Key Findings:

- **Approximately 33 % of people think that in the next six months, the economic situation of their family will get worse, while just 10% think that their economic situation will improve. Only 3 % of respondents think that current employment opportunities are favorable, while 79 % think that they are unfavorable.**

- **When asked about the importance of the ‘Standards for Kosovo’, the majority of both Albanian respondents and those from the non-Serb minority communities reported that they considered the ‘Standards’ important to open the discussion for the final status.**

- **Regardless of ethnicity the majority of respondents (47%) think that the continuation of dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade is important for the fulfillment of “Standards for Kosovo”. The most preferred priority for the dialogue is ‘Missing Persons’ followed by ‘Transport/recognition of travel documents’.**

- **Overall, around 32 % of Serb respondents think that cooperation between the community and the police is bad or very bad while just 10 % of Albanian and non-Serb minority respondents share this opinion.**

- **Approximately 53% of Albanian respondents agree with the return of displaced people to Kosovo, this figure is the same as that in November 2003. 97% of Serb and 65% of non-Serb minority respondents agree with the return of displaced people. When asked what their reaction would be toward people returning, 35 % of Albanians stated that they would ignore them, while the majority of Serbs stated that they would cooperate with them.**

Kosovo Early Warning Reports

The Kosovo Early Warning System Project is a component of UNDP’s regional early warning framework. The project aims to build the capacity of local analysts to foresee potential crises, and to advise crisis prevention policies. Early Warning Reports are produced every four months. The project is co-funded by USAID and UNDP and implemented by Riinvest Institute.

This Fact sheet is based on statistical analysis of an opinion poll conducted from 1 -14 March 2004, by Riinvest Institute. A local Serb NGO conducted the opinion poll in Serbian communities.

The survey was based in face-to-face interviews, and included 1,240 respondents: 946 Albanians, 158 Serbs, and 136 respondents from other minorities (30 Bosnian, 22 Gorani, 22 Turk, 15 Roma, 27 Ashkali, and 20 Egyptian). The sample was stratified on bases of geographic regions that are based on telephone area codes (7) and urban rural ratio (1:1).

For more information on the Kosovo Early Warning System contact: early.warning.ks@undp.org

Kosovo Early Warning Report #6 will be published in May 2004.

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1 The statistical analysis a is conducted by regression analysis and chi square significance
Regression Analysis: Estimation of the linear relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables or covariates.
Chi square: Tests the hypothesis that the raw and column variables are independent, without indicating strength or direction of the relationship.
Selected Indicators

- Economic and subjective welfare pessimism has increased since November 2003. Feelings of insecurity have slightly decreased, while political pessimism has remained the same.

Trends in Perceptions of Political Economic and Security Indicators

- Satisfaction with the performance of KFOR and KPS has remained the same as in the previous reporting period; satisfaction with government has increased slightly, while satisfaction with all other institutions has decreased.
Socio-Economic Stability

- Pessimism about the economy has been increasing since July 2003. Just 4% of people are satisfied or very satisfied with economic trends in Kosovo.

- Regardless of ethnicity the majority of respondents think that UNMIK is holding the most responsibility for the economic situation.

- Approximately 29% of respondents think that the economic situation of their family has gotten worse over the last six months, while just 8% of the respondents think that it has gotten better. Responses show the same trends regardless of ethnicity.

- Approximately 33% of people think that the economic situation of their family in the next six months will get worse, while just 10% think that their economic situation will improve.

- As compared to November 2003 when 8% of respondents considered the current business conditions as favorable, just 4% shared this opinion in March 2004. Similarly in November 2003, 11% of respondents were expecting positive improvements in the next 6 months while at present this number has fallen to 8%.

- Only 3% of respondents think that current employment opportunities are favorable while 79% think that they are unfavorable. Similarly only a small number (6%) of respondents think that employment opportunities will be better in next six months while 56% think that it will get worse while 19% think that it will remain the same.

- As can be seen from the chart below the majority of Albanians hold the KEK Board as responsible for the power supply crisis, while Serbs and other minorities see UNMIK as the main responsible institution.
As asked for the reasons for the low bill collection for power supply, around 46% of respondents thought that **low family income** is the main factor, while 20% thought that the **high price of power** is the most important factor.

**Political and Institutional Stability**

- Political pessimism has been increasing since July 2003

People’s satisfaction with functioning of UNMIK, the SRSG, and the Assembly has been decreasing since November 2002, while the satisfaction with the government has returned to the same levels as in November 2002.

**Percentage of people satisfied or very satisfied with the work of the institutions.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>SRSG</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Assembly</th>
<th>KFOR</th>
<th>KPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov-02</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-03</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-03</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-03</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>85.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-04</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Percentage of respondents (60 %) who perceive UNMIK as responsible for the political situation has remained the same as in November 2003. This trend is observed in all ethnicities. In total just 25% of respondents perceive the PISG, political parties and civil society as having power to effect the political situation.
Regardless of ethnicity, the majority of respondents said television is the most preferred media for getting the news on politics.

Around 59% of Albanians and 45% of non-Serb minority communities think that less than half or none of the competencies have been passed from UNMIK to the PISG, while just 7% of Serbs share this opinion. Approximately 56% of Serbs, on the other hand, think that more than half or all of the competencies have been transferred to the PISG, while just 5% of Albanians and 9% of non-Serb minority communities share this opinion.

The top three problems for all ethnic groups have not changed since November 2003 although some have switched places.

### Paramount problems facing Kosovo by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Non Serb (^2) minority communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Unemployment</td>
<td>Public and personal security</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo</td>
<td>Interethnic relations</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Poverty</td>
<td>Uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo</td>
<td>Uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in the chart below, the majority of Albanian respondents and those from the non-Serb minority communities think that the ‘Standards’ are important to open the discussion for the final status.

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\(^2\) “Non Serb” communities are all other minority communities that were included into the sample
Interethnic Relations

- With regard to the reasons for interethnic tensions, the same pattern is observed as in November 2003. The majority of Albanians and members of non-Serb minority communities list the influence of Belgrade and the lack of readiness of Serbs to be integrated into Kosovo society as being the major reasons for inter ethnic tensions. Serbs, on the other hand, list the attitude of Albanian leaders and insufficient efforts of Albanians to help the integration of Serbs as the main sources of interethnic tensions.

- Similarly as in November 2003, approximately 53% of Albanian respondents agree with the return of displaced people to Kosovo, while this figure is much higher for Serbs (97 %) and for non –Serb minority communities (65 %).

- As shown in the chart below, when asked about what their reaction would be toward the people returning, 35 % of Albanians state that they would ignore them, while this figure is much lower for non- Albanians.

- Similarly to November 2003 Albanians and members of non- Serb minority communities see unresolved final status of Kosovo as the major source of instability in the future. Serb respondents consider that the aggravation of interethnic relations would threaten stability.

- No matter the ethnicity the majority of respondents (47%) think that the continuation of dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade is important for the fulfillment of “Standards for Kosovo”.

- The most preferred priority for the dialogue is ‘Missing Persons’ followed by ‘Transport-recognition of travel documents’.
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Personal and Public Security

- As in the EWS opinion polls conducted during 2003, Serb respondents to this opinion poll continued to feel more insecure than Albanian respondents. However, non-Serb minority communities felt more insecure than Albanians in March 2004, which is a change from November 2003 when Albanian respondents felt more insecure than non-Serb minority communities.

- Overall around 32% of Serb respondents think that the cooperation between the community and the police is bad or very bad while just 10% of Albanian and non-Serb minority respondents share this opinion.

- The most favored response for bad cooperation between the police and the community from Albanian and non-Serb minority respondents was the fear of revenge, whilst the most favored response from Serb respondents was lack of trust in police bodies.

- There was a slight reduction in those who reported experiencing the conditioning of services with bribes, gifts or other favors. In November 2003, 13% of respondents reported that they experienced this, while in the March 2004 poll this dropped to 11%.

- When asked about the presence of corruption in various public companies, respondents felt that corruption was more present in KEK and PTK. Around 58% and 36% of respondents thought that corruption is present in a large scale in KEK and PTK respectively.

![Perceptions of corruption chart]
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![Graph showing trends in various indicators such as registered job-seekers, political pessimism, economic pessimism, subjective welfare pessimism, and dissatisfaction with the performance of the Assembly. The graph illustrates the increase in thousands compared to November 2002.]