BRIEF ON PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Prepared for the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination

by

Heather S. McHugh
Senior Research Analyst

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United States Agency for International Development
Center for Development Information and Evaluation
Office of Development Information
Washington, DC 20532-1820
(703) 875-4974

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I. OVERVIEW: WHY PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY?

Preventive diplomacy in international relations is NOT a new idea. As early as 1623, a French scholar published a treatise which called for a standing group of sovereigns or their delegates to resolve conflicts peacefully. The development of the concept is usually linked to the notion of collective security -- international peace and security can be maintained through preventive diplomacy as an alternative to the system of balance of power (Salim 175:1990). However, "modern history is a dismal chronicle of missed opportunities to take effective preventive steps" (Bloomfield 1994). According to John Stremlau, this failure of preventive diplomacy is due to the fact that conflicts today do not develop out of failures of foreign policy, but out of failures of domestic policy (Stremlau 1995). Collective security alone is not sufficient to prevent the use of violence to resolve conflict, to prevent crisis, or to prevent complex disasters.

This current international outcry for preventive diplomacy is offset by the reality that there is no body of law or set of norms that legitimizes intervention for the sake of preventing the use of violence to resolve conflicts inside states (Stremlau 1995). Without the international legal norms to sanction intervening in other countries' domestic crises, concerned organizations and nation-states can react to each crisis in an ad hoc, and confused manner. Despite this, recent interest in preventive diplomacy stresses the "preventive diplomacy and the preventive use of peacekeeping forces [that] can save many lives and spare the international community enormous costs" (Albright 1994). Failure to address the "root causes at their earliest stages" has meant that the US has spent billions on peacekeeping measures and humanitarian aid (Wharton 1994). In 1992, for the first time, the US spent more on relief and crisis activities ($824 million) than it did on long-term development activities ($800 million).

Preventive diplomacy must be the basis of the redefinition of national security. This involves economics, especially trade, as well as bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance. Preventive actions range from combatting poverty in third-world nations, to attacking illiteracy, to addressing the population explosion, to containing and reversing the spread of drugs and AIDS (Wharton 1994).

To respond to the post-cold war situation, the US badly needs a coherent strategy toward the changed nature of conflict. "To create one requires that present difficulties be assessed in the light of broad national interests. So far this has not really happened, and the great sucking noise one hears is the sound of fragments of doctrine rushing to fill the conceptual vacuum" (Bloomfield 1994).
II. TYPES AND MODALITIES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

According to Michael Lund of the US Institute for Peace, who has been studying this issue for some time, there are three major types of preventive diplomacy: crisis prevention, preemptive initiatives, and pre-conflict peacebuilding (Lund 1994:59). Distinctions between these types depend mainly on the relative intensity of violence, and on the focus of preventive diplomacy activity.

An analysis of the literature and experience in preventive diplomacy suggests that the instruments of preventive diplomacy can be characterized by military, diplomatic, and development responses. Traditionally, the emphasis has been on military and diplomatic responses, and most of the examples discussed in this paper fall into these two categories. On the other hand, Lincoln Bloomfield has identified publicity, deterrence, and proactive peaceful change procedures as the main approaches of preventive diplomacy (Bloomfield 1994). Because Bloomfield’s three approaches can and have been used by military-diplomatic and development organizations, they can be regarded as just some of the tools available to foreign policy organizations.

- **Military interventions include:** restraints on the use of armed force (arms control regimes, non-aggression agreements, demilitarized zones, blockades, preemptive peacekeeping forces); threat or use of armed force (deterrence policies, security guarantees, major military interventions) (Lund 1994:Appendix B; Arnold and Mitchum 1994).

- **Diplomatic interventions include:** coercive diplomatic measures (sanctions, war crimes tribunals); non-coercive diplomatic measures (international appeals, observation teams, early warning systems, bi-lateral negotiations, multilateral peace conferences, economic assistance or political incentives, arbitration, adjudication) (Lund 1994:Appendix B).

- **Development interventions include:** policies to promote national economic and social development; promulgation and enforcement of human rights, establishment of democratic and other standards; and national governing structures to promote peaceful conflict resolution (Lund 1994:Appendix B). Development activities to "promote economic well-being" can help minority and majority groups see the practical benefits of peaceful accommodation. Economic support, technical assistance, help in managing common water, land, and other natural resources, and other measures can be geared to show practical ways that a bargain can be struck to maintain the territorial status quo (Stremlau 1995). Development activities can be focused on the promotion of strengthening of indigenous capacity to mitigate conflicts and respond to crises that could otherwise lead to chaos (Douglas 1995). Likewise, Boutros-Ghali has linked conflict prevention to promotion of economic development, human rights, and democracy (Boutros-Ghali 1992).
Descriptions of Lund's three types of preventive diplomacy are presented below, and include examples from each of the three instruments outlined above. These examples are not necessarily successful, and are derived from literature.

Crisis Prevention includes efforts intended to halt the escalation of hostilities or contain their spread, in order to keep them from becoming a crisis or war. Violence already occurs, but has not yet erupted into full scale war or civil war. These measures include sanctions preventive peacekeeping forces, and deterrence, and tend to be aimed directly at the overt behavior of specific parties.

Military:

Example: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) threats of air-strikes to get Serbians to pullback from Sarajevo (Lund 1994:Appendix B).

Example: United Nations (UN) threats backed by US bombing of selected Iraqi targets, alternated with promises to unfreeze badly needed Iraqi oil revenues, after Baghdad recoiled from international attempts to monitor missile testing and promote the destruction of long-range ballistic missiles; compliance from Baghdad came only after credible threats of punishment (Bloomfield 1994; Dowty 1994).

Example: After the televised mortaring of a Sarajevo market, NATO "finally stirred itself into a credible posture and Serb guns were pulled back -- thus demonstrating the "CNN effect," and the painful truth that bullies respond only to believable threats (Bloomfield 1994).

Example: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with its ECOMOG peacekeeping force organized by (then) Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida successfully entered a combat zone in Liberia to force a ceasefire (Arnold and Mitchum 1994). This will serve as a model for future peacemaking and peace enforcement operations -- without the UN budget or political prestige (Arnold and Mitchum 1994).

Diplomatic:

Example: The international trade embargo of Serbia (Lund 1994:Appendix B).

Example: According to many foreign policy experts, the European Union's (EU) actions in Bosnia demonstrated a failure of diplomatic preventive action. The EU "suffering from tired blood and historical amnesia for far too long turned away from its responsibilities, and Washington ... declined to act alone" (Bloomfield 1994).

Development:

Example: Common Ground's activities in Burundi, where they are concentrating on negotiation training for political party leaders; conflict resolution training for parliamentarians; and NGOs (Shorr 1995).

Example: The Project on Ethnic Relations based in Princeton, NJ which "seeks to reduce tension between the government of Romania and leaders of the Hungarian minority and promote efforts to counter violence against the Roma population throughout the region. This experiment of grassroots efforts to lower barriers to accommodation among groups may provide practical lessons for other international NGOs" (Stremlau 1995).

Example: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (EBRD) conditioning its loans on constitutional changes to grant minorities full citizenship has been a success, but recently began to fail as EBRD's criteria have weakened (Stremlau 1995).

Preemptive Initiatives are actions that focus on particular disputes and issues even before they become especially intense. Methods such as good offices, facilitation and mediation, negotiation and adjudication, are aimed mainly at creating or sustaining dialogue and communications among the hostile parties, so as to provide an alternative to violence. That threat of violence seems imminent.

Military:

Example: According to Georgie Anne Geyer, of the Chicago Tribune, an example of preventive diplomacy is the military agreement between the US and Oman whereby the US would have access to Oman in critical times, and that the US would defend Oman in the case of aggression.

Example: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department's mandate in Macedonia is an example of successful "preventive diplomacy" (Albright 1994).

Example: Various regional security fora have considerably lowered the risk of interstate conflict ...and their "early warning and other conflict prevention mechanisms are highly" developed (Stremlau 1995).

Example: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formed a regional organization (the ARF, or ASEAN Regional Forum) which includes the 6 ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), the seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, European Community, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and the US), the three observers (Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea) and two special guests (China and Russia).
This regional organization, unlike other security organizations, was created during a time of peace and economic prosperity ... and not as a response to a threat or crisis. It is "proactive rather than reactive; a signal exercise in preventive diplomacy" (Singh 1994). Japan in particular placed a premium on preventive diplomacy. It was much easier to build from an existing forum than to start an entirely new one. The primary purpose of ARF is to prevent armed conflict. It is a **dialogue process**" (Ibid.). It is an attempt to manage strategic change in such a way that a new equilibrium between the major powers in East Asia can evolve gradually and peacefully over the next two decades (Ibid.).

**Diplomatic:**

Example: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has initiated the establishment of special monitoring missions in Belgrade and in Skopje, Macedonia, where diplomats are trying to achieve reconciliation between the ethnic factions (Shorr 1994). Other preventive missions have been set up in Estonia and Georgia (Shorr 1995). These missions are staffed by diplomats, military officers, and academics.

USG participation in CSCE missions is coordinated by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs (DOS), and has maintained between one and two monitors in Serbia and Montenegro, and two in the Macedonia monitoring mission (headed by US Ambassador William Whitman). In January 1993, then-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger signed an order establishing preventive diplomacy missions as a priority (Shorr 1994). "The key is to identify small, concrete issues" such as the education system, where mediation efforts can focus on language issues, for example (Ibid.).

Example: A glaring example of the failure of preventive diplomacy -- too little and too late -- is former Yugoslavia, where Germany insisted on premature recognition of Croatia by Europe without first ensuring guaranteed protection for the rights and interests of its Serbian minority (Stremlau 1995; Bloomfield 1994).

Example: Assistance to democracy in Russia and in other countries has been called "the best manifestation of preventive diplomacy" (Mzareulov 1993). The US is prepared to use its good offices and diplomacy in the area from the Baltic States to Ukraine and Central Asia in order to help reduce tension and settle disputes (Ibid.).

Example: Fact finding missions and dispute settlement by the Organization of American States (OAS) and by the Contadora Group in Central America have had modest success in preventing or reducing violent conflict (Bloomfield 1994).

**Development:**

Example: Common Ground's work in Macedonia, where there is no indication of imminent crisis, but where there are some indicators of problems. Common Ground is working to improve relations and perceptions between constituencies, and to gi
leaders more tools (training, education, dialogue fora, and building indigenous conflict resolution capacity) for collaborative problem solving (Shorr 1995).

Example: Open up areas of tension to "inspection" by recognized international bodies. The UN and international NGOs could play a role by using their international status and experience to collect and examine evidence on the ground and to recommend preventive measures (Odera 14:1994).

**Pre-conflict Peacebuilding** involves more generalized efforts that act on the climate of disputes in a troubled area-- to create a climate of trust, build processes and institutions of cooperation where they do not exist, or strengthen them where they are weak, and deprive the parties of the use of forceful methods of resolution. Such measures include confidence building international regime-building, the institutionalization of values such as democracy, minority rights, and the rule of law, and anti-arms proliferation policies. Pre-conflict peace-building may also include alleviating the most egregious socio-economic conditions that invite violent conflict, since achieving a minimally-secure material environment may be requisite for negotiations to start or proceed and to keep extremist elements such as radical nationalist leaders from seizing on such conditions as a pretext for provoking violence. The threat of violence seems probable, but not imminent.

Preventive diplomacy, as it applies to conflicts inside states, is an "ongoing process that is more open, flexible, low-key, and inclusive" than traditional diplomatic practice. It relies on detailed knowledge of local history, changes in ethnic relations, economies, land use, population changes, environmental degradation, and the distribution of political power. "Conflict prevention ... becomes a matter of finding ways to open political space for governments and the increasingly alienated forces demanding greater self-determination" (Stremlau 1995)

Placing primacy on good governance, information exchanges, and participation "will bring peace and development closer together" (Bernard Woods, in Stremlau 1995).

**Military:**

Example: Military-to-military consultations regarding military professionalism and the role of the military in society. Can include the issue of the separation of civilian police services from the military. For instance, the NATO-NACC meetings among Western and Eastern militaries is considered an example of this type of preventive diplomacy (Lund, 1994:Appendix B).

**Diplomatic:**

Examples: Trials of Serb and Croat offenders in Bosnia. War crimes tribunals, and similar endeavors (such as Truth Commissions), can prevent conflict from erupting into further violence or reprisals (Lund 1994:Appendix B).
Examples: The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) role in fostering domestic stability in Russia's hyperinflation, and experience in Asia suggests that interethnic accommodation becomes far easier with prosperity and economic well-being (Stremlau 1995).

Example: The establishment of conflict resolution centers, such as the ones USAID has funded in Guatemala, El Salvador, and South Africa, can "force attention to incipient hot spots governments know about but would prefer to ignore" (Bloomfield 1994).

Example: USAID's Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) which prevents large-scale starvation and conflict by monitoring data on rainfall and crop production, health and other indicators. Every 10 days FEWS issues a detailed bulletin, shared with other donors, on current conditions and longer-term trends. Aid is then targeted to threatened areas.

Examples: Elections monitoring and voter education, such as what occurred in 1989/1990 Chile (Lund 1994:Appendix B).

Example: Amnesty International and other non-governmental human rights groups use the media to throw "a healthy glare on egregious behavior regardless of governmental nervousness" (Bloomfield 1994).

Example: Political conditionality, which is sometimes attached to economic aid. This includes meeting democracy criteria for European Community membership (Lund 1994:Appendix B).

Example: Measures to support the role of traditional and local leaders as peacebuilders within countries likely to experience conflict shows promise (Douglas 1995). The Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee, comprised of Muslim and Christian leaders, have acted as peacebuilders within Liberia. Specifically, the Committee has worked to promote cease fires and has helped form a conflict resolution organization.
III. LINKAGES TO HUMAN RIGHTS

According to Boutros-Ghali, "unless multiethnic states respect human rights and develop according to democratic principles they will lack the resilience to withstand the self determination challenge" of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups that may claim statehood (Stremlau 1995). Thus, human rights should be the key focus of effective preventive diplomacy.

Therefore, early information about deteriorating power balances and human rights abuses within states is vital to conflict prevention (Stremlau 1995). The main indicator, according to Boutros-Ghali, is the decline in a government's commitment to human rights ... with special sensitivity to minorities. "The denial of human rights and adequate protection for minorities in this preventive context should be regarded as a tool of analysis, an early indicator that a state is in trouble" (Stremlau 1995).

Even in situations like Rwanda, such an approach can work. By February 1994 human rights organizations were warning that Hutu extremists were planning to scuttle the country's uneasy peace (The New Republic 1994). But the UN responded, with US assent, by removing troops.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is apparent that there is both a need and a demand for a strategic concept that unites the NGO community, local peacemakers, international organizations, scholars, and governments in cooperation towards conflict prevention and transformation (Rupesinghe 18:1994). What is not apparent is what organization or instrument has the political will to take the international lead in coordination, or what organization or instrument has the budget to engage in effective preventive diplomacy.
V. WHO IS WHO IN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Multilateral Organizations:

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
Jalan Sisingamangaraja 70a
Jakarta, Indonesia
Tel: 21 716451
Contact: Boonlert Wongpidul

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Thunovska 12, Mala Strana
110 00 Prague 1
Czech Republic
tel: 2 24311069
Director: Nils Eliasson (of the CSCE’s secretariat in Prague)
High Commissioner of National Minorities: Max Van Der Stoel

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
B-1110 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: 2 7284111
Contact: Dr. Jamie Shea

Organization of American States (OAS)
17th Street and Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 458-6046

Organization of African Unity (OAU)
PO Box 3243
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel: 251 1 517700
Contact: Dr. Christopher Bakwesegha

Western European Union (WEU)
4 Rue de la Resence
1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: 2 5004411
Contact: Diarmid Williams

United Nations
(Various agencies)

UN Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Secretariat
6 King George V Road, Onikam
P.M.B. 12745
Lagos, Nigeria
Tel: 01 636841

NGOs:

African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
c/o University of Durban-Westville
Private Bag X54001
Durban, 4000
S. Africa
Tel: 27 31 820 2816
Contact: Vasu Gounden

African Peace Research Institute
PO Box 5-757, Famlomo
Ikoyi
Lagos, Nigeria
Contact: Peter Okoh

Amnesty International
304 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
Washington, DC 20003
Tel: (202) 544 0200

Balkans Peace Project
Cambridge, MA
Contact: Paula Gotlove

Carter Center
Emory University
One Copen Hill
Atlanta, GA 30307
(404) 420-5100
Contact: Joyce Neu

Common Ground (also Search for Common Ground)
1601 Connecticut Ave., NW #200
Washington, DC 20009
Tel: (202) 265-4300
Director: Wanda Hall
Contact: David Shorr

Conflict Management Group
20 University Road
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: (617) 354-5444

Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action
58 East 68th Street
New York, NY 10021
Tel: (212) 734-0400
Director: Barnett Rubin
Contact: Darren Kew

Human Rights Watch
1522 19th Street, NW Suite 910
Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 371-6592
Contact: Melissa Crow

Inter Africa Group
PO Box 1631
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel: 251 1 51 87 90
Contact: Ato Abdul Mohammed

Inter Africa Network for Human Rights and Development
PO Box 32569
Lusaka, Zambia
Fax: 260 1 225 306
Contact: Ngande Mwanajiti

Inter-Church Coalition on Africa
29 St. Clair Avenue West
Toronto, Ontario M4V 1N5
Canada
Contact: Akwatu Khenti

International Alert
1 Glyn Street
London, SE11 5HT UK
Tel: 44 0 71-793 8383
Contact: Kumar Rupesinghe

International Crisis Group
London, UK

International Training Institute for Peace
Lagos, Nigeria
Tel: 212 652 4041 (in the US)
Contact: Prof. John Amoda (in the US)

Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee
Contact: Sheikh Kafumba F. Konneh

Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
400 Second Avenue, South Suite 1050
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401
Tel: (612) 341-3302
Contact: Nancy Arnison

Nairobi Peace Institute
Nairobi, Kenya

Project on Ethnic Relations
1 Palmer Square, Suite 3435
Princeton, NJ 08542
Tel: (609) 683 5666

Refugees International
21 Dupont Circle, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 828-0110
Contact: Lionel Rosenblatt

US Institute for Peace
Preventive Diplomacy Initiative
1550 M Street, NW Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 429-3860
Contact: Michael Lund
1. In November 1993 the OAU announced that it planned to develop a conflict resolution mechanism that is also "preventive."

2. The WEU is expected to function as a military tool in the service of the EU's preventive diplomacy efforts.

3. Although the Carter Center does not appear to have directed its attentions towards preventive diplomacy, it has been suggested that the Center may be a good source of information on preventive diplomacy actors.

4. This creation of this organization was announced a couple of weeks ago. It was formed with the support of George Soros and Morton Abramowits (of the Carnegie Endowment), and has been called a "privatized UN."

5. Is developing a framework for the transition in Liberia.

6. World Vision has proposed the creation of a tracking unit to spot Rwanda-style crisis.

7. The Canadians have apparently written a "Policy Staff Commentary" on preventive diplomacy.
VI. SOURCES USED


ANNEX A: OTHER USG

A. The US Military and Preventive Diplomacy:

Calls for a debate on the acceptable, legitimate, and effective role of the military in disaster situations have existed since at least 1992. At the moment, the US military must be invited by the US Department of State (DOS) to participate in international disaster assistance, and it takes its directions from the DOS. The DOS also defines the extent and limitations of the support provided by the military (Gaydos and Luz 1994). Despite the fact that the DOS takes the lead, 'the Pentagon fears its basic military readiness is being eroded by the ad-hoc, logistically challenging demands for humanitarian operations' (Atlas 1994). And the Defence Department continues to resist pressures to assume a "new role as a muscle-bound Red Cross" (The New Republic:1994).

According to recent studies, the US military should be used in disaster-related roles "if this is in the best interest of our government and does not seriously detract from readiness for combat" (Gaydos and Luz 1994). Military analysts have suggested that, once the military role has been defined, ongoing disaster-related work should take place at a formal center for information exchange, debate, research, training, and planning (Gaydos and Luz 1994).

B. The CIA and Preventive Diplomacy:

In 1992 the UN began to receive encouragement to go into the intelligence-gathering business, so that it could provide early warnings on potential conflicts, enabling the Security Council to take preventive action (Doyle 1992). This suggestion was made in a series of confidential position papers presented to the Secretary-General by the European Community, Russia, the Nordic countries, Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Ibid.). The proposals touched off a furor in Washington, DC which opposed any effort that would compete with the CIA and other intelligence services.

Some analysts countered that the UN was already receiving quality intelligence, but lacked the interest or ability to respond. Thus, Brian Urquhart emphasized the concept that "preventive diplomacy depends on fundamental changes in the thinking of the UN secretariat and council members" than on improving intelligence gathering capabilities (Ward 1992).

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1 According to news reports, former director of the CIA William Colby initiated the idea that the UN would benefit from greater access to the intelligence of member states.

2 The issue of problems with political will have been analyzed extensively by Alexander George. He identified three important factors in the use of intelligence and early warning systems into preventive action: the strength of the warning signal; the expectations of the listener; and the "rewards and costs" associated with correct recognition of the signal. This was discussed briefly in Stremlau's article (Stremlau 1995).
ANNEX B. DEFINITIONS OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

A. Overview

In order to address what is being done in the "preventive diplomacy" arena, and to identify a list of preventive diplomacy "who's who," the definitions of preventive diplomacy should be articulated. The variety of definitions proposed lead to varied methodologies for conducting preventive diplomacy, and to varied determinations of success and failure. Because USAID's policy towards preventive diplomacy has yet to be articulated, and because the US foreign policy community is still struggling to formalize even the concept of preventive diplomacy, a list of lessons learned relevant to USAID would be premature at this point.

B. Definitions

There are many competing definitions of preventive diplomacy, based in part on the "institutional" mind-set of the various actors involved in preventive diplomacy. While the current US administration has paid attention to preventive diplomacy for a number of years, its thinking often "remains more a slogan than specific policy prescription" (Atlas 1994).

Preventive diplomacy is ...

- the "most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict -- or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes" (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence between states, it needs early warning systems based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones. Preventive diplomacy should not be carried out bilaterally, through NGOs, or without the "cooperation" of the UN.

However, coordinating the resources of all these actors -- in partnership with the countries and populations at risk -- is essential. Capacity building, including early warning systems, conflict resolution mechanisms, and relief to development linkages, within vulnerable societies must be a major outcome of preventive strategies (Douglas 1995).

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3PDD-25 on reforming multilateral peace operations does not address prevention (Stremlau 1995).

4A review of the literature has revealed some lessons learned from various preventive diplomacy efforts, but these have tended to focus exclusively on military and diplomatic experience (eg, see Dowty for lessons learned from experience with the use of sanctions as a means of international enforcement).
Accordingly, the New York based Center for Preventive Diplomacy changed its name in 1994 to the Center for Preventive Action (Kew 1995).

Preventive diplomacy is the stuff of chapter VI of the Charter, in which initiative is left to member states, and is implied in articles 99 and 101, which respectively give the secretary general authority to bring matters to the attention of the Security Council and to send his representatives on fact-finding and mediation missions. The UN has often engaged in preventive diplomacy, but always in an ad hoc manner, often too late, usually without adequate background knowledge, operational information, or backup from headquarters, and almost always on budgetary shoestrings" (Puchala 1994:161).

Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, however, still prohibits intervention in the internal affairs of member states, except when the Security Council detects a threat to international peace and security (Stremlau 1994).

The involvement of "governmental or non-governmental diplomatic, political, economic, military, or other efforts that are taken deliberately at an early stage to keep states or communal groups from threatening or using armed force or coercion as the way to settle political disputes that arise from the destabilizing effects of national and international change. It aims to discourage or minimize hostilities, reduce tensions, address differences, create channels for resolution, and alleviate insecurities and material conditions that tempt violence" (Lund, 1994:53).

aimed at defusing crisis, and is the primary instrument of peacemaking (Bloomfield 1994).

when "conflicts can be resolved before they become costly disasters that distract attention from domestic priorities and require major expenditures of financial and political capital" (Stremlau 1995).

not just "diplomatic action," but also covers such activities as conflict resolution, collaborative problem solving, and development. The term "preventive diplomacy" should, therefore, be changed to preventive action."5 Furthermore, preventive diplomacy is not just for governments, multinationals, and their representatives -- NGOs can best play the first role in conflict prevention, as well as help in information gathering, leadership training, and more (Kew 1995) (Shorr 1995).

Thus, definitions of preventive diplomacy run the gamut from traditional bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and security activities centered in the international arena, to those definitions that focus on the UN as the primary actor and using UN instruments, to those that include conflict resolution and development efforts centered in the local arena. Whatever the definition of preventive diplomacy used, however, they all demonstrate the

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5Accordingly, the New York based Center for Preventive Diplomacy changed its name in 1994 to the Center for Preventive Action (Kew 1995).
need for unprecedented international cooperation -- at the global (e.g., UN), regional (e.g., ASEAN), bilateral, or unilateral (e.g., US government agencies) levels.