Operational Challenges in Post-Conflict Societies

A USAID Workshop
October 28-29, 1997
Acknowledgments

This report benefitted greatly from the assistance of Franca Brilliant, Francesca Dixon, Roberta Warren, and Ellie Dooling at MSI. We thank also Heather McHugh, Nick Cox, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, William Yaeger, and Ned Steiner who prepared the structure of the workshop. Finally, we would like to thank Brian Atwood, Administrator of USAID, who encouraged OTI to hold this event.

The views presented herein are those of the participants and should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the other workshop participants, or MSI. OTI takes responsibility for any errors or omissions.

This document was prepared by MSI under contract #FDA-0-00-98-00003-00
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

Background .............................................................................................................. 1

Workshop Summary .................................................................................................. 3
  Introduction ........................................................................................................... 3
  Session 1: The Post Conflict Environment—Security ........................................ 3
  Session 1: (continued) The Post-Conflict Environment—Other ...................... 5
  Session 2: Operationalizing “Rapid Response” ................................................ 6
  Session 3: Country Selection Process ................................................................. 7
  Session 4: Program Development and Implementation: .................................. 9
  Session 5: Leveraging Resources-Building Partnerships & Cooperation .......... 11
  Session 6: Results/ Future Challenges ............................................................... 13
  Session 7: Closing/ Next Steps ........................................................................... 15

Agenda

List of Participants

Acronyms List
The course of global events since the waning of the cold war has directly challenged the notion of bilateral development assistance. Where once resources were directed toward large scale agriculture and infrastructure programs without particular regard for the political context, today foreign assistance must be tempered by whether such assistance addresses the central political development needs of a country emerging from war, transition or ethnic conflict. This shift in foreign assistance — a shift arising from the complex humanitarian emergencies of the post-cold war — requires new tools to respond rapidly and appropriately to what has become an important characteristic of this age: the failing state.

As the number of political crises increases, the need for resources to address these crises has also grown. There are no shortages of ethnic conflicts, or conflicts caused by internal wars or rivalries. Nor are there signs of hope that long-term conflicts have ended, or that parts of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union are moving away from initial anarchy to more organized, centralized states. It is in this context, ongoing crises affecting parts of each world region, that donors have reached out to other donor states who have also recognized the importance of assistance to conflict-prone countries as a key factor in advancing and consolidating peace.

Working in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation can often be a lonely business. One trend that has been more apparent in recent years has been the creation of rapid response mechanisms to address this crucial stage in the development of nations. Donors have also recognized the vital importance of having in their foreign assistance portfolios resources and technical expertise that can support this “transition” period. The American, Dutch, British, Canadian, Swiss, and German governments have all created offices in their foreign assistance agencies to specifically address the response to states in conflict. These countries are grappling with the most efficient and effective way in which they can make a difference in supporting transitions and coordinating their efforts with other like-minded donor states.

Since 1994, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has tried to be responsive to the new global political environment by introducing new mechanisms, including the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). This small office, endowed with a funding mechanism that permits rapid disbursement of funds, is changing the way USAID does business. The Office of Transition Initiatives, in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, has become a focal point for innovative, timely, and responsive programming in post-conflict states.
In October 1997, OTI reached out to other governments and held the first workshop which brought together representatives of transition offices from other countries, the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Community. The two-day event included presentations and focused discussions on common transition themes: security, country selection, program development, project implementation, and exit strategies. It demonstrated that a common core of experience and knowledge about operations in the post-conflict environment is emerging. The participants also recognized the importance of sharing information and field experience, and coordinating resources where possible, to achieve the best immediate results. Those who attended the meeting recommended that similar consultations should take place on a regular basis, with other donors rotating the lead in organizing future meetings.

The report that follows details the various sessions of the workshop. It contains a summary of the discussion sessions and comments and questions that followed. We hope that this summary may help support even more coordination among donor states, and lay the foundation for greater collaboration among nations and organizations.
Introduction

Rick Barton, Director of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), opened the workshop by remarking that while the demand for donor assistance in post-conflict societies is very high, the available resources are relatively small. He expressed the goal of the workshop as getting to know each other so that the participants could find ways to enhance their effectiveness in doing this complex and important work.

Session 1: The Post Conflict Environment—Security

James Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), noted that the DOD is interested in post-conflict transitions because of the regional security issues involved and because the United States Government's (USG) response to complex emergencies draws heavily on DOD resources. While it is extremely difficult to coordinate government bureaucracies, especially during complex emergencies, the Clinton Administration has undertaken a new effort to harmonize the USG's response to complex emergencies through Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56).

This directive mandates the creation of a high-level interagency team, at the level of assistant secretary, which is responsible for setting out the USG's objectives, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of agencies and departments in the response effort, and crafting the USG's exit strategy. This team would coordinate the USG response as it occurs, inform the Cabinet of developments, and conduct an after-action review to ensure that lessons learned are captured. PDD 56 also requires the creation of a cadre of trained professionals who are highly knowledgeable about USG capacities to address complex emergencies. The Administration has begun working with its civil service training institutes to strengthen skills in this area.

Implementing PDD 56, however, has brought out three limitations: First, it takes time to decide whether a crisis would trigger PDD 56. Second, interagency planning has not yet reached the level of tactical coordination. Third, it is unclear how this process will integrate the efforts of other governments and international organizations.

Michael Dziedzic, Senior Military Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU), outlined the dilemma that the international community faces when weak states collapse:

Can [donors] restore institutional capacity for maintaining law and order without reinstating some of the worse elements of the collapsed regime?
Conflicts are increasingly characterized by unclear boundaries, murky command structures, and guerrilla leaders who view relief efforts as irrelevant or harmful to their cause. Since the Kurdish refugee crisis in 1991, the donors and the international organizations have been working together more successfully. At the same time, the gulf between the international community and rebel leaders, as well as leaders of new governments, has widened considerably.

Whether donors can restore institutional capacity for maintaining law and order without reinstating some of the worst elements of the collapsed regime. He identified three security gaps: the deployment gap, the enforcement gap, and the institutional gap. The deployment gap refers to the period when external military forces are tasked with establishing law and order in the absence of any other force capable of doing so. This is an awkward role for foreign military troops who generally do not have appropriate skills.

On the civilian side, the UN may be able to address this gap by developing a stand-by force of civilian police, ready to deploy in post-conflict situations on short notice. On the military side, countries such as Italy, France and the U.S., which have military police, need to ensure that the initial contingent of forces includes military police.

The second question is functional: How do military police enforce law and order under conditions where weapons are widely distributed among the population? How do they enforce peace agreements in the face of violent civilian opposition? Dziedzic believes that the most practical solution may be to create an interim police force based on the old police force. The last gap relates to the larger issue of restoring institutional capacity and function. It is critical to begin this effort as soon as the transition takes place, as it requires persuading political elites to change the way they operate. This is an issue that transitional offices should target.

Finally, if the police, judicial and penal security systems do not work together, the transition to law and order with justice will be considerably more complicated.

Discussion:

In response to questions about the availability, appropriateness, and effectiveness of military forces in post-conflict situations, both speakers acknowledged drawbacks, but pointed to specific ways in which military forces could contribute to ameliorating the situation on the ground. A participant referred to the goodwill generated by the engineering projects that UN forces undertook in Cambodia in 1992-1993. Dziedzic noted that civil affairs soldiers, who combine military training with civilian professions, contribute valuable skills to
He noted that NDU and others are working to develop benchmarks and indicators as guidelines for transition operations, but that attempts to quantify the quality of the political and security environment may ignore important elements that can not be measured.

Session 1: (continued)

The Post-Conflict Environment—Other

**Bill Garvelink**, Acting Director of USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), addressed the critical impact of security problems on humanitarian assistance in terms of access to beneficiaries, to staff and workers, and to commodities and resources. He pointed to the changing nature of humanitarian crises, and noted that conflicts are increasingly characterized by unclear boundaries, murky command structures, and guerrilla leaders who view relief efforts as irrelevant or harmful to their cause. Since the Kurdish refugee crisis in 1991, the donors and the international organizations have been working together more successfully. At the same time, the gulf between the international community and rebel leaders, as well as leaders of new governments, has widened considerably. What relief organizations do has an enormous effect on how the international community is viewed. OFDA is struggling with the best strategy for this complicated environment.

**Robert Cox**, Advisor for the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), reviewed priority areas for the European Community. He stressed the importance of undertaking a thorough assessment, incorporating human and social needs such as the level of homelessness, whether schools are functioning, and whether government employees are being paid. Donors may also set overly stringent conditions for their assistance. In Albania, for example, the international community initially made elections a pre-condition for aid. Donors subsequently learned that elections could not be held without significant external advice and assistance. The European Community is also concerned with reestablishing economic activity. In some cases, donors can arrange for work or stipends in exchange for disarmament, or pay for reconstruction labor. A final area of ECHO interest has been democratization through projects providing support to legislatures, civic education, human rights monitoring, promotion of independent media, and other efforts.

**Discussion:**

Participant questions focused on the stance adopted by the international community vis-à-vis issues of neutrality, conditionality, and maintenance of human rights standards. Arguments were raised both for and against a separation of human rights activism and humanitarian assistance. For example, one participant commented that one reason the international community had lost credibility was that it was willing to ignore human rights violations in places like the Congo in order to deliver food and relief commodities. Others pointed out that there has been progress towards peace and democratization.
Post-conflict transition settings are risky investments. Donors must invest both sufficient amounts of resources to get the work done and also be willing to lose investments if programs are unsuccessful or conditions change.

Michael Stievater, Country Director for OTI/ Bosnia, offered a field perspective on aspects of an effective transition program. First, speed is an essential component. Transition situations are very fluid and donors must take advantage of opportunities as soon as they appear. Stievater pointed out that in each country, OTI determines its role based on what other organizations are already doing and then filling in the gaps. Where donor presence is limited, OTI’s work will be closer to humanitarian assistance.

Stievater argued that field staff should have as much authority as is legally possible. They should also have ready access to decision-makers at headquarters for decisions that exceed their authority. Field staff should be involved in setting program goals from the very beginning, so that they are not implementing programs which they do not support. He commented that post-conflict transition settings are risky investments. Donors must invest both sufficient amounts of resources to get the work done and also be willing to lose investments if programs are unsuccessful or conditions change.

Steve Holtzman, Social Scientist in the Post Conflict Unit of the World Bank, discussed three topics: the role of humanitarian assistance, the World Bank’s perspective on response to countries in conflict, and the UN’s discussion of a strategic framework. Holtzman pointed to the tensions around providing humanitarian assistance in places like Goma (Democratic Republic of Congo), where recipients included troops who had slaughtered thousands of people. He proposed the following definition of humanitarian assistance: aid to maintain human capital during a conflict. He then turned to the Bank’s role in conflict countries. The Bank has avoided conflict situations for many years, but is now
reentering many countries in the post-conflict phase. UNDP and other international organizations are trying to bring the Bank and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on board before the conflict ends, so that Bank officials are well-informed before they have to make funding decisions.

The Bank’s changing role is just one example of the disarray in the international community. The UN is trying to remedy this situation by scrutinizing UN agency roles in conflict countries to determine where and how agencies can perform better. An international donor team recently reviewed UN operations in Afghanistan and concluded that many of the agencies were operating outside their mandates and areas of expertise. Donors need to support tighter coordination within the UN system. To do this, they will have to provide general funds that are not tied to specific projects or programs.

Discussion:

Several participants raised questions about the best way to achieve coordination and cooperation within the international community. Some pointed to new formal structures such as the MOUs (Memorandums of Understanding) between UN agencies. Others referred to positive field experiences in Haiti and Guatemala, stressing that in these instances coordination was informal and was dependent on the individuals involved for its success. Others noted that there were still tremendous bureaucratic obstacles to better coordination, and that in many organizations and institutions there are no incentives to devote resources to this problem. For UN agencies, involvement in transition work may undermine their ability to function as “neutral development agencies.” One participant suggested that in these chaotic settings, the best approach might be to apply “management by chaos”: to explore as many approaches at the same time as possible, and see which one brings the best results.

Session 3: Country Selection Process

Johanna Mendelson-Forman, Senior Advisor with OTI, explained the four part test OTI uses to determine whether a country is ripe for transition assistance:

1. Has some event or change occurred which makes the country ripe for intervention?

2. Is it in the US national interest to intervene? With the end of the Cold War, the definition of the US national interest has greatly expanded, but some countries are still more important than others.

3. Will OTI resources address the key political development issues?

4. Will the investment have a successful outcome?

In addition, OTI bases its work on four assumptions about post-conflict settings:

1. Security is a threshold issue for restoration of political and economic life.
In the absence of a strong, credible central authority, political development is best achieved through community organizations and through projects with tangible outputs.

Partnerships with other donors are essential to ensure long-term impact.

Humanitarian assistance will need to continue in the post-conflict period and should be tied into transition planning.

In addition, OTI assumes that most transitions will involve external aid, that donors will have access to each other and to local authorities during this phase, and that donors will develop joint strategies and undertake partnerships to implement them. Mendelson-Forman concluded by observing that there is a strong need to synchronize resources within the USG. Donors also need to create a strategy to promote longer term investments after transition work is done and to ensure that key diplomatic acts are linked to programming.

Caroline Lavoie, Project Officer with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) discussed the approach taken by the new peacebuilding unit within CIDA. As the unit is new, they have not developed a formalized selection process but instead use several criteria to determine where to invest their resources. These criteria include questions such as whether there is strong domestic support for intervention, whether there is a long-standing relationship with Canada, and whether the country is French speaking. Field visits and political analysis from field offices are factored into the determination.

Like OTI, the peacebuilding unit tries to evaluate the impact that assistance is likely to have before making a decision to intervene. National interest is not used to evaluate potential country involvement. Current regional priorities include the Great Lakes region, Cambodia, and Central America.

Even with a clear selection process, decision-making will be affected by a variety of factors including the level of media and public interest in a country, collective guilt or embarrassment over previous action or inaction, and support from other internal governmental partners.

Discussion:

Participants engaged in a lively discussion about country selection criteria. Some argued for maintaining a great deal of flexibility in the selection process, while others pointed out the value of having consistent criteria guiding any decision. There was general agreement that even with a clear selection process, decision-making will be affected by a variety of factors including the level of media and public interest in a country, collective guilt or embarrassment over previous action or inaction, and support from other internal governmental partners. One participant referred to his agency’s inability to predict the political upheavals in Cambodia despite
a careful screening process and noted that the agency ultimately canceled its project. Another participant argued that the donors should be looking for institutions that they can continue to work with, even following reverses like the one in Cambodia. Several participants referred to the limitations that are inherent in applying a “national interest” criteria. One participant noted that Norway had played a critical role in the successful peace accords in Guatemala, in part because it had defined its national interest as peace. Finally, the participants closed the session by reflecting on their common belief that creating conditions for economic and political development in post-conflict countries is a valid and important goal in and of itself.

Session 4: Program Development and Implementation:

Sylvia Fletcher, Senior Program Advisor with OTI, noted that program development focuses on when and how donor assistance can have the greatest impact. She presented two dilemmas: First, in the period immediately following a complex emergency, assistance will be based on principles of humanitarian assistance, with minimal consideration of the political context; however, during the post-conflict transition the political environment is critical. It is essential for donors to focus on the causes as well as the effects of the conflict. For example, in the Congo, a fundamental issue is the legal disenfranchisement of citizens. Transition work in Congo must go beyond trying to sort out the victims from the protagonists to ask who are the key players, and what they will do. Whereas the post-conflict recovery of victims is an extension of humanitarian response, transition out of conflict requires working on the conditions of the conflict, helping to tip the balance between warmakers and peacemakers.

The second dilemma concerns the limitations imposed by the existing tools that donors have available. OTI has frequently used demand-driven micro-projects, but this is not always the best approach. Rather than asking whether communities need schools, OTI should ask why they don't have schools. The

Whereas the post-conflict recovery of victims is an extension of humanitarian response, transition out of conflict requires working on the conditions of the conflict, helping to tip the balance between warmakers and peacemakers.
Seven Lessons About Post-Conflict Transition Assistance
(From the Department for International Development (UK))

1. Understand the economic rationale behind a conflict and separate the underlying causes, the dynamics of violence, and the factors which trigger violence.

2. Clearly establish the objectives for intervention. There are four levels of objectives, from the most to the least ambitious: reduce the level of violence, contain the conflict, mitigate the effects of the conflict, and transform the nature of the conflict. Donors can aim for more than one objective but should determine which has the highest priority.

3. Identify who will win and who will lose if the war ends or if it continues. Donors must ensure that all the parties, including the warlords, get some benefit from a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

4. Invest at the beginning in managing the external players. For example, the conflict in Afghanistan will be very difficult to resolve without the support of India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia.

5. Recognize the connection between what happens at high diplomatic levels and what happens on the ground. If representatives from the international community dismiss the UN or the EU as players, then the communities they work with lose respect for these institutions. At the same time, strong diplomatic signals of disapproval may affect the behavior of renegade regimes.

6. Pay attention to what constitutes justice in the country’s culture. No settlement will lead to a transition if it does not address popular grievances.

7. Be flexible and responsive, and willing to terminate programs that are heading in the wrong direction.

Program design for transition out of conflict should take into consideration at least five critical issues of the specific case at hand:

1. The nature of the conflict and how it was resolved, especially the commitment of parties to its resolution and means of persuasion, coercion, or enforcement when the going gets tough;

2. The security environment, including the presence or absence of peacekeeping forces;

3. The international scenario, especially the role of neighboring countries;
4. Leadership and institutional capacity for the recovery; and

5. Possible relief saturation in protracted emergencies that might have absorbed local talent and resources into internationally supported relief activities, away from their political activism.

Mukesh Kapila, Head of the Humanitarian Policy Sector with the Department for International Development (UK), outlined seven lessons that his department had learned about post-conflict transitions. (See box on page 10.)

Discussion:

Many of the participants agreed with the presentations on the need for thorough analysis before donors decide on interventions. This led to discussion about how to share analyses, or perform them jointly, and how to develop common objectives for interventions. One participant strongly questioned the value of quick interventions. Another pointed to the situation in Bosnia where advance work before the Dayton peace accords had clarified priorities and led to quick and decisive action. Participant remarked that while peace takes time to take hold, it is important to undertake some quick, highly visible actions to support implementation of peace accords immediately after they are signed. Participants also addressed concerns about engaging local populations. One participant raised the issue of the changing perception of justice in Rwanda, and the damage the international tribunal had done by not speaking with local people there.

Another pointed to the USG’s mistake in assuming that since the majority of the Haitian elites did not want Aristide to return to power, the majority of the population felt the same way. Participant commented that the international community cannot confront the root causes of a conflict; it can only help communities and nations to take this step themselves.

Session 5: Leveraging Resources-Building Partnerships & Cooperation

The moderator for the session noted that the UN Security Council had promoted the idea of standing groups of donors and international organizations as “friends of” countries in crisis.

Edmund Cain, Director of the Emergency Responses Division with UNDP, spoke about UNDP’s efforts to increase coordination within the UN system. He referred to UNDP’s role as the UN’s Resident Coordinator (RC) for crisis situations and commented that UNDP has begun to develop strategic frameworks for analysis and response for all of the international community. As part of the Secretary General’s reform initiative, the UN agencies responsible for peace, security, and humanitarian assistance are working to integrate their functions. UNDP is trying to bridge the gap between the Humanitarian Coordinator, who is responsible for humanitarian assistance, and the Resident Coordinator, who is responsible for overall development. Cain noted that institutional barriers to a common analysis and response
strategy still exist, and that donors will have to send a clear message about how the UN should proceed.

**Nat Colletta**, Senior Social Scientist at the World Bank, described the Bank’s changing approach to post-conflict work. The Bank has defined four functional areas for the new post-conflict unit that is currently being established:

1. Knowledge management—defining the problem, assessing the context, reporting on best practices.
2. Strategic operational support—providing technical assistance to Bank colleagues, arranging for secondments from other organizations such as UNHCR and OTI, establishing working groups.
3. Capacity building and staff development for Bank and country clients—conducting a Bank staff learning needs assessment to be followed by training for staff. Linking internal and external training.
4. External partnering—Engaging in partnerships through formal arrangements such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will be signed by the Bank and UNHCR. Organizing a Global Workshop series with the Carter Center to focus on regional problems.

In addition to the traditional funding instruments, the Bank will now award grants for post-conflict work to governments, transitional governments, NGOs, international agencies, and regional agencies.

**Amounts and categories are:**

- Conflict prevention and conflict analysis: up to $100,000.
- Watch and brief on conflicts: up to $250,000.
- Transitional support strategy: very flexible.
- Policy studies and analysis: up to $500,000.

**Discussion:**

The first discussant referred to an assessment tool the USG has been using in its democracy work that deals with political questions and suggested that such a tool would be a useful for transition work. Others commented on the importance of early involvement by the IFIs and of donor support for UN efforts to improve coordination. Several participants made suggestions about how to improve international community assistance, including developing key partnerships for resource allocation, ensuring the legitimacy of donor crisis groups, incorporating middle tier countries from the G77 into support and planning groups, and developing complementary donor programs. Other suggestions related to the importance of involving the private sector in post-conflict societies, and of leveraging local resources. Finally, a number of participants voiced their interest in meeting again, possibly with a wider group of participants.
Session 6: Results/Future Challenges

The moderator opened the session by noting the difficulty of measuring results and emphasizing the challenge of finding the right staff.

Heather McHugh, Program Analyst with OTI, remarked that OTI has explained its approach to measurement in its performance review submissions to USAID. Evaluation of the achievement of OTI's Strategic Objective—political transitions successfully advanced in priority, conflict-prone countries—requires a qualitative analysis that is difficult to capture in the Agency's current monitoring system. First, political transitions by their very nature defy easy measurement including especially challenging issues such as promoting expression of popular will, increasing the confidence of previously warring parties so that they can live together peacefully, and reducing fear of intimidation. Second, the security environment in conflict-prone countries may be such that data cannot be accurately collected during the program implementation stage, or it may be collected unevenly across a country. Third, much of OTI's programs are evolutionary—there are no beaten trails for OTI to follow in design, implementation, or in measuring its results. Fourth, in countries that are emerging from crisis, there is often a dearth of politically relevant baseline data—making it difficult to establish data for specified indicators. Fifth, OTI programs are implemented in various and very diverse countries further complicating data aggregation and presentation. Sixth, given OTI's short time frame for program implementation (target of two years or less), there may be little time to establish and collect political data before the program has ended. Indeed, the two year time frame also means that the impact of certain activities may not be manifested until a number of years after OTI's programs have ended.

In Bosnia, OTI field staff have developed three different survey instruments to assess the impact of OTI-funded activities. Thus, in many cases, staff will simply ask potential grantees to describe how they will know if the project achieves the intended results, and then use those indicators to assess the impact of the grant. She commented that results-based resource allocations encourage risk-avoidance because they require agencies to prove accomplishments.

Matthias Stiefel, Director of the War-torn Societies Project with the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), stressed that the solutions to conflicts must come from the local, national, and regional actors involved. The international community can only play a facilitating role.

The solutions to conflicts must come from the local, national, and regional actors involved. The international community can only play a facilitating role.
facilitating role. The War-torn Societies Project assembles teams of researchers, both international and local, who assess local conditions in countries in conflict and select high priority issues for further research. These teams provide a neutral space for the parties to the conflict to meet and begin to cooperate. The Project initially plays a coordination role but eventually turns over all responsibility for the group to the local level. The Project is currently active in Eritrea, Mozambique, Somalia, and Guatemala. Stiefel presented the following lessons from the Project’s experience:

1. Do a careful analysis of the situation, including local viewpoints, before taking any action.

2. Be sensitive to timing. Donors may either need to move very quickly or to wait for the right moment.

3. Pay attention to the relative importance of different actors. Donors tend to overestimate the influence of the international community and underestimate that of local and national actors, and of the private sector.

4. Do not adhere to rigid distinctions between relief and development. In the field they overlap considerably.

5. Do not neglect the importance of consensus building. In post-conflict settings, governments may become more authoritarian because they are insecure. Donors must work to develop room for dialogue.

Over the next year the Project will begin to apply these lessons to operational policies and tools.

Discussion:

The discussion started with questions about why lessons that donors were learning were not being applied in the field. Participant replied that the international community has made great improvements, but that the donors need to be more focused and to overcome their resistance to integrated assistance. He remarked that UN can play an intermediary role in Latin America, but not in Africa where it is not viewed as neutral. In the Horn of Africa, country governments have asked the Project to work with IGAD (Intergovernmental Agency on Development) to develop the capacity for dialogue at the regional level. Stiefel also commented that the work of the Project combines talk with very tangible outcomes. In Mozambique, for example, the Project is planning to bring the Frelimo and Renamo groups together in a conversation about power sharing and decentralization as a way to defuse tensions before municipal elections take place.

In response to a question about assessing potential partners, participant noted that OTI did not have a system for this, but that it was starting to keep a list of individuals who had skills and geographic knowledge relevant to OTI activities. Several participants noted that donors would benefit from sharing information about implementing partners.
Session 7: Closing/Next Steps

For the last session, the participants defined the following as the most pressing questions to emerge from the discussions:

1. **How does the international community define and measure success in its support to the transition process?**

2. **How can donors bridge the gap between theory and practice, and ensure that theoretical developments are field-tested?**

3. **How do donors know whether to intervene, when to intervene, how to intervene, and what to do? How can donors determine what the best timing for intervention is? How does a donor determine whether to intervene or to simply facilitate ongoing processes?**

4. **How do donors harmonize and/or neutralize their national interests to avoid a self-interested bias in their policies and programs?**

5. **How do donors ensure that they are doing adequate analysis without compromising the quality of their work or missing opportunities?**

The participants also recommended that the group take the following actions:

1. **Increase coordination among the donors, including influential non-donor countries and organizations.**

2. **Using the lessons described by Mukesh Kapila, undertake joint donor assessments before donors decide on strategies or action plans.**

3. **Develop ways to operationalize assessments and country analyses, and post recommendations electronically before the next meeting of the group.**

4. **Create more dialogue with civil society and with local leadership in conflict-prone societies. Explore opportunities for dialogue at the regional level.**

5. **Agree on a date and sponsor for the next meeting. Nat Colletta expressed interest in having the Bank sponsor the next meeting in six months.**
6. Use the contacts from this meeting to establish an informal network for discussion of planned actions.

7. Develop more facilitative leadership in the field.

8. Conduct tri-monthly reviews of field activities to evaluate continued appropriateness and effectiveness of programs.

If you have any additional comments or questions, or would like more information regarding the workshop, please contact us at:

The Office of Transition Initiatives
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
U.S. Agency for International Development
Federal Triangle Building
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20523-8602
Telephone: 202 712-5603
Fax: 202 216 3043
Email: oti@usaid.gov
Monday, October 27, 1997

6:30-8:00 PM  Reception*
Speakers: William Yaeger, Deputy Director OTI
Michael Doyle, President CHF

8:00-  Dinner

*sponsored by Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF)

Tuesday, October 28, 1997

8:30-9:00 AM  Registration/Sign-In
Coffee and light refreshments provided

9:00-9:30  Welcome and Introduction to the Workshop
Speaker: Frederick Barton, Director OTI

9:30-10:50  SESSION 1: THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT - SECURITY
Moderator: Johanna Mendelson-Forman, Senior Advisor OTI

Speakers: Michael Dziedzic, Senior Military Fellow
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University
James Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Peacekeeping and
Humanitarian Assistance
US Department of Defense

10:50-11:10  Coffee Break

11:10-12:30  SESSION 1 (CONT'D): THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT - OTHER
ISSUES
Moderator: Sylvia Fletcher, Senior Program Advisor OTI

Speakers: William Garvelink, Acting Director
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID

Robert Cox, Advisor
European Community Humanitarian Office

12:30-2:00 Lunch Break
2:00-3:30  **SESSION 2: OPERATIONALIZING "RAPID RESPONSE"**  
**Moderator:** William Yaeger, Deputy Director OTI  
**Speakers:**  
Michael Stievater, Country Director, OTI/ Bosnia  
Steven Holtzman, Senior Social Scientist, World Bank  

3:30-4:00  **Coffee Break**  

4:00-5:30  **SESSION 3: COUNTRY SELECTION PROCESSES**  
**Moderator:** Michael Mahdesian, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Response, USAID  
**Speakers:**  
Johanna Mendelson-Forman, Senior Policy Advisor OTI  
Caroline Lavoie, Project Officer Canadian International Development Agency (Canada)  

**Wednesday, October 29, 1997**  

9:15-10:45 AM  **SESSION 4: PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION**  
**Moderator:** Julie Defler, Project Development Officer OTI  
**Speakers:**  
Sylvia Fletcher, Senior Program Advisor OTI  
Mukesh Kapila, Head of Humanitarian Policy Sector Emergency Aid Department, Department for International Development (UK)  

10:45-11:00  **Coffee Break**  

11:00-12:30  **SESSION 5: LEVERAGING RESOURCES - BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS & COOPERATION**  
**Moderator:** Marion Kappeyne van de Coppello, Co-Director, Conflict Management, Prevention and Humanitarian Aid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands)  
**Speakers:**  
Edmund Cain, Director, Emergency Responses Division United Nations Development Program  
Nat Colletta, Senior Social Scientist World Bank  

12:30-2:00  **Lunch Break**
2:00-3:30  **SESSION 6: RESULTS/FUTURE CHALLENGES**

*Moderator:* Nicole Ball, Fellow
Overseas Development Council

*Speakers:*
- Heather McHugh, OTI Program Analyst
- Matthias Stiefel, Director, War-torn Societies Project
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

3:30-4:00  **Coffee Break**

4:00-5:00  **SESSION 7: Closing/Next Steps**

*Speaker:* Frederick Barton, Director OTI
List of Participants

BILATERAL CANADA

Caroline Lavoie
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Sarah Fountain Smith
Department Of Foreign Affairs & International Trade

GERMANY

Hessameddin Tabatabai
German Agency For Technical Cooperation (GTZ)

JAPAN

Mikio Hazumi
Embassy of Japan

David Breg
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

KOREA

Byung Hwa Chung
Embassy Of the Republic Of Korea

NETHERLANDS

Marion S. Kappayne van de Coppello
Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

Jeroen Verheul
Ministry Of Foreign Affairs
SWITZERLAND

Gerhard Pfister
Swiss Development Cooperation SDC

UNITED KINGDOM

Mukesh Kapila
Department For International Development

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Robert Cox
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)

Frank Sieverts
International Committee Of The Red Cross (ICRC)

Hans-Petter Boe
International Organization for Migration (IOM)

William Hyde
International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Edmund Cain
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Elizabeth Gibbons
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

James LeMoyne
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Yvon Madore
United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-DHA)

Matthias Stiefel
The War-torn Societies Project
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (URISD)

Nat Colletta
World Bank

Steven Holtzman
World Bank

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG)

Frederick Barton
USAID/OTI

Julie Defler
USAID/OTI

Sylvia Fletcher
USAID/OTI

William J. Garvelink
USAID/OFDA

Heather McHugh
USAID/OTI

Johanna Mendelson Forman
USAID/OTI

Marc Scott
USAID/OTI

Michael Stievater
USAID/OTI

Michael Dzeidzic
National Defense University (NDU)

James Schear
US Department Of Defense

William Yaeger
USAID/OTI
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTICIPANTS

Nicole Ball
Overseas Development Council

Douglas Stafford
USAID (Retired)

There were also many observers during the course of the two-day workshop. While there are too many to be named, we thank them for their participation and comments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Agency on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD 56</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRISD</td>
<td>United Nations Research Institute for Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>