



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

THE RELEVANCE OF DEVELOPMENT ETHICS FOR USAID

APRIL 2005

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by David A. Crocker and Stephen Schwenke; Management Systems International.

THE RELEVANCE OF DEVELOPMENT ETHICS FOR USAID



**Management Systems
International
Corporate Offices**
600 Water Street, SW
Washington, DC 20024

Contracted under contract number: AEP-I-00-99-00040-00, Task Order 9.

DISCLAIMER

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

- Part I: Development Ethics: Origins, Agreements, Controversies, Agenda1**
 - Sources 1
 - Areas of Consensus: Questions 5
 - Areas of Consensus: Answers 7
 - Controversies..... 10

- Part II: Development Ethics and USAID.....17**
 - Introduction 17
 - The “Toolkit” of Development Ethics..... 17
 - Transformational Development..... 19
 - Democracy and Governance Assessment..... 21
 - Conclusions 28
 - Recommendations for Future Activities..... 29

- References and Annotated Bibliography31**

PART I: DEVELOPMENT ETHICS: ORIGINS, AGREEMENTS, CONTROVERSIES, AGENDA

Development ethicists reflect on and assess the ends and means of local, national, regional, and global development. In this desk study, two development ethicists, one a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland, and one a technical director at Management Systems International, discuss (in Part I) the aim, nature, and methods of development ethics and (in Part II) the potential relevance of development ethics so conceived for the work of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Part II includes a description of some specific proposals for incorporating development ethics within USAID policy formation and practice, especially in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance.

National policymakers, project managers, grassroots communities, and international aid donors involved in development in poor countries often confront moral questions in their work.¹ Many development scholars and practitioners recognize that social-scientific theories of “development” and “underdevelopment” have – often implicit – ethical as well as empirical and policy components. Development philosophers and other ethicists formulate ethical principles relevant to social change in less developed countries; they also analyze and assess the moral dimensions of development theories and seek to resolve—often in dialogue with those most affected—the moral quandaries lurking in development policies and practice.²

SOURCES

One finds several sources for moral assessment of the theory and practice of development. First, activists and social critics, such as Mohandas Gandhi (beginning in the 1890s)(Gandhi 1927) in South Africa and India, Raúl Prébisch (1940s and 50s)(Prébisch 1962) in Latin America, and Frantz Fanon (in the 1960s)

¹ In 1978, David A. Crocker, then a professor of Philosophy at Colorado State University, created—with a professor of animal science and a scholar on Indian and Persian cultures—one of the first university courses on development ethics. The course was in response to a request (with funding) from a professor of economics and a professor of history for a graduate course for students and their professors engaged in international development projects. These two professors had just received a two-year grant from the US Department of Education to establish an MA program in Comparative Rural Development, and that program was to include a graduate seminar in “Ethics and Rural Development.” The course was to treat the moral and value issues that emerge in Colorado’s impoverished rural and mountain towns as well as in CSU’s overseas projects in international rural development. The project’s initiators argued that the need was great among both graduate students and their professors to address value and ethical questions in the field of development theory and practice. Faculty and students, they contended, learn much about the science of development, such as the causes and effects of poverty, and they acquire the technical skills to install tube wells in Pakistan or set up credit unions in Nicaragua. Once on the job, however, a host of questions assailed them for which they are ill prepared and have no ready answer: Am I doing more harm than good? What counts as harm and what counts as good? How much truth should I tell my funding agency, especially when they don’t want to hear it? Should I challenge my host country’s practice of gender inequality or take refuge in “moral relativism?” Is my “development” work contributing to a tyranny’s legitimacy? How should we define development and how should we try to promote it? Who should answer these questions, what methods should they use, and what should they say?

² For fuller sketches of the history of development ethics, see Crocker 2001, Goulet 1995, Gasper 1997 and 2004, Hamelink 1997.

(Fanon 1961) in Africa criticized colonialism and orthodox economic development and searched for better alternatives. Second, since the early 1960s, American development scholar and critic Denis Goulet, drawing inspiration from the work of Louis-Joseph Lebret and Gunnar Myrdal, and American sociologist Peter Berger pioneered what we now call “development ethics” by arguing that development theory, policy, and practices needs to be subjected to ethical assessment. Both insisted that what was conventionally called development was often bad for human beings and that both ethics and development would benefit from interaction.³

Des Gasper (Gasper 2004) suggests a third, more practical, 1960’s source of development ethics, namely, practitioners engaged in moral arguments about famine and emergency relief, human rights activists supporting the covenant on social and economic rights (1966), and religious communities influenced by liberation theology.

A fourth stimulus for development ethics was the effort of primarily Anglo-American moral philosophers in the late 1970s and the 1980s to deepen and broaden philosophical debate about famine relief and food aid. Beginning in the early seventies, often in response to Peter Singer's utilitarian argument for famine relief (Singer 1972) and Garrett Hardin's “lifeboat ethics” (Hardin 1974), many philosophers debated whether affluent nations (or their citizens) have moral obligations to aid starving people in poor countries and, if they do, what are the nature, bases and extent of those obligations.

The moral problem of world hunger and the ethics of famine relief were among the first practical issues that philosophers tackled after John Rawls’s pivotal 1971 study, *A Theory of Justice*,⁴ convinced them that reflection on normative issues was part of the philosopher’s task. Although Rawls himself limited ethical analysis to abstract principles of distributive justice, a new group of applied philosophers addressed the ethical and conceptual aspects of a variety of practical problems and policies. In the same year that Rawls’s volume appeared, Peter Singer first wrote about famine in East Bengal (now Bangladesh)⁵ and, more generally, about “the obligations of the affluent to those in danger of starvation” (Singer 1977, 36). In his 1974 *New York Times Magazine* article, “Philosophers are Back on the Job” (Singer 1974), Singer championed the philosophical turn to applied ethics, employing the ethics of famine relief as a leading example.

Philosophers were back on the job because, as John Dewey had urged fifty years earlier: “philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men” (Dewey 1960). One of these human problems in the mid-seventies was whether or not affluent states and their citizens were in any way morally obligated to send food to famine victims in other countries. Is such aid morally required, admirable but not obligatory, or impermissible? For instance, the editors of an anthology, widely used in university classes, asked, “What moral responsibility do affluent nations (or those people in them) have to the starving masses?” (Aiken and LaFollette 1977, 1). Peter Singer argued that such aid was obligatory and rich people commit moral wrong in refusing to aid. For, he asserted, “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care is bad” and “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” Finally, claiming that life-saving and suffering-reducing actions are indeed in our power, Singer concluded that famine relief is a moral obligation or duty and not a mere matter of charity (Singer 1972). Even though such a duty might be at odds with our moral judgments and complacent consumption

³ See, for example, Goulet, 1971, 1977; Berger, 1974.

⁴ Rawls, 1971, 1999, 2001.

⁵ Singer 1972. Singer’s initial essay was written in 1971 and first appeared in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* in 1972, the initial year of publication of what was to become a premier philosophical journal in applied ethics and political philosophy.

practices, we do grievous wrong in not donating to famine relief—even to the point of bringing our standard of living down to that of the world’s poorest.

Garrett Hardin, writing in 1974 in *Psychology Today Magazine*, likewise argued against charitable aid (Hardin 1974a). Unlike Singer, however, Hardin argued that rich nations and individuals (living in lifeboats) have a duty *not* to help the needy (swimming in the sea). Aid would only worsen the problems of hunger, because it would result in more mouths to feed, and would cause other countries to become dependent on handouts rather than solving their own food and population problems.

Throughout the seventies (and on into the eighties), often in response to Singer, on the one hand, and Hardin, on the other, many philosophers investigated whether there exists a positive moral obligation to aid distant and hungry people and, if so, what is its nature, foundation, and limits.⁶

By the early eighties, however, moral philosophers, such as Nigel Dower, Onora O’Neill and Jerome M. Segal, had come to agree with those development specialists who for many years had believed that famine relief and food aid were only one part of the solution to the problems of hunger, poverty, underdevelopment and international injustice.⁷ What is needed, argued these philosophers, is not merely an ethics of aid but a more comprehensive, empirically informed, and policy relevant “ethics of Third World development.” The kind of assistance and North/South relations that are called for will depend on how (good) development is understood.

A fifth source of development ethics is the work of Paul Streeten and Amartya Sen. Both economists have addressed the causes of global economic inequality, hunger, and underdevelopment and have addressed these problems with, among other things, a conception of development explicitly based on ethical principles. Building on Streeten’s “basic human needs” strategy,⁸ Sen argues that development should be understood ultimately not as economic growth, industrialization, or modernization, which are at best *means* for the *end* of the expansion of people’s “valuable capabilities and functionings”:

The valued functionings can vary from such elementary ones as avoiding mortality or preventable morbidity, or being sheltered, clothed, and nourished, to such complex achievements as taking part in the life of the community, having a joyful and stimulating life, or attaining self-respect and the respect of others (Sen 1997).⁹

These five sources have been especially influential in the work of Anglo-American development ethicists, such as Sabina Alkire, Nigel Dower, Stephen Esquith, Des Gasper, Denis Goulet, Daniel Little, Onora O’Neill, and the authors.¹⁰ When practiced by Latin Americans, Asians, Africans and non-Anglo Europeans, development ethics also draws on philosophical and moral traditions distinctive of their cultural contexts. See, for example, the work of Luis Camacho, Jorge Luis Chavez, and E. Roy Ramirez (Costa Rica); Adela Cortina and Jesus Conill, Emilio Martínez Navarro (Spain); Tarso Genro (Brazil); Godfrey Gunatilleke (Sri Lanka); Kwame Gyekye (Ghana); Bernardo Kliksberg and Oswaldo Guariglia

⁶ Singer 1972 and Hardin 1974a as well as the first wave of philosophical responses appeared in Aiken and La Follette 1977. For the more recent work, see Aiken and La Follette 1996 and Chatterjee 2004. For Singer’s most recent statement of the obligations of rich nations to poor ones, see Singer 2002, especially ch. 5 and Singer 2004 in Chatterjee 2004.

⁷ See, for example, O’Neill 1980, 1986, 1993; Dower 1988; Segal 2002.

⁸ Streeten, Burki, ul Haq, Hicks, and Stewart 1981. See also Galtung 1978/79, 1980.

⁹ Sen’s most systematic and readable statement of his agency and capability approach is Sen 1999. For the most complete bibliography of Sen’s writing on ethics and development through 2001, see Alkire 2002.

¹⁰ The following are major writings of these development ethicists: Alkire 2002, Dower 1998, Gasper 2004, Goulet 1995, Little 2003, McNeill and Bøås 2004, Onora O’Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Crocker 2002, forthcoming.

(Argentina); Ingrid Robyns (the Netherlands) Asunción St. Clair (Norway); Cristián Parker and Manfred Max-Neef (Chile); John Peter Opio (Uganda); Ramón Romero (Honduras), and Wilhelm Verwoerd (South Africa).¹¹

Presenting work by these and other thinkers, one anthology and two textbooks in development ethics appeared in the period 2002-2004: Bernardo Kliksberg, ed., *Etica y desarrollo: La relacion marginada* (2002);¹² Daniel Little, *The Paradox of Wealth and Poverty: Mapping the Ethical Dilemmas of Global Development* (2003);¹³ and Des Gasper, *The Ethics of Development* (2004).¹⁴ Three professional organizations have been formed: the International Development Ethics Association (founded 1987); the Human Development and Capability Association (founded 2000); the Inter-American Initiative on Social Capital, Ethics, and Development (2000), with a network of more than 80 universities.¹⁵ Stephen Schwenke and a few other practitioners currently provide consulting services in international development ethics and associated moral aspects of government integrity and “good governance”¹⁶. Inquiries into the relevance of ethics for development have been institutionalized in the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Norwegian Development agency (NORAD). In addition to its 25-year old Friday Morning Group on Values and Development, the World Bank early in 2005 initiated a committee to study the role of ethics in Bank policymaking and practice. Courses in development ethics have been or are being taught in more than a dozen universities in at least nine countries.¹⁷ Such publications, groups, institutional initiatives, and courses indicate that development ethics has become—like environmental ethics or bioethics before it—a recognized field or multidisciplinary “discipline”. We put the last word in quotes because development ethics, as we shall argue is not exclusively an academic inquiry let alone one with only one methodology. Development bridges the gap between theory and practice and does so with interaction in both directions. Moreover, development ethicists employ a variety of approaches to moral assessment, argument, and the envisioning of alternatives.

¹¹ For example: Camacho 1993, Chavez 1999), Ramirez 1987; Conill 2004, Cortina 2002, Martínez Naavarró 2000), Gunatilleke, G, Tiruchelvam, N. and Coomaraswamy, R. 1988; Kliksberg 2004, Guariglia 2001, Max-Neef 1993, St. Clair 2004, Opio P.J. 1993, and Romero forthcoming. The “Digital Library” on the Web page on the “Initiative on Social Capital, Ethics, and Development” of the Inter-American Development Bank is a valuable resource of recent work in development ethics in Latin America: <etica@iadb.org>.

¹² Kliksberg 2002. Earlier anthologies on ethics and development include Hamelink 1997, Ameigeiras 1998, and Parker 1998). An urgent need exists for English-language collections of historically important and recent articles in development ethics.

¹³ Little 2003.

¹⁴ Gasper 2004.

¹⁵ The groups’ respective websites are (1) the International Development Ethics Association (<http://www.development-ethics.org/>); (2) the Inter-American Initiative on Social Capital, Ethics and Development (<http://www.iadb.org/etica/ingles>); and (3) the Human Development and Capability Association (<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~freedom>). Although not explicitly to development ethics, other associations -- such as the Society for International Development, the United Nations Association, and the World Development Movement -- have had serious ethical interests related to development and foreign aid.

¹⁶ See Stephen Schwenke’s website on development ethics and international urban development at <http://www.developmentvalues.net>.

¹⁷ University of Aberdeen (Scotland), Carleton University (Canada), Colorado State University (USA), Institute of Social Studies (the Netherlands), Michigan State University (USA), SAIS/Johns Hopkins University (USA), Stellenbosch University (South Africa), Uganda Martyrs University (Uganda), Universities of Bergen (Norway), Universidad de Costa Rica, University of Maryland (USA), Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras, Universidad Nacional Heredia (Costa Rica), University of Notre Dame (USA), University of Oslo (Norway), Universidad de Santiago (Chile).

AREAS OF CONSENSUS: QUESTIONS

Although they differ on a number of matters, development ethicists exhibit a wide consensus about the commitments that inform their practice, the questions they are posing, and the unreasonableness of certain answers. Development ethicists typically ask the following related questions, many of which we relate to issues that have or might surface in USAID:

- What moral issues emerge in development policymaking and practice and how should they be resolved?¹⁸ Should USAID's efforts at democracy promotion emphasize Iraq at the expense of Africa or Latin America? Should an independent judiciary be viewed as part of the democratic ideal or as relative to only specific (Western) cultures? One example of a moral question intrudes in recent USAID documents is the following: "Is it enough, from a donor's point of view, that the legal and social instruments for inclusion exist and that there are no barriers to participation: Or should they also be concerned about whether the citizenry—indeed all segments of the citizenry—actually participates? And, if so, are they [sic] coerced to participate? . . . Should donors support programs to improve actual, not just permissive, participation" (USAID: Conducting a DGA: A Framework for Strategy Development, 23). Does a preoccupation with anti-corruption strategies crowd out long-term efforts at poverty reduction and participatory democracy?¹⁹ Should USAID personnel refuse to demote birth control (condoms) to a secondary status compared to policies of abstinence and marital fidelity?²⁰
- What should count as (good) development? What are clear examples of "good" development and "bad" development? How well are various regions, societies, and locales doing in achieving "development"? Development ethics, as should be clear from our discussion above, emerged due to dissatisfaction with conventional wisdom with respect to "development", and thrives on questioning how should good and better development be conceived.
- Should we continue using the concept of development instead of, for example, "progress," "economic growth," "transformation," "liberation," "sustainable livelihoods," (Clugston and Hoyt 1997) or "post-development alternatives to development" (Escobar 1995)? How, if at all, does (good) development differ from "modernization," "industrialization," "developmentalism," "transformational development," or the "Washington Consensus"?
- Are development's professed altruistic aims incompatible or coincident with the national interest of donor countries? Is it better for USAID to emphasize US foreign policy's self-interested motives in providing aid rather than altruism? Is professed altruism a rationalization for alleged Northern and Western economic dominance?
- If development is defined generically as "good socio-economic change," what basic economic, political, and cultural goals should a society or political community pursue, and what values or principles should inform their selection?
- How should the benefits and harms of development be conceived and distributed? Is the most fundamental category to be used in moral assessment GDP (per capita income), utility, subjective

¹⁸ For a sample of such moral dilemmas in development practice and cooperation, see Crocker 1991, Hamelink 1997, and Gasper 2004.

¹⁹ While anti-corruption strategies should encompass the objectives of poverty reduction and participatory democracy, a focus on controlling corruption can eclipse these other larger development goals and become the only end considered. See Moisés Naim, "Bad Medicine," *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2005, 95-96.

²⁰ See Nicholas D. Kristof, "When Marriage Kills," *New York Times*, March 30, 2005, A 27.

happiness (Graham and Pettinato),²¹ social primary goods (Rawls), access to resources (Roemer), basic human needs (Galtung, Max-Neef, Streeten, ul Haq), human capabilities and functionings (Sen, Nussbaum), human flourishing, or human rights? Is some aggregate measure of development success basic, such as economic growth or economic efficiency, or does social justice require maximizing the expectations of the least well off, getting all above a threshold, or reducing degrading inequality?

- Who or what bears (primary) responsibility for bringing about development—a nation’s government, civil society or the market? What role—if any—do or should more affluent states, international institutions, and nongovernmental associations, and developing countries themselves have in development? Is the Millennium Summit and Declaration correct in focusing donor nation and multilateral institutions responsibilities exclusively related on the “best performing” less developed countries. Who or what is responsible for those nations (and their citizens) that perform less well or abysmally?
- Regardless who has them, how should development duties or obligations be understood? Are duties based solely on divine commands, social pacts, general positive duties of charity (which permit donor discretion with respect to specific beneficiaries), specific duties to aid (any needy rights-bearer), negative duties to dismantle unjust structures or halt injurious action, or duties to make reparation for past wrongs? Is the duty of “Do no harm” enough or should citizens and development agents also consider positive duties to aid; and, if so, how should the duty not to harm be weighed in relation the duty to do good?
- What are the virtues and vices of various development agents? How good or obligatory is honesty and how bad or permissible is deception? Should USAID and similar donor agencies have a code of ethics or conduct for its personnel? What is the evidence with respect to the role of similar professional codes in improving conduct? Is a code likely to do more harm than good? Would the prohibitions of such a code encourage employees to act in questionable ways just up to the threshold so as to encourage problematic conduct? What would a defensible ethical code look like? Who should decide on such a code and by what process? Should it be imposed from the top or deliberated from the bottom? How should a code be enforced? How does an ethics of professional virtue or conduct relate to an ethics for assessing policy and institutional arrangements?
- What are the most serious local, national and international impediments to and constraints on good development? How should blame for development failures be apportioned among global, national, and local agents?
- To what extent, if any, do moral skepticism, moral relativism, national sovereignty and political realism, religious or political fundamentalism pose a challenge to this boundary-crossing ethical inquiry? To what extent should the aims of US foreign (and domestic) policy constrain or shape USAID’s policies?
- Who should decide these questions and by what methods? What are or should be the respective roles of appeal to authority, theoretical and critical reflection, public deliberation, donor deliberation, and “learning by doing”?

²¹ Graham and Pettinato 2002.

AREAS OF CONSENSUS: ANSWERS

In addition to accepting the importance of these questions, most development ethicists share many beliefs or commitments about their field and the general parameters for ethically-based development. First, development ethicists typically agree that – in spite of global progress with respect to achieving higher living standards for many – there are still **grave deprivations for many in contrast to the elevated affluence of a few**. Development ethicists start from judgments about what Dewey would call a “problematic situation”: many people throughout the world undeservedly and needlessly suffer or die. These deaths may be either agonizing slow, due to poverty of various sorts, or rapid but brutal due to ethnic and military conflict, repressive governments, or fragile states. In our affluent world, these unacceptable sufferings and deprivations need not continue, should be halted, and people everywhere should have a chance for a decent life. Pogge’s cool expression of moral outrage is typical of many who share his sentiments:

How well are the weak and vulnerable faring today? Some 2,800 million or 46 percent of humankind live below the World Bank’s \$2/day poverty line – precisely: in households whose income per person per day has less purchasing power than in \$2.15 had in the US in 1993. On average, the people living below this line fall 44.4 percent below it. Over 1,200 million of them live on less than half, below the World Bank’s better-known \$1/day poverty line. People so incredibly poor are extremely vulnerable to even minor changes in natural and social conditions as well as to many forms of exploitation and abuse. Each year, some 18 million of them die prematurely from poverty-related causes. This is one-third of all human deaths—50,000 every day, including 34,000 children under age five. Such severe and extensive poverty persists while there is great and rising affluence elsewhere. The average income of the citizens of the affluent countries is about 50 times greater in purchasing power and about 200 times greater in terms of market exchange rates than that of the global poor (Pogge 2002, 2; see also Little 2003, xiii and Gasper 2004, 2-3).

Moreover, development ethicists contend that **development practices and theories have ethical and value dimensions and can benefit from explicit ethical analysis and appraisal**. Although important, ascertaining the facts and their likely causes and effects cannot take the place of morally assessing what has been, is, and could be. Ethics or value commitments are lenses that reveal or highlight the valuational or moral dimension of human actions, institutions, and their consequences. It is important to know the causes and consequences of such things as poverty, corruption, repressive governments, and state fragility. It is another thing to evaluate the morally salient features of those actions and decide whether alternatives would be morally better. For example, does the economic growth supposedly generated by a given development strategy get translated to expanding valuable freedoms of a nation’s most vulnerable citizens? Ethical assessment of past policies and present options enables people who are active in development to keep their eyes on the ball of reducing remediable and undeserved human death and suffering. Many people work in development in order to make the world better, but the conceptual frameworks that guide them are largely concerned with technical means rather than morally urgent ends. Development ethics is a way of thinking that puts moral questions and answers in the center of thought and action.

In addition, development ethicists agree that **development is a multidisciplinary field that has both theoretical and practical components and that it should include both academics and practitioners**. Development ethicists aim not merely to *understand* the nature, causes and consequences of development – conceived generally as desirable social change – but also to argue for and *promote* specific conceptions

of such change. In backing certain changes, development ethicists assume that choice among alternatives is real and some are ethically better than others.²² The choices are not merely choices of strategies (goals plus general means) or tactics (specific means). Rather, choices concern or are informed by ethical principles with respect to basic goals and morally permissible means. “Know-why” and “know-how” — whether economic or political—are important but cannot replace “know-whether.”

It is best, at least in our present age of disciplinary and institutional divisions, that development ethics involve the work of many hands. Development ethics should include many voices. It ought to be multidisciplinary to ensure the presence of various theoretical elements – economics, but also sociology, political science, history, ecology, agronomy, law, theology, and philosophy. It ought to transcend the distinction between the pure and applied sciences and therefore include such fields as agricultural economics, education, engineering, nutrition, and social work. The moral dialogue ought to include theological ethics, so as not to neglect the resources of the religious communities, as well as secular ethics, in order to forge an improved global and public moral consensus that builds on and extends global commitments to common values and human rights.

Development ethics ought to go beyond theoreticians and include development policy makers, politicians, activists, journalists, and citizens. It ought to involve rural as well as urban participants if urban bias is to be corrected without neglecting crucial rural/urban linkages and the serious challenges confronting a rapidly urbanizing world. Public discussion must involve both women and men in order to eliminate sexism. Members of various groups must participate to extinguish racism, class bias, and an academic prejudice against traditional practices and popular wisdom. The participants should come from the South as well as the North to avoid ethnocentric imperialism. We need participants from the Middle East and East as well as the West so that the issues of religious and cultural conflict can be addressed and non-Western resources can contribute to a global vision. As it did in the days of the Marshall Plan, the US has the opportunity to overcome global fears of US domination and replace them with a recognition that the US stands for global justice and opportunity for all. Deliberative dialogue and democratic decision-making must be institutionalized on various levels and venues. It must involve citizens as well as governmental experts and private consultants if citizens are to have a real opportunity and encouraged to exercise their right to effective participation. In Part II, we propose some concrete ways in which development ethics might be conducted with and within USAID.

Furthermore, although they may understand the terms in somewhat different ways, development ethicists are generally committed to **understanding and reducing human deprivation and misery in poor countries and poor regions of rich countries**. Development ethicists persistently remind development agencies that development is for a better life for human beings rather than humans being an instrument of development. Assessment of development policies and projects should emphasize their impacts on preventing death as well as relieving suffering and loss of meaning. A consensus increasingly exists that development institutions, projects, and aid givers should seek strategies in which both human well-being and a healthy environment jointly exist and are mutually reinforcing.²³

Another source of agreement is that most ethicists are convinced that what is frequently called **“development” – for instance, economic growth – has created as many problems as it has solved**. The term “Development” can be used both descriptively and normatively. In the descriptive sense, “development” is often identified as the processes of economic growth and modernization that result in a

²² Des Gasper is particularly eloquent in articulating the widely shared assumption that development agents face alternative paths and that development ethics emphasizes “value-conscious ways of thinking about and choosing between alternative paths and destinations” (Gasper 2004, xi).

²³ See, for example, Engel and Engel 1990; Rolston 1996; Clugston and Hoyt 1997; Attfield 1999; Lee, Holland, and McNeill 2000; Balint 2000; Dasgupta 2001; Sen 2002; and Dower 2003, among other contributions.

society's achievement of a high or improving (per capita) gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP). So conceived, a "developed" society may be either celebrated or criticized. In the normative sense, a developed society—ranging from villages to national and regional communities as well as the global order—is one whose established institutions realize or approximate (what the proponent believes to be) worthwhile goals. Most centrally, development ethicists contend that these goals include the overcoming of economic and social deprivation. In order to avoid confusion, when a normative sense of "development" is meant, the noun is often preceded by a positive adjective such as "good," "authentic," "humane," "just," or "ethically justified."

Development ethicists also agree that development ethics must be conducted at **various levels of generality and specificity**. Just as development debates occur at various levels of abstraction, so development ethics should assess (1) basic ethical principles or ideals, such as justice, compassion, liberty, autonomy, solidarity, and democracy; (2) development goals and models, such as "economic growth," "growth with equity," "a new international economic order," "basic needs," and, most recently, "sustainable development," "structural adjustment," "human development" (United Nations Development Programme),²⁴ "transformational development;" and (3) specific institutions, projects, and strategies. Applied to USAID, this commitment implies that venues for ethical assessment, deliberation, and decision-making should exist at all levels of USAID activity—from the highest policy levels to country-wide programs and local projects.

Most development ethicists also contend that their enterprise should be **international or global** in the triple sense that the ethicists engaged in this activity come from many societies, including developing ones; that they are seeking to forge a cross-cultural consensus; and that this consensus emphasizes a commitment to alleviating worldwide deprivation. This agreement implies that USAID should maintain and deepen critical dialogue about the ends and means of good development with representatives of a variety of governments and non-governmental organizations.

Although many development ethicists argue that at least some development principles or procedures are relevant for *any* impoverished community or polity, most agree that **development strategies must be contextually sensitive**. What constitutes the best means – for instance, state provisioning, market mechanisms, civil society and their hybrids – will depend on a political community's history and stage of social change as well as on regional and global forces, such as globalization and international institutions. Just as the authors of the "Conducting a DG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development" (hereinafter, the "DGA Framework") recognize that the framework is "a 'navigation chart,' offering alternative paths and tactics, rather than a 'cookbook' with a single fitting approach" (DGA Framework, 11), so development ethics is a way of thought and practice that emphasizes the importance of often distinctive local problems and solutions.

Finally, this flexibility concerning development models and strategies is compatible with **the uniform rejection of certain extremes**. Ethically-based development is, as the DGA Framework emphasizes (DGA Framework, 22-23) "inclusive": it offers and protects development benefits for everyone in a society—regardless of their religion, gender, ethnicity, economic status, or age. Moreover, most development ethicists would repudiate two models: (1) the maximization of economic growth in a society without paying any direct attention to converting greater opulence into better human living conditions for its members, what Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze call "unaimed opulence" (Drèze and Sen 1989) and (2) an authoritarian egalitarianism in which physical needs are satisfied at the expense of political liberties and citizen agency. Development ethicists would applaud the DGA Framework's repudiation of "totalitarian"

²⁴ United Nations Development Programme 1990-2004. These *Human Development Reports* operationalize the capabilities approach and address such themes as consumption, globalization, human rights, technology, democracy, and the Millennium Development Goals. See Fakuda-Parr and Shiva 2003, St. Clair 2004a and 2004b.

and “authoritarian regimes” but would have two worries. First, US foreign policy goals, especially anti-terrorism strategies, still permit excessive reliance on authoritarian allies. US arrangements with certain repressive regimes include the regimes supplying data on terrorist threats in exchange for US/USAID agreement to refrain from aggressively pushing “democracy and good governance.” Ways exist to keep the pressure on for deepening democracy without abandoning security goals.²⁵ Second, USAID’s reforming of development assistance so as to reward good governance and democratic transition needs to be supplemented with finding significant (high impact) ways to benefit and empower the poor in repressive societies.

CONTROVERSIES

In addition to these points of agreement, one also finds several divisions and unsettled issues. One unresolved issue concerns the scope of development ethics. Development ethics originated as the “ethics of Third World Development.” There are good reasons to drop – as a Cold War relic – the “First-Second-Third World” trichotomy. However, no consensus exists on whether or how development ethics should extend beyond its central concern of assessing the development ends and means of developing or traditional societies and in “fragile” states. Some argue that development ethicists should criticize human deprivation wherever it exists, including in rich countries and regions since they too have problems of poverty, powerlessness, and alienation and so properly fall within the scope of development ethics. Some argue that perhaps the socioeconomic model that the North has been exporting to the South results in the underdevelopment of both. Moreover, just as the (affluent) North exists in the (geographic) South, so the (poor) South exists in the (geographic) North. Yet others restrict development ethics to poor countries by arguing that attention to Northern deprivation diverts development ethicists and agents from the world’s most serious destitution (in poor countries) and the ways in which rich countries benefit from the current global order.

Our own view is that restricting development ethics to “developing” countries is defective in three ways. It falsely assumes that the most severe deprivation occurs in poor countries when in fact, as Sen points out, “the extent of deprivation for particular groups in very rich countries can be comparable to that in the so-called third world” (Sen 1999, 21). Further, Northern and Southern poverty reduction are linked; migrants from the South making money in the North send valuable remittances to their families back home but may also drain the South of able workers and displace workers in the North. Finally, there is the increasing prevalence of applying “best practices” learned from development in the South to destitution in the North (as well as vice versa). For example, USAID applied – through its Lessons without Borders program – lessons learned abroad to destitute US cities. Development agents in different societies often face similar problems – such as unemployment, racism, violence, and powerlessness – and benefit from innovative ways of solving them.

A second question with respect to the scope of development ethics concerns how wide a net development ethics should cast with respect to the topics it addresses. It is controversial whether development ethicists, concerned with rich country responsibility and global distributive justice, should restrict themselves to official development assistance – traditionally conceived – or whether they also should treat such topics as international trade, capital flows, migration, environmental pacts, terrorism, civil conflict, state fragility, military intervention, humanitarian intervention, and responses to human rights violations committed by prior regimes. The chief argument against extending its boundaries in these ways is that development ethics would thereby become too ambitious and diffuse. If development ethics grew to be identical with all international ethics or even all social ethics, the result might be that insufficient attention would be paid to alleviating extreme *poverty and powerlessness* in various communities. Both sides

²⁵ See Carothers 2004, Carothers and Ottaway 2005.

agree that development ethicists should assess various kinds of North-South (and South-South) relations and the numerous global forces, such as globalization, that influence poverty as well as economic and political inequality in poor countries. What is unresolved, however, is whether development ethics also should address such topics as trade, security, the internet, drug trafficking, military intervention, the conduct of war, peace keeping, and the proposed international criminal court when – or to the extent to which – these topics have no causal relationship to absolute or relative poverty or powerlessness. USAID’s global leadership in including humanitarian relief, anti-corruption, attention to fragile states, and democracy promotion as components of good development and development assistance – all these activities argue for an enlarged conception of development on the part of both donor and recipient countries.

Development ethicists also are divided on the *status* of the moral norms that they seek to justify and apply. Three positions have emerged. Universalists, such as utilitarians and Kantians, argue that development goals and principles are valid for all societies. Particularists, especially communitarians and postmodern relativists, reply that universalism masks ethnocentrism and (Northern or Western) cultural imperialism. (Pro-development particularists either reject the existence of universal principles or affirm only the *procedural* principle that each nation or society should draw only on its own traditions and decide its own development ethic and path). A third approach – advanced, for example, by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, Jonathan Glover, as well as the authors²⁶ – tries to avoid the standoff between the first two positions. Proponents of this view insist that development ethics should forge a cross-cultural consensus in which a political community’s own freedom to make development choices is one among a plurality of fundamental norms. Further, these norms are sufficiently general to permit and also *require* sensitivity to societal differences. This mediating view is also expressed at various places in the DGA Framework (e.g. DGA Framework, 13).

One must also ask a further question related to the universalism/particularism debate: to what extent, if any, should development ethicists propose visions committed to a certain conception of human well-being or flourishing, and how “thick” or extensive should this vision be? There is a continuum here: at one end of the range, one finds a commitment to the values of individual choice, tolerance of differences, and public deliberation about societal ends and means; on the other end, one finds normative guidance and institutional guarantees with respect to the good or full human life but less tolerance for individual and social choice. We are attracted to a threshold view that identifies a minimal level of agency²⁷ and well-being that should be open to everyone, regardless of their citizenship, and is the “platform” for individuals and communities freely to decide their own conception of the fully good or flourishing human life. One reason for this approach is that it will be easier to get cross-cultural consensus for a “moral minimum” than for a robust conception of the good life. Another reason is that such minimalism respects the rights of individuals and communities to determine (within limits set by their respect for the similar freedom of others) their own conception of the good).

Even supposing that development principles have some substantive content (beyond the procedural principle of self-determination, that each society or person should decide for itself), there remain **disagreements about the substantive content of a development ethics**. If one accepts that societal development ultimately concerns human development, one still must explore the moral categories crucial to human well-being and development. Development ethicists, as we have seen, have offered various candidates for such fundamental moral notions, such as utility (preference satisfaction); subjective happiness (Graham and Pettinato); social primary goods (Rawls), such as political liberty, income,

²⁶ See Nussbaum and Glover 1995.

²⁷ Sen defines agency as when “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well.” (Sen 1999)

wealth, and self-respect; negative liberty (Nozick and Bauer);²⁸ basic human needs (Galtung, Streeten, Doyal & Gouch, Gasper);²⁹ autonomy or agency (O'Neill, Sen); human dignity and worth (Kantian ethics and Nussbaum), valuable capabilities and functionings (Sen, Nussbaum, Little; United Nations Development Programme); human or moral rights (Pogge, Sen), civic leadership and duty (virtue ethics), and compassion or care (feminist ethics), among others.

Although many think that a development ethic ought to include more than one of these moral concepts, development ethicists differ about which among these values ought to be given priority. The alternative that we favor endorses the development of an understanding of *minimal human well-being* (not flourishing) that combines, on the one hand, a neo-Kantian commitment to autonomy and human dignity, critical dialogue and public deliberation with, on the other hand, neo-Aristotelian beliefs in the importance of physical health, happiness, and social participation. Development duties might then flow from the idea that all humans have the right to a minimal level of well-being, and various institutions have the duty to secure and protect this well-being as well as restore it when lost. USAID, like the World Bank, should consider the merits of a rights-based approach to development. It is striking that moral considerations such as moral rights, which are not the same as legal rights, surface all too infrequently in USAID documents. (For exceptions, see DGA Framework 14, 16, and 22).

Each of these moral theories, and others like them, offers insights at both the broad policy level and at the level of specific interventions. Although these moral frameworks seldom provide definitive or specific answers, they do call attention to candidates for fundamental ends in the light of which many current strategies and tactics might turn out to be morally questionable or even morally impermissible. The moral theories provide lenses that enable us to see ourselves, our duties, and others in new and compelling ways. They can reinforce moral motivations and thereby shape both citizen and professional conduct.

One also finds an ongoing debate about how development's benefits, burdens, and responsibilities should be distributed within developing countries and between rich and poor countries. Utilitarianism, assumed in most neo-classical economics, prescribes simple aggregation and maximization of individual utilities. This solution to the problem of distribution puts economic growth as the basic end (and means) of development and assumes that such growth will benefit everyone. Rawlsians advocate that income and wealth be maximized for the least well-off (individuals or nations). Libertarians contend that a society should guarantee no form of equality apart from equal freedom from the interference of government and other people. Pogge broadens the libertarian notion of harm (and moral rights) and argues that rich elites and nations have a duty to refrain from harming the vulnerable and thereby violating their rights. Singer, as we saw above, continues to challenge development ethicists and citizens everywhere with his argument that if affluent nations and individuals can relieve suffering and death without sacrificing anything of comparable moral worth, they are morally obliged to do so. Capability ethicists defend governmental and civil responsibility to *enable* everyone to advance to a level of sufficiency (Sen, Crocker), dignity (Nussbaum) or flourishing (Little) with respect to the valuable functionings. Unfortunately, distributional questions are conspicuous by their absence from much development policymaking. Development ethics challenges this silence by asking not only who *in fact* gains and loses but which distribution of burdens and benefits is *most justified morally*.

Development ethicists also differ about whether (good) societal development should have – as an ultimate goal – the promotion of values other than the present and future human good. Some development ethicists ascribe intrinsic value – equal or even superior to the good of individual human beings – to such human communities as family, nation, or cultural group. Others argue that non-human individuals and species, as

²⁸ Bauer 1971, Nozick 1974.

²⁹ In addition to the works of Galtung 1978/9 and 1980 and Streeten 1981, see Doyal and 1991 and Gasper 2004, among many others.

well as ecological communities, have equal and even superior value to human individuals. Those committed to “ecodevelopment” or “sustainable development” often fail to agree on what should be sustained as an *end in itself* and what should be maintained as an indispensable or merely *helpful means*. Nor do they agree on how to surmount conflicts among environmental and other competing values. Stiglitz clearly recognizes that these and other value disagreements are sometimes implicit in what seem to be factual or value neutral policy disagreements:

There are important disagreements about economic and social policy in our democracies. Some of these disagreements are about values—how concerned should we be about our environment (how much environmental degradation should we tolerate, if it allows us to have a higher GDP); how concerned should we be about the poor (how much sacrifice in our total income should we be willing to make, if [sic] allows some of the poor to move out of poverty, or to be slightly better off); or how concerned should we be about democracy (are we willing to compromise on basic rights, such as the rights to association, if we believe that as a result, the economy will grow faster) (Stiglitz 2002, 218-19).

An increasingly important disagreement that concerns the resolution of the above disagreement is related to the roles of various experts (judges, political leaders, donors and their technical experts, development agents, philosophers), on the one hand, and popular agency, on the other, in resolving moral conflicts. On the one hand, popular participation and democracy often are suspect insofar as majorities (or minorities) may dominate others and insofar as people’s beliefs and preferences are deformed by tradition, adapted to cope with deprivation, and subject to demagogic manipulation. Moreover, experts often excel at “know how” if not “know why.” On the other hand, rule by experts or guardians can lead to new tyrannies, and many experts themselves affirm Sen’s “agent-oriented view” of development:

With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs. There is indeed a rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency – and even of constructive impatience (Sen 1999, 11).

Sen rightly, or so it seems to us, calls for development institutions to reorient their approach from one of providing goods and services to passive recipients to one of enabling countries and their citizens genuine opportunities to be authors of their own lives and development path. Such an “agency-centered” development perspective implies a deepening and broadening of democracy that includes but goes well beyond a universal franchise coupled with free and competitive elections. Crucially important is the engendering of venues – within both government and civil society – in which citizens and their representatives can engage in deliberative give and take to solve common problems.

The theory and practice of deliberative democracy, we contend, has much to offer development ethics and USAID.³⁰ Rather than focusing exclusively on free and fair elections, as important as they are, the theory and practice of deliberative democracy emphasize social choice through public discussion that aims at solutions – solutions that nearly everyone can accept – to common problems.³¹ Not only a philosophical

³⁰ See, for example, Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 2004, Crocker forthcoming a and forthcoming b, among other contributions.

³¹ Compare with John Rawls’s definition: “The definitive idea for deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself. When citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions. They suppose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion with other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or nonpolitical interests. It is at this point that

normative theory, deliberative democracy is informed by and informs promising experiments in deliberative democracy occurring in Porto Alegre and almost 200 other cities in Brazil, Kerala, India (an Indian state of 40 million inhabitants), and Chicago, Illinois, among other places.³²

Finally, controversy also exists with respect to **which agents and structures are largely if not exclusively to blame for the present state of global destitution and unequal opportunity**. Charles Beitz states the empirical aspects of the issue well: “There is a large, complex, and unresolved empirical question about the relative contributions of local and global factors to the wealth and poverty of societies.”³³ Some development ethicists, such as Pogge, assert that the global order is both dominated by affluent countries and unjustly tilted against poor countries.³⁴ This global order and the process of globalization amounts, claims Pogge, to a “strong headwind” against which any poor community must struggle and which is largely responsible for development failures: “national policies and institutions are indeed often quite bad; but the fact that they are can be traced to global policies and institutions” (Pogge 2002, 43). Other development ethicists and policymakers tend to ascribe development failure much less to global and foreign sources and much more to national and local causes – such as elite capture of power, widespread corruption, and the lack of democratic values.

We appropriate but develop Pogge's “headwind” metaphor in a way that captures a view more balanced and flexible (than the one Pogge usually expresses) about the relative and changing weight of external (global structure, rich country role) and internal (developing country role) factors in causing global poverty. Sailors know that the headwind against which they sail is an important but constantly changing and sometimes ambiguous factor and that getting to their destination requires skill and good judgment as well. The headwind is not always steady. Sometimes it gusts and sometimes it lulls (depending on the wind and whether their boat goes behind an island and is temporarily protected from the wind). Likewise, the impact of the global order (and rich country impact) increases and decreases from time to time and place to place.

Moreover, sometimes there are crosswinds, some of which aid the helmsman and some of which impede progress, and a good sailor must take advantage of the former and adjust to the latter. Likewise, the global order opens up opportunities for poverty reduction and democratization as well as impedes them, and wise leaders/peoples discern the difference. Furthermore, the good sailor tacks back and forth in the face of the wind, taking advantage of it for forward progress and not bucking it directly. Likewise, a developing country can find ways to take advantage of normally adverse global factors. For instance, a cutback on US aid in Costa Rica enabled Costa Rica to be less dependent on the US. Additionally, sometimes a headwind changes and becomes a tail wind. Then the global forces and rich country impacts coincide with and supplement internal development efforts. Finally, just as some boats are better than others with respect to resourcefulness, navigability, and stability, so some countries, owing to such things as natural endowments, democratic governance, and human and social “capital,” develop further and faster than others.

The moral of this nautical story is clear: Just as the national development efforts vary and from time to time and place to place, so do the impacts of the global order and the rich countries that dominate this order. USAID, of course, is situated in a political context in which it must sail, and its policies often may reinforce – unintentionally – global inequalities and well as sometimes purposively reduce them. While

public reason is crucial, for it characterizes such citizens’ reasoning concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice” (Rawls 1999, 138-39).

³² The most important source for case studies and ethical assessments of deliberative democracy in both developing and developed countries, is Fung and Wright 2003.

³³ Beitz 2001, 113.

³⁴ Pogge 2002, 15, 21, 112-16, 141-45.

the wind is always a factor in sailing (sometimes more, sometimes less, sometimes good, sometimes bad, often both), so is the skill of the captain and crew (and their ability to work together). Empirical investigation is important to determine which way and how hard the wind is blowing and how best to use national skills and resources to reach a society's destination. Pogge recognizes the variability of internal factors; in his less careful formulations, he fails to recognize the variability and complexity of external factors, the changing balance between external and internal factors, and the always important and sometimes crucial role of internal factors.

Is it up to developing national and local communities to seize the good and avoid the bad of a globalizing world? Or should the main "agents of justice" be the rich nations, transnational corporations, and global institutions? We agree with Stiglitz and contend that "today, the challenge is to get the balance right . . . between collective action at the local, national, and global levels" (Stiglitz 2003, xii). USAID can and should reduce the negative effects of its initiatives on developing countries; it also can and should increase its positive actions and their beneficial consequences for the lives of human beings. One way it can do so is to promote – more robustly than it does at present – "free and sustainable agency" (Sen 1999, 11) in developing countries and their citizens. Another way is to deploy development ethics in continually assessing and reassessing development principles, objectives, processes, and tactics.

PART II: DEVELOPMENT ETHICS AND USAID

INTRODUCTION

In Part I of this study, we introduced and described the field of development ethics. Development ethics, we contended, is a multidisciplinary field – now well established and already influential – in which theorists and practitioners carry out ethical reflection on the ends and means of local, national and global development. The argument of Part I is that a structured approach to values and normative concerns strengthens USAID as an institution, enabling it to realize more fully its stated mission.

Many USAID staff members, and many within the larger community of stakeholders in development, already recognize the desirability of addressing normative dimensions of alleviating poverty, stimulating economic growth, promoting democracy, and building global peace. The committed development practitioner or policy specialist at USAID will gain much from the explicit analytical frameworks and mode of thinking offered by development ethics, particularly when such reflection is firmly rooted in and informed by development practice. This study argues that the opportunity now exists to establish a fruitful relationship between USAID and development ethics. The question, however, is *how* to make specific USAID interventions – in design, implementation, and assessment of policies, programs, and projects – more effective in furthering the goal of transformational development by incorporating an overt, robust normative component.

In answering this question, Part II of this study considers a USAID normative perspective both at the policy level, and at the concrete level of a typical intervention. Regarding policy, Part II examines the recently articulated USAID core operational goal of transformational development. With respect to typical democracy and governance interventions, Part II then reviews the standard Democracy and Governance Assessment (DGA Framework), and suggests how an explicitly normative component would add value to that form of country-based analysis.

THE “TOOLKIT” OF DEVELOPMENT ETHICS

What does a “development ethics application” look like? When moving from a general consideration of the resources offered by the rich literature of theories and concepts within development ethics, as described in Part I, to a more focused review of practical avenues for applying these resources, one might ask whether in fact some general normative framework already exists within USAID. Is such a framework or “tool” ready to be applied to a multitude of development challenges, thereby generating important insights and guidance? Or if no inclusive and comprehensive framework exists, are there specific analytical tools readily available, “off the shelf”?

Although development ethics offers many moral theories and approaches that might guide USAID policy, practice, and assessment, development ethics is not a set of recipes and can’t be reduced to checklists (although such lists may have a role). Development ethics, rather, is a way of thinking about development, and ultimately a way of living. There are as yet no “tools” or specific analytical frameworks in the field of development ethics that have been applied directly to USAID’s needs. That work remains to be done, ideally in close collaboration with development ethicists, USAID policy makers, and with the intended users and beneficiaries of such tools and frameworks. Although specific USAID application tools are currently absent, the general practice of normative ethical analysis applies a variety of approaches (sometimes complimentary, sometimes not) to evaluate development goals, strategies, and

tactics. These normative resources, as we saw in Part I, range from 1) general, systemic and process-oriented assessments to 2) highly detailed assessments based on one (or more) specific moral theory (e.g. utilitarianism, Kantianism, the capability approach, virtue ethics, human rights moral theory, feminist ethics, and so on).

An example of the former is the four-level evaluative process crafted by a pioneer of development ethics, Denis Goulet;³⁵

- (1) Determination (including clarification and defense) of the most general and fundamental ends of development,³⁶
- (2) Establishment of criteria for specifying when these ends have been achieved or already exist,
- (3) Formulation of strategies (adoption of the most efficient and morally permissible package of means to achieve important ends), and
- (4) Consideration of individual means.

Goulet's framework moves us closer to a normative determination of when and where (genuine) development has occurred. It challenges the analyst to ascertain when and whether real progress is being made, and how one should assess the quality, effectiveness and ethical appropriateness of development strategies, policies, or interventions.

Clearly Goulet's second step or level – establishing the criteria and indicators for specifying basic development goals – depends in part upon a process of discernment and ethical reflection. This, in turn, must be based upon the application of norms and moral values. How does one select and justify the choice of moral values, among many competing moral theories?³⁷ Although this question raises some fundamental divisions of thought within development ethics, we argued in Part I that a strong argument exists for seeking a cross-cultural consensus in which a society's own freedom to make development choices is one among a plurality of fundamental norms and in which these norms are of sufficient generality so as not only to permit but also to require sensitivity to societal differences.³⁸

Returning to Goulet's four-levels concept of moral analysis, level three pertains to the formulation of strategies or sets of means designed to achieve development ends. Strategies are the means by which to achieve and sustain development goals. This means-ends thinking is closely related to the theory-practice relationship, since not only does development ethics formulate and defend certain ethical principles and goals for development but it also can be viewed as an essential strategy for achieving – in morally permissible ways – what one takes to be the desirable objectives of development.

Goulet identifies the fourth or most concrete level of moral analysis within development ethics as the consideration and choice of individual means (within sets of means). This disaggregation may be problematic in the context of development, where most means are closely interrelated and interdependent.

³⁵ Goulet 1995, 11-14.

³⁶ Goulet assigns less than adequate importance to this level, arguing that a broad consensus already exists on the general conceptions. Crocker argues to the contrary; in his view first level work has an important role to play in development ethics (Crocker, forthcoming).

³⁷ The choice of which specific norms and moral values to apply, as articulated and structured within competing moral theories, presents differing and powerful analytical opportunities. Part I included brief comparisons of some of these moral theories, considered ways in which they might learn from each other, and discussed the process of democratic deliberation as one way to resolve conflicts among moral outlooks.

³⁸ Crocker, 2002; and above.

Nevertheless, there is certainly scope for targeted ethical reflection on specific critical “means,” such as specific programs or tactics to achieve or protect decent standards of employment, equitable access to development resources, local empowerment³⁹ for decision-making, conflict management and prevention, the stabilization of fragile states, and so forth.

Goulet’s framework is but one approach. As we described above, the Nobel Laureate economist Amartya Sen also moved the analysis of development into the moral sphere when he argued that economic growth is not the fundamental “end” of development but is at best (and not always) a good “means.” Development, Sen argues, should be conceived and evaluated as a process of expanding the real or substantive freedoms that people have reason to enjoy.⁴⁰ Since its inception in 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in which Sen was and continues to be a major influence, also frames its view of development in relation to the goal of increasing freedoms,⁴¹ of which it lists seven:

- 1) Freedom from discrimination,
- 2) Freedom from want,
- 3) Freedom to develop and realize one’s human potential,
- 4) Freedom from fear,
- 5) Freedom from injustice,
- 6) Freedom of thought and speech and participation, and
- 7) Freedom for decent work (UNDP 2000, 1).

Although there is no existing USAID consensus on standard sets of indicators that can be used to carry out a normative analysis on the basis of these seven or similar types of freedoms, there are many candidates that can be developed for each category.

TRANSFORMATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

USAID’s recently released White Paper⁴² has attempted to bring some conceptual clarity to what many people perceived to be a plethora of inadequately defined (and overly numerous) goals for this institution. While it is beyond the scope of this study to offer a commentary on all five core operational goals listed in the White Paper, this study will examine the goal of “Transformational Development”.

As defined by USAID, “‘transformational’ development is development that not only raises living standards and reduces poverty, but also transforms countries through far-reaching, fundamental changes in institutional capacity, human capacity, and economic structure” (USAID 2005).

³⁹ As Sen argues (Sen 1999), something can be both an end and a means. Local empowerment is both. It is an important goal to be achieved, an adequate level of individual capability and communal agency. As such, means must be found to reach and sustain this goal, and these means may differ from locale to locale. Local empowerment is also itself a means to the achievement of other important goals, such as poverty alleviation and national accountability.

⁴⁰ See Sen 1999, 3.

⁴¹ Sen clarifies and argues for each one of these as well as for the moral space of freedoms, which in his more technical vocabulary he calls agency and capability (Sen 1999, 74 – 76). Consistent with UNDP’s recent publications and Sen’s basic commitments would be a sort of “meta” or foundational freedom: the freedom to decide the items on this list, their meaning, prioritization, and implementation.

⁴² <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/pdabz3221.pdf#search='USAID,%20White%20Paper'>.

At the center of this concept is an awareness that the transformation of any society to a more developed level depends on the quality of that society's leadership – the political will to pursue what is called “good governance.”⁴³

We contend that evaluating the political will of any society's leadership to pursue a “good governance” agenda is an exercise in ethical thinking as well as one informed by sobering empirical evidence. For example, the amount of money stolen by unscrupulous and corrupt African leaders (public and private sector) and now held in foreign bank accounts is equivalent to more than half of Africa's external debt.⁴⁴ Yet, an overemphasis on corruption may detract attention from its deep causes, such as widespread poverty and a culture of impunity, and its likely solutions, a deeper and more inclusive democracy.

Is it possible for a country's citizens (and their USAID partners) to hold leaders accountable? When viewed through the lens of the UNDP's human rights-based development approach, for example, the morally and legally legitimized human rights claims associated with development, with the seven essential freedoms mentioned above, are considered morally obligatory and not simply as optionally or instrumentally good.⁴⁵ Leaders and citizens have a moral duty to attend to these obligations and to demonstrate consistent progress towards their satisfaction. These claims *ought* to be fulfilled; they call forth moral motivation and demand action – action for which political leadership *ought* to be accountable. From the perspective of human rights-based moral theory, it would be morally wrong – and inconsistent with one's commitment to respect human dignity – not to do what is morally obligatory. It would be reasonable, therefore, to establish a metric under which the commitments and performance of political leadership fulfill these obligations. In turn, this measure of good governance should be applied to citizens and their enterprises. Rather than uncritically assuming that leaders (and their “agents”) are only motivated by a self-interest that must be curbed, USAID and its national partners should nurture and support commitments to public service, honesty and openness.

Virtue ethics offers a similar lens through which to evaluate the political will of any given leader or group of leaders. Unlike other moral theories, virtue ethics focuses not on actions, but on character. Being accountable and taking responsibility for one's self-interested and other-directed desires are attributes or virtues of character, and the self-development and exercise of these character traits are what constitutes the good and meaningful life. In other words, virtue ethicists do not see cultivating a virtuous character merely as a means to the good life – developing these virtues also *constitutes* the good life and the life of public service. If a dialogue can be fostered within a society that encourages the public to articulate their common expectations of the desired character or virtues of their leaders, standards could be established to measure public performance.

What do these points mean for the issue of political will? Good character in leadership – civic virtue – is not simply the absence of bad desires or evil actions. Nor is it the fortuitous occurrence of wholesome habits or a benign personality. Instead, character formation is a matter of intentional self-development and

⁴³ “Good governance” is understood by USAID as ruling justly, promoting economic freedom, and making sound investments in people, evidenced by actual policies and institutional performance. See DGA Framework 23-26.

⁴⁴ See the recently released report, Commission for Africa 2005. Patrick Wintour (Wintour 2005) of *The Guardian* noted that the *Report* “is designed to rouse moral indignation across the west, but also respond to the anger within Africa at the behaviour of some of its ‘kleptocratic leaders’” (Wintour 2005).

⁴⁵ The UNDP's human rights approach (UNDP 2000) exhorts national and local governments – and by implication their governmental leaders – as well as civil society and private sector leaders, to attend to many weighty moral demands. Under the UNDP approach, these include the duty to strengthen social arrangements for securing human freedoms (norms, institutions, legal frameworks, enabling economic environment); the duty to create inclusive and accountable democracy; the duty to eradicate poverty (capability poverty as well as income poverty); and the duty to promote transparency and accountability.

of purposive social promotion and civic education. Nurturing and sustaining good character by a political leader is a difficult and on-going process, and – once public expectations are raised regarding civic virtue – it is a process that will be exposed to on-going public scrutiny. Most importantly for leaders, character formation ultimately depends on the ability to recognize the ethical dimensions of situations as well as on the desire to respond accountably to such ethical challenges. Just as governmental legitimacy is a function of democratic processes and human freedoms, so – as Václav Havel, Nelson Mandela, and Oscar Arias show – public leadership depends on moral commitment and integrity.

In a society, such as ours, that places great value on the exercise of individual freedoms, the Aristotelian notion that the government ought also to create the enabling environment for the virtuous life and cultivate a virtuous citizenry – this notion may seem anachronistic. Yet many virtues ground personal freedoms: tolerance, respect for universal moral equality, temperance, generosity, liberality, magnanimity, mercy, wisdom, and justice, to name but a few. In the context of transformational development, it is the quality of governance that must be transformed. This transformation contributes to and in turn is dependent not only on the motivation – the political will – of its leaders but also on the expectations of the public with respect to the civic virtue of those in positions of public trust and authority. Those expectations must be transformed not only by holding corrupt leaders and corrupt institutions accountable for past betrayals of public trust but also by insisting on high standards for those who seek public office and who lead public institutions. Transformational development must constrain and sanction corruption. The other side of corruption is integrity, and in contrast to the assumptions of much of institutional economics, a transformational development informed by development ethics would also seek out and celebrate examples of public integrity in its leaders and in its institutions.

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT

USAID’s Center for Democracy and Governance (“DG Office”) exists in large part to assist USAID field missions in the design and implementation of effective programs – sensitive to the particular context of each country – that will strengthen democracy and good governance. To accomplish this, the DG Office developed in 2000 a specific strategic assessment framework, referred to and cited earlier (DGA Framework), to help each mission assess and improve democracy in particular countries.

The DGA Framework was formulated out of coordinated input from the disciplines of comparative political science, political sociology and political anthropology, political economy, and institutional analysis. It assumes that a consensus exists on the meaning of democracy, and it briefly lists (but fails to defend) some democracy-defining criteria: “ordered liberty,” open competition, the rule of law, inclusion (including respect for pluralism and minority rights) and good governance. Comparing democracy to a “political game”; the assessment methodology moves on to describe the dynamics of political games that occur in a given country as part of the normal process of consolidation of democracy. Analysts are tasked to identify and analyze – from a minimalist democratic perspective – what are the structural features of the country’s political game and what issues are confronting the country in its transition to democracy.

Although the DGA Framework refers to characteristics of democracy, it offers as settled what is in fact a highly contested definition of democracy itself, namely, open competition – through free and open elections – of candidates, power factions, and ideas (DGA Framework, 13). It affirms, without argument, distressingly thin ideals of good governance and solely minimalist democratic principles (DGA Framework, 23-25). Its stress, as we argued in Part I, is on competition for power and not deliberation as a process for forging consensus about public policies and the common good. We believe that superior normative and empirically informed conceptions of democracy are available.

Consider the views of Africans when asked about democracy. In a survey of over 21,000 respondents in 10 countries, the largest group (38%) associated democracy with civil liberties. After that, responses were

less clear: 22% had mixed views, 14% viewed democracy as government by the people, 9% as electoral choice, 7% as peace and unity, 6% as equality and justice, and 4% as socioeconomic development.⁴⁶ Even the variety of responses raises more questions – for example, what specific civil liberties did the largest group have in mind? Should USAID be making an effort to establish which civil liberties the people of Africa value the most, and should USAID evaluate the consolidation of their democracies on that basis? What should “government by the people” mean and how is it morally different from government by guardians (Plato) or experts, who have won competitive elections?

Defining terms such as *democracy* is a common starting point in analysis, but neither the concerns of purists nor demanding academic protocols drive the kind of analysis envisioned by the DGA Framework. The priority is to assist DG officers at USAID missions to perform the analysis in an efficient and timely manner (three weeks, typically); the report acknowledges that some tradeoffs and shortcuts are inevitable.

We provisionally accept these constraints but offer an assessment – not an unrealistic or utopian standard of analysis – that insists on results sufficiently robust to guide design and implementation of country-specific programs to foster and strengthen democracy. Instead of offering a point-by-point critique of the DGA Framework, which has considerable utility as an analytic tool, our comments make specific recommendations based on a more adequate view of democratization and development. These comments and recommendations should be read as friendly modifications of the Framework. Our aim is to enable the DGA Framework to assess and encourage broader and more deliberative citizen participation in deciding the ends and means of national and local development. Already the DGA Framework is valuable in directing assessors to (1) describe the features of a particular country or locale and (2) take into account USAID’s interests and constraints. The DGA Framework, however, requires supplementation to highlight the dimensions of values and citizen participation: the extent to which current policies and future options reduce both poverty and inequality and the extent to which decision making processes are inclusive and deliberative.

The DGA Framework urges assessors to characterize the status quo to identify the agents driving change; it does not challenge assessors or the nation’s citizens to deliberate about ethically defensible ends or ethically justified processes to attain such ends. In leaving these questions both unasked and unanswered, it permits unexamined biases to prevail or the status quo to rule (or both).

The DGA Framework consists of four inter-related but distinct stages of inquiry, all but the last of which we address in the same order:

- 1) Characteristics of the Political System: consensus, rule of law, competition, inclusion, and good governance
- 2) Identification of Key Actors: proponents, allies, and opponents of democratic reform
- 3) Institutions: the legal arena, the competitive arena (both competing parties and competing branches of government), governance (including the legislative arena), and civil society
- 4) Implementation (in relation to USAID’s interests and constraints).⁴⁷

In establishing the characteristics of any given country and its politics, the USAID analyst is encouraged to locate that country on a rather conventional continuum of archetypal regime types: totalitarian,

⁴⁶ See <http://www.afrobarometer.org/TableAttitudesDemocracy.pdf>.

⁴⁷ The normative ethical analysis of implementation is highly dependent on specific factors of the project, and hence is not addressed in this Study.

authoritarian, and democratic regimes (DGA Framework).⁴⁸ The DGA Framework offers a short list of five elements for this first stage of analysis: consensus, rule of law, competition, inclusion, and good governance. Each of these elements has clear normative dimensions. What is of interest to the development ethicist is not only the adequacy of the normative content of each element evaluated, but also who is doing this evaluation, and how. The DGA Framework isn't clear on these important aspects. Is there an appropriate role for involving local citizens and other stakeholders in the identification of problems (and opportunities) confronting their own democracy and in the forging of an answer to these challenges?⁴⁹ How should the USAID official (or a USAID consultant) view his or her role as an "outsider" in this analysis? If both "insiders" and "outsiders" are involved in the application of the DGA Framework in stage one, as they ought to be, how is this relationship best structured? What are the benefits and drawbacks – the moral perspectives as well as the technical expertise – that the "insider" and the "outsider" each brings to this task?⁵⁰

Considering "consensus," the first of the five constituent elements of stage one, the DGA Framework notes that there must be a consensus about "certain fundamentals" and "basic rules" if there is to be political legitimacy and stability (both being prerequisites for a healthy democracy). These fundamentals and rules are further primarily explained in relation to "social boundaries" – who is "in" and who is "out" and under what terms. From a moral perspective, everyone in a society is "in" if we assume the fundamental moral equality of all human beings. If approached from this vantage point, the analysis might best be directed to the quality (or lack thereof) of different forms of democratic participation, including deliberation, offered to citizens and other residents, whether permanent or temporary. Is there even a consensus on how to achieve a moral consensus on what the operative values are to be in any given society?

Also under the rubric of *consensus*, the DGA Framework raises many important normative queries about state legitimacy and the relationship (obligations, accountability, sources of decision-making authority, and so forth) between the state, civil society, and the individual. Although it argues that the ordered competition that underpins the democratic process depends on the widespread respect for legal rights and rules, it fails to advise the analyst to examine to what extent, if any, an adequate values-based dialogue and broad-based public discussion exists within the country under study. Such public discussion is the basis for grounding, prioritizing, and implementing rights and rules. What Sen says about public policy in general also applies to development policies – those of the donor as well as the recipient nation:

Public policy has a role not only in attempting to implement the priorities that emerge from social values and affirmations, but also in facilitating and guaranteeing fuller public discussion. The reach and quality of open discussions can be helped by a variety of public policies, such as press freedom and media independence (including the absence of censorship, expansion of basic education and schooling (including female education), enhancement of economic independence (especially through employment, including female employment) and other social and economic changes that help individuals to be participating citizens. Central to this approach is the idea of the public as an active

⁴⁸ A valuable empirical and normative exercise for USAID discussion would be to assess the strengths and weaknesses of this three-fold classificatory scheme with Thomas Carothers's alternative scheme: autocracies, "dominant-power systems," "feckless-pluralist systems," and liberal democracy. To Carothers's scheme, we would add "deliberative and inclusive democracy." See Carothers 2002, especially, chaps. 14 and 15.

⁴⁹ The DGA Framework does describe the typical three person analysis team as including one person who "should know the country very well". It is not clear, however, whether this person with local knowledge is a citizen of the country studied and an insider informed by local values, networks, and perspectives.

⁵⁰ For a moral argument of the merits and dangers of both insiders and outsiders in cross-cultural development ethics and cultural criticism, see Crocker 1991a.

participant in change, rather than a passive and docile recipient of instructions or of dispensed assistance (Sen 1999, 281).

The DGA Framework correctly enjoins USAID assessors to identify the *content* of a nation's consensus. In addition assessors should attend, through dialogue with social insiders, to the role of "participating citizens" in the process of consensus-building.

Turning to *rule of law*, the DGA Framework appropriately contends that: "any analysis of the rule of law must begin with a review of the country's human rights record" (DGA Framework, 16). We agree. More generally, the framework asks the right general questions about human security, the morally legitimate use of force, and the existence of guaranties of personal freedom. The DGA Framework, however, is vague about how much is enough and who should decide. Development ethics would bring valuable assets to this part of the analysis. It would consider, for example, the concept of "imperfect duties"⁵¹ with respect to human rights, and how to balance demands for different and sometimes conflicting rights (whether moral or legal rights). How should the rights to subsistence or due process be weighed against the right to security? How should a society balance the need to hold past human rights violators accountable with the need to promote reconciliation in situations where fragile but well-intentioned regimes take over from powerful but corrupt former regimes? Complying with "the rule of law" is only one of a plurality of morally urgent norms in countries seeking to produce "transitional justice."⁵²

Competition, the DGA Framework argues, is the "irreducible, unequivocal essence of democracy and popular sovereignty" (DGA Framework, 18). The framework describes the important role of political competition in balancing power and weighing ideas, in testing and enforcing popular sovereignty, and in holding valid elections; and the framework affirms the philosophical basis for popular sovereignty. The framework also embraces economic competition as the chief means in bringing about the just distribution of economic opportunities and resources. From a moral perspective, competition may issue in just distribution, but competition is not synonymous with nor does it guarantee justice. Market forces only yield justice when they are constrained and corrected by democratically determined policies and institutions. Most ethicists would question to what extent, if any, economic competition (with or without governmental regulation) is causing significant harm to others (putting your economic competitor out of business, in the absence of any job retraining or other social safety net) or exploiting others (making huge profits on the labor of disempowered workers). Competition is only permissible from a moral perspective if some form of compensation is offered to "losers," keeping them from falling "too low", and only if there are measures to prevent situations in which the minority (or even a majority) benefits from a system that generates a regular supply of exploited, harmed people. More basically, the virtues of competition in economic and political matters need to be balanced by the values of fairness, reciprocity and mutuality as manifested through a rights-based and democratic polity. Just as the National Football League teams with the worst won-lost records, pick first in the annual draft of college players, so a fair society enables losers to have a fair chance to be winners.

⁵¹ The concept of *imperfect duties* was articulated first by Immanuel Kant and recently championed by Amartya Sen (United Nations Development Programme 2000, 16), (Sen 1999, 230). A perfect duty specifies both how the duty is to be performed, to whom it is owed, and that it must be satisfied now. By contrast, the concept of imperfect duties – for example, in the context of human rights – argues only that the entitlements arising from human rights claims would be *good* for people to have, and *ought* to be provided at some time or other (when conditions are – or can be made to be – appropriate). The *imperfect duties* concept acknowledges the reality that satisfying human rights based claims may be impossible under current conditions, but it still allows for the assignment of those duties. This assignment places a moral obligation on the associated institutions of society constantly to demonstrate progress in the discharge of duties imposed by recognized human rights, and to maintain this as a priority in policy formulation.

⁵² For a discussion of transitional justice, see Crocker 1999, 2002.

The DGA Framework next considers *inclusion* – preventing practices that exclude segments of the population. The Framework stresses the importance of the full rights of public participation, but acknowledges that participation is often constrained or frustrated by the impact of poverty, public apathy, and the tendency of elites to limit participation only to others within the elite. The DGA Framework notes that popular participation can present a destabilizing threat to elite interests. It also tasks the analyst to consider whether barriers to participation exist, but does little to identify what those barriers might be. For example, the presence of certain empirical facts can undermine normative ideals of participation. Some people simply are better able than others to articulate their views and arguments in rational, reasonable terms – due to education, poverty, prejudice and privilege. Some people are less likely than others to be listened to, and some people are more likely than others to be heard. We agree that in situations where participation is adversely affected by gross inequalities in power and status, using a participatory forum to call for compromise may risk suppressing the concerns of marginalized groups.⁵³

We believe, however, that the DGA Framework’s view of inclusion is inadequate for two reasons. First, its emphasis on the right to participation (rather than the responsible cultivation of and duty to exercise that right) fails to recognize the importance of citizen voice and agency and the role of government action, civic education, and participatory activities themselves in nurturing that voice and agency.

Second, the solution to defects in democracy and deliberation is not less democracy but more and better democracy. The potential for democracy’s reducing political and economic inequality is even greater when a society – in the light of a firm grasp of democratic values – moves beyond formal or minimalist democracy defended by the DGA Framework to deepen and broaden its democratic institutions. The cure, then, for the deficiencies of democracy is not some non-democratic system but more and better democracy. John Dewey expressed it extremely well in 1927:

We object to the common supposition of the foes of existing democratic government that the accusations against it touch the social and moral aspirations and ideas which underlie the political forms. The old saying that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy is not apt if it means that the evils may be remedied by introducing more machinery of the same kind as that which already exists, or by refining and perfecting that machinery. But the phrase may also indicate the need of returning to the idea itself, of clarifying and deepening our apprehension of it, and of employing our sense of its meaning to criticize and re-make its political manifestations (Dewey 1927).

The theory and practice of deliberative democracy is precisely an attempt to rethink the ideal and institutions of “rule by the people.” We need not assume that moral and political equality must be fully attainable or completely in place before roughly free and equal group members can engage in injustice-reducing deliberation. In spite of political and economic inequalities, with the help of what Fung and Wright call “self-conscious intentional design efforts”,⁵⁴ such as training in public speaking and reason giving, people *in and through* the deliberative process itself may reduce their differences and promote justice as they together forge answers to practical problems. In deliberative venues as “schools of democracy,” they may learn (to deliberate and promote justice) by doing (deliberating justly).⁵⁵ Gianpaolo Baiocchi submits evidence that one of the important experiments in deliberative democracy, that of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, has had the outcome of reducing member inequalities and the occurrence of domination:

⁵³ For a detailed discussion of some drawbacks of deliberative participation, see Sanders 1997.

⁵⁴ Fung and Wright 2003, 23.

⁵⁵ Compare Fung and Wright 2003, 28, 32; Baiocchi 2003, 56-58; Drèze and Sen 2002, 362-63.

Despite significant inequalities among citizens, the didactic features of the [Porto Alegre] experiment have succeeded in large part in offsetting these potentials for domination. This confirms the expectations of democratic theorists who, while assuming that persons may come to deliberative settings with certain inequalities, expect that over time participation will offset them (Baiocchi 2003, 52).

The Porto Alegre experiment also shows that the participatory budgetary exercise itself has been “highly redistributive” (Baiocchi 2003, 67), contributing to the conditions that in turn help enable deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy often results in the bringing about of conditions that in turn contribute to more egalitarian distribution and deliberation. This point reinforces and gives empirical support to Drèze and Sen’s point that there is a “virtuous circle” of “achieving greater equity,” on the one hand, and citizen participation or “democratic practice,” on the other: “A reduction of inequality both contributes to democratic practice and is strengthened by successful practice of democratic freedoms” (Dreze and Sen 2002, 357). The conditions for deliberative democracy can be built through the practice of such democracy.

Finally, the DGA Framework in stage one urges the analyst to consider what appears to be a strongly normative notion: *good* governance. Oddly, this section begins by casting a cynical glance at what philosophy and ethics might bring to assessment: “Democracy is a form of governance, not a philosophy club” (DGA Framework 23). Although the intention of the text is clearly to focus the reader and the analyst on how well democracy produces measurable results (“delivers the goods”), the “good” in “good governance” remains a striking, although poorly articulated, dimension. The ethicist will ask: *Who* defines that “good?” Are the “goods” really good? *How much* “good” is good enough (for those that really need it)? *How fairly* is the good distributed? The ethicist will also contest the framework’s contention that “a few authoritarian regimes have also delivered good governance” (DGA Framework 25), for authoritarian regimes constrain the many and substantive freedoms that a good government is morally obliged to nurture and respect. Moreover, Mortin H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein, in their recent and important *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*, have presented massive evidence and compelling argumentation that overturns conventional wisdoms that authoritarian regimes typically do better in “delivering the goods” than do democratic regimes (Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein 2004). When poor democracies and democratizers are compared with autocracies and democratic backsliders at the same economic levels, the former do at least as well as and usually better than the latter with respect to both rates of growth and human development scores. A similar democratic advantage exists when rich democracies and rich autocracies are compared. Even if “delivering the goods” were an adequate measure of development success and good governance, USAID should resist lingering justifications for an authoritarian advantage

In stage one – the analysis of a political system – the DGA Framework gives considerable space to an overview of regime types, and particularly the traits and dynamics (democratization and political change, liberalization, transition, consolidation) of democratic regimes. The emphasis remains on how democracies perform according to these narrow and incomplete criteria and not in relation to more comprehensive ideals, principles, and public values foundational to deeper and more participatory conceptions of democracy. Judging the security and consolidation of a democracy on the basis of social and economic factors alone (minimum standards of living, middle class values and lifestyles, low to moderate levels of social inequality, relatively strong educational standards, and modest ethnic and religious tensions) is incomplete, without an evaluation of the quality of public agency and political participation, the strength of operative principles of universal moral equality, or the political and social commitment of all citizens to respect human dignity, democratic ideals, and civic virtues. In the United States, we honor these principles and consider them fundamental to our democracy. Why should a different standard apply as we consider democracy in other countries? As noted by Thomas Jefferson:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain Unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.⁵⁶

Stages two and three of the framework are concerned with a largely empirical analysis of the actors – the stakeholders and players – who make democracy possible, sustainable and healthy. These actors are both individuals and institutions, and as the framework describes, they are all players in the game of politics. It is often assumed that self-interested quests for raw power drive politics as well as economics. In this quest, power – which at first appears to be a mere means to other goals – becomes the end of political action. The DGA Framework suggests, however, that actors may be motivated to acquire power so that it can be applied as a means to the achievement of a public policy rather than a personal agenda. One expects, then, that the DGA Framework will propose or open up discussion of ethically justified development goals. Unfortunately, we are disappointed to find that such a larger vision is not even mentioned let alone elucidated or defended. Instead, the DGA Framework – reverting to the assumptions of neo-classical economics – suggests that the dominant motive of political players is acquisition of power – power as an end in itself. Development ethics identifies and challenges this assumption. For example, it shows that abundant empirical evidence exists for the ethical intentions and complex motivations of many political officials and citizens, including their commitment to self-determining agency.⁵⁷ The further objectives of any proposed political agenda must be clearly specified. Bringing clarity to the ends for which means are to be selected and evaluating the motives and actions of actors is essential if there is to be any clarity in linking and validating the means that outside donors and government officials propose and which stakeholders deliberate and decide.

The analogy to zero-sum games is carried further in stages two and three, as the DGA Framework challenges assessors to discern the particular rules under which the local political environment operates. Development ethicists would also want to get clear on these rules, but less from the standpoint of accepting the status quo and more from the standpoint of the justice of the power balance and the fairness of the rules that inform social choice and, especially, the opportunities offered losers.

Interests drive actors (who may be individuals or institutions) in the game of politics, but these agents may also be informed by rationally scrutinized principle and character. The framework makes no room for this form of virtuous or reasonable motivation, only for a fortuitous convergence of an actor's self-regarding interests with some larger agenda of democratic reform. The analyst should make room, however, for the possibility that actors are not (always) what Sen calls "rational fools" (Sen 1977) but are often motivated by, and act from, a principled and "virtuous" public position.

When the DGA Framework examines the dynamics of institutions within the political game (stage three), there is once again an absence of any consideration of principles or ideals shaping behavior, other than in the form of legal rules. Clearly such rules have an important role. Ethical codes of conduct (which the DGA Framework doesn't mention, but of which the analyst should be aware in important institutions) are one important form of such rules. Yet rules without motivation are of questionable efficacy. Where would this motivation come from? One source is the participation in forging the rules by those who will live under them. Extending an insight of the beleaguered president of Harvard University, Lawrence Summers, no one ever washed a rented car.

Without principled leadership, the effectiveness of rules to constrain or even sanction undesirable behavior is questionable. Development ethicists will examine an institution by first seeking evidence of

⁵⁶ http://www.archives.gov/national_archives_experience/charters/declaration_transcript.html.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Mansbridge 1990.

any articulated ideals or principles (mission statements or corporate visions), and then – through interviews, focus groups, or deliberative bodies – testing the impact of such ideals or principles on the shaping of the corporate ethos and behavior of the institution and those within it. Does an institution condition behavior by the example of virtuous, caring leadership? Are its rules consistent with the values of that institution? Are these rules fair (defined how?), and are they fairly applied (measured how?)? Although the DGA Framework makes reference to the Rawlsian device of rule making “behind the veil [of ignorance]” in which politicians make decisions on rules in ignorance of their position within the institutional and political power game, rules must also have two other characteristics to be effective. First, they must accord with the values – and hence the motivations – of those to whom they apply. Second, those living and working under the rules must be ethically aware and have a role in fashioning the rules, so that they perceive ethical dilemmas when they arise, know which rules to use to guide them to a morally permissible solution to the dilemma, and have an allegiance to the rules. This level of ethical awareness often requires a sustainable and ongoing process of ethics training and democratic participation within any institution, and the analyst will want to inquire regarding these opportunities.

The DGA Framework argues that analysts, when carrying out the assessment, should consider four aspects of governance: authority, transparency, accountability, and capacity to be effective. From a development ethics perspective, this is a list about means only, and not ends (or at least not about determinant ends). Important normative questions ought to be asked. From whom ought the government derive its power, and to whom ought it to be accountable? Why should the government be “transparent”? What are the expectations citizens should have with respect to elected and appointed officials and how ought the government to respond to these expectations? What does “effective” mean when the mission and purpose of a government institution has not been articulated? Effective at what, why, and in whose interests? Is the key to safeguarding democracy and liberty simply a question of balance among institutions and the way the political game’s rules have been written, or is there also room for exploring whether institutions and governments understand and clearly espouse the values implicit in the ideals of democracy and liberty?

CONCLUSIONS

USAID’s model of democracy and good governance is, we contend, ethically incomplete. It overemphasizes a pre-existing constitutional or social consensus on fundamentals, but fails adequately to advocate broad-based deliberative participation in forging consensus. USAID endorses rule of law, including fundamental human rights, but does not appreciate that the “right of rights” is citizen deliberation and agency. USAID highlights that democracy requires a competition about ideas and public policy as well as public offices but fails to affirm the value of reciprocity in the give and take of deliberation, respect for minority views, and the making of compromises. USAID urges formal and informal inclusion of all parts of the population yet too easily acquiesces to citizen apathy and expresses little commitment to facilitating greater civic awareness and removing obstacles to citizen participation. USAID unfortunately narrows “good governance” to the governments and bureaucrats efficiently “delivering the goods” to needy citizens rather than grasping the moral idea that governments are citizens acting directly or indirectly together to reduce if not resolve their problems. USAID also adopts the view that persons are motivated almost entirely out of self-interest, and that many persons – unless constrained by sanctions and oversight – will act corruptly. Not discussed is the alternative of encouraging, recognizing, and celebrating persons (officials and citizens) who demonstrate a personal commitment to integrity and public service or who simply are moved by and act from deep compassion for those less fortunate.

The DGA Framework does raise many important questions that an external assessor – in dialogue with developing country citizens – should raise. What we have done in this study is to illustrate additional

ethical questions that can and should be part and parcel of a full assessment. Our proposal can be generalized from DG assessments to the importance of ethical assessments of process and outcomes – development ethics based thinking – in all USAID programs and policies. Development ethics has a role to play in policy formation as well as in program design, implementation, and performance assessment.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES

How should USAID begin to apply development ethics to its thinking and its operations? In DGA work, which we use as an illustrative example, several options exist. These assessments, like others in USAID, would incorporate evaluative tools and diagnostic methodologies rooted in development ethics and tailored to USAID policy and programmatic needs.

We propose the following innovations:

1) Incorporate an ethical lens within the DGA Framework and include a development ethicist in the preparation of at least one DGA.

Normative ethical analysis should become an integral component of any democracy and governance assessment and of other standard forms of USAID assessments (conflict, gender, environmental, etc.). Such assessments should not be considered as merely a cosmetic add-on or a separate method to be kept in reserve on the shelf. Rather, it should be incorporated as an integral dimension of the current DGA Framework and similar manuals. To demonstrate concretely the value that development ethicists might add, we propose that USAID include a development ethicist in one or more upcoming DGA and/or other USAID assessments. The resulting report(s), guided by a revised and ethically enriched DGA Framework, would function as a case study enabling future analysts – without formal training in ethics – to address important normative concerns.

2) Facilitate a two-stage USAID workshop on development values and the identification and resolution of ethical dilemmas.

The first stage – Day One of this two-day workshop – would seek to facilitate USAID professionals in identifying ethical quandaries that emerge in their own work and experience. In the second stage, Day Two, development ethicists would facilitate USAID professionals in deliberatively resolving the most interesting and urgent dilemmas previously identified.

3) Facilitate a “Friday Morning Group”

Many, and probably most, individual USAID officers are motivated by a strong personal commitment to forward the ethical aims of global development and poverty alleviation. What they lack is an ongoing forum in which they can share their concerns, explore their common values, improve their ability to do ethical analysis, and support each other as they respond to the daunting challenges implicit in their work. The World Bank, whose staff shares a similar motivational commitment to development, has sponsored a one-hour meeting each Friday morning for over 25 years. Called the Friday Morning Group, this forum invites speakers from within or outside the Bank to talk for 20-30 minutes on some ethical issue or policy of concern. Time for discussion and debate then follows, with the stated intention being to address the values dimension of development and in so doing improve the Bank’s moral dialogue and policy deliberation.

We propose to facilitate a process in which USAID staff will be consulted as to their interest in forming such a group. Some interested persons would be invited to attend the World Bank’s Friday Morning Group in order to understand and consider that model. We would then facilitate USAID deliberation on

whether a similar group ought to be formed at USAID-Washington, and, if so, how best to set the terms for its creation and sustainability.

4) Offer an extended workshop or credit course on development ethics within USAID.

USAID has a strong commitment to training its officers and partners in the skills and knowledge essential to being effective agents of development. We propose a close collaboration with appropriate USAID staff to generate a course or set of courses for training in development ethics that would be appropriately related to USAID's interests and needs. Once a curriculum is agreed upon, we would teach this course as a pilot, survey the trainees to identify ways to improve the course, and revise the curriculum and teaching materials accordingly. We would then produce a training manual for future use in teaching this course. By arrangement, academic credit toward a MA or PhD degree could be given for such a course in connection with the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy Masters in Public Policy (MPP), Master in Public Management (MPP), and Ph.D. degree programs. For many years, the School of Public Policy has offered similar opportunities to employees in the USG's Environmental Protection Agency.

REFERENCES AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aiken, W. and H. LaFollette (eds.) (1976) *World Hunger and Moral Obligation*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Collects essays on philosophical debates in the early seventies over the ethics of food aid.)

Aiken, W. and H. LaFollette (eds.) (1996) *World Hunger and Morality*, 2nd. ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Collects 1990's essays on the philosophical recasting of ethics of food aid to an ethics of development and international justice.)

Alkire, S. (2002) *Valuing Freedoms: Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (An outstanding and sympathetic analysis of Sen's ethics and its application to grassroots income generation projects.)

Aman, K. (ed.) (1991) *Ethical Principles for Development: Needs, Capacities or Rights?* Upper Montclair, NJ: Institute for Critical Thinking. (Diverse approaches, to whether development ethics should emphasize needs, capabilities or rights.)

Ameigeiras, A. (ed.) (1998) *El desarrollo humano: Perspectivas y desafíos*, San Miquel, Argentina: Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento.

Attfield, R. (1999) *The Ethics of the Global Environment*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Attfield, R. and B. Wilkins (eds.) (1992) *International Justice and the Third World*, London: Routledge. (British essays on development ethics and international justice.)

Balint, P. J. (2000) "Balancing Conservation and Development: Two Cases Studies from El Salvador," Ph.D. Dissertation, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland.

Bauer, P.T. (1971) *Dissent on Development*, London: Weidenfeld & Nickolson.

Beitz, C. "Does Global Inequality Matter?" in Pogge 2001, 106-22.

Biaocchi, G. (2003) "Participation, Activism and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment," in Fung and Wright 2003. (Study of Porto Alegre Brazil's 15 year-old experiment in participatory budgeting.)

Bøås, M. and McNeill, D. (eds.) (2004) *Global Institutions and Development: Framing the World*, London and New York: Routledge. (Investigates the role of ideas – such as social capital, sustainable development, and governance—in multilateral institutions with an emphasis on how such ideas emerge, travel, and are implemented, modified, distorted, or resisted.)

Bohman, J. (1996) *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (A normative study, influenced by both Habermas and Sen, of democratic deliberation in developed countries.)

Bohman, J. and Rehg, W. eds. (1997) *Deliberative Democracy*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (The best early anthology of key works in the theory of deliberative democracy.)

Berger, P. (1974) *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change*, New York: Basic Books. (Pioneering essay linking "political ethics" and Third World poverty.)

Camacho, L. (1993) *Ciencia y tecnología en el subdesarrollo*, Cartago: Editorial Tecnológica de Costa Rica. (Leading Latin American philosopher of development and technology.)

Carothers, T. (2004) *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (An eminent scholar's collection assessing various approaches to democracy promotion.)

Carothers T. and Ottaway, M. (eds.) (2005) *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Timely critical discussions of democratization and democracy promotion in the Middle East.)

Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID (2000) "Conducting a DGA : A Framework for Strategy Development" (PN-ACC-887)
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnach305.pdf.

Chatterjee, D. (2004) *The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Recent philosophical writing on the morality of aid.)

Chavez, J.A. (1999) *De la utopía a la política económica: Para una ética de las políticas económicas*, Salamanca: San Esteban. (A Costa Rican economist argues for a political economy ethics.)

Clugston, R.M. and Hoyt, J.A. (1997) "Environment, Development and Moral Values," in Hamelink 1997, 82-103. (Employs the concept of "sustainable livelihoods to combine development ethics and environmental ethics.)

Commission for Africa (2005), *Report*, March 11.

Conill, J. *Horizontes de economía ética: Aristoteles, Adam Smith, Amartya Sen*, Madrid: Editorial Tecnos. (Informed by insights from Aristotle, Smith, and Sen, this Spanish philosopher defends an for an "ethic of development and solidarity.")

Cortina, A. (2002) *Por una ética del Consumo: La ciudadanía del consumidor en el mundo global*, Madrid: Taurus. (A prominent Spanish political philosopher and applied ethicist ethically assesses Northern consumption patterns and reorients consumption to be more just, globally responsible, and productive of happiness.)

Crocker, D.A. (1991) "Insiders and Outsiders in International Development Ethics," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 5(1991, 149-73. (Examines the advantages and dangers of both social insiders and outsiders in development ethics.)

Crocker, D.A. (1991) 'Toward Development Ethics', *World Development* 19: 457-83. (An introductory survey and bibliography of the nature, methods, and value of development ethics.)

Crocker, D. A. (1998) *Florecimiento humano y desarrollo internacional: La nueva ética de capacidades*, San José, Costa Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica. (An analysis and positive assessment of the ethical foundations of Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach.)

Crocker, D.A. (1999) "Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 13, 43-64. (An analysis, defense, and application of 7 norms to guide reckoning with past human rights violations.)

Crocker, D.A. (2002) "Development Ethics and Globalization," *Philosophical Topics*, 30, 2, Issue on Global Inequalities, 9-28. (Considers the origin, agreements, and controversies of development ethics and challenges ethicists to assess globalization globalization)

Crocker, D.A. (2002) "Punishment, Reconciliation, and Democratic Deliberation," *Buffalo Criminal Law Journal* (An effort to rehabilitate a moderate retributive approach to past wrongs and an effort to argue that just punishment can contribute to reconciliation conceived as democratic deliberation rather than social harmony.)

Crocker, D.A. (forthcoming) *Deliberating Global Development: Ethics, Capability, and Democracy*. (A capability approach to the foundations and democratic application of development ethics.)

Crocker, D.A. (forthcoming) "Sen and Deliberative Democracy," in Kaufman. (Argues that Sen's capability approach to international development requires democracy and can be enriched by and contribute to the theory and practice of deliberative democracy.)

Dasgupta, P. (2001) *Human Well-being and the Natural Environment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (An development economics employs both normative and empirical analyses to combine concern for human well-being and the environment.)

Dewey, J. (1927) *The Public and Its Problems*, Athens, OH: Swallow Press, Ohio University Press. (A classic defense of participatory and deliberative democracy as a way of life as well as elections.)

- Dewey, J. (1960). "The Need for Recovery of Philosophy," in *John Dewey: On Experience, Nature and Freedom*, ed. Richard J. Bernstein, New York: The Liberal Arts Press.
- Dower, N. (1988) 'What is Development? -- A Philosopher's Answer', *Centre for Development Studies Occasional Paper Series*, 3, Glasgow: University of Glasgow. (Argues for the role of philosophers in development studies and for the normative meaning of "development" as "a process of socio-economic change which *ought to take place*.")
- Dower, N. (1998) *World Ethics: The New Agenda*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (A leading development ethicist addresses development in the context of international relations and a "world ethic.")
- Dower, N. (2003) *An Introduction to Global Citizenship*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Defends an ideal of global citizenship and considers relation between development and environment.)
- Doyal, L and Gough, I. (1991) *A Theory of Human Need*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Dréze, J. and A. Sen, *India: Development and Participation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). (Dréze and Sen's most recent joint work, which updates their earlier study of India and illustrates their turn to democracy as public deliberation as a method of social choice.)
- Dréze, J. and A. Sen (1989) *Hunger and Public Action*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). (An application of the capabilities approach – its normative foundations and policy implications – to famine and chronic malnutrition in poor countries.)
- Engel, J. R. and J. G. Engel (eds.) (1990) *Ethics of Environment and Development: Global Challenge, International Response*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press. (An international collection that explores different ways of relating environmental and development ethics.)
- Escobar, A. (1995) *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Postmodernist "deconstruction" of development theory and practice as imperialist and destructive of traditional life.)
- Fanon, Frantz (1961) *The Wretched of the Earth*, reprint, Grove Press, 1986.
- Fakuda-Parr, S. and Shiva, A.K. (eds.) (2003) *Readings in Human Development: Concepts, Measures and Policies for a Development Paradigm*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fung, A., and Wright, E.O. (eds.) (2003) *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*, London: Verso. (Important collection of four deliberative democracy case studies (Chicago; Habitat Conservation Program; Kerala, India; and Porto Alegre Brazil) with normative analyses of the cases.)
- Feminist Economics* (2003) 9, 2-3. (Feminist scholars probe and assess both Sen's and Nussbaum's capability approach to ethics, development, and democracy.)
- Galtung, J. (1978/79) "The New International Order and the Basic Needs Approach," *Alternatives*, 4, 455-76. (Pioneer of the Basic Needs Approach to international development.)
- Galtung, J. (1980) "The Basic Needs Approach," in *Human Needs*, ed. Karin Lederer, Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain.
- Gasper, D. (1994) "Development Ethics: An Emergent Field?" in R. Prendergast and F. Stewart (eds.) *Market Forces and World Development*, London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. (A helpful stocktaking that defends development ethics as a "multidisciplinary field" that closes the gap between abstract philosophy and practical experience in order to promote desirable change in poor countries.)
- Gasper, D. (2004) *The Ethics of Development: From Economism to Human Development* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press). (Perhaps the best single volume available on development ethics – its history, scope, and challenges. Offering searching criticisms of mainstream development as conceptually blinded to human destitution and social injustice, Gasper analyzes and evaluates alternative development visions.)

- Gandhi, M.K. (1927) *Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, Navajivan Mudranalaya, Ahmedabad: Jitendra T. Desai.
- Goulet, D. (1971) *The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development* (New York: Athenaeum). (The classic text by a development ethics pioneer.)
- Goulet, D. (1999) *Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice* (New York: Apex; London: Zed, 1995). (A collection of Goulet's articles since 1971 with some new essays.)
- Goulet, D. (1989) *The Uncertain Promise: Value Conflicts in Technology Transfer* (New York: Horizons). (Value dilemmas in technology transfer and proposal for ethically-based resolutions.)
- Graham, C and Pettinato, S. (2002) *Happiness & Hardship: Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies*, Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. (A ground-breaking empirical study, with normative and policy implications on the impact on subjective happiness of poverty, inequality, and democracy.)
- Guariglia, O. (2001) *Una etica para el siglo. XXI: Etica y derechos humanos en un tiempo posmetafisico*, Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica. (A Latin American human rights philosopher addresses global and development challenges.)
- Gunatilleke, G., N. Tiruchelvam, and R. Coomaraswamy (eds.) (1988) *Ethical Dilemmas of Development in Asia*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. (Accessible international collection addressing ethical, empirical and political aspects of Asian development.)
- Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (1996) *Democracy and Disagreement*, Harvard: Harvard University Press. (Much discussed normative version of deliberative democracy with applications to developed societies)
- Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (2004) *Why Deliberative Democracy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Defense of deliberative democracy in comparison to its rivals and an application to bioethics, health care, truth commissions, educational policy, and decisions to declare war.)
- Halperin, M.H., Siegle, J.T., Weinstein, M.M. (2005) *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*, New York: Routledge. (An important work that debunks the conventional case that economic development and poverty reduction require political authoritarianism.)
- Hamelink, Cees (1997), ed. " *Ethics and Development: On Making Moral Choices in Development Cooperation*, Kampfen, Netherlands: Kok. (Anthology of essays that address moral issues in development aid and cooperation.)
- Hardin, Garrett (1974a) "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," *Psychology Today*, 8, 38-43. (Foremost proponent of "life boat ethics," which argues that it is both morally wrong and imprudent for rich countries to help poor countries.)
- Hardin, Garrett (1974b) "Living on a Lifeboat," *Bioscience*, 25, 561-68.
- Kaufman, A. (ed.) (forthcoming) *Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems*, ed. Alexander Kaufman, New York: Routledge. (Political theorists and philosophers analyze and evaluate Sen's and Nussbaum's egalitarianism in relation to rival theories.)
- Kliksberg, B. (ed.) (2002) *Ética y desarrollo: La relación marginada*, Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo. (A collection of short essays on ethical dimensions of development by largely Latin and North America policymakers, policy analysts, and philosophers.)
- Kliksberg, B (2004) *Más ética, más desarrollo*, Buenos Aires: Temas. (A collection of essays in development ethics by the director of the Inter-American Development Bank and Norwegian government's Inter-American Initiative in Social Capital, Ethics and Development.)
- Kristof, N.D. (2005) "When Marriage Kills," *New York Times*, March 30, A 27.

- Lee, K., A. Holland, and D. McNeill (eds.) (2000) *Global Sustainable Development in the 21st Century*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (A recent collection that probes the concept of sustainable development as a way of balancing conservation and development.)
- Little, D. *The Paradox of Wealth and Poverty: Mapping the Ethical Dilemmas of Global Development* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2003). (A recent introductory survey to the moral dimensions of development theory, policy, and practice.)
- Mansbridge, J. (ed.) (1990) *Beyond Self-Interest*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Economists, political theorists, and philosophers challenge the egoistic motivational assumptions of mainstream economics and political science.)
- Martínez Naavarro, E. (2000) *Ética para el desarrollo de los pueblos*, Madrid: Editorial Trotla. (Spanish thinker explores philosophical and theological resources for a development ethic.)
- Max-Neef, M. (1993) *Human Scale Development: Conception, Application, and Further Reflections*, London: Apex Press. (Chilean theorist and practitioner defends an original version of a needs-based development ethic.)
- Naim, M. (2005) “Bad Medicine,” *Foreign Policy*, March/April, 95-96.
- Nozick, R. (1974) *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, New York: Basic Books. (Class statement of a libertarian and rights-based social ethic that criticizes a redistributive state.)
- Nussbaum, M. (2000) *Women and Human Development: the Capabilities Approach*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Nussbaum’s most important statement of her version of the capabilities approach applied to women’s deprivations and opportunities.)
- Nussbaum, M. and J. Glover (eds.) (1995) *Women, Culture and Development*, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A valuable international collection of advanced essays explaining, assessing, and applying the capabilities ethic to the issue of gender equality in developing countries.)
- Nussbaum, M. and A. Sen (eds.) (1993) *The Quality of Life*, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Advanced essays that clarify and evaluate the capabilities and other approaches to quality of life in both rich and poor countries.)
- O’Neill, O. (1986) *Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- O’Neill, O. (1993) “Ending World Hunger,” in T. Regan (ed.) *Matters of Life and Death*, New York: London: Allen & Unwin. (A critique of utilitarian approaches to world hunger and an accessible statement of the author’s Kantian duty-based ethic of aid and development.)
- O’Neill, O. (2000) *Bounds of Justice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Opio, P.J. (1993) “Towards a New Economic Order: Needs, Functioning and Capabilities in Amartya Sen’s Theory,” MA thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. (Ugandan philosopher and development scholar interprets Sen’s theory and its relevance for Africa and business ethics.)
- Parker, C. (ed.) (1998) *Ética, democracia y desarrollo humano*, ed. Cristián Parker G., Santiago, Chile: Lom. (Latin and North American policymakers, activists, and theorists confront ethical dilemmas in development.)
- Pogge, T. (ed.) (2001) *Global Justice*, Oxford: Blackwell. (An anthology of Anglo-American and European philosophical writing on the central moral issues arising in the emerging global order with an emphasis on the responsibilities of the strongest nations.)
- Pogge, T. (2002) *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) (An uncompromising rights-based approach to global justice that emphasizes the negative duty of rich countries and their citizens to cease dominating the global order and exploiting poor countries.)
- Prébisich, R. (1962) “El desarrollo económico de la América Latina y algunos de sus principales problemas,” *Boletín Económico de América Latina*, 7, 1-24. (Innovative approach to Latin American development.)

- Przeworski, A. (1999) "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." in Shapiro and Haacker-Cordón 1999. (An approach to democracy that emphasizes nonviolent transfer of power and electoral politics.)
- Ramirez, E.R. (1987) *La Responsabilidad Etica en Ciencia y Tecnologia*, Cartago, Costa Rica: Editorial Tecnológica de Costa Rica. (Subtle exploration ethical responsibility in science and technology in developing countries.)
- Rawls, J. (1971; rev. ed, 1997) *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (Rawls's monumental work in distributive justice.)
- Rawls, J. (2001) *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (Rawls's latter work, emphasizing "overlapping consensus" of a "political" conception of justice.)
- Rawls, J. (1999) *The Law of Peoples with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,"* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Rawls state-centric approach to global justice and his defense of a version of deliberative democracy.)
- Rolston, H. (1996) "Feeding People versus Saving Nature," in Aiker and LaFollette 1996, 248-67. (Environmental ethicist who argues that saving nature should sometimes have priority to saving people.)
- Romero, R. (forthcoming), *Etica, ciudadanía y desarrollo*. (Ethical analyses of an Honduran philosopher, lawyer, and presidential advisor.)
- Sanders, L. (1997) "Against Deliberation," *Political Theory*, 25, 3, 347-76. (A theoretical and practical critique of deliberative democracy.)
- Schwenke, S. G. (2005) "Corruption in the Development Context: Sectoral Synthesis," *Pervasive Corruption: Strategies for Prevention in Developing Countries*, B. I. Spector, Ed.; Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press (A cross-sectoral analysis of corruption, with a focus on moral dimensions)
- Schwenke, S. G. "Balking at the Numbers," *SAIS Review of International Affairs* (Summer-Fall 2004, Vol. 24., No. 2) published for the Foreign Policy Institute, Washington, DC and part of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Affairs, The Johns Hopkins University (An overview and extension of Pogge's argument regarding the tragic choices that must be made in international relief, due to scarcity of resources and overwhelming need.)
- Schwenke, S. G. (2002) "Morality and Motivation: A Role for a Human Rights Approach in the World Bank's Urban Strategy?" PhD dissertation, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland (An ethical analysis and critique of the new urban strategy of the World Bank, and consideration of the important roles in ethical behavior of motivation and public participation.)
- Schwenke, S. G. (2000) "The Moral Critique: Corruption in Developing Countries", *Journal of Public and International Affairs* (JPIA), Princeton University, Spring 2000 (An assessment of the impact of corruption, based on the Nussbaum's version of the capability approach.)
- Segal, J. M. (2002) "What is Development?" in Verna Gehring and William A. Galston (eds.), *Philosophical Dimensions in Public Policy*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publications. (First appearing in the mid-80's, this influential paper that argues for an ethically-based concept of development and evaluates three development models: growth, growth with equity, and basic needs.)
- Sen, A. (1977) "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 45, 7, 317-44. Reprinted in Mansbridge 1990.
- Sen, A. (1984) *Resources, Values and Development*, Oxford: Blackwell; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Contains several of Sen's important early papers on the capabilities approach to development.)
- Sen, A. (1997) "Development Thinking at the Beginning of the 21st Century," in Louis Emmerij (ed.) *Economic and Social Development into the XXI Century*, Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.
- Sen, A. (1999) *Development as Freedom*, New York: Knopf. (An accessible articulation of Sen's agency-centered capability approach to development.)

- Sen, A. (1999a) "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy* 10 (3): 3-17. (Sen's normative defense of democracy, conceived as public discussion, and its universal value.)
- Sen, A. (2002) "Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice" in *Rationality and Freedom* (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap, Harvard University Press, chap. 18.
- Sen, A. (2003) "Democracy and Its Global Roots," *The New Republic* (229/4): 28-35. (An argument that democracy as universal relevance as well as roots in both non-Western and Western culture.)
- Sen, A. (2004) "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 32, 4: 315-56. (Sen's most recent statement of his theory of human rights and its relation to the ideals of public discussion and democratic institutions.)
- Shapiro, I. and Hacker-Cordón, C., eds. (1999) *Democracy's Value*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Collection of recent debates among rival democratic and other theories of governance.)
- Singer, P. (1972) "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1, 229-43. (Seminal essay that challenged many philosophers and others to confront problems of ethics and global famine.)
- Singer, P. (1974) "Philosophers are Back on the Job," *The New York Times Magazine*, July 7, 1974, 17-20.
- Singer, P. (1977) "Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument," in *Food Policy: The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices*, eds. Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue, New York: Free Press.
- Singer, P. (2002) *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Clear and forceful moral arguments concerning such issues as global warming and humanitarian military intervention as well as global justice).
- Singer, P. (2004) "Outsiders: Our Obligations to Those Beyond our Borders," in Chatterjee 2004, 11-32.
- St. Clair, A. (2004) "Poverty Conceptions in the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank: Knowledge, Politics, and Ethics," (Dr. Polit. Thesis, University of Bergen, Norway.)
- St. Clair, A. (2004) "The Role of Ideas in the United Nations Development Programme," in Bøås and McNeill 2004, 178-92. (Promising young scholar who combines historical, sociological, and normative reasoning to assess the UNDP and other multilateral institutions.)
- Stiglitz, J. (2002) *Globalization and Its Discontents*, New York: W. W. Norton. (Controversial assessment of globalization as well as of the US Treasury Department and the "Washington Consensus.")
- Stiglitz, J. (2003) *The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World's Most Prosperous Decade*, New York: W. W. Norton.
- Streeten, P. with Burki, S.J., Haq, M., Hicks, N., and Stewart, F. (1981) *First Things First: Meeting Basic Needs in Developing Countries*, London: Oxford University Press. (The classic statement of the basic-needs approach to change in poor countries.)
- United Nations Development Programme (1990-2004) *Human Development Report*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (UNDP volumes that operationalize the capability approach to appraise, respectively such phenomena as consumption, globalization, human rights, and the Millennium Development Goals.)
- United States Agency for International Development, Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research (November 2000) *Conducting a DGA : A Framework for Strategy Development*.
- United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (January 2004) *U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century*. (Generally referred to as USAID's "White Paper".)

United States Agency for International Development (2005) 2005 Budget, Statement of the Administrator, at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/administrator.html>.

Wintour, P. (2005) *The Guardian*, <http://society.guardian.co.uk/aid/story/0%2C14178%2C1435439%2C00.html>.

Young, I.M. (2000) *Inclusion and Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (US feminist philosopher argues against rationalistic, exclusively grassroots, and noninclusive models of deliberative democracy and for a version of deliberative democracy that is likely to promote social justice.)