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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEM Association of Electronic Media
AFP Agence France-Presse
BH Novinari Unified Association of Journalists
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
CIN Center for Investigative Journalism
CRA Communications Regulatory Agency
DG USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina Democracy and Governance Office
EC European Commission
EU European Union
FTV Public Television Channel of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
IAA International Association of Advertisers (BiH Chapter)
IREX International Research & Exchanges Board
JDG Journalism Development Group
MCS Media Centar Sarajevo
MIB Mareco Index Bosnia
NYU New York University Center for War, Peace, and the News Media
OSF-BiH Open Society Fund – Bosnia and Herzegovina
RTRS Public Radio and Television Broadcaster of the Republika Srpska
TV BH1 Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Television Channel 1
UMI United Media Industry
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USAIDMedia USAIDMedia program (implemented by Chemonics International)
This assessment of USAID Media Interventions was contracted by USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina to assist in the review and evaluation of USAID supported media projects within the changing media environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2003. The purpose of the assessment is to analyze the development of the media sector and review the two USAID programs in regard to their impact on supporting sustainable outlets and practices within the Bosnian media context. The assessment also makes recommendations for future USAID interventions over the short- and medium-term. The detailed Scope of Work is presented in Annex D.

The assessment team consisted of two experts in the field of media development and democracy-building programs. Terry Thielen and Sinclair Cornell have implemented media development projects and managed USAID programs in several post-conflict and political-transition environments, including Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Sudan, and Serbia. Sinclair Cornell acted as team leader on behalf of ARD, Inc.; the extensive contributions of Terry Thielen to the team were provided through Creative Associates International, Inc. as sub-contractor to ARD, Inc.

The fieldwork for the assessment was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 19 June to 1 July 2006. Interviews were conducted with USAID, international donors, USAID implementing partners, media outlets, association representatives, regulatory entities, and journalists. The team visited many television and radio stations, newspapers and magazines, media associations, donors and regulatory bodies in Bosnia (a complete list of contacts is presented in Annex C). The team also collected and reviewed available documentation (listed in Annex F).

The team would not have succeeded in its task without the committed support and critical insights of its coordinator/interpreter, Faruk Loncarevic, and transportation coordinator, Adnan Dervisevic. ARD support was provided in Vermont by David Green, Senior Associate, and Minnie Cruz, Project Manager. In Bosnia, ARD support was provided by Brian Fahey, USAID LAMP Chief of Party.

The team wishes to thank USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina for its assistance on this project—in particular Michael Henning, Director of the Democracy Office, and Jasna Kilalic, Project Management Specialist and Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO). We would also like to thank USAIDMedia (Chemonics International), the Center for Investigative Journalism (Journalism Development Group in Sarajevo), and the Media Centar Sarajevo for their hospitality and openness, which greatly facilitated our efforts.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Media Environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The development of the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) as a transparent and balanced authority in the field of broadcast regulation is generally considered a success. The CRA has been praised for setting standards of journalistic conduct at radio and television stations—even when compared to comments that the imposition of a code of conduct (and associated penalties for violations of the code) may have led to editors limiting the investigative risks journalists take in broadcast newsrooms. Nevertheless, there is room for the CRA to grow. Sanctions levied on outlets that violate CRA rules and guidelines remain low so that fines do not jeopardize the financial stability of stations and individuals. As a result, some outlets tend to accept the cost of potential sanctions as part of doing business.

The Press Council is at a critical stage in its attempt to establish a self-regulatory regime for the print sector. While internal steps are being taken to set the Council’s new business strategy in place, much will rely upon the ability of the Press Council to build credibility among the largest players on the print media scene. Implementation and review of the Council statute—particularly in regard to membership in Council bodies and potential conflict of interest—are the next challenges for Council leadership.

Media-related associations may represent the best and worst in Bosnia’s media sector development. The United Media Industry (UMI) has brought together leading nationwide television stations with major advertising agencies to make a substantial collective investment in the purchase of quality audience research that will improve each member’s ability to make management decisions regarding programming, advertising sales, and marketing. On the other hand, the recently unified journalists’ association (BH Novinari) struggles with implementation of a business plan after dealing with the theft of member pension contributions by a former employee; the Association of Electronic Media is led by a dynamic individual but has no supporting organizational structure, business plan, or a functioning system to collect member dues.

The broadcast media sector has shown considerable progress over the past three years, with leaders emerging in both radio and television that prove success comes from implementation of proven, modern media management strategies. Bosnia-wide television outlets are on the forefront, marked by their decisions to purchase quality audience research through UMI and to use this data in the process of making programming, scheduling, sales, and marketing decisions. Radio stations, such as Radio Stari Grad and Radio Kameleon, are employing style guides, detailed business plans and advanced branding and marketing techniques. Obstacles, however, still exist—television stations are reluctant to use their own funds to commission quality domestic productions; Bosnian production houses are forced to seek commercial sponsors to cover the total cost of making any new programs that would be offered to broadcast outlets. The radio market remains over-saturated, with more than 60 stations funded through cantonal or municipal budgets, and other stations shored up by finances from political or personal interests. No market correction is likely to take place as long as these artificial support structures continue to play significant ownership roles at scores of radio stations.

In contrast to the advances in the electronic sector, print media may have made the least progress over the past few years. From nearly all of those interviewed for this assessment, the opinion remains that the overall quality of journalism in BiH is still poor. Financial viability is a struggle at many print media outlets; circulation rates are low. Pressure on print media now takes the form of economic coercion, where firms (and their political or religious support structures) threaten to pull advertising accounts if newspapers or magazines publish unfavorable articles—or fail to print articles favorable to advertisers.

The low quality of journalism is also a direct result of a corresponding lack of quality university-level journalism programs. Students receive an outdated and theoretical education that is of little use when actually
working at media outlets. Practical training is best sought through domestic media development organizations such as Media Plan Institute and the Media Centar Sarajevo, where students and practicing reporters can improve basic professional skills and develop more advanced competencies in investigative journalism or issue-based reporting.

In spite of the many challenges still to face within the BiH media environment, international donor interest understandably wanes after 10 years and more than $100 million. The European Commission will focus on specialized technical assistance and projects that support the Communications Regulatory Agency. Other traditional media donors, such as the Swedish Helsinki Committee and the Open Society Fund-BiH (and the Open Society Institute Network Media Program), will have a more targeted approach to allocating decreasing funds that includes association development and media-related research.

**Evaluations of USAID Media Interventions**

The USAIDMedia program succeeded on a number of fronts. USAIDMedia staff coaching and technical assistance led (both directly and indirectly) to the establishment of the United Media Industry, to drafting of strategic plans by the Press Council and BH Novinari, and to more coordinated efforts between Mreza Plus television network partners. Management practices at selected outlets were improved as a result of USAIDMedia consultancies. The USAIDMedia small grants program helped to create some innovative public affairs programs for television and promoted investigative journalism projects at certain publications. Currently, USAIDMedia is supporting an extensive pre-election project to encourage issue-oriented reporting rather than stale coverage of political parties and politicians in the lead up to the national vote.

Other areas did not see the same level of USAIDMedia success. Unlike UMI, radio and print outlets have failed to consolidate resources for a joint purchase of audience research despite USAID Media efforts to bring managers together, and receiving previous research paid for by USAID Media. While acknowledging the quality of USAID-funded domestic production, television station managers are not generally motivated to purchase programs from local production firms with their own resources. In addition, original plans to help create widely-respected awards for quality Bosnian journalism have been a low priority within the slate of USAIDMedia initiatives.

The Media Centar Sarajevo, with significant assistance from USAIDMedia, has made great strides in the completion of a comprehensive business plan. The MCS strategy, surrounding its five “profit centers,” describes a broad range of activities from traditional media skills training, to creation of a digital media archive subscription service, operation of a public relations training center and development of internal video production capacity. The MCS is well placed to become a future implementing partner of USAID media assistance programs—if USAID so chooses. However, MCS management should not lessen its commitment to the business plan and the objectives detailed within. Questions regarding transition of legal ownership status from OSF-BiH to the MCS should be resolved by the end of 2006.

There are, of course, areas in which the MCS can improve. The MCS will need to continue efforts to diversify income streams to include a higher percentage of domestic contracts and grants. The MCS will need to exhibit advanced competency in assessing sector needs regarding media training, technical assistance, and timely project interventions. Furthermore, the MCS should develop systems to ensure that its own human resources can meet the needs of an ambitious range of projects, and create a plan to provide training that continually enhances the skills of MCS staff members.

The Center for Investigative Journalism (CIN) is an ambitious effort to elevate the standard of investigative reporting in Bosnia to a more internationally acceptable level. CIN has succeeded in compiling a diverse and dedicated staff of reporters and potential editors who are now well trained in the methods of western investigative journalism, and have fully internalized the skills (i.e., interviewing, research, story organization, and accuracy) needed to practice their craft. There is anecdotal evidence implying that CIN reports have in selected cases influenced government officials and policy makers. Overall, the original risk taken by USAID in financing the creation of such a center was well founded.
However, it is not clear at this time if CIN has had success in achieving its central goal of changing the news agenda in Bosnia or altering the way other news media approach investigative reporting. CIN management claims anecdotal evidence of impact of its past reports; while editors at the media outlets that CIN relies upon to publish reports doubt that CIN has had impact on operations at their outlets, or on their readers.

Despite its status as a local NGO, CIN is also still perceived as an international organization by most Bosnian media outlets, with the resentment that sometimes accompanies such perception. CIN’s international management has been slow to identify and install Bosnian leadership at the Center, citing greater than expected challenges in identifying and training appropriate personnel to an acceptable level of competency before transferring editorial and management responsibilities. As a result, after two years there is still no Bosnian editor-in-chief or Bosnian director, exacerbating the center’s image as a non-local media organization. The assessment team believes that the transfer to Bosnian management should have been prioritized earlier within the original CIN timeline (this should be noted as a flaw within the initial CIN proposal). In addition, the international managers—with their many years of experience working in the Bosnian media development environment—could have foreseen potential staffing difficulties and recognized the risks involved with waiting nearly two years to promote local management.

Acceptance of CIN content, by both readers and media managers, also seems to be affected by the current international management approach to journalism. Representatives of Bosnian news outlets that have carried CIN products, as well as editors of those outlets that have not, criticized CIN articles for being too long while at the same time not offering readers particularly new or useful information. This may be due to the extensive background material provided in CIN stories which, though internationally recognized as good investigative journalism practice, is something of a new concept for Bosnian readers who may construe it as redundant. Therefore, while adhering to the “highest western investigating standards,” CIN might also seek a more realistic balance between its high standards and producing content that editors want to publish, and Bosnians want to read. Changing readers’ habits and expectations will understandably take time.

There are also significant shortcomings in areas essential to a sustainable future at CIN, namely CIN name recognition and fundraising. To date there have been few public awareness or marketing efforts to promote CIN, the CIN brand, CIN journalists, or CIN product. Interviews during assessment field work with Bosnian media managers sympathetic to CIN, editors that considered CIN more as competition, and with other observers of the Bosnian media scene indicated that CIN is relatively unknown to the Bosnian public. CIN’s international management claims otherwise. At this time, no independent research data exists to support assertions on either side.

Equally concerning is CIN’s lack of tangible progress in securing any financing other than USAID’s initial three-year investment. CIN’s fundraising strategy for continuing operations past 2007 seems primarily dependent on receiving future USAID financing. Documents supplied by CIN management to the assessment team indicated that without substantial USAID support beyond the current three-year grant, CIN will close.

**Conclusions**

Understanding the history of international involvement in BiH media development since 1995, many of the USAID assistance efforts have been recognized as highlights in a sometimes lukewarm assessment of overall international investment in BiH media. USAID interventions since 2003 have attempted to build upon the more successful approaches taken by media development programs during the first seven years after the war. USAID sought to support leaders within the media sector, integrate Bosnian institutional expertise within the USAID supported media development effort, and implement alternative methods of improving the quality of journalism products available through local media outlets.

USAID has had direct and indirect impact in establishing a select group of leading media outlets widely considered to be the best in comparison to their competition—for example, Radio Stari Grad, Nezavisne
Novine, ATV, and NTV Hayat. Without USAID assistance and support, these outlets would very likely not be in the positions they are today and would not command such respect within their communities.

USAID attempts to improve the quality of journalism face more difficult opposition. Editors entrenched in their outdated or potentially politically-compromised ways restrict the significant number of reporters trained in basic and advanced journalism skills from practicing an improved craft. Some editors simply do not know how to produce a better product. A common theme throughout interviews was that it may take years for a new generation of editors to assume positions of authority at news outlets to truly impose changes in how reporters perform their duties.

USAID should receive great credit in taking chances on alternative methods of improving the quality of journalism product. Encouraging domestic television production was a worthy goal, although with mixed results during implementation. The USAID investment in the Center for Investigative Journalism was an extremely creative approach to generating an improved print journalism product. However, the current situation at CIN presents doubt as to whether the project can succeed in sustaining itself past USAID’s considerable three-year financial contribution. Also, there is concern regarding CIN’s managerial approach when investing USAID funds in human capital to improve investigative journalism products disseminated through Bosnian media.

**Recommendations**

The events of the coming year—a national election in October and the resulting change in the actors who will assert governmental authority—will affect media professionals as they will affect the nation. Media industry leaders—for the most part, those individuals who have benefited from USAID-supported material assistance and technical expertise in the past—are now at a “tipping point” where reinforcement of the successful lessons-learned will solidify their leadership positions within the sector. This is not, in any way, the time for USAID to disengage from its media development effort.

After more than 10 years of intensive donor support to the media sector, this is also the time for Bosnian media leaders and local institutions to be given greater responsibility for shaping and securing their own future. Thanks to USAID and other international support, there is a reservoir of Bosnian talent and expertise that should now be expected to play a more central role in forging the professional media environment envisioned by Bosnians and donors alike.

Therefore, the most important role that USAID can play after more than 10 years of media development assistance is to continue to empower Bosnian organizations so that local media development experts can determine needs for training, technical assistance, and potential grant-giving. In particular, with more developed needs-assessment and administrative skills, the MCS could be provided with USAID resources to implement projects and manage grant programs created as a result of Bosnian analysis of local deficiencies in the media sector. The MCS plays a substantial part in this effort now, but can take more of a leading position in the future—with USAID support and guidance.

With six months remaining in the USAIDMedia program contract, the Chemonics staff will need to push forward with a great number of program-related activities while also closing out the program by 31 December, including continued technical assistance to the MCS and the various components of election-focused programming. The USAIDMedia senior staff should request clear guidance from their USAID Democracy and Governance counterparts regarding expectations for delivery of services until the end of the year. A detailed plan should be developed for post-election reporting following the polling day in October. The most important part of current pre-election programming will be reinforcement of the lessons learned by media outlets over the six months prior to opening of the polls. Participating media outlets should have set strategies for reporting on campaign finance expenditure and campaign platform promises following Election Day and certification of election results.

Furthermore, we recommend that USAIDMedia should accelerate its support in preparing the MCS for a potential role in USAID media development activities after 31 December. Assistance to the MCS would
include building internal needs-assessment skills, expanding the MCS roster of domestic and international media experts, increasing MCS capacity to provide technical assistance in the field of association development, and—if USAID so decides—helping the MCS develop expertise in administering grants according to USAID regulations.

In response to the significant concerns with the present direction of CIN, USAID should make any future funding contingent upon meeting a number of conditions regarding project and fundraising activities. First and foremost, the transition to Bosnian leadership at the center must take place as soon as possible. CIN managers should develop a detailed marketing plan, and begin implementation of marketing activities. This strategic marketing effort should include quantitative and qualitative research to determine audience awareness of, and opinions regarding, CIN and its investigative journalism products. Such research, conducted independently, would also help to competently counter statements made by many actors on the local media scene that the Bosnian audience is for the most part unaware of CIN or its products. A closer collaborative relationship with editors at Bosnian news outlets should be cultivated as part of the CIN story development process, to ensure buy-in at local publications. Finally, CIN should prepare for, and encourage, the transition of some of its reporters and editors back into Bosnian newsrooms—so that CIN’s expertly-trained journalists can directly change the day-to-day product of Bosnian media outlets.

There are critical issues with the future financial stability of the center. USAID should consider support for CIN after July 2007 on a matching basis if CIN meets the programmatic objectives described above, but also contingent upon CIN reaching certain fundraising benchmarks. As CIN estimates the cost of operation to be approximately $350,000 per annum, CIN should be required to present USAID with evidence of secured donor financing in the amount of $175,000 prior to disbursal of USAID support. Securing diversified funding now will help ensure CIN’s financial viability over the long term, and in so doing protect USAID’s already substantial investment in the center.

USAID should also consider the following targeted interventions:

- Task MSC leadership with formulating a series of activities with leading media outlets to follow up on the effect of issue-oriented campaign reporting on post-election activities of newly elected parties and candidates. This should include investigation into the transparency and use of campaign finances.

- Support projects that promote linkages between regulatory bodies (the CRA, the Press Council, and the Competition Council) and advocacy associations (BH Novinari, the Association of Electronic Media, and the local chapter of the International Advertising Association). Projects that encourage cooperation and exchange of ideas would include:
  - Providing additional technical assistance to the CRA regarding regulation of the cable industry;
  - Training of judges regarding the spirit and application of the Law on Protection from Defamation;
  - Organization of a roundtable discussion regarding advertising practices and regulatory responses to “price dumping”; and,
  - Organization of public discussions to promote the rights and responsibilities of citizens in respect to media reporting.

- Create a production fund to provide seed money (on a percentage matching basis) to television stations for the purpose of commissioning programs from local production houses—hoping to persuade television station managers to develop a risk-reward attitude toward domestic program production. Such a fund could be administered as a grant program by the MCS, but channeled as matching funds through television stations themselves in order to encourage program managers to invest funds in outsourced productions. A similar production-investment program could be created for radio programming.
• Support the Radio Kameleon news exchange service that is scheduled to launch a national news program in August or September 2006.
1.0 THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: PLAYERS AND CHALLENGES

1.1 REGULATORY BODIES

1.1.1 Communications Regulatory Agency

Throughout the media community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the development of the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) over the past several years is generally considered a success. Since 2003, the CRA has made significant strides to strengthen its position as a Bosnian authority in the field of broadcast regulation, employing transparent, and measured approaches to decision-making. Over the past 18 months, two prominent advances were made concerning the CRA and broadcast media regulation: 1) appointment of Bosnian members to the CRA Council, signaling the first year that the Council enjoyed a purely Bosnian membership; and, 2) final adoption on 5 January 2006 of the Law on the Public Broadcasting System of BiH. The medium- and long-term goals of the CRA are to meet standards set for integration into the European Union—the CRA is steadily moving in that direction at a pace potentially faster than other institutions within BiH; for example, recently initiating research in preparation of a complete conversion from analogue to digital technologies (for which regulation must be in place by 2010).

Overall, the CRA is credited for its role in helping to maintain standards of conduct for journalism at radio and television stations; electronic news media professionals are widely felt to be restrained in comparison to their more sensationalist and (sometimes) defamatory print journalism colleagues. At times, commentators within the media sector have claimed that electronic media outlets practice a form of self-censorship that limits risk-taking through investigative journalism, either assuming the threat of sanction from the CRA or using potential CRA punishment as a justification for internal restraint on reporting.

The role of the CRA as the regulatory authority appears to be unchallenged within the media sector, indicated by the near perfect compliance (99%) with decisions taken during the allocation of long-term frequency licenses during 2004–2005, where over one-third of previously licensed radio and televisions stations that applied for frequencies were denied permission to broadcast.

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1 Economic and Legal Analysis of the Communications Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU CARDS Twinning Project BA 02.01/02.01, May 2006, 45.
The CRA also regulates cable distribution providers, reviewing cases and ultimately taking action as a result of internal monitoring and at the behest of industry advocates and individual actors. CRA interventions have responded to issues of infringement on copyright and exclusive broadcast agreements. Of the 55 sanctions levied due to violations of CRA rules and regulations in 2005, 21 were enforced upon cable distributors, including four of the top six largest individual fines.\(^3\)

Despite the CRA’s successful track record to date, there are challenges facing the agency and its efforts to regulate a technologically advancing sector. Political threats to the agency continue, particularly as reported by CRA management, in the form of pressure by the current Ministry of Transportation and Communications to wrest control over regulatory functions from the independent CRA to the ministry (and the minister, himself). Issues regarding conversion of CRA salaries to the BiH civil service scale (and thus regulated by government authority) and BiH Council of Ministers approval of a “Broadcast Sector Policy” that would effectively position the BiH government (and the Minister of Transport and Communications) as the authority regarding issues of broadcast frequency allocation and establishment of codes of conduct.

At the same time, it may be useful for the CRA to review its sanction power and policies. In particular, while the CRA has taken action against cable providers that have not abided by exclusive copyright arrangements in BiH, the level of sanctions may not be an effective deterrent to cable operators that avoid existing copyright agreements (the highest fine from 2005 being only 30,000 KM). Similarly, first-time sanctions levied on stations for programming violations of the Broadcasting Code of Practice seem to have resulted in certain instances where stations are willing to test the regulatory muscle of the CRA because the potential fine involved does not present financial difficulty to the organization in question.

### 1.1.2 Press Council

As an attempt to establish a functioning self-regulatory regime for the print media sector, the Press Council sits at a critical stage in its development. With a new director of the Press Council Secretariat and support from international assistance organizations—in particular USAID (through the USAID Media program), the Stability Pact (through Press Now), the Open Society Institute, and the Swedish Helsinki Committee—the Press Council has been working steadily to rectify problems it faced in the past. A new Press Council Statute and three-year strategic plan were drafted and approved in March 2006, and a restructuring of the Press Council board should be completed in July.

However, a Bosnian print sector self-regulatory effort faces specific challenges in principle and in practice. Unlike the powers of the CRA, the Council has no authority to impose penalties on print media outlets, nor can it issue or deny licenses. Within a culture that some may claim responds most effectively to assertive sanctions regimes, the Press Council—through its director—hopes to appeal to the more idealistic side of

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<th>Television</th>
<th>Radio</th>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>210</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>150</td>
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journals and media executives. In reality, however, confidence in the credibility of the Press Council is lacking. *Dnevni Avaz*, the publication often facing complaints before the Council and the daily newspaper with the highest circulation in BiH, does not currently participate in this regulatory effort; its editor-in-chief considers the Press Council to have only marginal influence on the print media sector.

In practical terms, much is dependent upon the current re-structuring of the Council and implementation of the Council statute. Of the 10 members of the Press Council Board, three will be nominated from publishers, and three members will come from the ranks of practicing journalists. However, only in the most ideal of worlds can the three journalist members be expected to act independently of the print media outlets which employ them. Not only does the Press Council Statute not include the obligation of recusal for members whose outlets face complaints before the Press Council or Complaints Commission, the Council’s director does not consider potential conflict of interest to be an issue.

### 1.1.3 Law on Protection from Defamation

An additional component of the regulatory environment in BiH is the ability of individuals to file suit before civil courts. By extracting defamation from the realm of criminal court proceedings, BiH has placed itself in a unique position within Southeast Europe as the only country in which journalists can serve specific sentences or pay fines in cases where the court determines insult or defamation has occurred. Divergent from the practice in some western countries, however, courts act under the local spirit of the law, which dictates that judges take into account that “amounts awarded for damages may lead to serious financial difficulties or bankruptcy of the defendant [the media outlet being sued].” In essence, rulings for plaintiffs do not normally exceed one or two percent of the amount requested in the suits (in cases where relatively large amounts are sought by plaintiffs). Recently, the number of cases has dropped because the financial cost of filing defamation cases in civil court tends to outweigh foreseen profit. Similar to the CRA approach to imposing sanctions, implementation of the Law on Protection from Defamation faces challenge from outlets willing to bear the potential cost of legal action—simply put, if sensationalism generates popularity among audiences. The cost of legal action is minimal in comparison to income resulting from increased sales of, and increased advertising within, a more popular product.

### 1.2 INDUSTRY AND MEMBER ASSOCIATIONS

The last three years have seen significant improvement in the development of media and industry associations in BiH. After years of distrust, media in all sectors are now working together to further common professional interests rather than continuing to focus on political and ethnic divisions. Actors such as the United Media Industry (formerly the Joint Industry Council), the International Association of Advertisers, and the Association of Electronic Media have established positive, collaborative working relationships among themselves, and have developed regular lines of contact with the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) on matters of mutual concern.

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4 “Do you need someone to slap you to become a responsible and professional journalist?” Interview with Ljiljana Zurovac, June 2006.

5 “[Recusal is] ridiculous, and not in the spirit of the Complaints Commission.” Interview with Ljiljana Zuravac, June 2006.

6 Halilović, Mehmed. “How the new Defamation Law is applied in BiH: Journalists haven’t profited all that much,” as referenced in Jusić, Tarik, *The Media in a Democratic Society: Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values?*, Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006, 301-303.
This shift has freed association leadership to focus on industry-related matters such as making joint purchases of research data, member education, setting norms and standards, and lobbying legislative and regulatory bodies on issues that affect them as an industry. For example, the International Association of Advertisers (IAA-BiH chapter) and the Association of Electronic Media (AEM) have both prioritized education of their members on industry issues such as better media planning and copyright infringement. IAA is developing with the University of Sarajevo a practical component in marketing and advertising to augment the university’s largely theoretical program. Both associations are also introducing standards to its membership: IAA plans to establish a “code of honor” in part to impose some standardization of advertising rates to avoid price-dumping; AEM has made it association policy that members must pay copyright fees. Finally, both these associations regularly join forces with United Media Industry to lobby the CRA and BiH government on issues ranging from cable operator avoidance of advertising restrictions to legislation regarding EU integration.

The United Media Industry (UMI) has led the media sector in the purchase and use of audience research. Comprised of seven leading advertising agencies and six national television networks (three public, three commercial), UMI began purchasing audience research in 2005, resulting in a 20 percent increase in advertising revenue per year. This year UMI commissioned research to be conducted using “people meters,” a more accurate research methodology demanded by major advertisers such as Coca-Cola. UMI executives anticipate an additional 20% increase in advertising revenue once research data from the people meters becomes available (this expectation was also confirmed in an interview with IAA). The purchase of this type of audience research data, at a cost of 900,000 km and fully funded through UMI membership fees, would have been impossible for any single member of the organization to have bought alone.

Finally, the merger of three ethnically-based journalist associations to form BH Novinari was a significant step in recognizing the need to pool resources and be more representative of working journalists in BiH. With the development of a comprehensive business and action plan, the association is well positioned to move forward with the establishment of new services for members as well as maintaining its current functions of running the journalist protection HelpLine and providing legal aid to journalists.

Despite the gains, there are challenges. A functioning publishers association has yet to be realized despite attempts to organize a lobbyist effort in response to the BiH government imposition of a universal Value Added Tax. UMI predicts that use of the “people meter” data for programming decisions will be resisted at first, at least by public television managers who may doubt results. BH Novinari has a slate of new services to implement as part of its business plan but must first regain credibility after a recent scandal involving theft of pension funds by a BH Novinari employee. AEM and IAA are run by dynamic but over-stretched individuals operating without written business plans. Finally, all three member associations struggle with collecting membership fees—a key component to their ability to become self-sustainable and exhibit commitment from their respective individual members.

### 1.3 MEDIA AUDIENCE RESEARCH

Electronic media managers throughout BiH currently have the opportunity to access research regarding audience viewing/listening patterns; this research is of substantial quality (even considering the fundamental difficulty in determining precise demographic data for BiH). Of course, the validity of statistics can always be questioned in any environment. Many media managers interviewed criticized aspects of currently implemented research methodology (reliance on the “diary method,” sample size and sampling error, or the sole use of telephone landline numbers as opposed to landlines and cellular telephone numbers for telephone interviews). Some managers also doubted respondents’ ability to understand, or willingness to answer, research questions accurately.

BiH suffers from attitudes similar to those held throughout nascent media sectors in other post-socialist or post-conflict societies. First, those media managers that seek media audience research often do so for little
reason more than to measure overall position within the market. Second, if the data does not seem to confirm a manager’s own interpretation of his/her station’s popularity, the data is often discounted as unreliable. Still, the media managers interviewed normally review available audience research. Whether acknowledged at media outlets or not, there is a quantity and quality of research data available to BiH media outlet executives that can be effectively used to help make decisions regarding program content and scheduling, as well as craft advertising and marketing strategies.

The more successful media outlets—chiefly those that are profitable or self-sustaining—are invariably led by managers that not only gain access to audience research, but have developed data analysis skills that can help in making management decisions about programming, scheduling, and sales/marketing. In the television sector, this approach is emboldened by the future use of “people meters” to gather more precise viewing records as part of the UMI-commissioned audience research from Mareco Index Bosnia (MIB), scheduled to begin in July 2006. This method of automatically determining which programs are watched, and at what times, helps to assuage concerns with the assisted-diary method that relies on the memory of the respondent as to what programs were viewed during the sample period. With increased confidence in data gathering, television station managers assign increased credibility to the research results—and therefore are more willing to utilize analysis tools provided by MIB. Radio station managers, like those in many western countries, receive data using the diary method, and can therefore choose to challenge the credibility of research findings on the grounds of faulty methodology, mentioned above (particularly if the findings do not affirm their station’s place as a leader on the local or national market).

A gap still remains, however, in terms of analysis at media outlets. Currently, two of the leading research firms (MIB and Prism Research) provide compiled data directly to outlets for each research wave. Stations are then expected to upload the data into software supplied by the research firm. Individuals at each client outlet are trained to use software programs to analyze uploaded data. This approach places the onus on station management to delve into the possibilities that data provides—however, it is not always the case that managers are motivated to take the time and effort to get the most out of their research product. Since expertise (and efficiency) in manipulating research data lies with the firms themselves, it might be both useful and profitable for research firms to provide more detailed analysis for their clients. This investment of time and effort might also help to minimize the opinion at media research firms that their electronic and print media outlet clients simply do not understand the true value of research.

For the print sector, a fundamental problem remains with the inability to gather centralized, and accurate, data regarding rates of circulation (both printed and sold/unsold per issue). Without an association of publishers advocating for—and implementing—an industry-wide approach to compiling circulation data (such as the creation of an Audit Bureau of Circulation), there is additional reason for print media managers to doubt the validity of readership figures.

### 1.4 RADIO

A number of radio stations in BiH have over the past three years achieved a high level of professionalism and financial stability. These stations are applying business practices common in other parts of the world, with clear target markets and diverse programming that meets the needs and interests of their listeners.

Such stations are typically characterized by directors who have actively participated in internationally-funded training courses and who have internalized the lessons and techniques provided. They pay attention to their listeners, and reinvest in their businesses with new equipment, competent personnel, and development of staff. One such director
noted that the problem with many of his less successful colleagues (as many as 90 percent of radio operators in BiH) is that “they are not ready to learn” and still insist on running their stations on “gut instinct” rather than apply standard tools such as business plans, radio formats, and audience research data to their station operations.

In contrast, successful stations for the most part have business and marketing plans in place, have in the past acquired USAID-funded research data or have purchased data using their own resources, and use research product to make both advertising and programming decisions. They also use various in-house methods (surveys, etc.) to supplement externally-acquired data. Station managers at Radio Nes and Radio eFm both acknowledge that they have dropped programs from the program line-up when research data indicated poor listenership. The director of Radio Stari Grad noted, too, that while neither the Prism nor MIB research products are ideal, station owners disregard it at their peril, as advertisers make their media buying decisions based on data from these two research firms. By using available audience data, Radio Stari Grad is able to command higher advertising prices for placement near programs with higher ratings, notably its 3:00pm news broadcast.

Several stations are using cross-marketing techniques such as sponsorship of special events (i.e., basketball tournaments or awards), television spots, and billboards to increase name recognition and attract new listeners. Additional revenue is generated by producing commercials using in-house equipment for outside entities.

In addition to individual radio station development, a new effort at creating a nation-wide radio network is also underway. Spearheaded by Radio Kameleon, this new Hot FM network would produce three-minute news packages with stories selected from 20 contributing outlets across BiH (including the Republika Srpska) to be rebroadcast three times each day on member stations. This initiative is being organized in cooperation with Croatian and Serbian news services and suggests a broadening of cooperation not only across BiH entity lines but national ones as well.

However, despite advances made by select radio stations, the radio environment in BiH is still too crowded, with 150 radio stations nationwide chasing too small an advertising market. For those stations operating outside the market economy, such as the over 60 state-owned stations financed by cantonal or municipal budgets, or private stations shored up by political or personal interests, a “market correction” is not likely in the near term. Understanding that radio is relatively cheap to operate—without the political will to privatize state-owned stations or severely limit the number of private licenses available, the over-saturated BiH radio market will likely remain.

1.5 PRINT MEDIA

The print sector has probably made the least progress of all media in BiH. Despite significant investment by the international community in training, equipment and other support, the quality of news content by and large remains low, with few named sources, confusing texts and a preponderance of sensationalist material.

As described above, the Law on Protection from Defamation has decriminalized libel, making slander a civil rather than criminal offense. But while print media outlets and journalists have found themselves the subject of lawsuits, the fines imposed by judges are not high enough to serve as a deterrent to future misconduct. The intent of keeping fines modest was to prevent lawsuits that would bankrupt media companies and individuals. However, the net effect is that companies see these fines as the cost of doing business and not as an incentive to produce better journalism.
Quality of print content is also largely a reflection of the quality of journalism education. Journalists at newspapers and magazines are typically young (the average age of reporters at many of the outlets interviewed was about 27) and, though often recruited from the university, learn most practical skills on the job as the university programs are theoretical and outdated. More practical training programs are available through the Media Plan Institute and the Media Centar Sarajevo, but relatively few journalists have access to them due to limited time and resources at their news outlets. In addition, except at more successful publications such as Nezavisne Novine and Dnevni Avaz where salaries are relatively good and regularly paid, experienced mid-career journalists who have not become “stars” tend to leave the profession for better paying jobs in international organizations or public relations firms.

As a result of the low quality and questionable veracity of news publications, readership is low. The best selling newspaper in BiH, Dnevni Avaz, reports its paid circulation to be approximately 40,000 copies (80,000 on Fridays)—about the same as all other daily publications combined. Avaz’s superior place in the market can be attributed to its higher production values and savvy marketing. It is also considered by many to be “pro-Muslim” which earns it greater advertising revenue (about 35 percent of the newspaper is advertising). According to the paper’s editor-in-chief, however, Avaz maintains an ethnic balance in its staffing and is “pro-Bosnian” (rather than “pro-Muslim”) and non-nationalistic.

With the exception of Avaz, the greatest challenge facing newspapers in BiH is financial viability. All agreed that the overt political and religious pressure experienced by the media after the war has mostly disappeared. Instead, print media are now susceptible to economic influence that can affect editorial content and advertising sales. Bosnia’s small market provides opportunity for advertisers to pressure newspapers and magazines into publishing—or not publishing—stories by threatening to withhold advertising. Most publishers claim they successfully resist this kind of coercion, but observers say that the effects are clear from the stories that appear in Bosnian publications. At the same time, some editors claim that [other] publications engage in “media racketeering” in which print outlets threaten to run negative stories about potential advertisers if they don’t buy ads.

All, however, is not bleak. The more successful publications are using written business and marketing plans to monitor their business progress and most use and pay for foreign news agency subscriptions including the Associated Press, Reuters, and AFP. (Several editors report that they recently cancelled their subscriptions to the local news agency ONASA because it has become too slow and does not provide adequate copy to make it worth their while.)

Furthermore, many news outlets, such as Nezavisne Novine and Dani, are diversifying their product line by introducing new publications such as women’s magazines, business and tabloid papers to generate new income streams and reach new audiences. START, meanwhile, will increase issue frequency from a bi-weekly to a weekly format based on research that indicated readers prefer weekly magazines. The magazine also won an award from Amnesty International for investigative reporting. These changes indicate that print media managers are thinking creatively about how to sustain their businesses as international funding decreases.
I.6 TELEVISION

The television industry has arguably shown the most significant development within the media sector over the past three years. Certain commercial outlets—particularly on the national scene—have established program formats based on target audience groups, and have thereby pulled other stations into more modern program management strategies through the need to compete for viewers within the country-wide market. Overall, the leading nationwide outlets are making more advanced choices regarding purchase of current international programming to attract and hold their audiences.

OBN, after re-vamping its program schedule once the former owner of Croatia’s NOVA TV purchased the network, unabashedly claims to target its programming toward women aged 17–48, particularly those employed living in urban areas—as these women make household choices regarding consumer goods, and are therefore sought after by firms that OBN covets as advertisers. Following from this selection of target audience, 80% of OBN’s programs consist of films, serials, and telenovellas; the network provides the minimum amount of news and information content as prescribed by CRA regulations (30 minutes per day) in order to concentrate on entertainment programming.

Similarly, TV Pink BiH is widely considered to target rural audiences and those viewers with relatively lower levels of education, particularly with its scheduling of music and reality programming (TV Pink BiH management was not interviewed as part of this assessment). As a result, aggregate data from MIB television audience research show that TV Pink BiH and OBN have shown the greatest increase in viewers from 2005 to 2006, largely at the expense of the public broadcaster of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, FTV.
Figure 1.1 National and Entity Television Audience Share: 4–10 April 2005

**BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Populacija</th>
<th>1.166.100 (starosna kategorija 12-69)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV BN</td>
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<tr>
<td>BHT 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pink BiH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Druge domace TV</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATV</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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**FEDERACIJA BIH**

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**REPUBLIKA SRPSKA**

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Source: Mareco Index Bosnia
Figure 1.2 National and Entity Television Audience Share: 10–16 April 2006

**BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA**

Population 1,166,100 (age group 12-69)

- Druge satelitske TV: 2.1%
- TV BN: 4.6%
- ATV: 3.8%
- NTV HAYAT: 4.8%
- RTRS: 5.1%
- Druge domace TV: 6.2%
- OBN: 6.8%
- BHT 1: 6.9%
- FTV 1: 12.1%
- Pink BiH: 13.8%

**FEDERACIJA BIH**

Population 639,600 (age group 12-69)

- Druge satelitske TV: 3.2%
- TV TK: 3.6%
- Druge domace TV: 5.5%
- OBN: 8.3%
- NTV HAYAT: 8.6%
- BHT 1: 9.2%
- Pink BiH: 11.7%
- FTV 1: 21.1%
- TV SA: 1.7%
- TV TUZLA: 1.2%

**REPUBLIKA SRPSKA**

Population 526,500 (age group 12-69)

- Druge domace TV: 3.6%
- BHT 1: 4.3%
- OBN: 5.6%
- TV BN: 9.1%
- ATV: 9.3%
- RTRS: 11.6%
- BN Sat: 1.4%
- Druge satelitske TV: 0.7%
- Druge ino TV: 36.5%

Source: Marco Index Bosnia
Mreza Plus, the television network supported by international donors (primarily USAID) over the past few years, is following suit. A new and dynamic 11:00pm “national” newscast is under development, spearheaded by the editorial teams of NTV Hayat in Sarajevo and ATV in Banja Luka. This news program will feature alternating studio presentation every two days between the two stations and a potential for live on-air feeds from both locations as dictated by top stories of the day. From September, Mreza Plus plans to launch a new network schedule, including programming geared toward a more rural audience (in particular, a reality program and game show)—presumably to compete with TV Pink BiH.

These developments at broadcasters with nationwide (or nearly nationwide) reach show that more advanced media management techniques are taking hold at the leading commercial television outlets in Bosnia. Station executives are studying available audience data, and making program choices to both target more specific audiences and compete for advertising accounts. The impact is felt at the public television outlets which, despite the advantage of residual loyalty to state broadcasters that often prevails in post-socialist societies, are slowly losing this advantage as viewers seek alternative programs that appeal to their respective tastes. Participation in the United Media Industry joint purchase of MIB data allows for the major players to make management choices using the same information (the quality of which will increase as “people meter” data is introduced). For example, Mreza Plus (which cites TV Pink BiH and its upcoming version of Big Brother as competition) is considering options regarding purchase of licenses for internationally branded program formats that would be produced locally but carry titles known worldwide (particularly for reality series and game shows).

There remains, however, a gap in terms of developing quality domestic programming for BiH audiences. While some local production houses are able to generate programs with high production value, stations generally avoid the potentially expensive prospect of purchasing programs from local producers in favor of creating programs in-house. As a result, limited station resources often lead to studio-based programming of questionable entertainment and production value, while private production houses are forced to undertake alternative strategies to see their own films or series broadcast. Currently, some production houses establish concepts for programs, and then seek potential sponsorship from firms to cover the cost of production. If an entire series can be paid for by income from sponsors, then the production house offers the program to a local television outlet for broadcast. Therefore, television stations themselves bear no risk for—nor do they consider possible investment in—domestic-made programs. Even the public broadcasters, which are bound by CRA regulations to maintain a minimum of 10% locally produced programs as part of their schedules, look more often to the production capability within the public broadcasting organization than to commercial production firms.

1.7 DOMESTIC MEDIA TRAINING

1.7.1 University Journalism Education

While the past 10 years has seen an extraordinary amount of training for journalists in BiH, the opinion widely held in the media community is that current tertiary-level journalism education is lacking in both quality and substance. Few practical skills are taught to students at journalism departments (normally housed within the political science faculties at universities in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Mostar). Most worrying are claims made during interviews that describe instructors at journalism departments who put pressure on students to abide by religious affiliations rather than maintain a fair and balanced approach to the practice of journalism. A more common concern is that university journalism education does not include
nearly enough practical skills training to produce qualified young reporters that can quickly step into functioning roles at electronic or print media outlets. There is hope, as the university-level education system in BiH begins to implement reforms necessary to conform to the Bologna Declaration, that journalism departments will depart from concentration on theory and institute modern approaches to teaching journalism used in Europe and other western nations. Simply put, the current criticisms of tertiary-level journalism education are a reflection of the outdated approaches to education throughout the university system and the slow transition to modern teaching practices that focus on critical-thinking and practical skills. Until that transition occurs, however, more practical methods of teaching skills to young and mid-career journalists reside at private media institutes that operate training programs.

1.7.2 Media Plan Institute

The Media Plan Institute operates an annual eight-month course within its High College of Journalism (HCJ). Originally created to fill the void of experienced journalists identified after the war, the HCJ guides 21–22 students each year through three modules that instill general media professional knowledge along with specific skills training in television, radio or print (including internet-based) journalism. Students take part in a one-month internship within the HCJ curriculum. From 1999 to 2004, the school boasts that 95% of its graduates found employment at media outlets; although only about one-half of the 2005 HCJ graduates were working in journalism. The institute assists in placement by informally recommending its students to media outlets, especially to TV BH1.

1.7.3 Media Centar Sarajevo

The Media Centar Sarajevo (MCS)—originally established as the home of the BBC School of Journalism from 1995 to 2003—offers a variety of courses for media professionals and journalism students. Within the scope of its Training Center, the MCS organizes short- and medium-term training modules at the demand of local and regional journalists, or at the request of international media donors that have assessed particular needs for skills development in the media sector. Of particular note is the application of a “blended” teaching approach that combines in-house, face-to-face training sessions with a distance learning component that utilizes the NetNovinar website and interactive educational platform. This “blended” method has been operational for two years, currently guiding a fourth group of reporters through the MCS investigative journalism training module.

The MCS has delivered a wide range of training courses, on topics including basic principles of journalism, technical radio and television production skills, desktop publishing, and more advanced specialized-reporting skills. In many cases, the MCS relies on the use of international trainers included as part of donor-sponsored training packages. Recently, the MCS has expanded its slate of training courses to include a week-long documentary film production seminar—a course fully funded through fees paid by participants.

A more detailed review of the MCS and its five established “Profit Centers”—which include the Training Center—can be found below in Section 2.1.1.

1.8 CURRENT AND FUTURE DONOR EFFORTS

After 10 years of extensive and costly assistance to Bosnian media, the international community is dramatically reducing its level of intervention and funding to the sector. This reality is generally accepted by the media as a natural next step in the transition to self-sustainability and independence. For donors, the challenge is to invest remaining limited funds strategically so that they bolster and support past efforts.
Principle remaining donors, apart from USAID, would seem to be the Swedish Helsinki Committee, the European Commission, and the Open Society Fund-Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Swedish Helsinki Committee expects funding of media support institutions such as the Press Council, BH Novinari, and Media Centar Sarajevo to remain its priority, in addition to targeted technical assistance to long term partner ATV in Banja Luka. The organization may also provide some limited funding for minority language radio production. The European Commission remains completely focused on the public media sector and the Communications Regulatory Agency. The EC has at this point discontinued all financial support and equipment purchases but expects to provide technical assistance to the public broadcast system and RAK for the next three to four years. It may also consider funding for feasibility or other studies around the cable and television digitization issues for the CRA and the public broadcaster.

The Open Society Fund-BiH and the Open Society Institute has been a significant investor in the media sector between 1995 and 2006. In the future, the local foundation (OSF-BiH) has no outright plans for core funding of operational costs at specific media outlets, and OSF-BiH provided its final operational support grant of $20,000 to the Media Centar Sarajevo in 2005. OSF-BiH does plan to partner with certain media outlets to implement media campaigns as part of larger projects that focus on civic participation and development of civil society. For example, OSF-BiH will support public awareness campaigns implemented by Bosnian civil society organizations as part of the Grozd project (which plans activities hoping to hold local officials accountable for promises made during election campaigns); similarly, OSF-BiH may support Bosnian initiatives to convince more young people to vote in upcoming elections. OSF-BiH contributes matching funds to specific projects implemented by the Media Centar Sarajevo, including an investigative journalism distance-learning course. In the future, the foundation may commission the MCS to conduct research on media-related issues that support OSF-BiH projects in other topical areas. The Open Society Institute Network Media Program and the Media Development Loan Fund have the ability to continue support for selected initiatives and outlets in BiH.
2.0 EVALUATION OF USAIDMEDIA INTERVENTIONS

2.1 USAIDMEDIA (CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL)

As the primary implementing partner for USAID’s interventions to develop media professionalism sector-wide, the USAIDMedia program succeeded on a number of fronts.

The most labor-intensive activities—and perhaps those most difficult to evaluate in quantifiable terms—were the extensive efforts made by USAIDMedia staff to consult with and coach Bosnian media partners to establish more advanced management techniques. Without USAIDMedia involvement, the following achievements may not have taken place:

- Establishment of the United Media Industry (also known as the Joint Industry Council, or JIC) by nationwide television outlets and major advertising agencies for the purpose of making joint purchases of media audience research under the auspices of a three-year contract with Mareco Index Bosnia (MIB). USAIDMedia staff members were instrumental in bringing individual players together to form the group. This act eventually led to a significant investment made by UMI through the purchase of “people meters” that will provide more accurate records of audience viewing patterns and, therefore, more accurate research data for use by media managers and advertising agency executives.

- Drafting of a strategic plan by Press Council management, which provides the association with a series of steps to solidify the role of the Council within the print media sector. As a result, the Council has a plan for restructuring the membership of the Council and Complaints Commission, for implementing new statutes, and formation of the Press Council Assembly. Having the Council strategic plan in place was an explicit benchmark for receiving additional donor support from the Swedish Helsinki Committee and the Open Society Institute.

- Drafting of a strategic plan by the unified Association of Journalists (BH Novinari) which describes the advocacy activities of the association and sets goals for generating income through membership dues.

- Coordination among network members for the creation of an expanded national Mreza Plus newscast, scheduled to begin nightly broadcast in September 2006.

In addition, representatives from both television and radio beneficiaries noted the value of business management training supplied by USAIDMedia supported consultant Graeme Moreland. Key to the success of Moreland’s technical assistance were the on-site consultations that followed group training at the MCS. For example, ATV in Banja Luka specifically noted the value of this approach, which in part led to development of station management and promotional materials.

The USAIDMedia small grants program was routinely identified as beneficial to the outlets that received support. In two cases, consumer and public affairs programs, initially produced through USAIDMedia grant funding, proved to be both popular and central to program schedules at their respective stations.

“Dzepobran” (“Pocket Protector”) will be produced for an additional series broadcast on FTV, while “Dosije” on ATV Banja Luka will continue as an in-house production. Another example of well-positioned
support is a grant provided to the commercial production firm “Prime Time Productions” in Sarajevo. Prime Time developed five initial episodes of a business magazine utilizing USAID support. In the future, the cost of production will be covered by commercial sponsors and the program will be broadcast on RTRS out of Banja Luka.

USAIDMedia small grants also enabled targeted print media managers to devote resources to investigative reporting initiatives. START magazine credited USAID support for several series of articles, in particular one set of reports the followed the trail of appropriated tax monies through government agencies. The START editor-in-chief proclaimed that the articles led to a parliamentary audit of a previous state audit report, and later to changes in spending procedures enacted by Parliament. The weekly publication DANI also received similar USAIDMedia assistance to cover the cost of articles that focused on health education and attitudes toward treatment for HIV/AIDS in Sarajevo and throughout the country.

The process through which such grants were allocated is also noteworthy. Rather than risk disbursal of cash up front prior to production of investigative reports, outlets were required to compile financial and narrative reports (along with the articles), for which USAIDMedia reimbursed the expenses of each investigative journalism project. In some cases, USAIDMedia provided training to complement the grant activities.

Most recently, grant-making efforts have targeted cross-media support for radio and television programming and print articles that hope to promote issues important to the upcoming electoral campaign rather than the ritual focus on politicians and parties participating in the election. Programs delving into the issues of small and medium enterprise development and tourism have been broadcast in parts of the country, with future topics to include water resource management, privatization, and the environment as features leading up to the October election. The impact of these programs on the voting population, of course, should be tracked during the 30-day pre-electoral period and during the months after the election itself.

There are initiatives, however, for which USAIDMedia efforts were not as successful, either due to choices made by local media managers or within the context of the reorganization of priorities by USAIDMedia program staff responding to budgetary and human resource limitations:

- After fully funding a negotiated joint purchase of print and radio audience research conducted by Prism Research prior to this year, in 2006 no collective print/radio data will be provided to former participating outlets. Executives at a few industry leaders—such as Radio Stari Grad and Radio Kameleon—who appreciate the value of audience research, either purchase data individually or acquire data by other means. The example set by UMI for television has yet to be replicated in other parts of the media sector.

- Those print outlets interviewed did not credit USAIDMedia with efforts to reorganize newsrooms according to modern standards. Nezavisne Novine acknowledges the efforts of IREX consultants prior to 2004 for its newsroom changes, as does the editorial management at NTV Hayat (who claims that, “we made a better program using no money

- While there were positive aspects of USAIDMedia support for domestic program production, the approach also fell short. The director of FTV noted the quality of the series “Stories from the Neighborhood,” yet he deemed the cost of production too high to continue the series with FTV funds after USAID support ended. This may reflect the opinion among many station managers that the risk of investing in program production is better made in their own stations, rather than commissioning programs from domestic commercial production houses.

- Despite the fact that the Association of Electronic Media (AEM) is headed by one of the most advanced media managers in the sector (Adnan Osmanagic of Radio Stari Grad), AEM suffers from the absence of a business plan and an effective strategy for collecting even nominal dues from members.

- There seems to have been little progress made on the establishment of sector-wide awards for outstanding journalism or for the creation of a journalism certificate program. The Association of
Journalists (BH Novinari) did present an award for radio production in 2005 (the winning entry being a joint production of Radio Kameleon and a Croatian radio station). USAIDMedia staff claimed that developing an award for television journalism was “too involved” for such an effort to be successful. Therefore, efforts to establish such awards were given lower priority by USAIDMedia staff.

2.1.1 Media Centar Sarajevo

The Media Centar Sarajevo (MCS) is currently both an implementer of USAIDMedia program activities and a recipient of USAID support and technical assistance through its subcontractor relationship with Chemonics International. In programmatic areas, the Media Centar has been effective as a delivery mechanism for selected USAIDMedia training initiatives. As noted above, the business management training conducted by international consultant Graeme Moreland was mentioned by partners as particularly beneficial.

The MCS has a much greater role as the coordinator of the USAID-financed pre-election project. Working in conjunction with USAIDMedia staff, the MCS manages the activities of twenty Bosnian media outlets that participate in the creation of election-oriented programs throughout the country. To support this task, the MCS hired a coordinator that also provides monitoring and feedback to radio stations regarding the content and form of election programs broadcast on respective outlets. This is an important step for the MCS acting as a USAID implementing partner, recognizing the need to bolster current human resources at the MCS in order to maintain quality management over a project.

Over the course of the past two years, the MCS—directly benefiting from intensive USAIDMedia staff consultations—developed an extensive business plan for the organization. This document is a key tool that MCS management can use to map out the direction of activities and monitor the resources needed for proper implementation of those activities. The MCS, through its core management body, has organized five distinct “profit centers” under which all MCS activities fall:

- **Center for Media Training** – Currently the critical component regarding USAID-supported media interventions, where MCS-organized training courses and technical assistance are managed.

- **Center for Research and Documentation** – An operation utilizing an innovative digital archive service (iDoc) that acts as a portal for institutions in Bosnia to access past and current official documents and print media articles.

- **Center for Media Policy** – The research and monitoring arm of the MCS, providing clients with data and analysis on issues affecting the media sector.

- **Center for Strategic Communication** – A training house for public relations and strategic communication skills development.

- **Production Center** – The video production unit at the MCS, creating public affairs and commercial programming at the request of clients and international donors.

The MCS business plan allows MCS management to determine the human, infrastructural, and financial needs of each center, and track both generation and allocation of resources necessary to implement the wide variety of MCS services. Crucial to this effort was the hiring at the end of 2004 of a business manager to supply the constant monitoring of resources and expenditures required for MCS executive management to make decisions regarding the direction of the MCS.

Reflecting the organized business acumen at the center, the 2005 fiscal year was marked by three specific indices of MCS capacity. First, original MCS projections were nearly matched by actual revenue. Second, total adjusted income for the MCS resulted in a net profit for the year even while considering the expected shortfall in subscription revenue for the iDoc service (within the Center for Research and Documentation).
Third, the MCS made considerable strides in raising the percentage of domestic commercial contracts for MCS services over past years. Precise figures for 2005 are presented below.

### Table 2.1 Media Centar Sarajevo Finances – FY 2005

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<td><strong>19,200</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Media Centar Sarajevo Business Manager

While the MCS stands on a firm business foundation—reflecting USAIDMedia management consulting technical assistance—there are several issues that MCS management should address in the coming year:

- The MCS must continue to implement and update their business plan. As management decisions should flow from the course laid out by the document, MCS senior managers should take the time and effort to return to this “big picture” regularly so as not to lose direction while dealing with the day-to-day challenges of operating a venture of this size in Bosnia. In particular, MCS management should maintain their current focus on the following tracks:

  Sustained development of varied income streams independent of any potential USAID support (as financial independence would generate a more beneficial partnership between USAID and the MCS);

  Active development of domestic grant sources—for example, Ministry of Culture seed monies for production of domestic programs, or support for iDoc to convert Bosnian publications into digital formats for archival research.

- Currently, in the MCS business plan, there is an assumption of significant USAID funding from 2006 to 2008 (listed under “USAID Chemonics”):

  More than 175,000 KM for television production over three years; and,

  Over 59,000 KM for core MCS operating costs (divided between 2006 and 2007).

These assumptions (minus, of course, previously-secured USAID Media 2006 support) should be discussed with USAID Media program staff and USAID to determine validity for planning purposes.
Legal ownership of the MCS rests at this time with the Open Society Fund-BiH. MCS should continue to work with OSF-BiH management to move forward with determination of how MCS will be transferred to MCS executive ownership, including valuation of assets and potential employee share purchase through private institution credit financing. The OSF-BiH, with support from the Open Society Institute-New York, is confident that this process can be completed by the end of 2006.

MCS executive management should establish a system for regular analysis of human resource capacity within the organization. As demand for MCS services from commercial clients and international donors may increase over the next few years, managers will need to be certain that the number of employees, and employee skill sets, at any particular time are appropriate to meet the needs of a wide variety of projects.

Similarly, there is currently no budget line reserved for MCS staff development and training—elements that may be necessary to help the MCS deliver services in the future. MCS should draft a plan that shows management commitment to skills development for its own staff—similar to the MCS commitment to training players in the media sector.

There is concern from USAIDMedia staff that the MCS has yet to show a developed capacity to perform assessment of needs in the areas of media training and technical assistance in the Bosnian media sector context—most often the MCS is called upon to deliver training and technical assistance at the request of donors or international organizations in Bosnia. The MCS should build upon existing analysis capabilities in selected staff members to create an in-house needs assessment capacity.

Even with its successful track record, the MCS should continue to develop its proficiencies in delivery of training and technical assistance. One example is to develop expertise in providing business management assistance to membership associations (such as those supported in the past by USAIDMedia). This might be achieved by adding to in-house trainer skills, or building relationships with external consultants that have experience in association development.

Programmatically, the MCS should draft a plan for extended follow through of the election programming project supported in 2006 by USAIDMedia. A common criticism of donors during interviews has been the one-off approach to projects supported at times of international anxiety, for example, during election seasons. The solid foundation established by the current USAID Media election programming surge should be continued well into 2007 to reinforce the pre-election activities such as:

- Issue-oriented political reporting;
- Holding elected candidates accountable for party platforms and promises made during the campaign; and,
- Tracking of campaign finance expenditures by political parties and candidates.

2.2 CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
(NEW YORK UNIVERSITY/JOURNALISM DEVELOPMENT GROUP)

The Center for Investigative Journalism (CIN), a project of New York University (NYU) and its subcontractor, the Journalism Development Group (JDG), is an ambitious effort to elevate the standard of investigative reporting in BiH to a more internationally acceptable level. Modeled after successful investigative centers in the Philippines, Romania, and elsewhere, CIN’s goal as stated in its proposal is to train future investigative reporters and editors under western editors, and to help set the news agenda for Bosnian media by offering the high quality investigative news stories produced by the center free of charge to Bosnian media outlets and publishing those reports on the CIN website.
The original strategy for achieving these goals was to recruit the best journalists in Bosnia, provide them intense on-the-job training in western methods of investigative reporting in a state of the art newsroom, build relationships with local media to ensure their stories were widely published, and launch a public outreach campaign to ensure Bosnian citizens—CIN’s potential readers—were aware of the center’s work and mission. A key component of this strategy was to “localize” the project by setting CIN up as a local NGO and having Bosnian leadership in place within the first two years of the grant period, thus giving the center greater credibility and legitimacy within the Bosnian media community. By the end of the three-year USAID grant, CIN should have implemented a multi-layered fundraising strategy to ensure the center’s long-term sustainability assuming limited USAID funding past the initial grant.

Progress and Successes to Date

The Center for Investigative Journalism has achieved many of its goals over the past two years. Within months of issuance of the grant, CIN was registered as a local Bosnian nongovernmental organization and currently operates in full compliance with Bosnian law. The center has created a newsroom environment comparable to any in the West in resources and technology (encrypted computer network, access to international databases such as Lexis-Nexis, own website, etc.).

Most importantly, CIN has put together a diverse and dedicated staff of reporters and potential editors who are now well trained in the methods of western investigative journalism and have fully internalized the skills (i.e., interviewing, research, story organization, and accuracy) needed to practice their craft. During the assessment team’s interviews with CIN journalists, all praised the “team approach” to investigative journalism that is at the heart of CIN’s methodology. Team members check each other’s research, confirm facts for accuracy, and review writing for fairness, balance, and clarity. The reporters seem to understand that their target is the public at large, and not elites or politicians—even with the center’s goal to affect change in the way political elites operate in BiH.

CIN documentation shows that the center has produced 62 stories which have been published, appeared in, or cited within at least 12 different news outlets, including newspapers, magazines, websites, and television news programs. Actual number of readers of CIN stories is difficult to measure as CIN reports appear in news outlets at the discretion of each outlet’s respective editor-in-chief. Given the outlets most-inclined to run CIN stories, and the low readership of all Bosnian print outlets, it is unlikely that the center’s articles reach a significant portion of the population.

Though the center’s reach is clearly not as broad as initially expected, CIN’s director believes the center’s stories have positively influenced events in Bosnia. For example:

- A federal minister of health resigned after being prominently featured in the center’s series on health care;
- The Sarajevo Tourist Bureau recognized the tunnel at the Sarajevo airport as a tourist attraction and promised funding to build a war museum after the tunnel was featured in the series on the loss of Bosnian culture; and,
- A series on Judge Gerald Gahima (Waiting for Justice) resulted in a demand by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council to review the process for hiring of international judges. This demand was codified in new OHR guidelines and should soon be implemented.

Evidence of impact is entirely anecdotal, and CIN management acknowledges that it cannot claim direct responsibility for these or other examples of positive change provided in their documentation. It does seem fair to assume, however, that some actions may have occurred at least in part due to the various investigative series the center has run over the past two years.

Concerns
The CIN concept is undeniably innovative and represents a well-taken risk by USAID. It has achieved much of what it set out to do since July 2004 in terms of training investigative reporters, and producing a high quality news product available to all media. It cannot be said, however, that CIN has had a discernable impact upon project goals such as setting the news agenda for Bosnian media, or that CIN has altered the way other news media approach investigative reporting. Despite its status as a local NGO, CIN is also still perceived as an international organization by many Bosnian media outlets, with the resentment that sometimes accompanies such perception. Our interviews did not provide us with corroboration that CIN is widely known to the Bosnian public.

Especially worrying is that CIN journalists, though highly trained, seem very disinclined to return to local news outlets, putting into question their ability to become “the next generation of investigative reporters and editors” who will go back into Bosnian newsrooms to create culture-change from within. Furthermore, CIN is currently not financially self-sustainable, a reality which CIN will need to address if the investment in the center is to lead to sustainable results.

Significant as these issues are, we believe these problems are more a result of the implementation strategy adopted over the first two years of the project by the international management at CIN, as opposed to a fundamental flaw with the concept of creating an investigative reporting center in Bosnia.

The proposal to USAID from New York University cited the success of investigative centers around the world as evidence that a similar center in Sarajevo could be the catalyst needed to affect change within the Bosnian media culture. Several of these attributes—transparency, independence, high ethical standards, non-partisanship, and a commitment to excellence—have clearly been achieved by the center and have been critical to its journalistic success.

However, CIN has not put into practice three of the most important attributes noted as key to the success of other investigative centers around the world—components upon which the CIN model is based. These three elements most affect the ability of CIN to function as a trusted and integral part of the Bosnian media environment, namely: 1) “localness,” i.e., installation of Bosnian leadership at the center to ensure local acceptance; 2) public outreach and marketing, to gain and maintain public support; and, 3) permanent funding to maintain independence of the center. Current CIN management have made these three issues relatively low priorities; however, we would argue, progress on these three fronts from the first day was critically important. If the center is not welcomed by the local Bosnian media, if CIN products are not demanded by the Bosnian public, and if funds to sustain CIN are not in place, then the value of CIN’s news product is negligible, and the talent of the center’s reporters goes un-utilized. Simply put, CIN may fail. Below we elaborate further on flaws in the current approach that we believe should be changed.

“Localness”

Bosnian media outlets currently publish CIN stories on an ad hoc basis, totally at the discretion of news editors. In order for CIN to have significant influence on the Bosnian news agenda, CIN reports should be widely carried in a majority of popular news outlets. Altogether, print circulation hovers below 100,000 paid copies; understanding this, CIN must reach as many readers as possible to have any impact on its proclaimed audience. The print media that typically run CIN stories have an approximate combined paid circulation of 30,000 (though pass along readership may be as much as four times higher). To be accepted by media outlets and achieve wider publication of its stories, CIN must be perceived as a Bosnian institution by actors in the media sector. This is hindered by two interconnected issues:

- Continued expatriate leadership: Fully two years into creation of the center, Bosnian media managers almost exclusively identify CIN by, and associate CIN with, its expatriate director. While some may have confidence in international leadership, this has also had negative impact on the willingness of Bosnian media outlets to carry CIN stories.
Delay in transfer to Bosnian leadership: CIN fellows were scheduled to be placed in leadership positions by the end of the project’s second year. As CIN enters its third year (July 2006), a local management team (editorial and administrative) has yet to be installed. The expatriate managers seem to have identified individuals that will later comprise the Bosnian management team, but are not yet fully confident in the ability of their selections to perform tasks to an “international standard”. Therefore, the expatriate director will request more time (as much as three months) to train the new management team.

CIN is largely viewed as a competitor by editors at media outlets interviewed, rather than a complementary asset to their outlets’ newsgathering ability. Viewed as an international organization with vast resources, CIN is the source of resentment among many of its potential partners. CIN appears to have a positive working relationship with two or three local media outlets (particularly Start, Nezavisne Novine, and SAN) but even editors from these publications emphasize CIN’s need to be further integrated into the Bosnian media community and collaborate directly with media outlets and their editorial staffs. In short, CIN is still seen as an outsider, and will continue to be considered an external player until Bosnian leadership can build necessary bridges to managers at media outlets.

CIN’s international leadership also affects presentation of content within articles. The original CIN proposal states that stories will explore solutions to the issues they raise—that they should stress how the public or policy makers can get involved to solve problems. This has not been a hallmark of stories to date; anecdotal comments from readers say that the “problem solving” element is missing from CIN articles. The stories are reportedly well-written; CIN reports are certainly longer and more in-depth than most investigative pieces currently familiar to audiences. However, CIN articles do not seem to offer readers particularly new information—or give the audience a ready sense of what to do with the extensively-compiled information. CIN should strike a balance between insisting on the “highest western investigating standards” and working within a Bosnian reality. CIN must accomplish the task of ensuring that excellent journalism skills are internalized by reporters and editors within the goal of producing stories that Bosnian editors-in-chief want to run, and that Bosnian citizens demand to read. Until this happens, CIN’s ability to “change and set the news agenda for Bosnian media” will remain limited.

Public Outreach

The Center for Investigative Reporting seems to be virtually unknown to the general public in Bosnia. This is surprising after public outreach was recognized as critical to the success of other investigative journalism centers referred to in NYU’s proposal. The CIN proposal states that “to maintain credibility with the community, the center must aggressively educate the public, other media, business, and the government on how it operates, how decisions are made, how it selects stories, and its mission to create a Fourth Estate.”

Nonetheless, two years into the grant period, most Bosnians have not heard of CIN or its journalists nor do Bosnians have any awareness of the center’s mission. Media outlets that run CIN stories often strip out the CIN byline and any references the center’s investigative reporting team in the text. Occasionally, CIN has been negatively profiled by news outlets hostile to the center, but it is CIN policy not to respond or offer corrections to inaccurate allegations. While there may be value in taking the “high ground” in such cases, when considering CIN’s minimal name recognition, this policy seems unwise as CIN risks being publicly defined by its detractors.

CIN management acknowledges this lack of name recognition—or branding—of the CIN product but maintains that branding is neither a priority nor particularly necessary. The expatriate managers believe that the CIN name will become better known as they expand into television (reporting that NTV Hayat has agreed to broadcast a CIN investigation as a documentary production this summer), and as more electronic media outlets refer to CIN stories in their own news reports.

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7 Center for Investigative Journalism, [Proposal, Scope of Work and Implementation Plan], 20.
While broader recognition of CIN may happen without specific effort (and there are no guarantees), it is no substitute for a well-planned public outreach campaign. A concerted public awareness strategy would strive to build Bosnian public identification with CIN, create a popular understanding of CIN’s mission, and generate public familiarity with CIN journalists. Relying on other media to make the CIN name a household word is a poor (and indolent) approach to building name recognition and does a disservice to CIN journalists. True investigative journalism can result in real threats to reporters and editors in Bosnia—CIN may at some point need public support as a defense. Such protection will be impossible to find if CIN remains invisible to its readers.

**Funding and Self-Sustainability**

The original NYU proposal outlines a four-pronged fundraising strategy for securing permanent funding for CIN which involves:

- Building an endowment—an endowment campaign was to be launched by week 56,
- Hiring a commission-based fundraiser by week 53,
- Soliciting individual contributions (ongoing), and
- Soliciting outside grants (ongoing).

At the end of Year Two of the grant period, however, CIN has made no tangible progress toward securing financial support beyond the current USAID contribution. The endowment campaign has not resulted in any contributions, nor has a fundraiser been hired (a Bosnian staff member is charged with fundraising efforts, but the original proposal to hire a dedicated commission-based fundraiser might result in a greater chance of success). CIN management indicated that for short-term financing they are counting on advisory board members acquiring individual $10,000-$20,000 contributions from “rainmakers.”

Funding shortfalls are not uncommon. However, the lack of urgency displayed by CIN management on this point is disconcerting. Realistically, NYU and JDG did not expect the center to be fully self-supporting within the first three-year grant period. In fact, the original proposal noted that securing an endowment during this time was probably unrealistic and suggested that USAID consider modest funding post-2007 at around $200,000 per year to supplement financial support from other sources until an endowment is in place. This strategy, however, assumes that some successful (non-USAID) fundraising would have taken place during the initial three-year grant period. So far, this is not the case.

Moreover, as part of the information CIN provided to the assessment team, CIN managers cited that they plan “…to ask USAID for local funding for three additional years. In that time, it is possible to get the center self supporting. Failure to get this funding will probably result in closure of the center as a functioning organization.” This statement places sole responsibility for keeping CIN operational directly on USAID, rather than on the center’s current leadership and their efforts to raise funds during the first three years of the project. The tone of this document seems to contradict the spirit of the original proposal that describes a strategy to secure non-USAID funding and ensure the financial independence of the center.

**Other Concerns**

In addition to the issues above that correspond directly to the NYU proposal, there are concerns about the CIN approach to staffing and the future of CIN journalists in the greater Bosnian media market.

The original staffing plan called for recruitment of the best journalists in Bosnia who would be paid an above average salary in order to get and retain them by the center. Predictably, this approach to hiring has created a certain amount of resentment among Bosnian media outlets that cannot compete with CIN’s international

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8 **CIN Sustainability Fact Sheet**, presented in Media Assessment Fact Sheets compilation of documents.
budget and resources. Nearly every print outlet interviewed (both those friendly to CIN and those that were not) mentioned this disparity between reporter salaries at the center and Bosnian media market standards as a major point of contention. Even if salaries at the center are not at the exaggerated level cited by other print outlets, this perception adds to the local animosity toward the center and presents an additional obstacle at those very media outlets CIN relies on to publish CIN articles.

Furthermore, CIN has not hired “the best Bosnian journalists,” those that might warrant higher salaries based on their skill and stature within the local media community. Apart from a few reporters, the center has hired talented, but primarily young, inexperienced, and unknown journalists that the international editors have trained from the ground up. The expatriate editors found that seasoned journalists either did not want to leave their secure jobs or were unwilling to learn a new way of reporting. This situation should have been foreseeable from the outset of the project, given the extensive experience of CIN’s international management in Bosnia prior to establishing the center. Resentment of CIN’s approach to hiring created an obstacle between the center and professionals at Bosnian media outlets that must be overcome. CIN’s choice of salary levels also created an additional burden on the operating budget of the center.

Finally, there is concern about the future of CIN journalists and how they are expected to become, as described in the original proposal, “a new generation of ‘watchdogs’: investigative reporters and editors who will return to local media and continue to spread a new set of standards for fair and balanced journalism.” Over time, CIN shifted its strategy from cycling fellows through the center and back into Bosnian news outlets, to having a permanent roster of reporters and editors who will operate CIN once the international management departs. While this permanent structure may be good for CIN as an individual organization, it does little to accomplish the goal of creating a cultural and professional shift in newsrooms across Bosnia by placing the “new generation of ‘watchdogs’” back into local media outlets. It is extremely worrying that none of the CIN journalists interviewed seem to want to work in a Bosnian outlet newsroom, claiming that such an adjustment would be impossible after working under the conditions provided by CIN. While the assessment team admires the commitment of CIN journalists to their organization, it is concerned by the reporters’ lack of commitment to the field of Bosnian journalism as a whole.

We consider this a failing of current CIN international management. Even if CIN retains certain staff members to maintain the center, some journalists will inevitably leave. There appears to be no “re-entry” preparation—or motivation—for CIN reporters to go back into the local Bosnian media market. Reporters will not have the same resources or freedoms they enjoy at CIN. To be effective in the overall market, and to affect the kind of change foreseen by NYU and JDG, CIN journalists need strategies to help them survive and thrive in Bosnian newsrooms. CIN reporters need the wherewithal to take the skills and tenacity developed at CIN and apply these attributes in other, less optimal environments.
3.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 CONCLUSIONS

The international community has made a substantial investment in the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s media sector over the past 10 years. An informal review by the Journalism Development Group estimates that since 1996 international donors have contributed well over $100 Million in equipment, training and technical assistance to media development efforts. Previous assessments and research reports have documented many of the highlights—and low points—of these interventions since the end of the war in 1995. Much progress has been slow in coming, especially when confronted with the complex political influences and threats that media organizations have faced over the past decade.

Understanding this history, many of the USAID assistance efforts over the years have been recognized as highlights in a sometimes lukewarm assessment of overall international investment in the BiH media sector. This reflects a true measure of success when considering the unique political environment in BiH, beginning with the impact of the Dayton Peace Agreement framework and filtering down to political structures and institutions at the national, entity, and local level. Journalists throughout the country are expected both to work within this context and yet rise above the political fray to report and comment on the realities that exist in BiH.

The USAID interventions since 2003 have attempted to build upon successful approaches taken by media development programs during the first seven years after the war. In addition, USAID sought to further target its assistance on leading organizations within the sector, further integrate Bosnian institutional expertise within the USAID-supported media development effort, and look to alternative methods of improving the quality of journalism products disseminated by media outlets to their audiences.

There are leaders within each section of the BiH media industry—print, radio, and television—and in the vast majority of these cases, USAID has had direct and indirect impact on helping these individuals and outlets establish themselves on the forefront of their respective fields. Management practices have been put in place at those outlets widely considered to be among the best in comparison to their competitors; i.e., Radio Stari Grad, Nezavisne Novine, ATV, and NTV Hayat (for a snapshot of what management tools are being used at a cross-section of BiH media outlets, see Annex B: Local Media Management Capacity Matrix). Without USAID assistance, these outlets would very likely not be in the positions they are today—and not command respect within their communities.

USAID attempts to improve the quality of journalism face more difficult opposition. Editors entrenched in their outdated or potentially politically-compromised ways restrict the resounding number of journalists that have received at least some form of training on international standards of journalism from practicing their improved craft. Some editors simply do not know how to produce a better product. A common theme throughout interviews was that it may take years for a new generation of editors to assume positions of authority at news outlets and truly impose changes in how reporters perform their duties.

USAID should receive great credit in taking chances on alternative methods of improving the quality of journalism product. In the television sector, USAID rightly identified the need to encourage domestic
production—both to raise the quality of programming and to develop greater audience loyalty at stations. However, taking the approach to provide support directly to production houses limited the impact on television station managers who remain wary of making the decision to use their own station’s resources to commission domestic programs.

Likewise, the USAID investment in the Center for Investigative Journalism was an extremely creative approach to seeking an improved journalism product from Bosnian media outlets. One original goal of the project—to create a highly-skilled, next generation of Bosnian investigative journalists and editors—was the right target at this point in the USAID media assistance effort. CIN efforts over its first two years have resulted in a team of well-trained investigative reporters. However, the current situation at CIN presents doubt as to whether the project can be successful in either sustaining itself past USAID’s considerable three-year financial contribution, or in meeting the objective of investing in CIN’s human capital to eventually improve investigative journalism products disseminated by Bosnian media.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently at an important juncture in its post-war history, as is the development of the media sector throughout the country. This is not, in any way, the time for USAID to disengage from its media development effort. The events of the coming year—a national election in October and the resulting change in the actors who will assert governmental authority—will affect media professionals as they will affect the nation. Media industry leaders—for the most part, those individuals who have benefited from USAID-supported material assistance and technical expertise in the past—are now at a “tipping point” where reinforcement of the successful lessons-learned will solidify their leadership positions within the sector.

USAID should continue to target support to the recognized trailblazers on the media scene, building up individual outlet strengths regarding management techniques and programming. At the same time, USAID should direct support to strengthen those institutions which maintain a “fair playing field” in BiH; namely, regulatory bodies and advocacy associations. Media professionals that employ the management and journalism skills encouraged by past USAID interventions will succeed when they can compete within a fairly regulated media environment that minimizes political or economic pressure on their stations and publications.

### 3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 3.2.1 USAIDMedia

The next six months will be critical in BiH—specifically in regard to the upcoming national elections. This is true concerning the media sector as well. Citizens throughout Bosnia face an uncertain future resulting from the October elections and so do the players within the BiH media sector. Media outlets may encounter pressure from political parties leading up to the elections, and may face increasing pressure from victorious political parties that receive a public mandate to take control of governmental institutions. Advocacy associations can consider the election an opportunity to assert influence upon a newly-elected governing party or coalition, and regulatory bodies may potentially face a new set of political actors bent on exerting control over independent regulatory efforts.

With the political uncertainty facing the country (and the media sector) in mind, it is crucial that the USAIDMedia program stay focused on programmatic activities precisely at the time when implementing partner attentions turn to close-out of operations and projects. Chemonics staff should detail a specific plan that balances the need to continue with project activities with administrative finalization of contractual obligations—and prepare for transition to whatever form USAID media development assistance will take after 31 December 2006. Within this context, we recommend the following steps be taken:

- USAIDMedia should meet with USAID Democracy and Governance counterparts as soon as possible to request clear guidance regarding USAID expectations for delivery of services during the final six months.
of the present contract. Detailed directions would be extremely useful in making certain that project gaps are not left as a result of the impending rush to program close out on 31 December.

• In turn, USAIDMedia staff should be aware of, and plan for, the upcoming demands on staff time so that neither close-out nor project activities suffer from inappropriate allocation of USAIDMedia personnel resources within the overall organizational workload.

• Specific plans should be made by USAIDMedia regarding the content of post-election reporting following voting day in October. Arguably, the most important aspect of the current election programming will be reinforcement of lessons learned by media outlets over the course of the pre-electoral period—both in terms of issues that resonated with audiences and implementation of issue-reporting. Media outlets participating in election programming should have set strategies for reporting on campaign finance expenditure and campaign platform promises following Election Day and after certification of election results.

• Finally, USAIDMedia should request from USAID DG counterparts direction regarding USAIDMedia’s role in preparing the transition to post-31 December USAID media development support. In particular, USAIDMedia should be prepared to provide technical assistance to a domestic BiH implementing partner organization. If USAID chooses to program media assistance efforts through the Media Centar Sarajevo, USAIDMedia staff should support the MCS to implement the following tasks:

  Develop training and technical assistance needs-assessment skills;

  Expand the MCS roster of domestic and international media experts, based on areas identified while assessing training needs within the media sector;

  Increase MCS capacity to provide technical assistance in the field of association development, for example:

  • to help focus BH Novinari resources and skills toward advocacy on behalf of its member journalists;

  • to assist the Press Council in developing conflict of interest guidelines that will help to build credibility among the media outlets served and regulated by Council activities; and

  • to examine possibilities for creation of an Audit Bureau of Circulation;

  Support MCS in creating systems for ongoing internal evaluation of human resource capacity and in drafting a staff training and development plan.

3.2.2 Legacy Institution – Media Centar Sarajevo

Similar to the situation described regarding the USAID Media program, it is in the mutual interest of both the MCS and USAID Democracy and Governance efforts to determine as soon as possible what role (if any) the MCS will have as a domestic organization implementing USAID media assistance efforts after 31 December 2006. The MCS is a competent and well-placed institution that would add its long-standing reputation and local-expert resources to enhance the quality and delivery of USAID media assistance in BiH. To prepare to take on a new role as direct USAID implementing partner, however, there are steps that should be taken during the final months of the USAIDMedia program and staff presence in BiH, in addition to those described in the previous section:

• While USAID does not currently foresee an MCS role to include a grant-giving function similar to that currently implemented by the USAIDMedia program, it may be useful to prepare the MCS if USAID
later finds that a grant component to USAID media assistance would benefit development activities. Therefore, it would be wise for the USAIDMedia staff to introduce appropriate MCS counterparts to the administrative processes, requirements and regulations overseeing USAID contractors that disburse grants. The MCS currently has limited experience with grantee and project evaluation using Swiss Development Corporation funds. However, USAID regulations are considerably more complex. If USAID-compatible systems are not put in place prior to Chemonics’ departure, it would be more difficult to install familiarity with and adherence to USAID grant-giving regulations after 31 December 2006.

Even if USAID does not choose to implement a grant-giving program, the training and information received by the MCS from an international contractor such as Chemonics would benefit internal MCS systems of transparency and add to MCS skill-sets in future work with other international donors.

- If USAID chooses to support domestic television production after 2006, implemented through the MCS, there may be conflict of interest issues in respect to the MCS having its own production center as a potential competitor for such USAID support. Therefore, USAIDMedia should assist the MCS in establishing transparent and precise conflict of interest guidelines that would preclude the MCS from competing for domestic production support channeled through MCS as a USAID implementer. Such guidelines would help to assuage accusations of favored support for MCS at the expense of other potential production house competitors within the media market.

Internally, there are other steps—some described in more detail in the previous section—which the MCS can take to strengthen its organization and ability to implement the broad range of activities described in the MCS business plan:

- MCS management should be willing to ensure that development as a potential USAID implementing partner does not interfere with meeting the objectives set out in the MCS business plan. If there is ever an instance where USAID priorities conflict with MCS “profit center” initiatives, MCS management should consider whether or not those USAID priorities are worth sacrificing resources from other parts of the Media Centar organization. The result will be a Media Centar that is a stronger partner for targeted USAID-supported initiatives.

- MCS managers must enforce their commitment to implementation of their business plan. At the same time, in order to be effective, the business plan should be a living document that can be adjusted according to the realities of the Bosnian economic and development context.

- As mentioned above, the MCS should create an internal staff development plan, including resources within the budget, to keep pace with new technologies and new demands for MCS services.

- The MCS, considering its investment and coordination role in the USAID Media-supported election project, should make a commitment to following through with the spirit of project activities after the election and post-Chemonics close-out. The impact of the election project stands a greater chance of succeeding with reinforcement of issues and messages after closure of the USAID Media program. This might necessitate development of a proposal for circulation to other international donors to secure funding and continue the project in some form after 31 December 2006, if USAID resources are not directed to this effort.

### 3.2.3 Center for Investigative Journalism

As discussed elsewhere in this report, Bosnian print media lag behind their television and radio counterparts in the quality of their news products, financial stability, and credibility with their audience. The practice of self-regulation is still in its infancy; the potential for corruption and coercion is ever present. In this kind of
print media free-for-all, where professional standards are selectively applied and excellent journalism is rare, the Center for Investigative Journalism has introduced a positive and unique approach to establishing higher standards of reporting, quality, trust, and respect for Bosnian readers.

However, as noted in the last section, while the integrity of the center or quality of the journalism produced is not in question, there are clear deficiencies in its management approach that should be addressed in the near term before further funding of CIN is considered. Below are the areas on which the assessment team believes CIN needs to direct attention and take corrective action. These steps should be taken where possible within the next six months, at the latest by the end of the current grant period. Issues are listed below in order of priority:

- The CIN expatriate staff must take immediate, concrete steps toward transferring editorial and administrative responsibilities to local Bosnian leadership. This transfer was supposed to have been completed by the end of the second year, but by the beginning of year three the new Bosnian editor and director have yet to be named. This delay has negative implications across the board—from budget shortfalls to broader acceptance by the local media—and needs to be resolved now.

- CIN is at least one year behind in fundraising. The current international director should take immediate and aggressive steps to get this effort on track. Delays in both fundraising and progressing with an active endowment campaign need to be addressed. CIN needs to show that non-USAID income streams have been identified and are being effectively pursued.

- A written marketing plan should be developed which includes the launch of a public outreach campaign to raise recognition of CIN as a brand and promote CIN’s product. The center recently published its first newsletter and has developed a packet of materials that describes the center. While these promotional materials are useful, CIN needs a comprehensive marketing plan to strategically and effectively elevate the name and image of the center. Cross-marketing techniques such as airing public service announcements on popular radio stations and targeted poster campaigns to promote upcoming reports should be considered.

- As part of a comprehensive marketing strategy, CIN should commission independent (outsourced) quantitative research to measure current awareness of the center, the CIN brand, and CIN reports. This research could also include qualitative opinions regarding reader understanding and use of information available in CIN articles. An initial research project would act as a baseline that CIN can use to compare with future research to measure change in audience recognition of CIN, as well as change in audience attitudes towards CIN and its products. If outsourced to an independent research institute or firm, analysis could be used by CIN management to both help craft a CIN marketing strategy, and more competently counter claims that CIN and its products are relatively unknown to Bosnian audiences (based on research results, of course). CIN should also begin using other research tools such as focus group studies and informal telephone surveys to further help gauge public awareness of the center, opinions on CIN stories, and reader preferences. Acquiring real data (instead of relying on anecdotal evidence) will allow the center to make more informed marketing, business, and journalism decisions and ensure the center’s news products are meeting the needs and expectations of readers.

- CIN should take concrete steps toward improving and/or broadening its relationships with management at local media outlets. As noted earlier, many outlets view CIN as a competitor. A more collaborative approach to dealing with these editors-in-chief as partners will be crucial to reaching more readers with CIN stories. This collaboration should begin with the selection of investigation topics to generate buy-in from editors early in the process of developing potential stories. Given its circulation and audience reach, CIN should consider approaching Dnevni Avaz, in particular, to explore possible collaboration.

- Central to CIN’s mission is changing the news agenda and reporting culture in Bosnia. For that to happen, CIN journalists and editors need to return to Bosnian newsrooms after their tenure at CIN ends. Job opportunities at local media outlets, particularly at the editorial level, should be explored and
cultivated by CIN managers. A “re-entry handbook” should be developed that provides guidance and strategies for handling difficult situations returning CIN journalists and editors may encounter in Bosnian newsrooms.

- A comprehensive written business plan should also be developed to guide the center’s journalism goals and fundraising strategies. Such a document will help the center frame its activities and track its progress against benchmarks established in the business plan. The document will also provide invaluable guidance to the Bosnian managers who will be tasked with future management of CIN.

Despite the center’s current shortcomings, CIN has, at a minimum, introduced a higher standard of investigative reporting within the Bosnian press landscape by training its current roster of nine reporters and potential editors to continue that legacy over the long term, either at the center or as employees in local media outlets. If the recommendations outlined above are embraced and implemented, we believe the center will be in an even better position to have lasting impact on the Bosnian media. Given that potential, and USAID’s already significant investment in the CIN concept, we recommend funding the center – though at a greatly reduced level after the current grant ends in July 2007.

We make this recommendation, however, with caveats. First, we strongly suggest that USAID seek a funding mechanism that will allow for greater oversight regarding CIN activities and management. USAID has extensive expertise and insight that will be beneficial to the center, particularly after management has been transferred from international staff to local leadership that may be less familiar with USAID expectations. We also recommend that before making any funding decisions USAID meet with the new CIN leadership to assess their capacity to manage USAID funds.

Second, if USAID is approached for bridging funds by CIN prior to the end of its current grant, provision of such funds should be contingent upon the successful transfer of leadership to Bosnian editors and managers, implementation of a written marketing plan and public outreach campaign, and documented progress toward securing non-USAID funding.

Third, and finally, we recommend that USAID consider post-July 2007 funding for CIN contingent upon written confirmation of a minimum of matching funds prior to disbursement of any new USAID monies. For example, CIN has indicated that, as a local organization, its budget will be approximately $350,000 per year. In this case, CIN would be required to raise $175,000, or half its total yearly budget from non-USAID sources. USAID could then consider making a matching grant to the center for the other half of its operating budget. The value of this funding requirement is that it makes CIN less dependent on long-term USAID funding which may or may not be available in the future. Securing diversified funding now will help ensure the financial viability of CIN over the long term, and in so doing protect USAID’s already considerable investment in the center. Furthermore, this approach will give CIN the additional motivation and incentive to redouble its efforts at fundraising and be responsible for its own future.

We strongly recommend that USAID only provide further funding to the center under these conditions. If CIN is not willing or able to meet these requirements, we suggest that USAID work with the center to determine how best to disburse its assets and place journalists in media outlets once funding for the center ends next July.

3.2.4 Potential USAID Media Interventions

In addition to the short- and medium-term recommendations regarding the two USAID-supported programs, there are a number of interventions that USAID media development should support over the coming two years. As stated above, BiH is at a critical juncture upon which USAID can have very direct impact with strategically placed program investments:
• **Post-Election Follow-up** – As described earlier, USAID has made an important outlay of funds to support elections-related programming throughout BiH. Maximizing the impact of this investment—and the impact on the electorate—should be a priority for continued USAID funding. Utilizing the current coordination and monitoring role of the MCS, the Media Centar leadership should be tasked with formulating a series of initiatives with leading media outlets to follow up on the effect of issue-oriented campaign reporting on post-election activities of newly elected parties and candidates. Furthermore, investigations into the transparency and use of campaign finances—an effort that was not wholly successful after the 2004 local elections—should be made in 2007 in an effort to bring voters more in-depth information about the electoral process.

• **Media Regulation-Advocacy Linkages** – The uncertainty surrounding the post-election period, especially in regard to the individuals and parties that will take control of government institutions in 2006–2007 may also manifest itself into a new series of threats to the media sector playing field. One area in which USAID can have a strengthening influence on the media environment is to promote linkages between regulatory bodies (the CRA, the Press Council, and the Competition Council) and advocacy associations (BH Novinari, the Association of Electronic Media, and the local chapter of the International Advertising Association). Projects that encourage cooperation and exchange of ideas between these respective organizations can reinforce the authority of regulatory entities while at the same time educate the public about media rights and responsibilities, and the role of media outlets in respect to their audiences. Such projects would include:

  - Providing additional technical assistance to the CRA regarding regulation of the cable industry;
  - Training of lower and higher court judges regarding the spirit and application of the Law on Protection from Defamation;
  - Organization of a public roundtable discussion on advertising practices and regulatory responses to “price-dumping” at the upcoming International Advertising Association national festival; and,
  - Organization of public discussions to promote the rights and responsibilities of citizens in respect to media reporting.

USAID might consider implementing such activities through a grant-giving capability at the MCS (the implications of which are noted above in section 3.2.2.).

• **Television Production Fund** – The USAID Media program sought to promote domestic production of quality, socially-relevant, television programming. This need still exists, but USAID might consider a different approach. As television executives continue to be wary of risking investments in outside productions (preferring lower-cost in-house production alternatives), USAID could create a fund to provide seed money for television stations to commission programs from local production houses. USAID funds would only support a percentage of production expenses, leaving the onus on television stations to either invest own funds or find sponsorship deals to cover remaining costs. This approach would hope to persuade television station managers to develop a risk-reward attitude toward domestic program production.

• **Radio News Exchange** – Radio Kameleon is currently leading an effort to establish a news exchange service including 20 radio stations throughout BiH. In June and July, participating stations have been testing their ability to comprehend and use the audio file exchange software platform to exchange news packages, with the full news service planning to begin official operation in August or September. The first benchmark for the project will be to organize a centralized national flash news service—a three-minute compilation of stories produced three times each day that can be re-broadcast live or in alternative time slots according to the needs of each respective station. Major contributors to the news service include Radio Kameleon, Radio Kontakt in Banja Luka, Free Radio in Prijedor, and Studio 88 in Mostar.
In the past, USAID and other international donors have encouraged unsuccessful attempts to create an integrated national radio newscast. However, this attempt, driven by leading station managers in the radio sector around BiH, seems to have an organic and self-driven quality worth an investment from USAID. USAID Media currently has a proposal in-hand from Radio Kameleon and advocates supporting the project with remaining USAID grant funds.

- **Radio Production Fund** – Similar to establishment of a television production fund described above, USAID could provide support in the form of seed money for radio stations to commission independent production of creative public affairs programming. Again, this might necessitate development of a grant giving function within the MCS.
ANNEXES

Annex A: Additional Recommendations for Potential Training and Media Development Activities

Annex B: Local Media Management Capacity Matrix

Annex C: Contacts

Annex D: Scope of Work

Annex E: Media Assessment Methodology

Annex F: Reference Materials
ANNEX A: Additional Recommendations for Potential Training and Media Development Activities
Additional Recommendations for Potential Training and Media Development Activities

After more than ten years of international assistance to the Bosnian media sector, USAID is currently placed at a critical stage as one of the major remaining players on the media donor scene. Building on its investment in local institution-building, USAID is in a unique position to empower a credible Bosnian media development organization – the Media Centar Sarajevo – with the ability to both assess media training needs of their Bosnian colleagues and outlets, and to implement training initiatives to address needs determined by the MCS.

This should be the first direction of future USAID interventions: to engage the Media Centar Sarajevo, which has a direct and long-term stake in the development of Bosnian media entities, in the design and implementation of journalism, media law, and media management capacity-building projects in both the electronic and print media sectors. The MCS, with its current diversified income streams and strategy for future activities, is well placed to continue leading media development initiatives beyond USAID’s planned financial and physical presence in BiH. Continuing within USAID’s present record of risk-taking in media development projects, USAID could provide the MCS with funding and broad parameters within which the MCS could direct and channel funds to meet training needs at media outlets based on an ongoing MCS evaluation of the progress of the media sector.

This approach, as mentioned in Section 3.0, would necessitate an improved capacity at the MCS to conduct independent media assessments, and translate such assessments into proposed training projects. Meanwhile, USAID would need to create a funding mechanism flexible enough for the MCS to move ahead quickly with training interventions at media outlets based on identified needs, with the confidence of USAID.

In addition to the tangible empowerment of the MCS, there are other fronts on which USAID might consider re-energizing its media development engagement over the coming years:

- **On-Site Consultancies** – When interviewing outlets that have received international assistance over the past ten years, media managers repeatedly cited that sustained, on-site consultancies were particularly effective in improving news and business operations at their media organizations. While there were many comments about the great number of basic journalism training courses organized in Bosnia since 1995, the need for better journalism product, especially from newspapers and current affairs magazines, endures. On-site consultancies at media outlets help to reinforce lessons learned in basic and advanced journalism courses through daily interaction between the consultant and news/editorial staff members. Long-term consultancies allow trainers to build trust and establish mutual respect with media managers who – if they buy in to the consultant’s advice – will be responsible for implementing new business and editorial systems in the workplace. One-off training courses simply do not result in putting lessons into practice with the same degree of success that longer-term consultancies do.

Therefore, USAID should (through the MCS) support the placement of international trainers at selected media outlets for at least three months – an amount of time proven throughout the region to be effective for long-term transfer of skills to journalists and media managers. Three-month consultancies can be spread over a six-month period during which trainers are on-site for 30 days, leave, and then return after a one-month absence to assess the application of new skills by reporters and editors – and make adjustments for the next 30 day consultancy accordingly.

Such sustained on-site consultancies would be particularly useful at print media outlets, which according to the interviews conducted during assessment field work, tend to be in most need of the application of internationally accepted journalism standards. While the initial investment would be significant, there is a greater likelihood of sustained improvement of journalism product over the long term. Print media candidates for on-site training consultancies could include Nezavisne Novine, Dnevni Avaz, Dani, and Start.
• **Targeted Professional Exchanges** — In addition to on-site consultancies, the opportunity for Bosnian media professionals to experience western newsrooms was also considered a successful training strategy by media managers. To change the culture of print journalism we believe it would be beneficial for select Bosnian print editors and publishers for placement as “management fellows” at western newspapers that consistently employ international standards. While currently many editors and publishers create obstacles to improving news content at many outlets, a “management fellows” program would encourage these media leaders to become gatekeepers to better Bosnian journalism. Each participating editor/publisher would be required to sign a contract that includes a detailed work plan and steps for implementing lessons learned during the fellowship upon return to Bosnia. Participants would work at the host newspaper, observing and eventually participating in daily activities to experience first-hand why western newsrooms are successful. Each newspaper would be expected to contribute to the costs of the fellowship, in order to encourage Bosnian outlet investment in the fellowship program. CIN editors might also take advantage of such a program to reinforce practices learned at the center. Management fellowships could be coordinated with on-site consultancies described above.

• **Support for Local Editions of Nezavisne Novine** — The publisher of Nezavisne Novine in Banja Luka indicated that he would like to create local editions of the newspaper to serve the Sarajevo and Mostar markets. Editorial offices would be located in the two cities to generate local copy, while articles placed in all three editions would be jointly produced from the three newsrooms. It is generally agreed that among print outlets, Nezavisne Novine has been the most responsive to international training: newsroom management practices better reflect international standards, business plans are in place, and advanced management techniques are being implemented. The overall business, with its various income streams, is self-sustaining in large part due to substantial USAID assistance. The creation of Nezavisne Novine local editions in Sarajevo and Mostar would establish two additional newsrooms that employ Nezavisne Novine’s international standards – and expand the circulation of a newspaper trusted by many among Bosnia’s daily readership. USAID should consider supporting this expansion, perhaps with a grant through the MCS, including consulting services to develop a strategic plan to establish the local editions.

• **Regional Cooperative Business Strategies** — Particularly within the electronic media, recent history has shown that stations in the Balkans which employ a cross-border approach to product distribution are better placed to succeed within individual domestic markets. The growing popularity of TV Pink BiH and the established audience preference for Croatian TV in Bosnia are examples of this approach.

USAID might consider support to Bosnian radio and television stations to partner with outlets in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro on joint purchase of international programming, coordination of joint advertising packages, and joint domestic production of entertainment and current affairs programming. Small grants (through the MCS) could be made to Bosnian outlets, contingent upon corresponding outlets in other countries securing matching funds, to attract program distributors and advertisers that are more reluctant to place products on the Bosnian market alone due to its relatively small size and audience. USAID could provide business consultants to guide media managers through initial negotiations of regional cooperative agreements with distributors and advertising agencies to be certain that stations abide by existing copyright regulations. Media donors that remain active throughout the region – such as the Open Society Institute Network Media Program and the Swedish Helsinki Committee could be sought out by USAID to consider matching funds for such projects.

USAID-funded grants could also be extended to help promote production of a cross-border television current affairs program utilizing similar technology to that being used for the upcoming Mreza Plus newscast linking NTV Hayat in Sarajevo and ATV in Banja Luka. A weekly cross-border debate program could bring together political and cultural actors from national and provincial capitols to debate issues that impact political decisions in individual countries across the Balkans – such as the future status of Kosovo in relation to Serbia, or the prospects for Montenegro’s economic self-sustainability after its split
Community Radio Production Support – While the local radio market is still over-crowded, with over 150 radio stations scattered throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, artificial financial support mechanisms remain that will prevent a market correction in the near future. In the meantime, USAID could support a joint training/grant program to help encourage the type of volunteer contributions to small-market radio stations that can place such outlets in a position to be more financially viable when the market correction does take place.

USAID could provide funds to the MCS to deliver training courses for youth and university groups regarding radio program production utilizing very basic equipment sets. Three to five members of each youth/university organization would be trained to develop, write and produce interactive programs that target their own demographic group (taking into account the needs and interests of the local audience). After successfully completing the training course, the youth/university group would receive a grant for a basic production equipment kit (no more than 3000 USD), with the requirement that the group secure a written agreement offering a time-slot at a local station to air a pre-produced 30- to 60-minute program, free of charge, for six months.

Such a project would not only expand the number of young people with radio presentation and production skills, but also encourage local and municipal stations to reach out to local volunteer groups to fill program schedules with attractive and potentially popular content. The MCS could also provide follow-up guidance to the station-youth group partnership on effective strategies to generate advertising or sponsorships from local firms that would cover future costs of the program. Such marketing and sales guidance would focus on firms that serve the demographic group sought after by the program, and thus help to develop specialization of advertising sales efforts tied to target audience.

Research on Attitudes and Preferences Regarding Print Media – Many media observers have noted that Bosnians do not read printed media products because the quality of journalism is poor and therefore the public has little credibility in existing publications. Media managers counter that the price of newspapers for the average citizen is quite high (“equal to the price of a loaf of bread”), and therefore publications cannot justify increasing paid circulation rates. Qualitative focus group research would provide credible evidence on attitudes and preferences regarding print media, lending substance to this on-going debate.

USAID should consider supporting focus group research commissioned by the MCS to help examine – in a more systematic fashion – Bosnian habits in regard to newspapers and periodicals. Focus group research would provide USAID and Bosnian media managers with evidence of audience attitudes toward current media products: i.e., what readers like and do not like about newspapers and magazines, why people read – or do not read – printed news products, public credibility of current publications, etc. Such research can also elicit from participants ideas for improving available news products and proposals for publications currently missing from the market.

The MCS-sponsored focus groups would be conducted throughout BiH, comprised of consistent readers and non-readers alike. The MCS would consult with selected publishers/editors on methodology and questions – and review video recordings of pilot focus group sessions with media managers to help build credibility in the research product within the media sector. The research results would provide publishers and editors with evidence of public attitudes regarding quality and credibility of journalism product, and allow media managers to consider adjustments in their approach to journalism based on audience feedback. The MCS could then follow the research project with a series of panel discussions open to journalists and the general public, based on issues raised during the focus group sessions. These panel discussions could be organized as part of a broader public dialogue in conjunction with the roundtable discussions recommended in Section 3.2.4 under Media Regulation-Advocacy Linkages.
ANNEX B: LOCAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT CAPACITY MATRIX
## Figure B-1 Local Media Management Capacity Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Media Outlet</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Purchases or Acquires Audience Research</th>
<th>Implements In House Audience Research Techniques</th>
<th>Written Business Plan</th>
<th>Written Sales / Marketing Plan</th>
<th>Applied for Loan / Institutional Financing</th>
<th>Received Loan / Institutional Financing</th>
<th>Purchases or Acquires News Agency Product</th>
<th>Purchases or Acquires CNN Product</th>
<th>Purchases or Acquires Locally Produced Programming</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Print</td>
<td>Nezavisne Novine</td>
<td>Banja Luka</td>
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<td>In Process</td>
<td>In Process</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Selected Reports</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Sarajevo</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Start</td>
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<td>In Past / Not Current</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stari Grad</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
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<td>eFM</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>In Past / Not Current</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Television</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NTV Hayat</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Not Determined</td>
<td>Not Determined</td>
<td>Not Determined</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C: CONTACTS
USAID and United States Embassy

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Sanja Pejcinovic
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Center for Investigative Journalism
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Rosemary Armao, Editor
Mirsad Brkic, Journalist
Ida Djonlastic, Journalist
Eldina Pleho, Journalist
Renata Radic, Journalist
Zeljka Kujundzija, Journalist

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Media Centar Sarajevo
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Tarik Jusic, Program Director
Sanela Hulic, Business Manager

Media Plan Institute
Radenko Udobicic, Institute Director/Head of Research

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Communications Regulatory Agency
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Dunja Mijatovic, Director of Broadcast Division
Amela Odobasic, Head of Public Affairs

Association of Electronic Media-BiH
Adnan Osmanagic, President

BH Novinari (United Journalists Association)
Borka Rudic, General Secretary
Selma Kukuruzovic, Media Specialist

International Advertising Association-BiH Chapter
Samra Luckin, President

Press Council
Ljiljana Zurovac, Director of Press Council Secretariat

United Media Industry (Formerly Joint Industry Committee)
Adnan Bilal, Chair
Neven Kulenovic, Deputy Chair

Print Media Sector

Dani
Senad Pecanin, Director

Dnevni Avaz
Fahrudin Djapo, Editor-in-Chief

Nezavisne Novine
Zeljko Kopanja, Director
Dragan Jeremic, Editor-in-Chief

Oslobodjenje
Senka Kurtovic, Editor-in-Chief

Start
Dario Novalic, Director
Eldin Karic, Editor-in-Chief

Radio Sector

eFM
Armin Ibrahimpasic, Director

Kameleon Radio
Zlatko Berbic, C.E.O., Radio Kameleon Tuzla
Elmir Imamovic, General Manager, Radio Kameleon Sarajevo
Ermin Bradaric, Director, Media Service

Nes Radio
Neven Kopanja, Director

Radio Stari Grad
Adnan Osmanagic, Director

Studio 88 (Mostar)
Amela Rebac, Director

Television Sector

ATV (Banja Luka)
Natasa Tesanovic, Director

FTV (Federation Television)
Jasmin Durakovic, General Manager

FIST Productions
Lana Tusevljak, Production Manager

OBN
Mirza Vilic, Director

Prime Time Productions
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Mreza Plus
Dzenan Priganica, Program Manager

NTV Hayat
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Reof Kljajic, Managing Director
Aida Hadziavdic-Begovic, Head of Research

Prism Research
Dino Djipa, Research Director

International Donor Organizations

European Union – Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
Michael Docherty, Head of Democratic Stabilization and Social Development Section
Dzenita Polic, Project Officer

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Hrvoje Batinic, Coordinator, Civil Society Projects

Swedish Helsinki Committee
Natalija Bratuljevic, Programme Officer
ANNEX D: SCOPE OF WORK
PURPOSE OF ASSESSMENT
There are two main objectives of this assessment. The first objective is to assess the overall impact of current USAID media projects on strengthening the sector within the context of the broad media environment in BiH. The second purpose is to obtain recommendations on the needs/possibilities for further USAID involvement in the sector.

USAID BiH seeks to gain a better understanding of how current media initiatives being implemented by USAID media implementers, other International Community (IC) organizations, and Bosnians contribute to the common goal of strengthening democracy. USAID’s two media assistance projects are scheduled to expire in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The budget for any follow-on work is limited: estimated at no more than $300,000-600,000 per year.

BACKGROUND
A. Media in the Country Context
The most recent study on the current state of affairs of the media environment in BiH, “Democracy Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina” was published by Open Society Fund (OSF) in 2006. The study as such is a comprehensive document as it provides the systematic assessment of the country’s political life in order to answer questions on country progress on democracy development, citizen’s satisfaction with the current situation and needs for improvement. One part of the study deals with the media in BiH democratic society.

Following is a short excerpt from the OSF’s report that summarizes the positive and negative aspects of print and electronic media development, differences between commercial and public sector media, and aspects of the legal and regulatory environment, especially in light of neighboring countries’ involvement in media in BiH and the financial viability of BiH media. The full report is available at www.soros.org.ba.

1. Independence of BiH media
1a. Press
The press is not subject to regulations in terms of editorial policy and content; instead, its ethical and professional standards are incorporated into the Press Code of Conduct, which is a self-regulatory instrument. The key self-regulation body is an independent non-governmental organization, the Press Council, established jointly by all the associations of journalists in BiH.

The Press Council tries to resolve any disputes between the readers/the public and the press using only the journalistic tools available: right to a response, publication of correction, apology and rebuttal. The Council has no power to sanction issue or revoke licenses, or fine newspapers and magazines. So, the government has no legal mechanisms of direct influence over editorial policies of the press.

1b. Commercial RTV sector and the Communications Regulatory Agency
As for electronic media, and in compliance with the practice of western democracies, regulation rests with the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA). The Law on Communications regulates the communications sector in the country and establishes the CRA as a functionally independent, non-profit agency regulating the RTV sector, public telecommunications networks and licensing, and defining basic conditions of operation of joint and international communications structures. CRA is responsible for planning, coordination, allocation and assignment of the spectrum of...
radio frequencies. In essence, this means that the legal independence of the Agency guarantees also the independence of electronic media from government interference.

1c. Public broadcasters

There is a public broadcasting system, made up of three broadcasters: BiH Public Broadcasting Service (hereinafter: BHRT) covering the level of the state, Public Broadcasting Service of the Federation BiH (RTFBiH) at the level of the Federation BiH, and Public Broadcasting Service of Republika Srpska (RTRS) at the level of Republika Srpska.

Public broadcasters are funded by the RTV subscription fee (TV set ownership tax), advertising and sponsorship. Editorial independence from government is further guaranteed by the fact that public broadcasters may not receive any state subsidies for regular programming and production.

Finally, as public broadcasters are also subject to the rules of CRA, independence of public broadcasters is conditioned by the independence of CRA the complex and specific situation in BiH bears critical impact.

2. Positive and negative indicators of media development

In the past ten years, the media in BiH have gone through a difficult period of post-war reconstruction, which entailed an expansion of the media sector, adoption of a series of laws relating to the media, establishment of regulatory and self-regulatory bodies, and development of the media market. The overall process has been marked and, to a large extent, determined by continuous efforts of political elites to maintain control over key media, particularly public ones, as well as constant efforts of international players (especially the High Representative, the European commission, USAID, as well as many others) to prevent the establishment of political control over the media, to assist the development of independent media, and to establish a functional legal framework for activities and development of the media sector. Such a polarized arena, with political elites on one side, and the international community on the other, leads to constant conflicts, delays in reforms, as well as hindrance in the implementation of laws which have been adopted, or rather, imposed by the international community and the Office of the High Representative. For example, until October 2005 and the adoption of the Law on the BiH Public Broadcasting System, in the past ten years the BiH authorities had not adopted a single law related to public broadcasting service at state or entity levels. All the decisions on these laws were imposed by the High Representative.

2a. Positive indicators

Today, there is a plethora of media outlets in BiH, particularly as compared with a relatively small population of some four million. Namely, according to information from the CRA public register of the media, in 2005 there were 42 television and 146 radio stations. Of these, 104 are private -23 TV and 81 radio channels. The situation is similar with print media, with seven daily newspapers and almost 50 weekly and bi-weekly publications, published on regular basis.

According to information available in relation to ownership over key media, at the moment BiH has no cases of serious media concentration which may represent any threat to fair and open market competition. The Avaz publishing company can be said to have gone further than any other in establishing a strong vertical ownership structure, as it includes the leading daily paper, the largest printing house, and the strongest distribution system, including several special publications such as Azra, Sport and Express. Still, all this does not put Avaz in a monopolistic situation in print media, particularly in view of the versatility and number of print media in the country.
The situation with Zeljko Kopanja in Banja Luka is similar, as he owns a printing house, Nezavisne novine daily, and the NES radio station. Again, even here one cannot speak of indications of monopolization, but rather about skillfully associated elements of media industry, which secure a clearer future of this company in a different situation. Moreover, reports on the ratings of electronic and print media in BiH do not indicate that any single media outlet dominates the market.

According to the report on self-sustainability of the media sector in BiH, published in 2005 by IREX, this is the data on circulation of newspapers in BiH (from no less than once a week, to daily): Dnevni avaz 40.2%, Vecernje novosti (from SCG) 11.9%, Oslobodjenje 9.8%, Vecernji list (from Croatia) 9.3%, Blic (from SCG) 8.0%, Glas srpski 7.8%, Nezavisne novine 7.7%. The same report cites the following data on circulation of magazines: Glorija (from Croatia) 16.1%, Azra 12.3%, Express 9.2%, Slobodna Bosna 9.1%, Dani 8.1%.

The media market can be said to be entering the consolidation stage, which will lead to a decrease in the total number of media outlets, and the creation of several powerful players in the field. As a consequence of major administrative barriers and legal uncertainty in business, as well as saturation and, at the same time, poverty of the media sector, with a limited advertising market, major international media corporations have shown very limited interest in investing in BiH. The two major cases thus far are the Slovenian Kmecka druzba, which bought a considerable stake in the Oslobodjenje daily, and the arrival of TV Pink from Serbia and Nova TV from Croatia through local station OBN.

2b. Negative indicators

BiH is obliged to implement the Competition Law, as required by the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. However, just like in other areas, ineffective and complicated administrative structures have prevented the implementation of the Competition Law and the establishment of the Competition Council, so that even today more than three years after the adoption of the Law, the Competition Council has not become truly operational.

An additional problem, which is a consequence of the above described situation and which contributes to its further exacerbation, is the lack of ownership transparency over companies in general. Namely, there is no central register of print media, nor a central register of commercial companies, either in the Federation BiH or in BiH as a whole, thus no real transparency of ownership over the media.

A problem of great importance for independence of radio and TV stations from the ruling structures is the fact that in addition to public broadcasters, BHRT, RTFBiH and RTRS, there are also 74 TV and radio stations under state ownership, at municipal and cantonal levels across BiH, largely dependent on municipal and cantonal government budget financing. Although the privatization of these broadcasters was supposed to commence in 2002, there has been no major advancement in this area.

The key pillar of the overall independence of public broadcasters is, certainly, their financial independence. However, public broadcasters face enormous difficulties in the collection of the compulsory monthly RTV fee, which puts them in a particularly difficult financial situation. Namely, compared with the pre-war rate of collection of the RTV fee of some 80 to 85%, according to unofficial estimates, in 2003 it was between 20 and 30%. After the introduction of a new system of collection through fixed-line telephone bills in 2004, the level of collection of the fee grew across BiH to 53 percent in 2005. Although the new system of collection is more effective, it has not delivered ideal results and it has often been used as a tool for pressuring public broadcasters. First of all, there is an almost systematic, politically motivated boycott of the fee, practiced by a considerable number of Croats in BiH, as the leading Croat political parties in BiH demand a different model of public broadcasters, with separate ethnic channels for each of the three constituent peoples. Thus the level of collection depends on which telecom collects it in which part of the country.

B. Project Information

The two current USAID media projects are discussed below:
The first is the Media Program, implemented by Chemonics International, Inc. under a three-year, $4.7 million contract signed in October of 2003. The program aims to improve the quality of news and programming available to all Bosnians. It provides training and technical assistance to independent media outlets in newsroom management, business development, independent domestic production, and legal, regulatory and policy issues. The program builds on lessons learned during previous media projects.

In the past three years the project implemented a vast number of activities that has had significant impact on the Bosnian media environment. In the area of training the project focused on specialized journalism trainings that resulted in many BiH journalists capable of reporting on topics of environment, disabled persons rights, truth vs. sensationalism, business and economic reporting, gender equality, and war crimes. These issues, although extremely important for development of the country were unfairly pushed back by daily politics. The USAID media project clients now operate based on well developed and implemented business plans. With our assistance and for the first time in the Balkans, all public and private statewide TV systems and all major advertising agencies agreed on standards for audience research and made a cooperative purchase. As a result of our business development assistance, media in BiH increased their circulation and revenues getting closer to full sustainability. Associations of journalists, divided for years along ethnic lines, finally created a unified organization. And, broadcasters recognized the importance of locally produced programs, emphasized by the project for years, which resulted in domestic programs being produced with the stations revenues and without donor assistance.

A second project is implemented by the New York University (NYU) and its subcontractor Journalism Development Group (JDG). It focuses on the creation and development of a permanent local organization called the Center for Investigative Journalism. This organization is dedicated to the practice of investigative reporting by local reporters that meets the highest international standards. Five fellows and five interns work side by side with two American editors to report on the issues most important to the Bosnian and Herzegovinian people. The Center strives to write stories that will help the people make informed decisions free of political rhetoric dominant in the current public discourse. This three-year NUY grant totaled $1.7 million. So far the center has printed the series of stories that covered some of the most important issues in BiH society: the health care system in BiH, losing culture, reconciliation, universities failing the grade, and articles on two major business companies, Elektrobosna and EFT. The full reports are available on www.cin.ba

III. STATEMENT OF WORK

The team, consisting of a team leader and another member, will evaluate the effectiveness of USAID’s media activities within the broader context of media sector development in BiH and identify needs and possibilities for further USAID involvement. USAID expects the team to view USAID activities in the broader context of the state of media sector development. The team is encouraged to be creative in identifying issues and options for future USAID involvement.

The team will review USAID efforts in supporting the media sector since 1995. It will also review other donors and government activities supported or funded during the same period.

The team will address the following key questions:

• What has been the principal impact of USAID’s two media projects on media sector development? What has been most effective? Least effective? Are there unexpected outcomes, both negative and positive, of USAID assistance?

• Has each of the two assisted local organizations (the Media Center Sarajevo with support from Chemonics International and the Center for Investigative Journalism with support from NYU) achieved
a sufficient level of professional media maturity to receive and manage direct USAID grants? In what area(s) has the assistance been most successful? What needs to be strengthened or developed further?

- To what extent have USAID-assisted projects fostered institutional and financial sustainability? What can USAID do to improve sustainability?

- In what ways has media development in BiH been influenced by regional and international factors? To what extent will such factors affect the sustainability of BiH media?

- What principal obstacles remain in the development of a balanced, independent media sector in BiH? What activities and approaches could USAID use most effectively in addressing such obstacles over the next five years?

- To what extent do the legal environment, role of the public sector media and role of the Communication Regulatory Agency affect the development of the commercial media sector? How can USAID best assist in addressing issues in these areas? Could a local implementing organization find relevant expertise locally to assist in these areas?

- What are other donors’, particularly the European Union and individual European donors, current and future media assistance activities, including current and planned financial support?

IV. ASSESSMENT TASKS

The team leader will be responsible for leading the evaluation team. The team leader will be principal contact with USAID. The team leader will also be responsible for coordinating the writing of the final assessment report with an executive summary; major findings and conclusions; a description of the evaluation methodology; a review of media projects’ key efforts to date and the overall impact of these efforts, and specific program recommendations. All team members will be responsible for contributing their portions by writing a sound methodological plan and drafting a comprehensive evaluation report with key recommendations and findings for their respective areas under the overall direction of the team leader.

Task 1: Desk Review

This review shall include reading all relevant background materials as provided in Annex B, background interviews, and at least one conference call with staff from USAID/BiH’s Democracy Office. The conference call is important to ensure that the Mission and the assessment team are in agreement on the scope and purpose of the assessment.

Task 2: Develop a Written Fieldwork Plan

Using the information gained from the desk review together with information provided in this SOW, the assessment team will develop a plan conducting the fieldwork. The plan should clearly outline the methodological approach the team will use. The plan should be submitted to USAID for approval prior to arrival in country.

Task 3: Conduct a Field Assessment

The assessment team will spend two weeks in-country to conduct the assessment. Fieldwork will commence beginning on or about in June 5, 2006 and end on or about July 22, 2006. While in BiH, the team will meet with key media representatives, representatives of the international community, civil society organizations, USAID staff, USG implementing partners, and others (see Annex A).

Task 4: Debrief Embassy and Mission

9 This question focuses on their development as media organizations, rather than their financial and logistical capacity to receive USAID grants, which USAID assesses separately.
Before departing the country, the assessment team will debrief interested personnel from USAID and Embassy on the team’s preliminary findings and recommendations.

V. DELIVERABLES

A. **Written Fieldwork Plan** as described in task one due not less than five business days before fieldwork commences.

B. **Draft Assessment Report** due within seven calendar days following completion of fieldwork. USAID/BiH will provide written comments within seven calendar days of receiving the first draft report.

C. **Final Draft Assessment Report** due not more than seven calendar days after receipt of USAID/BiH’s comments on the draft assessment report. The final draft assessment report will include, at minimum, an executive summary; major findings and conclusions; a description of the assessment methodology; and specific program recommendations. The main text should not exceed 30 pages (not including annexes). The final assessment report will be submitted to Jasna Kilalic, Project Management Specialist – ROL & Media, in electronic format as well as in hard copy within five business days after receiving USAID/BiH’s final written comments and/or questions.

**RECOMMENDED COMPOSITION OF ASSESSMENT TEAM**

The assessment team will consist of a team leader and one additional member. The team should have an understanding of media in transition countries, in both the public and private sectors. Experience working on media efforts in Eastern Europe and/or the former Soviet Union is highly desirable. Moreover, each team member must have experience evaluating USG media programs. Team members should have good analytical and writing skills. Members of the assessment team are authorized to work a six day work week while in the field.

In addition to the technical experts, the team is authorized to hire one local individual with excellent spoken and written English and experience interpreting/translating for international donor democracy/governance programs. This individual will be responsible for providing translation and logistical support to the assessment team members.

VII. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

A member (or members) of the assessment team will be responsible for making all logistical arrangements for the team members, including, but not limited to, scheduling appointments, arranging transportation, and providing translation services. Limited assistance may be provided by the secretary assigned to USAID/BiH’s Democracy Office.

VIII. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

The period of performance for this activity will be on/about June 5, 2006 to on/about July 22, 2006. Fieldwork should be conducted during the period from June 19 to July 1, 2006.

Proposed timeline for the assessment:

- June 5th to 10th – desk review, background interviews & development of fieldwork plan
- June 19th to July 1st – Assessment
- July 8th – Draft assessment report due
- July 15th – Mission comments are due
- July 22nd – Final report due

IX. TECHNICAL DIRECTION

The point of contact for this activity is Jasna Kilalic, CTO for all Mission’s media projects.
ANNEX E: MEDIA ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Media Assessment Methodology

Approach to Activity
The objective of this activity was to provide USAID/BiH with an assessment of the impact of current media programs and develop recommendations for further USAID investment in the BiH media sector. The two current programs evaluated were the Media Program implemented by Chemonics International and the Center for Investigative Journalism project implemented by New York University and its subcontractor, the Journalism Development Group.

Methodology
The BiH Media Assessment team used a methodology that included both an analysis of the results of USAID-funded assistance and an evaluation of whether the organizations benefiting from that assistance are implementing sustainable practices. The assessment team provided an analysis of variables that may have influence on media sector development. This included a review of other donor support as well as the influence of legal and regulatory frameworks. These analyses focused particularly on the time period from 2003 onwards.

The assessment was based on a series of interviews with a broad range of actors on the BiH media development scene, including:
- USAID and US Embassy staff;
- Managers of indigenous radio, television, and print media outlets;
- Representatives of media-advocacy associations;
- Representatives of broadcast and print regulatory bodies;
- Managers of indigenous media development organizations;
- Representatives of international media development donor organizations; and,
- Managers and staff of USAID implementing partners.

In addition, based on information gathered during interview sessions with local media outlet managers, the BiH Media Assessment team compiled a matrix of indicators to assist in evaluating the developing management capacity at Bosnian media outlets supported by USAID projects (The matrix includes information freely offered to the assessment team from those outlets interviewed during the two-week fieldwork assignment).

At the conclusion of the two-week fieldwork assignment, the BiH Media Assessment team presented initial findings, and preliminary recommendations for further assistance, to USAID/BiH staff. Comments made during this debriefing session were incorporated into the draft assessment report that followed the fieldwork phase of the activity.

Issues Addressed during Interviews

Macro – BiH Contextual Issues:
- Integration into Euro-Atlantic Organizations
- National Economic Development
- The Influence of Elections and Political Development
- Privatization
- Reduction of International Donor Involvement
Micro – Media Sector Issues

- Regulation of Broadcast and Print Media Sectors
- Competition from Foreign Media Entities
- Public Broadcaster Reform and Competition with Subsidized PBS
- Protection of Journalists
- Privatization of Public Media Assets
- Potential Position/Role of Radio
- Networking of Radio Outlets
- Influence of Cable Operators on Commercial Broadcasters
- Future Media Development Assistance Needs

USAID Assistance Issues

- Prospects for Institutional and Financial Sustainability of USAID-Supported Bosnian Media Development Organizations
- Legal/Ownership Status of the Media Centar Sarajevo

Miscellaneous Issues

- Journalism Awards
- Journalism Certificate Programs
- University-Based Journalism Education
ANNEX F: REFERENCE MATERIALS
Reference Materials

BH Novinari (Unified Journalists Association of Bosnia and Herzegovina), *Action Plan*, Undated


Chemonics International, Inc., *Subcontract Agreement with Media Centar Sarajevo: Strengthening the Independent Media Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAIDMedia)*, January 2004
- *Strengthening Independent Media (SIM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAIDMedia): Year 1 Work Plan*, November 2003
- *Strengthening Independent Media (SIM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAIDMedia): Year 2 Work Plan and Performance Monitoring/Management Plan (PMP)*, October 2004
- *Strengthening Independent Media (SIM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAIDMedia): Year 3 Work Plan and Performance Monitoring/Management Plan (PMP)*, October 2005
- *USAIDMedia Project Issued Grants*, June 2006
- *Year 1 Annual Report, October 1, 2003 – September 30, 2004*, November 2004

EU CARDS Twinning Project BA 02.01/02.01, *Analysis of the Communications Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, May 2006

IREX, *Media Sustainability Index, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2001*
- *Media Sustainability Index, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002*
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- *Media Sustainability Index, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005*

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- *Service Market Research for Media Centar Sarajevo*, by Aquarius Advertising, February 2004

Media Online, *Positive, but Slow Moves*, by Mirela Camo and Radenko Udovicic, July 2005
- *Between Money and Politics*, by Radenko Udovicic, January 2006

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- *Center for Investigative Journalism, [Proposal, Scope of Work and Implementation Plan]*, Undated
- *Media Assessment Fact Sheets*, compiled June 2006

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- *[Television Audience Research: 4-10 April 2005]*, April 2005

Open Society Fund-Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Democracy Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina [Chapter 10: The Media in a Democratic Society – Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values?*, by Tarik Jusic], 2006

Open Society Institute, *Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence [Bosnia and Herzegovina chapter by Tarik Jusic]*, 2005

South East European Network for the Professionalisation of the Media (SEENPM), *Media Ownership and its Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism [Bosnia and Herzegovina chapter by Tarik Jusic]*, 2004
- *The Business of Ethics, the Ethics of Business: Bosnia and Herzegovina*, by Nidzara Ahmetasevic, 2005


USAID Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, *Assessment of USAID Media Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996-2002*, by Dan De Luce, September 2003

USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Fact Sheet: Assistance for Free and Independent Media*, February 2006
- *FY2006 Strategy Statement*, revised November 2005
- *Statement of Work for Strengthening Independent Media (SIM) Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Undated

**Laws**

Law on Communications in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Official Gazette, BiH*, Bo. 33/02, 12 November 2002

**Rules and Guidelines of the Communications Regulatory Agency**


CRA Rule No. 21/2003 on media concentration and ownership over electronic and print media, March 2004

CRA Rule No. 01/1999 on definition and duties of public broadcasting, amended September 2003


Guidelines on Copyright Obligations for Public and Private Broadcasters, March 2001

