



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

SYRIA REGIONAL OPTION (SRO) FINAL REPORT

APRIL 2013

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by DAI.

SYRIA REGIONAL OPTION (SRO) FINAL REPORT

Program Title: Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI)
Sponsoring USAID Office: USAID/OTI Washington
Contract Number: DOT-I-00-08-00035-00/AID-OAA-TO-11-00032
Contractor: DAI
Date of Publication: April 2013
Author: DAI

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND SYRIA REGIONAL OPTION (SRO) OVERVIEW..... 1**
- ACTIVITIES ROUNDUP5**
- IMPLEMENTED ACTIVITIES.....5**
- CANCELLED & REJECTED ACTIVITIES8**
- CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS..... 11**
- OPERATIONS11**
- PROGRAMMATIC12**
- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SYRIA REGIONAL PROGRAM (SRP)..... 15**
- RECOMMENDATIONS & BEST PRACTICES FOR REGIONAL OPTION PROGRAMS..... 19**
- SUMMARY OF GRANT IMPLEMENTATION/ TAP FUNDS COMMITTED AND DISBURSED21**
- ANNEX A: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – SRO ASSESSMENT REPORT (OCTOBER 2012).....23**
- ANNEX B: LIST OF IMPLEMENTED ACTIVITIES BY COUNTRY OBJECTIVE.....25**
- ANNEX C: MAP OF SRO ACTIVITIES.....27**
- ANNEX D: REFERENCE MAP OF TURKEY AND SYRIA29**
- ANNEX E: SRO ORGANIZATIONAL CHART31**
- ANNEX F: MINI AAR MEETING MINUTES33**
- ANNEX G: LIST OF DELIVERABLES AND REPORTS SUBMITTED BY DAI TO OTI.....37**
- ANNEX H: FINAL LIST OF CONTACTS & NETWORKS.....39**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND SYRIA REGIONAL OPTION (SRO) OVERVIEW

This report describes the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of transition Initiatives (OTI) Syria Regional Option (SRO), implemented by Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT) III Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) implementing partner DAI from November 2012 through May 2013.

Stability in Syria has been deteriorating since March 2011. Civilian nonviolent protests demanding government reform have been met with state-sponsored repression perpetrated by the regime of Bashar al Assad. What began as a largely nonviolent revolution has spiraled into an armed conflict between armed rebel groups, some representing foreign extremist entities, and regime security forces. Caught among the continuing armed struggle are activists, youth, women, and media groups, as well as newly formed civilian governance structures and a nascent civil society struggling for reform and an end to the armed conflict.

On July 25, 2012, the Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) Contracting Officer's Representative requested that DAI engage in Syria under Provision 3.C.xiv of the Tunisia Transition Task Order to conduct an assessment and pilot implementation activities in Syria and neighboring countries. The assessment, conducted in September and October 2012 by a joint OTI-DAI team, highlighted potential areas of programmatic engagement with Syrian populations in the region and provided a foundation for the operationalization of activities with Syrian groups inside Turkey. (The Executive Summary of the SRO Assessment Report can be found in Annex A.) After the assessment was completed, OTI requested DAI to:

1. Establish an operational presence in Gaziantep, Turkey.
2. Support transition initiatives with the following country objectives:
 - a. Provide support to civil society groups and communities to actively participate in Syria's transition.
 - b. Provide support to emerging civil authorities to build the foundation for a peaceful and democratic Syria.

OTI and DAI conducted an abbreviated start-up conference in Washington, D.C., on November 5, and DAI's Team Leader departed for Turkey the following day. DAI's Program Development Manager arrived in Turkey on November 13. OTI's operational presence on the ground became permanent on December 1. The first SRO activity was cleared on November 29, and was a model of successful collaboration of all four corners, as the activity was developed in Washington with significant technical input from the SRO field team.

DAI's liaison office registration papers were approved by the Turkish Ministry of Economy on November 29. Soon thereafter, OTI secured approval from the U.S. Embassy and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that DAI staff could travel to Gaziantep in mid-December to continue operational start-up

procedures and continue developing activities and relationships with prospective grantees and partners. An office and living quarters were secured by December 29.

DAI's senior expatriate team on the ground was joined by an operations specialist on December 22, and DAI has had an expatriate operations specialist/manager ever since. This position proved instrumental for setting up systems, recruiting and training local staff, taking the lead role on grants management, and managing close-down operations. DAI's home office core team consisted of a Senior Program Manager, Program Manager, and a Program Associate. Additional support was provided by information technology (IT) specialists, a database specialist, a contracts administrator, the finance department, and DAI's Senior Manager for Procurement, Logistics, & Trade Policy on an as-needed basis.

On February 1, DAI's expatriate staff was supplemented by three locally hired staff: a Turkish Procurement & Logistics Officer, a Turkish Finance Officer, and a Syrian Arabic/English translator. All three staff performed exceptionally, and DAI is pleased that all three joined the Syria Regional Program (SRP) team after their DAI contracts ended on April 5.

The total budget ceiling for SRO, as advised by OTI/Washington (OTI/W) was \$1.5 million. This amount covered both the assessment and program implementation periods. Of this amount, \$458,433 was dedicated to programming (TAP, or transition assistance pool) in the form of grants under contract (GUCs), non-GUC Direct Delivery of Goods and Services (DDGS), non-GUC short-term technical assistance (STTA), and non-GUC training. The main reasons why the budget was heavier on the operational side than on the programming side than standard OTI programs include:

- The assessment phase, the cost of which was 100 percent drawn from operations funds;
- Start-up and closedown costs, which are usually counterbalanced by a program that is several years long with hundreds of activities, rather than the several-months-long SRO program; and
- An unexpected extended stay in Istanbul by the DAI team while awaiting the Government of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs review of OTI's mandate to work with Syrians from a platform in southern Turkey.

This report describes each activity in detail in the section Activities Roundup, including each activity's background, implementation process, outcomes, and potential for follow-up activities through the SRP, OTI's longer-term program for Syria currently being implemented by Chemonics International (CI).

The report continues with two sections of recommendations and best practices for future programming: Recommendations for the Syria Regional Program and Recommendations and Best Practices for Regional Option (RO) Programs. DAI has implemented two ROs for OTI under TTI (Libya and Syria). With that experience, DAI has created the latter section, a collection of administrative and operational suggestions for future ROs—many of which were already applied successfully during SRO and deserve emphasis to ensure their integration in future similar programs.

Despite some unique challenges (described in more detail in a section below on Challenges and Solutions), SRO successfully developed and implemented eight activities in a short time. More specific information on TAP commitments and disbursements can be found in this report's final section, Summary of Grant Implementation/TAP Funds Committed and Disbursed. In brief, 10 activities were cleared under SRO; of these, two were cancelled before any funds were disbursed. The total amount of TAP funds disbursed was \$290,756.

The closedown period of SRO (roughly mid-March through mid-April in the field and continuing from the DAI home office in April and May) proceeded smoothly as scheduled and included several successful handover tasks undertaken to assist CI with a smooth start-up for operations and programming under SRP. DAI and CI coordinated closely on both operational and programmatic issues, including:

- Office and inventory handover;
- Staff transition (CI hired all three of DAI's Turkish and Syrian staff);
- Introductions to prospective grantees for program ideas that had not been fully developed;
- Introductions to SRO grantees so that CI might consider follow-on activities;
- Briefings on the overall program, challenges, and best practices; and
- A briefing on each activity implemented by SRO and possibilities for follow-on activities.

All expatriate staff departed Gaziantep on or before April 12 to end their field-based SRO duties. The Team Leader and Program Development Manager continued to work remotely to complete reports and activity closeout tasks as needed.

A close-down meeting was held on April 17 in Washington, D.C., at the National Press Building. OTI representatives in attendance included Sarah Charles, Vanessa Ortiz, Colin Deschamps, Gretchen Murphy, Stephen Lennon, Leah Werchick, Frances Brown from OTI's Applied Best Practices & Coordination team, Eric Duneman from OTI's program office, and Bill Hyde. DAI representatives were Rebecca Coolidge, Adnane Raiss (phone bridge), Jackie Duclos, Erica Berkinpas (phone bridge), Skye Beare (phone bridge), and Albert Cevallos. Meeting minutes are included in Annex F.

ACTIVITIES ROUNDUP

SRO implemented eight activities over a period of four months, based on the following country objectives:

1. Provide support to civil society groups and communities to actively participate in Syria’s transition.
2. Provide support to emerging civil authorities to build the foundation for a peaceful and democratic Syria.

These activities included a wide range of interventions, including providing action-research, capacity-building workshops for media and civil society activists, direct assistance to Syrian communities, and support to activities and office infrastructure for emerging Syrian civic groups. These activities were well received and laid a solid foundation on which the SRP can capitalize. Below is a description of these activities, their implementation, outcomes, and follow-up that will be undertaken by SRP.

IMPLEMENTED ACTIVITIES

SRO001: Understanding Syria’s Local Administrative Council in Permissive Areas Awardee: Caerus Associates

This activity was designed to provide OTI/SRO with critical analysis of 20 local councils in Syria to help develop a strategy that supports democracy in transitional Syria by promoting good governance and accountability to citizens. Given the important role that these councils play in Syria—and will continue to play throughout the transition—and the lack of detailed information available on the council system in Syria, this research helped OTI better understand council emergence and growth, the services they seek to provide, perceptions of citizens toward councils, and the relationships between councils and other actors on the ground, including armed actors.

Activity outcomes included an analysis of 20 local councils and five “deep dive” reports on councils selected based on political maturity and accessibility. Throughout the activity, Caerus, OTI, and DAI had several conference calls in order to ensure timeliness of reports and that the reports satisfied SRO’s needs. Caerus was responsive throughout the activity and even provided two ad-hoc reports at OTI’s request without any budget modification request.

SRP will work with OTI to determine the best way to capitalize on this activity and the information on the councils that has been collected. A research review session was held on February 9 and included senior SRO staff from OTI, DAI, and CI.

SRO002: Building the Capacity of Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria (CCSDS) by Support of Office Infrastructure Awardee: CCSDS

This activity helped strengthen the capacity of the CCSDS in its efforts to support the development of democratic institutions and practices that are responsive and accountable to citizens. The provision of basic office equipment and staff stipends for the months of January through March allowed CCSDS operations and teams in Aleppo, Idlib, and Qamishli to conduct civic education activities through community discussion forums and the distribution of educational materials.

Discussion forums: Each of the three branches facilitated in-person community discussions on key topics including reconciliation, countering sectarian violence, community peace building, and transitional justice. While the events were meant to engage up to 30 citizens per week per branch, with the goal of engaging 1,080 citizens for the three branches over the course of three months, the security situation in Syria and other logistical and administrative constraints allowed CCSDS to reach only 637 people.

Distribution of educational materials: CCSDS designed a flyer and a questionnaire on transitional justice and then distributed it inside Syria to raise awareness on this topic.

SRP has already engaged with CCSDS and supported a campaign on the role of women in Syria (“I am She” campaign).

**SRO003: Building Democratic Media Through Content Development and Programming Support
Awardee: Various**

This activity was designed to strengthen the capacity of key independent Syrian media groups to move beyond reporting on the revolution and to educate Syrian citizens on democratic institutions and practices. USAID/OTI supported a five-day training in Gaziantep, Turkey, from February 11–15 to facilitate the development of media content and programs for eight Syrian media and civic groups on issues such as civic education, citizenship, public participation, accountability, and pluralism. The workshop included a basic orientation to editorial values and journalistic practices and led to a larger emphasis on generating content that introduced civic-oriented themes through innovative and diverse media. The activity also introduced participants to program conceptualization and the proposal process for donor funding. The later stages of the training focused on the program design process and the basics of how to construct a funding proposal. Most of the final day was devoted to a pitching session, where groups and individuals presented their media project ideas in a formal setting to a panel of experts including the two trainers, OTI representatives, and the CI SRP senior management team. The feedback received by trainees was extremely positive and many participants expressed their eagerness to go back to their respective groups and apply their new skills and knowledge.

The participating media groups were encouraged to submit funding proposals to SRP to be considered for OTI funding.

**SRO005: Supporting Aleppo’s Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Assessment Team
Awardee: Gathering of Free Syrian Engineers (GFSE)**

This activity strengthened the capacity of a professional and civic organization in its efforts to provide assessment, repair, and reconstruction information and services to local citizens and administrative councils in Aleppo. Over the course of 2.5 months, GFSE in Aleppo assessed infrastructure and rehabilitation needs in several areas in Aleppo—both urban and rural. Before becoming an OTI grantee, this group had already conducted nearly 1,000 building assessments, but the equipment and stipends provided by this activity improved their strategy, efficiency, and capacity to expand their work. To a large extent, GFSE is coordinating closely with the Aleppo Local Administrative Council (LAC), local civilian councils, and other civil society and activist groups on these assessments in order to ensure a collaborative, comprehensive approach. This activity contributed to helping the program build a critical local government-civil society partnership, while the work and methods of the grantee serves as models as Syrians prepare to rebuild their communities.

From January 15–March 31, GFSE assessed the infrastructure and reconstruction in several areas of Aleppo and submitted reports and other deliverables following the agreed-upon schedule. These

deliverables are being shared with SRP so that the program can continue to build on the relationship established through this initial grant.

SRO006: Capacity Building of CCSDS Through Training in Organizational Management and Training of Trainers

Awardee: CCSDS

This activity was designed to strengthen the capacity of a Syrian civic organization in its efforts to support the development of democratic institutions and practices that are responsive and accountable to citizens. The CCSDS, based in Gaziantep, Turkey, established three branch “offices” (really virtual offices) inside northern Syria with the support of USAID/OTI through a separate grant (SRO002). CCSDS has been concurrently striving to build its technical and administrative capacity to achieve its goals inside Syria. In support of this, OTI funded a one-week workshop to provide technical assistance on topics including organizational management, project planning and management, leadership skills and teambuilding, and facilitation and training skills. Twenty-two CCSDS staff members participated in the workshop, including three staff members from the Aleppo office, four from the Idlib office, five from the Qamishli office, and 10 from the main office in Gaziantep, including the organization’s two co-directors.

According to participant feedback, all participants gained organizational management and personal skills that are critical for their work. The workshop also served as a teambuilding opportunity for CCSDS staff that had come together for the first time during this activity. As a result of the workshop, CCSDS is better equipped with the tools to develop a clear and coherent strategic framework to implement their programs.

SRO007: Media Campaign for Shelter Winterization for Syrian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Awardee: Analysis, Research, Knowledge (ARK)

This activity sought to mitigate the humanitarian cost of winter on Syrians displaced by the current conflict. As part of a widespread print campaign, this activity funded the design and printing of winterization advice for Syrians who are internally displaced or living in refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Materials were disseminated in early February in order to be useful for Syrians already suffering extreme hardship from an unusually harsh winter in the region. The activity was implemented by Basma (“fingerprint” in Arabic), an Istanbul-based strategic communications and media organization comprised mostly of Syrians and administered and advised by ARK, a Dubai-based company, and was meant to contribute to broader interagency U.S. Government efforts to provide winter survival information to conflict-affected Syrians.

The artwork was completed by the Basma design team on January 27 and included:

1. An eight-page comic book providing advice on keeping warm in the winter. The comic was aimed at a youth audience as a means of reaching a greater section of the target audiences. In total, 23,000 copies were printed and distributed. The original goal was to distribute 30,000 comics, but time and administrative constraints resulted in a reduction of the quantity.
2. Two posters. A total of 1,180 posters were printed and distributed. The original goal was to produce 3,000 copies of the posters, but time and administrative constraints resulted in a reduction of the quantities.

According to a report submitted by ARK, the printed products were disseminated using other donor funding to the agreed locations inside Syria and in refugee camps in countries surrounding Syria.

SRO008: Building Relationships Through Assistance to Schools

Awardee: Various

This activity sought to strengthen the relationship between a key Syrian group and both the emerging Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and the U.S. Government. SRO provided a high-level representative of the U.S. Government with basic school materials to distribute with basic school materials during a visit to the main school for displaced Syrian children in the Turkish town of Gaziantep. The visible distribution of school supplies and book bags, specifically identified as priority needs by the Syrian Gathering of Gaziantep, contributed to some degree to the credibility of the U.S. Government, which despite significant contributions of humanitarian aid, has few opportunities for providing visible assistance. This activity also sought to encourage peaceful coexistence between Turks and Syrians at a time of increasing cross-border tensions.

SRO provided school supplies, such as notebooks and pens, to all 570 students, as well as backpacks for the 100 newly registered students. The supplies were distributed during the visit of the U.S. Government representative. On short notice, U.S. Government officials decided that the representative from the SOC's Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) should not attend the event because the municipality did not want to politicize the event. Therefore, two of the activity's objectives were not achieved, with no fault to SRO.

SRO009: Strengthening the Foundations of Syrian Civil Society

Awardee: Various

This activity was designed to strengthen the capacity of several emerging Syrian civil society organizations to help them manage their institutions, articulate their strategies, and implement projects. SRO supported a one-week workshop for leaders of key organizations and networks in Gaziantep, Turkey, from March 18–22. In attendance were 28 trainees selected from 14 emerging groups based in southern Turkey and Syria, including both current and potential OTI grantees. This workshop continued OTI's ongoing efforts to build a strong Syrian civil society network, and thereby bolster civic efforts to promote a peaceful and inclusive transition. A major secondary goal of this activity was to bring together groups that OTI wanted to know better, to get a better sense of who they are, expand the OTI network, and decide which groups might be promising partners for future activities under SRP. Many of the groups OTI and DAI met with in the past did not seem ready for immediate grant partnerships, so this workshop served as a good way to begin to engage with them.

The vast majority of the participants showed significant satisfaction with the knowledge and skills they acquired. In addition to applying some of the new skills they gained, many organizations made concrete steps toward developing real collaborations with each other after realizing that they were working on the same themes.

This workshop led to new inroads for OTI in both civil society and local councils, particularly Raqqa. A follow-up meeting was held on March 29 with the Raqqa council leadership to explore the potential for collaboration. SRP now has a number of new contacts on which to follow up.

CANCELLED AND REJECTED ACTIVITIES

SRO004: Providing Emergency Fuel to Cover Pressing Needs of Aleppo City Bakeries (rejected)

This activity was designed to procure and distribute fuel to Aleppo city bakeries to help mitigate the effects of the bread crisis. It was rejected due to the lack of a clear Government of Turkey-approved procurement mechanism and to a series of complex factors associated to the cycle of the implementation and monitoring.

SRO010: Expanding a Platform of Syrian Research (cancelled)

This activity was designed to strengthen cross-sectoral and political communication and reconciliation within Syria by supporting production, implementation, and distribution of a recorded speaker-series executed by Bait Qamishlo, a civil society organization based in Antakya, Turkey. This activity was cancelled because the founder of the organization was not cleared during the USAID grantee vetting process.

SRO011: Supporting Cleanup Campaigns in Aleppo City (rejected)

This activity sought to support Balad, a leading civic group based in the town Aleppo, to conduct a community cleanup campaign. After a series of meetings and discussions, it became clear that the project would carry significant environmental and health hazards and had to be rejected. The grantee planned to transfer garbage from the streets to temporary dumpsites in residential areas and to use unknown chemical products to sanitize the streets and areas that would be cleaned.

SRO012: Powering Aleppo Community Centers and Schools (cancelled)

This activity sought to mitigate the disruptive impact of the Syrian conflict on communities in Aleppo, particularly the education system, by providing solar panels to at least four community centers/schools. This activity was cancelled due to delays in securing the needed vetting information amidst the impending closedown of SRO.

CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

OPERATIONAL

The main operational challenges faced by SRO are described briefly below. Fortunately, SRO was able to overcome most of these challenges, although they did often result in programming delays.

Finding Qualified Local Staff

Finding qualified staff with the right language abilities, and who were willing to take on a short-term assignment, proved difficult. Very few people speak English in Gaziantep, and many of those who were qualified did not want to leave their current positions for an assignment that might only last a few months. OTI was helpful in connecting DAI to the U.S. Consulate in Adana's recruitment network. In addition, DAI was assisted by its longtime Turkish/Iraqi partner, Zozik Company. Finding a qualified Program Development Officer proved especially difficult: many candidates either did not have adequate language abilities, did not want to work in Gaziantep, or were already affiliated with an organization and did not want to leave their current position for a short-term job. One highly qualified candidate did not want to submit vetting information. DAI resolved this issue by hiring two very short-term Program Development Officers for ad-hoc assignments, such as researching Syrian media groups who were candidates for participation in media training activity SRO003. Having a full-time experienced (with both OTI and DAI systems) expatriate Operations Manager also allowed the Team Leader to take on more program-related development tasks, such as writing and submitting grants, managing the database, and taking charge of all activity files.

Delay Arriving in Gaziantep While Completing Registration and Obtaining U.S. Government and Government of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Buy-In for SRO

The DAI Team Leader and Program Development Manager's arrival in Gaziantep was delayed by several weeks while awaiting permission from the U.S. Embassy and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the team to move to Gaziantep and begin setting up operations and implementing programs. While DAI hoped to be fully operational and staffed by mid- to late December in Gaziantep, we were not able to complete our staff recruitment and office set up until mid-January. This delay also made developing programs difficult without the ability to have face-to-face meetings with potential grantees based in southern Turkey.

Licensing Equipment Delays

Due to U.S. sanctions and other export controls, SRO was required to obtain licenses from the Department of Commerce for any equipment that would go into Syria and that contained 10 percent or more (in terms of dollar value) U.S.-made or -exported components. DAI sought and received three such licenses, each of which required between 22 and 34 calendar days to obtain. This requirement, while unavoidable, caused programming delays with activities SRO002 and SRO005 in particular, as DAI was not able to deliver equipment to grantees until the licenses were approved. DAI tried to mitigate these delays by keeping the Department of Commerce informed on upcoming requests, and DAI's home office trade policy specialist was instrumental in providing timely guidance on any issues that arose.

Registration/Residence Permit/Work Permits Issues

The bureaucracies related to company registration, residence permits, and work permits, can be quite burdensome, and the requirements often contradict one another or cannot be completed in a linear

fashion. This resulted in delays of obtaining residence permits, tax registration, and work permits. DAI has overcome most of these obstacles with the assistance of a Turkish attorney and accounting firm, but many hours were lost dealing with painfully slow bureaucracy and by receiving contradictory information.

Information Security – Low-Profile Security (the Optic)

SRO sought to keep a very low profile optic in order to protect staff and grantees' safety and security. While the operating environment in southern Turkey is very permissive, there are sensitivities in working with Syrians in Turkey, and DAI was mindful of these sensitivities and the possibility of cross-border conflict. DAI's security manual provided guidance to staff and contingency plans in case problems arose. In terms of information security, DAI was extremely cautious in protecting the names of individuals and organizations with whom we worked.

Recruitment of Short-Term Technical Assistance (STTA)

Finding international consultants with special subject matter expertise *and* regional/language experience, or who are from the region, is challenging and time-consuming. Without maintaining a pool of willing and available talent ready to be mobilized rapidly, a program risks delays in grant implementation.

PROGRAMMATIC

Vetting

This aspect was by far the most difficult challenge for SRO programming for several reasons:

- Some interlocutors simply refused to share vetting information for fear of their personal security and that of their relatives, which caused limitations in terms of hiring qualified individuals and, in some cases, the type of activities that could be implemented.
- Other individuals expressed resistance and concern in sharing their personal information, and acquiring the information required a great deal of time and energy and trust-building. Socializing the vetting requirements among potential grantees was needed to secure the vetting information.
- Collecting vetting information for a large group was usually done through one or two interlocutors/intermediaries who then faced the same resistance while relating to their colleagues.
- Communications, in-country transportation, security, and electricity issues caused significant delays in collecting the required vetting information.
- When submitted to DAI, the information was in most cases incorrect or incomplete, requiring several conversations and exchanges and causing further delays.
- The founder of a potential grantee organization was not cleared, which led to the cancellation of an activity (SRO010). This occurrence brought forward the need to think carefully about how to share negative determinations and the repercussions such news might have on grantees and their constituents.

DAI adjusted its tactics by developing a one-pager (approved by OTI and translated into Arabic) to address these concerns and to enhance the level of trust and comfort of Syrian interlocutors, which highlighted the following talking points:

- Instead of referring to vetting, using the word “registration” (registration of participants in the context of workshops, or “opening a file/registering” the group in the USAID “system”).

- The requirement on USAID to collect the personal information of its direct beneficiaries, as it is held accountable for its public funding.
- The requirement to guarantee the safety of participants to workshops, by ensuring that invitees are not wanted by any law enforcement or public safety organizations.
- USAID's guarantee that the personal information will not be made public or shared with any other entity in the present time, or at any other time in the future.

This approach proved to be more efficient. If an organization turns out to be grant worthy, DAI recommends that program staff inquire about the organization's structure during the first meeting with them in order to determine who needs to be vetted and to explain that vetting information will be required to address any resistance and issues during the early stages of activity development.

Lack of Organizational Management and Experience with Donors of Nascent Groups

Lack of organizational management and experience with donors of nascent groups was illustrated in many ways by some groups, including:

- Inability to articulate basic elements of organizational identify (mission, objectives, methodology, achievements);
- Lack of capacity to develop a holistic approach to an activity or intervention design;
- Lack of appreciation for the level of detail needed to develop an activity (and often frustration with the amount of information and detail requested from DAI and OTI);
- Lack of respect of agreed-upon deadlines;
- Inability to produce precise organizational profiles, activity descriptions, proposals, and reports;
- Low level of professional, nonprofit management and organizational development skills; and
- Lack of focus and depth in articulating programming and areas of interest.

The SRO team spent a considerable amount of time and energy thinking through the various components and details related to specific activities under consideration and provided guidance and advice to potential grantees on aspects that were often overlooked (sometimes as basic as the number of beneficiaries or people involved), which ultimately helped in developing comprehensive and sound grants.

Change of Priorities Between Assessment and Implementation Phases

The initial activity ideas that were identified during the assessment phase (particularly the set of activities focusing on Syrian groups located in southeast Turkey) could not be executed during the implementation phase given the change of priorities and the need for the program to focus on directly connecting grants to Syrians inside Syria.

Constant Need to Triangulate Information

Due to the nature of remote programming, the fact that the SRO team could not conduct field visits to get a concrete sense of the potential grantees' activities, accomplishments, and beneficiaries, and the lack of objectivity of some interlocutors, meant that DAI staff had to spend a considerable amount of time triangulating information on potential grantees from various sources to secure a more accurate and comprehensive assessment of a situation or organization. In other cases, DAI resorted to trusted

individuals to conduct proper due diligence. For example, when planning for the media training workshop, DAI engaged a resource person to conduct research on the long list of media groups that were recommended by several parties to ensure that they were a good fit with the activity's objectives.

Remote Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Another challenge of remote programming was the inability for the SRO team to conduct thorough monitoring and evaluation in Syria. SRO faced challenges identifying third-party monitors who were qualified, vetted, and located near the activities that needed to be monitored (so they could travel without taking significant security risks). SRO attempted to engage third-party monitors among its pool of grantees and vetted individuals. However, the communications, electricity, and other logistical constraints did not allow for Syria-based activities to be monitored in this manner.

Logistical, Electricity, and Communication Constraints

These constraints caused major challenges and delays in communicating with Syrian groups to obtain necessary information, particularly during the activity development phases. In some instances, the electricity and telecommunications networks were down for up to six days in Aleppo. In some cases, such services are only available in the countryside for a maximum of two hours per day. SRO made a point of asking for regular, face-to-face meetings with potential grantees in Gaziantep to overcome this major challenge. We recommend incorporating a satellite internet device with a data plan to most Syria-based grantees as an additional form of support—to ensure regular and smooth communication during the implementation and monitoring phase.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SYRIA REGIONAL PROGRAM (SRP)

THEMATIC

Bolster the Capacity of Civic and Grassroots Organizations

While SRP seems to be focused on supporting the SOC and providing assistance to local administration councils in the short term, it is crucial not to overlook the nationwide civic movement of emerging grassroots organizations for the following reasons:

- Many civil society structures are likely to outlive the SOC and local administration entities—which are, in essence, temporary, fragile, and loose organizations—in light of the very volatile political and security situation in Syria.
- Unlike political organizations and local administration councils, there is a limited level of turnover with civic groups, which helps ensure opportunities for future engagement and cultivating significant relationships.¹
- As we have seen through several grantees, activists often transform into leaders of civil society groups, and then transform into council members, and possibly later into local leaders. Syria’s emerging civil society is not static, and connecting to different groups offers a lens into community and local governance dynamics.
- Given the considerable level of need of local populations, and their lack of capacity to fill the vacuum on their own, particularly in wide geographic areas, investing in civic groups that are addressing issues at the neighborhood, sub-district, district, and city level is highly strategic and would contribute to a new bottom-up paradigm of community development in transitional Syria.
- Civic groups can serve as the “glue” to the social fabric, which is an essential need from a community stabilization perspective and in promoting peaceful coexistence and participatory democracy.
- SRO built a valuable network, trust, and firmly established relationships with influential civic groups inside Syria (particularly in Aleppo) and in Turkey on which SRP can capitalize.

Foster Collaboration Between Local Administration Entities and Civil Society

There is significant confusion among local administration entities and civil society regarding their respective roles and responsibilities and boundaries. Often tensions exist due to the lack of perceived legitimacy or competition. It is vital to foster collaboration among these categories of players for the following reasons:

¹ Several factors for the high turnover in political and public organizations include elections, organizations becoming obsolete or weaker due to tensions with competing organizations, and people getting burned out or phasing out after not being able to deliver.

- A lack of collaborative planning and teamwork is often considered by Syrian activists as the most important impediment to efficient and sustainable civic engagement in Syria. Division, lack of trust, and suspicion remain the dominant paradigm of the Syrian social fabric and the corollary of the deliberate “divide and rule” policy adopted by the regime over the past decades.
- There is a need to set up successful models and mechanisms of collaboration to avoid redundancy, diluted efforts, and to assist civic groups in leveraging their work and benefitting from synergies at the local level.
- Tensions and lack of coordination among moderate civic groups can contribute to an environment that radical and extremist groups exploit. As is becoming evident, such radical groups often appear to be much more efficient, united, and professional, therefore attracting local constituencies who choose not to follow an uncoordinated or polarized civil society.

Promote Civic Education

Most segments of Syrian society admittedly possess vague and often incorrect information regarding basic principles related to democracy, civic participation and engagement, political processes and practices, and governance. Numerous Syrian activists have reported to DAI that this lack of awareness of basic civic values and principles has often contributed to chaos²—particularly in areas known for their low level of literacy—which will continue to be problematic in the post-revolution era and serve as a major obstacle to nation-building.

Build a Cadre of Local Trainers/Facilitators in Strategic Areas

Identifying and building the capacity of community leaders and recognized trainers will assist with sustainable and long-term efforts to engage the local population and groups of interest in critical methods of learning and information sharing/gathering such as capacity-building activities, technical assistance, and civic education.

GEOGRAPHIC

Recognize the Strategic Importance of Damascus

While the Gaziantep staging platform allows easy access to Syrian entities located in the northern governorates of Syria, particularly to the strategic location of Aleppo (with 25 percent of the Syrian population, and producing 40 percent of the country’s gross domestic product), a number of equally important areas such as Damascus are not accessed and served by OTI—representing a considerable missed opportunity. SRP might consider stationing a team member near the border with Jordan to engage groups from the Damascus area and other southern governorates, hiring a resource person currently based in Damascus, or exploring avenues to engage Damascus-based groups regularly (and providing satellite internet to interlocutors to ensure smooth and regular communications) through the program staff. For future programming purposes, it would be strategic to start collecting information, becoming familiar with the unique environment and lay of the land in southern governorates, building relationships with key players, and providing assistance whenever it is feasible.

² Several activists shared illustrations of this, such as the prevailing “*lawlessness mindset*” that has led to people carrying arms and acting as superiors to others; people resorting to violence and force to advocate for their demands; inability to organize as a community; selecting subjective and irrational criteria to allocate the number of seats per constituency in elections processes of local administration councils (such as engagement in the revolution and martyrdom); and entitlement attitude of individuals who have lost a relative as having superior rights over others.

Maintain a Presence in Antakya

Given the multitude of groups from inside Syria that represent both local administration councils and civil society, it would be advisable to have a Program Development Officer dedicated to the Hatay region and to visit there two or three days per week. This would provide a more visible presence and help to build relationships with potential grantees that visit the Antakya-Reyhanli corridor regularly.

OPERATIONAL

Keep in Mind the Highly Radicalized Environment While Designing Activities and Interventions

Strengthening moderate players and voices and fostering collaboration and synergies among them is crucial to counteract the rise of radical and extremist forces. While crafting educational and awareness-raising messages targeting local populations, it is advisable to tap into relevant and appropriate values and principles from the local culture. Specifically, Syrian activists have repeatedly advised that educational content should be “packaged and presented within an Islamic framework” in order for it to resonate well with local populations. Principles of civic education and democracy presented from a Western-based perspective are likely to be labeled as “secular,” along with any party associated with this effort, and will ultimately be faced with rejection and the usual suspicion.³ Engaging U.S.-based organizations that have developed sound approaches to combining Western-based principles and Islamic methods and values for such purposes could be useful (for instance the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy; and the Salam Institute for Peace and Justice).

Build a Cadre of Resource Individuals for M&E Purposes

SRP can identify a group of qualified individuals in targeted areas (if there is not staff based in these areas, which would be an even better solution) to provide regular assistance with M&E, given the challenges posed by this aspect of remote programming.

Seize Opportunities to Host Workshops

Seize opportunities of workshops organized by SRP and other key stakeholders to expand SRP’s network; build personal relationships; and learn from participants about their organizations, projects, and developments in their respective locations.

Provide Reporting Templates to Grantees

Providing reporting templates to grantees and briefing them early in the process on the type of information they are expected to collect will go a long way in ensuring high quality and relevant reports are delivered in a timely manner.

³ This notion has been verified by the resistance and reactions to some of the activities of CCSDS inside Syria in areas such as Aleppo that are highly conservative and religious.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR REGIONAL OPTION PROGRAMS

SRO is the second regional option program that DAI has implemented for OTI—the first was the Libya Regional Option—under the Tunisia Transition Initiative Task Order. At OTI’s request, DAI’s home office compiled some lessons learned, best practices, and recommendations from those two programs; these are described below.

RESPONSIVENESS

The RO mechanism is an outstanding programmatic and political tool to use in rapidly transitioning geographies. ROs uniquely position USAID/OTI and implementing partners to shape the environment, gauge the level of local participation, spearhead situational assessments, and truly be at the forefront of political transition, wherever and whenever this may be taking place. While ROs provide space for political analysis and reach back, they also allow for responsive, timely, and creative programming in tipping-point areas most in need of immediate interventions. Often in these areas, a vacuum exists between longer-term initiatives active before the transition and longer-term programs that are yet to be established or solely focused on immediate humanitarian assistance needs.

STRONG FOUNDATION

Employing the RO mechanism allows OTI insight into potential considerations as it builds and shapes the strategy for longer-term programs. In rapidly transitioning environments, where information is typically scarce, ROs allow for a foundational understanding of actors, programmatic landscape, and operational challenges any future initiatives may face, and allows for these to be accounted for in larger program design.

TIMING

While clarifying timelines for ROs is difficult in quickly transitioning contexts, it is exceptionally helpful in terms of strategic planning, setting realistic implementation schedules, and developing a robust portfolio of activities. Additionally, incorporating an assessment phase that includes the implementing partner, as with the Syria Regional Option, not only contributes to the foundational knowledge for OTI referenced above, but also allows for the development of a collective vision and baseline, between OTI and the implementing partner, from which to design and implement activities.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Financial clarity on the relationship between Task Order and RO funding, for example if RO funds will be added to the ceiling of the Task Order, at the outset of the RO helps set and communicate program and operational capabilities and strategy for both the prime Task Order holder and the RO staff.


STAFFING

With ROs activated in rapidly changing physical, programmatic, and political environments, having both OTI and implementing partner team members dedicated to the RO at the headquarters level was exceedingly helpful in navigating the nuances of a context that is: 1) time sensitive; 2) one where policy approaches are still being assessed while RO implementation is rolled out; and 3) in support of the OTI and implementing partner field teams responding to requests and challenges in the field.

LOCAL PARTNERS

While DAI's unique set of experiences in the region provided a solid platform from which to operate, the ability of the RO to allow the utilization of local partners, such as Zozik, proved invaluable. Allowing the flexibility to engage a local partner, with years of OTI and DAI experience and a trusted history of compliance in unique and challenging circumstances, allowed for both rapid mobilization and increased options in terms of cross-border programming. Additionally, OTI's ability to coordinate—most significantly with other implementing partners and grantees with a longer presence in the region—and integrate new information into RO responses, is successful, particularly in contexts that are shifting from stable and developing to kinetic and politically transitioning—contexts in which OTI, and its partners, excel.

SUMMARY OF GRANT IMPLEMENTATION/ TAP FUNDS COMMITTED AND DISBURSED



ANNEX A: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – SRO ASSESSMENT REPORT (OCTOBER 2012)

This report describes DAI's assessment method, findings, and recommendations for the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) Syria Regional Option (SRO) under the Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) task order. This report does not provide an exhaustive, comprehensive description of the Syrian revolution, nor all of the key actors, but rather seeks to provide details and recommendations that will enable OTI to rapidly set up the SRO program and provide targeted and meaningful assistance to Syrian opposition groups.

Conducted between September 10 and October 8 in several locations in Turkey, the assessment was completed by two DAI staff who were accompanied at times by three U.S. Government representatives, including two OTI transition advisors. This report was written by DAI and submitted to OTI for review and approval. The material herein is based on an extensive number of interviews and meetings (listed in Annex B), as well as the field team's own research of published articles, books, and briefing papers, and is informed by DAI's extensive experience in implementing OTI programs.

After a brief introduction and explanation of the SRO assessment objectives and the current political context in Syria and southern Turkey, the report describes three overlapping, but distinct, sets of Syrian opposition actors working in Syria and Turkey: 1) local administration, composed largely of local civilian councils that are actively providing services for Syrians in rebel-controlled territory; 2) civil society/civic organizing actors; and 3) media organizations, which are largely composed of citizen journalists and activists seeking to create networks, and who are understandably eager to share the tragedies and successes of the Syrian revolution with the rest of the world.

The report then recommends a strategic approach for programming, including guiding principles, program objectives, and a suggested technical approach. Applied robustly and in concert, these strategic parameters will guide a program that will: 1) launch strong partnerships with Syrian organizations that can be built upon for future, longer-term programming; 2) distinguish OTI and SRO from other U.S. Government and international actors on the ground; and 3) utilize and build upon OTI and DAI's comprehensive collection of lessons learned and best practices in transition programming.

An extensive section on activity ideas describes in detail 11 activities that SRO could realistically develop and implement within a three- to six-month timeframe, depending upon resource allocations. All of the activities address one or more of the programmatic objectives described in the previous strategy section. At the end of the section, a list of undeveloped ideas proposed either by Syrian actors or the field assessment team is listed as a means to encourage further programmatic creativity and collaboration among OTI, DAI, and Syrian partners.

DAI recognizes that all of the ideas and recommendations herein are not possible without an efficient and effective operating platform based in southern Turkey. Accordingly, based on its extensive experience in OTI implementation, as well as specific information gathered on the ground in Turkey, this report makes

specific recommendations for operationalizing SRO rapidly and successfully, including plans and interim measures for registration, office location and set-up, procurement, and staffing.

Finally, the report concludes with some words about the unique and historical opportunity that is presenting itself for the United States and Syria to work together toward a common and important goal.

ANNEX B: LIST OF IMPLEMENTED ACTIVITIES BY COUNTRY OBJECTIVE

Note: Due to the need to complete administrative details, activities SRO002 and SRO007 have not yet been officially closed as of May 13, 2013. The disbursed amount for SRO002 will be unlikely to change from that reported here. The disbursed amount for SRO007 will be \$18,454.

<u>Activity #</u>	<u>Activity Title</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>Activity Amt.</u>
<u>Status</u>	<u>Awardee</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Disbursed</u>

Provide support to civil society groups and communities to actively participate in Syria's transition.


SRO002	Building the Capacity of CCSDS by Support of Office Infrastructure	12/27/2012	\$52,815	
Completed	Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria (CCSDS)	4/5/2013	\$40,928	
SRO003	Building Democratic Media through Content Development and Programming Support	1/25/2013	\$36,941	
Closed	Various	2/28/2013	\$36,941	
SRO005	Supporting Aleppo's Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Assessment Team	1/21/2013	\$30,564	
Closed	Gathering of Free Syrian Engineers (GFSE)	4/5/2013	\$30,564	
SRO006	Capacity Building of CCSDS through Training in Organizational Management and TOT	1/31/2013	\$31,876	
Closed	Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria (CCSDS)	3/31/2013	\$31,876	
SRO007	Media Campaign for Shelter Winterization for Syrian Refugees and IDPs	1/31/2013	\$22,000	
Completed	ARK (Analysis, Knowledge, Research)	2/23/2013	\$0	
SRO009	Strengthening the Foundations of Syrian Civil Society	2/18/2013	\$32,074	
Closed	Various	3/31/2013	\$32,074	
Number of Provide support to civil society groups and communities to actively participate in Syria's transition. Activities: 6			Total Activity Amount	\$206,270
			Total Disbursed Amount	\$172,383

Provide support to emerging civil authorities to build the foundation for a peaceful and democratic Syria.

SRO001	Understanding Syria's Local Administrative Councils in Permissive Areas	11/29/2012	\$97,783	
Closed	Caerus Associates	1/25/2013	\$97,783	
SRO008	Building Relationships through Assistance to Schools	2/7/2013	\$2,136	
Closed	Various	2/13/2013	\$2,136	
Number of Provide support to emerging civil authorities to build the foundation for a peaceful and democratic Syria. Activities: 2			Total Activity Amount	\$99,919
			Total Disbursed Amount	\$99,919

Total Number of Activities: 8	Total Activity Amount	\$306,189
	Total Disbursed Amount	\$272,302


ANNEX C: MAP OF SRO ACTIVITIES



ANNEX D: REFERENCE MAP OF TURKEY AND SYRIA



ANNEX E: SRO ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



ANNEX F: MINI AAR MEETING MINUTES

Syria Regional Option DAI/OTI Lessons Learned April 17, 2013 1200-1330

Agenda

- 12:00 – 12:15 p.m. Introductions and overview (Sarah Charles)
- 12:15 – 12:30 p.m. From Assessment to Activation: Implementing Partner Perspective (Rebecca Coolidge)
- 12:30 – 12:45 p.m. Scope of Activities: A Quick Rundown (Vanessa)
- 12:45 – 1:15 p.m. What Went Well, What Didn't? A Candid Discussion on Challenges and Successes (facilitated by someone from OTI's ABC team)
- 1:15 – 1:30 p.m. Roundup of Lessons Learned and Closing (facilitated by someone from OTI's ABC team)

Biggest Successes, Biggest Challenges⁴

Successes:

1. The SRO's *connections with key networks and established social capital* were key to the Syria Regional Program's ability to start to quickly scale-up activities
2. The SRO benefited from *clear and open communications* channels between DAI and OTI
3. Having the *same DAI staff in Turkey during the OTI assessment and during the SRO* was very useful
4. The SRO allowed for learning around Syria-specific regulations, such as OFAC, BIS licensing, geographic code and legal authorities
5. Was useful to have dedicated SRO staff on both DAI and OTI in DC
6. Finance tracking was much better than on the Libya SRO b/c it was split out from the main task order early

Biggest Challenges (in addition to ones listed in report):

1. Vetting: blocked potentially great programs. Time in getting information.
2. Budget was compressed

Detailed Notes

Partner Perspective (Rebecca)

⁴ See page 13 of main report for additional information on successes and challenges

- Assessment with Brendan, Robbie, Rebecca and Adnane was very successful and was a great example of one-team approach.
- DAI was in Istanbul longer than was hoped. Registration began in September with consultations with Turkish attorneys in Istanbul and Gaziantep; found out later in the process that documents had to be translated in Turkey (not in the U.S.), Rebecca presented the documents herself in Ankara on Thanksgiving and a week later had registration approval from the Ministry of Economy.
- First grant cleared 29 November (Caerus), second activity cleared before Christmas
- 10 activities cleared, 2 canceled, 8 implemented; 6 closed as of 17 April
- Colin: month of November DAI was in Istanbul as OTI sorted out optic and how to present this to GoT (Vanessa notes that this month allowed DAI to get started on procurement and other legal issues, but DAI noted that we missed the opportunity to work directly with prospective grantees during that delay, which had significant impact on ability to develop and clear activities)
- Sarah: original thought had been to work in Turkey with Syrians, this changed
- Ops manager took over grants manager role. Very difficult to get PDO due to language, short-term nature, and salary. Had a few stringers. A lot of the people that they wanted to hire had connections to CSOs or wanted to be on local councils, etc. Having an experienced ops person took pressure off Rebecca, and she took pressure of Adnane.

Scope of Activities (Vanessa)

- SRO002 CCSDS: good opportunity to start things in Syria, also lots of lessons in terms of procurement, licenses, etc.
- **SRO003 Media: Logistical issues of having an event in Turkey with Syrian participants. Successful in getting strong facilitators. Criticized by USG beforehand (OTI overstepping lanes), but was a good activity.**
- **SRO005 GFSE: Identified grantee already doing good work, who has strong networks within the country (with LCs and others). They are very willing to share information.**
- **SRO009 Civil Society workshop: some orgs that participated were met during assessment, or through introductions**
- Average grant size \$50,000 (cleared) but will go down after de-obligations are completed. Total disbursed about \$290,000⁵.
- Bolded activities were foundational. The goal when developing activities was to have activities that built towards other activities (like for CCSDS). Follow-on activities for almost everything
- Cancelled activities: fuel, Bait Qamishlo, clean-up campaign in Aleppo, solar power support: spent a lot of time researching and developing these

⁵ This amount was misstated during the mini-AAR as approximately \$390,000. The correct amount disbursed is \$290,756.

Was financial tracking for Syria or Libya better?

- DAI: different approach. Libya was regional approach, but Syria was a mini-program (separate program). Rebecca also insisted on a system from day one as DAI had learned from the Libya experience that this would be important.
- OTI: systems weren't in place for Libya, so they created them halfway thru, and it was very difficult. Systems were already in place for Syria. Tension on OTI side, is that we don't know what regional option turns into—it may not result in a program, so difficult to set up everything as well as it should be.

Should we have done a regional option or gone straight to SWIFT?

- Counterfactual would have been a partner being in country late Dec
- Vanessa: a lot of money for few grants, high ops. It could have hurt us, because grants looked small and USG didn't understand what OTI could do. On the other hand, would \$30M have come through if OTI hadn't already been on the ground earlier and had invested time. Although the real constraint was the short period of the program and the delay being mobilized to Gaziantep, more Syrian staff may have helped develop more activities Chemonics had three Syrian staff after about two months on the ground in Gaziantep. *We should see how many activities they will be able to do because of this.
- Also, we had RFTOP out for longer because there was more time. That extra week makes a big difference, and there were better proposals. Everyone was smarter, because there was more time. Also, scale of RFTOP would have been much smaller. “Dumber but faster”
- Need to be clearer about what it is meant to accomplish: networks? Grants? But you can't just talk to people, because you have to give them something afterwards or you lose them. Also, if you don't do grants, you don't get to try out vetting and other systems.
- Lessons learned really are based on context, because needs in Libya were different.

Because it was a regional option, did DAI go slower in setting things up?

- No, DAI did not go slower *because* it was a regional option, but the delay in Istanbul held up operations and programming. Also DAI would have done things differently setting up for a long-term engagement.

ANNEX G: LIST OF DELIVERABLES AND REPORTS SUBMITTED BY DAI TO OTI

1. Assessment Report
2. Start-Up Workplan
3. Security Plan
4. Activity Cycle
5. Final Report

ANNEX H: FINAL LIST OF CONTACTS AND NETWORKS

(TO BE PROVIDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER FOR REASONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY)