HAITI SHELTER SECTOR ASSESSMENT:
One Year After the Earthquake

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This report constitutes an assessment of Haiti’s shelter sector approximately one year after the devastating earthquake of January 12, 2010. It was produced under a grant from USAID (521-G-10-00020-00) to the International Housing Coalition (IHC) during the period July, 2010 to February, 2011. It was based on a review of a wide variety of secondary source materials and two visits to Haiti to meet with USAID staff, shelter organizations and housing experts from the international donor community, NGOs, the private sector, the IHRC and the Government of Haiti.

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An IHC organized panel of international housing experts also reviewed and commented on the challenges facing housing reconstruction in Haiti based on their previous experiences with post-disaster shelter sector recovery. The review panel included Juan Belt, Chuck Billand, Peter Feiden, Larry Hannah, Seifalla Hassanein, Susan Hill, Duane Kissick, Barbara Lipman, Mike Shea, Ray Struyk, Chris Vincent, Chris Ward, and Roger Williams.

The IHC is a non-profit education and advocacy membership organization located in Washington D.C. that supports “Housing for All” and seeks to raise the priority of housing on the international development agenda. The conditions of slums and the poor housing of slum dwellers are of particular concern. The IHC supports the basic principles of private property rights, secure tenure, effective title systems and efficient and equitable housing finance systems—all elements essential to economic growth, civic stability and democratic values. To learn more about the IHC visit its web site at www.Intlhc.org.
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INTRODUCTION AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

The International Housing Coalition’s (IHC) Haiti Shelter Sector Assessment (HSSA) is one part of an evolving review of the progress and obstacles facing the recovery of the shelter sector after Haiti’s devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010. The HSSA is based on the prevailing shelter conditions one year after the earthquake. It supplements the policy advice previously provided by the IHC over the period of its USAID grant. Because of rapidly changing circumstances in Haiti’s shelter sector, the HSSA is intended to be updated, revised and expanded upon as the shelter recovery process unfolds in Haiti. The HSSA is presented in two parts: Part 1 - Summary and Conclusions; and Part 2 -Principal Issues Regarding Shelter Sector Recovery in Haiti.

Part 1 - The Summary and Conclusions of the HSSA, starts with background on the effect of the earthquake on the shelter sector and the USAID response through December 31, 2010. It presents the objectives and underlying principles of the Assessment. It also summarizes information on the present conditions in the shelter sector and the structure of the 2011 USAID program designed to assist the shelter recovery process. The last section of Part 1 summarizes the recommendations developed in Part II of the Assessment.

Part 2 - The Principal Issues Regarding Shelter Sector Recovery in Haiti, is organized around three types of issues and 14 specific issue areas:

1. USAID Specific Issues:
   A. Focus of USAID Bi-lateral Shelter Investments.
   B. Scale of USAID Shelter Projects.
   C. USAID Assistance for Safe Return to Communities in Port-au-Prince.
2. Broader Strategic Issues:
   A. Dealing with Households that Lived in Hazardous Locations.
   B. Institutional Arrangements for Implementing Shelter Sector Recovery.
   C. GOH Communication with the Public about Shelter Reconstruction.
   D. Participatory Planning & Implementation of Shelter Reconstruction.
3. Issues Related to Critical Aspects of the Shelter Recovery Process:
   A. Rubble Removal.
   B. Secure Land Tenure.
   C. Provision of Basic Infrastructure.
   D. Provision of Housing Finance & Housing Microfinance.
   E. Transitional Shelters and Shelter Reconstruction.
   G. Rental Housing.

Part 2 of the HSSA presents the rationale for 47 recommendations to USAID – an admittedly daunting list that reflects both the severity of the disaster and the complexity of the shelter sector. Some of the recommendations have to do with matters that are under the direct control of USAID. These recommendations have implications for how USAID uses its own scarce financial resources. However, many other
recommendations cannot be carried out by USAID alone. Rather, they call for USAID leadership and collaboration with the Government of Haiti (GOH), other donors and the NGO community. These recommendations involve using USAID funds and staff time to leverage resources from partner organizations, and influence the policies and strategies affecting the shelter recovery process beyond direct USAID investments.

Of the many recommendations in Part 2, five need immediate attention because they lie on the critical path to improving the pace of shelter sector recovery. The sooner the issues addressed by these recommendations are resolved, the sooner displaced households can find adequate permanent shelter.

1. In partnership with other donors, USAID capacity-building assistance to the Government of Haiti (GOH) should focus on creating a high-level housing policy staff, and USAID should immediately engage with major donors to negotiate the establishment of a Ministry of Housing and Community Development with the Haitian President-elect. Training programs in housing policy analysis and formulation are needed as soon a high-level Haitian policy staff can be assembled. National-level Haitian political leadership is essential, but currently there is no cabinet-level political leader with clear responsibility and authority over the shelter recovery process. Proceeding without a Minister of Housing will perpetuate the inadequate pace of the shelter sector recovery process.

2. Standardized shelter assistance packages developed by the GOH need to be flexible, fair and not overly complex. USAID should call on the GOH to make this issue an immediate priority and should offer any technical assistance possible. Standardized shelter assistance packages will facilitate donor/NGO coordination, encourage the efficient use of resources and clarify assistance options to affected households. Assistance packages should be differentiated based on the habitability of a household’s former home (Green, Yellow, or Red), whether the household was a house owner or tenant, and whether their former housing site can be made safe.

3. To the maximum extent possible, USAID should fund GOH development of those essential guidelines and plans identified in the IHRC “Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework” that have not yet been initiated. There are at least 12 essential guidelines and plans that need to be prepared as soon as possible. Some are underway, but USAID technical assistance can have great impact if applied to the other topics identified in Annex 1.

4. USAID, in collaboration with other donors, should provide additional staff to the IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Team as soon as possible to enable it to coordinate the full range of safe return programs being implemented by all types of donors and NGOs. A fully-functioning IHRC is critical to the success of the shelter sector recovery process. USAID should work with the IHRC to define its immediate staffing needs, and provide funding to the extent possible toward meeting those needs.
5. For the new settlements program component, USAID should create a team within the Mission with the skills necessary to manage the contractors providing professional/technical, construction and beneficiary relocation services. New settlements require careful supervision by USAID to achieve their intended results and to manage costs.

The identification of households that can safely return and repair/reconstruct their housing, as well as those that will have to relocate, is being carried out primarily through the neighborhood enumeration and risk mapping process (discussed in greater detail in Part 2 under “Participatory Planning & Implementation of Shelter Reconstruction”). The next essential step is to use this household and neighborhood information to design appropriate, standard packages of assistance. Once developed, the GOH needs to blanket the country with information about the availability of technical and financial assistance packages and the eligibility requirements for assistance. This has to be clearly communicated so that residents and business owners know what aid will be offered to whom, how to get it, and what, if any decisions they must make, such as resettlement options for themselves and for their communities for those who are permanently displaced (see Part 2 “GOH Communication with the Public About Shelter Reconstruction”).

The lack of experience and capacity as well as weak institutional arrangements within the GOH make it difficult for officials to develop a coordinated program of technical and financial assistance for shelter sector recovery. The best hope is for Haiti to make use of successful models from other countries by adapting them to the circumstances in Haiti.

Haiti’s shelter sector is a complex picture. The HSSA tries to present that complexity in ways that encourage appropriate action, but it must be recognized that the situation on the ground is ever changing. Only by careful monitoring of the shelter sector recovery process can USAID adapt their efforts to maximize positive development impact.

**Part 1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

Background on the impact of the earthquake on the shelter sector in Haiti and a review of USAID shelter assistance to the GOH through the end of 2010 is presented below. This is followed by a discussion of the objectives and principles of this assessment, as well as summaries of present conditions and USAID strategy in support of shelter sector recovery. Part 1 ends with a summary list of recommendations developed more fully in Part II.

**I. BACKGROUND**

On January 12th, 2010 a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, 15 miles west of Port-au-Prince. The quake killed more than 220,000 people and injured over 300,000. It left more than one million people homeless and the majority of the earthquake affected
families relocated to 1,300 temporary camps in and around Port-au-Prince.\(^1\) The total value of damage and loss was estimated to be $7.8 billion.\(^2\) The international community flooded Haiti with humanitarian aid in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. However, by the end of 2010, the long-term recovery and reconstruction of housing in Haiti was still threatened by weak leadership from the Government of Haiti (GOH), a lack of coordination between donors and the absence of an officially approved strategy.

The scale of destruction is a reflection of the conditions that existed in Haiti prior to the earthquake; specifically, the country’s high population density combined with endemic poverty. The population growth rate in 2008 was more than 2 percent, with an even higher growth rate in Port au Prince contributing to rapid urbanization. According to a World Bank survey, 49 percent of Haitian households and 56 of urban households lived in absolute poverty in 2001.\(^3\) Social indicators reflect this trend: 40 percent illiteracy rate, 20 percent child malnutrition rate, and 80 percent of the population lacking access to clean drinking water.\(^4\) High population density, together with widespread poverty and

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2. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. “Haiti: Earthquake Six Month Progress Report.” IFRC. 2010
4. Ibid.
lack of institutional capacity to enforce building standards or urban planning, contributed to the high death toll and extensive building collapse.

The map above shows that the zone of very strong/severe impact of the earthquake included the densely populated Port au Prince metropolitan area (see Annex 3 for detailed impact information). One of the greatest effects of the earthquake was the destruction and damage to houses and infrastructure; especially in the informal neighborhoods where the urban poor lived in structurally unsound houses. In the capital Port-au-Prince, 86 per cent of the city's two million residents lived in densely populated slum areas, where clean water and access to basic sanitation were a rarity. Approximately 105,000 houses were completely destroyed, over 208,000 were damaged and approximately 25 million tons of rubble covered the earthquake zone.

The cost to repair damaged houses, including rubble removal and the provision of temporary shelter, was initially estimated to be over $3 billion, and it was estimated by some analysts that an additional $2.3 billion would be required for 340,000 new permanent houses to settle people permanently displaced from their former houses.

Foreign assistance flooded the country in the aftermath of the disaster but this assistance has been mainly for humanitarian purposes. To house the displaced in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, temporary camps were established by the donor community. Donors and NGOs (supported in large measure with USAID/OFDA-provided relief supplies) achieved the international goal of providing an estimated 300,000 earthquake-affected households with basic shelter assistance, essentially two pieces of plastic sheeting per household, by May 1. In addition, 4.3 million people received food aid, 1.1 million gained reliable access to safe drinking water and 90 percent of displaced persons in Port-au-Prince were able to access a nearby health clinic. The Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) was created to mobilize and utilize contributions from donors. The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was also created as a temporary institution to approve and coordinate development projects and programs.

In the earthquake affected areas, technical teams have assessed houses for habitability as part of the reconstruction process. As of January 12, 2011, teams had assessed more than 380,000 of 400,000 targeted structures, tagging 54 percent green, or safe to inhabit, 26 percent yellow due to the need for minor repairs, and 20 percent red, indicating a need for major repairs or demolition. Many of the “green” houses have not yet been reoccupied; sometimes because former residents can no longer pay their rent and other times because households do not want to lose access to the aid provided in

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8 Ibid.
camps. As of January 12, 2011 USAID/OFDA grantees had completed repairs to enough “yellow” or “red” houses to accommodate only 1,875 households.9

As of December 2010, long-term reconstruction had hardly begun, and the slow removal of rubble on private property has hampered rebuilding. Recent USAID/OFDA data indicate that the January 2011 population of camps of displaced households throughout the earthquake affected area is approximately 810,000 people, a decline of approximately 690,000 people since July.10 Although it is not yet clear where people have gone, or if their shelter situation has improved, emerging anecdotal evidence suggests that returns to green-tagged structures are increasing in areas where rubble has been removed, services are beginning to be restored, and other shelter activity (hosting support, transitional shelter construction, and “yellow” structure repairs) is occurring. Rubble removal thus appears to be a prime motivator for returns, and returns are a key factor in promoting recovery.

New challenges have emerged including the unauthorized camps that surround official donor-run camps and the apparent lack of secure land tenure in many camps. Nevertheless, donors have shifted from the provision of emergency shelters to the construction of transitional shelters, and most recently to shelter units that may be upgraded to permanent housing. Transitional shelters are usually constructed of wood frames with plastic sheeting and sometimes more permanent materials to provide residents with shelter from hurricane-force winds and more privacy than emergency shelter. Their construction takes about two to three days and they can last three or more years. As of January 12, 2011, USAID/OFDA grantees had completed 13,662 transitional shelters, sufficient to house nearly 68,300 individuals.11 Upgradable shelter is usually similar to transitional shelter but built on a permanent concrete foundation as a solid base for an eventual permanent house. With upgradable shelter, land tenure issues are of particular concern. According to Haitian law, structures built on particular plot are the property of the landowners. This leaves residents of shelter units, whose land rights have not been established, vulnerable to future eviction.

By the end of December 2010, the State Department and USAID had developed the USG’s comprehensive strategy for assistance to Haiti which presents housing as priority number one to enable Haitians to “build back better”.12 Despite slow progress so far, the shelter recovery process is an opportunity to reverse Haiti’s trajectory of poverty, inequality, economic stagnation and corruption. However, this will require the long-term commitment of the Haitian government as well as the donor community.

9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
II. OBJECTIVE OF THE SHELTER SECTOR ASSESSMENT

The principal objective of the HSSA is to provide USAID with a broad perspective on support to the shelter recovery process. Recovery from such a devastating earthquake will take many years. Therefore, the assessment takes a medium to long-term perspective on the process, and recommends ways that USAID can have the most beneficial impact on development of the shelter sector. The shelter sector refers to housing and housing-related infrastructure as well as the essential elements required for housing and infrastructure development. These elements include planning, policies, financing, and institutional arrangements that facilitate the production of housing and related infrastructure on a scale sufficient to eventually provide adequate access to all Haitians.

To achieve its objective, the assessment identifies critical Haitian shelter sector issues, analyzes their current context and recommends appropriate actions to be taken or facilitated by USAID through its assistance program. It also provides Haiti-relevant lessons from international experience on development of shelter for the poor and post-disaster shelter reconstruction. The assessment is based on the in-country review of the shelter recovery process, findings and conclusions of a wide range of documents about shelter in Haiti as well as inputs from shelter experts on critical policy issues.

III. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE ASSESSMENT

A number of principles underlie the analyses and recommendations of the HSSA. These principles are derived from international best practices for shelter recovery following a major natural disaster and are summarized below.

- Do no harm. The shelter sector recovery process should make the lives, health, safety, and economic condition of the poor no worse than they were before the disaster. To the extent practical given limited resources and capacity, the recovery process should result in “building back better.”

- Facilitate “safe return” for as many households as possible. The shelter sector recovery process should enable households to safely return to their former neighborhoods and houses to the maximum extent possible.

- Recognize the need for a variety of shelter solutions. Renters and house-owners need different types of shelter solutions during the recovery process. The poor and the non-poor also have different needs, as do the most vulnerable populations.

- Haitian leadership for the recovery process is essential.
USAID can support shelter recovery, but Haitians must lead it. Leadership must start with the GOH, and a single focal point for housing community development policy and programs at the national government level is essential.

IV. SUMMARY OF PRESENT CONDITIONS IN THE SHELTER SECTOR\(^\text{13}\)

By the end of December 2010, shelter conditions for most households displaced by the earthquake had not improved substantially beyond emergency shelter in formal or informal camps. According to Habitat for Humanity International: “Habitat for Humanity and its partners distributed more than 21,000 emergency shelter kits and are on schedule to complete 2,000 transitional or upgradeable shelters by the end of January 2011. But the vast majority of disaster-affected families remain without options for improving precarious shelter situations. The 1.5 million internally displaced people in Haiti face extreme uncertainty, as their futures are threatened by forced evictions, improvised shelters and emergency shelter materials that have begun to deteriorate.”\(^\text{14}\)

The most fundamental problem facing the shelter sector is that responsibility for shelter issues remains divided among multiple Government of Haiti agencies, and capacity in these agencies is very weak. This is contributing to problems ranging from shortages of heavy equipment for rubble removal to identifying rubble disposal sites to establishing secure land tenure for housing reconstruction to clearing necessary materials through customs. These and other problems have slowed the delivery of transitional and permanent shelter for displaced households. In particular, rubble removal and land tenure affect not only rebuilding, but also resettlement of displaced Haitians and provision of services in their original neighborhoods.

The slow pace of shelter sector recovery is illustrated by the shelter program statistics of the International Committee of the Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shelter - IFRC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shelter Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households provided with emergency shelter materials: Reached - 172,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Households provided with emergency shelter materials for replacement: Planned - 80,000 Reached - 41,885</td>
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<tr>
<td>Households provided with improved shelter solution: Planned - 30,000 Reached - 2,645</td>
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<tr>
<td>Households provided with a transitional/upgradable shelter: Reached - 2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households provided with other shelter solution: Reached - 121</td>
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\(^{13}\) Summary based on U. S. Department of State. Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “HAITI ONE YEAR LATER”, January 10, 2011

The condition of land markets is chaotic and essentially lawless. Land ownership records are nonexistent or ambiguous. Lack of clear title to a plot of land or written approval from a verified owner makes it difficult to supply a potential beneficiary with a new house or to support re-occupancy of prior homes. The IFRC\textsuperscript{15} summarizes their view of the current situation as follows:

“The overriding challenge is land. Access to land has often been blocked due to a complex and informal system of land tenure making it unclear who actually holds the title to a piece of land. Haiti lacks almost all of the key attributes of a functional civil land system. The earthquake did not create land issues but it has certainly exacerbated them. As a result, plans to build shelters have been seriously impacted. The humanitarian community has no control over land ownership and efforts to secure sufficient amounts of land have taken much longer than expected with only a handful of identified settlements having been established over the past months.”

Un-removed rubble is also having a profound impact on shelter sector recovery. Rubble removal is an inherently time-, resource-, and labor-intensive process. Millions of tons of rubble remain. There is a need to identify sites for rubble disposal. Only one rubble disposal area has been approved to date and this is limiting the pace of removal.

Many occupants of what were intended to be temporary camps have been reluctant to return home or otherwise leave the camps due to concerns about safety of structures, crime, and lack of humanitarian assistance or economic opportunities outside the camps.

The Government of Haiti is in need of substantial strengthening of its capacity to direct and support the shelter recovery process. For example, lack of government capacity is delaying the registration of NGOs, the importation of shelter material, and identifying land for new settlement sites for permanent relocation. In the absence of a single ministry with a political mandate and responsibility for planning, coordinating and ensuring implementation of critical shelter functions, delays and inefficiencies in the shelter recovery process continue to arise.

\textbf{V. SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT USAID STRATEGY IN SUPPORT OF SHELTER SECTOR RECOVERY}\textsuperscript{16}

According to documentation provided, the U.S. Government’s overall goal is to promote a stable and economically-viable Haiti. It plans to achieve this goal by supporting economic opportunities outside Port au Prince with investments in housing, energy, agriculture, health, rule of law and national & local governance. USAID is responsible

\textsuperscript{15} International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, “Haiti Earthquake 2010 - One-year Progress Report”, January 2011.
for managing U.S. foreign assistance efforts but it intends to work with key stakeholders, including the GOH, other donors, NGOs, the private sector and local communities with special attention to building Haitian capacity.

In the infrastructure area (broadly defined), USAID is tasked with achieving *improved infrastructure that supports community and commercial development*. It plans to invest in areas where their assistance can add value, catalyze economic growth and help build Haiti’s institutions and their capacity to perform their roles. In the shelter sector specifically, the objective given to USAID is to support the GOH in creating safe and sustainable communities in Port-au-Prince and in GOH-designated development corridors through increased access to housing and community services.

Over the 18 months starting in January 2011, USAID plans to implement a program to address the shelter needs of Haitians displaced by the earthquake, and set the foundations for a sustainable shelter sector. The program consists of four components.

1. **Support for upgrading up to five Port-au-Prince neighborhoods, including provision of resources to accelerate rubble removal using heavy equipment.**

   In part through funding provided to the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (the multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank), USAID plans to assist in upgrading five informal neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince. The objective is to facilitate the return of displaced households to their original neighborhoods. Specific activities funded directly or indirectly by USAID will address rubble removal, land tenure security and the lack of community infrastructure, all of which currently combine to prevent the safe return of displaced households. Assistance may also include funding for repair of “yellow” houses and the incremental improvement of transitional shelter units in the neighborhoods.

   Within 18 months, USAID intends to facilitate the return of approximately 100,000 displaced households (500,000 people) to existing neighborhoods in the Port-au-Prince area; launch comprehensive upgrading of three neighborhoods; assist community-based resolution of documented ownership and occupancy claims for 40,000-80,000 parcels; and coordinate the implementation of programs providing an unspecified volume of vouchers and home improvement/repair loans to promote shelter sector recovery.

2. **Integrated investments to facilitate the establishment of up to three new communities that offer housing, jobs, and sustainable economic opportunities.**

   USAID plans to develop up to three new communities that offer housing, access to electricity and sustainable economic opportunities close to Port-au-Prince and in the vicinity of St. Marc and Cap Haitien. USAID intends to facilitate construction of new houses on lots allocated to Haitians who have not received transitional shelter and may be staying with friends or family, with a particular focus on households headed by single
women. USAID will also support the upgrading of transitional shelters in the same three areas to create more permanent homes on the model used in Port-au-Prince neighborhoods.

Within 18 months, USAID plans to identify sites for the new shelter settlements; contract projects and monitor construction of permanent housing units and related services and infrastructure; support at least 4,000 new core homes benefiting 20,000 people and provide infrastructure to other new shelter sites to facilitate the construction by other organization of 11,000 more houses to benefit approximately 70,000 people in the Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien development corridors; and design integrated investments for these communities in concert with other donors.

3. Provide capacity building and policy reform support to the GOH.

USAID plans to provide technical assistance in urban planning, management, construction, and housing administration. Policy assistance will be focused on land tenure and titling, the creation of an enabling environment for housing finance and mortgage markets, and regulation and supervision of building codes. USAID will also continue to: 1) fund the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) and any successor organization to improve the coordination of Haiti’s strategy for permanent housing, 2) support the Presidential Commission on Resettlement to facilitate the relocation of displaced households that can not return to their original houses, and 3) assist the Ministry of Finance to improve the land title and property tax records.

Within 18 months, USAID plans to provide significant (though unspecified) technical capacity to the IHRC, the Ministry of Finance and the Presidential Commission on Resettlement.

4. Increase access to housing finance.

USAID plans to encourage the recovery of the housing sector with housing finance mechanisms tailored to different segments of the population. A number of options will be assessed for implementation, including home improvement loans, construction finance, mortgage lending for the middle class and working poor, and subsidies & vouchers for the poorest.

Within 18 months, USAID plans to have enabled access to financing (in unspecified form) for an unspecified number of people to repair and upgrade their homes in Port-au-Prince.

VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR SHELTER SECTOR RECOVERY

The HSSA looks at the shelter sector recovery process broadly to identify important issues and recommend appropriate action by USAID, either on its own or in conjunction with other international donors and NGOs. Part 2 of the HSSA will present the rationale
for the recommendations summarized below as well as other information that may be useful to USAID.

1. USAID SPECIFIC ISSUES

A. Focus of USAID Bi-lateral Shelter Investments

1) USAID should identify the factors that motivate displaced families to return to their neighborhoods or relocate to new settlements. A study involving limited household surveys or focus groups should be funded by USAID. There are substantial risks to not making demand the key factor in the location of new houses.

2) USAID should attempt to relocate displaced families to places where their livelihood prospects and access to essential services are at least equivalent to their original informal community in Port au Prince. At a basic level, economic opportunity should be the essential site selection criteria for USAID new settlements projects, and should be made a binding constraint in the site selection process.

3) USAID should avoid making the success of new settlements primarily dependent on the prospect of foreign direct investment. When selecting sites, the USAID new settlement program component needs to take a much broader view of the demand for housing than to focus on a very limited number of foreign direct investment deals.

4) Selection of beneficiaries for relocation to USAID new settlements should favor households who have no possibility of returning to their former housing site. There will be a substantial number of households permanently displaced from their original neighborhoods. Some of these will be displaced due to neighborhood upgrading projects, some will be offered relocation in other new settlements, so coordination with other donor projects will be necessary. New settlements remote from Port au Prince may have various justifications but are unlikely to make a substantial contribution to re-housing displaced households from the earthquake zone.

5) In conjunction with local governments and community groups, potential USAID beneficiaries should be identified through the simultaneous application of Neighborhood Enumeration, Neighborhood Risk Mapping and Participatory Community Planning techniques. Use of all three techniques will show which registered households from a given neighborhood may be permanently displaced due to unmitigated risks or re-planning of their building site for a community facility or infrastructure right of way.
B. Implementation of USAID Shelter Projects

1) **USAID should attempt to identify in-fill areas where smaller new settlements can be constructed as near as possible to informal neighborhoods undergoing upgrading.** New settlements near existing informal neighborhoods will minimize the adverse impact of household relocation and make it easier to assemble land parcels with clear ownership.

2) **Wherever possible, USAID should utilize Haitian construction contractors under appropriate supervision.** Smaller new settlement projects can more easily encourage Haitian housing construction and development company growth.

3) **USAID should make certain that ownership of the land for any new settlement is undisputed.** Haitian landowners for each USAID new settlement project need to be able to demonstrate that they have well established control over the land that is to be developed.

4) **For the new settlements program component, USAID should create a team within the Mission with the skills necessary to manage the contractors providing professional/technical, construction and beneficiary relocation services.** New settlements require careful supervision by USAID to achieve their intended results and keep costs under control.

C. USAID Assistance for Safe Return to Communities in Port au Prince

1) **To the maximum extent possible, USAID should fund the GOH development of the essential guidelines and plans identified in the IHRC “Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework” that have not yet been initiated.** The Framework identified at least 12 essential guidelines and plans that needed to be prepared as soon as possible. Some are underway, but USAID technical assistance can have great impact if applied to the remaining topics identified in the Annex.

2) **USAID, in collaboration with other donors, should provide additional staff to the IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Team as soon as possible to enable them to coordinate the full range of safe return programs being implemented by all types of donors and NGOs.** A fully functioning IHRC is critical to the success of the shelter sector recovery process. USAID should work with the IHRC to define its immediate staffing needs, and provide as much funding as possible toward meeting those needs.
3) USAID should use policy dialog to promote agreement among all parties on appropriate risk mitigation, participatory community planning, affordable standards, and household contribution to rebuilding. Working with other donors and the NGO community, USAID should endeavor to influence the GOH approach to shelter recovery to incorporate citizen participation and efficient use of financial resources.

4) USAID should strongly advocate with the GOH for a central registry of Neighborhood Enumeration data to be established as soon as possible. This central registry could be housed in the National Center for Geospatial Information (CNIGS) if they received the necessary support to implement the registry.

2. BROADER STRATEGIC ISSUES

A. Dealing with Households that Lived in Hazardous Locations

1) USAID should expand its assistance for neighborhood enumeration to include concurrent risk mapping in the same communities. Adding risk mapping and mitigation specialists to the community enumeration teams will speed up the identification of registered families that will be permanently displaced from their former neighborhoods. The involvement of local governments and community groups in decisions about risk related displacement of households will be important.

2) USAID should engage the managers of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund on ways to accelerate the use of some of the USAID contribution toward risk mapping and mitigation activities. The sooner that risk mapping and mitigation cover more communities, the sooner an orderly process of safe return can be implemented.

3) To the extent possible, USAID should offer households registered by the International Organization for Migration the option to relocate to a USAID new settlement when they are displaced from their original neighborhoods due to unmitigated risks at their building site. Registered families that are unable to safely return to their original neighborhoods should be selected as beneficiaries for the USAID new settlements and offered a plot and assistance for building a house in the settlement of their preference.

B. Institutional Arrangements for Implementing Shelter Sector Recovery

1) In partnership with other donors, USAID capacity building assistance to the GOH should be focused on creating a high-level housing policy staff, and USAID should immediately engage with major donors to negotiate the establishment of a Ministry of Housing and Community Development with
the Haitian President-elect. National level Haitian political leadership is essential, but currently there is no cabinet level political leader with clear responsibility for the success of the shelter recovery process. Continuing without a Minister of Housing will perpetuate the inadequate pace of the shelter sector recovery process.

2) **USAID should negotiate for the IHRC Housing and Neighborhood Team to be shifted to a Disaster Recovery Division within a future GOH Ministry when the IHRC is disbanded.** The staff of the IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Team should be expanded as soon as possible so that it can manage the functions that are essential to the shelter recovery process.

3) USAID should focus capacity building assistance to municipal governments on the subjects of participatory community planning and facilitation of safe return to earthquake affected neighborhoods. Local governments should be important participants in the shelter recovery process. Assistance to local government can have a positive impact on the ability of municipal officials to facilitate safe return in their jurisdictions.

**C. GOH Communication with the Public about Shelter Reconstruction**

1) USAID should assist the GOH to professionally and programmatically communicate its longer-term vision for rebuilding and the immediate process for achieving it. Households need information to make good decisions about their housing options. USAID can support more useful communications about the shelter recovery process by helping the GOH to establish a focal point for housing policy development.

2) **USAID might help fund media outlets – radio, print, newspapers – as a relatively low-cost way to ensure that residents stay informed about the packages of assistance being developed and the options available to their households and communities.**

**D. Participatory Planning & Implementation of Shelter Reconstruction**

1) USAID projects should balance swift reconstruction against the need for households to influence their own re-housing process. By including residents as much as possible in the process of locating and designing the homes they are expected to occupy, they are more likely to be satisfied with the outcome.

2) **USAID should encourage neighborhood upgrading projects to engage community leaders and residents in the enumeration, risk assessment, and community planning process.** Residents have a more detailed understanding of each household’s tenure and risk situation in the pre-
disaster neighborhood than any outside organization can. Residents and community leaders who are actively engaged in redevelopment of their neighborhood are better able than outside experts to prioritize and locate sites for community facilities.

3) USAID new settlement projects should provide the flexibility to allow displaced households to design their own houses within the limits of a per unit budget and safe construction standards. Households are better equipped to make tradeoffs of space, amenities and layout than people who will never live in the units themselves.

3. ISSUES RELATED TO CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SHELTER RECOVERY PROCESS

A. Rubble Removal

1) USAID should assist the Ministry of Public Works with funding for the completion of an “Integrated Rubble Management Plan”. Currently, there is no officially approved plan for dealing with the remaining rubble that is found primarily on private property. Households need to understand what their rights and responsibilities are, and how the government plans to facilitate rubble removal and reuse.

2) USAID should advocate with the managers of the HRF to devote a major portion of the resources contributed by the USG to continued rubble removal. Rubble remains one of the most serious roadblocks to shelter sector recovery. HRF resources could be used strategically to support the rapid implementation of an Integrated Rubble Management Plan once it has been developed. Other donors should also be encouraged to contribute to this effort.

B. Secure Tenure

1) USAID should ensure that residents and groups that represent them are involved in the mapping of property boundaries and claims. Close-knit neighborhoods in Haiti tend to know and acknowledge who lives where and who has rights to what. The GOH should be encouraged to accept and codify these claims and resolve any outstanding disputes. This is the one of the main ways to help people begin the process of rebuilding.

2) USAID should advocate for GOH use of alternative forms of tenure security depending upon the situation of residents. International experience demonstrates that secure tenure can be achieved through a variety of means. At a minimum, residents should be free from the fear of sudden eviction. They will then have the assurance and stability to begin to invest incrementally in building and improving housing on their own.
3) USAID should pilot the use of Community Land Trusts (CLTs) in their new settlement areas. CLTs have the potential to provide both tenure security and long-term affordability in a new settlement. The governance structure of CLTs deserves careful consideration and should “reserve” seats at the table for women. Board membership might best be divided among resident representatives, local officials, and members of the nearby community. This will ensure that the CLT will be recognized both as a legitimate representative of community residents and a useful conduit for local officials to provide outreach and service delivery to the community.

C. Provision of Basic Infrastructure

1) USAID should promote the design of water and sanitation services to function on a neighborhood network basis. In Haiti, neighborhood based systems have traditionally provided the most reliable and cost effective service. Neighborhood water reservoirs or wells and condominium sewers connected to communal septic tanks can be developed to provide essential and cost effective services.

2) USAID should assure that there are good road connections between the USAID new settlements and major highways or city streets. Transportation connections will be critical to households’ ability to earn income after relocating to new settlements.

3) In assembling land on which to provide services and resettle displaced residents, USAID should encourage the GOH to consider using a variety of approaches. These include sites-and-services schemes for government owned land and land pooling and land sharing in the case of privately-owned land where the GOH might have to exercise the right of eminent domain and/or negotiate with land owners.

4) USAID should support efforts by local governments and future residents to participate in and plan the design of housing, infrastructure and other elements of communities built on newly assembled land. With the help of Haitian NGOs the international community should be able to organize residents and negotiate appropriate agreements.

D. Provision of Housing Finance & Housing Microfinance

1) USAID should focus technical assistance for housing finance on the development of non-mortgage lending products. The absence of clear titles to property makes it virtually impossible to use property as collateral for mortgage loans. Haitian banks are highly risk averse and this is reflected in their avoidance of mortgage lending. Making micro-finance
available for housing reconstruction will be a more productive use of scarce technical assistance resources.

2) USAID should support development of a housing microfinance assessment. Despite a fairly robust micro-finance sector, Haitian MFIs have not developed sustainable housing micro-finance products. Realistically, most households (because they depend on irregular income in the informal sector) will have to be served by housing microfinance products that permit affordable incremental building and improvements to housing that people make for themselves.

3) USAID should discourage the GOH from establishing a government-run housing bank. The record of such institutions is quite poor and usually results in large government subsidies. Moreover, the bank could inhibit the participation of privately owned housing finance institutions in the mortgage market.

E. Transitional Shelters and Shelter Reconstruction

1) USAID should try to minimize funding for NGO and other donor construction of any kind of housing units in favor of assisting families to repair or rebuild their own housing. With appropriate technical and limited financial assistance, households will produce better housing than can be provided by any donor organization. Haitians have historically demonstrated the ability to provide their own housing through incremental construction.

2) At most, USAID should support construction of upgradable shelter units in new settlement areas. Upgradable shelter units with a concrete foundation, permanent roofing, and walls of more temporary materials represent a more durable and cost effective shelter solution than T-shirts. Experience shows that households will improve and expand such units if they have secure tenure and adequate income.

F. Technical and Financial Assistance for Displaced Households

1) Standardized shelter assistance packages need to be developed by the GOH so that they are flexible, fair and not overly complex. USAID should call on the GOH to make this issue an immediate priority, and should offer any technical assistance possible. Standardized shelter assistance packages will facilitate donor/NGO coordination, encourage the efficient use of resources, and clarify assistance options to affected households. Assistance packages should be differentiated based on the habitability of a household’s former home (Green, Yellow, or Red) and whether their former housing site can be made safe for return of the household.
2) Once developed, the GOH and the donor community should urge all private actors, including NGOs, to operate within the guidelines to ensure some equitable basis for assistance. Otherwise, actual assistance provided to households will be based on a random (lottery-like) system in which assistance is determined on the basis on what neighborhood one happened to live in and what NGO happens to be working there now.

3) GOH (and all donor) communication about assistance packages needs to be continuous, informative, and two-way. Assistance packages and any options associated with the packages (such as for resettlement, for example), need to be clearly communicated to residents and business owners so that they make informed personal, household-level, and community-wide decisions.

4) USAID should encourage the development of multi-organization Neighborhood Resource Centers for the provision of technical assistance to displaced households. Households returning to existing informal settlements as well as those relocating to new settlements will require technical assistance in repairing, rebuilding, or upgrading their shelter.

5) USAID should support development of guidelines by the GOH for the provision of conditional financial assistance to households. Financial assistance needs to be provided in a manner that permits quality control over the shelter that is built. Linking fund disbursements to technical assistance should be a standard provision in assistance packages.

G. Rental Housing

1) USAID should recognize that development of a rental assistance program needs a thoughtful approach and design. Most households affected by the earthquake were renters. USAID should support both studies and neighborhood pilot programs in an effort to find combinations of assistance and incentives that work both for landlords and for displaced tenants.

2) In cases where renters need to be relocated because they cannot safely return to their neighborhood of origin, USAID should advocate that they be offered secure tenure options. Such options could include a voucher or other assistance to help with rent. However, consideration also should be given to offering former renters, who can afford it, the option of obtaining more stable homeownership status. This could involve a program of alternative tenure security (see Secure Tenure section in this report).

3) USAID should advocate that the GOH facilitate the restoration of the private rental housing stock rather than embarking on direct involvement in large-scale direct provision of housing for renters. Such mass public
housing projects have failed almost everywhere in the past, with a particularly bad record of maintenance in developed and developing countries alike. Private rental housing was the norm in Haiti before the earthquake and could be restored with the right combination of incentives and assistance.

4) **USAID should assess the feasibility of providing financial assistance through a standardized housing voucher mechanism.** Vouchers that enable displaced households to pay for a year's rent in advance (as was fairly standard in Haiti before the earthquake) would ease financial stress on unemployed households, create an incentive for landlords to repair/reconstruct units, and could be used as one means to encourage households to leave the camps and return to private housing.
Part 2: PRINCIPAL ISSUES REGARDING SHELTER SECTOR RECOVERY IN HAITI

I. USAID-SPECIFIC ISSUES:

A. Focus of USAID Bi-lateral Shelter Investments.

According to data provided by USAID, $93.4 million (over 53% of the planned USAID bilateral shelter assistance) is being spent on a combination of emergency plastic sheeting, habitability assessments, rubble removal and integrated transitional shelter programs (including cash-for-work and water/sanitation/health activities). These are programs managed by USAID/OFDA under their disaster response mandate. Of the remaining $82 million in USAID shelter assistance, $53.3 million (65%) is being programmed for the development of new settlements where 4,000 permanent housing units will be constructed by USAID, and basic settlement infrastructure will accommodate 11,000 more units to be built by other organizations. That leaves $28.3 million for all other bi-lateral shelter initiatives (see table on the following page).

The principal justifications for such a high concentration of bi-lateral funding focused on new settlements has been support for the GOH efforts to decentralize Port-au-Prince and provide encouragement for a foreign company’s development of a textile manufacturing plant in Cap Haitien. The present plans for USAID to build new permanent housing outside Port-au-Prince seem substantially motivated by the decentralization philosophy although the desirability of building in proximity to economic opportunities is mentioned. Lower costs and the ease of providing hard and soft infrastructure in new locations may also be factors. However, it is the willingness to build housing in anticipation of new employment or business activity in these areas that characterize the initiatives. The question is whether housing can be used to lead efforts to decentralize Haiti away from Port-au-Prince.

The concentration of people and economic activity has long drawn the attention of the development community. Theoretically, the concern arises from the notion that there is an optimal or at least desirable size distribution of urban settlements and that an overly large principal city (relative to other settlements) might inhibit national development rather than promote it. In cross-country empirical research Port-au-Prince is above the mean with respect to concentration of urban population in the capital but there are both successful as well as failing countries where the main urban area is more prominent than Port-au-Prince. Examples of the successful include South Korea and Thailand where they have had levels of concentration of population in the principal city as high as Haiti today. In population terms, Haiti is not an outlier but in the proportion of economic activity in the capital, it is.
### Table 1: Planned USAID Bi-lateral Investment in Haiti’s Shelter Sector (U.S. $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity/Budget Source</th>
<th>2010 ESF Carryover</th>
<th>OFDA 2010</th>
<th>2011 Supplemental</th>
<th>OTI/TI</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Plastic Sheet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated t-shelter programming (CFW, NFI distribution, and WASH components typically built into these projects)</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Red” house Demolition and/or Rubble Removal and/or Recycling</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0*</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Settlements/ Housing and Community Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitability Assessment and “Yellow” house repairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Enumeration</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Upgrading</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Local Housing Micro-Finance Institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Strengthening</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOH Institutional Strengthening</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to IHRC Shelter &amp; Neighborhoods Advisory</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* OFDA funding of $8.0 million represents OFDA’s one stand-alone grant solely for rubble removal. OFDA has supported a significantly higher amount of rubble removal activities, which have been a component of OFDA-supported cash-for-work (CFW) activities. In all, OFDA has provided approximately $49 million in funding for programs that include a CFW, and thus a rubble removal, component. OFDA partners do not report rubble removal funding separately.

Looked at from another perspective, accounting for about 30% of the population and 60% of the economy, the decision of people and businesses to locate in Port-au-Prince is quite rational. In fact, Port-au-Prince is the engine of the Haitian economy (however poorly it has been running).
The reasons why people move to the main city in their country are well understood. They include services, infrastructure, opportunities, work, the need to be close to government, the structure of the economy, access to finance and more. Better housing is not one of the principal reasons for urban migration. Haiti’s experience in this respect is typical in that housing in Port-au-Prince was neither an attraction nor a deterrent for people moving to the capital.

Understanding the incentives that internal migrants face with respect to their location preferences is critical for any housing strategy. Some issues, such as access to basic services and government, may be relatively inexpensive and quick to address. Others, such as major transportation facilities, for example, airports and ports, or restructuring the economy, are not. Specific knowledge about incentives becomes a critical input to the detailed design of all kinds of programs because it is easy to inadvertently introduce perverse incentives. In the housing sector typical problems might be providing overly generous housing in locations where jobs are scarce or incomes inadequate to even maintain the units. The reverse can also be a problem if an in-kind, rather than monetary, benefit is provided in locations that make its value much greater in the already congested settlements, again distorting the location decisions of recipients.

A policy of decentralization has been tried, in many countries, in a number of forms over a long period of time and housing has usually been a prominent tool for attempting to implement the policy. In some cases the approach was as simple as trucking squatters out of city centers to remote locations where they may have been allocated a barren plot or, at best, provided a core-house. Broader services were usually absent and the difficulty and high cost of commuting to jobs was the signature of these approaches. Even the best planned of such schemes, often supported by major international donors, left beneficiaries stranded. In the Philippines and Bangladesh (and many more countries) initial beneficiaries sold or abandoned their "new" home or long delayed any construction or occupancy of the site as in Senegal. The unfortunate story of relocating families suffering from poor or illegal housing to locations far from their livelihoods and detached from the social networks is widely understood.

Moving people in response to the threat or reality of natural disaster can have a similar result. The Asian tsunami of 2004 is the largest scale operation of this type and some of the best lessons come from Aceh where many donors supported shelter projects. The evaluations focused not only on how quickly housing was provided but also on how effective the solutions were after a couple of years. Not surprisingly the faster delivery came unencumbered by extensive consultation with displaced families or extended efforts to resolve property disputes and the like. When the projects were seasoned several years, it was found that there were significantly better occupancy and completion rates for programs where the location was agreed in advance with the recipients.

Building "new towns" has often been motivated by similar concentration concerns and housing has always been a principal mechanism to encourage people to move to these
new areas. Although this type of green-field development requires integration of many factors, getting jobs to these locations is always the main challenge. Expensive transportation linkages, that take a lot of time and money, have been the usual remedy.

Regardless of where new settlements are constructed, selection of beneficiary households will be an important aspect of the project implementation process. Beneficiary selection for USAID new settlements programs in Haiti should be a straightforward process in accordance with the overall shelter recovery strategy developed by the IHRC. The IHRC “Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework” provides a structure for carrying out housing activities in a coordinated fashion with IHRC and other donor organizations. In the Social Risk Management section of the Framework\textsuperscript{17}, there is a section on Beneficiary Selection.

The IHRC Framework calls for the beneficiary selection process to apply to both displaced households being relocated to new settlements and to the displaced that are being assisted to return to their original neighborhoods. It also recommends that assistance be provided for the safe return of households to their neighborhoods whenever possible. The Framework also recommends that priority for assisting safe return to neighborhoods of origin be given to vulnerable families including female-headed households, elderly, disabled, and orphans. In new settlement projects, the IHRC Framework calls for priority to be given to “households displaced from their prior neighborhoods because of safety concerns associated with the entire neighborhood or with their particular housing site”.

There is broad consensus on the two essential pre-conditions for households to be selected as USAID new settlements beneficiaries. All beneficiaries should be registered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and they should be identified with an enumerated shelter unit in order to receive USAID assistance. After those two minimum qualifications have been met, it will be necessary to determine which households will have to be permanently displaced from their original neighborhood. To make this determination, it will be necessary to undertake neighborhood risk/mitigation mapping and participatory community planning in order to determine which housing units should not be repaired or replaced due to unmitigated risks or the need to use the land for other purposes.

IOM is now registering displaced households who are not currently living in the larger camps already covered by registration. Enumeration is a much more complex and detailed process than registration, and it involves identifying where households live now, where they used to live and who owns the unit they now occupy or occupied before the earthquake. The enumeration process is done on a block-by-block and housing unit by housing unit basis. Various donors and NGOs are conducting enumeration projects in different neighborhoods during the first six months of 2011. The basic enumeration form that will be used to collect the data has been agreed to by all of the donors, and

USAID was instrumental getting all of the parties to agree to a basic form with consistent data. (See Annex 2 for an example of an enumeration questionnaire.)

One potential problem that needs to be resolved soon is that there is no central database for the enumeration data. IOM maintains a central database of all of the registered displaced households, but they have not been given the charge to maintain a central database of enumerated households.

By mid-2011, it is estimated that USAID will have at least 28,800 registered and enumerated households from which to select beneficiaries for their new settlements program. A much higher number of enumerated households will be available later in the year.

For the USAID new settlements program component, the priority for selection should go to households displaced from their original neighborhood because of safety concerns associated with the entire neighborhood, or with their particular housing site\(^\text{18}\). Households that lost units in their original neighborhood due to the placement of roads in densely populated areas or because their units were removed for other reasons should also be selected as beneficiaries. However, it is very important that the households voluntarily agree to move to a USAID new settlement.

Recommendations:

1) **USAID should identify the factors that motivate displaced families to return to their neighborhoods or relocate to new settlements.** There are substantial risks to not making demand the key factor on the location of new houses. If new houses require the intended beneficiaries to move away from existing livelihoods or new opportunities/jobs do not emerge as expected, there is a strong risk that the houses will either be cashed-in by the early recipients so they can move back where they have a greater economic opportunity or will ultimately sit vacant, sometimes long enough that they become worthless. Either outcome could taint USAID efforts or undermine the already fragile support of the Haitian people for the government, as well as risking wasting considerable scarce resources.

2) **USAID should attempt to relocate displaced families to places where their livelihood prospects and access to essential services are at least equivalent to their original informal community in Port-au-Prince.** At a basic level, economic opportunity should be the essential site selection criteria for USAID new settlements, and should be made a binding constraint in the site selection process. This means that new permanent housing should be built on the basis of effective demand where there are able and willing buyers (or renters). It means that housing should not be provided ahead of the absolute certainty of economic opportunity - jobs. Of course, demand

will need to be calibrated by the characteristics of the beneficiaries and by the subsidies that are available for any given program.

3) **USAID should avoid making the success of new settlements primarily dependent on the prospect of foreign direct investment.** Haiti’s past, as well as the circumstances following the earthquake, makes reconstituting the economy particularly difficult. Although it may be possible to have a major international investor build a plant in Haiti, it is not likely that FDI will power the economy in the immediate future. Another issue to consider is that new stable jobs will not likely go to the Port-au-Prince residents who have been displaced because they live in vulnerable areas. USAID new settlement programs need to take a much broader view of the demand for housing than to focus on a very limited number of FDI deals.

4) **Selection of beneficiaries for relocation to USAID new settlements should favor households who have no possibility of returning to their former housing site.** There will be a substantial number of households permanently displaced from their original neighborhoods. The number will probably exceed the number of serviced plots available in USAID new settlements, so coordination with other donor projects on a first-come-first-served basis will be necessary.

5) **Potential USAID beneficiaries should be identified through the simultaneous application of neighborhood enumeration, neighborhood risk mapping and participatory community planning techniques.** Application of all three techniques will show which households from a given neighborhood will be permanently displaced due to unmitigated risks or re-planning of their building site for a community facility or infrastructure right of way.

**B. Implementation of USAID Shelter Projects.**

International experience shows that large-scale projects for the construction of new settlements of 1,000 plots are complex undertakings that require careful planning, engineering design, construction management, marketing and communications with potential beneficiaries, social services for relocated households, and overall coordination with other donors as well as supervision from USAID. In the absence of effective Haitian partner organizations, USAID could find itself assuming the role that a housing developer would perform in the U.S. This is a role for which USAID currently lacks institutional experience, organizational capacity, and appropriately skilled staff. In this context, pressure to implement new settlement construction too quickly can lead to serious problems that would reflect badly on USAID and the overall USG effort to assist the shelter recovery process.

New settlements require project sites that are legally owned by a Haitian partner organization, whether public or private. USAID cannot afford to invest in infrastructure and housing on sites where undisputed secure tenure cannot be conveyed to beneficiary households. Assembling land for project sites large enough to
accommodate 1,000 plots in one location is going to be very difficult unless the GOH exercises their right to expropriate land for a public purpose. In urban areas, private land appears to be fragmented into relatively small parcels, and even these can be subject to multiple ownership claims due to the absence of a functioning, legitimate, and legally enforceable land ownership registration process in Haiti.

Public land of sufficient size is also scarce in urban centers, and expropriation of land for public use is not moving ahead well in Haiti at this time. Publicly owned sites large enough to accommodate settlements of 1,000 plots are most likely to be found outside of urban centers on peripheral land that is far from existing employment opportunities, and lacking access to adequate transportation for future residents. Even in these peripheral areas USAID needs to verify that public land ownership claims are legally enforceable since there are many reports of disputed claims.

Large-scale new settlement projects require construction contractors with capacity greater than typically found among Haitian companies. Large housing development projects were rare in Haiti even before the earthquake, so local experience with such projects is lacking. Large projects require appropriate equipment, large numbers of workers and supervisors, and a level of organizational skill not currently evident in Haiti. At the same time, it is important for USAID to use the shelter recovery process to further the development of Haitian construction and developer businesses as much as possible. Reliance solely on foreign constructors/developers (while expeditious) leads to minimal long-term development impact from USAID investment, and reduces the benefit of construction funding to the Haitian economy. However, development of Haitian construction contractors and consultants is best started with housing projects of a size they are capable of handling successfully.

Regardless of the scale of USAID new settlements projects, the agency will need to prepare to manage a complex housing development process. While the technical aspects of the work will have to be contracted to specialized firms (planners, architecture/engineering firms, construction management firms, social development experts, etc.), USAID/Haiti will have to have in-house capacity for several functions:

- Coordination and policy dialogue with the GOH and other donors on standards for settlement planning, housing unit design, infrastructure service levels, and the integration of USAID projects with related projects;
- Management of the overall housing development process including sequencing of the work on multiple sites, tracking progress, budget control, and achieving agreed results;
- Acquisition and contractual control of professional services, construction materials, and construction services;
- Technical supervision of the specialized contractors providing services to the projects including reviewing/approving technical recommendations, and maintaining control over costs;
- Reviewing and approving the physical works at appropriate stages of construction;
• Overseeing the selection, relocation, and assistance to the project beneficiary households including addressing grievances and complaints.

USAID/Haiti will need to build this capacity largely using long-term contract employees with experience as housing developers, architect/planners, civil engineers, and social/community development professionals. Given the volume of housing development currently planned, it will also be necessary to dedicate a fulltime Contracts Officer to the effort and anticipate a heavy demand on the time of the Regional Legal Advisor.

Recommendations:

1) USAID should attempt to identify in-fill areas where new settlements can be constructed as near as possible to informal neighborhoods undergoing upgrading. New settlements near existing informal neighborhoods will minimize the adverse impact of relocation on families displaced from the neighborhood. In-fill settlements will also be smaller in scale making it easier to identify land parcels with clear ownership. Projects on smaller sites are more suitable for the use of Haitian construction firms.

2) Wherever possible, USAID should utilize Haitian construction contractors under appropriate supervision. Small-scale new settlement projects can more easily encourage Haitian housing construction and development company development. Involving a U.S. housing developer as supervisor and mentor to multiple Haitian construction firms would develop needed organizational and technical skills in local firms. The U.S. developer would also help USAID/Haiti to manage the overall new settlements program component.

3) USAID should make certain that ownership of the land for any new settlement is fully vested in the Haitian partner organization, whether public or private. USAID’s Haitian partner organization for each new settlement needs to be able to demonstrate that they have well established control over the land that is to be developed. The lack of legal documentation for property complicates this due diligence process. The USAID Regional Legal Advisor should be involved in approving all new settlement sites before detailed project planning begins.

4) For the New Settlements program component, USAID should create a team within the Mission with the skills necessary to manage the contractors providing professional/technical, construction and beneficiary relocation services. New settlements require careful supervision by USAID to achieve their intended results and keep costs under control. The USAID team should be led by a professional with strong experience managing low income housing development projects in the Caribbean or Africa. Other members of the team should include a USAID Contracts Officer, an architect/planner or civil engineer (depending on the profession of the team leader), and a social services expert. Ideally, all team members (except the
Contracts Officer) should be Haitian or have extensive experience in Haiti or other least developed countries.

C. USAID Assistance for Safe Return to Communities in Port-au-Prince.

There is a broad informal consensus among donors, NGOs, and the highest levels of the GOH that the only feasible way to get displaced households out of the tent camps expeditiously is to enable as many as possible to return safely to their former neighborhoods. This approach is at the core of the IHRC “Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework”. The Framework is currently the only comprehensive strategy for accelerating the shelter recovery process. The Framework has been circulated within the relevant GOH ministries (with no objections registered), but formal adoption of the Framework will have to await the establishment of the new Haitian administration after the presidential elections are completed.

The IHRC Framework has the full support of USAID/Haiti. Assistance for safe return to existing neighborhoods is reflected in two components of the proposed USAID program: No.1) support for upgrading of up to five Port-au-Prince neighborhoods; and No.4) increased access to housing finance. The first component will be implemented to a small extent by USAID under its bi-lateral program, while the major part of the activities will be implemented by multi-lateral organizations led by the World Bank, but including the Inter-American Development Bank, UNDP, UN Habitat and others.

The Framework identifies the essential activities required to implement the safe return approach. However, almost all of these activities will need guidance to be provided by the GOH and coordination to be provided by the IHRC. Currently, the GOH has yet to formulate the policies needed to enable it to provide essential guidance to the donors, NGO and other actors in the shelter recovery process. At the same time, the IHRC lacks the staff capacity to adequately perform its coordination function. The longer that these two conditions persist, the longer it will take to implement the safe return of displaced households to their original neighborhoods.

The IHRC Framework identifies 12 areas in which policy development is urgently needed in order to guide the implementation of the safe return approach. These are presented in Annex 1 of this Assessment. The difficulty is that the relevant GOH ministries and other institutions do not have the experience and capabilities needed to formulate the necessary policy guidance. So far, only the Ministry of Public Works has drafted any guidance at all: e.g. “Guide Pratique de Reparation des Petits Baitiments en Haiti” (Practical Guide to the Repair of Small Buildings in Haiti). The GOH ministries and institutions are going to need external assistance to prepare their draft policy guidance for approval. This is an important gap to be filled by the donor community.

As essential policies and guidance are being established, the efforts of a wide range of shelter sector actors need to be coordinated over a variety of issues. The manner in which the safe return approach is implemented in different neighborhoods by different
organizations needs to be standardized for the sake of equity and economy. Among all of the organizations involved in supporting safe return, there is a universal recognition of the need for more coordination of effort, a standardization of approach, and an agreement on priorities. This is widely seen to be the mandate of the IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Team, and their efforts to date have been greatly appreciated; particularly the formulation of the Framework. However, the IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Team is not adequately staffed to handle the growing coordination agenda implicit in the Framework.

The IHRC needs to have a more robust organizational structure for its work on the shelter recovery process, and particularly the safe return approach. A full-fledged shelter sector technical group within the IHRC needs to be staffed up as soon as possible. While some key staff can bring an international perspective to the work, the bulk of the staff needs to be Haitian. International experts will need to mentor their Haitian colleagues so that they are prepared to operate on their own as foreign assistance winds down. An organization structure that lays out the essential functions of the technical group is presented in the diagram below.\(^{19}\)

**Diagram 1: Proposed IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Technical Group.**

\(^{19}\) The current head of the IHRC Housing & Neighborhoods Team has proposed this structure.
The sooner that the IHRC is staffed to meet its responsibilities for coordination of projects and programs supporting the safe return approach, the sooner displaced families will be back in permanent shelter in their original neighborhood.

While USAID has only limited bi-lateral resources available for support of the safe return approach, it is important to maximize the impact of these funds through active policy dialogue with the GOH, key donors, and other organizations. International experience points to several topics on which USAID should focus their attention.

- **Participatory Community Planning.** The neighborhood enumeration process will initially engage the households and community leaders in shelter recovery by having them identify who lived where as either renters or owners. The IOM census of affected households will also contribute essential data. In addition to the need to create a central registry of neighborhood enumeration data, building on that community engagement by expanding it to Community Planning is an important next step. USAID can facilitate Community Planning as part of the program component (No.3) focused on government capacity building & policy reform, and by working with other donors and NGOs to agree on a core Community Planning methodology that will be applied across all assisted neighborhoods.

- **Affordable Standards.** There is already GOH pressure on some donors to provide unrealistically high standards for infrastructure, plot sizes, and core housing units in new settlements. In order to achieve the results planned within the available budget for the new settlements component of its program, USAID will need to join with other donors implementing similar projects (such as the IDB) to agree on standard practices that assure equity for beneficiaries across projects and efficient use of resources in each project. While the goal is to build back better, it is important to recognize the tradeoff between building at high standards for very few households and using safe but lower standards to assist a greater number of households.

- **Household Responsibility for Housing.** Haitian households will do a better job of providing housing for themselves at reasonable cost than can be done by any government agency, donor, or NGO. USAID should encourage donors and NGOs to concentrate their resources on providing the collective goods such as planning, community facilities, and infrastructure which households cannot provide for themselves directly. Technical and financial assistance to households for repair, reconstruction, and improvement of housing units can then facilitate shelter recovery rather than provide finished units.

Recommendations:

1) **To the maximum extent possible, USAID should fund the development of essential guidelines and plans identified in the IHRC “Neighborhood Return and Housing**
Reconstruction Framework”. There are at least 12 essential guidelines and plans that need to be prepared as soon as possible in order to enable funds from USAID as well as other donors and NGOs to be utilized effectively and quickly. Some of these are already being prepared. IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods section can identify where gaps remain. USAID technical assistance will have great impact when applied to closing these remaining gaps.

2) USAID, in collaboration with other donors, should provide additional staff to the IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Section to enable it to coordinate the full range of safe return programs being implemented by all types of donors and NGOs. In addition to coordinating development of policy and guidelines for the shelter recovery process; the IHRC needs staff to coordinate the application of financial resources to shelter recovery; negotiate agreements with donors and project sponsors on common practices, methodologies, and standards; and coordinate the overall reconstruction process with the timely closure of camps. USAID should work with the IHRC to define its immediate staffing needs, and provide as much funding as possible toward meeting those needs.

3) USAID should use policy dialog to promote agreement among all parties on participatory community planning, affordable standards, and household responsibility for housing. Working with other donors and the NGO community, USAID should influence the GOH approach to shelter recovery to incorporate citizen participation and efficient use of financial resources.

4) USAID should strongly advocate with the GOH for a central registry of neighborhood enumeration data and IOM census data to be established as soon as possible. With multiple organizations engaged in enumeration and census taking there is a need to make the complete set of core data available to the GOH, IHRC, donors and NGOs so that assistance programs can be adequately coordinated. This central registry could be housed in the National Center for Geospatial Information (CNIGS) if they received the necessary support to implement the registry.

II. BROADER STRATEGIC ISSUES:

A. Dealing with People that Lived in Hazardous Locations.

Most of Haiti’s informal settlements were built in hazardous locations before the earthquake (see before & after photos of the same settlement below). As in many other countries, the urban poor can only afford housing on the most marginal land in the city. As a result, one finds densely populated informal settlements in and around Port-au-Prince stretching into flood prone areas and on unstable land that is subject to landslides in extreme weather or that is dangerous during seismic events.
Photos of Canape Vert settlement before & after: Katia Novet Saint-Lot

Constructing protective barriers, terraces, or retaining walls can mitigate some hazards. However, the sheer extent of the informal settlements in Port-au-Prince means that a significant number of buildings where people were housed are on land where life-threatening hazards cannot be adequately mitigated. Everything possible needs to be done to discourage households from returning to unsafe locations. Because of the physical and psychological trauma people experienced as a result of the earthquake, households are now more sensitive to hazardous locations and less likely to return to them if they are aware of the dangers. So, the sooner unsafe locations can be identified and the former residents informed, the less likely it is that households will be tempted to repair or rebuild in those areas.

A high priority needs to be placed on identifying households that formerly lived in locations where unmitigated hazards make safe return impossible. A combination of neighborhood enumeration and risk mapping can identify the households that are going to be permanently displaced from their original neighborhoods. It is these households that need to be offered a viable alternative to returning to their former housing as soon as possible. This is where appropriately located USAID new settlements could play a crucial role in the shelter recovery process.

Recommendations:

1) **USAID should expand its assistance for neighborhood enumeration to include concurrent risk mapping in the same communities.** Dealing with tenure security through neighborhood enumeration has to take into account whether a particular building site involves risks to future residents, and whether those risks can be mitigated sufficiently to allow safe return. Adding risk mapping and mitigation specialists to the community enumeration teams will speed up the identification of families that will be permanently displaced from their former neighborhoods.

2) **USAID should engage the managers of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund on ways to accelerate the use of some of the USAID contribution toward risk mapping and
mitigation activities. Using HRF funds to support the simultaneous implementation of neighborhood enumeration and risk mapping in areas beyond those served by the USAID bi-lateral program will accelerate the risk mitigation process. The sooner that risk mapping and mitigation cover more communities, the sooner an orderly process of safe return can be implemented.

3) To the extent possible, USAID should offer IOM registered households the option to relocate to a USAID new settlement when they are displaced from their original neighborhoods due to unmitigated risks at their building site. Registered families that are unable to safely return to their original neighborhoods should be selected as beneficiaries for the USAID new settlements and offered a plot and assistance for building a house in the settlement of their preference.

B. Institutional Arrangements for Implementing Shelter Recovery.

A functioning GOH institutional structure for implementing the shelter recovery process is almost entirely missing in Haiti. Responsibilities for various pieces of the process are spread across a variety of Ministries and agencies, but there is no Ministry responsible specifically for housing and community development. As a result, there is no Minister in the current government cabinet who sees it as his or her political responsibility to plan, promote and coordinate the shelter recovery process. No Minister, no ministry, no policies, no professional staff within a lead organization with a shelter recovery mandate; this is a recipe for the kind of governmental paralysis which has plagued the shelter sector in Haiti.

The lack of clear GOH leadership on the shelter sector recovery process is one of the principal reasons why the work of donors and NGOs has been significantly delayed. The recently established Inter-ministerial Commission for Housing, led by the Minister of Social Affairs, is not an adequate substitute for a line ministry with a clear mandate and direct responsibility for governmental leadership in the shelter sector. In other countries that have suffered a major natural disaster, the Ministry of Housing (whatever name it may carry) has been at the forefront of the shelter recovery process establishing policies, programs, and budgets to promote shelter recovery within weeks or a few months of the disaster. In those other countries, the government was able to speak with one voice about their vision, their needs, and the specific ways that donors and NGOs could best contribute to the shelter recovery process.

The only Haitian institution that currently has a clear mandate to work on the shelter recovery process is the IHRC. However, the IHRC is only a temporary organization due to terminate in October 2011, and it is not an integral part of the GOH. Furthermore (as explained previously), the current IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Team is inadequately staffed to perform the variety of functions that are essential to coordinating the many other organizations working in the shelter sector (see diagram on page 32). As a temporary organization outside the GOH, the IHRC is not in a position to independently establish policies, programs, and budgets. At most, it can advise the
GOH, donors and NGOs on how to coordinate their efforts, but even this is complicated by the lack of policy guidance coming from the GOH.

To accelerate the shelter recovery process, Haiti needs to establish a Ministry of Housing and Community Development as soon as possible. Creation of a Ministry responsible for housing was one of the recommendations of Haiti’s Administrative Reform Commission in 2002; though the recommendation has never been implemented. While this may not be on the agenda of the outgoing government, it is important to get the new government to act on this subject. USAID and the other bi-lateral and multi-lateral institutions providing assistance to the shelter sector should develop a common position on the creation of a Ministry and advocate it forcefully with the new president-elect once that person has been elected. The president-elect will be deciding on cabinet appointments soon after the election is completed. That would be the best moment to create a new cabinet position with a clear mandate over the shelter sector.

Development of the new Ministry should start with training in policy analysis and formulation for a high-level policy staff reporting directly to the Minister. This would enable the Minister to assert control over shelter sector policies quickly, and end the current leadership vacuum. USAID technical assistance in national policy development (as outlined previously) could be focused on the new Ministry. This would help establish the policies and guidance documents called for in the IHRC Framework.

Given its central role in the shelter recovery process, the IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Team needs to be staffed with additional Haitian and international shelter sector expertise immediately. As explained previously, adequate staffing is essential to IHRC successfully coordinating the myriad of actors and activities in the shelter sector. In addition, the Housing and Neighborhoods staff could become a key component of a future Ministry of Housing and Community Development once the IHRC is disbanded. Thus the simultaneous development of IHRC and the new Ministry would be mutually reinforcing.

At the same time, there is a need to build institutional capacity at the level of local government. Municipal governments do not currently have the capacity or know-how to contribute positively to the shelter recovery process. Given the limited USAID resources programmed for local government, a carefully focused program of technical assistance and training for municipal officials related to organizing participatory community planning and facilitating the safe return of households to their original neighborhoods would enable local government leaders to play an important role in the shelter recovery process. These are not the only functions that local government needs to perform better, but a broader program of local government capacity building would require far more resources than those allocated under the current USAID assistance plan.
Recommendations:

1) **In partnership with other donors, USAID capacity building assistance to the GOH should be focused on creating a high-level housing policy staff, and USAID should immediately engage with major donors to negotiate the establishment of a Ministry of Housing and Community Development with the Haitian President-elect.** Training programs in housing policy analysis and formulation are needed as soon a high-level Haitian policy staff can be assembled. National level Haitian political leadership is essential, but currently there is no cabinet level political leader with clear responsibility for the success of the shelter recovery process. Continuing without a Minister of Housing will continue the inadequate pace of the shelter sector recovery process.

2) **USAID should negotiate for IHRC Housing and Neighborhood staff to be shifted to a Disaster Recovery Division in a future Ministry of Housing and Community Development when the IHRC is disbanded.** Rapidly expand the staff of the IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods Section so that it can manage the functions that are essential to the shelter recovery process.

3) **USAID should focus capacity building assistance to municipal governments on the subjects of participatory community planning and facilitation of safe return to quake affected neighborhoods.** Assistance to local government can have a positive impact on the ability of municipal officials to facilitate safe return in their jurisdictions.

C. **GOH Communication with the Public about Shelter Reconstruction.**

By the end of 2010, the GOH had yet to present a coherent plan and coordinated program for shelter sector recovery. The GOH had not even communicated a vision for recovery to the millions of people affected by the disaster. International experience with urban disasters demonstrates that the vision, plans, and goals—as well as the process for getting there—has to be communicated to residents and business owners so that they can take individual decisions to relocate and/or rebuild.

In Kobe, Japan, the Hyogo Prefecture announced its strategic vision for the city three months after the earthquake, followed by a specific plan several months after that. This provided residents with a focus on the future and demonstrated the readiness and resolve of the government to “build back better.” This strategic vision guided all subsequent planning and reconstruction efforts over the next decade.

New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina is a contrary example. There, competing visions slowed down the process of recovery and confused residents, the business community and developers. The various overlapping efforts became known as “plandemonium.” Initially, debate centered on the issue of whether to shrink the city back to its original pre-levee footprint. Scores of grass-roots neighborhood associations, civic groups, and
homeowners associations sprouted up across the city, mostly in opposition. Several other citywide planning efforts went back to the drawing boards in response. Eventually, an international expert was called in to fashion the various alternative schemes into a cohesive plan. As recovery efforts bogged down, even engaged citizens grew cynical, not because of lack of commitment but because, as a UN report put it, “too many uncoordinated efforts and competing meetings chased too few tangible resources for honest-to-goodness problem solving.”20 Ultimately, the city designated a series of “target zones” for commercial and residential development.

In addition to this broader understanding of how recovery will progress, households need to understand the options available to them personally. A contributing factor to peoples’ reluctance to leave the camps is the circulation of rumors that those who stay may be offered a house. Thus, it is not only lack of information, but misinformation that is delaying recovery for households. The GOH needs to be supported in its effort to develop assistance packages and to communicate the options available to residents.

Access to information appears to be relatively good in the sense that the strong community cohesion that existed prior to the earthquake is still largely intact. In various neighborhoods and in the camps, resident spokespersons can represent residents’ concerns and convey information – as long as they are provided with frequent updates. Other methods also could be used. For example, the Aceh Emergency Radio Network was formed soon after the December 2004 tsunami to respond to the community’s information and communication needs. The network of stations was community-run and, in addition to providing information and updates, featured interactive talk shows about health and other topics.21

Recommendations:

1) USAID should assist the GOH to professionally and programmatically communicate their longer-term vision for rebuilding, and the immediate process for achieving it. USAID can support more useful communications about the shelter recovery process by helping the GOH to establish a focal point for housing policy development, and building a communications program within it.

2) USAID might help fund communications outlets – radio, print, newspapers – as a relatively low-cost way to ensure that residents stay informed about the packages of assistance being developed and the options available to their families and communities.

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20 UN, The Challenges of Sudden Natural Disaster for Land Administration and Management: The Case of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, draft report.
D. Participatory Planning & Implementation of Shelter Reconstruction.

As discussed previously under USAID Assistance for Safe Return to Communities in Port-au-Prince, several important activities need to engage current and former neighborhood residents simultaneously. The first is neighborhood enumeration to determine who lived where and where are they now. The second is risk mapping to determine what measures can be taken either to mitigate risks or to identify some areas as unsuitable for habitation. The third is a process of community planning – in which residents themselves are primary participants – to design appropriate housing solutions and address community needs such as access roads, schools, clinics, and areas for economic activities.

Neighborhood Enumeration:

The neighborhood enumeration process has begun in and around several neighborhoods and the camps where former residents fled after the earthquake. By the end of December 2010, six NGOs were carrying out enumeration surveys, with coverage expected to reach 28,000 in early 2011. USAID was instrumental in getting the NGO community to adopt a standard set of questions that will be used to collect the core information about each household (see Annex 2). Many neighborhoods still possess some semblance of a resident’s association (community based organizations – CBOs) even if on an informal basis. There are recognized community leaders living among their neighbors in the camps. Making use of CBOs and their leaders in the enumeration process can reactivate and strengthen the sense of community that existed before the earthquake.

It can be expected that the neighborhood enumeration process will also uncover conflicting claims on land and buildings. As part of the process of recognizing “who lived where,” the results of the enumeration need to be backed up by a process of community adjudication in which residents’ occupancy prior to the earthquake are recognized and acknowledged by neighbors and others in the community. This was implemented in Indonesia, for example, after the 2004 tsunami, when residents, citizen groups and NGOs actively participated with officials in the National Land Agency (BPN), in community land mapping efforts and also community adjudication of land claims.

A UN case study of an earlier Indonesian earthquake suggests that had community land mapping efforts not provided some certainty of ownership, reconstruction of housing would have been substantially delayed.\(^22\) Very few house providers decided to wait for the issue of land title certificates before commencing the rebuilding of houses. Although – in contrast to Haiti – there was a more formal titling system in place in Indonesia, its post-disaster experience still serves as an example of how community adjudication can move residents more quickly along the road to recovery. Proceeding in this way will

recognize the needs of residents more quickly and allow them access to various programs and packages for assistance offered as part of the recovery effort.

The difficulty in Haiti is that there is not a well functioning process for registering and enforcing property ownership on which to build. Resolving issues of tenure (whether freehold or leasehold) and making the decisions enforceable and secure will require innovations and creative thinking within the current Haitian legal framework.

Risk Mapping & Mitigation:

Among the pieces of information that will be collected during the neighborhood enumeration process are information on the vulnerability of peoples’ former houses to disasters such as hurricanes, floods and fires. This will provide a starting place for identifying houses or sites that may not be safe for returning residents. Organizing technical reviews of potentially unsafe locations also needs to involve community members and local government in determining the options (if any) for reducing risks to acceptable levels. Ideally, the teams conducting neighborhood enumeration should include engineers or engineering assistants who can identify and explain risk mitigation options and help community leaders and local government officials determine which houses and sites should not be reoccupied.

Designating certain areas as unsafe for development is not a simple task. Locations cannot be easily categorized as “dangerous” or “safe”. There are many “gray” areas. For instance, safe structures can be built on hillsides with the right design and construction. However it is also the case that some areas (flood plains, hillsides prone to landslides or rockslides) clearly are not safe. The government must map flood plains, landslide zones and fault lines, disclose them and decide after consulting the public which areas are unsuited for buildings. In addition, affordable land in safer locations must be made available – along with adequate and reliable transport – in order to forestall re-building of informal settlements on risk prone sites.

It should also be recognized that households will return to or invade unsafe, hazardous areas if they are not presented with a viable alternative. Packages of assistance – in this case, priority for resettlement – should be available to relocate households to safer areas. The GOH and donors need to refrain from offering assistance to households to remain in unmitigated hazard areas – even in the face of political pressure to do so.

Some experts have advocated a strong building code as the way to prevent deaths from future disasters. This seems reasonable since many badly constructed buildings collapsed in the earthquake. However, Haiti did not have a system of building codes and enforcement prior to the earthquake even though it was part of a Caribbean-wide effort to develop one. There is not a tradition, nor is there any capacity, to enforce the application of building codes in Haiti. Using scarce technical assistance resources to develop building codes that have virtually no chance of being enforced does not make sense. More appropriately, a series of guidelines for engineered and non-engineered repair and construction is now under development by the Ministry of Public Works.
However publication of the Ministry’s guidelines will not be sufficient to prevent the collapse of buildings in the future. Training in construction methods and incentives (e.g. linking a household’s financial support to compliance) will be necessary to convince residents to build to the guidelines. Engaging the community itself in identifying ways to promote safer building will help to identify factors that need to be addressed. For example, International experience shows that lack of tenure security is certainly one of those factors. A joint UN-World Bank report noted that “owners with insecure rights do not build safe structures regardless of building codes.” 23

Participatory Planning & Implementation:

Most of the neighborhoods heavily damaged by the earthquake were informal settlements that developed without prior planning. Many of the houses most heavily damaged were poorly designed or badly constructed to withstand the shock of the earthquake. In the absence of an effective government able to guide neighborhood development through planning and infrastructure provision or enforce safe construction practices through permits and inspections, people have had to take matters into their own hands. The shelter recovery process will (and should) continue to be driven primarily by the actions of individual households, but with appropriate external assistance the process can produce a better result than before. The key is to engage and guide the energy of the neighborhood residents, rather than to try to impose solutions upon them. Fortunately, the USAID supported efforts underway to upgrade and rehabilitate selected pilot neighborhoods are generally following a participatory planning approach. International experience shows that the same approach needs to be extended to the development of new settlements for displaced households.

An assessment of reconstruction efforts in Sri Lanka post-tsunami compared and contrasted an Owner-Driven Program (ODP) in which beneficiaries played a key role in redeveloping their communities and rebuilding their homes with that of a Donor Assisted Program (DAP) that relied on the use of centrally-funded contractors to design and build large-scale developments. It concluded that the ODP produced more houses, more quickly, of better construction quality, and at less cost. Space standards were generally better, and the community designs, layouts, and locations were more acceptable to beneficiaries. Infrastructure, services, and amenities were more readily provided to ODP sites. Far more than the ODP, the DAP fostered a culture of dependency among beneficiaries, arising from long periods in transitional shelters, often away from both original and final places of abode, with no active role for beneficiaries to play in the development of their own futures. 24


Similarly, an analysis of five approaches to earthquake housing reconstruction in Gujarat, examined in detail the workings, financing, product, and satisfaction levels with a range of owner-driven approaches, which differed in levels and nature of participation by beneficiaries, NGOs, the government, and the private sector. The findings clearly demonstrate that, despite the differences among programs, residents who managed their own reconstruction process were much more satisfied with the design and construction quality of their housing than in the contractor driven programs.\textsuperscript{25}

Recommendations:

1) **USAID should balance swift reconstruction against the needs of residents.** By including residents as much as possible, in the process of locating and designing the homes they are expected to occupy, they are more likely to be satisfied with the outcome.

2) **USAID should encourage neighborhood upgrading projects to engage community leaders and residents in the enumeration, risk assessment, and community planning process.** Residents have a more detailed understanding of each household’s tenure and risk situation in the pre-disaster neighborhood than any outside organization can. Residents and community leaders who are actively engaged in redevelopment of their neighborhood are better able than outside experts to prioritize and locate sites for community facilities.

3) **USAID new settlement projects should provide the flexibility to allow displaced households to design their own houses within the limits of a per unit budget and safe construction standards.** Households are better equipped to make tradeoffs of space, amenities and layout than people who will never live in the units themselves.

III. ISSUES RELATED TO CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SHELTER RECOVERY PROCESS.

A. Rubble Removal.

USAID has been a leader in the donor community on the issue of rubble removal. It appears that the USG has contributed more than any other government to the cost of clearing rubble. Despite this substantial effort, much remains to be done. Only a small percentage of the rubble has been removed. Only a few neighborhoods are mostly rubble free. Besides USAID, there are hardly any organizations that are removing debris on a large scale. As a result, rubble remains a serious impediment to the shelter recovery process.

By the end of 2010, there is still no full assessment of how much rubble will have to be removed so effective planning is difficult and, there is no reliable tracking mechanism in

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
place to adequately monitor progress being made. There have been several estimates
of the amount of rubble caused by the earthquake. At the end of December 2010, the
best estimate is that after having removed 2 million cubic meters of rubble there are 8
million cubic meters remaining to be removed (and funding committed to that objective
is only sufficient to remove another 2 million cubic meters). Rubble on private land has
resulted in many households (especially households that were previously renting)
remaining in the camps while their former housing units await repair or reconstruction.

The challenge of rubble removal is of such complexity and magnitude that it demands
an overall strategy. Such a strategy should include a variety of rubble removal methods
based on their effectiveness in a given geographical area rather than a blanket
methodology for the whole country. Yet, according to the IHRC, many key policy
decisions about rubble removal have not been made. There are many fragmented
rubble removal efforts underway. Supplementing the effort of the GOH on rubble
removal, various NGOs, bi-lateral and multilateral actors have implemented activities on
specific streets or neighborhoods. Given the multiplicity of actors, there is a need for all
organizations removing rubble to provide periodic reports on progress to create a global
view of on-going efforts.

The IHRC also urges that a global strategy address how rubble will be disposed and/or
recycled. Currently, uncontrolled dumping is the norm, and there are too few disposal
sites. The IHRC sees an immediate need for improved disposal site management based
on best practices for site operation, enforcement mechanisms and income generation
opportunities through recycling when possible.

Like so many other aspects of the shelter recovery process, the rubble removal effort
has moved ahead with minimal comprehensive planning, coordination of organizations
& activities, or effective leadership from the GOH. The IHRC Framework paper makes
a good case for the development of an “Integrated Rubble Management Plan” by the
Ministry of Public Works. The plan needs to cover: policies/legal requirements; removal
schedules by neighborhood; environmental damage mitigation methods; and citizen
participation mechanisms. To accelerate the development of this plan USAID should
provide assistance to the Ministry of Public Works as soon as possible.

In addition, USAID should continue to advocate with the managers of the Haiti
Reconstruction Fund to devote a major portion of the resources contributed by the USG
to continued rubble removal. It is already clear that more donors’ funding is going to be
required, and in the context of an integrated plan, the resources would be well spent.

Recommendations:

1) USAID should assist the Ministry of Public Works with funding for the development
   of an “Integrated Rubble Management Plan”. Currently, there is no comprehensive
   plan for dealing with the remaining rubble that is found primarily on private property.
   Households need to understand what their rights and responsibilities are, and how
   the government plans to facilitate rubble removal and reuse. Efforts by NGOs and
other donor organizations need to be better coordinated and monitored so that overall rubble removal progress can be tracked.

2) USAID should advocate with the managers of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund to devote a major portion of the resources contributed by the USG to continued rubble removal. Rubble remains one of the most serious roadblocks to shelter sector recovery. HRF resources could be used strategically to support the rapid implementation of an Integrated Rubble Management Plan once it has been developed. Other donors should also be encouraged to contribute to this effort.

B. Secure Tenure.

With neighborhood enumeration getting underway the first important step toward providing displaced households with secure tenure is being taken. Improving the tenure security for both house owners and renters compared to their pre-earthquake situation should be an important focus of neighborhood upgrading activities. International experience has clearly established that households with secure tenure (regardless of whether it is ownership or rental) will invest in improving their own housing unit. In the Haiti context, secure tenure is crucial to accelerating the repair and reconstruction of yellow and red houses.

Based on international experience, there are immediate steps that can be taken to improve tenure security in Haiti’s informal settlements so heavily damaged by the earthquake. In Indonesia after the 2001 earthquake, for example, attention focused first on the production of improvised maps created with the assistance of surviving residents. Provisional land titles provided assurance of secure tenure until proper titles could be issued. As mentioned previously, had this community land mapping effort not provided some certainty of ownership, reconstruction of housing would have been substantially delayed. Very few house providers decided to wait for the issue of land title certificates before commencing the rebuilding of houses.26

It is important to keep in mind that formal land ownership titling, as such, does not exist in Haiti. Instead, the system relies on notaries who do some minimal checking of ownership but this kind of proof of ownership generally does not provide sufficient security against contested claims. In this context, introducing a title/ownership form of tenure security for residents of informal settlements – who had little in the way of security prior to the earthquake – will be extremely challenging. An emerging consensus among international land experts is that secure tenure should be thought of as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. The experience in other countries shows that, for most low-income households, any form of tenure that protects them from forced evictions and legitimizes them as citizens will invariably be sufficient to

encourage them to invest what savings they have in improving their homes and local environments. When people are able to obtain public services irrespective of their form of land/housing tenure, settlements improve through individual and collective action as soon as people can afford it.  

Adoption of some recent incremental approaches may help Haiti make progress on property rights issues. Incremental tenure instruments such as certificates of use or registration of occupancy have helped residents in such diverse places as Trinidad, India, and Botswana obtain adequate security to invest, as well as qualify for public water and sanitation services. Even a basic step such as establishing numbered house addresses – as has been done in more than 50 African cities – may provide greater security for residents and provide a basis for delivering postal services, infrastructure, vaccinations and other services.

In Botswana, for example, a “Certificate of Rights” (COR) grants rights to the use of a parcel of land in perpetuity. The COR-holder has a right to develop and use the land but the ultimate owner is the state. Based on the COR the government has provided services and loans to help residents build and improve housing. The conditions of the COR are spelled out in the grant deed which is a simple two-page document give to the resident by the municipality. For their part, COR-holders agree to pay a monthly service charge. As long as the service charge is paid, the household can feel secure. It also is possible to convert the COR to a longer-term form of tenure (the equivalent of a 99-year lease). Private financial institutions view the CORs as temporary and will not lend on that basis but they will lend if the resident upgrades to a lease.

Another incremental tenure improvement mechanism, established in Trinidad and Tobago under 1998 legislation, is that of “Certificates of Comfort”. The certificates do not create a personal interest in the land but do grant protection from eviction. The certificates are granted based on the sworn testimony of the squatter plus the testimony of two other persons – who have to be non-relatives and able to attest that the squatter occupied the dwelling prior to a specific date. Holders of certificates were later eligible to apply for leases of 199 years as part of a land regularization program.

A Community Land Trust (CLT), although not widespread in the developing world, offers an innovative means of providing secure land tenure. A CLT is a private non-profit corporation created to acquire and hold land for the benefit of a community and provide secure affordable access to land and housing for community residents. The CLT results from a division of ownership – households own the residential buildings and improvements on the land while the CLT owns the parcel of land which those buildings and improvements occupy. Under this approach, land is owned by a CLT (which is usually governed by the community) and then leased to community members who

29 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Act No. 25 of 1998.
purchase homes built on CLT land. Because households need to purchase only the building and not the land (often the most costly component of shelter) a CLT home is more affordable. An important feature of most CLTs is that when a household wishes to sell their house the corporation has the first right of repurchase for the house at a price established by a resale formula written into the ground lease. In this way, the CLT maintains control over the resale of houses to keep them affordable for future residents. CLTs also place community residents in charge, organizing and implementing improvements for their own housing circumstances and for the benefit of their neighborhoods.

An example of community land ownership, similar to a CLT, is the Maria Auxiliadora Community, located near Cochabamba City in Bolivia. It was established by a group of homeless, female-headed households who built homes for more than 250 low-income families. Households can buy into the community with an initial payment of US$10 and make minimum monthly payments of US$10. Absentee ownership and renting out of land or dwellings are not allowed. Households that have become members of the community must either build their house or withdraw from the community and be reimbursed for the land. While there is no resale formula, plots change hands at the initial price of the plot plus the value of the house. In this way, communal land ownership has kept the community affordable for low-income families. Almost half of the families in the community earn less than US$1 per day per capita and many work in the informal sector – an economic circumstance not unlike that in Haiti.

Mutual help construction projects take place in the Maria Auxiliadora Community on Sundays with each household contributing a minimum of three to four hours per week. In addition to building individual homes, residents construct community amenities such as a playground, nursery, commercial projects and waste recycling facilities. Some infrastructure and community families have been funded through residents’ savings or from donations from NGOs. Local government has shared some of the infrastructure costs. With the cost of the plot of land ranging from US$600 to US$900 and housing from US$1,000 to US$10,000, and roughly US$180 for infrastructure, total costs per household range from US$1,800 to US$11,000. The combination of residents’ savings, microcredit, and a revolving loan fund ensures that the community does not have to rely heavily on external funding or government support.

In Haiti, creation of a CLT may require changes in existing laws or the development of specific CLT legal structures to comply with existing laws. For example, in some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, current law does not permit group ownership of property by condominiums or cooperatives. While cooperative ownership of land is permitted in Haiti, it is important that Haitian law be reviewed and revised, if necessary, to accommodate the CLT form of ownership. Another caveat is that, almost by definition, a CLT restrict individual property rights because there is co-ownership of the land. Some people may find this objectionable. However, it is the ability of the CLT to retain first buying rights and share in the seller’s profits that keeps housing affordable and funds community facilities and improvements for the benefit of the community.
While these examples of alternative tenure security mechanisms were not drawn specifically from a post-disaster situation such as Haiti’s, they provide useful lessons that can be adapted and implemented in the shelter recovery process.

Recommendations:

1) **USAID should ensure that residents and groups that represent them are involved in the mapping of property boundaries and claims.** Close-knit neighborhoods in Haiti tend to know and acknowledge who lives where and has rights to what. The GOH should be encouraged to accept and codify these claims and resolve any outstanding disputes. (See also the sections on Participatory Planning & Implementation of Shelter Reconstruction) This is one of the main ways to help people begin the process of rebuilding.

2) **USAID should advocate for the GOH to use alternative forms of tenure security depending upon the situation of residents.** At a minimum, residents should be free from the fear of sudden eviction. They will have the assurance and stability to begin to invest incrementally in building and improving housing on their own. Haiti should draw on the experiences and experts of other countries, for example experts from Trinidad and Tobago, to advise on the implementation of the Certificates of Comfort program or similar efforts implemented elsewhere. Haitian law may need to be revised to encompass new forms of tenure security.

3) **USAID should pilot the use of Community Land Trusts in their new settlement areas.** CLTs have the potential to provide both tenure security and long-term affordability in a new settlement. The governance structure of CLTs deserves careful consideration and should “reserve” seats at the table for women. Board membership might best be divided among resident representatives, local officials, and members of the nearby community. This will ensure that the CLT will be recognized both as a legitimate representative of community residents and a useful conduit for local officials to provide outreach and service delivery to the community.

C. Provision of Basic Infrastructure.

Access to basic infrastructure in many affected areas was limited even before the earthquake. The informal settlements that suffered some of the worst damage during the earthquake were already poorly served by water, sanitation, transportation and social infrastructure such as schools and health clinics. An important part of the shelter sector recovery process is improving access to infrastructure in the neighborhoods where households can safely return, as well as in the new settlements where displaced households will relocate.

The outbreak of cholera in Haiti makes it particularly crucial to improve access to clean water and adequate sanitation. However, except in limited areas, the urban water distribution network does not have the capacity to adequately serve existing customers,
let alone additional new customers. Even in economically better off neighborhoods, households rely on private wells, storage tanks, or neighborhood networks for water supply. Sewer networks cover very few urban areas, so at best people rely on septic systems.

Table 2: Water & Sanitation: Key Statistics
(Prior to the earthquake in January 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population with access to</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improved drinking water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population with access to</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improved sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No city has a functioning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sewage system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under five mortality as result</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of waterborne illness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since functioning, wide-area water and sewer networks are unlikely to be available in the foreseeable future, the shelter recovery process will have to rely on neighborhood level solutions. For water, this can be a local network that links households in one settlement area to a local source of water (whether wells or storage reservoirs replenished by tankers and/or rainwater capture). For sewerage, neighborhood sanitation systems can link multiple households to large septic tanks (easily accessible for pumping) through condominium sewers of the kind pioneered in the densely populated urban informal settlements of Brazil and Pakistan. The neighborhood network options have a good chance of success in Haiti because many informal settlements have strong community based organizations that can help to plan and manage the systems. USAID new settlement projects can build neighborhood networks, but the projects will also need to create community organizations to help manage and maintain the infrastructure as part of the household relocation process.

Improving access to transportation is another element of infrastructure development that will be important for the shelter recovery process. Transportation is essential for

peoples’ livelihoods. In existing informal settlements where households will return, there is a need for more all-weather access roads so that tap-taps and other forms of public transport can enter the neighborhoods and reduce the residents’ commuting time and cost. In the new settlements where displaced households will be relocated, the settlement sites need to be well connected to nearby streets or highways so that people can get to the places where they earn their living.

Another immediate, critical issue is making serviced land available for housing and reconstruction. Unused (of which there is very little), under-used and destroyed sites need to be identified and consolidated so that the land is available for new, more intensive development. Several paths can be taken towards this goal.

“Sites and services” projects – once a main form of assistance by international donors in the 1970s – are gaining some renewed interest, especially for post-disaster reconstruction. It is a way to address the critical housing shortage that also is compatible with the dominant incremental construction patterns of the urban poor. Usually, these projects take place on large tracts of government-owned land – feasible in Haiti because the government has the power to condemn property for public use (although it will have to compensate owners in the process).

Among the lessons learned from international experience, the GOH will need to engage in careful scrutiny of the proposed locations based on demand for services, access to jobs, transportation etc. They will also need to be careful to adopt infrastructure servicing standards and design densities which keep the plots affordable to the intended target group – starting, perhaps, with very basic “core” units which could later be added to and expanded by residents themselves. A further advantage of sites and services projects is that they can be coupled with housing microfinance/finance programs as well as programs to promote safer or greener low-cost technologies.

Where large tracts of public land are not available, it may be possible to assemble land for redevelopment from multiple private-owners. One tool that should be given consideration where appropriate is land readjustment or land pooling (LP/R). Land Readjustment refers to the process of combining small land parcels into a larger land area for efficient subdivision and development. Once improvements are made – usually in the form of infrastructure or public spaces – the reconfigured land is returned to the owners. The plots that are re-distributed, although smaller, are significantly more valuable than the original plots. This approach has been extensively used in East Asia, in post-World War II Europe and elsewhere.

LP/R also was implemented in the Indian state of Gujarat after the 2001 earthquake. For example, it was used quite effectively in the town of Bhuj to accelerate recovery within the walled city as new settlements were built in previously agricultural land outside the walls. Gujarat’s advantage was that LP/R has a long history in the state, dating back to town planning schemes that were authorized in Bombay in 1915. In the
last four decades, it has become the predominant urban expansion tool in the major cities in Gujarat.  

A tradition of land pooling/readjustment is lacking in Haiti and this may well make its application in present circumstances very difficult. The World Bank Urban Strategy notes that “International experience suggests that the successful application of this tool requires a number of facilitating conditions including: a sound land market assessment; governing regulations; land tenure clarity; availability of credit and developer finance; a sound communications and consultation strategy; and public sector capacity.” While most of these elements are missing in the context of Haiti post-earthquake, it still may be possible to broker LP/R schemes. For one thing, the GOH does have the authority to use the power of compulsory purchase against any minority holdout landowners if this becomes necessary. Also, with the assistance of the international donor community to help with the upfront financing for the infrastructure, there could be agreements put in place whereby private owners agree to help financially with maintenance and upkeep of services. Finally, Haitian and international NGOs may be able to help draw up LP/R agreements among private landowners and the GOH.

Land Sharing (LS) is another, similar mechanism for obtaining land and tenure security – although usually it involves one landowner (a private landowner or a public agency). LS can be used both for displaced residents who may already be squatting on the land and for obtaining land for additional residents to move into planned settlements. LS is a negotiated settlement between the illegal occupants of a piece of land and the landowner. The usual result is partition of the land with new services into two parts: one – usually the more valuable portion – is used by the landowner most often for commercial development and the other – a less valuable piece – is used by the illegal occupants for low-cost housing with secure tenure. An additional feature of LS is that it often promotes densification. Because most of the existing community is re-housed on a smaller portion of the land, the newly constructed units are of more compact design, but also are of improved quality and better serviced with infrastructure.

Bangkok, Thailand was an early adopter of the LS principle for minimizing evictions and providing low-cost housing and a measure of tenure security to low-income residents, with the first five projects undertaken in the 1980s. According to Angel and Boonyabancha, who studied the projects, the Thai culture for peaceful settlement of arguments, compromise and negotiation, and secure, incremental solutions played a role in the success of the concept. Here again the lack of a similar culture in Haiti is likely to be a limiting factor in the use of the LS mechanism.


In 2003, Cambodian authorities launched four pilot LS projects in the capital city of Phnom Penh. The projects aimed to attract private development on lands occupied by slum dwellers, and to move the slum dwellers into new housing on-site using cross-subsidies from commercial development. The four land sharing projects appeared to represent an historic breakthrough for the urban poor in Phnom Penh who often were the target of frequent and sometimes violent evictions. But, by early 2009 it became clear that, with only one partial exception, LS in Phnom Penh had failed.

An analysis of these projects attributes this outcome to several issues, chief among them the fact that community organization and impartial third party intermediation were lacking. Fragmentation of the slum populations was readily exploited by developers. One big divide was the distinction between those residents who were eligible in principle for new housing (house owners and those supporting the slum redevelopment plans) and those who were not (such as renters, opponents of the slum redevelopment plans and certain others). Collective action and resistance by the resident communities was weak and diminished. Compounding this was the fact that no external party (whether public authority or NGO) was able or willing to act as a consistent mediator between slum dwellers and private sector developers in shaping LS outcomes. This should be less of a concern in Haiti where there is a tradition of strong neighborhood cohesion and numerous NGOs

Recommendations:

1) USAID should promote the design of water and sanitation services to function on a neighborhood network basis. Water reservoirs or wells can supply the neighborhood. Condominium sewers connected to communal septic tanks accessible to pump trucks can serve the neighborhood.

2) USAID should assure that there are good road connections between the USAID new settlements and major highways or city streets. Transportation connections for families moving to the new settlements will be critical to their ability to earn an income.

3) In assembling land on which to provide services and resettle displaced residents, USAID should support the GOH in using a variety of approaches. These include sites-and-services schemes for government owned land and land pooling and land sharing in the case of privately-owned land where the GOH might have to exercise the right of eminent domain and/or negotiate with land owners.

4) USAID should support efforts by residents and their representatives to participate in and plan the design of housing, infrastructure and other elements of communities built on newly assembled land. The GOH should take advantage of the presence of

33 Land Sharing in Phnom Penh and Bangkok: Lessons from Four Decades of Innovative Slum Redevelopment Projects in Two Southeast Asian “Boom Towns” Paul Rabe, Univ. of Southern California, 2009 Available at: www.worldbank.org/urban
numerous NGOs in-country. With the help of Haitian NGOs and the international community the GOH should be able to organize residents and negotiate appropriate agreements.

D. Provision of Housing Finance & Housing Microfinance.

The volume of mortgage lending for housing in Haiti prior to the earthquake was insignificant. According to a recent study, loans for housing amounted to about 8.4 percent of the total lending portfolio of financial institutions. There are a number of reasons why mortgage lending has not taken root. Even if a borrower starts out with a decent house as collateral, the surrounding area can easily be invaded by unplanned informal structures that erode the value of that house. According to the banks, credit risk is also very high given Haiti’s volatile political and economic conditions, and income flows can be highly unstable.34

Table 3: Haiti’s Banking Sector - Value of Loans for Housing December 2009, March 2010 and June 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>December 2009</th>
<th>March 2010</th>
<th>June 2010</th>
<th>Change from December 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HTG 000</td>
<td>US $ 000</td>
<td>HTG 000</td>
<td>US $ 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sogebank</td>
<td>23,067</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>22,343</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unibank</td>
<td>639,406</td>
<td>15,985</td>
<td>594,775</td>
<td>14,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNC</td>
<td>495,480</td>
<td>12,387</td>
<td>459,728</td>
<td>11,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Bank</td>
<td>336,250</td>
<td>8,406</td>
<td>307,275</td>
<td>7,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sogebel</td>
<td>912,036</td>
<td>22,801</td>
<td>874,510</td>
<td>21,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotiabank</td>
<td>636,063</td>
<td>15,902</td>
<td>497,973</td>
<td>12,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citibank</td>
<td>11,883</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>4,676</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUH</td>
<td>57,935</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>55,632</td>
<td>1,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPH</td>
<td>70,244</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>66,713</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,182,365</td>
<td>79,559</td>
<td>2,883,625</td>
<td>72,091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Banque de la République d’Haïti (Compiled by Nathan Associates)

The Nathan Associates report highlights the stiff terms and conditions on mortgage loans pre-earthquake. Rates of interest stood at nearly 21 percent (12 percent for dollar-denominated loans) and required down payments amounted to 25 percent to 30 percent of final house value. Loan terms were for 20 to 25 years, but with a clause providing for loan renewal every three years. Banks also required borrowers to carry insurance on the value of the house to be financed and life insurance on the household’s primary

breadwinner and spouse. Purchasers also had to pay a land transfer tax, a mortgage registration tax, and bank fees. Property taxes added still more to the annual cost of house ownership and financing.

As a practical matter, it is difficult to extend mortgage credit to very poor people who lack regular employment – the situation for the majority of the population in Haiti. Even before the earthquake, the majority of poor households in Haiti built housing incrementally, as their resources permitted on land they did not necessarily own. In the Port-au-Prince area the majority of poor households were renters, not house owners. Financial institutions require completed units, constructed on land to which the owner holds title, and built to certain requirements or standards – conditions that are met by only a small segment of the population, and exclude even the middle-class.

A few employers in the private sector and in government autonomous public enterprises are reported to have organized house financing programs for their personnel. These programs vary by employer, but typically involve a subsidized rate of interest (e.g., as low as 6 percent in some cases, and terms up to 25 years). In some enterprises, all employees qualify after a certain length of service (e.g., five years), and in others only management staff do. The loans normally support around two thirds of the funding required for house construction or financing. Standard insurances (life and property) are required for the borrowers, often with an employer cost-sharing. One of the best known and established of these programs is in the Banque de la République d’Haïti. However, the reach of these programs prior to the earthquake was very limited.

Haiti’s savings and credit cooperatives have a product (“prêt logement”) aimed at members who wish to acquire, construct, repair, or improve a house. These loans, which can be up to HTG 3 million (US$75,000), carry rates of interest from 18 percent to 24 percent depending on guarantees offered and extend over terms from 2 to 5 years. Borrowers for these “caisses populaires” loans must be cooperative members and able to furnish both proof of capacity to repay and assorted guarantees, such as a third-party guarantor and deposit of funds in a blocked account amounting to between 20 percent and 33 percent of the loan. Transaction fees run to 1 percent to 3 percent of loan value. Despite these terms, which seem as onerous as those Haiti’s banks require, borrowers do come forward, especially for smaller sums, and use these loans as financial inputs to specific phases in the long-term house-building process: for land acquisition, for construction of a single room or an outside wall and the like. However, the reach of these programs was also quite limited.

Housing microfinance could be one way to reach individuals or families who build incrementally or who are too poor to qualify for traditional loans. In the past decade, important lessons have been learned about how to best implement these programs. So far, experience suggests that housing microfinance products have served the low-income salaried poor, and even those with irregular incomes, with encouraging results.

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35 This description is from the Nathan Associates report.
Down the road, subsidies may not be necessary as long as loan amounts are reasonable and terms are short.

However, according to staff at Fonkoze, a respected MFI operating primarily in rural Haiti, small-scale financing of home improvements for the poorest low-income households has been difficult to do in Haiti. In its own program, the Home Improvement Loans (HIL) were in the $150 - $200 range with repayment due in 12 – 18 months and were offered only to Fonkoze’s best clients with a good repayment track record.

The Fonkoze HIL program, carried out in rural areas in collaboration with Habitat for Humanity International, started in 2007, was a failure. In part, the economic circumstances of the time were responsible. In early 2008 the price of basic food items began to rise sharply. By April the situation was so bad that there were food riots. This was quickly followed in August of 2008 by the global financial crisis. Fonkaze’s HIL borrowers were unable to keep up with their payments and some were thinking of selling their houses to pay off the loan. Fonkoze stopped the program at that point. Taking a different track Fonkoze decided to offer the HIL product only to clients who could first steadily save a fixed amount equal to the loan payment (about $10 dollars) for the improvement they wanted to make. However, because Fonkoze targets the poorest of the poor, not one family (again primarily rural households) was able to maintain the required saving record and so nobody qualified for an HIL.

The lack of Haitian MFI experience with lending in urban areas poses some difficulty in introducing HIL programs in the hardest hit urban informal neighborhoods. However, there appears to be substantial potential for traditional types of micro-lending for enterprise development in urban areas, and Haitian MFIs may be able to develop a balanced portfolio blending enterprise lending and home improvement lending that does not target exclusively the poorest of the poor. While some efforts are getting started, Haitian MFIs will require specialized technical assistance to carry out market research, organizational development and product design before they can introduce lending programs in urban areas. At this point, it is not entirely certain that Haitian MFIs can find ways to operate HIL and other urban lending programs on a financially sustainable basis. However, if the research and technical assistance proves successful, then micro-credit programs tailored to the specific needs of the urban poor in Haiti can become an important supplement to direct grants to displaced households for housing repair/reconstruction and livelihood improvement. Once Haitian MFIs have determined that there is potential for a financially viable HIL program in the earthquake affected areas, then it would be appropriate for USAID to share the risk of starting up such programs by providing Development Credit Authority partial risk guaranties to interested MFIs.

One promising innovation in the field of housing microfinance is the “hybrid value chains” concept in which private sector companies (such as cement or building material companies in Mexico) team up with microfinance providers and citizen groups to provide credit (for the purchase of materials) and technical assistance for construction of incremental housing improvements. It would be useful to explore whether Haitian
building or construction firms could team up with foreign or multi-national building material suppliers to develop a program along these lines.

Recommendations:

1) **USAID should focus technical assistance for housing finance on the development of non-mortgage lending products.** The absence of clear titles to property makes it impossible to use property as collateral for housing loans. However, there are people with identifiable income streams (wage earners in the private sector or government) who could have loan payments deducted from their wages automatically. USAID should consider supporting a housing microfinance program as an incremental step towards the development of a future primary mortgage market.

2) **USAID should support development of a housing microfinance assessment.** Providing micro-finance in urban areas of Haiti has proven to be more complex than providing it in rural areas, and introducing micro-finance for housing adds another layer of complexity. Realistically, most households, as they depend on irregular income in the informal sector, will have to be served by housing microfinance products that permit incremental building and improvements to housing that people make for themselves. However, technical assistance and access to building materials could be offered as part of a loan package. The assessment should explore the market potential for urban microfinance, the appropriate design of home improvement lending programs, and possibility of participation in the program by a consortium of Haitian and international building materials suppliers.

3) **USAID should discourage the GOH from establishing a government-run housing bank.** The record of such institutions is quite poor and usually results in large government subsidies. Moreover, the bank could inhibit the participation of privately-owned housing finance institutions in the development of a mortgage market in the future.

**E. Transitional Shelters and Shelter Reconstruction.**

By December 2010, nearly a year after the earthquake, the utility of building transitional shelters (T-shelters) is very questionable. Already many NGOs are moving away from providing traditional T-shelters in favor of “upgradable” shelters that include a permanent foundation and good quality roofing material while building other structural elements of more temporary materials.

The biggest problem in implementing the ambitious T-shelter construction plan proved to be the difficulty of locating sites that offered secure tenure to the eventual residents. This on-going problem also affects upgradable shelters and can be expected to persist. Eventually the neighborhood enumeration and adjudication process will identify building
sites and households that can make use of upgradable shelters in greater numbers, but that will not happen until well into 2011.

In fact, the resources currently programmed for T-shelters (whether traditional or upgradable) would be better spent on building risk mitigation works and basic infrastructure (especially for clean water and sanitation) in neighborhoods where safe return can be possible. International experience clearly demonstrates that households themselves are quite capable of organizing their own shelter structures. It is essential infrastructure that they cannot provide for themselves. NGOs should be encouraged to shift from being “shelter providers” to being “shelter facilitators”.

In the meantime, if T-shelters are going to be built, the upgradable variety at least creates a better platform than the traditional variety for households to gradually improve their housing. Their use in new settlement projects would be the most appropriate location for this kind of shelter. Ultimately, the improvement process would be accelerated if households have access to technical and financial assistance (including micro-credit in the future) for shelter development.

Recommendations:

1) **USAID should try to minimize funding for NGO and other donor construction of any kind of housing units in favor of assisting families to repair or rebuild their own housing.** With appropriate technical and limited financial assistance, households will produce better housing than can be provided by any donor organization. Haitians have historically demonstrated the ability to provide their own housing through incremental construction.

2) **USAID should support efforts to introduce upgradable shelter units in new settlement areas.** Upgradable shelter units with a concrete foundation, permanent roofing and walls of more temporary materials represent a more durable and cost effective shelter solution than T-shelters. To minimize the number of households staying in camps, no shelter improvement should be introduced there. With minimal assistance, households in upgradable shelter units will be able to replace temporary materials with permanent materials over time.


“UN Habitat estimates that, 10 months after the earthquake, less than $10m had gone towards repairing houses, in part because donors lack UN and NGO partners with sufficient technical skills to support this. Yet prioritizing house repairs would have allowed hundreds of thousands of people to return home within a few months of the disaster.”

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As is often the case in disasters, assistance to Haiti arrived from all corners of the world. It has come from various sources – private, public, and official, national and international and is being channeled through a range of entities. While the response is gratifying, the lack of coordination from the GOH leaves in place a patchwork of assistance that may or may not be reaching the people in appropriate ways and that may or may not be helping people in an equitable manner. Poor and vulnerable households are likely to need a disproportionate level of assistance after a disaster because they are otherwise less able to rebuild or reestablish their livelihoods. However, by the end of 2010, very few poor households had received assistance to return to their neighborhoods to repair/rebuild their houses.

One year after the earthquake, there was no standard practice in Haiti for determining who needs help, what types of technical assistance they need, and how much shelter related financial assistance they should be provided. Determining these “packages of assistance” is an urgent and critical step to help people begin the process of recovery. As the World Bank disaster handbook points out, there may be no one right answer to these questions, and the process of arriving at solutions may be iterative. But, it is a process that needs to begin now.

The identification of households that can safely return and repair/reconstruct their housing, as well as those that will have to relocate, is being carried out primarily through the neighborhood enumeration and risk mapping process (discussed in greater detail under Participatory Planning & Implementation of Shelter Reconstruction). The next essential step is to use this household and neighborhood information to design appropriate, standard packages of assistance. Once developed, the GOH needs to blanket the country with information about the availability of technical and financial assistance packages and the eligibility requirements for assistance. This has to be clearly communicated so that residents and business owners know what aid will be offered to whom, how to get it, and what, if any decisions they must make, such as resettlement options for themselves and for their communities for those who are permanently displaced (see GOH Communication with the Public about Shelter Reconstruction).

The lack of experience and capacity as well as weak institutional arrangements within the GOH make it difficult for officials to develop a coordinated program of technical and financial assistance for shelter sector recovery. The best hope is for Haiti to make use of successful models from other countries by adapting them to the circumstances in Haiti. In this regard, the assistance model used in response to India’s Gujarat earthquake of January 26, 2001 is particularly relevant to Haiti. Shortly after the Gujarat earthquake, the government issued a comprehensive program of assistance to households and local governments that set out the following:

a relocation package (package 1) to enable entire rural villages to be relocated if 70% of the residents choose this option;

- four housing rehabilitation packages differentiated by whether the house was located in a severely affected rural area (package 2); a less affected rural area (package 3); a reinforced concrete building in an urban area (package 4A); or a building with load bearing walls (package 4B);

- a package of urban reconstruction and housing repair/reconstruction assistance specific to the four largest towns most severely affected by the earthquake (package 5) based on the other urban housing rehabilitation packages (4A & 4B).

These assistance packages (summarized in Annex 4) could serve as a guideline for organizing comprehensive and equitable assistance to Haiti’s displaced households. They were well regarded by both the residents of Gujarat and the international NGO and donor community that helped to implement the assistance.

Assistance Package 5 was utilized in the four most seriously affected urban areas (somewhat similar to those in Haiti) after the Gujarat earthquake. It should be noted that from the beginning, the government sought the active support and co-operation of private companies, NGOs, Public Sector Enterprises, national and international institutions. The program was not conceived of as compensation for loss but rather “an earnest effort to provide succor and assistance”. The objectives of the assistance were to:

- Provide adequate opportunities for development of private housing;
- Develop new areas with required infrastructure and facilities;
- Provide modern improved infrastructure facilities in the areas of health and sanitation, roads, education, water supply and power;
- Introduce a modern town planning system for overall development;
- Restore and upgrade places of cultural and heritage importance;
- Restore and develop community assets;
- Restore people’s economic livelihood by various means including setting up of training institutes for skill development; and
- Reconstruct settlements with the advice of qualified and experienced scientists, geologists, seismologists, engineers and town planners.

Assistance Package 5 was explicit in providing support to municipal government (enabling them to suspend property tax and other taxes for a year based on a grant-in-aid to sustain the municipalities). It also established the official requirement for participatory decision making with the involvement of the community in implementation, involvement of NGOs and other voluntary agencies, and involvement of the private sector in providing private houses and public infrastructure.

In cases of relocation under Assistance Package 5, renters were not eligible for allotment of land on the same basis as owners. There was a separate program for development of private housing for the tenants who could not be accommodated in their original location due to loss of their unit to re-planning or due to loss of their unit under the new risk mitigation regulations. Such tenants were provided houses of
about 250 sq. ft. at new locations. In such cases, any reconstruction assistance payable to the owner of the tenant’s unit was reduced. In cases where there was a tenant occupying all or part of a building damaged (but not destroyed) by the earthquake, the financial assistance for repair of the dwelling unit was disbursed by check to the landlord and the tenant in a joint account. In cases where the rented unit was destroyed or had to be pulled down for reasons of safety, the landlord was given the financial assistance for in-situ reconstruction on condition of signing an agreement for restitution of the tenants’ right of occupation upon reconstruction.

In informal settlement areas, households that occupied unauthorized/illegal buildings were eligible for assistance to construct a new house in an area specially set aside for them by the government. In return, the land they formerly occupied had to be vacated and turned over to the government. The assistance for the urban poor from informal settlements included a 50 sq. m. plot and $48 per sq. m for construction of a house up to a limit of $1,200.

A number of post-disaster assessments praised the features of the Gujarat assistance packages. Most notable was their endorsement of the focus on an owner-driven approach rather than a government or donor-driven approach. The assessments also pointed out that a clear role was established for NGOs both in the rehabilitation and reconstruction, and in key activities such as damage assessment. Assessments found that the government’s strategy of facilitating rather than building housing (providing technical assistance, land, and finance to help owners rebuild with quality control for new construction) was highly effective.

This system was not entirely without controversy. There were complaints from residents claiming they were not assessed at all or that the actual damage was more severe than the rating indicated. There were some requests for resurveys, which sometimes occurred, however, a final cut-off date for damage assessments of August 15, 2001 was applied. In retrospect, some officials noted it would have been better to implement a simpler system to provide assistance that did not rely on detailed damage assessment surveys. On the other hand, some post-disaster reports noted that, although the government responded quickly with assistance packages, the packages lacked flexibility and did not reflect the differing needs of households. All of this points to the difficulty of balancing simplicity and speed of implementation with flexibility and individually tailored assistance.

While Haiti must make its own determinations of the type and amount of assistance, several lessons are evident from the Gujarat experience.

- First, the types of assistance packages, the terms of the assistance, and the kinds of households that qualify for assistance need to be clearly communicated and clearly understood by displaced households.

- Second, financial and technical assistance need to be linked in order to encourage and enable households to build back better, and NGO as well as
international donor assistance should provide essential support for the technical assistance.

- Third, a simple form of damage assessment – perhaps based upon and adding some details to the red, yellow, green designations already in place – can allow rapid disbursement of funds with less need for technically skilled damage assessors.

- Finally, affected households need to be responsible for the repair/reconstruction of their own houses (with facilitation provided by government and their NGO/donor partners) and they need to be able to participate fully in the planning and implementation of the rebuilding of their communities.

Recommendations:

1) **Standardized assistance packages need to be developed that are flexible, fair and not overly complex.** Although the development of assistance packages cannot be undertaken by USAID alone, USAID should call on the GOH to make this issue an immediate priority and should offer any technical assistance possible. Assistance packages should be differentiated based on the habitability of a household’s former home (Green, Yellow, or Red), the household’s prior tenure arrangement (renter or owner) and whether it is possible for the household to safely return to their former building site. The criteria in the packages should be based on the enumeration efforts currently underway and continuing consultation with community residents and their representatives. Risk mapping will provide an indication of how much relocation assistance may be necessary. In addition, assistance levels need to be based on a realistic measure of the cost of rebuilding. However, it need not involve the complete rebuilding of units if core buildings can be provided that residents can complete later as time and resources permit.

2) **Once developed, the GOH should urge all private actors, including NGOs, to operate within the guidelines to ensure some equitable basis for assistance.** Otherwise, actual assistance provided to households will be based on a random (lottery-like) system in which assistance is determined on the basis on what neighborhood one happened to live in and what NGO happens to be working there now.

3) **GOH (and all donor) communication about assistance packages needs to be continuous, informative, and two-way.** Assistance packages and any options associated with the packages (such as for resettlement, for example), need to be clearly communicated to residents and business owners so that they make informed personal, household-level, and community-wide decisions. By the same token, the content of the packages and the distribution of assistance should be developed in consultation with residents to the greatest extent possible.

4) **USAID should encourage the development of Neighborhood Resource Centers for the provision of technical assistance to displaced households.** Households returning
to existing informal settlements as well as those relocating to new settlements will require technical assistance in repairing, rebuilding, or upgrading their shelter.

5) **USAID should support the provision of conditional financial assistance to households.** Financial assistance needs to be provided in a manner that permits quality control over the shelter that is built. Linking fund disbursements to technical assistance should be a standard provision in assistance packages.

**G. Rental Housing.**

“Before the earthquake, 60 per cent of the people now living in camps were renting either their houses or land. Falling incomes and rising prices caused by the destruction have meant that many of these people can no longer afford to pay rent. At the same time, the camps continue to offer free water, sanitation, health care, and other services, which in many cases were not available in the neighborhoods they lived in previously, especially in rural areas. Most camp residents can therefore return home only if there is investment in communities and sufficient jobs to allow people to pay rent.”38

As efforts to identify property ownership occupy the attention and resources of government and NGOs, renters tend to be left out of the process of re-establishing their housing rights and often are left to fend for themselves in post-disaster situations. For example, in Ache, as a result of the Tsunami, about 8,000 renting households lost their accommodation, and only a small share of these (about 10 percent) had received NGO assistance 18 months later, with another 10 percent deemed eligible to become the beneficiaries of relocation schemes.39

In Haiti there have been some small-scale efforts to assist renters. The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) has implemented a program for renters to help move people out of the IFRC camps. People were given an initial grant of $500 which could be applied to the rent of a green (i.e., relatively undamaged) unit. The households provided the $500 (or a portion thereof) to the landlord as rent and to make any necessary repairs and, in exchange, the household are to be allowed to live in the unit for 3 years without further payments. The IFRC inspects the units to ensure their safety. Subsequently, the households were provided with two additional grants of $250 each to re-establish their livelihoods. A systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the IFRC program could provide essential information for development of a large scale assistance program for renters.

The program is based on the idea that giving tenants initial control of the funding provides some leverage and negotiating room on the part of the tenants. It is not yet

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clear whether the 3-year agreements will be enforceable, although community pressures may ensure the tenants’ ability to stay.

The question remains whether a similar mechanism can and should be used to stimulate repair of yellow and red units in order to bring more units back into the rental market. It remains to be determined what incentives can be provided to landlords and what form those incentives should take. The lessons from programs to assist small landlords in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and in post-earthquake Gujarat are instructive.

After Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana’s Small Rental Property Repair Program offered zero-percent interest and potentially forgivable loans to landlords who owned small rental properties of ten or fewer units, if they agreed to make their units affordable to low- to moderate-income tenants. The amount of the potential loan increased from $25,000 to $100,000 per unit depending on the degree of affordability from market rate rents that the landlord was willing to accept (i.e., affordable to renters with 50%, 65% or 80% of the area’s medium income (AMI)). The loan would be completely forgiven if the landlord kept the rent caps in place for a full ten years or longer.

However, a major flaw in the design of the program was that the loan proceeds awarded under this program could not be disbursed until after: 1) the landlords had completed construction, 2) the structures had been inspected for compliance with new building codes and to make sure the units contained all the features that the landlords had promised, and 3) qualified low or moderate income tenants had been found to rent the units.

By the end of 2007, not a single unit of affordable rental housing had been built with program funds, approximately two-thirds of those who received “conditional award” letters had dropped out of the program both state-wide and in New Orleans, and less than 300 landlords had been issued commitment letters across the entire state. The primary reason seems to be that small landlords lacked the income to spend their own money on construction upfront and didn’t have the credit history to obtain loans for the construction from financial institutions.40

A different approach was taken in Gujarat, after the 2001 earthquake. Packages of technical and financial assistance were developed to assist building owners who wanted to rebuild in their former locations – after these locations were approved as safe. The level of grant assistance was determined based on the type of building structure and the extent of damage. However, if the building was partially or fully occupied by renters before the earthquake, then the owner was required, as a condition of the assistance, to sign an agreement permitting these same tenants to return to the repaired or reconstructed units. Payments were made to a joint landlord/tenant bank account at three stages of construction so that authorities and tenants could monitor the progress and also check that buildings met new earthquake risk mitigation standards. Where

multi-storied buildings could not be rebuilt to their original height according to the new risk mitigation standards, some renters lost their units. Rental units were also lost when building owners were unable to rebuild their building to its original size due to re-planning of the neighborhood for improved infrastructure and facilities. In such cases, the government allocated the renters land in a new settlement area in a nearby area of town and provided them with a 250 sq. ft. core house.

The foregoing suggests that several principles should apply to the design of programs to assist renters. First, landlords need to be offered assistance upfront – as they almost certainly lack the means to finance the cost of repairs on their own. Second, financial incentives need to be built in to the program to ensure that renters have some control over the process. This could include control over funding in the form of a voucher, right of first refusal to move back in to the unit, and/or withholding of installments of assistance payments unless a rental unit is provided to the original renter or to other renters from the neighborhood.

Finally, segmenting the rental markets will lead to better-targeted policies to assist the sector. For example, the strata of middle-class, wage-earning households in the country who either previously occupied rental housing or are now forced to rent are quite different from low-income renters who pay for a small unit, or a room or shared facilities. Middle-class families had higher rates of occupancy in multi-story buildings prior to the earthquake, so offering technical and financial assistance for landlords to repair or rebuild new rental housing of this type is a potential solution for this group and may reduce price pressure on housing traditionally occupied by lower-income families.

Recommendations:

1) **USAID should recognize that development of a rental assistance program needs a thoughtful approach and design.** USAID should support both studies and neighborhood pilot programs in an effort to find combinations of assistance and incentives that work both for landlords and for displaced tenants. A systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the IFRC program could provide essential information for development of a large scale assistance program for renters. Given the large number of former renters in the earthquake zone, reconstruction of units for rent needs immediate attention and high priority. There is a need for careful coordination of financial and other incentives among the GOH and donors to get rental housing rebuilt as soon as possible.

2) **In cases where renters need to be relocated because they cannot safely return to their neighborhood of origin, USAID should advocate that they be offered secure tenure options.** Such options could include a voucher or other assistance to help with rent. But consideration also should be given to offering former renters, who can afford it, the option of obtaining more stable homeownership status through a program of alternative tenure security. (See Secure Tenure section of this report.)
3) **USAID should advocate that the GOH facilitate the restoration of the private rental housing stock rather than embarking on direct involvement in large-scale direct provision of housing for renters.** Such mass public housing projects have failed almost everywhere in the past, with a particularly bad record of maintenance in developed and developing countries alike. Private rental housing was the norm in Haiti before the earthquake and could be restored with the right combination of incentives and assistance.

4) **USAID should assess the feasibility of providing financial assistance through a standardized housing voucher mechanism.** Vouchers that enable displaced households to pay for a year's rent in advance (as was fairly standard in Haiti before the earthquake) would ease financial stress on unemployed households, create an incentive for landlords to repair/reconstruct units, and could be used as a means to encourage households to leave the camps to return to private housing.

**IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:**

In every country the shelter sector is slow to recover from a major natural disaster such as the earthquake experienced by Haiti. The recovery process can take years even in a relatively developed country with a strong economy. Haiti is not such a country. In fact, Haiti is one of the least developed countries in the world. A few statistics help to clarify the context in which recovery has to take place:41

- Population living on less than $2 a day (2007) = 72%
- Percentage of the population without a formal job (2010) = 80%
- Percentage of urban population living in slums (2001) = 86%
- Percentage of people without access to sanitation (2008) = 58% in urban areas, and 75% in rural areas.
- Human Development Index ranking (2009): 149 out of 182
- Index of State Weakness (2008): 129 out of 141

With a very high percentage of the population surviving on very low income informal employment, there are few resources available for households to invest in housing. This explains why such a high percentage of the urban population was renting housing in slums before the earthquake.

Since many of the households displaced from their neighborhoods by the earthquake have also lost their already meager sources of income, the shelter sector recovery process is going to be heavily dependent on external assistance for the foreseeable future. At the same time, it is already evident that weakness of the Haitian state makes it very difficult to organize efficient and effective use of external assistance for shelter sector recovery.

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A year after the earthquake, the state of the shelter sector is little better than it was a month after the earthquake. It is estimated by the IOM that formal and informal camps still house approximately 200,000 households and the owners of the land where these camps are located are growing increasingly impatient with their continued existence. Forced, and often violent, evictions are increasing. This trend is likely to continue unless the government acquires the land and provides secure (even if officially temporary) tenure to the camp residents. Based on shelter sector recovery progress to date, shelter in temporary camps can be expected to be the "new normal" for a substantial period of time. Only when existing neighborhoods have been cleared of rubble and have access to essential services can displaced households begin to return to repair and reconstruct their housing.

The rebuilding process (once it begins) can only progress as fast as households can access resources for this purpose. While a few better off households are already starting construction, it can be assumed that as many as 95% of displaced households will need financial assistance to repair or rebuild their houses. According to Miyamoto estimates in January 2011, there are 113,000 housing units in the Yellow category and 82,000 units in the Red category. While an unknown (but small) number of Yellow buildings have been repaired and some new housing has been built, it is not unwarranted to assume that the 113,000 households that formerly resided in Yellow category units will want to repair them. If the average cost of repair is $2,000 per unit, then there needs to be a mechanism for mobilizing and distributing $226 million to 113,000 households, as well as enough building materials and builders available to complete the work. This will be a daunting task in Haiti.

If financial assistance to repair Yellow units began immediately and provided financial assistance to an average of 5,000 families per month, then it would be nearly two years from now before resources had been made available to repair all the available Yellow units. This would still leave approximately 77,000 households in need of financial assistance to build new housing to replace their Red units that could not be repaired. If clearing the site (or acquiring a new site) and constructing a basic shelter unit can be done for an average of $4,000, then there needs to be a mechanism for mobilizing and distributing $308 million to 77,000 households. If this can also be done at the rate of 5,000 households per month, then these camp residents could re-housed in approximately 16 months.

Repairing or rebuilding houses at the combined average rate of 10,000 units per month over 16 months and continuing at 5,000 units per month for and additional 6 months is extremely unlikely given the shelter production capacity of Haiti. Although there are no available statistics on shelter production rates in Haiti, a 1989 Working Paper for USAID on the "Haitian Housing Process" pointed out that the fastest rates of housing production were achieved in the informal sector, and cited the expansion of housing in
Cite Soleil from 1976 to 1988.\textsuperscript{42} Over those 12 years, informal housing production accommodated a population increase of 230,000 people. Assuming (conservatively) that each housing unit accommodated 3 people, then approximately 77,000 units were produced over 12 years at an average rate of 534 units per month. At that rate of production it would take nearly 30 years to accommodate the 190,000 earthquake displaced households in need of financial assistance to re-house themselves.

It is not inconceivable that the shelter sector recovery process in Haiti will require 30 years to complete. However, the efforts of USAID, its NGO and international donor partners, and (most importantly) the Government of Haiti should be able to greatly reduce this time requirement and prevent the existing camps from becoming permanent fixtures on the landscape. Although it will not be possible for NGOs to continue maintaining the existing camps much longer, it has to be recognized that it will be the most vulnerable – women headed households, the disabled and the elderly – who will be the last to leave the camps. USAID needs to make good on its promise to prioritize assistance to re-housing these vulnerable groups.

ANNEX 1

NEIGHBORHOOD RETURN AND HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK
(October 26, 2010 Draft)
Policy/Guidance Material Identified for Development

1. Integrated Ruble Management Plan: (MTPTC)
   a. Policies/legal requirements;
   b. Schedule;
   c. Environmental damage mitigation methods;
   d. Citizen participation mechanisms.
2. Guidelines on Site-Related Risks: (CIAT, Dpt. of Civil Protection, MTPTC, and others)
   a. Definition of risks;
   b. Mitigation options;
   c. Escape/protection options;
   d. Criteria for relocation sites;
   e. Basis for establishment of “no build” zones.
4. Guidelines on Community Enumeration: (CIAT)
   a. Standards;
   b. Core methodology.
5. Protocol for Prioritizing Neighborhoods for Return:
6. Comprehensive Household Registration Process:
7. Guidelines for Support of Repair/Reconstruction of Rental Housing:
   a. Legal Framework for Return of Tenants
8. Guidelines for Community Resource Centers:
9. Integrated System of Financial Support for Reconstruction and Relocation:
   a. Guidelines on Eligibility for & Allocation of Assistance to Households
   b. Rules for Selection of Beneficiaries
   c. Guidelines on Assistance Packages Offered to Camp Residents
10. Guidelines on Community Involvement:
    a. Guidelines for Participatory Community Planning
11. Guidelines for Development of Relocation Settlements:
    a. Procedures for Obtaining Building Permits
    b. Procedures for Social Assessment
    c. Guidelines of Social Safeguards in Housing Projects
    d. Rules for Implementation of Relocation Projects
12. Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Closure of Camps:
ANNEX 2

NEIGHBORHOOD ENUMERATION QUESTIONNAIRE
(Provided by Habitat for Humanity International; December 5, 2010)

Surveyor’s Initials: ..........................   # Survey: ..........................  Date and Time: ..........................

GPS Coordinates: ..........................  Picture:

Respondent’s name: .................................................................  Contact Phone #: ..........................

1) Household composition: who stays regularly at the home (spends the night)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex (F/M)</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Relation to the head of household (1)</th>
<th>Occupation (2)</th>
<th>Vulnerability (3)</th>
<th>Level of education completed (4)</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

1: Relation: a) spouse, b) sibling, c) child, d) parent, e) grandparent, f) grandchild, g) niece/nephew, h) aunt/uncle, i) cousin, j) extended family, k) friend of family, l) another relation (explain)
2: Occupation: a) currently working, b) currently not working, c) regular day worker, d) irregular day worker, e) small merchant, f) student, g) transporter, h) contractor/repairs, i) artisan, j) public servant, k) religious worker, l) farmer, m) metal worker, n) cash for work, o) other (explain)

3: Vulnerability: a) female head of household, b) handicapped, c) single parent household, d) pregnant woman, e) child head of household, f) widow(er), g) chronically ill, h) landless, i) internally displaced person, j) elderly > 65 ans

4: Level of education completed: a) never attended school, b) kindergarten, c) primary school, d) secondary school, e) university, f) professional school, g) vocational school, h) literacy school, i) other (explain)

2) House conditions (original home, not camp)

a) Was your house damaged by the earthquake? □ Yes □ No

b) ATC-20 rapid assessment result: □ Red □ Yellow □ Green □ Not evaluated

c) Material of the house: □ tarp □ corrugated iron sheets □ concrete block □ wood □ Other ...

d) How big is your home? ...............m X ...............m = .................m2

d) House location (before the earthquake):

Simon: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Other area: Pele, Cite Dieu Seul, PCS,
Other (name) ..............

f) If not, where do you sleep?

Simon: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Camp: Automeca, Boulos, PCS, Ancho 1, Ancho 2, Batiman, Nanbanan, Jacoman, other
Other area: Pele, Cite Dieu Seul, PCS, Jacoman

Other (name) ..............

g) How many families share the building? □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5+

i) What year did you move to Simon Pele?
Where did you move from?

j) Do you feel safe where you live? □ Yes □ No

k) How many rooms are in your house? □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5+

l) Does your house leak? □ Yes □ No

3) For home before the earthquake (not camp): Information regarding the house structure

Do you own, rent, or just occupy your house (not owner, but not paying)?

If owner:

Since what year?

Did you buy it or inherit it or build it yourself?

Who did you buy/inherit from?

If renter:

Since what year?

Who is the owner?

If just occupying:

Since what year?

Do you have an agreement with the owner?

Who is the owner?

4) For land before the earthquake (not camp): Information regarding the land
Do you own, rent, or just occupy the land (not owner, but not paying)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Since what year?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did you buy or inherit the land? Or other (explanation)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who did you buy/inherit from?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter</td>
<td>Since what year?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What kind of rent - normal or rent to buy?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who is the owner of the land?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>If just occupying?</strong></td>
<td>Since what year?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you have an agreement with the owner?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who is the owner of the land?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5) **People living in the house:**
a) Do you have regularly staying guests?  ■ Yes  ■ No

   
   
   b) If yes, how many on average?  ■ 1  ■ 2  ■ 3  ■ 4  ■ 5  ■ 6+

   How much are the main expenses per month? (in Haitian dollars)

   c) Where do the children spend the daytime?

6) **Health**
a) Was anybody in your family sick last week?  ■ Yes  ■ No

   b) How many times did you eat yesterday?  ■ 0  ■ 1  ■ 2  ■ 3  ■ 4+

   c) If 0 times, did you snack?  ■ Yes  ■ No

7) **Transportation**
a) What kind of transport do you use to get to work? (or whoever the main income earner is)

   ■ Walk  ■ Tap tap  ■ taxi  ■ bicycle  ■ personal car/motorbike

   b) How much does it cost per day for this trip? (in Haitian dollars)

   enter number

   c) Where does your family do its shopping?

   ■ In Simon Pele  ■ Port au Prince downtown  ■ Cite Soleil  ■ Croix de Bouquets  ■ Delmas  ■ Tabarre

8) **Economic activity**
a) Do you have work?  ■ Yes  ■ No

   b) If yes, are you paid on a regular basis?  ■ yes  ■ No  ■ Self employed

   c) Do you pay income tax?  ■ Yes  ■ No

   d) Do you take out loans?  ■ Yes  ■ No

   e) If yes, during what times of the year?  ■ January  ■ February  ■ March  ■ April  ■ May  ■ June  ■ July  ■ August  ■ September  ■ October  ■ November  ■ December  ■ All year  ■ Other (explain)  .........................
9) Water and Sanitation

a) Where do you get water for cleaning?  □ Well  □ Communal tap (paid)  □ Communal tap (free)  □ Rainwater catchment  □ Truck  □ Buy in the market/stall  □ Other (explain)

b) Where do you get water for drinking?  □ Well  □ Communal tap (paid)  □ Communal tap (free)  □ Rainwater catchment  □ Truck  □ Buy in the market/stall (plastic sacks or 5 gallon bottles)  □ Other (explain)  □ Other (explain)

c) Who retrieves the water?  □ woman  □ man  □ girl  □ boy  □ elder  □ Other

d) How long does it take?  □ 0 – 5 minutes  □ 5-10 minutes  □ 10-30 minutes  □ 30-60 minutes  □ 60+ minutes

e) Is there a toilet in the area?  □ Yes  □ No  □ Temporary  □ Permanent

g) How long does it take to get there?  □ Less than one minute  □ 2-5 minutes  □ 6+ minutes

h) □ private  □ communal

i) How many families do you share the toilet with?  □ 1 family  □ 2-3 families  □ 4-5 families  □ 6+ families

How many times per month is garbage collected in your neighborhood?  □ Yes  □ No

Who collects garbage in your neighborhood?

10) Disaster Risk Reduction

Have you ever experienced...?  □ flooding  □ fire disaster  □ eviction  □ None

If so, how many times?

a) Where did you go during hurricanes before the earthquake?

b) Where do you go during bad weather now?
ANNEX 3

DISASTER IMPACT INFORMATION
(Information assembled by IHC January 3, 2011)

List of disaster-affected zones (identified by local govt. jurisdiction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modified Mercalli Intensity</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Petit Goave</td>
<td>118,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Grand Goave</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Gressier</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Leogane</td>
<td>134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>1,235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Carrefour</td>
<td>442,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Delmas 73</td>
<td>383,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Miragoane</td>
<td>89,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Verrettes</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Description of Modified Mercalli intensity levels:

V. Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows broken. Unstable objects overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop.

VI. Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of fallen plaster. Damage slight.

40. Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken.

VIII. Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned.

IX. Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures thrown out of plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations.

X. Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed with foundations. Rails bent.

XI. Few, if any (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Rails bent greatly.

XII. Damage total. Lines of sight and level are distorted. Objects thrown into the air.

Analysis of socioeconomic characteristics of the affected area (income level, economic base, quality of major infrastructure)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data (Haiti)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>GDP growth, 2007 (annual %)</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade, 2007 (% of GDP)</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector: merchandise trade (% of GDP)</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multilateral debt, 2007 (% of total external debt)</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population, 2005 (% of total)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population growth, 2007 (annual %)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in largest city, 2007 (% of urban population)</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of undernourishment, 2007 (% of population)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate, adult (% of people ages 15 and above)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved water source, rural (% of rural population with access)</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban population with access)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone lines, 2007 (per 100 people)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, paved, 2001 (% of total roads)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Data</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of legal rights index, 2007 (0=weak to 10=strong)</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Group

Distribution and type of housing and infrastructure damage, number of housing units and population affected (by income level)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commune</th>
<th>EMS-98 Damage Classes</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction</td>
<td>Very heavy damage</td>
<td>Substantial to heavy damage</td>
<td>Moderate damage</td>
<td>Negligible to slight damage</td>
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<tr>
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<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>310</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>3899</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24062</td>
<td>34500</td>
<td>33546</td>
<td>18395</td>
<td>188236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, March 2010

**Damage Survey Map (October 2010)**
ANNEX 4

SUMMARY OF THE ASSISTANCE PACKAGES PROVIDED AFTER THE JANUARY 2001 EARTHQUAKE IN GUJARAT, INDIA
(Based on Government of Gujarat Decrees of February 13 and April 24, 2001)

The following is a summary description of each assistance package utilized after the Gujarat earthquake (with the amount of assistance converted from Indian Rupees to US Dollars at the prevailing exchange rate at the time) based on the official documents that authorized the assistance programs. From the beginning, the government sought the active support and co-operation of private companies, NGOs, Public Sector Enterprises, national and international institutions. The program was not conceived of as compensation for loss but rather “an earnest effort to provide succor and assistance”.

Package 1: Provided support for the relocation of severely damaged rural villages where 70% of villagers decide on relocation.

Relocation was planned and implemented with the full involvement of the villagers and with the consent of their village leaders. To the maximum extent possible, villages were relocated on a suitable site near the old village site. Where possible the sites were located on government land. Where government land was not available they were located on private land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act by invoking the urgency clause or through mutual consent award.

Earthquake resistant infrastructure and facilities were part of the assistance provided in the new village sites. The government provided lay out design, technical specifications, and recommended the types of material to be used for reconstruction. Building codes and town planning rules were followed for construction of private and public buildings. When local regulations did not exist, government or the concerned local authorities enacted such regulations and rules.

Assistance to households was specified in terms of their livelihoods and established that in each new settlement the plot size and building provided to the household was divided into four distinct categories as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr.No.</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Plot Area Sq. m.</th>
<th>Construction Area Sq. m.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Landless agricultural laborers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Marginal farmers up to 1 hectare land holding.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Small farmers between 1 to 4 hectares land holding, small traders and</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The program further specified that 10% of the cost of category 3 and 4 houses was to be provided as an interest free loan, repayable in equal installments over 10 years with a moratorium period of first two years.

**Package 2: Provided support for households in severely affected rural areas who opted for in-situ reconstruction rather than relocation.**

The affected households were allowed to rebuild their houses on their existing site. The government provided technical guidance, and material specifications for building an earthquake resistance building. The government also provided technical supervision of the construction.

Assistance was provided to the owner/actual possessor of the property. In addition to the cash grant assistance, if any affected household wanted to obtain a loan, the government helped to facilitate loans of up to $2,200 from banks or other financial institutions. However, the government did not provide any interest rate subsidy, and the household had to clearly indicate the amount of loan required during the damage survey of the house.

**For totally collapsed houses and severely damaged houses pulled down for safety reasons, the assistance program provided grants as follows.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Assistance (converted into US Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Completely destroyed hut</td>
<td>$870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Completely destroyed house</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) the built up area is up to 25 sq.m.</td>
<td>Up to $1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) the existing built up area is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 35 sq.m.</td>
<td>Up to $1,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) the existing built up area is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 45 sq.m.</td>
<td>Up to $1,957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The assistance is provided at the rate of $44 per sq. m. based on the measurement of the built up area of the existing damaged house.

**For partially damaged houses** the scale of assistance was as follows.
In cases where a dwelling unit occupied by a tenant collapsed or was pulled down for safety reason, the landlord of the house was given assistance subject to the condition that the tenant would be put back in possession of the dwelling unit as soon after the reconstruction of the house as possible. In cases of repair to a house, assistance was disbursed to the tenant for carrying out the repair.

**Package 3: Provided support for households in more remote rural areas that opted for in-situ reconstruction rather than relocation.**

The assistance mirrored that provided in Package 2, but with lower levels of assistance reflecting the character of housing found in the more remote rural areas.

**For totally or partially damaged huts** the scale of assistance was as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Completely destroyed hut</td>
<td>$152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Partially damaged hut</td>
<td>$44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**For completely destroyed or partially damaged houses** the scale of assistance was as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>If there are crack/cracks of at least ½ inch width</td>
<td>Up to $44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>For repair of damage up to 10%</td>
<td>Up to $109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>For repair of damage up to 25%</td>
<td>Up to $218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>For repair of damage up to 50%</td>
<td>Up to $436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Completely damaged kacha / pakka house.</td>
<td>Up to $870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of a completely destroyed house/hut or one required to be pulled down for safety reasons, assistance was disbursed to owner/actual possessor of the property. In cases where a dwelling unit occupied by a tenant collapsed or had to be pulled down for safety reasons, the landlord of the house was given assistance subject to the condition that the tenant would be put back in possession of the dwelling unit as soon
after the reconstruction of the house as possible. In cases of repair to a house, assistance was disbursed to the tenant for carrying out the repair.

Package 4A: Provided support to residents of reinforced concrete (RC) structures in urban areas (other than the four towns of Anjar, Bhuj, Rapar and Bhachau).

Assistance in both this package and Package 4B were designed around the structural characteristics of housing in urban areas as well as the greater cost of construction in those areas.

1. Financial assistance for collapsed/demolished buildings

In the case of reinforced concrete buildings, assistance was provided to affected households at the rate of $76 per sq. m up to a maximum built-up area of 50 sq. m, subject to a maximum grant of $3,800. However, for buildings that had been illegally constructed the extent of individual assistance was limited to 40 sq. m. at the rate of $76 per sq. m., subject to a maximum of $3,043.

2. Financial assistance for repairs & structural strengthening of damaged buildings

(i) Assistance to Single Storied Residential RC Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. more than ½ inch width cracks</td>
<td>Up to $44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 10% or more damage</td>
<td>Up to $109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 25% or more damage</td>
<td>Up to $218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 50% or more damage</td>
<td>Up to $436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) Assistance To Multi-storied Residential RC Buildings

The total amount paid out was based on the extent of damage and the type of building (low rise being less than five floors, and high rise being five floors or more), and limited to the amounts indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>Category of damage</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td><strong>Low Level of Damage</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Low rise buildings</td>
<td>Up to $1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) High rise buildings</td>
<td>Up to $2,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td><strong>Medium Level of Damage</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Low rise buildings</td>
<td>Up to $4,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) High rise buildings</td>
<td>Up to $8,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td><strong>High Level of Damage</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Low rise buildings</td>
<td>Up to $8,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) High rise buildings</td>
<td>Up to $17,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In cases where tenants were occupying units within the damaged building, the financial assistance for the repairs of the dwelling unit was disbursed as a check drawn in the name of the landlord and the tenant jointly. In cases where the building occupied by a tenant had completely collapsed or had to be pulled down by the authorities, the financial assistance was disbursed to the landlord by a check, but before the check was handed over to the landlord there had to be an executed agreement for restitution of the tenants' right of occupation after reconstruction.

**Package 4B: Provided support to residents of structures with Load-Bearing walls in urban areas** (other than the four towns of Anjar, Bhuj, Rapar and Bhachau).

1. **Financial assistance for collapsed/demolished buildings**

   In cases of buildings built with Load-Bearing walls, assistance was provided at the rate of $61 per sq. m. up to a maximum built-up area of 50 sq. m., and a maximum of $3,043. However, for buildings that had been illegally constructed the extent of individual assistance was limited to 40 sq. m. at the rate of $61 per sq. m., and a maximum of $2,435.

2. **Assistance for demolished huts**

   Owners/occupants of completely collapsed huts were given financial assistance of up to a maximum of $44.

3. **Assistance for repairs & structural strengthening** of low rise, load bearing residential buildings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>Type of Damage</th>
<th>Extent of Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>more than ½ inch width cracks</td>
<td>Up to $44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>10% or more damage</td>
<td>Up to $109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>25% or more damage</td>
<td>Up to $218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>50% or more damage</td>
<td>Up to $436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   In cases where tenants were occupying part or all of the damaged building, the financial assistance for repair of the dwelling units was given to the tenants. In cases where a building occupied by a tenant had collapsed or had to be pulled down by the authorities, the landlord was given the financial assistance for reconstruction subject to the condition that the tenant was put back in possession of the unit as soon after reconstruction as possible.
Package 5: Provided support for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of housing and infrastructure in Anjar, Bhuj, Rapar and Bhachau.

For each of the four towns most seriously damaged by the earthquake (Anjar, Bhuj, Rapar and Bhachau), a specific set of assistance packages for individual households modeled on Packages 1 through 4B was combined with a set of city development plans and other measures. The objective was to implement rehabilitation in two phases – (1) a short term plan for immediate requirements and (2) a medium & long term plan for improved infrastructure facilities with a one decade perspective.

In addition to providing assistance to households for repair or reconstruction of their houses, the Short Term Plan covered: 1) Clearance of rubble; 2) Restoration of essential services like water, sewerage, electricity etc.; and 3) Providing technical know-how for design & construction of earthquake resistant buildings. The Medium & Long Term Plan included: 1) Restoration and upgrading of existing infrastructure; 2) Technical assistance for repair of existing buildings; and 3) Provision of additional modern systems of infrastructure.

The objectives of the assistance included in Package 5 were to:
- Provide adequate opportunities for development of private housing;
- Develop new areas with required infrastructure and facilities;
- Provide modern improved infrastructure facilities in the areas of health and sanitation, roads, education, water supply and power;
- Introduce a modern town planning system for overall development;
- Restore and upgrade places of cultural and heritage importance;
- Restore and develop community assets;
- Restore people’s economic livelihood by various means including setting up of training institutes for skill development; and
- Reconstruct settlements with the advice of qualified and experienced scientists, geologists, seismologists, engineers and town planners.

Package 5 was also explicit in: providing support to municipal government (providing for a suspension of property tax and other taxes for a year based on a grant-in-aid to sustain the municipalities); requiring participatory decision making with the involvement of the community in implementation, involvement of NGOs and other voluntary agencies, and involvement of the private sector in providing private houses and public infrastructure.

1. Assistance to households that owned houses.

Because of the extensive destruction of buildings in the four principal urban areas, there was a need for large numbers of households to be relocated on re-planned/re-blocked land in and around the municipalities. The owners of houses which were fully collapsed or had to be pulled down in the inner town were given the option to relocate. Owners of houses which had to be removed in the re-planning process or did not conform to new risk mitigation regulations were required to relocate. It was
recognized that multi-storied buildings outside the inner town would lose units when their reconstruction/repair was done according to new risk mitigation regulations. Therefore the affected families who could not have their units reconstructed were relocated and given plots. All households that were relocated were given land in nearby areas that were re-planned and developed for this purpose.

Assistance was provided to the owner of the property in the form of a plot of land (if relocated) and/or financial assistance to rebuild/repair their house. The affected households were responsible for rebuilding their houses. Government provided technical guidance, material specifications and technical supervision for building earthquake resistant buildings. Financial assistance was provided at a specified rate times the measurement of built up area of the damaged/destroyed house.

2. Assistance to households that were renters.

In cases of relocation, renters were not eligible for allotment of land on the same basis as owners. There was a separate program for development of private housing for the tenants who could not be accommodated in their original location due to loss of their unit to re-planning or due to loss of their unit under the new risk mitigation regulations. Such tenants were provided houses of about 250 sq. ft. at new locations. In such cases, any reconstruction assistance payable to the owner of the tenant’s unit was reduced by 25% of the cost of the unit given to the relocated tenant. In cases where there was a tenant occupying all or part of a building damaged (but not destroyed) by the earthquake, the financial assistance for repair of the dwelling unit was disbursed by check to the landlord and the tenant jointly. In cases where the rented unit was destroyed or had to be pulled down for reasons of safety, the landlord was given the financial assistance on condition of signing an agreement for restitution of the tenants’ right of occupation upon reconstruction.

3. Assistance to households from informal settlements.

In informal settlement areas, households that occupied unauthorized/illegal buildings were eligible for assistance to construct a new house in an area specially set aside for them by the government. In return, the land they formerly occupied had to be vacated and turned over to the government. The assistance the urban poor from informal settlements included a 50 sq. m. plot and $48 per sq. m for construction of a house up to a limit of $1,200.

4. Financial assistance for housing provided in the four principal urban areas.

For owners of single storied houses and huts, financial assistance was based on the severity of damage assessed on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being heaviest damage).
For owners of multi-storied residential buildings, assistance was based on whether the building was high-rise or low-rise and the 1 – 5 damage assessment scale (where category 5 represented a totally collapsed building).
### ANNEX 5

**SUMMARY OF SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES & PLANS**  
*(Assembled by IHC; December 2010)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agence Francaise de Developpement</td>
<td>Urban development project in Jacmel (flood prevention, drainage, support to the municipality) in partnership with the city of Strasbourg</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>布列塔尼发展署</td>
<td>Provision of emergency shelter kits, hygiene kits, kitchen kits</td>
<td>$1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
<td>Contribution to the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS) to provide transitional shelters to 15,000 earthquake-affected families in Haiti. Project is managed jointly by CRCS and the International Federation of Red Cross Societies (IFRC).</td>
<td>$19,150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross Emergency Appeal: Support relief operations and focus on temporary shelter, restoring water and sanitation facilities, and providing medical care and psychological support to the affected population.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$10,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to International Organization for Migration (IOM) to provide basic shelter to support displaced persons</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHF International</td>
<td>Over 1,500 shelters built (focused on returning Haitians to their original communities). Plan to build or improve up to 6,000 shelters. CHF’s transitional shelters are made of a wooden structure and special plastic sheeting. The size of the shelter responds to international standards of 3.5 square meters per person. Where a Haitian family has an existing good quality shelter, CHF provides them with a kit of construction equipment and training to enable them to make their shelter safe, sanitary and resistant to the climate.</td>
<td>$20,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat for Humanity International</td>
<td>Goal to serve 50,000 families over the next five years. In the first six months after the earthquake, Habitat supported early recovery with emergency shelter kits, assessments of damaged houses and construction of transitional shelters. For the remainder of 2010, focus is on transitional shelters. Beginning in 2011, focus will remain on delivery of transitional shelters but also include repairs and retrofits, upgradable t-shelters and constructing core houses.</td>
<td>$20,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Implementing its Haiti recovery project through community-based Habitat Resource Centers (HRCs). HRCs that provide services including damage assessments, repairs and retrofits, assistance in securing land and tenure, loans of tools and equipment, materials fabrication, water and sanitary solutions, transitional shelter, shelter upgrades and core homes. Housing finance will be added so that families can continue to improve and enlarge their homes. Habitat Resource Centers are operational in: Léogâne, Cabaret, Gonaïves Cap-Haïtien and Hinche, with future centers planned for Port-au-Prince and other locations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-American Development Bank</th>
<th>Grant from the Republic of Korea, through the Korean Fund for Poverty Reduction, administered by the Inter-American Development Bank, to finance the construction of 150 temporary houses</th>
<th>$286,860</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Through the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF): campaign to build some 2,000 shelters this year in Haiti, run through Un Techo</td>
<td>$2,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grant to HFHI: rebuild or repair wrecked houses in Cabaret, a city north of Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grant to finance the construction of 5,000 homes in a new settlement on public land in the northern outskirts of Port au Prince</td>
<td>$30,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</th>
<th>Emergency shelter, tents: Target of 10,000 households. As of August, 92% delivered</th>
<th>212,320,161 CHF (for all disaster-management activities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency shelter, tarps: Target of 80,000 households. As of August, 146% delivered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency Shelter, toolkits: Target of 20,000 households. As of August, 121% delivered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transitional timber shelter program: 300 planned in Annex de la Mairie, 15 planned in Saint Marc, 353 planned in La Piste. As of August, assessments and beneficiary selection were ongoing in camps in Caradeux.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The removal of tents from the La Piste “ghost” camp was commenced in early August. Next steps: engage a site surveyor and identify where the roads, community fields and housing plots will be.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opened pre-fabrication factory for shelter walls and roof trusses Red Cross warehouse, Woodstock. After fabrication, panels are sent to sites for assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Habitat</td>
<td>Unavailable to the researcher.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Additional Financing (AF) approved in October 2010 for the Urban Community Driven Development Project for Haiti in order to improve access to: basic and social infrastructure and services; and income-generating opportunities for residents of targeted disadvantaged urban areas. 30% of this additional funding is for &quot;access to urban services and housing&quot;</td>
<td>$30,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>