EDUCATION TO COMBAT ABUSIVE CHILD LABOR

USING ECONOMIC AND EDUCATION INCENTIVES

BASIC EDUCATION AND POLICY SUPPORT (BEPS) ACTIVITY
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By
Susan Bissell
Ernesto Schiefelbein

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Beyond globalization, trade, and industry practices, child labor is influenced by the economic situation of the family, cultural values, traditions, and the value placed on education by parents and children. Educational access is limited by many inter-related factors, including direct and indirect educational expenses, the opportunity cost of lost income, and late school enrollment. More needs to be done to understand the influences and factors that can make school a viable option for disadvantaged groups and to design incentive mechanisms that effectively influence the decision of families to send their children to school, instead of relying on their labor.

The following paper examines the impact of educational incentives on the supply of and demand for basic schooling for working children. It examines factors that influence the performance of global educational incentive programs, including cost-effectiveness, sustainability, and the potential for replication. It is not a prescription for correct policy; rather, it strives to explore successful programs and derive lessons learned. This is a daunting task, because a program needs to benefit those children at greatest risk, while ensuring that the interventions do not exacerbate the problem. There is a risk that such programs may attract children to dangerous situations so they can benefit from the activity being offered, while programs that forcibly extract children may have the undesired effect of leaving families in a more precarious economic situation. Lessons learned in the incentive programs presented in this publication should help in the design of effective strategies to increase schooling access by helping to clarify the opportunities and constraints that such incentives can have on working children. Combining incentives with other strategies may more effectively discourage work while providing children with viable alternatives.

This publication is the third in a series developed under the Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS)/Education to Combat Abusive Child Labor (ECACL) Activity. The first publication examined education policy and child labor, while the second looked at international interventions for child workers and lessons learned about the assumptions and experiences that shaped the design and success of these programs.

We hope that this series will be of assistance to USAID and other stakeholders in planning and implementing effective education programs that benefit children in, or at risk of, abusive and/or exploitative work environments.

L. Diane Mull
Senior Associate
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Providing children with educational programs is a promising strategy for combating child labor. Many of the 186 million child laborers below the age of 15 in the world (Hagemann et al, 2002) could be enrolled in school if economic incentives were provided to their families, the schools were more attractive, or bans on child labor were enforced. In spite of the international media attention and the growing number of programs on behalf of child labor, some children never enroll in school, are ousted from school, or drop out of educational programs to work.

What Is the Status of Child Labor Worldwide?

As analyzed in a previous ECACL publication (Myers 2001), the 1990s saw a growing international commitment to eliminate child labor and support children’s basic rights. Despite this international interest, advances have been slow. Although the Dakar World Education Forum (2000) revealed advances in enrollments during the 1990s, it also identified over 100 countries that were still far from reaching the goal of complete primary schooling of adequate learning quality. Those countries also harbor most of the child labor detected by the International Labor Organization in 2000 (see Annex 1, Classification of Countries by Child Labor Risk Levels). A growing number of developed countries, international agencies, and private and corporate organizations are exploring possible roles in the child labor elimination process.

Incentives—defined in this paper as any monetary or non-monetary method of changing behavior in relation to the enrollment and retention of children in schooling—can be a viable strategy for helping needy families afford schooling, desire education for their children, and thus remove them from abusive labor situations. Lessons learned from successful incentive programs presented in this publication should help in the design of effective strategies to increase schooling access by children involved in the worst forms of child labor.

Why Children Work: Household Poverty and External Forces

There are three major causes for children not enrolling in school or dropping out of school to work, often in abusive or exploitative situations. Poverty is the main reason. At the family level, the rural and urban poor often decide to expose themselves to exploitative relationships because of the need for immediate survival and the search for viable, income-generating strategies. Further, whatever family income does exist may be affected by “shocks” to the family’s income or social context, such as illness or incapacitation of a household income earner, the need to pay for medicine and medical treatment, marital breakdown, natural disasters such as earthquakes and tornados, or the effects of crime.

The other causes involve forces outside the household. Many students do not enroll or drop out due to the poor supply of education, which relates to the quality and relevance of the instruction. Factors that affect instructional quality include lack of space to enter primary school, overcrowded classes, lack of a higher grade to attend (mainly in rural areas), lack of continuation schools, lack of transportation to reach a distant school, punishment from teachers, and student failure. Other problems relate to students “older” than the average age of the class, cultural or religious factors, pregnancy and marriage, and low expected gains from education. In addition, the large gap in achievement levels of developed and developing countries is mainly linked to teacher training, parents’ education, amount of time available for learning, relevant scripts or frameworks for learning, and a lack of early stimulation (McGinn and Borden 1995, 11). Other external forces, including war,
trafficking, and family and street violence, often push children into exploitative and abusive work situations rather than school.

**Incentives to Use: Exploring the Options**

Within this context, two types of incentives have been used effectively to attract children to school rather than work:

- **Economic incentives**: interventions that involve augmenting student or household income; and
- **Education incentives**: interventions that improve access to and the quality of educational services.

Economic incentives include school fee waivers, vouchers, scholarships, in-kind support, school feeding, school health care, cash grant compensation/stipends, partial income substitution, household food subsidies, adult family member replacement of former child workers, community development programs, and income-generating activities. Education incentives include teacher training, local school management apprenticeships, school-to-work, and safe work programs, support for school administrators, interactive learning scripts (modules or frameworks), and parent-oriented early stimulation programs.

The economic and education incentive programs that are highlighted in this publication have been implemented in various regions of the world.

**Featured Economic and Education Incentive Programs**

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<td>Providing Education to Migrant Child Laborers and Their Families (Honduras)</td>
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<td>Factory Worker Stipend Program (Bangladesh)</td>
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<td>Female Secondary School Stipend Program (Bangladesh)</td>
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<td>Save the Children Foundation Child Soldier Reintegration Program (Democratic Republic of Congo)</td>
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<td>The Jua Kali Pilot Voucher Project (Kenya)</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire: PROSAF Rural Transports System Progém</td>
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Economic incentive programs have been successful in increasing enrollments in developing countries but have produced mixed results in terms of providing quality education. Although only a few education incentive programs are featured, descriptions are complemented by an “experts” evaluation of programs and a statistically-inspired list of cost-effectiveness indicators for improving education quality.
Designing USAID Interventions: Findings and Recommendations

Because education is a long-term endeavor, there are no “magic bullets” for using education to minimize child labor except hard work, rigor, creativity, and commitment. Nevertheless, programs document that education can be an effective incentive. The following findings are offered:

- USAID should seek incremental progress toward the integration of educational development, economic incentives, and legal reform while fighting the fatalistic view of child labor as a consequence of poverty and traditions.

- Successful use of economic and education incentives to promote schooling for working children depends on a careful sequence of decisions.

- Incentive programs should have a key component (easy to implement and able to make an impact by itself) to be improved by other complementary components (more difficult to implement), but never reduced if the complementary components are not well implemented.

- The selection of specific goals and the parallel incentive strategies depend on a careful optimization with respect to several constraints.
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<td>BEPS</td>
<td>Basic Education and Policy Support Activity</td>
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<td>CEF</td>
<td>Community Education Fund Project, Tanzania</td>
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<td>Convention 138</td>
<td>ILO Convention on Minimum Age of Work, 1973</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990</td>
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<td>ECACL</td>
<td>Education to Combat Abusive Child Labor</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IPEC</td>
<td>International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>PROGRESA</td>
<td>The Education, Health, and Nutrition Program of Mexico</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>US$</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

What Is the Status of Child Labor Worldwide?

Many of the 186 million child laborers below the age of 15 in the world (Hagemann et al. 2002) could be enrolled in school if economic incentives were provided to their families, the schools were more attractive, or bans on child labor were enforced. In spite of the international media attention to child labor and the growing number of programs and interventions on behalf of children in the developing world, too many children never enrolled in school, were ousted from school, or dropped out of school.

The 1990s saw a growing international commitment to eliminate child labor as evidenced by the studies about the magnitude and scope of the child labor problem (ILO 1996) and the Jomtien World Conference on Education for All (EFA) sponsored by UNESCO, the World Bank, UNICEF, and UNDP (1990). Various reasons for this worldwide interest were analyzed in a previous Basic Education and Policy Support Activity (BEPS) / Education to Combat Abusive Child Labor (ECACL) publication (Myers 2001). International conventions indicate a significant shift in the way the world views the rights of children. Certainly the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is a landmark. Never before has a UN convention been so widely ratified. The 1996 International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate of 250 million child workers also drew international attention. In addition, the new ILO Convention on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999) has received rapid, widespread support. Moreover, research shows that more education will increase personal and social income.

Despite this international interest, advances have been slow. The Dakar World Education Forum (2000) revealed advances in enrollments during the 1990s, but also identified over 100 countries that were still far from reaching the goal of complete primary schooling of adequate learning quality. Those countries also harbor most of the child labor detected by ILO in 2000 (see Annex 1, Classification of Countries by Child Labor Risk Levels (according to Net Enrollment Rates). Given the magnitude of the problem, the Dakar meeting postponed until 2015 the “Universal Primary Education” goal. Lessons learned from using non-formal and formal basic education to combat child labor have been presented in a previous ECACL publication (Mull and Elkins 2002).

A growing number of developed countries and international agencies are searching for a role in the child labor elimination process, and even private and corporate sectors are grappling with their roles and responsibilities in addressing the problem. The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) is preparing a report for a group of 17 significant external supporters of education in developing countries to improve the effectiveness of their overseas assistance.

There are enormous challenges to reducing child labor, and real results for children are difficult to monitor and measure. Lessons learned from successful incentives programs presented in this publication should help to address these issues.
The Potential Role of Incentives to Improve Educational Opportunities

Poverty is the main cause for children working, either for those that never enrolled or for those that dropped out of school. Therefore, economic incentives, together with high quality schools and/or law enforcement, can help to keep students—especially those at risk of dangerous and exploitative work—in school. However, incentive programs also need to address constraints often associated with underdevelopment: lack of institutional capacity; limited funds; scanty monitoring mechanisms; meager information technology; and poor control processes. The design of relevant incentive programs is limited because evidence linking schooling to the elimination of child labor at the family, community, regional, and national levels is lacking (Anker and Melkas 1995; Schiefelbein 1997; Anker et al. 1998), and rescuing former dropouts from child labor has been difficult. Therefore, selected incentive programs are analyzed in this report to evaluate the feasibility of bringing good programs to scale.

What Are Incentives, and Why Should They Be Used?

In this paper, incentives refer to any monetary or non-monetary method of changing behavior in relation to the enrollment and retention of children in schooling. Incentives can do one of the following:

- affect the decision of children and families to enroll children in school and keep them there, which involves augmenting student or household income (economic incentives); or

- improve access to and the quality of educational services (education incentives).

“Doing the right thing” to improve the lives of children in this worldwide campaign to eliminate child labor concerns multilateral and bilateral agencies, civil society, the private sector, and individuals. How do we know that the support being provided is effective or that the children are better off? Preceding BEPS/ECACL publications note that it is particularly difficult to locate studies that measure the effect of schooling on the situation of children over the long term—the time frame that basic education activities need in order to show results (Myers 2001; Mull and Elkins 2002). When research findings on those effects are available, a high variance is observed (Schiefelbein 2002, 173). Despite a great deal of analysis on the historical roots and evolution of child labor, there is still a lack of empirical data on what happens to children when development organizations intervene.

What is known is that once children drop out of school and start working, it is more difficult to get them out of work and back into school. Although there are a few interventions to get working children back to school (McGinn and Borden 1995), there are more success stories of governmental and non-governmental programs that increase school enrollment and retention in schools and keep children from dropping out and starting work. More longitudinal and multi-disciplinary studies are needed to grapple with the mélange of political, social, cultural, and economic factors that contribute to this problem. Such an approach is more challenging, more time consuming, and
more costly than other traditional methods of research and monitoring. It is often easier to document results in those aspects of programs where measurement issues are more straightforward. The social and economic benefits of schooling for children only become evident later in life and therefore are more difficult to measure.

This paper will identify economic and education incentives that can be adopted to assist families in sending their children, especially those at risk of dangerous and exploitative work, to school. Because using incentives is such a resource-intensive approach, the challenge is to keep costs down by concentrating only on those families most in need of assistance. Another challenge is to develop ways to use incentives to tackle especially difficult situations, including those created by war and drought as well as those resulting from family violence; slavery, serfdom, or forced labor; child trafficking; production of pornography or pornographic performances; and forced recruitment of children in armed conflicts. These circumstances generally require special or more comprehensive strategies, which are discussed later in this paper.
II. SCHOOLING AND WORK: HOUSEHOLD AND EXTERNAL

In order to understand the role of incentives in increasing school enrollment/retention and eliminating child labor, policy makers and practitioners need to understand the many causes for dropping out of school or not enrolling in school in order to work. Awareness of causes, incentives, and their linkages can aid in identifying better ways to influence family decision making about school.

Although there is agreement on most factors related to poverty and school participation, opinions are divided on the strategies to reduce child labor. Positions at the extremes lead to very different policy prescriptions. At one extreme, child advocates and scholars argue that no child should be exposed to the formal or informal workplace irrespective of economic status (Burra 1997). These proponents, who consider the elimination of child labor a human rights issue, believe that parents and governments should bear the responsibility for supporting the rights and economic needs of children. On the other extreme, there are child advocates, families, and governments who feel that poverty is an acceptable reason for having children work if the survival and preservation of the family are at stake (Boukhari 1999).1

Regardless of the position, it is important for analysts to concentrate on the reasons that families enroll children in school, keep them enrolled, or send them to work (McGinn and Borden 1995). These reasons relate to household income, quality and relevance of instruction, and various other external forces.

Poverty: Livelihoods, Enrollments, and Work

At the family level, the rural and urban poor may decide to expose themselves to exploitative relationships because of the need for immediate survival and viable, income-generating opportunities. Sending children to work in potentially dangerous and exploitative conditions is an example of what can be termed a “self-exploitative coping strategy,” a way to find a viable source of income. In analyzing the state of rural farmers in Asia, Scott (1976, 14) states that, “guaranteeing them a basic subsistence, an orientation that focuses unavoidably on the here and now, occasionally forces peasants to mortgage their own future.” Self-exploitation sets the stage for abuse in the workplace and risks the physical and psychosocial health of young people. While an in-depth discussion of the health consequences of child labor is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that parents and children knowingly put themselves in exploitative environments out of a sense of duty to the family and because of compelling short-term livelihood interests of family members.

The story of Akram (see box, “Akram, the Egg Seller”) illustrates the multiple dimensions of decisions about schooling and work. Employment opportunities available to adult family members influence all aspects of a child’s life, including the kind of work the child may perform and his/her opportunity to attend school. Indeed, the household is perhaps the best unit of analysis when considering schooling, labor, and the use of economic incentives in eliminating child labor. The following case illustrates the economic role that children play in marginal poor families.

1 See Bequele and Boyden's comments (1998) on dismissal of the economic value of child work, and Boyden, Myers, and Lindgren (1998, 127) for a discussion of "poverty as the main cause of child work and exploitation."
Akram, the Egg Seller

Akram is about 12 years old, but he is not sure because he has no birth certificate. While he was cheerful prior to the interview, when it begins he becomes subdued, fidgets, and refuses to make eye contact. As he relaxes, he begins to describe his father, who is a pushcart pusher, or thela gari wala, who works intermittently depending on the weather and the availability of work. His mother works as a domestic servant in the home of a wealthy family. Though his younger sister goes to school for a few hours each day, she spends most of her time fetching water, washing dishes, and sweeping the mud-packed floors. Akram's older brother works in a garment factory. He has been employed for only a few months and earns about 2000 taka a month.

Before coming to the UNICEF-sponsored program, Akram had never been to school. He worked in a garment factory for two years cutting threads in the “finishing section” of the factory, where he described being abused by factory managers. Apparently, his parents wanted to enroll him in school, but they could not afford the admission fee or the cost of tutors, preferring instead this work, which earned him about 600 taka per month. Through UNICEF’s program, Akram now receives a per diem of 300 taka per month from the school. When asked how he manages with less money, Akram proudly says he sells eggs after school. He found the job himself, and likes it better than garment work because no one mistreats him. If you give bad eggs to people what happens? Do they not scold you? To this Akram responds: “I tell them I did not go inside the eggs. How will I be able to tell?”

In Akram’s egg-selling business he buys the eggs on credit at a wholesale price. “After I’m done selling at night, I pay the price for the eggs and keep my profits.” In Akram’s opinion, it is a good business because he can both work and go to school, something that the long hours in the factory did not allow. He is also more independent, selling only when he wants to, meandering through the market at his own pace, attracting customers, resting at will. When asked what happens when he is not keen to sell eggs, Akram hastens to explain that he sells balloons instead. Still, his preference is eggs: “I like selling eggs. It is at night. In the summer, I sell balloons in the day, in the hot sun. I feel very hot. I get sick sometimes.” “Besides”, he explains, “egg selling is more profitable than balloon selling.” He gives most of the money to his mother, who uses it to buy food for the family. He keeps only about 5 taka for himself as pocket money.

S. Bissell, Interview in Dhaka, February 11, 1998
At the household level, there is compelling evidence that the decision to drop out of school and begin work also is influenced by “shocks” to the family’s income or the social context. For example, in urban squatter settlements in Bangladesh, various events that upset the routine of the household have potentially severe effects on income and security (Salway, et al. 1997, 107). These include the illness or incapacitation of a household income earner, the need to pay for medicine and medical treatment (one-quarter of respondents reported health-related shocks as having a major impact on household income) (Salway et al. 1997, 11), marital breakdown, and crime. These unexpected occurrences can also damage the psychological health of children, as parents react to the frustration of not being able to feed or otherwise provide for their families.

In the early 1990s, such social and economic occurrences motivated many Bangladeshi children to seek work in the garment industry. The reason most cited was the illness of a male family member, who was usually the primary wage earner. Those that cited the illness of their mother tended to be in families where the mother was the head of household. Families lacking support from other sources, such as the extended family, insurance, or government services, had little choice but to send children to work to earn the necessary income. The statements from children in Bangladesh, collected in ethnographic studies, reveal some of the reasons that children feel compelled to work (see box, “Reasons Children Work: The Case of Child Garment Workers in Bangladesh”).

Statements and observations from other countries provide further insight into the reasons why children work. In Kenya, as in much of Southern Africa, AIDS has struck parents of all ages, leaving children as primary wage-earners or heads of households. In Sierra Leone, women were forced to serve as sexual slaves by the revolutionary army. In Zimbabwe, hunger kept children from attending school. In Chile, a student’s inappropriate behavior resulted in expulsion from school, leaving work as the most viable alternative. In Cambodia, a boy was forced to beg from dawn to midnight. Graduates from elementary school who did not have access to further education became domestic workers in Indonesia (see box, “Reasons Children Work: Quotations and Observations”).

These stories confirm the complex relationship between household economy, industrialization, child labor, and public education. The ethnographic studies, which complement the research of economists (see Basu and Van 1998; Diamond and Fyed 1998), provide a better understanding of why children work and should help in the design of relevant programs to combat child labor.

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2 Salway and Nurani (1997, 94) in their study of female-headed households reported particularly high levels of morbidity. Forty percent of male workers in the study, and 30 percent of female workers reported loss of work because of illness (Ibid., 95).
Reasons Children Work:
The Case of Child Garment Workers in Bangladesh

Shahinor, age 12
Q. Why did you go to work?
A. My father used to work as a house painter. But now he doesn’t work anymore. He has been sick for two years. He has high blood pressure. You were living in the village. Why did your family move to Dhaka?
A. My father became sick. He couldn’t work anymore. We didn’t have money enough to live on. We didn’t have a big brother to support us. So we moved to Dhaka. Then my elder sister worked, I also worked in the garments. We sold everything we had, our small bit of land in the village, to treat my father. Now he is a little better. But he can’t work.
(Interview in Dhaka, March 15, 1998).

Rokshana, age 11
Q. Why do you have to work in a garment factory?
A. There is hardship in the family. My father is an old man now. He can’t work regularly. He works for a few days, then he gets sick for a few days, and he keeps going on like that.
Q. Your father does not drive a rickshaw all the time?
   He can’t. He gets sick quite often.
(Interview in Dhaka, February 22, 1998).

Lailey, age 11
A. My father used to drive a rickshaw. After he started to get sick he got into selling fruits and vegetables. But soon after he opened the shop, he died. After he died, we became very helpless. My sister was working in the garments. Her income was not enough for the family. So, she took me into garments. There I was working as a helper, and I was about to become an operator—my sister was teaching me everything. But that’s when the owners made a bunch of us leave our jobs; they said that we were too small to work in garments and they can’t keep us anymore. Otherwise, they’ll get fined 35,000 taka per child worker found in the factory.
(Interview in Dhaka, March 31, 1998).

Source: Ethnographic study by S. Bissell, Dhaka, March 31, 1998
**Reasons Children Work: Quotations and Observations**

**Medar, age 53 and the father of five children, living in Varanasi Province, India**  
"Children should go to school and work with the family, weave carpets, and support the family. If the children don’t help out, how can we feed the family and live our daily lives?"  
(Hoegen 2002, 18)

**Ovwanda, a nurse in Nairobi, Kenya**  
"AIDS strikes the young men and women who earn the money and grow the food that supports their families. When these breadwinners become sick or die, children are forced to drop out of school, and grandparents struggle to find some way of supporting them. The dismal economy leaves them few options, and many desperate youth resort to prostitution and drug abuse, putting them at greater risk of contracting the virus."  
(Epstein 2002, 15)

**Emily M’Bayo, 19, now living with her father and sister in Grafton Camp, Sierra Leone**  
From 1996 to 2001, Emily was forced to serve as a sexual slave by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Now she is learning food preparation in the local school.  
(Griswold 2002, 20)

**Alipheli Dube, mother of seven children, in Zimbabwe**  
“My children, they’re seriously affected. When there is no food, they cannot go to school, otherwise they faint.”  
(Swarns 2002, A)

**Roberto, 5 years, former student of a kindergarten in Lautaro, Chile**  
“The principal of the kindergarten expelled Roberto because he pulled up a classmate’s jumper.”  
(Marambio 2002, 8)

**Carlos Rebolledo, 19, enrolled in the Colegio La Puerta, Las Condes, Chile**  
“I have always been violent. I am ready to fight with my fists. In third grade I had six pages of negative comments in my file. I have been cut off from five schools. However, I have been lucky, and I am now a senior in a high school for problem students.”  
(Nuñez 2002, 2)

**Santi, 10, a Cambodian boy begging in Bangkok**  
“His father died of sickness many years ago. A “grandmother” or friend of her mother arranged to take him through the border directly to Bangkok. She paid for travel and food expenses. She takes care of him quite well, but she forces him to beg from dawn to midnight. If he gets less than 200 baht, the grandmother beats him.”  
(CWA 1998)

**Tina, 14, a domestic worker in Yogyakarta, Indonesia**  
“After graduating from elementary school, Tina became a child domestic worker. She sends to her family Rp 30,000 each month and her wages are Rp 35,000. She works more than 12 hours a day and takes a rest between 1 and 3 p.m. She goes home only for special ceremonies. After six months of work, she is thinking of stopping work because she feels tired and her boss is always angry with her without any reason. Worse still, her boss is coming into her room at night and embraces, hugs, and kisses her.”  
(CWA 1998)
Generalized assumptions about the nature of poverty and the influences on household income in poor, marginal communities are difficult to make. Countries go through different patterns of growth and economic and social development, and there is nothing homogeneous about poverty except that it describes a lack of something. At the national level, growth and development are relative terms, influenced by population, culture, political systems, legislation, industry, and global trading relationships. No single measurement of growth and development across nations can capture these variations accurately.

It is recognized, however, that household income can influence whether a child attends school. In Bangladesh, for example, ex-garment workers could not afford to attend non-formal schools or receive private tutoring in schools set up for retrenched workers. Less than one-third of the participating children reported ever attending school prior to enrolling in the program. Poverty was the most cited reason. Even when poor children attended school, many combined work and their studies. (The transcript excerpt from Milan, age 13 (see box) is typical of the situation of the majority of children in the Bangladesh garment sector, where although compulsory primary schooling is free, in reality, schooling has other associated costs like fees and uniforms). Research in Colombia found that if schools were not made absolutely free of direct and indirect costs, poor children usually could not attend. Families in these circumstances are unable to fulfill obligations under the strict legislation for compulsory schooling (see also Espinola et al. 1988: 94).

Legislating compulsory primary schooling, therefore, is not sufficient to place children in school (in communities living below the poverty line). Direct costs that limit children's access to school, including fees, books, uniforms, transportation, and other learning materials, in addition to the opportunity cost of losing a child's wages, often make school unaffordable. To effectively improve school participation and reduce child labor, education policy legislating compulsory primary education should also make schooling affordable for poor children.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Milon, Age 13</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Have you been to school before?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Before you came here?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>You have never been to school before this?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What did you do before going to school?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>When you worked in garments, how did you feel?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why?</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **But you did not go to school before you went to the garment job?** | I asked my parents to send me to school. They said, "We are poor. How can we send you to school?"
| **Tell me more about it...** | They did not say much. They would say, "We're poor. We can't afford to send you to school." |
| **Your parents, did they ever want to send you to school?** | They did, but you need money to get admitted into school, then tutors' fees. That's why they did not send me to school. |
| **When your parents did not send you to school how did you feel?** | I felt really bad. |
| **Why?** | Everybody goes to school. Rich kids go to school all the time. We cannot go. They learn everything. We cannot learn anything. |

*S. Bissell, Interview in Dhaka, February 17, 1998*
Instruction, Education, and Work

In addition to being able to afford school, child workers will not attend school unless they are interested in the curriculum and the school has effective teaching methods (McGinn and Borden 1995, 134). Therefore, the opportunity and ability to enroll poor children in school does not necessarily result in the elimination of child labor. Even though child labor probably perpetuates poverty (when it forces the child to drop out of school), poor children cope and learn in a variety of environments, including the work environment, where they can acquire technical and interpersonal skills. Given the costs of schooling, education policy must look beyond formal measures that make school affordable and examine ways to make it relevant to the social context and the economic milieu of poor communities. Government policy makers and donors must cope with poor teaching, corruption, gender, and social class gaps.

Boring and meaningless classes are often the result of poor teacher training and the lack of validated learning modules. Sometimes teachers need written instructions on how to effectively engage students because they do not have the time or training to design good lesson plans (Askew 2002). Traditional textbooks require time and pedagogical skill in order to tailor the content into effective learning sessions. Poor textbooks are the result of not validating the prototype textbooks with real students in a systematic research process (Slavin 2002, 15). Unfortunately, few learning materials are well tested before they are massively distributed to students in developing countries.

Instructional quality is sometimes impacted by income-generating strategies that develop around the free, lesser quality educational services offered at most public schools. An example of this is a “de facto” need for students to pay for private tutoring fees so that they can acquire the basic skills needed to pass their exams, with the tutoring often provided by the same teachers that teach them at school. In Bangladesh, as reported by Blanchet (1996, 184), “Teachers have little commitment to teach in the classroom. They impart their knowledge, but in private tutorship [emphasis added] for an extra fee. Poor children born of illiterate parents, if in school at all, are likely to be...the first ones to drop out. They suffer discrimination... unable to afford assistance which only money can buy.” Such situations create a disincentive for teachers to provide quality education in the classroom and increase educational costs for already strapped families.

Gender also affects the demand for education. For boys, paid employment is often more readily available than for girls. For girls, domestic work is usually the only opportunity to earn money. Otherwise, they are likely to work for the family doing housework or working in the fields. This limited availability may impact whether parents consider it important or relevant to keep girls in school.
In addition, the social environment influences enrollment and attendance. For example, public school parents are sometimes encouraged to buy uniforms, even when uniforms are not expected or required, because the uniforms serve as an important status symbol. Using uniforms suggests that children who afford them are, in some way, equal to those enrolled in other upper class, fee-paying schools. Surprisingly, this trend was found even in non-formal education programs designed specifically to eliminate direct costs of schooling for students. Money might be better spent on materials or other elements that could improve instructional quality.

The Impact of War, Trafficking, or Street Violence

Unfortunately, some of the worst forms of child labor involve the use of children in armed conflict. Children have been used as soldiers in many civil wars that have erupted in developing countries. When recruited, these children are often suffering from starvation and disease. Others are forcibly enlisted into military service. When the war has ended, children are often faced with horrendous tasks of resettlement, healing, and reconciliation.

Child traffickers often flourish by recognizing and exploiting the plight of poor families. Needy children are often lured to accept temporary or full-time employment in agricultural or domestic settings, only to be sold and forced to work in slavery-type conditions. Economic crisis also seems to exacerbate the problem of child prostitution, another of the worst forms of child labor, as girls find it increasingly necessary to work in the sex industry to support themselves or their families.

Street children may be surviving and living on the street for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to parental death or abandonment, physical abuse at home, or drug addiction. Personalized attention by NGOs and philanthropic institutions has been successful in coping with some cases, but few examples of large-scale programs exist.

All of these factors—poverty, the quality and relevance of education, and especially difficult circumstances that involve children in the worst forms of child labor—can influence the household decision-making process concerning whether to send a child to school or work. (A summary of the different causes of not enrolling or dropping out of school and the work that often results is presented in Table 1.) Addressing child labor in these cases requires political skill, technical expertise, support from bilateral and multilateral agencies, and knowledge about the constraints that reduce the feasible family alternatives.
### Table 1. Causes for Being Out of School and Frequent Types of Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Begging in streets and markets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents unwilling or unable to pay costs required to send all children to school</td>
<td>Running errands and walking to gather water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents exploiting their children to increase family income</td>
<td>Harvesting crops during short harvest period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited employment opportunities for adult family members; family need for assistance in making ends meet</td>
<td>Helping parents in the field or on farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to pay for further schooling or to finance related costs</td>
<td>Scrounging for food because of hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of space in public schools in the neighborhood</td>
<td>Helping parents in the field or on farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased attraction of buying goods and services</td>
<td>Scrounging for food because of hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shocks to the family income:  illness or incapacitation of a household income earner/need to pay for medicine or medical treatment; natural disasters such as flood, hurricane, drought, or crop infestation</td>
<td>Helping parents in the field or on farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available work in informal and formal industries (clothing, rugs, shoes, agricultural commodities, fireworks, mines)</td>
<td>Helping parents in the field or on farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of earning more money for the family/achieving a higher status in the community</td>
<td>Helping parents in the field or on farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents die from AIDS, leaving orphans without support</td>
<td>Helping parents in the field or on farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug or alcohol addiction and the related need to procure drugs and alcohol</td>
<td>Helping parents in the field or on farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality and Relevance of Education</td>
<td>War, Trafficking, or Street Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brutal corporal punishment, caning, slapping, or whipping</td>
<td>Family violence, being beaten by relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students bored with school lessons and activities</td>
<td>Trafficking, sale of children, or any type of compulsory work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believing that little is learned at school (to be used in real life)</td>
<td>Slave or bonded child labor to pay debts to money lenders or to pay for dowries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual exploitation in school</td>
<td>Army or guerilla compulsory recruitment of children for battles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released by school principal for misconduct or slow learning</td>
<td>Recruitment or offering of children for prostitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations to learn and be trained for job skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic Incentives and Education Reform

Economic incentives and education reform are necessary conditions to combat child labor, but are only part of the picture.

---

Note: See boxes in pages 6, 8, 9, and 12 for details of causes and types of work.

Household Poverty and External Forces Impacting the School/Work Decision: A Summary

The decision to work and not attend school is influenced by a host of family and external variables affecting family income and survival. Even though full-time schooling (without working) provides a higher long-term income stream than full-time employment (without attending school), many families cannot afford to send their children to school (McGinn and Borden 1995, 136). “In many instances, child work is the result of capital market failures: when households [emphasis added] cannot afford education for their children and cannot borrow for this purpose, although the long-term benefits would be high” (Fallon and Tzannatos 1998, 5). Although studies show that individual economic benefits from secondary schooling more than repay the investment of children’s time (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002), even families that are aware of these benefits may not be able to take advantage of them. Household decision making related to children’s participation in school is constrained by external social events and trends. Salary averages for child labor result from social trends on supply and demand. “The role of fertility behavior, the household’s risk management, and government policies with respect to social expenditure and population control … affect the supply of child labor. On the demand side, the structure of the labor market and the prevailing production technology are the two main determinants of child labor.”

Other external forces also influence whether children attend school or go to work. To the external economic variables already mentioned must be added the legislative framework (nationally and internationally), which usually involves a ban on child labor that is rarely enforced effectively …” (Grootaert 1998, 3), and the quality and relevance of the actual instruction. War, trafficking, and/or street violence also may dramatically alter children’s enrollment and participation in school.

Economic incentives and education reform are necessary conditions to combat child labor, but are only part of the picture. More needs to be understood about the relationship between incentives, family context, and work for policy makers to alter a child’s decision to forego school to work.

In the next chapter, various types of incentives for keeping students in school or rescuing former dropouts are summarized and analyzed. Examples of programs implementing those incentives in developing countries are provided in Chapters IV and V.

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3 For example, news about the Global March Against Child Labor is available in the following web site: http://www.ei-ie.org/action/english/etrclglobalmarch.html
III. INCENTIVES TO USE: EXPLORING THE

Incentives—any monetary and non-monetary method of changing behavior concerning the enrollment and retention of children in formal or non-formal education—can both affect the demand for services by motivating families to enroll their children in school and keep them there, or improve the supply of education services by raising their quality and relevance to at-risk youth. Incentives that influence school participation by affecting the household or student income will be referred to as economic incentives. Incentives that improve the supply of schooling will be termed education incentives (see Table 2).

“Prevention” or “rescue” programs generally merge two or more types of incentives (even though incentives are recognized in their singular characteristics in this chapter). For example, proponents favoring economic incentives for child laborers view economic incentives as an effective counterpart to labor enforcement because children in the most extreme cases usually benefit from them. Contemporary practice, however, suggests that schooling and law enforcement are both necessary to end child labor—especially the worst forms. Children will not necessarily quit abusive work because it is made illegal, just as an incentive will not guarantee that a child will enroll in school. A combination of strategies can discourage work while providing children with a viable alternative.

For policy makers desiring to assist child laborers, questions of what how, why, and for how long continue to surface. Given the lack of impartial monitoring and evaluation of international and government programs, documentation of the effectiveness of the various approaches (with respect to specific causes) is currently difficult to find in the development literature. Nevertheless, incentives can be effective when appropriately matched with the causes of child labor (see Table 1).

This chapter includes an overview of the two types of incentives and examples of each one. Children who for various reasons are at a higher risk of being involved in the worst forms of child labor are also described.

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4 This review and the descriptions are primarily culled from Anker and Melkas (1995) as well as Schiefelbein (1997). These are key texts in the sparse literature on the use of incentives in education and child labor elimination.
### Table 2. Types of Economic and Education Incentives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incentive</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Incentives</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Fee Waivers</td>
<td>Cover direct schooling costs by compensating schools according to actual enrollment and attendance rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vouchers</td>
<td>Provide funding for children and parents to attend an institution of their choice, making schools more likely to offer better educational services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>Provide cash grants directly to the child for each day s/he attends school, based on school performance, household income, or work status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-kind Support</td>
<td>Pays indirect costs of attending school such as transportation, uniforms, books, and supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Feeding</td>
<td>Offers nutritional supplement for children that may not have access to adequate nutrition at home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Health Care</td>
<td>Provides basic healthcare services through the school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Grant Compensation/Stipends</td>
<td>Replace income lost from enrolling a child in school (to low-income families), based on income contributed to the family or work the child performed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Income Substitution</td>
<td>Replaces income lost from removing a child from work through debt relief, revolving loans, healthcare, or apprenticeship training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Food Subsidies</td>
<td>Provide food for families, outside of the school, such as with many “food for work” programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Family Member Replacement of Former Child Worker</td>
<td>Substitutes the labor of children with that of an underemployed or unemployed adult (family) member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development Programs</td>
<td>Address the multiple deprivations that contribute to abusive child labor, including poor living conditions and the lack of basic services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income-generating Activities</td>
<td>Create economic opportunities for poor families and reduce their dependency on the income of young people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Incentives</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td>Trains teachers with practical skills and relevant knowledge to assist working children in school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local School Management</td>
<td>Involves the community in the management of local school (including hiring of teachers), giving them a greater stake in their success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprenticeships, School-to-work, and Safe Work</td>
<td>Help children combine safe work and study, at least until better arrangements can be made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for School Administrators</td>
<td>Provides incentives based on periodic performance reviews and/or the ability of the school to attract and retain at-risk children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive Learning Scripts (Modules or Frameworks)</td>
<td>Provides scripts, modules, and textbooks that make learning experiences more interesting, useful, and relevant for children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent-oriented Early Stimulation Programs</td>
<td>Early stimulation (talking, telling stories, or singing together) may reduce learning problems of children once they enroll in school.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Economic Incentives

Economic incentives affect the ability of households to afford schooling, when applied while considering variables such as the attitudes and aspirations of families, the real and perceived value of attending school, and the confidence in the school system (McGinn and Borden 1995, 175). Scholarships, vouchers, and school feeding programs can influence some of these variables, although decisions are still highly dependent on events or circumstances at the household level. Paying poor families to keep their children in school may be useful as an income transfer mechanism, but may not be effective in improving performance if students repeat grades so that their parents can continue receiving money. Descriptions of twelve types of economic incentives follow.

School Fee Waivers

Waivers are designed to cover the direct costs of schooling. Only the specific child for whom the waiver is intended can use them, and they cannot be transferred or used for any other purpose. Schools report child attendance to the administrative authority, public or private, which provides compensation. Although this is a popular and effective method used extensively in many parts of the developing world to target subsidies to children most in need, it is prone to nepotism and abuse.

Vouchers

Vouchers allow children and parents to seek schooling from an institution of their choice, provided the school is recognized under the voucher scheme. Vouchers are similar to school fee waivers, in that they subsidize schools of choice, and pay schools according to their ability to enroll and retain children. This incentive makes the supply of school services responsive to demand, while providing direct subsidies for parents to keep their children enrolled (Schiefelbein 1997, 27). There are both government and private-funded voucher systems, and voucher payments are made to families “…to enable their children to enter public or private schools of their choice. The stated purpose is usually to increase parental choice, to promote school competition and to allow low-income families access to private schools” (West 1996, 1). Evidence suggests that voucher systems have positive effects on the quality and outreach of educational services (Levin 1998; 1999), but there are also arguments against vouchers (Wilms 1996; Martinez et al. 1996).

Scholarships

Scholarship programs are a popular and powerful incentive to a child’s participation and performance in school. In some programs, cash grants are only provided for each day the child attends school (Anker and Melkas 1995, 30). In Bangladesh, former garment workers have been provided an attendance-based monthly allowance, which they were encouraged to save in a bank account. In other cases, cash grants have been provided following the completion of the

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5 See Brown, et al. (2001) for a discussion of household-level decision making, poverty, and child labor.
school term, semester, or full school year. For child labor programs, scholarships can be linked to criteria other than school performance, including household income, participation in particular kinds of work, or living in a female-headed household.

**In-Kind Support**

In-kind support can cover the costs that other incentive programs do not, such as transportation, uniforms, books, and supplies. Because such costs are often prohibitively expensive for poor families, providing in-kind support is an effective way to shift the decision away from work and toward school. Free textbooks, uniforms, and shoes are becoming increasingly common in Latin America as a way to reduce the direct costs of schooling (Schiefelbein 1997, 12). Teachers and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers usually achieve community and school “outreach” by making home visits to assess needs and distribute the required materials. In-kind support can be provided directly to the child in school or to the household. However, this kind of support may bring corruption, and goods may be sold by the family.

**School Feeding**

School feeding programs have two purposes: (i) to encourage children to attend school; and (ii) to improve their nutritional status and learning capacity. While feeding programs almost always attract many new students, evidence is less clear whether the nutritional supplements improve the performance of students or the effectiveness of the school (Pollit 1990). Where “children are already in school…lunch programs are not alone likely to retain them there.” (Anker and Melkas 1995, 24). School meals cannot replace overall improvements in school quality, because the enrollment it fosters is independent of service quality. Parents and children still need confidence that schooling is useful and relevant. Cost is also a limiting factor since food subsidies can quickly become too expensive unless mechanisms are found for targeting assistance only to those children in greatest need. In summary, a school feeding program should make a larger impact in areas/communities with low rates of school enrollment, school attendance, literacy, and/or income.

**School Health Care**

Schools are an important mechanism to deliver medication and medical treatment for children at risk of disease and accidents (Pollit 1990). Simple treatments are often sufficient to treat a wide range of preventable and curable diseases, such as parasitic infections, diarrhea, micronutrient deficiencies, and malnutrition. James Williams and Kay Leherr (1998) examined data collected in the Volta Region of Ghana to explore the relationship between nutritional/health status and educational achievement. Data included information on the status of parasite infection, physical characteristics, and the presence of hemoglobin, iodine, and vitamin A. The study found that de-worming and health education improved school achievement in the project area, although it did not improve attendance significantly.

**Cash Grant Compensation—Direct and Indirect Costs**

Cash grants to families are intended to replace income lost by removing a child from work and enrolling him/her in school. Cash grants enable families to use the money as they choose. There are many criteria for determining who receives benefits, including, but not limited to, the socio-economic status of the family, the type of work in which the child is engaged, and the amount of money

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6 See also Liang (1996a) regarding the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Assistance Project and the provision of scholarships.
that the child contributes to the family income. Payments may be made directly to the child or deposited in a family bank account for as long as the child attends school. Cash stipends may not work in an economy that is not monetized or that has an inefficient bank system.

Partial Income Substitution in Cash or Kind

When children are removed from hazardous work activities, the job loss triggers a series of reactions at the household level. With the habit of relying on the income contribution of the child, no matter how small, families may find themselves in severe economic hardship. Cash or in-kind contributions can be made to partially substitute for this lost income. There are examples of income substitution programs that target children when they initially lose their jobs, in order to alleviate the immediate shock to the household. Income substitution may come in the form of “debt relief, revolving loans, health facilities, and apprenticeship training” (Anker and Melkas 1995, 25). However, these alternatives are prone to nepotism and abuse. Better examples include vocational training of mothers and the provision of full employment for adult members of the same family.

Household Food Subsidies

The provision of food or food subsidies for poor families has a long history. The United Nations’ World Food Program (WFP) sponsored a variety of adult food for work programs in the developing world (see Chapter IV). Food subsidies are provided to families according to their socio-economic status and the education status of their children. To date, such programs have not been targeted for families with children in the worst forms of labor although many working children have certainly benefited under such programs.

Adult Family Member Replacement of Former Child Workers

Labor replacement programs are designed to remove children from work and provide employment opportunities for an underemployed or unemployed adult worker from the same family. There are few examples of success with this particular approach, at least partially because children are often engaged in work that adults refuse to do, and because the approach ignores the internal family motivations that sent the child to work in the first place. Most evidence suggests that the viability and sustainability of adult replacement workers for child labor is more mythical than real (Anker et al. 1998; Basu and Van 1998a; 1998b). However, more study regarding general, non-family adult labor recruitment for certain jobs vacated by children, is needed.

7 See Bissell (2001) and Bissell and Sobhan (1996) for a detailed discussion of cash or in-kind contributions.

8 It is noteworthy that this was the reason for the provision of a stipend to children who lost their jobs in the Bangladeshi garment sector.
Community Development Programs

Community development activities in areas with a prevalence of child labor are indirect, but effective, incentives to address the multiple deprivations resulting from poor living conditions and a lack of basic services. For instance, a community with poor or prohibitively expensive healthcare facilities may prompt families to send children to work to pay for the costs of a family medical emergency. Improving health care and making credit available could become an important indirect incentive for families to send their children to school. Community mobilization and awareness-raising activities could provide many unexpected synergies when support is provided to grassroots organizations. Health and nutrition programs, including those that make clean water and sanitation facilities available, may improve attendance and learning by reducing the incidence of preventable disease.

Income-generating Activities

Micro-enterprise development, credit, and employment training for adults are successful approaches for raising overall income and self-sufficiency levels. The success of linking this strategy to the protection and the education of young people, however, is an area for study and debate. In theory, new income sources would reduce the dependency of the family on the income or the labor of young people. However, the creation of new business opportunities may create new demand for labor by the household, and actually keep children away from school. More needs to be examined about the utility of these programs in reducing child labor and ways to adjust existing systems so that they better serve the needs of working children and their families.

Education Incentives

Education incentives should improve the efficiency of schools and other education providers, to make them more responsive to the needs of children. By rewarding the schools that enroll, retain, and educate children, incentives can make it lucrative for education providers to reach out and provide services to these children. According to the CRC, and the agreements reached in Jomtien (1990) and Dakar (2000), primary schooling of quality should be compulsory and free to all. Many countries, however, still have not enacted free compulsory schooling laws, and those that have laws have not enforced them and continue their struggle to reach children in marginal areas. Even when free schooling is legislated, children may not attend because there are no schools available, they cannot afford the associated costs, learning is not relevant, or their birth was not registered. In some instances, incentives that improve the quality of education are sufficient to affect the decision to enroll children in school and keep them there—a primary challenge for decreasing the prevalence of abusive child labor.

Improved Teacher Training

Given the primary role of teachers in students’ learning, sound initial training or practical in-service upgrading is a way to increase school enrollment and retention of at-risk children. Relevant incentives could include: upgraded initial training, in-service and refresher training, commendation and promotion based on the attendance and performance of students, and cash incentives to reach out to children in exploitative labor and get them in schools. Building the capacity of teachers is highly dependent on making other aspects of their working environment more tolerable, most importantly to pay them a living wage so that they can have the income necessary to support themselves and their family (McGinn and Borden 1995, 52).

9 Births are often not registered because the absence of birth records enables families to marry off daughters at a young age.

10 See Bissell and Sobhan (1996) and Bissell (2001) for a discussion of the role of teachers and support for them as a form of incentive. Also see World Bank Nd.d.: 30.
Local School Management

There is a recent international trend toward educational decentralization to bring the decision-making responsibilities and financial management to the local level. Involving local community members, especially parents and students, can improve the performance of schools and establish the accountability necessary for schools to better serve their constituencies. They can also support the development of relevant curriculum that may serve as an incentive to children’s participation in school. Methods previously discussed are common mechanisms to transfer control, including vouchers, school improvement grants, and direct transfers (Schiefelbein 1997, 13).

Apprenticeships, School-work, and Safe Work

Apprenticeship programs are traditional methods of facilitating the transfer of vocational skills between generations. The method of “learning by doing” is a powerful way to build the capacity of young people to take advantage of opportunities in the local economy. In most instances, this approach is more cost-effective and sustainable than formal vocational training, which is highly dependent on inputs from student tuition and government funding. While apprenticeships are effective, they also have the potential to contribute to the exploitation of young people and their absence from school. In many cases, families pay for the opportunity of children to work under abusive conditions. As the educational value of the experience declines, apprenticeships can become an exploitative relationship that provides little or no pay and little job skill attainment.

Work-and-study programs aim to decrease the exploitation and increase the educational results of apprenticeship relationships. This often entails the merger of school and work into a schedule that meets the needs of the employer, while improving the learning opportunities of children and protecting them from abuse. The programs enable children to attend school in the morning and work in the afternoon, or vice versa, with an emphasis on flexible schedules and interesting curricula. Work-and-study programs are challenged to balance the interest of education providers and employers.

Support for School Administrators

In Latin America, incentive programs have been established for school administrators, principals, and teachers based on the belief that poor schooling is driving children to the workplace. Innovative incentive mechanisms include: (i) hiring staff for an academic year, after which their performance and attendance are evaluated to determine the feasibility of a contract extension; (ii) paying cash incentives to administrators and other staff, based on performance and the ability of the school to attract and retain children; or (iii) awarding operating costs to school councils based on their ability to improve the overall performance of the school, according to school enrollment and retention indicators. These types of incentives may be restricted if local decisions are constrained by central norms, there are few resources to manage, or indicators of performance require an efficient national testing system.
Development of Interactive Learning Scripts (Modules or Frameworks)

Inappropriate and uninteresting lesson plans are a cause of poor school performance and high dropout rates (McGinn and Borden 1995, 110). Teaching strategies are often neglected despite their primary role in educational quality. Interesting, useful, and relevant learning scripts (modules or frameworks) can improve the appeal of school and improve retention when families and children perceive a net gain for the child and the family. As a result, social mobilization and awareness-raising activities are keys to success. The overriding objective is to test and revise learning materials to a level that results in a higher probability that children will be better prepared for the labor market and more capable of becoming entrepreneurs and business developers (Slavin 2002, 15). Society, however, may expect teachers to generate good learning processes individually and may not be willing to invest in developing reliable materials.

Information for Parents to Provide Early Stimulation

Mass media information concerning the role parents play in providing early stimulation may help to reduce learning problems of their children. Simple activities like asking questions, reading a short story at bedtime, and smiling, singing and talking with infants may contribute to better performance in school. These activities involve minimal cost, yet make a significant, long-term impact on learning.

Targeting Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances

Incentives may also be effective in reintegrating into society and school those children experiencing especially difficult circumstances, including war, slavery, or loss of parents. For USAID, priority has been given to children in the worst forms of child labor, consistent with the 1999 ILO Convention 182. However, economic and education incentives and assistance must be targeted and well planned, and should take into consideration the social and economic context. While it is impossible to generalize for all cases, the following examples illustrate the use of complementary incentives to reduce different forms of abusive child labor in rather extreme situations.

War-affected Children

Children who have been exposed to war, either as soldiers or victims, can benefit from school attendance, especially when a vocational component is included. No other intervention offers children the stability or semblance of stability that attending school can provide. Incentives can play a valuable role in making this normalizing influence available to children. Given exposure to a range of potentially damaging influences, incentives to attend school may only partially address the needs of these children. In such instances, opportunities for relocation and reintegration with the family together with psycho-social counseling may be needed to help heal the scars of combat and abuse. However, planners and policy makers need to give careful thought to what is most appropriate, given that teachers are usually neither trained nor paid to provide such services or special training.
**Child Trafficking and Slavery**

The trafficking of children for forced labor or sexual exploitation is a pervasive and prevalent problem throughout the world, with many established markets and trade routes. A child is trafficked whenever there is an intermediary, a transaction, and the motive to exploit the child. The primary challenge is to locate the children and return them to their parents. If parents are part of the exploitation ring, however, the primary challenge becomes establishing monitoring systems that ensure that the children are working under acceptable conditions with access to school. As with most exploitative child labor situations, there are not any easy answers, but schools can form an essential link between employers and those interested in assisting with the schooling of the child. Transit centers can help children contact their parents and make arrangements to return home or to be placed in an alternative safe living environment, while learning basic literacy or vocational skills.

**Commercial Sex Workers**

For children involved in commercial sex work, economic incentives may need to be combined with other strategies to convince children to give up their work, enroll in education programs, and remain there. There are children involved in prostitution who attend school while continuing to prostitute themselves, especially in those areas where the trade is accepted by the community or their peers (Montgomery 2000). In such cases, social marketing and social mobilization programs may be helpful in creating demand for schooling and for withdrawing children from dangerous sexual activity. As stated by Heather Montgomery, who researched child prostitution in Thai slums, “...economic incentives may alleviate symptoms of deprivation; developing new livelihoods and welfare systems is a much larger challenge” (Montgomery 2000, 196).

**AIDS-affected Children**

With the growing pandemic of HIV/AIDS in Africa and elsewhere, many children have become victims, orphans, or care providers. In such cases, even a small incentive could give a child the resources needed to pay school fees, obtain health services or medical care for themselves or family members, purchase medicines, or buy even a few hours of assistance from a caregiver and free the child to participate in school. Social mobilization programs could also help communities to better understand the disease, and to provide children with the psychological and social support they need.

**Factory Workers**

As evidenced in Bangladesh, children who abruptly leave their jobs—whether willingly or unwillingly—are especially vulnerable. For such children, a small stipend or scholarship could mean the difference between attending school and immediately seeking other work, possibly in even more exploitative situations. An incentive can take the edge off the sudden loss in income and “buy” the time needed for children to review options and reorient themselves to their new sit-
The possibility of delivering such support should be explored through the local school. The economic incentive may be combined with “legal disincentives” (truancy, labor, or health laws; mass media advocacy; and legal prosecution and sanctions).

**Launching Complementary Strategies**

USAID should seek to progress incrementally toward the integration of educational development, economic incentives, and legal reform while fighting the fatalistic view that child labor is a consequence of poverty and traditions (Mull and Elkins 2002, 7). It is easier to make educational opportunities available to at-risk children and prevent abusive child labor, than to reintegrate child laborers into society and school. Building confidence and success in simple *prevention* projects is therefore the basis for eventually designing more complex *rehabilitation* or *protection* projects in the future.

To be effective, comprehensive incentive programs should have one key component that is easy to implement and capable of making an impact by itself, which would be improved by other complementary components that are more difficult to implement, but never reduced if the complementary components do not succeed. The program should be the sum of separate initiatives, but not affected if one of those initiatives fails. Complementary components might include legal reform (compulsory primary schooling or minimum age for workers), monitoring of the situation of working children, social welfare policies, social mobilization, symbolic rewards, promotion of early stimulation, or anti-drug campaigns (Fallon and Tzannatos 1998, 8).
IV. USING ECONOMIC INCENTIVE PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND RE-ENROLL CHILD LABORERS

The economic incentive programs presented in this chapter have been successful in increasing school enrollments and therefore effective in coping with child labor through prevention or reenrollment in school after becoming involved in exploitative situations. In these programs, incentives have been applied in creative ways to reduce costs or increase family income, thereby increasing the demand for education by children working in exploitative situations or at risk of becoming involved in the worst forms of child labor.

Descriptions are organized by region of the world to demonstrate the widespread presence of the child labor problem and the varied applications of the various interventions. School feeding programs as well as stipend, scholarship, or voucher initiatives have been effectively applied to improve school enrollment and attendance. Because women’s empowerment is important to ending child labor, many of the programs highlighted focus on enrolling and keeping girls in school. The scope of the following interventions can be compared with the causes of child labor (Table 1 in Chapter II) and the summary table (Table 2) presented in Chapter III.

It is interesting to note that the reviewers found few attempts to combine economic and education incentives. Coincidentally, the programs highlighted present mixed results in terms of quality of education. Because of this, to further enhance success, implementation of incentive projects may need to be combined with education incentives that are described in Chapter V. There are other drawbacks with implementation of these incentives as well. These are commented on after each description.

Finally, these examples of economic incentive programs only serve as an introduction to these as well as a range of possible interventions. The reference list at the end of this document (and some selected website addresses included in that list) may be useful for readers interested in more detailed materials that relate to specific projects. Other incentive-type programs are presented in a previous study of the ECACL series (Mull and Elkins 2001, 18).

Worldwide

Global Food for Education Project (GFFE)

The Global Food for Education Project (GFFE), one of the largest incentive programs ever embarked upon, was developed by the United States in response to the Education for All (EFA) initiative articulated at the conference in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990. Managed by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), GFFE received strong support from United States Governor George McGovern and Senator Bob Dole and was instituted by President Bill Clinton in July 2000.
The goal of GFFE is to increase access to schooling while helping to meet the nutritional needs of children. By linking the goals of nutrition and education, the program intends to support long-term education-related goals such as improved workforce development, health care, and family planning. The program donates surplus foodstuffs, including wheat, beans, and maize, which are partially distributed to schools and partially sold to raise money for administrative and project-related expenses. In the first year, the $300 million project funded 53 programs in 38 countries, with a beneficiary group of 8.3 million children.

An interim assessment of the GFFE program by the General Accounting Office (2002) found a number of problems with the implementation of the project in the first year. The report detailed how the project did not build on lessons learned from previous food for education programs or harness the managerial and other resources necessary for food logistics, management, and control. The food cost of US $34 per child per academic year is high given that the lowest income countries spend only an average of US $20 per year per student. In addition, the food distribution created an artificial demand for services, and most school systems could not keep up with the demand for education services, let alone increase quality.

Despite such problems, there is potential for improvement if lessons learned from implementation are more fully incorporated into the program design. More research on the capacity of nutritional supplements to improve educational performance could be helpful. In addition, a USAID report found in two poor communities in Haiti and St. Martin that a basic diet for an adult (1500 calories and 30 grams of protein) costs about $4.80 per month, and the school meal ration (800 calories and 40 grams of protein) has a similar value. This cost represented about half of the average monthly income of the families. In such a context, “a poor family would have been irrational not to send as many children to school as possible” (Easton and Fass 1989,189). The implications of this type of incentive are illustrated in the Bangladesh: Food for Schooling Program that follows.

**Asia and the Near East**

**Bangladesh: Food for Schooling Program**

In 1993, the government of Bangladesh began implementation of the Food for Schooling (FFS) Program, one of the first large-scale national school feeding programs. FFS was designed to be responsive to the needs of children from poor families who do not attend school either because their families cannot afford expenses such as tuition or supplies, or because the children’s contribution to the family cannot be spared. The program provided the families with a food incentive: 15-20 kg of food that can be consumed by the family or sold to meet school-related expenses.

To be eligible, the family must meet one or more of the following four criteria: (i) the household is landless or near landless, owning less than half an acre; (ii) the head of household works as a day laborer; (iii) the head of household is female (widowed, separated, or divorced or the husband is disabled) or the family wage earner(s) are in low-income profession(s); and (iv) the child attends at least 85 percent of classes per month. By 2000, the pilot project reached 17,811 public and private primary schools, accounting for about 27 percent of all primary schools in Bangladesh. Out of 5.2 million students enrolled in FFS schools, ut 40 percent (2.1 million students) receive food grains through FFS.

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11 The cost of an academic school year is calculated as the product of 180 school days x 19¢ per day.
The program achieved mixed results. It immediately increased student enrollment by 35 percent (a remarkable increase of 44 percent for girls and 28 percent for boys). However, the student/teacher ratio increased from 63 to 76 students per teacher and student achievement scores dropped, as did merit-based scholarship awards. The program did not fully meet its outreach objectives, because the 13 percent of eligible families with school-age children that did not participate were often much poorer than beneficiaries of the program.

Bangladesh: Factory Worker Stipend Program

In the mid-1990s, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was reached between the Government of Bangladesh and the ILO to move children from exploitative work in garment factories to school. Under the terms of the agreement, children were provided with a stipend of 300 taka per month (roughly US $9). The designers of the MOU, guided by local child labor activists, envisaged the stipend as partial income substitution that would enable children to avoid work in exploitative or hazardous situations.

The program approach had mixed results and brought with it an emotionally charged debate. In most cases, stipends were pooled into the household resources and consumed immediately. Most of the children reported that their stipend money was needed mostly to buy food, followed by the need to pay household rent. The needs for cash varied between girls and boys. Research found that most boys sampled were working part-time for cash payment, while collecting the stipend and attending school. In contrast, most girls receiving the stipend and enrolled in school worked in the family home for no money, given the lack of wage employment opportunities available for females (Liang 1996a, 19). The only exceptions were the girls who worked as domestics before or after school. The range of occupations of families participating in the program showed the need for using the stipend. The most lucrative profession was garment work, yielding an adult wage of approximately 2000 taka per month. Entrepreneurs, such as a tailor shop owner, had sporadic earnings. Other professions showed a monthly income of between 1000 and 1700 taka. Day laborers, rickshaw pullers, and others engaged in work dependent on weather were the most vulnerable. In this context, the fact that families needed supplementary income was not surprising.

Bangladesh: Female Secondary School Stipend Program

In 1993, the World Bank started the Secondary School Stipend Program to address the economic, cultural, and religious factors depressing the demand for girls’ education. While not targeted to the worst forms of child labor, the program was designed to help parents accommodate the high educational costs of secondary education for girls. The program strategy is to augment family income to enable them to afford school costs and motivate parents to keep their girls in school. “[T]he private cost of secondary education…represents a significant proportion of disposable income for rural households after covering basic needs for food, clothing and shelter.” (Liang 1996b, 3). The stipend, which is the major component of the program, is provided in a coordinated package of other inter-
ventions. Stipends, amounting to between 30 and 54 percent of direct secondary schooling costs, are paid directly into bank accounts set up for the girls. A girl who successfully completes all five years leading to the secondary school certificate will have received a total of US $107 (Liang 1996b, 5). Tuition assistance is also provided under the program, although this assistance is provided directly to the school. The program is managed locally by parent-teacher associations and school-level coordinators. District management committees oversee local management, and a district education officer is the link between the district and central program implementation officials.

An evaluation found that the program was “another successful example of providing monetary incentives for girls to reduce the direct cost of schooling and to encourage participation” (Liang 1996a, abstract). It assisted in the enrollment of female secondary school students in 118 districts who met specific eligibility criteria. In addition, another study reported some evidence to suggest that increases in primary school completion rates were at least partially due to the financial support that was provided at the secondary level (Khandker, Pitt, and Fuwa 2003).

At the time of the Liang report, the Government planned to expand the program to 460 rural areas, financing 282 districts with its own funds (Liang 1996b, 4). No attempts have been made to draw conclusions on the impact of the program on the worst forms of child labor involving girls.

**Pakistan: Direct Payment to Schools Based on Enrollment in Balochistan**

The Balochistan intervention provides financing for schools based on the ability to serve girls, the beneficiary group. Payments are made directly to schools, based on female enrollment levels. The village organization is granted a sum of about US $4 per child per month. The money is then budgeted entirely at the discretion of the organization, going toward such expenses as teacher salaries or supplies, or into a community savings fund. Enrollment grants are provided to schools when they are established. This helps to pay for materials, supplies, and other facilities. Annual grants with a maximum of US $800 per school per year are made to the school, with slight increases in future years, which provides the basis for ongoing maintenance costs. Boys are permitted to attend the schools, but no funds are awarded to the community organization for their attendance. In addition to the funds for girls’ enrollment and attendance, the school receives a bonus of US $2 per month for every month a girl attends, up to a maximum of US $100. This bonus is paid once per year at the end of the school year.

The program is implemented in rural and urban components. In rural communities, the Government of Pakistan uses funds to leverage private sector support. Teachers’ salaries are paid with public funds, while buildings and land are donated by the private sector. To be eligible, a village must: (i) be part of a larger community support program; (ii) lack any government school facilities; (iii) have an existing village organization; and (iv) have an enrollment of at least 25 girls between the ages of 5 and 10 years.

The Balochistan project is noteworthy because it is the private/NGO sector, not the state, that has assumed responsibility for delivering primary education (Liang 1996c, 1). It demonstrates that the provision through private/NGO providers can be a cost-effective strategy from the government point of view. Less government funds are provided since there is strong...
private and community input. There is strong accountability to the community, by the teacher, and the school managers, given their inter-relationship and the decision-making authority of the community. Preliminary evidence from Balochistan suggests that community vouchers can be an effective policy tool for stimulating educational demand and equalizing opportunities for girls (Liang 1996c, 1). Moreover, it is possible to affect the quality of schooling offered under this scheme.

An urban version of the project began in Quetta, Pakistan in 1994. Again, the project involved the private sector in areas where there are no government schools. Parent education committees were established in poor communities, consisting mainly of the parents of eligible primary school children. Schools were provided with subsidies sufficient to cover the costs of hiring one teacher as well as some recurrent costs for “every 25 girls age 5 to 8 attending school” (Liang 1996c, 4). The emphasis was on generating enrollment of large numbers of girls, so schools with less than 50 girls do not receive any money. Subsidies are not provided for enrolled boys or for girls who are over 8 years of age.

The following additional features are common to both the rural and urban schemes: (i) they are entirely private with no government involvement in education delivery; (ii) scholarships are provided to the community as a whole, empowering better community level decision making; (iii) only new schools are supported, helping to concentrate schooling in hard-to-reach areas; (iv) teachers must have at least a 10th grade education and attend a teacher training program; (v) class size should be less than 50, irrespective of gender composition; (vi) schools still have the right to charge parents a small fee; and (vii) no grants are provided for boys who attend (Liang 1996b, 5).

Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Save the Children Foundation (SCF) Child Soldier Reintegration Program

In poor neighborhoods of Kinshasa, DRC, SCF and its NGO partners currently operate the USAID-funded Social Welfare, Protection, and Inclusion Program, which targets demobilized child soldiers, ex-prostitutes, street children, and children treated as witches. The program offers protection for the children and provides education, health care, and income-generation activities. Scholarships are also provided to children so they can afford to attend school. The demobilized soldiers living with their families raise rabbits and vegetables and participate in other income-generation projects to increase their family income (see boxes). Rabbits are provided to children who enroll in the school program.

SCF has plans to cooperate with the DRC’s National Office for Demobilization and Reintegration (BUNADER) in the anticipated government demobilization and reintegration program. SCF is expecting to train teachers and care-providers, and raise awareness of adults to the special needs of child soldiers.
Child Soldier Transit Center, Kinshasa

This boy is an 11-year-old demobilized child soldier. His father is absent and he lives with his mother. At the age of 9, he left his family without telling his mother and joined the army. He then spent six months at a training camp, but was never sent to the front line. Life in the army was very different than he expected, so he left and came back home. When asked why he became a soldier, he replied, “For the money.....”

He now participates in a project operated by Alliance de Secour Chretien pour le Developpement de l'Enfant (ASCDE) with support from Save the Children Foundation-UK that is located in a poor neighborhood of Kinshasa, operated in an abandoned factory. The children are involved in rabbit breeding and small garden projects to generate income.

"Now I raise rabbits, thanks to this project. With the money I earn, I study electricity and do some work. One day I hope to be an electrical engineer. Maybe one day I'll study abroad and become a real expert."


Paysanat Child Soldier Transit Center

18-year-old demobilized child soldier

"I was a street child. When I heard (former) President Laurent Kabila was recruiting, I decided to join up. I had no job, and was doing nothing. I had finished primary school. At 16, I went to a training camp to join the 3rd Brigade. I went to the front in Equateur province at Basankusu. I stayed there seven months learning how to use heavy weapons-rocket launchers, mortars, and 60 PCM, as well as light weapons. We had been doing nothing, and the good side was that we made friends and some money. The bad side was the killing. We saw many people die, and we killed many people. I regret this fact, and I'm sorry for the families of these young people. Adults send kids to war. That's the problem."

"After the battle we returned to Kinshasa. I came to Paysanat, began breeding rabbits, and doing a course in metalwork to make chairs, doors, and other furniture. My dream is to start a metalworking company that will employ others and stop them from going to war. I ask the United States and rich countries to stop making weapons that kill people in Africa. We need to make peace in Congo. Rich countries should send money so that people can go to school instead of going to war. Many foreigners come and take our pictures, but we wonder if they actually do anything for us. We need something practical like money, and a chance to go to school."
Kenya: The Jua Kali Pilot Voucher Project

The long-term goal of the Jua Kali Project is to enhance private sector entrepreneurship, and reduce employment and income constraints in the informal sector in Kenya. While program documentation makes no reference to child labor alleviation, the program clearly targets economically active young people of school age. The project manages a micro and small enterprise fund that is disbursed through a voucher mechanism for training courses that typically last between two and six weeks. Applicants are entitled to as many vouchers as needed to cover the costs of their training, though they are expected to pay at least 10 percent of the training costs. To screen for serious applicants, everyone must pay an application fee. “Funding is entirely demand driven, and individual choice is also respected” (Liang 1996b, 1). Services are offered for individuals in the private and the public sectors.

Zimbabwe: Earn and Learn Program

In the Eastern Highland of Zimbabwe, a company runs schools on their tea estates and coffee plantations, so that children can earn school fees while they attend school (Bourdillon 2001). This is a valuable approach in a country where children make up about half of the population, and where the AIDS pandemic has contributed to the high rate of child-headed households. Children attending school are not required to work on the estate. However, these convenient, high quality schools are a good substitute for state schools that charge fees and have problems with quality. While the schools are reported to have higher standards, they also charge higher fees.

The earn and learn scheme employs children over the age of 13. They attend school in the morning, are provided with lunch, and work in the fields of the estate from two to five in the afternoon. The project operates mainly in the winter months during the harvest season, and children are paid standard rates for the tea or coffee they pick. Children stop work at 4:30 in mid-winter to allow them time to return home before dark. They are expected to work Saturday mornings but this is not enforced. During the summer months, when there is little work, children sometimes are given tasks of weeding the fields. If they do not have work, they are not paid. In periods of no work, the school organizes games and activities for the children in the afternoons (Bourdillon 2001, 1). The program also operates a boarding school where children from various parts of the country reside free of charge. During harvest the children are paid the same rate as adults, although schools fees and meal charges are deducted. The Government pays roughly 55 percent of the costs for running the schools, while the company pays the balance. The most promising students are also offered scholarships by the company so they can pursue higher education (Bourdillon 2001, 2). While the cost of labor is not cheaper in the program, management appreciates the consistent labor supply.

The program is controversial because tea plucking is hard work. In some cases, work conditions are poor, and children may not have rest breaks or access to toilet facilities. Moreover, the long working days cause children to fall asleep in
class (Bourdillon 2001, 2). However, the issue is not whether children should work but how much they should work, and the program must be assessed based on a fuller understanding of the context of their living conditions (Bourdillon 2001, 3). In most cases, the families of these children expect them to contribute, and the communities do not regard working children with the same “horror” as people in more affluent societies.

*Côte d’Ivoire: PROSAF Rural Transports Systems Program*

In Côte d’Ivoire, isolation and the lack of transportation present problems for children and families in many rural areas. In some villages, children have to walk 14 kilometers each day to school; thus, the mother often prefers to keep them in the fields with her.

In 1998, the World Bank funded a pilot project with Promotion de la santé de la femme (PROSAF) to help establish and improve the conditions of rural transports systems and thereby improve the lives of rural communities. In the PROSAF program, meeting the rural transportation needs is addressed from a gender perspective, and building the capacity of women and men in the matter of participatory rural transports development is a primary objective. The village of Kounihiri near Beoumi is the site of the pilot.

One component of the pilot project is the Moto Program, which provides "small motos" or motorbikes to rural communities to help alleviate local transportation problems. The project helps to procure inexpensive motos, provides training for drivers, clears paths, and prepares roads. Each "moto," which is equipped with a carriage that can accommodate up to eight small children, is used to complete a variety of daily tasks—including fetching and distributing water, gathering firewood, helping agricultural extension workers reach the field, and daily transporting children to and from school. The motos are also used by village chiefs to take censuses of the births in order to plan for school enrollment from year to year and to conduct free vaccination campaigns.

Since the project has been implemented, dramatic increases in school attendance have been noted by community leaders. Children are no longer needed to serve as porters of water, cocoa, coffee, yams, mangos, and firewood, and many have a means of getting to school.

*Latin America and the Caribbean*

*Mexico: PROGRESA*

Established in Mexico in 1997, the Program for Education, Health, and Nutrition, or Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA), aims to address the integral needs of rural and indigenous communities, with a special emphasis on women and children living in poverty. It is one of the few programs that specifically focuses on eliminating child labor and increasing school enrollment through the use of stipends.

Under PROGRESA, boys and girls receive equal stipend amounts to attend primary school. At the secondary level, girls receive larger stipends than boys to help equalize the differential in school attendance between boys and girls while supporting equal access to school entry at the primary level. About 24 million persons, mostly families with income in the lowest 20 percent, have accessed the program.
A preliminary impact evaluation found that the rate of school participation has increased, with a greater effect on the participation of girls (Schultz 2001). It is still unclear, however, to what extent increased education participation has reduced exploitative child labor practices.

Guatemala: Eduque a la Niña: Girls’ Scholarship

The USAID-funded Eduque a la Nina program, which provides scholarships to increase girls’ participation in schooling, responds to a widespread problem of low enrollment by young girls in Guatemala. Moreover, half of all rural children who enroll in school never reach the fourth grade (Liang and Marble 1996, 1). The program works through parent committees and community outreach workers, who are responsible for reaching out to eligible girls and their families. Scholarships are distributed through parent scholarship committees assigned as part of the overall project. The scholarship of only US $4 per month is provided 11 months of the year, and is about one quarter of the average monthly income for women with less than one year of schooling in Guatemala (Liang and Marble 1996, 2). The criteria for participation include: (i) enrolling in public primary schools in one of the twelve participating rural communities; (ii) being between the ages of 7 and 14, preferably in grades 1 through 3; (iii) having access to only limited economic resources; and (iv) having the interest and consent of parents.

An evaluation of the program conducted five months into implementation suggests that the approach is expensive, although it has effectively improved school attendance, dropout rate, active participation, and teacher attendance. There is no indication of the impact of the program on the participation of girls in the worst forms of child labor.

Brazil: Bolsa Escola

The Bolsa Escola Scholarship Program, which was introduced in 1995 to eliminate poverty-induced school dropout, was the first to target child laborers in Brazil. The program provides a monthly stipend, or bolsa, to low-income families for as long as children between the ages of 7 and 14 remain in school. (The amount is roughly the equivalent of a minimum wage, or about US $128 per month, irrespective of family size.) In addition, a deposit of about US $90 is made into a savings account of each child if the child is successful in completing that year and is promoted to the next grade (Vawda 1997, 1). Extra classes are provided for academically challenged children who would be forced to drop out of the scholarship program. The criteria for participation include five years residency in the city, a family income less than US $50 per month per person, school attendance by all school-aged children with no more than two absences per month, and all unemployed parents actively seeking employment. The overall budget for the program is US $29 million, benefiting 44,382 children.

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12 This sum was determined according to the experience of AGES, a local non-governmental organization. They tried to determine “a sum that would entice parents to send their daughters to school, but would not completely cover their opportunity cost” (Liang and Marble 1996, 2).
Evaluations of the project by both UNICEF and the Institute for Applied Economic Research indicate that the program contributed to a reduction in both dropout and grade repetition, and enrollment rates have also increased\(^\text{13}\) (Vawda 1997, 2). In Brasilia and other satellite towns, the number of children attending school nearly doubled (Jefer 2003).

**Latin America: Fe y Alegria**

Fe y Alegria (meaning faith and happiness) is a public service educational organization with a program that offers both formal and informal programs for school-age children and adults in various countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Education is provided largely through education centers, which integrate community participation and flexible service programs that provide efficient, cost-effective solutions for the varied problems encountered by underprivileged children and adults. Although it is not a program for children involved in exploitive child labor settings, the Fe y Alegria acknowledges the incidence of child labor in public and FYA schools because of family financial burdens. The schools incorporate seven student-retention strategies that have been identified to help prevent drop out and academic failure in the Latin American and Caribbean Regions: prevention programs; compensatory programs (for children with learning disabilities); flexible grade promotion; active community involvement; economic incentives; preschool programs; and work-study programs for older children.

Fe Alegria schools represent a collaborative effort among perspective governments, communities, and the private sector. In these schools, the Ministry of Education covers the cost of teacher salaries, supervises the standard of education, and provides professional development for education center teachers and principals. Communities participate in the construction of buildings and infrastructure. FYA covers all other costs.

In countries where FYA operates, FYA does not provide direct financial incentives such as cash payments to parents or students. Rather, FYA covers indirect economic incentives in the form of school food programs, payment of direct school expenses (e.g., transportation, school uniforms, and school materials and supplies), or free textbooks. Economic incentives are directly or indirectly financed for the most part through resources generated by the FYA National Office or by the education centers (Swope and Latorre 2000). Technical secondary education programs, which provide education, a protected work experience, and occasionally some income-generating activities at school, discourage early exits from the secondary school.

In 2001, the students and others participating in FYA reached 1,031,527 (829,941 when adjusted for those who participated in more than one program) (Swope and Latorre 2002). In the majority of the countries studied by the researchers, FYA registered lower accrued grade repetition rates, lower definitive dropout rates, and higher global student retention rates than their public school counterparts.

**Performance and Effectiveness of Economic Incentives**

The analyses of the sample programs presented above suggest that economic incentives can increase enrollments, but their impact on child labor has not been evaluated, and there are mixed results in terms of quality of education. The question, “What works and what does not?” cannot be

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\(^{13}\) See also Buarque (2001) for a full description of Bolsa Escola program.
answered because the context varies in each developing country. There is no “general solution” to be presented to decision makers. Alternatives that were defined in Table 2 and analyzed in Table 3 should be considered and adapted according to the existing resources, institutional capacity, traditions, magnitude, expectations, political backing, and/or legal framework in each situation.

To be most effective, economic incentives should be implemented only if resources are available, monitoring is operational, and sustainability is guaranteed (i.e., the future flow of resources can be maintained over time). In addition to these three requisites, key opportunities and constraints posed by each incentive mechanism can be specified. Although the summary presented in Table 3 is by no means complete, USAID programmers and government policy makers can use it as a starting point for a systematic analysis of the use of economic incentives in child labor programs, by including other negative or positive outcomes according to the situation in which the incentives are being deployed.

“...economic incentives should be implemented only if resources are available, monitoring is operational, and sustainability is guaranteed (i.e., the future flow of resources can be maintained over time).”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School Fee Waivers</td>
<td>• Easy to target. Easy to operate.                                             • Because no fees should be charged for primary school—a waiver system may be an indication of the need for reform.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More likely that the recipient of the benefit is the child (i.e., non transferable).</td>
<td>• May support a parallel system of education if private rather than public schools participate in the waiver scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Private or publicly funded.                                                  • Lack of control in the level of expenses. May be expensive.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vouchers</td>
<td>• Easy to target.                                                              • A voucher system may indicate a lack of responsibility of the State to provide free and compulsory education.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can be funded by private organizations, the government, or a combination of both.</td>
<td>• Lack of control in the level of expenses. May be expensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Feeding</td>
<td>• Increases enrollment.                                                       • May stigmatize poorest children if lunches are provided only to the most needy. Creates artificial demand for services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• May improve the ability of poor children to learn (in certain types of diet)</td>
<td>• Does not protect children from child labor after school hours or on holidays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Addresses some of the nutritional needs of children.</td>
<td>• For those children fed while attending school, meals at home may be withheld and given to those children not attending school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Expensive. Not necessarily linked to increases in learning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>• Addresses the relationship between education and poverty by targeting children most in need and families most interested in education.</td>
<td>• Costly. But there is control on the number of scholarships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can monitor and reward attendance effectively.                               • May support two strata of children—those with scholarships and those without.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Children learn how to handle money (i.e., children having their own savings accounts).</td>
<td>• Difficult to determine if child is benefiting from the cash for his or her personal needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Requires management capacity. Possible corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Difficult to sustain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 See West (1996) for a review of waiver and voucher systems.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incentive</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-kind Support</td>
<td>• Addresses the needs of working children who must earn money to afford books, uniforms, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Success of this kind of support is well documented in several parts of the world.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can effectively support intervention through private channels.</td>
<td>• Materials sometimes sold by family rather than used by the child. May need warehouses and transportation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Difficult to target children most in need and may create divisions between the poor and the very poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Recurring costs make approach expensive and may threaten sustainability. Goods may not arrive in time. Possible corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Grants</td>
<td>• Welfare/social service approach may keep children out of the worst forms of work.</td>
<td>• Difficult to target. Needs a banking system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More effective when payments are made to mothers in household.</td>
<td>• Costly. Possible corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can increase potential in female single-headed households.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Income Substitution in</td>
<td>• May protect children from exploitative work.</td>
<td>• Can be costly, difficult to target, and challenging to sustain.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash or Kind</td>
<td>• Does not create a dependency relationship.</td>
<td>• Requires a monetized economy and efficient management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Respects immediate needs of working child families.</td>
<td>• Similar to constraints for the two previous incentives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Subsidies16</td>
<td>• Recognizes the basic needs of recipients.</td>
<td>• Difficult to determine if groups most in need of food (i.e., women and children) receive it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Food may be sold on the 'black market'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

15 Many examples of this are in Anker and Melkas, 1995.
16 See World Food Program documentation in USAID-assisted countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Yields from Community Development Programs</strong></th>
<th><strong>Constraints</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Creates opportunities for widespread social mobilization.</td>
<td>• Difficulty targeting families and children with special needs, (i.e., single parent households, households with an ill family member).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Creates community vestment in sustaining gains that are made.</td>
<td>• There are few successful examples.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Income-generating Schemes</strong></th>
<th><strong>Constraints</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Addresses the underlying problem of poverty in a sustainable way.</td>
<td>• Frequently involves cottage industries and home-based work that are not particularly lucrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Criteria of no child labor involvement may place financial sustainability at risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Questionable assumption that families only send children to work when income is below a certain level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Income-generating Activities for Families</strong></th>
<th><strong>Constraints</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Addresses poverty at the household level.</td>
<td>• Hard to make cost-effective and sustainable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Able to target poorest families with children at greatest risk of abusive work.</td>
<td>• Must have economies of scale and cost-effective outreach to become financially sustainable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Adult Family Worker Replacement of Former Child Workers</strong></th>
<th><strong>Constraints</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ideally, provides jobs for adults who can accrue income, and no longer need children to work.</td>
<td>• Children are not necessarily replaceable by adults.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Industries and jobs, within which children work, are not accessible to adults for a variety of reasons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 Research on the substitutability of children by adults has demonstrated that the proposition is more mythical than real.
On the basis of the pros and cons of existing studies (summarized in Table 3), it
is difficult to answer the final question: “Are economic incentives cost-effective
and/or sustainable? Increasing enrollment is different from increasing (or reduc-
ing) learning (the latter will be discussed in the next chapter) and should be
included only as an economic benefit. More research is required to avoid misuse.
Studies on school dropouts and grade repetition rates in the late 1980s and early
1990s have prompted the World Bank to support subsidies, scholarships, fee
waivers, and other incentive mechanisms, but the Dakar World Education Forum
showed little progress at the turn of the century. In the late 1990s, a World Bank-
sponsored assessment on voucher systems in 20 countries concludes that
vouchers can be a cost-effective method to expand school access, because they
serve the dual purpose of improving efficiency while moving away from the
monopolistic structure that currently exists in public education (West 1996, 11).
However, even this conclusion is challenged by research showing that most dif-
fferences in test scores usually disappear when the impact of the socio-econom-
ic level is statistically controlled. In that case, vouchers may result in subsidies for
high-income families (Levin 2001; Schneider et al. 2000; Carnoy 1997).

Incentive programs also present administrative risks in countries where control
over the vast resources to subsidize or feed millions of children is weak or polit-
ical groups want to take a share. Corruption and waste can easily result without
the necessary oversight. More research needs to be done to find ways to direct-
ly subsidize the more needy families. In the meantime (while research findings are
processed), expertise can be systematically gathered in a Delphi type estimation
of cost effectiveness indicators (Schiefelbein et al. 1998). An example will be pre-
sented in the next chapter.

Due to the cost, incentive programs are often difficult to continue over long peri-
ods of time. Yet even incentive programs that cannot be funded indefinitely can
have sustained results. World Bank research (King 1990) demonstrated a sus-
tained impact over generations, given educated girls are more likely to educate
their daughters. Prather et al. concur (1996 94), stating that, “Sustainability is not
just the funding of a program year after year, with continuity of staff and program
activities. . . . sustainability is when any improvements that result from partici-
pation continue to have an impact after the program has ended.”

---

18 Anker and Melkas (1995, 24) note that they were unable to determine project cost effectiveness
because all the necessary information was not collected during their survey.
V. USING EDUCATION INCENTIVES TO KEEP OR ATTRACT STUDENTS

There are sound economic reasons to use education incentives: to supply a better educational service with small increments in costs; and to attract families to send children to school (Hummel-Rossi and Ashdown 2002). Even though there is still insufficient longitudinal data to support widespread adoption of a specific strategy, two programs have impressive evaluations and others are worthy of mention. These are presented below. There are even less data on the cost-effectiveness and sustainability of education incentive programs for the eradication of child labor. Some interesting Delphi evidence is presented at the end of this chapter. More research in this area is warranted.

As presented in Chapter II, students often do not continue their schooling due to limitations in the supply of education (see Chapter II to review specific causes). Many of these problems can be solved by expanding educational capacity and raising the quality of education.

Expanding the Supply of Education

Expanding the supply of education in an existing system usually involves adding a similar unit cost per student as is used in the rest of the system. Isolated, or far away, areas generate small increases in unit costs. Providing services for nomadic or handicapped students or war areas may involve a large increase in unit costs (McGinn and Borden 1995, 7).

Expanding the supply of education can involve several factors. When the problem is to expand supply in “average” service areas within the country (no peculiar characteristics), class size (or teacher/student ratio) should be examined. In situations where there is overcrowding, many countries have increased the number of classes with no change in students’ achievement by reducing the number of students per class (Rothstein and Rothstein 2002; Fuller and Clarke 1994). On the other hand, maintaining a large class size and providing learning materials and teacher training may have a positive impact. When the lack of space in school affects school enrollment and retention, more school buildings can be built. Successful programs for utilizing local contributions (in land, work, or materials) could be implemented if required conditions for implementing such programs are met. Use of nontraditional materials should also be considered when those materials can be combined with lower construction costs. Countries are prepared to “do more of the same” if resources are available (from the national budget or international loans). Although it is more difficult to implement more substantial changes, for example, to introduce double shifts to expand coverage or to train teachers and prepare materials (scripts or frameworks) for multigrade classes to deliver all grades in primary education, these strategies have been used effectively. The successful case of the Colombian Escuela Nueva program (presented shortly) illustrates the feasibility of this approach.

Increasing the supply of education services generally requires an increase in the number of teachers. Expansion of the system therefore may involve the operation of accelerated training of teachers or other alternative teacher training strategies.

Improving the Quality of Education

As previously stated, the large gap in achievement levels of developed and developing countries is mainly linked to teacher training, parents’ education, amount of time available for learning, relevant scripts or frameworks for learning, and early stimulation (McGinn and Borden 1995, 11). It is difficult to change all these factors at the same time, and some of them are notalterable or would only make a difference in the long term. Nevertheless, even the incorporation of a few alterable factors could generate more interest and demand.
Several programs are described below. These programs are a representative sample of the multiple approaches that have been evaluated and have proven to be successful in very different contexts. Given the limitless number of feasible alternatives for improving quality of education, the only requirement for implementation should be that there is enough evaluation data to show that the selected program will probably deliver the expected increase in the quality of education.

**Colombia: Escuela Nueva**

The Escuela Nueva program is an educational innovation for basic primary schooling in Colombia that integrates curricular, community, administrative, and teacher training strategies in a systemic way (Schiefelbein 1992). Although not a child labor program, it addresses the role of seasonal work in the lives of rural Colombian children. Escuela Nueva involves several key elements: learning in informal settings as well as in school buildings; child-centered learning approaches supported by carefully designed scripts; and democratic practices and learning circles (group work) that improve teacher effectiveness. In 1989, the World Bank selected the program as one of the three most successful education reforms in the world, demonstrating an ability to go to scale. Guatemala has since incorporated the Escuela Nueva approach and achieved similar results in academic achievement, girls’ participation, and democratic behavior.

**Honduras: Providing Education to Migrant Child Laborers and Their Families**

In 2002, after conducting a rapid, comprehensive planning analysis of education and child labor in Honduras, USAID, through its Basic Education and Policy Support/Education to Combat Abusive Child Labor Project, launched a one-year pilot project to provide education to children of migrant worker populations. Instruction is being provided by education facilitators who conduct afternoon interactive distance education (EDUCATODOS) classes while living and traveling with the migrant families. A supplemental work activity booklet raises community awareness regarding child labor and occupational safety, health education for children laboring in fruit and vegetable production, salt production, and harvesting of fish and shrimp. The workbook seeks to communicate simple messages to youth susceptible to pesticide exposure, heat stress, and other work hazards that pose severe long-term dangers to their health and safety. Job risk analysis of work activities and pre- and post-testing of the workbook will be conducted to determine the efficacy of the materials.

Because this project is just in its first year, no data are available on its impact. Developers are hopeful, however, that with more information about the dangers of exploitative work and affordable, accessible educational opportunities, more migrant children will spend time in school. At the project’s close, an evaluation to glean lessons learned and best practices for children working in these occupations will be conducted to compare knowledge increase and learning gains among targeted children and a control group of migrant worker children.
Bulgaria: Combating Human Trafficking

In a second BEPS activity, USAID is working to reduce the incidence of prostitution and child trafficking through improved teacher training. The town of Ruse, Bulgaria, on the border with Romania, lies along one of Eastern Europe’s most popular human trafficking routes. To serve this population so heavily affected by trafficking, five local Bulgarian NGOs—the Women’s Alliance for Development, the Step by Step Program, the Society for Neglected Children, the Open Society Club-Ruse, and the United Nations Association—are working together on a pilot project to use education to combat child prostitution and trafficking in and around this border city.

The project, launched in January 2003, aims to raise youth, parent, teacher, and local authority awareness about the dangers of prostitution and trafficking. The project also seeks to improve the retention of economically disadvantaged students, particularly ethnic minorities, through teacher training and summer programs, and to provide vocational training, job counseling, and life skills classes for at-risk youth. The development of a model for the collection of data on child prostitution and trafficking is also being considered.

Tanzania: Community Education Fund

The Community Education Fund (CEF) is a combined intervention of the Government of Tanzania and the World Bank to empower communities to improve primary schools. Village Councils and Committees determine their participation in the program, and they set school funding priorities for the entire community. A school plan is developed with approval from the Village Committee. Parents are required to contribute half of the costs to set the school plan in motion (World Bank Nd.b). The Government subsequently deposits the matching contribution into an agreed upon account. In some cases, the government contribution exceeds the community contribution where areas are considered “very poor.” There are strict criteria concerning schools that are eligible for participation: “schools must be registered and have a parent-elected school committee, and parents must sign a plan and Memorandum of Understanding. They must also agree to accept all children regardless of their ability to pay. Periodic community meetings are held to review progress, and the government conducts assessments to determine achievements and progress.” “Teachers are energetic participants in the process...[and] have a key role to play in preparing the school plan and managing implementation” (World Bank Nd.b, 3). There is a widespread sense of ownership among parents and the community creating overwhelming confidence in the education system as a whole, as shown by the low rate of theft of desks and other equipment.

Performance and Efficiency of Education Incentives

Research on reform programs suggests that few education incentives and development programs funded by international banks have really increased achievement (UNESCO-LLECE 2001, 34; Wolff et al. 2002). In most cases, their impact on child labor has not been evaluated (for example, see the case of Indonesia, presented above), and the gap between developed and developing countries is constant at best according to the TIMSS (1999) and IALS (2000) reports. Therefore, most of the frequently used strategies implemented in development programs in the last decade are at least under doubt.

The main challenge is to improve and update the training of the “trainers of future teachers.” Most of them have been exposed to “frontal teaching” in primary education, in high school, and also in
higher education. It is difficult to move from an authoritarian teaching structure, oral transmission, the need to learn by rote “the single correct answer” (and no opportunity to discuss divergent answers), lack of peer group discussion, and failure to link teaching with the local context. In addition, there is no accumulation of “what works” for different types of students. Therefore, even those teachers willing to try new approaches find few innovative models that can be adapted to their needs.

Decision makers should consider education leaders, teacher unions, research experience, resources, institutional capacity, traditions, expectations, political backing, or the legal framework when comparing available alternatives to be adapted to each situation. Those alternatives were defined in Table 2 (Chapter III), and their advantages and constraints are summarized in Table 4.

**Cost-effectiveness of Education Incentives**

Education incentives presented in Table 2 were selected because they have shown positive results in the past (the summary of pros and cons is presented in Table 4). However, the cost of each program is a key element in prioritizing incentives. The relative increment in cost should be compared with the increment in the “outcome” to estimate a cost-effectiveness indicator. Unfortunately, data on impact and costs are seldom available (Mull and Elkins 2002; Hummel-Rossi and Ashdown 2002; Schiefelbein, Swope, and Schiefelbein 2000). Research will eventually provide such data, but it will take a few years to use such information. Given that decision makers must solve current problems, an alternative approach should be used in the meantime.

Expert advice is a low-cost—and practical—alternative for assessing cost-effectiveness. Table 5 shows the estimations made by a group of ten world experts on the impact and cost of well-defined strategies frequently used in educational programs (Schiefelbein, Wolff, and Schiefelbein, 1998). Using the Delphi approach, a pre-evaluation strategy, the experts estimated the impacts (costs were estimated by the authors of the study) in the educational system of an imaginary country representing the average situation of Latin America, because estimations of impact should be made in specific contexts.

The findings of this study suggest that strategies are efficient when they provide a positive contribution with a low cost. According to their estimations, the most cost-effective strategy for improving education quality in Latin America is allocating the best teacher to the first grade for students to improve their ability to read and write. Not a single development project implemented in the last decade in Latin America included the strategy suggested by the experts as the most cost-effective strategy. This gap between expert advice and project design should be explored in each region or country, to optimize investment in education (and to overcome the small improvements detected in the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000).

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19 Martin Carnoy and Henry Levin (Stanford University); Claudio de Moura Castro (ADB); Steve Heyneman, Himelda Martinez, and Eduardo Velez (World Bank); Noel McGinn and Fernando Reimers (Harvard University); Jeffrey Puryear (Interamerican Dialog); and Juan Carlos Tedesco (BIE-UNESCO).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 4. Opportunities and Constraints of Various Types of Education Incentives</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved Teacher Training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Critical to the sustained enrollment, participation, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>achievement of all children in schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Undervalued, therefore any support is appreciated and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It is difficult to change the &quot;trainers of teachers.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• May be costly. Trainers must (probably) do graduate work in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign universities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Difficult to monitor. Who can control the change process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactive Learning Modules</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Important given that parents and children often find</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>curriculum irrelevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cost effective—not a recurring expenditure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support in bilingual education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lengthy and expensive process. Involves formative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   evaluation. There is a lack of tradition for "accumulation."
| • Need cooperation and involvement of a wide range of         |
|   education specialists (i.e., curriculum specialists,        |
|   evaluators).                                               |
| • Involves preparation of materials in each language.         |
| **Apprenticeships, School-to-work, Safe Work**                |
| • Acknowledges the economic reality of child work and poor    |
|   school attendance.                                          |
| • Provides life and vocational skills training that can serve |
|   children well in their adult lives.                        |
| • Reduces need for other economic incentives if children     |
|   receive at least partial income support under the scheme.  |
| • May subject children to abuse in the workplace if work     |
|   situation or apprenticeships are not monitored.            |
| • Does not eliminate child labor.                             |
| • Work and school may be too demanding for the child; no time |
|   left for play and leisure activities.                      |
| **Support for School Administrators**                        |
| • Addresses important function of school management.         |
| • Often overlooked as indicator of quality in schools, yet   |
|   critical to the enrollment and retention of children in    |
|   school.                                                    |
| • Indirect impact on children.                               |
| • Depends on authority of principals to hire teachers and to |
|   manage the budget.                                         |
| • Centralized control overcomes local interest and proposals.|
| **Local School Management**                                  |
| • More likely to develop appropriate and flexible child       |
|   centered schools.                                          |
| • Ownership of and pride in schools increases sustainability.|
| • Less corruption.                                            |
| • Human and financial resources of the community help to     |
|   support intervention.                                      |
| • May exclude poorest of the poor.                           |
| • Male-dominated systems may impact local management         |
|   structures and reduce the participation of motivated       |
|   community members, especially the mothers.                 |
| • There can be strong opposition from political bosses that  |
|   fear losing control of appointments and money.             |

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20 Many Latin American examples, some with USAID support, others evaluated by USAID. See Schiefelbein (1997).
### Table 5: Estimated Cost-effectiveness of Education Interventions in a Latin American Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Number and Description</th>
<th>A. Estimated Increase in Achievement (%)</th>
<th>B. Probability of Adequate Implementation (%)</th>
<th>C. Probable Impact (%)</th>
<th>D. Estimated Increase in Cost (%)</th>
<th>E. Cost-effectiveness [C/D]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assign best teachers to first grade</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1531.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforce regulations on official length of school year</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>699.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 10% of 4th graders and distribute results to teachers</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>480.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease in cost</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media campaigns for parents to read to children</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy not to switch classroom teachers during school year</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 10% of 4th graders and grant one week remedial work</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce size of bureaucracy and pay higher salaries</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare and implement bilingual education</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal testing of 4th graders</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide learning materials for individualized instruction</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast high quality preschool TV programs</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization with supervision</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide classrooms with standard textbooks</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide small libraries to classrooms</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide standard textbooks and train teachers in usage</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extend length of school year</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train teachers on developing cooperative learning</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train teachers on using programmed learning materials</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaint teachers with modern curriculum</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple interventions: learning packages; school-based management; training; testing</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmentally oriented pre-schooling (100 percent unit cost of primary school)</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly checkup and referral by doctor</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extend daily schedule by one hour</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School feeding programs (50 percent receive free snack)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School feeding programs (100 percent receive free snack)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-service training to teachers without follow-up materials</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School feeding programs (50 percent receive free lunch)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide one-hour access to computers</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School feeding programs (100 percent receive free lunch)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVERAGES (nonweighted)</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>62.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>76.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) Estimated average percentage increment in student achievement on a standardized test in mathematics and reading, given to sixth graders, with an initial score of 50 out of 100, compared to a control population, which did not receive the intervention.

(B) Probability (in percentage) of adequate implementation of the intervention, based on both technical and political considerations.

(C) Probable increment in annual operational unit cost from the intervention including the annualized capital cost.

(D) Probability (in percentage) of adequate implementation of the intervention, based on both technical and political considerations.

Although the results in Table 5 are context-specific, they can help decision makers from other regions to be more successful in improving instructional quality.

Delphi estimations can be replicated in key countries or regions (with well selected groups of experts) and updated in each context. The results of those studies will provide some idea of the implications of research findings linked with the impact of each strategy (as the long-term approach to identify education interventions that are effective in addressing the causes of not being in school and reducing child labor).

Even if those studies are eventually available, it is good to keep in mind that education research findings are not always consistent and that the result of one study may not be applicable in a different context. Table 6 shows that on average, from 13 to 61 percent of regression studies confirm the expected hypothesis. Therefore, a few research studies will not be able (in the short term) to provide a reliable basis for decision making.

Table 6. Percentage of Regression Studies “Confirming the Expected Hypothesis”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Associated with Achievement and Sign of the Expected Hypothesis</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures per student (unit cost)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students per teacher (average class size)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students having personal textbooks</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School library</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher’s length of education (in years)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-the-job teacher training</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of experience of the teacher</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class preparation time</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional time (time spent on instruction)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of homework</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multigrades (one teacher for several groups)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student’s self-esteem</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple average (nonweighted)</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In summary, selecting education incentives to minimize child labor is challenging and the results are controversial. On the one hand, incentives can assist in expanding the outreach of schooling to at-risk children. On the other hand, education reform may dilute the scarce resources earmarked to address the child labor problem. More needs to be understood about the mechanisms that are effective in reaching education objectives for working children, including building the capacity of teachers, improving school outreach, increasing enrollment and attendance, and making relevant teaching materials available.
VI. DESIGNING USAID INTERVENTIONS

Successful use of economic and education incentives to promote schooling for working children depends on a careful sequence of decisions. There are no “magic bullets” except hard work, rigor, creativity, and commitment, because education is a long-term endeavor. Within that context, the following steps can be used in the decision-making process:

- Select the potential targets;
- Estimate the probability of success for each one;
- Optimize the impact (given the available resources);
- Build up a support coalition; and
- Prepare the required evaluation and monitoring for accumulating knowledge for future projects. (Understanding the causes for being enrolled or working and the linkages with alternative incentives is important for USAID to formulate and promote coherent education policies and programs that can reduce the incidence and severity of abusive child labor (Mull and Elkins 2002, 1).

Specific information about these steps is provided below.

Specific Achievable Recommendations and Next Steps

1. **Compare the initial definition of the target with the three basic alternative approaches to curbing child labor: prevention, protection, or rehabilitation.** As stated earlier, it is easier and cheaper, and there is more knowledge available on preventing child labor than on rehabilitating children working in abusive situations. However, the definition of the target (included in global policies) may require attacking the more difficult tasks of protection or rehabilitation or may be linked with place of residence, ethnic group, or gender (criteria that are not open to varying interpretations by decision makers). The decision may be painful, and sometimes it may not be feasible to provide benefits to certain children while ignoring the poverty claims of others. At times, the needs of the beneficiary group may not be as great as other children in the general population.

2. **Examine the potential specific goals of prevention (or rehabilitation).** Is there a need for increasing the demand for education? Alternatively, is the education so poor that the supply should be improved? Potential targets must be selected according to the diagnosis of the main causes of low enrollments discussed in Chapters IV and V. This is a daunting task, because the benefit of those children at higher risk should be compared with a smaller improvement of a larger number of children with less risk, given the (fixed) amount of resources. It is probable that the greater the need, the lower the probability of success and the larger the amount of resources required.
3. **Explore for each target the probable impact of economic and education incentives on the demand for basic schooling (for at-risk or working children) and the quality (appeal) of the supply.** Decision makers must examine factors that enhance or constrain the performance of education-related incentive programs, including cost-effectiveness, sustainability, and the potential for replication. Each of the many alternative programs—such as stipends, food for education programs, and school decentralization—may be appropriate for a well-defined problem, but inappropriate in other contexts. Exploring successful programs and lessons learned, and reviewing Delphi estimates, such as those in Table 5, can be instrumental in making good decisions about the use of incentives.

4. **Select the specific goals and the parallel incentive strategies.** This selection depends on a careful analysis with respect to five criteria: (i) size of the problem and amount of resources; (ii) type of child risk or work (harvests, factory, sexual, or revolutionary army) and the effectiveness of the available incentives; (iii) probable impact on enrollments and available school space (present capacity plus investments); (iv) consistency between the child labor intervention process and global policies; and (v) cost-effectiveness of the best result of this process and alternative strategies (for example those resulting in a Delphi process as in Table 5). For example, cash grants or food subsidies may be effective in increasing school enrollment and supporting the decision of a small group of families to move their children away from dangerous work, but they may be too expensive for a massive effort to reduce child labor or may generate too high a demand for school construction. Expensive programs could be unsustainable, given the economic pressures facing most developing nations.

5. **Conduct a social and cultural assessment before preparing the specific program.** This step is described in detail in the next section of this chapter.

6. **Compare the proposed incentives with existing national and international policies.** Where appropriate, existing policies may need to be revised or new policies may need to be proposed (see follow-up section of this chapter).

7. **Check the feasibility of estimated technical and financial demands.** Required assistance may include support for national ministries, education committees, school administrators, community-based organizations, and (most importantly) teachers (Mull and Elkins, 2002, 15). Visits to demonstration programs operating successfully could be valuable to launch new programs.

8. **Prepare a work plan to implement the selected goals and incentives.** This step involves building up a support coalition and organizing the required evaluation and monitoring for accumulating knowledge for future projects.
Conducting a Social and Cultural Assessment

The design of education-related incentives programs should consider the social and cultural aspects that a child experiences in the local context. Most often, this local context will differ significantly from the idealized global construct, where acceptable childhood activities are measured against international treaties and conventions. Such a socio-cultural assessment is critical to the success of any intervention.

There are many factors that influence the design and implementation of child labor education programs, either explicitly or implicitly. Questions to be answered in the assessment include the degree of consistency between the draft idea of the program and the following:

- The evolving role of the child in the family;
- Expectations placed on children at different ages, based on gender or physical capacity;
- The role of work in the socialization of children;
- Mechanisms for families and communities to make decisions;
- The especially difficult circumstances that are constraining personal decisions; and
- The cultural factors affecting compliance with the provisions of Convention 182.

Culture plays a crucial role in the way a society defines child labor and related abuses. A study of incentives and child labor in the Middle East and North Africa, remarks: “the difference between the CRC and Islamic law is not the acknowledgement of child rights but the definition of childhood. Legally, the CRC considers teenagers as children with rights that should be protected, while in the Middle East and North Africa, teenage children are not considered minors” (Mustafa 1996, 40). Such attitudes and practices need to be taken into account because they are a benchmark against which progress can be measured. This is true even when findings are inconsistent with the positions put forward and maintained by international organizations and international norms.

The relation between poverty, household decision making, and child labor need to be carefully considered before any intervention is developed. Poverty has different manifestations and degrees of severity, and these determine the most appropriate strategies in different situations. To take this into consideration, it is important to consult poverty assessments and household decision-making studies, the goal of which is to understand the mechanics of how the decisions that affect child welfare are made.
Economic relationships should also be examined to determine the extent to which economic sectors are dependent on the external shocks to the family. High external dependency results in high vulnerability and sensitivity to change, which can have profound effects on resource capacity at the household level. When such context-specific studies are not available, USAID should consider funding action-oriented research, such as rapid assessments, to facilitate local knowledge into the child labor elimination effort. Because the context of child labor is continually shifting, assessments and interventions need to be revisited and adjusted on an ongoing basis. Programs should encourage alternative processes with partners to effectively adapt programs.

**Developing and Reforming Policy**

Any program for curbing child labor should be consistent with key areas of national and international policies. Putting child labor on the agenda of the educational policy dialogue is an important step towards the recognition of their needs and developing a realistic education strategy. The following dimensions of policy should be investigated:

- **Global economic policy** needs to reflect and enhance the real opportunities and constraints faced by children and their families, especially in social welfare and structural adjustment programs. It is important to anticipate the effects of macroeconomic policies and to institutionalize the safety nets to alleviate negative effects of these policy decisions.

- **Poverty alleviation policies**—including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and qualification for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative—need to develop support mechanisms that specifically target and improve the lives of at-risk groups. This is particularly salient in the discussion of child labor because marginalized groups are disproportionately represented in the child labor force.

- **Employment policies** need to be brought into compliance with other social support policies, such as poverty alleviation, education, and health. If child work is outlawed, as many argue it should be, other policies must be in place to support alternatives and to provide these children access to the services they need.

- **Specialized policies** need to be developed according to the needs of child soldiers, commercial sex workers, and other vulnerable groups. While education is an important stabilizing influence for these children, other social support mechanisms may also be warranted, such as training and counseling.

**Education Policy**

Free quality education must go beyond mere legislation and receive a suitable budget allocation. Although not a panacea for eliminating the worst forms of child labor, child-centered and well-proven learning materials could help to reduce the supply of young workers (Slavin 2002; Askew 2002). Eventually, policies need to assign more time in the classroom and support better interaction between teacher and student. Specific areas of reform include:
The period for compulsory schooling should encompass the entirety of childhood, or more specifically, the time frame a child is prohibited from entering the work force. By linking policy to actual practice, the compulsory school policy can serve as a realistic intervention to children entering dangerous work.

Compulsory primary education legislation should lessen or significantly alleviate the responsibility of meeting the costs of education on families who already find it difficult, or impossible, to meet the needs of basic survival. Such inflexible and unrealistic policies punish parents and may have little effect on making education available to the poorest children.

The decentralization of school finance places responsibility for school management with those that benefit from the services. This approach has yielded results in Latin America and has received substantial support from international organizations, such as the World Bank. More needs to be understood about how such programs benefit working children.

Curriculum content should reflect local business opportunities, while assuring that tasks are appropriate for youth at various ages and levels of development.

Health Policy

Health policy is an important determinant in a child's decision to work, and may impact the terms of work that is acceptable to the family or the child. Free health care, family planning and other health services have a profound impact on livelihood security and affects how families budget household income. In the absence of health support policies and services, even a modest health crisis in the household can mean the difference between a child staying in school or seeking full-time employment.

Building a Support Coalition: Development Partners and Counterparts

The development process involves developing sustainable processes and institutions capable of identifying problems and promoting change. A key to success is finding the partners that can help to implement programs and the counterparts that can best benefit from capacity building and technical assistance. These can include the government ministries and departments that are responsible for public education programs, non-governmental organizations responsive to the specific needs of at-risk communities, and international organizations that are working to address the child labor issue.

22 In most countries, children are prohibited from entering the work force until the age of fourteen.
Government Institutions

Government institutions are vital to the assessment process and the development of vision and leadership by national bodies. The best examples of successful programs in education and child labor are the result of enlightened leadership and involvement by helping national policy “go to scale”. Government support of the Escuela Nueva in Colombia is a good example. Where national stakeholders are not involved, USAID could actively seek their support even if it requires more resources and does not seem to lead to direct results for working children.

The method and extent of cooperation with local government depends on the structure and decision-making process of the public sector. Full, centralized national support for child labor education can greatly reduce barriers to cooperation at the local level. Local government usually has greater potential for promoting change for the poor, but is also much more likely to lack the human and financial capacity to implement or support intervention programs. Building bridges between decision makers and local governments is, thus, paramount to promoting change. Cooperation between national and local entities also sets the stage for collaboration between stakeholders in the private and public sectors.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs have long led interventions in the child labor elimination process. However, these programs often yield a number of small interventions with limited geographic outreach, ultimately assisting relatively few working children. Their greatest challenge has been going to scale and reaching financial and institutional sustainability. To maximize results working with these groups, USAID may want to consider conducting a comprehensive assessment of the capacity, performance, and activities of organizations already involved in child labor by reviewing evaluations, assessing their instructional needs, and forecasting the effects of expanding current efforts. It is also important to assess how the program respects (complies with) government policy, and how NGO programs can work toward promoting sustainable change at the national level.

National universities and research institutes can be an excellent starting point, even when their activities have not focused directly on child labor, education, or economic incentives. Other studies may provide interesting insights, including poverty studies (which have been popular over the past decade), ethnographies, and other sociological research. Research collaboration partnerships can yield valuable data as well as build the capacity of partners to implement future research.

International Organizations

There is great potential in collaborating with the three key international organizations involved in child labor—namely the World Bank, UNICEF, and the ILO. Education is a key focus of their joint efforts. The International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) of the ILO is already working closely in the field with UNICEF. To date, UNICEF has concentrated on using education to combat abusive child labor and may be a good source of information and skills in this area. IPEC, over the last decade, has amassed significant knowledge and experience through its numerous child labor projects around the world. These experiences have been collected into a new document that reviews lessons learned (ILO 2001). Additionally, information on efforts to meet the “Education for

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23 The World Bank, UNICEF, and the ILO implement the Understanding Child Work program that is working to synthesize research and project activities between donors and between programs.

24 See the internet website:  http://www.ei-ie.org/action/english/etrcglobalmarch.html
All" goals is regularly disseminated by UNESCO.\footnote{See the internet website: http://www.unesco.org/education/}

Finally, it may be helpful to look beyond the traditional UN agencies. Other smaller organizations, such as the Population Council and the Asia Foundation, are involved in research and programming that are relevant to child labor education and economic incentives. For instance, the Population Council in Bangladesh conducted a study of young female garment workers and the effects of their work on the demographic transition. Not designed as a child labor study, the findings were nevertheless useful in programming initiatives for young workers. Regional development banks are also active in this area.

**Assessing Whether We “Got It Right”: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Research**

Alleviation of child labor implies costly strategies, so the lack of reliable data on the impact of alternative strategies also may have a high economic cost, even though Delphi estimates can reduce the mistakes (see Table 5). Moreover, where assistance is focused on eliminating the worst forms of child labor, programmers and policy makers need to make doubly sure that the interventions they support do not leave children and their families worse off. Systems that can forecast the potential impact of interventions by taking into consideration economic and ethnographic factors should be applied. Evaluation teams already working in the field are also integral to such a process.

With USAID assistance, rapid assessments can be conducted in high prevalence areas, with the goal of better understanding the social and cultural aspects of childhood. To be fair and accurate, the methodology should concentrate on interviews with development programs, government institutions, beneficiaries and local community groups. Though time-consuming, such studies are instrumental in making programs more realistic, cost effective and relevant. In all cases, efforts need to be made to assure that relevant studies are incorporated.

As noted in the earlier papers within this ECACL series, impartial assessments have long been overlooked in child labor and education programming. More impartial and analytical methods should be supported, especially those that are community-based and participatory, and that actively involve young people. The goal of any monitoring system is to allow programmers to chart the progress of the intervention and to provide necessary corrective actions in a timely manner. For example, the mid-term review of the Bangladesh garment sector project revealed a problem with the strategy of adult labor substitution for child workers. The monitoring system allowed the project to redirect resources to other project areas. USAID has extensive experience in developing and implementing monitoring and evaluation systems, and could provide much needed direct services or technical support.

As earlier papers in this series also suggest, research is a pragmatic, and much needed, way for USAID to work toward the elimination of child labor. Critics
argue that research is off the point, is too costly, takes too long, is unreliable, or provides no direct benefits for children. Given the billions of dollars invested each year in education development programs, however it is very important to have a sound economic basis on which to decide what projects should be supported and how to bring them to scale. Expert advice can be a realistic alternative in the short and medium term (see last section in Chapter V).

The Challenge: Developing a Coordinated and Feasible Response

To effectively address the educational and social needs of child laborers, social support programs need to coordinate their activities. No single sector intervention can solve the problem. This need for coordination is an important reason why the problems associated with the worst forms of labor have not yet been met in most of the developing world. Truly multi-sectoral child labor programs are required to support, assess, and adapt programming in a variety of sectors. While this is a major challenge, it may also be seen as an opportunity for USAID to exercise its capacity in many program areas that need attention, including education, social policy, economic growth, health care, and training. The challenge is to place these children on the agenda, and for each of these programs to contribute to an improvement in their situation.

The design of large-scale education programs to mainstream working children into education may pose risks to the families of child laborers. It is important to make sure that supported interventions do not leave children and their families worse off, either by depriving them of income for survival or by pushing the phenomenon underground, where children may become more vulnerable to abuse.

Nevertheless, incentives can affect family decisions to send a child to school rather than to work. USAID and other planners should consider the use of incentives, alone or in combination with other interventions, to improve the quality of life of children and families throughout the world.
ANNEX 1. CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES BY CHILD LABOR RISK LEVELS (ACCORDING TO NET ENROLLMENT RATES). 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Highest Risk Level NER &lt; 50%</th>
<th>High Risk Level 50% &gt;= NER &lt; 70%</th>
<th>Some Risk Level 70% &gt;= NER &lt; 90%</th>
<th>Low Risk Level 90% &gt;= NER &lt; 100%</th>
<th>Data Not Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab States/ North Africa</td>
<td>Djibouti, Sudan (2)</td>
<td>Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Mauritania, Yemen (5)</td>
<td>Lebanon, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar (6)</td>
<td>Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Palestinian A.T., Syria, Tunisia (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South/West Asia</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bangladesh (2)</td>
<td>India, Nepal, Pakistan (3)</td>
<td>Iran (1)</td>
<td>Maldives, Sri Lanka (2)</td>
<td>Bhutan (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Haiti (1)</td>
<td>Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela (6)</td>
<td>Argentina, Bolivia, Chile Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep, Ecuador Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Panama, Uruguay (13)</td>
<td>Argentina, Antigua &amp; Barbuda, Bermuda, Canary Islands, Slyvian &amp; Tobago, Surinam (12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>Bahamas (1)</td>
<td>Araba, Antilles, Belize, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Trinidad &amp; Tobago, Suriname (12)</td>
<td>Aruba, Anguilla, Antigua &amp; Barbuda, Bermuda, Canary Islands, Slyvian &amp; Tobago, Surinam (12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (3)</td>
<td>Armenia, Georgia, Turkmenistan (3)</td>
<td>Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Croatia, Hungary, Yugoslavia (3)</td>
<td>Albania, Bulgaria, Czech R, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania (9)</td>
<td>Belarus, Bosnia, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia Pacific</td>
<td>Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Macao, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Thailand (7)</td>
<td>Australia, China, Fiji, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Viet Nam (13)</td>
<td>Cook Is., Kiribati, DPR Korea, Marshall Is., Nauru, Niue, Tonga, Tuvalu (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America &amp; Western Europe</td>
<td>See list in Note 3 [26]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Risk level is estimated according to the Net Enrollment rates (NER). The NER takes account of the age structure of those enrolled by excluding all those children that are older or younger than the officially school-eligible age group from the numerator of the ratio. Thus, by definition, it cannot exceed 100%.

Note 2: No NER was available for 17 countries, but only the Gross Enrollment rate and/or the Adult Literacy rate. These rates were used to estimate the NER in order to classify the risk level of those countries.

Note 3: The 26 countries are: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA.

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http://timss.bc.edu/timss1999i/math_achievement_report.html


ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Susan Bissell, Ph.D., a consultant with GroundWork, Inc., is a writer and an Honorary Scholar, Key Center for Women’s Health and Society, Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences, University of Melbourne. Her doctoral thesis, in the discipline of medical anthropology, was entitled, "Manufacturing Childhood - Lives and Livelihoods of Children in Dhaka’s Slums." A specialist in the fields of children’s rights and child labor, Ms. Bissell spent twelve years with UNICEF, briefly in headquarters, then on longer-term postings in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and currently in India. Past work with UNICEF included short-term assignments in Lesotho, Nairobi, and New York headquarters. Her academic background ranges from international relations to economics and human rights law. Ms. Bissell’s most recently published article, which appears in Visual Anthropology 13(2), is entitled, "In Focus - Film, Focus Groups, and Children in Bangladesh." She is currently affiliated with London-based Xingu Films, and is producing an hour-long film for television broadcast called "A Kind of Childhood."

Ernesto Schiefelbein, Ed.D. (Harvard University), is a Fellow at the Centro de Investigacion y Desarrollo de la Educacion (CIDE-Chile) and a member of the Advisory Committee on the White House initiative to create three Hemispheric Centers of Excellence. He is also President of the Board of Trustees of the Universidad Metropolitana de Ciencias de la Educacion (UMCE). Dr. Schiefelbein was also President of Universidad Santo Tomás (1997-2001); Director of the UNESCO Regional Office of Education for Latin America and the Caribbean (1993-1996); Educational Economist in the World Bank in Washington (1985-1987), and a visiting professor at the University of Harvard (1973-1974). His past work has been reviewed in the education journal Pedagogia e Vita 58 (5), 2001 (Brescia, Italy) and in W. Böhm, Worterbuch der Pädagogik, Kröner, 2000 (Germany).

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GroundWork is an international research company established in 1997 to provide research and implementation services to organizations working in national and international development. GroundWork’s mission is to do valid, practical participatory research that can be used by national and international agencies and local people alike. GroundWork concentrates on practical, participatory research approaches through a collaboration of experts who help communities to develop their own resources within the context of national policies-skilled in bridging local and national interests to strengthen the middle ground. They offer expertise in research, research support, project work, and institutional development. For more information on GroundWork, visit the website at www.groundworkers.org.
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PHOTO CREDITS

(Clockwise, from top left)

Bangladeshi children benefit from incentive programs. Photo by Creative Associates International, Inc.

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Small child works in garbage dump, Colombia Photo made available by ILO-IPEC

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