



2006 USAID Summer Seminar Series

August 1: The Declining Neutral Space - USAID and the Military

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Handouts (appended):

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

NSPD 44 - Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization

Session Summary

The "neutral" or "humanitarian space" concept suggests that those working to provide humanitarian relief, and more recently development assistance, in times of conflict, are not partisans in the conflict, and thus should be able work without fear of being assaulted or impeded in their mission. We inherit the principle from the 19th century establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (1863) and the work of Henri Dunant. It was reinforced and elaborated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. For a variety of reasons, that space - which provides a comfort zone for contemporary humanitarian and development workers - is shrinking. In particular we at USAID can no longer find comfort in this declining neutral space - because since 9/11 U.S. foreign assistance has been aligned closely and self-consciously with U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. national security policy in particular.

Although this may appear to be an anomaly related to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is in fact consistent with the history of U.S. foreign assistance. Since the Marshall Plan was established in 1947 U.S. foreign assistance has been an element of U.S. national security policy. The first recipients of Marshall Plan assistance were not the defeated and destroyed axis countries or our closest World War II allies, but rather Greece and Turkey, which were both facing internal communist threats. As the Cold War emerged U.S. foreign assistance was often used to shore up allied countries in the developing world to keep them from alliance with the Soviet Union.

USAID's role in Vietnam in the 1960's was a paramount example of the nexus between assistance and national security. There U.S. defense, diplomacy and development personnel worked closely to accomplish overtly national security goals. The CORDS (Community Outreach and Revolutionary/Rural Development) program actually went so far as to integrate civilian and military efforts in development under a single command structure. Although the war in Vietnam was ultimately lost, the CORDS program was generally considered successful and innovative.

While the 1970s saw a separation of development assistance from national security, they were rejoined - if less intimately - during the 1980s. The national pre-occupation with Latin, and particularly Central America (El Salvador, Nicaragua) of that decade was national security driven. Accelerated economic development and improved rule of law were pursued as remedies to the threat of communist states being established in our own hemisphere.

With the demise of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new link was forged between foreign assistance and national security. USAID initiated substantial new programs in the former communist countries to ensure that they followed the path of democracy and market economics - so that they would never again pose a threat to U.S. national security.

So the events of 9/11/01, and the refocusing of all tools of national power on protecting national security, merely continued and reinforced a central principle of U.S. foreign assistance; foreign assistance is one of the elements of national power to be applied in the protection of national security. September 11 was but a reminder of the multi-dimensionality of the threats to national security.

What is indeed new is the lethality of the environments in which humanitarian and development workers operate, and the dramatic increase in the risk and danger that these workers face. Why are they so much more at risk today? Various explanations have been offered; because they are working in more militarized/lethal environments? because of the more politicized nature of their work? because of the co-mingling and cooperation between development and military personnel? because of the practices of

humanitarian/development organizations themselves? Recent research suggests the most salient factor is the politicization of their work itself in conflict-prone settings.

Although uncomfortable for some in the development and humanitarian communities there are persuasive arguments in favor of a strong linkage between development and defense, between foreign assistance and national security, between USAID and the U.S. military. The first argument is utilitarian; as development workers are at risk in conflict environments, the military can provide protection and support. A second argument is instrumental; there can be no effective humanitarian relief or development in the absence of security, and security can only be provided by the military. Moreover the military can provide a range of technical support, mobility and lift capacity to improve the delivery of assistance. A third argument in favor of close cooperation is the opportunity for each community, military and developmental, to learn from each other. The development community has much to offer the military in terms of refining its understanding of the national security threats we face. The development community can likewise learn a great deal from the military in terms of planning, logistics, and technology.

The main national security threats to the U.S. today are terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and global criminal networks. These threats all thrive in weak, failing and failed states. The US must engage those states more effectively. The key official documents that articulate the national response to these new threats include;

- National Security Strategy 2002 and 2006
- NSPD 44 - Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization (Dec 7, 2005)
- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006
- DoDD 3000.05 - Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (Nov 28, 2005) (appended)

The National Security Strategy of the U.S., first released in September 2002, acknowledged the threat to the U.S. posed by weak and failing states. To meet this challenge it states that diplomacy, defense and development (the three "D"s) must all work together and proposes that America's national security institutions must be transformed to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

The purpose of NSPD-44 was to create a plan for managing inter-agency coordination in reconstruction and stabilization situations. It establishes a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization to oversee and help integrate all DOD and civilian contingency planning. It specifies that the State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should take the lead in integrating the efforts and capabilities of all departments and agencies, civilian and military, for reconstruction and stabilization purposes. S/CRS is tasked with developing strategies and identifying states which may become unstable and may require stabilization and reconstruction. In addition to coordinating the overall USG response, S/CRS is responsible for coordinating with foreign countries, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and international organizations. Finally S/CRS is tasked with developing a strong civilian response capacity for reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR, 2006) is meant to operationalize DOD defense strategy and shape the future force over next 20 years. The findings of the most recent QDR led to the conclusion that DOD capabilities must be reoriented to address a wider range of challenges (non-traditional, asymmetric warfare). It emphasizes interagency partnership as a key to success. For the first time the QDR requires the DOD to assist civilian agencies in seeking support from the Congress related to civilian agency capacities. This year's QDR identifies four priorities;

- Defeat Terrorist Networks
- Shaping choices of countries at strategic crossroads
- Defending the homeland
- Preventing enemy from acquiring/use of WMD

USAID can play a significant role in at least the first two. It can help defeat terrorist networks by supporting the development of effective civil societies, by broadening cooperation across the entire USG, and by building and leveraging host country partner capacities. USAID can contribute to shaping choices of countries at strategic crossroads, helping them to become constructive actors and stakeholders in international system.

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05 (released 11/28/05) is the Pentagon's response to the multi-dimensional challenges of reconstruction and stabilization. The directive elevates reconstruction and stabilization operations to the same level of priority as major combat operations - an unprecedented change in the DOD world-view. Henceforth reconstruction and stabilization considerations must be included in all plans. The directive acknowledges that many of the tasks and responsibilities associated with reconstruction and stabilization operations are not ones for which the military is necessarily best-suited, however in the absence of civilian capacity to carry out these tasks, the capabilities will be developed within the military. To do so, DOD will work closely with other USG entities, foreign governments, IOs, NGOs, private sector, etc.

USAID is currently in the process of adapting to these new challenges. The first step was the establishment of the Military Policy Board, chaired by the Assistant Administrator of PPC. The Board is focused on developing the long-term relationship with DoD, and USAID positions on national security issues. Early last year the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) was created in the DCHA

bureau to serve as focal point for USAID-DoD engagement and to forge effective working relationships, including NGO-military interface.

OMA is currently working at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level OMA is informing DOD doctrine development. OMA serves as the USAID contact for DOD 3000.05 and QDR implementation, and for the military/civilian joint Congressional engagement strategy. It is the point of contact for USAID policy engagement with DOD, and for the recent DOD Transfer Authority (Section 1207 Authority). Operationally, OMA along with the State Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs is working on terms of reference for POLAD/Senior Development Advisors posted to the military Combatant Commanders (COCOMS), while establishing liaison exchanges with the Joint Staff and the COCOMs. At the tactical level OMA is coordinating USAID's participation in integrated planning and execution with the Coalition Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa. It is developing Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and Agency surge capacity in addition to its work on a tactical Conflict Assessment Framework and programming guide.

National security decision making is a rapidly evolving and dynamic process. USAID can have a significant impact if it plays its part in making sure that three "D"s are synchronized effectively. To do so USAID must build its own capacity to play a constructive role alongside the military. Secretary Rice as told us, "We can and must do better!"

Question and Answer Session

Question: I am somewhat concerned with the fact that in the recent past Congress has trusted the military to do development and humanitarian assistance (HA) programs more than it has trusted the organizations created and mandated to carry out that type of program, such as USAID.

- This concerns me because the DOD has very minimal accountability and no requirement to report on the HA programs they carry out.
- I see in this recent development a serious disconnect, the tendency to give such large quantities of money to the military, an organization not designed to carry out these types of projects or be held accountable for their implementation.

Response: DOD doesn't necessarily know what it is that they don't know.

- When DOD professionals see something that needs to be done (such as HA) and they are given the funds, they will carry it out to the best of their abilities.
- They are also, however, fully willing to create structures to do it more effectively.
- The DOD is filling roles they don't necessarily want to fill, but until others have the capacity to fulfill those needs they will continue to step up.
- There is no hesitation from the military to partner with aid organizations.
- The DOD is redesigning itself - Directive 3000.05 is symptomatic. It states that what civilians don't provide, the DOD will develop.

Comment: The Military is extremely thirsty for information about State and AID programs and how they work.

" The Military has edicts to accomplish certain set tasks, and when they get an edict, they accomplish the task quickly. Throughout this process they welcome input and assistance, but realistically they have the personnel and institutional capacity to do it faster.

Question: How can we maximize, improve, and expand our collaboration with DOD on top of everything else we have to do here. I am from a fairly small USAID office dealing with gender issues. We would love to have the capacity to adequately respond to all of the requests of the DOD, but we just don't have the resources.

Response: The military itself is trying to develop long-term training and capacity building programs with and for the civilian agencies - they are in development.

- In the absence of national guidance from the top down, commanders are looking for AID and State help on their own initiatives and not necessarily in any organized or centrally coordinated manner.
- In March of 2005 the Office of Military Affairs (DCHA/OMA) was created to help the coordination efforts.
- DCHA/OMA is working to create something like focal points for functional imparities, individuals who can coordinate knowledge sharing and transfer as well as communications.

Question: I am concerned about the lack of cultural mapping; there is some effort within the military to fulfill this need through Foreign Area Officers, but there seems to be nothing within USAID that is meeting the very real necessity for it in the field. Can the State Department or USAID come up with some sort of capacity building personnel training exercise to fulfill this need?

Response: While both State and USAID have been re-building their staffs after years of decline, it is important to also keep in mind the extensive expertise residing in private, non-governmental organizations with which both State and USAID work.

- USAID in particular works extensively with specialized non-governmental organizations which provide much of the implementation capacity needed for development.

Question: Development work with our partners is tricky. How does this new relationship with the military affect our partnerships and working relationships with the donor community and the NGOs? Will some be reluctant to cooperate with USAID if it means closer relations with the U.S. military?

Response: Donor coordination is an excellent principle - in principle. However it is important to acknowledge that different donors have different objectives, different methods, different constituencies, and different work paces. Coordination is not therefore always easy - nor is it always possible.

- USAID for example is a U.S. governmental agency whose top priority must always be to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security. That is an over-riding objective that is not shared by other donors. The best posture is to work together on shared objectives realizing that other donors cannot be coordinated to meet objectives they do not embrace.
- There is no doubt that closer interaction with the U.S. military is uncomfortable for some NGOs. They may indeed be reluctant to work with USAID if it means working alongside the military. Indeed many NGOs will not accept any funding from USAID or other governmental agencies as a matter of principle to protect their independence. That is a choice for individual NGOs to make, and we are aware that some may choose to withdraw from USAID support. Thankfully there have not been many that have done so.

Comment: In Southern Philippines our lab has worked and coordinated with the Pacific Command and USAID. As a result of that coordination we were able to reduce the number of Philippine military battalions stationed there from 15 to only 2 military battalions stationed there, and the situation went from roaming terrorists to fast food restaurants on corners.

Question: The issues associated with the differences in available resources, both personnel and money, between DOD and the civilian agencies, in particular USAID, and the associated capabilities are certainly valid concerns.

- Cultural mapping comes in different flavors. It's not just about mapping the cultures of the countries we are working in, but also within the State Department, USAID, and the Pentagon. Each of these institutions has its own internal culture and they don't necessarily know how the others operate.

Response: Through the QDR, we are trying to improve and retool National Defense University, shifting it to become National Security University. This will include more of those involved in Defense, Diplomacy and Development (the three Ds) as well as others involved in implementation overseas.

- We are trying to develop a core cadre of national security officers who are equipped to handle challenges in all of the Ds.
- Part of understanding organizational culture involves developing a shared vocabulary and commonly-understood expectations. Traditionally, terms like "operational" and "strategic level planning" have different meanings for each agency. And they play out differently. Recently, for a NATO colleague, "collaborate on a presentation tomorrow" was understood to be a directive, whereas the USAID partner heard it as a first step in a process. There is much to learn from this, as we go forward.

Question: Do countries receiving assistance from the USG have increased hesitation about accepting that aid as the perception grows that US led development is subservient to US national security interests? Same question regarding NGOs.

Response: One point of this presentation is that U.S. foreign assistance has always been given in the context of U.S. national security and that the historical context shows that the current environment is really not unique or different.

- Beneficiaries of our assistance are not naïve and know that we give money according to our interests. The recent move towards greater cooperation with the military does not appear to have had an impact on the willingness of developing countries to accept U.S. foreign assistance.
- In the past developing countries have been opportunistic about accepting U.S. assistance, generally accepting it when they perceive a shared purpose.

- The NGO community may be uncomfortable with our new proximity to the military, but it is that proximity that gives us the opportunity to help the military define and refine their own perception of the challenges they face.



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 3000.05
November 28, 2005

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

References: (a) Sections 113 and 153 of title 10, United States Code
(b) Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011, March 2004¹
(c) DoD Directive 1322.18, "Military Training," September 3, 2004
(d) DoD Directive 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements," June 30, 1998

1. PURPOSE

This Directive:

1.1. Provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. Future DoD policy will address these areas and provide guidance on the security, transition, and reconstruction operations components of SSTR operations and DoD's role in each.

1.2. Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a) and the guidance and responsibilities assigned in reference (b).

1.3. Supersedes any conflicting portions of existing DoD issuances. Such instances shall be identified to the office of primary responsibility for this Directive as listed at web site <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all

¹ The Strategic Planning Guidance is classified. For access to the document contact the Director, Executive Services, refer to document control number OSD 75774-04.

other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the “DoD Components”).

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

3.2. Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Stability operations tasks include helping:

4.3.1. Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment;

4.3.2. Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and

4.3.3. Develop representative governmental institutions.

4.4. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations. Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations (hereafter referred to as “International Organizations”), U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations (hereafter referred to as “NGOs”), and private sector individuals and for-profit companies (hereafter referred to as “Private Sector”).

4.5. Military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool. The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams.

4.5.1. Their functions shall include ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

4.5.2. Participation in such teams shall be open to representatives from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector with relevant skills and expertise.

4.6. Assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.

4.7. The Department of Defense shall develop greater means to help build other countries’ security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere.

4.8. Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be:

4.8.1. Exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (i.e., tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.

4.8.2. Integrated with U.S. Government plans for stabilization and reconstruction and developed when lawful and consistent with security requirements and the Secretary of Defense’s guidance, in coordination with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

4.9. The Department of Defense shall support indigenous persons or groups – political, religious, educational, and media – promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy, who oppose extremism and the murder of civilians.

4.10. DoD intelligence efforts shall be designed to provide the optimal mix of capabilities to meet stability operations requirements, taking into account other priorities.

4.11. Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels.

4.12. Information shall be shared with U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and the members of the Private Sector supporting stability operations, consistent with legal requirements.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.1.1. Develop stability operations policy options for the Secretary of Defense.

5.1.2. Coordinate DoD relations with the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (hereafter referred to as "S/CRS") or any successor organization.

5.1.3. Represent the Secretary of Defense in discussions on stability operations policy and strategy with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, including S/CRS, foreign governments, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.1.4. Identify DoD-wide stability operations capabilities and recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense.

5.1.5. Submit a semiannual stability operations report to the Secretary of Defense, developed in coordination with responsible DoD Components. This report shall:

5.1.5.1. Identify tasks necessary to ensure the Department of Defense implements the responsibilities prescribed in this Directive; and

5.1.5.2. Evaluate the Department of Defense's progress in implementing this Directive using the measures of effectiveness directed herein.

5.1.6. Develop a list of countries and areas with the potential for U.S. military engagement in stability operations in consultation with relevant DoD Components and U.S. Departments and Agencies. This list shall be submitted semiannually to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.1.7. Ensure stability operations are incorporated into the strategic policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans the Secretary of Defense provides to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to Section 153 of reference (a).

5.1.8. Create a stability operations center to coordinate stability operations research, education and training, and lessons-learned.

5.1.9. Develop a process to facilitate information sharing for stability operations among the DoD Components, and relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector while adequately protecting classified information and intelligence sources and methods, in coordination with relevant DoD and non-DoD entities (such as the Director of National Intelligence).

5.1.10. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.1.6. through 5.1.9.

5.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) shall:

5.2.1. Ensure DoD intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are developed to support stability operations, in coordination with relevant U.S. Government intelligence entities and DoD Components.

5.2.2. Ensure the availability of suitable intelligence and counterintelligence resources for stability operations, including the ability to rapidly stimulate intelligence gathering and assign appropriately skilled intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to such missions.

5.2.3. Support the Combatant Commanders' development of intelligence support plans and intelligence campaign plans, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.2.4. Ensure intelligence career paths attract and retain the quantity and quality of skilled intelligence personnel required for stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).

5.2.5. Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the relevant Combatant Commanders, and members of the U.S. intelligence community to ensure the effective use and employment of intelligence activities and resources in stability operations.

5.2.6. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.2.1. through 5.2.5., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall:

5.3.1. Identify personnel and training requirements for stability operations and evaluate DoD progress in developing forces to meet those requirements, according to DoD Directive 1322.18 (reference (c)).

5.3.2. Develop a joint and combined stability operation training policy that promotes interoperability with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security

forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.3.3. Develop methods to recruit, select, and assign current and former DoD personnel with relevant skills for service in stability operations assignments, and recommend necessary changes to laws, authorities, and regulations related thereto.

5.3.4. Develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop stability operations skills by:

5.3.4.1. Undertaking tours of duty in other U.S. Departments and Agencies, International Organizations, and NGOs;

5.3.4.2. Participating in non-DoD education and training programs relevant to stability operations; and

5.3.4.3. Learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies.

5.3.5. Develop opportunities for personnel from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, and NGOs to participate, as appropriate, in DoD training related to stability operations.

5.3.6. Identify personnel with skills required to support intelligence campaign plans, in coordination with the USD(I) and the Combatant Commanders.

5.3.7. Ensure DoD medical personnel and capabilities are prepared to meet military and civilian health requirements in stability operations.

5.3.8. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.3.1. through 5.3.7., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) shall:

5.4.1. Ensure research, development, and acquisition programs provide the Department of Defense with robust stability operations capabilities compatible with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, and International Organizations.

5.4.2. Streamline acquisition processes for science, technology, and products used in stability operations by encouraging acquisition planning and the training of DoD personnel in rapid acquisition processes.

5.4.3. Ensure stability operations capabilities are a key focus of the Defense Science and Technology planning, programming, and budgeting process, including the ability to identify pre-

conflict indicators of instability and collect information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships, and non-military security forces.

5.4.4. Ensure logistics support policies, procedures, and products are in place to support stability operations.

5.4.5. Identify technologies available through the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, and off-the-shelf Private Sector programs that could bolster U.S. stability operations capabilities and direct those technologies into rapid demonstration, experimentation, and fielding.

5.4.6. Ensure oversight of contracts in stability operations and ensure U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries are able to secure contract support rapidly.

5.4.7. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.4.1. through 5.4.6., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.5. The Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller shall:

5.5.1. Ensure the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process addresses resource requirements for stability operations

5.5.2. Institutionalize procedures to achieve rapid distribution of funding, goods, and services, with appropriate accountability safeguards, by U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries in support of stability operations.

5.5.3. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.5.1. and 5.5.2., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall:

5.6.1. Ensure Defense Information School activities support stability operations training and education for DoD public affairs professionals.

5.6.2. Design and articulate DoD visual information requirements to support stability operations.

5.6.3. Ensure American Forces Information Service activities support stability operations.

5.6.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.6.1. through 5.6.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration shall:

5.7.1. Ensure effective information exchange and communications among the DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector involved in stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(AT&L).

5.7.2. Develop processes that shorten the acquisition period for communications capabilities, including in-country indigenous capabilities, in coordination with the USD(AT&L).

5.7.3. Assist the USD(AT&L) in nominating science and technologies for information exchange and communications that support stability operations into rapid demonstration, experiment, and fielding.

5.7.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.7.1. through 5.7.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.8. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.8.1. Identify stability operations capabilities and assess their development.

5.8.2. Develop stability operations joint doctrine in consultation with relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.8.3. Support the USD(P) and appropriate U.S. Departments and Agencies through participation in U.S. Government and multinational stability operations planning processes.

5.8.4. Provide annual training guidance that addresses stability operations capabilities and analyze training results.

5.8.5. Develop curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for the conduct and support of stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

5.8.6. Ensure instructors and students from other U.S. Departments and Agencies are able to attend DoD schools to receive or provide instruction on stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P&R).

5.8.7. Ensure that U.S. Armed Forces have the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

5.8.8. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.8.1. through 5.8.7. and report on force readiness for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P).

5.9. The Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.9.1. Designate an appropriate military officer as the Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations to ensure proper emphasis is given to preparing for stability operations. The Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations shall:

5.9.1.1. Identify stability operations requirements.

5.9.1.2. Incorporate stability operations into military training, exercises, and planning, including intelligence campaign plans and intelligence support plans.

5.9.1.3. Engage relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(P).

5.9.2. Conduct intelligence campaign planning for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(I). These intelligence campaign plans shall be tested and shall include, at a minimum:

5.9.2.1. Information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships, non-military security forces, infrastructure, sanitation and health structure, munitions facilities, border controls, and customs processes.

5.9.2.2. Requirements for the order of battle, open source data, and numbers of personnel with appropriate language and cultural skills and proficiency levels.

5.9.2.3. Means to meet these requirements by specifying particular national and DoD intelligence capabilities.

5.9.3. Submit stability operations ideas and issues to Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), for further exploration as part of the joint experimentation program.

5.9.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.9.1. through 5.9.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.10. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.10.1. Explore new stability operations concepts and capabilities as part of the joint concept development and experimentation program, in coordination with the USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.10.2. Develop organizational and operational concepts for the military-civilian teams described in paragraph 4.5. including their composition, manning, and sourcing, in coordination with relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.10.3. Establish, design, and conduct experiments to identify innovative ideas for stability operations, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(P), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.10.4. Support Combatant Commander stability operations training and ensure forces assigned to USJFCOM are trained for stability operations.

5.10.5. Gather and disseminate lessons-learned from stability operations.

5.10.6. Participate in the Defense Science and Technology planning process to ensure stability operations requirements are supported by Defense Technology Objectives and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). Recommend sponsors for ACTDs as appropriate.

5.10.7. Participate in the Defense Operational Test and Evaluation planning process to ensure stability operations requirements are supported by Joint Test and Evaluations (JT&Es) programs. Recommend sponsors for JT&Es as appropriate.

5.10.8. Develop Joint Public Affairs capabilities for stability operations.

5.10.9. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.10.1. through 5.10.8., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.11. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(P), shall each:

5.11.1. Appoint a senior officer to lead stability operations initiatives.

5.11.2. Develop stability operations capabilities.

5.11.3. Ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and service schools prepare personnel for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P&R) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.11.4. Ensure Foreign Area Officer, Enlisted Regional Specialist, Civil Affairs, Military Police, Engineer, and Psychological Operations programs develop the quantity and quality of personnel needed for stability operations.

5.11.5. Support stability operations joint concept development, experimentation, and capability development.

5.11.6. Ensure research, development, and acquisition programs address stability operations capabilities and are integrated, in coordination with the USD(AT&L).

5.11.7. Support interagency requests for personnel and assistance to bolster the capabilities of U.S. Departments and Agencies to prepare for and conduct stability operations as appropriate, in coordination with the USD(P).

5.11.8. Ensure Public Affairs programs effectively support stability operations.

5.11.9. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.11.1. through 5.11.8., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.12. The Heads of the DoD Components with responsibilities assigned in this Directive shall provide semiannual reports to the USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the relevant measures of effectiveness identified in this Directive.

6. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The reporting requirements in this Directive have been assigned a Report Control Symbol DD-POL(SA)2207 according to DoD 8910.1-M (reference (d)).

7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.



Gordon England
ACTING

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 7, 2005

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND COUNSEL TO THE
PRESIDENT
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Reconstruction and Stabilization

Introduction

The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

Policy

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and

market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

Responsibilities of the Department of State

Need for Coordinated U.S. Efforts. To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.

Coordination. The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.

To achieve the objectives of this directive, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the following functions and may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization ("Coordinator") to assist the Secretary to:

- (1) Develop and approve strategies, with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, for reconstruction and stabilization activities directed towards foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife;
- (2) Ensure program and policy coordination among Departments and Agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and other relevant assistance laws, as well as section 408 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and related Agencies and Appropriations Act, 2005, with respect to such states;
- (3) Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate;
- (4) Provide United States Government decision makers with detailed options for an integrated United States Government response in connection with specific reconstruction and stabilization operations including to recommend when to establish a limited-time PCC-level group to focus on a country or region facing major reconstruction and stabilization challenges;
- (5) Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine;
- (6) Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities with capabilities that can contribute to such efforts provided that the Secretary of the Treasury shall lead coordination with the international financial institutions and multilateral financing bodies and shall facilitate the Secretary of State's stabilization and reconstruction work with respect to these institutions and bodies;
- (7) As appropriate, work with people and organizations, including in expatriate and foreign communities, with relevant ties, expertise, or knowledge related to countries

- in which the United States may conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities;
- (8) Develop strategies to build partnership security capacity abroad and seek to maximize nongovernmental and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities;
 - (9) Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively;
 - (10) Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations;
 - (11) Resolve relevant policy, program, and funding disputes among United States Government Departments and Agencies with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, related to reconstruction and stabilization consistent with the Office of Management and Budget's budgetary and policy coordination functions; and
 - (12) When necessary, identify appropriate issues for resolution or action through the NSC interagency process in accordance with NSPD-1. Such issues would include the establishment of a PCC-level group as described in sub-paragraph (4) above.

Responsibilities of Other Executive Departments and Agencies

To enable the Secretary of State to carry out the responsibilities in this directive and to support stabilization and reconstruction activities and requirements with necessary resources, Executive Departments and Agencies whose programs and personnel may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges will:

- (1) Coordinate with S/CRS during budget formulation for relevant reconstruction and stabilization activities prior to submission to OMB and the Congress or as required to coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities;
- (2) Identify, develop, and provide the Coordinator with relevant information on capabilities and assets;
- (3) Identify and develop internal capabilities for planning and for resource and program management that can be mobilized in response to crises;
- (4) Identify within each agency current and former civilian employees skilled in crisis response, including employees employed by contract, and establish under each agency's authorities mechanisms to reassign or reemploy skilled

- personnel (including by contract) and mobilize associated resources rapidly in response to crises;
- (5) Assist in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency plans, responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and undertaking other efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S. response and effective international reconstruction and stabilization efforts;
 - (6) Designate appropriate senior United States Government officials and government experts as points of contact to participate in relevant task forces, planning processes, gaming exercises, training, after action reviews, and other essential tasks; and
 - (7) Make available personnel on a non-reimbursable basis, as appropriate and feasible, to work as part of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and develop plans for additional personnel exchanges, as appropriate, across departments and agencies to increase interoperability for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Coordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.

Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be re-designated as transitions are required.

Policy Coordination Committee

I hereby establish a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The PCC will be chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a designated member of the NSC staff. The PCC shall include representatives in accordance with NSPD-1.

Nothing in this directive shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals. In addition, this Directive is not intended to, and does not: (1) affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the United States; (2) affect the DNI's and D/CIA's authorities under title 50 of US Code; (3) affect the authority of the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance under Section 493 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; and, (4) create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

This directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56, May 20, 1997, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations."

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Guzel", written in a cursive style.