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DOS/USAID INPUT INTO OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE TRANSITION

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We are now five months into the Rwandan emergency. The unprecedented, large-scale, rapid population movements that characterized the earlier months have largely ceased though hundreds are still reported to be fleeing Rwanda on a daily basis. The goal of massive refugee repatriation is still elusive though many of the 1960-era Rwandan refugees are reported to be moving back to Rwanda. The regional Rwandan and Burundi refugee, returnee and internally displaced persons caseload is over five million. The refugee population of some three million can be expected to remain at that level for at least another six months.

The U.S. military aspect -- known as Operation Support Hope (OSH) -- of the USG relief effort provided a critical and massive boost in the emergency relief response. DOD has done an outstanding job under difficult circumstances. With the principal initial taskings to OSH either completed or well in hand, our goal is to achieve a seamless, mutually satisfactory handover from the U.S. military to the more traditional humanitarian assistance agencies, particularly the UNHCR which has the lead on refugee relief.

DOD's assistance in arranging and financing humanitarian airlift under its regular humanitarian assistance authorities (Section 2551, Title II of the DOD Appropriations Act, 1994 (PL103-139) and Title 10) should be considered separately from the issue on OSH's continued life and should be maintained as this provides critical assistance to international and non-governmental organizations attempting to move urgently needed equipment and supplies to the region.

With respect to ongoing U.S. military assistance under the OSH rubric, UNHCR has just (9/7) forwarded its requests (attached) for additional relief capacity that it currently judges can only be covered by military assets. UNHCR requests center around critically needed logistics capacity for air delivery of relief, a service that UNHCR would like extended for another six months. Although the situation in the region is still very fragile, this is much longer than we want or need to commit U.S. military assets absent significant renewed violence and population displacements. State and USAID recommend addressing some, not all, of UNHCR's requests. Depending on the response, the U.S. military's presence may be required beyond September 30, but for less than six months. The Ad Hoc meeting on Rwanda should review the policy implications of this.

In summary, additional requirements may be grouped as follows:

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I. AIR OPERATIONS

1. The U.S. military should inform UNHCR (and other UN agencies and NGOs) of the remaining time under OSH that it will airlift humanitarian assistance supplies from Europe to the region and within the region so relief agencies can plan their delivery schedules. Included in these deliveries should be the airlift of four satellite terminals from Patrick AFB; two pickup Toyotas, two water tankers, and two trucks from Frankfurt; and twenty trucks and fifteen water tanker trucks from Germany and Mombasa already requested by UNHCR. (N.B. Humanitarian airlift for UNHCR and NGOs on a case by case request should continue under DOD's regular humanitarian assistance authorities as noted above.)
2. UNHCR is specifically requesting that the U.S. military continue to manage the ground logistics structure, aircraft handling and cargo handling based in Kigali and continue 12-hour airfield support services at Kigali airfield. Since the JTF reports that substitute civilian assets are already or will soon be in place, this request should be the subject of further detailed technical discussions between UNHCR and the USG. Agreeing to the request would, of course, require U.S. military presence beyond September 30 and would require that a new timeline be established.
3. Ground control of landing aircraft in Kigali is currently being handled by the U.S. military. Rwandan air marshals are slowly coming back on the job and were receiving training from the USAF. U.S. military should complete training before departing Kigali.
4. The British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) in Kigali is currently offloading civilian humanitarian aircraft. USAF material handling equipment is essential to supplement the ODA equipment for certain requirements. ODA relies on the U.S. military K-loaders to offload the wide-bodied high aircraft. The departure of the two K-loaders, currently scheduled for Sept. 11, will put a damper on the operations and significantly increase operational costs.
5. UNHCR requested on 8/30 and reiterated on 9/7 that OSH transfer the following equipment for continued operations at the Kigali airport: 2-25K loaders; 1-40K loader, 4-10K forklifts; 3 generators; 1 high mobility vehicle; and 1 airfield lighting system. State and USAID reiterate their recommendation for providing this critical equipment as Section 506(a)2 authority would permit. A fully cleared interagency position on a response to UNHCR should precede any withdrawal of equipment from Kigali.

6. In Goma, CARE manages offloading operations at the airport utilizing three U.S. military forklifts which remain at the airport despite U.S. troop departure. Per the DART, turnover to UNHCR of at least two of these forklifts is needed for continuation of offloading operations.
7. The U.S. military should expedite the airlift from Scotland the trucks, bulldozers and other heavy equipment funded by BHR/OFDA in the Action A.I.D./Assist UK grant for urgent refugee site preparation activities specifically in Goma. This is important as site preparation equipment is integrally linked to enhanced security in the camps.
8. Although the U.S. military does not fly into Bukavu, the USAF forklift positioned in Bukavu to offload the Saffair and New Zealand flights has been essential to the relief operation there. Should the USAF pull out the forklift, air operations to Bukavu would stop. UNHCR specifically requested a second forklift. It is essential that the U.S. military leave at least one forklift in place in Bukavu. Two are recommended as long as the Bukavu airport is operating. It may be closed for some runway repairs.
9. UNHCR has requested that USAF C-130s fly to Goma and Kigali (or other locations) from Dar Es Salaam, Entebbe, Kigoma and Mombasa. The Ad Hoc Rwanda Group should review the possibility of making those air assets available for an additional period beyond OSH compared to the possibilities of civilian contract.
10. UNHCR has requested that Geneva aircell participation in monitoring and technical assistance for the Rwanda emergency be extended for six months. Six U.S. military officers have already been recalled, with only three officers remaining. The Rwanda Ad Hoc Group should review this requirement separately.
11. UNHCR has requested that DOD turnover to it Entebbe aircraft loading equipment with the option of redeployment to other airports in the region. This request should be reviewed by the ad hoc group.

II. WATER OPERATIONS

1. Until its departure on August 26, the U.S. military supported water distribution operations in Goma refugee camps. The U.S. military transferred the operation and \$2.8 million worth of selected equipment to the U.N. that contribute to water distribution as well as site preparation.

UNCLASSIFIED

- 4 -

2. As formally requested by UNHCR, the U.S. military should provide to UNHCR the tools and spare parts kits for the donated equipment to allow for continued operation (list attached). (NB: This request also applies to the road/site preparation heavy equipment which is related to the security issue vis a vis preparation of smaller, more manageable camps.)

III. ROADS

- o UNHCR has requested that the U.S. military repair the road from Kisoro-Bunagana-Rutshuru and Sake to Bukavu, particularly between Kalebe Airport and Bukavu.
- o This would be a new task for DOD and would require the reintroduction of troops, therefore DOS/USAID recommend that UNHCR be encouraged to contract privately or seek other donor support for this item.

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