USAID | WEST BANK/GAZA
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
ELECTION ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

AAPD	Acquisition and Policy Directive
ATC	Anti-Terrorism Certification
ATF	Arab Thought Forum
CEC	Central Election Commission
CFI	Civic Forum Institute
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EC	European Community
ESRG	Election Reform Support Group
HCLE	High Commission for Local Elections
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
LRC	Local Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled in Jenin
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
RFP	Request for Proposals
SDPRC	Society for the Development of Palestinian Refugee Camps
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of Tamkeen's election-related programs on the education of Palestinian voters. The activities and impact assessed revolved around the period from December 2004 through January 2006, including four rounds of local elections, the presidential election, and the legislative elections of January 2006. The consultant also was asked to examine the larger question of Tamkeen's impact on the conduct of free and fair elections, as well as on the "development of civil society and democratization of Palestine in general."

Background

This assessment was carried out at a pivotal point in the history of Palestinian democratization: the moment at which the traditional ruling party was dismissed, which shocked many Palestinians and international observers. It is at this moment that Palestinians themselves are trying to understand the results and implications of this inaugural democratic transition and are working to fit the results not only into the larger picture of their own political life, but also for our purposes, into the narrative of the civil society strengthening program funded by Tamkeen. Against this backdrop, the assessment made every effort to focus on the work accomplished up to and including the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) vote, before the results of the election were known. It nevertheless became clear that many grantees could not answer questions about their work except through the lens of who won the majority of seats in government.

The study was designed to determine:[1]

- What was the contribution of Tamkeen and its grantees to the conduct of free and fair local and national elections
- Whether civil society organizations (CSOs) themselves were strengthened in their democracy and governance mandates by conducting voter education programs, candidate fora, non-partisan election observation, and other election-related activities funded by Tamkeen
- How the major elements of Tamkeen's election assistance program fit into the overall effort to educate Palestinian voters in both local and national elections
- What could be done to improve election-related initiatives by CSOs in future elections

Scope of the Study

The study pursued the aforementioned questions through review of documents (including grants, reports, and project documents), personal interviews, and analysis. Information was gathered during two workshops, five group interviews, and more than 20 one-on-one interviews. In all, more than 80 people offered their views of Tamkeen's impact on the electoral process. The vast majority of interviewees were Tamkeen grantees. Other interlocutors included representatives from the international community of donors and assistance providers, government officials, and

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[1] Taken from the consultant's scope of work.

representatives of civil society not funded by Tamkeen. Some interviews were conducted in English, while others were conducted with the help of translators.

Quantifiable Measurement and Anecdotal Findings

The methodological construct and scope of work for this study created specific parameters for this assessment. In the main, interviews were conducted with grantees, and not beneficiaries, allowing for rigorous analysis regarding the capacity of the CSOs themselves and anecdotal findings regarding the impact of their programs on the electorate. While hard data could be collected about the work done through Tamkeen's 96 grants, this study could not draw valid conclusions about the impact of those grants on the democratization of Palestine in view of the assessment's methodology and the scope of the data. How the programs affected voters' thoughts and actions can be assessed only through extensive polling or in-depth interviews with the universe of beneficiaries. Ultimately, this study relied on both quantitative and qualitative research to create the most practicable and solid picture of Tamkeen impact.

This study sought to achieve an assessment of the work accomplished by the CSO grantees under the Tamkeen election-related mandate, including an analysis of how Tamkeen reached approximately 100,000 beneficiaries of its voter education program and the 45,000 beneficiaries of its candidate forum project, and contributed to the culture of the vote in the West Bank and Gaza.

Major Findings and Recommendations

1. *Atmosphere*. The greatest contribution of Tamkeen programming was to the atmosphere in which the elections took place and to the conduct of the vote. The final voter turnout of more than 90 percent of the electorate and the 2.86 percent spoiled-ballots rate (within the range of acceptable international standards) indicate informed voters who understood the voting process and were comfortable and confident about going to the polls to express their political choice. Tamkeen programs contributed to this success.

2. *Voter education* played an important role in these elections. The project conducted 2,834 voter education sessions that reached approximately 100,000[2] people, a feat given Tamkeen's budget and human resources. While these figures represent a small percentage of the 1.3 million-person electorate, the efforts of Tamkeen grantees complemented the full range of activities by other entities, including the electoral authorities, government, political parties, and other CSOs.

3. *Inclusiveness*. Tamkeen's programs successfully targeted women and marginalized or otherwise disadvantaged voters, including deaf and hearing-impaired voters, physically handicapped voters, illiterate voters, and youth. By its own accounting, the project directly reached 28,016 women and 24,818 youths through voter education.

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[2] The number of direct beneficiaries increased to 100,000 from the original 87,000 presented to USAID in March due to the inclusion of two additional grants that had not been accounted for at that time.

4. *Election-day domestic observation* was perceived by voters as a form of insurance, signaling that the elections would be carried out in a free and fair manner, that a mechanism was in place to resolve on-the-spot procedural disputes, and that this was a sovereign process in which they could take national ownership and pride. Tamkeen was responsible for the fielding of 2,842 domestic observers during four rounds of local elections.

5. *The Palestinian Code of Conduct for Political Parties* produced by the Arab Thought Forum (ATF) with Tamkeen funding was an important demonstration of the political will of all parties to ensure the transparency and good conduct of the electoral process. The ATF brought all of the parties, including Fatah and Hamas, to public agreement on the conduct of the process in a way that many observers had thought impossible.

6. *Candidate fora* sponsored by Tamkeen grantees were conceived to highlight candidate platforms and qualifications and thus to encourage voters to let go of the habit of basing leadership decisions on family ties or patronage. The manner of facilitation could be refined to take better advantage of the fora.

7. *A "seal of approval"*. The international donor community and other entities regard Tamkeen as a seal of approval, which is to say that if a CSO has been vetted and supported by Tamkeen then it is viewed as a competent organization with integrity, and it is expected to be a good partner.

Looking to the future, the following recommendations are posited for program design and focus.

1. *The addition of programming that encourages civic engagement and other features of democracy*. Tamkeen's work during the period assessed focused on the process-oriented preparation of the electorate. Other aspects of democracy and democratization can now be pursued, such as citizens holding elected officials to their campaign promises and governance mandate; citizens requiring elected officials to speak to the bigger issues of public opinion (e.g., negotiation with Israel and security issues); and active political debate that centers on post-election governance.

2. *Further emphasis on working with secular, far-reaching, charitable organizations*. Tamkeen should continue to work with existing democracy and governance CSOs and to identify new players who can affect policy (or who can be trained to affect policy) through citizen and political party advocacy. When considering the long-term Palestinian progress, the current and potential impact of far-reaching, charitable organizations must not be overlooked. These organizations, especially the older ones, have strong grassroots networks, are well-respected, and are not tied to any one political party. They also control a large number of services related to public health, education, and welfare, and as a consequence they carry great leadership weight in various communities. They can serve as a secular counterweight to the religious grassroots organizations whose reach is extensive.

3. *Oversight*. Programmatic oversight of projects – that is, on-site, personal visits by Tamkeen staff to grantee program sessions for the purpose of quality control and consistency – is an ongoing concern that pervades all of the activities carried out in the West Bank and Gaza, due to difficult, though not impossible, restrictions on movement of Palestinian staff. Additional, creative methods of oversight will be necessary for future activities.

4. *Finding space for civil society in the new government structure*. Civil society and the organizations that represent it face many challenges, and one of the strongest may be the new role of the freely-elected local councils. This also may be an issue at the national level, although findings for this study were concentrated at the local level, which has been virtually government-free for years. Up to this point, Palestinian civil society has acted not in the space between government and the family traditionally allocated to civil society, but in place of the government. It may be that, if elected local councils prove up to the task of truly representing their constituents and providing services in a transparent and fair manner, then the work of helping civil society to find its rightful place between the family and state will have just begun.

5. *Youth*. Much more work needs to be done with youth, according to the CSOs interviewed. If an election is to be held in four years, then there is a generation of upcoming voters that has not been directly exposed to the process of democratic voting. While Tamkeen projects reached a total of 24,818 youths, observers said this represents a "drop in the bucket" compared to future needs.

The success of the election cycle in the West Bank and Gaza rests on the independence and confidence of Palestinian voters. Tamkeen's program was an important contribution to the overall efforts to educate Palestinians about their rights and role as voters in a free and fair election. It was well designed and implemented in partnership with – and in the service of – an active and sophisticated civil society.

SECTION I: OBJECTIVES

This study examines the impact of Tamkeen's election-related programs on the education of Palestinian voters, on free and fair elections in the West Bank and Gaza , and on the development of civil society and democratization of Palestine in general. It covers the period from December 2004 through January 2006, including four rounds of local elections, the presidential election, and the legislative elections of January 2006.

In that time, Tamkeen made 96 grants valued at $1.7 million to 28 different CSOs. In addition to the grants, Tamkeen's programs included training-of-trainers sessions, workshops, and a two-day conference for the Central Election Commission (CEC), the High Commission for Local Elections (HCLE), CSOs, and international donors. Annex A lists Tamkeen activities chronologically alongside the dates of elections. Annex B details all grants made by Tamkeen during this period.

SECTION II: HISTORY OF THE PROJECT

This study is the third in a series of evaluative assessments aimed at identifying the impact and progress of Tamkeen's activities in the West Bank and Gaza. It assesses the election-related work undertaken by Tamkeen-funded Palestinian CSOs and posits recommendations for future activities, adjustments in strategies, and other efforts that could add to the overall efficacy of Tamkeen's mandate.

Two aspects – one internal to the project, the other external – must be mentioned to help readers appreciate the context of Tamkeen's work in the West Bank and Gaza. These aspects are (1) the nature of Tamkeen's shift to election-specific work, and (2) certain aspects of the elections' macro-political climate.

A. Palestinian Political Background: The Call for Elections

Tamkeen's election-related programming was born of the political opening presented by the demise of Yasser Arafat. Though the Palestinian Authority under Arafat had put both local and legislative elections on the Palestinian political agenda, these elections were delayed repeatedly. The delays stemmed from the entrenched domination of Arafat's Fatah movement, particularly since the signing of the 1993 Oslo Agreement, which supported Fatah as the governing party in the West Bank and Gaza as part of the attendant peace process. When Yasser Arafat died, a decision was made to hold both local elections – for the first time in 30 years – and legislative elections, which had not taken place in a decade. Though dates for the elections took time to schedule, four rounds of local elections, a presidential election, and the national legislative election were held in the West Bank and Gaza between December 2004 and January 2006. A fifth round of local elections will complete the cycle in 2006. (See Exhibit 1, Election Schedule)

The call for elections offered a unique opportunity for Palestinian CSOs. Civil society can play an important role in preparing an electorate for its election cycle. In the Palestinian context, CSOs were poised to take on a much higher profile than in other elections. Overall, the Palestinian context required more participation of civil society because of the weakened state of the government and its institutions. As one example, the High Commission for Local Elections was crippled by a provisional mandate and

no budget. Because of the space they occupy outside of the political sphere and their relative maturity in terms of organizational functioning, CSOs were a logical choice to prepare the Palestinian electorate for the anticipated local, presidential, and legislative elections.

As discussed at length in this report, voter education became a big challenge in this election cycle largely because the election law changed to introduce a new election system and quota systems unfamiliar even to Palestinians who had voted in elections decades earlier (see Exhibit 2: Election Systems and Laws). Because CSOs could reach large constituencies, they were a logical conduit for educating the electorate.

Tamkeen itself was ready to perform its role in terms of planning, identifying potential grantees, and making grants without delay, because of its existing mechanisms, staff, and roster of high-performance CSOs. An interesting and important part of the history of Tamkeen's election-related role involves its ability to turn to classic democracy and governance activities – the election-specific activity focused on in this study – from its position as a civil society advocacy and service delivery support program.

Exhibit 1: Election Schedule for Local, Presidential and Legislative Elections

Election Date	Type
December 23, 2004	First round of local elections
January 9, 2005	Presidential elections
January 27, 2005	First round of local elections in Gaza
May 5, 2005	Second round of elections in West Bank and Gaza
September 29, 2005	Third round of local elections in West Bank and Gaza
December 15, 2005	Fourth round of local elections in West Bank and Gaza
January 25, 2006	Palestinian Legislative Council elections

B. From Civil Society Advocacy and Service Delivery to Elections

At the call for elections, USAID asked Tamkeen to restructure its efforts to focus its support on the role of CSOs in the upcoming electoral process. Prior to USAID's request, Tamkeen provided advocacy support, grants disbursement, and programming in response to the needs created by the start of the 2000 Intifada.

At that time, Tamkeen was asked to provide civil society services within a framework of democracy and governance to fill the area's conflict-provoked vacuum. In this way, Tamkeen combined the work of traditional service delivery organizations, such as that of the charitable societies discussed below, with democracy and governance efforts, priming them to later assume their election-specific roles.

Tamkeen issued grants to organizations that specialize in health, education, democracy, and economic development. For instance, Al-Amal in Gaza used a Tamkeen grant to establish a club for the deaf and hard of hearing to advocate for their rights and to provide a means for socialization among constituents. Al-Amal

eventually used the network it had cultivated to provide voter education to the deaf and hard of hearing in Gaza, reaching 140 people in the 2005-2006 elections who otherwise were disenfranchised. Similarly, before the election cycle began, the Local Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (LRC) in Jenin worked to advocate on behalf of the disabled and to raise awareness about the rights of the disabled while providing essential services, including the construction and fitting of prosthetic devices, to the expanded Jenin community. While students received classic civic education training through model parliament and voting exercises with Al-Mawrid before the elections, Tamkeen also supported essential services through grants to CSOs like the Palestinian Hypertension Association, which used project funds to conduct blood pressure tests in 15 locations along the Gaza Strip, particularly in refugee camps and remote areas.

By the end of 2004, the project had provided $16 million in grants to almost 100 CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza for activities such as traditional democracy and governance work, civil society advocacy work, and straight service delivery. When the elections were announced in 2004, circumstances changed dramatically. USAID again turned to Tamkeen, this time to focus on the nexus of the civil society and elections/political processes pillars of democracy and governance strengthening. Tamkeen made the transition efficiently, since Tamkeen was connected to a well-managed group of CSOs that:

- Were familiar with Tamkeen policies and procedures
- Were familiar with the democracy and governance imperative, and in some cases had experience in advocacy, training, networking, and other governance capacities required in the new mandate
- Had already achieved a certain level of organizational capacity reflective of their connection to and training from Tamkeen
- Had pre-existing relationships with Tamkeen staff, an advantage which cannot be overemphasized

All of these factors made the transition to election-specific grant making and programming fast and relatively uncomplicated. Tamkeen called on current grantees using existing mechanisms and staff to approve election-related grants and to design an election observation capacity-building program for CSOs interested in becoming involved in the new democratic opening in the West Bank and Gaza. Tamkeen designed a voter education program, carried out domestic monitor training and deployment, conducted candidate fora, and harnessed the strength and momentum of existing CSOs to contribute to an atmosphere conducive to free and fair elections.

C. External Considerations: The Anti-Terrorism Certification

Along with the programmatic history of Tamkeen's work, an important external factor during this period was anti-terrorism certification.

As USAID prepared its assistance strategy for the Palestinian election cycle, the requirements of Acquisition and Policy Directive (AAPD) 02-19 (through revisions 04-07 and 04-14), also known as the Anti-Terrorism Certification (or ATC), were put into play for all potential grantees. The ATC is a worldwide USAID requirement designed to certify that USAID grantees do not support terrorism. A copy of the certification is attached in Annex B.

There was considerable debate among CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza, even among those who previously had operated extensively with United States funding, as to whether they should accept U.S. aid under this requirement. Many CSOs accepted both the logic and principle of the ATC and chose to remain or to become Tamkeen grantees within the ATC framework. Others rejected the conditions as colonial in intent and compromising of their nationalist pride.[3] A number of CSOs refused to sign the ATC. Others (ATF, for example) chose to sign, which resulted in the resignation of board members on principle. Still others publicly protested the requirement but later signed quietly. It is generally understood among the international community of assistance providers that the ultimate result of the ATC was to limit their choice of grantees to the reduced pool of CSOs that agreed publicly with the terms of the certification.[4] It is not clear whether the reduction of eligible CSO partners adversely affected Tamkeen's work. The grantees with whom Tamkeen worked were all subject to a formal application process, which involved a standardized call for expressions of interest, and an objective, deliberative process resulting in award of a grant.[5] There is no indication that Tamkeen lowered its standards to find suitable grantees within the smaller pool of eligible CSOs. Nor is there evidence that, given the amount of time, the size of the Tamkeen staff, and the budget available, more or better work could have been accomplished if CSOs that chose not to sign the ATC had participated.[6]

That said, the impact of the ATC on Palestinian civil society is an interesting subject that merits more comprehensive study.

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[3] This finding reflects interviews with grantees and discussions with Tamkeen staff about that period.
[4] Interviews with Tamkeen staff and international donors, including the EC and UNDP.
[5] The procedures for issuing the grants are included Tamkeen's USAID-approved Fixed-obligation Grants Manual. At each stage of election assistance, Tamkeen consulted closely with USAID, receiving its approval on the level, type, and distribution of each set of election-related grants.
[6] Indeed, there is an argument to be made that if the ATC meant opening the field to CSOs outside of 'the usual suspects,' then it resulted in more CSOs receiving capacity building training, a goal of this project.

SECTION III: THE EVALUATION

The findings of this study are organized to reflect of the five areas of inquiry set forth in the scope of work provided to the consultant. The first four areas involve questions of project impact; the fifth pertains to recommendations for future activity.

A. Scope

This study was conducted within the specific parameters of inquiry defined by Tamkeen. The five questions put forth in the scope of work that guided the study are as follows:

- Overall, what was the contribution of Tamkeen and its grantees to the conduct of free and fair local and national elections? Did the programs succeed in creating more informed voters and a higher level of democratic political discourse?

- How were the CSOs themselves strengthened in their democracy and governance mandates by conducting voter education programs, candidate fora, non-partisan election observation and other election-related activities funded by Tamkeen?

- How did the major elements of Tamkeen's election assistance program fit into the overall effort to educate Palestinian voters in both local and national elections (including other CSOs, international assistance efforts, and the election authority)?

- Specifically, what was the ultimate impact of the code of conduct work conducted by the Arab Thought Forum with Tamkeen funding?

- What could be done to improve election-related initiatives by CSOs in future elections?

B. Methodology

This assessment was carried out at a pivotal point in the history of Palestinian democratization: the moment at which the traditional ruling party was dismissed, which shocked many Palestinians and international observers. It is at this moment that Palestinians themselves are trying to understand the results and implications of this inaugural democratic transition and are working to fit the results not only into the larger picture of their own political life, but also for our purposes, into the narrative of the civil society strengthening program funded by Tamkeen. Against this backdrop, the assessment made every effort to focus on the work accomplished up to and including the PLC vote, before the results of the election were known. It nevertheless became clear that many grantees could not answer questions about their work except through the lens of who won the majority of seats in government.

The consultant spent two weeks in the West Bank and Jerusalem, with additional time in Washington, conducting background research and interviews. The questions posed in the scope of work were pursued through review of documents (grant documents, reports, project documents, and outside papers), personal interviews, and analysis. In-

country interviews accounted for the bulk of the information gathered. Altogether, data was collected from five group interviews (defined as including three or more interviewees) with Tamkeen grantee CSOs, two workshops (one in the West Bank with 18 CSO leaders, the other via video conference in Gaza with 13 CSO leaders), and 20 one-on-one interviews, in which more than 80 people offered their views on Tamkeen's overall impact on the electoral process. In some cases, interviews were conducted in English, while others depended on translation to and from Arabic.[7] A schedule of interviews is appended to this report (Annex C).

Based on the methodological construct and scope of work, this study has a highly specific place in the overall assessment of Palestinian democratization. Because interviews were conducted with grantees, and not with beneficiaries, except in limited cases, rigorous analysis was possible regarding the capacity of the CSOs themselves, but the question of the impact of those grants was necessarily left to anecdotal findings. (For example, the questions "How many people could you reach, and how did you manage your project?" could be asked to a CSO, and answered with hard data. But the question "Did the Tamkeen grantee's program change your mind or teach you something new?" could not be addressed to a representative sample of the electorate, leaving the specific question of impact to anecdotal evidence and conjecture.) Similarly, while data could be collected about the work of Tamkeen's 96 grants to 28 CSOs, the task of extrapolating from that data the impact of those grants on the democratization of Palestine would be beyond the scope of this consultancy; it would require extensive polling and in-depth interviews that targeted a sample of far more voters than were reached by this consultancy. What this study sought to achieve is an assessment of the work accomplished by the CSO grantees under the Tamkeen election-related mandate, including an analysis of how Tamkeen reached the approximately 100,000 beneficiaries of the voter education program and the 46,000 beneficiaries of the candidate forum project, to contribute to the culture of the free and fair vote in the West Bank and Gaza.

C. Findings

C1. Atmosphere

The greatest contribution of Tamkeen programming was to the atmosphere in which the elections took place and to the conduct of the vote. Among those interviewed, there was near consensus that given the scope of their programs, Tamkeen had a positive impact on the education of the voters it reached and thus made an important contribution to the free and fair nature of the elections.[8] The final voter turnout of more than 90 percent of the electorate and the 2.86 percent spoiled-ballots rate (which is within the range of acceptable international standards), indicate informed voters

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[7] A word about information gathered through translated interviews: This study was conducted by a consultant who does not speak Arabic, and who was thus dependent on interpretation and translation for data collection. In many cases, Tamkeen staff, including the chief of party, were present at the interviews to provide that translation. It is worth noting that it is unlikely that the presence of Tamkeen representatives did not have some effect on the interview, whether it is of tone or of substance. While I do not think this fact changes the conclusions of this study, it is a point to consider for future evaluations.

[8] One CSO leader (not funded through Tamkeen) was a notable exception: He dismissed civil society's election-related work—indeed all of civil society's work in the West Bank and Gaza—as "cute and nice," and entirely irrelevant. He felt that civil society has been weakened, rather than strengthened, by international efforts, and recommended that funding be cut to all organizations except his own.

who understood the electoral process and were comfortable and confident going to the polls to express their political choice.[9]

Most of the Palestinians interviewed and all of the international donors or assistance providers reached characterized the process as free, fair, inclusive and reflecting the will of the people. They credit civil society with an important role in contributing to and protecting a free, safe, and democratic atmosphere through pre-election voter education, election-day monitoring, the code of conduct for political parties, and, with some important exceptions, the candidate fora that introduced candidates and their platforms to voters.

C1a. Voter Education

Voter education in its purest form was considered a success and can be credited with leading people to understand the secrecy of the ballot so as to vote their conscience with no fear of recrimination, in a peaceful and optimistic manner.

In all, Tamkeen conducted 2,842 voter education sessions that reached approximately 100,000 people, a feat given Tamkeen's budget and human resources.[10] While these figures represent a small percentage of the 1.3 million-person electorate, the efforts of Tamkeen grantees complemented the full range of activities by other entities, including the electoral authorities, government, political parties, and other CSOs. Tamkeen's programs were targeted to achieve maximum impact within the reach of the 28 grantees it funded (14 each in the West Bank and Gaza Strip).

Voter education played a particularly important role in these elections on two levels. First, voter education materials emphasized the secrecy of the ballot and the rights of the voter to cast a ballot free from coercion and to have that ballot counted equally among others. Second, voter education was necessary to explain complicated voting laws, which were new, involved a quota system, and changed between rounds of local elections. The obvious need for voter education was addressed professionally and sensitively by Tamkeen. The complexities of the changing laws regarding quotas and systems are evident in Exhibit 2 "Election Systems and Laws," which follows.

Exhibit 2: Election Systems and Laws

Election Date and Type	Pertinent System and Law
Lead-up to election cycle	• *October, 2002.* Head of Central Election Commission and members appointed by presidential decree; modification of basic law. • *August, 2004.* Voter registration process starts in preparation for municipal and general elections by presidential decree. No dates are set. • *September 4, 2004.* CEC starts the registration process, including security forces. • *November 13, 2004.* Death of President Yasser Arafat. PLC head appointed as interim president for 60 days, until elections.

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[9] Statistics for elections were collected in interviews with outside experts and the CEC, and can be found at the official CEC Web site, www.elections.ps

[10] Tamkeen's own statistics. The total budget was $1.7 million.

Election Date and Type	Pertinent System and Law
First round of local elections in the West Bank December 23, 2004 First round of local elections in Gaza January 27, 2005	Elections conducted under Local Elections Law No. 5 of 1996[11] (with amendments), using plurality vote system. • Quota for women: a minimum of two seats per larger local council, and one in smaller councils. • New minimum age for candidacy, lowered from 30 to 28 years of age.
Presidential elections January 9, 2005	• Elections conducted under Elections Law No. 13 of 1995. • The candidate who receives the highest number of votes wins the elections, regardless of the percentage of votes. • January 9, 2005: Presidential elections held among seven candidates and won by Mahmoud Abbas, with 74% of votes.
Second round of elections in West Bank, Gaza May 5th, 2005	Elections conducted under Local Elections Law No. 5 of 1996, including the amendments regarding the minimum number of seats for women and the lowered age for candidacy.
Third round of elections in West Bank, Gaza September 29, 2005	August, 2005: PLC modifies the 1995 local elections law to become a 100% proportional system. • Quota for women (20% of seats) expressed in relation to the arrangement of candidate names on each list. • Minimum age of local council members lowered from 28 to 25 years.
Fourth round of elections, including Gaza December 15th, 2005	Amendments from the previous round of local elections included.
PLC legislative elections January 25th, 2006	Elections conducted under Elections Law No. 9 of 2005, which adopted the mixed electoral system for PLC elections. • The mixed electoral system combines the majority system (districts) and the system of proportional representation (lists). The law divides the 132 seats of the PLC equally between the majority system (66 seats) and the system of proportional representation (66 seats). • Quota for women: In accordance with the law, each electoral list must include a minimum of 7 candidates and a maximum of 66 candidates. Each list must include at least one woman in the first three names, at least one woman in the next four names and at least one woman in each of the five names that follow in the list. • Quota for Christian seats and distribution defined in presidential decree No. 14/2005.

To confront the challenges presented by the complexities of the changing elections laws, Tamkeen worked with CSOs and local elections authorities to make the laws comprehensible and user-friendly for the electorate. Tamkeen's efforts centered on the development of educational materials and training. In February and March 2005,

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[11] In the CEC documents available, reference was made alternatively to Local Elections Law No.5 of 1995 and Local Elections Law No. 5 of 1996.

the project brought in two international experts, Jennifer Collins-Foley and Lazhar Aloui, to conduct training for CSO managers, trainers, and facilitators on developing effective voter education programs. The sessions featured a roundtable discussion with CSOs and Tamkeen staff members on the purpose and content of voter education programs, a one-day training for voter education trainers, a one-day training for candidate fora facilitators, production of a manual for conducting voter education programs and candidate fora, expert guidance and facilitation during the Jericho conference on elections, and expert assistance with the production of a voter education guide for local elections. Examples of voter education activities include the following:

- Prior to the second round of local elections (May 2005), Tamkeen grantee CFI produced 165,000 copies of five voter education flyers and 15,000 copies of a voters' guide, which were disseminated throughout the West Bank and Gaza during workshops conducted by partner CSOs.

- After the second round of local elections in May 2005, Tamkeen, its partners, and the CEC worked together to produce a high-quality, uniform (or "common") booklet for the PLC elections that could be used in all Tamkeen-funded voter education efforts. At the same time, CSO trainers and facilitators were required to attend common training-of-trainers programs in the West Bank and Gaza. The booklet and training-of-trainers program was conducted under a grant to CFI, but all partner CSOs participated in the effort, especially those partners, like the ATF, that had substantial expertise on their staffs. The first round of PLC election activities (conducted in July and August 2005) saw the distribution of 30,000 copies of "A Voter's Guide to Local Elections," and included $350,000 worth of grants.

Defining the Concepts: The Use of the Terms "Civic Education" and "Voter Education" in this Study

Voter education is usually defined as targeted efforts to explain "how and why to vote." Programs inform voters about such issues as where and when to register to vote, explain registration and voting procedures (how to mark a ballot, how the ballots are counted, how the overall process of casting a vote and having it counted equally among others actually works), and serve to decode the election law and election system. Voter education is defined as technical, and as including information about all aspects of the vote, from security issues, to illiterate voting, to an explanation about what recourse there is for voter complaints. It is carried out by both governmental and non-governmental entities. Voter education is more narrowly focused than, and should not be confused with, civic education.

Civic Education is much broader than voter education. It seeks to inform and educate citizens about the broader issues of democracy and democratic participation; and it delves into both the practical and the theoretical aspects of rights in a democracy, from duties and responsibilities as a citizen to the farther-reaching concepts of democratic values and good governance. Voter education at times is considered a subset of civic education. Examples of civic education can include school curricula that explain the principles of democracy and efforts in schools such as model parliaments or mock elections. Civic education can involve programs to create awareness about women's rights, such as those carried out by nongovernmental organizations, or efforts to inform citizens of their rights in relationship to their government. In its more in-depth efforts, civic education can transfer ideas about the values of participatory governance, the secular nature of democratic society, and the role of fully-informed and open public debate about political issues, candidates, and platforms.

For the fourth round of local elections held in December 2005, the Our Rights and Human Development CSOs conducted 44 separate voter education sessions for more than 1,400 voters in the Gaza Strip. Their work was part of an overall effort that

included candidate fora and reached an additional 6,800 voters in the West Bank. For the PLC elections, the Society Voice CSO alone conducted 90 sessions of voter education in Middle Gaza, reaching 2,700 voters. This was only one part of the total 2,134 sessions that reached some 58,000 voters throughout the West Bank and Gaza for that election. Annex A presents all the programs funded by Tamkeen and includes statistics regarding beneficiaries reached, materials produced, and funds spent.

Inclusiveness. Tamkeen's programs targeted women and the marginalized or otherwise disadvantaged voters within their reach, including hearing-impaired and deaf voters, physically handicapped voters, illiterate voters, and youth. Through its voter education component, Tamkeen reported that it directly reached 28,036 women and 24,818 youths through materials produced by the project.[12]

Tamkeen grantees were able to use the "common" voter education materials (that is, the booklet designed by Tamkeen grantees cooperatively for the local elections originally published in April, 2005 and the second booklet published in July, 2005 for the PLC elections) and adapt them to their target audiences, including illiterate voters and deaf or hearing-impaired voters. The Al Amal CSO in Gaza, which supports the hard of hearing and deaf community, worked with two other Gaza CSOs to adapt the Tamkeen materials to educate 140 citizens who were hard of hearing about their role and rights in the election process. Women in Jenin, who received the same materials from the Local Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (LRC), took it upon themselves to cut out the pictures from the voter's guide, copy them, and carry them door-to-door in villages with low literacy rates to show citizens where and how to vote in the local elections. In Gaza, Shareef Abu Watefah from Civitas said that his organization "had to find new techniques to educate the illiterate. I used to tell my groups that the difference between the old [voting] laws and the new ones is like when you go to the market to buy a tomato. You can buy it two ways: one, in a closed box, and you don't know what's in it (the proportional representation system), or you can pick one tomato at a time (the district voting system)."[13]

In another example of targeted voter education, the Association of Women Committees for Social Work gave presentations to women from 18 to 25 years old from 33 villages and 3 refugee camps in the Ramallah area as part of an effort to increase their participation in local elections. Another grant was awarded to Juhoud for Community and Rural Development based in Ramallah to educate women and young voters about the election law and process, particularly with regard to the PLC elections. The effort sought to prepare voters to hold candidates accountable for their positions after the elections. It reached 850 direct beneficiaries.

C1b. Domestic Election Observation

Domestic observation of the local elections was perceived by voters as another form of insurance that the process would be carried out in a free and fair manner, that they had recourse in the event of an on-the-spot procedural dispute, and that this was a sovereign process in which they could take national ownership and pride. International monitors and technical election experts (NDI and IFES, respectively)

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[12] Tamkeen printed 80,000 copies of a Tamkeen/Al-Mawrid pamphlet on elections for school children throughout the West Bank.

[13] An example of CSOs' ingenuity in adapting Tamkeen's training to their communities. The accuracy of the analogy is not addressed.

praised the role of the Tamkeen domestic monitoring initiative: "The only domestic observers around – in fact in many places the only observers at all – were the CSO observers. You can't have an election like this – any election – without that presence. The international community can't do it."[14] Tamkeen oversaw the fielding of 2,541 domestic observers in the course of the local elections process.[15]

In May of 2005, Tamkeen funded the launch of coordinated election observation efforts for local council elections by partner CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza. To recruit and train observers throughout the election cycle, CSOs drew on skills learned during Tamkeen's training-of-trainers program held in December 2004. In addition, Tamkeen released a report to USAID in May 2005 that evaluated observer performance and coverage to that point, with an eye to refining observation needs and techniques. This report and others drew from an "observing the observers" exercise conducted by the Tamkeen staff after each local election. Staff findings were used as a grantee-monitoring practice and to advise CSO partners in refining techniques.

C1c. The Palestinian Code of Conduct for Political Parties

Funded by Tamkeen, the code of conduct produced by the ATF and signed by all political parties was an important demonstration of the will of all political parties to ensure the transparency and good conduct of the electoral process. This, in turn, assuaged people's fear of post-balloting violence and recrimination, and helped open and protect the integrity of the process. The ATF brought all of the parties, including Fatah and Hamas, to public agreement on the conduct of the process in a way that many observers had thought impossible. This particular effort, discussed in detail in Section C2a, is mentioned here because it was a major factor in creating and maintaining a positive and inclusive electoral atmosphere and the smooth conduct of the vote.

C1d. Candidate Fora

While the candidate fora sponsored by Tamkeen grantees were designed to highlight candidate platforms and qualifications and thus to encourage voters to let go of the habit of basing their leadership decisions on family ties or patronage, in fact, these fora produced the least comment from interviewees in terms of effectiveness. For the most part, candidate fora were well-attended. For example, six candidate fora in Gaza sponsored by Civitas drew more than 1,300 voters. Mohammed Manasra of Al Hares in Bethlehem reported that 11.9 percent of voters in his district took part in Tamkeen-funded fora organized by his CSO. In all, the candidate fora reached an estimated 46,000 people from among the 1.3 million registered voters.

Even as the fora drew substantial audiences, little information on their effectiveness could be mined from interviewees. On a positive note, the Local Committee for the Rehabilitation for the Disabled in Jenin observed that the fora "helped to break down the barriers between citizens and candidates." Ms. Samah Kessab, project manager for Palestinian Commission for Refugees Rights Protection in Gaza, was thoughtful in her praise of the candidate fora: "I believe that the candidate forums had a good effect, that is, on the watching of the council by the people," she said, adding "now [that the people and the candidate have met, and the candidate knows the people who

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[14] Jarrett Blanc, IFES.
[15] They did this primarily through the Civic Forum Institute.

voted for him] he is trying to do his best for the people." It should be noted that while candidate fora were conducted in a limited fashion during the 1996 PLC election, some Palestinians were familiar with the format from university student council elections.

The study found that there was less enthusiasm for the impact produced by the fora than there was for the observation and voter education components of the Tamkeen program. Two constraints that emerged from interviews were that the fora suffered from over-facilitation[16] and from candidates' lack of preparation. With regard to over-facilitation, many interviewees noted that the facilitator almost fully controlled the dialogue and had the greatest opportunity to interact directly with the candidate. Questions typically were either filtered through the facilitator, who then chose which questions to pose to the candidate, or they were asked by the facilitator himself. The explanation given for this was that there had to be strict controls over the fora because of their political sensitivity. Specifically, CSOs and Tamkeen staff were concerned about potential violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah candidates and supporters. But even when Hamas did not participate, voters did not always have direct contact with the candidate. One example of how this concern manifested itself came from the SDPRC Project Manager Taysir El-Belbaisi in Gaza, who said "We had to be cautious while making the candidate fora because of the political sensitivities [i.e., the chance of clashes between Hamas and Fatah candidates and supporters]. So we had to carefully manage each candidate forum… We believed the facilitator had to ask the questions to clarify the major points of each candidate to prevent problems." (This case illustrates an often-heard occurrence. While it may not be true that there was over-facilitation in all cases, it was repeated to the consultant in enough interviews to make it a viable concern).

Interviewees also generally agreed that better-trained candidates would have made the fora far more useful. This is an important point, because if candidates could not express or did not have a platform, it raises questions about whether there was a level playing field among candidates and whether voters were informed as they cast ballots. Tamkeen was not tasked with the training of political party candidates. That said, the apparent lack of candidate preparedness could only detract from the effectiveness of candidate fora.

C2. Political Discourse and Democratization

The scope of work for this study requires analysis of both the "democratization of Palestine in general", including commentary on Palestinian democratic culture, and whether the programs "succeeded in creating a higher level of democratic political discourse". The analysis included within each point of the study's findings generally addresses these questions. Voter education and domestic observation speak to the issue of discourse insofar as they both create an atmosphere conducive to a democratic vote free of coercion. The code of conduct and candidate fora more directly illustrate the effect of Tamkeen's work on Palestinian political discourse. The question of democratization is addressed separately, in section C2b.

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[16] To research this question, CSO leaders were asked "How was the candidate forum conducted?" They also were asked to describe the steps they followed to carry out each forum.

C2a. Political Discourse

C2a1. The Palestinian Code of Conduct for Political Parties

Made possible by Tamkeen, the code of conduct presents a clear example of the maturity of political discourse in the Palestinian elections. The idea for the code of conduct emerged at a Tamkeen-sponsored conference in Jericho in March 2005, and in discussions that followed Tamkeen, NDI, and the Arab Thought Forum began to formulate it. Signed by all political parties affiliated with the PLC elections, the code of conduct is the primary example of civil society using its position relative to political activity in an inclusive, dynamic fashion. While it is an example of elite discourse, it speaks directly to the goals of the project.

The code of conduct (attached to this report as Annex D) was conceived of as a mechanism for political parties and candidates to "base their campaigns on ideals and standards of democratic principles and to seek inspiration from the morals and precepts of societal trends."[17] It was motivated by the desire to have peaceful and orderly political campaigning that focused on policy issues, avoided personal recrimination, and prevented violence, intimidation, and abuse of elections laws. Supported by NDI and Tamkeen, the ATF took the following steps in pursuit of the code of conduct:

Phase I

- Holding consultative meetings with all political parties and the CEC. The meetings were held during September 2005 and involved the 13 parties that formally agreed to participate in the process in cooperation with the CEC.
- Forming a working group of representatives from each party and the CEC, which were assigned to draft the code.
- Developing a draft of the code, an objective completed in October, 2005.
- Holding a national conference, which culminated with the approval and signing of the code by the heads of the political parties. Civil society leaders also participated in this event, widely covered by the news media, including a live broadcast. The code then was issued and disseminated.[18]

Phase II

- Establishment of a national and sixteen regional committees to oversee the code's implementation and to resolve disputes. Each committee was made up of representatives from all of the code signatories, as well as the ATF and the CEC. The committees created real-time mechanisms to expeditiously resolve disputes, thus avoiding open conflict.

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[17] The code of conduct is found in Annex D. The final report of the ATF, found at www.multaqa.org, is an excellent explanation of the context and its results. It is well worth reading for anyone interested in a thoughtful analysis of the recent Palestinian election cycle.
[18] Ibid.

Phase III

- Establishment and training of a group of non-partisan observers to monitor adherence to the code and to report to the national and regional committees, the CEC, and the Election Monitoring Civil Committee.

In its 25 points, the code includes such provisions and promises as to:

- Abide by the Palestinian Elections Law provisions, the regulations and instructions issued under the law, and by the directions and decisions of the CEC concerning the electoral process and its progress.
- Exclude from the electoral campaign any incitement or challenge against other candidates, political parties or electoral lists; refrain from defamation, slander, or cursing; and abstain from igniting religious fanaticism or exploiting religious, sectarian, tribal, regional, familial, or racial emotions and feelings among citizens.
- Forbid exerting any form of pressure, intimidation, treachery, accusation of disbelief in God, or violence against any candidate and/or any voter.
- Avoid offering or promising any gifts, donations, cash, in-kind assistance, or other benefits to real persons or bodies corporate during the electoral process either in a direct or indirect manner.
- Avoid using the official logo of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Palestinian National Authority, or any similar logo in meetings, posters and electoral statements or writings, drawings, and pictures for campaigning.[19]

Acceptance and ratification of the code required political sophistication, diplomacy, and legitimate compromise. Abdel Rahman Abu Arafeh, ATF's executive director, was engaged in 11th-hour negotiations with the main political parties, whose leaders realized that they had a great deal to gain by taking part in a national education campaign and everything to lose by placing themselves outside of the mainstream of political will surrounding the elections. Having sat at the same table once, there is reason to believe that these parties would be able to govern in a similarly cooperative fashion.

C2a2. The Candidate Fora

Although interviews suggested that they were only modestly effective, the candidate fora also provided an opportunity for political discourse, their very presence serving as an important step toward encouraging constructive political discussion. As noted, the fora introduced political discourse to many Palestinians. One LRC beneficiary, a woman who also put herself forward as a candidate for local elections, said "I am now closer to the people, and because they could evaluate me at the candidate forum, now they ask me, 'Are you working on that issue yet?'"

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[19] See Annex D for full text of the code of conduct.

C2b. Democratization

The concept of democratization is particularly complex, and the question of Tamkeen's impact on "Palestinian democratization" and the culture of democracy must begin by determining whether democratization is to be defined as a process that begins and ends with an election.

Tamkeen's cumulative program gave a number of Palestinians the opportunity to exchange ideas – among grantees and between grantees and candidates – and to exercise their right to vote. The project's mandate during the electoral process was limited to imparting voter education in the classic sense. It sought to ensure that people went to vote; that the vote was inclusive; that people understood their vote was secret; that they voted in a non-violent atmosphere; that they did not fear recrimination for voting their conscience; and that there was no violent reaction to the results.[20]

This analysis would be incomplete, however, without a nod to the duality inherent in the terms democratization and democratic culture. While no system can be legitimized as a democracy without elections, in fact the requirement of elections is only one part of what constitutes a democracy and a democratic culture. The questions to be asked about success in terms of promoting democracy revolve around the content of the democracy promotion program: Whether it spoke exclusively to the democratic ballot and attendant transition, or whether it included such internationally-recognized facets of democratization as: the promotion of political debate; the relationship between government and governed, and how to manage that relationship both in opposition and as the party in power; the organization of civil society and political actors around democratic institutions and policy considerations; and other such "higher" democratic principles traditionally considered indicators of democratic society (this list is illustrative).[21]

Even given Tamkeen's voter education mandate, this study cannot make a definitive analysis of Palestinian democratization based on the work of Tamkeen grantees or on the reactions of the few beneficiaries interviewed again because of the study's predefined methodology. Referring strictly to anecdotal findings, however, one legitimate (if hard to measure) indicator of democratization did frequently present itself: the political motivation of the Palestinian voter. Three items were almost universally cited as factors that motivated the Palestinian voter.

In the Palestinian elections, one of the issues that emerged consistently as a motivating factor to vote for Hamas was the rampant corruption among Fatah representatives. This represents a classic political science model of democratic transition known as "throwing the rascals out," which in turn reflects well-developed

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[20] In addition, the Palestinians to whom I spoke consistently referred to their eagerness for "the next election" or to "what we need to do in the next four years" to vote Hamas out of power. This is surely a victory for the concept of electoral democracy. Neither coup nor violent revolution was mentioned as an option to prompt transition.

[21] Examples come from the consultant's 15 years of USAID democracy and governance work in elections and political processes. In addition, as the workshop coordinator for the development of USAID's elections and political processes indicators, this consultant calls on the broad range of indicators discussed among assistance providers during that process.

democratic political will.[22] A voter is displeased with the way he or she is being represented by the government in power, and shows that displeasure at the polls in an informed, dispassionate fashion.

While this provides us anecdotally with one good indicator for democratization, the 2006 Palestinian elections were more complex than a single-issue vote. The other, often-cited motivations for the Palestinian vote were issues about religion and occupation.[23] As one woman told me, summarizing succinctly the recurring themes that I heard by way of explaining the Hamas victory: "Look, it's easy to vote for God; it's easy to vote against corruption; and it's easy to vote for the one who is killing the most Israelis." This comment sheds light on the many factors that internal actors took into account as they cast their votes in the West Bank and Gaza, each one a more complex indicator to analyze and to measure.

Ultimately, any conclusions surrounding the impact of Tamkeen's work on Palestinian democratization must recognize that Tamkeen was not tasked with the kind of civic education programming that addresses the complex issues of democratization in its election-related scope. While there appears to have been sufficient voter education, there was no in-depth program component related to democratization in Tamkeen's mandate during this period, and so the inculcation of a true democratic culture, that is, the culture of the democratic vote together with the culture of the practice of democratic values, cannot be measured against intent. Many of the CSO leaders to whom I spoke felt that this kind of civic education was an important activity that was missing in their work. (More about this can be found in section D3 of this report).[24]

C2c. Findings on the Election Process and the Perceived Influence of Israel and the U.S.

Though this consultant never asked about external influences on the Palestinian vote, 13 out of 20 interviewees in one-on-one discussions focused extraordinary energy and interview time on the "role of the United States and Israel in the election." Though this report concludes with a value-neutral analysis of these comments, it would seem irresponsible to leave such a statistically significant point out of this effort. Clearly, many interlocutors saw the interview with this consultant as an opportunity to air deeply-held beliefs and complaints. They did so with such consistency that it is

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[22] While this phrase is a favorite among academics and politicians alike, an excellent reference for the theory is the 1985 article by Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, *Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1980,* in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2. (June, 1985), pp. 359-372.

[23] Thirteen of 20 CSO leaders I spoke to insisted that "the occupation" was the single motivating factor in the election, and that the vote was a response to that issue. Other CSO leaders I spoke with, Islam Manasra of Bani Naim, Arel Jaffal of CFI, and Amer Rahhal of LRC, among others, all spoke about "religiosity" as one of the biggest motivators in Palestinian society; this, along with "tribalism" were seen as the biggest challenges to what they consider true democratic action: voting based strictly on candidate qualifications (words in quotation were their word choices, interviews in English except for Rahhal). This finding came regardless of the positive impact Tamkeen had on de-emphasizing family voting and the pressures of "tribalism."

[24] In fact, three people I spoke with (Mohammed Manasra from Al Hares, a successful Fatah candidate in Bethlehem, and Deputy Minister of Information Ahmed Soboh, who represented Fatah on the Code of Conduct Committee) and the leadership of CFI, among others, all made a strong argument that the January 25 elections were not actually free and fair, based on the lack of information voters had to make their choices.

appropriate to include their opinions. Further, the theme does speak to the question asked in the consultant's scope of work: "Overall, what was the contribution of Tamkeen and its grantees to the conduct of free and fair local and national elections?"

The question of whether the election was free and fair involves myriad factors, most of which cannot be analyzed by a three-week consultancy. One issue mentioned repeatedly as having an impact on the free and fair nature of the elections does bear comment, however, if for no other reason than that it was the most frequently heard comment – and contradiction – over the course of the study. It is the issue of the effect of the occupation by Israel on the conduct of the election. The linkage between free and fair elections and these issues was made by interlocutors, not by this consultant.

During the course of this consultancy, interviewees talked constantly about the occupation, and consistently presented two conflicting ideas about the role of Israel and the occupation in the election cycle. On the one hand, they insisted that the entire election cycle, culminating in the January 25, 2006 Legislative Council elections, could not be considered outside of the context of the "Israeli occupation of Palestine." In fact, Israeli and U.S. election-related positions most often were conflated, and even the results of the election were laid at the feet of these forces. I was told repeatedly that the elections "could not have been free or fair," because "it is Sharon and Bush's fault together that Hamas won the election." On the other hand, I was told by the same people that these elections were in fact technically free, fair and sovereign, and that the Palestinians had gone to the polls to vote their conscience free from external influence. While some Palestinians claim to have felt pressured to vote for Hamas because the Israeli and U.S. governments were against the terrorist party,[25] the widespread belief in the secrecy of the vote and the confidence in a free and fair process meant that inside the voting booth, people could vote what they believed, and not what they felt pressured to do, indicating ultimately that Hamas' victory was simply a matter of voters' preference.[26]

For a final word on the subject of the relationship between the election and occupation, this reports defers to the conclusion arrived at by the Arab Thought Forum in its own final report, which states "despite living under Israel's military rule, Palestinians proved the occupation cannot be used as an excuse to hinder their political, social, cultural and democratic development, all of which was evident by the success of the elections." [27] In other words, the nature of the electoral process was a victory for the Palestinian people that they can embrace as their own.

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[25] Over and over, I was directed to Israeli and U.S. statements about Hamas as the reason Palestinians would vote for Hamas and against Fatah. In addition, virtually every person asked insisted that the most effective campaign slogan by Hamas was "The US says no to Hamas; Israel says no to Hamas… And you?"

[26] An excellent historical example of this is the 1990 Nicaraguan election. In that case, all the polls (except one by an Argentine firm) anticipated a victory for the Sandinistas. What happened was, voters—who were unsure of what the Sandinistas would do to them if they told the truth to a pollster, but were confident of international assurances that the vote would be fair, secret and free from recrimination—told the pollsters they would vote for Ortega, but inside the voting booth they voted their conscience: they checked the box for Chamorro in landslide numbers.

[27] ATF Final Report, www.multaqa.org

C3. Capacity Building, Confidence, and Reputation

The capacity of CSOs to conduct election-related democracy and governance work is discussed throughout this report in the form of voter education, domestic observation, training, and other related initiatives. In this section, capacity building is broken down into three categories: organizational capacity; increased self-confidence of an entity to move forward and expand its work; and heightened profile and reputation in terms of high quality work, integrity, and trustworthiness, all of which speak to a CSO's ability to carry out a multitude of programs, including but not limited to democracy and governance programs. The first category incorporates objectively verifiable indicators; the others are not quantifiable but can be assessed anecdotally.

Tamkeen appears to have affected these areas in a positive manner. On the question of confidence, however, while CSOs displayed high self-confidence in their capabilities, it is not clear that they have the ability to continue their work in a coordinated fashion without the support of Tamkeen.

C3a. Organizational Capacity Building

C3a1. Indicators for Success in Organizational Capacity Building

- CSOs used the proposal and report writing techniques they learned from Tamkeen to win funding for add-on activities from other international donors.

Leaders of the one CSO in Nablus, for example, said that after taking Tamkeen's proposal writing workshops they had gained international and national donor support, as well as new partners. "We have a great network now," one of the CSO's leaders said. The Arab Thought Forum, a long-time USAID grantee, also attributed a measure of its progress to the Tamkeen proposal workshop and the techniques it imparted. The other side to these findings is the enthusiasm of the UNDP governance representative who heaped praise on Tamkeen for preparing CSOs to work with other donors. Muneir Kleibo from UNDP told me that when the UNDP was looking to reach CSOs covering remote villages, they found a CSO in Nablus that "had already learned the important art of proposal writing from Tamkeen and more. What I needed to present to the final funding committee, I had in a week – the analysis, the information and the proposal, in an efficient and timely way. The way [the CSO] handled it, from A to Z, made me very pleased." Two CSOs that received funding from the UNDP carried on projects originally developed with Tamkeen.

- CSOs adopted international standard administration and accounting systems for their daily operations.

As one example, Mohammed Manasra, the director of Al Hares, was proud of the systems set up at his organization's headquarters. Along with computer hardware and network connections (provided by different donors in coordination), and a new Web site, Manasra pointed to administrative bylaws, a professional organizational structure, financial procedures, and an audit system that meets international standards, all introduced by Tamkeen. "Now we are ready to take on any project," he said.

- CSOs were able to expand the reach of their services beyond their traditional base not only because of the increased funding but also because of specific techniques learned and skills transferred.

A CSO in Nablus, for instance, had no experience in election work before participating in the Tamkeen program. "We are neutral, and we wanted to do something about the elections," one of the CSO's leaders said. "We had it in our hearts, but it only became possible through Tamkeen." The organization cited the workshops, especially the ones led by international consultants, the materials Tamkeen made available, and the periodic feedback and evaluations that Tamkeen required, as having helped the organization to strengthen its knowledge and capacity in the realm of election work.

For LRC, Tamkeen-sponsored candidate fora helped cultivate a working relationship with grassroots organizations that will continue into the future. The training of trainers, the outreach techniques to conduct voter education and observation, and the process of organizing candidate fora enabled the group to reach beyond the Jenin refugee camp to some 40 villages throughout the Jenin Governorate. Not only did the organization reach more grass roots groups, but it learned techniques for organizing and coordinating small local beneficiaries, which can be a precursor to large-scale advocacy work.

- Repetition of techniques and skills learned through multiple rounds of elections reduced the need for additional training of trainers and increased efficiency and quality of CSO beneficiary education.

There is no question that the multiple rounds of elections served as an ideal training ground for improving CSOs' skills and techniques. Tamkeen established evaluative mechanisms, such as the May 2005 report to USAID about election observation, to continually assess, refine, and improve its own work and that of its beneficiaries.

Tamkeen seemed to strike the right balance between transferring skills and techniques for capacity building and inserting its own agenda. Ismail Njoum from Mawrid, an organization for teaching democratic principles in schools, said "We learned much from Tamkeen. We did not change our vision, but we developed the capacity of our organization to carry out our vision… [Tamkeen] brought us the kinds of skills that allow us to realize our own vision."[28]

C3a2. Further Need for Capacity Building

In virtually all cases examined, capacity building was considered to be very well done, but there was disagreement about whether the job of capacity building was complete, or whether more capacity building should be funded.

I was told by a number of CSOs that they feel their capacity building needs are met, and that they do not need more donor funding in this area (The Al Hares leader said, "Please don't give me more funds for building my systems. Just give me money to pay my staff and do my programs.") However, there were greater numbers of CSOs that said more capacity building was needed. For the most part, the smaller CSOs felt they needed more capacity-building support (this was a common refrain from CSOs such as Al Amal, Civitas, and SDPRC in Gaza, and Juhoud in the West Bank, among others), but even the larger CSOs, envisioning an expanding mandate and role for

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[28] This interview was conducted in English with no translation

themselves, recognized that additional skills and capacities might be needed (this from LRC, Bani Naim, and others).

C3b. Profile and Reputation

C3b1. A "Seal of Approval"

The international donor community and other entities regard Tamkeen as a "seal of approval," which is to say that if a CSO has been vetted and supported by Tamkeen then it is viewed as a competent organization with integrity, and is expected to be a good partner. This was especially important to the UNDP, who sought out Tamkeen grantees when capable partners were needed. From their own stories, I also learned from CSOs that, along with the proposal writing and budgeting skills they took from their Tamkeen training, they touted themselves as Tamkeen grantees to other donors because that carried substantial weight.[29]

C3b2. Visibility

Tamkeen capacity building activities boosted the profile and reputation of CSOs across the political landscape and among the organizations' constituents. The profile and reputation of the democracy and governance CSOs was raised by the visible work they did in coordinating political parties (ATF) and other CSOs (CFI, by coordinating CSOs to field observers and in printing and distributing the voter education material). The same is true for the charitable organizations and service delivery CSOs, but with results that were less visible on a national scale. For example, LRC raised its profile because, with Tamkeen's funding and capacity building, it was able to reach about 50 villages outside of the Jenin camp, its traditional base. LRC's reputation as a "go to" organization for democracy and governance issues became firmly established because of the relationships it forged with women's groups, youth, and disabled citizens during the candidate fora and voter education.

C3c. CSO Coordination

As discussed elsewhere in this study, there were a number of coordinated CSO efforts, such as preparation and dissemination of voter education material, domestic monitoring, and group training. It unlikely, however, that the heightened level of coordination established by Tamkeen will continue in the absence of the project. Ismail Njoum of Mawrid, speaking in excellent English, offered comments echoed by many CSOs:[30]

"The CSO community will continue to benefit from the kind of umbrella that Tamkeen provides. We want to further develop the role of CSOs in society as a whole, and we will perform better with a body who will take the initiative to convene meetings, discuss issues of mutual importance, and prod us to do joint activities. It is still more compelling to attend a meeting when Tamkeen convenes it and does the inviting. We still have singular interests, and we still suffer from competition among ourselves. No local organization has the capacity to serve as coordinator or to organize an effective coalition – not yet, not at this time."

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[29] One example is ATF.
[30] With the exceptions of Al Hares and CFI, which view themselves in part as CSO coordinating entities.

The context in which Njoum made the above comment reflects an important socio-political trend in thinking that needs to be highlighted here. Njoum described his view of the electoral results this way: "The new ruling party cannot understand humanity itself. This is a darkness for me. Hamas has a different view of education and social structure, and since the work we were doing was not codified under law, we think they will make laws that do not see our vision. We have to prepare ourselves to present our own philosophy, and we have to be prepared to resist that [the potential new laws]. You must work together and prepare a coalition to do that." Thus the importance of CSOs working in a coalition, and the perception that they currently do not have that capacity, takes on direct, practical meaning.

C4. Tamkeen's Role in Relation to Other Efforts to Educate Voters

This study sought to place Tamkeen's work in the larger context of assistance activities, by investigating how the major elements of Tamkeen's election assistance program fit into the overall effort to educate Palestinian voters in both local and national elections, including efforts by NGOs, international assistance providers, and the election authority.

C4a. Tamkeen's Role Regarding the Electoral Authority

The High Commission for Local Elections (HCLE) was an administrative body created on a provisional basis under the authority of the Ministry for Local Government, an institution of the Palestinian Authority. The HCLE received no funding in support of its mandate. When its work with the local elections was finished, it was disbanded, and all electoral management was absorbed by the Central Election Commission.

Constraints to the performance of the HCLE were numerous, including a lack of financial resources and trained staff. In interviews with both Bashar Deek, the former director of the HCLE, and Jarrett Blanc, IFES' in-country election expert, Tamkeen's contributions to the local elections process through voter education, especially the design, printing, and dissemination of voter education material and domestic monitoring through Palestinian CSOs, "made the local elections possible."[31] The IFES on-site election specialist was insistent in his view that the role of domestic monitors was decisive in the conduct of the local elections in a free and fair manner. He was clear that while he was not a supporter of this secondary election authority body for technical management reasons, nonetheless the need for voter education to clarify the electoral law as well as non-partisan observation was a prerequisite for a smooth and inclusive election, and that process had to be managed by a competent body. In this way, Tamkeen's efforts were designed to complement the electoral authority's work.

C4b.Other CSOs

Tamkeen worked to put voter education materials into as many hands as possible, including CSOs, which would then train others using a training-of-trainers format; the election authorities; and voters themselves. As noted elsewhere in this report, among CFI, Mawrid, and ATF, 335,000 copies of voter education materials were printed and distributed. The CSOs worked together. For example, after May 2005, local experts were engaged under a Tamkeen grant to CFI to refine the materials and produce a

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[31] Bashar Deek

high-quality booklet that could be used by all CSOs for voter education efforts. At the same time, a common training-of-trainers program was developed and used by the Tamkeen CSO network in the West Bank and Gaza. (See Annex A.)

Domestic monitoring, too, was a joint effort among CSOs. As discussed in detail in sections C1a and C1b and throughout this study, CSOs coordinated on many aspects of the Tamkeen program. Training sessions on domestic monitoring were held jointly, common materials were employed, and Tamkeen international consultants provided training to trainers in a group format. Such workshops were conducted not only for training but also for evaluation, including some for this study. Among grants made, Tamkeen sometimes required CSOs to work together, in part to bring smaller CSOs into the mix.[32]

C4c. International Assistance Efforts

Donor coordination is an important and difficult task to achieve. To their credit, Tamkeen's management was diligent in maintaining the logic of Tamkeen's efforts in light of the bigger picture of international assistance. There was constant monitoring of the Election Reform Support Group (ERSG), and consistent networking with international assistance providers and donors to avoid duplication of effort. The NDI country representative said that Tamkeen fulfilled its part of the "equation" when it carried out the domestic monitoring component of the election. I was also told by the UNDP representative for governance that it "relied on Tamkeen's input and grantees to complement [its] work"[33] and that the ATF code of conduct that Tamkeen funded was "the most impressive and important project" for the conduct of the election. It is important to remember that the code of conduct was itself a joint effort of NDI and Tamkeen, created to fill a perceived gap in the process.

It appears that Tamkeen fulfilled its mandate and filled gaps in assistance where they were evident and it was appropriate, with no duplication of effort.

C5. The Impact of the Code of Conduct Work Conducted by ATF

Discussed throughout this study, the impact of the code of conduct was overwhelmingly positive. The work of the Arab Thought Forum demonstrates very acutely what USAID and Tamkeen can accomplish in the realm of democracy and governance work. The story of the code of conduct as an activity funded by Tamkeen is really two stories that speak to the role of the CSO in the electoral process. First, through the actions of the ATF in creating the code, it demonstrated the powerful influence an NGO can have in the political sphere while maintaining its own status as a non-political actor. Second, the code and the monitoring component that followed was by all accounts an important activity in the progression of a peaceful electoral process and a key element of what was called "the accumulation of trust" in the democratic process.

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[32] This was true particularly of CFI, which played an umbrella role in the printing and dissemination of voter education materials and in the deployment of observers. Tamkeen required that representatives from partner CSOs be included in the management of these projects and not only as beneficiaries.
[33] Muneir Kleibo, UNDP Governance

D. Recommendations and Conclusions

The scope of work asks what could be done to improve election-related initiatives by CSOs in future elections. Recommendations are outlined below.

D1. Emphasize Work with Secular, Far-Reaching Charitable Organizations

Tamkeen's approach to supporting CSO efforts in the electoral process was a smart, effective dual-track initiative. Tamkeen focused on two different spheres or tiers of civil society. On one track, they made grants to the so-called service delivery tier, which in this case was made up of very well established charitable organizations (e.g., Bani Naim, and LRC), and special interest service delivery organizations (e.g., Al Amal, for the deaf and hard of hearing). On the other track, Tamkeen funded recognized democracy and governance organizations, specifically Arab Thought Forum and CFI, which (though CFI denies this characterization) do not enjoy grassroots reach to the same extent as the service delivery organizations but do have contacts with and enjoy status among urban and national political elites.

By pursuing this dual-track program of grants and assistance, Tamkeen was able to make an impact on the range of actors and tiers of political discourse.[34]

Tamkeen should continue to work with existing democracy and governance CSOs, and to identify new players who can affect policy (or who can be trained to affect policy) through citizen and political party advocacy. When considering the long-term Palestinian progress, the current and potential impact of far-reaching, charitable organizations must not be overlooked. These organizations, especially the older ones, have strong grassroots networks, are well-respected, and are not tied to any one political party. They also control a large number of services related to public health, education, and welfare, and as a consequence they carry great leadership weight in various communities. They can serve as a secular counterweight to the religious grassroots organizations whose reach is extensive.

Visiting Bani Naim charitable organization in Hebron was like visiting a town. The group owns multiple buildings at three locations in Hebron. The facilities that I visited included a fully-equipped medical clinic with full-time nurses and doctors, obstetric and pediatric facilities, and outpatient services. Bani Naim hosts a kindergarten that educates children from miles around. The organization sponsors income-generating cooperatives for women and provides free Internet access and computer training. Additionally, it is a charity that gives out free food, medicine, and clothing to those in need. It is a mainstay of the extended community, reaching deep into the roots of Palestinian society in ways that traditionally defined service delivery organizations do not. In Bani Naim's case, its director, Islam Manasra, is a local hero and a revered personality, and his constituency has only benefited from his thoughtful, political vision. And Manasra has counterparts elsewhere, such as Amer Rahhal from LRC in Jenin. There are many well respected charitable organizations throughout the West Bank.

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[34] By working with well-established CSOs like CFI and ATF, Tamkeen also was able to have these CSOs provide training and assistance to smaller, less sophisticated CSOs. In this way, the program stopped using external training resources after May, 2005.

These charitable organizations may be fertile ground for effective civil society strengthening as USAID and Tamkeen continue their democracy and governance work in the West Bank and Gaza.

D2. Oversight

Programmatic oversight of projects is an ongoing concern that pervades all of the activities carried out in the West Bank and Gaza because of difficult, though not impossible, restrictions on movement of Palestinian staff. This is a chronic problem in an area controlled by checkpoints. While international staff members have few problems (except for occasional inconvenience at international "VIP" checkpoints), Palestinian staff members have difficulty moving about to conduct satisfactory oversight procedures in some areas of the West Bank (e.g., the far north West Bank near Jenin).

This consultant was impressed by the ingenuity employed by Tamkeen staff in working through the related oversight obstacles. For example, Tamkeen staff members managed to continue their work in Gaza even when it was impossible to travel there by managing the Gaza office and staff via videoconference. In fact, I conducted one group workshop with 13 CSO leaders and four individual interviews with Gaza CSO leaders using this technology.

Programmatic oversight for training sessions, candidate fora, and other activities was nevertheless curtailed at times. This is important because voter education training, for example, is historically hard to conduct, and it is hard to relay the information, even after receiving training in a trainer-of-trainers format. This problem is exacerbated in an area where even CSO leaders are voting under a new system and new laws. It is always a good idea to have periodic and consistent oversight at the beneficiary level.[35]

D3. Civic Education Programming and the 'Positives' of Democracy

As noted above, many grantees asserted that Palestinians would have benefited extensively – even to the point of changing their choice in the polling booth – had they been educated about the more nuanced nature of "democratic culture" in addition to the voter education received. Those who claimed that the vote was neither free nor fair used this argument to make the case that Palestinians were not sufficiently informed about democratic values and that ultimately many people voted on the basis of emotion or tribal allegiance, rather than rationally.[36]

Of course, Tamkeen did not have this responsibility in its mandate. The work done before and during the election, and the holding of elections itself, is part of the cumulative effect of democratization, but it speaks most directly to the vote. Other aspects of democracy and democratization can now be pursued, such as citizens holding elected officials to their campaign promises and governance mandate; citizens requiring elected officials to speak to the bigger issues of public opinion (e.g., negotiation with Israel and security issues); and active political debate that centers on post-election governance.

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[35] Oversight is an important principle behind every activity funded by a responsible organization, and no less so when the funding agency is accountable to the American taxpayer.
[36] Refer to section 2b for discussion on this point.

D4. Finding Space for Civil Society in the New Government Structure

Civil society and the organizations that represent it face many challenges, and one of the strongest may be the new role of the freely-elected local councils. This also may be an issue at the national level, although findings for this study were concentrated at the local level, which has been virtually government-free for years. Up to this point, Palestinian civil society has acted not in the space between government and the family traditionally allocated to civil society, but in place of the government. Even though local councils existed, they were easily dismissed not only because of their performance as bloated patronage machines, but also because they were appointed rather than given their mandate by the people they were supposed to serve. It may be that, if elected local councils prove up to the task of truly representing their constituents and providing services in a transparent and fair manner, then the work of helping civil society to find its rightful place between the family and state will have just begun.

D5. Timing

A recurring complaint of all of the CSOs interviewed was that there was not enough time to complete their pre-election activities. Of course, this is a factor that is out of the donors' hands. Everyone recognized that it was the timing of the call for elections that created the need to move quickly. Much to Tamkeen's credit, the organization was able to shift its grant-making, capacity-building, and training activities quickly and efficiently to meet the new needs. From the comments that I heard, I conclude that Tamkeen's CSO partners were sufficiently mature as organizations to adjust their programs to meet the needs of the elections, and that their familiarity with Tamkeen – and vice versa – made the transition possible and relatively easy.

D6. Literature

I had the opportunity to tour the facilities of a number of CSOs, all of which were impressively outfitted for their purpose. One particular charitable organization, Bani Naim, stands out in my mind. For all of its highly-developed resources, it was surprising not to see any books or printed material available for the people who visit daily. This was true of all of the community-service offerings I saw in the West Bank. The Palestinians are proud to say that they are a highly-educated people with minimal illiteracy, although a lack of literacy likely would be concentrated in the very villages these organizations serve. It seems that some effort to help CSOs acquire reading materials on democratic life, institutions, and other aspects of good governance would be a positive addition to continued civil society strengthening. Resource centers have been set up in other parts of the world as "democracy libraries." They are inexpensive to create and are a good place for like-minded individuals to meet in a way that cannot be accomplished with a computer lab. Resources made available for on-site use could include articles by the international community about civil society, election systems, or rule of law; sample training materials; service delivery distribution models; or election laws. In addition to offerings from the Arab world, many U.S. NGOs have such materials readily available in Arabic

D7. Youth

Much more work needs to be done with youth, according to the CSOs interviewed. Consider that if an election is to be held in four years, then there is a generation of upcoming voters that has not been exposed to the process of democratic voting. While Tamkeen's election-related projects directly reached a total of 24,818 youths, observers said this represents a "drop in the bucket" compared to future needs.

The success of the election cycle in the West Bank and Gaza rests on the independence and confidence of Palestinian voters. Tamkeen's program was an important contribution to the overall efforts to educate Palestinians about their rights and role as voters in a free and fair election. It was well designed and implemented in partnership with – and in the service of – an active and sophisticated civil society.

Tamkeen can be credited with carefully considered and culturally-appropriate program design and implementation. It deservedly enjoys a good reputation throughout the West Bank and Gaza, and in the international community of donors and assistance providers.

ANNEX A:
TAMKEEN ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS BY TIMING OF THE ELECTIONS[37]

Election Activity and Date	Tamkeen Activity and Outputs
First round of local elections December 23, 2004: West Bank (39 municipalities) Jan 27, 2005: Gaza Strip (Five municipalities)	Grants: In addition to two ongoing simplified grants implemented by CFI and Our Rights (total: $190,034), Tamkeen issued the first round of elections fixed obligation grants (FOGs). Tamkeen awarded 12 new FOGs to as many organizations for the first round of local elections and the presidential vote (see below). The total value of these grants was $139,945, with about half going to the West Bank and about half going to the Gaza Strip. All grants supported voter education and candidate fora. Tamkeen also conducted an initial capacity building initiative for CSOs in mounting non-partisan election observation mission. The program was led by two international consultants fielded by Chemonics, with assistance from the Tamkeen professional team. While Tamkeen did not fund election observation for the first round of local elections, most partners fielded observers on a voluntary basis using the skills they learned from Tamkeen. For most partners, it was the first time they had conducted election observation of any type.
Presidential election January 9, 2005	No Tamkeen grants were awarded to CSOs to support work related to the presidential elections. However, most partner CSOs fielded non-partisan observers using training received during Tamkeen's initial capacity building program (see above).

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[37] Tamkeen supplied all the information in this annex; it was not collected by the consultant. Some of the statistics in the chart have been updated due to the close-out of the election grants. As such, some statistics presented to USAID in March have changed.

Election Activity and Date	Tamkeen Activity and Outputs
Second round of local elections May 5, 2005: In 86 municipalities (84 in the West Bank, 2 in the Gaza Strip)	*Tamkeen lead-up to local elections.* In mid-March 2005, after releasing observation reports on the first round of municipal and presidential elections, Tamkeen hosted a two-day conference in Jericho for 42 representatives from key CSOs, the CEC, the HCLE, and major donors[38]. The conference's main recommendations included: • Coordination of stakeholder efforts • Independence of the CEC and HCLE • Election law • Integrity and transparency • Codes of conduct • Voter lists • Voter education *Capacity building in voter education and conducting candidate forums.* Responding to a need identified during the first round of election grants, Chemonics fielded two expatriate consultants (Alawi and Collins-Foley) to conduct training programs in methods of voter education and conducting candidate fora. The consultants also contributed to the conference (see above) and helped CSOs develop a first set of voter education materials. *Support to HCLE.* Awarding a two-week grant to the CFI, Tamkeen agreed to cover the cost of nine advertisements ($20,757) on behalf of HCLE informing the public about the registration process for the second round of elections. *Observation.* With Tamkeen assistance, partner CSOs fielded 393 non-partisan observers. In an improvement over the first round of local elections, CSOs were asked to coordinate observation efforts with one another and the Election Monitoring Civil Committee. In Gaza, all training and fielding of partner observers was unified, by agreement, under the leadership of one CSO. *Material development.* CFI was awarded a one-month grant in the amount of $16,534 to prepare and print 15,000 copies of the voter education booklet and 165,000 copies of five flyers on the role of security forces, voting and counting procedures, and campaign regulations. *Voter education.* Tamkeen issued 22 grants worth $316,918 to 21 partners to implement voter education and candidate fora. Of the grants, three (total $50, 857) were awarded to as many Gaza CSOs to prepare material for and educate the hard of hearing on their voter rights and elections procedures. The grants also supported translation of the voter guide into a sign language booklet, the first of its kind in the Palestinian territories.

[38] During the conference, three working groups analyzed major challenges affecting the election process, prioritized those challenges, and proposed solutions. Issues discussed included election laws and enforcement mechanisms, independence of the CEC and HCLE, election day preparations, voter registration, voter education, and election security and conflict prevention.

Election Activity and Date	Tamkeen Activity and Outputs
Third round of local elections September 29, 2005 Elections were held in 3 Gaza municipalities and 82 in the West Bank.	Tamkeen signed four grants valued at $40,613 with as many CSOs to conduct voter education and candidate forums in the West Bank. Because of the late announcement of the election date, only limited voter education programs were possible. One of the grants involved the provision of alternative voter education through a drama or short play as presented to the public in many villages in the Nablus district. Unifying observation efforts, Tamkeen signed two grants with the Civic Forum Institute (CFI), which chaired the executive committee of the Election Monitoring Civil Committee, to field 800 domestic non-partisan observers, mostly in the West Bank. Coordinating with the CFI, four other partners also fielded observers.
Fourth round of local elections December 15, 2005 Held in the West Bank, where 37 of 44 municipalities were targeted, and the Gaza Strip, where three municipalities were targeted.	Tamkeen issued six grants valued at $46,684 to as many CSOs to conduct voter education and candidate fora. Tamkeen also issued two grants valued at $46,684 to CFI to field 920 domestic, non-partisan observers and supervisors on behalf of the Election Monitoring Civil Committee.
Legislative elections January 25, 2006	Tamkeen launched two major initiatives to educate voters about the PLC elections and conduct candidate fora, the first in July and August 2005 and the second in December 2005 and January 2006. In all, the project issued 39 grants valued at $772,522. Voter education initiatives directly reached 58,011 people, while candidate forums reached an additional 11,966. To prepare for the program, Tamkeen brought its partners together to develop a common set of voter education materials and a trainers guide during June 2005. A subcommittee of partner CSOs drafted the materials, which there then designed and printed by CFI. The CEC participated in the materials development process, and reviewed the final voter education guide before 85,000 copies were printed and distributed. To further ensure quality programs, Tamkeen required all CSO voter education trainers to attend a common training-of-trainers program on the materials. While the TOT program was conducted under a Tamkeen/CFI grant, CFI engaged experts from two other CSOs to augment its staff. The training of trainers program was repeated in December 2005 in Gaza under a grant to another CSO before the launch of the second stage of the program. *Generating high-level discussion about the elections and their possible impact.* The impact of new elections laws on the future Palestinian political map was discussed among civil society and political actors in a series of workshops and in a final conference in Ramallah conducted by the ATF under a Tamkeen grant. The ATF credits the conference with generating initial interest in the code of conduct and credibility for the CSO with a range of political actors. Issues such as including other factions in the entire government (not just the PLC) and the dangers of the mixed system of representation for disorganized parties were raised

	and discussed in the final conference. Noted pollster Khalil Shakaki was engaged to write a background paper for the entire series and participated in the end-of-project conference.
	The ATF Code of Conduct. Three grants were carried out between August 2005 and February 2006 to negotiate, draft, sign, and follow up parties' adherence to the code though national follow-up committees and 84 field monitors. The code was signed by 13 parties on October 17, 2005 and in December 2005 and January 2006, by Hamas and other, newly registered candidate lists.
	With Tamkeen's encouragement, partner Al-Mawrid developed a simple guide for children, working with other CSOs and representatives from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the Ministry of Education. Al-Mawrid and Ed-Net both conducted training for teachers and students in UNRWA, public, and private schools in the West Bank. By itself, Al-Mawrid reached all UNRWA middle-schools in the West Bank. In total, Tamkeen partners distributed 80,000 copies of the brochure for school children in December 2005 and January 2006.

ANNEX B:
Tamkeen Grants from December 2004 to January 2006[39]

	Grant No.	CSO Name	Value	Location	VOTER EDUCATION					CANDIDATE FORUMS					OBSERVATION
					No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Observers
					No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		
															FIRST ROUND OF LOCAL ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: DECEMBER 2004 TO JANUARY 2005
1	04-303	Local Rehabilitation Committee	$6,316	North West Bank				160	6				0	0	0
2	04-303	Al Lod Society	$12,350	North West Bank				0	0				2,840	23	0
3	04-301	Palestinian Center for Helping Resolve Community Disputes	$6,152	North West Bank	168	526	190	884	18	101		88	189	6	0
4	04-300	Arab Thought Forum	$20,222	Middle & North West Bank				0	0	446	1,767		2,213	16	0
5	04-299	Juhoud	$11,825	Middle West Bank	80		20	100	4				600	5	0
6	04-254	Our Rights	$60,961	Middle Gaza	100	300		400	10	150	300		450	7	0
7	04-308	Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection	$8,900	Middle Gaza	200	300		500	10	150	350		500	7	100
8	04-309	Palestinian Association for Legal Sciences	$8,025	Middle Gaza				0	0				0	0	100
9	04-310	Peace Center	$10,104	South Gaza	200	150		350	10	200	300		500	10	0
10	04-311	Society for Developing Palestinian Refugee Camps	$11,678	South Gaza	400	500		900	22	0	0	0	0	0	10
11	04-312	Human Development Association	$10,006.78	South Gaza	100	300		400	10	250	300		550	10	0
12	04-313	Our Rights	$13,360.72	Middle Gaza	0	0	0	0	0	300	350		650	13	0
13	04-304	Al Hares Center	$21,006	South West				0	0				0		83

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[39] The number of participants reflects those individuals who attended a particular event or participated in observation. It does not account for possible double counting if individuals attended more than one event (e.g., a voter education workshop and then a candidate forum).

				Bank											
14	04-289	Civic Forum Institute	$129,073.40	All West Bank				4,085	122				672	34	0
TOTAL			**$329,979.90**		**1,248**	**2,076**	**210**	**7,779**	**212**	**1,597**	**3,367**	**88**	**9,164**	**131**	**299**

SECOND ROUND OF LOCAL ELECTIONS: MAY 2005														
	Grant No.	CSO Name	Value	Location	VOTER EDUCATION					CANDIDATE FORUMS					OBSERVATION
					No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Observers
					No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		
1	05-345	Al Hares Center	$16,885	South West Bank (WB)	271	1,543		1,814	16	164	60		224	10	0
2	05-344	Al Mawrid Center	$19,096	South WB	399	169	406	974	28				0	0	51
3	05-343	Arab Thought Forum	$23,288	All West Bank				0	0				3,600	24	0
4	05-342	Association of Women	$23,400	Middle WB	541	535	237	1,313	50				0	0	0
5	05-341	Bani Naeem	$22,709	South WB	410	549		959	25	320	1,015		1,335	8	0
6	05-340	Al Lod Society	$22,473	North WB	852	995		1,847	50				0	0	100
7	05-339	Palestinian Center for Democracy & Conflict Resolution	$21,200	North WB	1,334	686	357	2,377	45				720	8	0
8	05-338	Local Committee	$19,779	North WB	1,070	667	841	2,578	60	837	733		1,570	20	0
9	05-336	Islamic University of Gaza	$12,440.32	Middle Gaza			1,900	1,900	30				0	0	0
10	05-335	Human Development Association	$7,820	South Gaza	0	0	0	0	0	600	700		1,300	12	10
11	05-334	Society for Developing Palestinian Refugee Camps	$16,603	South Gaza	500	700	900	2,100	20	250	1,600		1,850	10	40
12	05-333	Our Rights	$18,718	Middle Gaza	450	250		700	20	500	1,000		1,500	10	0
13	05-332	Al Sharq Center	$16,395	South Gaza	450	750		1,200	28				0		0
14	05-331	Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection	$15,744	North Gaza	500	700		1,200	16		1,000		1,000	10	15
15	05-330	Al Amal Rehabilitation Society	$15,235	South Gaza	150	200		350	12	120	115		235	8	0
16	05-329	Maghazi Society	$11,546	Middle Gaza	90	110		200	6	40	60		100	4	0
17	05-328	Jabalia Society	$8,268	North Gaza	25	35		60	3	70	80		150	3	0

	Grant No.	CSO Name	Value	Location	No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total	No. of Sessions	No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total	No. of Sessions	No. of Observers
18	05-323	Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection	$7,501	Middle Gaza				0					0	0	100
19	05-359	Juhoud	$15,028	Middle WB	230		270	500	12				900	8	53
20	05-361	Arab Thought Forum	$2,790	Middle WB				0	0				0	0	24
TOTAL			**$316,918.32**		**7,272**	**7,889**	**4,911**	**20,072**	**421**	**2,901**	**6,363**	**0**	**14,484**	**135**	**393**

THIRD ROUND OF LOCAL ELECTIONS: SEPTEMBER 2005															
					VOTER EDUCATION					CANDIDATE FORUMS					OBSERVATION
	Grant No.	CSO Name	Value	Location	No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Observers
					No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		
1	05-387	CFI	$20,463	South West Bank				0	0				0	0	400
2	05-386	CFI	$16,302	North West Bank				0	0				0	0	400
3	05-385	Al Lod (drama)	$8,725	South West Bank	66	591		657	23				0	0	51
4	05-384	Al Hares	$11,105	South West Bank				0	0	691	1,314		2,005	12	30
5	05-383	Bani Naeem	$9,077	South West Bank				0	0	105	699		804	8	20
6	05-382	Juhoud	$11,706	Middle West Bank				0	0				850	3	99
TOTAL			**$77,378**		**66**	**591**	**0**	**657**	**23**	**796**	**2,013**	**0**	**3659**	**23**	**1,000**

FOURTH ROUND OF LOCAL ELECTIONS: DECEMBER 2005															
					VOTER EDUCATION					CANDIDATE FORUMS					OBSERVATION
	Grant No.	CSO Name	Value ($)	Location	No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Observers
					No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		
1	05-401	Our Rights	$5,010.61	North Gaza	120	200	100	420	14				0	0	0
2	05-402	Human Development	$8,945.50	South Gaza	300	700		1,000	30	70	180	100	350	5	0
3	05-395	ATF	$13,793.00	Middle & North WB				0	0	30	379		409	7	0
4	05-392	CFI	$24,853.00	All West Bank				0	0				0	0	460
5	05-391	CFI	$21,346.00	All West Bank				0	0				0	0	460
6	05-389	Al Lod	$5,699.00	North WB				0	0	534	383		917	12	0
7	05-388	Local rehabilitation Committee	$13,221.00	North WB				0	0	1,772	2,124		3,896	42	0
8	05-394	Juhoud	See PLC elections	Middle WB				0	0				1,250	3	0
TOTAL			**$92,868.11**		**420**	**900**	**100**	**1,420**	**44**	**2,406**	**3,066**	**100**	**6,822**	**69**	**920**

					VOTER EDUCATION					CANDIDATE FORUMS					OBSERVATION
					No. of Participants					No. of Participants					
	Grant No.	CSO Name	Value	Location	No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total	No. of Sessions	No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total	No. of Sessions	No. of Observers
1	05-416	Taawon	$20,350	North & Middle West Bank (WB)	1,046		866	1,912	52				0	0	0
2	05-415	Kalandia	$12,273	Middle WB	466	231	309	1,006	32				0	0	0
3	05-414	Local Committee	$14,002	North WB	432	376	387	1,195	48	750	998		1,748	16	0
4	05-413	Al Lod	$12,036	North WB	214	272		486	18	563	657		1,220	18	0
5	05-412	Bani Naeem	$20,263	South WB	600	579		1,179	46	218	1,218		1,436	9	0
6	05-411	Society Voice	$21,345	Middle Gaza	930	1,260	510	2,700	90				0	0	0
7	05-410	Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection	$24,999	Middle Gaza	750	750	900	2,400	80	50	650		700	3	0
8	05-409	CIVITAS	$24,973	North Gaza	1,237	1,026		2,263	80		1,250		1,250	5	0
9	05-408	Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection	$21,358	North Gaza & Gaza	1,505	1,295		2,800	80				0	0	0
10	05-407	Human Development Association	$18,644	South Gaza	1,159	1,246		2,405	80				0	0	0
11	05-406	Our Rights	$15,991	Middle Gaza	500	700		1,200	80				0	0	0
12	05-405	SDPRC	$22,183	South Gaza	100	1,400		1,500	80				0	0	0
13	05-403	Al Sharq	$16,185	South Gaza	400	800	600	1,800	60				0	0	0
14	05-400	Ednet	$17,000	Middle & North WB-Public & private schools	22	26	5,100	5,148	59				0	0	0
15	05-399	Al Mawrid	$25,000	All West Bank-UNRWA schools	29	59	8,226	8,314	96				0	0	0
16	05-398	ATF (COC)	$25,000	West Bank & Gaza				0	0				0	0	80
17	05-396	ATF	$19,600	West Bank & Gaza				0	0	245	1,177		1,422	11	0
18	05-393	AL Hares	$19,954	South West Bank	579	591		1,170	34	353	1,516		1,869	12	0
19	05-315	Juhoud (simplified)	$59,412	Middle West Bank	582		352	904	36				0	0	0
20	05-362	Civic Forum Institute	$23,483	Middle West Bank	354	336		690	25				0	0	0
21	05-363	Civic Forum Institute	$23,406	North WB	311	355		666	25				0	0	0
22	05-364	Civic Forum Institute	$24,906	South WB & Middle Gaza	540	316		856	30				0	0	0

PLC ELECTIONS: JANUARY 25, 2006

		PLC ELECTIONS: JANUARY 25, 2006													
					VOTER EDUCATION					CANDIDATE FORUMS					OBSERVATION
	Grant No.	CSO Name	Value	Location	No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Participants				No. of Sessions	No. of Observers
					No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		No. of Women	No. of Men	No. of Youth	Total		
23	05-365	Al Mawrid	$21,159	South WB	605	627		1,232	40				0	0	0
24	05-366	Kalandia	$19,291	Middle WB	565	585		1,150	46				0	0	0
25	05-367	Ednet	$18,941	South WB	609	602		1,211	40				0	0	0
26	05-369	Jabalia Society	$14,335	North & Middle Gaza	100	200		300	90			15	15	0	0
27	05-370	Our Rights	$18,904	Middle Gaza	400	420	380	1,200	80	50	650	40	740	0	0
28	05-371	Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection	$18,425	North & Middle Gaza	350	550	100	1,000	80		1,250	40	1,290	0	0
29	05-372	Society Voice	$17,336	Middle Gaza	600	300	600	1,500	80			50	50	0	0
30	05-373	Al Amal Society	$11,675	Khan Younis	60	80		140	80			105	105	0	0
31	05-374	Al Sharq	$14,326	Khan Younis	250	350	400	1,000	80			40	40	0	0
32	05-375	Human Development Association	$15,811	South Gaza	450	800		1,250	80			43	43	0	0
33	05-376	Society for Developing Palestinian Refugee Camps	$15,390	South Gaza	700	800		1,500	60			38	38	0	0
34	05-377	Al Lod	$14,459	North WB	583	591		1,174	50				0	0	0
35	05-378	Local Committee	$19,074	North WB	830	523	677	2,030	96				0	0	0
36	05-379	Bani Naeem	$17,548	South WB	536	627		1,163	53				0	0	0
37	05-380	AL Hares	$16,746	South WB	486	681		1,167	35				0	0	0
38	05-394	Juhoud	$12,248	Middle WB	210		190	400	13				0	0	0
39	05-404	Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection	$24,490	Middle Gaza				0	0				0	0	150
		TOTAL	$772,522		19,030	19,354	19,597	58,011	2,134	2,229	9,366	371	11,966	74	230

Eighteen voter education grants numbers 05-362 to 05-404 were awarded in July 2005 in anticipation of PLC elections followed by a second round of twenty grants signed in December 2005.

OTHER INITIATIVES					
	CSO Name	**Budget**	**Subtotal**	**Election Round**	**Remarks**
Advertisements					
05-327	CFI	$20,757		2nd round, local elections	9 ads
			$20,757		
Material Preparation					
05-337	CFI	$16,534		2nd round, local elections	165,000 copies of 5 flyers; 15,000 copies of voter guide
05-358	CFI	$21,860		PLC elections	40,000 copies of voter guide
05-399	Mawrid	*See PLC elections matrix*		PLC elections	40,000 copies of student guide *distributed to 93 UNRWA Schools in WB, 40,000 copies distributed to public & private schools in WB by ed-net and other 3 organizations.*
05-390	CFI	$15,267		PLC elections	*Reprinting of* 35,000 copies of voter education booklet *prepared in grant 05-358*
			$53,661		
Code of Conduct					
05-381	ATF	$22,560		PLC elections	Develop and sign text, conference
05-397	ATF	$25,000		PLC elections	National committee(s)
05-398	ATF	*See PLC elections Matrix*		PLC elections	Monitoring of party adherence during campaigning and election day
			$47,560		
Political Map					
05-368	ATF	$25,000		PLC elections	Analytical paper, community meetings, and conference
			$25,000		
Student Education					
05-399	Mawrid	*See PLC elections Matrix*		PLC elections	As above
05-400	Ed-Net	*See PLC elections Matrix*		PLC elections	8,314 students in 55 public schools
		TOTAL	**$146,978**		

TOTALS							
	No. of CSOs	No. of Grants	Total Budget	Total Sessions		Observers trained and deployed	Total Beneficiaries	
				Voter Education	Candidate Forums		Voter Education	Candidate Forums
First round of elections	13	14	$329,979.90	212	131	299	7,779	9,164
Second round of elections	20	20	$316,918.32	421	135	393	20,072	14,484
Third round of elections	5	6	$77,378.00	23	23	1,000	657	3,659
Fourth round of elections	6	7	$92,868.11	44	69	920	1,420	6,822
PLC elections	21	39	$772,520.81	2,134	74	230	58,011	11,966
Total Tamkeen Election Grants	86	$1,589,665.14	2,834	432	2,842	100,939	46,095
Total Other Election Initiatives	7	$146,978.00					
Total Grants Value	93	$1,736,643.14					

ANNEX C:
Anti-Terrorism Certification

By signing and submitting this application, the prospective recipient provides the certification set out below:

1. The Recipient, to the best of its current knowledge, did not provide, within the previous ten years, and will take all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not and will not knowingly provide, material support or resources to any individual or entity that commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated, or participated in terrorist acts, as that term is defined in paragraph 3.

2. The following steps may enable the Recipient to comply with its obligations under paragraph 1:

   a. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient will verify that the individual or entity does not (i) appear on the master list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, which list is maintained by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and is available online at OFAC's website: http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf, or (ii) is not included in any supplementary information concerning prohibited individuals or entities that may be provided by USAID to the Recipient.

   b. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient also will verify that the individual or entity has not been designated by the United Nations Security (UNSC) sanctions committee established under UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) (the "1267 Committee") [individuals and entities linked to the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, or the Al Qaida Organization]. To determine whether there has been a published designation of an individual or entity by the 1267 Committee, the Recipient should refer to the consolidated list available online at the Committee's website: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm.

   c. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient will consider all information about that individual or entity of which it is aware and all public information that is reasonably available to it or of which it should be aware.

   d. The Recipient also will implement reasonable monitoring and oversight procedures to safeguard against assistance being diverted to support terrorist activity.

3. For purposes of this Certification,

   a. "Material support and resources" means currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications

equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials."

b. "Terrorist act" means-

(i) an act prohibited pursuant to one of the 12 United Nations Conventions and Protocols related to terrorism (see UN terrorism conventions Internet site: http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp); or

(ii) an act of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents; or

(iii) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

c. "Entity" means a partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, group or subgroup.

d. References in this Certification to the provision of material support and resources shall not be deemed to include the furnishing of USAID funds or USAID-financed commodities to the ultimate beneficiaries of USAID assistance, such as recipients of food, medical care, micro-enterprise loans, shelter, etc., unless the Recipient has reason to believe that one or more of these beneficiaries commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.

e. The Recipient's obligations under paragraph 1 are not applicable to the procurement of goods and/or services by the Recipient that are acquired in the ordinary course of business through contract or purchase, e.g., utilities, rents, office supplies, gasoline, etc., unless the Recipient has reason to believe that a vendor or supplier of such goods and services commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.

This Certification is an express term and condition of any agreement issued as a result of this application, and any violation of it shall be grounds for unilateral termination of the agreement by USAID prior to the end of its term.

Signed: _____ _____
(Typed Name and Title)   Date
(Name of Organization)

Annex D:
People Interviewed

Participants in West Bank Workshop
Monday, March 6, 2006

1. Abdul Rahman Abu Arafeh   Arab Thought Forum
2. Ahmad Rwaidi   Arab Thought Forum
3. Aref Jaffal   Civic Forum Institute
4. Khalid Abu Alya   Civic Forum Institute
5. Sama Farhan   Kalandia Camp Women's Cooperative Society
6. Niveen Hamdan   Kalandia Camp Women's Cooperative Society
7. Samer Salameh   Juhoud for Rural & Community Development
8. Abd Ramhim Hasan   Juhoud for Rural & Community Development
9. Khalid Jasser   Taawon for Conflict Resolution: Al-Taawon Youth Forum
10. Essam Ghanem   Taawon for Conflict Resolution: Al-Taawon Youth Forum
11. Islam Manasra   Bani Naim Charitable Society
12. Mohammad Manasra   Al-Hares Center for Media & Studies
13. Saleem Dabbour   Association of Women Committees for Social Work
14. Rola Daghash   Association of Women Committees for Social Work

Participants in Gaza Workshop
Tuesday, March 7, 2006

1. Iyad El-Krunz   Palestinian Center for Human Development
2. Suzan El-Bia'   Palestinian Center for Human Development
3. Fareed Hamdan   Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Our Rights)
4. Shareef Abu Watfah   Civitas
5. Raedeh Kheshan   Human Development Association
6. Taysir El-Belbaisi   Society for the Development of Palestinian Refugee Camps
7. Sahar Abu Armanah   Society for the Development of Palestinian Refugee Camps
8. Darwish abu Sharekh   Al-Amal Rehabilitation Society
9. Samer Shaqfa   Al-Amal Rehabilitation Society
10. Sami Abu Ishaq   Al-Sharq Society
11. Ayman Abu Shamalah   Society Voice for Community and Civil Work
12. Talat Bathatha   Society Voice for Community and Civil Work
13. Samah Kessab   Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection
14. A'del El-Goul   Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection

Individual Interviews

1. Ambassador Ahmed Subh   Deputy Minister of Information
2. Bashar Deek   Executive Director, Higher Commission for Local Elections
3. Ismail Njoum   Director, Al-Mawrid Teacher Development Center
4. Islam Manasra   Director, Bani Naim Charitable Society
5. Two officials   Central Election Commission
6. Mohammed Manasra   Director, Al-Hares Center for Media and Research
7. Amer Rahhal   Program Coordinator, Local Rehabilitation Committee Jenin
8. Abdul Rahman Abu Arafeh   Director, Arab Thought Forum
9. Aref Jaffal   Director, Civic Forum Institute

10.	Samer Salameh	Director, Juhoud for Community and Rural Development
11.	Alban Biaussat	Political Officer, European Commission Representative Office (West Bank and Gaza)
12.	Dr. Mohammed Al Mbaid	Chief of Party, Palestine Legislative Strengthening Project
13.	Muneir Kleibo	Director of Democracy Programs, UNDP
14.	Dr. Nader Sa'id	Director, BZU Development Studies Programme
15.	Michael Murphy	Director, National Democratic Institute (West Bank and Gaza)
16.	Staurat Krussal	Director, International Republic Institute (West Bank and Gaza)
17.	Jarret Blanc	Director, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (West Bank and Gaza)
18.	Shareef Abu Watefah	Director, Civitas
19.	Darweesh Abu Sherekh	Director, Al-Amal Rehabilitation Society
20.	Taysir El-Belbaisi	Project Manager, Society for Developing and Protecting Refugee Camps
21.	Samah Kessab	Project Manager, Palestinian Commission for Refugee Rights Protection
22.	Nimer Abu As'ad	Head of Local Council, Saffa
23.	Ilias Azer	Head of Local Council, A'aboud
24.	Faisel Abd Al Majeed	Deputy Head of Local Council , A'aboud
25.	Saeed Shraiteh	Head of Local Council, Al Zaytona
26.	Issa Qaraqa'	Elected PLC member (Fatah list)
27.	Maher Assaaf	PLC candidate (Independent Palestine list)

ANNEX E:
The Palestinian Code of Conduct for Political Parties

We, the political forces and parties participating in the second Palestinian Legislative Elections, desiring that the electoral process be completed in all its stages with transparency and fairness and be dominated by honest competition among candidates and electoral lists in a manner that serves and strengthens the public interest, realize the importance of abidance by the Election Law, Regulations and Instructions issued to organize the electoral process and therefore pledge to undertake the following:

First: Abide by the Palestinian Elections Law provisions, the regulations and instructions issued under this Law and by the directions and decisions of the Central Elections Commission concerning the electoral process and its progress.

Second: Cooperate with the Central Elections Commission in its effort to organize free and fair elections and to respect its teams.

Third: Respect the role of local and international monitors and cooperate with them in performing their monitoring role.

Fourth: Abide by maintaining the voting secrecy principle and the right of the voter to select his/her lists and candidates freely.

Fifth: Conform to the electoral campaign period as set forth by the election laws.

Sixth: Abide by not to include in the electoral campaign any incitement or challenge against other candidates, political parties or electoral lists, refrain from any defamation, slander or cursing and abstain from igniting religious fanaticism or exploiting religious, sectarian, tribal, regional, familial or racial emotions and feelings among citizens.

Seventh: Refrain from subjecting other electoral campaigns to physical acts such as sabotage, tearing or fixing pictures and slogans over other pictures and slogans or carrying out other acts that are interpreted as physical assault against the electoral campaigns of other candidates.

Eighth: Abide by not to practice any form of pressure, intimidation, treachery, accusation of disbelief in God or violence against any candidate and/or any voter.

Ninth: Abide by not to carry any arms or use them during public meetings, marches, and other election activities.

Tenth: Abide by not to offer or promise any gifts, donations, cash, in-kind assistance or any other benefits to real persons or bodies corporate during the electoral process either in a direct or indirect manner.

Eleventh: Abide by not to affix campaigning posters and pictures on private places or the doors and walls of shops and stores without the owner's explicit approval. Also not to affix campaigning posters and pictures on the signs owned by private

companies or citizens without obtaining their explicit approval. Abide by the removal of all campaigning material after the completion of the electoral process.

Twelfth: Abide by not to use the official logo of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Palestinian National Authority or any similar logo in meetings, posters and electoral statements or writings, drawings and pictures used in campaigning.

Thirteenth: Abide by not to hold rallies and public meetings in mosques, churches, near hospitals or in buildings and locations occupied by governmental or public departments and institutions and abide by not to use the Palestinian security headquarters and military camps or public supplies centers for electoral campaigning purposes.

Fourteenth: Maintain a clean environment during the electoral campaign by avoiding arbitrary fixing of posters and statements in public places and to take responsibility for the care and cleaning of public places during and after electoral marches and rallies.

Fifteenth: Abide by not to obtain money, directly or indirectly, from any foreign or external source to cover the expenses of the electoral campaign. It is not permitted to obtain money from the PA for the same purpose.

Sixteenth: Abide by the expenditure limit set for the electoral campaign such that it does not exceed US$1,000,000 or its equivalent for the single national district, and US$60,000 or its equivalent for member districts.

Seventeenth: Abide by submitting detailed financial statements to the Central Elections Commission concerning all financial sources and amounts spent during the electoral campaign within a month from the date of announcing the final elections results.

Eighteen: Train political parties on the conduct of their monitors as issued by the Central Elections Commission.

Nineteenth: Accept responsibility for all campaigning activities undertaken by campaign staff.

Twenty: Provide the Central Elections Commission with all websites through which an electoral campaign is conducted.

Twenty First: Accept responsibility for any bulletins, posters or statements issued during campaigning.

Twenty Second: Abide by following the legal means regarding objections and challenges to the results throughout and cooperate with the relevant parties concerning investigations into any objections, challenges and complaints.

Twenty Second: Abide by following the legal means to settle any disputes, objections or challenges throughout the election period and cooperate with the

relevant parties concerning investigations into any objections, challenges and complaints.

Twenty Third: Abide by Palestinian judicial decisions regarding the electoral process.

Twenty Fourth: Abide by the official and final results of elections issued by the Central Elections Commission and/or the competent court.

Twenty Fifth: Form a national committee to follow-up the commitment to the provisions of this Code of Conduct and raise their awareness in society.

Abiding by the provisions of this Code of Conduct, we sign it on:
14 Ramadan 1426 A.H
17th October, 2005 AC

National and Islamic Forces and Factions participating in the Legislative Electoral process:

Palestinian National Liberation (Fatah)
Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)
Palestinian People's Party
Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine
Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine
Palestinian Democratic Union (Fida)
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (Al-Nidhal)
Palestinian Liberation Front
Arab Liberation Front
Palestinian Arab Front
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command
Al-Sa'qa Organization
Palestinian National Initiative

Witnessed:

Central Election Commission
Arab Thought Forum