



**‘VOICES FOR PEACE’  
IMPACT EVALUATION OF A RADIO  
DRAMA TO COUNTERACT VIOLENT  
EXTREMISM IN THE SAHEL REGION IN  
BURKINA FASO  
ENDLINE REPORT**

DRG Learning, Evaluation, and Research  
(DRG-LER) Activity

TASKING N062

Contract No. GS-10F-0033M / AID-OAA-M-13-00013

JUNE 2019

# ‘VOICES FOR PEACE’ IMPACT EVALUATION OF A RADIO DRAMA TO COUNTERACT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE SAHEL REGION IN BURKINA FASO

ENDLINE REPORT

DRG Learning, Evaluation, and Research  
(DRG-LER) Activity

TASKING N062

JUNE 2019

Prepared under Contract No.: GS-I0F-0033M / AID-OAA-M-13-00013

**SUBMITTED TO:**

Brandy Witthoft

**SUBMITTED BY:**

Rezarta Bilali  
New York University

**CONTRACTOR:**

NORC at the University of Chicago  
Attention: Renée Hendley  
Bethesda, MD 20814  
Tel: 301-634-9489; E-mail: [Hendley-Renee@norc.org](mailto:Hendley-Renee@norc.org)

**DISCLAIMER**

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	1
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE SAHEL REGION IN BURKINA FASO.....	3
EDUTAINMENT AS A TOOL TO IMPACT SOCIAL CHANGE AND COUNTERACT VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE) .....	4
Edutainment’s theory of change .....	4
Factors inhibiting the impact of edutainment .....	6
A CVE RADIO DRAMA (EDUTAINMENT) INTERVENTION IN THE SAHEL REGION OF BURKINA FASO.....	8
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, OUTCOMES, AND HYPOTHESES.....	10
RQ1. Does CVE radio drama influence listeners’ beliefs, attitudes, discussions, and willingness to engage in behaviors that counter violent extremism?.....	10
RQ2. Does radio drama’s influence disseminate to listeners’ social networks?.....	10
Hypotheses and expectations .....	10
RESEARCH DESIGN .....	12
METHODS .....	14
Sample size.....	14
Sampling of villages.....	14
Sampling of participants .....	14
Random Assignment of Villages Using Block Randomization Following Baseline Survey .....	15
ATTRITION.....	18
MEASURES .....	20
Outcome Measures .....	20
Attitudes toward violence: Justification of violence .....	20
Behavioral intentions regarding collaboration with the police.....	20
Beliefs about the police and collaboration with the police.....	21
Awareness of violent extremism and governance as high priority issues.....	22
Beliefs about the causes and factors contributing to violent extremism.....	23
Self and collective efficacy beliefs.....	24
Discussions about violent extremism.....	24
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERVENTION.....	25
Challenges during the implementation of the intervention .....	25
Attendance and participation .....	25
Contamination/Spill-Over assessment .....	27
Intervention participants’ views and reception of the radio drama.....	27

DATA ANALYSIS.....	29
Intent-to-treat specification.....	29
Treatment on the Treated specification (LATE specification).....	30
Robustness Checks.....	30
Data analysis of the network sample.....	30
RESULTS.....	31
Attitudes toward violence: Justification of violence.....	31
Behavioral intentions regarding collaboration with the police.....	32
Beliefs about the police and collaboration with the police.....	33
Awareness of violent extremism and governance as high priority issues.....	33
Beliefs about the causes and factors contributing to violent extremism.....	35
Self and collective efficacy beliefs.....	36
Discussions.....	37
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF GROUP DISCUSSIONS.....	38
SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS.....	42
APPENDICES.....	46
Appendix A: Sample size considerations.....	46
Appendix B: Sample Characteristics at Baseline.....	47
Appendix C: Village List and Treatment Assignment.....	52
Appendix D: Balance between treatment and control condition.....	57
Appendix E: Attrition.....	59
Appendix F: Outcome Measures.....	61
Appendix G: Intervention participants’ reactions to the soap opera.....	64
Appendix H: Intraclass Correlations (ICC).....	68
Appendix I: Descriptive Statistics and Additional Analyses.....	71
Appendix J: Other Outcomes Unreported in the Report’s Results Section.....	80
Appendix K: Instrument.....	82
REFERENCES.....	109

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Randomization of villages to control and treatment conditions.....	16
Figure 2.	Percentage of participants that had heard about the show Wuro Potal.....	26
Figure 3.	Percentage of participants that had participated in at least one listening session of the show Wuro Potal.....	27
Figure 4.	Justification of violence by treatment condition.....	31
Figure 5.	Percentage of respondents who identified governance and violent extremism/insecurity as priorities for the government to address.....	34
Figure B1.	The sample’s ethnic composition.....	47
Figure B2.	Languages spoken at home.....	48
Figures B3.	Reported religious affiliation among primary participants and their networks.....	48
Figures B4.	Education level.....	49
Figure I1.	Most effective thing ordinary people can do to combat violent extremism.....	72
Figure I2.	Responses to “Suspicious person” scenario.....	72
Figure I3.	Attitudes towards and beliefs about collaboration with the police and security forces.....	73
Figure I4.	The most common causes of violent extremism mentioned by participants.....	77
Figure I5.	How many people in each of these groups support violent extremism?.....	77
Figure I6.	Distribution of discussion items by treatment status.....	79

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Attrition rates for core participants along with a t-test for the difference in the treatment and control groups.....	18
Table 2.	The effects of the intervention on justification of violence .....	32
Table 3.	The effect of the intervention on willingness to collaborate with the police.....	32
Table 4.	The effect of the intervention on perceptions of police, collaboration and “minimize risk of becoming target of attack” scenario.....	33
Table 5.	Prioritizing governance and violent extremism as most important problems facing the country .....	34
Table 6.	How many members in these groups support violent extremism? .....	35
Table 7.	The effect of the intervention on efficacy of beliefs .....	36
Table 8.	The effect of the intervention on discussions .....	37
Table A1.	Sample size calculations for an effect size of 0.2 SD.....	46
Table B1.	Employment.....	49
Table B2.	Economic difficulties and grievances.....	50
Table B3.	Ownership of a variety of goods on one’s household .....	51
Table B4.	How often do you receive information coming from the following sources?.....	51
Table E1.	Do attrited respondents in the treatment group differ from attrited respondents in the control group? .....	59
Table E2.	Do attrited respondents differ from non-attrited participants? .....	60
Table H1.	Intraclass correlation coefficients across variables .....	68
Table I1.	Justification of Violent Extremism.....	71
Table I2.	The effect of the intervention on collaboration in 'suspicious person' scenario.....	73
Table I3.	Descriptive statistics for beliefs about the police and collaboration with the police.....	74
Table I4.	Descriptive characteristics of “minimizing risk of attacks” scenario responses .....	75
Table I5.	The effect of the intervention on responses to the “minimizing risk of attacks” scenario .....	76
Table I6.	Descriptive statistics of efficacy beliefs .....	78
Table I7.	Descriptive characteristics of discussion outcomes .....	79
Table J1.	Descriptives of outcomes unrelated to violent extremism .....	81
Table J2.	The effect of the intervention on social trust, and civic engagement.....	81

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

‘Voices for Peace’ is a 5-year participatory media, local governance, intervention funded by USAID, and implemented by the NGO Equal Access International to reduce vulnerability to violent extremism in the Sahel region of West Africa: Burkina Faso, Niger, Cameroon, Mali, and Chad. The goals are to 1) denounce violent extremism and reduce support for it; 2) raise awareness about the factors that contribute to violent extremism and to youth’s recruitment into violent extremist groups; 3) increase people’s engagement in behaviors that counter support for violent extremism (specifically, through increasing collaboration with the security forces); and 4) encourage participatory governance.

A key feature of ‘Voices for Peace’ involves the use of educational radio dramas—a methodology referred to as education entertainment or shortly edutainment. Edutainment is defined as the “process of purposely designing and implementing a media message to both entertain and educate, in order to increase audience members’ knowledge about an educational issue, create favorable attitudes, shift social norms, and change overt behavior” (Singhal, Cody, Rogers, & Sabido, 2004, p. 5). Edutainment blends educational messages about social issues into an entertaining format, such as a radio drama.

Edutainment radio dramas are commonly used to promote positive behaviors for social change especially in different domains, such as public health (e.g., Myers, Sebert, & Bell, 2002). Though less prevalent, edutainment has also been used as a tool for violence prevention, (e.g., domestic violence, see Usdin, Scheepers, Goldstein, & Japhet, 2005; intergroup violence in the Eastern DRC, e.g., Bilali, Vollhardt, & Rarick, 2017; Paluck, 2010), and to promote intergroup reconciliation in the aftermath of mass violence (e.g., Bilali & Vollhardt, 2013; Paluck, 2009). Because of this, edutainment has been suggested as a potential promising approach to address and counter violent extremism (Ferguson, 2016). However, so far there has been limited research assessing whether edutainment radio dramas could be effective tools to counteract violent extremism.

Building on this rationale, an Impact Evaluation (IE) study was conducted to evaluate the potential of a radio drama, part of the ‘Voices for Peace’ project, to reduce vulnerability to violent extremism by promoting dialogue and positive alternative narratives in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso. The IE study employs a cluster randomized control trial in one province in Sahel—the Seno province. 132 villages and districts of the Seno province were randomly assigned to receive the intervention (the radio drama) or to a ‘business-as-usual’ control. Following a baseline survey of randomly selected participants across all 132 villages (22 participants in each village), the participants in the intervention villages were invited to participate in special weekly listening sessions of the radio drama in their communities during a 12-week period to listen to content equivalent to 6 months of the radio drama, or 52 episodes. An endline survey was conducted during the month following the end of the intervention.

The results of this impact evaluation study show that the radio drama Wuro Potal in the Seno province of Burkina Faso

1. reduced justification of violence,
2. increased willingness to collaborate with the police and security forces,
3. increased awareness of governance and insecurity as priority issues that need to be addressed by the government, and
4. increased people’s self and collective efficacy beliefs to impact change in their community.

The intervention did not influence beliefs about the causes of violent extremism, communities' perceived ability to cope with violent extremism (e.g., to protect oneself from becoming a target of attack), and the extent to which they discuss about violent extremism with others in their community. It also did not influence perceptions of the police and security forces (e.g., confidence and trust in security forces or the belief that collaboration with the police will increase security).

Analyses of group discussions following listening sessions revealed that participants drew positive lessons from the show in line with the main objectives of the intervention. Importantly, the most common themes and positive lessons brought up by participants in these discussions included the importance of social cohesion, collaboration with the police, and good governance for achieving security.

The observed effects are particularly important given that the research design employed might underestimate the effects of the intervention. Public broadcasting is an important way through which edutainment impacts audiences because it facilitates changes in perceived norms (i.e., as listeners know others in the community are listening to the same shows) and it encourages discussions. In this study, the radio drama was delivered to selected participants prior to broadcast, thereby potentially inhibiting two main routes of media influence—change in social norms and encouraging discussions. This Impact Evaluation's research design reduces the drama's potential to encourage discussions as listeners' families and friends are not exposed to it. It also reduces the drama's ability to change social norms as not everyone in the community was exposed to the drama.

Overall, the results show that edutainment can be a promising approach to address CVE goals. However, further research is needed to investigate the impact of the public broadcasting of the edutainment intervention; whether the changes in behavioral intentions translate into behavioral change; and whether these changes are sustainable over time.



## **VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE SAHEL REGION IN BURKINA FASO**

Sahel is one of Burkina Faso's 13 administrative regions. It was created on July 2, 2001. The region's capital is Dori. Four provinces make up the Sahel region – Oudalan, Seno, Soum, and Yagha. As of 2010, the population of the region was 1,086,250 with 50.30 percent females. The population in the region was 6.91 percent of the total population of the country. The main languages spoken in Sahel Region as of 2006 were Fulfulde, Tamasheq (or “Bella”), and Moore.

A variety of armed groups including Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups operate in this region. Burkina Faso has become a target of attack since 2015, with attacks on military outposts in the Mali border and other cross-border raids and kidnappings. Other major attacks have been perpetrated in the Sahel region, especially in the Soum province, as well as in Burkina Faso's capital Ouagadougou. While much of the extremist threat in Burkina Faso is thought to be external (i.e., coming from neighboring countries), one group is homegrown. Based on a recent International Crisis Group (2017) research report, the main protagonist of Burkina Faso's homegrown insecurity crisis is a group (named *Ansarul Islam*) founded by a local preacher, Malam Ibrahim Dicko (now believed to be in exile). Initially, Malam Dicko's sermons addressed issues related to oppression and rituals in Sahel that perpetuated an unjust social system. For instance, he challenged the unjust social hierarchies in these communities by challenging the power of certain minority families (referred to as marabout families) who are considered to be the only “legitimate religious authority”. He also challenged the power of traditional leaders and the continued divisions and hierarchies between the descendants of masters (the Fulani) and slaves (the Rimaibe). His sermons also had an anti-western dimension (International Crisis Group, 2017). Malam Dicko funded daily broadcasts of his sermons via radio, which became very popular. The appeal to social justice initially attracted a lot of followers, however most of these followers left when Malam Dicko resorted to violence (International Crisis Group, 2017). This group, with its attacks and retaliation to opponents, has created a climate of fear and terror in this region.

One problem that exacerbates the current insecurity crisis is the mistrust between the people of the Sahel and the government. The population feels abandoned and marginalized by the central government due to lack of development, poverty, poor infrastructure, etc. Moreover, the security forces placed in the Sahel come from other provinces, and often abuse the population, thereby further damaging the potential for collaboration.

An International Crisis Group (2017) study draws four main recommendations for the government and international partners to address violent extremism in the Sahel region in Burkina Faso: 1) encourage intercommunity and intergenerational dialogue to help communities address social divisions; 2) address the mistrust between security forces and the population; 3) support development projects, improve justice provisions and reduce corruption, and 4) encourage cross-border collaboration.

## **EDUTAINMENT AS A TOOL TO IMPACT SOCIAL CHANGE AND COUNTERACT VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE)**

Edutainment is defined as the “process of purposely designing and implementing a media message to both entertain and educate, in order to increase audience members’ knowledge about an educational issue, create favorable attitudes, shift social norms, and change overt behavior” (Singhal, Cody, Rogers, & Sabido, 2004, p. 5).

Edutainment weaves educational messages in an entertaining format, typically a serial drama that can be delivered through various media channels including radio and TV (Singhal & Rogers, 1999). Radio has become a common medium for broadcasting edutainment programs. As de Fossard argues “Radio is based on oral tradition. Every culture has traditions of storytelling, and the fascination of listening to a good tale well told has never been lost” (de Fossard, 2005, p. 30). Edutainment has been used increasingly, and with great success to induce social change in various domains, including empowerment of women, development, health issues, family planning, domestic violence, etc. (e.g., Singhal et al., 2004). In developing countries, edutainment through radio is commonly used to promote positive behaviors surrounding public health concerns such as family planning (e.g., Valente et al., 1994) or to address social issues such as teenage sexuality (e.g., the radio drama *Dehleez* in India, Pant, Singhal, & Bhasin, 2002) (for a detailed review, see Myers et al., 2002). Though less prevalent, edutainment has also been used as a tool for violence prevention (e.g., Usdin et al., 2005), including in addressing intergroup violence and conflict (e.g., Bilali & Vollhardt, 2013; Bilali, Vollhardt, & Rarick, 2015; Paluck, 2009; see also Bilali & Staub, 2016).

Can edutainment be an effective tool to counteract violent extremism (CVE)? The typical CVE approach to violent extremism typically uses counter-propaganda strategies that involve disseminating information and campaigns that counter the information and arguments of extremist groups. In a compelling review of evidence, Ferguson (2016) argues that this counter-propaganda approach to CVE builds on false assumptions, is reactive, and therefore is unlikely to be an effective tool. Instead, Ferguson (2016) highlights the potential of alternative approaches to CVE, including the use of edutainment strategies such as radio and TV dramas for social change. Instead of tackling and countering the violent extremists’ narratives and communications (i.e., instead of being reactive), this approach provides alternative narratives and stories about conflict (its roots and consequences), violence, and society that are appealing to communities.

### **EDUTAINMENT’S THEORY OF CHANGE**

**Social learning through role models.** Different theoretical frameworks grounded in various disciplines drive the design and can explain the effects of edutainment interventions (for a review see Sood, Menard, & Witte, 2004). Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory is one of the main social psychological theories at the basis of edutainment. This theory posits that human beings learn through observation and imitation of role models: Certain behaviors are encouraged or discouraged by the use of negative, positive and transitional characters in a serial drama. Role modeling is expected to influence efficacy and outcome expectations for engaging in behaviors that drive social change (see Bandura, 2004). Accordingly, the radio dramas use role models to portray desirable and undesirable behaviors, such as encouraging people to take action to prevent violence. Fictional characters serve as role models to the audience by adopting positive attitudes and behavioral patterns to address particular challenges in the community. Through identification with the characters, audience members can observe and vicariously experience how people similar to them can act to improve their lives. The actions taken by the positive role models provide new behavioral options, increasing the audience members’ perceived self-efficacy to impact change in their lives and

communities (Bandura, 2004). Similarly, negative role models exhibit detrimental behaviors and choices that the audience is meant to avoid. A study of an edutainment drama on violence prevention in the Eastern DRC isolated the effects of the role modeling mechanism, showing its impact on increased efficacy beliefs for change, and on willingness to engage in modeled actions (Bilali et al., 2017).

**Social norms.** Exposure to prosocial media and role models can also influence social norms, which in turn have a powerful impact on behavior (Greitemeyer, 2011). Studies in different contexts, such as in the context of reduction of gender-based violence in South Africa (e.g., Usdin et al., 2005) and Uganda (Green, Wilke, & Cooper, 2017), or in reconciliation and peacebuilding programs in Rwanda (Paluck, 2009), showed that these interventions' impact on behavior are likely to occur through changes in perceived social norms (see also Tankard & Paluck, 2015) and may eventually change social norms. For example, during the first year of a radio drama on prevention of mass violence (produced by Radio La Benevolencija), Paluck (2009) carried out a randomized impact study in which she randomly assigned members of 14 communities across Rwanda to listen to either an experimental or a control radio drama during the course of one year. The study revealed that the intervention increased social norms about intergroup relations (e.g., outgroup trust and reduced social distance toward outgroups) as well as behaviors (e.g., cooperation).

In a study examining the social processes of edutainment, Arias (2016) assessed private versus public exposure to a radio drama on gender-based violence, thereby comparing the individual versus social mechanisms of influence. Those participants who were invited to listen to the program in groups rather than individually were more likely to identify gender-based violence as an issue (i.e., increased awareness), and were also more likely to want to educate their kids on gender equality, and more likely to report that they would intervene to stop a domestic abuse. Therefore, the public nature of the shows (i.e., knowledge that other people might be listening and exposed to it) in and of itself can diffuse norms.

**Raising awareness.** Edutainment media interventions can be effective in raising awareness about important social issues by bringing them up in the public sphere. Raising awareness can be especially important in contexts where certain issues are silenced or taboo. Highlighting social issues through drama not only brings community's attention to them, but also encourages reflection and engagement with different perspectives on those issues.

**Educating populations (knowledge and beliefs).** Edutainment is often used to educate the population by identifying factors that contribute to the problem that needs change, as well as educating about the consequences of various behaviors. For instance, the reconciliation radio drama Musekweya in Rwanda aims to educate the population on the causes and evolution of mass violence (e.g., Staub, Pearlman, Weiss, & Hoek, 2007; Staub & Bilali, 2016). However, to date there is no evidence that edutainment programs in the realm of violence prevention influence knowledge and beliefs about these issues (e.g., Green et al., 2017; Paluck, 2009).

**Discussions.** Edutainment interventions can be powerful tools for social change because they exert an influence not only at the level of individual attitudes and behaviors, but also at the community level through its effects on social norms (as discussed above), and through encouraging discussions. People often listen to the radio together, and discuss the stories with family and friends (Paluck, 2010). The dramas provide a basis for starting discussions on important, and often sensitive, issues in the community. Through encouraging discussions, the influence of media interventions can be amplified and move through networks, even among those people who are not directly exposed to the programs, but are exposed to them indirectly through their peers.

Discussion and dialogue are typically encouraged for building tolerance as they are thought to form the basis of democratic process. Importantly, group discussions are also critical to coordinated collective social change action: it is through social interactions that individual perceptions and ideas are socially validated and transform into shared norms and cognitions that drive action (McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bliuc, 2014). Media interventions can steer discussions by providing the normative content that facilitates positive social change: they raise awareness about shared grievances and communicate norms about collective efficacy and prosocial actions. These discussions can reinforce and help facilitate the positive effects of media interventions (e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009).

## **FACTORS INHIBITING THE IMPACT OF EDUTAINMENT**

There are a few conditions that can inhibit the mechanisms of change discussed above.

First, **raising awareness** can be beneficial when there is a lack of awareness in the population. While raising awareness can put an issue in the public spotlight, it is not clear how and in which direction raising awareness per se might influence behavior. For instance, raising awareness about a problem without providing prescriptions about how to address that problem might not be useful. Indeed, programs that only focus on raising awareness by portraying the problematic behaviors might not be effective (e.g., Bilali et al., 2017), and might inadvertently influence the perceived social norms to suggest that these behaviors are frequent in the community (Paluck & Ball, 2012). For instance, portrayals of smoking and drinking behaviors as normative and common in a community are likely to increase these behaviors. Because people have the tendency to comply with social norms in their communities, interventions that highlight the high incidence of the problematic behavior might increase rather than decrease the problematic behavior.

Second, social learning theory suggests that role modeling is effective under certain conditions: positive **role models** are unlikely to have a positive influence if the modeled behaviors are not effective, or if the role models are punished (or face other negative consequences). Indeed, showing role models who, because of their brave actions, might face negative consequences (such as punishment) might discourage the audience's engagement in such actions. For instance, if a character of a show on domestic violence reports the abuse to the police, but as a result of this report suffers further abuse from authorities, their family, and the community, then the modeled behavior (i.e., reporting domestic violence) is likely to be ineffective or to further reduce reporting. This raises an important challenge for edutainment programs, as many programs aim to be realistic in addressing complex issues in communities (such as violence), acknowledging and validating people's experiences, such as the potential negative effects of speaking out or acting against mainstream social norms. Active bystanders (upstanders) in every society can be faced with negative consequences. However, showing negative consequences of positive desired behaviors might also discourage such behaviors.

Third, while **encouraging discussions** is typically desirable, discussions are not a panacea for constructive solutions. Under certain conditions, discussions might inhibit the positive effect of media intervention. If through participation in discussions, individuals targeted by the intervention realize that others in their community do not share the norms and behaviors promoted by media, social change processes might be thwarted, and endorsement of prescribed behaviors may be perceived difficult or unrealistic. In some circumstances, discussions can also polarize in ways that might lead to more extreme or undesirable consequences. For instance, a study by Paluck (2010) in the Eastern DRC examined the effect of a talk show that encouraged discussions about a radio drama on conflict. The talk show reduced intergroup helping (an opposite effect to that aimed for by

the soap opera). Another later study of the same program revealed that the observed impacts of a radio drama episode diminished when participants were given the opportunity to discuss the programs (Bilali et al., 2017, Study 2). This is because during discussions people might raise issues that can counteract the messages in the intervention, or they can come up with examples in which the modeled actions are not successful.

## **A CVE RADIO DRAMA (EDUTAINMENT) INTERVENTION IN THE SAHEL REGION OF BURKINA FASO**

An edutainment radio drama named Wuro Potal was designed and produced by the NGO Equal Access. The radio drama focuses on violent extremism (specifically violence inflicted on a fictional community by an armed group), collaboration between the population and the security forces/military, governance and corruption, and migration. The drama is a complicated story about a city where corruption is pervasive, violent attacks by armed gang groups are frequent, police and security forces are abusive and mistrusted by the population, and there is high poverty and few opportunities for employment for youth. Below, we further describe elements of the 52-episode radio drama relevant to the social change themes of the intervention.

**Violent extremism.** During the 52 episodes, the city of Wuro Potal is the target of several attacks by an armed group. The group includes members of the Wuro Potal community, and seems to have some connections to a few corrupt police officers. The armed group is involved in smuggling weapons. They take advantage of poverty and unemployment to lure youth by providing them opportunities to earn money, and sometimes force the youth to participate in their activities through threats of violence or torture.

The group seems intent on inflicting as much damage and fear as possible, but the motivations for the violence are not completely clear as the series begins. However, there are several references throughout the drama that dissatisfaction with the corruption in the city is a motivation for violence, and thereby the need to “take over” the city from the corrupted elites. This suggests that there is an ideological reason behind the violence related to dysfunctional institutions, corruption, and unemployment. However, it is not clear how harming the population as a whole through attacks in public spaces will serve those ideological goals. Importantly, the 52 episodes end with an attack on the governor’s house and governorate. Many people are kidnapped, including two members of the governor’s family.

### **Portrayal of police/security forces and collaboration with police/security forces.**

Interactions between police/security forces and the population are shown extensively in the drama. Most of these are negative interactions that portray the police as corrupt or abusive. There are a few instances, however, where the police are portrayed as fair (e.g., refusing bribes).

The characters’ discussions about collaboration with the police are rich and provide different points of views, such that if one character promotes collaboration, another character explains the dangers of collaboration. The message is that while there are some bad, abusive and corrupt police/security forces, there are also many good people who are working for the security forces. Occasionally, other positive characters bring up the importance of going to the police to resolve their problems, rather than through illegal means. The drama also brings up issues such as fake accusations to settle personal vendettas.

With regard to role modeling, one case involves one of the negative characters associated with the armed group has a change of heart and informs authorities about an imminent attack. That person is then sought out by the armed group, highlighting the danger of collaboration.

Importantly, in response to one of the main cases of police brutality portrayed in the drama, the officers were put on trial. During the trial, an abusive security officer confesses that he enjoys causing pain to others. Justice was done in this trial as the police officers were convicted for their

abusive acts. However, following the trial other security personnel protested the court's decision to imprison the abusive security officers.

The drama provides a complex story regarding the status of security and the role of the police/security forces. Overall, the message seems to be that the only way to tackle insecurity is for the population, security forces, and other community leaders to work together. However, although the drama portrays a few instances of collaboration, it portrays more instances of corruption and abuse.

**Participatory governance and migration.** Corruption and poor governance are two important themes in the drama. Various leaders in the city, such as the mayor, are shown to be corrupt (e.g., accepting bribes). Indeed the poor conditions of the city, including unemployment, poverty, corruption, and dysfunctional institutions, seem to have incited two types of actions, destructive and constructive, in different factions of the population: The first is the violence committed by armed groups, which is claimed to be an attempt to “take back the city” from the corrupt leadership. Youth from the city are lured into such violence, by being offered an opportunity to “help” their city, to earn money, or provide a path to migration. The second action includes constructive, peaceful contributions by involved citizens. In various meetings portrayed in the drama, several citizens put pressure on their leaders, speaking up and holding them accountable. An association led by two positive characters aims to fight corruption, raise awareness regarding the dangers of migration, and create employment opportunities for young people. They work for peace and stability, and speak truth to power by holding leaders accountable.

Migration is consistently portrayed as dangerous, unprofitable, and harmful for the community. People are advised not to migrate, but instead to help develop their communities.



## RESEARCH QUESTIONS, OUTCOMES, AND HYPOTHESES

### **RQ1. DOES CVE RADIO DRAMA INFLUENCE LISTENERS' BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, DISCUSSIONS, AND WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN BEHAVIORS THAT COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM?**

We aimed to examine whether a radio drama on violent extremism influence the different outcomes reported by edutainment interventions: specifically, its influence on self-reported behaviors (willingness to collaborate with the police), attitudes toward violent extremism (i.e., justification of violence), awareness of violent extremism as a high priority issue that needs to be addressed, beliefs about violent extremism, and discussions. In addition, we also examined other important outcomes and mechanisms of change such as perceived self- and collective efficacy to impact change, perceptions and attitudes toward the police, and perceived ability to cope with the threat of violent extremism.<sup>1</sup>

Specific outcomes related to the objectives

1. **Attitudes** toward violence: Justification of use of violence
2. **Behavioral intentions** regarding collaboration with police and security forces
3. **Beliefs** about the police and collaboration with the police
4. **Awareness** of violent extremism and governance as high priority issues in the country
5. **Beliefs** about causes and factors contributing to violent extremism in the Sahel
6. **Self and collective efficacy beliefs**
7. **Discussions** about violent extremism

### **RQ2. DOES RADIO DRAMA'S INFLUENCE DISSEMINATE TO LISTENERS' SOCIAL NETWORKS?**

The second goal of the research was to examine whether the impact of the education entertainment can disseminate to listeners' social networks; that is whether the intervention can indirectly influence the social network of primary targets (direct listeners) through communication and discussions among them. Unfortunately, due to logistical and feasibility constraints, we were not able to implement one of the research design elements that aimed to address this question (an individual-level Randomized Controlled Trial encouraging discussions among randomly selected listeners). Therefore, we are not able to fully address this question with the present research design. We discuss this issue further in the Research Design section.

## **HYPOTHESES AND EXPECTATIONS**

Based on its goals, we expected the radio drama to counter support for and recruitment to extremist groups. We also expected the edutainment intervention to increase awareness of violent extremism and potentially the factors that contribute to it, and to increase understanding of the consequences of behaviors for insecurity.

Specifically, we expected that,

---

<sup>1</sup> Although we discussed the possibility of social norm changes, we did not examine the perceived social norms (that is, participants' beliefs about how others in their community would behave and what they deem appropriate behavior regarding violent extremism) because the questions were too sensitive in the context of Sahel.



- The intervention will reduce justification of violence.
- The intervention will increase willingness to collaborate with the security forces and police.
- The intervention will increase the belief that collaboration with the police helps reduce insecurity.
- The intervention will raise awareness of violent extremism and governance as high priority issues that need to be tackled by the government.
- The intervention will increase discussions about violent extremism and higher likelihood that people would contribute to those discussions.
- The intervention will increase perceived efficacy/agency to address violent extremism and cope with the extremist threat; and it will increase self- and collective-efficacy for change.

In addition, we explored whether:

- The intervention will shift beliefs about the roots and consequences of violent extremism.
- Whether the intervention influences perceptions of police, such as police fairness, and trust and confidence in the police.

## RESEARCH DESIGN

To assess the causal impact of the radio drama, we take advantage of the fact that the intervention (i.e., radio drama) was not yet broadcast. This allowed us to assess the effect of the radio drama intervention on attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral intentions prior to its broadcast in the media. We conducted a clustered randomized control trial with two arms: the treatment condition (radio drama) vs. business-as-usual control. The randomization was carried out at the village level (the equivalent district level is used for urban areas). Selected participants in selected villages and districts in the Seno province were invited to special listening sessions of the radio drama in their own villages over 12 weeks<sup>2</sup>, to listen to 52 episodes of the radio drama (equivalent of 26 weeks or 6 months of radio broadcast). Facilitators brought the recorded episodes of the radio drama to each selected village every week. In each weekly session, participants listened to 4-5 episodes of the radio drama (about 1 hour or a ‘double dosage’ of a typical radio showing). The control condition is a ‘business-as-usual’ condition that did not receive an intervention. Participants across all conditions completed a baseline survey, as well as an endline survey immediately following the intervention.

The timeline of the data collection and intervention is shown below:



To examine the second research question—how a media intervention that aims to impact social change influences communities beyond its direct beneficiaries (i.e., the listeners), we aimed to assess whether the radio drama influences the social networks (i.e., family or friends whom participants report to have frequent discussions and communications with) of individuals who are exposed to the programs. At the baseline, participants were asked to provide the names of three people with whom they interact (have conversations) most frequently. We randomly selected one of these individuals to be included in the baseline and endline surveys. The proposed research design included an add-on ‘nudge’ intervention in which randomly selected participants in the intervention group would be encouraged weekly through SMS to discuss the programs with their friends and family. This would allow us to specifically examine the effects of encouraging discussions on listeners’ networks. However, this element of the design was not implemented due to the lack of infrastructure in the province where the research was conducted. For example, there was poor cellphone coverage in many villages, low rates of cellphone ownership, and no power/electricity in many villages resulting in uncharged cellphones for long time periods.

Within the Sahel region, we chose Seno province over other communes as the location for the impact evaluation mainly because of security concerns. Although influenced by the same security concerns as other regions of Sahel, Seno has been safe from attacks, ensuring the safety of

<sup>2</sup> The radio drama intervention was scheduled for 12 weeks for logistic reasons: participants in these areas can only commit to participation in listening sessions during the dry season, and importantly the villages were accessible only during this period.

participants and all the involved staff. USAID and NORC financed a scoping trip to the Seno province in July 2017 to examine the security concerns in the region and the feasibility of the intervention and of the impact evaluation. A local research associate visited each commune in the Seno province to gather information regarding the intervention and the research's risks for participants, researchers, and facilitators. The researcher interviewed mayors or mayor's representatives and traditional leaders, conducted meetings with various youth groups, and visited 1 or 2 villages in each commune. Although the interviewees were concerned about the security situation and the possibility of spill-over of the attacks to their province, there was consensus from all parties that this intervention and the associated research would not pose risks to participants, researchers or facilitators.

## METHODS

### SAMPLE SIZE

The sample included 132 villages, which were randomly assigned to the treatment (66 villages) or the control condition (66 villages). The number of clusters or villages ( $v$ ) was estimated based on power calculations using the following parameters: power: 80%;  $\alpha = 0.05$  (two-tailed test), clusters of equal size, for an effect size of 0.2 standard deviation (SD). We estimated the sample size (i.e., number of clusters required per condition) using an intra-cluster correlation ( $\rho$ ) of 0.10 based on prior research in the region (see Appendix A for more explanation). We accounted for attrition of 2 village pairs, and 20 percent attrition at the individual level. Based on these estimates, for an experiment with 2 treatment arms, the suggested sample size was 66 villages per condition (for a total of 132 villages), and 22 core participants per village (with an expected attrition of 20 percent). Therefore, the total baseline sample was expected to include **2,904 core participants**.

For network participants (to answer the second research question), due to budgetary constraints, we could not include the networks of every core participant. Therefore, out of the 22 potential networks per village (1 network member for each core participant), we interviewed a subsample of 16 network participants per village (see details regarding sampling below): a total of **2,112 network participants**. (Note that, as described on page 17, we were not able to implement Research Question 2 which regards to social networks; while we provide the sample characteristics, we will not provide analyses with regard to social network sample).

Further details on sample size calculations are presented in the Appendix A.

### SAMPLING OF VILLAGES

As of December 2017, Seno province had 208 villages and districts (i.e., urban areas). Among these, 13 are urban districts (the 8 districts of Dori and the 5 commune centers of the 5 communes of Seno province). We excluded 10 villages (including one urban district) that were reported to be high security risk, inaccessible, or the main spoken language was not Fulfude (the language of the radio drama intervention). In addition, villages were eligible if they had a minimum of 76 households. This number is double the number of the participants we needed to sample in each village (i.e., 38 households, 1 participant per household), allowing for a replacement for each household contact. Eight villages did not meet this inclusion criteria (i.e., they had less than 76 households), and therefore they were dropped from the sample.

To sum up, 190 villages were eligible in the Seno province. From this list, we randomly selected 132 villages to participate in the study (see Flow Diagram chart on page 26).

### SAMPLING OF PARTICIPANTS

**Core participants.** Participants were eligible if they were at least 16 years old. We chose to include youth as young as 16, as youth is the main group targeted for recruitment by violent extremist groups (Burkina Faso's national youth policy statement (2008) defines youth starting at age 16).

The baseline data was collected during January 2018 over a period of 18 days by a local survey company, CERFODES. Data collection was conducted in Tablets, using ODK collect, by 40 enumerators and 10 controllers. They received a one-week long training on household and participant selection, the questionnaire, interviewing, the use of smartphones in data collection, and ethics. A random-walk methodology was used to randomly select households in the selected villages.

In each village, 22 core participants were selected through the random walk procedure. Once in the household, a roster of household members over 16 years through 90 years of age was taken, and a family member was afterwards randomly selected by ODK from this list (stratified by age and gender). Each respondent was interviewed individually by an enumerator. The interviews were conducted in Fulfulde using a standardized translation on paper, but the enumerators coded participants' responses into tablets in French due to the enumerators' greater comfort with reading and writing in French. Interviewers who have been educated primarily in French are still able to fluently read and speak Fulfulde. However, during instrument translation and review, it became clear that enumerators were able to record responses more quickly and accurately in French, so a decision was made to allow them to read the interview questions from a paper translation but use French on the tablets to code responses.

**Network participants.** To assess the effect of the radio drama on networks of listeners, we also collected data from 16 of the listeners' network members (i.e., a person with whom each listener has most interactions/discussions with). Core participants provided the names and contact information of 3 individuals with whom they have the most discussions. The 16 core participants whose contacts were chosen to be interviewed were chosen through a systematic process (specifically, each enumerator systematically chose a selected number of participants out of the list of participants they interviewed each day). One of these contacts was randomly selected by the enumerator to interview as a network participant. (Note that we will not include network participants in the analyses of the results, as we were not able to implement the design for research question 2 that involves network participants, see explanation on page 17).

Overall, 5,016 participants (2,904 core, and 2,112 network participants) were interviewed in the baseline survey. Appendix B provides a summary of characteristics of the sample at baseline (reproduced from the baseline report).

## **RANDOM ASSIGNMENT OF VILLAGES USING BLOCK RANDOMIZATION FOLLOWING BASELINE SURVEY**

Randomization of villages into treatment and control conditions was done following the baseline data collection (but before the individual-level data was processed). We used a cluster block randomization procedure (using R allocation algorithm "blockTools") with matching to (a) maximize the power of the experiment by minimizing differences between treated and control villages, and (b) reduce spill-over effects by not blocking together villages that are geographically very close or share commonly-used infrastructures such as shared markets, schools, wells, or health centers.


Randomization was carried out in three steps. In the first step, the villages were clustered based on their physical location using a hierarchical clustering. Specifically, villages were grouped into clusters using the GEO coordinates from baseline data—the villages within a distance threshold of 2 kilometers were grouped into the same cluster. In the second step, the villages were matched into paired blocks based on baseline characteristics, requiring that no villages from the same cluster be paired together. We used a set of 13 variables from the baseline to do the paired matching: *population, number of households and household size, having an electric grid, water supply, distance to nearest primary school, distance to nearest secondary school, having a literacy center, distance to nearest police station, distance to nearest health center, distance to nearest market, having a bad road leading to the village, distance to nearest paved road.* Some of these variables (such as the population and household numbers) came from the *Annuaire Statistique 2014 de la region du Sahel* collected by Institut National de la Statistique, whereas the other variables were collected during the baseline data collection. An optimal greedy algorithm was used to find the best of all possible pairs, matching on mahalanobis

distance and requiring that each village in a matched pair belong to different clusters. That is the algorithm that finds the minimum mahalanobis distance between two villages (i.e., best match) that are not in the same cluster, removes them from the set, then finds the next best match among the remaining villages, until all villages have a matched pair.

Lastly, in the third step, the villages in each pair were randomly assigned to treatment and control, requiring that all villages in the same cluster are assigned to one condition (either the treatment or the control) and that paired matches of those villages always receive the other condition. That is, one of the 132 villages was randomly assigned to treatment, which automatically requires that its matched pair is assigned to the control group. The algorithm then assigns any villages in the same cluster as this newly assigned treatment village and assigns them to treatment as well, and it assigns any villages in the same cluster as the newly assigned control village to control.

See Figure 1 for the distribution of control and treatment villages in the Seno province.

**Figure 1. Randomization of villages to control and treatment conditions.**



The research team generated the allocation sequence, following baseline data collection in January 2018. Following random assignment, the list of the treatment villages<sup>3</sup> and participants in these villages was sent to the intervention implementer NGO to start their recruitment for the

<sup>3</sup> An administrative mistake in producing the list of treatment villages to be sent to the NGO led to mis-assignment of 4 villages in control and treatment conditions (2 villages originally assigned to the treatment, were mistakenly moved to the control group list and 2 villages assigned to the control were mistakenly moved to the treatment group list). These villages are noted in the Appendix C. The impact analysis is conducted including and excluding the affected village pairs. The results were robust across these analyses.

intervention. The list of villages with their assignment is provided in Appendix C. Enumerators were blind to the details of the intervention.

The randomization scheme resulted in excellent balance between treatment and control condition, both on village-level indicators as well as on all individual-level variables. Appendix D provides a report of balance tests on individual-level variables at baseline.

## ATTRITION

Among core participants, the overall attrition rate from baseline to endline survey was 6.37%. There was a significantly higher attrition in the control group (7.85%) compared to the treatment group (4.89%) (Difference = 2.96%,  $t = 3.27$ ,  $p = .001$ ) (see Table 1). There was no difference in the attrition rate in network participants across groups.


**Table 1. Attrition rates for core participants along with a t-test for the difference in the treatment and control groups.**

ATTRITION AMONG CORE RESPONDENTS		
Group	Pct. Attrition	Obs
Control	7.85%	1452
Treatment	4.89%	1452
Combined	6.37%	2904
Difference	2.96	$t = 3.27$ , $p\text{-value} = 0.001$

While the difference in attrition between treatment and control is statistically significant, the difference is small, the attrition rate is low (overall attrition rate of 0.064, with a differential attrition of 0.029), and attrited respondents are similar in the treatment and control group (see Appendix E for more information on attrition). The low attrition rate is important and provides confidence on the ability of the study’s design to make causal claims about the impact of the intervention. The data analysis in this report ignores attrition (that is, we have not conducted imputations to replace the attrited data).



**FLOW DIAGRAM**



## MEASURES

The sets of measures include the followings:

- Individual-level survey at baseline and endline, including outcome measures and covariates, as well as a short questionnaire on self-reported participation in and reactions to the intervention. Outcome measures are summarized in Appendix F. They are also described in detail below in the ‘Outcome Measures’ section.
- Village characteristics collected at baseline. Specifically, we assessed (1) resources in the village (e.g., # households, power grid, water supply, school, police post, health center, market, distance to paved road); (2) ongoing development projects (e.g., infrastructure, health, education), and (3) observational data on security markings: police vehicles, soldiers or army vehicles, customs post, etc.
- Implementation data report by intervention facilitators on weekly attendance and on how the listening session went (e.g., if there were any disruptions).
- Qualitative data from focus-group discussions. To examine participants’ perceptions and reactions of the drama, open-ended discussions were held once in each group throughout the 12 weeks of the radio drama intervention (in 63 groups following one of the listening sessions). Open-ended data was analyzed through content and thematic analyses.

## OUTCOME MEASURES

### ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE: JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE

Justification of extremist violence was measured with three items used in previous research in the Sahel region (Finkel, McCauley, Belasco, & Neureiter, 2016). Participants were read two opposing statements (as shown below), and asked which statement they agreed with. After participants selected one of the statements, they were asked to what extent they agreed with that statement (moderately or strongly).

#### Justification of violence scale

1. A. The use of violence is never justified. /B. It is sometimes necessary to use violence to defend just causes.

2. A. Violence is not an effective tool to resolve problems. /B. Violence can be an effective tool to resolve problems.

3. A. Violence in the name of religion is never justified. /B. Violence in the name of religion might be justified.

The responses to these three items were coded on 4-point scales anchored at: 1 = violence is not justified; 4 = violence is justified. Then, the responses were aggregated ( $\alpha = 0.74$  at baseline) to create a single composite scale of **justification of violence**.

### BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS REGARDING COLLABORATION WITH THE POLICE

We examined intentions to collaborate with police using an open-ended question and a scenario type question, as shown in the table below.

The open-ended question was adopted from an Afrobarometer study by Buchanan-Clark and Lekalake (2016) and asked participants “**What is the most effective thing that people like you could do to help combat violent extremism in this country?**” The responses were coded by the

interviewer into a-priori codes that included: a) nothing/people can't do anything; b) collaborate with the police/forces of security; c) refuse to collaborate with the extremist groups; d) signal the suspicious activities to the security forces; e) talk about the problem, for example by calling a radio program or writing a letter; f) talk about the problem to friends and family; g) be vigilant; h) other (\_\_\_); i) I don't know.

The scenario-type question was created for the purpose of this research. After reading the scenario, participants rated the likelihood of engaging in each of the 5 different behavioral options. The behavioral option « contacting the official authorities (e.g., the security forces)», which was a goal of the show, was the key item assessed. Participants responded to each behavioral option on 4-point scales ranging from (1) completely likely to (4) completely unlikely.

**What is the most effective thing that people like you could do to help combat violent extremism in this country? (open-ended)**

**In the context of insecurity in the Sahel, imagine that you are approached by someone that seems suspicious or is part of a suspicious group that makes you an interesting financial proposal and asks for your help. Please tell me if it is likely or unlikely that you would personally do the following in this situation (4 point scale, ranging from completely unlikely to completely likely):**

- a. I would try to avoid contact with that person.
- b. I would consult a friend or family member.
- c. I would consult a community leader
- d. I would contact the official authorities (e.g., the security forces) [key item]
- e. I would try to learn more about the offer.

## **BELIEFS ABOUT THE POLICE AND COLLABORATION WITH THE POLICE**

We examined perceptions that the police is fair (i.e., police fairness), trust in the security apparatus; outcome expectancies, such as the beliefs that collaboration with the police helps ensure insecurity, minimizes the risk of becoming the target of an attack, or that it might be dangerous. These outcomes can operate differently, therefore they are assessed separately (e.g., it is possible to view the police as fair, but believe that collaboration might not help in securing the region; similarly, it is possible that collaboration with the police might help safety and security for the village and community, but might be personally dangerous as witnesses are at heightened risk for revenge by extremist groups).

Five items adopted from the Procedural Justice Scale from Gau (2014) and Mazerolle et al. (2013) measured police fairness ( $\alpha = 0.86$ ); trust in security apparatus was examined with 3 items ( $\alpha = 0.86$ ); the belief that police collaboration increases safety and security and that police collaboration is dangerous were assessed with 2 items each ( $\alpha = 0.87$  and  $\alpha = 0.67$  respectively). All items are assessed on 4-point scales.

Lastly, a scenario-type question also examined the belief that police collaboration minimizes one's risk of becoming a target of an attack. In this scenario, participants rated (on 4-point scales) the extent to which different behaviors might reduce their risk of becoming a target of attack. The key behavioral option among the different behaviors listed was «Seek the support and protection of the security forces », and therefore we focus on this behavior.

## Beliefs about police/security forces and collaboration with the police

### POLICE FAIRNESS

Treat people with respect  
Treat people fairly  
Take time to listen to people  
Make decisions based on facts and law, rather than on their personal opinions  
Explain their decisions to people

### TRUST IN THE SECURITY APPARATUS

To what degree do you trust:

... the police  
... the security forces  
... the military

### COLLABORATION HELPS SECURITY

Collaborating with the police / security forces helps ensure community safety.  
Collaborating with the police helps prevent violent attacks in the community.

### COLLABORATION ENDANGERS SELF

Collaborating with the police can be dangerous as it puts one at risk of attacks.  
Collaborating with the police can damage relationships with other members of the community.

### COLLABORATION MINIMIZES RISK TO SELF

People use different strategies to minimize their risk of becoming a target of an attack or retaliation by radical groups. I will read a list of things that some people have suggested they would do to minimize this risk. We would like your opinion regarding whether each action might help or not in minimizing the risk of becoming a target of an attack.

1. Do not speak out against them
2. Do not express opinions about them
3. Abide, if someone affiliated with those groups asks you to do something
4. Avoid contact with state institutions
5. Avoid use of certain public services
6. Avoid going to certain areas
- 7. Seek the support and protection of security forces [key item]**
8. Seek the support and protection of your community/village

## AWARENESS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND GOVERNANCE AS HIGH PRIORITY ISSUES

To examine whether the intervention raised awareness about the importance of governance and violent extremism, we adopted one open-ended question (endline only) from Afrobarometer surveys, which asks:

**In your opinion, what are the three primary most important problems that the country faces that the government needs to tackle? (open-ended)**

TEXT

Participants' answers were coded by the interviewers into one of the 34 a-priori codes grouped into the following categories: economy, agriculture, infrastructure, public services, health, governance, and "other" or "I don't know".

We were interested in the **Governance category** which included the following codes: crime, corruption, instability/political divisions/ethnic divisions, political violence, strikes, incivility, discrimination, women’s rights, war, democracy/political rights, and insecurity and violent extremism; as well as, more specifically, the category **insecurity and violent extremism**.

We created two dichotomous variables: The first variable “Governance” was coded as “1” if participants mentioned at least one Governance item among the three priority problems that the government needs to address (otherwise, code = 0). The second dichotomous variable “Insecurity” assessed whether participants mentioned insecurity and violent extremism as one of the main 3 problems (i.e., mentioning violent extremism = 1; otherwise = 0).

We examined whether intervention increases the likelihood of choosing governance and insecurity as high priority issues that need to be addressed in the country.

### BELIEFS ABOUT THE CAUSES AND FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

We examined whether the radio drama intervention shifts perceptions and beliefs about violent extremism. We examined three types of beliefs through a variety of open-ended and closed-ended questions adopted from Afrobarometer on Violent Extremism and presented below (all questions were assessed at the endline only): (1) beliefs about the causes of insecurity and violent extremism (adopted from Buchanan-Clarke, & Lekalake, 2016), (2) perceived support for violent extremism by various groups (used in Afrobarometer, Nigeria/Cameroon, 2014/2015), and (3) motivations for supporting violent extremism (used in Afrobarometer, Nigeria/Cameroon, 2014/2015).

Participants’ responses to the open-ended question on the causes of insecurity were coded by the interviewer following an a-priori coding scheme that included the following 20 categories: nobody, religious groups, ethnic groups, security forces, local authorities, traficants, the marginalized people, foreigners, western governments, immigrants or refugees, the state, self-defense groups, jihadists, bandits, political groups, armed or extremist groups, poverty, corruption, personal enrichment, “other”, and “I don’t know.” Participants could list as many categories as they wanted.

#### Beliefs about Violent Extremism

##### BELIEFS ABOUT THE CAUSES OF INSECURITY

In your opinion, what are the causes of insecurity in the Sahel region? (open-ended)

##### PERCEIVED SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Some people help or support the activities of the extremist groups and violence. I will list you a number of groups. Please tell me how many people in each of these groups, in your opinion, are implicated in support or giving assistance to extremist groups that have launched attacks in the Sahel region?” (4 point-scale: none, some, many, all)

1. Foreign governments
2. government representatives
3. members of the Army/police
4. religious leaders
5. the population of Sahel.

##### MOTIVATIONS FOR SUPPORTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

In your opinion, what are the factors that lead some groups to support extremist groups? (4-point scales: 1= not at all; 4 = completely).

1. corruption/personal enrichment
2. government mistreatment or injustices experienced
3. poor performance of government to meet the needs of people
4. religious beliefs
5. coercion/fear of extremist groups
6. “they are bad people”.

An exploratory factor analysis of the items assessing motivations for supporting violent extremism revealed that the first three items, corruption, government mistreatment and poor performance of governance, loaded onto the same factor and therefore were aggregated into a scale of 'poor governance'. The other items were analyzed separately.

### SELF AND COLLECTIVE EFFICACY BELIEFS

We examined perceived community efficacy to cope with violent extremism (3 items,  $\alpha = 0.80$ ) and fatalism about violent extremism (2 items,  $\alpha = 0.74$ ). Because one goal of the intervention was to increase people's agency to influence their communities (e.g., decision-making and leadership), we assessed self-efficacy (2 items,  $\alpha = .79$ ) and collective efficacy beliefs (3 items adapted from Van Zomeren, Saguy, & Schelhaas, 2012,  $\alpha = 0.92$ ) to influence and improve one's community more generally. All items were assessed on 4-point scales.

#### Collective efficacy or fatalism about violent extremism

##### EFFICACY

My community is able to prevent the spread of violent attacks to our community.  
My community can protect our people from violent attacks.  
My community can successfully address security threats we face.

##### FATALISM

We are helpless when it comes to dealing with insecurity in the region.  
My community has little control over its future when it comes to insecurity.

#### Self and collective efficacy beliefs to impact community

##### SELF-EFFICACY

I can influence the community in which I live.  
I am able to impact my community in important ways.

##### COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

I think that we, as a community, can improve our situation.  
We, as a community, together can overcome our difficulties.  
As a community, I think we can change the difficult conditions we face.

### DISCUSSIONS ABOUT VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Five items examined different aspects of discussions about violent extremism. We examined whether the radio drama intervention influenced frequency of discussions about violent extremism (5-point scale: never, rarely, sometimes—about once per month, frequently—more than once per month, always), whether others in participants' community discuss violent extremism (4-point scale: nobody, some people, many people, the majority), perceived censorship during discussions (whether people feel free to voice their opinions, 4-point scale), confidence about one's opinions in discussions (4-point scale), and ability to assert opinions (e.g., through voicing one's disagreements during discussions, 4-point scale). All items are presented below.

#### Discussions of violent extremism

How often do you discuss violent extremism?  
How many people in your community discuss violent extremism?  
People feel free to express their opinions on violent extremism?  
How often do you disagree with others during these discussions?  
How confident are you of your opinions on this issue?

## IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERVENTION

The intervention was implemented by Equal Access over 12 weeks between April 5<sup>th</sup> to June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2018. Each week, groups of participants in each village listened to 4-5 episodes of the soap opera (each episode is 15 minutes long). Each listening session was about 1-1.5 hours long.

Participants were paid a monetary incentive for their participation in each session.

Eight facilitators implemented the intervention in the 66 assigned villages in the Seno province. Overall, 793 listening sessions were held in 66 villages over 12 weeks.

## CHALLENGES DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERVENTION

A variety of logistic issues and challenges faced the implementation of the intervention: 1) Proper identification of participants was difficult due to lack of official identity cards and mismatch of participant names in the identity cards with the names provided in baseline; 2) It was difficult to find space for listening sessions in remote villages. Therefore, in many villages, Equal Access, in collaboration with local leaders, built huts for listening sessions. 3) Difficult terrain conditions—e.g., poor conditions of roads and access to the villages was a daunting challenge, sometimes resulting in minor injuries during these trips on motorcycles for facilitators; 4) Poor phone coverage, low availability of cellphones, and extended power outages made it harder to reach participants. It also made it infeasible to implement the planned individual-level ‘nudge’ discussion intervention that was planned in the research design.

Although the implementing organization worked on monitoring the sessions, the monitoring of the sessions was not very thorough due to the logistical difficulties, including the complex terrain and geography, and the many concurrent sessions run daily.

Specific challenges were reported in two intervention villages. In one village (Goulgountou) participants’ main language was Tamashek rather than Fulfude. Although participants showed up, they were dissatisfied that the programs were in Fulfude. In another village (Village Touka Bayel), there was political strife between members selected for the listening session, leading to issues regarding sitting together to listen to the show.

## ATTENDANCE AND PARTICIPATION

We examined participation and attendance in two ways—through self-reports at endline (participants were asked whether they have heard the show Wuro Potal, and if so, whether they have participated in listening sessions) and through facilitators’ reports of participants’ attendance.

As shown in Figure 2, 101 participants (7.31%) in the treatment condition reported to have never heard of the program. Among those participants who heard about it (1280 participants), 145 (11.33%) reported not to have been part of a listening session and 88.67% (1,135 participants) reported to have participated in listening sessions. Overall, the endline data indicates that **17.8% of the endline intervention/treatment sample (246 participants) did not participate in listening sessions** (see Figure 3).

In every session, facilitators took attendance in their tablets by writing down participants’ names.


From the attendance data entered in the implementation sessions across the 12 listening sessions in the 66 intervention villages, 205 attendees’ names were not matched to the survey data. Main

reasons for lack of a match included: (a) two participants in the village had the same name; (b) differences between the listed name in the baseline and the official names in the identity cards; (c) report/use of different names, when participants had multiple names.

Available attendance data shows that the average number of sessions attended per participant was 8.62 (SD = 4.54). Seventy percent of participants attended 10 or more sessions out of the total of 12 sessions. Across sessions, the average participation/attendance per village was 17 participants (SD = 3.27, range: 3-22), varying between 10 to 21 participants.


Facilitators reported several reasons regarding why people did not attend sessions, including inability to identify and contact the participant, migration to other regions, rain, employment, lack of interest, or lack of trust in international organizations which often do not fulfill made promises.

**Figure 2. Percentage of participants that had heard about the show Wuro Potal.**





**Figure 3. Percentage of participants that had participated in at least one listening session of the show Wuro Potal.**



**CONTAMINATION/SPILL-OVER ASSESSMENT**

Contamination/spill-over effects refer to possible influence of the control condition participants through their interactions with treatment group participants or through unplanned exposure to the intervention. To examine the likelihood of spill-over effects we examine who has heard of Wuro Potal and who has participated in listening sessions. Among the core respondent group, 1,371 participants reported to have heard of the show—1,280 were in the intervention condition and 91 were part of the control group. Among participants in the control condition, 91 (6.8% of the respondents) of them said that they had heard of the program. When asked how they had heard of the program, 5 participants reported to have listened to the program, 70 participants reported to have heard from others, and 16 said that they had heard about it in the radio. Considering that the programs were not reported in the radio, it is likely that these participants confused the program/name of the program.

Those participants who said that they had heard of Wuro Potal, then were asked whether they had attended listening sessions of Wuro Potal. Among the 91 participants in the control condition, only 2 of them reported to have attended listening sessions.

**INTERVENTION PARTICIPANTS’ VIEWS AND RECEPTION OF THE RADIO DRAMA**

The quality of the intervention/radio drama and listeners’ identification with it and its characters are pre-requisites for its effectiveness. Therefore, at the endline, we asked intervention participants their reactions to Wuro Potal. We asked participants about their views of the radio drama – whether they found it realistic, whether they identified with it, whether they discussed it with other people in their village. We present the descriptive results to these questions in Appendix G.

As shown in the Figures in Appendix G, the majority of participants felt that the characters were similar to people in their daily lives, the show was realistic reflecting their reality, and the vast

majority of participants felt part of the story. In addition, about half of the intervention sample reported to have discussed the show at least once a week with other people in their village, and about 20% reported to have discussed it with people from other villages.

When asked about their emotions/feelings when listening to the drama, participants reported feeling stronger positive emotions (which were assessed with the following emotions: inspired, happy, enthusiastic, and hopeful, Mean = 3.04, SD = .65, 4-point scale) than negative emotions (which were assessed with the following emotions: sad, disgusted, angry, afraid, Mean = 1.97, SD = .73, 4-point scale).

When asked which character they identified with the most, the majority of participants identified with the two positive role models, Welore (35%) and Pendo (32%).

At the end of the survey, we asked participants in an open-ended question what they thought the main message or lesson of Wuro Potal was. The vast majority of responses included social cohesion, peace and solidarity as the lesson of Wuro Potal. Other lessons included fighting corruption, development, addressing insecurity, education the population, doing good deeds, etc.

## DATA ANALYSIS

The data was analyzed using intent to treat (ITT), as well as treatment on the treated (TOT) with randomization assignment as the instrumental variable. The intent to treat analysis (ITT) examines the effect of the assignment to the treatment condition on the individual-level outcomes. The treatment on the treated (LATE) analysis uses the random assignment to predict whether a participant actually received the treatment (i.e., whether they actually participated in the listening sessions), which in turn is used to predict the outcomes. This last (TOT) analysis accounts for non-compliance – the fact that about 18% of participants in the treatment condition did not participate in the intervention at all.

All the analyses were conducted with Core Respondents only (that is, with respondents who were randomly selected to either participate in the listening sessions or their controls; not with network participants).

Because the treatment assignment was at the village level, a source of variation in participants' responses comes from the village level. Intra-class correlations across outcomes are shown in Appendix H.

### INTENT-TO-TREAT SPECIFICATION

The main specification of the ITT analysis is based on a basic OLS regression as follows:

$$Y_{ivb} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{vb} + \rho_b + \varepsilon_{ivb}$$

where  $Y_{ivb}$  corresponds to the outcome variable for individual  $i$ , in village  $v$ , in randomization block  $b$ .  $T_{vb}$  corresponds to the village-level treatment variable (that is, radio drama vs. control).

$\rho_b$  corresponds to randomization block fixed effects and finally  $\varepsilon_{ivb}$  is the error term.

When the outcome variable was also examined at baseline, we also include the baseline measure in the equation as follows, to increase the power of the experiment:

$$Y_{ivb} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{vb} + \beta_2 Y_{0ivb} + \rho_b + \varepsilon_{ivb}$$

Following this first model, we also conducted the same analyses by adding a set of individual-level (denoted as  $X$ ) and village-level (denoted as  $Z$ ) covariates:

$$Y_{ivb} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{vb} + \beta_2 Y_{0ivb} + \gamma Z_{vb} + \delta X_{ivb} + \rho_b + \varepsilon_{ivb}$$

The individual level covariates include: gender,  $\ln(\text{age})$ , education status, employment status, economic grievances, wealth index, belonging to a religious group, belonging to a political group<sup>4</sup>.

Village-level covariates include: population size ( $\ln(\text{population})$ ), accessibility (poor or impassable road to the village) and at least 1 security marking present.

---

<sup>4</sup> We have conducted preliminary exploratory analyses to examine potential differences in treatment effects for different genders, however those analyses did not reveal differential effects for gender.

Dichotomous outcomes are assessed using probit regression, and all single-item ordered outcomes are examined using ordered probit regressions. Aggregated scales are examined using linear regression models.

We provide the results for both models in the results section: Model 1: ITT estimations without covariates; Model 2: ITT estimations including covariates

### **TREATMENT ON THE TREATED SPECIFICATION (LATE SPECIFICATION)**

This estimation involves specifying a “first-stage” model of the treatment condition that the individual actually experienced as a function of the assigned treatment and covariates. In the second stage, the outcome of interest is a function of the treatment actually experienced, as predicted in the first stage, as well as of covariates. That is, we estimate the following system of equations:

#### **Step 1:**

$$P_{ivb} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{vb} + \beta_2 Y_{0ivb} + \gamma Z_{vb} + \delta X_{ivb} + \rho_b + \varepsilon_{ivb}$$

where  $P_{ivb}$  is the reported attendance or participation at least in one listening session—it takes the value of 1 if the individual  $i$  in village  $v$  in block  $b$  participated in at least 1 intervention session.

#### **Step 2:**

$$Y_{ivb} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_{ivb} + \beta_2 Y_{0ivb} + \gamma Z_{vb} + \delta X_{ivb} + \rho_b + \varepsilon_{ivb}$$

where  $P_{ivb}$  is the predicted value of attendance or participation from Step 1.

### **ROBUSTNESS CHECKS.**

We also conducted two sets of robustness checks. First, we conducted all the analyses excluding the 4 pairs of villages for which the randomization was mixed. Second, we conducted the analyses after excluding 2 villages in which the facilitator reported specific challenges: in one village, the participants reported to be more comfortable in a language (Tamashek) different from the radio drama’s language (Fulfulde); in another village, facilitators reported that there were political conflictual divides among participants in the village. The results of these analyses were exactly the same as the one with the whole sample presented here.

### **DATA ANALYSIS OF THE NETWORK SAMPLE.**

We conducted the same analyses with network participants as well (that is, comparing network participants in the intervention villages with network participants in the control villages). We did not find statistically significant effects of the intervention on network participants. We have not presented the results of these regression analyses in this report.


## RESULTS

Below, we present the results from both Intent-to-Treat (ITT) and Treatment-on-the-Treated (ToT) analyses for each group of outcomes. Therefore, we report the impact of the intervention on participants that were assigned to the treatment, the ITT impacts, (independent on whether they participated in listening sessions; note that 18% of baseline participants did not participate in listening sessions), as well as the estimated impact of the intervention on those participants who participated in at least one listening session, the ToT impacts<sup>5</sup>.

### ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE: JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE

Participants revealed a low level of justification of violence: Participants mostly did not agree that the use of violence is justified (see Figure 4 and descriptive statistics in Table II in Appendix I)

**Figure 4. Justification of violence by treatment condition.**



Graph of justification of violence scale for core respondents at endline

Although justification of violence was quite low, as shown in Table 2, the intervention further reduced the justification of extremist violence compared to the control group (see Table 2). However, the effect was very small: the intervention reduced justification by about a tenth of a standard deviation of the control group or in other words, the intervention reduced justification by roughly 3.7% when compared to the control group average.

<sup>5</sup> All the effects are provided on the whole sample (not disaggregated by gender). Exploratory analyses assessing potential differential treatment effect by gender do not reveal significant differences across these groups.

**Table 2. The effects of the intervention on justification of violence**

	<b>CONTROL MEAN SD</b>	<b>(1) B(SE)</b>	<b>(2) B(SE)</b>	<b>(3) B(SE)</b>
Justification of violence scale	1.522	-0.051**	-0.042**	-0.051**
	0.567	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.024)

Notes. The first column reports control group mean and standard deviation. The first and the second regressions report intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated effects using Instrumental Variable (TOT) analyses. Justification of violence is a composite scale ranging from 1 to 4. Linear regressions are reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Ns = 2,703-2,719. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS REGARDING COLLABORATION WITH THE POLICE

When asked “what people like you can do to combat violent extremism”, about 60% of participants said that the most effective way to combat violent extremism is to collaborate with the police or to signal suspicious activities to the security forces (see responses depicted in Figure 11 in Appendix I). Importantly, participants in the intervention group were more likely to say that collaboration with security forces is the most effective thing ordinary people can do to combat violent extremism (this is because participants in the intervention condition were less likely to say nothing or to say that talking about the problem is most effective). Participants assigned to the intervention were about 6% more likely to report collaboration with the police as a strategy. The effect of the intervention on those who attended (i.e., were exposed to) the intervention was bigger: The intervention increases reporting of this strategy by about 18% for participants who attended at least one session.

Intervention participants were also more likely to report that they would contact security forces in the “suspicious person” scenario – they were about a fifth of a standard deviation more likely to agree that they would contact authorities. In other words, the intervention led to roughly a 10% increase compared to the control group average.

The summary statistics of all responses to the “suspicious person” scenario are shown in Figure 12 Appendix I, and the effects of the intervention on all responses are provided in Table 12 in Appendix I.

**Table 3. The effect of the intervention on willingness to collaborate with the police**

	<b>CONTROL GROUP MEAN, SD</b>	<b>(1) B(SE)</b>	<b>(2) B(SE)</b>	<b>(3) B(SE)</b>
What would you do in a situation with a suspicious person? (higher numbers less likely to agree)				
Contact official authorities (e.g., security forces)	1.862	-0.166***	-0.157***	-0.193***
	0.937	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.053)
What people like you can do to combat violent extremism?				
Collaborate with Security Forces	0.606	0.058***	0.055***	0.177***
	(0.489)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.067)

Notes. The first and the second regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable (TOT) analyses. The outcome “Contact official authorities” is assessed in 4-point scale, and regressions for this outcome are ordered probit; The outcome “Collaborate with security forces” is a dichotomous variable and the regressions for this outcome are probit. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## BELIEFS ABOUT THE POLICE AND COLLABORATION WITH THE POLICE

The intervention did not influence attitudes toward the police and security forces or beliefs about expectancies related to collaboration with the police. Neither did it influence the expectancy that seeking the support or the protection of the police reduces the risk of becoming a target of an attack (see Table 4). (Summary statistics and distributions of these outcomes are shown in Table I3 and Figure I3, Appendix I. Summary statistics and the effect of the intervention on all responses to the “Minimize risk of becoming a target of attack scenario” are shown in Table I4 and Table I5 respectively, Appendix I)

**Table 4. The effect of the intervention on perceptions of police, collaboration and “minimize risk of becoming target of attack” scenario**

	CONTROL GROUP MEAN, SD	(1) B(SE)	(2) B(SE)	(3) B(SE)
Police fairness scale	3.041	0.043*	0.041*	0.050*
	0.596	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Police collaboration helps security scale	3.558	-0.025	-0.030	-0.037
	0.493	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Police collaboration is dangerous scale	2.235	-0.027	-0.014	-0.018
	0.790	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.054)
Trust in police and security forces scale	3.189	0.025	0.018	0.022
	0.502	(0.036)	(0.034)	-0.042
Seeking the support and protection of security forces minimizes the risk to the self	3.245	-0.004	-0.013	-0.015
	0.878	-0.052	-0.051	(0.063)


Notes. The first and the second regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable (TOT) analyses. All outcomes are measured in 4-point scales. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## AWARENESS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND GOVERNANCE AS HIGH PRIORITY ISSUES

Figure 5 shows the percentage of respondents who identified governance and insecurity/violent extremism as one of the 3 main priorities for the government to address in the country.

**Figure 5. Percentage of respondents who identified governance and violent extremism/insecurity as priorities for the government to address.**



Note: Percentage of core respondents reporting insecurity or governance as one of the top three problems in the country. Responses are not mutually exclusive.

Question asked at endline only.

The results of probit regression analyses (see Table 5), revealed that participants in the intervention condition were more likely than those in the control condition to name a governance issue and violent extremism/insecurity as priorities for the government to address. Specifically, being assigned to the intervention increased the likelihood of naming governance by 5%, and it increased the likelihood of naming violent extremism by 2.5%. Attending one or more sessions of the intervention increased the likelihood of naming governance by about 23% and it increased the likelihood of naming insecurity/violent extremism by about 15%.

**Table 5. Prioritizing governance and violent extremism as most important problems facing the country**

	(1) B(SE)	(2) B(SE)	(3) B(SE)
Governance	0.050*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.016)	0.228*** (0.067)
Violent Extremism/Insecurity	0.025* (0.013)	0.028** (0.013)	0.149** (0.070)

Notes. The first and the second regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable (TOT) analyses. Both outcomes are dichotomous variables. Coefficients are probit estimates. Robust standard errors are included in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



## BELIEFS ABOUT THE CAUSES AND FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

To the open-ended question about beliefs of violent extremism, the most common cause of insecurity listed included bandits, jihadists, and extremist groups (The most common categories mentioned by participants are portrayed in Figure 14 Appendix I). We combined these three categories onto a single category, and the rest of the causes into “other than extremist groups” category. We then tested whether participants were more or less likely to mention extremist/armed groups (jihadi, bandits, and armed groups) as compared to factors other than extremist groups. The intervention did not change beliefs about the causes or factors contributing to violent extremism (see Table 6).

**Table 6. How many members in these groups support violent extremism?**

	CONTROL MEAN (SD)	(1) B(SE)	(2) B(SE)	(3) B(SE)
<b>BELIEFS ABOUT CAUSES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM</b>				
Jihadists, bandits and armed groups	0.66 (0.473)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.063)
<b>PERCEIVED SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISM</b>				
Foreign Governments	1.843 (0.644)	-0.059 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.055)	-0.066 (0.068)
Government Representatives	1.520 (0.639)	-0.112* (0.064)	-0.093 (0.063)	-0.119 (0.078)
Members of Army/Police	1.430 (0.604)	-0.103 (0.066)	-0.061 (0.065)	-0.079 (0.080)
Religious Leaders	1.767 (0.653)	-0.100* (0.057)	-0.090* (0.053)	-0.113* (0.066)
Population of Sahel	1.982 (0.586)	-0.004 (0.062)	0.013 (0.063)	0.013 (0.077)
<b>MOTIVATIONS FOR SUPPORTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM</b>				
Poor governance scale	2.292 (0.810)	0.004 (0.049)	0.031 (0.048)	0.038 (0.058)
Coercion from extremist group	2.574 (0.976)	-0.058 (0.060)	-0.033 (0.057)	-0.042 (0.070)
Religious beliefs	2.113 (1.017)	0.033 (0.054)	0.049 (0.052)	0.059 (0.064)
They are bad people	2.774 (1.052)	0.034 (0.059)	0.065 (0.054)	0.079 (0.066)

Notes. The first and the second regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable. The first item “Jihadists, Bandits, Armed groups” is dichotomous (hence, probit estimates are reported); other items are measured on 4-point scales; On perceived support for violent extremism responses almost nobody chose the category “all” or “4”, therefore items we recoded into 3 categories: none, some, many (ordered probit estimates are reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Similarly, there were no differences in the perceived support of violent extremism by different groups (see Figure I5 for responses to these items), or on motivations to support violent extremism. Results are shown in Table 6.

### SELF AND COLLECTIVE EFFICACY BELIEFS

The intervention did not have an impact on collective efficacy (perceived efficacy of one’s community to prevent and protect themselves from attacks) or fatalism (perceived helplessness of one’s community to address insecurity and violent extremism) regarding addressing violent extremism, but it had an impact on self and collective efficacy to impact change in community more broadly (see Table 7). Specifically, the intervention increased self-efficacy by one eighth to one sixth of a standard deviation of the control group; or by 4.7% for assigned; and it impacted collective efficacy about one tenth to one eighth of a standard deviation of the control group; 2% of the mean. (Summary statistics of efficacy beliefs are reported in Table I6 in Appendix I)

**Table 7. The effect of the intervention on efficacy of beliefs**

	<b>CONTROL GROUP MEAN, SD</b>	<b>(1) B(SE)</b>	<b>(2) B(SE)</b>	<b>(3) B(SE)</b>
<b>Collective efficacy and fatalism about addressing violent extremism</b>				
Efficacy	2.214	0.043	0.043	0.052
	0.785	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.041)
Fatalism	3.084	-0.025	-0.021	-0.026
	0.786	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.039)
<b>Self and collective efficacy to impact community and social change</b>				
Self-efficacy	2.627	0.086***	0.096***	0.117***
	0.757	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.034)
Collective efficacy	3.358	0.050*	0.061**	0.074**
	0.599	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.032)

Notes. The first and the second regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable (TOT) analyses. OLS estimates reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## DISCUSSIONS

As shown in Table 8, the intervention did not have an impact on any of the discussion items. Summary statistics and distribution of these outcomes are reported in Table 17 and Figure 16 in Appendix I.

	CONTROL MEAN, SD	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
How often do you discuss violent extremism?	2.76	-0.026	-0.023	-0.028
	0.95	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.041)
How many people in your community discuss violent extremism?	2.58	-0.016	-0.023	-0.029
	0.75	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.034)
People feel free to express their opinions on violent extremism	2.98	0.046	0.049	0.059
	0.97	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.083)
How often do you disagree with others during these discussions?	1.42	0.074	0.089	0.106
	0.59	(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.073)
How confident are you of your opinions on this issue?	2.61	0.052	0.067	0.084
	0.94	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.077)

Notes. The first and the second regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable. Estimates are ordered probits. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF GROUP DISCUSSIONS

As discussed in the research design, most intervention participants engaged in a group discussion in their listening group, once during the 12-week intervention. We randomly selected which groups would have discussions every week, so that we would have a set of discussions every week over the course of the interventions. Overall, 63 discussions were held. All discussions were facilitated by the facilitators by asking group members what they thought about the episode of the drama they just listened to. The discussions were recoded and then transcribed and translated.

Then the discussions were coded (by two different coders) using a thematic analysis. Seven themes or topics were brought up in discussions: peace and social cohesion, collaboration with the police and security forces, youth migration, governance, (un)employment, children's education, and women's issues.

**Peace and social cohesion.** Participants overwhelmingly believed that the show reflected the reality of their lives, and its goal was to promote peace and social cohesion. For instance, participants would say that *Wuro Potal* is about “raising awareness and promotes solidarity and peace”, “showing how to live in social cohesion” and about “union and dialogue”.

Participants understood that the lesson of the show was to work for peace and social cohesion in their communities. For instance, one participant said “We think this is a good thing because this show tells us about peace and social cohesion. This will allow us to live in harmony while respecting each other.” Another participant said that the show is about “promoting peace and unity, we must make the village of Goulgountou a reflection of peace and unity.” Creating social cohesion was discussed as the main tool for improving the situation in their villages. Often, participants would comment on the necessity of social cohesion to reach the goal of peace through referencing the show: “They [the show] talked about how they live together and how they do things to keep the peace. I found it good because we can follow their examples. So, with social cohesion we can together overcome our difficulties.” Another participant said: “In my opinion too, people have to unite and to seek social cohesion, participate in meetings to solve the problems at the source, it will allow us to live in solidarity and thus to live in peace.”

Participants appreciated that the show was helpful in making them more aware of politics, and issues of migration and corruption. Participants remarked that they were made aware of situations of violent extremism, bad politics, and child migration, and that this awareness also taught them that “social cohesion is the basis of development” and that they may live in harmony if they have individual agreement and fight for peace and against injustice. The actions of Wellhore and Pendo in the show were cited often as role models who worked with others to fight against injustice.

Participants reacted negatively to the use of weapons, specifically guns, and violence in the show, often stating that it disrupts social cohesion and the development of the community, or that weapons are for war not for the village or the children. Some participants were pained by the death and cries of the fictional village members in the show; they were upset by the use of “weapons made for war” and were made to “fear an armed attack on my village, and [they] are helpless in this situation”. They also recognized how the disorder and insecurity of the village allowed the bandits to continue their attacks.

**Collaboration with police.** In addition to bringing up social cohesion as a tool to achieve peace, participants very frequently mentioned that the show highlights the “the need to report to and collaborate with the security forces.” Many participants felt that without collaboration it would be impossible to move forward as a community. They agreed that peace is possible when “we

collaborate with our security forces and I encourage all those present to work with them but also to convince others to do so because it is for the good of all.”

Below are a few of the participants’ quotes with regard to lessons they learned about police collaboration:

“I think we need to collaborate more with the security forces by reporting suspicious activity to them and respecting established security instructions.”

“We must be cautious and vigilant to help the defense and security forces to protect our country against armed groups.”

“Any suspicious activity must be reported to the authorities. We must work with our easers so that they know that we are accompanying them in their struggle.”

“In my opinion too, it is necessary to denounce the people who help from the inside because it is sure that accomplices from outside support them to set the attacks that we have undergone. It means that the terrorists have a lot of internal support.”

“Thanks to the radio broadcasts of Wuro Potal I understood that we could fight against the weapons proliferation in our community so that we can identify and denounce suspicious persons to the authorities.”

It is important to note that in discussions about collaboration with the police, some participants mentioned that the security forces need to treat the population better so that people can trust them, and report to them. Many participants reported disagreements with the violent acts of the security forces portrayed in the show; for example: “the part I disliked is where the police were sent to help a community, but they made them suffer.” They emphasized that security forces should protect and not harm the villagers and they should be working together to create harmony and peace instead.

Overall, participants recognized that Wuro Potal’s message is that they “need to work with security forces to help them keep [them] safe”, however they also realized that the show highlighted that “there are some lousy leadership, some government abusers, and wrongdoers” but it is important to follow the good lessons of those people “working for the good”.

**Governance.** Participants’ comments also focused on the importance of good governance, avoiding corruption, and the importance of participation in governance (i.e., accountability). For instance, one participant said: “We have to work with our government, revealing its flaws and not sticking to false promises like the Mayor of Wuro Potal.” Many of the comments highlighted that the elected officials should fulfill their duties instead of making “false promises.”

Participants also emphasized the importance of electing leaders of high caliber and positive character. One participant said: “...our leaders should be the promoters of this peace, so our leaders must be people of good character to build peace in the community.” Another participant said: “...I will say that peace is only obtained if there is justice. We will try everything without justice we will always return to the same starting square. That is why we must choose between honest and reliable leaders.”

Participants disapproved of the dishonest actions of government officials portrayed in the show. For example, they reported that the mayor (in the show) “enriching himself illegally was not a good thing because it is the people who voted for him...he has a duty to his people.” They also disapproved with his lies about the uses of their taxes and his involvement with the bandits. Participants highlighted that “no bandit was arrested at the end of some episodes despite the crimes committed”

and “the authorities become accomplices to enrich themselves...and also with their position in the administration, they will take advantage to protect the backs of the latter (bandits).” Participants were upset that the mayor was not being held accountable for a set of funds that disappeared, that were meant to fund an initiative to create jobs for the youth.

In sum, participants were taken aback by the story of the elected officials and authorities that were corrupt, lying, and engaging with the bandits in illegal weapons trafficking; and therefore these individuals were not arrested because the elected officers were their accomplices.

Many participants applauded the actions of Wellhore and Pendo (positive characters in the show) to work with the mayor to end corruption and include villagers’ voices in decision-making. Participants appreciated when characters stood up against corrupt officials, saying for instance: “I appreciate the ones who criticize the authorities for the promises they did not make” and “I liked the part where a woman saw the mayor to tell him that they did not respect their electoral promises since the previous campaign. I found this woman brave”. Similarly, they appreciated when the Governor and Mayor in the show started to include citizens of Wuro Potal in their discussions, and the positive impact that the actions of Wellhore and Pendo had on addressing corruption, ending the misuse of the taxes, and keeping officials accountable.

**Youth migration.** An important theme from the show that resonated strongly with participants was the topic of youth migration. On this topic, participants observed that many scenes of the show were similar to their lives. They believed that the show portrayed their current reality and showed that “young people, because of lack of employment, leave their localities...emptying the villages...and those who remain fall into drugs or alcohol or join armed groups and commit attacks for money.” The lesson that participants received from these scenes is that migration can be dangerous, and that the youth should be working for and helping to develop the village that they are a part of.

A few quotes from participants on this topic include:

“... migration is the real source of conflict, aggression, theft and murders; it would be better for everyone to stay at home and work for the development of his community.”

“I am of the opinion that migration to our children should be prohibited because of the risks and dangers of migration out of the country. Avoid going to work in another country, let it work here because all the wealth acquired outside remains outside.”

“what marked me a lot in Wuro Potal are the questions about migration. I believe that the message has gone well, we are all convinced that it is better for our young people to stay here and contribute to the development of their community and the country as a whole because it will benefit us.”

**Unemployment.** Participants were very pleased with two characters of the show (Pendo and Welore) who worked relentlessly to create jobs for the youth. They acknowledged that unemployment lures the youth into a life of crime, such as using and dealing drugs and alcohol, becoming bandits or getting involved in violent extremism or terrorism. For instance, a few participants said:

“If they [the youth] not to work, they become bandits. I agree with them that we need to create jobs for young people so it will reduce the high percentage of unemployment, and children will no longer be involved in harmful activities and they will better contribute to the development.”

“In my opinion, the lack of work drives young people to steal, to go out to look for something to eat, so creating jobs for young people would be good.”

“... many people go on an adventure, but they never return home; often they leave widowed women and orphaned children. Jobs need to be created so that other countries attract less young people. Something should be planned to help them find work in their country.”

Many participants acknowledged that poverty can lead to crime, however they also pointed out that those who are in poverty should not be blamed because they have no other means of surviving. For example, one participant said: “In Wuro Potal, some people have been corrupted ... I think that if our government was able to provide for the needs of its population, all this could have been avoided. Being poor could lead to illicit activities, as the poor cannot refuse certain amounts of money whatever the work we ask them to perform.”

**Children’s education.** Participants stated that educating children was a way to keep them out of crime and to advance society. Families were encouraged to provide a good example, by providing a healthy environment for children (e.g., parents should work out their differences rather than argue or fight with each other). For instance, a participant said: “I invite each parent to counsel his children at home and to follow carefully all the activities that they do, so that we are able to move forward.” Education was also perceived as synonymous with peace and the ability to lead the community in a positive direction. From the participants’ perspective, the responsibility of educating the youth falls both on the family and government. For instance, participants want the government to provide a good and high-quality education to children in their communities:

“Improve the education system to have well-educated children to help to keep the peace.”

“In my opinion, our leaders should also focus on educating our children because ignorance can also lead to many bad things.”

“... the place of a child is at school and not in the arms of the trafficking networks”.

Participants discussed how children who are not educated or employed are vulnerable to be exploited, or likely to become bandits or migrate. One participant noted: “the part where the migration and goldmine sites are forbidden to children, I think that is good, but we need to create jobs so that children are not vulnerable and exploited. This will better occupy them and avoid giving in to the terrorist groups’ offers”.

**Women’s issues.** Issues about women were brought up several times. Participants emphasized the importance of changing attitudes toward and treatment of women. They appreciated the show’s “advice” against violence toward women: for instance, “I liked the part where it is advised that we should not exercise violence against women.” Many participants highlighted the importance of women’s education (which will benefit the whole community in their views), respect toward women in the household, and the importance of partner support in child rearing. One participant said: “In my opinion, we should not let the woman alone take care of the children’s education. Me as a woman I find that one cannot educate alone his children it is necessary that the father also commit himself to a complete education.” Another participant said: “let us put emphasis on girls that must be enrolled in school because educated women are the route to success.”

## SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS

The findings show that the intervention (1) had a very small impact on reducing justification of extremist violence, (2) increased behavioral intentions to collaborate with the police and security forces, (3) increased awareness of governance and violent extremism as important issues that need to be prioritized in the country's agenda, and (4) increased the perceived self and collective capacity to make positive changes and improve the conditions of the community. However, the intervention did not influence (1) beliefs about causes and factors that contribute to extremist violence, (2) beliefs about the consequences of collaborating with the police and attitudes towards the police (police fairness, trust), (3) community's efficacy or fatalism about preventing or addressing violent extremism, or (4) frequency and content of discussions about violent extremism. The discussion sessions following the episodes also revealed that participants drew positive lessons from the show; importantly, the three primary lessons/themes that participants discussed were in line with the intervention's objectives: the importance of social cohesion, collaboration with the police, and good governance.

**Raising Awareness.** The intervention raised awareness by increasing intervention participants' prioritizing of 'governance' and 'insecurity/violent extremism' among the top 3 issues to be addressed by the government. This is an encouraging finding because many edutainment programs (and other interventions) have explicit goals of raising awareness. It is likely that the levels of violence and its negative effects portrayed in the drama might have contributed to this awareness. It is however unclear how and whether raising awareness might influence behavioral change, especially in contexts that provide few opportunity channels for community members to influence governance and government decisions.

**Justification of and beliefs about violent extremism.** The results are encouraging with regard to reducing justification of violence. Although the magnitude of the intervention's effect on justification of violence was very small, it is important to highlight that justification of violence was already very low in this sample, therefore there was not much opportunity to lower the level of violence justification further and thereby observe large effects on this outcome (even if the intervention is effective). Importantly, the drama does not explicitly denounce violent extremism. It seems that portrayals of violence and the devastating impact on communities might have led to a small reduction in justification of such violence.

**Collaboration with the police.** The intervention's impact on willingness to collaborate with the police is especially important. This behavioral intention effect was found in two different types of questions – an open-ended question and a scenario-type question, increasing the confidence on the results. Interestingly, the analysis of the radio drama episodes suggests that collaboration with the police is discussed in a complex way by providing different points of view—that support and encourage collaboration, but also in ways that problematize collaboration due to police corruption, ineffectiveness, and abuse. So, calls for collaboration are coupled with arguments against collaboration (although, often the arguments against collaboration come from people who are involved with the armed group). It is possible that, although it provided both points of view and alerted the listeners about the pitfalls of collaboration, collaboration with the police was also provided as the only way to address the insecurity and violence: The message is that only through working together in unison with the security forces, the communities can effectively address the issue of insecurity. In line with this interpretation, the group discussions show that the goal of collaboration with the police as a way to prevent extremist violence was clearly understood and resonated with participants.



The drama intervention did not influence perceived community's efficacy to address violent extremism, nor did it influence the expectancies (or perceived consequences) of collaborating with the police. The intervention also did not influence perceptions of police (e.g., trust and perceived police fairness). Indeed, these results are not surprising considering that the radio drama reveals the police to be corrupt and abusive.

These findings raise questions about whether (1) intentions to collaborate would transform into actual behaviors when people are faced with the constraints of their reality (e.g., the dangers of collaboration), and (2) whether such behavioral intentions are sustainable over time. On one hand, it is indeed possible that the small effects on willingness to collaborate would dissipate as soon as the intervention's memory fades. On the other hand, interactions are dynamic, and in order to repair relationships that have a history of mistrust, it is important for each party in that relationship to make a collaborative step. It is important to note that the aspect of the intervention focused on improving community-police/security forces interactions had also a goal of raising awareness among the police officers and security forces about the impact of their behaviors and their interactions on population's willingness to collaborate; it aimed to reduce security forces' abuse of the population. However, this study did not assess the impact of the intervention on security forces and police. Therefore, an optimistic interpretation of these findings is that the intervention might nudge parties to take that first collaborative step or gesture. If that collaboration step is reciprocated positively by the police, then the effects of the intervention would be strengthened. However, if that collaborative step is not reciprocated, then the intervention effects would disappear.

**Self- and collective efficacy.** While the intervention increased perceived efficacy to impact change in the community, it did not influence perceived ability to address and cope with violent extremism. It is possible that coping perceptions with regard to violent extremism are a consequence of efficacious actions taken by the community (e.g., collaboration with the police). The portion of the radio drama that was assessed did not reveal effective ways to address the insecurity and cope with the violent attacks in its first 52 episodes. The 52-episode series ends with a major attack and the kidnapping of a large number of people. Considering that the drama does not portray coping with violent extremism, or efficacious actions to address/prevent it, then it is not very surprising that we find no effects on these outcomes at this point. By contrast, several actions are taken by the youth association to address other forms of social change in the community, including fighting corruption, creating employment for youth, addressing the issue of migration, and raising awareness campaigns, which might have influenced self and collective efficacy to impact change in the community more generally. Indeed, most listeners identified with the role models that focused on social change and participatory governance in the community, rather than with characters involved in insecurity and violence.

**Beliefs.** The null effects on "beliefs about violent extremism" are in line with other research that has found null effects of edutainment interventions on beliefs and knowledge (e.g., Green et al., 2017; Paluck, 2009). The null effects on "beliefs" in this IE study are hard to interpret for a few reasons. First, the analyses on "Beliefs" were exploratory as it was not clear how the drama would influence the sets of beliefs assessed (which were adopted from other violent extremism surveys in Africa). For instance, it was not clear whether the targeted communities are misinformed about the causes of violent extremism, and if so, which aspects of beliefs about violent extremism need to be changed. Therefore, these null results could be interpreted in 3 ways: (a) the radio drama does not change beliefs, as argued in other research, (b) this intervention program might have highlighted knowledge and beliefs that listeners already subscribe to (hence, there was no opportunity to impact change), or (c) beliefs might have changed about some aspects of violent extremism that were not measured in the study. The examination of the 52 episodes of the radio drama indeed shows that the causes

for violent extremism are not well articulated in the drama. Although the drama refers to how certain factors exacerbate violence (such as lack of employment, poverty, and corruption), it does not elaborate the different causes and motivations of violent extremism. It focuses more on how violent groups attract youth—through luring them or forcing them to collaborate. So, it is not surprising that the study did not find differences on these outcomes.

**Limitations of the research and intervention design that influence the interpretation of the findings.** There are several limitations of the research design and potentially of the intervention design that are important to consider when interpreting the findings. A few constraints of the research design employed might underestimate the effects of the edutainment programs: (1) the lack of public broadcast, (2) listening in “un-natural” groups, (3) testing of a short story arc delivered within a short period of time.

First, this study did not assess the impact of a public broadcast of the radio drama.

Public broadcasting is an important mechanism of media influence, through at least 2 mechanisms: perceived social norms and discussions. Knowledge that others in the community are exposed to the same messages and norms can be the crucial mechanism for the effectiveness of media interventions that function through social norms (e.g., Arias, 2016). By constraining listening sessions only to a few selected members of the community (rather than to the whole community), the current design might have limited the effectiveness of the programs by cutting out an important mechanism of change: perceived social norms. Furthermore, the lack of observed effects on frequency of discussions (which is a typical outcome of edutainment) is also likely due to the lack of broadcast—because participants’ families and friends were not exposed to the show, there were little opportunities for discussions on the topic of the show. Therefore, the current research design also inhibits a second important mechanism of influence of the radio drama (discussions).

Second, participants listened in “un-natural” groups. Because participants were randomly selected, and mixed in gender and age, it is possible that some participants were uncomfortable in these groups (e.g., in expressing their opinions). The social processes in self-selected groups might be different, as listeners are more likely to express their opinions, and to have discussions about the themes of the show with people they know. They might also enjoy the listening experience more, which also can increase the influence of the intervention.

Third, only a 6-month story arc was tested (i.e., the first 52 episodes of the drama). Educational dramas are particularly effective as they can develop stories and characters through a long story arc. A typical story in an educational drama is 1 year; this time is important to develop the context, characters, and the targeted situation, as well as to model the actions that need to be taken to address that situation. A 6-month story (i.e., shorter than typical) might reduce the drama’s ability to effectively meet the goals for behavior change. In addition, the content of the show was delivered at a shorter period of time than usual: 6 months content was delivered in 3 months. The compressed content might diminish participants’ opportunities for reflection as the story progresses, thereby reducing its influence.

A couple of limitations of the research design might overestimate the effects of the edutainment program: social desirability and lack of a placebo control condition.

First, the temporal proximity and salience of the show and its goals can increase social desirability in participants’ self-reported answers. Knowing the goals of the show, participants in the intervention condition might be more likely to express opinions that align with the intervention goals. However,

the lack of intervention's effects on many socially desirable outcomes, such as on beliefs about coping with violent extremism, agreement with regard to "refusal to cooperate with suspicious people", and police fairness, suggests that the observed effects are likely not due to just social desirability. If social desirability was driving the effects, we would also expect differences in many of the other outcomes measured.

Second, the present study did not include a placebo control condition—a placebo control condition would involve participants listening to a different program in the same way as in the treatment condition. The intervention implementer was not able to find programming in the Fulfude language (of a similar quality and length to the intervention drama) that could be used as a placebo. The lack of a placebo condition is an important drawback of this Impact Evaluation, because the intervention and control conditions do not differ only on the radio drama listening: the intervention participants gathered in weekly meetings to listen to the show whereas control condition participants did not. Although there is no reason to expect that any community gathering (where the topic of violent extremism would not be addressed) would impact the outcomes of interest with regard to violent extremism, the intervention might influence other related outcomes, such as perceived collective and self-efficacy for change/improving one's community. For these outcomes, it is not clear whether the impact was due to the edutainment program, participation in community meetings, or a combination of the two.

The effects of the radio drama were assessed in the month following the intervention. It is not clear how the timing of the endline influences the study's power to detect the effects of the radio drama intervention. On the one hand, temporal proximity to the intervention (i.e., salience of the intervention) might enable us to observe the short-term effects of the show, but it is not clear whether these effects would be sustained over time. On the other hand, because there was not much time for the lessons of the drama to 'sink in' and be put into practice, the effects of the intervention might be better observed after some time passes following the intervention.

Limitations in the intervention design process might also undermine accurate estimation of the potential of edutainment programs to impact change. Edutainment is most effective when in-depth and systematic knowledge of the context and target audiences influences the development of the messages and the specific goals of the programs. Despite the depth of local knowledge of the members of the design team of the radio drama series, to our knowledge there was no systematic research conducted on the knowledge, attitudes, social norms, and behaviors related to outcomes of interest in the targeted province prior to the intervention design, nor was there piloting of episodes of the intervention to examine the reception of the messages by community members.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: SAMPLE SIZE CONSIDERATIONS

We estimated the required sample size to detect an effect of 0.2 SD, for a two-arm experiment. We considered ICC = .10: the ICC was decided based on reported ICCs from USAID-funded studies by Finkel et al. in the Sahel region on support for violent extremism scale and by Belasco et al. in Burkina Faso. Finkel and colleagues reports an  $\rho = .13$  on support for violent extremism, whereas Belasco and colleagues report  $\rho = .09$  (item: violence is effective to solve problems) and  $\rho = .02$  (violence in the name of religion is justified) on two related items.

The table below shows the sample size estimation with three different intra-cluster correlation ( $\rho$ ) values: .05, .10, and .13. To balance the number of clusters with cluster size, we also show the estimation of the number of clusters required using 3 different cluster sizes: 40, 30, and 25 individuals per cluster/village. We take into account variance captured by baseline covariates at .10, and made adjustment for attrition at the individual level at a rate of 15%.

**Table A1. Sample size calculations for an effect size of 0.2 SD**

# VILLAGES PER CONDITION	ICC	PROPORTION OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY COVARIATES+BLOCKS	# PARTICIPANTS/ VILLAGE	ENDLINE SAMPLE 2-ARMS
68	.13	.10	40	5440
72	.13	.10	30	4320
74	.13	.10	25	3700
54	.10	.10	40	4321
58	.10	.10	30	3480
60	.10	.10	25	3000
32	.05	.10	40	2560
35	.05	.10	30	2100
38	.05	.10	25	1900

**APPENDIX B: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AT BASELINE**


**(From Baseline Report)**

**DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

The sample included 2,904 primary participants. The sample included 1,638 males (56.40%) and 1,266 females (43.60%). Participants’ average age is between 39 and 40 years. The youngest participants are 16 years old, while the oldest are 89.


The vast majority of participants are of Fulani origin (or ‘Peul’ in Figure 1), with a minority of participants spread across various ethnic groups, most common include Gurmatche, Mossi, and Bellah. The “Other” category consists of ethnic groups that less than 3% of participants selected; some examples of these groups include Gourounsi, Haoussa, Bwaba, and Dogon (see Figure 1).

**Figure B1. The sample’s ethnic composition**




Accordingly, participants’ primary language is Fulfulde (94% of the sample). The spoken language distributions are shown below in Figures 2.

**Figure B2. Languages spoken at home**




As shown in Figure 3 below, the majority (over 94%) of participants identify as Muslim. Although significantly fewer, the other most common religions participants reported were other sects of Islam such as Tidjana Brotherhood and Sunnite. The “Other” category includes religions and religious sects that less than 1% of the participants reported, such as Christian, Catholic, Protestant, various sects of Islam (Wahabite, Ahmadiya, Mouride Brotherhood, Ismaelite), or did not identify with any religion at all.

**Figures B3. Reported religious affiliation among primary participants and their networks**



With regard to education status, the majority of participants (about 53%) did not complete any formal education. About a third of the sample had some form of non-formal education.

### Figures B4. Education level



When asked about their main occupation, slightly more than a third of participant reported to be subsistence farmers, followed by housewives (about 27%) and miners (8-10%). Table I shows the breakdown of the sample by reported occupations, separately for primary and network participants.

**Table B1. Employment**

	PRIMARY		NETWORK	
	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
Subsistence farmer	974	33.54%	741	35.09%
Housewife	792	27.27%	559	26.47%
Miner	242	8.33%	214	10.13%
Trader / hawker / vendor	183	6.30%	116	5.49%
Large scale commercial farmer	180	6.20%	131	6.20%
Artisan/skilled manual worker	136	4.68%	58	2.75%
Small private farmer	113	3.89%	74	3.50%
Student	45	1.55%	30	1.42%
Has never worked	31	1.07%	28	1.33%

### ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND GRIEVANCES

To examine participants’ economic conditions, and especially the level of poverty, we asked them about the degree to which they have lacked basic necessities such as food, water, medication, fuel, or more generally lack of money (see Table 4).

The level of poverty was quite high. About 58% of the sample reported to lack food at least sometimes; over a quarter of the sample reported lacking food often. Similarly, over half of the sample reported lacking drinking water at least sometimes. In addition, over 40% lack medication or fuel at least sometimes. Notably, over half of the participants expressed that they always experienced lack of money in the last 12 months. Over 90% of the sample reported that they lack money at least sometimes (see Table 2).

**Table B2. Economic difficulties and grievances**

		NEVER	INFREQUENTLY	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS
Insufficient Food to eat	Primary	696 (23.98%)	514 (17.71%)	677 (23.33%)	793 (27.33%)	222 (7.65%)
	Network	464 (21.97%)	451 (21.35%)	462 (21.88%)	590 (27.94%)	145 (6.87%)
Lack of drinking water	Primary	750 (25.85%)	592 (20.41%)	587 (20.23%)	621 (21.41%)	351 (12.10%)
	Network	536 (25.38%)	468 (22.16%)	411 (19.46%)	450 (21.31%)	247 (11.70%)
Lack of Medication	Primary	703 (24.24%)	785 (27.07%)	757 (26.10%)	499 (17.21%)	156 (5.38%)
	Network	495 (23.44%)	600 (28.41%)	512 (24.24%)	375 (17.76%)	130 (6.16%)
Lack of fuel for meals	Primary	937 (32.27%)	688 (23.69%)	554 (19.08 %)	471 (16.22%)	254 (8.75%)
	Network	647 (23.44%)	508 (28.41%)	403 (19.05%)	344 (26.29%)	210 (9.94%)
Lack of money	Primary	65 (2.24%)	126 (4.34%)	309 (10.65%)	842 (29.02%)	1,559 (53.75%)
	Network	44 (2.09%)	104 (4.93%)	214 (10.15%)	599 (28.42%)	1147 (54.41%)

We also asked participants whether they owned a few goods in their households (see Table 3). The majority of participants do not own a radio or television. More than half of participants in core and network groups own a telephone. Only a few participants own a car, about 20% owned a motorbike, and over 30% owned a bicycle. Well over half of the participants own poultry and sheep/goats, and a little under half owned cows. The majority of participants have a main source of water for the household, and well over half have toilets or latrines.



**Table B3. Ownership of a variety of goods on one's household**

	PRIMARY	NETWORK
Radio	801 (27.58%)	609 (28.84%)
Television	256 (8.82)	158 (7.48%)
Motorbike	636 (21.90%)	482 (22.82%)
Car	14 (0.48%)	8 (0.38%)
Bicycle	954 (32.85%)	708 (33.52%)
Telephone	1,621 (55.82%)	1,221 (57.81%)
Cows	1,428 (49.17%)	1,036 (49.05%)
Sheep/goats	2,060 (70.94%)	1,511 (71.54%)
Poultry	1,881 (64.77%)	1,306 (61.84%)
A main source of water for the household	2,416 (83.20%)	1,740 (82.39%)
Toilets or latrines	1,924 (66.25%)	1,373 (65.01%)

When asked about their feelings about the direction of the country, about half of the sample (50.2%) reported that they believed the country is going in a positive direction. About 34% reported that they believed the country is going in a negative direction, and 16% believed that the country's situation is neither improving nor worsening.

### SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION

Table 4 demonstrates that the main source of news and information in the Seno province is radio: About 50% of participants reported to listen to the radio as a news source, at least sometimes, whereas other mediums were rarely used. About 20% of the sample also follow news in TV. Written press and internet are reported to used only among very few participants.

**Table B4. How often do you receive information coming from the following sources?**

		NEVER	INFREQUENTLY	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS
<b>Radio</b>	<b>Core</b>	705 (24.38%)	752 (25.90%)	586 (20.18%)	440 (15.15%)	420 (14.46%)
	<b>Network</b>	500 (23.67%)	629 (29.78%)	448 (21.21%)	284 (13.45%)	250 (11.84%)
<b>Television</b>	<b>Core</b>	1,955 (67.32%)	396 (13.64%)	253 (8.71%)	173 (5.96%)	126 (4.34%)
	<b>Network</b>	1,413 (66.90%)	321 (15.20%)	185 (8.76%)	110 (5.21%)	82 (3.88%)
<b>Written Press</b>	<b>Core</b>	2,784 (96.21%)	73 (2.51%)	16 (0.55%)	8 (0.28%)	4 (0.14%)
	<b>Network</b>	2,038 (96.50%)	41 (1.94%)	14 (0.66%)	6 (0.28%)	4 (0.19%)
<b>Internet</b>	<b>Core</b>	2,784 (96.21%)	73 (2.51%)	16 (0.55%)	8 (0.28%)	4 (0.14%)
	<b>Network</b>	2,038 (96.50%)	41 (1.94%)	14 (0.66%)	6 (0.28%)	4 (0.19%)

**APPENDIX C: VILLAGE LIST AND TREATMENT ASSIGNMENT**

COMMUNE	VILLAGES	RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
DORI	Chef-lieu Dori Secteur 5	Control
DORI	Chef-lieu Dori Secteur 8	Control
DORI	Chef-lieu Dori Secteur 7	Control*
DORI	Chef-lieu Dori Secteur 3	Control
DORI	Chef-lieu Dori Secteur 1	Control*
DORI	Chef-lieu Dori Secteur 6	Treatment
DORI	Katchirga	Control
BANI	Tibilindi	Treatment
SAMPELGA	Chef lieu Sampelga	Treatment*
DORI	Beybaye	Control
DORI	Yebelba	Control
DORI	Ouro baagabe	Control
BANI	Chef lieu Bani	Control
FALAGOUNTOU	Sella	Treatment
BANI	Diatou	Control
GORGADJI	Chef lieu Gorgadji	Treatment*
GORGADJI	Boundounoudji	Treatment
DORI	Kiryollo Ouro Arsaba	Control
DORI	Bellare Maga	Control
SAMPELGA	Waboti I	Treatment
GORGADJI	Lelly	Control
SAMPELGA	Aligaga I	Treatment
BANI	Karga	Control
FALAGOUNTOU	Kargono	Control
SEYTENGA	Ouro foni	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Sidibebe	Control
DORI	Boureye longondjou	Treatment
BANI	Kallo	Treatment
DORI	Guide	Treatment
BANI	Lamdamaol	Treatment

COMMUNE	VILLAGES	RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
BANI	Tialol Tiope	Control
GORGADJI	Bangataka Iere	Treatment
BANI	Amsia	Treatment
DORI	Padala	Control
DORI	Taaka	Control
SAMPELGA	Woulmassoutou	Control
FALAGOUNTOU	Zargaloutan	Control
BANI	Alalel	Control
DORI	Kodiolaye	Treatment
DORI	Boureye	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Oussaltan Dongobe	Treatment
SAMPELGA	Damdegou	Treatment
DORI	Ouro torobe	Control
BANI	Bomboel	Control
FALAGOUNTOU	Ekeou	Control
DORI	Mallere	Control
BANI	Tchelel	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Bambary	Treatment
DORI	M'bamga	Control
GORGADJI	Tonga	Control
GORGADJI	Tiekaledji	Control
SEYTENGA	Keindabe	Control
SAMPELGA	Bandiedaga	Treatment
DORI	Dantchadi	Control
FALAGOUNTOU	Goulgountou	Treatment
BANI	Petareobe	Treatment
BANI	Gorouel kadje	Control
BANI	Tiguibamloye	Treatment
BANI	Ouro Sambo	Control
DORI	Baaga	Treatment
DORI	Foulgou	Treatment

COMMUNE	VILLAGES	RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
GORGADJI	Oulfou Alfa	Treatment
DORI	Nelba	Control
BANI	Babirka ouro sory	Control
SEYTENGA	Foufou	Control
DORI	Tobidioga	Control
GORGADJI	Lere	Treatment
BANI	Winde Dake	Treatment
DORI	Mamassiol	Treatment
DORI	Boundou Woundoudou	Control
SEYTENGA	Soffokel	Control
BANI	Winde Djibairou	Treatment
BANI	Solsala	Treatment
BANI	Gassel	Control
SEYTENGA	Ouro daka	Control
DORI	Selbo	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Kourakou	Control
BANI	Tiabia	Treatment
DORI	Tigou	Treatment
DORI	Malbo	Control
GORGADJI	Tadjo	Control
DORI	Bouloye Thiouly	Treatment
BANI	Babirka ouro esso	Control
DORI	Bafele	Treatment
DORI	Fetombale	Control
DORI	Oulo	Treatment
DORI	Binguel	Treatment
BANI	Diouga	Treatment
DORI	Tohounguel	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Petel Habe	Treatment
GORGADJI	Diobbou	Treatment
BANI	Tialel	Control

COMMUNE	VILLAGES	RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
DORI	Koria	Treatment
DORI	Sambonaye	Control
DORI	Kouri	Control
BANI	Babirka tangassouka	Control
DORI	Touka Bayel	Treatment
GORGADJI	Peteguerse	Treatment
DORI	Dangade	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Seno Tiondi	Control
BANI	Ourfare djouma	Treatment
BANI	Winde Gnebe	Control
BANI	Gorouol kolle	Control
DORI	Ourfou	Control
BANI	Babirka mango	Treatment
DORI	Balandagou	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Yattakou	Control
DORI	Demni	Control
BANI	Goundere	Treatment
DORI	Katchari	Treatment
DORI	Bambofa	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Tandakoye	Treatment
BANI	Bouna	Control
DORI	Bouloye	Control
BANI	Modjouma	Control
DORI	Touka Welde	Treatment
DORI	Boudounguel	Treatment
BANI	Debere dioulde	Control
DORI	Djigo	Treatment
BANI	Gangaol	Treatment
DORI	Goudoubo	Treatment
DORI	Touka Diomga	Treatment
SEYTENGA	Tao	Treatment

COMMUNE	VILLAGES	RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
BANI	Seno sofare	Treatment
BANI	Ouro Tiaguel	Treatment
DORI	Petakolle	Treatment
BANI	Bayeldiaga	Control
DORI	Fetombaga	Control
SEYTENGA	Chef lieu Seytenga	Control
DORI	Gassel Biankou	Control
BANI	Bamguel	Treatment
DORI	Nobiol	Control

**Note.** The starred assignment status (\*) indicates 4 villages whose assigned treatment status was mixed due to an administrator error after random assignment was completed

**APPENDIX D: BALANCE BETWEEN TREATMENT AND CONTROL CONDITION**

Variable	N/[Clusters]	(1) Treatment Mean/SE	N/[Clusters]	(2) Control Mean/SE	N/[Clusters]	(3) Total Mean/SE	t-test (1)-(2) Difference
Community efficacy to to cope with violent extremism	2502 [66]	2.299 [0.034]	2496 [66]	2.333 [0.038]	4998 [132]	2.316 [0.026]	-0.034
Helplessness to cope with violent extremism	2502 [66]	2.957 [0.032]	2496 [66]	2.941 [0.031]	4998 [132]	2.949 [0.022]	0.016
Justification of violence	2508 [66]	1.466 [0.026]	2508 [66]	1.522 [0.026]	5016 [132]	1.494 [0.018]	-0.056
Minimize Risk - Do not speak out against them	2478 [66]	1.857 [0.052]	2473 [66]	1.876 [0.054]	4951 [132]	1.867 [0.037]	-0.019
Minimize Risk - Do not express any opinions about them	2480 [66]	1.833 [0.051]	2476 [66]	1.845 [0.050]	4956 [132]	1.839 [0.035]	-0.012
Minimize Risk - Abide, if someone affiliated with those groups asks you to do so	2452 [66]	1.854 [0.073]	2450 [66]	1.885 [0.074]	4902 [132]	1.870 [0.052]	-0.030
Minimize Risk - Avoid going to certain areas	2485 [66]	2.596 [0.049]	2478 [66]	2.547 [0.060]	4963 [132]	2.571 [0.039]	0.049
Minimize Risk - Seek the support and protection of security forces	2491 [66]	3.196 [0.041]	2492 [66]	3.229 [0.039]	4983 [132]	3.212 [0.028]	-0.033
Minimize Risk - Seek the support and protection of your community/village	2498 [66]	3.014 [0.037]	2499 [66]	3.040 [0.038]	4997 [132]	3.027 [0.026]	-0.026
Suspicious person - Try to avoid contact with that person	2507 [66]	3.736 [0.029]	2508 [66]	3.766 [0.026]	5015 [132]	3.751 [0.019]	-0.030
Suspicious person - Consult with a trusted friend or family member	2502 [66]	3.558 [0.041]	2499 [66]	3.568 [0.035]	5001 [132]	3.563 [0.027]	-0.010
Suspicious person - Consult with a community leader	2502 [66]	3.514 [0.038]	2500 [66]	3.518 [0.038]	5002 [132]	3.516 [0.027]	-0.004
Suspicious person - Contact official authorities	2496 [66]	3.337 [0.040]	2493 [66]	3.376 [0.038]	4989 [132]	3.357 [0.028]	-0.039

Variable	N/[Clusters]	(1) Treatment Mean/SE	N/[Clusters]	(2) Control Mean/SE	N/[Clusters]	(3) Total Mean/SE	t-test (1)-(2) Difference
Police collaboration helps security	2491 [66]	3.442 [0.026]	2493 [66]	3.429 [0.025]	4984 [132]	3.435 [0.018]	0.013
Police collaboration is dangerous	2472 [66]	2.284 [0.032]	2463 [66]	2.248 [0.029]	4935 [132]	2.266 [0.022]	0.036
Police fairness	2461 [66]	3.095 [0.026]	2470 [66]	3.077 [0.026]	4931 [132]	3.086 [0.018]	0.018
Male	2508 [66]	0.578 [0.018]	2508 [66]	0.577 [0.019]	5016 [132]	0.578 [0.013]	0.001
Age	2508 [66]	39.910 [0.436]	2508 [66]	39.915 [0.472]	5016 [132]	39.912 [0.320]	-0.005
education==No formal education	2508 [66]	0.541 [0.016]	2508 [66]	0.524 [0.020]	5016 [132]	0.532 [0.013]	0.017
education==Informal (including quoranique)	2508 [66]	0.303 [0.015]	2508 [66]	0.301 [0.016]	5016 [132]	0.302 [0.011]	0.002
education==Non-formal/Vocational	2508 [66]	0.058 [0.007]	2508 [66]	0.055 [0.007]	5016 [132]	0.057 [0.005]	0.003
education==Unfinished primary	2508 [66]	0.046 [0.007]	2508 [66]	0.056 [0.006]	5016 [132]	0.051 [0.005]	-0.010
education==Primary or higher	2508 [66]	0.052 [0.007]	2508 [66]	0.064 [0.016]	5016 [132]	0.058 [0.009]	-0.012
Employed Full-time or Part-time	2504 [66]	0.650 [0.019]	2506 [66]	0.637 [0.020]	5010 [132]	0.644 [0.014]	0.013

The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.

Standard errors are clustered at variable villa.

\*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.



**APPENDIX E: ATTRITION**

We examined whether attrited participants in the treatment and control conditions differed on various covariate measures (age, gender, employment, education level, beliefs about country's direction) at baseline. There were no differences on these measures (i.e., attrited participants in the treatment and control conditions were similar on these characteristics).

**Table E1. Do attrited respondents in the treatment group differ from attrited respondents in the control group?**

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	TREATMENT STATUS	TREATMENT STATUS	TREATMENT STATUS
ln_age	-0.074 (0.187)	-0.058 (0.264)	-0.129 (0.286)
Sex = 2, Femme	-0.043 (0.161)	-0.032 (0.275)	-0.028 (0.199)
Employed full-time or part-time = 1, Yes	0.082 (0.149)	0.228 (0.241)	-0.039 (0.179)
Level of Education = 2, Informal education only	-0.156 (0.144)	-0.078 (0.257)	-0.193 (0.191)
Level of Education = 3, Some formal education	-0.159 (0.305)	-0.149 (0.335)	-0.054 (0.342)
Socioecon status better than most in the village = 1, Yes	-0.202 (0.186)	0.020 (0.278)	-0.316 (0.251)
Point of view on country's direction = 2, In the right direction	-0.026 (0.213)	-0.028 (0.251)	-0.033 (0.249)
Point of view on country's direction = 3, Neither good, nor bad	-0.166 (0.227)	-0.328 (0.307)	-0.059 (0.298)
Observations	413	182	231
<b>Respondent Type</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>Core Participants</b>	<b>Network Participants</b>

Each column reports a different probit regression analysis for the whole sample, core respondents, and network respondents respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

We also examined whether attrited participants differed from non-attrited participants. As shown in the table below, there were some differences, such that attrited participants (e.g., among core respondents) were more likely to be younger, male, employed full time, and have some formal education. However, they were not different in their views about the country's direction.

**Table E2. Do attrited respondents differ from non-attrited participants?**

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	ATTRITION BETWEEN BASELINE AND ENDLINE	ATTRITION BETWEEN BASELINE AND ENDLINE	ATTRITION BETWEEN BASELINE AND ENDLINE
Treatment Status = 1, Treatment	-0.086 (0.079)	-0.180** (0.092)	0.006 (0.103)
ln_age	-0.271*** (0.074)	-0.276** (0.108)	-0.247** (0.112)
Sex = 2, Femme	-0.233*** (0.063)	-0.252** (0.100)	-0.198** (0.089)
Employed full-time or part-time = 1, Yes	-0.163*** (0.059)	-0.202** (0.088)	-0.128 (0.078)
Level of Education = 2, Informal education only	-0.007 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.098)	0.015 (0.077)
Level of Education = 3, Some formal education	0.076 (0.110)	0.278** (0.130)	-0.150 (0.139)
Socioecon status better than most in the village = 1, Yes	-0.078 (0.069)	-0.083 (0.111)	-0.066 (0.099)
Point of view on country's direction = 2, In the right direction	-0.098 (0.071)	-0.130 (0.086)	-0.076 (0.090)
Point of view on country's direction = 3, Neither good nor bad	-0.004 (0.092)	0.006 (0.110)	-0.004 (0.129)
Observations	4,960	2,868	2,092
<b>Respondent Type</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>Core Respondents</b>	<b>Network Respondents</b>

Each column reports a different probit regression analysis for the whole sample, core respondents and network respondents respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**APPENDIX F: OUTCOME MEASURES**


ITEMS	SCALE	SOURCE	BASELINE?	
Attitudes toward violent extremism: Justification of extremist violence	<p>A. The use of violence is never justified. /B. It is sometimes necessary to use violence to defend just causes.</p> <p>A. Violence is not an effective tool to resolve problems./ B. Violence can be an effective tool to resolve problems.</p> <p>A. Violence in the name of religion is never justified./B. Violence in the name of religion might be justified.</p>	3 items, $\alpha = 0.74$ , 4-point scale	Finkel, McCauley, Belasco, & Neureiter, 2016	Yes
Behavioral intentions regarding collaboration with the police	<p>In the context of insecurity in the Sahel, imagine that you are approached by someone that seems suspicious or is part of a suspicious group that makes you an interesting financial proposal and asks for your help. Please tell me if it is likely or unlikely that you would personally do the following in this situation:</p> <p>a. I would try to avoid contact with that person.</p> <p>b. I would consult a friend or family member.</p> <p>c. I would consult a community leader</p> <p>d. I would contact the official authorities (e.g., the security forces)</p> <p>e. I would try to learn more about the offer.</p>	Key item is item d “contacting the official authorities”; items analyzed individually, 4-point scales	N/A	Yes
	What is the most effective thing that people like you could do to help combat violent extremism in this country?	Open-ended question, coded by interviewer	Buchanan-Clarke, & Lekalake (2016) Afrobarometer	No
Collaboration with security forces and perceptions of/confidence on security forces	<p>Treat people with respect</p> <p>Treat people fairly</p> <p>Take time to listen to people</p> <p>Make decisions based on facts and law, rather than on their personal opinions</p> <p>Explain their decisions to people</p>	Police fairness, 5 items, $\alpha = 0.86$ , 4-point scale	Gau, 2014; Mazerolle et al, 2013	Yes
	<p>To what degree do you trust:</p> <p>... the police</p> <p>... the security forces</p> <p>... the military</p>	Trust in the security apparatus, $\alpha = 0.86$	N/A	No
	<p>Collaborating with the police / security forces helps ensure community safety.</p> <p>Collaborating with the police helps prevent violent attacks in the community.</p>	Collaboration helps ensure safety, $\alpha = 0.87$ , 4-point scale	N/A	Yes
	<p>Collaborating with the police can be dangerous as it puts one at risk of attacks.</p> <p>Collaborating with the police can damage relationships with other members of the community.</p>	Collaboration endangers self, $\alpha = 0.67$ , 4-point scale	N/A	Yes

ITEMS	SCALE	SOURCE	BASELINE?
	<p>People use different strategies to minimize their risk of becoming a target of an attack or retaliation by radical groups. I will read a list of things that some people have suggested they would do to minimize this risk. We would like your opinion regarding whether each action might help or not in minimizing the risk of becoming a target of an attack.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do not speak out against them</li> <li>2. Do not express opinions about them</li> <li>3. Abide, if someone affiliated with those groups asks you to do something</li> <li>4. Avoid contact with state institutions</li> <li>5. Avoid use of certain public services</li> <li>6. Avoid going to certain areas</li> <li>7. Seek the support and protection of security forces</li> <li>8. Seek the support and protection of your community/village</li> </ol>	<p>Key item is “seek the support and protection of security forces”, 4-point scales</p>	<p>N/A</p> <p>Yes</p>
<p>Awareness/ Priority of violent extremism and governance</p>	<p>In your opinion, what are the three primary most important problems that the country faces that the government needs to tackle?</p>	<p>Afrobarometer</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>Beliefs about violent extremism</p>	<p>In your opinion, what are the causes of insecurity in the Sahel region?</p>	<p>Open-ended Buchanan-Clarke, &amp; Lekalake (2016) Afrobarometer</p>	<p>No</p>
	<p>Some people help or support the activities of the extremist groups and violence. I will list you a number of groups. Please tell me how many people in each of these groups, in your opinion, are implicated in support or giving assistance to extremist groups that have launched attacks in the Sahel region?”</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Foreign governments</li> <li>2. government representatives</li> <li>3. members of the Army/police</li> <li>4. religious leaders</li> <li>5. the population of Sahel.</li> </ol>	<p>Perceived support for violent extremism</p>	<p>Single items analysis, 4-point scale: none, some, many, all. Adapted from Afrobarometer (Nigeria/Cameroon), 2014/2015</p> <p>No</p>
	<p>In your opinion, what were the factors that lead some groups to support extremist groups? The motivations coded included: corruption/personal enrichment, government mistreatment or injustices experienced, poor performance of government to meet the needs of people, religious beliefs, coercion/fear of extremist groups, and internal attributions “they are bad people”.</p>	<p>Motivations for supporting extremist groups</p>	<p>Open-ended Adapted from Afrobarometer (Nigeria/Cameroon), 2014/2015</p> <p>No</p>
<p>Self and collective efficacy beliefs</p>	<p>My community is able to prevent the spread of violent attacks to our community. My community can protect our people from violent attacks. My community can successfully address security threats we face.</p>	<p>Perceived collective efficacy to prevent violent extremism, 4-point scales, <input type="checkbox"/> = 0.80</p>	<p>N/A (created based on collective efficacy scales, see below)</p> <p>Yes</p>
	<p>We are helpless when it comes to dealing with insecurity in the region. My community has little control over its future when it comes to insecurity.</p>	<p>Fatalism to prevent violent extremism, 4-point scales, <input type="checkbox"/> = 0.74</p>	<p>N/A</p> <p>Yes</p>


	ITEMS	SCALE	SOURCE	BASELINE?
	I can influence the community in which I live. I am able to impact my community in important ways.	Self-efficacy, □ = .79		Yes
	I think that we, as a community, can improve our situation. We, as a community, together can overcome our difficulties. As a community, I think we can change the difficult conditions we face.	Collective efficacy beliefs, 4-point scale, □= 0.92	Van Zomeren, Saguy, & Schelhaas, 2012	Yes
Discussions of violent extremism	How often do you discuss violent extremism? How many people in your community discuss violent extremism? People feel free to express their opinions on violent extremism? How often do you disagree with others during these discussions? How confident are you of your opinions on this issue?	Discussions		Yes
Other variables	I can get what I need in this community. This community helps me fulfill my needs. I feel like a member of this community. I have a say about what goes on in my community. I feel connected to this community.	Sense of community	Peterson, Speer, & McMillian, 2008	Yes
	How much do you trust: Your neighbors Other people in your village/community Other people from your ethnic group Other people from your religious group People from other ethnic groups People from other religious groups Your community leaders Local authorities The government (at the national level) Police Gendarmerie Military	Social trust index	Afrobarometer, 2016, round 6	Yes (partial)
	I'm going to list several activities that some people take part in. For each of the following activities, can you please tell me which one you have personally carried out in the past 4 months? Attended community meetings Joined others to resolve a problem in the community Contacted at least one government representative or community leader about an issue Contacted the media, like calling a radio program or writing a letter to a newspaper Participated in a demonstration or protest march Participated in political reunions or campaigns	Civic Engagement Index	from Afrobarometer Burkina: protest activity and political engagement)	Yes

**APPENDIX G: INTERVENTION PARTICIPANTS' REACTIONS TO THE SOAP OPERA**


We asked participants about their views of the soap opera and their identification with its characters. Overall, the majority of participants felt that the characters were similar to people in their daily lives, the show was connected to their reality, and the vast majority felt part of the story. In addition, about half of the respondents reported to have discussed the show at least once a week with other people in their village and about 20% reported to have discussed it with people from other villages.




Note: Question asked at endline only, to respondents who indicated they had participated in Wuro Potal listening groups. N=1185.




Note: Question asked at endline only, to respondents who indicated they had participated in Wuro Potal listening groups. N=1183.




Note: Question asked at endline only, to respondents who indicated they had participated in Wuro Potal listening groups. N=1187.



Note: Question asked at endline only, to respondents who indicated they had participated in Wuro Potal listening groups. N=1185.




Note: Question asked at endline only, to respondents who indicated they had participated in Wuro Portal listening groups. N=1,188.



Note: Question asked at endline only, to respondents who indicated they had participated in Wuro Portal listening groups. N=1,137 for primary respondents; N=51 for secondary respondents.





Note: Question asked at endline only, to respondents who indicated they had participated in Wuro Pc listening groups. N=1,137 for primary respondents; N=51 for secondary respondents.

**APPENDIX H: INTRACLASS CORRELATIONS (ICC)**

VARIABLE	ICC	S.E.	95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL		
			LOWER	UPPER	OBS
Justification of violence scale - Baseline	0.099	0.016	0.068	0.130	2904
<b>COPING WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISM</b>					
Community efficacy to cope with violent extremism	0.119	0.018	0.084	0.154	2888
Hopelessness to cope with violent extremism	0.088	0.015	0.059	0.118	2888
My community can prevent our people from joining violent groups.	0.062	0.013	0.038	0.087	2824
Perceived Threat	0.088	0.015	0.059	0.118	2888
Minimize Risk - Do not speak out against them	0.120	0.018	0.085	0.155	2853
Minimize Risk - Do not express any opinions about them	0.108	0.017	0.075	0.141	2857
Minimize Risk - Abide, if someone affiliated with those groups asks you to do so	0.213	0.025	0.164	0.262	2825
Minimize Risk - Avoid going to certain areas	0.097	0.016	0.066	0.128	2864
Minimize Risk - Seek the support and protection of security forces	0.074	0.014	0.047	0.101	2878
Minimize Risk - Seek the support and protection of your community/village	0.039	0.010	0.019	0.059	2889
<b>PERCEPTIONS OF AND COLLABORATION WITH POLICE</b>					
Police fairness	0.112	0.017	0.078	0.146	2844
Police collaboration helps security	0.103	0.016	0.071	0.135	2880
Police collaboration is dangerous	0.079	0.014	0.051	0.107	2847
Trust in Police and Military	0.111	0.017	0.077	0.145	2708
Suspicious person - Try to avoid contact with that person	0.111	0.017	0.078	0.144	2903
Suspicious person - Consult with a trusted friend or family member	0.136	0.019	0.099	0.174	2894
Suspicious person - Consult with a community leader	0.108	0.017	0.075	0.141	2893
Suspicious person - Contact official authorities	0.097	0.016	0.066	0.128	2885
Suspicious person - Try to find out more about the proposal	0.088	0.015	0.058	0.118	2718
Effective to Combat Extremism - Collaborate with Security Forces	0.090	0.015	0.060	0.120	2719
Effective to Combat Extremism - Refuse to Collaborate with Extremists	0.030	0.010	0.012	0.049	2719
Effective to Combat Extremism - Talk about the problem	0.063	0.013	0.038	0.088	2719

VARIABLE	ICC	S.E.	95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL		
			LOWER	UPPER	OBS
Effective to Combat Extremism - Nothing	0.058	0.012	0.034	0.083	2719
<b>DISCUSSIONS</b>					
How often do you discuss violent extremism with family/friends?	0.011	0.007	0.000	0.025	2904
People feel free to express their opinions on violent extremism	0.107	0.017	0.074	0.141	2746
How many people in your community are discussing violent extremism?	0.069	0.013	0.043	0.095	2712
How often do you disagree with others during discussions of violent extremism?	0.118	0.018	0.082	0.154	2510
In discussions, how confident are you of your opinion on this issue?	0.206	0.025	0.157	0.255	2510
What is your level of involvement in these discussions?	0.085	0.015	0.054	0.115	2510
<b>BACKGROUND VARIABLES</b>					
ln(age)	0.037	0.010	0.017	0.057	2719
Economic Grievances - 1=Poorest;5=Richest	0.228	0.026	0.178	0.279	2904
Wealth Index (percentage of goods owned)	0.086	0.015	0.057	0.115	2904
Not feel safe in your neighborhood? (Last 12 mos.)	0.178	0.022	0.134	0.222	2904
<b>Awareness</b>					
Governance - 1 of top 3 problems	0.062	0.013	0.037	0.087	2719
Insecurity/Violent Extremism - 1 of top 3 problems	0.049	0.012	0.027	0.072	2719
<b>BELIEFS</b>					
Cause Sahel insecurity - Jihadists, Bandits, and/or armed groups/extremists	0.052	0.012	0.029	0.075	2719
Support Extremist Groups in Sahel - Foreign Governments	0.070	0.015	0.041	0.098	2346
Support Extremist Groups in Sahel - Members of Army/Police	0.128	0.019	0.090	0.166	2484
Support Extremist Groups in Sahel - Religious Leaders	0.119	0.018	0.083	0.155	2624
Support Extremist Groups in Sahel - Population of Sahel	0.155	0.021	0.113	0.196	2647
Reasons people support extremist groups in Sahel - poor governance	0.252	0.027	0.198	0.306	2685
Reasons people support extremist groups in Sahel - coercion from extremist group	0.133	0.019	0.096	0.171	2700
Reasons people support extremist groups in Sahel - religious beliefs	0.114	0.018	0.079	0.148	2703

VARIABLE	ICC	S.E.	95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL		
			LOWER	UPPER	OBS
Reasons people support extremist groups in Sahel - they are bad people	0.140	0.020	0.101	0.179	2706
<b>OTHER</b>					
Sense of Community	0.101	0.016	0.068	0.133	2719
Sense of Self-Efficacy	0.092	0.016	0.061	0.123	2719
Community Efficacy	0.122	0.018	0.086	0.157	2716
Social Trust	0.170	0.022	0.127	0.214	2719
Civic and Social Engagement	0.062	0.013	0.037	0.087	2719

## APPENDIX I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

### ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENT EXTREMISM: JUSTIFICATION OF EXTREMIST VIOLENCE

Table II. Justification of Violent Extremism.									
	TREATMENT			CONTROL			OVERALL		
	MEAN	S.D.	OBS	MEAN	S.D.	OBS	MEAN	S.D.	OBS
<b>BASELINE</b>									
Justification of violence scale	1.469	0.544	1452	1.522	0.567	1452	1.495	0.556	2904
<i>INDICATORS</i>									
It is sometimes necessary to use violence	1.461	0.658	1452	1.504	0.668	1451	1.482	0.663	2903
Violence can be an effective tool	1.475	0.661	1452	1.532	0.668	1450	1.503	0.665	2902
Violence in the name of religion is justified	1.470	0.724	1446	1.526	0.727	1444	1.498	0.726	2890
<b>ENDLINE</b>									
Justification of violence scale	1.421	0.516	1381	1.469	0.549	1338	1.445	0.533	2719
<i>INDICATORS</i>									
It is sometimes necessary to use violence	1.462	0.750	1381	1.527	0.795	1337	1.494	0.773	2718
Violence can be an effective tool	1.391	0.602	1381	1.431	0.658	1337	1.411	0.630	2718
Violence in the name of religion is justified	1.411	0.687	1381	1.447	0.702	1338	1.429	0.694	2719

Note. Descriptive statistics for Core Respondents. Items assessed in 4-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree)

BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS REGARDING COLLABORATION WITH THE POLICE

Figure II. Most effective thing ordinary people can do to combat violent extremism





Figure I2. Responses to “Suspicious person” scenario



**Table I2. The effect of the intervention on collaboration in 'suspicious person' scenario**


What would you do in a situation with a suspicious person? (higher numbers less likely to agree)	CONTROL GROUP	(1)	(2)	(3)
	MEAN, SD	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
Try to avoid contact with that person	1.188	0.100	0.086	0.107
	0.451	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.099)
Consult with a friend or family	1.343	-0.052	-0.016	-0.029
	0.555	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.085)
Consult with a community leader	1.446	-0.096	-0.067	-0.086
	0.636	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.088)
Contact official authorities (e.g., security forces)	1.862	-0.166***	-0.157***	-0.193***
	0.937	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.053)
Find out more about the proposal	1.59	0.026	0.029	0.034
	0.997	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.067)

Notes. The first and the second regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable (TOT) analyses. The outcome “Collaborate with security forces” is a dichotomous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**BELIEFS ABOUT THE POLICE AND COLLABORATION WITH THE POLICE**

**Figure I3. Attitudes towards and beliefs about collaboration with the police and security forces**



**Table 13. Descriptive statistics for beliefs about the police and collaboration with the police**

	TREATMENT			COMPARISON			OVERALL		
	MEAN	S.D	OBS	MEAN	S.D	OBS	MEAN	S.D	OBS
<b>BASELINE</b>									
Police fairness	3.094	0.529	1420	3.080	0.530	1424	3.087	0.530	2844
Police collaboration helps security	3.442	0.549	1440	3.422	0.530	1440	3.432	0.540	2880
Police collaboration is dangerous	2.287	0.770	1426	2.251	0.710	1421	2.269	0.741	2847
Seeking support of security forces minimizes risk to self	3.186	0.980	1439	3.232	0.942	1439	3.209	0.961	2878
<b>ENDLINE</b>									
Police fairness	3.090	0.561	1376	3.041	0.596	1331	3.066	0.579	2707
Police collaboration helps security	3.539	0.477	1381	3.558	0.493	1337	3.549	0.485	2718
Police collaboration is dangerous	2.234	0.796	1368	2.235	0.790	1317	2.234	0.793	2685
Trust in security forces	3.164	0.756	1377	3.125	0.783	1331	3.149	0.769	2708
Seeking support of security forces minimizes risk to self	3.186	0.980	1439	3.232	0.942	1439	3.246	0.862	2717

Note. Descriptive statistics for Core Respondents. All items and scales assessed on 4-point scale



**Table 14. Descriptive characteristics of “minimizing risk of attacks” scenario responses**

	TREATMENT			CONTROL		
	MEAN	S.D	OBS	MEAN	S.D	OBS
<b>BASELINE</b>						
<i>Minimize Risk of Becoming a Target</i>						
Do not speak out against them	1.880	1.066	1429	1.865	1.062	1424
Do not express any opinions about them	1.860	1.034	1431	1.839	1.047	1426
Abide, if someone affiliated with those groups asks you to do so	1.844	1.174	1412	1.870	1.183	1413
Avoid going to certain areas	2.612	1.200	1434	2.543	1.206	1430
Seek the support and protection of security forces	3.186	0.980	1439	3.232	0.942	1439
Seek the support and protection of your community	3.022	1.075	1444	3.053	1.074	1445
<b>ENDLINE</b>						
Do not speak out against them	2.004	1.131	1376	1.975	1.118	1333
Do not express any opinions about them	1.995	1.069	1377	1.975	1.065	1334
Abide, if someone affiliated with those groups asks you to do so	1.802	1.079	1376	1.852	1.153	1335
Avoid going to certain areas	2.856	0.982	1380	2.851	1.066	1337
Seek the support and protection of security forces	3.247	0.846	1379	3.245	0.878	1338
Seek the support and protection of your community	3.114	0.876	1380	3.081	0.938	1338

Note. Descriptive statistics for Core Respondents. All items and scales assessed on 4-point scale

**Table 15. The effect of the intervention on responses to the “minimizing risk of attacks” scenario**


<i>What strategy minimizes the risk of injury in an attack?</i>	CONTROL GROUP	(1)	(2)	(3)
	MEAN, SD	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
Do not speak out against them	1.975	0.024	0.011	0.015
	1.118	-0.044	-0.046	(0.056)
Do not express any opinions about them	1.975	0.013	0.004	0.006
	1.065	-0.04	-0.044	(0.053)
Abide if someone affiliated with those groups asks you to do so	1.852	-0.026	0.009	0.010
	1.153	-0.087	-0.076	(0.093)
Avoid going to certain areas	2.851	-0.035	-0.032	-0.039
	1.066	-0.038	-0.038	(0.047)
Seek the support and protection of security forces	3.245	-0.004	-0.013	-0.015
	0.878	-0.052	-0.051	(0.063)
Seek the support and protection of your community/village	3.081	0.032	0.032	0.038
	0.938	-0.044	-0.044	(0.053)

Notes. The first and the second ordered probit regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable (TOT) analyses. All items are measured on 4-point scales. Robust standard errors in parentheses.


\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

BELIEFS ABOUT THE CAUSES AND FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

**Figure 14. The most common causes of violent extremism mentioned by participants.**



**Figure 15. How many people in each of these groups support violent extremism?**



Note: Question asked at endline only. N=2,208 for control; N=2,258 for treatment.

**SELF AND COLLECTIVE EFFICACY BELIEFS**

<b>Table 16. Descriptive statistics of efficacy beliefs</b>						
	<b>TREATMENT</b>			<b>CONTROL</b>		
	<b>MEAN</b>	<b>S.D</b>	<b>OBS</b>	<b>MEAN</b>	<b>S.D</b>	<b>OBS</b>
<b>BASELINE</b>						
<b>COLLECTIVE EFFICACY AND FATALISM ABOUT ADDRESSING VIOLENT EXTREMISM</b>						
Efficacy	2.32	0.74	1447	2.35	0.79	1441
Fatalism	2.96	0.73	1448	2.96	0.76	1440
<b>SELF AND COLLECTIVE EFFICACY TO IMPACT COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE</b>						
Self-efficacy	2.56	0.69	1452	2.58	0.70	1452
Collective efficacy	3.19	0.65	1448	3.19	0.68	1445
<b>ENDLINE</b>						
<b>COLLECTIVE EFFICACY AND FATALISM ABOUT ADDRESSING VIOLENT EXTREMISM</b>						
Community efficacy to cope with VE	2.26	0.77	1381	2.21	0.78	1336
Hopelessness to cope with VE	3.06	0.78	1381	3.08	0.79	1337
<b>SELF AND COLLECTIVE EFFICACY TO IMPACT COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE</b>						
Collective efficacy	3.40	0.56	1380	3.36	0.60	1336
Self-efficacy	2.72	0.73	1381	2.63	0.76	1338


Note. All outcomes are measured in 4-point scales.

## DISCUSSIONS

**Table 17. Descriptive characteristics of discussion outcomes**

	TREATMENT			CONTROL		
	MEAN	SD	N	MEAN	SD	N
<b>BASELINE</b>						
Frequency of discussions	2.85	4.51	1452	3.09	5.75	1452
People feel free to express their opinions on violent extremism	2.86	1.08	1388	3.03	1.03	1358
<b>ENDLINE</b>						
Frequency of discussions	2.73	0.92	1379	2.76	0.95	1335
People feel free to express their opinions on violent extremism	3.02	0.96	1365	2.98	0.97	1321
Frequency of discussions in community	2.56	0.75	1379	2.58	0.75	1333
Frequency of disagreement in discussions	1.46	0.63	1273	1.42	0.59	1237
Confidence in one's opinions	2.67	0.96	1273	2.61	0.94	1237
Degree of participation in discussions	1.88	0.67	1273	1.88	0.69	1237

**Figure 16. Distribution of discussion items by treatment status.**



Graphs by Treatment Status

## APPENDIX J: OTHER OUTCOMES UNREPORTED IN THE REPORT’S RESULTS SECTION

In addition to the main outcomes, we also explored the potential effect of the intervention on 3 additional variables that were measured both at the baseline and endline: civic engagement, social trust, and sense of community.

While increasing civic engagement was a goal of the intervention, we did not expect to observe effects on civic engagement considering that the endline occurred immediately following the intervention (i.e., there is no timeframe allowing participants to engage civically following the intervention).

The measures are listed below:

<p>SENSE OF COMMUNITY (Peterson, Speer, &amp; McMillian, 2008)</p>	<p>I can get what I need in this community. This community helps me fulfill my needs. I feel like a member of this community. I have a say about what goes on in my community. I feel connected to this community.</p>
<p>SOCIAL TRUST INDEX (adapted from Afrobarometer, 2016, round 6)</p>	<p>How much do you trust: Your neighbors Other people in your village/community Other people from your ethnic group Other people from your religious group People from other ethnic groups People from other religious groups Your community leaders Local authorities The government (at the national level) Police Gendarmerie Military</p>
<p>CIVIC ENGAGEMENT INDEX (adopted from Afrobarometer Burkina: protest activity and political engagement measure)</p>	<p>I’m going to list several activities that some people take part in. For each of the following activities, can you please tell me which one you have personally carried out in the past 4 months? Attended community meetings Joined others to resolve a problem in the community Contacted at least one government representative or community leader about an issue Contacted the media, like calling a radio program or writing a letter to a newspaper Participated in a demonstration or protest march Participated in political reunions or campaigns</p>

Descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Table J1.

	TREATMENT			CONTROL		
	MEAN	SD	OBS.	MEAN	SD	OBS.
<b>BASELINE</b>						
Social trust index	3.30	0.51	1452	3.30	0.53	1452
Civic engagement index	2.17	0.67	1452	2.15	0.69	1451
<b>ENDLINE</b>						
Social trust index	3.22	0.46	1381	3.19	0.50	1338
Civic engagement index	2.07	0.54	1381	2.02	0.56	1338

Note. Descriptive statistics for Core Respondents.

Table J2 shows the effects of the intervention on these variables. We observe an effect of the intervention on civic engagement (i.e., increased civic engagement). Our assessment of the indicators of civic engagement suggest that this effect was driven by only one item: participation in community meetings. Considering that the intervention participants in our study participated weekly in listening groups, the observed differences seem to be due to participation in listening sessions. Therefore, we do not interpret this result as an impact of the radio drama intervention on civic engagement.

	CONTROL MEAN	(1)	(2)	(3)
	SD	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
Social trust index	3.189	0.028	0.025	0.031
	0.502	-0.024	-0.022	(0.027)
Civic engagement index	2.017	0.051***	0.056***	0.068***
	0.562	-0.018	-0.018	(0.023)

Notes. The first and the second regressions include Intent to treat (ITT) effects without covariates (1), and with covariates (2). The third regression (3) reports Treatment on the Treated Effects using Instrumental Variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## APPENDIX K: INSTRUMENT

### Burkina Faso, CVE Radio Program IE

#### Questionnaire d'évaluation finale d'impact, Juin-Juillet, 2018

#### GESTION DE L'ENQUETE

M 001\_E. GEOLOCALISATION [remplissage automatique du lieu de l'entretien pour chaque ménage enquêté]

M 002\_E. IDENTIFICATION DU REpondANT : [remplissage manuel, de l'identifiant unique de l'enquêté]

M 003\_E. Province: [faire apparaître la liste de toutes les provinces de l'échantillon]

M 004\_E. Commune/Département: [faire apparaître la liste de tous les départements de l'échantillon]

M 005\_E. Village/Secteur: [faire apparaître la liste de tous les villages/secteurs de l'échantillon]

M 006. ID de l'enquêteur [entrer l'ID unique de l'enquêteur]

M 007\_E. Date: [remplissage automatique de la date]

M 008\_E. HEURE DE DEMARRAGE [remplissage automatique sur la tablette de l'heure de début de l'interview]

M009new\_E. Type de questionnaire

1. Questionnaire contrôle
2. Questionnaire traitement

M00010new\_E. Nom de l'enquêté

#### INTRODUCTION

Bonjour ! Mon nom est [NOM DE L'ENQUETEUR]. Je viens du CERFODES, une structure de recherche indépendante basée ici au Burkina Faso. Nous étudions les opinions des citoyens du Burkina Faso et demandons leur avis sur un certain nombre de sujets qui affectent nos vies. Nous aimerions mener une évaluation finale de suivi sur certains de ces problèmes avec le membre de votre ménage qui a déjà participé. Toutes les informations resteront confidentielles et présentées uniquement dans des résumés statistiques de toutes les personnes interrogées. Étiez-vous la personne qui a déjà été interviewée par notre équipe ou est-ce quelqu'un d'autre dans votre ménage? [Enquêteur : vérifier le nom du répondant dans la liste des répondants. Si le répondant indiqué n'est pas à la maison, demandez quand il reviendra et planifiez un rappel.]

#### SI LE RÉPONDANT CHOISI A 16 OU 17 ANS:

Puis-je parler aux parents ou au tuteur de [NOM DU RÉPONDANT SÉLECTIONNÉ]?

Bonjour ! Votre enfant a déjà été choisi dans ce ménage pour répondre à quelques questions importantes qui touchent tout le monde au Burkina Faso. Nous sommes ici aujourd'hui pour mener une dernière entrevue de suivi avec eux. Leurs réponses seront confidentielles. Ils seront rassemblés avec les réponses de **4200** autres personnes à qui nous parlons, pour avoir une vue d'ensemble. Il sera impossible de choisir leurs réponses à partir de ce qu'ils disent, afin qu'ils puissent se sentir libres de nous dire ce qu'ils pensent. Cette entrevue prendra environ 45 minutes. Votre enfant est libre de participer ou de refuser à tout moment. Leur participation à cette étude est volontaire et n'implique aucun risque physique ou émotionnel au-delà de celui de la vie quotidienne. Si vous avez des questions sur l'évaluation, n'hésitez pas à appeler CERFODES au +226 25 35 82 09 ou le coordinateur d'étude au +226 78 04 04 25.



M 009a\_E. Êtes-vous prêt à autoriser votre enfant à continuer?

1. Oui [Demander à parler à l'enfant et continuer au CONSENTEMENT ECLAIRE DE L'ENFANT]
2. Non [Merci parent et fin de l'interview]

*[Enquêteur: Vous devez obtenir une réponse claire "oui" ou "non". Si oui, lisez la déclaration de consentement à l'enfant. Si non, remerciez-les, enregistrez cette tentative comme un refus, et continuez jusqu'au prochain ménage.]*

### **ÉNONCÉ DU CONSENTEMENT ECLAIRE DE L'ENFANT**

Bonjour. Nous aimerions effectuer un dernier entretien de suivi avec vous aujourd'hui. Vous avez été choisi dans ce ménage pour répondre à quelques questions importantes qui touchent tout le monde au Burkina Faso. Vos réponses seront confidentielles. Elles seront rassemblées avec les réponses de 4 200 autres personnes à qui nous parlerons, pour avoir une vue d'ensemble. Il sera impossible de choisir leurs réponses à partir de ce que vous dites, de sorte que vous pouvez vous sentir libre de nous dire ce que vous pensez. Cette entrevue prendra environ 45 minutes. Vous êtes libre de participer ou de refuser à tout moment. Votre participation à cette évaluation est volontaire et n'implique aucun risque physique ou émotionnel au-delà de la vie quotidienne. Si vous avez des questions sur l'évaluation, n'hésitez pas à appeler CERFODES au +226 25 35 82 09 ou le coordinateur d'étude au +226 78 04 04 25.

**M 009b\_E. Pouvons-nous commencer?**

1. Oui. [Passez à M10 et commencez l'interview]
2. Non. [Merci l'enfant et fin de l'interview]

### **SI LE RÉPONDANT CHOISI A 18 ANS OU PLUS: CONSENTEMENT ÉCLAIRÉ**

Bonjour ! Nous aimerions mener une dernière entrevue de suivi avec vous aujourd'hui. Vous avez été choisi dans ce ménage pour répondre à quelques questions importantes qui touchent tout le monde au Burkina Faso. Vos réponses seront confidentielles. Elles seront rassemblées avec les réponses de **4 200** autres personnes à qui nous parlerons, pour avoir une vue d'ensemble. Il sera impossible de vous distinguer de ce que vous dites, alors n'hésitez pas à nous dire ce que vous en pensez. Cette entrevue prendra environ 45 minutes. Vous êtes libre de participer ou de refuser à tout moment. Votre participation à cette évaluation est volontaire et n'implique aucun risque physique ou émotionnel au-delà de la vie quotidienne. Si vous avez des questions sur l'évaluation, n'hésitez pas à appeler CERFODES au +226 25 35 82 09 ou le coordinateur d'étude au +226 78 04 04 25.

**M 009c\_E. Êtes-vous prêt à continuer ?**

1. Oui [Continuer à M 010]
2. Non [Remerciez le répondant et terminez l'entrevue]

*[Enquêteur: Vous devez obtenir une réponse claire "oui" ou "non". Si oui, commencez l'enquête. Si non, remerciez-le, enregistrez cette tentative comme un refus, et continuez au prochain foyer.]*

## I. QUESTIONS INTRODUCTIVES

Q 101\_E Commençons par votre point de vue général sur la situation actuelle de notre pays. Certaines personnes pensent que le pays va dans la bonne direction et d'autres, le contraire. Selon vous quel est votre point de vue ?

1. Dans la mauvaise direction
2. Dans la bonne direction
3. Ni mauvais ni bon
- 99 Ne sait pas [*ne pas lire*]

Q 103\_E Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous (ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes ?

	Jamais	Rarement (1 ou 2 fois dans l'année)	quelques fois (une fois par mois)	Souvent (plus d'une fois par mois)	Toujours (chaque semaine)	Ne sait pas
a. Nourriture insuffisante pour manger à sa faim?	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. Manque d'eau potable pour les besoins domestiques?	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. Manque de médicaments ou de soins médicaux ?	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Manque de combustible pour la cuisson des repas?	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. Manque d'argent?	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q104new\_E A votre avis, quels sont les problèmes les plus importants auxquels le pays fait face et auxquels le Gouvernement devait s'attaquer? [*Ne pas lire les options. Coder à partir des réponses. (Acceptez jusqu'à trois réponses.)*]

	1ère réponse	2ème réponse	3ème réponse
<b>Economie</b>			
1. Gestion économique	1	2	3
2. Salaires et revenus	1	2	3
3. Chômage	1	2	3
4. Pauvreté/exclusion sociale	1	2	3
5. Impôts et taxes	1	2	3
6. Prêts/crédits	1	2	3
<b>Alimentation/Agriculture</b>			
7. Agriculture	1	2	3
8. Commercialisation agricole	1	2	3

	1ère réponse	2ème réponse	3ème réponse
9. Insécurité alimentaire/famine	1	2	3
10. Sécheresse	1	2	3
11. Problème de terre / foncier	1	2	3
<b>Infrastructure</b>			
12. Transports	1	2	3
13. Communication	1	2	3
14. Infrastructures routières	1	2	3
<b>Service publics</b>			
15. Education	1	2	3
16. Logement/habitat	1	2	3
17. 18. Eau	1	2	3
18. Electricité	1	2	3
<b>Sante</b>			
19. Sante	1	2	3
20. Maladies	1	2	3
<b>Gouvernance</b>			
21. Crime	1	2	3
22. Corruption	1	2	3
23. Instabilité/divisions politique/divisions ethnique ou religieux	1	2	3
24. Violence politique	1	2	3
25. Grève répétitive	1	2	3
26. Incivisme	1	2	3
27. Discrimination/Inégalité	1	2	3
28. Droit de la femme	1	2	3
29. Guerre	1	2	3
30. Démocratie/droits politique	1	2	3
31. Insécurité et Violent Extrémisme	1	2	3
<b>Autres Réponses</b>			
32. Autre (autres problèmes)	1	2	3
33. Rien à dire (pas de problème)	1	2	3
34. Ne sait pas	1	2	3

## II. COMMUNAUTE LOCALE

Maintenant, nous aimerions vous poser quelques questions sur cette communauté où vous vivez; c'est-à-dire, votre village, votre entourage /quartier.

Q 201\_E. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les énoncés suivants concernant la communauté (village, quartier) où vous habitez ?

		Tout à fait d'accord	D'accord	En désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sais pas
a.	Je peux obtenir ce dont j'ai besoin dans cette communauté.	1	2	3	4	99
b.	Cette communauté m'aide à répondre à mes besoins	1	2	3	4	99
c.	Je me sens comme un membre de cette communauté	1	2	3	4	99
d.	J'ai un mot à dire sur ce qui se passe dans ma communauté.	1	2	3	4	99
e.	Je me sens connecté à cette communauté.	1	2	3	4	99
f.	Je peux influencer la communauté dans laquelle je vis.	1	2	3	4	99
g.	Je suis capable d'avoir un impact important sur ma communauté.	1	2	3	4	99
i.	En tant que communauté, nous pouvons ensemble surmonter nos difficultés.	1	2	3	4	99
j.	En tant que communauté, je pense que nous pouvons changer les conditions difficiles auxquelles nous sommes confrontés.	1	2	3	4	99

Q 202\_E. Maintenant je voudrais vous poser quelques questions sur les autorités locales et sur votre communauté. S'il vous plait dites-moi comment vous êtes en accord ou en désaccord avec les différentes affirmations ? Donc premièrement...

		Tout à fait d'accord	d'accord	désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sait pas
c.	Je peux influencer les décisions prises par les autorités locales de ma communauté	1	2	3	4	99
e.	Tous les membres de la communauté sont traités de la même manière par les autorités locales	1	2	3	4	99
f.	Tous les membres de la communauté font confiance à l'équité et l'impartialité du système judiciaire	1	2	3	4	99

		Tout à fait d'accord	d'accord	désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sait pas
g.	Les forces de sécurités traitent tous les membres de la communauté de la même façon	1	2	3	4	99
h.	Les forces de sécurité et les autorités locales sont tenues comptables (Responsable) de leurs actions	1	2	3	4	99

Q 204\_E. À quel point faites-vous confiance aux personnes et aux institutions suivantes ?  
[Enquêteur: Lisez toutes les options, sélectionnez une réponse.]

		Pas du tout	Un peu	Assez	Complètement	Ne sait pas
b.	Tes voisins	1	2	3	4	99
c.	D'autres personnes dans votre village / communauté	1	2	3	4	99
d.	D'autres personnes de votre groupe ethnique	1	2	3	4	99
e.	D'autres personnes de votre groupe religieux	1	2	3	4	99
f.	Les personnes d'autres groupes ethniques	1	2	3	4	99
g.	Les personnes d'autres groupes religieux	1	2	3	4	99
h.	Les leaders communautaires	1	2	3	4	99
i.	Les autorités locales	1	2	3	4	99
j.	Le gouvernement	1	2	3	4	99
k.	Police	1	2	3	4	99
l.	Gendarme	1	2	3	4	99
m.	Militaire	1	2	3	4	99

### III. ENGAGEMENT CIVIQUE ET SOCIAL

Q 301\_E. Je vais énumérer plusieurs activités auxquelles participent certaines personnes. Pour chacune des activités suivantes, pouvez-vous me dire à laquelle vous avez personnellement participé au cours des quatre derniers mois? [Enquêteur: *Si oui, demandez si cela a été fait souvent, parfois ou une fois ou deux au cours des 4 derniers mois; Si non, demandez s'ils participeraient ou pas si on leur en donnait l'opportunité*]

		Oui, souvent	Oui, quelques fois	Oui, une ou deux fois	Non, mais pourrait	Non, ne pourrait pas	Ne sais pas
a.	Participation aux réunions communautaires	1	2	3	4	5	99
b.	Se joindre à d'autres pour résoudre un problème dans la communauté	1	2	3	4	5	99
c.	Contacté au moins un représentant du gouvernement ou communautaire à propos d'un problème	1	2	3	4	5	99
d.	Contacté les médias, comme la radio ou écrire une lettre aux journaux	1	2	3	4	5	99
g.	Participé à une marche de démonstration ou de protestation	1	2	3	4	5	99
h.	Participer à des réunions politiques ou des campagnes	1	2	3	4	5	99
i.	Participer à une protestation violente pour une cause politique	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q302new\_E. Pensez aux différents leaders de la communauté, de la région et du pays. Ceux-ci peuvent être des autorités locales, des dirigeants politiques ou religieux. Veuillez me dire dans quelle mesure vous êtes d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes:

		Tout à fait d'accord	d'accord	désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sait pas
a.	Les gens devraient critiquer les déclarations faites par ceux qui occupent des positions d'autorité.	1	2	3	4	99
b.	Les personnes en position d'autorité disent généralement la vérité.	1	2	3	4	99
c.	Les gens devraient être sceptiques de toutes les déclarations faites par ceux qui occupent des postes d'autorité	1	2	3	4	99
d.	Nous devrions croire ce que nos dirigeants nous disent.	1	2	3	4	99

#### IV. SÛRETÉ ET SÉCURITÉ

Q 401\_E Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois vous et votre ménage: [Enquêteur: lisez les options à voix haute].

	Jamais	Rarement (1 ou 2 fois dans l'année)	quelques fois (une fois par mois)	Souvent (plus d'une fois par mois)	Toujours (chaque semaine)	Ne sait pas
a. Ne vous êtes pas sentis en sécurité dans votre village ou quartier?	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q 403\_E. L'un des principaux problèmes au Sahel au cours des dernières années a été l'insécurité croissante et les attaques violentes de groupes extrémistes/radicaux. Parce que c'est une question tellement pertinente, nous aimerions mieux comprendre les opinions des gens qui vivent dans cette région. Dans cet esprit, veuillez me dire dans quelle mesure vous êtes d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes:

	Tout à fait d'accord	d'accord	désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sait pas
a. Les attaques armées au Sahel ont ébranlé mon sentiment de sécurité et de sûreté personnelle	1	2	3	4	99
b. Quand je pense à des attaques armées, je ne me sens pas en sécurité.	1	2	3	4	99
c. Je m'inquiète que moi ou quelqu'un qui m'est cher soit blessé dans une attaque armée dans ma communauté.	1	2	3	4	99
d. Je crains qu'il y ait une attaque dans ma communauté dans un proche avenir.	1	2	3	4	99

Q405new\_E. Selon vous, qui est la cause /base de l'insécurité dans la région du Sahel ? (*Réponses multiples mais ne pas lire les modalités*)

1. Personne
2. Groupes religieux
3. Les groupes ethniques
4. Les Forces de défense et de sécurités (FDS)
5. Les autorités locales
6. Les trafiquants
7. Les marginaux
8. Les étrangers
9. Les pays occidentaux
10. Les immigrés ou les réfugiés
11. L'Etat

- 12. Groupes d'auto-défense (Koglweogo)
- 13. Jihadiste
- 14. Les bandits
- 15. Groupes politiques
- 16. Groupes armés ou extrémistes
- 17. Pauvreté
- 18. Corruption
- 19. Enrichissement personnel/illicite
- 20. Autres (à préciser: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 99. Ne sait pas

Q 407\_E. Les gens utilisent différentes stratégies pour minimiser leur risque personnel de devenir la cible d'une attaque ou de représailles de la part des groupes radicaux. Je vais vous lire une liste de choses que certaines personnes ont suggérées pour minimiser ce risque. S'il vous plaît, dites-moi si vous pensez que chaque action peut aider ou pas à minimiser le risque d'une attaque ou de représailles.

	Pas du tout	Un peu	Assez	Complètement	Je ne sais pas
a. Ne parlez pas contre eux	1	2	3	4	99
b. N'exprimez aucune opinion à leur sujet	1	2	3	4	99
c. Restez, si quelqu'un affilié à ces groupes, vous demande de faire quelque chose	1	2	3	4	99
f. Évitez d'aller dans certaines zones	1	2	3	4	99
g. Rechercher le soutien et la protection des forces de sécurité	1	2	3	4	99
h. Cherchez le soutien et la protection de votre communauté / village	1	2	3	4	99

Q 409\_E. Dans ce contexte d'insécurité dans le Sahel, imaginez que vous êtes approché par quelqu'un qui vous semble suspect ou faisant partie d'un groupe suspect qui vous propose une offre financière intéressante et vous demande de l'aider. Veuillez me dire s'il est probable ou improbable que vous preniez personnellement ces mesures dans cette situation. *[Enquêteur : veuillez lire les modalités ci-dessous].*

	Complètement probable	Plutôt probable	Complètement improbable	Plutôt improbable	Ne sais pas
b. J'essaierais d'éviter le contact avec cette personne	1	2	3	4	99
c. Je consulterais un ami de confiance ou un membre de la famille	1	2	3	4	99
d. Consulter un leader communautaire sur la question	1	2	3	4	99



	Complètement probable	Plutôt probable	Complètement improbable	Plutôt improbable	Ne sais pas
e. Contactez les autorités officielles (par ex. : forces de sécurité)	1	2	3	4	99
g. Je voudrais essayer d'en savoir plus sur la proposition	1	2	3	4	99

Q 410\_E. Les affirmations suivantes concernent la capacité de votre communauté à faire face à la propagation de l'insécurité dans la région. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec ces énoncés?

	Tout à fait d'accord	d'accord	en désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sais pas
a. Ma communauté est capable d'empêcher la propagation d'attaques violentes dans notre communauté.	1	2	3	4	99
b. Ma communauté peut protéger notre peuple contre les attaques violentes.	1	2	3	4	99
c. Ma communauté peut empêcher nos gens de rejoindre des groupes violents.	1	2	3	4	99
d. Ma communauté peut faire face efficacement aux menaces de sécurité auxquelles nous sommes confrontés.	1	2	3	4	99
e. Nous sommes impuissants face à l'insécurité dans la région.	1	2	3	4	99
f. Ma communauté a peu de contrôle sur son avenir en matière d'insécurité.	1	2	3	4	99

Q 411\_E. Ensuite, je vais vous lire quelques paires de déclarations. Veuillez me dire avec quelle déclaration vous êtes le plus d'accord et dans quelle mesure vous êtes tout à fait d'accord avec cette affirmation. Voici les deux premières déclarations:

- A. L'usage de la violence n'est jamais justifié
- B. Il est parfois nécessaire d'utiliser la violence pour défendre des causes justes *[Enquêteur : Une et une seule réponse possible, donc exclusive]*

- 1. Tout à fait d'accord avec A
- 2. D'accord avec A
- 3. D'accord avec B
- 4. Tout à fait d'accord avec B
- 99. Ne sait pas *[Ne pas lire]*

Q 412\_E. Voici les deux déclarations suivantes:

- A. La violence n'est pas efficace pour résoudre les problèmes
- B. La violence peut être un moyen efficace pour résoudre les problèmes

*[Enquêteur : Une et une seule réponse possible, donc exclusive]*

- 1. Tout à fait d'accord avec A
- 2. D'accord avec A
- 3. D'accord avec B
- 4. Tout à fait d'accord avec B
- 99. Ne sait pas [Ne pas lire]

Q 413\_E. Voici les deux dernières déclarations:

- A. La violence au nom de la religion n'est jamais justifiée
- B. La violence au nom de la religion peut être justifiée

*[Enquêteur : Une et une seule réponse possible, donc exclusive]*

- 1. Tout à fait d'accord avec A
- 2. D'accord avec A
- 3. D'accord avec B
- 4. Tout à fait d'accord avec B
- 99. Ne sait pas [Ne pas lire]

Q422new\_E. Certaines personnes aident ou soutiennent les activités de groupes extrémistes et la violence. Je vais énumérer certains groupes. Dites-moi, s'il vous plaît, combien de personnes appartenant à ces groupes de personnes, selon vous, sont impliquées dans le soutien et l'assistance aux groupes extrémistes qui ont lancé des attaques au Sahel? *[Nous ne vous demandons pas de désigner les groupes ou personnes spécifiques]*

	AUCUN	CERTAINS	BEAUCOUP	TOUS	NE SAIT PAS
a. Des gouvernements étrangers	1	2	3	4	99
b. Des représentants du gouvernement	1	2	3	4	99
c. Membres de l'armée ou de la police	1	2	3	4	99
d. Des leaders religieux	1	2	3	4	99
e. La population du Sahel	1	2	3	4	99

Q423new\_E. Selon vous, dans quelle mesure chacun des facteurs suivants est-il une raison pour laquelle certaines personnes au Sahel soutiennent et aident les groupes extrémistes?

	Pas du tout	Un peu	Assez	Complètement	Ne sais pas
a. Corruption/Enrichissement personnel illicite	1	2	3	4	99
b. Injustice/maltraitance gouvernementale	1	2	3	4	99
c. Croyance religieuse	1	2	3	4	99
d. Faible performance du gouvernement à subvenir aux besoins de leurs communautés	1	2	3	4	99
e. Coercition/peur des groupes extrémistes	1	2	3	4	99
f. Ils sont des mauvaises personnes	1	2	3	4	99

Q416new\_E. Maintenant, nous allons vous demander de proposer deux stratégies / moyens pour le gouvernement de traiter efficacement l'extrémisme violent. Quelle serait selon vous la meilleure voie pour le Gouvernement d'être plus efficace dans le traitement du problème de l'extrémisme violent?

[Enquêteur: Ne pas lire les options de réponse. Coder à partir des réponses.]

Rien (i.e. il n'y a rien à faire pour être plus efficace contre ces groupes)	0
Le Gouvernement est déjà efficace dans le combat contre eux	1
Renforcer la réponse militaire ou les capacités militaires	2
Travailler avec les leaders traditionnels pour s'attaquer au problème	3
Travailler avec les leaders religieux pour s'attaquer au problème	4
Améliorer l'économie et créer plus d'emplois	5
Améliorer le système éducatif	6
Gouverner plus efficacement / offrir de meilleurs services publics	7
Traiter plus équitablement les communautés d'origine des extrémistes	8
Donner plus de pouvoir aux autorités locales pour prendre leurs propres décisions	9
Autre ____ (préciser)	10
Je ne sais pas	99

Q417new\_E. Selon vous quelle serait la seconde meilleure voie pour le Gouvernement d'être plus efficace dans le traitement du problème de l'extrémisme violent? [Enquêteur: Ne pas lire les options de réponse. Coder à partir des réponses]

Pas de deuxième	0
Le Gouvernement est déjà efficace dans le combat contre eux	1
Renforcer la réponse militaire ou les capacités militaires	2
Travailler avec les leaders traditionnels pour s'attaquer au problème	3
Travailler avec les leaders religieux pour s'attaquer au problème	4
Améliorer l'économie et créer plus d'emplois	5
Améliorer le système éducatif	6
Gouverner plus efficacement / offrir de meilleurs services publics	7
Traiter plus équitablement les communautés d'origine des extrémistes	8
Donner plus de pouvoir aux autorités locales pour prendre leurs propres décisions	9
Autre ____ (précisez)	10
Je ne sais pas	99

Q418new\_E. Quelle est la chose la plus efficace que les gens comme vous peuvent faire pour aider à combattre l'extrémisme violent dans ce pays? [Enquêteur: Ne pas lire les options. Coder à partir des réponses]

Rien / Les gens ne peuvent rien faire	0
Collaborer avec la police/force de sécurité	1
Refuser de collaborer avec groupes extrémistes/radicales/ armée	2
Signaler les activités suspectes aux forces de sécurité	3
Parler du problème, par exemple, en appelant un programme de radio ou en rédigeant une lettre.	4
Parler du problème avec les amis et les proches	5
Etre vigilant	6
Autre ____ (précisez)	
Je ne sais pas	99

## DISCUSSIONS

Q419new\_E. À votre avis, combien de personnes dans votre communauté discutent le violent extrémisme ?

1. Aucun
2. Quelques-unes
3. Beaucoup des gens
4. La majorité de personnes.
99. Ne sait pas (ne lire pas la modalité)

Q 414\_E. Lorsque vous vous réunissez avec vos amis ou votre famille, à quelle fréquence discutez-vous de l'insécurité ou de l'extrémisme violent? Diriez-vous que vous discutez de ce sujet:

1. Jamais (**si 1, aller la Q415\_E**)
2. Rarement (Environ une à deux fois par an)
3. Quelques fois (une fois par mois)
4. Souvent (plus d'une fois par mois)
5. Toujours (chaque semaine)
99. Ne sait pas

Q420new\_E Combien de fois avez-vous été en désaccord avec vos associés pendant les discussions ?  
*Citez toutes les assertions, si le participant ne répond pas immédiatement.*

1. Nous n'étions jamais en désaccord.
2. J'étais parfois en désaccord avec leurs avis.
3. J'étais en désaccord la plupart de temps avec leurs avis
4. J'étais toujours en désaccord avec leurs avis.

Q421new\_E Dans ces discussions, à quel point vous sentez-vous confiant de donner votre avis sur cette question? [*Si vous n'avez pas eu de telles discussions, alors imaginez ce que vous feriez pendant de telles discussions*]

1. Pas de tout confiant
2. Un peu confiant
3. Assez confiant
4. Complètement confiant

Q422new\_E. Quel est votre niveau d'implication à ces discussions?

1. J'écoute surtout ce que les autres disent, mais ne dis pas grand-chose
2. Je participe quelque fois à la discussion
3. Je contribue toujours à ces discussions

Q 415\_E. Lors de discussions sur l'extrémisme violent, pensez-vous que les gens se sentent libres d'exprimer leurs opinions ou pensez-vous qu'ils retiennent leurs opinions? [*Enquêteur: spécifiez «toujours» ou «habituellement» lorsque le répondant dit «libre» ou «retenez», puis sélectionnez une réponse.*] (*une et une seule réponse habituellement*)

1. Libre d'exprimer ses opinions, Toujours
2. Libre d'exprimer leurs opinions, Habituellement
3. Retiennent leurs opinions, Habituellement,
4. Retiennent leurs opinions, Toujours,
99. Ne sait pas [*Ne pas lire*]

## V. COLLABORATION POLICIERE

Q 501\_E. Ensuite voudrais-je vous poser quelques questions au sujet des forces de sécurité ou de police dans votre zone. A quel point vous êtes d'accord ou en désaccord avec leurs actions ci-après ?

	Tout à fait d'accord	d'accord	en désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sais pas
b Traiter les gens avec équité	1	2	3	4	99
c Prendre le temps d'écouter les gens	1	2	3	4	99
d Prendre des décisions basées sur les faits et lois et non sur leurs opinions personnelles	1	2	3	4	99
e Expliquer leurs décisions aux gens	1	2	3	4	99

Q 503\_E. A quel point vous êtes personnellement d'accord ou en désaccord avec chacune des déclarations suivantes ? [*Enquêteur : lire les affirmations*]

	Tout à fait d'accord	d'accord	En désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sais pas
a. Collaborer avec la police/les forces de sécurité aide à assurer la sécurité à la communauté	1	2	3	4	99
b. Collaborer avec la police aide à prévenir les attaques violentes dans la communauté.	1	2	3	4	99
c. Collaborer avec la police peut être dangereux parce que ça expose les gens aux risques d'attaques.	1	2	3	4	99
d. Collaborer avec la police dégrade les relations avec les autres membres de la communauté	1	2	3	4	99

## VI. CORRUPTION

Q601new\_E. Nous allons maintenant vous poser une question sur un autre problème important, qu'est la corruption : A votre avis,

	Pas du tout	Un peu	Assez	Complètement	Ne sais pas
a. Comment estimez-vous l'ampleur de la corruption des fonctionnaires dans votre localité?	1	2	3	4	99

## Q602new\_E. À votre avis,

	Aucun	Quelques-unes	Beaucoup de gens	La majorité	Ne sait pas
a. Combien de personnes de cette localité donnent des cadeaux ou de l'argent supplémentaire aux fonctionnaires pour obtenir des services ?	1	2	3	4	99
b. Combien de personnes de cette localité donnent des cadeaux ou de l'argent supplémentaire aux fonctionnaires pour se tirer d'affaire?	1	2	3	4	99
c. Combien de fonctionnaires dans votre localité refusent-ils des cadeaux, s'ils leur sont offerts pour services rendus ?	1	2	3	4	99
d. Combien de fonctionnaires dans cette localité acceptent les cadeaux ou les pots-de-vin des citoyens pour les services?	1	2	3	4	99
e. Combien de personnes dans votre localité pensent qu'il est dangereux de signaler ce type de corruption aux acteurs de lutte contre la corruption?	1	2	3	4	99
f. Combien de personnes dans cette communauté se prononcent publiquement contre la corruption?	1	2	3	4	9 9
g. Combien de personnes dans cette communauté dénoncent quand elles sont témoins de la corruption?	1	2	3	4	99

Q603new\_E. Quelle est la chose la plus efficace que les gens comme vous peuvent faire pour aider à combattre la corruption dans ce pays? [Enquêteur: Ne pas lire les options. Coder à partir des réponses].

Rien / Les gens ne peuvent rien faire	0
Refuser de payer	1
Signaler la corruption quand on est témoin ou on en fait l'expérience	2
Voter pour des candidats de partis intègres ou pour des partis qui promettent de combattre la corruption	3
Parler du problème, par exemple, en appelant un programme de radio ou en rédigeant une lettre	4
Parler du problème avec les amis et les proches	5
Signer une pétition demandant une lutte plus farouche contre la corruption	6
Rejoindre ou soutenir une organisation qui lutte contre la corruption	7
Prendre part à des marches de protestation ou des manifestations contre la corruption	8
Autre ____ (préciser)	
Je ne sais pas	99

Q604new\_E. À votre avis, combien de personnes dans votre communauté discutent de la corruption ?

1. Aucun
2. quelques-unes
3. Beaucoup des gens
4. La majorité de personnes.

Q605new\_E. Lorsque vous vous réunissez avec vos amis ou votre famille, à quelle fréquence discutez-vous de la corruption? Diriez-vous que vous discutez de ce sujet:

1. Jamais (*si 1 ; aller à la Q609new\_E*)
2. Rarement (une ou deux fois par an)
4. Souvent (plus d'une fois par mois)
5. Toujours (chaque semaine)
99. Ne sait pas [*Ne pas lire*]

Q606new\_E. Combien de fois avez-vous été en désaccord avec vos associés pendant les discussions ? *Citez toutes les assertions, si le participant ne répond pas immédiatement.*

1. Nous n'étions jamais en désaccord.
2. J'étais parfois en désaccord avec leurs avis.
3. J'étais en désaccord la plupart de temps avec leurs avis
4. J'étais toujours en désaccord avec leurs avis.

Q607new\_E. Dans ces discussions, à quel point vous sentez-vous confiant de donner votre avis sur cette question? [*Si vous n'avez pas eu de telles discussions, alors imaginez ce que vous feriez pendant de telles discussions*]

1. Pas de tout confiant
2. Un peu confiant
3. Assez confiant
4. Complètement confiant

Q608new\_E. Quel est votre niveau d'implication à ces discussions sur la corruption ?

1. J'écoute surtout ce que les autres disent, mais ne dis pas grand-chose
2. Je participe quelque fois à la discussion
3. Je contribue toujours à ces discussions

Q609new\_E. Dans les discussions sur la corruption, pensez-vous que les gens se sentent libres d'exprimer leurs opinions ou pensez-vous qu'ils retiennent leurs opinions? [*Enquêteur: spécifiez «toujours» ou «habituellement» lorsque le répondant dit «libres» ou «retiennent», puis sélectionnez une réponse*]

1. Libres d'exprimer leurs opinions – Toujours
2. Libres d'exprimer leurs opinions – Habituellement



3. Retiennent leurs opinions – Habituellement
4. Retiennent leurs opinions – Toujours
99. Ne sait pas [Ne pas lire]

## VII. MIGRATION

Q701new\_E. Beaucoup de gens essaient de migrer en raison de difficultés économiques et pour une vie meilleure. Les gens ont des points de vue différents sur les risques et les avantages de la migration. À votre avis, quelle est la dangerosité de la migration?

1. Pas du tout dangereux
2. Un peu dangereux
3. Assez dangereux
4. Très dangereux
5. Je ne sais pas

Q702new\_E. À votre avis, quels sont les risques et les dangers de la migration hors du pays? [Ne pas lire les options. Code basé sur les réponses des participants]

1. Il n'y a pas de risques / dangers
2. Ne pas parler la langue du nouvel endroit
3. Etre forcé ou vendu
4. Se faire voler
5. Se faire tuer
6. Autre \_\_\_\_\_

Q704new\_E. À votre avis, combien de personnes dans votre communauté discutent de la migration ?

1. Aucun
2. quelques-unes
3. Beaucoup des gens
4. La majorité de personnes.

Q705new\_E. Lorsque vous vous réunissez avec vos amis ou votre famille, à quelle fréquence discutez-vous de la migration ? Diriez-vous que vous discutez de ce sujet:

1. Jamais (**si 1, aller la Q709new\_E**)
2. Rarement (une ou deux fois par an)
4. Souvent (plus d'une fois par mois)
5. Toujours (chaque semaine)
99. Ne sait pas [Ne pas lire]

Q706new\_E. Combien de fois avez-vous été en désaccord avec vos associés pendant les discussions ? *Citez toutes les assertions, si le participant ne répond pas immédiatement.*

1. Nous n'étions jamais en désaccord.

2. J'étais parfois en désaccord avec leurs avis.
3. J'étais en désaccord la plupart de temps avec leurs avis
4. J'étais toujours en désaccord avec leurs avis.

Q707new\_E. Dans ces discussions, à quel point vous sentez-vous confiant de donner votre avis sur cette question? *[Si vous n'avez pas eu de telles discussions, alors imaginez ce que vous feriez pendant de telles discussions]*

1. Pas de tout confiant
2. Un peu confiant
3. Assez confiant
4. Complètement confiant

Q708new\_E. Quel est votre niveau d'implication à ces discussions sur la migration ?

1. J'écoute surtout ce que les autres disent, mais ne dis pas grand-chose
2. Je participe quelque fois à la discussion
3. Je contribue toujours à ces discussions

Q709new\_E. Dans les discussions sur la migration, pensez-vous que les gens se sentent libres d'exprimer leurs opinions ou pensez-vous qu'ils retiennent leurs opinions? *[Enquêteur: spécifiez «toujours» ou «habituellement» lorsque le répondant dit «libres» ou «retiennent», puis sélectionnez une réponse.]*

1. Libres d'exprimer leurs opinions - Toujours
2. Libres d'exprimer leurs opinions - Habituellement
3. Retiennent leurs opinions - Habituellement
4. Retiennent leurs opinions - Toujours
99. Ne sait pas [Ne pas lire]

M009dnew\_E. Confirmation du type de questionnaire

1. Questionnaire contrôle
2. Questionnaire traitement

## **QUESTIONS TEST -- CONTOL**

Q710Cnew\_E. Maintenant, je vais vous lire un certain nombre de choses que les gens disent qu'ils ne feraient pas. Après vous avoir lu toutes les choses, dites-moi juste combien d'entre elles vous ne feriez pas. Je ne veux pas savoir lesquels, juste le nombre (COMBIEN) :

1. Fumer des cigarettes
  2. Boire de la sucrerie
  3. Voter
  4. Exprimer mon opinion contre la décision d'une autorité locale
- (la réponse devrait être un nombre de 0 à 4)**

Q711Cnew\_E. Certaines personnes pensent que les familles Marabout ne soient pas les seules autorisées à diriger des prières ou les seules à donner des avis sur des questions religieuses. Les autres imams devraient être autorisés à exercer les mêmes fonctions. Quel est votre avis par rapport à ces déclarations / idées? :

1. Tout à fait d'accord
2. d'accord
3. Indifférent
4. Désaccord
5. Tout à fait en désaccord
6. Ne sait pas (ne pas lire la modalité)
7. Refus de répondre

Q712Cnew\_E. Certaines personnes appellent à un changement dans les pratiques traditionnelles, pour l'élimination de cadeaux ou de paiement (argent/ or) aux marabouts lors des cérémonies, des dots ou des mariages. Quel est votre avis par rapport à ces déclarations / idées?

1. Tout à fait d'accord
2. D'accord
3. Indifférent
4. Désaccord
5. Tout à fait en désaccord
6. Ne sait pas
7. Refus de répondre

#### **QUESTIONS TEST -- TREATMENT**

Q710Tnew\_E. Maintenant, je vais vous lire un certain nombre de choses que les gens disent qu'ils ne feraient pas. Après vous avoir lu toutes les choses, dites-moi juste combien d'entre elles vous ne feriez pas. Je ne veux pas savoir lesquels, juste le nombre (COMBIEN) :

1. Fumer des cigarettes
2. Boire de la sucrerie
3. Voter
4. Exprimer mon opinion contre la décision d'une autorité locale
5. Collaborer avec la police/force de sécurité

**(la réponse devrait être un nombre de 0 à 5)**

Q711Tnew\_E. Un leader religieux, Malam Dicko et son groupe, demandent que les familles Marabout ne soient pas les seules autorisées à diriger des prières ou les seules à donner des avis sur des questions religieuses. Les autres imams devraient être autorisés à exercer les mêmes fonctions. Quel est votre avis par rapport à ces déclarations / idées ?

1. Tout à fait d'accord
2. d'accord
3. Indifférent
4. Désaccord
5. Tout à fait en désaccord
6. Ne sait pas (ne pas lire la modalité)
7. Refus de répondre

Q712Tnew\_E. Le leader religieux, Malam Dicko et son groupe, réclament un changement dans les pratiques traditionnelles, pour l'élimination de cadeaux ou de paiement (argent/ or) aux marabouts lors des cérémonies, des dots ou des mariages. Quel est votre avis par rapport à ces déclarations / idées?

1. Tout à fait d'accord
2. D'accord
3. Indifférent
4. Désaccord
5. Tout à fait en désaccord
6. Ne sait pas
7. Refus de répondre

## VIII. DEMOGRAPHIE

Et enfin, j'ai quelques questions sur vous et votre ménage pour nous aider à catégoriser vos réponses.

D 601\_E. Sexe : [Enquêteur : Ne pas demander le sexe ; observer et noter]

1. Homme
2. Femme

D 602\_E. Quel âge avez-vous ? : [Enquêteur : Ne sait pas = 99]

D603new\_E. Les gens pratiquent leurs religions de différentes façons. En dehors des mariages et des funérailles, combien vous adonnez-vous personnellement à des pratiques religieuses comme la prière, la lecture d'un livre religieux ou participez-vous à des services religieux ou à des réunions de groupes religieux ? Diriez-vous que vous les pratiquez : [Lire à haute voix les options de réponse]

	Jamais	Quelques fois par an	Environ une fois par mois	Environ une fois par semaine	Environ une fois par jour	Plus d'une fois par jour	Répondant n'a pas de religion [Ne pas lire]	Ne sait pas [NPL]
La prière	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
Lecture d'un livre religieux	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
Participer à des services ou réunions religieux	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99

D604new\_E Savez-vous lire ou écrire assez pour lire un article dans un journal?

- 1 Oui
- 2 Non

#### IX. PARTICIPATION AU GROUPE D'ÉCOUTE

Q901new\_E. Avez-vous déjà entendu parler d'une émission radiophonique appelée Wuro Potal?

1. Oui
2. Non (*si 2, aller à Q903new\_E*)

Q902new\_E. Si oui, comment ?

1. J'ai fait partie du groupe d'écoute Wuro Potal
2. J'en ai entendu parler par un ami ou une famille
3. Autre \_\_\_\_\_
4. Je ne sais pas

Q903new\_E. Avez-vous fait partie du groupe d'écoute Wuro Potal?

1. Oui
2. Non [*si 2, aller à la section 10*]

Q904new\_E. A quelle fréquence avez-vous discuté du programme avec les personnes suivantes:

	Oui, plusieurs fois par semaine	Oui, une fois par semaine	Oui, quelques fois seulement	Non, jamais
a. les membres de mon groupe d'écoute	1	2	3	4

	Oui, plusieurs fois par semaine	Oui, une fois par semaine	Oui, quelques fois seulement	Non, jamais
b. d'autres personnes de mon village qui n'étaient pas dans mon groupe d'écoute	1	2	3	4
c. d'autres personnes dans d'autres villages	1	2	3	4

Q906new\_E. Maintenant, nous allons poser quelques questions sur Wuro Potal et ses personnages : En général, dans quelle mesure les personnages de Wuro Potal sont-ils similaires ou différents des membres de votre communauté (à vous)?

1. Très semblable
2. Assez similaire
3. Un peu différent
4. Très différent

Q907new\_E. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les énoncés suivants?

	Tout à fait d'accord	d'accord	En désaccord	Tout à fait en désaccord	Ne sais pas
a. En écoutant Wuro Potal, je me suis senti partie prenante de l'histoire	1	2	3	4	99
b. Je pensais que Wuro Potal était un village / une ville imaginaire sans grand rapport avec la réalité.	1	2	3	4	99
c. Je pensais que Wuro Potal était une vraie ville comme notre village / ville.	1	2	3	4	99
d. J'ai comparé les personnages de Wuro Potal avec quelqu'un que je connais personnellement.	1	2	3	4	99

Q908new\_E. En écoutant Wuro Potal, quel sentiment l'histoire a suscité en vous d'une manière générale?

	Pas du tout	Un peu	Assez	Complètement	Ne sais pas
Triste	1	2	3	4	99
Inspiré	1	2	3	4	99
Pessimiste	1	2	3	4	99
En colère	1	2	3	4	99
Content	1	2	3	4	99

	Pas du tout	Un peu	Assez	Complètement	Ne sais pas
Peur	1	2	3	4	99
Optimiste	1	2	3	4	99

Q909new\_E. Vous avez écouté Wuro Potal avec un groupe d'autres personnes. Dans quelle mesure vous sentiez-vous à l'aise dans ce groupe?

1. Très confortable
2. Confortable
3. Mal à l'aise
4. Très inconfortable

Q910new\_E. Combien de personnes dans le groupe d'écoute connaissiez-vous personnellement avant de participer \_\_\_\_\_ (écrivez un chiffre de 0 à 21)

Q911new\_E. Maintenant que le groupe d'écoute est terminé, combien de personnes dans le groupe d'écoute considérez-vous comme des amis? \_\_\_\_ (écrire un nombre de 0 à 21)

Q912new\_E. A quel personnage de Wuro Potal, tu t'identifies le plus et auquel tu souhaiterais ressembler ?

Noms	
Aucun	0
Weloré	1
Pendo	2
Béro	3
Guèladjo	4
Bounty	5
Korka	6
Yobbi	7
Birgui	8
Bodorou	9
Saourou	10
Hayrè	11
Binta	12
Ba Wouro	13
Dja djè	14

Dembo	15
Barkè	16
Ina Barkè	17
Pattè	18
Amirou	19
Maire	20
Gouverneur	21
Commissaire	22
Commandant	23
Lieutenant	24
Naforè	25
Autres (préciser)	

Q913new\_E. Quel personnage de Wuro Potal avez-vous aimé le plus?

Q914new\_E. Et quel second personnage de Wuro Potal avez-vous aimé le plus?

Noms	1ere	2eme
Aucun	0	0
Welorè	1	1
Pendo	2	2
Bèro	3	3
Guèladjo	4	4
Bounty	5	5
Korka	6	6
Yobbi	7	7
Birgui	8	8
Bodorou	9	9
Saourou	10	10
Hayrè	11	11
Binta	12	12
Ba Wouro	13	13
Dja djè	14	14
Dembo	15	15



Barkè	16	16
Ina Barkè	17	17
Pattè	18	18
Amirou	19	19
Maire	20	20
Gouverneur	21	21
Commissaire	22	22
Commandant	23	23
Lieutenant	24	24
Naforè	25	25
Autres (préciser)		

Q915new\_E. Selon vous, quel était le message principal ou la leçon de Wuro Potal?

---



---

**X. QUESTIONS A REMPLIR PAR L'EQUETEUR**

*L'enquêteur doit répondre à ces questions après avoir fini l'interview*

M 801\_E. Dans quelle langue l'enquête a été réalisée ?

1. Fulfulde
2. Français
3. Mixte (Fulfulde et Français)
4. Autres : (préciser) \_\_\_\_\_

M 802\_E. Où est-ce que l'interview a été réalisée?

1. Dans le ménage de l'enquêté
2. Hors du ménage de l'enquêté
3. Autre : (préciser) \_\_\_\_\_

M 803\_E. D'autres personnes étaient-elles présentes durant l'entretien ? Si oui, combien étaient-elles?

1. Non, seulement l'enquêté et moi étions présents

2. Oui, une autre personne était présente
3. Oui, 2-3 autres personnes étaient présentes
4. Oui, 4 autres personnes ou plus, étaient présentes

M 804\_E. L'enquêté a-t-il répondu de lui-même ou d'autres personnes ont-elles influencé ses réponses ?

1. L'enquêté a toujours répondu de lui-même sans l'influence d'autres personnes
2. Il y a quelques influences d'autres personnes
3. D'autres personnes ont beaucoup influencé les réponses

M 805\_E. Utilisez une échelle de cinq pour apprécier le comportement de l'enquêté durant l'entretien :

		Très	assez	Passablement	Assez	Très	
a.	Amical	1	2	3	4	5	Hostile
b.	Coopératif	1	2	3	4	5	Non coopératif
c.	Intéressé	1	2	3	4	5	Désintéressé
d.	A l'aise	1	2	3	4	5	Mal à l'aise

M 806\_E. Dites-nous s'il s'est passé quelque chose d'extraordinaire durant cet entretien ou si vous avez d'autres commentaires sur la façon dont l'entretien s'est déroulé

## REFERENCES

- Arias, E. (2016). How does media influence social norms? A field experiment in the role of common knowledge. Working Draft.
- Bandura, A. (1986). *Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory*. Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Bandura, A. (2004). Social cognitive theory for personal and social change by enabling media. In A. Singhal, M. J. Cody, E. M. Rogers, & M. Sabido (Eds.), *Entertainment-education and social change: History, research, and practice* (pp. 75-96). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Bilali, R., & Staub, E. (2016). Interventions in real world settings. Using media to overcome prejudice and promote intergroup reconciliation in Central Africa. In C. Sibley, & F. Barlow (Eds.), *Cambridge handbook of the psychology of prejudice*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bilali, R., & Vollhardt, J. R. (2013). Priming effects of a reconciliation radio drama on historical perspective-taking in the aftermath of mass violence in Rwanda. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49*, 144-151.
- Bilali, R., & Vollhardt, J. R. (2015). Are mass media interventions promoting peace effective in contexts of ongoing violence? Evidence from Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. *Peace & Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology*.
- Bilali, R., Vollhardt, J. R., & Rarick, J. D. R. (2017). Modeling collective action through media to promote social change and positive intergroup relations in violent conflicts. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 68*, 200-211.
- Buchanan-Clarke, S., & Lekalake, R. (2016). Violent extremism in Africa. Public opinion from the Sahel, Chad, and the Horn. Afrobarometer policy paper no. 32.
- de Fossard, E. (2005). *Writing and producing radio dramas: Communication for behavior change*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ferguson, K. (2016). Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies. A review of the evidence. Partnership for Conflict, Crime & Security Research.
- Finkel, S., E., McCauley, J. F., Belasco, C., A., & Neureiter, M. (2016). Contextual violence and support for violent extremism: Evidence from the Sahel.
- Gau, J. C. (2014). Procedural justice and police legitimacy: A test of measurement and structure. *American Journal of Criminal Justice, 39*, 187-205.
- Greitemeyer, T. (2011). Effects of prosocial media on social behavior: When and why does media exposure affect helping and aggression? *Current Directions in Psychological Science*.
- Green, D., Wilke, A., & Cooper, J. (2017). Countering violence against women through mass media: A field experiment in rural Uganda. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), San Francisco, September 2017
- International Crisis Group (2017). The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso's North. Africa Report No. 254.
- McGarty, C., Thomas, E., Lala, G., Smith, L., & Bliuc, A. M. (2014). New technologies, new identities, and the growth of mass opposition in the Arab Spring. *Political Psychology, 35*, 725-740. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12060>.
- Myers, M., Sebert, A., & Bell, S. (2002). Institutional Review of Educational Radio Dramas. *Atlanta: CDC*.

- Paluck, E. L. (2010). Is it better not to talk? Group polarization, extended contact, and perspective-taking in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36, 1170-1185. doi: 10.1177/0146167210379868
- Paluck, E. L. (2009). Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict using the media: a field experiment in Rwanda. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96, 574 -587.
- Paluck, E. L. (2012). Media as an instrument for reconstructing communities following conflict. In K. J. Jonas & T. A. Morton (Eds.), *Restoring civil societies: The psychology of intervention and engagement following crisis* (pp. 284-299). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Paluck, E.L., & Ball, L. (2010). Social norms marketing aimed at gender based violence: A literature review and critical assessment. New York: International Rescue Committee.
- Paluck, E. L., & Green, D. P. (2009). Deference, dissent, and dispute resolution: An experimental intervention using mass media to change norms and behavior in Rwanda. *American Political Science Review*, 103, 622-644.
- Pant, S., Singhal, A., & Bhasin, U. (2002). Using Radio Drama to Entertain and Educate: India's Experience with the Production, Reception, and Transcreation of Dehleez. *J. Dev. Comm.*, 13, 52-66.
- Peterson, N. A., Speer, P. W., & McMillan, D. W. (2008). Validation of a brief sense of community scale: Confirmation of the principal theory of sense of community. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 36, 61-73.
- Singhal, A., Cody, M. J., Rogers, E., & Sabido, M. (Eds.). (2004). *Entertainment-education and social change: History, education, and practice*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Singhal, A., & Rogers, E. (1999). *Entertainment-education: A communication strategy for social change*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Sood, S., Menard, T., & Witte, K. (2004). The theory behind entertainment-education. In A. Singhal, M. J. Cody, E. M. Rogers, & M. Sabido (Eds.), *Entertainment-education and social change: History, research, and practice* (pp. 117-145). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
- Staub, E., Pearlman, L. A., Weiss, G., & Hoek, A. (2007). Public education through radio to prevent violence, promote trauma healing and reconciliation, and build peace in Rwanda and the Congo. *The panorama of mass violence: origins, prevention, reconciliation and the development of caring and active bystandership*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Tankard, M., & Paluck, E.L. (2016). Norm perception as a vehicle for social change. *Social Issues and Policy Review*.
- Valente, T. W., Kim, Y. M., Lettenmaier, C., Glass, W., & Dibba, Y. (1994). Radio promotion of family planning in the Gambia. *International Family Planning Perspectives*, 20, 96-100.
- van Zomeren, M., Saguy, T., & Schellhaas, M. H. (2012). Believing in "making a difference" to collective efforts: Participative efficacy beliefs as a unique predictor of collective action. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 16, 618-634
- Usdin, S., Scheepers, E., Goldstein, S., & Japhet, G. (2005). Achieving social change on gender-based violence: a report on the impact evaluation of Soul City's fourth series. *Social Science & Medicine*, 61, 2434-2445.