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ZAMBIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT
Monitoring and Evaluation Studies

BASELINE STUDY:

BENEFICIARY PROFILE

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## A. INTRODUCTION

This report describes the extent of political participation in Zambia and the opinions and feelings of Zambian citizens about the political system in their country. It presents comprehensive results from a pilot national survey of political attitudes, the first of its kind in Zambia.

* The report was commissioned by USAID as part of a series of monitoring and evaluation studies for the Zambia Democratic Governance Project. It provides a profile of the status of the intended beneficiaries of the Project". These data constitute a benchmark of "people-level" indicators against which changes in political attitudes and behaviors, in some cases as a result of Project interventions, may later be measured.


## Survey Activities

* The baseline beneficiary survey was planned and executed collaboratively by researchers from Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Zambia (UNZA) ${ }^{2}$. Survey planning and design of a 120 -item questionnaire instrument took place in May 1993. Field tests of some questionnaire items had been conducted earlier during focus group interviews conducted in Zambia in February and March, 1993. We undertook further field testing in the environs of Lusaka in the last week of May, following which the length of the questionnaire was significantly reduced (to 100 items) and the wording of selected items was refined. Because the survey was exploratory, we did not opt for extensive precoding and left many items open-ended. The questionnaire was then translated into four local languages (Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and Kaonde).
* In liaison with colleagues from the Central Statistical Office, Lusaka ${ }^{3}$, the authors drew a multistage random sample of survey areas across the country. Maps were prepared for each survey area. The authors then designed a frame for drawing a quota sample in each area. Details of sampling procedure are provided in the next section.
* Twelve survey enumerators were recruited from UNZA research institutes and from among

[^0]${ }^{3}$. Mesirs. Chipako, Banda and Akende, whom we thank.
recent UNZA graduates in the social sciencest. They underwent a three-day training program from June 7 to June 9, 1993 which emphasised sampling procedure, interview technique, and correct recording of responses. The enumerators were divided into three teams of four persons according to language ability (dubbed the "North", "East" and "South" teams). Each enumerator was given several opportunities to conduct practice interviews in English and local languages. Inter-enumerator reliability was maximized through group discussion to resolve problematic questionnaire items or translations.

* Survey teams were deployed to the field for ten to twelve days between June 10 and June 21, 1993. Each team covered one urban district and either one and two rural districts. The research sites were Choma District (Southern Province), Kitwe Urban District (Copperbelt Province), Lusaka Urban District (Lusaka Province), Mumbwa District (Central Province), Petauke District (Eastern Province), and Solwezi District (Northwestern Province). For the distribution of respondents by province and district, see Tables A. 1 and A. 2 in Appendix A.
* In the field, survey supervisors ${ }^{5}$ were responsible for ensuring that the sampling quotas were correctly filled and that questionnaires were accurately completed. Each interview took approximately one hour and each enumerator completed an average of four interviews per day. Supervisors checked the completed questionnaires each evening to try to correct mistakes, capture missing data, and remove contradictory responses. Thanks to the enthusiastic efforts of the field teams in Zambia, data collection was accomplished quickly and accurately.
* An in-depth debriefing was conducted on June 22, in which supervisors and enumerators made useful recommendations about the administration of sampling and, especially, the rewording questionnaire items. These suggestions will be incorporated into later stages of research.
* The survey data were coded, cleaned, and entered for computer processing in East Lansing, Michigan during the months of July and August by four MSU graduate research assistants ${ }^{6}$. Data were entered using Lotus $1-2-3$ and analysed with SPSS/PC+. A complete data set and multiple copies of the data codebook were sent to UNZA at the end of this period. Data were

[^1]analysed and this report prepared during September 1993.

## Sampling Procedure

* The target population for the survey was eligible voters in Zambia as of June 1993. The sample of survey respondents thus inciuded Zambian citizens who were at least 18 years old on the day of the survey. Non-Zambians, or persons under 18, vere not interviewed.
* The sample was designed to constitute a represertative cross-section of the population of eligible voters. By paying careful attention to the representativeness of the sample, we sought to establish grounds on which to make scientifically valid inferences about the population of Zambian citizens as a whole. The accuracy of a sample, and the risk of error that a researcher is willing to accept, are determined primarily by sample size. In selecting the size of our sample, we opted for standard parameters commonly used for the type of categorical (i.e. noninterval) data generated by our survey questions. These parameters included a confidence level of 95 percent and a confidence interval of plus or minus 5 percent. Thus, the reader can be sure in 19 cases out of 20 that a reported mean score on any given variable will differ by no more than 5 percent in either direction from what would have been obtained by interviewing all Zambian adults. Sampling theory allows that, within these parameters, reliable results can be generated with a minimal sample size of 385 (Rea and Parker, 1992, 125-131).
* The sample was designed using a mixture of random and quota methods, in multiple stages. In the first stages, we used random methods to pick provinces, districts, census supervisory areas (CSAs) and standard enuneration areas (SEAs). The selected areas, labelled with Central Statistical Office CSA and SEA identification numbers are listed in Table A.A. in Appendix A.
* Below the standard enumeration area, at the level of individuals, we employed a quota sampling method to select survey respondents. This was necessary because, according to the Central Statistical Office, there is no readily available list of individuals in Zambia that can serve as a sampling frame. A quota sample identifies potential respondents in the proportions in which they are known to exist in the survey population. We used data from the 1990 census of population and other published statistical sets to discover empirical frequencies for various subgroups in the national (and, where possible, provincial and district) populations (see Table A.C, column 1).
* Three main criteria were used to establish quotas for sampling: gender, age and social status. First we stratified the population by gender in order to determine how many men and women should be included in the sample. Then we stratified the population of eligible voters by age into three equal-sized groups of "young" (aged 18-26), "middle-aged" (27-44) and "old" (45 years and older). Finally, we stratified the population by social status. In urban areas, we distinguished persons in formal employment on the one one hand from those who were either informally employed or unemployed. In rural areas, we were determined to overcome the spatial bias which inhibits researchers from perceiving rural poverty (Chambers, 1983, 13-16). Here we conceived of social status in spatial terms (understanding that location correlates to
some degree with socio-economic opportunity and status), distinguishing those who lived "on-the-road" (within 5 kilometres of a main communications artery) versus "off-the-road" (beyond 5 kms .). The quotas were then adjusted to account for subgroup variations due mainly to patterns of population migration, again based on available census data. For example: the sample included more young males in urban areas than rural areas, and a smaller proportion of women than men in formal employment.
* The planned numbers of survey respondents in each quota for each area are listed in Table A.B. To take an example, in Mumbwa District, enumerators were charged to interview two young males who lived off the road (see Table A.B, top row, last column). Each of the three interview teams were asked to conduct 140 interviews, for a total planned sample size of 420.


## Characteristics of the Sample

* In practice, the survey teams returned from the field with 429 completed questionnaires, mainly due to occasional instances of duplication in administering the quota sample ${ }^{7}$. From this number we selected 421 respondents who satisfied the sampling requirements. We thereby attained an extremely close fit between the planned sample, the actual sample, and the national population of eligible voters in Zambia. These data are as summarized in Table A.C.
* The respondents in the sample possess the following demographic characteristics:
* Urban dwellers make up $42.8 \%$ of the sample and rural dwellers $57.2 \%$ (See Table A.3). These proportions accurately describe the location of the Zambian population as a whole as reported in the 1990 census of population ( $42.0 \%$ urban, $58.0 \%$ rural) (see Table A.C, row 1$)^{8}$.
* Just over half (50.8\%) are females; males constitute 49.2\% (See Table A.4). These proportions exactly reflect the gender distribution of the population as reported in the 1990 census (see Table A.C, row 2).
* When location and gender are combined, the sample continues to mirror the Zambian population. The sample contains $21.3 \%$ urban females and $21.3 \%$ urban males (compared with $20.9 \%$ and $21.1 \%$ respectively in the population); it also contains $29.5 \%$ rural females and 27.8\% rural males (compared with $29.9 \%$ and $28.1 \%$ respectively) (See Table A.C).

[^2]* The average age of respondents is 36 years, in a range from 18 years to 81 years (See Table A.5). The distribution of the sample by age closely approximates the population of eligible voters in the country as a whole. The division of this population into three equal parts (33.3\% each) yields age cohorts of 18 to 26 years, 27 to 44 years, and 45 years or more. The proportions of respondents in these age groups in the sample are $32.3 \%, 34.0 \%$ and $33.7 \%$ respectively (See Table A.C). These data are displayed graphically in Figure 1.
* The sample contains respondents from all the major ethnic groups in Zambia, though not in precise proportions to their national representation (See Table A.6) (See also Figure 7). The Tonga are somewhat overrepresented ( $20.9 \%$ in the sample versus $15.2 \%$ nationwide), as are the Chewa-Nsenga-Ngoni groups ( $25.4 \%$ versus $17.6 \%$ ) and the Kaonde (11.4\% versus $10.2 \%)^{9}$. By contrast, people identifying themselves as Bemba are underrepresented (11.4\% in the sample versus $36.2 \%$ nationwide), as Lozis ( $4.0 \%$ versus $\mathbf{9 . 2 \%})^{10}$.
* The educational attainments of respondents are arrayed in the sample as follows: $13.4 \%$ report no formal education, $42.6 \%$ report some primary education (1-7 years), 36.3 report some secondary education ( $8-12$ years), and $7.4 \%$ report some higher education (more than 13 years) (See Table A.7) (See also Figure 6).
* The average size of a respondent's household is 6.9 persons (See Table A.8). For the distribution of households by size, see Figure 2.
* In terms of employment, just under half of respondents (46.4\%) say that they earn income from some kind of job or self-employment (See Table A.9) (See also Figure 3). But only 12.6\% name jobs in the Curmal sector (See Table A.11), a figure which accords quite closely with the $\mathbf{9 . 7 \%}$ of persons in formal employment as reported in official statistics (CSO, 1992, 5) (See Table A.C) ${ }^{11}$.
* Respondents reported a median income of K15,000 per month (See Table A.12). Taken together with median spousal income of approximately K20,500 (See Table A.13), monthly household income of respondents is estimated at K40,000. For graphical representations of

[^3]income distribution, see Figures 4 and 5.

## Conventions and Caveats

* The purpose of this report is descriptive. In a situation where little is known about the political knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of an electorate, the first task is to describe. Thus the narrative and appendices of this report present a welter of data, aimed at revealing the contours of public opinion and political values in Zambia as of mid-1993.
* Analysis is intentionally kept to a minimum. We report only selected bivariate relationships where demographic characteristics of respondents are significantly related to political attributes. In keeping with our descriptive agenda, the choice of topics is derived inductively from the data. Several subsequent papers, which vill aim at testing propositions from existing political science literatures, will be tightly focussed on key topics and will be theoretically-driven.
* The results in this report generally reinforce patterns in political values and public opinion revealed in an earlier focus group study by the same authors (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1993). We find, for example, the same basic patterns of limited political knowledge, restricted opportunities of political representation, and moderate levels of trust in governmental institutions. Only now, we can attach much more precise and reliable numbers to these phenomena. In the narrative, we refrain from mentioning the numerous instances where the survey results confirm the focus groups results; we only highlight items where findings diverge.
* All of the data is presented in tables in appendices to the report. Appendix A contains demographic data on the respondents and the sample. Appendices B through E contain frequency distributions of responses to every item on the survey questionnaire. Measures of central tendency (mean, median, and mode) and dispersion (standard deviation) are provided for interval-level data. Appendix F presents cross-tabulations of selected bivariate relationships between demographic characteristics of respondents and indicators of political knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. Only those relationships that are statistically significant at a .05 level or lower are listed.
* There are two basic types of probleisis in interpreting attitude surveys of which readers should be aware: problems attributable to the poor execution of surveys and problems due to the superficial and ephemeral nature of public attitudes (Weisberg and Bowen, 1977, Ch.6).
* With reference to the first problem, there are possibilities for error at every stage in the survey process. Survey designs often reflect unclear or multiple goals, none of which are covered well. We would have liked to have included more questionnaire items on economic reform, but were not willing to do so at the expense of the political variables which are the focus of the survey. Sampling is one of the most frequent sources of error. We devised a means of sampling with equal (or at least known) probability from the population about which we want to generalize (see above). We also established a high ratio of survey supervisors to enumerators
(1:4) in part to ensure adherence to sample design and accurate questionnaire completion.
* Perhaps the trickiest element in survey design is question wording. While field pretesting led to the removal of unreliable items, inevitably some slipped through into the final version of the questionnaire. Respondents appear to have misunderstood some items because they were vague ${ }^{12}$ or difficult ${ }^{13}$; somelimes, they tried intentionally to mislead the interviewer ${ }^{14}$. We also plan to allow greater time for cranslation and back-translation of questionnaires in subsequent surveys.
* The wording of questions is particularly crucial if attitudes are not firmly fixed. Which brings us to the topic of "non-attitudes", that is, attitudes that are ill-formed or tailored to the respondents' judgement about the interviewers's expectations ${ }^{15}$. A survey of politicai attitudes, particularly in a country that has recently emerged from a political regime in which citizens were urged to suppress their individual preferences in favor of official party views, runs the risk of

[^4]giving too much weight to non-attitudes. Thus caution is required to avoid assuming that the patterns of attitudes reported here are more tangible and immutable than they really are.

* This caveat is especially important with regard to attitude change. While we are not measuring changes in attitudes in this first baseline study, we may wish to do so in later evaluation studies. Sample designs that return to the same panel of respondents and questionnaires that use exactly the same questions can help to address the problems of measuring attitudinal change. But inevitably, we will have to take particular care to avoid mistaking ephemeral non-attitudes for real attitude change.
* The more concrete the topic, the more salient it is likely to be to the respondent; the more abstract the ideas to be tapped by the question, the less meaningful the answers. Thus, among the results reported here, the most reliable data refer to the respondents's social background, political participation and involvement in associational life. By contrast, data on respondent attitudes about political authority, political accountability, and political tolerance are probably less reliable. Somewhere in between are reported attitudes which, while abstract, evoke strong and clear emotional responses, on topics like policy preferences, political trust, and life satisfaction.
* Respondents in the current survey of political attitudes apparently found the survey questions to be meaningful. People said they were grateful to be asked their opinions on civic life, that no-one had bothered to so before, and that the survey questions were "the kinds of things we talk about all the time". Many respondents asked the enumerators to be certain to present their opinions to the Government of Zambia.
* With these necessary warnings about interpreting results with caution, let us now turn to an
examination of survey findings. examination of survey findings.


## B. POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

## Interest in Politics

* There is prima facie evidence that a solid majority of Zambians are attitudinally predisposed to become active citizens. Two-thirds of the survey respondents ( $66.6 \%$ ) consider themselves "somewhat" or "very" "interested in politics" (See table B.1). An almost identical proportion (68.0\%) say they "often" or "sometimes" discuss politics with other people (See Table B.2).
* On the other hand, a sizeable minority of Zambians appear completely detached from the political process. One-third of respondents ( $33.3 \%$ ) say that they are "not interested" in politics and "never" get involved in political discussions (32.1\%).
* The respondent's gender explains much of these basic political orientations: In Zambia, n:2n are much more likely than women to be interested in politics (See Table F.1) and to engage in political discussion with others (See Table F.2). Moreover, the survey data confirm the obvious point that respondents with more education are likelier to discuss politics than those with less education (See Table F.3). But, counter to our initial expectations, interest in politics is higher among rural than urban respondents (See Table F.4), perhaps because the latter have higher levels of cynicism about leaders and politics.


## The Scope of the Political World

* Most Zambians apparently find local politics at the community level to be more relevant to their own lives than elite politics in national arenas. Asked which political actors are "very important" in their lives, survey respondents most often cite members of their own family ( $91.7 \%$ ), members of their own ethnic or language group (72.2\%), and traditional leaders such as chiefs and headmen (70.1\%) (See Tables B. 3 to B.8). Fewer than half of the survey respondents felt that local government councillors ( $44.9 \%$ ) and Members of Parliament (MPs) ( $46.3 \%$ ) were "very important" in their lives, though a majority ( $74.8 \%$ and $74.3 \%$ respectively) were at least willing to concede that they were at least "somewhat important" (See Tables B. 6 and B.7). Many Zambians thus tend to operate day-to-day in a community-based politicai arena that remains largely disconnected from, and undisturbed by, the activities of central or local governments.
* It is noteworthy that the salience of public officials in the eyes of ordinary citizens does not decline in a linear fashion from locality to political center. One might have predicted, for example, that local government councillnrs would be more important than MPs in the daily lives of ordinary Zambians. After all, coun llors live in the locality and are responsible for small local government wards rather than larg- parliamentary constituencies. Yet respondents report that councillors are no more important in their lives than MPs. We are not willing to ?"gue that councillors are less relevant to constituents than MPs, even though they score lower on we "very important" scale; the difference between councillor and MP scores is within the range of sampling error for the survey. Rather, we hypothesize that citizens, perhaps being well-
informed
about the poor performance record of local government councils in Zambia, calculate that councillors can do little to help them.
* Selected survey results reveal that Zambians regard informal political contacts with "other powerful people in the community" to be just as important as formal interactions with public officials. Half of the respondents ( $50.1 \%$ ) said that ties to influential patrons were "very important" (See Table B.8). Included in this group are businessmen, church leaders and politicians who do not hold public office. Informal ties between "big men" and local clients deserve further exploration. In fairness, however, we must mention that respondents nevertheless still think that, in order "to get something done", they could be politically more effective by forming a group and stating demands in public (76.6\%) than by making "private approaches to influential leaders" (23.4\%) (See Table D.24).
* Despite their local political orientation, respondents are split (49.4\% "yes", 49.4\% "No") on the question: "should chiefs and headmen play a part in governing Zambia today"? (See Table B.20). Support for a continued political role for traditional leaders, especially among rural respondents ${ }^{16}$, is motivated mainly by a concern to improve communication linkages between the locality and the political center, particularly "to represent people to government" ( $22.5 \%$ ), but also "to represent government to the people" (14.4\%) (See Table B.21). These observations accord with findings reported from the focus groups and elsewhere in this report on the mass perception in Zambia of a lack of adequate opportunities for political representation.


## Political Information

* Zambia's verbal culture manifests itself in politics as in other facets of social life. Most Zambians gather political information from the radio ratier than from newspapers or other printed sources. The dominance of the airwaves as a source of political information is revealed in numerous survey findings. Whereas 56.8\% of households own a radio (See Table B.22), only $27.5 \%$ regularly $b u_{j}$ a newspaper (See Table B.27). Whereas $69.0 \%$ of respondents sometimes listen to a news bulletin on the radio (See Tabie B.23), only $51.7 \%$ ever read a newspaper (See Table B.26). And, whereas $48.1 \%$ of radio listeners tune in to the news every day, only $15.7 \%$ of newspaper readers peruse the dailies with the same frequency (See tables B. 24 and B.29). Newspaper readers usually see a paper just "several times a week" (39.5\%).
* The most popular radio news show, among 80.5\% of listeners, is the evening Radio Zambia broadcast (See Table B.25) ${ }^{17}$. The most widely read newspaper is the Times of Zambia

[^5](39.9\% of readers), closely followed by The Daily Mail (32.3\%) (See Tabie B.28) The Weekly Post reaches $20.0 \%$ of newspaper reading households. We note that most newspapers have multiple readers, with $42.2 \%$ of readers reporting that they share a newspaper bought by another person and $29.4 \%$ reporting that they sometimes buy, sometimes share (See Table B.27).

## Political Knowledge

* The political knowledge of respondents about the identity of their political represertatives reflects the orientation of many citizens to local politics. Half of the respondents can correctly name the incumbent local government councillor (52.3\%) and Member of Parliament (50.4\%) for their area (See Tables B. 9 and B.10). Beyond the local arena, knowledge about the identity of major political figures rapidly decays. Basic facts are fairly well known: for example, 69.5\% of respondents could name Levy Mwanawasa as the current Vice President of Zambia (though one respondent in Eastern Province thought it was Robert Mugabe!) (See Table B.13). But a quarter or fewer of respondents could correctly identify the Minister for the Province ( $25.6 \%$ ) in which they lived and the current Minister of Finance (Ronald Penza) (18.4\%) (See Tables B. 11 and B.12).
* When asked "what is a local government council supposed to do?", respondents overwhelmingly stressed developmental functions: development in general (16.7\%), social welfare ( $13.8 \%$ ), road-building and maintenance ( $13.1 \%$ ), and provision of domestic water supplies ( $10.3 \%$ ) (See Table B.14). Only 4.0\% thought that local government councils offered a forum for the representation and deliberacion of local community concerns. Instead, mosi respondents seemed to see local government as an extended arm of central government, perhaps because local councils in Zambia have long depended on the central government budget for core financial support. When asked whether there is "a difference between the central government and your local government council?", a sizeable minority (42.4\%) replied that these institutions were "the same thing" (See Table B.19).
* There was less unanimity among respondents about what the National Assembly should do, with only $19.2 \%$ saying it should "solve national development problems" (See Table B.15). While $24.0 \%$ correctly stated that the Assembly makes and amends laws, some $5.3 \%$ mistakenly thought that it should implement laws. Other respondents focussed on the Assembly's furctions of representation ( $10.6 \%$ said "represent people") and deliberation ( $11.5 \%$ said "discuss national affairs"). One-fifth of respondents ( $\mathbf{2 0 . 7 \%}$ ) were honest enough to admit that they had no idea what the national Assembly was supposed to do.
* Civic organizations have a long way to go to establish an identity in the public consciousness. A mere $15.3 \%$ of respondents said they had ever heard of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) (See Table B.16), and one-third of these (36.5\%) could not go on to identify FODEP's functions (See Table B.17). Of those who had an opinion on what FODEP was "supposed to do", most cited election monitoring (20.6\%) or words to the effect of "safeguarding democracy" (20.6\%). Very few respondents mentioned dispute mediation or civic education ( $4.8 \%$ each).
* There is considerable confusion among the respondents about the distinct functions of political parties and governments. One out of two Zambians (47.0\%) apparently believe that a party and a government are "the same thing" (See Table B.18). This aspect of Zambian political culture is directly traceable to the constitutional, ideological and pragmatic fusion of party and state functions during the single-party Second Republic, 1973-1991. We see this "statist" interpretation of political parties as further evidence that channels for interest articulation and political representation are underdeveloped or blocked.


## C. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

## Associational Life

* Zambians are "joiners". When each survey respondent was asked whether he or she was "a member of a community organization such as a church, club, union or cooperative", 83.8\% answered affirmatively (See Table C.19). The overwhelming majority of these respondents ( $75.6 \%$ ) belong to a Christian church, most commonly the Roman Catholic Church (13.6\%), the Seventh Day Adventists (10.5\%), or the United Church of Zambia (7.1\%) (See Table C.2018. Of the remaining voluntary associations, membership is most common in cooperatives (7.1\%), sports clubs (3.1\%), and trade unions and women's clubs (both 2.4\%) ${ }^{19}$.
* Voluntary association is a relatively recent political phenomenon in Zambia with more than half of the participants ( $53.9 \%$ ) belonging to their respective groups for less than ten years (See Table C.21). We guess that associational life expanded in the 1980s, especially under the protective umbrella of the churches, as opportunities for political participation were proscribed systematically in the single-party state. We further expect that membership in secular organizations will have been encouraged by the political openings of the 1990s.
* Within their associations, Zambians seem to be reasonably active. Almost two-thirds (64.5\%) claim to attend "all" or "most" association meetings (See Table C.23), and more than a quarter ( $27.6 \%$ ) hold positions as association leaders (calculated from Table C.22). Considering the large amounts of time of ordinary Zambians have to devote to ensuring economic livelihood, it is remarkable to find informal political activism at the community level. Further analysis and research is required to confirm the reliability of the finding and to understand its possible relationships to economic problem-solving.
* Almost half of all association members perceive that their associations work well, citing "no prölems" (See Table C.24). The remainder mention, in order of importance, funding constraints, membership apathy, and internal factional conflict.


## Party Identification

* Perhaps because, in an earlier era, Zambians were coerced to become members of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), respondents now show limited enthusiasm about joining political parties. A full $43.5 \%$ of survey respondents insist that they do not "support a political

[^6]party", preferring either neutrality or to keep their partisan attachments secret (See Table A.14). Of the $56.5 \%$ who are willing to publicly associate themselves with a party, the vast majority (86.8\%) predictably claim affiliation with the governing Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) (See Table A. 15 and Figure 8). Many MMD supporters are known to be recent "converts" since the time of the 1991 election campaign, and the depth and intensity of their attachments is unknown. Only $36.6 \%$ of all respondents ( $64.7 \%$ of party supporters) say that they carry a party membership card (Sce Table A.16).

## Forms of Participation

* The 1991 general elections marked the remobilization of many Zambian citizens into national politics for the first time since independence. This is partly reflected in the $58.7 \%$ who say that they have attended an election rally (See Table C.8). Also, a remarkably high $25.0 \%$ claim to have "worked for a political candidate or party", though this question was surely misinterpreted by some respondents to mean more casual levels of participation than being an official campaign agent (See Table C.9). By the same token, $25 \%$ rule out the prospect of ever assisting in an election campaign.
* Between elections, mass political participation is quite extensive, but confined largely to community arenas. Two-thirds of respondents ( $66.9 \%$ ) report having attended a community meeting in the past five years (See Table C.7), and one-third ( $32.9 \%$ ) having gone to a traditional leader such as a headman for help in solving a problem (See Table C.10). The data confirm the common sense expectation that rural folk are more likely than urbanites to make representations to traditional leaders ( $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ significant at .00000 level) (See Table F.6). But they also reveal the less obvious fact that most of these representations are made by men rather than women ( $X^{2}$ significant at .00001 level) (See Table F.7).
* All other forms of political participation occur infrequently. Only $17.4 \%$ of citizens report having approached a local government councillor for help in solving a problem (See Table C.11) and only $6.9 \%$ have approached an MP (See Table C.12). It is noteworthy that councillors are contacted far more often than MPs, but at only half the rate of headmen. We suspect that these patterns reflect the nature of problems experienced by citizens (with headmen fielding many complaints about family and community disputes), and the relative physical proximity of leaders to their constituents (with councillors, though judged unimportant or ineffective, having the virtue of at least being more accessible than MPs).
* The low level of contact between constituents and their political representatives is due partly to the fact that, in general, the latter make few constituency visits and schedule few public meetings. Respondents reported that, in the course of the year from mid-1992 to mid-1993, councillors held an average of only 2.02 meetings in their wards (median $=0$ ), and MPs held an average of 1.77 meetings in their constitutencies (median $=0$ ) (See Tables C. 17 and C.18).
* Zambians rarely participate in politics by writing letters to newspapers (6.5\%) (See Table C.13) or joining in peaceful (6.5\%) or violent (3.6\%) demonstrations (See Tables C. 14 and
C.15). Predictably, educated people are significantly more likely to use written means to express political opinions (See Table F.8):


## Voter Registration

* When eligible voters were asked whether they were registered to vote, only two-thirds ( $65.1 \%$ ) answered in the affirmative (See Table C.1). The placement of the question on voter registration as the first on the questionnaire may have induced some non-registered voters to feel that they must answer positively, thus inflating this survey estimate ${ }^{20}$.
* Political apathy is a principal reason for non-registration, with approximately one-diird of those without a voter's registration card (30.7\%) stating that they were "not interested" in voting (See Table C.2). A further one-third missed the registration exercise, either because they claimed to be in ill-health ( $14.3 \%$ ), absent from the area, ( $10.7 \%$ ), "otherwise engaged" ( $2.9 \%$ ), or for reasons unspecified ( $\mathbf{8 . 6 \%}$ ). The high frequency of illnesses cited suggests a population with a genuinely poor health status; but it is also possible that at least some respondents concocted "excuses" as a cover for a lack of intention to register. Relatively few respondents reported technical problems, for example being under age at the time of registration (5.7\%) or having lost a national registration identification card (10.0\%).
* Age is a powerful explanatory factor of voter registration in Zambia. Whereas 79.6\% of persons aged 45 or older report being registered, only $41.2 \%$ of eligible voters aged 26 or younger so report. This relationship is one of the strongest and most significant relationship between a demographic variable and a political behavior or attitude found so far in the data set (See Table F.9). The result is largely understandable by the fact that large numbers of young people have come of voting age since the last supplementary voter registration in Zambia in September- October 1990.


## Electoral Turnout

* Post-election surveys in other countries show that more respondents claim to have voted than are documented in official electoral turnout figures derived from polling station records (Clausen, 1968-69). Zambia is no exception. For the October 1991 general elections, just over half of the eligible voters surveyed claimed to have voted ( $54.9 \%$ ) (See Table C.3) whereas just under half of registered voters actually cast a ballot (estimated 45\%) (NDI, 1992, 67). For the 1992 local government elections, the claimed participation rate from the survey (39.9\%) (See Table C.5) was more than double the presumed national turnout figure of below 20 percent.

[^7]These discrepancies may be attributable to the natural human inclination of repondents not wanting to admit they did not engage in the behavior being studied, especially where there was an implied moral duty attached to the behavior.

* There is a tendency for reported voting behavior to vary by gender, with male respondents being more likely than female respondents to say they voted in both elections. For example, in the 1992 local government elections $70.1 \%$ of registered males claimed to vote versus $51.9 \%$ of registered females (See Table F.10). Urban voters also turned out in greater proportions than rural veters for the 1991 general elections (See Table F.11).
* The immediate reason that eligible voters stayed away from the historic multiparty polls of the early 1990s was that they were not registered to vote. This reason accounts for $77.3 \%$ of the nonparticipation in 1991 and $58.7 \%$ in 1992. In addition, about one of of five registered non-voters consistently cite technical obstacles; they explain that they have either lost their voter registration cards ${ }^{21}$ or are registered to vote in area other than the one in which they are now living (See Tables C. 4 and C.6). Despite these reasons, the dramatic indication of voter indifference the 1992 local government elections still demands explanation. For this election, the survey revealed different answers than the focus groups conducted in March 1993. Earlier, we reported that many voters did not vote in 1992 because they said they already felt disillusioned that the new MMD government had not delivered on its promises (Bratton and Katundu, 1993, 6). In the June 1993 survey only $3.1 \%$ of respondents said they were disillusioned or had lost interest since the last election. This discrepancy, which may be a function of research methods, remains to be resolved.

[^8]
## D. POLITICAL ATTITUDES

## Political Authority

* In this section of the survey, we want to know whether Zambians accept or question prevailing authority relations. We found mixed results, depending on whether respondents were considering general or specific situations. We found a general predeliction to defer to entrenched authority, but a willingness to challenge the existing distribution of power in specific situations. To tap such attitudes, we asked interviewees to respond to a series of statements about political authority on a five-point Likert scale ("strongly agree," "agree," "can't say," "disagree," "strongly disagree"). We report the results by aggregating the responses at each end of the scale: respondent support for a statement is calculated by adding "agree" and "strongly agree" responses into an aggregate percentage figure; respondent opposition to a statement is calculated from "disagree" plus "strongly disagre?" responses.
* In general terms, Zambians express concern about the erosion of the traditional cultural norms that have maintained order in their society. A clear majority (59.5\%), especially among rural dwellers ${ }^{22}$, support the notion that "these days in Zambia there is not enough respect for authority" (versus 39.3\% opposed) (See Table D.1). Accordingly, they prefer to see political power concentrated in the hands of older people, expressing opposition (57.6\%) to the idea that "this country would have fewer problems if young people were given more of a chance to hold public office" (versus $39.3 \%$ in support) (See Table D.8) ${ }^{23}$. We also found widespread deference in political decision-making to educated elites; for instance, most respondents (59.5\%) reject the assertion that "people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues" (versus 38.8\%) (See Table D.4).
* On this last item, one begins to see an elitist and anti-democratic streak in mass political culture. A predeliction to curb the voting rights of those who "don't understand all the issues" is especially strong among the young, among urban dwellers ( $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ significant at .002 level in both cases), and especially among educated people (.00000) (See Table F.13). This seems to challenge the conventional wisdom that attachment liberal democracy tends to increase with education.
* Once confronted with specifics, however, many respondents report more egalitarian political values. There was virtual unanimity among respondents ( $91.5 \%$, with $69.8 \%$ "strongly agree"), for example, that "women should have the same right as men to vote in elections" (versus $6.9 \%$

[^9]opposed) (See Table D.2). A majority also opposed the related proposition, though less resoundingly ( $76.9 \%$ ), that "only men should be allowed to run for public office" (See Table D.5) ${ }^{24}$. We cannot necessarily read these responses as rurning counter to the prevailing political norms, however, since women's equal participation in formal electoral politics has been embodied in the laws of Zambia for at least a generation and now constitutes part of the status que.

* Again at a general level, most Zambians are willing to countenance an expansion of governmental authority in order to obtain social tranquillity; respondents clearly rejected (56.8\%) the general proposition that "the police have too much power in this country" (versus 38.9\% in support) (See Table D.3).
* Again, general sentiments are qualified in specific situations. Respondents sometimes asserted the rights of the individuals to be protected from authoritarian behavior by government agents. For example they resoundingly opposed (74.6\%) the Minister of Home Affairs' widely debated proposal that "the police should be allowed to shoot anyone fleeing from the scene of a crime" (versus $24.9 \%$ support) (See Table D.6). They also clearly concurred (73.3\%) with the notion that "the govemment should not be allowed to detain people without first giving them a fair trial" (versus $26.0 \%$ opposed) (See Table D.7). This question may have been particularly meaningful to respondents since the survey was administered just three weeks after President Chiluba had lifted a state of emergency and released political detainees on May 25, 1993.


## Political Accountability

* In some respects, Zambians feel that they receive fair and responsive treatment from public officials. Probably as a consequence of former President Kaunda's policy of balancing appointments and investments on ethnic and regional lines, Zambians can comfortably concur (75.7\%) that "one's tribe makes no difference in politics and government" (See Table D.10). The current government also tends to benefit from a perception that public resources are distributed even-handedly with almost half ( $46.2 \%$ ) denying that "the President's region of the country gets more government services than any other region" (36.7\% opposed) (See Table D.13). The unusually large proportion of undecided responses ( $17.1 \%$ "can't say"), however, suggests that opinion is not firmly formed on this item.
* Respondents have some difficulty in distinguishing the legitimate duty of a political representative to bring home the bacon from favoritism in the distribution of development resources. Orce sampling error is take into account, respondents are essentially split (54.5\% support, $44.0 \%$ oppose) on the proposition that "there is nothing wrong with a Minister helping his home village with development projects" (See Table D.11).

[^10]* Any generosity toward the accountability of public officials largely disappears when questions are posed directly about official corruption. A sweeping majority (70.7\%, with $40.7 \%$ "strongly disagree") oppose the statement that "bribery is very rare among public officials in Zambia" (See Table D.9). Indeed, there is a streak of deep cynicism in the Zambian populace about the motivations of political leaders, with most respondents (72.5\%, 48.9\% "strongly agree") supporting the notion that "most government officials and politicians are mainly concerned with enriching themselves" ( $24.4 \%$ opposed) (See Table D.12). Respondents again diverged on whether "corruption was a worse problem under the old UNIP government than these days". Whereas $43.5 \%$ supported this statement, $49.7 \%$ opposed (and $6.7 \%$ were undecided) (See Table D.14). Nevertheless, the MMD cannot take comfort from this finding since it indicates that fully half the respondents think that the new regime is more corrupt than the one it replaced.
* The demographic characteristics of respondents go a long way toward explaining attitudes on political accountability. Women and rural dwellers are consistently more likely to give political leaders the benefit of the doubt and to infer honest behavior on the part of public officeholders ${ }^{25}$. By contrast, educated people are more cynical and more likely to suspect corruption ${ }^{26}$.


## Political Trust

* In the survey, respondents were asked to rank various social groups and political institutions according to how much trust they place in them. On a scale of one to ten, 1.0 signifies a response that "I do not trust them at all" and 10.0 that "I trust them completely".
* Unsurprisingly, Zambians show greatest trust in social groups with whom they have direct personal contact and whom they know best. Respondents report most trust in persons within their immediate community (mean score $=7.98)^{27}$, intermediate levels of trust in relation to other Zambians (6.35), and least trust in non-Zambian foreigners (3.81) (calculated from data in Table D.15).
* Within the community, family members are most trusted (9.44) and neighbours least (6.33) (See Table D.15 ). The survey did not confirm the focus group finding that female relatives are more trusted than male relatives.
* The results on poiitical trust for Zambians from different regions were biased by the ethnic composition of the sample; we await more definitive results from a sample in which Westerners

25. Respondent's location (urban or rural) is significantly related to five of the six accountability items on the questionnaire. Respondent's gender is significantly related to four of these six items.
${ }^{26}$. Education is significantly related to three of the six accountability items.
${ }^{27}$. Community is defined here to include family, relatives and neighbors.
and Northerners are better nepresented. We nonetheless observed a rather narrow gap in reported levels of trust between a respondent's own ethnic group (7.15) and for Zambians from other regions (6.15), suggesting a real presence of national identity and interethnic tolerance in the country.

* Among foreigners, Zaireans are least trusted (2.39) and the British are most trusted (5.22) (See Table D.15).
* The trust trend is reversed for governmental institutions. Interestingly, respondents tend to show less trust in institutions that have a presence in the local community and more trust in distant institutions with which they have little personal contact. For example, the survey revealed somewhat less trust in local government institutions (e.g. police and local government councils, mean score $=6.29$ ) than central government institutions (e.g. National Assembly and Cabinet $=6.61$ ) (See Table D.). We interpret this to mean that Zambians are predisposed to put faith in governmental institutions, but that their direct experience with local government institutions has undermined this initial confidence.
* The respondents show more confidence in non-governmental organizations (mean score $=$ 7.45) than they do in the apparatus of the state (6.45) (See Table D.18) ${ }^{28}$. The mean political trust score of 9.00 for the churches describes an attainable target for service organizations towards which both FODEP (5.32) and Zambian public institutions might strive.
* Zambians show relatively high levels of trust in the public media, particularly for Radio Zambia (7.88), ZNBC TV (7.17), and the Times of Zambia (7.09) (See Table D.18). The survey showed lower levels of trust for the Weekly Post (6.46) and the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, but we consider that these preliminary results are contaminated with too many responses from non-readers and non-listeners.


## Political Efficacy

* Compared with Westemers, Zambians generally share an underlying ethic of reciprocity, kinship solidarity and collective benefit in interpersonal relations. Almost all respondents ( $90.9 \%$ ) say they put their "main effort" into improving the lives of their children and younger relatives at the expense of improving their own lives (See Table D.20). Respondents also report that they prefer to work in groups (71.5\%) rather than alone (See Table D.19).
* At the same time, Zambians are generally unconstrained by a sense of fatalism in which life events are seen to be beyond an individual's influence or control. Most respondents ( $69.8 \%$ ) say that they actively "try to plan ahead" and do not subscribe to the view that outcomes are "a matter of luck" (See Table D.21). This sense of personal efficacy extends to political affairs, at least within immediate locality of kin, friends and neighbors. A similar proportion of

[^11]respondents ( $66.2 \%$ ) is confident that that they can "influence the opinions of others" in discussions about politics (See Table D.22).

* These Zambian data suggest that there is no necessary contradiction between collective cultural values and an individual's sense of personal and political efficacy. One does not have to express individualistic values in order to feel that one can be effective in the world, including the world of politics.
* Respondents feel much more powerless, however, in the arena of national politics. Most ( $66.7 \%$ ) recognize that they lack requisite political knowledge, agreeing that "government sometimes seem so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on" (See Table D.23). Most ( $59.0 \%$ ) also rue the ineffectiveness of their efforts at political representation, agreeing that "we are usually unable to make our councillors and MPs listen to us" (See Table D.25).
* Respondents also doubt, though to a lesser degree, the capability of their national leaders "to solve national problems". Slightly more people ( $55.5 \%$ ) see the government as "not very effective" than see it as efficacious (44.5\%) (See Table D.26).


## Political Tolerance

* Tolerance of political diversity is a core component of democratic values. On the basis of evidence presented below, there is some reason to believe that many Zambians possess this particular attribute of democratic citizenship.
* Attitudes of political tolerance are revealed in support for selected human rights. A clear majority of respondents $(75.4 \%$ ) supports the right of freedom of expression, even for those with differing viows to themselves, and even if some people become "confused" by a diversity of opinion (See Table D.27). The respondents are less certain about the right of freedom of association, perhaps due again to indoctrination under one-party rule. Only a bare majority (52.3\%) agrees that community organizations should be free to form independently without affiliating with the ruling party, a result that could be attributable to sampling error (See Table D.28).
* On one human rights item, respondents give a contrary signal. With reference to freedom of religion, they convincingly reject ( $80.7 \%$ ) the right of Muslims to form an Islamic political party (See Table D.29). This result, the most strongly held opinion in the tolerance battery, was probably influenced by the fact that many respondents had never had personal contact with Muslims, and by President Chiluba's recent assertion that Zambia is "a Christian country".
* Despite some ambiguity of opinion about human rights, the respondents clearly favor the accomodative style of politics associated with tolerance of political diversity. For example, they overwhelmingly favor compromise with political opponents (83.4\%) rather than blind adherence to "one's own side" (See Table D.33). Moreover, three-quarters of the respondents (75.4\%)
condemn the use of coercion to reach political goals, proclaiming that violence is never justified in Zambian politics (See Table D.30).
* Even at this early stage of the democratization process in their country, many Zambians express attachment to the idea of democratic governance. As a whole, they tend to agree ( $63.4 \%$ ) that "the best form of government is a government elected by its people", even when forced to choose between this form of government and an effective government "that gets things done" (See Table D.31). An even larger majority (74.5\%) is willing to credit the political transition of 1991 with the installation of real democratic gains: far form "becoming another single-party state", the current regime offers Zambian citizens "a real choice among different political parties and candidates" (See Table D.32)
* We plan further analysis to search for the existence of democratic or authoritarian value constructs in the data set. We wish to know, for example whether some respondents can be coded as "democrats" depending on conjunctions of responses to selected key items of political knowledge plus attitudes of efficacy, equity, and tolerance. We will then want to explain how such value sets come about and what effects they have on other attitudes, for example in relation to free market reform.


## E. POLICY PREFERENCES

## Economic Knowledge

* When interviewees were asked "which national issues do you consider most important to you and your family", by far the most common response concerned the high prices of consumer goods ( $42.9 \%$ ), often with specific reference to maize-meal, the staple food (See Table E.13). Respondents next referred to inadequate education (11.5\%) and health services (9.8\%) and to the high prices of agricultural inputs ( $6.2 \%$ ). As might be expected, rural and urban dwellers have different concerns ${ }^{29}$. Respondent comments on numerous other open-ended questionnaire items revealed an almost obsessive preoccupation among Zambians with the rising cost and declining standard of living in their country.
* Asked to analyse the reasons for rising food prices, respondents sometimes seemed vaguely informed. Just one in ten could point to the withdrawal by government of consumer price subsidies ( $10.6 \%$ ), with a greater percentage ( $22.9 \%$ ) citing increased costs of production and marketing inputs like fertilizer and fuel (See Table E.21). Others cite drought in the 1991/92 growing season (11.0\%) or loosely blamed farmers or political leaders ( $14.6 \%)^{30}$.
* In this vein, many respondents confer responsibility on "the new government" (i.e. MMD) for creating current economic conditions ( $39.7 \%$ ), without at the same time exonerating "the old govemment" (i.e.UNIP) (33.4\%) (See Table E.20). Even though the majority that blames MMD could conceivably be due to sampling error, there is no gainsaying the fact that at least one-third of the electorate already regards the new government as the primary cause of their economic plight. In passing, let us also note that very few respondents were willing to lay responsibility at the feet of either the people of Zambia (14.2\%) or international financial institutions (5.5\%).
* Respondents were willing to assume personal responsibility, however, for helping to rehabilitate run-down public services. Asked where the money should come from to improve roads, clinics and water supplies, almost half ( $47.2 \%$ ) conceded that taxes of various types would have to be raised (See Table E.22). Some open-ended responses implied that such taxes could be broad-based, and not only targetted at "the rich". Few respondents thought ine answer lay in foreign aid or loans ( $16.9 \%$ ).

[^12]
## Economic Policy Preferences

* Zambians appear to be divided over the advisability of the economic reform program on which the Chiluba government has embarked. Survey respondents accept some aspects of the program, while at the same time rejecting others. Overall, there is greater support for fees-forservice and market pricing, than there is for privatization and public sector retrenchment. This suggests the hypothesis that mass publics in countries like Zambia are deeply attached to the public proivision of services and employment and are slow to accept the need for major structural adjustments to to existing institutions for economic production and distribution.
* A clear majority of respondents accepts the need to pay for part of the costs of educational services, provided such services improve. Faced with a choice of statements on this subject, $72.5 \%$ agreed that "it is better to raise educational standards, even if we have to pay school fees", whereas only $27.3 \%$ chose to say that "it is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low" (See Table E.2).
* Notwithstanding mass anxiety about price inflation, a slim majority of respondents ${ }^{31}$ is apparently willing to tolerate market pricing for consumer goods if such reforms are accompanied by other benefits. Whereas $44.7 \%$ think that "it is better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods", $54.5 \%$ prefer "to have goods in the market, even if the prices are high" (See Table E.1).
* A clear majority ( $60.7 \%$ ) also thinks that "the Government should encourage foreigners to invest in Zambia" ( $38.8 \%$ opposed) (See Table E.23). The supporters of foreign investment think that government policy to this effect will create jobs (27.0\%), attract capital (19.4\%), and improve the availability of goods (14.3\%). The opponents of the policy fear that foreign investment will compromise Zambia's independence (26.4\%) ("they will rule us again") or lead to the appropriation of the nation's resources (21.9\%) (See Table E.24) ${ }^{32}$.
* Respondents are quite wary about the privatization of public enterprises, saying that they would rather expand government ownership of "factories, businesses and farms" (59.9\%) than expand private ownership (39.4\%) (See Table E.4). For at least two reasons, this item requires further research: first, opposition to privatization apparently contradicts support for foreign investment and, second, some survey enumerators reported difficulty in winning respondent comprehension of the abstract concepts of public and private ownership in local languages.
${ }^{31}$. Within the range of sampling error.

32. The percentages are calculated from the supporter and opponent subsamples ( $\mathrm{n}=252$ and $\mathrm{n}=155$ respectively), rather than from the total number of valid responses listed in the table ( $\mathrm{n}=408$ ).


#### Abstract

* Respondents had little difficulty understanding the implications of public sector retrenchment and came out firmly opposed to this aspect of the adjustment package. Whereas $32.7 \%$ are willing to concede that "the government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay off some of them", more than twice as many respondents ( $67.3 \%$ ) proclaimed that "our leaders should provide us with government jobs, even if this is costly to the country" (See Tables E. 3 and E.4). The popular expectation that political patrons will deliver public employment may be one of the deepest attitudinal legacies of one-party rule, and one of the slowest to change.


## (Post) Materialism

* Inglehart (1971) has predicted that mass populations in industrial societies, especially younger cohorts, are likely to display a "post-materialist" set of values which emphasises individual freedom, self-expression and the quality of life. These post-materialist values are posited to be conducive to democratization. Inglehart and Abramson (1993) further propose that the value priorities of poorer populations in pre-industrial societies with low GNPs will reflect "materialist" preoccupation with economic and physical security. Even so, they expect to find higher proportions of postmaterialists among younger people, "provided that the given society has had sufficient economic growth during the past four or five decades so that the younger cohorts have experienced significantly greater economic security during their (formative) preadult years" than older generations (pp. 19-20). Results from the 1990-91 World Values Survey conducted in Nigeria confirm these expectations. The data show both high levels of materialist values and negligible intergenerational value differences, which the authors attribute to the fact that Nigeria had "virtually no increase in real income per capita since the 1960s" (p.22).
* We included one item from the World Values Survey battery on postmaterialism in the Zambia political attitudes questionnaire. Respondents were asked to choose from a list of policy options the "top priority...goals for the nation...over the next ten years". They gave their first choice as follows: fighting rising prices (54.2\%), maintaining order in the nation (32.3\%), giving people more say in government decisions ( $8.2 \%$ ), and protecting freedom of speech (4.6\%) (See Table E.14; for second choices, see table E.15). Materialist preferences clearly predominated. And, as in Nigeria, we could find no significant intergenerational value differences in Zambia, a country in which per capita national income declined by 2.1 percent over the last two decades (World Bank, 1993).
* Instead, a respondent's party identification is apparently important in his or her orientation toward postmaterial values. MMD supporters are much more likely tha: UNIP supporters ( $\mathbf{X}^{\mathbf{2}}$ significant at the .025 level) to give first priority to protection of rig'hts to free speech and political participation (See Table F.17).
* Following up on the respondents' concern for law and order - identified as their second highest priority - we note the impact of crime on Zambians. Two-thirds ( $67.8 \%$ ) say that crime is "a major problem" in their lives (See Table E.16). Those who report the prevalence of crime have adjusted their behavior by restricting their movements, especially at night ( $29.6 \%$ ), becoming "more fearful" ( $19.5 \%$ ), and taking anti-theft measures to protect their property
(13.0\%) (See Table E.17). We infer that crime has become an increasingly salient social problem as a joint consequence of political and econonic reform, rising as the state relaxes political controls over society and as necessary economic adjustment measures intensify the tendency of living standards to fall in the short run.
* Despite these findings, we have reason to question the post-materialist thesis. For example, it does not square with the evident attachment of many Zambians to the right of free expression, as reported above. We would argue that economic poveriy does not displace an individual's need for autonomy and self-actualization. Moreover, Anderson's survey research in Nicaragua (1990) suggests that economic insecurity is not the only factor motivating poor people to become politically active. When we asked Zambians who had participated in politics what they were trying to achieve by doing so, they listed a variety of motivations. In order of priority these were "to express a political opinion" ( $23.4 \%$ ), "to obtain political information" ( $16.2 \%$ ), and "to solve a social problem in the community" (15.1\%). All of these non-economic reasons were listed with greater frequency than the goal of "solving an economic problem" (14.0\%) (See Table C.16).
* There are significant differences in these attitudes among demographic subgroups. Urban folk are more likely than ruralites to be motivatud into politics "to solve an economic problem", but they still cite this reason less frequently than "to solve a community social problem" (See Table F.18). Women, unlike men, do not seem to be primarily motivated by economic concerns; they say they take political actions "to solve domestic disputes", "to obtain political information" and, "to engage in social interaction" (See Table 1.19). This finding is surprising in the light of the common belief that women have been particularly vulnerable to the effects of economic contraction in Zambia (Geisler and Narrowe, 1990; Mudenda, 1991). As for educated people, their prime motivation for political activity is "to express a political opinion" (a post-materialist value); by the same token, however, they no less likely than less educated to become politically active to attain an economic objective (a materialist value) (See Table F.20).
* Until we can explore these issues further ${ }^{33}$, therefore, we remain agnostic whether materialist values are the sole, or even main, engine of political mobilization in Zambia.


## Life Satisfaction

* The respondents in the survey express a moderately positive view of their circumstances, with $58.9 \%$ saying they are "very" or "fairly" satisfied with the lives they are leading (with $41.1 \%$ complaining that they are "not very" or "not at all satisfied") (See Table E.8). Respondents are most satisfied with the states of their health and least satisfied with their financial situations, with the latter factor being the strongest determinant of overall lire satisfaction (See Tables E. 5 to E.8).

[^13]* Responses were completely split on whether people felt better or worse about life today than one year ago ( $49.2 \%$ versus $50.6 \%$ ) and five years ago ( $50.3 \%$ versus $49.6 \%$ ) (See Tables E. 9 to E.10), Many respondents also found difficulty in anticipating the future, perhaps because so much of their attention is devoted to day-to-day economic survival. Again, approximately the same proportions thought that life would get better over the next one and five years as thought it would get worse (See Tables E. 11 to E.12).
* Among other factors, we anticipate that life satisfaction and future expectations influence whether individuals support or oppose economic reform. Duch (1993) reports from a survey in the former Soviet Union that "those who expect their personal financial situations to deteriorate are more likely to oppose free-market initiatives" (1993, 599). For Zambia, we can confirm that there is a strong and significant positive relationship between respondents' optimism about their life prospects and their willingness to tolerate market prices (See Tables F. 21 and F.22)


## Assessments of Government Performance

* The respondents were asked: "What are some things MMD has done better than UNIP?". They replied as follows, in order of priority: effectively distributed food relief during the recent drought ( $26.0 \%$ ); improved the availability of consumer goods ( $19.0 \%$ ); improved the quality of roads and transportation services ( $8.0 \%$ ); and improved the quality of nalth care services (7.6\%) (See Table E.18). The second most frequent response, however, is that MMD has "done nothing better" (19.2\%).
* The respondents were also asked: "What are some things MMD has done worse than UNIP?". They replied as follows, in order of priority: allowed the prices of consumer goods to rise ( $55.1 \%$ !, a very high concentration of responses for an open-ended question) and "they have done nothing worse" (18.8\%) (See Table E.19).
* This apparently mixed view of government performance is clarified somewhat when respondents are asked directly: "what is your overall assessment of the performance of the new MMD government". Opinion breaks down thusly: "very good" (16.7\%); "good" (27.5\%); "fair" (34.1\%); "poor" (13.5\%); "very poor" (7.7\%) (See Table E.25).
* Patterns and trends in popular support for the MMD government are already evident. First, despite the government's overwhelming victory in urban areas in the historic October 1991 elections, urban dwellers now clearly give a less favorable assessment of governmental performance than do rural dwellers ( $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ significant at .009 level) (See Table F.23). Second, educated Zambians are far more skeptical of the government's achievements than those with primary or no education ( $X^{2}$ significant at .00000 level) (See Table F.24). Finally, and predictably, political partisanship influences citizen approval of leadership performance: MMD supporters are much more likely than opposition party supporters to think that the government is doing a good job ( $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ significant at .00002 level) (See Table F.25).
* To summarize: by June 1993, after twenty months of the Chiluba administration, Zambian citizens apparently give their leaders a better than average performance rating. At the same time, however, they wish to remind the government that a solution to the problers: of falling real living standards remains the key to their political satisfaction in the long run. They are also concerned about perceived corruption among public officials and they desire stronger measures to ensure democratic accountability. These attitudes are more strongly held among male citizens in the urban areas than by female citizens in the Zambian countryside.


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Appendix A - Demographic and Sampling Data
Table A.A: Random Sample
of Census Supervisory Areas and Standard Enumeration Areas

| TEAM | DISTRICT | CSA | SEA | DISTRICT | CSA | SEA |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SOUTH | Mumbwa | $\begin{aligned} & 015 * \\ & 038 * \\ & 007 * \\ & 005 \\ & 051 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1 \\ & 1 \\ & 3 \\ & 2 \\ & 2 \end{aligned}$ | Choma | $\begin{aligned} & 034 * \\ & 012 * \\ & 075 \text { * } \\ & 025 \text { * } \\ & 097 \end{aligned}$ | 3 1 1 2 2 |
|  | Lusaka Urban | 198* | 4 |  |  |  |
| EAST | Lusaka Urban | $\begin{aligned} & 217 * \\ & 205 * \\ & 039 * \\ & 097 * \\ & 085 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 3 \\ & 2 \\ & 3 \\ & 1 \\ & 1 \end{aligned}$ | Petauke | $\begin{aligned} & 122 * \\ & 060 * \\ & 074 * \\ & 026 * \\ & 050 \end{aligned}$ | 1 4 3 2 1 |
| NORTH | Kitwe | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 070* } \\ & 101 * \\ & 036 * \\ & 064 * \\ & 018 * \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 1 \\ & 2 \end{aligned}$ | Solwezi | $\begin{aligned} & 034 \text { * } \\ & 006 \star \\ & 026 * \\ & 045 \\ & 056 \end{aligned}$ | 3 2 2 1 4 |

[^14]Table A.B: Quota Sample
By Gender, Age and Social Status

| DISTRICT |  | GENDER |  | AGE |  | staitus On | $\begin{gathered} \text { (Location) } \\ \text { Off } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Male | 26 | Yng | 7 | 5 | 2 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 9 | 6 | 3 |
| MUMBWA | 52 |  |  | Old | 10 | 6 | 4 |
|  |  | Female | 26 | Yng | 9 | 5 | 4 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 8 | 5 | 3 |
|  |  |  |  | Old | 9 | 6 | 3 |
|  |  | Male | 34 | Yng | 12 | 8 | 4 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 11 | 7 | 4 |
| CHOMA 69 |  |  |  | Old | 11 | 7 | 4 |
|  |  | Female | 35 | Yng | 10 | 7 | 3 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 12 | 8 | 4 |
|  |  |  |  | Old | 13 | 9 | 4 |
|  |  | Male | 34 | Yng | 12 | 8 | 4 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 10 | 6 | 4 |
| PETAUKE | 70 |  |  | Old | 12 | 8 | 4 |
|  |  | Female | 36 | Yng | 12 | 8 | 4 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 12 | 8 | 4 |
|  |  |  |  | Old | 12 | 8 | 4 |
|  |  | Male | 25 | Yng | 8 | 5 | 3 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 8 | 6 | 2 |
| SOLWEZ | 53 |  |  | Old | 9 | 6 | 3 |
|  |  | Female | 28 | Yng | 9 | 5 | 4 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 9 | 6 | 3 |
|  |  |  |  | Old | 10 | 6 | 4 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Emp | Inf/Un |
|  |  | Male | 45 | Yng | 15 | 6 | 9 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 15 | 5 | 10 |
| LUSAKA | 89 |  |  | Old | 15 | 6 | 9 |
| URBAN |  | Female | 44 | Yng | 15 | 2 | 13 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 15 | 2 | 13 |
|  |  |  |  | Old | 14 | 1 | 13 |
|  |  | Male | 44 | Yng | 15 | 5 | 10 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 15 | 5 | 10 |
| KITWE 87 |  |  |  | Old | 14 | 6 | 8 |
|  |  | Female | 43 | Yng | 15 | 1 | 14 |
|  |  |  |  | Mid | 14 | 2 | 12 |
|  |  |  |  | Old | 14 | 1 | 13 |

Table A.C: Comparison of Characteristics of National Population and Baseline Study Sample

| Urban | $42.08{ }^{1}$ | 42.0\% | (176) | 42.8\% | (180) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rural | 58.0\% | 58.0\% | (244) | $57.2 \%$ | (241) |
| Female | $50.8 \%^{2}$ | 50.5\% | (212) | 50.8\% | (214) |
| Male | 49.2\% | 49.5\% | (208) | 49.2\% | (207) |
| Urban Female | 20.9\% ${ }^{3}$ | 20.7\% | (87) | 21.3\% | (90) |
| Urban Male | 21.1\% | 21.2\% | (89) | 21.3\% | (90) |
| Rural Female | 29.9\% | 29.8\% | (125) | 29.5\% | (124) |
| Rural Male | 28.1\% | 28.3\% | (119) | 27.8\% | (117) |
| Over 18 years old | 45.015 est. ${ }^{4}$ | 100\% |  |  |  |
| of which, 18-26 years | 33.095 est. | 33.1\% | (139) | $32.3 \%$ | (136) |
| 27-44 years | $33.0 \%$ est. | $32.9 \%$ | (138) | 34.07 | (143) |
| 45 years or more | 34.0\% est. | 34.0\% | (143) | 33.7\% | (142) |
| Formally employed | 9.78 ${ }^{5}$ | 10.0\% | (42) | 12.6\% | $(53)^{6}$ |
| Informaily/unemployed | 90.3\% | 90.0\% | (378) | $87.4 \%$ | (368) |
| Male, formally employed | $7.8 \%$ est. ${ }^{7}$ | 7.9\% | (33) | 9.7\% | (41) |
| Female, formaily employed | 1.9\% est. | 2.1\% | (9) | 2.9\% | (12) |

[^15]


Figure 6 - Respondent's education

Figure 8 - Respondent's party affiliation

Table A. 1 - Province of Respondent

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Copperbelt | B | 87 | 20.7 | 20.7 | 20.7 |
| Central | C | 54 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 33.5 |
| Eastern | E | 67 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 49.4 |
| Lusaka | $\pm$ | 95 | 22.6 | 22.6 | 72.0 |
| Northern | N | 53 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 84.6 |
| Southern | S | 65 | 15.4 | 15.4 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table A. 2 - District of Respondent

| Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> PGrcent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| C | 62 | 14.7 | 14.7 | 14.7 |
| K | 87 | 20.7 | 20.7 | 35.4 |
| L | 93 | 22.1 | 22.1 | 57.5 |
| M | 59 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 71.5 |
| P | 67 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 87.4 |
| S | 53 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | -421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table A. 3 - Location of Respondent

Value Label
RURAL
URBAN

| Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| R | 241 | 57.2 | 57.2 | 57.2 |
| $U$ | 180 | 42.8 | 42.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | -221 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table A. 4 - Respondent's Gender

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Male | 1.0 | 207 | 49.2 | 49.2 | 49.2 |
| Female | 2.0 | 214 | 50.8 | 50.8 | 100.0 |
|  |  | -21 | -100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table A. 5 - Respondent's Age

```
Mean year born - 1957.6 Mean Age - 36 years
Median year born - }196
Mode - 1967 Std deviation - 48.4 years
```

Table A. 6 - Respondent's Ethnic Group

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ngoni | 1.00 | 15 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| Bemba | 2.00 | 48 | 11.4 | 11.4 | 15.0 |
| Tonga | 3.00 | 88 | 20.9 | 20.9 | 35.9 |
| Lozi | 4.00 | 17 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 39.9 |
| Lunda | 5.00 | 15 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 43.5 |
| Chewa | 6.00 | 22 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 48.7 |
| Nsenga | 7.00 | 70 | 16.6 | 16.6 | 65.3 |
| Tumbuka | 8.00 | 10 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 67.7 |
| Kaonde | 9.00 | 48 | 11.4 | 11.4 | 79.1 |
| Other | 10.00 | 88 | 20.9 | 20.9 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table A. 7 - Respondent's Education

| Value Lab |  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Fercent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| None |  | . 00 | 56 | 13.3 | 13.4 | 13.4 |
| Primary | 1-7) | 1.00 | 178 | 42.3 | 42.6 | 56.0 |
| Secondary | (8-12) | 2.00 | 153 | 36.3 | 36.6 | 92.6 |
| Tertiary | (13+) | 3.00 | 31 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 100.0 |
|  |  | . | 3 | . 7 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |
|  | Mean |  | Med | an | 7.000 |  |
|  | Mode |  | Std | dev | 4.251 |  |

Table A. 8 - Number of Persons : n Respondent's Household

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| One to Three | 1.0 | 63 | 15.0 | 15.4 | 15.4 |
| Four to Six | 2.0 | 154 | 36.6 | 37.6 | 52.9 |
| Seven to Nine | 3.0 | 119 | 28.3 | 29.0 | 82.0 |
| Ten or more | 4.0 | 74 | 17.6 | 18.0 | 100.0 |
|  | . | 11 | 2.6 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Mean }-6.927 \\ & \text { Mode }-6.000 \end{aligned}$ |  | Median - <br> Std dev | $\begin{gathered} 5.000 \\ 4.113 \end{gathered}$ |  |  |

Table A. 9 - Do you have a job which earns some money?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Yes |  |  |  |  | 46.4 |
| No | 1.0 | 195 | 46.3 | 46.4 | 46 |
| Missing | 2.0 | 225 | 53.4 | 53.6 | 100.0 |
|  | -9.0 | 1 | -2 | Missing |  |
|  |  | $-10 t a l$ | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table A.10. - (If yes) What sort of job?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Farmer | 1.0 | 70 | 16.6 | 35.7 | 35.7 |
| Entrepreneur | 2.0 | 19 | 4.5 | 9.7 | 45.4 |
| Marketer | 3.0 | 27 | 6.4 | 13.8 | 59.2 |
| Service | 4.0 | 16 | 3.8 | 8.2 | 67.3 |
| Artisan | 5.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 3.6 | 70.9 |
| Domestic | 6.0 | 3 | . 7 | 1.5 | 72.4 |
| Miner | 7.0 | 2 | . 5 | 1.0 | 73.5 |
| Technical | 8.0 | 8 | 1.9 | 4.1 | 77.6 |
| Teacher | 9.0 | 18 | 4.3 | 9.2 | 86.7 |
| Government | 10.0 | 13 | 3.1 | 6.6 | 93.4 |
| NGO | 11.0 | 3 | . 7 | 1.5 | 94.9 |
| Professional | 12.0 | 6 | 1.4 | 3.1 | 98.0 |
| Other | 13.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 225 | 53.4 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table A. 11 - Employment by sector

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Formally employed |  |  |  |  |  |
| Informally employed | 1.00 | 53 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.6 |
| Unemployed | 2.00 | 143 | 34.0 | 34.0 | 46.6 |
|  | 2.00 | 225 | 53.4 | 53.4 | 100.0 |

Table A. 12 - Kwacha per month Earned by Respondent

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 thru 999 | 1.00 | 12 | 2.9 | 6.4 | 6.4 |
| 1000 thru 4999 | 2.00 | 30 | 7.1 | 16.0 | 22.5 |
| 5000 thru 9999 | 3.00 | 28 | 6.7 | 15.0 | 37.4 |
| 10000 thru 19999 | 4.00 | 41 | 9.7 | 21.9 | 59.4 |
| 20000 thru 29999 | 5.00 | 39 | 9.3 | 20.9 | 80.2 |
| 30000 thru 39999 | 6.00 | 9 | 2.1 | 4.8 | 85.0 |
| 40000 thru 49999 | 7.00 | 11 | 2.6 | 5.9 | 90.9 |
| 50000 thru 74999 | 8.00 | 8 | 1.9 | 4.3 | 95.2 |
| 75000 thru 99999 | 9.00 | 6 | 1.4 | 3.2 | 98.4 |
| 100000 or more | 10.00 | 3 | . 7 | 1.6 | 100.0 |
|  | -9.00 | 234 | 55.6 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |
| Mean Mode | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Median - } 15000.000 \\ & \text { Std dev - } 74912.143 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |

Table A. 13 - Kwachn per month Earned by Spouse


Table A. 14 - Do you support a political party?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1.0 | 236 | 56.1 | 56.5 | 56.5 |
| No | 2.0 | 182 | 43.2 | 43.5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 3 | . 7 | Misaing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |
|  | e A. 15 | - (If yes) | Which one? |  |  |
| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| MMD | 1.0 | 204 | 48.5 | 86.8 | 86.8 |
| UNIP | 2.0 | 26 | 6.2 | 11.1 | 97.9 |
| UDP | 3.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 99.6 |
| NADA | 4.0 | 1 | . 2 | . 4 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 186 | 44.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table A. 16 - Do you have a membership card for this party?

| Value Label | レ-' | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1.6 | 152 | 36.1 | 64.7 | 64.7 |
| No | 2.0 | 83 | 19.7 | 35.3 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 186 | 44.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

## Appendix B - Political Knowledge

## Table B.1 - How interested are you in politics?

| Vaiue Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Not interested | .0 | 139 | 33.0 | 33.3 | 33.3 |
| Somewhat interested | 1.0 | 165 | 39.2 | 39.5 | 72.7 |
| Vezy interested | 2.0 | 124 | 27.1 | 27.3 | 100.0 |
|  | -9.0 | 3 | .7 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table B. 2 - How often do you discuss politics?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Never | . 0 | 134 | 31.8 | 32.1 | 32.1 |
| Sometimes | 1.0 | $\pm 96$ | 46.6 | 46.9 | 78.9 |
| Ofこen | 2.0 | 88 | 20.9 | 21.1 | 100.0 |
|  | -9.0 | 3 | . 7 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B.3 - How important is your family in your life?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not important | . 0 | 5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Somewhat important | 1.0 | 30 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 8.3 |
| Very important | 2.0 | 386 | 91.7 | 91.7 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 4 - How important is your ethnic group in your life?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Not important |  | 17 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Somewhat important | 1.0 | 100 | 23.0 | 23.8 | 27.8 |
| Very important | 2.0 | 304 | 72.2 | 72.2 | 100.0 |
|  | $\because$ | -101 | -100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 5 - How important is your chief or headman in your life?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not important | . 0 | 25 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| Somewhat important | 1.0 | 100 | 23.8 | 23.8 | 29.8 |
| Very important | 2.0 | 295 | 70.1 | 70.2 | 100.0 |
|  | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421. | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 6 - How important is your councillor in your life?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Not important |  |  |  |  |  |
| Somewhat important | 1.0 | 105 | 24.9 | 24.9 | 24.9 |
| Very important | 1.0 | 126 | 29.9 | 29.9 | 54.9 |
|  | 9.0 | 189 | 44.9 | 44.9 | 99.8 |
|  |  | 1 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |

Table B. 7 - How important is your MP in your life

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Not important |  |  |  |  |  |
| Somewhat important | 10 | 105 | 24.9 | 24.9 | 24.9 |
| Very important | 2.0 | 118 | 28.0 | 28.0 | 53.0 |
|  |  | 9.0 | 195 | 46.3 | 46.3 |

Table B.B - YCN important are other powerful people ir the community in your life?



Can you tell me the names of the following people? Table B. 9 - The councillor for ti.is area

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Incorrect | . 0 | 29 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.0 |
| Correct | 1.0 | 218 | 51.8 | 52.3 | 59.2 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 170 | 40.4 | 40.8 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 4 | 1.0 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |
| Table B. 10 - The Member of Parliament for this area |  |  |  |  |  |
| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| Incorrect | . 0 | 28 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 |
| Correct | 1.0 | 211 | 50.1 | 50.4 | 57.0 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 180 | 42.8 | 43.0 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing | . |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 11 - The Minister for this Province

| Value Label | Value | Frequericy | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Incorrect | . 0 | 17 | 4.3. | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Correct | 1.0 | 107 | 25.4 | 25.6 | 29.2 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 294 | 69.8 | 70.3 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 3 | . 7 | Missing |  |
|  | Totai | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 12 - The Minister of Finance

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Incorrect | . 0 | 27 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.4 |
| Correct | 1.0 | 77 | 18.3 | 18.4 | 24.8 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 315 | 74.8 | 75.2 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 13 - The Vice-President of Zambia

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Incorrect |  | -0 | 14 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Correct | 1.0 | 292 | 69.4 | 69.5 | 72.3 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 114 | 27.1 | 27.1 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | .2 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table B. 14 - What is a local government supposed to do?

| Category label | Code | Count | Pct of Responses | Pct of Cases |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Solve local development | 1 | 110 | 16.7 | 26.4 |
| Build and Maintain roads | 2 | 86 | 13.1 | 20.6 |
| Build and Maintain housing | 3 | 61 | 9.3 | 14.6 |
| Domestic water | 4 | 68 | 10.3 | 16.3 |
| Provide sanitation | 5 | 57 | 8.7 | 13.7 |
| Social welfare | 6 | 91 | 13.8 | 21.8 |
| Provide education | 7 | 19 | 2.9 | 4.6 |
| Provide health services | 8 | 30 | 4.6 | 7.2 |
| Provide police services | 9 | 7 | 1.1 | 1.7 |
| Electrification | 10 | 6 | . 9 | 1.4 |
| Build and maintain markets | 1.1 | 6 | . 9 | 1.4 |
| Represent locality | 12 | 26 | 4.0 | 6.2 |
| Dont know | 13 | 53 | 8.1 | 12.7 |
| Other | 14 | 38 | 5.8 | 9.1 |
|  | Total responses | 658 | 100.0 | 157.8 |

Table B. 15 - What is the National Assembly supposed to do?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Solve national development | 1.0 | 80 | 19.0 | 19.2 | 19.2 |
| Represent people | 2.0 | 44 | 10.5 | 10.6 | 29.8 |
| Discuss national affairs | 3.0 | 48 | 11.4 | 11.5 | 41.3 |
| Make and amend laws | 4.0 | 100 | 23.8 | 24.0 | 65.4 |
| Implement laws | 5.0 | 22 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 70.7 |
| Other | 6.0 | 36 | 8.6 | 8.7 | 79.3 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 86 | 20.4 | 20.7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 16 - Have you ever heard of FODEP?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Yes |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No | 1.0 | 63 | 15.0 | 15.3 | 15.3 |  |
| Missing | 2.0 | 350 | 83.1 | 84.7 | 100.0 |  |
|  | -9.0 | 8 | 1.9 | Missing |  |  |
|  |  |  | $-10 t a l$ | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table B. 17 - What is FODEP supposed to do?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Safeguard democracy | 1.0 | 13 | 3.1 | 20.6 | 20.6 |
| Monitor elections | 2.0 | 13 | 3.1 | 20.6 | 41.3 |
| Mediate party disputes | 3.0 | 3 | . 7 | 4.8 | 46.0 |
| Civic education | 4.0 | 3 | . 7 | 4.8 | 50.8 |
| Other | 5.0 | 8 | 1.9 | 12.7 | 63.5 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 23 | 5.5 | 36.5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 358 | 85.0 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 18 - In Zambia, is there a difference between a political party and a govermment, or are they the same thing?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Same | . 0 | 197 | 46.8 | 47.0 | 47.0 |
| Different | 1.0 | 215 | 51.1 | 51.3 | 98.3 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 19 - Is there a difference between the central government and your local government council, or are they the same thing?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Same | . 0 | 178 | 42.3 | 42.4 | 42.4 |
| Different | 1.0 | 230 | 54.6 | 54.8 | 97.1 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 12 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 20 - Should chiefs and headmen play a part in governing Zambia today?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1.0 | 208 | 49.4 | 49.6 | 49.6 |
| No | 2.0 | 208 | 49.4 | 49.6 | 99.3 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 3 | . 7 | . 7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 21 - (If yes) What role should they play?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Custodians of culture |  |  |  |  |
| Percent |  |  |  |  |

Table B. 22 - Does your household own a radio?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Yes |  |  |  |  |  |
| No | 1.0 | 239 | 56.8 | 56.8 | 56.8 |
|  | 2.0 | 182 | 43.2 | 43.2 | 100.0 |

Table B. 23 - Do you ever listen to news bulletins on the radio?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1.0 | 263 | 62.5 | 69.0 | 69.0 |
| No | 2.0 | 118 | 28.0 | 31.0 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 40 | 9.5 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table B. 24 - How often do you listen to a news bulletin?


Table B. 28 - Which newspaper (s) do you read?

| Category label | Code | Count | Pct of Responses | Pct of Cases |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Times of Zambia | 1 | 175 | 39.9 | 84.1 |
| Daily Mail | 2 | 142 | 32.3 | 68.3 |
| Weekly Post | 3 | 88 | 20.0 | 42.3 |
| National Mirror | 4 | 9 | 2.1 | 4.3 |
| Daily Express | 5 | 1 | . 2 | . 5 |
| Sunday Times | 7 | 5 | 1.1 | 2.4 |
| Financial. Mail | 8 | 3 | . 7 | 1.4 |
| Other | 9 | 16 | 3.6 | 7.7 |
|  | Total responses | 439 | 100.0 | 211.1 |

Table B. 29 - How often do you read a newspaper?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Less often than monthly | 1.6 | 24 | 5.7 | 11.4 | 11.4 |
| Monthly | 2.0 | 34 | 8.1 | 16.2 | 27.6 |
| Weekly | 3.0 | 36 | 8.6 | 17.1 | 44.8 |
| Several times a week | 4.0 | 83 | 19.7 | 39.5 | 84.3 |
| Every day | 5.0 | 33 | 7.8 | 15.7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 211 | 50.1 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

```
Appendix c - Political Participation
```

Table C.1 .. Are you a registered voter?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Yes |  |  |  |  | 65.1 |
| No | 2.0 | 274 | 65.1 | 65.1 | 65.1 |
|  |  | 147 | 34.9 | 34.9 | 100.0 |

Table C. 2 - Why are you not registered?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| None | . 0 | 5 | 1.2 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| Missed Registration | 1.0 | 12 | 2.9 | 8.6 | 12.1 |
| Ill Health | 2.0 | 20 | 4.8 | 14.3 | 26.4 |
| Absent | 3.0 | 15 | 3.6 | 10.7 | 37.1 |
| Voter Card Missing | 4.0 | 1 | . 2 | . 7 | 37.9 |
| National Card Missing | 5.0 | 14 | 3.3 | 10.0 | 47.9 |
| Under 18 | 6.0 | 8 | 1.9 | 5.7 | 53.6 |
| Not interested | 7.0 | 43 | 10.2 | 30.7 | 84.3 |
| Engaged | 8.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 2.9 | 87.1 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 1 | . 2 | . 7 | 87.9 |
| Other | 20.0 | 11 | 2.6 | 7.9 | 95.7 |
| Not Enough Information | 11.0 | 6 | 1.4 | 4.3 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 281 | 66.7 | Missing |  |
| - | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table C. 3 - Did you vote in the 1991 general elections?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Yes |  |  |  |  |  |
| No | 1.0 | 231 | 54.9 | 84.3 | 84.3 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 43 | 10.2 | 15.7 | 100.0 |
|  |  | 147 | 34.9 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | -921 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table C. 4 - Why didn't you vote in 1991 general election?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Ill health |  |  |  |  |
| Percent |  |  |  |  |

Table C. 5 - Did you vote in the 1992 local government election?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1.0 | 169 | 40.1 | 61.9 | 61.9 |
| No | 2.0 | 104 | 24.7 | 38.1 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 148 | 35.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

## Table C. 6 - Why didn't you vote in the 1992 local govermment elections?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not registered | 1.0 | 1 | . 2 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Ill health | 2.0 | 23 | 5.5 | 22.8 | 23.8 |
| fibsent from area | 3.0 | 24 | 5.7 | 23.8 | 47.5 |
| Registered elsewhere | 4.0 | 12 | 2.9 | 11.9 | 59.4 |
| Voter Card Missing | 5.0 | 9 | 2.1 | 8.9 | 68.3 |
| National Card Miss | 6.0 | 1 | . 2 | 1.0 | 69.3 |
| Otherwise engaged | 7.0 | 12 | 2.9 | 11.9 | 81.2 |
| Lost interest | 8.0 | 10 | 2.4 | 9.9 | 91.1 |
| Disiliusioned | 9.0 | 3 | . 7 | 3.0 | 94.1 |
| Not aware of electio | 10.0 | 2 | . 5 | 2.0 | 96.0 |
| Other | 11.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 100.0 |
| No'c applicable | -9.0 | 320 | 76.0 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table C. 7 - Have your participated in a community meeting in the last five years?
(If "no," would you ever participate?)

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Would Never Do | . 0 | 20 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.8 |
| Might Do | 1.0 | 117 | 27.8 | 27.9 | 32.6 |
| Have Done | 2.0 | 281 | 66.7 | 66.9 | 99.5 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 2 | . 5 | . 5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

> Table C. 8 - Have you participated in an election rally in the last five years?
> (If "no," would you ever participate?)

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Would Never Do | . 0 | 36 | 8.6 | 8.6 | 8.6 |
| Might Do | 1.0 | 133 | 31.6 | $31.7^{\circ}$ | 40.3 |
| Have Done | 2.0 | 246 | 58.4 | 58.7 | 99.0 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table C. 9 - Have you worked for a political party or candidate in the last five years?
(If "no," would you ever?)

| Value Label | Value | Frequ:ency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Would Never Do | . 0 | 104 | 24.7 | 25.0 | 25.0 |
| Might Do | 1.0 | 201 | 47.7 | 48.3 | 73.3 |
| Have Done | 2.0 | 104 | 24.7 | 25.0 | 98.3 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

```
Table C. 10 - Have you been to see a headman or chief
    in the last five years?
    (If "no," would you ever?)
```

|  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Would Never Do |  |  |  |  | 8.4 |
| Might Do | 1.0 | 35 | 8.3 | 8.4 |  |
| Have Done | 2.0 | 242 | 57.5 | 57.8 | 66.1 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 138 | 32.8 | 32.9 | 99.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
|  |  | 2 | .5 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table C. 11 - Have you been to see your local councillox in the last five years?
(If "no," would you ever?)

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Would Never Do | . 0 | 51 | 12.1 | 12.1 | 12.1 |
| Might Do | 1.0 | 292 | 69.4 | 69.5 | 81.7 |
| Have Done | 2.0 | 73 | 17.3 | 17.4 | 99.0 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table C. 12 - Have you been to see your MP in the last five years? (If "no," would you ever?)

| Value Label | Value |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Would Never Do |  | . 0 | 83 | 19.7 | 19.8 | 19.8 |
| Might Do | - | 1.0 | 301 | 71.5 | 71.8 | 91.6 |
| Have Done |  | 2.0 | 29 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 98.6 |
| Dont Know |  | 9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 100.0 |
| Missing |  | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table C. 13 - Have you written to a newspaper in the last five years? (If "no," would you ever?)

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cumin <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Would Never Do |  |  |  |  |  |
| Might Do | 1.0 | 109 | 25.9 | 26.2 | 26.2 |
| Have Done | 2.0 | 268 | 63.7 | 64.4 | 90.6 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 27 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 97.1 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 12 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 100.0 |
|  |  | 5 | 1.2 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

## Table C. 14 - Have you participated in a legal demonstration in the last five years? <br> (If "no," would you ever?)

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Would Never Do |  | .0 | 180 | 42.8 | 43.3 | 43.3 |
| Might Do | 1.0 | 196 | 46.6 | 47.1 | 90.4 |  |
| Have Done | 2.0 | 27 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 96.9 |  |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 13 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 100.0 |  |
| Missing | -9.0 | 5 | 1.0 | Missing |  |  |
|  |  | Total | $-\ldots-121$ | -100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table C. 15 - Have you participated in a violent demonstration
in the last five years?
(If "no," would you ever?)

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Would Never Do | . 0 | 311 | 73.9 | 74.9 | 74.9 |
| Might Do | 1.0 | 81 | 19.2 | 19.5 | 94.5 |
| Have Done | 2.0 | 15 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 98.1 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

# Table C. 16 - What were you trying to achieve with this action? 

| Value Label Val | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| None | . 0 | 3 | . 7 | . 8 | . 8 |
| Solve economic problems | 1.0 | 51 | 12.1 | 14.0 | 14.8 |
| Solve social-domestic prob | 2.0 | 45 | 10.7 | 12.4 | 27.2 |
| Solve social-community prob | 3.0 | 55 | 13.1 | 15.1 | 42.3 |
| Solve problem unspecified | 4.0 | 11. | 2.6 | 3.0 | 45.3 |
| Obtain pol information | 5.0 | 59 | 14.0 | 16.2 | 61.5 |
| Express pol opinion | 6.0 | 85 | 20.2 | 23.4 | 84.9 |
| Engage in social interaction | - 7.0 | 27 | 6.4 | 7.4 | 92.3 |
| Other | 8.0 | 23 | 5.5 | 6.3 | 98.6 |
| Dont Know | 9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 100.0 |
| Not applicable | -9.0 | 57 | 13.5 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table C. 17 - To your knowledge, how many times has your local government councillor held a meeting in this area during the past year?


Table C. 18 - To your knowledge, how many times has your Member of Parliament held a meeting in this area during the past year?


| Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| . 0 | 274 | 65.1 | 65.4 | 65.1 |
| 1.0 | 62 | 14.7 | 14.8 | 80.2 |
| 2.0 | 36 | 8.6 | 8.6 | 88.8 |
| 3.0 | 21 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 93.8 |
| 4.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 95.5 |
| 5.0 | 2 | . 5 | . 5 | 95.9 |
| 6.0 | 1 | . 2 | . 2 | 96.2 |
| 7.0 | 3 | . 7 | . 7 | 96.9 |
| 9.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 98.6 |
| 10.0 | 2 | . 5 | . 5 | 99.0 |
| 99.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
| -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing |  |
| Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Median - } 0.000 \\ & \text { Std dev - } 9.709 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |

Table C.19 - Do you belong to a community organization?

|  |  |  | Valid <br> Value Label <br> Yes | Value | Frequency | Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Yorcent |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table C. 20 - Which organization (a)?

| Category label | Code | Count | Pct of Pct of Responses Cases |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Trade Union | 1 | 10 | 2.4 | 2.8 |
| Cooperative | 2 | 30 | 7.1 | 8.5 |
| Womens Club | 3 | 10 | 2.4 | 2.8 |
| Sports Club | 4 | 13 | 3.1 | 3.7 |
| PTA | 5 | 7 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| Other Assoc | 9 | 33 | 7.9 | 9.3 |
| Church unspecified | 10 | 104 | 24.8 | 29.3 |
| Roman Catholic | 11 | 57. | 13.6 | 16.1 |
| UCZ | 12 | 30 | 7.1 | 8.5 |
| New Apostolic | 1.3 | 23 | 5.5 | 6.5 |
| Watchtower | 3.4 | 12 | 2.9 | 3.4 |
| Evangelical | 15 | 11 | 2.6 | 3.1 |
| Seventh Day Adv | 16 | 44 | 10.5 | 12.4 |
| Dutch Reform | 17 | 7 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| Baptist | 18 | 3 | . 7 | . 8 |
| African Methodist | 19 | 2 | . 5 | . 6 |
| Syncretic church | 20 | 2 | . 5 | . 6 |
| Other Church | 30 | 21 | 5.0 | 5.9 |
| Other | 37 | 1 | . 2 | . 3 |
|  | Total responses | 420 | 100.0 | 118.3 |

Table C. 21 - For how long 1. ... vou belonged?

| Category label | Code | Pct of pct of |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Count | Responses | Cases |
| One month to Two years | 1 | 79 | 19.2 | 22.5 |
| Three to Five years | 2 | 62 | 15.0 | 17.7 |
| Six to Ten years | 3 | 81 | 19.7 | 23.1 |
| Eleven to Twency years | 4 | 107 | 26.0 | 30.5 |
| Twenty one to Thirty years | 5 | 41 | 10.0 | 11.7 |
| More then Thirty years | 6 | 39 | 9.5 | 11.1 |
| Dont know | 97 | 3 | . 7 | . 9 |
|  | 'rotal responses | 412 | 100.0 | 117.4 |

Table C. 22 - What leadership position do you hold (if any)?

| Category label | Code | Count | Pct of Responses | Pct of Cases |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chair or president | 1 | 28 | 24.1 | 26.7 |
| Vice Chair | 2 | 4 | 3.4 | 3.8 |
| Secretary | 3 | 20 | 17.2 | 19.0 |
| Treasurer | 4 | 14 | 12.1 | 13.3 |
| Committee Member | 5 | 5 | $\underline{4.3}$ | 4.8 |
| Church leadex | 6 | 35 | 30.2 | 33.3 |
| ocher | 7 | 9 | 7.8 | 8.6 |
|  | 10 | 1 | . 9 | 1.0 |
|  | Total responses | 116 | 100.0 | 110.5 |

Table C. 23 - How many meetings have you attended?


Table C. 24 - What are the problems in the way your organization works?

| Value Label |  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No problems |  | . 0 | 159 | 37.8 | 45.8 | 45.8 |
| Funding problems |  | 1.0 | 68 | 16.2 | 19.6 | 65.4 |
| Membership attendanc |  | 2.0 | 36 | 8.6 | 10.4 | 75.8 |
| Internal Factions | - | 3.0 | 25 | 5.9 | 7.2 | 33.0 |
| Leadership problems |  | 4.0 | 14 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 87.0 |
| Organization ineffec |  | 5.0 | 15 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 91.4 |
| Other |  | 6.0 | 22 | 5.2 | 6.3 | 97.7 |
| Dont know |  | 9.0 | 8 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 100.0 |
| Missing |  | -9.0 | 74 | 1.7 .6 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table c. 25 - Why do you not belong to any organizations?

| Value Label Val | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not interested | 1.0 | 19 | 4.5 | 27.9 | 27.9 |
| In i.ll health | 2.0 | 2 | . 5 | 2.9 | 30.9 |
| Otherwise engaged/too busy | 3.0 | 12 | 2.9 | 17.6 | 48.5 |
| Can't afford it (e.g. fees) | 4.0 | 6 | 1.4 | 8.8 | 57.4 |
| No organizations arailable | 5.0 | 13 | 3.1 | 19.1 | 76.5 |
| Distrusts leadership/members | S 6.0 | 1 | . 2 | 1.5 | 77.9 |
| Other | 7.0 | 14 | 3.3 | 20.6 | 98.5 |
| Don't know | 9.0 | 1 | . 2 | 1.5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 353 | 83.8 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements

Table D.I - These days in Zambia, there is not enough respect for authority

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 42 | . 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 123 | 29.2 | 29.3 | 39.3 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 40.5 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 106 | 25.2 | 25.2 | 65.7 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 144 | 34.2 | 34.3 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 2 - Women should have the same right as men to vote in elections

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 9 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 20 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 6.9 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 8.6 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 91 | 21.6 | 21.7 | 30.2 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 293 | 69.6 | 69.8 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1. | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 3 - The police have too much power in this country

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Vaild <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Strongly disagree |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagree |  | 1.0 | 64 | 15.2 | 15.3 | 15.3 |
| Cant say or Dont krıo | $\because$ | 3.0 | 174 | 41.3 | 41.5 | 56.8 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 18 | 4.3 | 4.3 | -1.1 |  |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 93 | 22.1 | 22.2 | 83.3 |  |
| Missing | -9.0 | 70 | 16.6 | 16.7 | 100.0 |  |
|  |  | 2 | .5 | Missing |  |  |

Table D. 4 - People should vote even if they don't understand all the issues

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 129 | 30.6 | 30.7 | 30.7 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 121 | 28.7 | 28.8 | 59.5 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 61.2 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 76 | 18.1 | 18.1 | 79.3 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 87 | 20.7 | 20.7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 5 - Only men should be allowed to run for public office (such as councillor or MP)

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 212 | 50.4 | 50.5 | 50.5 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 111 | 26.4 | 26.4 | 76.9 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 77.9 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 38 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 86.9 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 55 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 6 - The police should be allowed to shoot anyone fleeing the scene of a crime

| Value Label | - Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 202 | 48.0 | 48.3 | 48.3 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 13.0 | 26.1 | 26.3 | 74.6 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 2 | . | . 5 | 75.1 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 61 | 14.5 | 14.6 | 89.7 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 43 | 10.2 | 10.3 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 3 | . 7 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 7 - The government should not be allowed to detain people without first giving them a fair trial

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 55 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 13.1 |
| Disagree | 2.C | 54 | 12.8 | 12.9 | 26.0 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 3 | . 7 | . 7 | 26.7 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 76 | 18.1 | 18.1 | 44.8 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 232 | 55.1 | 55.2 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 8 - This country would have fewer problems if young people were given more of a chance to hold public office

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | percen: | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Strongly disagree |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagree | 1.0 | 127 | 30.2 | 30.2 | 30.2 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 2.0 | 115 | 27.3 | 27.4 | 57.6 |
| Agree | 3.0 | 15 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 60.7 |
| Strongly agree | 4.0 | 96 | 22.8 | 22.9 | 83.6 |
| Missing | 5.0 | 69 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 100.0 |
|  | -9.0 | 1 | .2 | Missing |  |

Table D. 9 - Bribery is very rare among public officials in Zambia

| Value Label |  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree |  | 1.0 | 171 | 40.6 | 40.7 | 40.7 |
| Disagree |  | 2.0 | 126 | 29.9 | 30.0 | 70.7 |
| Cant say or Dont knc | $\cdots$ | 3.0 | 20 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 75.5 |
| Ag:ee |  | 4.0 | 70 | 16.6 | 16.7 | 92.1 |
| Strongly agree |  | 5.0 | 33 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 100.0 |
| Missing |  | -9.0 | 1 | . 2. | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 10 - One's tribe makes no difference in politics and government

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 26 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.2 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 69 | 16.4 | 16.5 | 22.7 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 24.3 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 154 | 36.6 | 36.8 | 61.1 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 163 | 38.7 | 38.9 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D.11 - There is nothing wrong with a Minister helping his home village with development projects

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 91 | 21.6 | 21.7 | 21.7 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 94 | 22.3 | 22.4 | 44.0 |
| Cant say or Dont kna | 3.0 | 5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 45.2 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 105 | 24.9 | 25.0 | 70.2 |
| Strongly agree | 5. 0 | 124 | 29.5 | 29.5 | 99.8 |
|  | 11.0 | 1 | . 2 | . 2 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 12 - Most government officials and politicians are mainly concerned with enriching themseives

| Value Label |  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree |  | 1.0 | 30 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.2 |
| Disagree |  | 2.0 | 72 | 17.1 | 17.2 | 24.3 |
| Cant say or Dont knc | , | 3.0 | 13 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 27.4 |
| Agree |  | 4.0 | 99 | 23.5 | 23.6 | 51.1 |
| Strongly agree |  | 5.0 | 205 | 48.7 | 48.9 | 100.0 |
| Missing |  | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 13 - The President's region of the country gets more government services than any other region

|  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 73 | 17.3 | 17.4 | 17.4 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 121 | 28.7 | 28.8 | 46.2 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 72 | 17.1 | 17.1 | 63.3 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 88 | 20.9 | 21.0 | 84.3 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 66 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 14 - Corruption was a worse problem under the old UNIP government than these days

| Value Label | . Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Strongly disagree | 1.0 | 106 | 25.2 | 25.2 | 25.2 |
| Disagree | 2.0 | 103 | 24.5 | 24.5 | 49.8 |
| Cant say or Dont kno | 3.0 | 28 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 56.4 |
| Agree | 4.0 | 64 | 15.2 | 15.2 | 71.7 |
| Strongly agree | 5.0 | 119 | 28.3 | 28.3 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | . 2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 15 - Political Trust: Social Groups "How much do you trust the following social groups?"

| Variable | Mean | Std Dev | Minimum | Maximum | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Immediate family | 9.44 |  | 1.51 | 1.0 | 10.0 |
| Male relatives | 8.11 | 2.36 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 411 |
| Female relatives | 8.02 | 2.33 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 411 |
| Neighbors | 6.33 | 2.79 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 411 |
| Your ethnic group | 7.15 | 2.71 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 411 |
| Zambians-Southern prov | 6.40 | 2.83 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 402 |
| Zambians-Western prov | 5.56 | 2.87 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 401 |
| Zambians-North prov | 6.14 | 2.93 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 410 |
| Zambians-East prov | 6.48 | 2.81 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 409 |
| Zaireans | 2.39 | 2.16 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 407 |
| Malawians | 4.15 | 2.89 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 404 |
| White S. Africans | 3.49 | 2.96 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 399 |
| British | 5.22 | 3.21 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 401 |

Table D. 16 - Political Trust: Governmental Institutions
"How much do you trust the following government institutions?"

| Police | 6.63 | 2.95 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 411 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Local council | 5.94 | 2.98 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 407 |
| National assembly (MP's) | 6.41 | 3.15 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 409 |
| The Cabinet (Ministers) | 6.80 | 3.01 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 408 |

Taile D. 17 - Political Trust: Non-governmental Institutions
"How much do you trust the following non-governmental institutions?"

| Churches | 9.00 | 2.81 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 408 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Trade ur : ons | 6.59 | 2.89 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 389 |
| FODEP | -5.32 | 3.32 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 272 |
| This interview team | 8.14 | 2.56 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 409 |

Table D. 18 - Political Trust: Media
"How much dö you trust the following media?"

| Times of Zambia | 7.09 | 2.92 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 376 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Weekly Post | 6.46 | 3.16 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 349 |
| ZNBC TY | 7.17 | 2.98 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 359 |
| Radio Zambia | 7.88 | 2.69 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 388 |
| BBC | 6.79 | 3.30 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 360 |

```
"Please tell me which statement is closest to your own opinion"
Table D. 19 A. I usually do better working with a group B. I usually do better working alone
```

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Better working in groups |  | 1.0 | 299 | 71.0 | 71.5 |
| Better working alone | 2.0 | 119 | 28.3 | 28.5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 3 | .7 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table D. 20 A. I put my main effort into improving my own life B. I put my main effort into improving the lives of my children and other younger relatives

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Improve my life |  |  |  |  |  |
| Improve childrens•lives | 1.0 | 38 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 9.1 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 380 | 90.3 | 90.9 | 100.0 |
|  |  | 3 | -7 | Missing |  |

Table D. 21 A. It is not wise to plan too far ahead, because many things turn out to be a matter of luck B. I always try to plan ahead because I feel I can make my plans work

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dont plan too far ah | 1.0 | 124 | 29.5 | 29.7 | 29.7 |
| I can make plans wor | 2.0 | 291 | 69.1 | 69.8 | 99.5 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 2 | . 5 | 5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 4 | 1.0 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 22
A. In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, $I$ can influence the opinions of others B. As far as politics is concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| I influence others |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Friends done listen | 1.0 | 274 | 65.1 | 66.2 | 66.2 |  |
| Mont know | 2.0 | 136 | 32.3 | 32.9 | 99.0 |  |
| Missing | 9.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100.0 |  |
|  | -9.0 | 7 | 1.7 | Missing |  |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 23 A. Government sometimes seems so complicated $I$ cannot really understand what is going on B. The way that government works is generally understandable to people like me

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Govt is too complica |  | 1.0 | 278 | 66.0 | 66.7 |
| Govt is understandab | 2.0 | 139 | 33.0 | 33.3 | 100.7 |
| Missing | -9.0 | .0 | 4 | 1.0 | Missing |

Table D. 24 A. To get something done, it is best for individuals to make private approaches to influential leaders B. To get something done, it is best to form a group and to state your demands in public


Table D. 25 A. As a community, we are generally able to make our political representatives listen to our problems B. We are usually unable to make our councillors and MPs listen to us

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Reps generally listen | 1.0 | 169 | 40.1 | 40.5 | 40.5 |
| Reps do not listen | 2.0 | 246 | 58.4 | 59.0 | 99.5 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 2 | . 5 | . 5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 4 | 1.0 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 26 A. Government leaders are capable of solving the problems that the country presently faces
B. The government is not very effective at carrying out programs to solve national problems

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Govt can solve probl |  |  |  |  |  |
| Govt is ineffective | 2.0 | 186 | 44.2 | 44.5 | 44.5 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 232 | 55.1 | 55.5 | 100.0 |
|  |  | -9 | .7 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table D. 27 A. If people have different views than you do, they should be allowed to express them
B. It is dangerous and confusing to allow the expression of too many different points of view

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| People should express |  |  |  |  |  |
| Too many views dange | 2.0 | 313 | 74.3 | 75.4 | 75.4 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 101 | 24.0 | 24.3 | 99.8 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 1 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |
|  |  | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |

Table D. 28 A. It people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party
B. If people want to form a community organization, they should be free to do so independently

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Orgs affil with part | 1.0 | 194 | 46.1 | 46.7 | 46.7 |
| Orgs should be indep | 2.0 | 217 | 51.5 | 52.3 | 99.0 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 29
A. Even though the President says Zambia is a Christian country, Muslims should be allowed to form an Islamic political party
B. Muslims should not be allowed to form an Islamic political party

| Value Label |  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Muslim Party ailowed |  | 1.0 | 77 | 18.3 | 18.6 | 18.6 |
| Muslim Party not all | : | 2.0 | 335 | 79.6 | 80.7 | 99.3 |
| Dont know |  | 9.0 | 3 | . 7 | . 7 | 100.0 |
| Missing |  | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 30 A. In Zambia, the use of violence is sometimes justified in reaching political goals B. The use of violence is never justified in Zambian politics

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Violence justified |  |  |  |  |  |
| Violence not justified | 1.0 | 101 | 24.0 | 24.3 | 24.3 |
| Dont know | 2.0 | 313 | 74.3 | 75.4 | 99.8 |
| Missing | 9.0 | 1 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |
|  | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table D. 31 A. The best form of government is a government elected by its people
B. The best form of government is a government that gets things done

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Elected government | 1.0 | 262 | 62.2 | 63.4 | 63.4 |
| Effective government | 2.0 | 149 | 35.4 | 36.1 | 99.5 |
| Don't know | 9.0 | 2 | . 5 | . 5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 8 | 1.9 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 32 A. In Zambia today, we now have a real choice among different political parties
B. In Zambia today, we are well on our way to becoming another single party state

| Value Label |  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| We have a choice |  | 1.0 | 309 | 73.4 | 74.5 | 74.5 |
| We have a single-party |  | 2.0 | 101 | 24.0 | 24.3 | 98.8 |
| Dont know | ; | 9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 100.0 |
| Missing |  | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table D. 33 A. Compromise with one's opponents is dangexous because you betray your own side B. The only way we can all get along in this world is if we accommodate each other

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Compromise is danger | 1.0 | 68 | 16.2 | 16.4 | 16.4 |
| We need to accommodate | 2.0 | 346 | 82.2 | 83.4 | 99.8 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 1 | . 2 | . 2 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

## Appendix E - Policy Preferences

"Please tell me which is closest to your own opinion"

Table E. 1 A. It is better to have goods in the market, even if the prices are high
B. It is better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum. <br> Percent |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Better to have goods |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Low prices | 1.0 | 228 | 54.2 | 54.5 | 54.5 |  |
| Dont know | 2.0 | 187 | 44.4 | 44.7 | 99.3 |  |
| Missing | 9.0 | 3 | .7 | .7 | 100.0 |  |
|  | -9.0 | 3 | .7 | Missing |  |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 2 A. It is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low B. It is better to raise educational. standards, even if we have to pay school fees

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Better free schooling |  | 1.0 | 114 | 27.1 | 27.3 | 27.3 |
| Better to raise stan | 2.0 | 303 | 72.0 | 72.5 | 99.8 |  |
| Dont krow | 9.0 | 1 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |  |
| Missing | -9.0 | 3 | .7 | Missing |  |  |
|  |  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

A. Our leaders should provide us with government jobs, even if this is costly to the country
B. The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay off some of them

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Govt should provide |  | 1.0 | 280 | 66.5 | 67.3 |

Table E. 4 A. Government ownership of factories, businesses, and farms should be expanded
B. Private ownership of factories, businesses, and farms should be expanded

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Govt should own busi | 1.0 | 249 | 59.1 | 59.9 | 59.9 |
| Private ownership is | 2.0 | 164 | 39.0 | 39.4 | 99.3 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 3 | . 7 | . 7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E.5 - How satisfied are you with the work you are doing?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not at all satisfied | . 0 | 51 | 12.1 | 13.5 | 13.5 |
| Not very satisfied | 1.0 | 80 | 19.0 | 21.2 | 34.7 |
| Faixly satisfied | 2.0 | 96 | 22.8 | 25.4 | 60.1 |
| Very satisfied | 3.0 | 151 | 35.9 | 39.9 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 43 | 10.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 6 - How satisfied are you with your financial situation?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not at all satisfied | . 0 | 14.5 | 34.4 | 34.9 | 34.9 |
| Not very satisfied | 1.0 | 125 | 29.7 | 30.0 | 64.9 |
| Fairly satisfied | 2.0 | 98 | 23.3 | 23.6 | 88.5 |
| Very satisfied | 3.0 | 47 | 11.2 | 11.3 | 99.8 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 1 | . 2 | . 2 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | $1,00.0$ |  |

Table E. 7 - How satisfied are you with your health?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not at all satisfied | . 0 | 40 | 9.5 | 9.6 | 9.6 |
| Not very satisfied | 1.0 | 86 | 20.4 | 20.7 | 30.3 |
| Fairly satisfied | 2.0 | 158 | 37.5 | 38.0 | 68.3 |
| Very satisfied | 3.0 | 132 | 31.4 | 31.7 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 8 - How satisfied are you overall, with the life you lead?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not at all satisfied | . 0 | 65 | 15.4 | 15.6 | 15.6 |
| Not very satisfied | 1.0 | 106 | 25.2 | 25.5 | 41.1 |
| Fairly satisfied | 2.0 | 171 | 40.6 | 41.1 | 82.2 |
| Very satisfied | 3.0 | 74 | 17.6 | 17.8 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 9 - How satisfied are you compared with one year ago?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Much less satisfied | . 0 | 83 | 19.7 | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| Slightly less satisf | 1.0 | 127 | 30.2 | 30.6 | 50.6 |
| Slightly more satisf | 2.0 | 138 | 32.8 | 33.3 | 83.9 |
| Much more satisfied | 3.0 | 66 | 15.7 | 15.9 | 99.8 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 1 | . 2 | . 2 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 10 - How satisfied are you compared with five years ago?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Much less satisfied | . 0 | 110 | 26.1 | 26.5 | 26.5 |
| Slightly less satisf | 1.0 | 96 | 22.8 | 23.1 | 49.6 |
| Slightly more satisf | 2.0 | 125 | 29.7 | 30.1 | 79.8 |
| Much more satisfied | 3.0 | 84 | 20.0 | 20.2 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 11 - How satisfied do you expect to be in one year's time?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Much less satisfied | . 0 | 94 | 22.3 | 22.7 | 22.7 |
| Slightly less satisf | 1.0 | 103 | 24.5 | 24.9 | 47.6 |
| Slightly more satisf | 2.0 | 124 | 29.5 | 30.0 | 77.5 |
| Much more satisfied | 3.0 | 80 | 19.0 | 19.3 | 96.9 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 13 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 7 | 1.7 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 12 - How satisfied do you expect to be in five year's time?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Much less satissied | . 0 | 122 | 29.0 | 29.5 | 29.5 |
| Sligintly less satisf | 1.0 | 64 | 15.2 | 15.5 | 45.0 |
| Slightly more satisf | 2.0 | 96 | 25.8 | 23.2 | 68.3 |
| Much more satisfied | 3.0 | 111 | 26.4 | 26.9 | 95.2 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 20 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 8 | 1.9 | Missing |  |
|  | rotaj | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 13 - What national issues do you consider most important?

|  | Code | Count | Pct of <br> Responses | Pct of |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Cases |  |  |  |  |

Table E. 14 - Which national goal is your top priority?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nothing | 0 | 1 | . 2 | . 2 | . 2 |
| Maintain order | 1.0 | 134 | 31.8 | 32.3 | 32.5 |
| Give people more say | 2.0 | 34 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 40.7 |
| Fight high prices | 3.0 | 225 | 53.4 | 54.2 | 94.9 |
| Protect free speech | 4.0 | 19 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 99.5 |
| Dont know | -9.0 | 2 | . 5 | . 5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 15 - Which national goal is your second priority?

|  |  |  |  | Valid  <br> Value Label Value | Frequency |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Maintain order |  |  | Percent |  |  |
| Percent |  |  |  |  |  |

Table E. 16 - Is crime a major problem in your life?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1.0 | 280 | 66.5 | 67.8 | 67.8 |
| No | 2.0 | 133 | 31.6 | 32.2 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 8 | 1.9 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 17 - (If yes) In what way have you changed your life because of crime?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| I have done nothing |  |  |  |  |  |
| I am more fearful | .0 | 43 | 10.2 | 15.5 | 15.5 |
| Movements are restri | 1.0 | 54 | 12.8 | 19.5 | 35.0 |
| Took anti-theft meas | 2.0 | 82 | 19.5 | 29.6 | 64.6 |
| Contacted police | 3.0 | 35 | 8.6 | 13.0 | 77.6 |
| Joined neighb watch | 4.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 80.1 |
| Murder in family | 5.0 | 5 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 81.9 |
| Other | 6.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 83.4 |
| Replaced stolen good | 7.0 | 32 | 7.6 | 11.6 | 94.9 |
| Dont know | 8.0 | 9 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 98.2 |
| Missing | 9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 100.0 |
|  |  | -9.0 | 1.44 | 34.2 | Missing |

Table E. 18 - What are some things MMD has done better than UNIP?

| Category label | Code | Count | Pct of Pct of Responses Cases |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nothing is better | 0 | 101 | 19.2 | 24.3 |
| Drought relief | 1 | 137 | 26.0 | 32.9 |
| Goods now available | 2 | 100 | 19.0 | 24.0 |
| Improved health care | 3 | 40 | 7.6 | 9.6 |
| Improved education | 4 | 19 | 3.6 | 4.6 |
| Improved transportation | 5 | 42 | 8.0 | 10.1 |
| Enabled political freedom | 6 | 28 | 5.3 | 6.7 |
| Other | 7 | 53 | 10.1 | 12.7 |
| Too soon to tell | 8 | 2 | . 4 | . 5 |
| Dont know | 9 | 5 | . 9 | 1.2 |
|  | Total responses | 527 | 100.0 | 126.7 |

Table E. 19 - What are some things MMD has done worse than UNIP?

| Category label | Code | Count | Pct of Responses | Pct of Cases |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nothing is worse | 0 | 91 | 18.8 | 21.9 |
| Price rise for goods | 1 | 266 | 55.1 | 63.9 |
| Frice rise for inputs | 2 | 12 | 2.5 | 2.9 |
| Fees for health services | 3 | 17 | 3.5 | 4.1 |
| Fewer jobs | 4 | 6 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| Corruption among officials | 5 | 12 | 2.5 | 2.9 |
| Public squabbles | 6 | 7 | 1.4 | 1.7 |
| Other | 7 | 58 | 12.0 | 13.9 |
| Too soon too tell | 8 | 5 | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| Dont know | 9 | 9 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
|  | Total responses | 483 | 100.0 | 116.1 |

Table E. 20 - In your opinion, who is responsible for current economic conditions in Zambia?

| Value Label |  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ol. ${ }^{\text {d }}$ govt is to blame |  | 1.0 | 139 | 33.0 | 33.4 | 33.4 |
| Nern govt is to blame | , | 2.0 | 165 | 39.2 | 39.7 | 73.1 |
| IMF or World Bank |  | 3.0 | 23 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 78.6 |
| People of Zambia |  | 4.0 | 59 | 14.0 | 14.2 | 92.8 |
| Other |  | 8.0 | 20 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 97.6 |
| Dont know |  | $\bigcirc .0$ | 10 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 100.0 |
| Missing |  | -9.0 | 5 | 1.2 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | 42.1 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 21 - In your view, why have maize-meal prices risen?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Govt reduced subsidi |  |  |  |  |
| Porcent |  |  |  |  |

Table E. 22 - If public services are to be improved (such as roads, clinics, water, and sewage), the Government must raise money to pay for them. In your view, where should this money come from?

| Value Label |  | Value | Frequency | Fercent | Valid Percent | Cum <br> Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Taxes unspecified |  | 1.0 | 141 | 33.5 | 34.5 | 34.5 |
| Income taxes |  | 2.0 | 16 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 38.4 |
| Tax on Zambian busin |  | 3.0 | 14 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 41.8 |
| Other taxes |  | 5.0 | 22 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 47.2 |
| From govt unspecifie. |  | 6.0 | 28 | 6.7 | 6.8 | 54.0 |
| From cuts to govt bu |  | 7.0 | 4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 55.0 |
| Private fundraising |  | 8.0 | 23 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 60.6 |
| New export revenues |  | 9.0 | 22 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 66.0 |
| Foreign aid or loans |  | 10.0 | 69 | 16.4 | 16.9 | 82.9 |
| Other |  | 11.0 | 23 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 88.5 |
| Dont know |  | 12.0 | 47 | 11. 2 | 11.5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | - | -9.0 | 12 | 2.9 | Missing |  |
|  |  | 'rotal | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 23 - Do you think the Government should encourage foreigners to invest in Zambia?

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1.0 | 252 | 59.9 | 60.7 | 60.7 |
| No | 2.0 | 161 | 38.2 | 38.8 | 99.5 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 2 | . 5 | . 5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 6 | 1.4 | Missing |  |
|  | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 24 - Why should/not the government encourage foreigners to invest in Zambia?

| Value Label |  | Value | Frequency | Percent | Valid <br> Percent | Cum Percent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (If "yes") |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| They bring money |  | 1.0 | 49 | 11.6 | 12.0 | 12.0 |
| They bring jobs |  | 2.0 | 68 | 16.2 | 16.7 | 28.7 |
| They bring technolog |  | 3.0 | 11 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 31.4 |
| They bring know-how |  | 4.0 | 19 | 4.5 | 4.7 | 36.0 |
| Increase tax revenue |  | 5.0 | 7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 37.7 |
| Encourage competitio |  | 6.0 | 18 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 42.2 |
| More goods available |  | 7.0 | 36 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 51.0 |
| Other |  | 8.0 | 43 | 10.2 | 10.5 | 61.5 |
| Dont know |  | 9.0 | 2 | . 5 | . 5 | 62.0 |
| (If "no") |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| They cause price inc |  | 10.0 | 5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 63.2 |
| They take away resou |  | 11.0 | 34 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 71.6 |
| They will rule us ag |  | 12.0 | 41 | 9.7 | 10.0 | 81.6 |
| Dont trust foreigner |  | 13.0 | 34 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 90.0 |
| Other |  | 14.0 | 38 | 9.0 | 9.3 | 99.3 |
| Dont know |  | 15.0 | 3 | . 7 | . 7 | 100.0 |
| Missing |  | -9.0 | 13 | 3.1 | Missing |  |
|  | T | Total | 421 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

Table E. 25 - What is your overall assessment of the performance of the new MMD government?

|  | Value | Frequency | Percent | ValidCum <br> Percent <br> Percent |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Value Label |  |  |  |  | 7.7 |
| Very poor | 1.0 | 32 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.7 |
| Poor | 2.0 | 56 | 13.3 | 13.5 | 21.3 |
| Fair | 3.0 | 141 | 33.5 | 34.1 | 55.3 |
| Good | 4.0 | 114 | 27.1 | 27.5 | 82.9 |
| Very good | 5.0 | 69 | 16.4 | 16.7 | 99.5 |
| Dont know | 9.0 | 2 | .5 | .5 | 100.0 |
| Missing | -9.0 | 7 | 1.7 | Missing |  |
|  |  | Total | --21 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Appendix F - Selected Analyses
Table F. 1 -
How interested are you in politicas
by Respondent's Gender

| Count | Respsex <br> Male Female |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1.0 | 2.0 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Row } \\ & \text { Total } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Not interested 0 | 49 | 90 | $\begin{array}{r} 139 \\ 33.3 \end{array}$ |  |  |
| Somewhat interes | 88 | 77 | $\begin{array}{r} 165 \\ 39.5 \end{array}$ |  |  |
| $2.0$ <br> Very interested | 68 | 46 | $\begin{array}{r} 114 \\ 27.3 \end{array}$ |  |  |
| Column Total | $\begin{array}{r} 205 \\ 49.0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 213 \\ 51.0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 418 \\ 100.0 \end{array}$ |  |  |
| Chi-Square |  | Value |  | DF | Significance |
| Pearson <br> Likelihood Ratio <br> Mantel-flaenszel test for linear association |  | 16.92556 |  | 2 | . 00021 |
|  |  | 17.1284215.51072 |  | 2 | . 00019 |
|  |  |  |  | 1 | . 00008 |
| Minimum Expected Frequency - 55.909 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Missing Observations: 3 |  |  |  |  |  |

Table F-2 -
How often do you discuse politice? by Reapondent's Gender


| Chi-Square | Value | DF | Significance |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Mearson | - |  |  |
| Likelihood Ratio | 16.45557 | 2 | .00027 |
| Mantel-Haenszel test for | 16.65769 | 2 | .00024 |
| linear association | 16.07855 | 1 | .00006 |
| Minimum Expected Frequency | 43.158 |  |  |

[^16]

Significance
--ー------ー-
.00031
.00014
.00005



## Significance

 .00324 .00315Table F. 6 -
Have you been to see a headman or chief? by Respondent's Location


Table F. 8 -
Have you written to a newspaper? by Respondent's Level of Education

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Count Row pct Col Pct Tot Pct \& \begin{tabular}{l}
EDUCLEVL \\
NONE
\[
.001
\]
\end{tabular} \& PRIMARY

1.00 \& SECONDAR
2.00 \& TERTIARY
3.00 \& Row Total \& <br>
\hline PARNEWS \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{Would Never Do ${ }^{0}$} \& 24 \& 53 \& 28 \& 3 \& 108 \& <br>
\hline \& 22.2 \& 49.1 \& 25.9 \& 2.8 \& 26.2 \& <br>
\hline \& 43.6 \& 29.9 \& 18.3 \& 10.7 \& \& <br>
\hline \& 5.8 \& 12.8 \& 6.8 \& . 7 \& \& <br>
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{Might Do 1.0} \& 30 \& 115 \& 103 \& 18 \& 266 \& <br>
\hline \& 11.3 \& 43.2 \& 38.7 \& 6.8 \& 64.4 \& <br>
\hline \& 54.5 \& 65.0 \& 67.3 \& 64.3 \& \& <br>
\hline \& 7.3 \& 27.8 \& 24.9 \& 4.4 \& \& <br>
\hline \multicolumn{7}{|l|}{PARNEWS} <br>
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{Have Done 2.0} \& \& 3 \& 18 \& 6 \& 27 \& <br>
\hline \& \& 11.1 \& 66.7 \& 22.2 \& 6.5 \& <br>
\hline \& \& 1.7 \& 11.8 \& 21.4 \& \& <br>
\hline \& \& . 7 \& 4.4 \& 1.5 \& \& <br>
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{Dont Know 9.0} \& 1 \& 6 \& 4 \& 1 \& 12 \& <br>
\hline \& 8.3 \& 50.0 \& 33.3 \& 8.3 \& 2.9 \& <br>
\hline \& 1.8 \& 3.4 \& 2.6 \& 3.6 \& \& <br>
\hline \& . 2 \& 1.5 \& 1.0 \& . 2 \& \& <br>

\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Column Total} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{$\begin{array}{rr}55 & 177 \\ 13.3 & 42.9\end{array}$}} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$$
\begin{array}{r}
153 \\
37.0
\end{array}
$$} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{$\begin{array}{rr}28 & 413 \\ 6.8 & 100.0\end{array}$}} \& <br>

\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline Chi-Square \& \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Value} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{DF} \& Significance <br>

\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{| Pearson |
| :--- |
| Likelihood Ratio |}} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{40.89274} \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{9} \& . 00001 <br>

\hline \& \& \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{42.45734} \& 9 \& \& . 00000 <br>

\hline \multicolumn{6}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{| Mantel-Haenszel test for |
| :--- |
| 5.14662 1 |
| linear association |}} \& . 02329 <br>

\hline \& \& \multicolumn{5}{|c|}{linear association} <br>
\hline \multicolumn{7}{|l|}{Minimum Expected Frequency - . 814} <br>
\hline \multicolumn{7}{|l|}{Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 5 OF 16 ( 31.3\%)} <br>
\hline Number of Missing Ob \& servations \& : 8 \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table F. 9 - Voter Registration, by Age


Table F. 10 - Voted 1992, by Gender

|  | Count: <br> Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct | $\left\{\begin{array}{c} \text { RESPSEX } \\ \text { Male } \\ 1.0 \end{array}\right.$ | Female | Row Total |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| voteloc |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Yes | 1.0 | 101 | 68 | 169 |  |  |
|  |  | 59.8 | 40.2 | 61.9 |  |  |
|  |  | 70.1 | 52.7 |  |  |  |
|  |  | 37.0 | 24.9 |  |  |  |
| No | 2.0 | 43 | 61 | 104 |  |  |
|  |  | 41.3 | 58.7 | 38.1 |  |  |
|  |  | 29.9 | 47.3 |  |  |  |
|  |  | 15.8 | 22.3 |  |  |  |
| Column Total |  | 144 | 129 | 273 |  |  |
|  |  | 52.7 | 47.3 | 100.0 |  |  |
| Pearson |  |  | 8.76144 |  | 1 | . 00308 |
| Continuity Correction |  |  | 8.03811 |  | 1 | . 00458 |
|  |  |  | 8.79191 |  | 1 | . 00303 |
| Mantel-Haenszel teat for |  |  | 8.72935 |  | 1 | . 00313 |
| Minimum Expected Frequency - |  |  | 49.143 |  |  |  |




Table F. 13 - All Should Vote, loy Education

| Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct | EDUCLEVL <br> NONE <br> .00 | PRIMARY 1.00 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { SECONDAR } \\ & \mathbf{Y} \quad 2.00 \mid \end{aligned}$ | TERTIARY $3.00$ | How Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| UNDISS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strongly disagre | 10 | 41 | 63 | 14 | 128 |  |
|  | 7.8 | 32.0 | 49.2 | 10.9 | 30.7 |  |
|  | 17.9 | 23.2 | 41.2 | 45.2 |  |  |
|  | 2.4 | 9.8 | 15.1 | 3.4 |  |  |
| Disagree 2.0 | 17 | 42 | 55 | 7 | 121 |  |
|  | 14.0 | 34.7 | 45.5 | 5.8 | 29.0 |  |
|  | 30.4 | 23.7 | 35.9 | 22.6 |  |  |
|  | 4.1 | 10.1 | 13.2 | 1.7 |  |  |
| UNDISS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cant say or ${ }^{3.0}$ | 3 | 4 |  |  | 7 |  |
|  | 42.9 | 57.1 |  |  | 1.7 |  |
|  | 5.4 | 2.3 |  |  |  |  |
|  | . 7 | 1.0 |  |  |  |  |
| Agree 4.0 | 10 | 40 | 18 | 7 | 75 |  |
|  | 13.3 | 53.3 | 24.0 | 9.3 | 18.0 |  |
|  | 17.9 | 22.6 | 11.8 | 22.6 |  |  |
|  | 2.4 | 9.6 | 4.3 | 1.7 |  |  |
| UNDISS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strongly agree | 16 | 50 | 17 | 3 | 86 |  |
|  | 18.6 | 58.1 | 19.8 | 3.5 | 20.6 |  |
|  | 28.6 | 28.2 | 11.1 | 9.7 |  |  |
|  | 3.8 | 12.0 | 4.1 | . 7 |  |  |
| Column | 56 | 177 | 153 | 31 | 417 |  |
| Total | 13.4 | 42.4 | 36.7 | 7.4 | 100.0 |  |
| Chi-Square |  | Value |  | Dr |  | Significance |
| Pearson <br> Likelihood Ratio |  | 47.51176 |  | 12 |  | . 00000 |
|  |  | 50.28391 |  | 12 |  | . 00000 |
| Mantel-Haenszel test for 24.90678  |  |  |  |  |  | . 00000 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Minimum Expected Frequency - .520 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cells with Expected | Frequency | < 5 - | 4 OF | 20 ( 20.0 |  |  |
| Number of Missing Observations: 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table F. 14 - Men for Office, by Education


Table F. 15 - Young for office, by Gender



Table F. 17 - Priority Goals, by Party Identification


Table F. 18 -
What were you trying to achieve with this action?
by Respondent's Location



Table F. 19 -
What were you trying to achieve with this action? by Respondent's Gender

WHYPART


Solve
WHYPART

| Count <br> Row Pct <br> Col Pct <br> Tot Pct | $\begin{gathered} \text { RESPSEX } \\ \text { Male } \\ 1.0 \end{gathered}$ | emale | Row Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WHYPART |  |  |  |
| Solve economic ${ }^{1.0}$ | 36 | 15 | 51 |
|  | 70.6 | 29.4 | 14.0 |
|  | 19.1 | 8.5 |  |
|  | 9.9 | 4.1 |  |
| WHYPART |  |  |  |
| 2.0 | 21 | 24 | 45 |
| Solve social-dom | 46.7 | 53.3 | 12.4 |
|  | 11.2 | 13.6 |  |
|  | 5.8 | 6.6 |  |
| Solve social $\stackrel{3.0}{ }$ | 34 | 21 | 55 |
|  | 61.8 | 38.2 | 15.1 |
|  | 18.1 | 11.9 |  |
|  | 9.3 | 5.8 |  |
| WHYPART |  |  |  |
| Solve problem ${ }^{4.0}$ | 5 | 6 | 11 |
|  | 45.5 | 54.5 | 3.0 |
|  | 2.7 | 3.4 |  |
|  | 1.4 | 1.6 |  |
| Obtain pol info | 25 | 34 | 59 |
|  | 42.4 | 57.6 | 16.2 |
|  | 13.3 6.9 | 19.3 9.3 |  |
| WHYPART |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| 6.0 | 50 | ${ }^{35}$ | 85 |
| Express pol opin | 58.8 | 41.2 | 23.4 |
|  | 26.6 | 19.9 |  |
|  | 13.7 | 9.6 |  |
| Engage soc $\begin{gathered}7.0 \\ \text { inter }\end{gathered}$ | 8 | 19 | 27 |
|  | 29.6 | 70.4 | 7.4 |
|  | 4.3 | 10.8 |  |
|  | 2.2 | 5.2 |  |
| Column Total | $\begin{array}{r} 188 \\ 51.6 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 176 \\ 48.4 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 364 \\ 100.0 \end{array}$ |

Chi-Square

Pearson
Likelihood Ratio
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association
Minimum Expected Frequency - 1.451 Cells with Expected Frequency $<5$ - 4 OF 20 (20.0\%) Number of Missing Observations: 57

Table F. 20 -
What were you trying to achieve with this action? by Respondent's Level of Education


Table 21 -
Accept Market Prices for Consumer Goods by Future Life Satisfaction (one year)


Table 22 -
Accept Market Prices for Consumer Goods by Future Life Satisfaction (five years)






[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$. As such, the report is a companion piece to the Baseline Study: Institutional Profiles, which assesses the status of key project institutions at the time the Project started, and which was delivered to USAID in July 1993.
    ${ }^{2}$. The authors took shared responsibility for designing the questionnaire, training enumerators, and planning survey logistics. Beatrice Liatto-Katundu took the lead in implementing the survey and Michael Bratton was reponsible for overseeing data entry and conducting the first stage of data analysis reported on here.

[^1]:    4. The enumerators were Tekani Chirwa, Herbert Kakonkanya, Peter Mashinkila, Sylvia Michelo, Maybin Mbulo, Paul Mumeno, Lizzie Peme, Samuel Sandi, Richard Shimishi, Felix Simeo, Hudson Unene, John Zulu.
    5. The field supervisors were Royson Mukwena, Lecturer in Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zambia (UNZA) and Mapanza Nkwilimba, forrnerly National Coordinator of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP). Dr. Katundu led the third team.
    ${ }^{6}$. Julie Alderfer, Philip Alderfer, Kathleen Dowley and Michele Gorman. Special mention is due to Philip Alderfer, who provided valuable technical assistance in software selection, data preparation, and programming for analysis. Fie also prepared all the data appendices for this report.
[^2]:    7. At the margins, a few quotas for particular population subsets were either over- or underfilled, usually due to respondent misreporting of social characteristics during screening questions.
    8. We suspect that the Government of Zambia's official 1990 census data underestimate the extent of urbanization in Zambia. The United Nations Development Program reports that urban dwellers constitute $50 \%$ of total population in Zambia (UNDP, 1993, 179). We will seek clarification of the discrepancies in these estimates before we draw another sample.
[^3]:    9. Central Statistical Office, 1980 Census, Analytical report, Volume 3, p.4. The $10.2 \%$ figure refers to "Northwestern".
    ${ }^{10}$. Our strategy of including Copperbelt Province in order to capture Bemba and Lozi respondents proved to be inadequate. Fortunately, the Bemba subsample is stili large enough to test whether the sample is biased on ethnic lines. Nevertheless, subsequent sampling designs will expand coverage from the six provinces included in the baseline study to nine provinces nationwide.
    ${ }^{11}$. While the sample thus slighty over-represents persons in formal employment, the resultant bias is so minor that we are confident that it has no fundamental effect on the survey results.
[^4]:    ${ }^{12}$. When asked whether they were "interested in politics" (Q.7), respondents usually interpreted this to refer to elite politics in the national arena, and did not always include local, community affairs. Similarly, when asked whether they would use informal or official channels "to get something done" (Q.7), some respondents wanted to know whether the question referred to a personal or a public matter. Respondents also experienced difficulty in understanding statements phrased with negatives e.g. "the government should not be allowed to detain people without first giving them a fair trial" (Q29). And we think people sometimes gave an opinion about the way things should be, rather than the way they actually are, e.g. in response to the statement that "one's tribe makes no difference in politics and government" (Q.31).
    ${ }^{13}$. The ten-point numerical scale used for questions on political trust proved too difficult for a few respondents who were old and illiterate, engendering a few meaningless responses. In the end, however, enumerators agreed that this higher level of measurement (compared, say, to a five-point Likert agree-disagree scale) could be used with the vast majority of Zambians.
    ${ }^{14}$. For example, some people didn't want to reveal that they had a radio in the house for fear that it would be stolen. We also failed to capture situations in which a household owned a radio, but it was broken or had no batteries.
    ${ }^{15}$. How real are the public attitudes revealed by surveys? People often do not have attitudes on the topics that researchers consider important. Not wanting to appear uninformed, respondents may proffer answers even though they do not understand, or have never thought about, the question. For their part, interviewers, seeking to maximize the amount of useable data, may press respondents to choose answers on an "agree-disagree" scale when their preferred response is "I have never thought about it". According to Weisberg and Bowen, "the respondents are not at fault in these situations; it is the researcher who is asking the questions before the public has had a chance to crystallize their opinions" $(1977,83)$.

[^5]:    ${ }^{16}$. See Table F. 5 ( $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ is significant at the .003 level).
    17. Calculated as responses for "evening", "all", "moming and evening", plus "lunchtime and evening".

[^6]:    ${ }^{18}$. These percentages refer to the subsample of members of community organizations, not to the sample as a whole.
    19. The figure on union membership may appear low in a country that is associated with powerful trade union movement. Yet, given the fact that only $9.7 \%$ of the adult population is formally employed, we are reporting that one in four of these is a union member.

[^7]:    ${ }^{20}$. Given that there are some 4.074 million persons in the population of eligible voters in Zambia, then approximately 2.652 million persons would appear to actually registered in 1993. This figure is considerably lower than the official figure of 3.2 million on the electoral rolls in 1991 as reported by the Electoral Commission, Lusaka (NDI, 1992, 33). The correct figure is probably somewhere between these two estimates.

[^8]:    21. Technically, they should have been able to vote with a substitute certificate in the 1991 elections, though few people new about this option at the time (NDI, 1992, 35).
[^9]:    22. Rural respondents are significantly more likely to perceive a lack of respect for authority (See Table F.12).
    ${ }^{23}$. Women are espscially likely to disagree with young people holding office (See Table F.15) ( $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ significant at the . 0004 level).
[^10]:    ${ }^{24}$. Disagreement with reserving political office-holding for men is significantly related to education ( $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ is significant at the. 0006 level) (See Table F.14).

[^11]:    ${ }^{28}$. The percentages are mean trust scores calculated from Tables D.16 and D.17.

[^12]:    ${ }^{29}$. Whereas rural dwellers identify the high price of agricultural inputs, urban dwellers stress the low standards in schools (See Table F.16) (X ${ }^{2}$ significant at the .00005 level).
    ${ }^{30}$. Calculated from "old government is to blame" plus "new government is to blame" plus "farmers are to blame".

[^13]:    ${ }^{33}$. A first step is to test for intercoder-reliability on this item.

[^14]:    * An asterisk indicates the CSA/SEA in which interviews were conducted. The numbers represent the identification codes for CSA/SEAs used by the Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.

[^15]:    ${ }^{1}$. Republic of Zambia. 1990 Census of Population, Housing and Agriculture: Preliminary Report. Lusaka, Central Statistical Office, December 1990, p.4.
    2. 1990 Census, pp.6-7.
    ${ }^{3}$. Republic of Zambia. Women and Men in Zambia. Lusaka, Central Statistical Office, April 1991, p. 16.
    4. estimate calculated from Republic of Zambia. 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Analytical Report. Lusaka, Central Statistical Office, 198?, Volume II.
    s Republic of Zambia. Selected Socio-Economic Indicators, 1992. Lusaka, Central Statistical Office, 1992, p.5.
    ${ }^{6}$. From responses to the survey question "what job?"; sum of responses coded 6-12 (domestic, miner, technical, teacher, government, NGO, or professional worker).
    7. Projected for 1990 as 20 percent of formal employment from trends in female employment, 1975-1986. See Selected Socio-Economic Indicators, p.5.

[^16]:    Number of Missing Observations: 3

