: 1979), vol. 1, p. 343.

the north of Indus.²⁶ He and his ancestors never tolerated Afghan rulers, even Ahmad Shah Abdali, in the height of his power, to meddle in the affairs of Dir and they never did so.²⁷ Successive rulers of Dir, Chitral and Bajour, neither tolerated Kabul to interfere in their internal affairs nor did they pay any tribute to it. Rather, from time to time, they sought help and support from Maharaja of Kashmir. For example, Rahmatullah Khan of Dir sought help from Maharaja of Kashmir in 1866 to overthrow the government of his younger brother, Jamdad Khan who had seized the throne after the death of their father, Ghazan Khan.²⁸ Rahmatullah Khan used to receive stipendiary from the Maharaja.²⁹ The same is the case with Swat, and Chitral. Chitral upto 1660, was ruled by decedents of Alexander the Great. When the last ruler, known as Shah Rais, died in that year, he was succeeded by his Prime Minister Shah Kator-I. The Kator family ruled over Chitral till merger of the state with Pakistan. The Kator family never allowed Afghanistan to interfere in the affairs of Chitral. During life of Ahmad Shah Abdali, one of his ministers, Shah Wali Khan sent a message to Shah Afzal, the then Mehtar of Chitral, to pay tribute to his master.³⁰ Shah Afzal handled the issue like a professional diplomat by saying that his area consisted of nothing but barren hills and unproductive valleys and that his ancestors had never paid tribute to any one. In this way, Shah Afzal dashed to the ground the designs of Afghanistan regarding Chitral. In 1888, Chitral came under suzerainty of Kashmir when Maharaja and the ruler of Chitral Aman-ul-Mulk signed an agreement for this purpose.³¹ Chitral and Bajour had their own flags. Instead of Afghan currency, people of these areas were using Indian currency.

Afghanistan, for the first time in history made a claim over Swat and Bajour in 1857, but the British administration warned Kabul not to harass its northern peaceful neighbours and if Kabul did so, the Indian government was bound to help these independent states.³² Due to impending threat from the north, Chitral decided to strengthen its ties with Kashmir. In 1876, the Mehtar of Chitral sent his envoy, Jafar Ali to Maharaja of Kashmir with a message of friendship. In response to a friendly answer from the Raja, another messenger of Chitral reached Kashmir with an important letter.³³ The growing friendship

²⁶ Lt. Colonel MacGregor, *Central Asia Part 2*, (Calcutta: 1871), p. 167.

²⁷ Raverty, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

²⁸ C. Latimer, *Notes on the Chiefs of Malakand Agency other than His Highness the Mehtar of Chitral, Malakand*, 1928, p. 1.

²⁹ F.B, *Report on Chitral*, (Lahore: Government Press, 1883), p. 30.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.18.

³¹ Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, vol. XI, (Delhi: 1933), p. 427.

³² Lt. Col. A.L.E. Holmes, *Gazetteer of NWFP from Bajour and Indus Kohistan on the North to the Mari Hills on the South*, vol. 1, Simla, 1887, p. 101.

³³ *Correspondence Relating to Chitral*, (London: 1895), p. 1.

between Chitral and Kashmir alarmed Amir Sher Ali of Afghanistan and he viewed it as a threat to the interests of his country. In 1876, he sent the governor of Jalalabad, Ahmad Khan to Said Abdul Ghafoor, popularly known as Akhund of Swat as well as Saidu Baba to form an alliance against the British administration of India. Saidu Baba understood intentions of Kabul, and declined to do so by saying that "Sher Ali Khan was the man who wanted to strengthen the hands of Englishmen in India."³⁴ Threatened by Indian government and disheartened by Saidu Baba, the Amir of Afghanistan, instead of direct confrontation, sent his agents to create problems for rulers of Dir, Swat and Bajour. In 1887, Umra Khan of Jandul arrested an Afghan agent, Abu Bakkar alias Makrani Mulla in Bajour. The Khan released the agent after keeping him in prison for several days with a warning not to come into that area again. Fearing Umra Khan's retribution, Makrani Mulla fled to his native city, Kabul and never returned to Bajour.³⁵ After this incident, Amir Abdur Rahman himself came to Asmar to personally supervise his plan regarding Bajour and Swat but the Indian government warned him to "interfere neither with Bajour nor with Swat."

The signing of Durand Agreement, very much upset Umra Khan, the then ruler of Bajour and Dir because under this agreement, Asmar and Marawara, both the areas of Bajour were handed over to Afghanistan.³⁶ Umra Khan was time and again asked to attend proceedings of Asmar Boundary Commission but he in protest, never did so. Major Dean says that so far Asmar is concerned, Umra Khan was right that it was part of Bajour.³⁷ The handing over of Asmar to Afghanistan greatly offended Umra Khan.³⁸ Now he was waiting for chance to inflict a deep wound on Indian government for this injustice done to him. It was after delimitation of the frontier in Bajour that Umra Khan involved himself in Chitral's affairs. After two months, he occupied Chitral to take revenge from the Indian Government. He arrested several Indian soldiers and two British officers. The Indian government organized Chitral Relief Force. As a result of military action, Umra Khan was removed from power and he fled to Afghanistan.

Under Durand Agreement, a vast portion of Chitral was handed over to Afghanistan. These include Nusrat, Narai, Barikot, Chandak, Plasgor, Nurdi, Sao and Bailam. Prior to the Durand Agreement, these were parts of

³⁴ Muhammad Asif, *History of Swat*, p. 95.

³⁵ Captain A.H. McMahon and Lt. A.D.G. Ramsay, *Report on the Tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajour*, p. 84.

³⁶ NWFP Directorate of Archives and Library, Peshawar, File, No. 937, p. 2.

³⁷ Major Dean, *Chitral Relief Force*, (Lahore: Government Press, 22 November 1895), p. 2.

³⁸ H.C. Wylly, *Tribes of Central Asia, From the Black Mountains to Waziristan*, (1996), p. 162. The book was first published from London in 1912.

Chitral.³⁹ Under the accord, Chitral was to retain Arnawai or Bashgal valley. Another accord signed on 9 April 1895, clearly states that Arnawai or Bashgal would be part of Chitral.⁴⁰ After several months, Afghanistan occupied Bashgal valley and named it as Nooristan.⁴¹ On 21 December 1928, the Mehtar of Chitral Shuja-ul-Mulk, presented a petition to the Indian government to help him in recovering all his lost territories but was discouraged.⁴² Later, the Mehtar died with the hope that Chitral would one day recover its lost territories.

So far, as FATA is concerned, these were independent long before the signing of Durand Agreement. The British Administration had signed more than forty treaties with tribals of Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, and North and South Waziristan Agencies, from 1852 to 1890. It was under the Durand Agreement that Lalpura, an area of Mohmand Agency, was given to Afghanistan. It may be recalled that the Indian government, prior to the accord, was responsible for appointment and dismissal of Khan of Lalpura. For example, Muahmmad Akbar Khan was appointed as Khan of Lalpura by the Viceroy on 12 June 1880.⁴³

This is not correct to say that Amir Abdur Rahman did not sign the Durand Agreement. The Amir says that Mr. Durand was very fluent in Persian. Both the leaders talked in Persian and a Mir Munshi of Afghanistan noted down each and every word of the negotiations.⁴⁴ However, final draft of the agreement was prepared in English, as all international agreements are written in English. Each article of the treaty was thoroughly studied, checked, rechecked and then signed. Some people of Afghanistan claim that the Durand Agreement has lost its validity as it was cancelled by Afghan Parliament in June 1949. But they forget that international accords cannot be cancelled unilaterally as it means declaration of war and if this is not so, then we have also every right to declare the Simla Agreement of 1971 as null and void, even though India and international community accept it. Afghan writers, and scholars and Pakhtoon nationalists argue that NWFP should be handed over to Afghanistan, as in the past, it had ruled Peshawar and Kohat etc. Whether Afghanistan will be ready to return Herat and Kandahar to Iran and Mazar-e-Sharif to Uzbekistan as these areas were parts of Iran and Uzbekistan in past, is an open question. It is an open question, if frontiers of countries can be redrawn on the basis of centuries old claims and counter claims and if this is done, map of the whole world will have to be changed.

³⁹ The NWFP Directorate of Archives and Library Peshawar, File No. 1895, p. 5.

⁴⁰ Aitchison, vol. XI, p. 260.

⁴¹ Amir Abdur Rahman, op. cit., p. 245.

⁴² Tribal Research Cell Peshawar's File No. 405, Bounle 14, p. 5-6.

⁴³ Aitchison op. cit., vol. XI, p. 461.

⁴⁴ Amir Abdur Rahman, op. cit., p. 254.

Afghanistan is opposed to fencing of Pak-Afghan border as it will directly weaken its stand regarding the Durand Line. Some elements say that the people of NWFP should join Afghanistan, because by language, culture and race, they are more akin to Afghans living in that country. But they do not realise that there are also Tajaks, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Hazara communities in Afghanistan. Whether Afghanistan would be ready to let them join Tajakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran? The Pakhtoons of Pakistan are more at ease than those living in Afghanistan, which is much poverty stricken and underdeveloped as compared to Pakistan. When the ex-Afghan Foreign Minister, Muhammad Naim, visited Pakistan in January 1960, his Pakistani counterpart, Manzoor Qadir gave him an unexpected proposal. He said that the wishes of Pakhtuns, on both sides of the line, should be ascertained as to whether they all desire to live together in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. Since the Pakhtuns of Pakistan have already declared in favour of Pakistan in a referendum, it remains to seek opinion of the Pakhtuns living on other side of the border. Muhammad Naim's only reply to the proposal was that he had not come to negotiate.⁴⁵ As two-third of all Pakhtuns live in Pakistan and only one-third in Afghanistan, it is more rational for the minority to join the majority.

So far as Pakistan is concerned, it has no claim even on a single inch territory of Afghanistan. Rather, it is Afghanistan which is claiming a vast territory of our motherland. Such a baseless claim does not yield any fruitful results but it is just the wastage of time, resources and creating ill-will between people of the two countries. Therefore, Afghan writers should desist from making such irrational claims. It is in the supreme interest of both Afghanistan and Pakistan to forget bitter memories of the past and work collectively for peace and stability in the region. ■

⁴⁵ *Dawn*, March 8, 1960.

CHAPTER V

SHAPING UP THE GLOBAL MILIEU – ROLE OF THE WEST

Uzma Shakeel

President Bush's grand strategy after September 11, was the result of a pattern of strategic adjustment in the aftermath of crisis situations that have occurred repeatedly and predictably in the American history. Such situations have generated shocks and pressures, creating an opening for new strategic ideas. Leading state officials have availed the opportunity to put forward their preferred approach, based largely on their perceptions of national interest.

The continuity between the pre-9/11 phase of the Bush administration, with its inclination towards tough bargaining and its scepticism about nation building and its later turn to pre-emptive war and aggressive rhetoric about promotion of democracy, directed world politics towards new and dangerous trends. Thanks to the crisis atmosphere after 9/11, and the grandiosity of American ambitions under-written by unipolarity, Bush's call to wage a war on terror gained momentum. The attack on Afghanistan did not provoke any anti-war sentiments nor was there any hue and cry about America's imperial ambitions, for most people in most countries believed that it was a reasonable response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, since it was Taliban, the hosts of the terrorist outfit – Al-Qaeda and not the US, that was arbitrarily violating the international norms on human rights, cultural autonomy, democracy and international law. It was the US invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration's unilateralist rhetoric that made the difference that was the point when major European countries, which were the traditional allies of the US, adopted a different path in response to Washington's decision to attack Iraq in 2003. The disagreement also illustrated that Europe and the US sometimes did not share a common vision of international politics. It also highlighted that Britain and France, two major European Union members, have long had different visions of their shared future. However, the Iraq crisis seemed to be a turning point for the EU's CFSP. It forced the British and the French, and the rest of Europe, including the East and Central Europeans that were about to accede to the EU, to take sides with America or against it. Here the question arose: would Europe be the same after the Iraq crisis? Polls, all over Europe, showed that the US, particularly the incumbent administration, was regarded as a threat to international peace and stability. Washington was, however, not unhappy with the schism in Europe because in the eyes of the White House if 'old' Europe is nicely divided with Britain, Spain and Italy on

its side, along with the new Europe to the East, more pro-American than ever, the US was the net gainer in such a situation.

European's Perception

Iraq

Germany, France, Belgium and Russia strongly condemned American adventurism in the Middle East and pointed out that the US had made a triple mistake; moral, political and strategic.

The US had invaded Iraq with the intention of making it a model for the Middle East, with promises that success in Iraq would be followed by efforts to transform the political systems of Iraq's neighbours. However, this was not the vision any Middle Eastern regime was likely to embrace. In this scenario, the UN and NATO were widely perceived as damaged, if not broken, by their failure to agree on what to do about Iraq.

The 45-nation Council of Europe, which has several EU states as members, also firmly condemned the invasion. The Council's Parliamentary Assembly, which brings together members of the Parliaments of all member countries, adopted a resolution, describing the war as illegal and contrary to the principles of international law.

The resolution said that the use of force against Iraq was not justified and that there was no evidence that Iraq posed a threat to the states which attacked it. The Council went on to express regret for the rift revealed by the crisis between Europe and the US.

Charles Kupchan, an influential foreign policy expert and former National Security Council officer, was of the view that the current Trans-Atlantic crisis will ultimately strengthen Europe because it has been so damaging to the Atlantic relationship that even those like Blair who wanted a Europe tightly bound to the US, will find out that it is not 'doable'. And they will ultimately throw their weight behind a stronger and more independent Europe.¹

Public opinion in Europe was overwhelmingly against the war. Indeed, according to the latest polls from seven European Union countries, including those whose leaders backed the US, strong majorities favour a more independent stance vis-à-vis Washington. The clash over Iraq, made it clear that basically France, Germany and Russia are prepared to contemplate life after Pax Americana and that the US is prepared to part company with its key allies on the most fundamental principles of international relations.

The Iraq crisis has also shown clearly that, like in the past, the foreign policies of nation states, are ultimately determined by national interest.

According to professor Fritz Katochvil, the dispute over Iraq was essentially an inter-European conflict rather than an Atlantic one, with a

¹ Martin Holmes, *European Integration, Scope and Limits*, (N.Y.: Palgrave, 2001), p. 149.

majority of the governments of NATO and the European Union opposed to the stand taken by France and Germany. At the same time, European public opinion was highly critical of the war.

Fourteen years ago in 1993, Huntington argued that a “clash of civilizations”² was about to dominate world politics, with culture, along with national interests and political ideology, becoming a geopolitical fault-line. Yet what has not been recognised sufficiently is that today the world faces what might be called a “clash of emotions” as well. The Western world displays a culture of war and humiliation, and much of South East Asia displays a culture of hope.

Instead of being united by their fears, the twin pillars of the West, the United States and Europe, are more often divided by them or rather, divided by how best to confront or transcend them.

The US obsession with security after September 11, is understandable and legitimate. But what has it cost in terms of US influence and image in the world? Violation of human rights by the US has badly tarnished its image. Standards associated with the Guantanamo Bay have also painted the US red in tooth and claw.

Europeans believe that US actions merely reflect the country's immediate preference as opposed to their judgement about its underlying interests, a distinction behind the European opposition to the war in Iraq. Whereas Europeans try to protect themselves from the world through a combination of escapism and appeasement, Americans try to do so by dealing with the problem at its source abroad. But behind the Bush administration's forceful and optimistic rhetoric lies a sombre reality; that the US response to the September 11, has made the US more unpopular than ever. The US intervention in Iraq, has generated more problems than it has solved any.

The culture of humiliation is not limited to the Middle East but extends to the Muslim diaspora in the West as well. The riots that took place in France in 2005, had an essentially socioeconomic origin, but they were also a lashing out by the disaffected against a society that claims to give them equal rights in principle but fails to do so in practice. The gap is in part, the product of incompatible worldviews, stemming from different historical eras. As societies in Europe are becoming increasingly secular, the importance of religion in the daily life of the Muslim world is increasing.

On the side of West, it is clear that the US is facing chaos in Iraq. The US is so unpopular in the region, that its support is enough to undermine a government's legitimacy with its public. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group, recommended that Bush must engage Iran and Syria. And he is doing so by sending an additional aircraft carrier to the Gulf and patriot missiles to neighbouring countries. This is exactly the opposite course advocated by the

² *Journal of European Studies*, vol. 19 & 20, nos. 2 & 1, July 2003 & January 2004.

Iraq Study group³ which urged serious diplomatic talks rather than military sabre rattling. It has never been likely that the US could stabilise Iraq and destabilise Iran and Syria at the same time. Those societies, by reason of their proximity, cultural affinity and blood ties have more access to and influence within Iraqi society than Americans can ever hope to achieve.

The telling of the Iraq Story is distorted. The weight of effort in Iraq has shifted overtime, from defeating the Iraqi military and liberating the Iraqi people, to building up Iraqi security forces and local institutions, and to transitioning responsibility for security to the Iraqis. “What about the counter insurgency part?” Indeed, the main lesson the Pentagon seems to have learnt from Iraq is “Let’s never do this again”. According to Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow in Defence and National Security Studies American Enterprise Institute, USA⁴, the Pentagon seems to have understood neither the strategic culture of Afghanistan and the connection between terrorism and the larger political culture of the greater Middle East, nor the strategic culture of the United States, as articulated in the Bush Doctrine.

On Middle Eastern front, what President Bush really wants to do, has little to do with armour in any case. His real aim is to provoke war with Iran, no matter how overstretched and over burdened his forces might be. By taking to this line of thinking, the run-up to the war in Iraq is now repeating itself exactly and President Bush will seize any handy *casusbelli* he can to ignite a conflagration in Iran. Intelligence estimates also say that “Iran is not likely to be a major driver of violence in Iraq, but no matter. If the President can now whip up Feith style smoke screen of innuendo that Iran is the root cause of all woes in the war, and give the enemy a single recognizable force Ahmadinejad as the new Saddam”.⁵

Iran

The end of Saddam’s rule in 2003, significantly reduced the security threat to Tehran. But by then, for Iran, the United States had already taken Iraq’s place, Washington having made it clear that it wanted regime change in Iran, too. In his January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush had denounced the government of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as members of an “axis of evil” with ties to international terrorism. In 2002 also, Nuclear Posture Review, which was leaked to the press, listed Iran as one of the states to be considered as a potential target by US nuclear war planners. In April 2006, when asked

³ *Iraq Study Group Report*, December 2006.

⁴ *International Herald Tribune*, January 7, 2007.

⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, February 19, 2007.

about preventive nuclear strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, President Bush pointedly replied "all options are on the table".⁶

Here question arises if Iran must not be allowed to go nuclear, what then can be done to stop it? A US military strike on Iran today should be avoided for the same prudent reasons that led Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to choose diplomacy and arms control over preventive war in their dealings with the Soviet Union and China. Even if the US is confident that it has identified all major nuclear related sites in Iran and the Pentagon would hit all the targets, the US would expose itself to the possibility of severe retaliation in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq.

The recent history of Iran's nuclear programme and diplomacy actually suggests that the current central problem is not Iran's quest for nuclear technology but it is Iran's behaviour as a revolutionary state, with ambitions that collide with the interests of its neighbours and the West.

The lesson to be drawn from the history of non-proliferation is not that all states eying the bomb eventually get it but that non-proliferation efforts succeed when the US and other global actors help satisfy whatever concerns drove a state to want nuclear weapons in the first place. Governments typically pursue nuclear power for one of three reasons; to protect themselves against an external security threat, to satisfy the parochial interests of domestic actors, or to acquire an important state status. Iran is, mostly a classic case of a state that wants nuclear weapons to dissuade an attack. It is in a perennially unstable region, has long faced a belligerent Iraq, and now wants to stand up to Washington's call for regime change in Tehran. Any viable solution to Tehran's appetite for nuclear weapons will, therefore, require that the US learns to coexist peacefully with Iran's government.

What a malleable war Iraq has been! First, it was waged to vanquish Saddam's non existent nuclear arsenal and his non existent collaboration with Al Qaeda. Then, it was going to spread non existent democracy throughout the Middle East. Now it is being re-branded as a fight against Tehran. President Bush keeps saying that his sabre rattling about Iran is not a pretext for war. May be so, but at the very least, it is a pretext for prolonging the disastrous war we already have.

On the European side, Iran, in many ways, is a more important test for European foreign policy than Iraq. In the case of Iran, the EU has leverage that the US, which has not had diplomatic relations with Tehran since the late 1970s, entirely lacks. Here, differences on policy means are sharp, with America seeking to isolate and Europe attempting to engage Iran to promote reforms.

⁶ Scott D. Sagan "How to Keep the Bomb from Iran" *Foreign Affairs*, September-October, 2006, vol. 85, no. 5.

Foreign ministers from the Islamic countries, meeting in Islamabad in February 2007, issued a warning against the dangerous escalation of tension over Iran's nuclear programme and called for a peaceful resolution of the standoff between Tehran and western capitals. One way to address the problem would be to offer to mediate between the two sides. Better skill would be to convince Iran to declare that the uranium enrichment programme will not be expanded to produce weapon-grade uranium.

South Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan

"A period of extreme turbulence will follow if the Iraq War ends up in an Islamic fundamentalism", thus stated Henry Kissinger and added that "unrest would not be confined to the Middle East but could also extend to nations outside the region, with large Muslim populations such as Pakistan, Indonesia, India, Turkey and Malaysia".⁷

Keeping in mind the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is clear now that the unrest is not confined to the Middle East. The Taliban-led insurgency is active on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. This is a sensitive time in South Asia. Pakistan is the epicentre of change and behind all this mess, is the miscalculation of the US policymakers. They have under-estimated the stakes in Afghanistan. They continue to do so today. A mere course correction will not be enough to prevent the country from sliding into chaos. The US and its allies must redraw their strategy towards politically precarious region named South Asia and significantly increase the attention and the resources. As there is a common perception in both Afghanistan and Pakistan that Afghanistan is not a high priority for the US and that the Taliban are winning as a result. US' appeasement of Pakistan, diversion of resources to Iraq and perpetual underinvestment in Afghanistan, which gets less aid per capita than any other state with a recent post-conflict rebuilding effort, have fuelled that suspicion.

The recent upsurge in violence is only the latest chapter in Afghanistan's 30-year war. That was started as a Cold War ideological battle, morphed into a regional clash of ethnic factionalism, and then, became the centre of the broader conflict between the West and transnational Islamists. Pakistan is caught between the extremist elements and trying to cope at its best. Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism, especially terrorism which had sprouted in Afghanistan.

Afghan conflict has caused disturbance in our society, particularly in the tribal areas of Pakistan. We are now engaged in a prolonged and sustained fight against terrorism. But the US intellectuals, like Barnett Rubin⁸ and think

⁷ *Washington Post*, Friday March 2, 2007.

⁸ Director and Senior Fellow at New York University's Centre for International Cooperation, and the author of *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*.

tanks are still of the view that US must rethink its strategy, especially its approach to Pakistan, which allegedly continues to give sanctuary to insurgents on its tribal frontier. Actually, the problem arises when the US policy makers and practitioners start doing contrary to what President Harry Truman had said that the responsibility of the great state is to serve and not dominate the peoples of the world. Security must be collective and indivisible, no nation can make itself secure by seeking supremacy over all others.

The most dangerous characteristic of the current period is that a single power dominates the world militarily and dominates international institutions of peace-keeping and law without countervailing forces. That makes the current world system much more dangerous, especially for the weak and the poor, than even during the Cold War. We exist in times much worse than those in the Cold War.

A Shared Global Agenda

The US and the EU have many common interests when it comes to the rest of the world. At the most general level, assuring a prosperous and peaceful world is an important shared objective. Beyond the emerging market economies, the US and the EU share a common interest in helping the under developed countries. The Millennium Goals involve quantitative targets in different important areas of human developments like poverty eradication and gender equality, etc. These development concerns are linked to a number of new issues of common interest for the transatlantic partners, such as: how to prevent and deal with regional conflicts, failed states and terrorism and how to address global environmental issues, including management of the world's energy supply and demand in a responsible manner that fairly balances the interests of producers and consumers. The world will indeed become more multipolar in the future, and demographic trends may well act to push apart the US and Europe in terms of popular perceptions, and interest in each other. There clearly is some potential, too, for transatlantic conflict and disputes in domestic policies, transatlantic economic relations and global economic development. Even so, the commonality of interest far outweighs the conflict.

The Doctrine of Global Civil Society

At the threshold of the third millennium and under the circumstances of unfolding interplay among various powers in the shaping of new global decisions, international relations need a new doctrine, commensurate with the evolving conditions and emerging needs. The new doctrine, drawing upon historical hindsight and relying on reason and objectivity, should shape a new order in international relations.

The main objective of this doctrine is the gradual realisation of a "global civil society", a society where liberty and salvation harmoniously

coincide to meet the spiritual and material needs of humanity in an institutionalised manner, and where comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development lies at the foundation of universal cooperation and participation.

The most significant foundation and feature of civil society and role of the West is the rule of law, which prevents despotism and anarchy at the domestic level and hegemony and war at the international level. Rule of law constitutes the only proper setting for the participation of all individuals and nations in shaping their own destiny and building a better and more prosperous tomorrow for their national societies and the global community.

The international community today, like its constituent member-states, simply cannot provide a peaceful and prosperous life for the people through coercion, autocratic decisions and culture of domination and hegemony. Therefore, the rule of law, as the very foundation of order and the relations among individuals and states, should be institutionalised. The world community should generate resolute political will to ensure in practice, respect for the plurality of differing views and values in political, social and cultural dimensions, and simultaneously withstand the institutionalisation of the dangerous trend of unilateralism as the embodiment of a new form of international despotism. There a huge responsibility lies on the shoulders of the West. Preservation, and more importantly progress, of a pluralistic world with a great and ever-increasing variety of thoughts, ideas, beliefs, traditions and values depends, as a matter of principle, on the promotion of tolerance and moderation. In the modern world, it is only through forbearance and moderation that various cultures, ideas and schools of thought would find the opportunity to flourish and come to fruition. The idea of the preponderance and hegemony of one particular culture and value system over all others is not but subjugation to dogmatism and blind prejudice.

The theory of "clash of civilizations" is contradictory in essence and inconsistent with history. How could rational manifestations of human thinking, which in turn embody the striving and reflection of great men of culture and reasoning, be conceived in a state of clash and conflict?

Various human civilizations — cognizant of their intrinsic commonalities as well as outward differences and varieties — can and should engage in constructive dialogue, mutual understanding and fruitful cooperation. Active and continuous, albeit critical, interchange among civilizations makes them all the more creative, opens the possibilities for evolution and understanding, and contributes to a higher state of well-being and prosperity for the whole humanity. This is a fact borne out by the long history of civilisational exchange leading to mutual enrichment. In the course of this process of exchange, civilizations rooted in religious and divine thinking and values, can help the Western societies in responding to the serious problems in human relations, and simultaneously, benefit from the fruits of scientific and industrial advances in the West.

The question of Palestine, which lies at the very heart of the Middle East Crisis, represents the most vivid and persistent case of disregard for international law and systematic violation of fundamental human rights of individuals and peoples. The experience of the past few years has made it vividly clear that any scheme or proposal which fails to take full account of the realities in the region or the infamous Israeli patterns of behaviour is bound to fail.

The crisis in Afghanistan, caused by disrespect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as violation of the basic rights of an entire nation, has turned into a vicious cycle of violence and fratricide. The prolongation of the painful and disastrous war in Afghanistan has inflicted enormous damage and hardship on the terrorized people of this country. Severe social restrictions and flagrant violations of human rights, particularly against women and children — imposed unfortunately in the name of Islam — have tarnished the image of this proud country. Discrimination against religious and ethnic groups and intransigence and inflexibility of some warring factions have further exacerbated the crisis.

There is, undoubtedly, no military solution to the crisis in Afghanistan. It is indeed regrettable to note that some of the warring factions have yet to realize this evident truth. Only through the establishment of a cease-fire, negotiations between all Afghan groups and formation of a broad-based government representing all Afghans, can solve the crisis in Afghanistan and provide a lasting solution.

Confidence-building starts from the neighbourhood. In our interdependent world, security is indivisible. Thus, the end of Cold War and the universal rejection of Cold War mentality must open the way for arresting and dismantling of rival bloc formations and emergence of regional arrangements for security and cooperation.

In the Persian Gulf area, only cooperation and collective participation can bring about security and stability for all countries in the region. Taking full advantage of historical affinities, cultural ties and religious bonds and sparing no effort for the efficient and coordinated utilization of human and natural potentials and resources of the region constitute the single best long-term guarantee for security and tranquillity.

Terrorism is the wicked result of widespread lawlessness and violent obstruction of public participation, which — in its various forms and manifestations — threatens human societies at national, regional and international levels. This dangerous phenomenon affects not a particular country or region, but it is a ruthless international problem that threatens the security and tranquillity of the international community as a whole, tramples upon the most basic principles of human rights, and endangers territorial integrity of states. Political exploitation of this international problem through hurling unfounded allegations in order to advance certain ulterior motives or

cover up deficiencies in domestic or external policy is no less dangerous than terrorism itself. They concurrently diminish trust, stability and security at regional and international levels.

Resolution of this destructive problem requires a determined avoidance of sensationalism on the one hand and concerted international attempt at finding practical measures that are reasonable, objective and realistic in combating terrorism on the other.

Thus, in the complexity of world politics, there are many forces including the thrust of unrestricted liberalisation of the institutions and blurring of state borders in the name of globalisation. These have added a new dimension internationally and, therefore, the West is still shaping its role, though despite occasional differences between the US and Europe, they have a basic convergence of interests.

In short, a new trans-Atlantic bargain is required if the US-European security alliance is to meet the world's most threatening challenges collectively and effectively. Europeans, for their part, must part their money where their mouths are - that is to make sure that their preference for multilateralism can not be read as indifference to the world's pressing security problems. ■

CHAPTER VI

PAKISTAN AND CHANGING SCENARIO: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL

Dr Abdul Latif Tunio

Introduction

Western policies in their illusion of victory and development are losing the touch of social realities and have adopted the strategy of denial to new emerging socio-economic factors raising head in Eastern world. The Western dynamism of accepting the social change has grown stale. Western values are not internationally competitive. The West has become more inward looking and takes pride in its exceptionalism. After 9/11, Western society has become a close society in the name of security.

Western attitude on the question of head-covering shows their intolerance and abhorrence of Muslim community residing in the Western world. Same attitude of intolerance is even exhibited within its own creed such as the West Europeans are allergic of East Europeans. US government has also assaulted on the basic value of individualism in the name of homeland security. The example of Abu Gharib has damaged the standing of Western values. And Western institutions are no more source of universal reference. The West is losing its attraction in winning the hearts and minds of the people.

The process of social change which has gripped the West is now coming towards East. Because of abundance of social knowledge and long traditions of social respect for scholarship, East Asia has been very capable of developing its own system of social knowledge.

Rise and fall of nations, powers and civilizations, is a part of historical process. In the past, the West became powerful because it offered equality of opportunity to people. That raised its importance in attracting foreigners to join Western world. There is always a co-relationship between equality of opportunity with equality of conditions. In its illusion of development, West has reached its saturation point in sustaining equality of conditions because wealth generation is monopolised in a few hands which is the negation of Western values of providing equal opportunities.

Now East is outdoing West in creating equality of opportunity in the shape of outsourcing the global economy. It is not only raising economic

efficiency of the East but it is changing the division of labour which has been internationalised and is shifting employment to the East.

Perceptual Gap on Economic Growth

There is a conceptual divergence between the East and the West on the question of developmental strategies. Western world view on economic growth is market-centred, which is closer to the neo-liberal policy that argues that the free market mechanism has been and should be the dominant force in building capitalist industrial structure, rather than the intervening role of state. And allocation of resources can be effectively utilized if market mechanism is applied and state powers are reduced to minimum level.

On the other hand, East Asian export-oriented economic growth is known as developmental state. This paradigm of development is more state-centric and argues for state action in regulating the functioning of market mechanism. Its main purpose is to secure high investment, high economic growth and high savings rate.

For raising economic efficiency, East Asian states have adopted a strategy of knowledge-based economy by raising the quality of labour. At the same time, import of foreign capital and transfer of technology, are used as a means to achieving economic autonomy in the global system.

Thus, the East Asian 'Economic Miracle' depends mainly on wide and effective state intervention: targeted industrial policies and primacy of sustainable criteria of economic performance over the formal rationality of market forces.

The notion of developmental state was initially used to identify distinctive features of the national state in Japan. And later, it was extended to other small tigers. This second generation of development state adopted "catch up" industrial development. Now third generation of developmental state mechanism is underway in China.

Hence, the early industrialising of Western economies followed a market-centred path of growth, while the late industrialising states in East Asia, have followed a state centred one.

The development state model has succeeded in introducing new strategy of accommodation to dramatic transformation of the global market without disturbing the essence of those exiting structures of state. The shock of financial crisis of 1997 and later economic recovery and success has made development state able to accommodate markets without changing their state structures.

The negation of Communism has a cumulative effect on the development of capitalism, which has gone global in its enlargement and has adopted different variations like financial capitalism based on market economy and laying focus on capital accumulation. While Asian capitalism based on the

lines of developmental states, concentrates on capital distribution. A good example of it can be cited of China which after possessing one trillion US-dollars in foreign reserve announced to take out two hundred million-dollars for developmental purpose. China is moving out two hundred million Chinese from poverty line annually. China is turning its population into national assets. Thus China has addressed its political control with economic freedoms. One of the remarkable developments of our times is that China is reinventing itself. It has achieved its target without firing a shot, whereas a super power has failed, even after waging a war.

By embracing modernization with open mind, East Asia has succeeded in creating a synergy on perceptual dilemma between East and West on the question of their models of development. This bargain of East Asian states with Western worldview can be gauged from their gestures and notions of 'Eastern way and Western technology' or 'Chinese body with Western utility'. This is happening because East is recalling indigenisation of its knowledge in harmony with evolution of objectivity in their society.

Now East Asia, especially China is struggling to give a lead to world system in socio-economic sectors. The pace of socio economic transition is gathering momentum in these societies. The West has lost price war in global economy. The countries like Pakistan, no longer afford import from the Western world. It has made latter as a trade-deficit society. The trade surplus is now the prerogative of the East. It shows that the West has started paying the price of colonialism.

At the same time, East Asia is generating the wealth in lieu of their export-led economies. It has become more self confident. This is how the pendulum of productivity, knowledge and power is shifting and swinging towards East. The East has become a new cradle of resurrection; it is still in soul searching and needs much more to match the power of the West. But its economic growth is so rapid and spontaneous that it is bound to lead in the long run.

Rise of East Asia

The Eastern World is getting ready to play its due role in world politics. East Asia is quickly becoming a distinctive and crucial region in the world during the 21st century. It is undergoing a community building process with a new vision of collective identity.

The challenge of financial crisis in late 1990s, provided this region a strong impetus to strengthen regional cooperation. It has spurred the recognition that East Asia needs to institutionalise its cooperation to pre-empt or solve similar problems that may arise in future. This vision inspires East Asian people and governments to work towards building an 'East Asian

Community” that will address the region’s future challenges and advance mutual understanding and trust.

Major Objectives of this Community are:

- Preventing conflicts and promoting peace.
- Achieving closer economic cooperation in such areas as trade, investment, finance and development.
- Bolstering common prosperity by qualitative education and human resources development programmes focusing on basic education, skills, training and capacity building for turning it into human capital.
- Advancing human security.

Guiding Principle of Community are:

- Shared identity.
- Knowledge-based economy.
- Forward looking policies and open to the rest of the world.
- Harmony with global system.
- Common security.

Knowledge Based Economy

The economic boom of East Asian States is the by-product of cheap labour and development of human resources. Compared with other developing states, the leading East Asian economies have a larger stock of skilled and professional workers. The annual additions to the ranks of such workers are also higher than in most other parts of the world. Brain draining in the past especially from China and India is making a wave of reverse draining towards those societies. It has proved a blessing in disguise in gaining the new brains full of knowledge circulation. To embrace openness and start innovation depends on the circulation of ideas and knowledge-able workers. Much of East Asia has become open to such flows. This has helped it to raise the productivity and competitiveness of its economies.

In this context, Singapore’s strategy to become an “intelligent island”, Malaysian “Vision 2020”, Taiwan’s commitment to become “a green silicon island”, “rise of China”, “India is shining” and “Pakistan is taking off”, are the planning designed on knowledge based economies. Much of Asia has re-discovered its productive capabilities and is now riding the tide of transformation.

Looking Towards East

In recent times, one of the strategic objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to reach out eastwards to catch-up the new wave of industrialisation. Pakistan realises the need to be more proactive in balancing India’s rising influence in the South East Asia and East Asia. Towards that end, Pakistan has adopted a

policy of strategic vision of East Asia. It reflects Pakistan's new strategic approach to imply geo-economic means for geo-political ends. This is a part of Pakistan's forward looking policies to raise its strategic latitude in the region.

The rise of East Asia is providing an alternative system of development for countries like Pakistan. Realising the importance of economic growth in East Asia, Pakistan government launched its "Vision East Asia", in October 2003. The main thrust of Pakistan's look East policy is based on geo-economic considerations. Pakistan prefers East Asia, as a role model for its economic development to find new sources of market, investment, technology transfer and financial support. This shift in policy "Towards East", is motivated by the spirit to raise its autonomous capacity for development.

In the past, due to the political and security alignment with the West, Pakistan followed Western guidelines and prescriptions for developmental goals. This policy made Pakistan resort to rent seeking behaviour. Pakistan's economy became hostage to the whims of foreign aid; however, foreign aid brought cosmetic development and created an elite class to serve the Western cause.

As a matter of fact, Pakistan has followed its "Look East Policy" for building partnership with the countries of Southeast Asia and East Asia. This policy is driven to develop close relations in various fields and establish institutional links with these states on bilateral basis and on multilateral level.

Pakistan has become more active in seeking the membership of different regional forums in South East Asia. It has secured the status of Sectoral Dialogue Partner with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Now Pakistan has intensified efforts to become full dialogue partner of ASEAN and is quite optimistic of getting it in near future. Pakistan has also joined ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and is founding member of Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). Pakistan hosted last ministerial meeting of ACD in Islamabad in April 2005. Thus, Pakistan is engaged with most of the regional groupings in East Asia.

Pakistan can learn from the experience of the East Asian community by developing its export complementary to these rising economies. For looking at East, Pakistan should bring transformation in composition of its economic structure to give matching response to the demands of these emerging economies. In this regard, professional planning and efficient use of domestic resources can accelerate the pace of development by acquiring the export-led skills.

The most strategic question is to see as to how Pakistan can develop a positive dependency of these economic giants on the supply line of this country. In this respect, Pakistan can provide energy corridor to these growing economies that are running short of energy resources. Pakistan has good chance to introduce pipeline diplomacy provided it achieves relative peace on its frontiers. In this context, Pakistan can learn from 'the ASEAN Way' of

resolving bilateral disputes and establish a regional entity on the lines of cooperative security. East Asian states are highly interested to see stability in South Asia for promoting trade cooperation with it. Thus, Pakistan with its placement at the cross-roads of three regions can turn this strategic prize in economic achievements.

Pakistan with its population of 160 million people is attractive for East Asian States to collaborate with in the field of trade and investment. Reforms introduced by the present government make Pakistan a lucrative place for foreign direct investment. And introduction of joint ventures between private sectors of Pakistan and East Asian nations can enable both sides to enhance economic cooperation. For this, Halal Food industry has a good chance to succeed in attracting the markets in East Asia.

Pakistan should adopt a professional stance in branding its export commodities in value-added manner. Towards that end, Pakistan can tap its human resources to the optimum level to enhance export and compete in new trade arrangements, set by global economy.

Conclusion

The vision of East Asia is not only a source of inspiration but a new hope for Pakistan for self-actualisation by adopting indigenisation of knowledge. The urge for indigenization is a call for creativity and originality. By associating with East Asian region, Pakistan can enter in the realm of catch up with the technological progress, manufacturing capabilities and investment opportunities.

Besides, Pakistan can capitalise its geo-political position for its geo-economic purposes. In this respect, Pakistan can become highway of oil and gas transition towards East Asian countries. Since East Asia is backing the generation of wealth; Pakistan's share could be that of a cream in a cake if the later provides energy corridor towards growing economies of Asia.

Pakistan is basically looking to East for multiple reasons. Those are highlighted as under:

- Balance of trade.
- Transfer of technology.
- Energy supplier.
- Investment.

Hence, Pakistan needs to develop knowledge-based economy to attain the objective of export led economy. Pakistan has looked to West for more than half a century for securing transfer of technology but to no avail. Now Pakistan is looking to East for the same purpose. By tapping oil, gas and coal resources and providing passage in supplying energy to growing economies,

Pakistan can be beneficiary in capital accumulations. For this purpose, East Asian states are eager to invest in power and energy sector in Pakistan.

In conclusion, Pakistan's "Look East Policy" should not be viewed in narrow terms of nationalism; in fact 'look east' policy should not be in conflict with looking towards West. After all, Pakistan was Western-ally during Cold War period. So, it should not develop any enemy image with Western world but simply diversify the alternative sources of economic achievement. As old saying goes, "Never put all eggs in the same basket". ■

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