The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) in former Yugoslavia: Lessons Learned for OAU Civilian Missions

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Introduction
Following a joint OAU International Peace Academy (IPA) seminar in Addis Ababa in late 1998, I was asked to write a short paper describing a conflict prevention initiative that arose at the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslav Republic. I was to realise later on that even though the European Community Monitor Mission in former Yugoslavia (ECMM) had been established in 1991 and was still operating in Bosnia Herzegovina, little of its work and achievements were known. For numerous reasons, the ECMM had been overshadowed by the UN Operation, UNPROFOR and by the work of NATO under Operation IFOR, now SFOR. The ECMM has taught us some lessons that could benefit other regional initiatives, among others its capacity for rapid deployment and the limited resources required to operate.

The Cairo Declaration in 1993 expanded the OAU charter by adding a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and then specifically empowered its Central Organ, Secretariat and the Secretary-General to support the primary objective of anticipating and preventing conflict. The Cairo Declaration further endowed the OAU Secretary-General with responsibility for undertaking peacemaking and peace-building functions in order to
facilitate the resolution of conflicts wherever they arose. Within this new mandate the Secretary-General was granted additional resources, among others, a special fund specifically set aside to support this new mechanism, and the authority to dispatch fact-finding missions.

In an age where time, information, and capability are of the essence in preventing the outbreak of conflicts, every effort should be made to streamline the process of preventive mechanisms at hand. Considering that the OAU Mechanism is still in its infancy, even though it is fully engaged in conflict prevention and resolution, any lessons that can be drawn from other organisations in the field of conflict prevention initiatives, should be considered.

Part of the Mechanism's recent effort has been dedicated to the conception and implementation of an early-warning system (EWS). Numerous studies have demonstrated that without an efficient EWS, the Mechanism would be seriously hampered in its preventive capability. To be effective in any crisis the process must provide for timely intervention by the majors actors, as was pointed out in July 1993 during the 31st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Since then many steps have been undertaken to improve this preventive capability, which is still undergoing development and refinement. Among other things, the principals of the Mechanism have already identified the necessity of upgrading their facilities electronically. This will then allow them to select and tap into existing African and international information-gathering networks that monitor the African continent. The sensitivity of this information-gathering gave birth to the elaboration of a protocol of information-sharing and the creation of a data bank, along with the acquisition of the necessary technical assistance required to support and to maintain it. As these improvements take place, other initiatives should be observed to further enhance the EWS capability.

For instance, standardised and common procedures should be in place to deploy a fact-finding mission to further investigate and analyse a situation that is showing serious signs of deterioration. To do so, the Mechanism must be able to count on additional resources to guarantee a smooth and timely transition between the analysis of the signals provided by the EWS and the political action that must be taken, as provided by the Cairo Declaration. These improvements should allow for the establishment of fact-finding missions endowed with the required authority to negotiate and mediate with the parties in the dispute. In order to cope with rapidly evolving conflict, these missions need to be structured in a way as to provide the basis for any major necessary changes in their role. It is within this versatile framework that the ECMM initiative offers potential perspectives for the OAU mechanism.

Please note that this paper reflects my personal opinions, and is the result of my employment with the ECMM and research on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. I served with the ECMM in Central Bosnia from February 1993 to the end of August 1993, a period considered one of the stormiest of this conflict. My tour took place at the ECMM Regional Centre of Zenica (50 kilometres North West of Sarajevo).

European Community Monitoring Mission in former Yugoslavia

My intention at this point is to describe the ECMM's organisation, and analyse it as a tool for preventive actions, which may be tailored to the needs of other regional and sub-regional organisations. Besides providing an apparatus for conflict prevention, this initiative has a moderate capacity for being advantageously employed in a conflict environment.

ECMM's Origins

The decision to establish the ECMM was taken by the CSCE/OSCE (Conference/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in July 1991. Subsequently, control of the Mission was handed over to the EC. Following this decision, the EU Troika (representing the former, the present and future ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries that had, is and will fulfill functions of the EU Presidency) met on July 7 1991 at Brioni, with representatives of the former Yugoslav republics. The Brioni Agreement, signed by all the parties in the dispute, legally established the Mission for the first time, initially as a monitoring mission with the aim of easing the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Slovenia.

As the situation deteriorated in the former Yugoslavia, the risk of the conflict spilling over to neighbouring countries increased, and at the invitation of the respective governments, the ECMM mandate was extended to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania in the course of 1992. In 1992, the ECMM brought together the twelve EC members and five additional CSCE countries (Canada, Sweden, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland). In 1993, the Mission comprised some 400 diplomats, military officers and civilians, of whom about 200 were monitors and the remainder were either drivers, signalers, clerks or headquarters personnel.

The Organisation

The head of the ECMM and its directing staff are appointed by the EC Presidency for a period of six months. They report directly to the EU Presidency, which in turn keeps EC partners and the OSCE informed. In 1993, the Mission headquarters was overseeing seven Regional Centres, several co-ordinating centres, and a varying number of residential liaison officers and stand-alone tasks, for example, monitoring airfields. In the spring of 1993, ECMM had a liaison team with the permanent conference on the former Yugoslavia (Geneva), UNPROFOR headquarters (Zagreb), the CSCE in Macedonia, UNPRO-
that ECMM was the only non-humanitarian organisation operating in former Yugoslavia for a full year before the first peacekeepers appeared under the UN banners.

**Characteristics and Strengths**
I will briefly describe the main characteristics that have enabled ECMM to outlive UNPROFOR under three headings: the strategic level, the operational level and the tactical level.

**Strategic Level**
ECMM is a preventive unarmed mission which was established with the backing of all the CSCE's member states and entrusted to the EC to implement and conduct. It is an authorised organ with the endorsement and within the mandate of a specific Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for each individual state in which the ECMM is deployed.

It is a diplomatic mission that plays and has played a larger role than its creators had originally envisaged. ECMM's nature and composition allows it to adjust and to evolve with the situation, without having to undergo a revision of its initial mandate. For example, in April 1993 after the Vance Owen plan was accepted by the Croats and Bosnians, the Zenica Regional Centre was given the task to promote and ease the implementation of the new plan by holding meetings with the local and regional politicians. Because of this unique feature, the ECMM was able to adjust to the evolving situation throughout the war in former Yugoslavia, and be in a position to maintain an effective and active role on different fronts.

In addition, its mixed composition of militaries, diplomats and EC public servants at all levels associated with its reporting network, gives its leadership a unique capacity to rapidly exchange information and gain a better and a more global understanding of the overall situation. For example, monitors, when required, could be flown to Zagreb or Geneva to provide specific information or to report on certain progress.

Its ultimate leadership, the EC and its Presidency, provides it with a very persuasive tool which combines political, diplomatic and economic might, to directly influence the attitude of the states and warring factions involved. The monitors are not just representatives of an international organisation, they are officials, some with the rank of ambassador, representing EC countries (the same countries that could influence the flow of money entering those states, etc.). This is a major advantage when compared to the actual political leverage of contributing countries not having a seat on the UN Security Council.

**Operational Level**
The ECMM's nature allows for rapid deployment with a minimum level of resources and training. All of its monitors, most of them Europeans, are experienced active diplomats or serving military personnel, and are usually deployed to
their field assignment within one week of their arrival to ECMM headquarters.

The lean and simple ECMM chain of command, linked to its unique system of communication, allows the dissemination of vital information almost instantaneously. Each monitoring team can report within minutes to ECMM headquarters, providing the top decision-makers with reliable and relevant information, usually accompanied by a local assessment of the situation.

The diplomatic and unarmed nature of the ECMM requires a limited logistic tail resulting in an overall ratio of about one supporter for one operator. Today’s peacekeeping missions have a ratio of about five to six supporters for one operator. This attribute resulted in an inexpensive and easily manageable mission. In addition, it provided the mission with an increased sustainability factor that could allow for a further enlargement and extension capability, if required.

ECMM’s diplomatic composition means that it is not perceived as a hidden military apparatus and its representatives are allowed access to areas and actors that are denied military missions. In addition, it can readily establish a (working) relationship with international and regional Non-Governmental Organisations which otherwise would have been very difficult, if not impossible to achieve.

**Tactical Level**

All of the mission members are unarmed and dressed in white garments. This was often instrumental in being allowed to defuse situations that otherwise could have raised suspicions, generated fear and prevented the mission from intervening.

All of the Regional Centres and Co-ordination Centres are stationed within the community they are responsible for and their members are living (at risk) under the same conditions as the surrounding civilian population. Consequently, the ECMM members are not isolated or confined to a specific area like most of the peacekeepers, thus adding significantly to the credibility of the mission and its members in the eyes of the parties in conflict.

The possibility of gathering and processing information in a timely manner was unlimited considering that the same monitoring team was given carte blanche within their area of responsibility. As the only ECMM representative for a sector, the team was given the authority to map out and maintain contact with all the sector’s actors from all ethnic groups, be it local, regional and national military commanders, politicians and civil society representatives. In addition, they were responsible for maintaining contact with all other institutions or organisations that were active in their sector. This gave a great advantage to the ECMM over the UNPROFOR. For instance, the same area of responsibility within the UNPROFOR structure was shared between a multiple of representatives who in turn were limited to interact with a precise segment of the local society. This resulted in the UN having to hold regular and timely meetings, in a never ending effort to collate all available information. Only then could they analyse and prepare the necessary assessment of the situation.

Beside this ability, the ECMM had a significant technical advantage over most of the other organisations operating with it. Each monitoring team and static station was equipped with a communication system that provided permanent communications with any place in the world. This autonomous system (batteries and/or generator operated) called CAPSAT, allowed each station (through a laptop computer) to operate in a secure fax mode using satellite communication. The communication standing procedures gave authority to any station to report directly to ECMM headquarters, or any other stations if the situation warranted it, in addition to their immediate superior. It took only 15 to 30 minutes to set up the equipment when the monitors were mobile before they could send a transmission. On this basis one can readily imagine the advantage we had over all other co-located organisations for reporting minute by minute incidents as they were taking place, to the senior headquarters, if need be.

**Deficiencies and Weaknesses**

I will limit my comments to the main weaknesses observed during my stay and the problems that arose when some of the ECMM’s Regional Centres were kept running in areas of conflict.

The rotation of the Presidency every six months had very disruptive effects on the chain of command since most of the key players of the senior leadership and the logistic section were rotating at the same time. In addition, it was obvious that each country assuming the Presidency had its own agenda and level of resources to implement it, thus the two rotations that I witnessed were carried out in an ad hoc manner. The entire staff of the mission felt the changes of leadership and it took the ECMM a few weeks on both occasions to readjust to the new leadership and to the revised standing operation procedures. These transitions had distinct negative effects on the overall performance of the ECMM and on its relationship with the parties in conflict. The rotations had profound impact on some of the previous Presidency’s initiatives, which were given a different priority by the new Presidency.

Here is what the Deputy Head of the Mission for political affairs (during my stay) had to say on this characteristic.

"... the future performance of the Mission will, to a large extent, be conditioned by the commonly felt necessity to overcome its infancy stage of structural iniquities, procedural vagueness and institutional instability. The unavoidable leadership fluctuation of a short term rotating presidency will in this context have to be counterbalanced by structures and procedures of a more rational durable character. ..."
though the EU should have been talking with one voice, there were at times serious disagreements within the foreign ministries of the major EU countries, which had a direct impact on the leadership provided to the ECMM by the EU.

It was well known within the Mission that the monitors from the EU's major powers were reporting directly to their own country, even though they were placing the independence and impartiality of the mission at risk by doing so. The rotation of every mission's member, which varied from three to four, or six months, and sometime one year's tour, was the exclusive responsibility of the contributing country. This was an administrative nightmare for the leadership and had a major impact on the continuity of the operations. This situation was compounded by the fact that there was no quality control over the personnel attached to the mission. In addition, the distribution of candidates was done on the basis of an even representation by country in the centres and on the guarantee that larger delegations were to be given their quotas of senior positions.

As a preventive mission, the ECMM lost some of its luster as the overall situation kept deteriorating in former Yugoslavia and as the Blue Helmets, because of their more robust nature, became the major players. The ECMM, being a diplomatic organ, has a limited capability of influencing the day to day situation in war zone area. Since the ECMM members were unarmed and living with the local population equipped only with personnel garments, the safety and security of its members became a serious concern whenever teams or regional centres operated in war zones. Thus the ECMM constantly had to negotiate and rely on pre-arrangements with UNPROFOR's contingents for the protection and extraction of its personnel.

The nature of the organisation prevented its senior management from exercising strong leadership. The lack of a shared vision and set goals, added to the lukewarm ability to revise them, resulted in an environment where priority of efforts was lacking in consistency. As a result, the regional centres competed for additional resources through the submission of new activities that were not always related to the most urgent needs of the situation.

I will conclude this section by reaffirming that ECMM combines the attributes of a diplomatic mission with the flexibility of a field military organisation. Its role is not limited to a specific task, but may encompass a multitude of tasks relating to conflict prevention and peace building initiatives. This flexibility comes mainly from the combination of professional diplomats, military personnel and specialised technicians who can be equipped to face any of the above tasks. Its nature lies between the concept of the military UN Blue Helmets and the more recent concept a standby force of specialised professionals ready to be deployed in a post-conflict situation or in a disaster area, the UN White Helmets'. Most of the reported deficiencies of the ECMM initiative can be easily overcome if the implementing organ is provided with a clear mandate, the appropriate level of authority, and resources required to fulfill its preventive mission. In addition, ECMM proved that it has a certain role to play within a war zone situation, assuming that its limitations are accurately determined in advance.

**OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention**

**Introduction**

My intention here is to reflect on how elements of the ECMM initiative could be integrated into the OAU Mechanism for conflict prevention. My comments will address three specific areas: how the new Division headquarters should be structured and the relationship it should have with all of its field missions; the need to create and maintain a multi-national and multi-professional standby force; and finally, how to determine the characteristics of the communication system needed to support this organ.

**Division HQ**

One of the ECMM's most innovative characteristics (which may yet become its best) was its unlimited capability to expand its organisation and to adjust it to new developments on the ground. This was a direct consequence of its preventive nature, the aggressive leadership emanating from its three-headed headquarters and the quality of human resources at its disposal. These factors allowed the Mission to maintain a very active and efficient presence in its areas of deployment at all times. This was also achieved by entrusting a broad operational latitude to the ECMM headquarters, and by the streamlining the reporting process, allowing the organ continually to readjust the nature and level of resources required.

Another one of ECMM's attributes was the efficiency with which field information was transmitted to the Head of the Mission, a direct consequence of the limited number of intermediate headquarters. In practice, all of the communications were transmitted daily to the headquarters' Operations Centres through daily briefings, or whenever necessary. A summary of the fluctuating situations was then circulated to the Head of the Mission (HOM) and Deputy Heads of the Mission (DHOMs).

To design a new structure for the Mechanism's headquarters, one would without a doubt, limit the number of intermediary reporting levels between the field and the SC, who is the official responsible for the working of the Mechanism. In addition, one should ensure that from the moment the Mechanism launched any field mission, a permanent and round-the-clock Operation Centre was established. This Operation Centre would then have to provide the senior staff
of the organ, including the OAU SG, with regular briefings and special monitoring on the situations. One has to bear in mind that the nature of this organ is to prevent conflict. This can only be accomplished if the responsible official is provided with timely and accurate information. For those reasons alone, I would favour the direct involvement of the OAU SC in this process as soon as it is activated.

I will now refer to the 'PROPOSED OAU CHART' which is a preliminary attempt to describe the OAU conflict prevention division, if it is organised along the lines of the ECMM HQ. Let me first describe some of its characteristics. This headquarters has a very lean chain of command between all of its field missions and its Head of Division (HOD), the OAU SG. On a daily basis, the Deputy Head of Division, policy section, (DHOD(Pol)) exercises overall responsibility for the Division. He is seconded by the Deputy Head of Division, operation section, (DHOD(Ops)). As soon as the first field initiative is launched, the Operations Centre is to be manned on a permanent basis under the direction of a Chief of Operations (COO). All of the ECMM field initiatives, whatever the nature of their tasks and composition, will report to the same Operations Centre of the OAU's mechanism.

I will now describe briefly the three major components of this proposed structure, their responsibilities and the way they should interact. The DHOD (Pol) is the principal Deputy of the OAU SG for this Division and acts as the overall co-ordinator of the Division. In addition, the DHOD (Pol) is responsible for the Division's policy section, which directs and co-ordinates the EWS. His main responsibility can be summarised as being the daily co-ordinator for the conflict prevention Division and operating the EWS. Ultimately, he will provide the OAU SG with timely analysis for the initiation of any preventive actions in an attempt to reduce the risk of further deterioration to violent and armed conflict. The nature of his analysis will trigger the staff process in the other sections of the organ, which will eventually result in fielding missions. In addition, the nature of his position designates him as the Division's media representative.

The DHOD (Ops) is the SC's designated second Deputy for the Division and heads the Operations section. His responsibilities are two fold. Firstly, he has to establish and maintain standby arrangements with all the contributing countries to the OAU Mechanism which includes the list of all available standby personnel and their relevant skills. This also includes overseeing the preparation of all contingency planning for potential missions. Secondly, when a preventive initiative is decided upon, he is then responsible to field and maintain all aspects of the mission. This includes the co-ordination and establishment of training standards required by the mission personnel before deployment.

The COO heads the Centre of Operations. Experience has taught us that from the time a field operation is launched, it is necessary to provide a permanent operations centre, totally dedicated to supporting the deployed missions. To guarantee its integrity and efficiency, this centre has to be distinct from the Policy and Operation sections. This centre must be the only responsible agency overseeing the daily operations of all the deployed initiatives. Accordingly, this section has to be kept independent from the other two sections, which are more involved with medium and long term planning. In addition, the Operation Centre becomes the co-ordination centre, where daily briefings are held involving the three sections and medium and long-term actions are considered and developed.

Multi-national and multi-professional standby force.

One of the lessons to be learned from the ECMM and which could easily be integrated into the OAU Mechanism concerns the flexibility of its manning capacity. The ECMM staff are provided by the contributing countries and are
trained and experienced in different fields of expertise. They required only a minimum period of transition at the senior headquarters, prior to field deployment.

The OAU has this capability but, I believe, does not fully exploit it. As an example, one may consider the time required to train soldiers for a peacekeeping mission before they can be put on a standby list for deployment. As a conservative figure, it would take a minimum of six months for a unit of battalion size (about 500 men) to reach that level of readiness, assuming that they are already proficient in their profession.

Now imagine the OAU Mechanism being provided with a list of personnel trained in different fields that could be called in with minimum warning time. The preparation and maintenance of that list would require the permanent assignment of resources to prepare and update the different memorandums of understanding with the contributing countries. In addition these lists of experts will require regular amendments, the recalling system would need to be rehearsed from time to time. In addition, to be effective, this standby list would require constant input from the EWS section to ensure that the personnel with the appropriate skills are on standby.

Specific personnel needs would have to be identified as a particular crisis develops so that potential candidates could be sorted out and selected in time, and the appropriate level of readiness could be put in place. When an operation is initiated, the responsible headquarters staff, in addition to fielding the necessary personnel to the mission, would then have to initiate the replacement process, assuming that the mission extends over a longer period.

This enhanced reaction capability, when appropriate, needs to be generated as the counterpart of the EWS section, if the Mechanism is to effectively fulfill its task of functioning in a preventive mode.

Communication System

One of the major downfalls of technology, besides its expensive acquisition cost and unquenchable thirst for research and development, is its short life span. In addition, the older the technology is, the longer the logistic tail needed to support it. Before acquiring any technology one should always consider its life span, and its logistical and training needs within a time spectrum. For example, if we have the choice of buying line or cellular phones or any other communication systems, we should not only consider the acquisition costs of the system but also its installation and servicing costs, along with the manning level required to operate it. Other criteria include: the normal conditions in which the system is expected to operate; its reliability over an extended period of time; and its compatibility with other existing systems.

My point is that part of the ECMM's success was attributable to the reliability, expeditiousness, accuracy and security with which the information was transmitted from field stations to the most senior headquarters. The system was individual and environment tested, requiring a minimal logistic tail and, above all, a minimum level of training to operate it. If they had relied on the military type of voice communication, one could imagine the additional number of personnel and stations they would have required to provide the same level of effectiveness (for a region like the former Yugoslavia). In addition, since the main reporting system was based on written communications, none of the duty personnel had to transcribe the communications for further use. Within the framework of existing standardised operational procedures, the field information, just like e-mail, could be sent to an extensive distribution list. This is something that cannot be accomplished with the standard military voice communication system or would require heavy static equipment to do so.

When I was in Bosnia, I recall a time when cellular phones were very popular among some of the factions, until the transmission towers were blown out or were out of reach. With the ECMM system each monitoring team was equipped with a self-powered portable laptop communication system which could be made fully operational within a short period of time. All of the Regional Centres, which were static in nature, were outfitted with an additional secure voice capability.

One must realise that to be effective, preventive initiatives need to be given the appropriate level of resources. This is the only tool that will allow any security organisation to operate in a pre-emptive mode. Without it the organisation is doomed to operate in a reactive mode.

I would like to conclude this section by adding that the operational success of any preventive mechanism hinges on three distinct capabilities that require the same level of priorities when it comes to resources. These capabilities need not only the same level of resource they have to be fully integrated under the same headquarters. The capabilities are: the quality of the analysis generated by its EWS, the speed at which it can field a mission with the required level of expertise, and the efficiency by which it can timely process its first hand information.

Conclusion

I will conclude by saying that the ECMM initiative combines, among others, these main characteristics: flexibility in size, role, and composition; non-military organisation; legitimacy, transparency and affordability; and capacity for speedy deployment. These characteristics contribute to making it a valuable tool for consideration in the context of a mechanism for conflict prevention with its mediating, monitoring and fact-finding capabilities. In addition it has proved to have a certain role to play in a war zone situation, assuming that its limitations are well understood.
Footnotes

1 See the Declaration of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government on the establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, article 22, page 11, June 1993.

2 The reading material that was circulated is an ECMM official document that was prepared and circulated in early 1993 and made available to the media. European Community Monitor Mission, I Hotel, Remetinecka 106, 4100 Zagreb, Croatia, Press Officer Tel: 041-650-083. This was the address of the actual ECMM headquarters when I served with them.

3 This Centre was responsible, at that time, for the whole of the federate Bosnia and Herzegovina. I served principally as the co-director of the Busovaca Joint Commission (overseeing the February 1993 cease-fire agreements between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Central Bosnia), chief of operations, and Deputy Head of the Zenica Regional Centre.

4 The Head of Mission (HOM) was normally a serving senior diplomat and for the duration of his tour held ambassador's rank from his country and the EU. The Deputy Head of Mission Political (DHOM(Pol)) and Deputy Head of Mission Operations (DHOM(Ops)) assisted the HOM. The DHOM(Pol), was the designated replacement of the HOM in his absence and was usually a serving senior diplomat, with ambassadorial status. His main responsibility was to monitor the political situation and to provide analytical assessments, political input on different contingencies and act as the senior advisor on the ongoing situation. The DHOM(Ops), was the second designated replacement of the HOM and was usually a serving general officer. He had overall responsibility for the daily operations of the mission, for implementing new ECMM mandates, and was the senior advisor to the HOM on all military matters. The Chief of Operations (COO) section was headed by a serving senior military officer and responsible for the daily operations of the headquarters and all of the reporting centres. Five sections were supporting the HOM and the HOM (Pol and Ops) and the COO; A logistical unit decentralised from the headquarters to better meet all of the deployed units' logistical requirements; A signal section was responsible for maintaining and operating the communication system within the headquarters and providing technical support to all reporting centres; An administrative section was responsible for the overall administration of the headquarters and its personnel; A media office was responsible for all outside official communication; In addition toward the end of its second year of operation, the Mission took the decision to create a Humanitarian section with the primary responsibility of co-ordinating all humanitarian works done by the Mission, maintaining liaison with all of the humanitarian agencies within the operational theatre and investigating any special humanitarian situations. All counties involved in the ECMM have a small detachment overseeing the logistical needs of their representatives, including, among others, their rotation, repatriation and provision of protective garments.

5 The strategic level in this case represents the decision process at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EC and EC Presidency level. The operational level links the strategic and the tactical levels of operations. It is the level at which major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within an area of operation. In this case the ECMM's headquarters, where the decision-making process originated for the entire mission, was the operational level. The tactical level was the actions taking place at the monitors and regional centre level.


7 This is a concept that has been developed by the Argentineans in the early 1990’s and launched in 1993 as a global initiative for the creation of national volunteer groups, called White Helmets. They would be available to the UN with the main objective of providing a reserve capability to developing counties in support of UN activities. They would mobilise in the field of emergency humanitarian assistance and the gradual transition from relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. This concept was later on endorsed by the UN General Assembly. (See the A/RES/49/139/B dated December 20, 1994 and A/RES/50/ 144 dated July 10, 1995.) It was fully endorsed by the UN General Assembly A/RES/50/19/ as of December 22,1995) as “The White Helmets” initiative (participation of volunteers in activities of the United Nations in the field of humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and technical co-operation for development).