COMMUNITY POLICING IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE WAY FORWARD

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CONTENTS

OVERVIEW

El Salvador, Guatemala, and Central America in general face complex security problems, including the proliferation of violent gangs, drug-trafficking organizations, and organized crime, as expressed in homicide rates that are among the highest in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

Police reform that incorporates a community policing (CP) approach could contribute significantly to solutions, but it faces significant hurdles, including entrenched opposition to police reform, poor leadership and management capacity within police and other law enforcement entities, corruption as well as a challenging security environment.

This report focuses on the status of USAID and U.S. State Department support for CP in El Salvador and Guatemala, and the road ahead, addressing five questions:

- What key elements are leading to successful CP in El Salvador and Guatemala?
- What factors keep CP programs from succeeding?
- How can programs achieve quick successes in target communities, become sustainable, and be replicated?
- What are we missing — and what else can we do?
- Which innovative aspects of current practices can be used as best practices in the challenging security situation in these countries?

This report presents an assessment of each country's current CP situation and the ongoing support from USAID and the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The assessment offers country-specific conclusions, next steps, and observations about key elements for successful replication in the region.

These findings are based on a January 2011 investigative mission to El Salvador and Guatemala and incorporate information from background documents we gathered during that mission and received from the USAID Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) coordinator. USAID's senior police advisor, John Buchanan, provided valuable insights during the mission and contributed to this report. We received excellent in-country support for the investigative mission and draft report review from U.S. Embassy and USAID mission personnel, USAID implementers, and Government of Guatemala and Government of El Salvador agencies, especially the police.

SECTION I. BACKGROUND

Community policing refers to an ambitious and complex approach to policing that involves the whole organization and makes community orientation, problem-solving, and partnerships the central focus of its work. Exhibit 1 summarizes CP's general principles.

Exhibit 1. General Principles of the Community Policing Approach

Dimension	Principle
Philosophical	Respect, trust, engagement, and accountability are the essence of police/community relations. CP is understood broadly as: covering all police work, including prevention, law enforcement, and maintenance of order; having the main objectives of problem targeting and problem-solving; and being driven by community partnership.
Strategic	Geographic focus and geo-referenced crime problem analysis; community relations, partnerships; interagency planning, coordination and intervention; and providing opportunities for planned police/community interaction.
Operational	Beat configurations, patrol allocation, and deployment (for saturation, crackdown, surveillance, etc.) conform to participatory problem assessments as an addition to routine patrol; situational crime prevention occurs through measures that reduce opportunity for crime; identifying and assessing problems; designing and implementing effective solutions; constant monitoring and evaluation and community feedback activities; special units (for organized crime, anti-gang, juvenile narcotics, etc.) coordinate interventions.
Managerial	Mission, vision, and leadership principles are defined in CP terms; police as individual and collective change agents; horizontal, decentralized planning; ongoing evaluation and information gathering for operational feedback; proactive efforts to build community relations.

Under these principles, CP is not limited to a specific community relations unit or agent, but is an organization-wide approach that must be synchronized with other agencies in its orientation to community needs. In commenting on this report, USAID's senior police advisor, John Buchanan, stated this idea of an organization-wide approach most clearly:

> The perpetuation of the idea that CP is soft policing is detrimental and should be corrected at every opportunity. Community policing is not just prevention. It involves all facets of police work, including enforcement. Prevention encompasses many activities that can stand-alone or be part of a CP approach. However, prevention will be much less effective without attachment to intervention and enforcement. Lawful, focused enforcement is just one more tactic used by CP organizations and may be utilized effectively in response to high crime rates or to address locations that may have become ungoverned spaces. The response to focused enforcement will be much more supportive if the police have relationships with the neighborhood. In fact, the neighborhood will ask for heavier presence and provide information to support if the police build relationships and trust.

A. Operational and Managerial Aspects of Community Policing

Most crimes, anywhere in the world, are prevented or solved because of citizen information and cooperation. This fact emphasizes the importance of trust, alliances, and accountability in relations between the police and the community and advocates for a CP approach. Because CP can lead to better criminal information, it requires stronger back-office operations and enhanced criminal investigation to deliver results consistently, underlining the need for a holistic, comprehensive, organization-wide approach.

In operational terms, CP implies policing by well-supervised, qualified professional officers who — after a reliable recruiting process and specialized training in clearly defined methods and procedures — obtain long-term neighborhood assignments that enable them to obtain respect, information, and cooperation from individuals and organized citizens as they assess and solve problems. These partnerships help prevent and reduce crime and violence and improve citizen security.[i]

Even in police departments throughout the United States, CP-oriented reform is challenging, complex, and not always successful. For example, without clear understanding by police, community members, and local government of their corresponding responsibilities, supported by efficient coordination of partnerships, CP risks focusing more on problem identification than problem-solving. When that happens, it can lead to unrealistic expectations that the police alone can solve any problem, even non-police issues such as litter and potholes.

Introducing CP in Central American countries poses additional challenges. In the United States, local authorities have autonomous control over their police departments. As a result, U.S.-based reform toward CP — including budget commitments and the introduction of new forms of selection and training — is an exclusively local process. In Central America, policing is a centralized, national-level institution. Local authorities have very little control or voice in policing, and police middle managers do not have the autonomy to engage in new approaches. In this context, reform depends on national-level decisions, because there is little or no local authority to improve many aspects of policing (such as leadership and supervision, training and selection, community engagement and partnerships, patrolling practices, use of information, and citizen-perception surveys).

B. Philosophical and Strategic Aspects

Deeply entrenched problems with organizational culture, leadership, and administration systems represent even larger obstacles to any effective police strategy. Reforming Central America's dysfunctional police institutions and reorienting them toward CP will require strong political will and commitment to organizational transformation from the highest level of government. To achieve long-term sustainability, reform must include two elements: a dramatic shift away from a reactive, law enforcement-only philosophy and practice; and a significant reduction in widespread corruption, poor management, and inadequate leadership. Such change will also require country-specific approaches, as organized crime, gangs and violence take on specific forms and offer specific challenges.

Representatives of Mexican drug-trafficking organizations and other criminal organizations have been making inroads in Central America's domestic crime markets, further eroding trust in the government's capacity to guarantee rule of law and reduce impunity and corruption. These organizations are significantly changing the configuration of crime and delinquency in El Salvador and Guatemala, fueling organized crime, enlisting gangs, and stimulating extortion practices and mafia-like penetration of public and private institutions. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates the cost of crime and violence to be seven percent of Guatemala's gross domestic product.[ii]

There is strong evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and the United States that the penetration of drug trafficking-related organized crime transforms local gangs from loosely organized, neighborhood-based delinquent groups into vertically steered, well-armed, and radically more violent organizations, creating new policing challenges.

Locally, gangs in their different forms are clearly understood as the main threat and principal perpetrator of homicides and other crime.[iii] There are an estimated 10,500 gang members in El Salvador and 14,000 in Guatemala,[iv] and the United States has deported more than 18,000 people with criminal records to both countries in the past couple of years. Analyses of how these factors relate to homicide and other crimes vary significantly in different parts of each country, but all agree the situation represents huge new challenges for policing.

High-crime environments pose specific challenges to CP:

- Citizens confronted daily with high rates of serious and violent crime want immediate solutions. They may lose patience in CP if they see it only as addressing root causes (such as risk factors) rather than solving specific crimes (such as assault).

- In communities penetrated by drug-trafficking organizations, violent gangs, or other organized crime, the risk of retaliation against citizens who collaborate with the police increases. Gang informants may infiltrate participatory meetings and retaliate against "snitches." Citizens may prefer more secretive mechanisms, such as anonymous tip lines efficiently followed up by law enforcement, and professional witness protection.

- Ensuring CP's internal and external legitimacy requires improved institutional performance in responding to community expectations about reducing serious and violent crime. These expectations may increase when the community is informed about reforms; if CP does not deliver (for example, because back-office operations and criminal investigation functions are not also enhanced), the approach will backfire. Citizens and local governments may also believe that introducing CP means increasing the number of police officers. In reality, CP may reorient services without increasing the police force, as it replaces a traditional or poorly conceived and executed deployment scheme. Information campaigns to inform citizens on reform aspects are critical.

Given the circumstances, programs have repeatedly pursued less ambitious reforms:

Community-oriented policing assigns a level of priority to accountability and citizen orientation that is similar to CP — including mainstreaming nondiscriminatory practices, operating victim support services, preventive approaches, and participatory problem-solving. However, community-oriented policing is less involved in street patrolling, in part because there may not be enough agents and transportation to cover the extensive municipal jurisdictions, even when deployment and supervision would be significantly improved. Community-oriented policing also:

- Concentrates significant attention on reforming back-office functions to guarantee that all three pillars of crime reduction (prevention, intervention, and enforcement) are operational

- Promotes institutionalized coordination with the highest level of local government

- Commits to working with all stakeholders to jointly support problem resolution

In addition to community-based information gathering, community-oriented policing can make strategic use of technical, operational, and conceptual tools, such as crime observatories, for diagnosing and solving problems.

Community-based prevention implies a territorially based commitment to preventing crime and violence by individual and organized neighbors or neighborhood organizations. It operates by raising awareness, mitigating and preventing crime, lobbying for institutional support, and engaging in alliances, including with the police, to jointly support problem resolution. Community-based prevention is led by neighbors and neighborhood associations — or by organizations that foster partnerships, including with local government and the police — who define and undertake common prevention activities, diminish risk factors, and increase protection. It may include community-based practices in the form of neighborhood watch organizations, such as the *juntas locales de seguridad* in El Salvador. When such groups adopt vigilante-style approaches, however, their actions no longer qualify as community-based prevention; they have become private security or paramilitary groups. Given the risks, support for neighborhood watch forms of community-based prevention warrants strong oversight, ideally by the police.

This report's central question is an exploration of how — given the challenges in Central America and CARSI's priorities — USAID and other U.S. government agencies can best support CP piloting, sequencing, scale-up, and rollout, including support for initially less ambitious approaches, such as community-oriented policing and community-based prevention.

SECTION II. GUATEMALA

A. Context

Police reform is the game changer for CP and crime and violence prevention in Guatemala. The *Policía Nacional Civil de Guatemala* (PNC) needs reform to overcome serious problems of corruption, efficiency, malfunctions, human rights violations, and lack of accountability. The formal appointment of Helen Mack as Commissioner of the Police Reform Commission in 2011 — and attribution by the Government of Guatemala of about $7.5 million for the Commission's work until 2014 — represents a crucial step toward CP. As Ms. Mack emphasizes, "Prevention and community-oriented policing have to become inherent in every member of the institution, transversal in the Police Academy, and integral to our general policing philosophy."[v]

Currently, the PNC has a Community Relations Division, but it does not seem to be very active. The national government agencies have initiated some community-oriented prevention initiatives. The Vice Ministry of Communitarian Support (under the Ministry of Government) is Guatemala's principle government locus for structuring relations with communities and local governments. USAID's Crime Prevention Program (CPP) supports institutional strengthening and promotes the definition and evaluation of prevention programs such as Safe Schools (*Escuelas Seguras*) and Open Schools (*Escuelas Abiertas*), implemented through the Vice Ministry's Division for Violence Prevention. Annex C describes these programs in more detail.

Though there is a window of opportunity for CP, there is significant uncertainty about the outcome of police reform. A clear reform agenda has yet to be established, Guatemalan congressional support for reform is not self-evident, and there are ad-hoc proposals for partial reforms (such as creating a National Guard) independent of the Police Reform Commission's work. In addition, other challenges remain, warranting careful planning of future projects, but also presenting opportunities to redefine the field.

- Guatemalan citizens and community organizations have strong reservations about cooperating with a police corps that is hampered by inefficiency and corruption.

- Many mayors have expressed interest in working on citizen security but are unable to deal with the malfunctioning police apparatus or overcome citizen mistrust in police.

- No national-level interagency commission exists to plan and coordinate municipal crime-prevention efforts and enhance coordination.

- Support for more citizen-oriented and accountable policing has been part of bilateral and multilateral donor efforts since the 1996 peace agreements. However, many donors have discontinued support or intend to do so, given weak results, which are mainly due to lack of political will from the Guatemalan government and insufficient

PNC commitment to organizational transformation that would alter the entrenched internal and external interests in maintaining the status quo.

- Weak donor coordination is another obstacle, resulting in limited communication between projects (including pilots).

B. The INL/NAS Model Precinct (MP) Approach to Community-Oriented Policing

The INL/Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) model precinct approach aims to reduce crime and improve citizen relations in selected locations through a complete overhaul of the local police station to guarantee acceptable levels of police efficiency and improved citizen perception of and trust in policing.

With support from the NAS, the first MP was launched in 2004[vi] in Villa Nueva — a large, poor, and populous suburb of Guatemala City. The success of the MP methodology in Villa Nueva led in 2009 to replication in Mixco, the other main suburb of Guatemala City. New MPs are being planned for three towns in the department of Alta Verapaz: Coban, Tactic, and Tamahu. The success of this first MP also inspired INL-supported replication in Lourdes, El Salvador, and Colon, Honduras (a suburb of San Pedro Sula). Of these initial MPs, only the Villa Nueva MP has completed the full five-year project cycle; it thus provides lessons learned for future MPs.

The following are the main characteristics of the MP approach:

- *Implementation starts with a three-pronged participatory assessment* — of citizen perceptions of local police, of the criminal investigation and justice administration performance, and of how police officers assessed the results and what they thought could be done to improve perceptions and performance.

- *The MP reflects a "clear, hold, build, and sustain" strategy* that, in essence, dismantles the existing structure of a precinct (or sub-precinct) and rebuilds it with new or improved parts, reforming police operations and back-office functions. For details, see Annex A.

- *The MP centers on objective selection of participants, invests most of its resources in training personnel, and uses a policy in which residents help define security and policing priorities.*[vii] Specifically, the MP process includes:

  — Full initial vetting and continuous, random vetting of all rank-and-file officers, and a minimum of 400 hours of specialized training for all personnel.[viii]
  — Modernization of infrastructure, communications, mobility, security cameras, and other equipment, giving the model its resource-heavy character.
  — Creation of a victim-support office, with particular attention to women.
  — Community-oriented patrols that use saturation and other effective deployment practices.
  — Creation of an internal control office inside the precinct.

- *The vetting results and internal opposition underlie the challenges ahead.* More than 90 percent of veteran police officers applying for work in the MPs fail the polygraph test and/or other parts of the vetting procedure. Of new police agents (recent graduates of the academy), about 50 percent pass. Once trained and employed in an MP, however, a significant majority passes the semiannual vetting procedures, although agents who work at MPs (in criminal research or on patrols) find themselves the object of constant informal institutional resistance, including threats from other units or former police officers. Currently, the main incentives for police officers to apply and continue working for MPs are the training and other support they receive from INL, their love of the work, the community support they receive, and the team's celebration of small victories and results.

- *Some Villa Nueva MP components have been scaled up or split off to become PNC headquarters operations.* These national program components now support not only the Villa Nueva MP, but also Mixco and the three new MPs foreseen in Alta Verapaz. These components include:

  — A national tip-line on police corruption.

  — *Juzgados de turno* (24-hour courts), which bring together police, prosecutors, and judges to more efficiently process arrests.

  — A national criminal information analysis center (CRADIC) with five specialized units — gangs, organized crime, life-threatening crime, drugs, and special crime[ix] — now the most advanced in Central America and widely used by prosecutors and judges.

  — A national anti-gang unit (PANDA), begun in Villa Nueva, which has become a headquarters-based investigative unit that developed a strong relationship with anti-gang prosecutors. The unit now includes some 100 vetted police agents who use wiretapping and other high-tech tools to handle an increasingly national caseload (about 60 cases per week) and pursue multi-month criminal investigations that have dismantled crime rings through arrests and sentencing.

The MP approach follows a community-oriented policing model. Although it does not involve organization-wide police reform towards CP, its bottom-up approach is a comprehensive and ambitious form of community-oriented policing with a strong focus on making the community the center of policing. It incorporates lessons from a variety of places, in particular from San Diego, California. NAS Guatemala considers San Diego's model a "more refined and effective form" of community policing than the original model from Berkeley, California.[x] The San Diego approach overcame two problems associated with traditional community policing that make the original model, according to NAS, "a non-starter" for the Guatemalan context — it put policing in the community's hands and worked with communities already penetrated by criminal organizations.[xi] The MP philosophy emphasizes prevention, information collection and processing, and community relationships.[xii]

Community integration is an integral part of the MP implementation strategy. For details, see Annex A. Concrete activities include:

- A community relations office directed by the precinct commander.
- Training on solution-oriented patrolling.
- Reconfiguration of beat boundaries and patrol deployment to conform to problem assessments.
- Long-term assignments for neighborhood patrol officers to establish relations and assess problems with *consejos comunales de desarollo* (community development councils, or COCODES), *juntas locales de seguridad* (citizen security patrols), parents' associations, neighborhood associations, and other community-based groups.
- Agents assessing and solving problems by meeting on a regular basis with the n three thematic groups (school-related issues, residential issues, and commerce/other private-sector issues).

Problem-solving measures taken by the MP in consultation with these neighborhood groups, schools and businesses in Villa Nueva include:

- Implementation (2005) of the anonymous tip-line "Tell it to Waldemar" ("*Cuéntaselo a Waldemar*").
- Given the tip-line's success, creation (2006) of CRADIC Villa Nueva to further analyze tips.
- Anti-gang patrols and an anti-gang criminal investigation information unit (PANDA).
- Twenty-three agents are involved in patrolling 120 schools (of 700) and maintaining contact with school directors, teachers, parents, and other members of the school community. This stopped the prior practice by gang members of charging 1 Quetzal (about US $0.13) a day for each child to enter the school.
- The Police Athletic League works with 250 students in four schools in the municipality.[xiii]
- Specially trained police officers provide DARE and GREAT programs in eight elementary and secondary schools.

The newer MPs are territorially more comprehensive than Villa Nueva's pilot.

- In the town of Mixco, the MP sits in the main police station and covers the whole town — the Villa Nueva MP covered only one of its four sub-stations.[xiv] This structure implies that all MP services in Mixco, including vetting, are implemented throughout the town, not just in a single substation. Because 90 percent of Mixco's police officers were replaced by new officers (for either failing the polygraph or refusing to take it as part of the MP implementation path), the whole town now has a highly qualified and specially trained new police corps.

- Given the success in Villa Nueva and Mixco, President Colom and the governor have requested support for a department-wide MP approach in Alta Verapaz that will eventually cover all 17 municipalities and corresponding police stations. Though commitments by the GOG and the governor's office will define the speed of the

rollout, in its first stage the MP will cover: the central departmental Police Commissariat, which is also the main police precinct for the town of Coban; the precincts in the towns of Tactic and Tamahu, where USAID is already working on community-based crime prevention; and Playa Grande, given its intense problems with crime and smuggling. Some MP services, such as the criminal investigation unit, will again provide wider territorial services as well.

C. USAID's Crime Prevention Program: A Community-Based Prevention Approach

Since March 2010, USAID/Guatemala has been implementing, a five-year, $26 million Crime Prevention Program (CPP), under CARSI objectives. CPP will intervene in 40 neighborhoods in 10 municipalities. USAID and the Government of Guatemala selected locations based on highest violent crime numbers (not rates). By February 2011 (Year 1), 25 communities in 10 municipalities were operational.[xv]

As a secondary prevention program, the CPP has three goals:

- Opportunities for youth[xvi]
- Community participation
- Institution strengthening

Under its first goal, and with its gang membership preventive character, CPP offers potentially life-changing opportunities for at-risk youth, while working with their families, communities, and the municipality as part of its second goal. Participants include former gang members — the program does not include active gang members, who would require a different approach. The CPP does support a tattoo removal program in Guatemala City.

The CPP's third goal, institution strengthening, includes the activity of "promoting community-based policing" (see Annex B). Its wording ("community based policing") confuses, because it implies a focus on neighborhood watches or citizen patrols, but CPP operations do not include such initiatives; rather, they work with communities on formulation and community-led implementation of neighborhood crime-prevention plans. In this context, the CPP can provide some support to the PNC for its community-oriented initiatives. Such activities should be qualified as "community-based prevention" activities. To prevent misunderstandings, especially among citizens, the term "policing" should be reserved by USAID for activities led by the police.

At neighborhood level (in each of the 40 selected neighborhoods), CPP operations are promoted through a neighborhood outreach center[xvii] or through a human and technological development center.

- *Neighborhood outreach centers*, implemented by the Youth Alliance Association, offer structured preschool and afterschool academic and recreational activities for youth (ages 6 to 19), focusing on at-risk children.

- *Human and technological development centers* — implemented by *Grupo Ceiba*, an established faith-based organization — use an approach that is vocational and job placement-oriented. Currently, youth are mainly referred by churches, friends, and families, but not through the police, which has not been involved with the centers.

These centers operate as seed organizations for prevention-oriented community organizations, assisting providing technical assistance to the Consejos Comunales de Desarollo (COCODES) and *comités comunitarios de prevención* (or *grupos interinstitucionales de prevención).* The committees formulate community prevention plans (*planes comunitarios de prevención*), which include a strong focus on generating socioeconomic opportunities for at-risk youth (including training, education, job insertion) as well as situational security considerations*,* prevention campaigns, and other prevention initiatives tailored to each community's needs.[xviii] PNC personnel participation on the prevention committees has been inconsistent and has included only low-level officials and reflected a general lack of understanding of community participation practices.

At the municipal level (in each of the 10 selected towns), the CPP supports platforms to stimulate replication and sustainability of community-level initiatives:

- The program supports participatory operations of the Municipal Prevention Council (*Consejo Municipal de Prevención*), harmonizes its effort with crime-prevention aspects of municipal (economic) development plans, where these exist, or helps formulate socioeconomic opportunity agendas for youth.

- The programs reach out to municipal-level foundations, NGOs, and private-sector organizations interested in supporting components of the CPP.

- The 10 local governments provide some support to specific CPP activities,[xix] and the city councils are represented on the interagency prevention councils.

At the national level, the CPP implements activities in support of municipal and neighborhood-level work, to enhance sustainability:

- *Institution strengthening of the Division for Violence Prevention* at the Vice Ministry of Communitarian Support in the Ministry of Government, including awareness-raising communication strategies and campaigns. The Division for Violence Prevention promotes or contributes to programs such as Safe Schools (see Section D); it is the GOG's locus for structuring violence prevention programs at the local level, although not always in close coordination with local governments.[xx]

- *Institution strengthening of the Youth Alliance Association and Grupo Ceiba*, which guarantees a countrywide support network that permits economy of scale and improved sustainability (compared to youth or development centers, which are supported on a case-by-case basis). Working through two of these platforms ensures knowledge-sharing and further reduces risks to sustainability.

- *Institution strengthening of the Technological Service Park in Guatemala City*, the largest human and technological development center and the headquarters for *Grupo Ceiba*. The center's downtown location offers a large building and a step-by-step labor market reintegration program (including education, training, in-service training, and job placement) to help students achieve life plans. After negative experiences with more traditional vocational training (such as car repair and construction) in the early 2000s, the center now focuses on jobs in call centers, computer service and repair, graphic design, and web design. Youth can be referred to this central location, which also steers the 17 smaller human and technological development centers.

D. Other Government-Led Crime and Violence Prevention Initiatives

The Government of Guatemala promotes some prevention programs with a clear community-oriented approach, in particular Safe Schools (*Escuelas Seguras*), Open Schools (*Escuelas Abiertas*), and Safe Neighborhoods (*Barrios Seguros*). Annex C provides details on these programs. Although the MPs have developed synergy with some of these programs, the CPP has not done so.

One school director expressed satisfaction with the Safe Schools and Police Athletic League programs, but was critical of the Open Schools program for two reasons:

- Non-students had introduced vandalism, aggression, and other problems.
- Computers and other equipment provided by the Open Schools program cannot be accessed during regular school hours.

The Open Schools program can possibly be strengthened through further partnerships with the MP's School Saturation component, and by engaging with CPP when coinciding territorially.

E. Key Elements of Success and Innovation

Bottom-up approach. With the Police Reform Commission only in its preliminary phase, the PNC lacking a CP philosophy and confronted by major organizational problems, and few local governments seriously committed to crime prevention, the U.S. government's bottom-up approach to community-oriented policing (through the MPs) and community-based prevention (through the CPP) offers a sound crime- and violence-prevention approach for this challenging environment.

The comprehensive, multidimensional character of the MP approach enables it, within the limits to sustainability already indicated, to overcome the challenges posed by a malfunctioning police organization and address community needs related to crime and violence. Aspects that strongly contribute to this success are:

- Constant vetting and training of all police officers
- Credibility and leverage of the U.S. Embassy
- Contextualized implementation and sequencing

Partnership orientation. Both the NAS and USAID approaches create environments in which proactive local stakeholders (such as local governments, community organizations, and private-sector organizations), when available, can collaborate around a unified goal of crime prevention. The citizen participation and trust generated through these partnerships neutralize, to a certain extent, the negative impact of the malfunctioning police apparatus and the resulting community mistrust, both of which hinder long-term sustainability and replication. (For more on sustainability, see Section G.)

Local government support. In Villa Nueva, the mayor was initially very supportive (becoming less so over time), and civil society contributed by lobbying for stronger, higher-quality services from the prosecutor's office, the coroner's office, and other agencies. In Mixco, the MP moved in at the insistence of the mayor, who had made crime prevention his priority when he was first elected in 2004. One of the mayor's initiatives has been to create 180 *juntas locales de seguridad* (a type of neighborhood watch organization permitted under a 1998 PNC provision) and provide communication equipment, with private-sector support. Nevertheless, and despite the continuous efforts of NAS/INL, the Mixco MP has encountered institutional roadblocks and suffered delays in rollout due to lack of commitment and counterproductive actions by the PNC.

Learning by doing. The newer MPs — in particular, the department-wide approach foreseen for Alta Verapaz — have learned from the Villa Nueva MP and will be more sustainable.

Experienced implementers. The CPP is well-positioned to support prevention-oriented community organization, because it works with experienced, established implementers that are able to build trust and long-term relationships by adapting the model to specific community and local government contexts. The youth and human development centers, given their neighborhood presence and community service-oriented approach, are not tied exclusively to youth. Generally speaking, individually operated youth centers are among the most difficult prevention programs to sustain, given the need for highly skilled social workers, risks of gang infiltration, high turnover of juveniles, high rates of drop out, and other factors. As experience in other countries demonstrates, however, these factors become less of a threat when centers work as a network, as under the CPP. The CPP, working through two support organizations with national presence (the Youth Alliance and *Grupo Ceiba*) and benefiting from their networks, economies of scale (including in fundraising), and lessons learned, supports sound conditions for sustainability and replication.

The NAS and USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance are increasingly coordinating their approaches, have already achieved some mutual buy-in, and foresee stronger on-the-ground coordination for upcoming interventions in Coban, Tactic, and Tamahu. In addition, the fact that USAID has contracted the CPP with a single implementer for all its components improves and facilitates coordination.

Combined, these elements of the U.S. government approach have three main effects: helping reduce crime and violence in hotspots; generating inspiring examples for

replication to other communities and municipalities; and providing national institutions with concrete ideas for reform based on these practices. The critical point of crime and violence reduction, however, needs further analysis, because data are not yet available for the CPP and — somewhat surprisingly — are not yet precise enough for more robust conclusions in the case of the MPs, even in Villa Nueva. (Annex D provides further details on this point.)

F. Key Elements for Improvement

In Guatemala, CP means different things to different people. This situation inspires confusion and hinders the U.S. government's ability to engage in integrated goal-setting and planning across agencies. Though CP is on the Police Reform Committee's agenda, the Committee has yet to clearly define what it understands as CP. Qualifying USAID or INL current approaches in Guatemala as CP is mistaken, considering the generally accepted definition outlined at the beginning of this report. Defining certain aspects of the CPP as "community-based policing" is also confusing. The current MP approach is best defined as community-oriented policing, and the CPP approach is best defined as community-based prevention.

Misunderstandings about the MP approach. Some in the USAID community identify the MP approach with *mano duro* ("heavy hand"), rather than community-oriented policing. Thus, the approach risks being too isolated an effort, and opportunities for synergy with USAID's CPP approach are easily missed. To clarify the MP approach in terms of community-based policing, NAS should produce a booklet that presents the model's main characteristics, sequencing, prevention and law enforcement dimensions, and its potential for cooperation with CPP activities and current Government of Guatemala prevention programs (such as Safe Schools, Open Schools, and *juntas de seguridad local*).

Insufficient synergy between the MP approach and the CPP. Currently, synergy between the two approaches varies from location to location:

- No synergy: In Villa Nueva, the five CPP-supported outreach centers[xxi] and the CPP-supported vocational center[xxii] have had few synergies with the MP. The outreach center (Ciudad del Sol) closest to the MP, has had some communication, but no coordination or common objectives have been established. However, the CPP implementer recognizes the potential benefit, and would like NAS support for enhancing synergy with the PNC. Potential for constructive relations with other substations than the MP are limited, given low community trust in the police.

- Some synergy: In Mixco, the five outreach centers fall under the MP's jurisdiction, a situation that has already created some synergies. Many opportunities to improve integration and coordination exist, including around Open Schools programs.

- Strong potential for synergy: NAS and USAID recognize that real opportunities for cooperation exist in the department of Alta Verapaz, particularly in the municipalities of Tactic and Tamahu, where the CPP is already active and MPs are planned, in part

precisely because USAID is already there. Although Coban is not one of the 10 CPP municipalities, the CPP will help create a community outreach center and USAID will also support a Justice House. All three municipalities offer opportunities to work toward a better-coordinated NAS/USAID and MP/CPP approach. (Section G provides more detail on enhancing sustainability.)

Complex challenges to integrating police with the CPP's community-based prevention work, except in locations where an MP is present. Currently, only the MP officers have been trained on CP, with INL support. Given the malfunctioning police organization and the pending results of the Reform Commission, it is not feasible to provide non-MP police officers with ad-hoc CP training — let alone a more ambitious approach, such as replicating USAID/El Salvador's "Leadership for Change" training. An alternative for USAID in locations without MPs may be to lobby the Vice Ministry of Governance to initiate the Safe Schools program, including its specially trained police officers and generate synergy with the CPP. More rigorous evaluation is needed to assess if there is a comparative advantage for USAID to do CPP in jurisdictions without an MP.

Insufficient information to establish program impact on crime reduction. More precise data are needed to guarantee more systematic evaluations of the impact of specific programs on different types of crime in different parts of town. In addition, making such data available to citizens and other stakeholders on a regular basis would help increase understanding and knowledge of the impact of these programs. Generating more precise data from primary sources, which could be accomplished more effectively with a municipal crime observatory, would contribute to more precise impact measurement.

Implementing municipal-level crime observatories. The MP approach uses police data, and USAID primarily uses perception surveys, but neither approach eliminates the need for a municipal crime observatory operated by local government or a civil organization (public or private). USAID anticipates creating municipal crime observatories under the CPP in the 10 program municipalities, but they have yet to be established. Even if the PNC were more functional, and taking responsibility for generating trustworthy crime numbers on their side, the municipal crime observatories are still a priority, because they collect and consolidate data from various primary sources, including the police, but also the coroner's office, and health sector based institutions. They can be implemented relatively easily and at low cost, while know-how and implementation protocols are widely available. Sustainability can be increased by obtaining the buy-in of a public health faculty at a local university, which can provide technical assistance and networking for the observatories. Once operational at the local level, such an academic partnership can also help link information with national-level observatories — and eventually regionally, linking with the SICA Regional Crime Observatory.

G. Sustainability Issues

Police corruption and inefficiency continue to be rampant. Perceptions of low competency, high corruption, and lack of fairness generates very low police legitimacy, hinders the long-term sustainability of community-oriented policing under the MP approach, and limits the impact of community-based prevention. Most police officers

lack basic skills for communicating effectively with community members. Of some 26,000 current police officers, only 400 have been vetted and trained under the MP approach. Another 600 officers (also vetted) have received other forms of U.S. government-supported training. Thus, only 4 percent of the PNC have received such support.

Police reform would dramatically increase the efficiency and impact of the MP approach and USAID's community-based prevention approaches. Support for police reform is the most obvious means of moving toward CP. Reform towards CP will require strong, coordinated international support for

> "If the powerful within the agency resist reform, our efforts towards CP will not be sustained. Those who oppose reform can wait until we leave and they know it."
>
> — *John Buchanan, USAID's senior police advisor, commenting on this report*

the Police Reform Commission, as well as efforts to create awareness among its members about lessons learned, including from the MP and CPP programs. It is unlikely that a new president (2011) would eliminate the Police Reform Commission or replace Helen Mack, although political will and support for CP might dwindle. NAS is already supporting the commission in developing a proposal for a new Police Academy curriculum, and USAID's CPP would like the commission to incorporate training on community-based prevention dynamics. Supporting the Commission's work — and its chair — should be a U.S. government priority for diplomacy, defense, and development, regardless of the election's outcome. Better-coordinated support from the international donor community's Coordinating Committee on Crime Prevention and Security would also be important.

Increased sustainability and efficiency will occur when NAS and USAID work in a complementary and coordinated manner, as foreseen in Coban, San Marcos, Tactic, and Tamahu — and eventually in all of Alta Vera Paz. These locations offer an opportunity to incorporate the different initiatives from the start, including national government programs such as Safe Schools, Open Schools, and Safe Neighborhoods, within an integrated prevention, intervention, and enforcement framework. With strong coordination, U.S. government agencies will achieve greater leverage and impact in crime prevention, crime control, and police reform. Better coordination is also warranted on issues as municipal crime observatories, monitoring and evaluation (including crime data and perception studies), and in building a shared intervention model that can be replicated in other places, and eventually throughout the country.

A more rapid replication of the MP approach is unlikely without true police reform; buy-in from the Government of Guatemala has only partially materialized. NAS would be able to support more MPs with the same amount of resources, were it not for inefficiencies in Guatemalan government support, as reflected in vetting issues, structural issues such as the high turnover of ministers and PNC directors, and lack of compliance with different kinds of support for the MPs.

Without significant police reform, the MP approach will require permanent NAS support and guidance. This is true even in the more sustainable environments of Mixco and Alta Verapaz. Because INL is obliged, under these circumstances, to continue supporting the

Villa Nueva MP, and now that CPP will be there for the next four years, it may want to push again for rollout to the whole town — as originally foreseen.

Sustainability of community-based prevention initiatives, such as community committees and plans, is challenging, especially without stronger local government and PNC commitment. A critical need is the systematic involvement of the highest ranking officers from the corresponding police precinct in neighborhood meetings. Such involvement is currently far more easily obtained and effective where CPP operates in a MP jurisdiction.

The 2011 national and local elections represent some risk to sustainability. Upcoming municipal elections are generating some uncertainty as related to the impact on crime and violence prevention programs in those municipalities where local government support has materialized and proven to be critical. However, a significant number of the incumbent candidates, including those in Mixco, Villa Nueva, and Guatemala City, are likely to be reelected.

A program styled on Colombia's "Departamentos y Municipios Seguros" initiative may contribute to scale-up, sustainability, and self-replication. With support from USAID, Colombia's Ministry of the Interior and National Police created this program in 2004 to enhance coordination among local governments and police. Under a contextualized Guatemalan version of the program, activities could include:

- Department-level, semiannual, joint training events for mayors and police chiefs.

- A clearinghouse to provide local governments, NGOs, the PNC, and other practitioners with information and lessons learned from in-country municipal crime prevention.

- A quarterly magazine, containing clearinghouse information, freely distributed to all police commanders, mayors, city council members, and civil society organizations.

Such activities could gain buy-in from USAID's local governance and transparency programs. They could also involve organizations of mayors and governors, such as ANAM and Femica, which have expressed interest in supporting municipal security policies, although these groups have lately lost organizational strength and focus.

SECTION III. EL SALVADOR

A. Context

In El Salvador, the U.S. government supported a CP approach through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) from 1992 to 2004. Though the PNC subsequently abandoned much of the CP work, the main principles of ICITAP's approach have survived in the current work of the PNC, USAID, and INL.

In terms of quality, education, and professionalism, El Salvador has one of the better police forces in the region and police number 2.7 per 10,000 inhabitants, the highest in the region.[xxiii] Rather than a need for more officers, El Salvador's challenge is better managing and deploying its current police force.

In early 2010, the PNC adopted the Strategic Institutional Plan 2009-2014,[xxiv] which includes CP as a central element. The strategic plan underlines the "active participation of society" and collaboration between local governments and public and private institutions.[xxv] The plan is the result of wide consultation and a participatory planning process, including USAID technical assistance.[xxvi]

The PNC's strategic plan lists specific activities and indicators of success for CP, including police-led activation of and participation in *consejos municipales de prevención social de la violencia y del delito* in neighborhoods, *colonias*, *cantons* (wards), *comunidades*, and others.[xxvii]

With its CP philosophy (Exhibit 3), the PNC now promotes the idea that citizen security policies are, to a large degree, local and should be led in partnership. This philosophy goes beyond what it had been doing through its prevention departments, community police intervention patrols (PIP-COM),[xxviii] and Family and Youth Services Division.

Exhibit 3. Influences on El Salvador's Community Policing Philosophy

Proximity of Police	Problem-Solving Orientation	Koban Model (Japan/Brazil)
Community well-being	"Scan, Analyze, Respond, and Assess (SARE)" methodology	Police rationality
Improving quality of life	Community participation	Police as community organizer
Community contributions to police planning		
Accountability to citizens		

Source: PNC, *Manual de Formación de Policía Comunitaria de El Salvador*, 2010, San Salvador, p. 27.

In line with its strategic plan, the PNC insists that it will roll out CP to the whole country (22 police delegations and 5 regions) over the next four years.[xxix] The National Academy has published the thorough *Handbook on Community Policing*[xxx] (with support from the Japan International Cooperation Agency), the Institutional Doctrine of Community Policing,[xxxi] and the Implementation Plan for Community Policing.[xxxii] Exhibit 4 lists the cycle of CP implementation, on which officers are trained.

Exhibit 4. Methodological Sequence of Community Policing: El Salvador

1. Local participatory diagnostic of incidence of crime, risk factors, protection factors, context.
2. Combine results diagnostic with criminal intelligence. Elaborate plans for specific territories.
3. Implement operational plans aimed at preventive and dissuasive work.
4. Based on feedback, adjust with daily operational information. Supervision and internal control.
5. Accountability to community. External control.
6. Back to Step 1.

Source: PNC *Manual de Formación de Policía Comunitaria de El Salvador*, 2010, p. 27

The PNC has also scheduled a complete CP training program for 19,000 police officers and 5,000 administrative personnel,[xxxiii] to be implemented between 2010 and 2014 by the National Academy for Public Security, which is independent of the police but operates as its academy. The training program will start with a training-of-trainers phase to create a group of *instructores policiales comunitarios* who will implement the training program countrywide, precinct to precinct. Though the National Academy will implement the program, experienced police officers will be the primary instructors for the train-the-trainer classes. Some mayors will be invited to present their experiences.

Internally, the PNC does not seem to have given full support to its Community Policing Division. First, not all PNC leadership is on the same page regarding CP — partly because most of its higher-level staff have not yet been trained on the topic — and internal resistance to institutional change is strong. Second, the PNC states that it wants to steer clear of "pilots," but has yet to present a clear plan for rolling out CP, which is a complicated process that will require commitment at all levels.[xxxiv] In this context, although training is necessary, additional elements (such as supervision, standards, and policy) are required if reform is to have an impact at the line agency level and in terms of changed behaviors and attitudes.

The only towns in which police delegations and precincts are already implementing CP are those with international donor support from USAID and/or the UNDP — Izalco was the first in April 2010. Without international technical assistance, it is unlikely that the PNC will be able to complete the full CP rollout until 2014 in a sustainable way.

The Government of El Salvador, through the Presidential Office for Territorial Affairs, has developed a national strategy for the social prevention of violence in municipalities. The strategy gives central importance to creation of "municipal councils for the prevention of violence." At the department-level, governors, who are appointed by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, are asked to convene mayors in similar councils to coordinate supra-municipal policies.

The National Council for Public Security's formal role is to be an advisory committee, particular for the Ministry for Public Security and Justice, but it has taken on an operational role by carrying out prevention and rehabilitation projects sponsored by the European Union and other donors. Since 2008, the council has had USAID support to work on a national prevention plan. In 2010, the government created a presidential-level strategic affairs secretariat for municipal prevention work.

B. USAID's Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project

USAID/El Salvador began implementing the Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project in 2008. Program municipalities were chosen from the 25 most violent, using PNC data on absolute homicide numbers (not homicide rates). To enhance measurement of project effectiveness by use of a random-assignment intervention methodology, U.S. government implementers were all assigned to different municipalities. This approach has led to a geographic diffusion of program interventions and has created few opportunities for synergy. The exception is Nahuizalco, where USAID has started using the opposite approach, bringing most programs into the town.

Six of USAID's program components have a direct relationship with CP.

B1. PNC's "Leadership and Change Management" Training Program

This two-week, full-time training program for mid-level PNC officials, given at the private university, *Escuela Superior de Economía y Negocios* (ESEN), focuses on mid-level PNC officials. The program aims to: increase their awareness of responsibility and civic ethics; promote changes in attitude; and provide instruction on team issues, individual work-planning strategies, personnel and organizational leadership, principled leadership, and the importance of being an agent of change.

Since 2009, 210 officers have been trained through 8 courses (1 per quarter). The USAID implementer selects participating officers, in coordination with the PNC.

One objective of this project is to staff critical areas of the organization with up-and-coming leaders who have sufficient skills and project support to initiate and follow through on needed change. The use of work and project plans can begin to familiarize the agency with the value of following change management tactics in individual command positions. Graduates described a feeling of empowerment that allowed them to implement change at the station level without new personnel or resources. In addition to assigning graduates to critical posts, this approach fosters sustainability by providing future leaders with leadership skills — providing a "missing link" for successful police reform.

The Academic Council of the Police Academy, which operates independently of the PNC, initially approved the Leadership and Change Management course but has yet to formalize its decision. The PNC director general recognizes the importance of the course, however, and uses it increasingly as a means of selecting and assigning officers.

The PNC is adding two weeks of CP induction to the leadership course, including training on how to: conduct participatory assessments of delinquency, risk factors, and protection factors; introduce or improve beat boundaries; work with schools; carry out foot patrols; and organize solution-oriented community meetings on specific topics. A shorter (one-week) version of the same course is provided to police delegations that will begin rolling out CP to personnel, initially using PNC trainers. Each delegation will, in turn, replicate the training with personnel from its substations. This approach risks diluting the quality and impact of these courses, especially if rollout is not hands-on and not guided by experienced police officials.

B2. Support for Rollout of CP in 7 Municipalities

At the start of CP rollout, a baseline citizen-perception survey is carried out by Analitika, a Guatemalan firm, in each of the seven municipalities, and repeated every six months. In Nahuizalco, the only town where results of the second survey were available, perception of police improved from 4.7 to 6.3 (scale of 10). Similarly, our field observations in Sonsonate and Quezaltepeque, which each have about 100 officers trained in CP, seemed to show a radical change in work culture, organization of police work, increased job satisfaction and enthusiasm, and improved community relations. In these two localities, a significant number of leaders participated in the leadership course at ESEN, and all other officers received internal CP training during the one-week PNC course. One officer reported, "It is as if we have more police officers, because we get more work done."[xxxv]

In principle, the new police orientation applies to the whole jurisdiction. In practice, due to lack of personnel and mobility, it is difficult to reach outlying areas. Most police stations have just one working car for 30 police officers and one motorbike for 25 police officers. Foot patrols are limited to areas inside or close to the urban part of town.

B3. Community-Based Prevention in 12 Municipalities

This program orients its work with a "cross-cutting, gender equality and domestic violence prevention strategy" through a step-by-step, interagency capacity-building process that subscribes to a holistic, grassroots approach focused on at-risk populations (communities, leaders, and youth) and institutional strengthening.

The main program goals are "to improve citizen security" and to provide technical assistance at neighborhood, municipal and national levels "to better understand crime and violence patterns, plan and implement prevention activities, measure initiatives' impacts and replicate practices across municipalities." The program works in about five selected neighborhoods or *cantons* (wards) per municipality, providing: support for ward prevention committees and sometimes youth committees; participatory assessments and perception studies; and an open grants competition for community projects, including

public space renovation, school-based and community-based prevention programs, and technical assistance for local governments initiatives, including municipal crime observatories (operational in Santa Tecla) and hotspot mapping (for use by local governments, police, and forensic medicine).

At the municipal level, the program supports an inter-institutional working group, monthly convened by the mayor. Members are stakeholders committed to the town's development, including a representative of the National Council on Public Security. It also supports a subcommittee (*mesa*) on citizen security that meets more frequently — as do other subcommittees (health, emergency, recreation) — and guides implementation of its Participatory Strategic Citizen Security Plan, supported by a social grants fund. In Quezaltepeque, for example, strategic interventions established in the plan focus on children and adolescents, youth development organizations, family strengthening, community leadership, municipal regulatory frameworks, and crime prevention. Crime prevention interventions mainly address primary prevention issues (such as community meetings, community organization, recuperation of public space, and graffiti removal).

B4. Creation of Municipal Crime Observatories in 12 Municipalities

The municipal crime and violence prevention observatory in Santa Tecla — a multi-donor effort (USAID, UNDP and bilateral Spanish funding) - helps identify high-risk locations and track changes in crime pattern. It systematically receives information from the PNC, through forensics and wireless mobile and web-based real time crime mapping applications that police officers use under a partnership with Qualcomm 3G wireless technology. Santa Tecla's lessons learned are being shared with other municipalities, and will be taken into account to set up a similar observatory in the metropolitan area. Such observatories are critical in relation to the information-based needs of CP, and for comparable reasons as those already put forward for Guatemala.

B5. Creation of 18 Youth Outreach Centers in 3 Municipalities

The USAID Regional Youth Alliance Initiative supports 18 youth outreach centers in 3 municipalities in El Salvador. Comparable to the approach in Guatemala, these centers focus on skills training, structured preschool and afterschool support, and other activities for at-risk youth. They are also working with the surrounding communities to create 18 community-based prevention committees and to provide guidance and support for a municipal interagency prevention committee backed by a crime observatory.

B6. National Support Strategy for Municipal-Level Social Prevention

In the context of the National Prevention and Social Peace Plan (2007), the Government of El Salvador has defined a National Municipal Support Strategy for Social Prevention (2010)[xxxvi] that aims to have all local governments committed to prevention policies and programs. The strategy also establishes a central role for municipal violence-prevention councils, to be led by local governments, assisted by a trained, national-level team, known as "PRE-PAZ," from the Vice Ministry for Territorial Development, and in cooperation with the National Institute for Children and Adolescents.

PRE-PAZ, with about 170 staff members trained by USAID, will roll out the program to all 262 municipalities through municipal violence-prevention diagnostics, municipal violence-prevention plans, awareness creation, training and support for national municipal crime-prevention policies,[xxxvii] and a communication strategy.

C. The INL/NAS Model Precinct in Colon

In 2009, Colon (department of La Libertad) began implementing an MP, inspired by the Villa Nueva MP in Guatemala, with INL funding and with support from the regional gang coordinator at the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. The Colon police delegation has jurisdiction over Colon and five other municipalities (Ateos, Sacacoyo, Ciudad Arce, Tepecoyo, and Yayaque), with 632 police officers in 10 locations. The MP covers the town of Colon (215 police officers, 98,000 people), but some of its services apply to the police delegation's whole jurisdiction.

Implementation of the Colon MP follows the Villa Nueva methodology for vetting, equipment, training, an anonymous tip-line ("*Cuéntaselo a Chepe*," begun in 2011, which will be backed by private award system), criminal investigation, foot patrolling, school patrolling, and other community-oriented prevention work.[xxxviii] Through INL/NAS, some 20 vetted officials received CP training. INL's regional core training courses include "Basic Principles of Community Policing."[xxxix]

In Colon, the UNDP has also a two-year, $1 million crime-prevention program that includes funds for building a crime observatory and training 75 percent of PNC personnel in CP (already implemented). The Colon MP has been credited for a 9 percent reduction in homicides, from 316 in 2009 (El Salvador's most violent year to date) to 287 in 2010.

D. Key Elements of Success and Innovation

USAID/El Salvador has developed a holistic and comprehensive strategy for community-oriented and — in part — community-based crime and violence prevention. This strategy is very much in line with Government of El Salvador policies, including the PNC approach to CP and the national social prevention strategy.

Although USAID is working with a variety of implementers, work is distributed territorially so there is no evidence of duplication. A basic agreement among international donors, in particular with UNDP, has also led to territorial distribution that limits duplication. Meanwhile, there is a strong consensus among implementers about the road forward and a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities.

USAID is working with highly qualified implementers who are capably assessing local environments and community needs as they relate to program design and contextualized implementation. Implementers have promoted realistic expectations among USAID's beneficiaries about the scale, rollout, and potential impact of its programs.

Acknowledgement of the critical role of local governments. The USAID Regional Alliance Initiative's comprehensive approach is especially local government-focused.

The three mayors of the towns involved participated in a study tour to Guayaquil and Bogota, meeting with former Bogota mayor Antanas Mockus and others to learn about local government-steered prevention policies. In parallel, USAID is heavily involved in juvenile justice system reform through the same implementer.[xl]

Implementation of the MP approach in El Salvador is too recent to evaluate, but its methodology and short-term impact is comparable to Guatemala (see Section I, above).

The Leadership and Change Management training program receives high marks from mid-level police officers and, increasingly, from PNC leadership. By including delegated police officers on its team, USAID has created a program whereby project staff is embedded in the PNC, helping to drive the changes from within. With its increasing leadership for municipal-level prevention work, PNC ownership is critical. In addition to the quality of the training — generally perceived as excellent — USAID has been successful in guaranteeing that graduated officers are assigned to critical positions and retained in those positions for at least two years, focusing on assignments in precincts where the CP program has been rolled out.

E. Key Elements for Improvement

Continue to enhance coordination among USAID program components and implementers and guarantee INL participation in the USAID CP working group. INL and USAID should further support programs and implementers in enhancing relations with the PNC, now that the PNC is increasingly taking the lead on local prevention work. Implementers indicate their interest in better coordination. For example, the USAID Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project is not designed to support the PNC explicitly, but would like to involve the PNC more.[xli] Opportunities, however, are in part lacking due to the geographically dispersed set-up of the various interventions. For example, although the PNC participates on the municipal prevention councils, the outreach centers do not have a link to any CP program yet, in part because CP roll-out has occurred elsewhere.

Enhance geographic concentration and improve opportunities for synergy. By geographically dispersing programs for measurement purposes across different municipalities— except in Nahuizalco — the U.S. government approach runs counter to its stated objective of supporting a holistic and comprehensive crime- and violence-prevention approach. Such an approach is difficult to guarantee by operating different program components in different municipalities, without opportunities for synergy. U.S. government support cannot reach every municipality where there is a need. A more comprehensive approach would offer, in selected municipalities and depending on local needs, a tailored and well-coordinated selection from the menu of program components

Enhance local government buy-in for all approaches: PNC-oriented, community-oriented, and youth-oriented. The Government of El Salvador is redefining the role of local government through its Social Prevention Plan,[xlii] partly inspired by USAID's prevention approaches and activities.[xliii] Creating incentives for local government buy-in and using success stories to illustrate may help. For example, Santa Tecla is creating an enabling environment for successful prevention of crime and violence through strong

local government leadership, a newly positioned and trained police commissioner, assignment of 200 newly trained police officers, and community-based prevention initiatives. In addition, methodologies such as the study tour to Bogota and Guayaquil seem to have significantly enhanced interest and commitment.

Widen efforts to create awareness about CP rollout. Governors and mayors have yet to be systematically briefed on CP rollout. This can best be done through the *consejos departamentales de alcaldes*, and via *Comures*. A more ambitious way to create awareness would be to set up a program based on *Departamentos y Municipios Seguros,* similar to the one proposed above for Guatemala (see Section II, subsection G).

Enhance international donor coordination around CP. A first step toward better donor coordination might be to produce a document that clearly defines which agency will support what part of the 2011-2014 CP rollout. USAID, for example, is in a position to support rollout in possibly 8 of the 22 police delegations through July 2012. A more uniform U.S. government approach to CP among INL, USAID, and USAID implementers will also contribute to improved coordination among other donors, thus improving momentum for CP.

Make selection criteria for program municipalities less arbitrary. In addition to the main indicator currently used (last year's number of homicides) it would be useful to incorporate additional indicators, as the homicide rate, but also direction of both rates and numbers over the last five years. Human development and quality-of-life indicators could provide additional useful baseline information. Using homicide numbers (and even rates) as main impact indicator in a volatile environment is a tricky affair — attributing dramatic short-term reductions (1-3 years) in homicide to specific programs, such as the MPs or community-based prevention efforts, leaves us without answers or explanations when homicides rise again. A coherent combination of various geo-referenced crime indicators, results of citizen perception studies of policing and security, and human development and quality-of-life indicators, may provide better results.

Different situations warrant different sequencing of interventions. According to the PNC, as stated by a high-level official, the intensity of crime and violence in certain municipalities, such as Apopo, does not permit rollout of CP unless it is preceded by a strong law enforcement operation (including military intervention). The point is well taken, but the wording and sequencing proposed still seems to reflect the assumption that CP is "soft" policing and requires another approach than "real" police work. Beyond that, CP roll out must certainly be done in a context-specific manner. This has implications for the sequencing of a comprehensive U.S. government CP approach. For example, in extremely difficult contexts, as in Apopo, an MP might be a logical first step, followed by USAID supported community-based prevention activities within the MP's jurisdiction, and with strong interagency coordination from start to finish.

F. Sustainability Issues

The PNC knows where to go with CP, but not necessarily how to get there. To be sustainable, PNC-led rollout of CP will need external technical assistance for training,

implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Although everyone in the PNC does not yet agree and important political issues still stand in the way, the current window of opportunity should not be missed. Lessons learned from ICITAP, which provided 12 years of training-only support for CP, apparently without much sustainable impact, should be taken to heart.

The PNC's top echelon, a group of 62 commanders, has not participated in the leadership training program or the CP course. This gap explains some of the PNC's internal resistance. Although training second-tier officials is fundamental — they are the future's first tier — it is important to involve the current commanders. The PNC is in negotiations with a local university to create a certificate program for commanders, to include CP training. A special leadership course at ESEN could complement that program and include training on the USAID approach, the MP approach, and other relevant programs.

The PNC's strategic plan for 2009-2014 does not refer to the MP approach, in part because some misunderstand MP as "mano duro" (heavy hand) policing, and others do not grasp the relation with CP. A booklet that describes the MP methodology in a more systematic and accessible way than currently available may help overcome this obstacle.

INL will strengthen hands-on guidance of the MP approach by hiring experienced U.S. law enforcement practitioners to operate as MP coordinators starting 2011. The work of these coordinators should contribute to sustainability, particularly where the coordinator also works to promote synergy with other prevention programs, especially USAID's. The first coordinator will be assigned to the Colon MP in mid-2011.

Improving security in urban areas, where most interventions are concentrated, may cause gangs to move to outlying wards in the same municipality. This may negatively affect economic growth in those areas and increase rural-urban migration. Understaffing and insufficient cars and motorcycles at many precincts make it impossible to implement full community-based policing in every *canton*. In Huatalanca, one of the pilot communities, only 4 of the 15 wards have patrols working in CP style. Even there, a lack of personnel and other deployment issues make coverage non-continuous.

Successful CP implementation is seriously hindered by the lack of police mobility. A central challenge is improving maintenance of vehicles and motorbikes. Initiating a maintenance program (for example, outsourced to a private-sector organization external to the PNC) need not be costly, but would have a dramatic positive impact on the reform of patrol assignment and deployment practices, beginning in jurisdictions with MPs or other USAID-supported aspects of the CP rollout.

SECTION IV. KEY ELEMENTS FOR REPLICATION IN THE REGION

To increase impact and leverage strengths, USAID and other U.S. government agencies should enhance joint goal identification, planning, implementation, and evaluation of CP. This recommendation does not mean each agency should not be involved in what it does best, but it does require intensifying coordination to arrive at a common vision for CP and related police reform in each country.

The municipal level, with its responsibility for day-to-day service delivery, including policing, is the most effective entry point for crime prevention.[xliv] Local government buy-in and municipal-level interagency coordination will ensure community-based prevention approaches do not stand alone. Whenever possible, it is important to showcase the work of proactive mayors and create combined training events for mayors and police chiefs.

Maintain focus on institutional reform and national priorities. Only recently have Central American governments begun developing better institutions for confronting crime and violence, recognizing that citizen security is a national government affair, a fundamental right, and a critical public service.[xlv] Ministries of interior and national police forces are now struggling to establish strategic leadership, information-based planning, monitoring and evaluation capacity, interagency and territorial coordination capacity, professional budget management, and to redefine roles for local governments and other partnerships. Supporting capacity building is fundamental to advancing CP.[xlvi]

Hands-on guidance and interagency coordination are critically important for the MP approach. Following a 2008 evaluation, which showed that sustainability and baseline introductions had not been addressed, the INL regional gang coordinator is now in the process of hiring qualified advisors to embed within each MP, where they will assist with implementation and benchmarking. This process is an excellent opportunity to intensify coordination with USAID's crime- and violence-prevention programs, work toward a coherent U.S. government approach in these locations, and overcome the frequent disconnect between enforcement and prevention discussed at the beginning of this report.

Programs such as "Bogota Como Vamos," which engages the private sector, academia, and media organizations to support, diffuse, and discuss victimization survey data and perception studies, are useful means of informing public opinion and enhancing local ownership of prevention policies and in-country capacity to conduct perception surveys, monitoring and evaluation, and monitoring of specific issues (such as the rollout of community policing, and media campaigns). In-country research center staff should be trained to carry out these activities, using the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras*' work on the national crime observatory as a model.

Success will be affected locally by particularities of crime and organized crime dynamics in communities, wards, and municipalities. Such differences have to be better acknowledged and assessed; perception studies are necessary but not sufficient.

ANNEX A. THE MODEL PRECINCT APPROACH
Objectives, Implementation Strategies, and Criminal Investigation Components

General Objective
Make police work operationally and administratively efficient.

Specific Objectives
1. Improve citizen trust through close community relations. 2. Reduce crime through efficient patrolling. 3. Minimize impunity through professional forensic investigation.

Implementation Strategies
• Combat internal corruption (vetting).
• Capacity and attitude training (one weekly specialized course over two years: 1,000 hours).
• Increase productivity, quality control, evaluation (special tools, training, human resources management).
• Community integration
• Crime-prevention programs: targeted use of school-based programs, such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE), Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT), and the Police Athletic League (PAL) led by specially trained police instructors; referrals to existing public and private services.
• Strategic alliances with local government and all relevant agencies and programs.
• Inform the community and promote awareness of the new policing model and its operations, results, successes.
• Information-led patrolling, digital processing of complaints, training, and continuous evaluation.
• Pass relevant information from "field information cards" and other tools to the Center for Compilation, Analysis, and Diffusion of Criminal Information (CRADIC).
• Select and apply sector-specific types of targeted, preventive, multisectoral, or event patrolling based on statistical crime-monitoring information and focusing on 10 crime events.
• Disaster preparation by specially trained personnel.
• Handling arrests.
• Weekly coordination meetings; regular effectiveness analysis and reporting.

Criminal Investigation
For common crime. Reform back-office citizen services, including attention to victims, reorganization of basic criminal investigation procedures that lead to arrest warrants, report writing, and case filing.
For organized crime. Immediate referral to specialized organized crime investigative unit.
Internal General Inspection Office and Professional Responsibility Offices have priority over all other research; ethics training and tools; internal ethics code.

Source: NAS, U.S. Embassy Guatemala, "*Comisarias Modelo*," SFR 8/30/2010, p. 6-30. Author's elaboration.

ANNEX B. USAID/GUATEMALA CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM (2011-2015)

Note the difference in wording for community or neighborhood watch groups.

Intermediate Results	Lower Level Results
1. Promote sustainable interventions with at-risk youth	1.1.3: Provide socioeconomic opportunities for youth at risk
2. Promote community-based policing 2.1: **Community-based policing** and crime prevention Interventions Implemented	2.1.1: Local crime prevention capacity with focus on most vulnerable and youth groups (includes safer community assessments). 2.1.2: Support community crime and violence prevention plans and implementation (participatory, including police). 2.1.3: **Enhance community policing program** (supporting community and civil society in supporting community policing).
3. Increase community interventions that diminish vulnerability to organized crime and gangs 3.1: Enhance local government and key services support to mitigate and prevent crime (In particular through Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Education, National Association of Municipalities of Guatemala, and *Secretaria General de Planeación*	3.1.3: Community action fund and raise local key service providing capacity. 3.1.4: Support policy reforms for CP, civilian management of security issues and forces 3.1.5: Establish information systems (national, departmental, municipal)

ANNEX C. PRINCIPAL COMMUNITY PREVENTION-ORIENTED PROGRAMS LED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA

A. Safe Schools (*Escuelas Seguras*)

This national program of the Vice Ministry of Governance, in coordination with the Ministry of Education, covers 47 public school buildings (45 in the metropolitan area), including elementary and secondary schools. Most of these buildings host three administratively separate schools, operating mornings, afternoons, and evenings. Thus, the Safe Schools program covers 143 administratively separate schools — less than 1 percent of Guatemala's 17,000 schools.

The Safe Schools program provides for improved physical infrastructure of the 47 school buildings and induction of the 143 school directors, teachers, students (and the student council) and parents (parents' committee and school council). The program also finances and installs six to eight security cameras in each school to control perimeters and prevent criminal activities (drug dealing, extortion, sexual harassment, etc.).[xlvii] The program has set up a free tip-line phone number, which is also open to nonparticipating schools.

Sixteen police officers from the PNC's Prevention Division have been trained and assigned to the Safe Schools program. Their role is to guarantee that local patrols of the corresponding police sub-precincts take better responsibility for keeping the school perimeter safe.[xlviii] The fact that the officers are from a special division and not from the nearest precinct, however, contradicts the core CP principle of decentralization and may have detrimental effects, such as diffusion of accountability, confusion about responsibility, and overlapping and unneeded command structures.

At the neighborhood level, community relations are handled through parents' committees. Some of the Safe Schools are also covered by the Police Athletic League program, which is provided through the MPs. Some local governments also support the Safe Schools program through Social Development or similar services, as in Villa Nueva.

B. Open Schools (*Escuelas Abiertas*)

Led by Ministry of Education, the Open Schools program provides counselors and tools (such as computers) to selected schools, primarily in high-crime areas with high concentrations of at-risk youth. Open Schools are for members of the school community, including non-students, and they make selected public schools' infrastructure available to youths and other community members on Saturdays and Sundays. The program covers less than 1 percent of Guatemala's 17,000 primary and secondary schools, and most participating schools seem to be located in the metropolitan area. About half of the Safe Schools are also Open Schools.

C. Safe Neighborhoods (*Barrios Seguros*) and Safe Public Spaces.

Another potentially relevant national program is Safe Neighborhoods, based on the national Safe Public Spaces (*Espacios Públicos Seguros*) program of the Vice Ministry of Governance and apparently led directly by the Office of the President. The Vice Ministry of Governance is working with about 150 local governments on prevention programs, including those already mentioned.

D. *Juntas Comunales de Seguridad*

Over the last decade, certain neighborhood associations in different municipalities have been transformed into *juntas comunales de seguridad,* following a general PNC order issued around 1998. These *juntas* operated for a while, but when their requests went unanswered, many became inactive or limited their roles to that of providing information to the police. Around 2007, the PNC evaluated the *juntas* and suggested transforming them into armed neighborhood watch committees with a preventive function, supposedly under the strict guidance of specially assigned police officers. When systematic guidance never materialized, however, some of the armed *juntas* became vigilante-style groups. The 2007 reform was eventually reversed, and some *juntas* have reentered a more formally regulated crime-prevention environment, such as the 180 *juntas* enlisted by the local government and MP in Mixco or under the more inclusive community-based prevention platforms supported by USAID. Other *juntas* continued to operate as vigilante-style groups or have been enlisted by organized crime and drug-trafficking organizations.

ANNEX D. MODEL PRECINCT IMPACT ON HOMICIDE RATES FOR VILLA NUEVA AND MIXCO

In Villa Nueva, police data (the only data available) show that between 2004 and 2009, the number of homicide cases in the five municipalities covered by the main police commissariat (#15) increased steadily and significantly, from 329 to 568. Violent injuries also increased, but the number of assaults decreased from 193 to 61. In 2010, homicides decreased by 22 percent; violent injuries and assaults also decreased. Unfortunately, neither the PNC nor the MP program separates these categories, so there are no precise numbers for trends in the town of Villa Nueva or in the more limited jurisdiction of the NAS model substation. Although numbers provided by the Villa Nueva mayor's office show a 13 percent reduction for the town, these are not formal police numbers, and therefore not taken into account for MP or other reporting purposes.

In Mixco, homicide rates decreased in 2010, as compared to 2009 (when the MP program started), as did all other crime indicators except violent injuries (+6 percent). Overall, criminal incidents in Mixco fell 28 percent, compared to 9 percent nationwide. NAS provides different explanations:

- The national anti-gang unit, PANDA (scaled up from the Villa Nueva MP) conducted several raids on gangs and cliques in Mixco when the MP program was initiated.

- The intensity of patrolling prevents the return of these gangs, along with significant citizen organization, security cameras, and local government support.

- There has been a near-total replacement of the police corps with vetted agents.

NOTES

[i] For studies on community policing in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), see (among others) Hugo Fruhling, *Calles mas Seguras. Estudios de Policia Comunitaria en LAC*, Inter-American Development Bank, 2004.

[ii] UNDP, "Economic Cost of Violence in Guatemala", 2005,available at www.pnud.org.gt.

[iii] In Guatemala, organized crime and narco-trafficking are said to be stronger predictors of homicide than gang presence, but such distinctions are becoming increasingly arbitrary in El Salvador, where officials have attributed 60 percent of homicides to gangs, though the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has contested the evidence. (See Congressional Research Service, 2009; and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Transnational youth gangs in Central America, Mexico, and the United States," March 2007.)

[iv] Comision de Jefes de Policia de Centroamerica y El Caribe. Other estimates put the number of gang members in El Salvador at around 18,000.

[v] Helen Mack, meeting with Sarah Werth (USAID/LG) and Gerard Martin, Guatemala, January 27, 2011.

[vi] The initiative was backed by a letter of agreement.

[vii] Idem.

[viii] The INL regional gang advisor in El Salvador supports training of vetted mid-level officials from the precincts at the INAL in San Salvador, to follow four courses, including a community-oriented policing course created with support from the U.S. Department of Justice-sponsored Florida Regional Community Policing Institute at St. Petersburg College's Center for Public Safety Innovation. (See www.spcollege.edu/ac/cpsi and http://cop.spcollege.edu/, including their instructor's manuals on community-oriented policing.)

[ix] Two additional units are planned: one for internal inspection and another for prison-related information.

[x] See "*Comisarias Modelo,*" NAS, U.S. Embassy, Guatemala, SFR 8/30/2010, p. 5.

[xi] Idem.

[xii] Idem, p. 30.

[xiii] The Police Athletic League program is also rolled out to four schools outside the town of Villa Nueva, but inside the main Villa Nueva police jurisdiction. In total, however, there are approximately 1,000 schools in these outlying areas; about half of them public schools. (Source: NAS estimates.)

[xiv] The Mixco model precinct, in addition to the whole of Mixco, also covers the part of the municipal jurisdiction of adjacent San Juan that is within the jurisdiction of the Mixco police precinct. Two other municipalities are also within the Mixco precinct, but substations there are not (yet) included in the precinct model services, for various reasons. In Villa Nueva, on the other hand, while the central police station (Comisaria 15) has jurisdiction over 13 substations, four in the town of Villa Nueva and the rest in four adjacent municipalities, the MP operates in one of the four Villa Nueva substations, which was created to specifically host the MP. Thus, in the town of Villa Nueva, only personnel from the new substation are vetted, trained, and assigned to use the new policing practices. The original aim was to scale up the MP to all substations in town, eventually to the substations in the other municipalities within *Comisaria* 15's jurisdiction. This expansion never occurred, due to lack of government and PNC support, even though INL/NAS has tried to have it otherwise. Although citizens in other parts of Villa Nueva and surrounding towns are not directly affected, some MP services do reach them. For example, motorized school patrolling and school saturation covers schools all over Villa Nueva, and all five municipalities are covered by criminal investigations, the tip line, and PANDA. The uniformed anti-gang and saturations units also cover the complete jurisdiction, but lack of personnel restricts most of the patrolling to Villa Nueva.

[xv] In particular, Tactic y Tamahú in the department of Alta Verapaz, seven communities in Guatemala City, six in Villanueva, five in Mixco, and one in San Pedro Ayampuc, Jocotenango, Santa Catarina Pinula, Palencia, and Palín.

[xvi] See the USAID report, "*Recomendaciones de la Política Publica para la Prevención de la Violencia Juvenil*" by *Coalición por una Vida Digna para la Juventuda*, Guatemala, December 2009, p. 80.

[xvii] The other AJJ-run outreach centers are in Guatemala City (four) and in the rest of the country (two).

[xviii] In addition, the human and technological development centers work with youth and youth organizations through neighborhood-level urban peace platforms on proposals for prevention and support, focusing on reconciliation between neighborhoods through cultural events, fairs, and other activities (sponsored by German Misericor) as a community gang prevention and reduction dynamic.

[xix] In Guatemala City, the rollout involves CUS and *alcaldes auxiliares*, structures that do not exist in the other program municipalities.

[xx] The vice ministry also has a Civil Intelligence Division.

[xxi] In the Villa Nueva communities of Barcenas, Ciudad del Sol, Bucaro, Santa Isabel (visited for field research), and Peronia.

xxii In Mezquital.

xxiii El Salvador: 2.5; Costa Rica: 2.5; Guatemala: 1.7; Nicaragua: 1.2; Honduras: 1.2. Compare with Colombia: 4,5; and Chile 3.6.

xxiv PNC, *Dirección General, Plan Estrategico Institucional 2009-2014 "Seguridad y Tranquilidad, con participación social,"* February 2010.

xxv See page 5. One institutional value stressed by the plan is that police and community form a union, which is why they have to be strategic partners to guarantee tranquility and security (p. 20). Among its core policies, the plan mentions "participatory planning" (p. 24), and among its objectives, "design and implementation of plans, programs and projects with a preventive and dissuasive character, to incorporate citizen participation and the philosophy of community policing as a transversal axis for institutional performance" (p. 25). The plan's performance indicators to measure progress and success with implementation include "citizen trust in the PNC" (p. 26). Although CP does not appear by itself as one of the plan's seven strategic priorities, different "operational actions" listed under at least two of the priorities focus on it. Under strategic line #3 ("Crime and Violence Prevention with Citizen Participation"), the first four of nine operational actions focus on community policing: (1) "Active participation with local governments, public institutions, NGO, local actors, community leaders in the social prevention of delinquency and violence"; (2) "Philosophy of community policing"; (3) Strengthening of security within the territory; and (4) System of crime prevention. Strategic line # 7 ("Policing and Accountability"), also lists operational actions immediately relevant to community policing: quality of service; observing a code of conduct; and accountability of police work. The National Academy for Public Security, which is independent of the Police, but operates as its Academy is in charge of monitoring and evaluation of the strategic plan, including the CP component.

xxvi The strategic plan refers to "*Diagnostico Organizacional de la PCN, realizado por el programa de USAID para el Fortalecimiento de la Democracia,*" "*Mejorando el Sistema de Justicia en El Salvador elaborado por Checci and Cie., junio de 2009*", and "*Trabajos desarrollados por personal policial del Nivel Ejecutivo en el Dipomado Liderazgo y Cambio Organizacional, impartido en la Escuela Superior de Economía y Negocios (ESEN), con el apoyo de USAID.*"

xxvii See Strategic line #3. Other actions foreseen under this strategic line include (i) to standardize methodological guides to realize situational diagnostics, risk maps for departments and municipalities; (ii) design and execute prevention plans and programs as well as citizen consultancy events; enhance the secretary for community relations; make the community policing handbook official [done]; coordinate with the National Police Academy the incorporation of the theme of community policing in the academic curriculum [done]; coordinate with the National Police Academy on the general formation of all the institution's personnel and materials in CP; promote prevention policies; establish mechanisms to improve communication with the community; and undertake assessments of the territorial reality. Strategic Line 7 lists the following: (i) undertake citizen opinion surveys to determinate the degree of satisfaction with PNC services; (ii) shorten the wait time to attend the public.

xxviii Considered successful, but not in sufficiently permanent relation with the community to be qualified as community policing. See Fruhling (2004), *op. cit.*

xxix See p. 16 of the implementation plan. It will be done in five phases: (i) training in CP for all personnel in all territories; (ii) local diagnostics, including mapping and quarterly progress evaluations; (iii) operational planning for primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention; (iv) implementation of operational plans; and (v) internal and external supervision and evaluation. For a precise schedule of implementation between 2010 and 2014, see p. 47-48 of the implementation plan.

xxx PNC, *Manual de Formación de Policia Comunitaria de El Salvador*, 2010, San Salvador, p. 192.

xxxi Policia Nacional de El Salvador, *Doctrina Institucional sobre Policia Comunitaria*, San Salvador, May 2010, p. 17.

xxxii Policia Nacional de El Salvador, *Plan para Implementar la Filosofía Comunitaria a Nivel Nacional, 2010-2014*, San Salvador, May 2010, p. 48.

xxxiii Policia Nacional de El Salvador, *Plan Conjunto PNC – ANSP, para capacitar en la filosofía de Policia Comunitaria a nivel nacional durante el periodo 2010-2014*, San Salvador, June 2010, p. 15. Will be done in three phases: (i) design and authorization of the program [done]; (ii) training of trainers process, design of curriculum and diplomas; and (iii) training the 19,000 police and 5,000 administrative staff members. See p. 12 for time table.

xxxiv On January 22, 2011, a national newspaper called attention to the start of a national "*Plan Piloto de Policia Comunitaria*" in the municipality/delegation of Atiquizaya (14 *cantones*), in Ahuachapán.

xxxv Observation made by a police agent during a field visit to Quezaltepeque.

xxxvi See Republica de El Salvador, *Estrategia Nacional de Prevención Social de la Violencia en Apoyo a los Municipios*, December 2010. Contributing agencies are *Secretaria para Asuntos Estratégicos de la Presidencia* and its *Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Territorial y Descentralización*, *Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Publica* (in particular its *Dirección General de Prevención Social de la Violencia y Cultura de Paz,* or "PRE-PAZ"), *Policia Nacional Civil, Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Publica, Fondo de Inversión Social*

*para el Desarrollo Loca*l, *Dirección Nacional de Juventud, Secretaria de Inclusión Social*. The project also financed the background study, "Paths to prevention – Violence and Crime Prevention Policies Inventory in Central America," 2009.

[xxxvii] This includes training senior staff of Government of El Salvador agencies to apply the procedures manual, *How to Work Locally and in Participatory Way in Crime and Violence Prevention*. Contents include: (i) conceptual, methodological and operational approach; (ii) best practices, success factors, problems and challenges; and (iii) a summary of lessons learned.

[xxxviii] INL also works in parallel on prison reform (under CARSI funding) and will enhance regional-level criminal gang intelligence sharing between police and prisons.

[xxxix] Others are intelligence-led policing, homicide reduction seminars, gang training, and the GREAT Officer Certificate Course for 3,000 elementary and junior high school students. INL is also working with the private sector to see if it can fund and run an anonymous tip award program.

[xl] This includes Juvenile Justice System and public policy-oriented prevention policies, a Central American Integration Initiative observatory index and indicator development, and a framework on successful crime prevention initiatives in the region, as related to a system of 13 risk factors. It also does impact studies.

[xli] *Comité Intersectorial del Municipio de Quezaltepeque*, "*Plan Estrategico Participativo Mesa de Seguridad Ciudadana. Modulo 3*," Alcaldia, PNC, Checchi.

[xlii] A perception study (no hard data are included) on citizen security improvement in Altavista shows a slight improvement in the security in the area, and underlines improvement in perception of police work, explained to a significant degree by creation of a new substation in the area. The Altavista neighborhood of San Salvador has been a pilot community for the Government of El Salvador's social prevention policy since 2007; the government itself, through its CNSP, established a baseline. See *Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Publica*, "*Levantamiento de la Línea de Base de los Núcleos Poblacionales de la Etapa Piloto del Plan Nacional de Prevención y Paz Social,*" mimeo, September 2007.

[xliii] USAID joined the Altavista process in 2008 and produced an impact study, "Main findings of Evolution of Crime and Violence in the Altavista Neighborhood 2007-2009," in December 2009.

[xliv] The World Bank, *The urban poor in Latin America*, Washington D.C., 2005, p. 176.

[xlv] A 2004 assessment of CP in four urban areas in Latin America, including Villa Nueva in Guatemala, already stressed the importance of a combination of training strategies, community participation, and especially institutional change — where we often miss the mark — and interagency coordination. See PNUD, *Abrir Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano*, Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano para América Central 2009-2010, Colombia, 2009, Chapter 11 (*Un Sistema Robusto y Eficiente*).

[xlvi] See Hugo Fruhling, *Calles mas Seguras. Estudios de Policia Comunitaria en LAC*, Inter-American Development Bank, 2004.

[xlvii] Per school, the program typically invests $65,000 for infrastructure upgrading and $450 or more per month per security camera and monitors (funded by Ministry of Education). The security camera contract is set up for three years, after which the cameras and their maintenance become property of the state. However, NAS typically contracts similar security cameras and services for $160 per month.

[xlviii] An official of the presidential DARE program is assigned to the program as well. UNDP prepared a baseline and citizen security expert. Hugo Fruhling's Chilean team will do monitoring and evaluation.