LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING PROGRAM (LSP) MIDTERM EVALUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING

Final Draft

November 2011

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LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING PROGRAM (LSP): MIDTERM EVALUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................... III
ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................... 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... 2
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 7
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................. 12
FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS ....................................................................................... 16
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 28
RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................... 29
ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK ............................................................................................... 34
ANNEX 2: PROJECT TIMELINE ......................................................................................... 43
ANNEX 3: RESUMES OF EVALUATION TEAM ..................................................................... 44
ANNEX 4: DESCRIPTION OF LSP OBJECTIVES ................................................................. 46
ANNEX 5: ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED FROM MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ........ 47
ANNEX 6: THE FISH-KROENIG LEGISLATIVE POWERS SURVEY ................................... 49
ANNEX 7: BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 51
ANNEX 8: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS ........................................................... 52
ANNEX 9: THE DEVELOPMENTAL ARCH ......................................................................... 53
ANNEX 10: COMPOSITION OF FOCUS GROUPS ................................................................. 55
ANNEX 11: RESPONSES TO SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE (CIVIL SOCIETY) ................................................................. 56
ANNEX 12: RESPONSES TO SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE (MEDIA) ........... 58
ANNEX 13: SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE ON DONOR AND PROGRAM COORDINATION ................................................................. 60
ANNEX 14: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS ............................................................................. 62
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECOM</td>
<td>LSP Implementing Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPPS</td>
<td>Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Change Management Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Council of Representatives (Parliament)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General of the COR’s Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRL</td>
<td>State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Rights and Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICPD</td>
<td>Iraq Center for Parliamentary Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISCI</td>
<td>Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>Legislative Strengthening Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MPDP</td>
<td>Members Parliamentary Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Management Services International</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERFORM</td>
<td>Performance Evaluation and Reporting for Results Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>QED</td>
<td>The QED Group, LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMP</td>
<td>Performance Management Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Parliamentary Powers Index</td>
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<td>SOW</td>
<td>Scope of Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>STTA</td>
<td>Short Term Technical Assistance Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly or Training Needs Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Midterm Evaluation of the Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP), financed by USAID's Democracy and Governance Program, is organized into two parts: (1) LSP performance assessment since 2008 and (2) recommendations for future directions. The LSP is implemented by AECOM in partnership with Management Systems International (MSI). LSP’s purpose is to strengthen the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) and help to ensure its sustainable development. The program began October 1, 2008 and has since been extended to March 2014. Its current project value is $73.1 million. The scope of the program is defined by the following six sub-results, hereinafter referred to as objectives:

1. Developed and strengthened Iraq Center for Parliamentary Development;
2. Strengthened staff capacity and political will for staff reform;
3. Streamlined legislative process and improved committee operations;
4. Strengthened oversight and budget review capacity;
5. Strengthened COR outreach; and
6. Improved donor coordination and COR development planning abilities.

This midterm evaluation serves four purposes: (1) to substantiate whether LSP’s objectives have been or will likely be achieved; (2) to assess whether the methodology and approach of the LSP is effective in working toward those objectives; (3) to help set reasonable expectations for what can be achieved over the next three years, if the Mission continues to invest in LSP activities; and (4) to inform the scope of future investments in Iraq’s national legislature.

Table 1: LSP Evaluation Interviewees and Questionnaire Respondents by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECOM Leadership and Staff</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR Senior Staff Members</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR Political Advisors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR Academic Advisors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Government Commissions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freelance Journalists</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG implementing partners</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern scholars (outside Iraq)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Donors and Implementing Agencies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two principal evaluation participant groups were targeted: 1) LSP’s implementing partner (AECOM) and 2) LSP’s direct beneficiaries, Members of Parliament (MP) and the Council of Representatives (COR). Participation from a small segment of indirect beneficiaries that interface with the COR include: Iraqi
political and academic advisors, media representatives, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Other stakeholders reached include representatives of the USAID Mission to Iraq and the US Embassy and other donors and implementing actors. The qualitative evaluation design employs the following methods: document/content review, analysis of LSP Performance Management Plan (PMP) data, one-to-one in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and anonymous self-administered questionnaires. Data and information were compiled and processed from a total of 36 interviews and 38 completed self-administered questionnaires (Table 1) as well as two focus group discussions (FGD).

The inability to successfully tap into certain groups or secure purposively selected individuals during the relatively short and untimely (Ramadan) evaluation period is a significant limitation to evaluation findings.

Evaluation participation represents a relatively small and narrow subset of groups and individuals conveniently selected. The Team is aware of the potential bias to findings. Methodological checks and balances have been employed to ensure the highest possible quality data (i.e., triangulation of methods and respondents and anonymity of questionnaire respondents).

The findings of the Evaluation Team are presented in response to the evaluation questions posed by USAID, first, with respect to LSP performance and, second, with respect to potential future direction of the program.

Responses to Questions on LSP Performance

Question 1: Is the current approach to strengthening the legislative process in Iraq effective?

The Evaluation Team is of the opinion that LSP’s current approach to strengthening the legislative process in Iraq is not effective based on the following findings:

- At midterm, LSP falls short of meeting most of its base period objectives (with the exception of strengthened budget review capacity). Review of current PMP data show indicators are not fully met (either the performance criteria/index items were not satisfied or the projected target was not reached). At the same time, interpretation of these values and assessment of likely determinants show that not all of these shortfalls are a reflection of AECOM performance, but rather generated by the political situation in the COR.

- The Assessment and Program Design Phase Final Report identified three important success factors for program implementation: counterpart ownership, realistic program design, and a strong team. None of these factors has been given full attention. As of now (August 2011), there is insufficient counterpart ownership, the program design is over-ambitious relative to the existing state of development and COR political realities, and implementing staff and “partners” are deeply frustrated and not coming together cohesively enough to find broad success as a team.

Question 2: What are the successes and shortcomings of the current project? What aspects of project design and implementation contributed to these outcomes?

Successes resulted from providing targeted technical assistance; i.e., the fellowship program, the orientation program, and budgetary guidance to the COR in areas where it had little to no institutional capacity. Identified shortcomings can be described in two ways: (1) those beyond the control of AECOM and resulting from the delays associated with the 2010 election; and (2) those due to deficiencies in AECOM staff capacity and structure and unsuccessful navigating negative circumstances which threatened to overtake the program.

Question 3: Has the project yielded results and impacts, other than those planned, which should be documented?

The Team has not identified any unplanned positive impact, but surmises that the project has had unintended unfavorable impact. That the program should be more responsive
to cultural and contextual learning needs was a theme heard consistently from MPs, COR DGs, and party officials. However, the question remains; did LSP performance warrant these criticisms or was it political?

**Question 4:** Rate the effectiveness of LSP’s approach to operating in an unstable political environment, including the 2010 national elections and protracted government formation which effectively stalled the work of the COR. AECOM staff was indeed burdened by several political circumstances outside the control of the program. For example, the protracted formation of the new government and the subsequent ‘change in the guards’ at the COR, resulted in the introduction of a Sadrist party First Deputy Speaker. However, AECOM appears to have lacked the capacity to address or adapt to circumstances that are inherent to the dynamic, highly politicized Iraq programming environment. The program was affected by political circumstances but was unskilled in dealing with them. AECOM’s first response to the political shut-down was to shift its emphasis to staff training and committee assistance – not unreasonable under the circumstances. However, after viewing the political landscape in early 2011, experienced political players would have attempted to build pressure with a sizeable coalition of respected MPs.

Even bigger and broader than LSP performance, the evaluation discovered a sobering public reaction to the government’s inability to address their concerns since the 2010 election. Evaluation participants felt the question of LSP performance was irrelevant when MPs are inaccessible and not accountable to the people they represent and should serve.

**Question 5:** Were the expectations of the primary beneficiaries, the members, staff and administration of the COR, met by the performance of the project? Is there sufficient political will in the COR for continued donor-assisted development programs in general, and for the LSP in particular? Overall, the Team found no indication that program stakeholders or direct beneficiaries are thoroughly enthusiastic about the LSP program – though there are discrete areas where LSP support was unique, targeted and, therefore, deemed valuable by stakeholders. The evaluation team noted a sense of fear amongst stakeholders just below the surface that presents a constant barrier to program benefits. At the same time, LSP has not adequately identified the COR’s needs, nor optimized regional and other expert practitioners for cultural perspective and strategic value. In addition, COR “political will” may need to be stimulated externally.

**Question 6:** How does the Evaluation Team assess the sustainability (including ‘localization’ and ‘institutionalization’) of program interventions and project results? For reasons already stated, the Team finds that sustainability for LSP goals is still some distance away, and will be determined by the settlement of current political difficulties that beset the program.

**Responses to Evaluation Questions on Future Opportunities**

**Question 1:** Are there institutional ties between the COR and USAID’s donor partners, and, if so, how strong are they? The Department of State grantee, National Democratic Institute (NDI) appears to enjoy a more welcoming relationship with the COR. NDI is not subject to the lack of access to the COR experienced by AECOM, although both are American entities. Because AECOM has a bigger presence, it may be caught in a political stratagem to keep the COR off-balance. In an assessment of COR institutional needs before inaugurating its own legislative strengthening program, UNDP determined that it would work at two levels: “institutional and substantive”. Encouraged by

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1 Information provided during an Evaluation Team meeting (September 12) with UNDP’s Crisis Prevention and Recovery Advisor Helen Olafsdottir, who assessed COR legislative strengthening needs with the support and encouragement of the Sadrist First Deputy Speaker Sheikh Khalid Al-Attiya.
COR Sadrists, UNDP is careful to target its technical assistance only to needs identified by MPs. The EU is also designing a major technical assistance program, but it is not scheduled to begin until after January 2012. Based on questionnaire responses to donor coordination, two foreign government sponsors (Germany and Italy) are withdrawing and Britain (through Global Partners) describes mutual coordination between its project staff and COR’s long-standing staff.

**Question 2:** Have there been key changes in the legislative environment since the USAID baseline assessment: (a) in organizational changes within the COR; (b) in mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which governance is exercised; and (c) in relationships between actors in the legislative process? The key organizational, process, institutional, and relational changes in the legislative environment since 2008 are well documented throughout this Report.

**Question 3:** What is the COR’s developmental arch? Using the Fish-Kroenig survey, what “sister” parliaments (those with similar parliamentary cultures and powers) can be identified for purposes of a comparative analysis? The USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening compares the roles of various legislatures. The COR was designed as a hybrid system combining parliamentary and presidential models and adapted Iraqi norms. The Team finds the developmental arch of the COR is closer to a parliamentary regime than a presidential or hybrid system.

In response to the question phrased in the SOW, “Is investment in legislative strengthening over the next three years (2012-2015) likely to lead to tangible improvement in the responsiveness of Iraq’s government to priority citizen needs?”, evaluation findings show that representative, accountable government does not currently and is unlikely to flow from Iraq’s current electoral system. Therefore, the counter question is whether or not there is time to await reform of the electoral process from within and, while waiting, continue to strengthen the legislative institution. Alternatively, is it feasible to try to stimulate electoral reform externally by supporting an indigenous movement of Iraqi activists seeking electoral reform?

Two principal recommendations are made for addressing identified core issues: 1) LSP strengthening and 2) election law reform. These recommendations might be treated as mutually exclusive options, or addressed together (starting at or about the same time, but with different time horizons). Recommendations are outlined below, the first calling for comprehensive and prioritized programmatic changes to LSP, followed by a fundamental electoral change over a longer term.

**Recommendations for Programmatic Issues in the Short Term**

1. **Diplomatic Intervention:** USG intervenes at a significant diplomatic level with both the Iraqi Government and the COR Leadership to remove existing LSP implementation barriers.
2. **Revisit MOU Negotiation:** MOU should be opened for further negotiation to create more COR input into the activities that are to be carried out by LSP.
3. **Functional Analysis/Needs Assessment:** In a collaborative effort, LSP with COR staff shall update its functional analysis of the directorates from an overall institutional perspective, and then perform a Needs Assessment to determine the overall institutional needs of the COR.
4. **Rules and Policies to Prevent Political Interference with Secretariat:** Original political orientation design of the COR Secretariat should be changed to merit-based hiring.
5. **Draft Scope of Work and Work Plan with Institution-Building Theme:** LSP and COR staff shall draft a SOW and Work Plan reflecting agreement on program-supported technical assistance and determinants of success, such as an adjusted and more realistic program design, renewed local counterpart ownership, and a professionally strong implementation team.
6. **Repair Relationship with Media Directorate:** Based on reported false attribution of credit by AECOM for work it did not perform as reported by the Media DG.
7. **Build Relationship with the COR**: As part of relationship building and fostering trust with the COR, improve communication with the COR about the program and assistance it can provide to MPs and staff.

8. **Streamline Reporting Requirements**: The pressure to submit timely, required reports at the current volume and frequency is burdensome for staff. It may also lead to inaccurate or, as revealed in the Report, false reporting. This is related to the nature of the implementing mechanism; a deliverables contract in which the contractor is paid based on submission of deliverables, including reports. This has led to a skewed perception as to whether the client is the COR or USAID.

9. **Improve Quality of Training Delivery**: Institute case-oriented training; ensure that trainers are skilled practitioners and Arabic speakers; coordinate training from one central office in line with the organizational chart; ensure training is competency-based and performance needs are gauged; utilize state-of-the-art training methods and materials; and ensure the use of training participant selection criteria.

10. **Reduce USAID Branding**: Brand with discretion. USAID to provide guidance.

11. **Promote Merit-Based Staff Hiring**: Staff appointments to the COR Secretariat and/or COR Committees should be guided by professional standards.

12. **Facilitate Civil Society Involvement**: Develop an advocacy strategy that educates legislature and constituencies about the role of civil society in governance and legislative development, builds on AECOM’s efforts to encourage civil society input into legislative hearings, and engages civil society in finding solutions to issues preventing delivery of public services (i.e., healthcare, education, utilities, and industrial and agricultural pollution control).

13. **Promote Association with Iraqi Universities for Consultation and Expertise**: Activities can be undertaken independently or through the new Parliamentary Development Center.

14. **Ensure Transition for the Next Parliamentary Term**: A well-executed transition to the next term will go a long way in renewing relationships with the COR. AECOM’s model for orientation and training at the beginning of Parliament’s current term was effective.

15. **Ongoing Training to MPs**: Computer literacy; English language; Iraqi constitution; analysis of public services and delivery; rules of legislative engagement (legislative drafting, management of plenary and committee sessions, debate, amendments, and motion practice); and train women parliamentarians.

16. **Re-visit Opportunities for Exchange Visits**: Field visits outside of Iraq were endorsed by both AECOM and the COR. This activity creates healthy competition between potential recipients and serves as an incentive to higher performance.

17. **Reduce Program Overlap**: Strengthened donor coordination and an expanded donor group that includes each donor’s implementing partners could be a solution.

The Team Leader’s recommendation for electoral reform addresses the fundamental and longer-term issues. Electoral reform is a political undertaking. The USG should not undertake this initiative on its own but rather as an international initiative (e.g., a broad cohort of Western democracies).

Finally, the Team recommends consideration of new projects that would support political reform. More specifically, the purpose of such projects would be to: 1) strengthen political parties that would serve as counter-weight to existing political party models, and 2) strengthen the role of civil society in Iraq that would transfer learning in how to make voices heard and counted in the halls of parliament.
INTRODUCTION

This Report presents the results of an independent midterm evaluation of the Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP) financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Democracy and Governance Program. Evaluation results are organized into: (1) assessment of LSP performance since 2008; and (2) recommendations for the future direction of USAID legislative strengthening in Iraq.

The LSP was designed to assist Iraq’s Council of Representatives (COR) in meeting its goals and objectives as the nation’s national parliament. With the LSP extended to 2014, there is an imperative for projections about the program’s future opportunities and direction.

Background on Governance in Iraq, 2005-2011

USAID/Iraq’s Democracy and Governance Program is based on the view that responsiveness and effectiveness of Iraq's governance institutions might be strengthened by supporting: (1) community-based development and decentralization, (2) national policy management and administrative reform, (3) electoral management, and (4) legislative strengthening. Effective, responsive governance is a priority for Iraq’s sustainable development.

However, the fractious political process in Iraq impedes progress in these areas. Specifically, tensions between the executive and legislative branches of government frustrate needed reforms and contribute to Iraq's political turmoil. Iraq’s four major political coalitions are externally divided, despite what was seen as progress in the 2005 Constitution formation process, the 2006-2009 term of the COR, and the 2010 government formation negotiations. Yet the roads to Iraq’s stable political transition continue to lead through the COR, where all consequential legislation must be negotiated and finalized. While the COR’s formal Constitutional powers are significant, its capacity to exercise them in a meaningful and constructive way remains weak.

Overview of U.S. Government Support and Response

USAID’s support to Iraq’s national parliament began with the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), elected in January 2005 after transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the Iraq Governing Council in 2004. Governed by the CPA’s Transitional Administrative Law, the TNA’s primary task was to write a permanent constitution, authorize a popular referendum and, following ratification and national elections, transition authority to a permanent legislative body.

During this process, two significant governance decisions were made:

(1) Representation in transitional bodies was allocated based on religious and ethnic groupings. The absence of Iraqi experience in policy-based politics, as is typically found in modern democracies, left no basis for selecting parties other than through ethnic and sectarian lines. With the approval of American policymakers in the CPA, such groupings were established for Iraq’s initial transition to democratic forms in the 2005 elections. These sectarian divisions intensified into cleavages from 2006 to 2008 when sectarian violence was at its height. Some scholars noted that, as a result, Iraqis began to show a negative disposition towards sectarianism.2 But in the elections of 2009 and 2010, while there appeared to be some crossover from one sectarian group to another, the parties still retained their

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2 Dai Yamao, Panel on Building Political Parties in Iraq, June 22-23, 2011
respective sectarian allegiances and sought coalition building to extend their power reach beyond their largely sectarian base.

(2) The Election Law, gazetted on September 15, 2005, as later amended, established in law Iraq’s current proportional representation voting system. A nationwide estimated population of 30,000,000 divided by 300 national seats yields the 100,000 votes one must get to win a seat in the COR. The COR has 325 seats, but 25 are allocated as compensatory seats to minorities - Christians, Turkmen, Yazidis, and Sabiat. If the Party itself or its leader aggregates over 100,000 votes, the leader (after ensuring he has his 100,000 votes) may then allocate the overage to anyone on his open list who needs votes to reach 100,000, or to anyone else in the same position. Pledges of absolute support are extracted in return. This system yields huge imbalances. For example, someone with 47 votes can be given 99,953 votes and win, while a person with 60,000 votes on his own (with no overage allocated to him) loses. Representation and accountability in this system seem diminished.

In this early transition period, USAID supported the TNA through technical assistance for the drafting and adoption in 2005 of an Iraqi Constitution. After national elections in December of 2005, responsibility for USG donor assistance to the COR shifted to the State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Rights and Labor (DRL). In late 2007, the Government of Iraq requested assistance from the U.S. for improvements in the COR’s (1) management of its external affairs, (2) institutional management, and (3) legislative processes.

**Description of the Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP)**

The Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP) is implemented by AECOM in partnership with two subcontractors, Management Systems International (MSI) and Sallyport Global Services, which provides security. The purpose of the LSP is to help strengthen the COR and facilitate its future institutional development along a more sustainable democratic path.

The program’s design is based on the Baseline Parliamentary Assessment, conducted in July 2006. The program’s two-year base period started on October 1, 2008 and has been extended (several times) to March 2014 (See the Project timeline in Annex 2). The total budget now stands at $73.1 million.

**Figure 1:** USAID Mission to Iraq, Strategic Objective 10 and corresponding Intermediate Results

| Strategic Objective: Capacity of National Government Institutions Improved |
| Intermediate Result 10.1: Core functions of national level institutions improved |
| Intermediate Result 10.2: Policy, legal and regulatory environment improved |

LSP’s Six Objectives

(See description of these objectives in Annex 4)

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3Original results framework; Modification #8 streamlined these 6 objectives into 2: Building the Capacity of the COR’s Administrative Systems, Structures and Management of Change; and Improving COR Parliamentary Functions.
LSP falls under Strategic Objective (SO) 10 of the USAID/Iraq Transition Strategy (2006-2008), “Capacity of National Government Institutions Improved,” and is designed to contribute to this SO through the following two Intermediate Results (IRs): 10.1 Core Functions of National Level Institutions Improved; and IR 10.2 Policy, Legal, Regulatory Environment Improved. LSP’s initial scope is defined by six broad objectives, (contributing sub-results), which provided the basis for technical assistance during the base period:

1. Developed and strengthened Iraq Center for Parliamentary Development;
2. Strengthened staff capacity and political will for staff reform;
3. Streamlined legislative process and improved committee operations;
4. Strengthened oversight and budget review capacity;
5. Strengthened COR outreach; and
6. Improved donor coordination and COR development planning abilities.

The program was intentionally designed to apply broadly rather than deeply, given the lack of a prior comprehensive parliamentary strengthening program in Iraq. The description in Annex 4 spells out the justification of each objective. In the option year (April 2011 to March 2012), USAID refined these objectives to the following two (partially in response to no or significantly diminished access to COR personnel and activities): (1) capacity for change management strengthened and (2) core parliamentary functions strengthened. Major activities to improve governance included: (1) strengthening internal parliamentary management systems, (2) institutionalizing checks and balances through the budget oversight and legislative process, and (3) expanding citizen access to the legislative process. The revision de-emphasized the initial objective, Developed and strengthened Iraq Center for Parliamentary Development, while other major activities remain the same.

The Evaluation looks at LSP up through the present (the base period and four months of the option year) and focuses on the original six objectives for which AECOM had been responsible up until March/April 2011. That said, it is important to note that during the option year LSP is to be implemented with a degree of flexibility as the context has changed over the life of the Program.

Table 2 shows LSP base period objectives and the major activities designed to contribute to the achievement of each objective.

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**Table 2: LSP base period objectives and major activities**

**LSP Objective 1: Developed and Strengthened Iraqi Center for Parliamentary Development (ICPD)**

**Major Activities:**
- Design and governance of the Iraqi Center for Parliamentary Development (ICPD).
- Procure basic equipment for ICPD.
- Support for the development of ICPD institutional research products.
- Development of ICPD training programs.
- Build linkages with other parliamentary institutes internationally.
- Enable the ICPD to provide a parliamentary development strategy to newly-elected COR.

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**LSP Objective 2: Strengthened staff capacity and political will for staff reform**

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4 LSP Performance Management Plan (PMP), October 2010 – March 2011, p5
5 LSP Performance Management Plan (PMP), October 2010-March 2011, p7
Major Activities:
- Comprehensive COR Management & Service Review
- Delivery of Core Staff Training
- Developing Human Resources Capacity
- Fellow, Apprentice, and Intern Programs
- Build COR Technical Capacity to Facilitate Networking and Office Automation

LSP Objective 3: Streamlined legislative process and improved committee operations

Major Activities:
- Help the COR to develop bylaws
- Strengthen legislative document management systems and platforms for improved transparency and accountability
- Strengthen legislative management processes for transparency & accountability
- General support in strengthening committee operations
- Support to the Presidency Council Offices
- Overall support to COR to enhance the role of newly-elected

LSP Objective 4: Strengthened oversight and budget review capacity

Major Activities:
- Support to the establishment of a Budget Office
- Strengthened MP awareness and knowledge of oversight techniques
- Improved ability of sectoral Committees to hold the Government accountable for performance
- Improved functioning of “Money” Committees
- Improved communication between selected Committees and Ministries

LSP Objective 5: Strengthened COR outreach

Major Activities:
- Increase COR presence in the provinces
- Support to the parliamentary outreach activities
- Improve COR Transparency through COR media development

LSP Objective 6: Improved donor coordination and COR development planning Abilities

Major Activities:
- Improve capacity for donor coordination by the COR
- Improve medium-term vision with regards to parliamentary development

The LSP management structure was created to facilitate internal project coordination as well as regular consultations with both USAID and parliamentary leadership. Currently the program has a total of 58 staff members (12 expatriates and 46 Iraqis). With the recent shift in LSP’s approach to the COR (in response to AECOM’s diminished access imposed by the COR) each expatriate staff member is assigned a certain number of Committees.
**Purpose of the LSP Midterm Evaluation**

Following the 2010 elections, there was an 80 percent turnover in the COR’s membership, making critical the need to support COR’s democratic development and increase the likelihood of sustainable governance. However, the COR’s political leadership was unable to gain traction and set the overall tone for assistance, while growing Sadrist discontent with American presence in the COR culminated in AECOM employees being prevented access to the COR. Whether LSP positioned itself to consolidate gains, make adjustments and seize new opportunities is a central question of this evaluation. The evaluation will serve four purposes:

1. To substantiate whether LSP’s objectives (expected results) have been or are likely to be achieved;
2. To assess whether the methodology and approach of the LSP is effective in working toward achievement of program objectives;
3. To help set reasonable expectations on what can be achieved over the next three years, if the Mission continues to invest in legislative strengthening activities at the current levels; and
4. To inform the prioritization and scope of future investments in Iraq’s national legislature, not just as an end in itself, but also as a platform for broader Mission democracy and governance objectives.
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation design is based on the SOW, employing qualitative methods to answer specific questions solicited for this assessment (see Annex 1: SOW, Section III). Because the evaluation is qualitative, findings do not necessarily represent the larger groups with which evaluation participants are affiliated. To the extent possible, the mix of information gathering methods and participant groups filtered anecdotal information, perceptions and opinions and enriched the base of information gathered. The table below provides a snapshot of the framework used to develop the evaluation methodology.

Table 3: Information needs and corresponding information sources and methods of collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information needs</th>
<th>Respondent Groups</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSP project description and history of USG assistance</td>
<td>AECOM, USAID</td>
<td>Document review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq’s political landscape</td>
<td>Academics, independent journalists, political party officials</td>
<td>Document review, interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of LSP’s performance</td>
<td>MPs, COR staff, AECOM, journalists, USAID/ Iraq</td>
<td>Interviews, self-administered questionnaires, document review, PMP content review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSP successes and shortcomings</td>
<td>MPs, COR staff, AECOM, USAID/ Iraq</td>
<td>Interviews, document review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR performance</td>
<td>MPs, COR staff, AECOM</td>
<td>Document review, interviews, self-administered questionnaires, focus groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ access to the COR</td>
<td>MPs, CSOs</td>
<td>Interviews, focus groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying ‘sister parliaments’ for the COR</td>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>Interviews, document review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor and program coordination</td>
<td>Donors (providing assistance to the COR), AECOM, USAID/ Iraq</td>
<td>Interviews, self-administered questionnaire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Team Composition
The Evaluation Team comprised four members (see resumes in Annex 3): 1) Jack J. Schramm (US), Team Leader, Legislative Reform Specialist and International Development Counsel; 2) Anitra Jankevica (Latvia/EU), Parliament Specialist; 3) an Iraqi Media Expert; and an Iraqi Translator/Interpreter.

Principle Evaluation Activities
The evaluation period was from July 21 – September 23 and included one week of pre-departure preparation and planning and eight weeks deployment in Baghdad. Principle evaluation activities carried out over this time period include: extensive review of background and program documents, meetings in
The Team Leader and Parliament Specialist coordinated closely with USAID/Iraq’s Democracy and Governance (D&G) representatives in Baghdad and had begun networking prior to arrival in Baghdad. Identification of local contacts was more feasible and systematic once the Team was complete with its local counterparts. A mid-term evaluation briefing of the D&G team and a wider audience of USAID offices and representatives (i.e., Executive, Program, Technical, Contracts, Finance) helped to inform methodological priorities in the last stages of fieldwork.

**Selection of Evaluation Participant Groups**

Two principal evaluation participant groups were targeted as part of the methodology: 1) LSP’s implementing partner (AECOM) and 2) LSP’s direct beneficiaries (MPs and COR senior staff). Contacts were identified from these groups to participate in interviews or discussions and/or complete self-administered questionnaires. The Evaluation Team secured participation from a small segment of indirect beneficiaries that interact or potentially interface with the COR – more specifically, Iraqi political and academic advisors to the COR, independent journalists that report on COR activities, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that provide input into the COR. Program and governance stakeholders were included in the evaluation: representatives of the USAID Mission to Iraq and the US Embassy as well as other donors and implementing actors (Annex 8, List of Interviews and Meetings).

**Collection of Data and Information**

Data collection methods were chosen and instruments developed to answer questions solicited in the Evaluation Team’s SOW. Methods include: document review (Annex 14, List of Documents), analysis of LSP report Performance Management Plan (PMP) data, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and anonymous self-administered questionnaires. Review of current PMP data informed interview and discussion questions and served as a means of triangulation. Data and information were compiled and processed from a total of 36 interviews, 38 completed self-administered questionnaires, and two focus group discussions (FGD). Table 3 shows the distribution of interview and questionnaire respondents.

**Interviews** were conducted one-to-one and lasted on average of 1.5 hours. Through its local member, the Team was able to access a limited number of MPs from different parties, including Sadrists and prominent political party officials. Party affiliations represented by MP interview respondents include: The National Alliance (3), IRAQIA (2), and the Kurdistan Alliance (1). The Team expanded its pool of COR interviewees by asking each person interviewed to reach out to their network for individuals available and willing to be interviewed. The vast majority of COR senior staff are men.

**Self-administered questionnaires** offered the option of anonymity. Questionnaires developed for MPs were distributed through a limited number of MPs (for wider circulation) with which the Team had interviewed and established cooperative relationships. Of the 170 distributed for wider circulation, only eighteen were completed and returned (the actual number of questionnaires circulated is not known). Self-administered questionnaires developed for senior COR staff members were not circulated due to hesitation on the part of the staff manager responsible for circulating. A separate set of questionnaires were distributed to members of the donor community (U.N. agencies and foreign governments) and the few implementing actors supporting the COR. Of the eight questionnaires distributed, three were completed and returned from Global Partners and Associates (British Embassy), Italian Embassy, and NDI (U.S. Department of State). Final sets of questionnaires were distributed to representatives of the media and CSOs, respectively.
FGDs were held with each media and CSO group of representatives following their completion of the questionnaires (Annex 10: Composition of Focus Groups). FGDs and questionnaires aimed to: (1) assess media access to the COR and coverage of COR activities, and (2) assess civil society access to the COR for purposes of legislative advocacy and executive oversight. This combined approach of methods, lasting about three hours, provided data and information of both depth and breadth and helped triangulate findings. Of the 10 (including two female) CSO representatives contacted, eight completed the questionnaire and all participated in the FGD. Of the 10 (including three female) media representatives contacted, nine completed the questionnaire and all participated in the FGD.

Table 3: LSP Evaluation Interviewees and Questionnaire Respondents by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECOM Leadership and Staff</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR Senior Staff Members</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR Political Advisors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR Academic Advisors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Government Commissions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG implementing partners</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern scholars (outside Iraq)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors and Implementing Agencies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Challenges and Limitations

The outcome of evaluation participation represents a small and narrow subset of groups and individuals from a much larger and more diverse pool of program direct and indirect beneficiaries and stakeholders. The inability to successfully tap into certain groups or secure purposively selected individuals during the relatively short and untimely evaluation period is a significant limitation to evaluation findings. As a result, the Team was not able to meet an adequate proportion of MPs (the Iraqi Parliament has a total of 325 seats) nor meet with members of the Executive Branch or COR’s provincial offices. The Evaluation Team is aware of the potential bias to findings. Although the number evaluation participants (groups and individuals) does not allow for optimal triangulation, the Team has incorporated checks and balances into its methodology and employed measures, where it could, to ensure the highest quality of data and information possible.

Principal reasons for this limitation include the following:

- The Evaluation Team was not complete until the early stage of fieldwork once a key local resource person was identified and hired for the purpose of linking the Team to a wide network of contacts and potential evaluation participants.
The evaluation design included purposive selection of evaluation participants to achieve, as possible, a cross-section of representatives and gender balance in each stratum (direct beneficiary, indirect beneficiary, and other program/governance stakeholder). However, on the ground and as the evaluation period evolved, the Team was limited to selecting groups and individuals out of convenience due to hesitation or unwillingness of many to participate, and unavailability of potential participants during the Ramadan period and COR holiday adjournment.

The Team was unable to assess opportunities for cost-sharing between the COR and USAID as it had planned due to strained relations between the COR and USAID.
FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

Findings are presented in response to the evaluation questions posed by USAID, first, with respect to LSP performance, and, second, with respect to future directions for the program.

A. Responses to Evaluation Questions for LSP Performance

Current available LSP performance data show the extent to which indicators are met for each of the six objectives in the base period. The “actual” values documented in the PMP (vis-à-vis performance targets) provide a useful quantitative snapshot of LSP performance, which has served as a basis for response to evaluation Question 1. Further qualitative assessment served to interpret and explain these values, address the other evaluation questions, and understand the likely determinants and implications of LSP achievements and shortfalls.

Question 1: Is the current approach to strengthening the legislative process in Iraq effective? To begin to answer the first question on LSP effectiveness, the Evaluation Team assessed LSP’s progress in achieving its base-period objectives. The table below (taken from the PMP) shows base period performance indicators by respective objectives, along with target and actual values for years two and three. Analysis of these figures and the merit of the measurements themselves are briefly discussed after the table.

Table 5: LSP’s progress in achieving its base-period objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Indicators by Objective</th>
<th>Baseline Values</th>
<th>Year 2 Values Oct 2009 - Sept 2010</th>
<th>Year 3 Values Oct - Mar 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Targets Actuals</td>
<td>Targets Actuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 1: ICPD developed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. (# of ) ICPD developed and operational</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2: COR staff capacity and political will for staff reform strengthened</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. (# of ) Administrative management processes reformed and service delivery improved</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. COR staff effectively trained</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>78% Apr-Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. (% of ) COR IT services effective and satisfactory</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27% Oct-Mar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 LSP Performance Management Plan (PMP), October 2010-March 2011
## Performance Indicators by Objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Baseline Values</th>
<th>Year 2 Values</th>
<th>Year 3 Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Objective 3: Legislative process streamlined and committee operations improved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus committees</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.2 Oct-Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary orientation</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Objective 4: Oversight and budget review capacity strengthened

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget research department</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight sessions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7 Oct-Mar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Objective 5: COR outreach strengthened

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial field offices</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18% Oct-Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary press gallery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Objective 6: Improved donor coordination and planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium-term development strategy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Objective 1: ICPD developed and operational

To date, four of at least nine items on AECOM’s performance index for this objective are documented as met and include: facility audit completed; mission statement approved by the Presidency Council; and AECOM-initiated facility renovations completed. While an impressive amount of work has been completed on infrastructure, IPCD development (in the more holistic sense) was assessed by the Evaluation Team as stalled and not operational under the current COR leadership. For these reasons, largely out of the contractor’s manageable interest, it is unlikely that this objective will be achieved by AECOM.

### Objective 2: COR staff capacity and political will for staff reform strengthened

According to the PMP data, this objective has been achieved. Actual values for all three indicators exceed the performance targets. Information obtained during fieldwork does not necessarily support this documentation. For example, eight of 12 criteria are reported as being met for Indicator 2.1...
Administrative management processes reformed…”), while most completed questionnaires self-administered by MPs show some to complete dissatisfaction with staff support. Met criteria include: completion of training needs analysis and follow-up training plan. However, evaluation findings reveal that training has not always been adapted to the needs of the COR, sometimes being too basic and other times too advanced. Indicator 2.2 (“COR staff effectively trained”) appears to be based loosely on test scores or outcomes of two individual and stand-alone training workshops, rather than the application of an intentional training approach. Several AECOM representatives acknowledge COR training standards need to be higher, citing COR staff not always having received training relevant to their functions, and DGs reportedly using LSP training to reward their staff rather than to meet identified capacity needs. These findings suggest that selected performance indicators are not necessarily appropriate or accurately measured and that this objective has been only partially achieved.

Objective 3: Legislative process streamlined, committee operations improved: Actual performance values are lower than the targets, which suggest that the objective is not met or is only partially met. With respect to one indicator, “parliamentary orientation effectively implemented”, the two-day orientation session provided does not seem sufficient to satisfy the indicator. Around 80 percent of MPs are new and some of them have only basic education. Based on interviews with MPs and their collective questionnaire responses, the Evaluation Team estimates that there is a considerable number of MPs who do not fully understand their role as an elected Member of Parliament.

Objective 4: Oversight and budget review capacity strengthened: Although this objective has not been fully achieved, this status is not necessarily a reflection of AECOM performance in this area. The stated and documented political delays affected the ability of the focus committees to carry out the budget review and oversight activities during the reporting period. Interviews with the LSP’s Budget Team suggest that AECOM has performed reasonably well toward the achievement of this objective.

Objective 5: COR outreach strengthened: With respect to the first of two indicators (“Provincial Field Offices provide MP services”), the Year three target is surpassed. Due to time and security constraints, the Evaluation Team did not visit any Provincial Offices. However, interviews with AECOM suggest that performance has been accurately measured and documented. With respect to the second indicator, (“Parliamentary Press Gallery established and active”), none of the 11 criteria have been satisfied. LSP explained that it sought to recruit an STTA to focus on the Press Gallery, but recruitment has been delayed until the start of the new project year. Based on interviews with both the DG of Media and AECOM, the Evaluation Team has learned there is currently no LSP assistance to the Press Gallery or to the Media Directorate, and repairing the relationship between AECOM and the Media Directorate will require some effort. The Evaluation Team suggests that this indicator be revisited and adjusted according to the future direction of the LSP and political realities in the COR.

Objective 6: Improved donor coordination and planning: This objective has not been achieved. None of the seven requisite pre-conditions for a medium term development strategy exist. COR’s capacity in donor coordination has not improved and AECOM itself is observed to be having difficulties in establishing productive or collegial relationships with other donors. To the contrary, AECOM is observed to have a strained relationship with NDI as well as with the other principle actors that will soon be operating in-country (i.e., EU, UNDP). In this situation, it will be increasingly difficult for AECOM to broker the attention of the COR.6

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6 It bears noting that, in Modification #10, USAID drastically reduced the budget for and focus on this objective, which had already become a sub-objective of the modified Objective #1. This reflected the assessment of USAID as to the feasibility of the COR absorbing donor coordination writ large, as a task, under its current political leadership (i.e. Sadrists elements responsible for coordinating with USG as a donor when Sadrists in COR will not meet with USG funded projects or staff).
With two of the six objectives not being met, three objectives partially met, and only one performing reasonably well, the Evaluation Team is of the opinion that LSP’s current approach to strengthening the legislative process in Iraq is not effective, at least as currently measured. The Assessment and Program Design Phase Final Report identified three important success factors for program implementation: counterpart ownership, realistic program design, and a strong team. None of these factors has been given full attention. There is currently insufficient counterpart ownership, the program design is over-ambitious relative to the existing state of development and COR political realities, and implementing staff and “partners” are deeply frustrated and not coming together as a team.

**Question 2:** What are the successes and shortcomings of the current project? What aspects of project design and implementation contributed to these outcomes?

**Answer:** The project has experienced a number of individual successes that appear mostly to be the result of filling a void - providing technical assistance in vital areas in which the COR lacked guidance and capacity. The most visible success attributed (anecdotally) to the LSP is the COR’s increased capacity in budget development and management. It became demonstrably clear at the beginning of the program that MPs and COR budget staff had no experience in budget development, expense tracking, or any basic fiscal management. Budgets were put together without line item justifications and were impossible to understand let alone use as a management tool. AECOM staff has mentored and provided targeted, applied technical assistance, which has paid off immensely and received consistently excellent feedback. The Fellowship Program can also be lauded as a success. It is viewed as being responsive to the needs of the COR.

**Other project performance highlights:**
- Trained 70% of provincial level COR staff in outreach by soliciting and encouraging participation from MPs and committee staff eager to learn despite an unsupportive environment in which professional development opportunities were often suppressed at the top.
- Introduced Budget Research Department (BRD) to a new way of looking at budget management, essentially, through Performance-Based Budgeting methodology.
- Leveraged support of selected key stakeholders, such as the former COR Secretary General.
- Transfer of skills in IT, communication and response to the media, organized public hearings,
- Noted TA in orientation to incoming MPs, MPDP Phase I, COR’s Human Resource policies, restructured modular approach to training COR staff, strategic planning among COR senior management.

The shortcomings fall into two categories: (1) those generated by the political situation in the COR, and (2) those generated or poorly managed by the LSP. Shortcomings in both categories have fed one another, culminating in a program that has stymied. Early delays prevented implementation during the period leading up to the 2010 election and the several months of Government formation thereafter. In the period that followed (from April 2011 forward), program activities were significantly hampered by government leadership’s refusals to approve: the launch of the Legistar bill tracking system; the development of the COR’s internet platform; and the progress of the ICPD. As an anti-American sentiment has begun to take root, LSP has not been able to gain appreciable ground nor build the requisite relationships with the COR. Further compounding an already-problematic operating environment are perceived deficiencies in LSP-supported training (i.e., inexperienced staff/trainers, non-applicable training content and methods, absence of Iraqi and regional expertise and lack of Arabic speakers). There was also an allegation by a high ranking official of false attribution of credit on the

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7 As objective 4 shows, however, current measurements are not always appropriate.

8 It should be noted that most of the 18 MPs responding in a self-administered survey rated LSP support in the middle or “good” range on a 5 point scale.

19 Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP) Midterm Performance Evaluation Report
part of one AECOM employee (since fired). LSP has demonstrated an overall inability to respond in a politically astute manner and allowed these circumstances to overtake the program and overshadow any gains.

Other shortcomings that have affected the performance of the program:

- The program generally seems to be unresponsive to the needs of the COR.
- Staff (expats) turnover at AECOM prevent developing critical relationships with the COR.
- Training is conducted without proper planning and coordination across AECOM offices.
- The AECOM Washington office is not perceived as responsive to LSP needs on the ground.
- AECOM operates under a deliverables contract mechanism that leads to a perception of USAID as the client, not the COR.
- AECOM has not been able to sell its program. Despite having the largest assistance program at the COR with a physical presence in the parliament, it is largely unknown to MPs. LSP has not been able to build a core of support to shepherd it through the politics of the institution.
- AECOM has not shown the necessary political savvy to operate in Iraq's complex political environment.
- USAID branding at a time of anti-American sentiment in the COR has done the project a disservice and shined a light on it, which political detractors used to the program's disadvantage.
- AECOM failed to communicate the difficulties encountered to USAID, particularly at an early stage when resolve might have been possible.

Question 3: Has the project yielded results and impacts, other than those planned that should be documented?

Answer: The Team has not identified any unplanned positive impact, but rather is led to believe that the implication of shortfalls in expected results has had unfavorable impact. The questions arise: How vulnerable to this criticism is the program? Is it real or political?

Question 4: How would the Team rate the effectiveness of LSP’s approach to operating in an unstable political environment, including the national elections and protracted government formation process of 2010, which effectively stalled the work of the COR?

Answer: The unstable political environment took root during 2004 to 2005 when Iraqis were divided into Shia, Sunni, and Kurd voting blocs. In 2005 an approved non-partisan constitution was approved in an attempt to end the tradition of Iraqi centralized authority. Subsequently, separate allegiances transcended into factional fighting and further ingrained original divisions. Continuing until the election of the second parliament in 2010 (which displaced 80 percent of incumbents), the result was a stalemate and months of negotiation before a Government was finally formed in late 2010. In the following months, Iraqi government has been dysfunctional: municipal services have not been upgraded, joblessness has been pervasive, Baghdad remained an armed camp, and Maliki began to consolidate power. Ordinary people, feeling ignored, took to demonstrations.

LSP was commissioned in late 2008 to help facilitate institutional development of the National Parliament along a more sustainable democratic path. By the Spring of 2011, a consensus agreement allowed Sadrists to share power in the COR via the Presidency Council (comprising the Speaker and his First and Second Deputies, similar to a “troika”), effectively creating veto capability. With this capability, any substantive LSP support was halted (i.e., Parliamentary Development Center and installation of
electronic bill tracking and voting systems) and confined to a circumscribed training schedule. For AECOM, the net result of this political context in Iraq has been a diminished program.

LSP's response to the political situation is viewed as ineffective. While the program was affected by political circumstances, AECOM was not skilled in dealing with these circumstances. AECOM's first response to the political "shut-down" was to shift its emphasis to staff training and committee assistance – not unreasonable under the circumstances. However, after viewing the political landscape, experienced political players might attempt to leverage pressure with a sizeable coalition of respected MPs, build inroads and create options within the parliamentary decision-making process.

More broadly, the depth and breadth of public reaction to the government's inability to address their concerns is sobering. In response to the question about the effectiveness of the LSP, most said that USAID should redirect the $70 million allocated to LSP to supporting the establishment of a democratic electoral system that produces parliamentarians who are accountable. More importantly, respondents have stated that this is the wrong question to be asking when “we cannot even get to our MPs”, “MPs aren’t accountable to the public”, and “MPs don’t represent us.”

Question 5: To what degree were the expectations of the primary beneficiaries – the members, staff and administration of the COR – met by the performance of the current project? Is there sufficient political will in the COR for continued donor-assisted development programs, in general, and for the Legislative Strengthening Program, in particular?

Answer: The Team was unable to identify any beneficiaries or stakeholders who are enthusiastic supporters of the program – except in areas in which LSP support was unique and, therefore, valuable (discussed above). While the Team is aware that 18 MP questionnaire respondents cannot be considered a representative sample, findings are still noteworthy (see Annex 5 for full analysis).

Half of the MPs who returned completed questionnaires did not answer all questions. Most respondents chose the option of anonymity, so any apprehension about revealing one’s identity is presumably not an issue. The Team speculates that these MPs have no knowledge of the activity in question and/or did not participate in the activity. Of the nine who responded to questions on familiarity with LSP programs and whether or not COR needs were addressed, most responses were in the middle range (“to some extent”) of a four-point Likert scale. Most responses to questions on the quality of support provided are also in the middle range (“good”). Responses to support desired, but not received include (in order of preference): legislative formulation and procedures (5), hearings (2), interfacing with media (2), trips (2), politics (1), the role of women MPs (1), and national reconciliation (1). This demonstrates some interest on the part of MPs in learning more, especially about legislative formulation and procedures. Regarding such issues as the quality of the assistance provided, whether COR needs were addressed, and familiarity with LSP programs, we find that the answers were mostly in the middle range, i.e., “to some extent” (not “to a large extent”) or “good” (not “very good”). The hedging suggests a lack of familiarity with these programs. But with respect to the relevance and usefulness of the information presented, the few who responded felt that the information was “very useful”, the top category, suggesting some enthusiasm when there was exposure to the training (See the full analysis in Annex 5).

At a deeper level, the Evaluation Team sensed a pervasive fear among respondents. A senior member of the Secretariat and an outspoken journalist had been recently assassinated. Senior COR staff members

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9 The Sadrist’s 40 seats allied with the ISCI 30 seats (another conservative religious bloc) and, when combined with Maliki’s 89 seats, provided Maliki a near majority (just four votes short and easily claimed once the Sadrist-ISCI alignment was brokered).
are cautious about talking with an American unless cleared by Sadrist leadership. Also, a recruited AECOM staff member was effectively dissuaded from employment with an American firm and subsequently resigned.

The question of “political will” on the part of the COR is more complex. Evaluation findings suggest that currently there is insufficient political will in the COR for the LSP to continue. Important parts of the program (ICPD, IT projects) have been stalled by the First Deputy Speaker. AECOM staff members do not have badges to enter the COR (however, nor do other donors). In the latest development, AECOM was asked inauspiciously to vacate its office in the COR to make room for the EU program. Moreover, LSP is not able to get an audience with the Speaker, not to mention the First Deputy Speaker. The situation may or may not change at the end of the year with the withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq. The US Army is regarded as an occupying force by the Sadrists and a prime reason for the antagonistic view of Americans in Iraq.

However, as suggested by MPs and COR staff members during key informant interviews, there are ways to potentially get through these barriers. For example, using allies and working through influential MPs who do not need the approval of the First Deputy Speaker and others who are blocking the process. There are moderate MPs amongst the Sadrists. Many MPs and interviewed observers outside the COR state that if LSP were able to offer training and assistance perceived as valuable, it could stimulate Sadrist MPs to participate. However, if the notion is at all viable it is still likely to be a slow process.

**Question 6:** How does the Evaluation Team assess the sustainability (including ‘localization’ and ‘institutionalization’) of program interventions, as well as project results and outcomes?

**Answer:** The Team finds that LSP interventions and outcomes are not sustainable. LSP is questioned and criticized from many directions and, in a number of vital areas, stopped altogether. On the basis of interviews, the Team found that program delivery is generally weak due to expressed staff deficiencies, and the inability of LSP staff to bridge cultural differences as documented throughout the report. LSP’s early expectation for sustainability lay in the furtherance of the Parliamentary Development Center, but its progress, though considerable, was suddenly stopped by the political situation. LSP is now conducting a functional review of all Directorates. A successful exercise means further assistance be adjusted to increase prospects for sustainability. Ultimately, sustainability rests in the settlement of political difficulties that beset the program. It is the team’s early finding that settlement is likely to come only if it is attempted at the highest political levels.

**B. Responses to Evaluation Questions for Future Opportunities**

**Question 1:** Strength of institutional ties between the COR and USAID’s donor partners.

**Answer:** To assess current and potential levels of program coordination between and amongst donors and implementing agencies, the Team surveyed key informants from the small pool of donors and implementing agencies that currently or will potentially support governance in Iraq. Findings presented below are based on data and information obtained through meetings and self-administered questionnaires.

NDI early on operated under USAID’s auspices in Iraq, and later became a State Department DRL grantee. It is clear to the Evaluation Team that both AECOM, as LSP’s implementer, and NDI are in competition, notwithstanding high level meetings that sought to open doors of communication and coordination between these two organizations. The competition plays out at the COR, with whom NDI

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10 Again, respondents in the self-administered survey rated the program in the middle range of five point scale.
seems to enjoy a more welcoming, if not more robust, relationship. The explanation is likely in a combination of factors. On the one hand, NDI might provide assistance that is more closely adapted to the needs of the COR and might be more successful in fostering and maintaining personal relationships with the COR. On the other, AECOM is a bigger entity that is visibly branded and therefore might present more of a target. The Evaluation Team recommends that the comparative advantages of these actors be clearly defined by donors and respective roles as USG representatives be clearly delineated and understood by recipients.

UNDP’s institutional ties to the COR appear to be strengthened or renewed. UNDP undertook an assessment earlier this year of donor assistance to the COR and potential areas in which it might make a contribution. UNDP determined that because training was provided by the LSP, it would not duplicate efforts and refrain from engaging in the same area. Instead, UNDP determined it would work at two levels: institutional and substantive. At the institutional level, potential targeted assistance might include Human Resource Development and Information Technology. At the substantive level, potential contribution might mean legal support through UN expertise to any number of committees, such as The Committee on Human and Labor Affairs. UNDP is conscientious about meeting technical assistance and support needs as identified by MPs and not interfering on a political level.

For these purposes, UNDP has received a one-year $300,000 grant from the “Global Fund”. If its program is successful, UNDP will likely seek and secure additional funding for further work with the COR. USAID might consider the option of coordinating its technical assistance through the GF.

The EU is procuring a 5.4 million Euro project for COR assistance, which will run for 22 months, beginning at some point in 2012. At the same time, the Evaluation Team was told that the COR had officially issued notice to AECOM that its administrative office on the COR premises had to be vacated within days in order to make room for the EU program. Because EU program start-up is not imminent, one might speculate that the eviction of AECOM from the COR is yet another instance of Sadrist pressure to remove USAID from the COR stage.

Self-administered questionnaires on donor and program coordination were completed and returned to the Evaluation Team by the German and Italian Embassies, Global Partners and Associates (Britain), and NDI (see Annex 13). For the most part, NDI and AECOM do not capitalize on opportunities for synergies and do not coordinate individual work plans. On the other hand, NDI and AECOM both point to instances of mutual cooperation.

Representatives from the German and Italian Embassies report that budget constraints are causing them to considerably curtail programs and so their engagement in the COR is minimal. Global Partners (British Foreign Office) are informed, long-standing participants in COR development programs and describe mutual coordination and understanding between theirs and the COR’s long-standing project staff.

The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID maintain its ongoing relationships with the UNDP and EU as well as other donors that seek to offer services to the COR with the purpose of collaboration and coordination and to avoid overlap and duplication of resources.

**Question 2: Key changes in the legislative environment since the USAID baseline assessment, including: (a) in organizational changes within the COR; (b) in mechanisms,**

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11 Although not reported by DFID in the questionnaire, Global Partners and LSP did coordinate in the area of COR budget (finance committee). In the past, LSP had Global Partners staff on its panels and workshops during the MPDP.
processes, and institutions through which governance is exercised; and (c) in relationships between actors in the legislative process.

**Answer:** The key organizational, process, institutional, and relational changes in the legislative environment since 2008 are documented throughout this Report. The 2010 elections arguably set the stage for dysfunctional government with Maliki’s grip on power and his assembly of a “shaky” coalition heavily reliant on the Sadrist. The consequent ceding of power over the COR to Sadrists by agreeing to a “troika” system of governance in the Speaker’s Office, effectively gives the Sadrist First Deputy Speaker veto power over every initiative. Moreover, Iran exercises influence through a relationship with the Sadrists.

a) With the change in leadership, the organization of the COR changed its tone in a way that blocked the USAID project's progress. These changes dramatically affected the ‘ownership’ of the project, the relationship of the LSP with the Secretariat, as well as its access to the Speaker's inner circle and therefore its protection.

b) With the current leadership's role in leading institutional development and administration at the COR, the mechanisms and processes which govern the COR changed in an adverse way for the LSP.

c) Maliki’s failure to unite the Government to enact legislation and improve service delivery leaves the Iraqi population discontent and restless.

In this climate, the AECOM administrative office in the COR has been forced to vacate. Perhaps positively stimulated by this climate is a growing acknowledgement of the place of civil society in governance (though much remains to be done in that area). Other small, but promising steps reported include: more time devoted to committee work, growing willingness to hold public hearings and exercise oversight, bylaws being talked about in the COR, and guidance on parliamentary procedures published on the parliamentary website (in Arabic).

**Question 3:** COR developmental arch and comparative analysis using “sister” parliaments and the Fish-Kroenig survey

**Answer:** The Evaluation Team consulted the USAID’s *Handbook on Legislative Strengthening*, particularly the table in Annex 9 that compares the parliamentary presidential models of government regarding the role and power of a legislature and its constituent parts (individual members, political party caucuses, the leadership, committees, staff, etc). Like many legislatures, the Iraqi Council of Representatives was designed as a hybrid system, and adapted norms of deliberation based on perceived values and preferences from Iraq’s emerging political culture. However, given Iraq’s political realities and the dominant role of party leaders and blocs, the Evaluation Team believes that the developmental arch of the COR is much closer to a parliamentary regime than a hybrid system (See Annex 9, The Developmental Arch).

To identify ‘sister’ parliaments which help to construct a comparative analysis, the Team used Professor Matthew Kroenig’s Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI). The PPI reflects a score that seeks to measure a legislature’s aggregate strength ranging from “zero” (least powerful) to “one” (most powerful). The PPI score is calculated by summing the number of powers (the authors identify 32 such

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12 See the Legislative Powers Survey (LPS) in M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, *The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). The LPS is a list of 32 items that gauge the legislature’s sway over the executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas, and its institutional capacity.
powers overall) that the national legislature possesses and dividing by 32. For example, a country with a national legislature that possesses 16 of the 32 parliamentary powers has a PPI of 0.50.

The components that are used to generate the PPI include:

- **Legislative powers survey**: A count of the number of powers (out of a possible 32) that gauge the legislature’s sway over the executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas, and its institutional capacity. These powers are clustered into four groups, as shown below (see the full list of powers in Annex 6). The variable ranges from zero (least powerful) to 32 (most powerful).

- **Influence over executive**: An index measuring the legislature’s influence over the executive. This variable is a count of the number of powers related to the legislature’s influence over the executive that the national legislature possesses, e.g., the legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials, and hearings with the executive branch or its committees are regularly held. The variable ranges from zero (least powerful) to nine (most powerful).

- **Institutional autonomy**: An index measuring the legislature’s institutional autonomy. This variable is a count of the number of powers related to institutional autonomy that the national legislature possesses, e.g., the legislature is immune from dissolution by the executive; the legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions. The variable ranges from zero (least powerful) to nine (most powerful).

- **Specified powers**: A count of the number of specified powers possessed by the national legislature, e.g., the legislature can change the constitution without the involvement of any other agencies. The variable ranges from zero (least powerful) to eight (most powerful).

- **Institutional capacity**: An index that gauges the legislature’s ability to do its work. This variable is a count of the number of specified powers related to institutional capacity possessed by the national legislature, e.g., the re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced members. The variable ranges from zero (least powerful) to six (most powerful).

The table below shows the PPI for countries in the Middle East.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PPI (max 1.00)</th>
<th>Rank on list</th>
<th>Legislative powers survey (max 32)</th>
<th>Influence over executive (max 9)</th>
<th>Institutional autonomy (max 9)</th>
<th>Specified powers (max 8)</th>
<th>Institutional capacity (max 6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>7-14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>41-49</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>74-81</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>93-102</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>93-102</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>108-117</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>123-131</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>132-137</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>145-149</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>145-149</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>155-156</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The European democracies top the list (falling primarily in the 0.72-0.84 range). With a PPI of 0.63, Iraq falls in the same group as Australia, US, South Africa, Portugal, India, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jamaica and Fiji. Most of its regional neighbors, with the notable exception of Turkey, are in the second half or toward the very end of the list. The problem, fairly evident in this juxtaposition, is that the parliamentary powers identified are those expressly set out in a Constitution. This measurement, performed without analysis, serendipitously places Iraq amongst the mature and established democracies. However, the reality is different. Iraq’s Constitution was helped and guided by Western democracies (mostly Americans, as was the case with Bosnia and Herzegovina). Thus, one is prompted to ask, is the Iraqi Council of Representatives using these powers (or is it able to use them)? The answer is no. On influence over the executive, Iraq scores 7 from max 9 (US is 5), which is quite good and represents what most countries on top of the list score (7-8), but the actual situation is completely the reverse. Also, on institutional autonomy, Iraq scores 8 out of max 9 (countries in the top of the list range from 6 to 7). However, the COR’s capacity to exercise those powers is very weak. Institutional capacity, in the opinion of the Evaluation Team, with the score of 2 from max 6, does reflect the real situation and is closer to most of its Arab neighbors in the region.

This exercise suggests to the Evaluation Team that, in the case of Iraq, the use of the PPI index should be exercised with discretion. The post-war political situation in Iraq plus Western assistance in the development of Iraq’s 2005 constitution may give a false impression about the strength of the COR. The Team consulted an expert in Middle Eastern legislatures and former UN Legal Adviser on constitutional reform in Iraq, who said:

“Although the Iraqi constitution provides it with wide ranging powers, the COR is essentially the same in nature and in function as other Arab parliaments. The Iraqi parliament probably passes less legislation than its Arab counterparts but that is mostly due to dysfunction at the Council of Ministers level and is also due to the ethno-sectarian system of governance that has been prevalent in the country since 2003, and which requires for all parties to agree to all policy initiatives. As with all other Arab parliaments, the Iraqi parliament cannot legislate without the Council of Ministers and also does not exercise effective oversight. What is required for the COR to become more effective is constitutional reform, something that is currently not in the cards.”

MPs are keen to visit other parliaments for training, and, in that connection, Lebanon is often mentioned as a destination. Our parliamentary experts suggest that other locations be sought on the grounds that Lebanon representation is also based on sectarianism and that model should not be encouraged (further) in Iraq. Nonetheless, the Team suggests that exposure to the operations of other parliaments would be a valuable (and welcome) experience for Iraqi MPs.

**Question 4: Civil society access to the COR for information purposes and for legislative advocacy and executive oversight.**

The Evaluation Team finds that for civil society to be effective in their interaction with the COR (in this case, CSO and media segments), these representatives need more knowledge about democratic political processes, parliamentary affairs and legislative procedures. Specific findings are highlighted below (See Annex 11 and 12 for CSO and Media responses to self-administered questionnaires, respectively).

Half of all CSO respondents of self-administered questionnaires (four) state that their input was frequently welcomed and utilized by the COR. Only two (of eight) found that their input frequently made its way into policy or draft legislation. Two respondents stated they understood the legislative process and where to intervene so that their voice could be effectively heard. When asked where they received information about the COR’s legislative agenda, two stated COR’s website and three cited contacts in the COR. When asked if, from their observation, MPs understood the role of civil society in the legislative process, most (six) report “no”. Two participants have testified in a public hearing.
Almost all said they would welcome a workshop on participation of civil society in the legislative process (Annex 11: Civil Society Responses to Self-administered Questionnaires).13

In the CSO FGD that followed, there was unanimous agreement (10 of 10) that the COR was not truly representative. The electoral system was identified as the underlying cause. Participants desire a USAID-supported program on educating civil society and voters on democracy, elections, and their government. All participants were of the opinion that CSOs should be allowed to observe COR sessions and to monitor the performance of MPs. Most CSOs feel neglected by their elected representatives whom they see being accountable to their political parties and not to the people. The Evaluation Team notes that the LSP is encouraging the COR committees to work more with civil society. The Team was told by several independent observers that in this parliamentary term there is greater involvement with civil society than in the last. While this shows progress, it does not dismiss the significant gap that exists between present practice and desired international standard.

Self-administered questionnaires completed and returned by nine representatives of the Media show only a few are familiar with the COR’s Rules of Procedure, oversight responsibilities, and legislative procedures. Only one person was familiar with the principles by which the parliamentary parties identify themselves. Only three stated having any (“some”) access to the COR. The journalists in the group were critical about their lack of free access to the COR members, committees and directorates. In the FGD that followed with 10 media representative, one journalist posited that many MPs are under the control of their political party leaders and, thus, a system of electronic voting is not in the interest of party leaders. There is solid consensus that MPs are not accountable to the people with the electoral system identified as the underlying cause. Almost all journalists state having been threatened before. There is unanimous opinion that journalists need to be able to follow/cover MP performance.

13 At the time of this research, LSP was planning a workshop, in collaboration with NDI, scheduled for November 2011.
CONCLUSION

Overall, findings show a gap between the people and the parties, which have little to no ideological basis and form power coalitions to govern. There are strong sentiments that the political leadership is more interested in the preservation and enhancement of its own political power than in the betterment of the people who are supposed to be the real beneficiaries. In this context, political parties, MPs and political appointees at the COR could be perceived as not being genuinely invested in the institutional development of the Parliament, or enhanced skills building and capacity building. This speaks to not only a lack of political will for the objectives of the LSP but a lack of interest in real fulfillment of those objectives.

While LSP has had some notable successes, these are outweighed by its inability to respond to identified performance and capacity needs within the cultural context; and its lack of political skills to navigate a complex and hostile political environment. The Evaluation Team finds that the LSP project needs to be re-envisioned through a modification of the scope of work and that staffing patterns should be reconsidered.

The Evaluation Team is also acutely aware of USAID’s influential and leadership role in supporting democratic change in the developing world, including in Iraq, and recommends negotiating continuation of a stronger LSP program at the highest diplomatic level. Only if negotiations are not effective does the Team recommend withdrawing the LSP.

The long-term stability of Iraq requires an elected Council of Representatives that is both representative of and accountable to the people at large. This is in line with USAID’s overarching Democracy and Governance objectives for Iraq. However, Iraq’s system of proportional representation (even with open lists) provides neither of these fundamental requirements. Many systems do, including many well-designed proportional representation models. The most fundamental question then raised by this evaluation is phrased in the SOW as follows: “Is investment in legislative strengthening over the next three years (2012-2015) likely to lead to tangible improvement in the responsiveness of Iraq’s government to priority citizen needs?” The Team’s short answer is that further investment in LSP is not justified until and unless MPs are elected under a democratic system that forces them to be accountable.

The Evaluation Team would be remiss to not address the fundamental weaknesses of the current political process documented throughout this report. Accordingly, the Team asks if there is time enough to await reform of the electoral process from within and, while waiting, continue to strengthen the legislative institution or whether electoral reform should be stimulated externally by supporting, but not leading, an indigenous movement of Iraqi activists seeking electoral reform. Political will, if exercised to make a more responsive parliament, might weaken the current grip of the leadership and may well need to be stimulated externally. The Team’s overall recommendation is for a joint approach: comprehensive LSP restructuring and fundamental electoral change over a longer term. Both are discussed in the Recommendations Section.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The Evaluation Team presents two recommendations: 1) LSP strengthening, and 2) election law reform. These recommendations might potentially be treated as mutually exclusive options or addressed together, starting at or about the same time with different time horizons. The Evaluation Team considers the latter an optimal response to its findings and has outlined suggested steps to restructure LSP in the short term (Section A) and fundamental electoral change over a longer term (see separate Advisory Note to USAID/Iraq, Office of Democracy and Governance).

A. Recommendations Regarding Programmatic Issues in the Short Term (Restructure LSP)

1. **Diplomatic Intervention:** If the freeze against LSP implementers is still in place, then the USG should intervene at a significant diplomatic level with both the Iraqi Government and the COR Leadership with the goal of addressing and removing the political barriers that exist today against American programmatic participation in legislative strengthening. In particular, the Presidency Council should be called upon to reinstate its original rule and abandon the requirement that the Speaker and First Deputy and Second Deputy Speaker must all agree before an action is taken. If this effort fails, USAID may wish to reconsider going forward with LSP and consider other options, such as technical assistance through the Global Fund (or teaming with UNDP for that purpose), technical assistance to civil society (possibly including political party formation) to help the public assume a more vigorous voice in the affairs of the government (see Further Recommendations at the end of this section).

2. **Re-visit MOU Negotiation:** AECOM and USAID failure to respond to a COR Steering Committee request to re-visit the COR-AECOM MOU in 2010 contributed to a strained relationship between the COR and AECOM/USAID. The terms of the MOU should be reconsidered/re-negotiated with the objective of creating more COR input into restructuring and institution building interventions and activities. In particular, agreement should be negotiated for the reactivation of PDC and IT (electronic voting and bill tracking activities) support.

3. **Functional Analysis/Needs Assessment:** In a collaborative effort, LSP with COR staff should update its functional analysis of the directorates from an overall institutional perspective, and then perform an institutional needs assessment of the COR.

4. **Rules and Policies to Prevent Political Interference with Secretariat:** In its original design, the Secretariat was to serve MPs and facilitate the political agenda of the Presidency Council. The role of this vital position must now change to support the COR institution.

5. **Draft Scope of Work and Work Plan with Institution-Building Theme:** In a collaborative restructuring effort, LSP and COR staff should draft a modified Scope of Work and Work Plan.

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14 The Evaluation Team is aware that providing support to civil society to inform actions leading to electoral reform (in order to achieve more representative and accountable government) might be an unusual response by USAID. The agency may well choose to avoid a more aggressive formulation of this approach and, perhaps, moderate the effort politically by piloting pieces of our recommendation, trusting that the requisite reform of the electoral system will come in time.
Work Plan that will reflect joint prioritization (with the COR) of technical assistance to build a sustainable parliamentary institution. Activities might include the following:\textsuperscript{15}

a. Parliamentary Development Center (if still relevant and wanted).

b. Completion of IT installation and operation (electronic voting, Legistar) if there is ownership and commitment by COR leadership.

c. Media Center (Content Management System and Web Services Platform, development of COR Press Gallery and expansion to independent journalists, and training on parliamentary procedures, fact-finding and reporting)

d. Staff development (public hearings, oversight management, legislative analysis and drafting, merit-based civil service)

e. Technical assistance to Provincial Offices (communications, outreach strategies)

f. Functional review of eight directorates continued

g. Institutionalization of the culture of human resource management and best practices.

h. Planned donor coordination and development

i. Finance and budget capacity

j. Fellowship and apprenticeship programs

6. Repair Relationship with Media Directorate: The Evaluation Team was alerted to potential false attribution of work by one AECOM former staff member who was since fired. While the work was written up in AECOM reports as performed by AECOM, the Media DG claims the work to be a product of his office and without input from AECOM. This difference has unnecessarily strained the relationship between AECOM and Media DG. It is strongly recommended that a formal apology be extended by USAID before further work is discussed.

7. Build Relationship with the COR: Concerted effort and considerably more time must be devoted to building strong relationships based on trust and respect, the basis for sustainability. MPs who are familiar with LSP and are willing to cooperate should be involved in the design of a new program. The program must be made known to the COR and AECOM’s presence in the COR (if still viable) used in this way. Experienced Iraqi staffers should be trained and empowered to encourage MPs and their staff to work more closely with the LSP program.

8. Streamline Reporting Requirements: AECOM produces weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual reports along with PMP reports. The pressure of timely submission of required reports at this volume and frequency is likely to lead to situations of inaccurate reporting and even false attribution (as discussed earlier). It is recommended that USAID’s DG Office consider revising its reporting requirements/schedule and streamline its format (with the objective of simplifying) and notify the contractor of its decision. USAID should reconsider use of a deliverables contract as the implementing mechanism. Paying the contractor based on submission of reports has led to a skewed perception as to whether the client is the COR or USAID.

9. Improve Quality of Training and Delivery:

a. Case-Oriented Training: The training of staff in legislative procedures should be case-oriented, theory minimized and case studies maximized.

b. Skilled Practitioners as Trainers: Trainers should have demonstrable and applied experience in the disciplines in which they train.

\textsuperscript{15} The Assessment and Program Design Phase Final Report, 2008 (p. ii), in anticipation of the LSP, identified three important success factors for program implementation: counterpart ownership, realistic program design, and a strong team. These factors, no less important today, should be given full attention in their application of a new or continued LSP.
c. **Arabic Speakers Sought as Trainers**: While Arabic speakers should be sought as trainers as often as possible, it is recognized that many of the subjects in the legislative strengthening field may not yield a broad array of practitioners. When such gaps occur, every effort should be made to have training presentations combine the skills and experience of an expat practitioner with an Arabic speaker who has an academic or research familiarity with the subject matter.

d. **Coordinated Training**: Training should be coordinated from one central location/office on the organizational chart and not from various and often ad hoc locations in the central administrative office. Furthermore, training plans and objectives should correspond with identified capacity/performance needs and established priorities documented in a joint LSP-COR work plan.

e. **Competency-based Training**: The functions, roles and responsibilities of potential trainees must be known prior to development of the curriculum and target competencies identified. The changing performance needs of individuals and training groups must be gauged training received at the appropriate levels.

f. **Selection of Training Participants**: Ensure the right people are trained (selection criteria) and for the right reasons (performance monitoring: documented performance needs assessments, performance reviews, etc). As per the current situation, verification of training participants is also needed to ensure they are, in fact, the intended beneficiaries.

g. **Current Training Material**: Training material must be up-to-date if not state-of-the-art.

10. **Reduce USAID Branding**: At a time when American presence in Iraq is tenuous, at best, the branding of LSP products with the USAID logo should be used with discretion, if not minimized. The quality of the product should be sufficient to sell its value. USAID must communicate to implementing agencies any modifications to these protocol and procedures in a timely manner.

11. **Promote Merit-Based Staff Hiring**: Staff appointments to the COR Secretariat or COR Committees should be guided by the COR mission and proven performance. Senior COR Secretariat decision-makers should be mentored on the merits of broadening the professional staff base in the COR. AECOM had begun this training program, and it should be continued.

12. **Facilitate Civil Society Involvement**: In a democratic governance system, access to those in power must be guaranteed. Those who shape policy and are otherwise influential are part of the equation. Program efforts should be directed accordingly so that the role of civil society in governance and legislative development is well understood. At a process level, build on AECOM’s promising practices in this area, such as advocate and encourage civil society input into hearings. At a substantive level, engage civil society finding solutions to issues in delivery of public services (i.e., health, education, utility, and industrial and agricultural pollution).

13. **Promote Association with Iraqi Universities for Consultation and Expertise**: University experts are often called upon to advise MPs on policy matters, a common practice worldwide. Development of these networks and partnerships should be either led independently or through the new Parliamentary Development Center, if created.

14. **Ensure Transition for the Next Parliamentary Term**: A well-executed and smooth transition to the next term will go a long way in renewing relationships among the MPs, the leadership, and the Secretariat. AECOM’s model - perhaps its best effort - for orientation and training of the current parliament at the beginning of their term of office was effective and attended by a majority of the newly elected MPs and should be followed.

15. **Provide Ongoing Training to MPs**: 
a. **Computer Training**: Most MPs are not computer literate and it is necessary for them to continue to learn how to use a computer and upgrade their skills in communication and research.

b. **English Language Training**: The desire for English language skills has come from numerous MPs and should be encouraged.

c. **Iraqi Constitution**: MPs need to learn the basis of their legal system (organic law) and how it is intended to guide the formulation of all other laws in Iraq. From this basis, MPs will better understand the powers of the central government and subordinate units of government, such as the governorates and their elected Provincial Councils, as well as the federal system contemplated by the framers.

d. **Analysis of Public Services Delivery**: MPs must know the issues associated with the delivery of public services (i.e., health, education, utilities, industrial and agricultural pollution, etc) that affect their constituents and be able to analyze root problems and recommend legislative alternatives/solutions.

e. **Rules of Engagement**: The rules for management and resolution of differences of opinion in public policy constitute the purpose and business of democratic government and should be mastered by members of any parliamentary body. Continue to train MPs in the spectrum of legislative functions including parliamentary courtesy, legislative drafting, rules and procedure for managing plenary and committee sessions, debate, amendments, and motion practice.

f. **Train Women Parliamentarians**: By and large, Iraqi culture does not prepare women for positions of leadership in their community or nation. Having heard this complaint frequently, the Team recommends a training intervention that meets the unique learning needs of women MPs so that they are able to assume and maximize their roles in the governance structure of Iraq.

16. **Re-visit Opportunities for Exchange Visits**: Field visits outside of Iraq are enthusiastically and unanimously endorsed by MP and AECOM staff reached during the evaluation. The Team recommends that USAID re-visit its policy and guidelines on exchange visits and, perhaps, offer capstone opportunities to candidates based on a meaningful set of criteria. These visits could be of added value when objectives and deliverables are attached to these opportunities. Moreover, this activity creates healthy competition between potential recipients and serves as an incentive to higher performance.

17. **Reduce Program Overlap**: While there have apparently been significant attempts to anticipate and reduce or eliminate potential program overlap between LSP and NDI, duplication and a sense of unhealthy competition exists between the two programs. USAID and the State Department will need to renew their discussions, arrive at a reasonable solution and ensure compliance to the solution. Each donor group reached by the Evaluation Team appears to have the same information needs. Strengthened, perhaps more vigorous, donor coordination and an expanded donor group that includes each donor’s implementing partners could be a solution. At present, USAID chairs a donor coordination group attended by AECOM, Adam Smith International (DFID funded) and NDI (State Department DRL funded). International Republican Institute (IRI; also DRL funded) attended for two years until their grant for work in the COR ended. Another challenge is engaging those organizations, without a full Iraq presence, that run their programs from Jordan or elsewhere, e.g. UNDP, EU and British Foreign Office (Global Partners’ donor).
B. Recommendations of the Team Leader on Fundamental and Longer Term Issues (Electoral Reform)

Without significant electoral reform that leads to greater accountability of lawmakers to Iraqi citizens, continued investments by USAID in LSP will have limited impact. At the same time, the Evaluation Team acknowledges that changing election law is a political undertaking, which might disqualify its application at the outset. However, the Team Leader believes that the circumstances in Iraq warrant exception to this suggested political undertaking. Clearly, current parties that benefit from the existing system are unlikely to substitute a formula that has given them power, a common political dynamic. In order to avoid negative repercussions from Iraq’s current political establishment and reinforcing the negative perception of American intervention, it is recommended that the USG not undertake such a potentially controversial initiative on its own, but rather as an international initiative supported by the UN or a broad cohort of Western democracies.

The Team Leader recommends a prescribed set of elements be included in a strategy to change Iraq’s proportional representation voting law to a largely geographical district-based law, proportional system with smaller districts, or a combined approach and that it be applied the election of Members of the Council of Representatives. These elements are detailed in a separate Advisory Note to the USAID/Iraq Office of Democracy and Governance.16

C. Further Recommendations

The Evaluation Team offers further recommendations, or other options, viewed as essential and fundamental to recapture Iraqi support in pursuit of a stable and democratic society. The Team also believes these options are valuable and meritorious on their own and, if undertaken and implemented successfully, would move Iraq toward meaningful political reform. That said, the Team recommends that USAID consider the creation of the following new projects:

1. **Political Party Strengthening Project**: The models for political parties in Iraq teach the wrong lessons about the role of a political party in a democratic society. A counter-weight to the existing models might quicken their reform or, more likely, stimulate the organization of another party that might organize itself without an ethno-sectarian requirement for membership or with a reform platform that addresses basic issues that affect the lives of people (e.g., education, health care, power generation and distribution, municipal sanitation, infrastructure needs, pollution control, etc) and governmental reform that might affect the electoral system in Iraq. Such a project might teach modern methods of communication, networking, and how to build support for party principles.

2. **Strengthening the Role of Civil Society in Iraq**: Civil society has long been frustrated because of its inability to get the attention of the parliament or individual MPs who believe that their allegiance is to their party leaders and not to the people. Such a project would provide instruction on public policy research, organization techniques, teaching the duties of citizenship in a democratic society, election campaigns, tracking the voting record of MPs, testifying at public hearings and, in general, making their collective voice heard and be counted in the halls of parliament.

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16 The Team Leader’s view is that the recommendation for electoral reform specifically responds to evaluation findings. However, because this recommendation might be viewed by some as beyond the scope of the evaluation, the author has detailed the implementation steps for electoral reform in a separate Advisory Note to USAID.
I. Purpose

The USAID/Iraq Mission requires an evaluation of its Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP), implemented by AECOM in association with Management Systems International under REDI Task Order No. 3 (Contract No: 263-I-03-06-00015-00). This evaluation will serve four purposes:

1. To substantiate whether LSP's objectives and goals—at the results levels—have been or will likely be achieved;

2. To assess whether the methodology and approach of the LSP is effective in working towards those objectives and goals;

3. To help set reasonable expectations on what can be achieved over the next three years, if the Mission continues to invest in legislative strengthening activities at current levels.

4. To inform the prioritization and scope of future investments in Iraq's national legislature, not just as an end in itself, but also as a platform for broader Mission democracy and governance objectives; and

The Mission expects that approximately one-half of the evaluation will be devoted to LSP’s activities from 2008-2011, and the other half to informing future program management options.

II. Background

USAID/Iraq’s Democracy and Governance program strengthens the responsiveness and effectiveness of Iraq’s governance institutions by supporting: (1) community-based development and decentralization, (2) national policy management and administrative reform, (3) electoral management, and (4) legislative strengthening.

Effective, responsive governance is a priority for Iraq’s sustainable development. It is essential for consolidating security gains, strengthening the country’s democratic base, enabling economic growth and diversification, and improving the quality of life through improved essential services for the majority of Iraqis. However, a zero-sum, fractious political process impedes progress in these areas. Specifically, tensions between the executive and legislative branches of government frustrate needed reforms and contribute to Iraq’s political turmoil.

Iraq’s four major political coalitions are internally and externally divided over existential issues of the state—including the balance of power among the branches of the Federal Government, checks on the Prime Minister’s executive authority, center-peripheral authorities, control over natural resources, and disputed internal boundaries. These issues remain unresolved, despite progress in the 2005 constitution formation process, the 2006-2009 term of Iraq’s Parliament (the Council of Representatives (COR)), and the 2010 government formation negotiations. But all roads to Iraq’s stable political transition
continue to lead through the COR, where all consequential legislation must be negotiated and finalized (if not originated).

While the COR’s formal legislative, oversight and political powers are significant, its capacity to exercise those powers in a meaningful and constructive way remains weak. In 2008, USAID launched the Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP) to address some of these weaknesses. Six sprawling objectives define LSP’s initial scope. In the option year (April 2011 to March 2012), USAID refined these objectives to two: (1) capacity for change management strengthened and (2) core parliamentary functions strengthened. Looking forward to the impact the program could have on improving governance in Iraq, some of the more promising activities involve: (1) strengthening internal parliamentary management systems, (2) institutionalizing checks and balances through budget oversight and legislative process, and (3) expanding citizen access to the legislative process.

USAID assistance to the COR may continue, but important questions regarding future program focus and objectives must be answered. This evaluation/assessment thus represents a key opportunity to (1) assess the performance of LSP against its performance measures and (2) shape the outline of future USAID legislative assistance in Iraq.

Brief History of USAID Assistance to Iraq’s National Legislature

USAID’s support to Iraq’s national legislature began with the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), popularly elected in January 2005 after transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraq Governing Council in 2004. Governed by the CPA’s Transitional Administrative Law, the TNA’s primary task was to write a permanent constitution, authorize a popular referendum, and following ratification and national elections, transition authority to a permanent legislative body. Through a cooperative agreement with the National Democratic Institute (the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS III)), USAID supported the TNA and its staff through:

- Technical assistance for the drafting and adoption of an Iraqi constitution that promotes democratic principles and values.
- Support for constitutional conferences and conventions; public awareness, education and participation in constitutional discussions
- Training in lawmaking, representation, executive oversight, and constituent outreach.

USAID also provided technical assistance to Iraq’s interim executive authorities (the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers and its presiding Prime Minister) in developing governing processes, rules of procedure, regulations and directives necessary to function as a democratic body.

After national elections in December of 2005, responsibility for USG donor assistance to the COR shifted to the State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Rights and Labor (DRL). DRL, through grant support for the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, continues to support the COR.

In late 2007, the Government of Iraq requested assistance from US seeking improvements in (1) the COR’s management of its external affairs (Executive branch oversight, constituency outreach), (2) the

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17 (1) Development and Strengthening of Parliamentary Development Center; (2) Strengthened Staff Capacity and Political Will for Staff Reform; (3) Streamlined Legislative Process and Improved Committee Operations; (4) Strengthened Oversight and Budget Review Capacity; (5) Strengthened COR Outreach; and (6) Improved Donor Coordination and COR Development Planning Abilities.
COR’s institutional management (staff reform, establishment of a Parliamentary Development Institute), and (3) the COR’s legislative processes (committee operations, legislative/procedural reform). Responding to this request, USAID conceived the Legislative Strengthening Program and procured the services of AECOM to design and implement the program over a two-year base period with a one-year option period. The program’s base period commenced in October of 2008 and was extended by six months in September 2009. Extension of the base period bumped the option year period from October 2010-September 2011 to April 2011-March 2012, with a total estimated cost of $46.8 million. The mission exercised the option year in August of 2010. In April of 2011, the Mission added an additional two years and $28.3 million to the program, bringing its projected end date to March 2014 (approximately the beginning of the COR’s next four year term).

While AECOM mobilized a field Team and successfully formulated an inaugural work plan, the Mission had to issue a cure notice in the first year of the program. Despite bumps at the beginning and problems filling the Chief of Party position (and the removal of one for non-performance), AECOM appears to have performed reasonably well. According to reports, AECOM is meeting its targets. Quarterly narratives and success stories show steady progress, with a substantial increase of activity in the sixth quarter, but momentum slowed after adjournment of the COR in January of 2010 and the protracted government formation period.

As anticipated in the design documents, the end of the first parliamentary term and the beginning of the second represents a critical period in the COR’s development. In this period many practices and precedents will become institutionalized and will heavily influence the COR’s long-term development trajectory. There is a critical need to support the development of COR practices, precedents and institutions along a more democratic path, and thereby strengthening the likelihood of sustainable democratic governance in Iraq. The COR’s political leadership will set the overall tone for assistance, present new opportunities, and foreclose others. Staff adjustments after “wave” elections (there was an 80% turnover in the COR’s membership) are inevitable and predictable. Whether LSP positioned itself to consolidate gains, make adjustments and seize new opportunities is a central question of this evaluation.

III. Evaluation Questions, Methodology and Deliverables

The key deliverable for this evaluation/assessment is a two-part report no longer than 40 pages. The first section should focus on an evaluation of LSP activities; and the second section, on recommendations for future programming (e.g., how legislative strengthening activities should be directed and coordinated with the Mission’s broader democracy and governance program.)

In accordance with the Instructions for Conducting a Legislative Strengthening Impact Study, the evaluation report shall provide a high-level assessment of the following questions:

- Whether and how legislative performance in representation, lawmaking, oversight, and political will for a stronger legislature has changed; and
- What impact USAID or other donor interventions have had on these changes.

In addition to these questions, the evaluation must address the following additional questions and tasks in section 1 (Evaluation of LSP Activities):

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18USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening, Center for Democracy and Governance, February 2000
1. Is the current approach to strengthening the legislative process in Iraq effective? Specifically assess LSP’s contribution towards achieving its base-period results: (a) development and strengthening of a Parliamentary Development Center; (b) strengthened staff capacity and political will for staff reform; (c) streamlined legislative process and improved committee operations; (d) strengthened oversight and budget review capacity; (e) strengthened COR outreach; and (f) improved donor coordination and COR development planning abilities. Are the Mission’s DG objectives that require action by the COR realistic? Here, the mission is especially interested in accessibility of parliamentary committees and the capacity of partners to influence policy and resource decisions that impact on the Mission’s development priorities.

2. What are the successes and shortcomings of the current project? What aspects of project design and implementation contributed to these outcomes?

3. Explore whether the project has yielded results and impacts, other than those planned, that should be documented.

4. Assess the effectiveness of LSP’s approach to operating in an unstable political environment, including the national elections and protracted government formation process of 2010 which effectively stalled the work of the COR.

5. To what degree were the expectations of the primary beneficiaries—the members, staff and administration of the COR—met by the performance of the current project? Is there sufficient political will in the COR for continued donor-assisted development programs, in general, and for the Legislative Strengthening Program, in particular?

6. Assess the sustainability (including ‘localization’ and institutionalization) of program interventions, as well as project results and outcomes.

In Section 2 (Considerations for Future Programming), the evaluation must address the following additional questions and tasks:

1. Identify and assess the strength of the COR’s institutional ties with key Mission partners such as the Central Executive and Service Ministries, the Elections Commission, Local Government and Community Organizations; other USG implementing partners such as NDI, IRI, IREX and USIP; and donors such as UNAMI, DFID, EU and the World Bank.

2. Assess the relevance of the current parliamentary strengthening indicators and suggest more appropriate indicators if relevant, based on intended results.

3. Highlight key changes in the legislative environment since the USAID’s 2008 baseline assessment: (a) organizational changes within the COR; (b) mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which governance is exercised; and (c) relationships between actors in the legislative process.

4. Assess the COR’s developmental arch and identify “sister” parliaments to inform future comparative analysis. Drawn from USAID’s Handbook on Legislative Strengthening, a table in Annex 9 compares the role and power of a legislature and its constituent parts (individual members, political party caucuses, the leadership, committees, staff, etc.) based on whether the national legislature is structured under a parliamentary or presidential model of government. Like most legislatures, the Council of Representatives is a hybrid system, adapting norms of deliberation based on of values and preferences of Iraq’s emerging political culture. The Team shall plot where the COR falls on this continuum, assess its overall trajectory and institutional vision (to the extent there is one), and evaluate whether LSP is reinforcing the COR’s
developmental arch or whether it is imparting skills and systems that are not appropriate for the COR’s organic growth. Based on this analysis, the Team shall identify “sister” parliaments, ones with similar parliamentary cultures and powers that can serve as a basis for comparative analysis.  

5. Assess citizen and NGO access to the COR and to information for purposes of legislative advocacy and executive oversight.

6. Assess opportunities for cost sharing between USAID and the COR to support shared objectives.

7. Outline the nature and scope of possible future legislative assistance interventions based on the above.  

Methodology

Key Information Sources. The contractor shall conduct a background review of key documents as well as on-site research through discussion with focus groups, surveys, roundtables, and interviews with relevant Iraqi stakeholders, including a diverse group of GOI officials, professional staff, academics, media, and Iraqi NGOs operating in the COR. The Team shall conduct in-depth interviews with the program management Team at their Arlington VA Head Quarters and Baghdad field office. The “information gathering” portion of the assignment will involve the collection of data from various sources, including previous assessments, program evaluations, reports, and other analysis and reports developed by USAID, and other Iraqi or donor organizations.

While the Council of Representatives is located in Baghdad’s International Zone, the contractor is strongly encouraged to use Iraqi experts or even Iraqi organizations as sub-contractors to reach key sources outside the IZ: e.g., the COR’s provincial offices, media outlets who cover the COR, CSO who lobby the COR, political parties present in the COR, ministries who are accountable to the COR, citizen groups and professional organizations whose interests are represented by the COR, and academics who provide policy guidance to the COR.

The contractor is free to propose its own approach/methodology for the evaluation with its response to this scope of work for approval by the Democracy and Governance Technical Office.

Documents for review prior to arrival in Baghdad:

- LSP Scope of Work and Key Modifications
- Performance Management Plan
- Annual work plans

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See e.g., the Legislative Powers Survey (LPS) in M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, *The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). The LPS is a list of 32 items that gauges the legislature’s sway over the executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas, and its institutional capacity.

These will not only inform the development of work plans under LSP, but also DG projects with a nexus to the COR: e.g., the roll out of two new good governance projects (The Governance Strengthening Project and the Administration Reform Project-Tarabot, and the design of a new Civil Society Project with a potential focus on policy advocacy.
• Implementing partner quarterly reports
• Most recent portfolio review materials for LSP
• 2008 baseline survey and design documents
• USAID/Iraq’s Administrative Reform Project-Tarabot RFP
• USAID/Iraq’s Governance Strengthening Project RFP

See Appendix A, Key Documents.

**Team Composition & Conflict of Interest.** The contractor shall provide a technical Team comprised of four persons (not including support staff (interpreter)) to work directly with USAID/Iraq’s Democracy and Governance Team to conduct the work, including up to two expats and two Iraqi experts and professionals.

The Team shall include:

- A Team Leader (Expatriate) who is a senior-level legislative strengthening specialist, with significant experience working on legislative development projects and evaluations of USAID projects. The Team leader shall have an advanced degree (MA, JD, LLM or Ph.D.) and a minimum of 10 years’ relevant experience, ideally in post-conflict and transition settings. The Team Leader shall be responsible for coordinating and directing the overall assessment, including preparation and submission of the draft and final report. The Team leader should have excellent written and oral communication skills in English. Knowledge of the Arabic language is desirable.

- A senior-level regional specialist with knowledge of democratic development and political transitions in the Middle East region, and significant experience with evaluations of USAID projects. This Team member (Expatriate) will have a relevant degree and at least 10 years of relevant experience in development program implementation. S/he will possess strong knowledge of the region and experience in the design, implementation and/or evaluation of USAID civil society, media, good governance or political process programs. Strong writing skills are a requirement. Knowledge of the Arabic language is desirable.

- Two Team Members (local Iraqi media, civil society or governance experts): Experienced professionals, with excellent understanding of Iraq’s parliament. At least five years’ experience in the Iraqi media, civil society or governance sector is required. Fluency in English is desirable.

- One qualified English-Arabic interpreter, familiar with relevant terminology, and capable of interpreting simultaneously and consecutively.

The Contractor will certify that there is no conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest with respect to the performance of the assignment on the part of contractor and the contractor’s Team members. The Contractor will guarantee that substitutions will not be made for individuals proposed as Team members without prior USAID’s approval.
**Implementation Timeline.** Timeline for the evaluation is as follows.

**Week One: Desk Review:** The first phase of the activity will involve a desk review of materials and key documents. A pre-trip meeting with relevant USAID/USG/DRL Washington D.C. staff and key experts on Iraq’s politics and legislative systems should be conducted by at least one of the expatriate Team members during the preparation phase. On the basis of this information, the Team will develop an assessment/design methodology that includes research questions and interview protocols; and preparing a schedule of interviews for the subsequent field work stage. Six working days per Team member are authorized for the preparation phase. The Team will submit a work plan for mission review and comment prior to the Team’s arrival in country.

**Week Two: Five Field Work Phase:** The Team will spend 24 work days in Iraq (four weeks) conducting field research, including gathering of additional documents. It will also involve the conduct of structured interviews with key informants (and focus groups, if appropriate) and project beneficiaries, including indirect beneficiaries (such as media, civil society and community organization). USAID will provide one staff member to assist the Team and to participate in the field-work phase of the assignment, when possible and appropriate. The field work will include interviews with MPs, COR professional staff and other key legislative stakeholders, as well as informational interviews with USAID staff, Embassy officials, donors, and implementers.

Upon arrival to Iraq, the expatriate members of the Team will meet with the Iraqi members of the Team and will integrate them into the process, briefing on what they learned in Washington D.C. and sharing documents.

**Week Six: Submission of the Draft Report:** The Contractor will draft the Final Assessment Report, which will include background section, broad analysis of Iraqi civil society organizations, and recommendations for a future programming, risks and potential opportunities for proposed approach.

**Week Seven: Submission of the Final Report.**

**Deliverables.** The contractor shall provide the following deliverables to USAID/Iraq.

1. **Work plan.** Based on an initial desk review and the SOW, the Team should develop a work plan for conducting the mid-term evaluation. The work plan should include information about the methodological approach, including data collection method, desk research, approach for in-country interviews, questionnaire, as well as a timeline.

2. **Oral Briefings (three).** The contractor will provide three briefings for USAID, including: (a) In-brief within four days of arrival in country, when a work plan will be presented; (b) mid-briefing within 15 working days, when an annotated outline of the assessment and notional recommendations will be presented; and (c) an exit briefing one day prior to departure, when a detailed outline of the assessment report and recommendations will be presented.

3. **Annotated Outline of the Assessment & Notional Findings and Recommendations.** Within 15 working days, the assessment Team will present an annotated outline of a draft the assessment with notional recommendations.

4. **Detailed Outline of Assessment Report & Final Findings and Recommendations.** The draft report will be submitted and presented to USAID, but not later than one day before Team’s departure. This document should substantively respond to the requirements of the SOW.
5. Draft Report. Six Days after departing, the Team shall submit a draft report incorporating comments received from the earlier draft.

6. Final Report. The final report will be provided to USAID in electronic format in MS Word and Adobe PDF, within 10 calendar days following receipt of comments on the draft report from USAID. The document should not exceed 40 pages (excluding appendix). Appendices should at a minimum include the scope of work for the assessment, a list of individuals interviewed with contact information, a complete description of methodology used for the evaluation; and any questionnaires used.

IV. Other Requirements

Restrictions on Dissemination. The Team’s final report belongs to USAID and may not be shared with any organizations or individuals outside of USAID. The final report shall follow USAID branding and marking requirements. The Contractor shall sanitize the final report for private/personal information and upload copy of the final report onto the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) website.

Period of Performance. The work called for this scope will start in mid-June and will be completed approximately 10 weeks later. The commencement of the field work is targeted for mid-July. All work must be satisfactorily completed no later than September 15, 2011.

Technical Direction. PRO will be responsible to coordinate any technical direction to be provided by USAID’s Office of Democracy & Governance. PRO ensures that the Evaluation Team gets access to relevant USAID documentation and list of people to be contacted during the evaluation implementation period. The Assessment Team is also required to propose review of additional documents for desk research and recommend relevant Iraqi experts for interviews.

Appendix A: Key Documents

Baseline Reports and Key Assessments

- Comparative Review of Parliamentary Institutes (AECOM, 2008)

Reports on Performance

- Base Period Results Framework
- Performance Management Plan (2008-2010) and Bi-Annual Updates
- Base Period Quarterly Reports (2008-2010)
- Success Stories
**Statement of Work, Modifications and Work Plans**

- Original Statement of Work
- Option Year Modification, Memo
- 2014 Extension
- Base Period Work Plans
- 2014 Extension Work Plans

**Key COR Documents**

- COR 2009 Organizational Chart
- Staffing Profile, Salaries; Human Resources Strategy
- COR 2010 Budget
- PC/Governor/Local Council Members, Now MPs
- Oversight Manual and Committee Clerk Manual
- Budget Training Manual and Budget Office Comparative Guide
- Constituency Outreach Offices, Services
- Legislative Drafting Manual and Rules of Procedure Update
- MP Orientation Toolkit
ANNEX 2: PROJECT TIMELINE

- **Project Base Period**: 1st Term on Dec 2005 - 2nd Term on Mar 2010
- **Option Year 2012**: Aug 2010 Option Year Exercised
- **Additional Two Years**: Apr 2011 Additional Two Years Added
- **Approximately the beginning of the COR’s next four year term**

Start Date: Oct 2008
End Date: March 2014

- **$46.8 Million**
- **$15 Million**
- **$28.3 Million**

Extended By Six Months
Extended By Six Months
Extended By Six Months

Extended By Six Months
Extended By Six Months
Extended By Six Months

Option Year 2012
Additional Two Years
ANNEX 3: RESUMES OF EVALUATION TEAM

JACK J. SCHRAMM

Mr. Schramm’s more than 38 years of Rule of Law experience includes a wide-ranging background in practicing, creating, administering, enforcing, and lobbying the law. His nationally recognized leadership as an elected member of his state’s Legislature (Missouri) for eight years included the Eagleton Institute of Politics of Rutgers University (“one of the outstanding legislators in the nation”); Wall Street Journal (crediting him in a national front page feature with “beginning to impact state governments around the nation”); and St. Louis Post-Dispatch (citing him as “one of the most effective legislators ever to sit in the House of Representatives”).

He was Regional Administrator of the Mid-Atlantic regional office of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (supervising a staff of 600 technical employees and a budget of $2 billion). For his creative problem-solving skills and compliance effectiveness in resolving cases of national import, he earned the offer of a Presidential appointment as head of the Agency’s national compliance office in Washington (declined);

Mr. Schramm established the first regulatory affairs office in Washington, D.C. for Waste Management, Inc., the world’s largest environmental services firm (75,000 employees worldwide), and contributed to the formulation of national environmental policy with the U.S. Congress and EPA.

He began his career practicing law in St. Louis, his home, but in the last 22 years, Mr. Schramm has applied his rule of law and governance experience internationally, both in developing countries and, more recently, in post-crisis countries. He has worked in some 25 countries formulating governance programs, drafting implementing laws and regulations, and strengthening the institutions that administer them -- all supported by such donors as USAID, The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and OECD. His most recent assignment (2010) was in Iraq for USAID mentoring 15 elected Provincial Councils on their law-making responsibilities during which time he was the Keynote Speaker at a National Legislative Conference urging government officials to faithfully implement the new Constitution’s provisions for shared powers in its newly created federal system.

Mr. Schramm’s political background includes his 1972 primary victory as the Democratic nominee for the office of Lieutenant Governor of Missouri. In the general election that year, notwithstanding a Republican landslide (70% - 30%), a massive crossover vote for him nearly earned him an upset. He conceded in a very close race after a recount taking three weeks, losing by just one vote per precinct.

Within a rule of law framework, Mr. Schramm has become familiar with all aspects of strengthening legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, together with the multidimensional problems associated with jurisdictional decentralization and the devolution of programs.

Mr. Schramm has a Juris Doctor degree in law from Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, MO and a Bachelor of Arts degree (Hons.) in politics and philosophy from Colgate University, Hamilton, NY. Mr. Schramm has delivered commencement addresses at several universities.
ANITRA JANKEVICA

Ms. Jankevica’s 19 years work experience includes government and parliament affairs both in her home country of Latvia and internationally. A professional with firsthand experience in top level governmental and parliamentary negotiation and decision-making processes, she was a staff member at the Latvian Parliament for eight years, advising the Deputy Speaker on Baltic regional issues, drafting speeches, and representing the Baltic Assembly Secretariat at the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference.

Ms. Jankevica has worked both in South-Eastern Europe and Northern Europe. She was a Legislative Strengthening Program Manager at the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2002 to 2005 and also worked in Kosovo after the war. Following five years in the Balkans doing parliamentary support and democratization, she moved back to Northern Europe and joined the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in Stockholm, Sweden in the position of Senior Advisor on the human dimension (soft security), democracy and parliamentary issues. (CBSS is an intergovernmental organization with 11 Member States in Northern Europe and the European Commission.)

Since 2010, Ms. Jankevica has been working as an independent consultant on governance, democracy and parliamentary issues.

Ms. Jankevica has a background in both geography and international relations (a Masters Degree in each) and speaks, in addition to her native Latvian, English, Russian, French, and some Serbian-Croatian.
ANNEX 4: DESCRIPTION OF LSP

OBJECTIVES

1. Developed and strengthened Iraq Center for Parliamentary Development
   The Parliament is capable of translating into reality its expressed wish to create a Parliamentary Development Center (PDC) by undertaking with LSP support a series of concrete, realistic and achievable steps, notably: adopting a workable governance and management structure; devising a planned timeline for the renovation of the physical structure; assuring a capital and operation budget for its sustainability; establishing a range of training services; acquiring notoriety as the principal source of non-partisan institutional capacity building available to the Members and staff of the COR.

2. Strengthened staff capacity and political will for staff reform
   The COR acquires and maintains the political will to introduce and apply more merit-based hiring and promotion practices and policies, and continues to support the provision of donor assisted guidance in the delivery of training and capacity building to MPs and staff. The COR inculcates a culture of non-partisanship among the stakeholders in the creation of administrative and procedural practices more in line with solid established democratic parliaments. 2

3. Streamlined legislative process and improved committee operations
   The Committees and support staff of the COR come to appreciate the need for greater efficiency and expediency in its deliberation of draft laws, and facilitate the adoption of tried and tested practices to move legislation through the process of deliberation, amendment and adoption. The COR begins to adopt institutions that resemble those of more developed institutions, including development of a cadre of professional legal committee clerks. Directorates and committees begin to utilize modern office networking and automating applications, allowing them to better share documents and information across offices.

4. Strengthened oversight and budget review capacity
   Basic oversight methods are introduced and adopted by parliamentary committees. Interaction between the COR and government ministries is increased. MPs develop an improved understanding of oversight objectives allowing them to better monitor the functions of government. Parliament takes a stronger interest in the budget process and is more proactively engaged in deliberating the budget and offering comments back to the Ministry of Finance.

5. Strengthened COR outreach
   The members of the COR recognize their representational role towards the Iraqi electorate such that the establishment of constituency offices becomes a necessity; these offices will serve as a conduit of communication between the COR Members and their regions; that the government ministries and agencies assume their responsibility towards the MPs in the treatment of constituency casework. Outreach by the COR becomes a greater priority and restrictions upon access to the COR by journalists and civil society is reduced.

6. Improved donor coordination and COR development planning abilities
   The donor community collaborates in a non-competitive manner under the coordination of the COR itself; that their various products and services become components of a concerted plan, adopted and directed by the COR, hastening the institution’s development through the provision of technical assistance to membership and staff.
ANNEX 5: ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED FROM MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

The Evaluation Team received 18 questionnaires back from MPs. The Team is aware that this is a limited sample and cannot be generalized to the larger group of MPs. Nevertheless, the results from this group are noteworthy.

- Quality of LSP assistance provided (Choices: very good, good, Medium, Poor)? 5 Good; 2 Very Good; 11 did not answer
- Information relevant and useful (Choices: Very Useful, Useful, Medium, Not very useful)? 5 Very Useful; 2 Useful; 1 Medium; 10 did not answer
- Is LSP addressing COR needs (Choices: Yes, to a Large Extent, To Some Extent, Not at All)? 9 To Some Extent; 1 To Large Extent; 8 did not answer
- Familiar with what LSP provides (Choices: Yes, To a Large Extent, To Some Extent, Not at All)? 9 To Some Extent; 3 Not at All; 6 did not answer
- Getting necessary support from staff (Choices: Yes, To a Large Extent, To Some Extent, Not at All Satisfied)? 7 To Some Extent; 1 To Large Extent; 3 Not at All; 7 did not answer; 3 were very negative
- Clear on role as representing and accountable (Choices: Very Clear, Somewhat Clear, Not at All Clear)? 5 Very Clear; 5 Somewhat Clear; 1 Not Clear; 2 Ask Voters, Not Us; 5 did not answer
- Aware of assistance from other donors (Choices: Yes, generally aware, Somewhat Aware, Not Aware at All)? 10 Not Aware at All; 1 Generally Aware; 1 Somewhat Aware; 6 did not answer
- What kind of assistance have you received from the LSP?
  a. Training – what type? Legislation – 7; Media – 1; General – 1; No Help – 4; 5 did not answer
  b. Workshop – What kind? Legislation – 4; Unspecified - 6; 8 did not answer
  c. TA/Research – On Draft Law? Which? Constitution – 3; Education – 1; Rule of Law – 1; Committee Work – 1; General – 2; 10 did not answer
  d. Organizing a public hearing – What kind? Education – 1; 17 did not answer
- How has the assistance helped you?
  a. Provides advice and develops the MP’s skills
  b. Opens new horizons on work of a democratic parliament
  c. Strengthens skills and helps ideas to mature
  d. Adds new information and how to formulate legislation
  e. Helps to participate in the media
  f. Permits wide discussion on all the course subjects
- Any recommendations on the kind of assistance you would like from LSP?
  a. Legislative formulation and procedures (5)
  b. Hearings (2)
  c. Media (2)
  d. Trips (2)
  e. Intense Training (2)
Analysis and Summary of Findings for MP Questionnaires

The most obvious finding is that an average of 50 percent of the respondents did not answer each question, which leads to speculation about the reason. The respondents could choose to be anonymous, and many so chose, so any apprehension about revealing one’s identity was presumably not an issue. The likely reason is that the respondent had no knowledge of the activity in question and/or did not participate in it. We tentatively conclude, therefore, that of these 18 MPs, roughly half had little knowledge of LSP’s programs. But other donors were much worse off here, since practically all of the MPs were unaware of the assistance programs of other donors.

Consistent with the foregoing conclusion regarding LSP, with respect to such inquiries regarding the quality of the assistance provided, whether COR needs were addressed, and familiarity with LSP programs, we find that even in the half that responded, the answers were mostly in the middle range, i.e., “to some extent” (not “to a large extent”) or “good” (not “very good”). The hedging suggests a lack of familiarity with these programs. With respect to the relevance and usefulness of the information presented, of the half that responded most felt that the information was “very useful”, the top category, suggesting some enthusiasm when there was exposure to the training.

As to whether the MPs felt that they were getting necessary staff support, the answers were generally negative: three were highly displeased and most of the remaining respondents were “to some extent”, the middle range again. It’s fair to conclude, we believe, that the MPs are generally not well satisfied with their staffs.

The MPs outlined the assistance they did receive whether in training, workshops, or research, and most of it was in the formulation of legislation and legislative process. A few received help on constitutional issues (3), the media, and education. But while more than half did not reply to this inquiry about assistance from training/workshops/research, a resounding 17 out of 18 did not reply to an inquiry about their participation in training to organize a public hearing. Though, it has to be remembered that 80 percent of the current MPs are new and there is not much that the LSP has managed to do for the current term, apart from the Orientation Session.

The responding MPs made some general comments on how the assistance helped them, and then recommended the kind of assistance they would like to receive from LSP: It included (in order of preference) legislative formulation and procedures (5); Hearings, media, and trips (2 apiece); and parliamentary behavior, politics, the role of women MPs, and national reconciliation (1 apiece). Most of the MPs participated in this final exercise which, in and of itself, demonstrates some interest in learning more.
ANNEX 6: THE FISH-KROENIG LEGISLATIVE POWERS SURVEY

**Influence over the executive:**
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of other agencies, can impeach the president or replace the prime minister.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of the legislatures.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials, and hearings with executive branch officials testifying before the legislative branch or its committees are regularly held.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigations of the chief executive and the agencies of the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret police).
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
7. The legislature's approval is required to confirm the appointment of individual ministers; or the legislature itself appoints ministers.
8. The country lacks a presidency entirely; or there is a presidency, but the president is elected by the legislature.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government without jeopardizing its own term (that is, without the threat of dissolution).

**Institutional autonomy:**
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the executive.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof of essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto power, or has the veto power but the veto can be overridden by a simple majority in the legislature.
13. The legislature's laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping authority.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriate by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the executive lacks the power to appoint any members of the legislature.
19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of the other agencies, can change the constitution.

**Specified powers:**
20. The legislature’s approval is necessary for the declaration of war.
21. The legislature’s approval is necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
23. The legislature has the power to pardon.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself appoints members of the judiciary.
25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by the legislature.
26. The legislature has substantial voice in the operation of state owned media.

Institutional Capacity:
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
29. Each legislator has at least one non secretarial staff member with policy expertise.
30. Legislators are eligible for reelection without any restriction.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough position that legislators are generally interested in and seek reelection.
32. The reelection of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time there legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced members.

ANNEX 7: BIBLIOGRAPHY


Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, *Strengthening Legislatures for Conflict Management in Fragile States*.


ANNEX 8: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS

(Removed – For Internal Use Only)
## ANNEX 9: THE DEVELOPMENTAL ARCH

### Developmental Arch of the COR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES*</th>
<th>Council of Representatives</th>
<th>PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater incentive for party discipline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Less incentive for party discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* While party leaders try to shape the appeal of their parties around the organizing principles of religion or nationalism or non-sectarianism or national reconciliation or services, the individuals who are elected under this system owe their victories (and, consequently, their allegiance) more to party leaders rather than to the voting public.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater concentration of power in hands of party leaders</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Power may be concentrated in hands of party leaders, but individual legislators tend to have greater influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* In Iraqi politics personalities count. Political party leaders hold power and the party structure is such that most members feel they have no say, and wait for leadership directives. The same party leaders also control the executive, so there is no real oversight.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less of a need for committee structure</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Incentives exist for a strong committee system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* There are 26 committees in the COR and more time is being devoted to committee work in this parliamentary term. There is also a growing willingness to hold public hearings and to exercise oversight. Accordingly, some incentives are in the process of being developed for a stronger committee system.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less of a need for rank-and-file legislators to develop policy expertise</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Individual legislators have some incentive to develop policy expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* With power concentrated in the hands of political party leaders, there is not much incentive for individual legislators.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policymaking functions tend to be concentrated in parties or ministerial bureaucracy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Policymaking functions tend to be concentrated in the legislature (specifically within the committee system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* As with all other Arab parliaments, the COR cannot legislate without the Council of Ministers and also does not exercise effective oversight. Ethno-sectarian system of governance requires all parties to agree to all policy initiatives.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying (by individuals or groups) tends to focus on party leaders in government, the party organization, and/or bureaucracy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Greater amount of lobbying directed toward individual members of the legislature, including members of minority parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Party leaders have the principal impact in both the legislative and executive branches. Lobbying, as it is known in Western democracies, is not yet present in Iraqi politics, except as civil society tries to make itself heard, with little success to date.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little influence over policy by lower-than-cabinet level legislators, even for those who belong to the party or coalition of parties in government</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Individual legislators can influence policy, even when not a member of a larger party or the party controlling the executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* In the case of Iraq, individual legislators tend to exert minor influence over policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions for passing legislation set at beginning of legislative term</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Coalitions for passing legislation tend to be ad hoc and temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The 2010 elections, arguably, set the stage for dysfunctional government with Maliki seizing power by putting together a shaky coalition heavily reliant on the Sadrist/ISC blocs; with consequent ceding of power over the COR to Sadists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining over legislation occurs between parties that form the government</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Bargaining over legislation occurs among parties in the legislature and between the legislature and the president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The system of governance that has been prevalent in the country since 2003 requires all governing parties to agree to all policy issues.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition parties are excluded from policymaking role; their role is one of oversight.</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Minority parties are not necessarily excluded from a policymaking role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* There is no concept of “opposition” in Iraqi politics. Iraqi politics is about blocking things. Democracy is still new in Iraq and those in power do not know how to be constructively political, and need skills on how to compromise.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and legislation tends to be more responsible than responsive</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Government and legislation tends to be less responsible; they may be more responsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Evaluation Team is of the opinion that government and legislation in Iraq is neither responsible (policies are efficiently and coherently turned into laws), nor responsive (policies and laws reflect the parochial interests and needs of voters).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 10: COMPOSITION OF FOCUS GROUPS

(Removed – For Internal Use Only)
## ANNEX 11: RESPONSES TO SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE (CIVIL SOCIETY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONS</th>
<th>QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE CATEGORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does your organization have regular interactions with the COR?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Who initiates this interaction?</td>
<td>Our Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is your input welcomed and utilized by the COR?</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Does your input make its way into policy or draft legislation?</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do you understand the legislative process and where to intervene, so that your voice is effectively heard?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. From your observation, do the MPs themselves understand the legislative process and how to move legislation through that process?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Where do you get information about the COR’s legislative agenda?</td>
<td>COR Website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. From your observation, do the MPs understand the role of civil society in legislative process?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Have you ever testified in a public hearing?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Have you ever attended training for the proper participation of civil society in the legislative process, including public hearings?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. If not, would you welcome a workshop on participation of civil society in the legislative process?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Are you familiar with the USAID’s Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP) for the COR?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. If yes, in your opinion, has it benefited, or improved, the performance of the Members of Parliament?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Are you aware that the LSP has trainings for members of civil society to enable participation in the legislative process?</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Have you attended any of these trainings?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. If you have attended, have you benefited from the training?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Does the electoral system in Iraq provide a government that truly represents the people?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Does your participation in elections help assure that the COR will be accountable to you and your fellow citizens?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. In your opinion, would electronic voting and bill tracking provide a better public understanding of an individual MP’s record?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Does your organization belong to any NGO/ civil society network?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. If yes, what is the purpose of your network?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working actively and sharing ideas in order to bring people together to make pressure against decision makers (e.g. lead campaign or demonstration to enforce the government or legislative council to take decisions that fit people’s needs).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In order to share ideas and interact with community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reinstate the rights of the disadvantaged and defend them.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 12: RESPONSES TO SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE (MEDIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONS</th>
<th>QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE CATEGORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Are you familiar with the COR Rules of Procedure for how a bill becomes a law?</td>
<td>Fully</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Are you familiar with the oversight responsibilities of the COR?</td>
<td>Fully</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Have you ever attended a Committee hearing that is designed to oversee the operations of a Ministry?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Are you familiar with the procedures by which a committee considers amendment to a draft bill and its recommendation to the full house (plenary session)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Are you familiar with the principles by which the parliamentary parties identify themselves (what do the parties stand for?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Is the religious alignment of the parties a good thing for Iraq?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Does the public want to see a religious alignment of the parties?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Are the media outlets owned by political bodies?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Should media outlets be owned by political bodies (anyone having an interest in the outcome of legislation)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. In your experience, does the general public seem to be satisfied with your coverage of COR activities?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Is the COR willing to have an honest reporting of their activities for public consumption?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Are you free to report on COR events and proceedings as you understand them?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Are the MPs cooperative and forthcoming to parliamentary reporters?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. In your experience, do you have free access to the COR, its members, committees and directorates? Are you able to freely obtain the information necessary to file your reports?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Are you aware of the USAID Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP) to support the COR (i.e., training to MPs and staff, assistance with public hearings, committee support etc)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>16. Did you attend an LSP three day workshop in June 2009 for journalists, or any other similar training?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. If you attended, did it help you better understand the proper function of journalists covering the COR?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. In your opinion, has the COR performed more effectively as the result of the USAID Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP) training?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. In your opinion, would electronic voting and bill tracking provide better public understanding of an individual MP’s record?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Please state your organization

2. Are you aware of any other donor organization providing the same kind of assistance as yours? Please mark in bold your preferred answer.
   a. Yes
   b. No

3. Would you consider closer cooperation with other donor organization if it was complementing your program, or if you saw that your activities could complement their program? Please mark in bold your preferred answer.
   a. Yes
   b. Yes, but on the condition that ____________________________
   c. No

4. In your opinion, is there any donor coordination taking place? Please mark in bold your preferred answer.
   a. Yes, to a large extent
   b. To a some extent
   c. Not at all

5. Would it be helpful for your program to have greater donor coordination? Please mark in bold your preferred answer.
   a. Yes, absolutely
   b. Maybe
   c. We are not interested in what other donors are doing

6. Please describe what kind of donor coordination, if any, would be most useful for your program, e.g. regular coordination meetings amongst all donors, information exchange by email, shared work plans and so forth.

   What do you think are the biggest impediments to donor coordination? Please specify!

7. Do you think that there is enough capacity in the COR to absorb all the donor assistance provided to them? Please mark in bold your preferred answer.
   a. Yes
   b. To some extent
c. No

8. Do you have any other thoughts / ideas / observations about donor coordination in assistance to the COR?
ANNEX 14: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS

Baseline Reports and Key Assessments
- Comparative Review of Parliamentary Institutes (AECOM, 2008)

Reports on Performance
- Base Period Results Framework
- Performance Management Plan (2008-2010) and Bi-Annual Updates
- Base Period Quarterly Reports (2008-2010)
- Success Stories

Statement of Work, Modifications and Work Plans
- Original Statement of Work
- Option Year Modification, Memo
- 2014 Extension
- Base Period Work Plans
- 2014 Extension Work Plans

Key COR Documents
- COR 2009 Organizational Chart
- Staffing Profile, Salaries; Human Resources Strategy
- COR 2010 Budget
- PC/Governor/Local Council Members, Now MPs
- Oversight Manual and Committee Clerk Manual
- Budget Training Manual and Budget Office Comparative Guide
- Constituency Outreach Offices, Services
- Legislative Drafting Manual and Rules of Procedure Update
- MP Orientation Toolkit