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# COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF DECENTRALIZATION IN AFRICA: MOZAMBIQUE IN-COUNTRY ASSESSMENT REPORT

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# ACRONYMS

ANAMM	The National Association of Mozambican Municipalities
CIP	Center for Public Integrity
FCA	<i>Fundo de Compensação Autárquica</i> (Municipal Compensation Fund)
FIIL	<i>Fundo de Investimento e Iniciativa Local</i> (Fund for Investments of Local Initiative)
GIDA	Independent Group for the Development of Angoche
GTZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Technical Cooperation Agency)
ICE	Tax on Specific Consumption
IPA	Tax on Municipal Personnel
IRN	National Reconstruction Tax
IRPC	Tax on Corporations
IRPS	Tax on Individual Incomes
IVA	Value-Added Tax
LOLE	<i>Lei dos Orgaos Locais do Estado</i> (Law of Local Organs of the State)
MAE	Ministry of State Administration
MDM	Mozambique Democratic Movement
MP	Member of Parliament
NWW	North, Wallis, and Weingast
OCINA	Organization of Independent Candidates of Nacala
OIIL	Local Initiative Investment Budget
OLE	<i>Órgãos Locais do Estado</i> (Local Agencies of the Central State)
PR	Proportional Representation
PROL	Program of Reform of Local Organs
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Education Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Decentralization in Mozambique takes two forms: deconcentration and devolution. Under deconcentration, central government authorities implement programs in the 128 districts of the country, each run by a district administrator nominated by the central government. Devolution occurs in 43 municipalities, each electing a president and a Municipal Assembly. This report on Mozambican decentralization is based on field research in Mozambique between July 31 and August 14, 2010. We interviewed officials in central government ministries and agencies, local-level politicians and administrators, academics, and representatives of nongovernmental and civil society organizations. The team conducted interviews in Maputo, Matola, Boane, Manhiça, Nampula, Beira, Dondo, Angoche, Ilha de Mozambique, and Nacala Porto. We also reviewed a variety of documents.

Our report should be viewed as a complement to the USAID desk study on Decentralization in Mozambique (Reaud & Weimer, 2010). Note that we do not repeat here either an extensive history of Mozambican decentralization policy or many details of its current functioning except where it is crucial to our analysis.

Mozambique's policy of decentralization is a product of a variety of forces. Clearly, donors including USAID, the World Bank, and European aid missions such as the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and GTZ, pushed for decentralization. The donors felt that Frelimo had an essentially socialist orientation, that it had no intention of sharing power with Renamo, and that extending the electoral franchise to the local level would allow civil society and, most importantly, "traditional authorities," to reassert themselves. But Frelimo leadership did not universally oppose the program; indeed, many segments of the Frelimo elite seemed enthusiastic about decentralization. Early in the post-civil war period, Frelimo seemed to envisage elected assemblies and mayors for both urban and rural administrative units, as reflected in Law 3/94, a law approved by the Parliament before the multi-party elections of October 1994. Moreover, Frelimo leaders seemed open to recognizing and incorporating the traditional authorities. President Chissano, for example, met with groups of *ex-regúlos* in several Mozambican provinces before the 1994 elections, and his effort was paralleled by lower-level Frelimo operatives.

Frelimo perceived Renamo's strong performance in the elections of 1994, especially in rural areas, as a threat to its dominance. The result, in 1996, was an amendment of the 1990 Constitution that envisioned *parallel* systems of local government. Urban areas benefitted from devolution, i.e., the creation of *autarquias* (municipalities), while rural areas were 'deconcentrated,' i.e., the central government created Local Agencies of the Central State (*Órgãos Locais do Estado* [OLE]). A package of laws established administrative, financial, and patrimonial autonomy for municipalities and defined their attributions, or competencies. The central government created 33 *autarquias* and later expanded this number to 43. Municipal elections are held for four-year terms, electing a president and a Municipal Assembly. Municipalities have limited revenue-raising capacity and an impressive list of attributions, or programs, they are gradually to administer.

As Mozambique's decentralization policy has evolved, it is clear that a fully democratic outcome, what North, Wallis and Weingast (NWW) would term an "open access order," is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. In recent years, after a period of relative neglect, the central government has clearly favored the districts, over which it exerts much tighter control, against the municipalities. While the regime deals with many traditional authorities, these local leaders turn out to have little chance of affecting policy except by engaging in a clientelistic exchange, and so it is easy for the regime to utilize them to consolidate its own power. Instead of representing their communities, they are as likely to see their positions simply as an alternative source of rents. The municipalities, in their turn, function poorly as cradles of democracy. Their technical capacity, especially in the smallest municipalities, is very limited, and their policy competencies are vague. Moreover, the institutional structure of municipal assemblies (like the national and provincial assemblies) enables only very weak local accountability, because citizens have no individual representative to whom they can turn. Pressing for the establishment of more municipalities means simply that very small communities, some even without electricity, will find themselves bereft of the central government support they would have received had they remained as districts.

Imperfect as it is, the overall policy of decentralization, with its deconcentration branch and its devolution branch, represents a chance to consolidate Mozambique's liberalization and even make some progress toward a more democratic regime, i.e., a regime in which elites compete without fear of reprisal and prove their worth by providing public goods. Further municipalization currently is not likely to support competitive democracy, but further deconcentration can support local economic development, counter the discontent of citizens, and buy time for the development of conditions necessary for an open access order.

# 1.0 MOZAMBIQUE: COUNTRY CONTEXT

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

This report has seven sections. In the first, we discuss the theoretical basis of decentralization. We explore the short- and medium-term probabilities of Mozambique becoming a more open, democratic society, the role of decentralization in affecting a democratic outcome, and a brief history of relevant aspects of Mozambican decentralization. Section 2 details the nature of fiscal decentralization to both districts and *autarquias* (municipalities). Section 3 goes deeper, providing a series of case studies of the response of the Frelimo-led central government to local Frelimo dissidents and to Renamo opposition. Section 4 examines local representatives of the state. Section 5 scrutinizes decentralization in terms of the role of civil society; i.e., it asks if the assumptions decentralization makes in terms of civil society make sense. Section 6 considers the potential evolution of decentralization policy, focusing on district-municipality performance and relations. Section 7 offers findings and conclusions.

## 1.2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECENTRALIZATION

Political scientists often distinguish between *liberalization* and *democratization*. Liberalization is the process of redefining and extending rights. It is a process making effective rights protecting individuals and social groups from arbitrary acts of the state. Liberalization typically includes habeas corpus, freedom of speech, due process, freedom of the press, and so on. Extending these rights lowers the costs of expression and multiplies the likelihood that others will express themselves. Democratization is citizenship. It means that people have rights to equal treatment, and it puts obligations on the ruled. Many different kinds of institutions have come to be called democratic. Always, however, there is the secret ballot, universal suffrage, and regular elections. Sometimes, but not always and not necessarily, democratization includes judicial review. At its core, democratization means accountability and responsiveness to the citizenry.

Liberalization and democracy are naturally related. Although the interval between liberalization and the development of representative institutions varies greatly, liberalization always occurs first. People begin to express themselves, the regime allows the expression, more people take up their right to express themselves, and the process becomes irreversible. This experience of liberalization—in the US, Europe, and much of Latin America—seems inevitably to lead to democratization, though the democracies that result may be representative, with strong checks and balances and clear lines of accountability, or plebiscitary, with a strong executive free to govern until the next election.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, democratization has come to be intrinsically intertwined with a free market economy and with protection of property rights.

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<sup>1</sup> Here plebiscitary democracy is synonymous with O'Donnell's (1994) concept of "delegative democracy."

But if the liberalization-democratization linkage seems inevitable when viewed through the lens of Western experience, it looks very different when we include the experience of non-Western nations. Liberalization may be necessary, but it is hardly a sufficient condition for democratization. Moreover, too-rapid movement toward democratization may lead to reaction and to a regression toward authoritarian rule.

In their pioneering work “Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History” (2009), North, Wallis, and Weingast (NWW) establish three “doorstep” conditions necessary for liberalization to lead to democratization, i.e., what they call an “open access order.” These three conditions are (1) rule of law for elites; (2) perpetually lived organizations (organizations independent of the lives of their members) in the public and private spheres; and (3) consolidated, civilian control of the military and other legally accepted organizations with violence potential. A society that has not achieved these conditions is a “limited access order” or a “natural society,” to use NWW’s terminology. In such societies, it is difficult for elites to pursue impersonal policies promoting the provision of public goods; instead, they respond to demands with transfers or with clientelistic goods.

Central to this conceptual framework is the idea that the transition between a mature limited access order and an open access order has to follow the logic of the limited access order. Elites must see that their own interests are furthered by treating individuals as citizens, by allowing access to all, and by generating public goods like education, infrastructure, and social insurance programs. But if such policies fail to further the interests of elites, their adoption can undermine elites’ ability to manage growth and minimize violence.

Mozambique is clearly in the limited access order category. Considerable progress has been made in liberalization: elections are free and reasonably fair, press freedom is generally respected, and civil society organizations are allowed to form and function. However, Mozambique’s principal elites are narrowly circumscribed: leaders of the dominant Frelimo party, foreign investors, and (perhaps) international donors, with a smaller role for leaders of the opposition party, Renamo. Frelimo’s dominance is so great that, as Brian Levy puts it, “a political culture that distinguishes sharply between insiders and outsiders might go too far, with insiders consolidating power and undercutting countervailing spheres of influence to the point that accountability is lost” (Levy, 2010, p. 20). Still, Frelimo’s dominance has provided a base for strong economic growth and better services for the poor.

Mozambique’s policy of decentralization is a product of a variety of forces. Clearly, donors, including the USAID, the World Bank, and European aid missions such as Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and GTZ, pushed for decentralization. USAID provided funding to the Ministry of State Administration (MAE) as part of its “Democratic Development in Mozambique” project. According to West and Kloeck-Jenson, researchers in the project’s Decentralization/ Traditional Authorities Component “toured the country between September 1995 and October 1996, staging workshops with ‘traditional authorities,’ local officials and representatives of ‘civil society’ in eight of the ten provinces.” This project eventually produced a series of five brochures “intended to educate local state functionaries concerning the role of ‘traditional authority’ in Mozambican society” (West & Kloeck-Jensen, 1999).

The donors felt that Frelimo had an essentially socialist orientation, that it did not intend to share power with Renamo, and that extending the electoral franchise to the local level would allow civil society and, most importantly, “traditional authorities,” to reassert themselves. This view is

oversimplified. Frelimo leadership did not universally oppose the program; indeed, many segments of the Frelimo elite seemed enthusiastic about decentralization.

As far back as 1983 (during its Fourth Congress), the leadership of Frelimo, aware of the excessive centralization of power in Portuguese colonial administration and the weakness of provincial and district levels, recommended profound political and administrative reforms. Frelimo leadership referred to the paternalism and clientelism of the colonial state and even began to talk of decentralization. In 1986, the central government made an attempt at administrative deconcentration by creating 25 new districts and eliminating two others. The scheme included an administrator nominated by the central government, an Executive Council composed of the administrator and three to five members of the district assembly which would act as a secretariat supervising the administrative apparatus.

In 1987, the district was defined, for planning purposes, as the basic unit of government. Various attempts were made to construct a profile of the activities districts would undertake. These studies focused less on principles than on the specific necessities of the districts. By the end of the decade, the idea of administrative reorganization and local democracy continued to be the centerpiece of discussions among the Frelimo leadership, but without questioning the idea of a single dominant party. At the same time, the People's Assembly, an instance of "popular democracy," was reactivated. In a 1988 brochure entitled "Power and Democracy," Frelimo leadership reaffirmed the official vision of power and its implementation in the whole country. In a conference with the deputies of the People's Assembly, the leadership noted that the 1975 Constitution had created these "Popular Assemblies" at every level of the country (province, city, district, and locality) and claimed that it was time for these assemblies to assume their prerogatives and responsibilities.

The Constitution of 1990 institutionalized the process of decentralization, but still considered sub-national organs as organs of the state. In other words, the Constitution attempted to conciliate the desire for decentralization with the fear among the governing elite that decentralization might fragment the nation. The chapter on decentralization foresaw the creation of new local governments, which, alongside the executive organs designated by legislation, would include representative bodies of elected citizens. According to Article 185 of the 1990 Constitution, these representative bodies would "organize the participation of citizens in the resolution of the problems of their communities and in the promotion of local development." In other words, this conception of decentralization reflected a kind of developmentalist decentralization, betraying an uncertainty of Frelimo leadership concerning the identification of the citizenry with the new nation. The implementation of the decentralization strategy can be read in two main phases.

### 1.2.1 PHASE 1

The constitutional provisions culminated with the law of local *autarquias* (municipalities), Law 3/94. This resulted in part from the engagement of the central government with a structural reform program of the World Bank after the peace agreement of 1992. By this time, the provincial assemblies had lost their political relevance in a one-party regime, and at the national level, there was no intermediate body that could serve as a bridge between the citizen and the state. The result was an increase in the weight of Maputo and the isolation of deputies elected and residing in the provinces. For the Frelimo political elite, decentralization was not only an

issue of levels of government but also an issue of the penetration of the regime throughout the national territory.

The first phase, which culminated with Law 3/94 creating the municipal districts, had begun with the Program of Reform of Local Organs (PROL) in 1992. Its object was to transform the centralized administration into 23 urban municipal districts and 128 rural municipal districts. The municipal districts would be governed by three organs, the President of the Municipal Council, the Municipal Assembly, and the Municipal Council, all elected by universal secret ballot. These organs would have administrative, financial, and patrimonial autonomy. Although the one-party assembly approved this law unanimously, it became clear that there were grave doubts about it among the various elements of the central government. Bureaucrats worried about an untried model of governance in rural zones, and politicians linked to Frelimo worried about the potential for a fragmentation of the state. Of course, they feared the loss of control over economic rents. Autonomy in the management of local resources could intensify the competition between national party leaders and local elites.<sup>2</sup>

The new municipal districts were expected to coincide with the boundaries of the existing rural districts. Like urban zones, rural zones would receive the same treatment and the same application of municipal law and could, in the exercise of their power, maintain the respect from and establish good relations with the traditional authorities residing in the territories.

The municipal districts would have their own financial and budgetary base. Revenues would come from municipal taxes, fees, and municipal services or from income from municipal capital or sales of physical assets. Given that many of these future municipal districts actually had no buildings, not even for the presidents of the Municipal Councils or the Municipal Assemblies, there was a certain unreality, even a certain mimetic quality, in this legislation.

### 1.2.2 PHASE 2

The new National Assembly (*Assembleia da República*), which emerged from the 1994 general elections, ended the unanimity and near-consensus that had led to the first municipal law, reversing Law 3/94 in 1996. This second phase began with the creation of “local *autarquias*,” or municipalities. In the election of 1994, Frelimo obtained 44.33 percent of the votes; Renamo received 37.78 percent. Frelimo won in all the provinces of the south: Maputo city, Maputo province, Gaza and Inhambane with more than 80 percent of the votes. Frelimo also won in the extreme north, in Niassa (47.45 percent) and Cabo Delgado (58.25 percent). Renamo won in all the provinces of the center and East: Sofala (78.8 percent), Manica (41.51 ), Tete (34.51 percent), Zambézia (52.54 percent) and in Nampula (40.66 percent), the largest of the north. The split was also urban-rural: the population of the cities had a 59 percent majority for Frelimo, while Renamo received only 29 percent. Rural zones, which would have become future municipal districts had Law 3/94 remained in force, favored Renamo 41 percent to 40 percent.

The central government’s response to the 1994 electoral results was to shift decentralization policy to a system of “*gradualismo*.” The central government (Frelimo) pushed through an amendment to the 1990 Constitution and a new law (9/96 of November 22), which added 11 articles concerning local power to the law about local organs of the state. Here the government

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<sup>2</sup> Section 3 of this report details instances in which such competition has emerged.



introduced its new hybrid model of devolution and deconcentration. New local organs in the municipalities would now complement rather than substitute for the local organs appointed by the central government. This dual administrative structure meant that the rural zones would be governed by an administrator appointed by the central government exercising parallel power with the organs in the new municipal zones. Thus, decentralization would accentuate the division of the country into autonomous urban centers and rural zones subjected to the assistance of the state. The state would now deal with parallel district administrations and municipal governments that are not hierarchically subordinate to one another.

Beyond the introduction of new municipalities, state reform also included a transformation of the relations between the central government and the various levels of the state with the introduction of Law 8/2003, the Law of Local Organs of the State ([LOLE] *Lei dos Orgaos Locais do Estado*). Law 8/2003 defined the composition, functioning, and competencies of various organs in the provincial government, the district governments, and the administrative posts; defining the organs of consultation and popular participation. It made the district the principal territorial unit of the state, in terms of functioning and organization, as well as the basis of national economic, social, and cultural development. The organs of the state at the local level were no longer to be reproductions of the central agencies, and their structure was conceived in terms of the necessities of local development. By 2005, Consultative Councils came to exist in all 128 districts as well as 389 councils in administrative posts and 1042 councils in “localities.” In theory, this assured the participation of communities in planning, in economic and social development, and in decision making around the allocation of the investment budget.



# 2.0 FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

## 2.1 DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY IN EXPENDITURES AND TAXATION

International best practices hold that decentralization strategies should include explicit policies governing the allocation of state resources to lower levels of the administrative structure. While Mozambique has a considerable volume of legislation affecting resource allocation, it is not yet clear what the central government intends. The absence of a clear policy of fiscal decentralization generates space for sectoral legislation that passes responsibilities to the local level but does not transfer fiscal resources. For example, the current initiative of decentralizing funds for education, health, roads, and water gives local governments access to additional resources, but it runs counter to the policy of allowing these local governments to link their budgets to their own economic and social plans rather than to sectoral programs.

The absence of explicit linkages between Mozambique's broad decentralization policy and sectoral processes leads to frictions and inefficiencies in both municipal and sectoral operations. The need for clear policy guidance arises from the widely varying incentives experienced by institutional participants. Ministries, particularly those who previously were principal providers of public services, may associate decentralization with a loss of power and prestige and a loss of budgetary and human resources. Both line ministries and central political leadership are likely to experience elected municipal officials as unresponsive in contrast to directly subordinate deconcentrated subnational administrators. Serious efforts to build democracy or to improve public services through strengthening of municipal governments must take into account these forces. Ministries have to be involved in planning decentralization and must be held to account to ensure their decentralization plans are aligned with overall policy.

## 2.2 RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE

Table 1, along with Appendix 3, shows the legal responsibilities and authorities of the local organs of the state and of the *autarquias* (municipalities) in terms of public expenditures. The adequacy of legislation governing district responsibilities at each level differs for different activities. For example, in the area of water supply, the authority attributed to district government is clearly defined in the LOLE: "(a) construct fountains and open wells; and (b) generate or promote the management of water supply systems." But in the area of education, the rules are quite vague: "(a) promote the good functioning of schools in the district, (b) promote the fight against illiteracy, (c) promote contact with the school community." This is rather subjective; constructing a primary school promotes the fight against illiteracy just as much as the

design of school curricula. It is not clear which level of government is responsible for which activity.

For municipalities, the functional responsibilities falling to them include: (1) local economic and social development; (2) environment, basic sanitation, and quality of life; (3) provision of public services in water and energy; (4) health; (5) culture, sport, and recreation; (6) education; (7) municipal police; and (8) urban development, construction, and housing. In addition, the municipalities can take on other activities in these areas by virtue of contracts with relevant units of the state administration.

In practice, municipalities provide the typical public services: water, local roads and municipal infrastructure, garbage collection, and water supply. In 2006, Decree 33/2006 established new responsibilities for the municipalities in health and education. This addition in responsibilities was matched by a revision of the Law of Municipal Finance.

Decree 33/2006 resulted from municipal demands for more responsibilities from the state. Curiously, however, more than three years after the decree only Maputo, of all 43 *autarquias*, had formalized the process of transfer and only three others (Beira, Nacala Porto, and Angoche) had shown a formal interest in assuming these responsibilities. The three-year period established by Decree 33/2006 for showing interest in transferring responsibilities has now expired. The failure to transfer authority in the area of health and education shows clearly the ambivalence of both municipalities and national leaders regarding devolution of authorities and responsibilities to elected local officials. The ambivalence, even reticence, of central officials is also apparent in the jumbled distribution of responsibilities and authorities reflected in Table 1.

**TABLE 1. DIVISION OF SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES AMONG LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR**

Public Service	Policy and Supervision	Implementation and Provision
Education	CG	CG, P, D, M
Health	CG	CG, P, D, M
Transportation and communications	CG	CG, D, M
Infrastructure	CG	CG, P, D, M
Basic Sanitation	CG	P, D, M
Energy	CG	SEE
Water Supply	CG	P, D, M, SEE, PS
Culture, leisure time and sports	CG	CG, P, D, M
Social action	CG	CG, P, D, M
Environment management	CG	CG, P, D, M

Source: Law 8/2003 and Law n° 1/2008.

CG – Central Government; P – Provincial Government; D – District; M – Municipality, SEE – business owned by State; PS – private sector

Table 1 demonstrates that rather than the clear, exclusive assignment of well-defined responsibilities to each level of government consistent with international best practices, service responsibilities in Mozambique are unclearly divided among all levels of government for most services. The central government has responsibility for establishing broad policy and supervision, as it should, but shares overlapping, poorly defined responsibilities for direct

delivery of every public service! The single instance of unequivocal assignment of service delivery responsibility to a single level of government is energy, which is the responsibility of a single state-owned enterprise. This division generates potential conflicts between deconcentrated organs (the districts and the representative of the state) and the municipalities wherever municipalities assume any independence in service provision. The continued prerogative of the central government in supplying goods and services to the local level legitimates sectoral resistance and slows down the rhythm of decentralization of resources from the ministries at the central level to justify the financing of responsibilities that they have, or tactically insinuate, at the local level.

### 2.3 RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC RESOURCES: TAXES, FEES AND FISCAL TRANSFERS<sup>3</sup>

The Mozambican public sector revenue system is highly centralized. Municipal governments cannot define tax bases or set tax rates. Municipalities have relatively clear authorities, established in legislation, to collect and manage certain fees, tariffs, and taxes defined by central authorities. Provinces and districts do not have independent authority to levy taxes. As established in Law 8/2003, the financing of a large majority of expenditures at the provincial and district levels is based on (1) budgetary transfers coming from central funds to finance current and capital expenditures, (2) shares of central fiscal revenues assigned to provincial and district levels (see details in Appendix 3), and (3) donations from private NGOs and from bilateral or multilateral international cooperation.

**TABLE 2: DIVISION OF REVENUE AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT**

Type of Tax	Fixing the Tax Base	Fixing the Rate	Collection	Revenue Management
Tax on corporations (IRPC)	CG	CG	CG, P	CG
Tax on individual incomes (IRPS)	CG	CG	CG, P	CG
Value-added tax (IVA)	CG	CG	CG, P	CG
Tax on specific consumption (ICE)	CG	CG	CG, P	CG
Import-export taxes	CG	CG	CG, P	CG
Stamp tax	CG	CG	CG, P	CG
Tax on inheritances and donations	CG	CG	CG, P	CG
Sisa (Sales tax on house sales)	CG	CG	M	M
Special tax on games	CG	CG	CG, P	CG
National Reconstruction Tax (IRN)	CG	CG	CG, P, D	P, D
Tax on municipal personnel (IPA)	CG	CG	M	M
Vehicle tax	CG	CG	M	M
Building tax	CG	CG	M	M
Contribution for Improvements	CG	CG	M	M
Fees and licenses, tariffs	CG	CG	CG, P, D, M	CG, P, D, M

CG – Central Government; P – Provincial; D – District; M – Municipality

Source: Law n° 15/2002, March 26 and Law n° 1/2008, January 16.

<sup>3</sup> Municipalities can also contract loans, but in the interests of brevity we will not discuss these here.

Note that own-source revenues of provinces and districts are limited to fees and tariffs collected as a result of services provision, the granting of licenses for undertaking certain economic activities, or by using land or public property.

At the district level, fiscal revenue collections are limited to the National Reconstruction Tax (IRN), while non-fiscal revenues include the own-source revenues of the district administration (construction; rehabilitation and repair fees; bicycle and office license fees; and fees and licenses for woodcutting, making boards, and similar commercial fees). The money collected has to be deposited in the office of finance and then requisitioned for later use as expenditures. This process may weaken incentives for local efforts at collection, but the districts are not independent units of government.

## 2.4 FISCAL TRANSFERS

Transfers to districts were previously made directly by central or provincial units whose budget had a budget line assigned to a particular province or district. This meant that part of the expected expenditures of the districts was in the budgets of the central government ministries. Over time, these funds have begun to be distributed either sectorally or directly to the districts. The famous “7 million meticaís” (Reaud & Weimer, 2010) falls into this category, i.e., between 2006 and 2007, each district received a fixed amount, 7 million meticaís (about US \$300,000). In 2008, the allocation criteria were changed so that the distribution was based on population, geographic size, the provincial poverty index, and the fiscal performance of the district. The 7 million meticaís is now effectively a minimum annual amount for each district.

By 2007, the central government decentralized part of the sectoral funds in the areas of roads, water, agriculture, and education and health infrastructure. A recent study by Nguenha and Kulipossa (2009) of the decentralization of these funds (in two provinces, four districts, and four *autarquias*) concluded that (1) the decentralization of the funds has not really occurred yet; (2) the involvement of planning and community consultation of these institutions is, in fact, working; (3) the presenting of accounts is complex, slow, and counterproductive; (4) the system of monitoring and evaluation at the district level needs improvement; (5) there is an institutional “disarticulation” in the application of legislation in the area; (6) the criteria for assigning sectoral funds are inconsistent and little understood; and (7) in the districts, there is no systematic and planned multi-sectoral perspective, and thus resources are channeled outside the economic and social plans of the local organs of the state.

In terms of the municipalities, the law establishes the following transfers: (1) the municipal compensation fund *Fundo de Compensação Autárquica* (FCA); (2) specific expenditures for projects of investment in the municipalities; (3) the fund for investments of local initiative *Fundo de Investimento e Iniciativa Local* (FIIL); (4) expenditures to correct the negative effects of investments and other actions of the central administration and the implementation of urban programs that are too large for the *autarquias*, including the fund to fight erosion that is channeled to municipalities such as Nacala Porto; and (5) extraordinary transfers, as in case of transfers to deal with public calamities like floods. The state also created a road fund, but this source of resources for the municipalities has not been explicitly defined in the Law of Municipal Finance, which makes it unpredictable for the municipalities, and subject to changes by the central government. By law, the FCA is supposed to be 1.5 percent of the fiscal revenues

of the state. The distribution formula is based on (a) the number of inhabitants, with a weight of 75 percent; and (b) the municipalities' territorial area, with a weight of 25 percent.

Table 3 shows the distribution of selected sectoral resources between the levels of government. Clearly, there is a progressive tendency over the period reflected in the table to decentralize these expenditures. In 2009, slightly less than 40 percent (adding provinces, districts, and *autarquias*) of these selected public expenditures are made by subnational units. Over this very brief period, with respect to these selected expenditures, the increases in percentage of expenditures for districts and provinces has grown much faster than the percentage of municipal expenditures. The Law of Municipal Finance establishes that the state should transfer 1.5 percent of its revenues to the municipalities, a level that has not been reached since 1998, the year in which municipalities were first established.

**TABLE 3: DIVISION OF SELECTED CENTRAL FISCAL RESOURCES BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, (2007 – 2009)**


Level of Government	2007	2008	2009
Central Government	74.5%	62.2%	60.1%
Provinces (11)	21.9%	32.4%	32.2%
Districts (128)	2.7%	4.3%	6.5%
Municipalities (after 2009, the number of municipalities grows from 33 to 43)	0.7%	1.1%	1.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Provinces + Districts + Municipalities</b>	<b>25.4%</b>	<b>38.8%</b>	<b>39.9%</b>

Source: Nguenha and Kulipossa (2009). *Descentralização de Fundos Sectoriais: Educação, Saúde, Estradas e Água*.

## 2.5 THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE MUNICIPALITIES

The municipalities, given that the tax collection authority allowed by central government is much broader than that of provinces and districts, are collecting a volume of own-source revenues<sup>4</sup> that is evolving nominally and progressively, as illustrated in Figure 1 below.

**FIGURE 1: MUNICIPAL BUDGET STRUCTURE**



Based on data provided by the National Budget Directorate, Ministry of Finance

<sup>4</sup> The meaning of the term "own-source revenues" as applied to Mozambican municipalities is somewhat different than in other countries, because the discretion of Mozambican municipal officials over revenues is limited to collection effort. In other contexts, local officials may have discretion concerning tax bases and rates, thus giving a broader meaning to "own-source revenues."

The trends presented in this figure, combined with findings from previous tables in this section suggest that municipalities are making increasing efforts to collect own-source revenue and having a degree of success in doing so. However, note that the revenues that the *autarquias* collect finance only a fraction of the expenditures for the salaries of municipal employees, which means that these salaries are still guaranteed by the state, especially those paid by the Municipal Compensation Fund. This figure, by itself, tells us very little about the financial situation of the *autarquias*. An accurate assessment of the overall financial situation of municipalities would compare revenue from all sources against the likely costs of meeting all mandated responsibilities.

The financial profiles of Mozambican *autarquias* are quite diverse. Around 25 municipalities finance their budgets with less than 40 percent of own-source revenues. This group includes Angoche, Mocímboa da Praia, Gurué, Milange, Moatize e Chiomoio, which finance less than 20 percent of their expenditures with their own-source revenues, according to the results of the 2008 budget. Only 10 *autarquias* generate enough resources to finance more than 50 percent of their respective budgets. This group includes Vilankulo and Mandlakazi, which get up to 70 percent of expenditures from their own-source revenues.

Overall, then, how has Mozambique progressed in terms of fiscal decentralization? The LOLE and the municipal legislation established responsibilities and authorities for provinces, districts, and *autarquias*. In general, the LOLE is clear, but at some points, it is not specific about responsibilities and does not establish in a definitive way the mechanisms financing decentralized responsibilities. For this reason, the central government has produced specific or particular legislation, often via ministerial decrees, decentralizing sectoral funds. The channeling of the decentralized funds occurs at the margin of the district budgets, either by the sectoral or provincial budgets, according to non-objective criteria (e.g., the road fund and water fund). On the revenue side, the most important determinant of revenue behavior is the centralization of the national tax system. The creation of taxes, the definition of tax bases and the rates of taxes are all under the control of the central government. The municipalities have been granted financial, patrimonial, and administrative autonomy; but they face powerful constraints in terms of tax authority. Consequently, the authority of municipalities relative to access to resources is inadequate in comparison to the decentralized responsibilities these levels of government possess in terms of public expenditures. What is needed is a municipal tax system composed of carefully selected taxes, with a degree of municipal discretion over at least tax rates. Such a tax system could redefine the division of sources of resources in terms of municipal “spaces” currently under the responsibility of the state (e.g., revenues coming from the ports, railroads, airports, coal mines, etc.). Such a tax system could also revisit the mechanisms of access to credit to finance the purchase of goods and supply of basic services, provided the central government’s ability to enforce a hard budget constraint was not imperiled. Finally, as part of a new tax system there needs to be investment in the creation and implementation of an integrated system of fiscal information supporting the management of public finance.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> It makes little sense to consider significant taxation authority for the OLEs because they lack effective representative bodies to levy taxes and mediate service expectations; though the recent move to elect provincial “legislatures” may be a step in the direction of eventual provincial taxation authority.



# 3.0 FRELIMO AND POLITICAL COMPETITION: MUNICIPAL CASE STUDIES FROM NAMPULA PROVINCE

Nampula Province, particularly its three municipal governments on the coast (Angoche, Ilha de Mozambique, and Nacala Porto), provide interesting sites in which to examine the potential and actual effects of the limited political competition prevailing in Mozambique. These three municipalities were governed by elected Frelimo administrations from 1998 to 2003, by elected Renamo administrations from 2003 to 2008 and by elected Frelimo administrations from 2008 to the present. These three municipalities, plus Marromeu and Beira (currently controlled by a third political party, the Mozambican Democratic Movement [MDM]),<sup>6</sup> are the only subnational governments in Mozambique that have experienced alternations in party control of local government over time. All other municipalities have been under continuous Frelimo administration throughout the era of decentralized governance. The decentralization literature hypothesizes, based on limited empirical evidence, that municipalities experiencing significant political competition may have better municipal performance (improved service delivery) than municipalities with low political competition.<sup>7</sup>

These municipalities also have economic and political significance to Mozambicans. All three are port cities and historic centers of trade, commerce and culture. Nacala Porto is the best deep water harbor in Mozambique and is served by one of Mozambique's three east-west rail transport corridors. These transport corridors are major sources of foreign exchange and regional geopolitical influence for the government. Immense investments in the port, warehousing facilities, transport corridor and urban infrastructure are being made by the Government of Mozambique, international donors and international and domestic investors. Ilha de Mozambique was the first, and long-time, seat of Portuguese colonial administration. Angoche was an important trading port and center of Mozambique's cashew industry. All three municipalities are important centers of Muslim religion and culture, especially Angoche.

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<sup>6</sup> Beira was governed by a Frelimo president (who ran unopposed when Renamo boycotted the elections) from 1998 to 2003, a Renamo president from 2003 to 2008 and is currently governed by the 2003–2008 president, who left Renamo, formed MDM and won a second mandate in 2008.

<sup>7</sup> See Hiskey (2003) who examines the effects of electoral competition on Mexican municipal performance.

In the following paragraphs, we discuss both intra- and inter-party political competition and the effects they may have had on municipal performance. In order to assess intra-party competition, it is useful to discuss the experiences of Frelimo and Renamo separately.

### 3.1 FRELIMO<sup>8</sup>

The first municipal elections were held in June of 1998. Because Frelimo is very centralized and without internal democracy, central party structures were able to interfere in candidate selection at the local level, provoking conflicts and splits among potential local Frelimo candidates, often overruling the results of local party internal elections. The consequences of these interventions for the exercise of power by candidates who were eventually nominated and elected to office were negative in the cases examined in this report.

Frelimo's process of choosing candidates produced (or aggravated) cleavages inside the party. The choice of candidates was far from consensual, in the sense of reflecting local preferences. Many of the chosen candidates represented national-level party interests rather than local-level interests. Candidates were not perceived, in the Mozambican expression, as "sons of the earth" (native born) in the jurisdictions in which they competed. For example, Geraldo de Brito Caetano in Nacala Porto had been transferred from Angoche to serve as District Administrator in Nacala Porto before the 1998 elections with the explicit expectation that he would become a candidate in the first municipal elections. In Angoche, candidate Joao Constantino was born in Boila, an administrative post in the district of Angoche, but his father was from Inhambane and his mother from the Ilha de Catamoio. Abacar Abdul Naimo, candidate for Frelimo in Ilha de Mozambique, was born on the island but never lived there.

In two of the three cases examined here, the local party did not want the "consensus" candidates selected by national party leadership. In Ilha de Mozambique, Frelimo's Abacar Naimo ran unopposed in local elections after selection by national party leadership; but in Nacala Porto, Frelimo's Geraldo de Brito Caetano was opposed by João Baptista Mussa and the Organization of Independent Candidates of Nacala (OCINA). Mussa, a local Renamo stalwart and would-be candidate, declared his independent candidacy after the withdrawal of Renamo in the local elections of 1998. Mussa failed in his bid for municipal president, but OCINA elected a significant minority membership (13 of 39) to the Municipal Assembly. The OCINA minority consistently opposed Frelimo/Caetano initiatives throughout the subsequent mandate. The minority was, of course, unable to stop Frelimo initiatives, but they consistently embarrassed the Frelimo majority by exposing self-serving actions by the municipal administration.

In Angoche, José Constantino, a candidate imposed by central Frelimo leadership, fought against Independent Group for the Development of Angoche (GIDA) and Isidro Assane in the 1998 municipal elections. Assane—also a dissident local Frelimo party member—and GIDA failed to capture the presidency or significant membership in the Assembly, but the effects of the dispute within the local Frelimo cadre and between the local cadre and national leadership continue to influence local party affairs.

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<sup>8</sup> Unless otherwise referenced, the discussion presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is based on information contained in Rosario (2009).

The second local election cycle, in 2003, was again held in a climate of tension and conflict over access to election candidacies. Frelimo's dominance of local elections in 1998 and 2003—a dominance that confined the opposition almost to marginality—masks the difficulty that Frelimo has in regulating internal struggles over nominations. Of the five Frelimo municipal presidents in Nampula Province in the first municipal mandate (1998-2003), only Caetano, the President of Nacala Porto, gained the support of the party at the central level for a second term. Frelimo's central leadership perceived the others as technocrats rather than politicians. To hold onto power in these municipalities (Angoche, Ilha de Mozambique, Monapo, Nacala Porto, and Nampula), the previously elected presidents were replaced by politicians irrespective of their origin and birthplace.

In the 2003 municipal elections in Nacala Porto, local Frelimo leaders and Frelimo incumbents in the Municipal Assembly opposed Geraldo de Brito Caetano, the only candidate, because of his municipal management during the first mandate, but he was elected in intra-party polls with 99 percent of the votes. In Angoche, José Constantino was opposed by local leaders of the party and by local notables. The national political committee of Frelimo had rejected his candidacy six months before the local elections, but he was elected in the internal balloting with 93 percent of votes. In Ilha de Mozambique, in a much-disputed internal election, the putative winner was the incumbent President of the Municipal Council, but Margarida Talapa, member of the National Political Committee and Head of the Central Electoral Office of Frelimo, intervened. The results were changed, and Mutafite Materua was declared winner with 51 percent of the votes. Margarida Talapa and Moreira Vasco (first secretary of Frelimo in Nampula), and the candidate, Mutafite Materua, were all from the interior of Nampula.

In the election of Mutafite Materua, the split between the coast and the interior was determinant. Strong party discipline calmed tensions between candidates but did not end them. The excluded candidates failed to support the candidates of the party in the municipal elections of 2003, creating tensions and internal confrontations. The poverty of the municipalities and the perceived maldistribution of rents among the different factions of the party made it difficult to negotiate between these members and started serious conflicts affecting Frelimo's ability to mobilize local voters and potentially raising the patronage costs of local intra-party coalition building.

These conflicts in the internal candidate selection process in the elections of 2003 played an influential role, not just in the management of the municipalities of Angoche, Nacala Porto, and Ilha de Mozambique between 2003 and 2008, but also in influencing Frelimo's strategy for candidate selection. For the local elections of 2008, Frelimo broke partially with the old practice of imposing external candidates on the local milieu. In Angoche, for example, Frelimo chose Américo Assane Adamugy, a "son of the earth," a man from Ilha de Catamoio and a consensus figure among local Frelimo party members. In Ilha de Mozambique and Nacala Porto, Frelimo bet on figures that might not be liked by everyone, but had already exercised governing power in the local offices of the agencies of the state implanted when Renamo took municipal power in the elections of 2003. In Ilha de Mozambique, the candidate nominated was Alfredo Matata, born in Netia-Monapo, and in Nacala Porto, the candidate nominated was Chale Ossufo, born in Angoche. This nomination generated argument at the local level because, until the eve of the electoral campaign, Chale Ossufo had been simultaneously a member of both Frelimo and

Renamo.<sup>9</sup> In Nacala Porto, belonging to both parties was a strategy adopted by local politicians to maximize their slim possibilities of access to resources. Because resources were distributed through a clientelistic logic, strategic politicians wanted to be close to the winning group, regardless of party.

In the elections of 1998, which Renamo boycotted, Frelimo candidates won the presidential elections in all 33 municipalities and majorities in all Municipal Assemblies. In Nacala Porto, OCINA (a non-partisan civic group whose president was a former member of Renamo) elected 11 of the 39 members of the municipal assembly. But potential OCINA opposition in the Assembly was turned ephemeral, because OCINA's president, one of the 11 elected to the Assembly, was appointed a member of the Municipal Council by Frelimo's municipal president. The strategy made it difficult for the OCINA group to function in collective opposition in the Assembly. OCINA expelled its leader, accusing him of working for Frelimo and affiliating with the party.

### 3.2 RENAMO IN ANGOCHE AND NACALA PORTO

The President of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, the only party president and the party's only candidate for president of the country in its approximately 16 years as a political party, has repeatedly stated that his party is more democratic than Frelimo because its candidates are chosen without the influence of the central level of the party. In fact, Renamo has a militarized vertical structure inherited from the civil war; candidate selection, both national and local, is generally understood to be even more centralized than in Frelimo. To preserve his dominance of party affairs, Dhlakama has repeatedly marginalized or expelled intra-party rivals. Candidates mobilize resources to win party "primaries," but in the end, the president of the party chooses the candidates on the basis of personal criteria. The result is conflict with the local party members, and in Angoche and Nacala Porto, these conflicts led to splits in the local Renamo party.

Intra-party conflict in Renamo was palpable even in the 1998 municipal elections, which Renamo boycotted. Following the decision to boycott, a limited number of Renamo members opted to contest the 1998 elections as independent local candidates (in Nacala Porto) while others left Renamo to join Frelimo and emerge as Frelimo candidates in the elections in Mocimboa da Praia.

In Angoche, Renamo had three members vying for the party nomination for the municipal presidency prior to the 2003 municipal elections. The three potential nominees were all "sons of the earth": Mário Salimo Omar (the Renamo political delegate of the district), António da Graça Semedo (a member who had worked clandestinely during the civil war), and Alberto Omar (a member affiliated with Renamo only since 2000). Mário Salimo won an internal local "primary election" with 71 votes, against 52 for Semedo and only 10 for Alberto Omar. But the choice of the local delegates was rejected by the provincial delegate of Renamo, Ussufo Momade, who altered the electoral result, "*because Renamo needed qualified candidates to direct the municipalities,*" (Interview by Domingos do Rosario in Maputo, July 27, 2006). His nomination of Alberto Omar as the official candidate led to the constitution of two Renamo factions in Angoche.

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<sup>9</sup> "Município of Nacala Porto : candidate of Frelimo is a member of Renamo," *Canal de Mozambique*, November 17, 2008.

Alberto Omar was the 2003 Renamo candidate and won election as president of the municipality. Mário Salimo and António da Graça Semedo were elected to the Municipal Assembly. Renamo won the majority in the 2003 elections, conquering its first opportunity to engage in democratic governance and establish itself as a viable alternative to Frelimo.

Shortly after the elections, a dispute emerged between the factions. The dispute concerned the granting of privileges and the distribution of economic resources offered by the municipality. Given the predominance of the executive over the Assembly, the Municipal Councils manage, in effect, the resources of the municipalities. In the view of the Salimo and Semedo wing, the primary election results should have been respected, and thus they should have run the municipality. Both factions sought control of these valuable patronage resources, and a compromise could not be reached.

Followers of the Salimo and Semedo group were excluded from the patronage benefits, and thereby, the influence of Salimo and Semedo was confined to the Municipal Assembly. Renamo's opportunity to demonstrate its abilities in democratic governance in Angoche was deeply undermined by the institutional paralysis that emerged from intra-party competition throughout the 2003 mandate. The Renamo majority in the Municipal Assembly, led by Salimo and Semedo, blocked most of the projects sent by the Municipal Council to the Assembly for approval throughout the entire mandate.<sup>10</sup> Renamo members of the Assembly were aggrieved by the lack of a salary for Assembly members and the perceived failure of the president to include them sufficiently in the presumed patronage benefits of electoral victory.

A similar electoral result occurred in Nacala Porto. Here the protagonists were Manuel dos Santos and Jorge Aguiar. But Nacala Porto is a city made up of populations from many different regions of the country, so the notion of "sons of the earth" was less problematic and the conflict between the "two Renamos" of Nacala Porto did not reach the intensity of Angoche. In Nacala Porto, the Renamo president-elect, Manuel dos Santos, worked with Renamo Municipal Assembly members (two were appointed to the Municipal Council and its associated financial benefits) to weaken any potential opposition that could establish itself in the Municipal Assembly.

### **3.3 THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STATE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL BLOCKADE**

The municipalities of Ilha de Mozambique, Nacala Porto, and Maxixe (Inhambane) are municipalities whose administrative limits coincided, in 2003, with the limits of a district. Between 1998 and 2003, the local services of the state in these municipalities were under the responsibility of the presidents of their Municipal Councils, because the Assemblies' role had not been clearly defined in legislation. Although similar situations had been foreseen by legislation (Law 9/96 of November 22), the Frelimo government at the national level allowed the situation of legislative vacuum to persist until Renamo had won some local elections. In the municipalities brought under Renamo control by elections in 2003 (Ilha de Mozambique and Nacala Porto), the central government nominated (on the basis of Decree 65/2003 of December 31), a representative of the state. In Maxixe, where Frelimo retained control after 2003, no local

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<sup>10</sup> We do not conclude that Renamo failed on its own. See a following discussion of Frelimo's actions to undermine municipal governance in Renamo controlled municipalities.

Representative of the State was nominated by the central government. In effect, the nomination of the Representative of the State had a political function: to block the exercise of Renamo government.

Frelimo had promised to be a responsible opposition in the municipalities in which it is not in power, and allow the opposition to govern if the “interests of the people were respected.”<sup>11</sup> But the inevitable occurred: Frelimo began to block the exercise of power by Renamo. In some places, the representatives of the state at the local level began to mobilize all the resources at their disposition to block Renamo’s municipal governments, arguing that Frelimo had an “historic responsibility” to direct the Mozambican nation.

In the cases studied in Nampula Province, the central government has a wide variety of instruments at its disposal to repress municipal dissidents:

- a) Closing of the community radios belonging to the municipalities of Angoche and Nacala Porto, under the guise that they were illegal and were serving as propaganda vehicles of Renamo;
- b) Sealing, in the municipalities of Angoche, Ilha de Mozambique, and Nacala Porto, the administrative records from Frelimo’s 1998-2003 municipal government and transferring them to local offices of the party or to the private residences of the leaders;
- c) Delaying, in Angoche, Ilha de Mozambique, and Nacala Porto, the sending of funds for municipal compensation, control of erosion, and road construction;
- d) Withdrawing, in Angoche, subsidies to 120 elderly people who had participated in voluntary work in cleaning the city, on the grounds that the volunteering proved they were still able to work;
- e) Bringing back to the civil service, in Angoche, workers whom Renamo had tried to keep out, resulting in a financial burden for the municipality;
- f) Taking from the municipalities certain functions that had belonged to them, including local taxes, market fees, and management of water fountains located in the municipality;
- g) Imposing inspections, normally conducted once per year, every three to four months in the Renamo controlled municipalities; and
- h) Imposing, in Angoche, Ilha de Mozambique and Nacala Porto, neighborhood secretaries loyal to Frelimo.

The last of these tactics, the imposition of neighborhood secretaries loyal to Frelimo, merits some discussion. The electoral victory of Renamo in 2003 had created conditions for the exercise of executive power in a situation of electoral legitimacy. Renamo sought to legitimate its neighborhood secretaries to fortify its social and political control by devolving power to the local traditional structure that had been marginalized during the one-party period. From 2003 to 2008, in the municipalities under its control, Renamo’s neighborhood secretaries flew flags of the municipality in front of their houses while community authorities loyal to Frelimo flew the flag

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<sup>11</sup> “In the municipalities in which we lost, we won’t block any government.” *Noticias*, December 23, 2003. p. 2.

of the Republic of Mozambique. The imposition of Frelimo loyalists as neighborhood secretaries created a double administration in the municipal territories of Renamo, and it made Renamo government virtually impossible.

Frelimo also transferred municipal workers in the Municipality of Ilha de Mozambique to the office of the representative of the state. Note that civil servants, in the Mozambican system, are actually part of the central government apparatus. Under the terms of Decree 45/2003 of December 17, the state was expected to transfer workers from the deconcentrated organs of the state (provinces and districts) to the municipalities, where needed. Instead, the provincial government in Nampula transferred experienced workers (including the only accountant and the officials responsible for finance) from the municipality to the Representative of the State offices. When Frelimo took back the municipality in the most recent election, some of these workers went back to the municipality.

Furthermore, Frelimo reduced the geographic area of the Municipalities of Nacala Porto and Ilha de Mozambique. As a result, both the revenue base and the number of potential Renamo voters were reduced. The area removed from Ilha de Mozambique became a rural district, a deconcentrated unit. Finally, projects of the Renamo government were stalled; in one case, three water supply projects were halted despite the fact that they were essentially complete. Interestingly, these projects became operational on the day of the announcement of electoral results in 2008, with the victory of Frelimo.

Renamo's response was equally politicized. It expelled workers in Angoche, Ilha de Mozambique, and Nacala Porto on the grounds that they were continuing to work for Frelimo rather than for the municipality. Renamo's hiring in these municipalities was highly partisan. Renamo governed essentially in the style for which they criticized Frelimo, i.e., using nepotism and clientelism. In effect, Renamo resisted Frelimo's neopatrimonialism by adopting the same strategy, one that would minimize its own short-term political risk.

### **3.4 FACTORS AFFECTING SUBNATIONAL POLITICAL COMPETITION**

Section 3 is based in a detailed look at local politics over three election cycles, with primary reference to just three municipalities that Renamo governed from 2003 to 2008. We began this section by noting that the decentralization literature predicts that municipalities experiencing significant political competition will have better municipal performance (improved service delivery) than municipalities with low political competition. Mozambique provides limited evidence for testing this hypothesis, limited in the sense that very few municipalities have truly been competitive. Based on the experience of these few divided municipalities, the benefits of competition seem to be reduced by the centralization of both Frelimo and Renamo. The national leadership of both parties seems willing to impose locally unpopular candidates on communities even at the risk of party fissures. The basis for these impositions is not necessarily the same in the two parties. In Frelimo's case, the national leadership seems to assume that unpopular candidates will still win; it therefore feels safe in applying criteria that reflect the interests of the national party. In Renamo's case, the party has long been centralized around its founder, Afonso Dhlakama. Given the low probability that Renamo can gain power nationally, rewarding the remaining cadres may be the only viable strategy. In both cases, however, intra-party dynamics limit the potential salutary effects of municipal political competition.

These cases also suggest that governance suffers when neither side accepts the legitimacy of the other's victories at the local level. The legitimacy of opposition control of municipal government might be more easily accepted when it is more common, but as long as opposition victories are rare, it is likely that both government and opposition will do everything possible to obstruct the other's attempts to govern. As long as opposition victories are rare, the lack of effective national political competition, in effect monopoly control of the national government by Frelimo, may reduce local elections to, at best, a "protest vote." That is, local electors can deliver the responsibilities of local governance to Renamo, but they can't enable Renamo to govern effectively because Frelimo controls the overwhelming resources of the central government and has used them, within and outside the law, to undermine Renamo governance.

The municipal cases also suggest that the current "balance" of the powers and prerogatives of local executives and local assemblies is problematic for local political competition and municipal performance. The cases are ambiguous in that one could argue that, if there were an effective rule of law, binding on both Frelimo and Renamo, many of the abuses and failures described in the cases would be remedied. Since significant improvements to the rule of law are not on the immediate horizon, concerted attention to clarification of the functions of municipal assemblies and increases in the resource devoted to them may be worth pursuing and are certainly worth investigating.



# 4.0 DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

Going back to Tocqueville, and emphasized again in such modern scholars as North, Wallis and Weingast, stable democracies (NWW's "open access orders") seem to depend on the existence of a vigorous civil society. A strong civil society reduces the costs of collective action and articulates the vast and multidimensional interests of individual citizens and families. Mozambique has an active civil society, especially in urban areas, but its ability to represent community interests is weak. As West and Kloeck-Jensen (1999, p. 461) point out

*Populations subjected in succession to an authoritarian colonial regime, a highly centralized socialist state and, in some instances, an insurgent military hierarchy, had experienced strong disincentives to forming spontaneous social institutions (trade unions, religious associations, agricultural cooperatives, and groups organized around expressive and communicative media).*

In some parts of Mozambique, traditional leaders, commonly called *régulos*, or *autoridades gentílicas* were clearly imposed on indigenous society by the Portuguese colonial authority. In other areas, they represented tribes that had conquered other tribes and occupied the latter's territory. In still other areas, their existence was nearly irrelevant in a society organized in small territorial units. Under the Portuguese, traditional authorities collected revenues, resolved conflicts, recruited labor for mandatory (and uncompensated) public works, enforced colonial rules, and performed ceremonial functions. The antipathy of current Frelimo district and provincial officials toward traditional authorities stems, in part, from the implicit and explicit competition for citizen loyalty. Frelimo public officials frequently question the ability of *régulos*, largely illiterate, with no experience in administering water supply programs, building schools or health posts, or negotiating with international donors, to participate effectively in public decision making. If traditional authority reclaimed influence in these areas, what would become of elected officials and trained administrators?

In part, this issue feeds back into the party politics of the immediate post-civil war period. Renamo had defined itself (in part to escape its South African connection) as a party of rural

areas and against Frelimo's urban orientation. It had no alternative to relying on traditional authorities, because it lacked political offices and had few resources to attract political clients.<sup>12</sup>

In a simplified, even simplistic view, public opinion results provide a gauge of people's views of elected and appointed officials versus traditional authority. The Afrobarometer survey regularly measures trust in various kinds of leaders, officials, and institutions across Africa in countries with regular elections. In Mozambique in 2008, citizens were asked about their trust in traditional leaders, with responses grouped into "not at all," "just a little," "somewhat," and "a lot."<sup>13</sup> Almost half of Mozambicans (46.4 percent) reported they had a lot of trust in these leaders, and only 32 percent said that they trusted them not at all or just a little. In rural areas—which are roughly coterminous with districts—trust was, not surprisingly, higher: 52 percent had a lot of trust, and only 27 percent trusted traditional leaders not at all or just a little.

But the story is more complicated than the results above. If the question is changed to measure trust in "local government council," i.e., either municipal assembly or district consultative council, the results are actually more positive. Over half (52.6 percent) of Mozambicans trust these local assembly or council members "a lot." In rural areas, the number with a lot of trust rises to 60 percent. In other words, trust in local assembly or council members is actually higher, in both municipalities and districts, than trust in traditional authorities. Moreover, almost 75 percent of both rural and urban respondents approve or strongly approve of the performance of their local government assembly member or district council member.

These data on trust in various kinds of formal-sector leaders need to be put into a parallel context, i.e., the nature of formal Mozambican politics. Political institutions create conditions in which citizens have more or less contact with elected and appointed officials, and these contacts affect their trust. What is surprising about Mozambique's levels of trust in local assembly members and councilors is that the formal structure is ill designed to foster such trust.

Once again, the Afrobarometer offers insights: when respondents were asked to identify their Member of Parliament (MP), only 11.2 percent of all Mozambicans was successfully able to do so. In Botswana, the percentage of correct identifiers was 74 percent; in Kenya, it rose to 86 percent; and even in Liberia, 44 percent of respondents could correctly name their MP. In all of Africa, only the Republic of South Africa (at 2.7 percent) had a lower percentage of correct identifications.

Why so low? The countries with high parliamentary member recognition scores tend overwhelmingly to have single member, first-past-the-post electoral systems.<sup>14</sup> Botswana and Malawi (80 percent correct) both have single-member districts. Lesotho (58 percent correct) has 80 single-member seats and 40 proportional representation (PR) seats. Madagascar (50 percent correct) has multiple single-member seats and two PR seats. Tanzania (77 percent correct) has single-member districts. South Africa, with the lowest scores in the entire sample, has PR.

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<sup>12</sup> See 'Régulos de Montepuez exigem o poder de volta', *Notícias* daily newspaper, Maputo, 19 October 1995; 'Renamo nomeia regulos em Gaza á revelia da Constituição', *Notícias* daily newspaper, 7 March 1996; and 'Autoridades tradicionais lutam pelo poder na provincia de Nampula', *Notícias* daily newspaper, Maputo, 2 June 1997.

<sup>13</sup> There are also the usual "missing," and "Don't Know/Haven't heard enough" categories. All estimates from the Afrobarometer come from their online data analysis facility at Afrobarometer.net.

<sup>14</sup> These data come from the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa. <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/countryindex.htm>.

Mozambique's situation gets no better at provincial and municipal levels. At both these levels, elections are held in a totally closed-list PR framework. Given the absence of programs differentiating the parties, Mozambique does not get the usual benefit of a PR system, i.e., strong parties posing alternative programs for voters to choose. Instead, at all levels of government, the Mozambican system hinders accountability between legislator and citizen. It is difficult to imagine any circumstance, especially given low literacy rates and extreme poverty, in which strong ties between legislators and constituents can develop at any level of Mozambican legislature or assembly.<sup>15</sup>

In our view, these responses suggest that there is no mass demand to increase the influence of traditional leaders in public decision making. Mozambican civil society does not yet meet NWW's doorstep conditions for an open access order. But the repression that civil society experienced during colonial times, along with the natural disjuncture between traditional authority structures and a modern state, will not be reversed by relying on leaders who have even less legitimacy than elected or appointed politicians and who lack competence or accountability in terms of the skills needed to develop a modern state.

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<sup>15</sup> We have been unable to find any evidence that either Frelimo or Renamo considered any other electoral system during constitutional discussions.



# 5.0 DISTRICT-MUNICIPALITY PERFORMANCE AND RELATIONS

Our research team heard repeatedly that the Frelimo government is in the midst of formulating a new decentralization policy. No one seemed ready to speculate on the details of the new policy. But the creation of more municipalities is apparently inevitable. This is hard to understand, because any new municipalities are likely to be very small, and not only is there no obvious pressures from below for their creation, but any new municipalities are not likely to have electricity, buildings for a municipal government, or the capacity to administer programs. At the same time, it is widely believed that the central government is not fully committed to devolution. A dominant-party state inevitably fears independent units of government, and municipalities are always a threat to elect opposition leaders.

At the same time, the Frelimo government cannot continue its current level of clientelism. Even before the “donor strike” of March 2010 or the Maputo riots at the beginning of September of the same year, it was clear that a government dependent for about half its revenues on international donors must be very careful with clientelistic expenditure programs unless it builds in mechanisms that will limit demands. One approximation of limiting demands is to try to give small amounts to all demanders. The OIIL district investment fund (Local Initiative Investment Budget), commonly known as the *Sete Milhões*, may be evolving into such a program; district administrators seem to be decentralizing distribution of this fund to administrative posts as a way of deflecting potential criticism of its misuse. There is a widely observed norm to distribute equal shares to each administrative post, with each recipient post encouraged to decide further division of the funds. Frelimo local officials have also discovered, in some cases, that disappointed followers, those who did not receive a share of the OIIL, can cause a degree of trouble that outweighs the benefits from those who did receive the money. It may be that the creation of new municipalities has a similar function in reducing the political risk to the central administration.

## 5.1 SUCCESSFUL MUNICIPAL PRESIDENTS AND MUNICIPALITIES

Although there are no systematic studies of municipal performance, the same names come up repeatedly. Two municipalities widely regarded as successful have elected the same president three times (Vilankulo and Dondo). Nacala Porto had a Renamo president from 2003 to 2008, and Manhiça had one successful reelection. What led to the success of these municipalities?

Size matters. Big and medium-sized municipalities generally are more successful. Very small municipalities have few resources, either human or fiscal. Typically, the smaller municipalities do not want additional responsibilities. They seek “voice” rather than authority. We heard repeatedly about delays in the fiscal transfers to which municipalities are entitled as well as delays in the salaries of municipal employees, which are basically financed by the central

government transfers due to lack of resources in the small municipalities. Large municipalities, such as Maputo, have an advantage because they start with relatively skilled staffs, can attract skilled staff more easily than small municipalities, and because of their importance in the political economy of Mozambique. Maputo is in a better bargaining position than Dondo *vis-à-vis* central authorities.

Municipalities seem somewhat passive in dealing with the failure of the central government to transfer resources the municipalities are owed. They may fear confrontation, and the mobility channels of municipal leaders typically run through Frelimo.

Technical agreements with international donors and NGOs seem essential as well. Programs like P-13—which includes money from the international cooperation agencies of Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and others—functions in the Municipalities of Beira, Dondo, Marromeu, Nacala, Pemba, Matola, Mocimboa da Praia, Montepuez, Ilha de Mozambique, Cuamba, Metangula, Quelimane and Mocuba. P-13 does training, planning, internal management, improvement in tax collection, environmental programs such as erosion control, and education. In our conversations with the Mozambican technocrats implementing these programs, it became clear that the donor organizations had selected relatively dynamic municipalities as their project sites. Given the centrality of technical agreements and partnerships for municipal policy success, this selection process may lead to a greater distance between municipal “haves” and municipal “have nots.”

Finally, municipal success depends upon political leadership and organization. Dondo, an exception to the “size matters” criterion, has had only one president, and he has gotten along well with all but one of the nearby Dondo district administrators (see below). This small municipality has constructed classrooms and health posts. It paid the salaries of a nurse for two years out of municipal revenues before the province assumed the obligation. In Dondo municipality (Sofala province), each of the community’s 10 neighborhoods has a neighborhood representative and a *núcleo de desenvolvimento*, a development core group that does some planning at the neighborhood level. The Municipal Council normally accepts the recommendations of the neighborhood representative up to the limit of their resources. The Municipal Council also has a section for community activities that meets monthly, and they have committees for management of water and local policing.

Dondo has learned to work the system. Their administrators (*vereadores*) told us they do not expect central government support of the municipalities to decline. They clearly did not feel oppressed by the central government.

How can municipal performance be improved? In terms of revenues, municipalities clearly need to raise more own-source revenue. Bernard Weimer argued (interview, August 2010) that his research on six municipalities shows that municipalities could almost double their tax receipts with minimal effort and that such an increase would give them money for substantial investments. Some municipalities appear to be gradually succeeding in establishing a “culture of taxation,” which may grow over time. Significant increases in revenue via nondiscretionary transfers from central government seem unlikely in the foreseeable future. Such transfers have never been consistent with the minimum percentage of annual central revenues that must be distributed under national law, the required percentage was cut in half (from 3 percent to 1.5 percent) in 2008 (see Law 1/2008, the Law of Municipal Finance), and the number of recipient

municipalities increased from 33 to 43 in 2008, thereby diminishing each municipality's share of the total.

In terms of policy outputs, municipalities can clearly learn from each other and, thereby, become more efficient and responsive in their operations. Nampula province, for example, has a Provincial Forum of Municipalities, with the participation of all six municipalities in the province.<sup>16</sup> The forum provides a periodic exchange and debate regarding relatively successful municipal practices. The performance of such inter-jurisdictional exchanges may contain the potential for self-sustaining capacity building, which, given the costs and long time horizons of such work, might be regarded as a "holy grail" of municipal assistance efforts.

In terms of democratic performance, we are less sanguine. Only in the larger cities can one talk of an active civil society, and only Maputo supports watchdog groups like the Center for Public Integrity (CIP). The National Association of Mozambican Municipalities (ANAMM) is supposed to lobby the central government on behalf of the municipalities, but its efforts are invisible to outside observers and members alike. Newspapers are active and growing, but again, their circulation and reporting is mostly in bigger cities. Ties between members of the municipal assemblies and citizens, as we pointed out earlier, will inevitably be weak in an at-large proportional representation system. As we have argued in this report, a single dominant party has many means and substantial incentives to undermine municipal-level political competition.

Significant improvements in municipal public services are likely to be influenced by each of the performances discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Links between municipal public services and total municipal revenues are obvious. Links to own-source revenues are less obvious, but important because own-source revenues may generate appropriate, concomitant incentives for citizen engagement and oversight of municipal decision making. Policy performance and sustained capacity building are a basis for municipal efficiency in service provision, and in democratic circumstances, responsiveness to citizen preferences. The performance of municipal-scale democracy, frequently composed of relatively small "islands" of democratic governance in a sea of poor performing (but increasingly funded) district administrations, is not likely to be stellar, but it may not have to be stellar to improve public services. At a minimum, if improved local public service delivery is the goal, municipalities must provide avenues for articulation and adjudication of citizens' preferences for services. A modicum of revelation of preferences may be provided through administrative channels, required in law (or donor regulations in a project context); favoring citizen participation and oversight in, for example, planning and budgeting (typically multiple service fora) and/or at the points of delivery of single public services (schools and health posts, for example).

## 5.2 THE PERFORMANCE OF DISTRICTS

Assessing the performance of districts is more difficult, because the districts are not independent units of government. Not only are they part of the central Frelimo-dominated state, but they also have responsibilities (such as secondary education) inside municipal jurisdictions. Assessing the performance of districts is also made more difficult by rapidly changing circumstances, that is,

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<sup>16</sup> The forum functions by paying the subsidies and expenses of the municipal leaders who attend. Participation of the six municipalities is facilitated by Frelimo's current control of all six. If some municipalities were controlled by opposition parties, it is doubtful that, failing substantial donor involvement and facilitation, all municipalities would freely exchange ideas in a single forum.

by relatively recent and substantial increases in funding and in their political importance as perceived by the central government. There is the sense that a process has been set in motion whose dimensions and results are not yet fully visible.

Although most of the international donors have directed their efforts to municipalities, there are some projects in districts. The Austrian Agency for International Development, for example, has a rural water supply and sanitation project in Sofala province. This is a three-phase project: 1999-2002, 2008-2009, and beginning in 2012. At the province level, the project works with NGOs to train people to go into communities (at the lowest level, the *povoação*) and determine where water fountains will be built. Each fountain then has its own committee to collect water use fees. At the district government level, the project pays the salaries of technicians for one year, after which they become part of the regular civil service of the seven districts in the project. The project also supplies computers and offices. As in the case of the municipalities, project money seemed to flow to the most dynamic provinces and districts. In this case, Austrian cooperation chose to follow UNICEF money.

Each district has layers of consultative councils, appointed and chaired by the district administrator. These councils exist (in theory, if not in fact) at all four levels of the district, i.e., *distrito*, *posto administrativo*, *localidade*, and *povoação*. But the consultative councils have no real power: they do not deliberate, they approve but they do not really examine. They are crippled by their lack of resources. The councils are supposed to meet just twice per year, but in the absence of per diem expenses and transportation for members, this turns out to be quite difficult. Whether this is consistent with the intentions under which the councils were formed is unknown at this time. Incremental improvements to the regulations establishing the councils have been made over the short span of their existence; indicating, perhaps, an intention that they function to some degree to articulate local demands and to provide a degree of citizen oversight/review of district decision making.

### 5.3 DISTRICTS AND MUNICIPALITIES: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

Districts and municipalities occupy separate physical spaces, but they cannot help but interact. Districts have responsibilities within municipalities for such activities as secondary education, and there might be a market in a municipality that the nearby district seeks to tax. The economic activities of districts, whether in ports, mines, or agriculture, affect and are affected by contiguous municipalities. Our research revealed a wide disparity in the relationships between districts and municipalities. We could not sample enough district-municipality interactions to come to a definitive conclusion as to the conditions favoring positive and negative relationships, but we have some intuitions.

On the positive side, consider Dondo and Ilha de Mozambique. Dondo's long-term president meets regularly with the administrator of Dondo district. Together they planned where to put school classrooms. Dondo's development groups, the *núcleos de desenvolvimento*, negotiate with either the district or the municipality, depending on the relevant authority. Both the municipal president and the district's secretaries (the district administrator had only assumed power the day before our visit) report regular cooperation. In Nampula province, Ilha de Mozambique is another case in which the municipality and district are coterminous. The president of the municipality regularly participates in meetings of the district administration, and the district administrator participates in sessions of the Municipal Council. These meetings are important to



plan such activities as sanitation and drinking water supply; indeed, they are examples of joint efforts developed by the municipality and the district government.

In Manhiça, there seems to be no cooperation. When the Spanish International Agency for Development Cooperation tried to assist a project for a health research center in the municipality, they faced opposition from the district administrator. The conflict seemed long standing, and the Spanish were unable to mediate the conflict, because they were identified with the municipality. In the short run, the solution involved bringing in the local Representative of the State, but in the long run, according to our informant in Spanish cooperation, it would make sense to mount joint district-municipality projects.

The classic district-municipality conflict naturally involves Beira, the only municipality currently controlled by an opposition party. Originally elected by Renamo, Daviz Simango formed his own party and won reelection after he failed to win Renamo internal support for his reelection. Simango claims that he deals with continual conflicts with the provincial government and with the Representative of the State in Beira.

Though we lack data for a systematic investigation of district-municipality conflicts, our sense is that they really have two sources. Manhiça's conflict seems purely personal. Interparty rivalry of the kind characterizing Beira is naturally rare, precisely because all other municipal presidents are Frelimo. Ironically, the dominant-party state has an advantage: party discipline and centralization encourage elected and appointed officials to cooperate to assure their political futures.



# 6.0 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our research leads us to a series of conclusions:

- a) Frelimo dominates Mozambican political space, and to a lesser degree, Mozambican economic opportunity. For the foreseeable future, this dominance limits the extent to which further municipal democratization will democratize national politics.
- b) Representative bodies at all levels of government in Mozambique are inherently feeble. Legislatures and assemblies are endowed with few functions, and because Mozambique uses a closed-list proportional representation electoral system in an environment where parties do not offer competing programs, ties between voters and their representatives (parliamentary deputies and Municipal Assembly members) are very likely to remain extremely weak.
- c) Urban and rural poverty are increasingly important political issues in Mozambique. The urban poor have “voice” through street-level violence, while rural areas, because of their high rates of abstention in all elections, represent a potential source of electoral uncertainty in the event that they start to vote in large numbers.<sup>17</sup>
- d) Small municipalities (roughly speaking, “vilas” reclassified as municipalities) are characterized by weak policy and public service capacities.
- e) The Government of Mozambique has clearly shifted its technical and financial assistance in recent years in favor of district governments.

These findings lead to conclusions that differ in important respects from the conclusions of the USAID desk study of decentralization in Mozambique (Reaud & Weimer, 2010). Reaud and Weimer find that municipalities generally perform better than districts and suggest that small municipalities have in some respects performed better than large municipalities.<sup>18</sup> Our report views municipalities and districts as “different” rather than “better” or “worse” and suggests that large municipalities perform, on average, better than small ones.

In our view, the somewhat different conclusions of the two reports result from differences in points of view rather than quarrels about the facts of local governance in Mozambique. The logic of Reaud and Weimer values local democratic procedure as the primary desired outcome of decentralization; indeed, it may value local democratic procedure as somehow better than national-level democratic procedures. By contrast, the logic of our study sees municipal performance as measured better by service and policy outcomes.

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<sup>17</sup> Note that we make this argument with reference to “rural areas” rather than “rural poor.” We lack data examining rates of abstention by income or wealth categories.

<sup>18</sup> See pages 34-35 of Reaud and Weimer (2010).

Our findings suggest that creating additional municipal governments in Mozambique is a dubious strategy if its goal is further democratization. The central government does not, by its actions, support democratization. Frelimo's actions and its historic ideological positions do not favor the competitive, multiparty politics that donors seek to support. The political decentralization implied by a limited number of elected municipal governments is substantially constrained by weak municipal capacity in smaller municipalities, continuing dependence on central transfers in all municipalities, and Frelimo's dominance of the central government. Together, these constraints enable a robust system of patronage politics. But examples do exist of such systems evolving into competitive democracies; the case of Mexico, in which 70 years of single-party dominance rapidly evolved into a competitive pluralism, is illustrative.

Political decentralization is also belied by the robust structure of deconcentrated governments that condition the context of local governance in Mozambique. Such structures include the rights of *tutelle* retained by central authorities, by provincial-level and district-level officials of the central ministries with sometimes overlapping, vaguely defined responsibilities for service delivery, and (where invoked) by agents of the state. This vast web of executive power greatly limits the exercise of authority normally conferred by elections.

In our view, Frelimo is not interested in further municipalization in support of democratization, but it may very well be interested in further deconcentration in support of local economic development to counter the increasing discontent of average citizens. We found considerable evidence that Frelimo is interested in a modicum of "good governance" in the districts: it rotates district administrators in ways that reward good performance, and it seeks to limit waste and corruption in the distribution and utilization of funds whose *raison d'être* is basically political.

Strengthening decentralization should be viewed from the perspective of furthering eventual democratization. Yet pushing municipalization to very small communities, in our view, is counterproductive. Mozambique has a dominant political organization. Pressing that organization to preserve liberalization, in the sense of freedom of organization, freedom of the media, freedom of speech and action, and so on, is absolutely central to developing the conditions that can lead to a competitive pluralism, to an open access order. In the short term, however, helping the regime in its preferred decentralization strategy, the strategy of deconcentrating authority and resources to the districts, may advance democratization more than a premature and sure-to-be-resisted push for immediate devolution to unprepared municipalities.

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# APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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Salvador Langa, Chief of cabinet, Manhiça

Manuel Cambezo, president of Dondo municipality

João Oliveria, administrator of Dondo district

Sr. Chaporica, municipal cabinet, Dondo

Zacarias Zicai, Austrian Cooperation

Daviz Simango, President of Beira





# APPENDIX 3: RESPONSABILIDADES DESCENTRALIZADAS PARA CADA NÍVEL DE GOVERNO

Governo Provincial	Governo Distrital	Autarquias
<p>1. No âmbito da administração em geral: (a) garantir a execução, no escalão da província, da política governamental centralmente definida; (b) exercer as competências previstas em leis específicas.</p> <p>2. No âmbito do plano e orçamento: (a) aprovar a proposta do plano e orçamento provincial; (b) supervisionar a sua execução e apreciar o respectivo relatório balanço, observando as decisões do Conselho de Ministros; (c) controlar a execução dos programas determinados centralmente e realizados ao nível do distrito; (d) fazer a programação e repartição dos créditos de investimento do Estado, bem como a programação dos contratos-programa plurianuais entre o Estado e as autarquias locais.</p>	<p>1. No âmbito da administração em geral: (a) dirigir a execução do Programa do Governo e o Plano Económico e Social; (b) aprovar o plano de desenvolvimento e o orçamento do distrito; (c) aprovar o relatório de balanço e de contas de execução do orçamento distrital e submetê-lo ao Governador Provincial; (d) aprovar relatórios de balanço de execução dos planos de desenvolvimento local; (e) zelar pela cobrança das receitas fiscais e não fiscais do Estado, na sua área de competência; (f) garantir a defesa e consolidação do domínio público do Estado e do património do Estado no respectivo distrito; (g) fixar as taxas e tarifas de receitas não fiscais, conforme as competências atribuídas por lei; (h) aprovar o seu regulamento interno.</p> <p>2. No âmbito da emergência: realizar ações de prevenção, proteção e defesa civil da população, na iminência ou ocorrência de calamidades naturais, em colaboração com as forças de defesa e segurança estacionadas no distrito, e com a sociedade civil desde que os resultados não pudessem ser alcançados de outro modo.</p> <p>3. No âmbito da preservação do ambiente: (a) elaborar propostas sobre a definição e estabelecimento de zonas protegidas e submetê-las às entidades competentes; (b) aprovar e executar programas de fomento de actividades de manutenção, proteção e reconstituintes do meio ambiente; (c) aprovar as propostas do plano de estrutura, do ordenamento do território, compreendendo zonas ecológicas e outras áreas de protecção; (d) estabelecer as reservas distritais de terra; (e) aprovar e incentivar programas de aplicação de energia alternativa à energia lenhosa e de carvão vegetal; (f) definir o</p>	<p><i>Competência próprias de investimento público</i></p> <p>1. Infraestruturas rurais e urbanas: (a) espaços verdes, incluindo jardins e viveiros da autarquia; (a) rodovias, incluindo passeios; (c) habitação económica; (d) cemitérios públicos; (e) instalações dos serviços públicos da autarquia; (f) mercados e feiras; (g) bombeiros.</p> <p>2. Saneamento básico: (a) sistemas autárquicos de abastecimento de água; (b) sistemas de esgoto; (c) sistemas de recolha e tratamento de lixo e limpeza pública.</p> <p>3. Energia: (a) distribuição de energia eléctrica; (b) iluminação pública urbana e rural.</p>

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<p>3. No âmbito do apoio aos programas de desenvolvimento distrital participativo, aprovar o programa plurianual de apoio aos programas de desenvolvimento distrital participativo adiante referido e executar o referido programa.</p> <p>4. No âmbito da educação e saúde: (a) acompanhar a criação e gestão das unidades de prestação de serviços de saúde primários; (b) acompanhar a criação e gestão das escolas primárias de ensino geral.</p> <p>5. No âmbito das obras públicas, dar orientações e instruções ao Administrador Distrital para garantir a execução das obras públicas previstas no Plano e Orçamento do Estado, bem como para execução das tarefas definidas na Política Nacional de Águas e na Política Nacional de Estradas.</p> <p>6. No âmbito da execução das decisões centralmente definidas, deliberar sobre questões que se suscitem em relação à aplicação de decisões emanadas das autoridades centrais da administração do Estado.</p> <p>7. No âmbito de planeamento e</p>	<p>modo e os meios de recolha, transporte, depósito e tratamento de resíduos sólidos, em especial, os dos hospitais e outros tóxicos; (g) promover a educação das populações sobre o controlo das queimadas; (h) garantir a defesa das espécies protegidas; (i) efectuar e transmitir os registos hidrométricos e meteorológicos; (j) promover ações preventivas dos efeitos de desequilíbrios, pragas e ocorrências meteorológicas que criem risco de carência alimentar em colaboração com as associações de defesa do meio ambiente;</p> <p>4. No âmbito do comércio e indústria: (a) proceder o recenseamento da rede comercial; (b) prestar informação sobre pedidos de abertura de estabelecimentos comerciais; (c) Inspeccionar a rede comercial e industrial; (d) divulgar o potencial industrial; (e) atrair investidores; (f) promover a pequena indústria para o aproveitamento das capacidades e potencialidades locais.</p> <p>5. No âmbito do abastecimento de água: (a) construir fontanários e abrir furos e poços; (b) gerir ou promover a gestão dos sistemas de abastecimento de água.</p> <p>6. No âmbito da educação: (a) garantir o bom funcionamento dos estabelecimentos de ensino do distrito; (b) promover a luta contra o analfabetismo; (c) promover a ligação escola comunidade.</p> <p>7. No âmbito da saúde: (a) assegurar o bom funcionamento das unidades sanitárias; (b) realizar campanhas de vacinação; (c) divulgar informação sobre epidemias e pandemias; (d) promover o combate às tripanossomíases; (e) zelar pela higiene e salubridade públicas.</p> <p>8. No âmbito da gestão dos recursos naturais e faunísticos: (a) assegurar o respeito dos períodos de caça e defeso; (b) emitir licenças de caça e abate; (c) combater a caça furtiva; (d) assegurar o respeito pela legislação florestal; (e) assegurar uma relação adequada entre o Homem e os animais bravios; (f) autorizar o abate de animais perigosos e excedentários.</p> <p>9. No âmbito dos recursos energéticos: (a) providenciar energia eléctrica em colaboração com outras entidades; (b) promover o aproveitamento energético dos recursos hídricos; (c) promover o uso de energias renováveis.</p>	<p>4. Transportes e comunicações: (a) rede viária urbana e rural; (b) transportes colectivos que se desenvolvam exclusivamente na área da respectiva autarquia.</p> <p>5. Educação e ensino: (a) centros de educação pré-escolar; (b) escolas para ensino primário; (c) transportes escolares; (d) equipamentos para educação de base de adultos; (e) outras actividades complementares da ação educativa, designadamente nos domínios da acção social escolar e da ocupação de tempos livres.</p> <p>6. Cultura, tempos livres e desporto: (a) casas de cultura, bibliotecas e museus; (b) património cultural, paisagístico e urbanístico da autarquia; (c) parques de cispismo; (d) instalações e equipamento para a prática desportiva e recreativa.</p> <p>7. Saúde: unidades de cuidados</p>

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<p>desenvolvimento: (a) mobilizar os interessados, cidadãos, residentes, empresas, associações, a participar a realização de objectivos de planeamento e desenvolvimento do território provincial; (b) gerir a coordenação das políticas do Estado no território da Província em especial na dinamização do processo de desenvolvimento rural e o ordenamento do território.</p> <p>8. No âmbito da administração e governação, determinar as medidas adequadas para o desenvolvimento organizacional e bom desempenho dos órgãos locais do Estado nos escalões inferiores aos da Província.</p>	<p>10. No âmbito dos transportes e trânsito: (a) manter operacionais, as pistas de aterragem e aeródromos; (b) promover o uso da bicicleta e da utilização de tração animal como meio de transporte; (c) efectuar a sinalização das vilas e povoações; (d) regular a actividade dos transportadores que operam na área de jurisdição do distrito.</p> <p>11. No âmbito do desenvolvimento local participativo: (a) promover e apoiar as iniciativas de desenvolvimento local com vista à elaboração do Plano de desenvolvimento distrital participativo; (b) elaborar propostas e pareceres sobre ações ou programas de promoção e apoio à actividade económica no distrito, submetendo-os à decisão das instituições ou entidades competentes; (c) efectuar o recenseamento de áreas cultivadas e avaliar o potencial de produção; (d) incentivar a produção alimentar e de rendimento; (e) incentivar o plantio de árvores de fruta; (f) promover o fomento pecuário; (g) construir e gerir tanques carracidas; (h) efectuar o arrolamento anual do gado; (i) estimular o aproveitamento do potencial de pesca nas águas interiores e marítimas; (j) promover mecanismos de financiamento da produção.</p> <p>12. No âmbito da prestação de serviços públicos: (a) cemitérios públicos; (b) matadouros, mercados e feiras; (c) reflorestamento, plantio e conservação de árvores de sombra; (d) construção e manutenção de ruas nas zonas urbanas e de estradas nas zonas rurais; (e) remoção, recolha, transporte, depósito e tratamento de resíduos sólidos, incluindo os dos hospitais e os tóxicos; (f) limpeza pública; (g) iluminação pública; (h) jardins, campos de jogos e outros parques públicos; (i) latrinas públicas.</p> <p>13. No âmbito das obras públicas: (a) assegurar a reabilitação e manutenção das estradas não classificadas, pontes e outros equipamentos de travessia; (b) assegurar a construção e manutenção de edifícios públicos; (c) promover a utilização de material local para melhorar as condições de habitação das populações; (d) construir valas de irrigação; (e) construir jardins públicos, infra-estruturas gimno-desportivas e parques de estacionamento.</p> <p>15. No âmbito da recreação, cultura e turismo: (a) assegurar o licenciamento dos espectáculos públicos; (b) apoiar os grupos culturais; (c)</p>	<p>primários.</p> <p>8. Ação social: (a) actividade de apoio às camadas de população vulnerável; (b) habitação social.</p> <p>9. Gestão ambiental: (a) proteção ou recuperação do meio ambiente; (b) florestamento, plantio e conservação de árvores; (c) estabelecimento de reservas municipais.</p>

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	realizar estudos sobre a cultura e valores locais; (d) promover a arte, cultura e artesanato; (e) promover a divulgaço do potencial turístico e cinegético; (f) emitir licenças turísticas nos termos de legislaço específica; (g) preparar o plano turístico distrital.	

Fonte: Lei dos Órgos Locais do Estado e Lei de Finanças Autárquicas (Lei nº 1/2008, de 16 de Janeiro).

Nome do Municipio	Receitas Próprias				Total	Transferencias do Estado (definidas por Lei - FCAeFIIL)						Total
	2005	2006	2007	2008		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Lichinga	4,456	5,174	9,067	5,258	23,954	13,548	15,286	18,296	16,813	20,354	25,886	128,013
Cuamba	2,938	3,077	5,261	10,606	21,882	8,569	9,623	11,858	10,707	12,276	15,613	80,607
Melangula	636	5,004	2,102	2,646	10,388	2,015	2,333	3,426	3,194	4,225	5,373	22,814
Marrupa						-	-	-	-	7,207	9,165	16,371
Pemba	16,023	21,008	1,667	24,925	63,623	11,194	11,112	16,334	14,609	17,226	21,907	110,281
Montepuez	6,595	7,250	8,192	21,366	43,403	8,011	8,859	10,137	9,007	10,061	12,795	70,852
Mocimboa da Praia	631	1,356	3,024	4,103	9,114	6,277	7,108	8,479	7,524	7,600	9,665	56,240
Mueda						-	-	-	-	6,019	7,655	13,674
Nampula	31,490	48,267	63,665	114,726	258,148	77,117	76,856	54,872	48,716	55,585	70,690	446,568
Angoche	1,124	1,043	3,343	3,406	8,916	12,659	14,224	16,347	14,683	15,856	20,165	111,492
Ilha de Moçambique	1,498	1,574	2,584	34,194	39,850	5,966	6,709	7,782	7,031	9,509	12,093	57,573
Nacala	17,303	19,918	14,264	27,554	79,039	27,288	28,830	31,709	28,585	31,956	40,640	226,344
Monapo	1,603	7,722	7,013	5,873	22,210	7,202	7,936	8,902	8,311	9,217	11,721	61,740
Ribaue						-	-	-	-	9,773	12,429	22,202
Quelimane	12,031	37,419	35,289	36,912	121,651	23,580	28,002	29,046	25,696	27,174	34,559	203,893
Gurúe	2,710	2,720	2,927	3,161	11,519	1,823	7,751	8,035	7,624	14,564	18,522	65,530
Mocuba	6,292	5,651	5,583	7,315	24,842	7,942	8,875	12,003	10,719	11,578	14,725	78,315
Milange	1,336	811	3,126	1,629	6,902	3,101	6,502	7,706	6,848	6,919	8,800	49,881
Alto Molocue						-	-	-	-	6,626	8,427	15,053
Tele	12,888	15,838	15,948	25,586	70,260	18,922	18,328	24,462	22,090	23,620	30,039	163,134
Moatize	1,543	1,414	2,615	2,832	8,403	5,036	5,694	6,824	6,548	7,166	9,113	45,960
Ilongoe						-	-	-	-	4,153	5,282	9,435
Chimoio	8,479	9,518	9,969	10,767	38,734	23,757	27,219	30,963	27,533	30,254	38,475	214,750
Manica	2,771	11,538	7,309	10,130	31,748	6,852	7,129	8,574	7,801	8,231	10,468	58,134
Catandica	2,967	2,255	2,182	3,613	11,017	2,526	4,562	3,511	3,183	3,915	4,979	26,592
Gondola						-	-	-	-	6,839	8,697	15,536
Beira	49,383	76,065	66,725	71,649	263,821	67,396	80,758	87,214	77,232	77,730	98,853	589,635
Dondo	9,379	13,930	20,901	16,055	60,265	11,415	14,688	15,739	14,753	18,497	23,523	111,752
Marromeu	8,882	2,626	3,138	5,859	20,505	3,338	3,422	4,418	4,191	6,055	7,700	32,933
Gorongosa						-	-	-	-	8,246	10,487	18,733
Inhambane	6,867	15,839	13,690	16,452	52,848	11,466	12,662	20,123	18,631	23,191	29,493	126,826
Maxixe	5,265	6,569	8,000	7,456	27,290	14,698	16,435	21,296	19,020	20,899	26,578	138,721
Vilankulo	5,527	17,886	7,543	14,450	45,406	7,105	7,977	9,419	8,478	8,478	10,782	62,296
Massinga						-	-	-	-	5,756	7,320	13,075
Xai-Xai	6,468	17,552	12,780	12,980	49,780	18,396	20,845	23,006	20,222	21,982	27,955	160,652
Chibuto	4,635	4,202	10,502	12,500	31,839	11,064	12,493	14,345	12,756	12,756	16,223	96,116
Chokwe	2,847	2,880	4,850	7,383	17,959	8,171	9,220	10,424	9,307	10,213	12,988	72,350
Mandlakazi	1,131	1,147	2,720	18,834	23,832	3,342	3,719	4,849	4,452	4,451	5,661	30,780
Bilene Macia						-	-	-	-	6,856	8,720	15,576
Matola	26,082	24,829	25,477	46,951	123,338	42,248	64,968	76,026	67,520	75,811	96,412	510,248
Manhiça	2,909	4,107	4,584	5,604	17,204	5,343	6,107	9,376	8,850	12,419	15,793	63,402
Namaacha						-	-	-	-	8,195	10,422	18,617
Cidade de Maputo	120,860	137,289	169,313	312,938	740,401	144,840	154,788	164,077	145,279	147,594	187,702	1,149,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>385,550</b>	<b>533,478</b>	<b>555,353</b>	<b>905,711</b>	<b>2,380,091</b>	<b>622,205</b>	<b>711,021</b>	<b>779,577</b>	<b>697,912</b>	<b>837,031</b>	<b>1,064,494</b>	<b>5,582,301</b>

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