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## Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. African Command</td>
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<td>ANE</td>
<td>Asia Near East Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commanders Emergency Response Program</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMM</td>
<td>Conflict Mitigation and Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPLANs</td>
<td>Concept Plans</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Community of Practice</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Critical Priority Countries</td>
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<td>CRC-A</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps - Active</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<td>DATT</td>
<td>Defense Attaché</td>
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<td>DCHA</td>
<td>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Democracy and Governance</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DR</td>
<td>Disaster Response</td>
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<td>EGAT</td>
<td>Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>Food for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of Forces</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Interagency Policy Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCOA</td>
<td>Joint Center for Operational Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Joint Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Elections Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>OCR</td>
<td>Office of Civilian Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODC</td>
<td>Office of Defense Cooperation</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHDACA</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Policy Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>PNSR</td>
<td>Project on National Security Reform</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Office</td>
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Background

The Civilian Military Relations Study Group (the “Group”) is a panel of subject-matter consultants who were tasked to provide expert advice on civilian-military relations and related issues that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) should consider when implementing its Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy. The Group’s work includes, but is not limited to, a review of the current internal and external environment and opportunities or hindrances to implementing the policy. The Group’s assessment takes into consideration the institutional challenges from the perspective of USAID, the Department of Defense (DoD), the United States Government (USG), and the international community. Based on these observations and related changes within the institutions, the Group formed consensus options with associated implications for each option of what could be anticipated as a result of institutional changes.

The Group felt it important to formulate near-term recommendations in light of longer-term requirements, and develop recommendations for longer-term efforts which needs to begin as soon as possible. The Group also felt that new techniques for joint planning and implementation across the development and security sectors must involve host nation partners. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Group considered it important to “think big.” This is the first time in recent memory the government has been more ready for significant reform. However, even this term falls short and may not be an accurate portrayal of the tasks at hand. The Group concluded that the recommendations offered here are critical for the future of USG development as a “whole of government” requirement.

The Study Group

G. WILLIAM ANDERSON: Mr. Anderson is an independent consultant who specializes in foreign assistance reform; interagency collaboration in national security and foreign affairs; and strategic planning, program design, and evaluation. He has varied experience as a senior leader and manager and troubleshooter in multi-cultural situations as well as in team building, facilitation and training, and executive and organizational coaching.

From July 2006 through July 2008, Mr. Anderson served as the USAID Senior Development Adviser at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. He was the first USAID Senior Development Adviser posted to a DoD Combatant Command. He received the Joint Civilian Service Commendation Award.

Mr. Anderson is a former USAID Senior Foreign Service Officer (1979-2001), having served mainly in Africa with long-term assignments in Senegal, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania (Deputy Mission Director), and Eritrea (USAID Mission Director). He was USAID Mission Director in Eritrea at the beginning of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border War in 1998 through the first year of the conflict. In his last USAID assignment, he directed the Office of East and South Asia in USAID’s Asia Near East Bureau (ANE).

Prior to USAID, Mr. Anderson served for six years as the Legislative Director for Congressman Clarence D. Long, a former Chairman of the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee.

Mr. Anderson is a graduate of Davidson College (Phi Beta Kappa) with a Master of Public Affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and a Certificate in International Security Studies from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), which is part of the National Defense University. At ICAF he was a Distinguished Graduate, and he received the Commandant’s Award. He is fluent in French, and he speaks basic Kiswahili. He also is a trained Executive Coach.
**EUGENE V. BONVENTRE:** Dr. Gene Bonventre is a senior consultant who specializes in the intersection of global health and national security. He assists governmental agencies, academia, and international and non-governmental organizations (NGO) to deal more effectively with the military in the areas of civil-military health, complex emergencies, post-conflict reconstruction and health diplomacy. Currently, he is an Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he chairs a health and security working group in the Global Health Policy Center. As adjunct staff at RAND’s Global Health Center, Dr. Bonventre supports a study on the NGO-military relationship, and the creation of a handbook for the monitoring and evaluation of military humanitarian assistance programs. He is an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Surgery and of Preventive Medicine and Biometrics at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland.

Dr. Bonventre retired as a Colonel in the U.S. Air Force in October 2008, completing a 25-year career. In his final assignment he was a Senior International Health Policy Advisor in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy, where he supported policy oversight of the Department of Defense’s Humanitarian Assistance Programs. During his tenure, the program grew to 300 projects per year with a budget of $83 million.

Dr. Bonventre created and led an International Health Specialist Team for the Headquarters of U.S. Air Forces Europe and EUCOM from 2001 to 2004. He learned to speak French and German, taught disaster medicine in 6 countries, planned 30 humanitarian exercises in 16 nations, and supported DoD HIV/AIDS activities in Francophone Africa. He served on the United Kingdom’s post-conflict advisory team in Sierra Leone in 2001 and on the Country Team for two American Ambassadors. He was awarded USAFE’s Outstanding Global Health Field Grade Officer of the Year for 2003. At U.S. Joint Forces Command from 2004 to 2006, Dr. Bonventre developed concepts and capabilities for the health role in stability operations and security cooperation, and assisted with lessons-learned analysis for the Kashmir earthquake response in Pakistan, and for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Dr. Bonventre has published articles in three languages, most recently on military humanitarian policy with Harvard University, on monitoring and evaluating, and on humanitarian assistance in the Ladakh Himalayas with the military forces of India. He is a Flight Surgeon, a Board-Certified General Surgeon, and a Diplomat in the Medical Care of Catastrophes awarded by the Society of Apothecaries of St. James, London, in 1998. Dr. Bonventre has delivered more than 50 invited presentations in 22 countries.

**FREDERICK M. BURKLE, JR.:** Professor Burkle is a Senior Fellow with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative at Harvard University and a Visiting Scientist at the Harvard School of Public Health. He is a Senior Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington D.C., a Professor at Monash University Medical School in Melbourne, Australia, Senior Associate Faculty in the Department of International Health and the Center for Refugee and Disaster Response at Johns Hopkins University Medical Institutes, and an Adjunct Professor of Military and Emergency Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences.

Dr. Burkle is the recipient of the military’s Gorgas Medal for "distinguished work in preventive medicine, groundbreaking work in disaster management and humanitarian assistance and the training of an entire generation of U.S. and international personnel," He was elected to the prestigious Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences.

Dr. Burkle is highly published in the field of disaster management and humanitarian assistance research. He has worked in and consulted on numerous humanitarian emergencies and large-scale international disasters in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe for the military, NGOs, the Red Cross and the World Health Organization. He actively researches, teaches, and consults on conflict and post-conflict situations.
From 2002-03, Dr. Burkle served as Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Global Health at USAID, Senior Medical Officer for the Disaster Assistance Response Team in Iraq and as the Interim Minister of Health in Iraq.

A 1961 Saint Michael's College and 1965 University of Vermont College of Medicine graduate, Dr. Burkle holds post-graduate degrees from Yale, Harvard, Dartmouth, the University of California at Berkeley, University of Geneva, and the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland. He is a retired Navy Reserve Captain and combat decorated for service with the U.S. Marines. He is a current member of the Board of Directors and Overseer of the International Rescue Committee, the world's largest refugee NGO.

SHARON ISRALOW: Ms. Isralow retired after 30 years of federal service at USAID. Ms. Isralow spent a decade managing democracy and governance programs in Latin America (1988–1998), and then she moved to USAID's Bureau for Africa to work on the Liberia and Sierra Leone wars. In 2001, she became chief of the Africa Bureau's peace-building and governance division, managing a staff of technical experts engaged in democracy and good governance, counter-extremism, conflict mitigation and management, and civil-military relations. Upon her retirement in 2009, she was honored with an outstanding career achievement award for her sustained work in the area of reconstruction and stabilization, with particular expertise in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

LETITIA BUTLER: Ms. Butler, an international economic development specialist with LTL Strategies, currently provides senior support to USAID as coordinator of transition planning and policy in the Office of the Chief Operating Officer.

From 1977 to 2002, she worked for USAID headquarters, in multiple field missions in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, as Deputy Mission Director in the Caribbean, Guatemala, and Afghanistan, and as Director of the Office of Regional Sustainable Development for Latin America and Caribbean Bureau. From 2002 to 2004, she served as Director of the Office of Policy Planning, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, where she led USAID's formulation of the White Paper on the Future of Foreign Assistance and the Fragile States Strategy, as well as managing the critical policy dialogue on the Agency’s role in security sector reform. From 2004 to 2008, Ms. Butler served as Senior Associate at Booz Allen Hamilton where she worked in interagency wargame design and delivery, civil-military coordination, strategic planning, and led an effort to build corporate civil-military initiatives.

Ms. Butler has two BA degrees, one from the University of Virginia (1976) in Asian Studies, and a second in Economics and Commercial Studies (1984) from the U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute, from where she also holds a Senior Seminar Certificate in Leadership in Foreign Policy and National Security Studies (2001). She received the Distinguished Unit Citation awarded for her service on the 2002 Central Asia - Afghanistan Task Force. She was also conferred the Administrator's Award for Distinguished Career Service in 2004.

Currently she is an Adjunct Professor in development studies at the Georgetown University Graduate School program.

DAYTON MAXWELL: Dayton Maxwell participated with the study team and contributed material for the report that he drafted for a USAID document prior to his retirement in November, 2008. He is a former Senior Foreign Service Officer whose last post was as Senior Development Advisor at the Pentagon. He currently is a consultant for the Joint Forces Command and the Project for the National Security Reform. He was not employed by LTL Strategies.
Executive Summary

The Group determined that the future civil-military relationship between USAID and DoD should originate from the following USAID vision statement for civilian-military relations:

As the USG's Development and Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Agency, USAID will lead the Interagency in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating development and humanitarian assistance programs through a planning, training and operational framework linked to resources (staff and budgets). For stabilization, transition, and reconstruction programs within regions and countries where DoD, State and USAID are engaged, USAID will be fully represented as an equal partner and decision-maker to plan, synchronize, and maximize USG resources overseas.

Major Challenges:

I. Securing a long-term commitment from the Administration to rebuild USAID

It is critical that USAID enjoy a full partner status with DoD to enable USAID to act in all types of country settings as an effective humanitarian and development partner. To do this, it is absolutely essential to secure from the Administration a long-term commitment of 10 years to 15 years to rebuild USAID’s human resources and core programming systems of strategic planning, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation.

II. Determining USAID’s rationale and strategic objectives

It is critical that USAID begin to build a responsible relationship with DoD, regional Combatant Commands (COCOM), and DoD field staff by clarifying its institutional rationale and indicators and targets of success while understanding whether its strategic objectives for this relationship differ according to the types of country settings.

III. Summarizing operational objectives for USAID in a civil-military relationship

- Rebuild essential USAID capabilities and staff to engage with DoD as a reliable partner and as an effective counterweight.
- Regard the USAID/DoD relationship as a “glass half full” with major opportunities and risks.
- Expand the USAID presence and influence in interagency venues (National Security Council [NSC], National Election Commission [NEC], and others) at all levels (Principals, Deputies, Interagency Policy Committee [IPC], etc.).
- Use all of USAID’s regional and bilateral field missions, USAID Europe and Japan representatives, assessment capabilities, and the quick response capabilities of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) to demonstrate USAID’s value and capability in country and regional settings. This would include: conflict/crisis situations, failing/failed states, weak/fragile states, poor but stable countries, countries of high strategic/foreign policy interest; permissive, semi-permissive, and non-permissive environments.
IV. Specific component parts that influence this process:

Part I - Priorities

A. Near-term priorities

- Ensure that all USAID senior managers and staff, including bilateral and regional field missions, are cognizant that one of their highest priorities is to support the Agency’s development of a stronger, coherent, realistic and mutually beneficial relationship between USAID and DoD.
- Encourage the new USAID Administrator to develop a strategy for securing from the Administration and Congress a commitment of 10 years or more to rebuild USAID’s strategic and program planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation, program implementation and oversight capabilities. These capabilities and basic systems have been substantially degraded, contributing to a loss of professional respect once enjoyed by the Agency.
- Determine the most important “front line” requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan and respond effectively with human resources, flexible funding, and useful planning, assessment, and evaluation capabilities.
- Rebuild USAID’s strategic planning systems and capabilities to engage DoD in Guidance for Employment of Forces (GEF), regional theater strategies and plans, and country-cooperation plans.

It is crucial to leverage DCHA’s quick response capabilities the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the Office of Food for Peace, (FFP), the Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management (CMM), the Office of Democracy and Governance, (DG), the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and the Office of Civilian Response (OCR) in an integrated capability plan with DoD and the USG interagency. This would likely foreshadow a possible Administration decision to shift the field response responsibility for post-conflict situations to USAID from State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

- Engage intensively with DoD at both national and COCOM levels in program areas, such as security sector reform, disaster assistance, HIV/AIDS and malaria, and support and capacity building of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). There is an immediate need for closer coordination in these areas.
- Expand USAID and DoD awareness and understanding of each other’s resources, capabilities, and field assets. Design and deliver a three- to four-day DoD introductory course for USAID staff and a USAID introductory course for DoD staff. Each course should be designed to be presented in a classroom and electronically.
- Upgrade DoD’s ability in outcome analyses, shared data collection, and measures of effectiveness. This will assure USAID and other humanitarian agencies and organizations that their decision-makers and implementing staff are compliant with these tasks. Unifying situational awareness effectively and efficiently at all levels demands a common language on monitoring and evaluation based on appropriate assessments.
- Initiate a series of retrospective assessments of USAID and interagency performance, lessons learned, and best practices in representative conflict, post-conflict, and conflict-prone environments, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Northern Uganda (10 years+ of experience), DRC-Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, Philippines, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia, and other countries with similar history.
B. Medium- and longer-term priorities

- Identify additional conflict-prone or post-conflict country settings, including the countries chosen under DCHA/OMA’s Focus Country Initiative (Paraguay, Morocco, Liberia, Cambodia, and Albania) for experimental efforts to build models of USAID/DoD collaboration in conjunction with State.
- Move to a much broader level of effort to expand mutual awareness and understanding between USAID and DoD by:
  - training all new USAID staff.
  - increasing the number of USAID staff detailed to DoD in Washington and the COCOMs and vice versa.
  - increasing USAID participation in high-priority DoD meetings that include annual COCOM Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) semi-annual Global Synchronization Conferences (GSC) and exercises such as the annual Austere Challenge exercise at U.S. European Command (EUCOM), which always involves a scenario of post-conflict, relief and reconstruction.
  - sending USAID speakers to address national and service war colleges and other principal DoD training institutions, such as the Naval Post-Graduate School and the Combined Arms Center (CAC) long-term training programs at Fort Leavenworth.
  - expanding DoD and especially COCOM staff participation in global and regional conferences (i.e., Mission Director Conferences), program and technical officer conferences in health, and other related USAID training courses i.e., the Backstop 76, Crisis and Recovery, Conflict 102 (CMM), and OFDA training of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).
- Follow the USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy and its Implementation Guidelines to assign clear leadership, roles, and responsibilities in USAID/Washington for deepening the USAID/DoD relationship, including designation of a lead Bureau/Office, such as DCHA/OMA. Also clarify the roles and responsibilities of DCHA leadership and other parts of DCHA, pillar bureaus, regional bureaus, and bilateral and regional missions.
- Assign responsibility within USAID/Washington to mine existing and new USAID evaluations and assessments, especially those done on conflict and conflict-prone settings, to define more effective approaches, models, processes, and structures that can be used by USAID and the interagency for conflict/crisis prevention instead of conflict/crisis response. Such work will enable USAID to contribute substantially to future interagency and multi-national efforts at more effective conflict/crisis prevention.
- Assign responsibility in USAID/Washington for facilitating a more collaborative relationship between DoD with an emphasis on the five regional commands, the U.S. and international NGO communities and the international donor community. USAID’s representatives to the donor and NGO communities in Paris, Brussels, Geneva, Rome and in Japan and USAID regional and bilateral missions that work closely with their donor and NGO counterparts in their host countries are essential instruments in facilitating this relationship.

Part II - Assumptions

The Group identified the following key assumptions that will either undergird or constrain effective implementation of USAID’s Civilian-Military Policy:

- Rebuilding of USAID’s or a successor foreign assistance department/agency staff will continue through the current Administration.
USAID will be expected to concentrate staff and resources on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for at least the next four years. Performing effectively in these strategic, high-priority settings, as judged by senior interagency/NSC officials, is critical to USAID’s future and the future of a semi-independent foreign assistance agency.

DoD’s senior leaders, Secretary Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen, COCOM and U.S. Joint Forces Commanders (JFCOM), and Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy Michelle Flournoy, have clearly articulated the desire and need for a closer relationship with USAID at all levels and are willing to shift responsibility for reconstruction, stabilization, and other post-conflict tasks to USAID and other civilian agencies as civilian capacities are rebuilt.

DoD will continue to request Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) and other authorities that duplicate the roles of civilian agencies to hedge their bets, in case the Administration and the Congress do not maintain a long-term commitment to rebuild USAID and other civilian capabilities, such as State.

USAID’s mission now clearly includes both development and humanitarian assistance and crisis management, making close working relationships with DoD staff inevitable.

Significant numbers of USAID staff in Washington and in the field are uncomfortable and do not understand the rationale for a closer relationship with DoD and the changes in their responsibilities this will bring. Therefore, all USAID staff needs training and senior-level explanations of the rationale for developing this new set of relationships in Washington and in the field.

U.S. and international NGOs have legitimate concerns with the expanding role of DoD in humanitarian assistance and development and their un-verified claims of success. There needs to be an unmitigated clearing of concerns from the humanitarian community.

Part III - Principal Risks of a Closer USAID-DoD Relationship

- Lack of long-term commitment to rebuild USAID and other USG civilian foreign affairs and foreign assistance institutions, thus leaving the field to DoD.
- DoD will succeed in obtaining global CERP authority, thus confusing roles and responsibilities regarding reconstruction and stabilization and economic assistance in conflict-prone environments.
- Inability of State to reassert decision-making authority with the NSC on whether to continue relationships with developing country militaries that are not accountable to civilian authorities, do not observe international human rights standards, and do not maintain the proper relationship with local populations.
- International perception of “militarization” of U.S. foreign assistance.
- DoD civil affairs projects may not be coordinated, done poorly, or may conflict with and duplicate other USAID activities.
- Increased NGO concerns, problems, and safety issues.
- Congressional blowback. See the two recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) reports raising issues with DoD’s role overseas.

Part IV - Mitigating the Risks

- Seek a long-term commitment from the Administration and the Congress to rebuild USAID or a comparable institution. Have this commitment enshrined in legislation, report language, and in Presidential speeches.
- Assign appropriate numbers of officers of appropriate rank to regional commands and elsewhere to carry out “robust engagement” with DoD.
Civilian-Military Relations Study Group: Consensus Report, 2009

- Insist on seeing the evidence from DoD that the painful lessons of U.S. military assistance and training in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s have been internalized in military assistance and military training guidance and doctrine and are followed today in all regions.
- Work with the international donor and NGO communities to initiate and broaden their understanding and potential consequences of future relationships with DoD, including raising their issues and concerns with DoD Washington and COCOM staff.

Part V - USAID's Corporate Decisions on its Relationship with DoD

- USAID needs to come to terms internally and in regional bureaus, pillar bureaus and the field and build an agency consensus on the objectives and nature of USAID's relationship with DoD.
- Following an internal discussion that involves both USAID/Washington and the field in regards to the USAID/DoD relationship. USAID senior leadership should define USAID’s goals and objectives, openly discuss major risks, recommend how to address those risks, discuss constraints to a closer relationship with DoD, and indicate to USAID staff how to mitigate or remove those constraints.

Part VI - USAID Rationale for a Closer DoD Relationship

- USAID’s main objective in working more closely with DoD should be to help achieve USG and USAID foreign policy, foreign assistance, and international objectives.
- More pragmatically, USAID and DoD should identify each other’s comparative advantages and how the resources, field assets and capabilities of each complement the other.
- DoD's principal contribution to USAID's work is to help establish secure and stable environments in which USG civilian agencies and the NGO community can work.
- Areas in which USAID and DoD clearly need to collaborate are disaster and crisis response, security sector reform, HIV/AIDS and malaria, and DoD’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civil Aid (OHDACA) programs that risk duplicating or conflicting with existing USAID programs in education, health, water and sanitation, and rural infrastructure.
- USAID's collaboration with DoD can help lead to more effective models, approaches, and structures of conflict and crisis prevention at the USG interagency level and enable the USG to contribute more flexibly to multi-national efforts at conflict and crisis prevention.

Part VII - Education and Training

- Establish an understanding among USAID and DoD staffs of the other partner’s resources, field assets, and capabilities.
- Expand formal training and add new skill sets to USAID and DoD.
- Expand immediately the training, detail assignments, and participation in the other partner’s conferences and exercises in high-priority countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Darfur and Southern Sudan, and other field sites.

Part VIII - A USAID-DoD Learning Center

- Establish a joint USAID/DoD Learning Center to assess the experience in the four Critical Priority Countries (CPC). In the full range of conflict-prone settings, draw lessons, and establish best practices in evaluation, assessment, and After Action Reviews (AAR) as well as, more broadly, in interagency collaboration in each type of country setting.
- Continue rebuilding the USAID broken monitoring and evaluation system.
• Undertake USAID self-assessments and evaluations of its experience over the past 10 years to 15 years in conflict and crisis response in all regions and draw lessons on how to intervene more effectively in such situations.
• Deposit and catalogue in the Development Experience Clearinghouse AARs or evaluations completed on conflict and crisis response. The knowledge of important parts of the USAID experience in conflict and crisis situations lies in DCHA (OFDA, OTI, CMM, FFP, DG), the regional and pillar bureaus, and in missions. However, no common approach exists to evaluate such experiences nor is it clear reports are circulated to the whole Agency.

Part IX – Personnel Issues

• Rebuild USAID’s human resources. It is critical that USAID be an effective partner and counterweight to DoD.
• Create a “robust engagement” with DoD in Washington, in the COCOMs, and in the field to build a more effective relationship with DoD. Such “robust engagement” with DoD requires USAID staff of sufficient numbers and appropriate rank to engage effectively with DoD counterparts, including raising issues and forcing necessary changes in DoD activities.
• Create a personnel system in DoD and USAID that rewards with promotions and career-enhancing onward assignments to those who accept interagency detail assignments or who focus on expanding interagency collaboration. This practice is not currently done.

Part X – Preparations for the new USAID Administrator regarding the USAID/DoD Relationship

• Outline for the new USAID Administrator a vision for a closer and mutually productive relationship with DoD and an action plan to establish such a relationship.
• Outline a strategy for the new Administrator to re-engage with senior DoD leadership, following up Administrator Fore’s recent meeting with Secretary Gates.
• Outline a parallel strategy for the new Administrator to assert USAID’s role as the USG’s primary foreign assistance and development agency, justifying USAID’s co-chairing the Development IPC and regular USAID presence at NSC Principals and Deputies meetings to represent development and foreign assistance perspectives.
• Prepare a negotiating and political strategy for resisting global CERP authority for DoD. Establish a time table under which authority and funding for DoD programs, which are similar to economic and humanitarian assistance, will be gradually turned over to USAID, State, and other civilian foreign affairs agencies.

Part XI – Current USAID Capacity

• Regain the trust and authority with the Congress, the White House, and USG interagency partners.
• Rebuild “deep smarts,” know-how, know-who, and tacit knowledge and experience on how to get things done in USAID that have been depleted through the retirement of experienced staff. This can be accomplished through innovative mentoring and coaching programs that compensate for the lack of experienced staff in the field who would normally handle the mentoring. The targets of coaching should be new mid-level staff and new senior managers, most of whom lack the required experience to perform effectively in their new positions.
Part XII - Linkages

- Work with DoD to identify areas of intersection in which USAID’s and DoD’s comparative advantages, if interrelated with each other in both planning and implementation, can complement each other and address both national security and development and foreign assistance objectives.
- The areas that offer the most potential for such synergies with DoD are:
  - Security sector reform, military reform, and rule of law.
  - Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegation.
  - Peace agreements and the process of negotiating, implementing and overseeing them.
  - Civil affairs activities by COCOMs and their service components, especially Special Operations Forces under OHDACA.
  - Disaster relief and response to complex emergencies for which relatively clear policies and guidance already delineates roles and responsibilities for USAID (OFDA), DoD, and State. Given this clarity, a close analysis of actual USG interagency collaboration in this area may yield clear principles and guidance for other areas of intersection.
  - Conflict mitigation and management with attention to DoD’s role in building professional militaries that can reduce, rather than exacerbate conflict.
  - Counter-terrorism with particular reference to interagency operations, such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) efforts with USAID and other USG agencies in Mindanao, Philippines.


- Identify lessons learned and best practices from previous or current interagency and multi-national models in which USAID, DoD, State, other USG agencies, and international organizations are working together. These include:
  - The experience of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups established in each COCOM after 9/11 and focused on counter-terrorism.
  - The current experiments by SOUTHCOM and African Command (AFRICOM) to build interagency presence throughout their directorate structures.
  - The model of negotiating and now acting under “Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments,” developed by DoD and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), InterAction, and the U.S. Institute for Peace and launched in July 2007.
  - Under the rubric of knowledge management, the U.N. Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UN OCHA), create an online archive and website related to previous disaster responses to disseminate lessons, training databases, and a current list of international disaster response personnel.

- Leverage DoD’s comparative advantage in developing and using a variety of IT collaboration tools, most of them presently classified, to create an unclassified interagency data base that displays or links to USG agency and country strategies, programs, funding levels, activities, and locations so that USG departments and agencies can begin talking with other USG partners on a basis of common knowledge.

- Compare USAID’s monitoring and evaluation system, including impact evaluations, once this system has been resurrected, with DoD’s AARs and formal lessons learned systems, which are different for
each service. Develop a system of identifying lessons learned and best practices applicable to and useful for all USG foreign affairs, national security, and foreign assistance departments and agencies.

**Part I. Priorities**

**Near Term**

1. **Determine the most effective Front Line requirements and respond accordingly**

USAID must plan for environments where there is a high likelihood of DoD involvement. Although all environments are important, critical study and analysis must be placed on conflict areas where the USG is likely to respond. Currently, the clearest requirements are those in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq where USAID officers have been working for years and where a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan has just been formulated. USAID should complete transition programming in Iraq and stay the course in development as conditions allow.

USAID must identify all countries with substantial DoD involvement in which USAID must prioritize their resources. Examples are Liberia where there is a major Security Sector Reform (SSR) effort and Sudan because of a large DoD security assistance effort to the armed forces of the Government of Southern Sudan. In doing so, USAID and DoD must also complete joint analysis and tribal mapping on Iran.

USAID’s substantive experience in strategy development, program planning, training, and project implementation will be of importance in feeding considerations for future policy formulation and adjustment. USAID has performed poorly in documenting, evaluating, and analyzing its crisis management experiences. The Group recommends a dedicated professional staff of four to do this, two for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq and two additional staff for other crisis response situations and for scouring institutional memories for what has been referred to as “lost” experiences.¹

2. **Develop a USAID capacity to become the “Supported Command” for major natural disaster responses requiring a large DoD support element**

USAID should lead USG development and humanitarian assistance and institutionalize DoD support of OFDA through common planning and training methodologies. The USAID DART team functioned essentially as the “Supported Command” during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991, a response universally recognized as a success.² One part of Operation Provide Comfort was the task-shifting of a Civil Affairs Unit to the DART team to set up and manage the major camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs.). This “Supported Command” concept is appropriate for the future. The assumption is that USAID would not have to provide the “Supported Command” staff, but would manage the military personnel tasked to the crisis response; therefore, USAID personnel requirements would not be excessive. Similarly, PACOM staff expressed a desire to stand up as the “Supporting Command” to USAID in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami.

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) report includes recommendations to set up either hierarchical teams for crisis management or Integrated Regional Centers that focus more on USG security

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¹ The only record of the Joint UK-US Civil Planning Mission to Sarajevo in 1994 is one consultant’s personal copy. USAID has already lost the Gaza Infrastructure Assessment it provided leadership to conduct three years ago.

management requirements. A USAID desiring to improve its status to more adequately fulfill its mandated role in crisis response to include major disaster responses should anticipate the possibility that the PNSR recommendations, or some variations thereof, will come into existence. Also, a PNSR team has discussed the possibility that a foreign response equivalent to the domestic National Response Plan be devised. The Federal Foreign Disaster Response Plan (FFDRP) was previously designed for USAID, but it has remained on the shelf for several years.

The Group recommends devoting one professional staff member working with OFDA and other DCHA offices to both study the feasibility of USAID enhancing this role and outlining the necessary steps to meet these requirements for USAID.

3. Develop a significant Strategic Planning capacity for USAID for crisis responses

USAID and DoD should reconcile military theater planning with civilian planning. This requirement is well known, fairly clear and needs little description. The COCOM TSC planning combined with the new Guidance for the Employment of Force directions to escalate the Phase Zero conflict prevention planning needs to be coordinated with Mission Strategic Plans and Country Assistance Strategies.

High priority should be given to improving USAID’s input into continuing USG strategic planning for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Institutionally, USAID needs to improve its strategic planning capability for these countries. Strategic planning at the USAID level is considered weak but resources must be provided to ensure that these skills are developed and considered generic to the Agency. DoD claims expertise in “strategic planning” but this is short-term and not consistent with the overall requirements of the Agency or the field missions. Health is an important gap area. A lack of strategy and capability for civilian health sector planning in Iraq has led DoD to take over this function, spending more than $500 million with questionable results. Roles and responsibilities for USAID Global Health, S/CRS and OFDA Health must be clarified, as health in post-conflict situations is too critical an issue to continue to fall through the cracks.

USAID must explore the need for a National Development Strategy in conjunction with national security requirements and draft it if needed. In this regard, the Study Group understands that a new National Security Strategy has recently been proposed.

The plan must account for at least seven principal types of country settings for which USAID needs to lay out its view of respective civilian-military roles and responsibilities:

1) Countries in active conflict with deployed U.S. combat forces. The aim is to mitigate the conflict with DoD assets in the lead.
2) Failed states or countries in active conflict without U.S. combat forces. The aim would be to work with existing forces (Regional U.N. organizations, i.e., African Union; U.N. Coalition Forces; non-U.N. forces, i.e., NATO). DoD may participate in providing logistics or airframe support but not forces on the ground. The existing forces would be responsible for conflict response and mitigation. Eventually, this would be a civilian-led mission with strong interagency participation in planning, implementation, and evaluation of all reconstruction programs.

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3 Forging a New Shield. The Project on National Security Reform, November 2008.
3) Countries in post-conflict situations (stabilization and reconstruction, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), etc.) with the aim of stabilization and recovery. This would eventually be civilian-led with continual linkages to DoD for security sector reform.

4) Conflict-prone environments in weak and fragile states. The aim is for conflict and crisis prevention under a civilian-led mission with DoD in supporting role.

5) Countries in stable, long-term development situations with low risk of internal conflict are civilian-led missions.

6) Countries of high strategic and foreign policy interest with low risk of internal conflict are civilian-led missions.

7) Natural disaster and complex emergency situations. These are civilian led (USAID/OFDA) with DoD assistance as requested, given logistical requirements and extent of conflict.

The Group feels strongly that USAID must work more effectively with the planning staff of the S/CRS. S/CRS has already drafted a set of civilian strategic planning principles, which has been approved at the Deputy's Committee level. This is a short version of a much more substantial “Practitioner's Guide” detailing how a “whole-of-government” strategic planning process will be conducted for major crisis responses. Chances are that in the upcoming structural changes stimulated by the PNSR effort, USAID and S/CRS capacities will be much more closely coordinated, if not combined.

USAID must build an internal Strategic Planning capacity for both USAID crisis response operations and to support whole-of-government operations. USAID's crisis response planning housed in the DCHA Bureau is overly stove-piped. Each DCHA crisis response office has its own independent plan and leadership. It has been recognized for years that USAID needed to develop a more coordinated crisis management planning capability but that step was never executed. Now that the requirement is recognized globally across the USG, it is essential for USAID to develop a coordinated planning process.

USAID must institutionalize its input to DoD's Guidance for Employment of Force (GEF), TSC Plans, and Country Campaign Plans. USAID must have regular input into DoD's Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism strategies and plans, and must influence DoD humanitarian assistance guidance and Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) project planning. USAID must ensure that protection of civilians is incorporated into DoD plans. USAID must institutionalize DoD's input into USAID's COPs, Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) and Focus Countries.

The Study Group recommends that a sufficient number of professionals with the appropriate talents and expertise be hired to address all of the Strategic Planning components outlined above.

4. Examine the Project on National Security Reform recommendations and assign staff to work with the PNSR Issue Teams

The PNSR report recommends a major reform of the State Department, titling the “Next Generation State Department” as the Department of International Relations (DIR). The Issue Team that will coordinate the DIR development process will consider combining all the State Department crisis response institutions into one entity, perhaps under a nominal USAID leadership. This clearly warrants immediate USAID attention. It is clear that USAID has a mandate and the experience to field teams for crisis management. Because of the fact that USAID is rebuilding its staff, partly in response to DoD's stating the necessity for increased civilian partnership, it is critically important to communicate USAID's plans on using its increased staff in the future to the PNSR Issue Teams. If instituted, the PNSR recommendations to establish either a much more robust system of “hierarchical teams” to focus on the various crises or Integrated Regional Centers to work alongside COCOMs will constitute significant changes.

6 The PNSR is funded by Congress through DoD, and DoD has dedicated officers working with the PNSR.
Part IV of the PNSR report focuses on USG structural budgeting problems with respect to national security. The results of the continuing exploration and resolution of these problems will definitely affect USAID’s operations and management.

5. Increase support for Security Sector Reform efforts

A new “Three-D” SSR policy was signed by Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of State Rice and USAID Administrator Fore in late 2008. SSR was originally developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Development Assistance Committee through years of effort beginning in the last decade, and has been incorporated broadly by other donor countries. It is the only discipline that examines how to establish sustainable security in a comprehensive manner. DoD has a significant responsibility to build more effective rule-of-law and SSR capacity within DoD.

The Group recommends that USAID lead an interagency approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegrations with DoD in support, recognizing that legislative relief will be required if USAID is to engage in disarmament and demobilization. We recommend consulting with USAID’s Senior SSR Adviser, on how many additional dedicated staff is needed to enable USAID to effectively fill its leadership role in this expanding and critical field for building host nation security in a comprehensive manner. It is of note that Ms. Julie Werbel, DCHA/DG, had already been tasked with presenting options to DCHA senior leadership on DDR, and she has strongly recommended that DDR be included in the training program currently being designed for a Civilian Response Corps-Active staff.

6. Develop training for Provincial Reconstruction Teams

As a “civilian surge” accompanies the “military surge” personnel in Afghanistan, USAID personnel sent to PRTs must be fully prepared to partner equally with DoD and assume a leadership role in development activities. They will require skills in civilian-military relations, DoD planning methods, organization, terminology and funding sources. USAID personnel must coordinate monitoring and evaluation of PRT activities and confirm security capacity and risk to civilian staff before transfer of any further duties from DoD to USAID.

7. Develop training for deploying USAID officers

As USAID grows, it is important to develop education and training programs for newly hired staff, not only in USAID processes and civil-military relations, but in skill sets required for operating in the seven country scenarios outlined above. Continuing education is also required as the Agency’s engagement in whole-of-government and civilian-military affairs continues to evolve.

8. Improving the analysis, evaluation, and documentation of field experiences to incorporate into strategic planning for the future

USAID and DoD must develop a common monitoring and evaluation framework and appropriate indices for development and DoD’s “development-like activities,” including the OHDACA program and hospital ship visits.
Longer Term

1. USAID-DoD planning for DoD’s new Building Partnership Capacity Initiative

DoD’s newly established Building Partnership Capacity Initiative, first funded for FY 2010, intends to implement much more robustly the development of host country capacity to achieve a sustainable security. Although the strategy to do this is still being developed and the FY 2010 budget isn’t approved, DoD will definitely need to work with USAID to achieve mutual objectives. The SSR program may build up to be the fundamental program to accomplish the comprehensive objectives required for sustainable security.

USAID and DoD must expand mutual situational awareness and understanding. In cooperation with DoD, USAID must develop effective training, interagency details, and other measures to rapidly expand mutual awareness and understanding between USAID and DoD staff of each partner’s resources, field assets, and capabilities and the implications of those characteristics for how each agency should relate to the other. As situational awareness and understanding increase, it is important to identify sectors or areas of activity, such as security sector reform or HIV/AIDS/malaria, where the potential gains from expanded collaboration and concentration are greatest.

USAID must assign clear leadership and other roles within USAID/Washington for carrying out these civilian-military efforts. It needs to decide what office and bureau within USAID takes the lead and determine the role and responsibilities of other parts of the Agency in carrying out these priority work efforts – among DCHA, DCHA/OMA, pillar bureaus, and regional bureaus. This should include choosing key USAID missions in selected countries that must take on the challenge of carrying out the above analysis and work in coordinating with DoD’s regional COCOM and the DoD field staff in-country or those that belong to sub-regional efforts, for example, Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) or Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), both in Africa.

As a necessary first step to improving transparency and trust between USAID and DoD, both agencies should measure outcome and impact indicators for their work, in a common format that allows information-sharing. Both agencies must move beyond measuring process indicators or money flows. Poor communication and situational awareness will remain unless the “common language” issues are solved. This is a necessary first step to build trust and transparency issue.

2. More effective use of information systems technology

For several years DoD has developed models, simulations, analysis and planning and other software for itself and the interagency to more effectively plan and manage crisis responses. Unfortunately, the civilian agencies have shown little interest, nor has DoD funded the transfer of this technology for use by civilian agencies. The potential for much more effective use of Information Technology (IT) is often unrecognized in crisis management situations. There is significant potential in using IT systems with host nation partners to resolve critical issues or promote cooperation among factions.

The PNSR recommendations include the establishment of a higher priority for knowledge management in connection with new national security structures. It is known from current experiences that DoD is struggling even internally to systematize its knowledge management operations, with each COCOM having developed its own system. Shared data between USAID and the COCOMs have proven to be problematic.

The Group recommends dedicating four technical officers to examine the potential for more effective crisis response using IT systems to build an Interagency data base and management information system (MIS) that is unclassified, designed by all those participating, not just by DoD, and accessible to all USG and other international partners. This goes beyond the current Theater Security Cooperation MIS (TSCMIS) and other forms of classified systems currently available in order to begin to build a “whole of government” approach.
3. USAID should lead the USG conflict prevention strategy with DoD plans in support, including drivers of extremism

USAID advocacy and leadership for advocacy on conflict prevention and host nation capacity-building is sorely needed, not just for fragile states but for crisis responses where success depends on building a competent host nation governance process.\(^7\) This would require an important decision by USAID leadership to ensure that this becomes a priority. State and other agencies contribute to pieces of state capacity building. This includes DoD, but none has a comprehensive mandate or contributes appropriately to any long-term strategic plan. This would have to be designed and carved out.

For the foreseeable future the world will remain conflicted. This will require USAID to be stronger in order to contribute effectively to address and resolve the problems. The current crises are well-known, and new crises could arise in North Korea, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Somalia, Central Asia, and Venezuela. USG has tended to shy away from crisis prevention for many reasons, but with DoD moving in that direction it will require a new business model. The fact that almost all the issues have an important security component and DoD has the respect of Congress and the American population does result in having enormous resources that can be co-opted. USAID must examine its own business model. To avoid placing form before function, the question worth exploring is whether it is a structural question and should it move OMA to the policy shop, the Administrator’s office, to the Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade (EGAT), or elsewhere, or simply is it a business model question that requires providing more substantial funding to OMA. This is not just a question of contingency planning for future crises. The need is to allocate substantial funding and intellectual resources to devise more effective models, approaches, processes, and structures based on past lessons learned and derived best practices on preventing future crises and conflicts.

Transformations in the USG are necessary. S/CRS, as contentious as it has been, has begun an internal transformation process. Although National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) has convinced some military organizations to build S/CRS into their plans, others have given up on S/CRS’ ability to manage major crises. The partners with the greatest operational capacities and responsibilities on the ground are USAID and DoD. Although placing S/CRS in State is seen as part of the problem, USAID must ratchet up its ability to plan for crisis responses to a much more significant level, and not just depend on S/CRS to do that.

USAID’s focus on prevention implies that they will focus on drivers and mitigators of conflict and crisis, and will be able to predict which social, economic, and political tensions (i.e., ethnic exclusion from the society) will lead to open conflict. USAID or other USG international organizations would then need to intervene quickly to reduce those tensions and increase stability for the future.\(^8\)

DoD, especially EUCOM and AFRICOM, view USAID and other USG foreign assistance agencies as playing a principal role in addressing causes and drivers of crisis, conflict, and violent extremism. The recent reports on the role of development assistance in addressing drivers of violent extremism (Africa Bureau Office of Sustainable Development or AFR/SD, prepared by Lynn Carter and Guilain Devenoux of Management Systems International, MSI) are key conceptual documents in this effort. Main contacts for this research and its implications are Angela Martin AFR/SD and Zeric Smith, AFR/SD. This report, “Guide to

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the Drivers of Violent Extremism,” February 2009, is now public and can be distributed. The importance of this research and subsequent programming recommendations lies in the leadership role it implies for USAID and for development assistance in addressing directly, effectively, and in a measurable way, drivers of conflict, crisis, and violent extremism.

4. USAID should ensure it is the primary interface between DoD and NGOs

Some NGOs are philosophically opposed to USAID working with the military, and cite concerns regarding staff safety. There is quite a contrast between NGO headquarters leadership who because of the agency’s “core values” are very reluctant to write the need for pragmatism on the ground into NGO policy, and their field staff who, facing the problems on the ground, simply decided to work with the military in a pragmatic manner. On interagency cooperation, the experiences we are facing in today’s world and the experiences we are gaining in the field are moving us to a much greater level of interagency cooperation, which will gradually overcome reticence. The relevant relationships are in two significant areas: post-conflict and humanitarian assistance (HA) response (which is well-defined), and crisis prevention (which is gaining increased attention). USAID has a major interest in both.

Part II: Assumptions

In order to proceed with analysis, the Group made certain assumptions regarding factors that are unknown to the Group or to USAID at this time. As the situation with new USAID leadership, relationships with Congress and with the State Department, a new National Security Strategy and budget issues become clearer, these assumptions should be revised or replaced with facts crucial to driving a revised strategic analysis of the situation.

1. The status of USAID will be elevated to the point where it is an integral part of the “three Ds” as outlined in the National Security Strategy of 2006.
   a. USAID will continue to co-chair the IPC on development.
   b. The Civilian-Military sub-IPC will be elevated to an IPC.
2. The USAID mission is both development assistance and crisis management; however, data suggests that crisis management will continue to play a more prominent role in the future.
   a. USAID has accepted counterterrorism as a valid issue area for it to address.
   b. Crisis management includes both conflict prevention and conflict response.
   c. This being said, USAID will continue to struggle to internalize these new missions.
3. USAID and DoD will continue to conceptualize the theater differently, and they will continue to have different perspectives on areas of responsibility and time frames for action.
4. The USG will continue to move toward a “whole-of-government” approach.
5. Both USAID and DoD are open to changing their programs.
Part III: Principal Risks of a Closer USAID-DoD Relationship

1. Internal Risks

A critical risk is the possibility the U.S. Government will not maintain the political will over the long term to rebuild USAID and other civilian foreign assistance and international affairs agencies. However, reform must proceed, whether long-term political will is sustained or not.

Placing Form before Function: There is a risk of contributing to the complicated process by adding short-term solutions to fit the existing structures whether they make sense or not. The HA and Disaster Response (DR) work is not inherent within the DoD, yet it is tempting to try to adapt both existing and future functions to a dominant DoD structure. But few DoD HA projects would have passed muster in the broader humanitarian community, including USAID. DoD and the COCOMS, in particular, have invented these projects without consideration of tested approaches to HA and for the most part without study, reflection, or collaboration with USAID, let alone the humanitarian community.

It is the reason why USAID/Washington responses are quite different than USAID-mission/field experiences. Whereas much of this might appear good on a strategic level, and possibly at the tactical level, it falls severely short at the operational level. It is time to wipe the slate clean and start all over again. DoD needs to recognize that USAID and others in the HA-development-sustainability professions really do recognize the need for strong DoD collaboration in areas of security, logistics, transportation and communications. All these functions are recognized responsibilities for DoD and require much more expertise, resources, and thought than they currently claim to have in modern-day SSR and DDR. USAID and others have grave concern when DoD becomes engaged in traditional HA programs for which they have no expertise. A question needs to be asked why things worked out so well in the Kurdish Crisis in Northern Iraq in 1991-92 where Major General Jay Garner only focused on those above stated assets and had an excellent and respectful relationship with OFDA/DART and other members of the international humanitarian community. What has changed since then?

A central dilemma inside USAID is whether the primary purpose is “impartial, poverty reduction” or “support of USG/whole of government objectives.” USAID staff is not of one mind on this, and it will take a clear articulation of basic principles from leadership and strong efforts to internalize those principles at all levels in USAID.

The DoD working relationship with OTI, OFDA, USAID missions, and USAID Headquarters are totally different. Each has dissimilar operational mandates, capacities, philosophy, and resources. Seeing the civilian-military relationship through just one lens risks creating inconsistencies and lack of buy-in at different levels within USAID. Speaking of “USAID” in the composite leads to confusion especially when moving from strategic-to-tactical-to-operational levels for both DoD and USAID components.

USAID maintains an inadequate training pool of personnel. DoD maintains an excess of about 14% of its personnel so that 14% of its people can be participating in training or exercises at any one time. According to State’s FY 09 budget request, State only maintains a 3% cushion for training and education. This percentage must be increased. After the gutting of USAID in the 1980s and 1990s, a desire for more robust interagency coordination, clearly an objective of the Obama administration, through more meaningful interaction with DoD, may be a useful way for USAID to advocate on the Hill for more resources.
Concentrating civilian-military expertise in OMA risks atrophy of that skill set in bureaus and missions. Similarly, creation of a new USAID career track to address these civilian-military issues would risk having only these skills available within the newly created USAID personnel staff. A similar situation happened to DoD. The Air Force created a new program to improve the language and cultural skills of DoD personnel. The program started with 63 individuals at all the COCOMs combined. Once the teams were trained and in place, a common attitude they encountered was that COCOM personnel expressed relief that they no longer had to worry about issues that required language skills or cultural knowledge. They just tossed them over to the new office and said, “fix this.” The true intent was to get the skill set out to all DoD personnel, so they could all deal more effectively in other cultures. To some extent, the same risks could happen in USAID, if OMA is expected to single-handedly run the USAID-DoD interface.

There is a risk that if USAID’s OMA is relied upon to be the sole interface at these events, that DoD experience will reside only in OMA. Familiarity should be more generalized.

2. Interagency Risks

The sheer size of the DoD, the complexity of how DoD is organized, and the very large number of programs of possible interest to USAID are all significant obstacles.

There is a risk of focusing on negatives and lamenting USAID’s past, rather than looking for opportunities and focusing on the agency’s future. Examples are:

- Lack of accountability and Measures of Effectiveness.
- Relegation of USAID to a subordinate agency to DoD.
- Poor coordination and duplication of effort.
- Different cultures of each agency do not mesh well.

There is also the risk of USAID being overwhelmed by requests to coordinate in any number of thematic or geographic areas from DoD COCOMs and their contractors.

3. External Risks

Perception of “militarization” of foreign assistance. Some NGOs, especially their field staff, take a pragmatic stance regarding working with DoD. Other NGOs have expressed concerns regarding a closer USAID relationship with DoD, the most pressing of which is the safety of NGO staff in the field during complex emergencies such as the early stages of the war in Afghanistan.

Further areas of potential opposition are from Congress and Congressional blowback; disparate funding authorities, and the possibility of world-wide authority for DoD’s CERP, which would confuse substantially USG roles and responsibilities for reconstruction and stabilization as well as economic assistance in conflict-prone environments, even where U.S. combat forces are not deployed.

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9 The International Health Specialist Program.
10 See the two recent SFRC reports on DoD’s role overseas.
Part IV: Mitigating the Risks

1. Internal

The Group recommends that USAID commission a study to identify the critical links between security and development. This document would be the framework to develop guidelines or toolkits for officers in DoD and USAID who work on various pieces of processes or programs so they can take into consideration how the activities and actions of one organization impacts the other organization. This is critical for the peace process implementation and SSR and DDR. Because DDR on the civilian side links directly to economic opportunities, community-level conflict mitigation and management, and political processes, USAID officers beyond the DDR/SSR staff need to understand and engage in this as well.

Greater transparency on what DoD is doing may allay fears regarding the militarization of foreign assistance. DoD recently opened the database of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects to Harvard University for review, analysis and comment. USAID should have the same, or a greater, degree of visibility. This improves civilian oversight of military “development-like” activities.

Create a formal “DoD 101” training courses for USAID and vice-versa with standardized curricula and exercise scenarios that include USAID/Washington, OFDA, OTI, USAID-Mission specific HA/DR activities. These would define specific DoD exercises and training events for USAID to focus on, to accomplish specific USAID objectives and to translate these into exercises. Of course, this would be incumbent upon increasing the percentage of USAID personnel available for training, ideally to a target of about 10%.

USAID must carefully examine the proposed global Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and other authorities. This might create an efficient field-level process for getting USAID approval of projects, or DoD and USAID could plan CERP activities together. The mechanism to do this would have to be relatively simple, quick, and user-friendly.

It is imperative that USAID retain primacy in development work with DoD in a supporting role, as an option of last resort. This process must proceed immediately and cannot wait for a renewal of USAID staffing to 1970 levels.

The Group recommends clearly defining terms that relate to USAID’s relationship with DoD and other USG agencies. These terms are coordination, collaboration, and cooperation. Success begins with both full understanding and acceptance of these definitions from strategic to operational levels. Unfortunately, this has never been fully realized and one should not be surprised by the consequences.

The Group suggests the following definitions:

1. **Coordination**: A sharing of responsibilities to prevent a duplication of effort. Most consider coordination to be a major factor leading to success or failure. Competing interests of NGOs, U.N. Agencies, and the military fight against coordination.

2. **Cooperation**: A closely related concept, referring to a sense of common purpose, and the use of common methods to work together to achieve something.

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3. **Collaboration**: A concept that is deeper than cooperation and represents a shared vision for the future and not merely the absence of competition. Partnership, shared understanding, open communication, tolerance of differences, and trust are key components of a collaborative approach.

U.N. OCHA’s definitions of the terms might also be appropriate, and for sake of consistency, both DoD and USAID must use common terminology where possible. OCHA defines civilian-military cooperation as:

> “The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.”\(^{12}\)

The “cooperation spectrum” is a concept that notes that the level of cooperation depends on the context of the situation where the relationship takes place – i.e., whether the U.S. military is a party to a conflict (a belligerent), as in Iraq and Afghanistan, whether they are in a peacekeeping role (Kosovo) or a supporting role (African Union’s mission in Sudan). It also matters whether it’s a natural disaster or a conflict. Certainly DoD’s relationship with USAID’s implementing partners would be drastically different in those varying circumstances. But relationships among all the USG agencies need to be consistent. Right now they are not, and relationships are very personality-dependent – so it varies greatly each time DoD or USAID have a personnel turn over.

There are several stages in an interagency relationship starting from basic knowledge of each other’s presence in the same “area” with the potential to rise to a much closer working relationship. One such nomenclature is:

- **Visibility** – provides knowledge of what other USG agencies are doing.
- **De-confliction** – avoids duplication or conflict between the programs and activities of two USG agencies.
- **Coordination** – enables two USG agencies to discuss their respective activities before they occur and seek to link or sequence their activities in a logical way that at a minimum does no harm and at best maximizes a successful outcome and transition to development.
- **Collaboration** – enables two USG agencies to plan ahead, compare strategies and broader programs to achieve greater positive results working together than working alone. This stage includes “joint planning.”

The question is what vision does USAID have of the process and its stages to build a relationship with DoD on many levels and work progressively more closely together. This includes raising issues early with DoD in the field, at COCOMs, and in Washington when USAID disagrees with what DoD is doing and assertively engaging to resolve such issues.

A key risk mitigation step is to keep USAID’s regional and pillar bureaus and missions involved and to emphasize liaison officers, modeled after OFDA/DART and Joint Task Forces. USAID is not one body. Many of these issues reflect issues particular to OFDA, or OTI, not USAID Missions or their field personnel. OFDA or OTI should be the lead and conduit with DoD in many of the issues discussed in this document. Many USAID Mission professionals do not have experience with DoD nor wish to, whereas OFDA or OTI has a natural affinity for these types of operations and relationships. USAID must clarify this through “statements of work” in order to answer the hard questions. It is crucial to discuss the issues with every USAID component: OFDA, OTI, and USAID Missions. DoD might interface with each of these in a totally

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different manner because they all have different missions and professionals. DoD must have a different understanding of what each of these USAID assets do and how they accomplish their missions. DoD tends to see USAID through one lens, but this always proves counterproductive. Also, there are major regional differences when working with a U.N. cluster system, OCHA, etc., and other militaries. Policy does not necessarily mean the objectives of the policy will be understood in the same way by everyone in the organization or that it will be internalized by the organization.

Within USAID/Washington, the environment is mixed among regional bureaus and pillar bureaus. In DCHA, where several of the components (OFDA, OTI, CMM, OMA, etc.) work more frequently and closely with DoD, the atmosphere is more positive. In the field, the atmosphere is more often mixed with varied experience working with DoD. In Europe and Eurasia, where every country with a USAID Mission also works with the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and the Security Assistance Office (SAO). Africa, in contrast has at least 12 countries where there are USAID Missions without ODC/SAO staff in-country. A Defense Attaché (DATT) may exist in-country but the DATT has other responsibilities or little interest in working on these issues. Progress on coordination has been made in East Africa where the regional mission and CJTF-HOA have agreed that proposed OHDACA-funded activities will be reviewed by the Embassy and Mission. USAID must pay careful attention to transitions and hand-offs of DoD staff, and create the capacity and culture within USAID to critically examine its own operations, and adapt, adjust, and explore alternatives, while stressing accountability and adherence to international human rights standards.

2. **External**

It is important to maintain a host nation focus as each agency reaches outside its established institutions and standard operating procedures and do joint planning, with synchronized planning cycles. The need for USAID and DoD to reconcile the civilian country-planning focus and military theater planning focus has been mentioned as a short-term priority. Both USAID and DoD have deeply set standard operating procedures that tend to guide them to do more of what they’re familiar with within their own institutions. But building effective host nation “whole-of-government” capacities, which are suggested in this document, requires both to do joint planning across the development and security assistance sectors with host nation partners. This unfortunately is rarely done or it is at cross purposes. DoD tends to do its planning at the theater (COCOM) level, not at the national level. USAID should consider resurrecting previous recommendations to set up a joint working group to study how the civilian country-planning focus and the military theater-planning focus could be reconciled.

The Group feels that the State Department and the NSC, not DoD, should define U.S. foreign policy in U.S. military-to-military relationships with foreign countries. Reassertion by State of authority, with the NSC, is essential to decide how and whether to continue to build mil-to-mil relationships with militaries that are not accountable to civilian authorities, do not observe international human rights standards, and do not maintain the proper relationship with local populations. This is especially important in regard to military-to-military relationships in weak, unstable states whose militaries may violate international human rights standards, resist accountability to civil authorities or whose governments may opt to use their militaries to remain in power. Here we need to look at the history of U.S. and especially DoD involvement in Latin and Central America in the 1970s and 1980s with some militaries that were not accountable and did not adhere to international human right standards. Were these lessons learned and integrated into current DoD doctrine for security cooperation? To what degree are these standards observed by regional COCOMs today?

Furthermore, the Group recommends the creation of non-agency specific funding authorities for crises so that agencies MUST plan together to access a certain amount of crisis response funds.

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13 The Defense Attaché works for the Defense Intelligence Agency, so his primary responsibility is collection of information of operational importance to the Department of Defense.
Other possibilities include the current “Focus Country” pilot initiative now led by USAID/OMA to develop approaches and models to build mutual awareness and understanding across agencies and to begin joint planning and joint implementation of selected programs and activities. However, there must be attempts to assess whether the Focus Country model is value-added to both USAID and DoD.

The Group recommends exploring the USAID-DoD relationship with NGO implementing partners. A key goal should be to emphasize transparency of both the relationship and the associated funding sources. One option is to inventory and query USAID staff regarding working with DoD, and then use the results to open dialogue with NGOs in hopes to allay fears of militarization of foreign assistance.

Whereas it is crucial for USAID to be the conduit in facilitating these relationships with DoD, most see USAID as being in a subservient position in relationship with DoD with little influence, power, and money, and really do not know who is actually talking when USAID speaks. Recent *Foreign Affairs* articles bolstered hope that there may be a return to the primacy of the “old” USAID when ranks were full and USAID careers were inextricably linked to those of the NGOs, U. N. Agencies, and other donor organizations with commonality of purpose, language and philosophy. This no longer exists and worse, the trust is lacking as many state they have already witnessed the death knoll of USAID. This confusion, notably made independently to several in this Study Group, is whether the DoD really wants out of the business of HA and shift the monies and power to USAID and State. Is this a myth? Therefore, many in the humanitarian community are treading water and waiting for a substantive Administration and encompassing strategic plan. All of this must be seen within the realization that the humanitarian community for the most part does recognize the need for a strong and collaborative relationship with military assets, especially in unconventional and asymmetrical conflicts but not just those of the U.S. military. USAID has an opportunity to play this role but much will need to change for USAID to acquire the authority and expertise to be in a position of trust during and after conflicts.

DoD and the COCOMs do not seem to have recognized that USAID, through its representatives in Paris, Brussels, Geneva, Rome, Tokyo, and China should be the channel and conduit for the COCOMs to link to and build relationships with both the donors and the international NGO community. COCOMs’ efforts to build direct relationships with donors and the international NGOs without the assistance of USAID representatives and USAID as an institution will likely make little progress because of skepticism about DoD’s objectives and intentions and fears about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. There remains a crucial opportunity for USAID to facilitate these relationships, and to include others such as U.N. OCHA, in New York and Geneva, as well as U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice. Clearly, USAID must overcome significant skepticism in the international community. However, the 2007-issued U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP)-OSD-InterAction civil-military guidelines may help to guide this process.  

Part V: USAID’s Corporate Decisions on its Relationship with DoD

USAID does not have clear objectives for what it wants to get out of its potential relationship with the military. The regional bureaus feel very differently about this than the rest of the agency. USAID must come to terms with this issue internally to get a broad internal agreement on what these objectives should be or whether there should be a relationship at all. Does USAID want to influence DoD’s humanitarian activities? Or do they just want awareness of the activities, to de-conflict with the activities of their implementing partners (i.e., ensure that DoD doesn’t drill wells in a village where USAID is installing a separate piped water system?) Do they want to convince DoD NOT to do certain activities? Do they want DoD to limit itself to direct security activities, or focus on building capacity for disaster response? Unless USAID broadly creates an internal consensus for what its objectives are, then USAID will have no influence on what DoD does or have a legitimate complaint when DoD does the wrong thing!

USAID senior leadership should clearly define USAID goals and objectives and focus on long-term USAID goals and foreign policy objectives when considering potential short-term solutions. The Group strongly recommends that USAID consider a total system make-over to establish clear USAID dominance in any structure that emerges once function is clearly delineated. This work requires command-level instructions for expanded USAID/DoD collaboration from the Secretary-Administrator level at DoD, State, and USAID down through regional assistant secretaries and administrators, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Ambassadors. It is crucial that this collaboration has the highest priority for all three agencies.

It would be helpful to look to the United Kingdom and other partners for the lessons they have learned regarding the relationships between their development agencies and their militaries, which for the most part remain within the lanes of security, logistics, communications, and transportation.

Part VI: USAID Rationale for a Closer DoD Relationship

USAID Objectives

Generally, USAID’s objective in forming civilian-military relationships with DoD should:

- help achieve USAID’s foreign policy and development objectives as part of overall USG foreign policy and national security goals.
- link to DoD’s resources, field assets, and capabilities to be more effective in conflict and crisis situations, post-conflict efforts, reconstruction and stabilization, long-term efforts in strengthening weak and fragile states, and in conflict-crisis prevention.

On a pragmatic level, the USAID-DoD relationship should reduce duplication and improve DoD awareness of all USAID functions and responsibilities, as well as those of the international community and its response mechanisms, so that DoD realizes it is not the “only game in town.” On the other side of the coin, the relationship should also help improve USAID awareness of potential DoD activities.

Certainly, a closer relationship should help advance the security-development nexus. At a minimum, there will be circumstances where USAID and DoD must work together in theatre, regardless of whether there is a
policy or systems in place for doing so. Clarifying roles, responsibilities and comparative advantages should allow USAID to exploit complementarities. There are programs or situations where USAID can benefit from DoD, such as resources, assets, assistance, and there are programs or situations where DoD can benefit from USAID assistance. The real challenge is finding activities that both agencies can do that adhere to each entity’s primary mandate and has some mutuality of benefit for each organization.

If leveraged properly, the USAID-DoD relationship could help to discourage DoD from doing certain activities, and lead to more effective crisis prevention and response. DoD’s primary engagement in country should be mil-to-mil. There is work to be done by DoD with host country militaries that is critical or complementary to and/or supportive of diplomatic and development efforts. Therefore, the relationship could be used to encourage DoD to focus on:

- DoD’s role through COMOs to establish security and stable environments, as well as regional peace-keeping capabilities, critical for the work of USAID and State. This is the security-development nexus.
- Clarity among DoD, USAID, and State over what comparative advantages in resources, field assets, and capabilities each bring toward specialization and exploiting complementarities.
- Identification of key areas for collaboration with short-term benefits for U.S. foreign policy objectives.
- Recommendations and lessons learned on moving toward a “whole of government” approach in key national security and foreign policy areas.
- Advances in conceptual and organizational approaches toward more effective conflict-crisis prevention at both the USG interagency and multinational levels.

DoD spends a significant amount of money in a large number of Title 10 programs that do not come under Foreign Assistance, but nonetheless have a direct impact on both development and diplomacy. One hundred percent of the OHDACA account, for instance, is spent on activities intended to benefit civilian populations. These program activities closely resemble traditional development programs of USAID but now include the DoD-specific objective of “gaining access to strategically important areas and influencing strategically important populations.” Up to 68% of the OHDACA account is spent on the civilian health sector, if you count water and sanitation projects and disaster training (such as avian influenza preparation). In addition, DoD spends at least $300 million annually on health programs that impact civilian populations in areas such as the Global Emerging Infectious Disease and Surveillance program, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Biological Threat Reduction program, and a variety of regional research laboratories (Naval Medical Research Units, Naval Environmental and Preventive Medicine Units, U.S. Army Medical Research Unit for Infectious Diseases, etc). USAID Global Health Bureau should have at least situational awareness of these and other similar programs, and might consider whether it needs to influence their deliverables in a positive manner.

**Costs to USAID to accomplish these tasks**

- Requires large increase in USAID personnel and buy-in from Congress.
- May alienate NGO implementing partners.
- Requires new business model for USAID.
- Requires “deep smarts” in USAID.

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Benefits to USAID to accomplish these tasks

- Strengthens USAID’s role as development leader and clarifies objectives.
- Creates more stable environments for USAID to operate.
- Improves civilian oversight of military activities.
- Allows access to DoD resources/assets/assistance.

Benefits to DoD if tasks are accomplished

There is no one major objective of the military unless it is to successfully do what they’re told. Most military officers will simply say they do what they’re told to do, and if it’s humanitarian assistance, they do it. One thing civilians tend to forget is that our military are also human beings who share our common values. Our values are to save lives of distressed populations, and our military wants to contribute to that. We tend to stereotype the military as “beady-eyed killers,” and some will actually say that is what they’re trained to be. But the military is a profession like lawyers, doctors, farmers and business executives, who all have values along with their professions. USAID personnel all share common objectives of carrying out operations as successfully as possible. One major objective of the military in forming civilian-military relationships is to transfer the authority of whatever they're doing that is normally a civilian operation back to civilians. USAID has generally worked with the military because of the non- or semi-permissive security environment that exists in doing work that USAID is mandated to do, and we depend on the military for security. In the same context, the humanitarian community is better trained and experienced than ever before. The numbers of “humanitarian professionals” has doubled to more than 100,000 in the last decade. As a group, they are most skeptical of a military HA/DR effort that uses achievement rather than outcome indicators, which leads to more distrust of what the military claims they accomplish.

It might benefit DoD to use USAID as an interface to NGOs and to international stakeholders in Tokyo, Geneva, and Brussels, for example. This would require the clear desire of USAID leadership and personnel to facilitate that role, but would need a significant increase in resources to do it effectively.

The military’s objectives vary from mission to mission and from program to program. But mainly, the military does “humanitarian” work, which is called civilian-military operations to achieve their mission objectives, which is security and other objectives. Gaining the cooperation of the civilian population is part of the strategy because the military cannot just impose security on an unwilling population so they do the so-called “winning hearts and minds” activities. Without coordination with the development experts from USAID, World Bank, European Community Humanitarian Organization and others these may amount to “random acts of kindness” rather than activities that fit into the overall strategic development plan for a region.

The DoD-OHDACA program offers a glimpse into the military’s motivations for these activities. There are four objectives for OHDACA: improve DoD access to strategically important areas; influence strategically important populations, especially those vulnerable to extremist influence; support USG efforts to build the capacity of partner nations to deliver essential services to civilian populations and better prepare for disasters; and have a demonstrable positive impact on the civilian population.

Military motivations for coordinating with USAID are to tap into the development expertise, monitoring and evaluation expertise, local knowledge and experience, and the long-term focus of the development community (which includes USAID and its implementing partners such as NGOs) to better achieve the military’s objectives. DoD recognizes that its viewpoint is very short-term, and wishes to improve continuity and sustainability of their activities.
It is important to understand that DoD and USAID use the term “humanitarian assistance” differently. DoD understands it to broadly mean any activity that is beneficial to the civilian population, such as disaster response, peacetime day-to-day activities, ship visits and exercise. If USAID defines humanitarian assistance as just the emergency phase of disaster response, then their objectives are those stated by OFDA: save lives, alleviate suffering and mitigate economic losses due to emergencies. USAID objectives in development focus around poverty reduction. Clearly, one single event works to reverse both of these objectives: conflict. Surely the best way to reduce the effect of conflict on development is to prevent conflict from happening in the first place through a coordinated diplomacy-development effort backed up by defense. This is the ultimate objective of a USAID-led whole-of-government approach to conflict prevention and mitigation, but unfortunately it’s not being done as effectively as it might be.

Part VII: Education and Training

Two key questions must be answered:

- How can USAID educate, effectively and efficiently, the key components of DoD (COCOMs and DoD field staff plus key contacts in OSD and the Joint Staff) regarding the importance of USAID resources, field assets, and capabilities for DoD objectives? And, in doing so, how can USAID demonstrate what USAID brings to the table for reconstruction and stabilization, natural disasters and complex emergencies, conflict-crisis situations, conflict-prone environments, and strengthening weak and fragile states?

- Conversely, how can USAID get DoD to provide or deliver effective information and education, such as DoD 101 multi-day courses, not just slide sets, to USAID staff in Washington and the field on what DoD brings to the table in terms of resources, field presence and capabilities that complement USAID objectives and programs?

The first step in developing new or revising existing training curricula is to outline the specific skill sets required of both USAID and DoD personnel. DoD maintains Mission Essential Task Lists at multiple levels – joint, service, and COCOM – that served as the model for the S/CRS essential tasks list. USAID should influence these task lists and consider building its own. Once the skill sets are finalized, training should be REQUIRED for select USAID and DoD personnel.

New skill sets should be included in USAID’s task list: Islamic extremism, and skills for stability operations (agriculture, engineers, economists, governance, city managers, etc).

DoD’s task list should include knowledge of development, USAID functions, and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) cluster response system. U.S. Joint Forces Command could be extremely helpful in this process because they oversee DoD joint training, and they have assisted S/CRS to develop its task list.

Multiple consultants have mentioned the pressing need for USAID and DoD “101” courses to educate staff. They say it is probably better to name it: “Introduction of USAID (or DoD) to Interagency Staff.” For USAID, only a 2-day Joint Humanitarian Operations Course exists that is delivered by OFDA to every COCOM yearly but this introduces DoD staff to only 2% of what USAID actually does. A detailed outline (entitled “USAID 101 course”) for a multi-day USAID Introductory Course, complete with readings, lesson modules, and exercises, for DoD staff was developed by USAID’s principal training contractor in December 2007.\(^\text{16}\) This is a 23-page detailed outline for a course design and pilot that could then be delivered to

\(^{16}\) International Resources Group: USAID 101 Detailed Outline, Final Draft 12-31-07
hundreds of COCOM staff and in-country teams around the world as well as other DoD audiences both in
traditional classroom settings and in electronic, interactive formats. But there has been no success in having
the design mandated by USAID/HR.

As new personnel are hired for USAID, the proposed “Introduction of USAID (or DoD) to Interagency
Staff” course could be a particularly important training venue offered at the outset of most every USAID
officer’s career, and more robust training and education. An ‘advanced’ course could be added for personnel
in specific locations where USAID would interface significantly with DoD. The new “Focus Countries”
might be a place for USAID personnel to identify in what skill sets they need training in especially as they
discover what gaps they have in their own training when they try to work together with DoD. Some of those
gaps might be filled by existing training courses, especially DoD training courses, which understandably might
need some curriculum adjustment to be more relevant to USAID attendees (i.e., remove acronyms!).

Some gaps can only be filled by new training courses. An effort should be made to offer “combined” training
courses so that USAID and DoD train together, increase their familiarity from the start, and learn from one
another. This should target specific DoD personnel with a high likelihood of interacting with USAID: Civil
Affairs, security sector reform, and Humanitarian Assistance Program Managers, to name a few.

USAID should carefully consider which specific DoD events, conferences and exercises to attend, since the
sheer number of these can be overwhelming. U.S. JFCOM publishes a catalog that lists major joint exercises
of potential interest to civilian agencies. There is a risk that if USAID’s OMA is relied upon to be the sole
interface at these events that DoD experience will reside only in OMA. Familiarity should be more
generalized. This is especially true since some OMA personnel are former military officers. USAID needs
development officers to interface directly with DoD, if the intent is to influence DoD with development
expertise.

For USAID to take full advantage of training opportunities, the agency needs additional resources, both
personnel and money, to participate without letting the day-to-day office tasks suffer. USAID must strive to
build and maintain a personnel buffer to allow 10% of its personnel to be at education and training venues or
exercises at any particular time.

**Part VIII: A USAID-DoD Learning Center**

USAID should establish a Learning Center that uses sound monitoring and evaluation and AAR practices.
USAID will need the authority to collect AARs and monitoring and evaluation data from all components of
the Agency, DCHA, regional and pillar bureaus and regional and bilateral missions. This would include
results of assistance in crisis response, conflict management and mitigation, post-conflict reconstruction and
stabilization, and conflict prevention.

The Center would need to establish methodologies, statements of work, electronic and other methods to
share experiences, AARs, evaluations and lessons learned from current operations in the full range of
conflict-prone environments and not just the four CPCs of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan. There are
at least 35 countries that can be considered conflict-prone environments where much of USAID’s assistance
contributes to conflict and crisis prevention as well as response in the medium and long term and not just in
the short term.

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The central issue is the need to rebuild USAID’s monitoring and evaluation system, including impact evaluations. The system is broken. As USAID rebuilds its monitoring and evaluation system, it needs comparable AAR and monitoring and evaluation attention so that USAID’s role in crisis response is mined for lessons learned and best practices. Evaluations that are already completed, such as OTI’s, and available on their website, must be included.

Inconsistencies in monitoring and evaluations within USAID must be overcome. Currently, it is unclear what types of evaluations or AARs are being completed by other offices in DCHA (i.e., OFDA, FFP, CMM, DG, OMA). Similarly, how do the regional and pillar bureaus evaluate their role in crisis response, if at all? Several technical offices like EGAT have carried out recent studies indicating how to program for economic growth, education, health, or rule of law in post-conflict situations. But where are the analyses and evaluations of past programs on which their prescriptive documents are based?

As a medium-term goal, USAID, DoD and select offices of the State Department Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration, and S/CRS must develop a common monitoring and evaluation system. This is a priority before reasonable collaboration can be realized. Currently, the Secretary of Defense’s Partnership Strategy office is working with RAND to develop a monitoring and evaluation framework for the OHDACA program, modeled on USAID’s monitoring and evaluation techniques. USAID personnel have already been extremely helpful with this process, and the intent is for that framework to also be used in other DoD programs, including the Focus Countries mentioned earlier, training activities, like Medical Civic Aid Projects, and even the hospital ship missions. This is an opportunity for USAID to access DoD’s project-specific information at the country team level to influence the planning and implementation of activities as well as which types of activities are implemented and which are not, and even for USAID personnel to evaluate the outcomes and impacts of some of DoD’s programs.

RAND has a draft monitoring and evaluation handbook for DoD that is entering pilot testing. USAID personnel are currently reviewing this document. However, as long as DoD measures only “process and achievement,” not “outcome” indicators, there can never be true accountability or measures of effectiveness; coordination, cooperation, and collaboration will continue to be elusive. A well-known controversy within the humanitarian community is how USAID steadfastly expects ‘outcome’ accountability from their grantees in the humanitarian community, but does not expect the same from DoD. Although this is the basis of the monitoring and evaluation work that RAND and others are doing, it is interesting that the COCOMS are strongly resisting this process.

Similarly, USAID should clarify who it is talking to within DoD. Is it DoD/Washington versus the autonomous and competitive COCOMS? Concerning the OHDACA program, the COCOMS are competitive with each other. They measure their effectiveness by achievement indicators only. They do not share budgets or field approaches and seem accountable to no one.

The Learning Center should examine the issue of transferring and sharing technology. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency develops technology solutions for DoD programs; a similar application for USAID certainly needs more study. U.S. Joint Forces Command J-9 uses online collaborative tools like the InfoWorkSystem in both classified and unclassified versions. Whereas the COCOMs use this system often, USAID prefers Groove, a different software program that serves the same collaborative purpose — to help teams in different location and organizations to work together electronically.

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18 See the recent report by Cindy Clapp-Wincek (former USAID) and Richard Blue and Holly Benner on current M&E practices in USG foreign assistance agencies.
Shared technology need not be overly complex. To oversee the OHDACA program, DoD uses an unclassified web-based database called OHASIS. The system contains more than 5,000 current and past DoD humanitarian assistance projects globally. Since the Secretary of Defense requires that COCOM Humanitarian Assistance program managers coordinate all projects with USAID at the country team level in a Partnership Strategies annual guidance message, USAID personnel on the country teams might have some awareness of this program. Since OHASIS is on the unclassified internet, USAID personnel at any location should be able to apply for a password and access that system. DoD plans to revise this system to include monitoring and evaluation data. This is an opportunity to formalize the USAID-DoD coordination on DoD HA projects, to de-conflict the location of schools, wells, clinics, etc, and possibly influence DoD regarding which activities it should or should not attempt. This is the database that DoD opened to Harvard researchers so they could analyze DoD’s project activity; the first of three articles by Harvard are in final draft now, and should be published early this fall.

The Learning Center could leverage a global DoD effort to build a capability for U.S. EUCOM to have a complete operating picture of all foreign assistance and technical cooperation going on in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility – mainly Europe and Eurasia with some additions. The main issue in this effort is what incentives do other USG agencies, international donors and NGOs have to provide data and information on strategies and programs. The assumption is that once USAID receives the data in the system the broader question becomes whether they will have a role in the design of the system so that it meets their needs and not just DoD’s needs. In any case, such massive info technology-collaboration software efforts are only a tool in what must result in a strategy for interagency collaboration at the COCOM and other levels, both in Washington and at the country team level.

Part IX. Personnel Issues

The main options for USAID’s engagement in civilian-military “collaboration” lie in the degree to which USAID decides to seize the opportunity to build a more collaborative relationship with DoD while securing a leadership role in development. This would be done while raising and joining issues with DoD over the concept of “robust engagement.” However, robust engagement with DoD will work only if USAID provides staff of the appropriate numbers and rank to engage vigorously with DoD in Washington, in the COCOMs, and in the field. USAID needs to start with a clear view of Agency objectives and development of a clear and focused strategy for building a relationship with DoD. Success in this effort, already being led by DCHA/OMA, requires rebuilding of USAID’s human capital, basic systems, including budget, policy, strategic planning, technology, monitoring and evaluation, presence and influence in the USG interagency, and leadership in the international donor-development community.

In critical missions, USAID must ensure adequate staffing that are paired with the right DoD staffing. The agency should staff Country Teams adequately, especially with the DoD staff required for development of day-to-day relationships with USAID Mission staff. Under current roles and responsibilities, and even as DoD changes to the configuration of a Senior Defense Official (SDO), a solid working relationship with USAID requires an ODC/SAO office in order to ensure sustained cooperation and/or collaboration in the field.

The Defense Science Board is currently undergoing a study, still in draft, that indicates DoD’s organization and personnel assigned to today’s challenges need changing. They are struggling with how many of DoD’s

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20 The Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System, www.ohasis.org
General Purpose Forces need to be re-trained to support Special Operations Forces work, which is the bulk of current operations. DoD has constantly struggled with how many Civil Affairs and Foreign Operations Officers they need, usually concluding they need more, but seldom move that debate to action. Although they have recently added a new active Civil Affairs unit, clearly this falls short of requirements. What the military desires appears to have USAID and other civilian agencies provide personnel with the civilian skills needed in stability operations, e.g., engineers, agriculture experts, economists, governance managers, city managers, etc. However, additional training and education is definitely in order to perform today’s operations more effectively. One specific area that has not gained the attention needed is providing training on Islamic violent extremism, to include how to intellectually review differences within Islam with authorities and populations in Islamic countries. One consultant reminded the Group that all Muslims are a product of the soil where they grew up (e.g., Bosnian soil is different from Saudi soil).

USAID must adjust the personnel system to create incentives for retired DoD personnel to work in USAID, and for retired USAID personnel to work inside DoD. At the moment, most retired DoD personnel take jobs as DoD contractors, which risks causing institutional inbreeding. What is needed is “cross-breeding” with State and USAID with incentives for retired USAID personnel to seek work with DoD as contractors or General Schedule civilians, a relatively low cost method for USAID to attract experienced personnel from other agencies, not just DoD. Changes and modifications in the career and promotion incentives in the USAID system, for both FS and GS employees, are one of the most important changes needed and must become evident to junior, mid-level, and senior officers and staff at USAID. Expanding interagency details through incentives and required interagency assignments for promotions and other career advancement would be critical to any success. Additionally, the National Security Professional Corps, with its own career track, could help build expertise for overall USG interagency collaboration.

USAID must further emphasize exchange of liaison officers, and maximize use of development advisors at the COCOM and Joint Staff. But changes in the personnel system are required to encourage these officers to return to USAID and share their experiences and lessons learned with the rest of the agency, otherwise this experience will be lost especially if they retire shortly after such an assignment.

**Part X - Preparations for the new USAID Administrator regarding the USAID/DoD Relationship**

Ideally, USAID should have a strong, clear, long-term commitment of five to ten years from the Obama Administration to rebuild USAID’s human capital and basic operational systems of policy, budget, strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation. However, there is substantial risk in not moving forward while waiting for this commitment or for new USAID leadership to be appointed. A listing of potential work that USAID can begin prior to the appointment of a new administrator is:

- Outline the future role of USAID for approval by the new administrator.
  - Develop a firm strategic plan.
Define whether USAID supports instrumental assistance, foreign policy objective or fundamental assistance, poverty reduction based on needs, without secondary objective or both? Do you keep these activities distinct? If so, how?

Is the goal visibility? De-confliction? Coordination? Collaboration and integrated planning? Is the goal different at different levels within USAID?

Survey USAID GS and FSOs at all levels to clarify these above questions.

Sit down with directors of each USAID level to determine goals, objectives, feasibility and resource requirements for OMA’s Civilian Military Cooperation Policy, point-by-point.

Commission a study on the critical linkages between security and development.

Use the study to develop guidelines and toolkits for USAID and DoD that both instruct and reveal agency ‘best practices’ as well as show evidence of how one agency’s activities may impact positively and negatively the other’s missions and objectives.

Encourage USAID to use its influence as the House re-writes the Foreign Assistance Act.

Develop a clear legislative agenda for the rebuilding of USAID.

Identify systems and processes of USAID and DoD that are compatible and incompatible. The focus country exercise by OMA is currently engaged with some of this.

Identify areas of engagement where communication, at a minimum, and coordination or collaboration is essential. Civil Affairs activities could be one area of improvement. When DoD undertakes development activities it can negatively or positively affect the mission’s strategic plans.

Discover what the perception is of USAID in the operational area, and what aspects affect our implementing partners and what may lead to diverting our resources.

When thinking through the cause-effect relationships on downstream activities, it is crucial to advise on what sections require immediate reform.

Once identified, develop and institutionalize methods and systems for communication and coordination and collaboration. East Africa provides a reasonable model.

Start the preliminary work on national development strategy. Develop a fall-back position that addresses attention to transitions in the existing national security strategy.

Concerning Secretary Gate’s comments on optimizing civilian capacity (i.e., Landon Lecture) the incoming USAID Administrator will need to approach the Hill and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) jointly with DoD when trying to increase civilian capacity.

Leverage think tanks, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Smart Power and Smart Global Health Power.

Fix the abundant internal USAID problems with strategic planning and budgeting and monitoring and evaluation regardless of new leadership or a long-term commitment from the administration.

(Note: there are systemic problems with strategic planning and budgeting at USAID that need to be corrected. Country development strategies are a thing of the past. USAID no longer prepares rigorous social soundness or other analyses prior to project approval. The checks-and-balance systems for planning and project documents has been weakened, and USAID replaced monitoring and evaluations to improve project performance with M&E to account for the use of funds. As a result, lessons learned are not feeding back into the agency. Some of these problems affect USAID’s ability to work effectively on planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring and evaluation with another agency or consistently across USAID itself.)

See the discussion on fundamental versus instrumental assistance in permissive and non-permissive environments in Dr. Reuben Brigety’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: On the Military’s Role in Development Assistance, submitted for the Record, July 29, 2008.
Work should start immediately on the ultimate goal of re-balancing USAID’s portion of foreign assistance relative to that of DoD’s. Since DoD spends about 20% of the U.S. Foreign Assistance budget, about $6 billion, State and USAID directly influence how this money is spent. USAID must be at the forefront of that effort. DoD’s Partnership Strategy office concluded the 1207/1210 legislation that allows DoD to spend up to $250 million per year to fund the activities of other government agencies to perform “stability operations” activities. The State Department controls the proposal submission process. So far, it has spent most of this money. USAID should look at this authority to see if it can use this appropriation to bolster its own activities that involve a DoD interface.

Many have said that the structure of Congressional Committees also needs reforming. Advocates for this should be sought within Congress. Members and staff, both committee and personal staff, of the following committees are key to building support for necessary changes in this area:

- House Foreign Affairs Committee, SFRC and staff.
- Congressional Research analysts working on these issues and preparing issue briefs for the Congress.
- House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
- House and Senate State/Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittees and Defense Subcommittees.
- House and Senate Government Operations Committees.
- Key Directors and Deputies of the NSC/NEC and key Policy Coordination Committees of the NSC/NEC.
- Secretary of State and her Deputies, Undersecretaries, and Assistance Secretaries combined with Ambassadors in the field.

Other than Secretary Clinton, the key member of the Executive Branch is the head of the NSC, Retired General Jones. Michelle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, wrote the Post-Goldwater-Nichols study that strongly recommended a much stronger NSC. With Secretary Clinton’s support, NSC Director Jones will make that happen. He will, perhaps, be the most influential person in the new administration with respect to interagency coordination on crisis response and management. Furthermore, a new IPC for Global Health has just been created at the NSC. This is a logical place for USAID to have a strong voice, not just through the Bureau of Global Health, but also for OMA, Conflict Mitigation and Management, and the Office of Transition Initiatives.

Additional advocacy can be brought to bear from outside the government, through efforts such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ new Global Health Policy Center. They advocate for a coherent U.S. government policy on global health, and in that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also created the “Smart Power” concept. They are natural allies.

Many lessons can and should be learned from what went right and what went wrong with Foreign Assistance reform under the F process.

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24 See http://www.csis.org/globalhealth/
Part XI. Current USAID Capacity

With all the current challenges USAID faces, such as staffing the CPCs, managing more than 75 country assistance programs, moving forward with country strategic plans, the question remains whether USAID has the capability to embark on a major initiative, such as building an expanded partnership with DoD in Washington, in the DoD COMS, and in the field. Arguably, USAID lacks authority and trust, so a top priority and a long-term goal of the agency must be to regain that trust and authority, both with the Congress and with the White House. Today’s USAID is subservient to DoD, so the agency must assert its dominant role in development. A jump start to this process would be for USAID to increase its use of DoD’s 1207 funds. USAID must also staff its country teams adequately, starting with priority-focus countries.

Disparities at the Combatant Commands are decreasing as DoD adds liaison officers and senior development advisors to the COMS staffs. And in Washington, the new Civil-Military sub-IPC has the potential to further reduce disparities. However, disparities at the country-team level are as severe as ever. The DoD-USAID relationship is the most personality-dependent at this level with many success stories and as many failures or lost opportunities. As both agencies spend more time improving the interface in D.C. and at the COMS, there is some risk that policies developed at these levels will not change behavior on the ground unless the relationship is codified, procedures streamlined, and training improved, for those personnel at the country-team level.

As USAID rebuilds its FS, GS, and FSN staffs, their ability to meet its responsibilities will increase, both in conflict situations like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in other areas where the focus is on prevention. However, even with a 10- to 15-year commitment to rebuild USG civilian capabilities in foreign affairs (and no commitments yet exist), it is going to take much longer than either the Executive Branch or the Congress will want to hear.

The large human capital gap that no one has really focused on is “deep smarts.” This means the know-how, know-who, and tacit knowledge and experience to make things happen and get things done in an organization like USAID. Without most of the personnel with 15 to 20 years of experience being available to mentor and coach new employees, USAID performance of its hundreds of new staff will suffer greatly. Many talk of the need for mid-level hiring, but this goes only part way in resolving this situation. Another avenue that has received little attention is the development of innovative coaching and mentoring of new employees. Most of this is currently virtual and/or through periodic face-to-face contacts and field visits. This process must be accelerated to be ready to take on greater responsibilities and have a fighting chance to succeed without “crashing and burning.”

Part XII. Linkages

USAID and DoD must act now to identify their individual comparative advantages and then the complementarities that the strategies and programs of each should exploit to achieve each agency’s own objectives. USAID should maintain a focus on host nation partners throughout this process.

Recognizing and understanding the critical importance of, and planning activities based on the linkages between what DoD does and what USAID does is at the core of civilian-military cooperation and collaboration. Both DoD and USAID will do a better job if the plan according to the areas of intersection, overlap and interdependence between the role of security actors and civilian governments and civil society is collectively understood and articulated. More often than not, these linkages go unexplored or unattended.

25 HBR article, September 2004.
Similarly, this has been the case in peace accords, where USAID rarely reviews and comments on the security protocols or is asked to opine on the cause-effect relationship of security institution building and civilian processes called for in the accord.

There are a number of linkages between work with security actors and work with civilians that are both necessary and obvious:

- **Rule of Law**: Linkages between arrest and detention, and administration of justice, including access to justice; equitable, efficient, and fair treatment including absorptive capacity of justice sector to handle cases; defense, prosecution and adjudication of cases.26

- **Military Reform**: Linkages between policies, processes and programs to restructure host country militaries and civilianization of former combatants unwilling or unable to be part of a restructured force. For example, the Government of Sierra Leone decision to allow only combatants currently cantoned to apply for the new military resulted in no one leaving the demobilization centers, which created an unmanageable pipeline in the DDR program and violence in the camps because of continued boredom and frustration.

- **DDR**: the military disarms barracks/cantons, and provides security for and/or integrates combatants into legitimate security forces. USAID integrates former combatants unable or unwilling to enter security sector into civilian life.27

- **Peace Agreements**: the interdependence between security protocols and economic and political protocols cannot be overstated. Timing and sequencing of the establishment of management, oversight and verification commissions can delay or affect civilian processes such as voter registration, demobilization, and physical access to different geographic areas.

- **Civil Affairs Activities**: DoD is mandated and funded to carry out humanitarian assistance activities that are not humanitarian assistance as USAID knows it, but are development activities. The DoD-executed activities are usually small scale, one-off, local efforts as compared to larger USAID programs. They are not necessarily planned with an eye toward sustainability, or for the purpose of development in and of itself. USAID can get stuck with having to maintain them or providing complementary services. For instance, in the case of schools, DoD does not traditionally work with the Ministry of Education to ensure teachers and textbooks are available and recurrent costs paid. These to date are not part of our strategic planning or budgets. It is not uncommon for local communities benefiting from Civil Affairs projects to turn to USAID implementers for downstream problems or needs associated with those projects, all of which put USAID in a difficult position.

- **Conflict Mitigation and Management**: The role of host country militaries in exacerbating or preventing conflict is not analyzed or assessed in USAID's conflict assessments. The USAID Conflict Assessment Framework looks at means, motives and opportunities of state and civil society actors, not the security sector, in fomenting conflict. It is understood that many governmental actors will fill in when and where DoD lacks the necessary contacts with host country militaries. With a more holistic picture of who is doing what on the ground, a better job can be done in designing programs to address root causes and consequences of conflict.

- **Counter-terrorism**: Among other related issues, the military works on training host country militaries to address terrorists and the strategic communications side of counterterrorism activities. However, USAID seeks to deny sanctuary and recruits for terrorist organizations through the extension of government services, provision of basic services and provision of employment opportunities and alternatives to violence to address grievances.

26 Recommend exploring this issue with Julie Werbel in DCHA/DG.

27 For instance, in Iraq, Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) did the information gathering/analysis for absorptive capacity of the Government of Iraq to train and integrate ex-combatants; USAID consultants worked with MNF-I to develop recommendations for Ambassador and CG for a DDR program.
It would be worthwhile throughout this process to identify key areas of collaboration that have short-term foreign policy benefits. However, it is also important to focus attention on transitions, not just complementarities.

**Part XIII. Effective Models for Joint Planning, Program Design, Implementation, and Evaluation**

One of the first functional and effective interagency and civilian-military cooperative mechanisms was the COCOMs’ Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, put in place shortly after 9/11 for counterterrorism information sharing and coordination. They vary quite a bit from region to region, and some do expand beyond the original counterterrorism mandate. U.S. Joint Forces Command created the prototype with assistance from retired USAID Foreign Service Officers.

Both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have new interagency organizational structures that involve USAID’s Senior Development Advisors (SDAs). It would be worthwhile to prospectively track what works and what doesn’t work in those structures and relationships. EUCOM’s SDA created guidelines and principles for SDAs assigned to COCOMs. As USAID develops broader experience through our USAID SDAs in all the COCOMs and other USAID staff in AFRICOM and through other linkages, USAID needs to identify and apply lessons learned, implications, and best practices.

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and InterAction negotiated civil-military guidelines for non-permissive environments, which was mediated by the USIP. This work could be expanded to include situations where USAID-DoD interaction is likely, including development in permissive environments and natural disaster response.

The U.N. OCHA maintains an online archive of all previous disaster responses, accessible on their password-protected site that could serve as a model for analysis and dissemination of lessons for USAID-DoD disaster responses. OCHA also maintains training databases on that site, as well as a current list of international disaster response personnel. The U.N.’s InterAgency Standing Committee evaluates responses and posts those evaluations on their website and on OCHA’s website.

USAID should examine the potential for various technology solutions to information sharing. Collaborative software such as InfoWorkStation, used by JFCOM, or Groove, used by NGOs, could also be used with DoD to coordinate responses. USAID should consider leveraging the Complete Operating Picture technology being developed for foreign assistance.

In the United Kingdom, the Department for International Development is a cabinet-level agency with a very strong minister at its head. The U.K. also has a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit. Both are worth examining for stabilization and reconstruction models and lessons learned.

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30 The Virtual On-Scene Operations Coordination Center http://ocha.unog.ch/virtualosocc/5z0cbc2kbbhmhx55q1slid545/VOLogin.aspx
JFCOM’s Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) prospectively collects lessons and observations through interviews while an operation is on-going and then passes the results to an analyst team who develops solutions. The weakness of the JCOA approach is that the analysis takes a long time, sometimes two years or more, and their solutions tend to get diluted by the COCOMs, who get to vet the analysis and the proposed solutions before they are published. Their reports also are generally classified so they are both difficult to access and share.

Another potential model is the military’s formal lessons learned systems. Each service has its own system. All are on the unclassified internet and are password protected. Personnel from the policy level to the field level access the sites frequently to guide their own work. However, since there are several such databases, there is much duplication of effort and little to no cross talk between them. There is also no formal mechanism to incorporate lessons into future doctrine or policy. Unfortunately, not much gets institutionalized. Lessons are “observed” more than they are “learned.” Although none of these systems is perfect, studying their advantages and disadvantages in some detail may yield important lessons for how USAID might create a better feedback loop, from response, to assessments, and back into planning for the next response.

There is much to be learned from the DoD-OFDA/DART/humanitarian relationship during the Kurdish refugee crisis of 1991-92, Operation Provide Comfort. DoD was impressed with the size of OFDA’s pocketbook to provide relief to the Kurds. Money talks and OFDA had a great team on the ground. Today’s challenges are hugely more complex, and the stakes are higher. One story illustrates this predicament. In an exchange at the Pentagon between USAID/ANE and the J-5 military personnel on Pakistan, a briefing by USAID focused on programs at the $150 million level. The DoD J-5 personnel quickly responded by asking how much more USAID needs. USAID personnel, incredulous with that question, basically stated that this funding was certainly enough. This response was based on USAID’s conventional thinking not to dare think big. Afterwards, the J-5 colleagues asked about how much money USAID spends in education and training. The USAID office of participant training has been decimated over the years because of funding limitations. If USAID were to “think big” on Pakistan, much more significant funding could realistically be put into education and training for the Pakistanis. As such, DoD would probably be open to accommodate significantly greater numbers of USAID officers assigned to work in their commands and units assigned abroad. The current JFCOM commander, Marine General Mattis, recently asked what would need to be done to replace all military in PRTs by civilians. If he asked that question to USAID, what would the response be? At this time it would be that USAID does not have sufficient staff and funding. Yet, it is interpreted by some to be a “defeatist” attitude by conventional USAID thinkers.

It would be worthwhile to examine lessons of DoD-USAID involvement in foreign policy in weak and fragile states in Latin and Central America in the 1970s-80s. USAID’s democracy and governance programming started then, as did the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, in El Salvador. USAID funded a civilian-military program in the 1980s to help foster civilian oversight of militaries.31

The Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) represents a further model worth examining regarding interagency cooperation in what is now AFRICOM territory for DoD.

The Combined Joint Task Force –Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is vetting all of its civil affairs projects with USAID. USAID must collect and disseminate the lessons learned from their methodology, to document what works and what doesn’t. Additional questions are: Did DoD change its selection of projects, or how they implemented each project, as a result of USAID coordination? If so, is that coordination value-added? What are the USAID missions’ objectives? Which objectives are being accomplished, which are not, and why or why not?

31 LAC-funded program by grantee American University in the 1990s in Guatemala. Johanna Mendelson and Lou Goodman were the principals. DCHA/DG Civil Society division should have an inventory of civilian-military activities.
The PRT models in Afghanistan and Iraq are somewhat different, and are certainly not without their critics. But DoD is incorporating the PRT concept into doctrine, so they are likely to be used for the foreseeable future. What portions of this model work, and what portions do not? What factors influence the use of PRTs and what factors influence their success or failure? Other than the obvious discrepancy of relative personnel strengths, are there any procedural lessons to be learned? What procedures need to be changed in order for USAID to use the PRTs more effectively? Are there legislative obstacles that need to be overcome?
## Appendix I. Summary of Obstacles and Solution Options for USAID-DoD Relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacles</th>
<th>Plan</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disconnect between policymakers (philosophy) and pragmatic approach of those in the field</strong></td>
<td>Issue command-level instructions for expanded USAID-DoD collaboration through Secretary/Administrator, COCOMs, and Ambassadors</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Lack of consensus among USAID’s components – OTI, CMM, technical bureaus, missions, etc.** | Greater leadership commitment to focus on multi-level USAID-DoD relationship  
Inventory opinions throughout USAID (and across GS and FSOs) on USAID-DoD relationship, identify gaps in knowledge or experience & address these in training |
| **Closer relationship with DoD threatens NGO implementing partners**      | Greater transparency of 1207 funds; greater use of 1207 to building USAID capacity  
Examine this issue in focus countries (do case studies)  
Use USAID internal inventory opinion to assuage NGO fears |
| **Mismatch with DoD regarding resources (people & money)**                | Increase USAID influence in DoD’s GEF, Theater Security Cooperation Plans, Quadrennial Defense Review  
Develop a National Development Strategy  
Develop interagency database and info management system  
Develop specific USAID training objectives to help select which DoD training events to participate in.  
Dare to think big regarding budgetary requirements.  
Don’t answer DoD requests with “we don’t have the staff/funding to do that” – think out of the box.  
Synchronize planning cycles |
| **Concentrating DoD interface in OMA risks overwhelming OMA and atrophy of skill set in other USAID sections** | Develop formal training, common USAID-DoD courses at multiple levels  
Increase % of USAID personnel available for training  
Effective use of liaison officers at multiple levels |
| **Global CERP authority risks role-confusion, even in areas where no troops are deployed.** | Clearly identify situation-specific roles & responsibilities  
Improve USAID influence on the Hill (Appropriations)  
Transparency, especially with implementing partners |
| **Militarization of foreign assistance**                                 | Reassert authority of State to define foreign policy (NSC)  
Create a new business model for crisis prevention  
Ratchet up USAID’s capacity for crisis response that doesn’t depend on S/CRS  
Encourage DoD to focus on mil-to-mil engagements |
<p>| <strong>Classification levels complicate communications</strong>                      | Unclassified interagency database/info management |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lack of focus on USAID “deep smarts”</th>
<th>Focus on recruitment of experienced personnel for senior and mid-level management, AND Focus on formal mentoring/coaching of new employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of State/NSC emphasis on <strong>contingency planning</strong></td>
<td>More proactive USAID leadership, especially from CMM and OTI Stronger USAID voice in S/CRS interagency planning courses, exercises and models More attention to new models, approaches, processes, structures for crisis response, prevention and mitigation, with focus on drivers of conflict More focus on drivers of violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DoD</strong> lacks institutional <strong>knowledge of development</strong>; USAID lacks institutional knowledge of <strong>DoD</strong></td>
<td>Develop common terminology Common training Focus on the institution, not the individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative constraints</strong> on USAID re: engagement with foreign militaries</td>
<td>Engage appropriate Hill staffers re: review &amp; revision</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix II. “Toward More Effective Crisis Prevention and Response”: USAID Report Excerpts


Initiatives Into the Future

Today’s ideological, political and economic struggles require a search for increased efficiencies, the application of our greatest ingenuities, and the most effective use of staff and financial resources to build global capacities to achieve stability and prosperity for at-risk population groups and governments. The long-term end state objectives are that at-risk nations build economic and governance capabilities to manage their own affairs without outside help. DoD’s National Defense Strategy, under it’s “Win the Long War” section, states, “…we cannot lose sight of the implications of fighting a long-term, episodic, multi-front, and multi-dimensional conflict more complex and diverse than the Cold War…” 32 It is mandatory that we seek more effective ways to achieve the desired end states.

Recommendations on increasing civilian capacities to perform the tasks that civilians, not the military, should be performing in crisis responses have come from a number of sources, particularly Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). It is in the interests of both USAID and DoD to pursue maximum capacity-building prospects for civilians to perform the roles within their mandates to overcome the civilian capacity shortfall. A good summary of these recommendations is the following:

“Violence prevention and peacebuilding are civilian tasks and should be undertaken primarily by local governments and populations, with the support of other civilian governments and nongovernmental organizations, and in coordination with international institutions. But underfunded, overstretched civilian agencies are often incapable of adequately responding to imminent crises. For the U.S., the absence of civilian alternatives often leaves the U.S. military, with its massive budgets and over 2 million employees, stepping in to fill the void. A U.S. civilian-led foreign policy is a constitutional prerogative and key to preventing violent conflict. Increased staff and resources for U.S. civilian agencies, enhanced development assistance, and more effective international and regional mechanisms for peacekeeping and peacebuilding are critical to ensure that the global community can effectively respond to crises and resolve them before they lead to mass atrocities or deadly conflict.” 33

A Congressionally-funded study, the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), aims its findings toward building civilian capacity through institutional changes in a similar manner:

“The concept of national security has broadened, but that is where agreement ends. … An emphasis on managing risks prompts recognition that now more than ever the national security system involves many players with diverse interests and perspectives. … Past presidents attempted to compensate for the imbalance between the national security system’s strong individual capabilities and weak integrating mechanisms through their personal leadership and interventions. … The systemic deficiencies in the national security system must be corrected.” 34

This literature points to significant upcoming changes in institutional structures and processes. Three former USAID Administrators conclude that USAID’s current institutional status has not worked and recommend the following:

“There are two proposed approaches to fixing the problem: integrating USAID even more completely into the State Department and granting it significantly more independence, either as its own cabinet-level department or as a strong autonomous agency whose head reports directly to the secretary of state. The first option would make things even worse than they now are. The right approach is to find some way of restoring USAID’s autonomy and vitality. The real question is whether USAID should be an independent agency reporting to the secretary of state or a new cabinet department.”

The initiatives listed below are challenges that face us as we move forward and should contribute to the considerations of institutional changes as they are formulated and implemented:

a. **Reconciling DoD Theater Security Cooperation Planning with State/USAID Country Assistance Strategy Planning.** Significant weaknesses in U.S. Government crisis planning are adequately documented. This is both in planning for major interventions and planning for contingencies. The RAND study on Iraq has been referenced above, and James Fallows’ articles, *Blind into Baghdad*, are examples of intervention planning weaknesses. Significant efforts to overcome the weaknesses have been triggered as a result, efforts which remain very incomplete. The importance of making institutional changes is reflected in the PNSR report:

“**Imperative #2:** The national security system requires effective long-range strategy formulation and strategic planning that articulates objectives, relates means and ends, and integrates all tools of national power. Translating and integrating these different aspects into a capacity for inclusive planning and strategy formulation requires coordinated appropriations and resource allocation mechanisms, effective management of regional areas of responsibility, and comprehensive oversight.”

Perhaps the highest priority among current efforts as we move into the future is to continue to improve our institutional mechanisms on crisis planning. The various efforts are listed below:

- **COCOMs** have traditionally conducted their planning in two inter-related processes: Theater Security Planning and Concept Plans (CONPLANS) for specific countries. USAID has traditionally developed Country Strategic Plans, which has evolved to today’s CASs. State has instituted a Mission Strategic Plan process. Much closer coordination among these various planning processes has begun. Reconciliation among these processes toward mutual development of Whole-of-Government plans is a step beyond current processes. The latest DoD Guidance for the Employment of Forces (GEF) includes an unprecedented (described as a “paradigm shift”) instruction to COCOMs to develop Campaign Construct Plans for Phase 0 for countries in their regions. The October USAID Administrator/DoD Secretary meeting established a Planning Working Group under the Civ-Mil Sub-Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) under the Development PCC to address the way forward on reconciling these planning processes.

- **S/CRS** has started to develop an interagency contingency planning process at the request of DoD/OSD. A list of countries to use to pilot an interagency contingency planning effort has been reviewed. DoD’s experiment to develop a DoD Strategic Guidance Statement toward the development of a CONPLAN for an African country with State and USAID participation was conducted in 2007-2008. It yielded promising results and can serve as a reference for this work. (This SGS was the basis for a DoD internal Multi-Service Force Deployment – MSFD – study with

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much more substantial results.) This effort is currently on hold, but will need to be resumed in some form in 2009.

- DoD has approved a Cooperative Security Joint Operating Concept (CSJOC) to serve as a conceptual guide to COCOMs to perform Phase 0 planning, now a key component of the GEF. JFCOM has begun a process to develop experimental efforts with COCOMs to implement this JOC, beginning with a planning session in November, 2008.

- S/CRS, with significant participation by USAID and DoD, is developing an interagency Planning Framework. This work is currently on hold but will resume in 2009. One drawback of the efforts to date is the difficulty in balancing the requirement for some form of equitable participation among all agencies in the documentation with the onerous crisis management requirements of USAID, DoD and State which have major/lead responsibilities and operational requirements during deployments. Another difficulty is the wide range of crisis responses that have been experienced and the need to maintain maximum flexibility for field managers to effectively address on-ground constraints and opportunities. Balancing institutional equities is not easy.

- S/CRS has also institutionalized the conflict assessment process developed by USAID’s CMM office as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) process — a part of the Planning Framework. USAID has developed a complementary Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) which DoD has included in its draft FM 3-24 on Counterinsurgency. The manner in which ICAF and TCAF will be integrated into crisis planning is being developed.

- The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command recently published its Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, which is intended to serve as “a cognitive process intended for use by commanders charged with designing, planning, and executing a campaign, and designed for use by any multinational, interagency, joint, or single service organization charged with solving a complex operational problem.”38 The annual U.S. Army annual war game, Unified Quest 2009 (UQ09), is under design to be held in May-June, 2009, and intends to accent the interagency context of today’s crises. Its Unity of Effort Seminar held in November, 2008, focused on how the ICAF and the Commander’s Appreciation processes will interact at the design stage. “As an experimental process, CACD is intended to shape future joint and Army doctrine.”39

b. A Frontlines Priority. The most important test as we move forward will be how USAID and DoD can partner effectively to address the Afghanistan/Pakistan challenges. The CENTCOM review of current operations, with State and USAID participation, will likely result in new priorities. A portrayal of the issues was reported by the Washington Post as:

“Early this month, U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson and Adm. Michael LeFever, the senior U.S. military officer in Pakistan, sent a joint cable to Washington criticizing the overall U.S. effort in Pakistan as disjointed and uncoordinated. It recommended a comprehensive new strategy that would better meld the same three counterinsurgency ‘legs’ — military, political and economic — that the United States has pushed the Pakistani government to adopt. The proposal, one U.S. official said, offered examples of current U.S. aid programs that have little relationship to political aims, and political objectives that dismiss military concerns.”40

The Iraq conflict seems to be winding down, so attention will shift to this theater. The Afghanistan/Pakistan insurgency is more complex at least in one sense — it involves two countries. Given the extent of popular support within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to the Taliban in their insurgency in Afghanistan, development of plans and strategies require the cooperation of both national governments. Building of host nation capacities to

overcome insurgencies is likely to require a significant level of resources in order to achieve host nation governments able to sustain their own stability.

c. **Diplomacy, Democracy and Governance (DG), and the USAID/DoD Partnership.** The partnership between USAID and DoD exists as a result of joint management of activities in crisis countries – humanitarian, reconstruction, governance/elections, PRTs, and more recently, beginning to plan for Phase 0 conflict prevention. Diplomatic activity is always a part of these efforts, but diplomacy is generally conducted separate from activity management. Two inter-related activities more central to Diplomacy will continue to grow and be integrated into field activities in the future as crisis-prevention planning comes to the fore:

- The NSPD 58 on Institutionalizing the Freedom Agenda was signed on July 17, 2008 with strong bipartisan support. The announcement of this policy document says:

> "The advancement of freedom is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability, reducing regional conflicts, countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism, and extending peace and prosperity."  

The increased realization that building effective host nation governments is critical to stabilization success will mean that greater efforts will be needed in the DG areas of activity. Crisis response planning will raise the priority attention on activities in this area.

- Strategic communications is recognized as both integral to all lines of activity and not effectively done as a Whole-Of-Government activity to date. It is too often limited in planning efforts as simply “messaging”, i.e., focusing on the messages the U.S. sends out through public announcements and to the media. It is also recognized, however, that a failure to connect and coordinate “messaging” with actual activities that are being conducted on-the-ground will limit the effectiveness of strategic communications.

d. **Making most effective use of USAID’s innovative capacity and flexible funding authorities.** DoD devised the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) for Afghanistan and Iraq. CERP provides funds to the field commander to use to finance humanitarian and reconstruction efforts on-the-ground, with significant flexibility. It is seeking to extend this funding flexibility for use globally. USAID also has a flexible funding capacity to respond to crises - it’s “notwithstanding” legislation, under the International Disaster Assistance account. USAID’s OFDA and Office of Transition Initiatives both are funded under this account. USAID’s use of it’s “notwithstanding” capabilities have contributed to its in-country partnership with and have been appreciated by DoD as mentioned in the reports above.

An important question to be explored, in relationship to the concern about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy also reviewed above, is the balance between funding legislated and used by the military versus that provided to USAID. Aspects of this question are the following:

1. The greatest constraint to civilians in managing reconstruction activities in many deployments is the insecure conditions. The practice of embedding civilians with military units has now grown significant experience which needs further examination to determine the extent to which it can become institutionalized. Both the CORDS experience in Vietnam and the current PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have fielded joint operations which disperse funds provided through both civilian and military channels. To what extent is the balance appropriate in funds available through each channel?

2. Funding provided to USAID through DoD channels are much appreciated, both through the NDAA Section 1207/1210 and funds available through a COCOM (e.g., see the PACOM report above – CJTF/HOA has also transferred funds to USAID). Further opportunities to transfer DoD funding to civilians when civilians are equally if not more qualified to manage the activities are very much worth exploring.

3. USAID will at times have more effective access and capacities to manage activities than the military. For example, USAID often uses indigenous institutions which are more important to achieving sustainability on the part of the host nation. To the extent that funding constraints is a legislative matter, DoD has offered and is very willing to work with USAID to take the case to OMB and the Hill that additional funding is required for USAID.

e. **Security Sector Reform (SSR).** The most effective effort for the near future is likely to be working with COCOMs and Country Teams to assess and plan security sector capacity-building actions in fragile countries. The GEF instructs COCOMs to develop “campaign plans” to achieve theater strategic end states as part of its Phase 0 planning. This will need to be done on a country-by-country basis, perhaps alongside the traditional regional Theater Security Planning approach. The interagency challenges that will need to be addressed are the following:

   - Legislative restrictions
     - Funding authorities and limitations: military vs. economic assistance
     - Different oversight committees

   - The color of money (Economic Support Funds vs. International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement vs. Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining vs. Peackeeping Operations, etc.)

   - Institutional mandates: security vs. development

   - Institutional cultures: whose vision?

   - Imbalanced resources: size counts

   The most recent development is to establish an SSR Working Group under the Civ-Mil Sub-PCC under the Development PCC chaired by the USAID Administrator.

f. **The Challenge of AFRICOM.** The model being developed for AFRICOM, a much greater integration of the military’s objectives with those of the rest of the USG in Africa, is an opportunity to work toward preventing conflict and avoiding the major costs that interventions incur. Two leading activities will be: 1) to jointly conduct more effective and comprehensive conflict vulnerability assessments to provide the basis for activities to deter terrorism and conflict, and 2) build host country capacity to achieve that. The efficient and effective use of limited funding to prevent and deter conflict depends on the success of these two activities.

   It is conceivable that the more effective Security Sector analysis and planning capacity that AFRICOM fosters can attract funding increases for public safety, rule of law and governance programming. Given increased funding, AFRICOM, State and USAID will have an increased capability to put teams in the field to provide short term design, periodic monitoring and punctual specialized technical support to country teams. This can include an increase in programs for joint indigenous civil-military dialogue, training and program planning.

g. **Employment of Information Systems Technology.** Cost effectiveness of interventions is a highly neglected area of exploration. Important studies have been conducted that argue the case for preventive action, including an important one by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict while it was active a decade ago. Although it is generally accepted and intuitively conclusive that much greater efficiency in addressing crises is possible, no significant studies show how that could be done.

One potential area “ripe” for exploration is how information systems technology can be used to achieve an order of magnitude improvement in efficiency in addressing crises. USAID has occasionally provided leadership in using modeling to address development assistance issues. It brought river basin development modeling to examine Mekong, Gambia and Niger River investment options. It brought a family planning model to assist third world countries in examining the value in supporting family planning programs, e.g., in 1985 the president of Niger completely reversed its policy not to support family planning. But USAID as an institution has not systematically and persistently examined the potential for applying information technology to address critical third world issues.

DoD, on the other hand, continues to vigorously explore the use of information systems technology as it addresses its Transformation. But DoD’s objectives are oriented internally, to improve its planning and operational efficiency. It does not expend resources to explore how technology can assist in building partnership capacity in crisis countries. It has not yet connected its technology development for internal purposes with the potential use of the same technology to build partner nation capacity which leads to host nation success in countering insurgency and terrorism.

To date, neither USAID nor DoD has identified nor connected how a transfer of information systems technology to partner nations can be helpful to significantly improve and increase our effectiveness in managing crises.

Pursuing cost effectiveness is a worthy endeavor.

h. Determining Most Effective Use of USAID’s Increased Expeditionary Capacity. Progress often leads to additional complications. As USAID has established the objective of doubling its size by 2012, its planning on how the additional staffing will be recruited and assigned to new positions has lagged. The Tabletop exercise described above may be only a start in how USAID partners with DoD to determine staffing priorities and balance development assistance needs with crisis management needs. In one sense, performing development assistance more effectively to build host nation capacity to govern effectively IS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT to achieve success in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism. On the other hand, development assistance priorities in the face of insurgencies and terrorism are different from the priority objectives of achieving economic growth, the normal mainstay of development assistance. Determining the most appropriate balance will be a priority for the near future.

One example of the challenges this task faces is the conclusion and recommendation on efforts in Afghanistan in a recent Atlantic magazine:

PRTs “have had no strategic impact on the insurgency, because they are too thin on the ground – the ratio of impoverished Afghan Pashtuns to provincial reconstruction teams is roughly a million to one. Local teams with on-site development personnel – ‘District Development Teams’, if you will – could change all that …”

A projection of this recommendation into a staff requirement, particularly if the effort also has to include the FATA area of Pakistan, could easily absorb a significant portion of the additional USAID staff being recruited.

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i. **Building Partnership Capacity.** In September 2008, DoD formally organized capability investment across the defense enterprise into nine capability portfolios, one of which, Building Partnerships, encompasses traditional security cooperation and security assistance. The Building Partnerships portfolio is managed within the Undersecretary for Policy purview and includes Joint Staff, Combatant Command, Service and interagency collaborative participation. Organizing the defense enterprise into capability areas provides the defense department the opportunity to better coordinate efforts across the department. Specifically, the Building Partnerships portfolio illuminates many activities that had not previously held clear sponsorship, for example, military assistance, stability operations, disaster relief activities to senior leader, and institutional resourcing deliberations. The Building Partnerships portfolio emphasis in improving the capacity of foreign partners to deal more effectively with security and instability challenges presents opportunities for greater and more effective USAID - DoD coordination and collaboration.

This proposal is likely to also raise the attention of both executive and legislative officials to the need to balance an increased military assistance budget with the appropriate level of development assistance resources to support improved governance operations for these partner countries. A good USAID-DoD strategy to examine requirements and present coordinated budget requests will probably be necessary. The results of the CENTCOM Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) effort will feed this process.

This may also raise to a more institutional level the considerations for flexibility in funding provided to both USAID and DoD. The text above reports on both USAID funding being transferred to DoD (contained in Congressional language) and DoD funding being transferred to USAID. This has pretty much been done in an *ad hoc* manner, based on specific priorities. But these transactions are increasing and mechanisms to create the cross-agency funding flexibility to meet crisis response needs are growing into institutional mechanisms. In conjunction with other institutional changes which will be considered, the advantages of providing and maintaining funding flexibility needs to receive good consideration.
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