CIVIL SOCIETY BIBLIOGRAPHY

with annotations

by

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INTRODUCTION

This annotated bibliography was generated in response to a global evaluation of USAID civil society projects and programs. As part of an ongoing series of assessments currently being undertaken by the Agency's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE), the civil society study is the second to address the general area of USAID's Democracy Initiative, following the Legal Systems Development assessment that began in FY 1992.

In the process of writing the evaluation draft design proposal, an initial literature search was launched, and the documents uncovered by the search began to be demanded by professionals both within and without the Agency. Focusing on the main theoretical questions of the CDIE evaluation team -- definitions of civil society, definitions of "state," the relationships between civil society and democracy, the nature of NGOs and their relationships to democracy -- this annotated bibliography will be a useful tool for USAID officers as they design and evaluate civil society projects and programs.

This annotated bibliography brings together selected writings from mostly non-donor sources and is organized into three main sections. The first section takes a look at civil society documents which take a general approach to the subject. The second section reviews articles which focus on the various regions of the world, as defined by USAID's bureau presence. This section contains mostly case studies. The last section of the bibliography lists additional documents that are not annotated.

This bibliography is not intended to be an exhaustive list of materials or case studies. Instead, it is intended to provide readers with an overview of major regional and theoretical issues. To obtain copies of these documents, please telephone PPC/CDIE/DI's Research and Reference Services, (703) 875-4807.


1 For the purposes of the CDIE evaluation, civil society has been defined as the "wide range of voluntary associations that occupy the broad terrain between the individual and the state, and which are the primary means by which citizens can articulate their interests to both the state and to the society at large" (See Blair 1994:1).

In this article, the author analyzes three main views of the state, and how those views relate to civil society: 1) For some analysts, civil society can be identified with the economy, and encompasses the realm of where private property, labor, class divisions and market relations are located -- civil society, therefore, is the product of a "social contract" which is established to protect individual rights; 2) For others, the economy is a part of civil society, and includes all non-state private and communal pursuits -- the main distinction, therefore, is between the state and civil society; 3) A third view holds that civil society is a sphere separate from both the state and the economy -- here most analysts simply define civil society as the voluntary, non-profit sector.


The article says that it is more accurate to think of pluralism and corporatism as alternative principles or modes of representation that can emerge and develop simultaneously in the same political system, trading positions of relative predominance in successive historical periods. Bianchi suggests that there are three interrelated factors that have promoted exaggerated efforts to enhance the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis civil society: "1) unbounded personal ambition; 2) infatuation with new foreign models in which corporatism is seen as part of an instant recipe combining 'economic miracles' with 'social peace'; and 3) the misfortune of relying on the unwise counsel of many in the discipline of political science where corporatism has been vastly oversold whether as an analytical concept or as an associational policy."

Projects to reshape associational life from above in developing countries have two recurrent consequences: 1) an initial rise in political opposition causing greater instability; and 2) a gradual strengthening of pluralist forms of representation. Instability is more severe and protracted where associational life historically was repressed and retarded as in South Korea and Iran, and crises of unruly corporatism were followed by even more intense elite hostility toward opposition groups. Alternatively, the prospects for a more vigorous pluralism are most evident where the art of association was widely cultivated, as in India and Egypt, and elites responded to crises of unruly corporatism by fashioning more flexible and heterogeneous systems that combined corporatist and pluralist elements.
Global civil society is outside the political space occupied by the nation-state system, and is delineated by networks of economic, social and cultural relations. These political spaces are occupied "by the conscious association of actors, in physically separated locations, who link themselves together in networks for particular political and social purposes." There are many transnational political networks being established by and among actors within a global civil society who themselves are, in a sense, "imagined communities", and who are challenging, from below, the nation-state system.

National governments are unable, or loathe, to provide the kind of welfare services demanded by citizens, who are more and more aware of what they want and how they might get it. Although many of these efforts are locally focused, they are not limited in terms of adopting forms of social organization applied elsewhere around the world.

The author finds that there are two main conceptualizations of civil society:

A) Civil society is a set of sociopolitical institutions that include: 1) a limited government operating under the rule of law; 2) a set of social institutions such as markets and associations based on voluntary agreements among autonomous agents; and 3) a public sphere, where these agents debate among themselves and with the state about matters of public interest and where they engage in public activities. This meaning of civil society corresponds to the sociopolitical systems of the United States and Great Britain; and,

B) Civil society is the set of social institutions, such as markets and associations, and the public sphere, which excludes the state institutions proper. These social institutions are generally considered outside the direct control of the state. This meaning of civil society corresponds to the sociopolitical systems of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes (for instance: Franco’s Spain and the Eastern European socialist societies).

"The connection between the two concepts is a close one, but it is not one of mutually necessary implication. [A] cannot exist without having a [B] as a part of it; but the reverse need not hold true: [B] may exist within or without an [A]."
Rudi argues that there are two types of NGOs: those "which by their objectives and methodology are fundamentally concerned with supporting ... social movements and/or initiatives of development that are the expression of the free will of groups -- groups which are formed to confront certain essential questions of life" (e.g., grassroots organizations that form around environmental social movements); and those NGOs which are the expression of certain social movements, having emerged from them or representing a certain degree of their institutionalization (e.g., grassroots organizations that create social movements).

Rudi then examines the relationship between a University in Brazil and social movement. He finds that the Faculty of Philosophy in a sense formed an NGO "inside the university." This relationship developed because of the sense of identification among the members of the university NGO and the population. He also notes that after the military coup, popular struggles were transferred to legal institutions such as workers' unions, neighborhood associations, and cooperatives.


The author describes the history of the term civil society. The idea of civil society has three main components: 1) a part of society composed of a set of autonomous institutions distinguishable from the family, the clan, the locality and the state; 2) a part of society possessing a particular complex set of relationships between itself and the state and a set of institutions that safeguard the separations of the state and civil society; and 3) the widespread pattern of refined or civil manners. The idea of a political community, where citizens have rights to public office and to participation in discussions of and decisions about public issues, doesn't enter into the civil society definition until after the nineteenth century.
SUPPORTING ARTICLES


Frequently, political parties and pressure groups have irreconcilable ideological positions, making compromise extremely difficult and leading to wide policy fluctuations.


In the US, the state did not "rule" civil society, because of the weakness or even the absence of the state. The constitution and the Supreme Court "provided the bedrock of civil society." The constitution is a "social contract" between the government and the people.

The author argues that the recent interest in civil society is a response to the demand for a more "manageable scale of social life, particularly where the national economy has become embedded in an international frame and the national polity has lost some degree of its independence."


The author sees four interconnected approaches to NGO project work: 1) project replication; 2) grassroots mobilization; 3) influencing policy reform; and 4) international advocacy. "Each calls for a more strategic relationship between NGOs and governments." The author then examines some actual examples of micro-policy reforms in Malawi, Zambia and India.


The author believes that transitions are attempts to create or recreate civil societies by gradual, if often dramatic change. The most serious feature of the economic transition to a market economy [on the way to a democratic transition] is that it requires a period of deferred gratification. Likewise, political transition leads to economic frustration, resulting in instability and unrest. "If there is any project that links economic and political reform, it must concern civil society. What is needed is institution building, not constitution building."


Participatory development builds the capacity of people to be in charge and leads to the
evolution of a broadly-based civil society, which in turn provides a base for a successful democracy.


The author envisions participatory political democracy as a process of interaction and negotiation based on a relationship between elected representative bodies, the administrative structures of the state, and self-governing groups within civil society. The conclusion reached is that "the dual crisis of [state] agency can be resolved by the development of civil society, but that a role remains for the state, in resolving residual conflicts of interest when negotiation fails to produce agreement, and for political parties, in promoting alternative perspectives on the distribution of resources, rights and responsibilities."


This article explores the characteristics of grassroots organizations, horizontal networks between such organizations, grassroots support organizations and other grassroots networks that reinforce democratic rather than oligarchic tendencies. The author concludes that horizontal and individual ties between NGOs reinforce the democratic characteristics of individual NGOs. Civil society, therefore, is an antidote to oligarchy.

Fisher contends that the massive increase in numbers of grassroots organizations and GRSOs is "rearranging relationships between governments and the independent sector." Governments respond by "adapting, co-opting, repressing, or even learning" from these new actors.

Friedman notes that the diversity that "resistance" civil society rhetoric recognizes may be not that of society as a whole, but of the movement: it is a demand not for the independence of all interests within society but for all those within the movement. Civil society organizations might seek to take over or colonize other institutions outside the state (instead of competing with them) in order to establish hegemony.

It is also possible that the part of civil society that speaks for "civil society" will demand, and win, significant independence from the state. "But this will be autonomy for a part of a single movement or tradition, not for civil society as a whole. And it could well be won at the expense of the rest of civil society."


International NGOs (INGOs) can be described as pressure groups or shapers of opinion primarily in the areas of education for development, protection of the natural and human environment, human rights and peace. The association movement has working "to bring about social change ... against a background of unprecedented disarray in prevailing theory and practice."


Highlights the need to "forge stronger links between the NGOs micro level experience with local grassroots groups and specific projects and the macro level public policies which can affect the development process." International NGOs should work with local NGOs to influence those policy decisions.

The relations between NGOs and governments vary drastically from region to region: in India NGOs derive support and encouragement from their government; NGOs in Africa also work in closely with government or at least avoid antagonizing the authorities; most NGOs in Latin America function as opposition to government; NGOs in newly democratic countries NGOs "see themselves as playing a crucial role in the strengthening of civil society."


"Modernization means mass mobilization; mass mobilization means increased political participation; and increased participation is the key element of political development." The author goes on to say that since all definitions are arbitrary, the definitions of political development as some combination or permutation of participation, rationalization, democratization, and nation-building are just as legitimate as any other definition. However, political development is the "institutionalization of political organizations and procedures."

Social mobilization and political participation are increasing rapidly in Asia, Africa and
Latin America. "These processes, in turn, are directly responsible for the deterioration of political institutions in these areas." Social mobilization can be moderated in many ways: to increase the complexity of social structure; to limit or reduce communications in society; and to minimize competition among segments of the political elite.


Micro-policy reforms are more likely to be achieved through facilitating social process than through legal proclamation.


"It is essential to emphasize that the crisis and breakdown of nondemocratic regimes is a process that should be kept analytically separate from that of transitions to political democracy." Sultanistic (personalistic) rule leaves a vacuum in society that makes the establishment and consolidation of democracy extremely difficult. Bureaucratic authoritarian rule, on the other hand, leaves a society with destroyed and corrupted social institutions. The author looks at the relationship between regime type (presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary) and redemocratization.


Lipton holds that both state and market must increase in power in early economic development, "yet as each does so it tends to weaken or subvert the other. In most cases, only institutions of public overview, some self-seeking and others not, are able to interact freely through 'civil society', and inhibit such weakening and subversion."


Once an authoritarian government begins to permit some contestation on issues previously declared off limits and lowers the costs for engaging in collective action, these regimes discover that public space (civil society) expands beyond anyone's expectations.


The author believes that the market is a "deadly enemy" of society. That the last generation saw "extended family, church, and local community neighborhood ... burnt up as fuel in the engine of economic development", with worse to come if economic rationalization is not halted. "If the values Pusey ascribes to market activity were culturally dominant, they would preclude the kind of identification with others and with
common purposes on which civil society relies."


Recently the private, nonprofit, or voluntary sector has been called on to substitute for government social welfare spending, and to help foster a civil society in countries in Central Europe and NIS. However, increased expectations about the potential contributions of the nonprofit sector are not based on a very clear understanding of the nature of this sector. This study has been funded to examine the role of nonprofit and to reevaluate the role of the state.

Twelve countries were selected for the project -- six developed countries, five less developed countries (Brazil, Ghana, Egypt, India and Thailand), and one Central/Eastern European country (Hungary).


The author examines models of civil society: 1) the dualistic model of state-civil society ("which is unsatisfactory because it makes civil society the rag-bag for everything that does not belong to the state"); 2) Freund's model opposing the public and private spheres; 3) the concept of public space, and the thesis of mutual infiltration of public and private spheres; 4) the opposition of systemic regulation ("automatism resulting from the coordination of publics and administration") and self-regulation; and 5) Habermas's model of System-Lifeworld.


Thinkers in such cities as Bucharest, Budapest, Vilna and Prague differ greatly when they talk of civil society from thinkers in Princeton, Chicago and Toronto. For those living "East of the Elbe", civil society is essentially a call for the "institutionalization of those principles of citizenship upon which modern liberal, democratic politics in the West are based." This includes: 1) freedom to form and join organizations; 2) freedom of expression; 3) the right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 5) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; 6) alternative sources of information (free press); 7) free and fair elections; and 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference." The author believes that the use of the term civil society instead of democracy is due to the fact that the term civil society is neutral and uncorrupted by 40 years of state propaganda whereas the term democracy is heavily tainted.

In the West, the term civil society invokes a greater stress on community, on the "reestablishment" of some public space to mediate what are seen as the "adverse effects of the ideology of individualism."

The author discusses Milton Esman and Norman Uphoff's analysis of "intermediaries in [third world] rural development," namely "local organizations" defined as organizations that "act on behalf of and are accountable to their membership and are involved in development activities." These organizations are virtually ubiquitous in the third world, without regard to variations of regime ideology. The impacts on political life by these organizations are difficult to ascertain by statistical methods; their long-term contributions to the advancement of democracy are ever harder to calculate; and they "bedevil attempts to classify third-world political systems." In these and many other countries, free discussion and dissent, fugitive arts in a sovereign state, are widely practiced in the private and nonformal governments of economic and social organizations.

Furthermore, the author objects to the Freedom House rankings. He finds, for example, that the future of Zimbabwean democracy appears "likely to turn largely on the question of respect for the autonomy of demonstrably accountable organizations of small farmers", but that this issue is not included in attempts to classify democracy.

"The norm of accountability [which is strengthened by devices that divide power and is exemplified in civil society organizations] appears to be the most widely practiced of democratic principles; it is by far more prevalent in the world than freedom of association to compete for governmental office, or popular participation in authoritative decision making, or the right to dissent from official polities without fear of retaliation ... Democracy comes to every country in fragments or parts; each fragment becomes an incentive for the addition of another."


This article identifies the role of the public sector in social service delivery, participatory development, and value for money that have served to promote greater interest in NGOs for efficiency reasons.


The identification of the public good with the state has legitimized the actions of powerful elites in control of state power and has "subordinated civil society" and therefore, subordinated democracy. Also, anti-statism that means leaving civil society at the mercy of the giant privately-controlled corporations who would like to "deploy capital in the global village free of all social controls and constraints" -- is not democratization.

The author contends that there are three elements of a democratic framework: democratic institutions and mechanisms must guarantee the rights, liberalities and entitlements of citizens; maximum decentralization and devolution of power must be
effected; and an independent and robust civil society will be needed that is protected from the state, and not just by the state. Civil society is about building "voice" at grassroots level. States and corporations operate differently, neither of them having a vested interest in building "voice." The interface between the state and civil society is via local government.


The author argues that civil society should be considered not the third sector but the first sector. The state has replaced the true role of civil society, and the greatest threat to democracy is the domination of the private and state sectors over the sovereign people.


The author argues that interventionist welfare states, for political and/or economic reasons, are withdrawing from service activity. Meanwhile, the state is becoming more involved in direct interventions in large parts of civil society -- to escape former economic responsibility and to maintain the "social order."


Author argues that a third "leftist" view of society, as an alternative to neo-classical republicanism and Marxist socialism, is a partial incorporation and partial denial of the first two views. On this view, civil society is "the realm of fragmentation and conflict but also of concrete and authentic solidarities, where we can be communal beings". Here "men and women [are] freely associating with one another, communicating with one another, freely forming and reforming groups of all sorts, not for the sake of any particular formation -- family, tribe, relation, commune, brotherhood or sisterhood, interest group or movement -- but for the sake of sociability itself."

The defense of civil society is also a defense of associational life and of individual freedom, "the right, above all, to enter and leave the various associations." Walzer goes on to state that the new social movements (concerned with ecology, work-place safety, immigrants’ rights, feminism, and so on) do not aim, as the democratic and labor movements once aimed, at seizing the state. Furthermore, individuals need to be protected from the power of employers, experts, professionals, full-time activists, and others. While small and weak groups need to be protected against large and powerful groups. According to Walzer, a strong and democratic civil society can't be built through state power, and can’t be built without state power.

Walzer defines the state as a "support system and a directive agency: a welfare-providing and policy-setting body ... the state is the instrument with which the members of society, acting as citizens, struggle to give a particular shape to their common life."

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"The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction." Dissent
Here, Walzer defines civil society as "the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks .... that fill this space." The author then examines four traditional "rival ideologies" of democratic society: the leftist-Rousseauian view that citizenship is a moral agency, an antidote to the fragmentation of contemporary society; the leftist-Marxist view that individual producers are free from the burdens of citizenship; the capitalist view where the marketplace is the setting for the good life, and entrepreneurs maximize their options; and the nationalist view where individuals identify themselves with a people and a history -- individuals do not have to be politically active to enjoy the "good life."

The author concludes that these ideologies miss the complexity of human society. He finds that a fifth view -- where fragmentation, struggle and authentic solidarities operate in civil society -- is also incomplete. Civil society, based on the idea that people are by nature social beings before we are political or economic beings, is too genial and benign and still requires a democratic state.


The author concludes that civil society is possible when people can be free to engage in an informed political discourse that is based on shared understandings of legal and societal normative structures.


Excerpts from this book focus on the motivations for group membership, the consequences of pluralism, and corporatism for policy, and the functions of "encompassing" organizations. Pluralism is defined here as a political process in which interest groups organize, attempt to exert influence, and survive or disappear largely without arousing the participation or concern of government bureaucracies.

Societal corporatism, of the European and Japanese variant, describes a political system in which the state, principally through relevant bureaucracies, orchestrates group conflict. Societal corporatism refers, therefore, to governments that regulate, constrain, or inhibit the free flow of organizations.

State corporatism -- authoritarianism -- defines an institutional arrangement that is similar to societal corporatism, but with less freedom of association and organization. The essential difference between societal and state corporatism is the location of policy initiative; in state corporatism, it invariably rests with the bureaucracy, while in societal corporatism it may not.

The author argues that meaningful intervention in the development process by NGOs is unlikely if such intervention is not complemented by appropriate action to mobilize and strengthen the energies of the state. The assumption that Africa's development dilemma arises from too much state intervention and meddling in the past, is matched by the view that non-development is related to ineffectual and inadequate intervention of the state in the economy and society.

The interaction between the state and civil society determines the terrain and limits of voluntary action for grassroots development in Africa. Rather than focus exclusively on either state engineering or associational empowerment, development strategies should simultaneously seek to arrest the process of state decay and boost the revitalization of civil society.


This article examines the membership, activities, internal structure, and external linkages of three "hometown" associations in Western Nigeria. The authors find that there are at least six interpretations of the importance of civil society: 1) civil virtue, where citizens are prepared to engage in selfless action to promote the common good; 2) shadow state, where associations are viewed as instruments of the state to shift the burden of social welfare costs to private organizations and local institutions; 3) bulwark against state power, where associations ward-off state power from oppressing citizens; 4) local "growth" machines, where associations are instruments of local capital created or co-opted to serve the interests of local business and political elites; 5) intermediary broker, associations link central institutions to local communities for the purposes of political bargaining, resource mobilization, and communication; and 6) attachment to place, where associations act as "communities of memory" which reaffirm peoples' sense of place and attachment to their hometowns or origin.


Bratton accepts Victor Azarya's definition of the state as: "an organization within the society where it coexists and interacts with other formal and informal organizations from families to economic enterprises or religious organizations. It is, however, distinguished from the myriad of other organizations in seeking predominance over them and in aiming to institute binding rules regarding the other organizations' activities." He adds that the state is a set of organizations -- legal, coercive, administrative -- whose functionaries do not always act cohesively. Bratton then examines the shallow penetration of society by
weak state institutions, which creates a relatively larger realm of unoccupied political space in African than anywhere else in the world. But, associational life in Africa occurs in arenas beyond state control and influence.

NGO policy influence in Africa has been modest because: NGOs in Africa have been self-absorbed in the policies that directly affect the operations of the voluntary sector (day-to-day concerns such as government registration requirements); NGOs in Africa have not found a way to express views on broader development policy issues, except in countries with strong commercial farmers' lobbies where they have been able to propose draft legislation (as in Zimbabwe and Zambia), and; NGOs in Africa have a lack of staff capacity to pursue public policy analysis and advocacy roles.

The author further states that "the absence of a true bourgeoisie has blocked the emergence, not only of capitalism in Africa, but also of democracy."


Demands for more political openness in Africa are affected by: voluntary groups that, rather than succumbing to repression by the government, actually escalate their demands on the state; and, calls for political reform which are couched uniformly in democratic terms. Despite "numerous equivocations, manipulations, partial measures and procrastinations, only a handful of governments have withstood these pressures."

In the African context, civil society is variously conceptualized as: a necessary precondition for state consolidation; as the key break on state power; in constant confrontation with the state; as a benign broker between state interests and local concerns; and as a medley of social institutions that interact with each other and with formal structures in a variety of ways that may either facilitate or impede political and economic development.

Some observers perceive voluntary organizations as the building blocks of liberal government, that they play a leading role in pluralizing the institutional environment. Others perceive these groups as fomenting particularism, fundamentalism, and ethnic nationalism as they separate citizens from meaningful participation with the state. Chazan contends that there is no axiomatic connection between the expansion of the voluntary sector and the consolidation of civil society [c.f. p. 20] in Africa; in other words, Chazan does not see the voluntary sector as being identical to civil society.

Chazan notes the three conditions that seem particularly conducive to the flourishing of civil society: 1) the relaxation of official controls over associational life; 2) the closure of alternatives to interaction within the state framework; and 3) the expansion of communication networks. The "fortification" of civil society in Africa calls for a deliberate and carefully designed strategy that "pays as much attention to balancing broad
economic, structural, and environmental needs as to meeting the specific requirements of particular voluntary groups."

And, Chazan further notes that to be considered part of the civic domain, groups "must" have the following attributes in common: "specific and well-defined objectives, participatory governing structures, discrete constituencies, activities that go beyond catering to the immediate interests of their members, and an ability to form alliances with other groups with quite different declared purposes." But, many groups in Africa possess only some of these features, and are not part of civil society.


State-based analytical frameworks of society focus on the state as a historical actor, the key collective agent of macropolitical processes. Explanations for present conditions in Africa are lodged in the state, state policy and reactions to state actions.

Society-based analytical frameworks focus on survival strategies in changing economic and political circumstances. This mode of analysis highlights the internal dynamics of socioeconomic relations in small-group settings. Society-based approaches "do not consider participation in the state as axiomatic or necessarily desirable." Specific social constellations measure their affiliations and the degree of their involvement in light of their concerns, capacities and needs.

By concentrating on the many webs of relations and the networks of interactions between state and society "it might be possible to attain a better understanding of the rhythm of unfolding processes." Furthermore, state and society are conceptualized as two intersecting and potentially independent variables with political process as the dependent variable.

The overall trend in Africa appears to be toward redesigning political arrangements to conform less to imposed models and more to locally defined interactive notions of statehood. The public domain is being reconceptualized not in terms of official structures, but in terms of the points of intersection between various existing power vectors. It is at these locations that politics take place, and around these foci that authority is accumulated and support garnered.


Rather than overtly challenging the legitimacy of government, the African masses have opted for safer modes of opposition -- they are entrenching themselves in civil society. However, the ruling class is constantly "colonizing" civil society in order to maximize its own supremacy.

Fatton defines civil society as the "private sphere of material, cultural, and political
activities resisting the incursions of the state." The "private spaces" of civil society have the capacity to become the social foundations of popular revolt: they can "paralyze and disrupt the mechanisms of state domination."


The central reference of civil society is to the associational life of civic, professional, trade union and other voluntary organizations. Civil society is "an alternative realm of the 'public' that is beyond the private concerns of individuals but not identical with the political realm of the state."

Fine examines the effect the new labor unions had on increasing internal demands for participatory democracy, accountability of delegates, open debate, the education of union activists, and the principle that workers should participate not only in action but in decision-making processes. The unions related demands for a work-place "rule of law" to the more "normal" issues of pay and conditions -- all of which attempted to construct a new political culture from the bottom up. The author then goes on to describe the "veritable feast of civic activity" that occurred in South Africa in the 1980s. He states that the state encouraged political violence between conflicting interests of civil society as a way of "relegitimizing the state."


Fowler notes the paradox within African states of dependence on both formal and informal political systems and dual moralities for its operation. "The problem of governance in Africa stems from its inability to resolve this dialectic in ways that are both democratic and economically viable."

In the final analysis, African governments adopt a political view of NGOs when: there is disputed territory; separatist agitation; emancipation efforts; NGOs provide refuge for those who do not fit within the regime; NGOs demonstrate and maintain an autonomy from the state by virtue of external support and linkages; the political realm is declared the exclusive domain of the party and NGOs contest that decision; the decreasing ability of most African governments to provide for the well-being of their citizens and NGOs step in to "divert" patronage away from those in power; NGOs act in direct confrontation with the states human rights and social justice abuses; NGOs divert official aid away from the state; and more.

Fowler notes that in Africa the "fragmentation of the NGO sector inhibits the formation of strong representative bodies to defend their interests and argue for them." And that governments are adept at ensuring that this fragmentation continues. And, in countries like Uganda and Kenya, state control over civil society can "partly be attributed to NGO action particularly on the part of the churches."

Civil society has neither the commitment nor the capacity to provide the monitoring and pressures essential to assure accountability and responsive government in modern Africa. Therefore, the governance of African states needs to be rebuilt from the bottom up, which implies the effective empowerment of a variety of interest groups. NGOs are the training grounds for the emergence of an articulate and empowered middle class.


The decline of weak predatory states and autocratic rule has opened opportunities for the formation of civil society in Africa. However, the emergence of civil society in Africa is still a nascent historical process. Moreover, the central institutions of civil society are still quiescent and fragmented in most African countries.

Dimensions of change that foster participatory regimes in Africa include: the consolidation of institutions [c.f. p. 17] within civil society is the primary task in the construction of a public sphere; constituting a civic space among societal groups is among the most pressing tasks in the quest for democracy; and the reform of political behavior will entail crucial changes in the accountability and democratic leadership-style of political leadership.


The Botswana experience provides evidence of an alternative path to democratic politics in Africa. In lieu of a pluralist structure to civil society, organized citizen influence has taken the form of a series of village based participatory institutions.

Botswana's problems of an authoritarian culture, a powerful state structure, an absence of organized and politically oriented groups, paternalistic representation, a submissive mass media, and elitist party structures are not unique to Africa. However, the possible use of community based institutions of popular influence can establish a tradition of popular control. These institutions may have a minimal impact on leadership change, but have a large effect on policy implementation. And, in the long run, these institutions may prove critical in facilitating institutionalization of pluralist forms of accountability.


The author examines the policy problem in which the South Africa state will be unable to become an instrument for development because of incapacity caused by the past exclusion of the majority from the skills of governance.

The foundations for a well organized, innovative, committed and decentralized civil
society are already in place through -- trade unions, civic associations, the churches, the emerging development NGOs, the organized progressive professionals, major funding and development agencies, the service organizations, and educational organizations and institutions. This foundation of civil society means that there is an acceptance of pluralism, and non-monopolistic role for the state in the policy, and that democracy entails at most the "institutionalization of uncertainty instead of the statist imposition of certainty." For development, this foundation of civil society means that South Africa will probably join the international trend towards NGO-driven development programs.

The author defines civil society as social movements rooted in significant networks of associations that are: independent of the state and political parties; not dependent on the for-profit sector for resources and support; capable of organizing the poor and articulating their grievances; capable of negotiating political mandates on behalf of their constituencies with the state, parties, business, development agencies and donors; and are in a position to deliver their members and supporters into a negotiated deal or program.


The inability of political elites in Africa to separate public and private spheres of interest undermines the development of productive economic exchanges. The formation of a civil society in Africa attempts to articulate a principle of political accountability that is binding on the state elite. Democracy is being linked directly with moral, political and economic rehabilitation.

The contradiction for an urban middle class that supports democracy is that its economic well-being is still very much grounded in its connections with the state, and not within the economy. A time gap will develop between the urban middle class' normative support for political and social pluralism and an intense competition to secure economic survival by capturing and maintaining state power.

In this article, the author looks at whether or not there will be any assertion of the power of civil society in North Korea against the state of the kind that occurred in Poland and Czechoslovakia. He asserts that "the idea that individuals in association could be free to pursue purposes and ends not specifically sanctioned by the state or prescribed by the official moral code is a further important constituent of the understanding of civil society largely absent from the East Asian tradition."


The NGO "sector" emerging in Bangladesh, the Philippines, India and Indonesia is characterized by: the layering in the types of NGOs (grassroots NGOs, professional NGOs, grant-making NGOs, and support NGOs) as the numbers of NGOs grows; horizontal growth occurs between NGOs as they network and form alliances; and NGOs are developing areas of expertise to strengthen NGOs as viable institutions.

The author predicts that in the future indigenous NGOs will begin to advocate significant institutional changes at the policy level, will need to create alliances to work for structural change, and will develop Third World leaders who will leave the NGO sector for government.


The authors suggest that "institutional arrangements, including regime type, the government's role in organizing interest groups, and the internal structure of the economic policy-making apparatus help to account for variations in policy choice, and thus for economic performance." [Emphasis added.]

Two lines of theory are explored in order to link political institutions to policy outcomes: how institutions reconcile individual and collective action rationality (groups organize not to advance collective welfare but to guarantee a disproportionate share of societal income for themselves); and how internal organizational characteristics of the state influence the formulation and implementation of public policy.


Hsiao examines 17 emerging social movements in Taiwan, and finds that: each social movement that has emerged in Taiwan since the 1980s has demanded reforms by the ruling state, rather than demanding changes in the state-society relationship so as to grant
more autonomy to civil society; that conflicts between classes are not the major sources for mobilizing organized movements; that the social movements have avoided linkages with political opposition; that most participants identify themselves as victims; that there are attempts to extend coalitions and alliances across movements. He concludes that although civil society in Taiwan will increasingly exert direct pressure on the conduct of the state, that this has not fostered democratization per se.


Because free elections were not held in Bangladesh during Ershad's rule, "there was no way of distinguishing genuinely popular-based parties from one-man parties which existed mainly on letterheads but served Ershad by effectively splitting the opposition against him."
EUROPE AND NEW INDEPENDENT STATES


The author adheres to Ralf Dahrendorf's definition of the concept of civil society (from Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London: Chatto & Windus, 1990): "Civil society is about substantial sources of power outside the state, and more often than not, against the state. It means the creation of a tight network of autonomous institutions and organizations which has not one but a thousand centers and can therefore not easily be destroyed by a monopolist in the guise of a government or party. Civil society in a certain sense sustains itself. It does not seem to need the state. ... This is why I prefer to think of civil society as providing the anchorage for the constitution of liberty, including its economic ingredients. Both are needed, civil society and the state, but they each have their own raison d'etre and their own autonomous reality."


The author states that it would be a "fatal mistake" to channel foreign assistance through government bureaucracies in the former Soviet Union where "independent grassroots groups have sprung up to address problems."


Under democracy, civil society is an integral part of the system of rule; under communism, the legal-political prerequisites for such a symbiosis are absent by definition -- the impetus for civil society to emerge is an antagonistic response to government.


The creation of "social communications" is the cementing factor for the Polish project of civil society. This civil society was wished for by the democratic opposition of the late seventies, actualized by the creation of Solidarnosc in 1980, given new form in the independent activities during and after martial law, and culminating in negotiations between representatives of civil society and the Communist regime. "The essence of this process of reconstitution was to mobilize the 'power of the powerless'. The idea of civil society has not evolved as a well-defined theoretical construct, but has emerged out of the lived needs of people and their longing for emancipation."

The author believes that civil society is the communication network via which collective actions (strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, etc.) can be called for, as well as the forms of self-government realized in a variety of social spheres. It is also a political strategy for change, also called "change from below. The goal of this strategy is the
emancipation of the nation/citizens in an evolutionary manner which depends on the people themselves and not on the goodwill of the rulers and, it is theorized, will eventually bring about a change in the nature of the state itself."


"Civil society was there [in the counter-reformation part of Europe], ready to be freed and/or endowed with political clout and formal constitutional recognition." However, in Marxist societies, civil society has to be created, revived and raised from the "nearly-dead", as well as have its preconditions also created "whatever they might be."


The idea of civil society (which operates in opposition to the state) -- "even one that avoids overtly political activities in favor of education, the exchange of information and opinion, or the protection of the basic interests of particular groups -- has enormous anti-totalitarian potential." The main task now in Poland is the construction of democratic stabilization mechanisms, such as constitutional checks and balances; civic education in the spirit of respect for law; and the encouragement of citizen action. Civil society should not act in opposition to the democratic state, but cooperate with it.


The author examines the concept of civil society, comparing the political usage to the analytical usage. In the analytical context, the term civil society is used to "conceptualize processes usually categorized under the labels of 'community', 'culture' or 'consumption'. In the political context, the term is examined with reference to recent events in Poland, where the concept has been applied to the emergence of independent self-governing social organizations lying outside the traditional state apparatus." The author also examines Gramsci's (A. Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Lawrence & Wishart: London, 1971) notion that civil society stands between the politics (state) and the economy (production).


In 1988-89 Hungary moved in the direction of re-establishing the rule of law and towards having a "real" constitution. The process of establishing the rule of law began with the codification of the right of assembly and association. This right "must be understood in the context of the extremely fast paced regeneration of civil society." At first, civil society was simply non-political gatherings and associations. Later there was an increasing need for political meetings and demonstrations, as well as for establishing trade and political unions.

Defines civil society as all those institutions that are "privately controlled or voluntarily organized."


In Poland, "revisionism and neopositivism" depended on the actions of elites, not on mass public pressure. And the elites helped to construct "a program that was unambiguously on the side of society against the authorities" or "civil society against the state." Poland's civil society was tied closely to the Catholic Church.

The terminology of civil society in Poland, which used terms from liberation theology like human dignity, truth, and solidarity, allowed civil society to escape from the principal barrier of worker and intellectual distrust. Furthermore, the "civil society project was also successful in organizing an opposition to the Soviet-type system because it contained no substantive politics."

Civil society returned to Hungary in 1977 using the same language as in Poland -- language that used terms like human rights and civil liberties.


The author states that in Romania the reestablishment of public life is the "precursor to constructing a civil society -- not the reverse." The existence and/or emergence of civil society is determined by practices in particular historical epochs and types of states. In the socialist states, civil society was repressed to a greater or lesser degree. "The public sphere was the 'property' of the party-state, which controlled the communications media and the institutional and public uses of space/property." Romanians must learn the "art of association" and unlearn the dynamics of fear that foster atomization.


The author believes that the only way for civil society to triumph in post-communist countries is through privatization. Yet, the movement behind the elimination of communism stood for the "primacy of the pre-political." Privatization of the former communist state's control over all strategic positions (property sales and the creation of property right entitlements as compensation for takings by previous regimes) could require a state "just as oppressive as the old State role of totalitarian suppressor."

Civil society, once repressed and restricted, will not avail itself of the new opportunities provided by market and democracy because of increasing apathy and social passivity. This social anomy is caused by: the change in the world of meanings and in the definition of the past, present and future; declassation of certain social groups; factors linked to the specific character of Polish transformation; and socio-psychological consequences of the process of change.


In Slovenia, the term civil society was introduced in 1983 to define autonomous social activities and to "envision the prospect of independent social action in the future." It was understood that the new social movement (NSM) would be the crucial institutions in the formation of civil society, and it was conceived as an alternative to the state, not in opposition to the state.

The principal actors in NSM were unable to register and be legally recognized, which they hoped would protect them from arbitrary state repression. In response, they formed an alliance with the state recognized official youth organization, which became the umbrella organization for the alternative civil society initiatives.


The movement of university colleges has played a "significant role in the process of repolitization and opening up of civil society in Hungary." Gradually, the colleges moved away from being a source of a new power elite aligned with the status quo, and became a source of independent political thinking and action.


The author concludes that the reemergence of civil society in the former-Soviet and Eastern European region "demonstrates the Marxist-Leninist system's failure in creating the new man -- and further, that this failure illuminates the flaw in theories which base sociopolitical systems upon potential features of human nature.


Faced with the probability of continued Soviet control and the consequent implausibility of both revolution and reform, East Europeans began to look for other strategies for social transformation. Through their search East Europeans, most notably the Polish, rediscovered the notion of civil society and developed the idea of the self-limiting revolution. This strategy did not involve the actual seizure of state power, but rather involved the incremental creation of a sort of "free-zone within existing state-supported metastructures. ... Intellectuals postulated that the reconstruction of civil society would,
in the long run, lead inexorably to the creation of a legalistic state, which in turn would lead to the realization of a pluralistic, democratic state."

Because Stalinization eliminated most aspects of civil society in the U.S.S.R. and because Stalinization was less complete in East Europe, their respective paths toward change may necessarily diverge.


The authors believes that civil society is a particular sphere of social intercourse that forges people into a community on the basis of voluntary associations independent of economic relations and possessing their own functions, to express different social interests, to mediate relations between the individual and the state, and to limit the omnipotence of the latter. Furthermore, in communist systems civil society, as expressing a special social contract between the citizens and the state, disappeared -- "dissolving itself in the state."

The authors then examine the question of the mechanisms of transforming the statocratic system in NIS into a regime of democratic civil society without major sociopolitical, economic, and other convulsions, including ecological ones, and on how to minimize losses and preserve sociocultural values and social protection. It is necessary to concentrate attention on the possibilities of a "gradual liberalization of society, on its evolutionary democratization, and not on revolutionary, explosive transformations." The state must play a progressive role in this process, encouraging the development of various social movements and even creating institutions of democratic government, "retaining the right to exercise a ubiquitous control only in regard to maintaining the observance of the law."


The authors believe that the "promise of the post-communist era rests largely on the potential for creating a more vibrant and deeply rooted network of organizations and institutions that mediate between the citizen and the State: the connective tissue of a democratic political culture." Such civil society organizations serve several functions: they provide a means for expressing and addressing the needs of society; they motivate individuals to act as citizens in all aspects of society "rather than bowing to or depending on state power and beneficence"; they promote pluralism and diversity in society, such as protecting and strengthening cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic (and other) identities; they create an alternative to centralized state agencies for providing services with greater independence and flexibility; and they establish mechanisms by which government and the market can be held accountable by the public.

In Romania, the legal space for social organizations to form exists, and civil society has sprung up with tremendous rapidity. What unites these organizations is a hatred of Ceausescu; but the word "collaborationist" has created a rift between such organizations. This issue, one of links to the former regime and its Communist ideology, may well be the central issue in the political struggle to come. The Romanian path to democracy will lead to a second revolution.

Because the Ceausescu regime destroyed any sense of solidarity among people, and because the Romanian political culture lacks a shared sense of the common good, these new formations "are mostly fragile attempts by small groups of individuals trying to give institutional expressions to their ideas."


Examines the East German independent peace movement, which began as a form of unofficial activity concerned with the growing militarization of public life. With initial support of the Evangelical Church, the movement became more complex as groups within the movement to promote their own agendas. This activism is indicative of the awakening of society after the long passivity imposed by a rigid bureaucratic regime, and can become the backbone of a democratic movement in East Germany.


The authors find that there are four stages in the ongoing development of civil society: defensive, where private individuals and independent groups actively or passively defend their autonomy against the party-state; emergent, in which independent social groups seek limited goals in a widened public sphere sanctioned by the reforming party-state; mobilizational, in which independent groups undermine the legitimacy of the party-state by offering alternative forms of governance to a politicized society; and institutional, in which publicly supported leaders enact laws guaranteeing autonomy of social action, leading to a contractual relationship between state and society regulated eventually by free elections.

Furthermore, the authors employ a variance of an accepted definition of civil society: the independent self-organization of society, the constituent parts of which voluntarily engage in public activity to pursue individual, group, or national interests within the context of a legally defined state-society relationship. In the context of post-totalitarian Communist rule in Central Europe, those individuals in society who did not accept the regime's domination of public association and participation developed alternative, underground networks of association and participation. The contractual approach to independent public activity was obviously not an option, and groups used extrasystemic means of articulation.
LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN


This paper argues that in Latin America, "webs" of grassroots organizations have "thickened" and formed new relationships with the public sector. The most important incentives that foster grassroots organizations come from the state.


The authors assess the potential of private sector business associations to participate meaningfully and substantively in the policy process beyond mere lobbying efforts. Furthermore, the authors take a neo-corporatist approach to the study, with the idea that over time, a "symbiotic relationship" develops between organizations and the state to the extent that the state's legitimacy "becomes in part reliant on the active consent of recognized interest organizations." This neo-corporatist model "offers a promising alternative for Third World countries attempting to implement free market strategies after years of state-led development, since it recognizes a role for both the state and organized interests in decision making and attempts to reconcile their often divergent objectives through a process of negotiation and bargaining."

A transformation of associational activity occurs as an association moves from a role of policy advocacy to one of policy participation and then is later accorded public status as a private interest government.

In conclusion, the authors find that neither the Jamaican government nor the business associations have bought the idea of working together in the policy process. However, where the public policy process is characterized by formal, institutionalized mechanisms where policy activities proceed in a set environment, the "real essence of a partnership concept is realized." For many associations, this has meant giving up lobbying and advocacy activities for active and inside participation with the government in bringing about change.


This article examines the argument that government needs to be insulated from political patronage networks in order to effectively implement the policies the political leaders choose. "Consequently, capacity-enhancing reforms ... occur only when the political leaders who must initiate them can expect to benefit from the reforms enough to outweigh the cost of losing the electoral advantages provided by the distribution of patronage."

This paper examines the theoretical assumptions underpinning support for NGOs as political actors. And Macdonald finds that NGOs "must not only strengthen grassroots institutions at the local level, but also link these organizations to regional or national movements designed to represent the interests of the popular sector and to construct more egalitarian and democratic political forms."


The author records the evolution of scores of NGOs and their "spider" networks, which comprise grassroots groups, grassroots support organizations, federations, and associations connected by a web of mutual-aid relationships, common interests, and resource and idea sharing schemes. The author believes that the recent proliferation of development NGOs is contributing to the rebuilding of democracy in Colombia.

Individual NGOs "may not be permanent: they come and go. But surprisingly, in the aggregate they form a fabric that does hold together, giving people a voice and a stake in their society." And in Colombia, a budding civil society began to fill the space left as the traditional political parties lost effectiveness as mediators between the people and the government.

A typical assessment of IAF's activities over the years (in the standard sectors of agriculture, health, education, housing, etc.) finds that grassroots development had very little impact. However, if an assessment of the impact IAF funding had on the evolution of strong NGO networks, on the reinforcing of the foundations of civil society, "the picture changes considerably." The "culture of democracy" is what IAF has been promoting in Colombia, where political and social space for peasants, women, the indigenous has been introduced.

NGOs are attempting to reinforce civil society on two planes: 1) at the grassroots where NGOs: a) constitute, or foster, the community organizations that are the basic building blocks of civil society; b) promote networks through which those organizations improve their bargaining position or their access to goods and services; and 2) as the interface between civil society and the state where NGOs: a) act as interlocutor, giving voice to marginalized segments of society and pressing the system to meet their needs; b) offer alternatives to the state that capitalize on local energy and initiatives or take a creative approach to an intractable problem.


The "exhaustion" of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in the 1980s stimulated new
interest in the interaction between civil society and the state in authoritarian contexts. Stepan focuses on the reciprocal relations between the power of the state and the power of civil society. He examines four possible relations: 1) the growth of state power may be accompanied in zero-sum faction by a diminution of the power of civil society; 2) the power relations between the state and civil society could have a positive-sum; 3) the interaction may prove to be negative-sum; and 4) there is the possibility that the power of actors operating outside the state apparatus may grow while that of those working within the state declines.

Lessons learned: a) state economic intervention, by politicizing "economistic" issues, may increase the potential for political organization in civil society; b) the threat of class conflict can create conditions for domination of civil society by the state; and c) the power of the state as an actor and institution cannot be analyzed in isolation from an understanding of the nature of the cleavages that rend civil society, on the one hand, or the growth of horizontal ties that bring different sectors of civil society together, on the other hand.
NEAR EAST


In the Islamic context, civil society may best be measured not in relation to the state, but in relation to religion. "In this sense, the primary meaning of civil is non-religious, and the civil society is one in which the organizing principle is something other than religion, that being a private affair of the individual." And the private affairs of individuals takes place in kin groups, craft groups, the ward or neighborhood within a city, and waqfs.

McHugh, Heather, Tim Meehan and Rebecca Latorraca. "SAIS Symposium on Civil Society in the Arab World." Notes from a Middle East Institute and Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) symposium on civil society in the Middle East, Washington, DC, 1993. USAID, Center for Development Information and Evaluation (POL\CDIE\DI\R&RS).

Notes taken during conference focus on presentation of case studies of civil society in Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. Review of civil society in the context of Islam, women, and western ideology is included.
ADDITIONAL READING LIST

USAID Documents:


Other Donor Documents:


Other Documents:


Johnson, Chalmers. "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: the Government-
business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan."


