A PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIC STABILITY IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

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Executive Summary

This paper provides a recommended democratic maintenance strategy for the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, all former English colonies. It serves as a companion piece to the Regional Democratic Development Strategy Framework for Latin America, which covers the Latin countries of South and Central America and the Caribbean.

The historical, economic, and social preconditions for stable democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean states were much more favorable than for most countries in Latin America. For this reason, it should not be surprising that most of these states have maintained democratic institutions at a relatively high level since their independence (see Freedom House rankings in Table I).

However, even in this short period, political events or behavior in several Caribbean Commonwealth and related states suggest the fragility of this accomplishment. Extreme violence in Jamaica's recent political history; continuing accusations of massive corruption in the Bahamas and Antigua; oppression, revolution, and counterrevolution in Grenada; the attempted use of the military to maintain an ousted leader in Dominica; the Marxist-Leninist takeover in Guyana; and a fanatical minority insurrection in Trinidad and Tobago cannot be lightly dismissed. The interference of the military in Suriname, a related country with a similar background, is well known.

A review of this behavior and a brief analysis of emerging problems in the region suggest that the following conditions constitute continuing threats to the region's democratic stability: economic vulnerability and insufficiency; inadequate and insufficiently diverse information and opinion sources; inadequate civic education; corruption and growing involvement with the drug trade; inadequate judicial and security services; weakened democratic traditions or nondemocratic sub-traditions; weakening political leadership; the insufficient decentralization of political power; and an inadequate regional mutual support system.

To meet these threats, a regional democratic support program is proposed to stabilize democracy in the region. Objectives of the proposed program are to: (1) continue strengthening the administration of justice; (2) improve information flows and public policy dialogue; (3) strengthen democratic political performance (especially financial management and local government); (4) strengthen democratic culture; and (5) strengthen the Caribbean democratic community.

To achieve these objectives, it is suggested that a number of projects be undertaken, continued, or extended in the region. Most of these undertakings would be regional rather than bilateral. In
many cases, the suggestions are exploratory, since their appropriateness or feasibility remains to be tested. Examples of these suggestions are: (1) the extension of training for journalists to all regional states and support for the development of regional media and think tanks; (2) continuation of judicial administration projects, as well as support for the improvement of security services in so far as these fall within A.I.D. guidelines; (3) support for education in civic institutions and values, as well as ethnic relations, on both adult and school levels; (4) extension to the Caribbean of planned regional local/municipal government and financial management projects; and (5) support for exchanges among Caribbean states, particularly in areas related to human rights and governmental performance.

Estimated resource requirements to carry out the program are $5 million per year for seven years, approximately equally divided between USAID/Jamaica and RDO/C. One additional staff position is needed in RDO/C for a DI officer.

RDO/C and Jamaica are encouraged to develop multi-pronged DI projects that can serve as funding instruments for buy-ins to the regional projects through which the program would be implemented, except for continuation of Mission administration of justice projects.
I. Introduction: General History and Context

This paper is intended to serve as a companion piece to the A.I.D. Democratic Development Regional Strategy Framework for Latin America, whose focus is primarily on the Latin countries of South and Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. This paper addresses the English-speaking Commonwealth Caribbean countries and Suriname.

As Table I indicates, the democratic status of the Commonwealth countries, as measured by Freedom House's annual survey, is far stronger than for the Latin countries. Only Guyana and Suriname have severe deficiencies. This can be explained in large part by the history and culture of the former colonies of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the Caribbean and Caribbean rim areas (Belize, Guyana, and Suriname), which are quite distinct from those of the former Latin (Hispanic, French, or Portuguese) colonies in the Americas. Unlike Latin America, the great majority of the inhabitants in these countries were brought to the New World to work on plantations as slaves (Africans) or indentured workers (primarily East Indians). While no one can doubt the suffering imposed on generations of such laborers, this experience and environment produced a population more adapted to democracy than is true of many other populations in the hemisphere. First, the colonizing powers developed democracy in their homelands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Frequently, they proceeded to extend aspects of political democracy and of the civil liberties associated with democracy to their colonies. Although this extension often was interrupted by long periods of direct rule and encompassed few if any of the subject peoples until this century, the extensive contact of Caribbean peoples with democratic institutions and the slowly growing significance of these institutions in their lives after the freeing of the slaves in the 1830s provided a basis for a more general democracy when it came to include the whole population of these countries, particularly after World War II. The non-Latin Caribbean states also benefitted, in retrospect, from not achieving their independence until well after the democratic revolutions had been successfully carried through in the homelands of their colonists. This meant that independence, when it came, was based on developed and well-known democratic models and values. This was in sharp contrast to the situation in the greater part of the hemisphere.

Of equal importance were the high educational and socio-economic standards of the non-Latin Caribbean peoples before independence. In large part this was due to the fact that populations were relatively small and highly concentrated -- even in Guyana and Suriname, countries of considerable size. This allowed for the development of essentially urban living standards for the bulk of the population at an earlier date than was possible in much of the hemisphere. For this and other reasons, the relatively affluent and educated "mother countries" successfully diffused many of their
own standards to their colonies. Continued intercourse with the colonial homelands and later with the United States also meant that a much larger percentage of the people had experience of the modern world than was true in most Latin countries.

Today, the countries of this region are characterized by democratic political systems and enjoy educational and health standards considerably higher than in most developing countries. Recurring and perhaps intensifying national economic problems and continuing poverty in some cases suggest that this situation may not endure; but the human basis from which development can proceed appears on the surface to be strong.

II. Democratic Status and Potential for Instability

The democratic institutions, political rights, and civil liberties of most Commonwealth Caribbean states have often been seen as comparable to those found in developed Western democracies. Free and fair elections are regularly held, political parties alternate in power, the media are free and varied (if sometimes insufficient), and the courts and the rule of law are respected. In most of the region, military coups are considered unlikely and military interference in politics is minimal. The regional democratic political culture would seem to offer little opening to those who would promote nondemocratic alternatives.

However, the more we consider the recent history of individual countries in the region, the more questionable this general picture seems. The detailed record suggests that the apparent stability of democracy in the region should not be taken for granted.

Aside from the exceptional examples of democratic failure in Guyana and Suriname discussed in separate sections, the most dramatic disturbance to democratic tradition occurred in Grenada. Immediately before and after independence, Grenada was governed by a populist labor leader, Eric Gairy. Although he maintained democratic forms and some openness, his use of strong-arm methods to suppress opposition was greatly resented. For this reason, his ouster by the leftist Maurice Bishop was welcomed initially; the subsequent suppression of democratic forms led to opposition by some members of the elite, but there was no strong movement within Grenada or the Caribbean to restore democracy until a radical clique within the "Revolutionary Government" executed Bishop and several of his supporters in 1983. At this point, the US and other Caribbean states intervened and restored democracy. The antidemocratic experiment begun by Bishop has little support in Grenada today. Yet it happened.

Another serious threat to democratic tradition was posed by the increasingly arbitrary and oppressive rule of Patrick John in Dominica in the 1970s. John organized a volunteer army with which
he developed a direct personal relationship. When because of corruption and other causes popular demonstrations forced John's resignation, and a subsequent election brought Mrs. Charles to power, the army attacked the police in an attempt to restore John. The resulting trials and disbandment of the army civilianized and democratized power but may not have created a thoroughly open political system.

In Antigua, the post-independence period has been dominated by one ruling family. It has succeeded in amassing almost unchallengeable labor, business, and political power in spite of repeated and credible charges of corruption against members of the family. Today, the system appears to be maintained by a combination of threats to job security, favors in land titles and jobs, unequal electoral districts, and perhaps failure to ensure a secret-ballot. For many years after independence, political struggles between Jamaica's main political parties were marred by numerous killings on both sides. Politics became an intense winner-take-all struggle. Fortunately, this situation has been greatly ameliorated in recent years. However, from a human rights perspective the police are still credited with a remarkably large number of homicides in the course of their work. Politics in Trinidad has been marred by recurrent racial problems, corruption, and most recently by a violent and destructive revolt by a small group of Islamic fanatics. Accusations that massive corruption and drug connections characterize the government of the Bahamas cannot be lightly dismissed: yet the government has managed to maintain itself in office. Separatist struggles have wracked several islands, the most notable leading to the introduction of British forces in Anguilla and its ultimate separation from St. Kitts and Nevis.

Several conclusions might be drawn from this recent history. First, while strong adherence to the British democratic tradition is characteristic of Barbados and perhaps a few other islands, unwavering fealty to the British model does not adequately reflect the overall regional experience. When threatened with the loss or subversion of their institutions, the people of these states often have not been able on their own to rectify the situation. The Caribbean democracies have been very slow to take effective measures to support, even rhetorically, threats to democracy in neighboring states. Many political leaders or factions in the region have resorted to violence to settle political problems. Finally, where ethnic divisions exist, the political system often has found it difficult to rise above them.

For a more generalized discussion of the ways in which democracies can be undermined see Appendix 5.
III. Potential Threats to Democracy in the Region

A. Economic Vulnerability and Insufficiency

The standard of living of the Commonwealth Caribbean is far above that in most of the underdeveloped world. This is reflected in GNP/Capita, health, and education indicators. That said, it is also important to note the considerable variation in GNP/Capita among the states in the region, as well as the gap between the living standards of the poor and the wealthy. It is also important to note the vulnerability of the mini-economies of the region to poor economic policies and to external factors such as recession in the U.S. and Europe, which affect tourism and remittances, or the loss of subsidies to key crops such as bananas or sugar.

As indicators of democratic stability, the important figures may not be the absolute levels so much as trends in these levels and the extent to which these trends parallel or diverge from expectations. The peoples of the Caribbean Commonwealth achieved independence in a context of relative plenty; they enjoyed effective government support systems that provided adequate health and educational services and freed people from crime and instability. After independence, some states experienced years of continued economic expansion and improvement in services; others have faced or now face lowered incomes, and, consequently, lowered government revenues and a decline in government services and employment. The entire region is presently in the thralls of a severe fiscal crisis that is forcing major layoffs and eroding the capacity to support important areas of infrastructure such as justice systems, which traditionally have been under-funded even in good times.

At the same time that these negative trends have developed, people throughout the region have been increasingly exposed through travel and television to North American living standards. The widening of the gap between expectation and reality threatens the stability of any governmental system. It is possible that people may turn to antidemocratic solutions if they come to believe that the choices available through the working of their democratic systems cannot narrow the gap.

B. Inadequate and Insufficiently Diverse Opinion and Information Sources

The states of the region are generally characterized by free media; discussion is open and highly partisan. However, in many states the broadcasting media are government owned and do not adequately represent the full spectrum of opinion. The increasing availability of North American television helps in some respects, but does little to increase the diversity of information about national or even regional affairs. In many cases, radio talk shows
help fill the information gap; they are avidly listened to by all, and often seem more responsibly concerned with public issues than in the United States.

Newspapers are in most cases much more varied in ownership and ideology than the broadcast media. However, their presentation of information tends to be highly partisan and parochial. There is no generally available Caribbean regional publication that responsibly provides regional and international news. Nor is there much offered by public policy-oriented research and educational institutions (think tanks) to enrich the public's capacity to make informed judgments on important political/economic issues, especially on the smaller islands. Public opinion polling is similarly limited. This lack of informed news and commentary impedes the ability of the people to make informed electoral decisions and understand the relationship between local and foreign affairs. It also reduces the sense of regional community that may be a key to stability in the region.

C. Inadequate Judicial and Security Services

Unlike many third world areas, the judicial system in the islands is generally regarded as fair, the judges unbiased and incorrupt. However, problems are emerging that unless dealt with may erode the democratic consensus. First is the inability of the financially strapped systems to provide adequate legal aid services for the poor, maintain courthouses, equip libraries, and pay for necessary staff (e.g. court reporters, administrators) and equipment. This, together with the rapidly growing drug-related caseload, is creating backlogs and bottlenecks in the system. Second is the difficulty in obtaining experienced judges and prosecutors. In many cases the police must prosecute cases, a role for which they are poorly prepared; in others, the system is forced to hire "contract judges" from the outside, with a resulting insecurity of tenure that raises questions of independence.

In a few countries, police behavior is an urgent problem. In the relatively violent Jamaican society, for example, the police have resorted to taking justice into their own hands. Police homicides have reached alarming proportions, and the people have come increasingly to fear their presence. In others, such as Belize, the police appear ineffective and underequipped, and thus unable to face up to new problems of drug related crime and gang violence. At the edge of the Caribbean area, the police in Suriname are also weak, prevented by gangs armed by the army from even entering much of the interior.

A related problem is that of the role of the military. The disturbing fact is that while the military forces of the Caribbean Commonwealth states have never been used to defend them against external threats, they have in several cases been used against their own people. In Trinidad, this use was in defense of the
elected government. However, in Grenada armed forces were used to overthrow the government, and in Dominica they nearly succeeded in an attempted coup (being disbanded as a result). Repeated and continuing military interventions against the government of Suriname are well known. In Belize and Jamaica military forces have been used to supplement the police to maintain domestic peace. The mission of the small army of Antigua, a society characterized by a closely held, family power structure in spite of its democratic facade, remains unclear. From this we may draw two conclusions. First, threats to the internal security of the islands are sometimes uncontrollable by the relatively weak police forces. Secondly, a tradition of using military force internally is developing, a tradition that could help undermine civilian political control when a Caribbean society comes under stress.

D. Lack of Government Accountability, Corruption, and Growing Involvement with the Drug Trade

Happily, most Caribbean governments are not corrupt, or are corrupt only in reference to the highest standards of probity. However, there has been a well-founded suspicion of massive corruption in at least two island governments (Bahamas and Antigua), and minor problems have surfaced elsewhere. There is widespread fear that the new generation of political leaders, surrounded by the big money of drug dealers who use their countries as conduits, may be unable to maintain the regional record. Suspicions of political favoritism, especially the use of position to favor members of the party in power, also feed a growing cynicism in many countries about their political system. The lack of government financial accountability, which provides opportunity for corruption, is a problem in Suriname, Guyana, and Antigua, and to some extent in Jamaica.

E. Inadequate Civic Education

In the educational systems the British left to the newly independent states, the civic values and symbols of England and the British Empire were effectively taught both within and outside school curriculums. However, after independence much of this educational effort has lapsed and little has taken its place. Few local history texts have become available to replace the colonial texts of the past, and little or nothing on the political institutions and values of the society is offered in the lower grades. The situation is only slightly better at the secondary level. A new generation is growing up with inadequate knowledge of the democratic system by which they are governed and little concept of their civic duty to that system.

F. Weakened Democratic Traditions or Nondemocratic Sub-traditions

While the inherited democratic traditions are alive and well in many of the region's societies, they have collapsed or been
severely weakened in others. In Jamaica, a culture of violence has been expressed in the political arena in past years by the behavior of gangs affiliated with both major parties. While this violence has subsided recently, there is a perception that the "thugs" surrounding major political leaders maintain an atmosphere of fear and intimidation both within and between parties, especially in certain districts. In Guyana, years of essentially one-party socialist rule has left the democratic traditions of the country in tatters. While the major parties remain intact, it will be years before the people will be able to regain confidence in the system — and before the hatreds engendered by this period are overcome. In Antigua, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, the maintenance of political power has involved the wholesale distribution of jobs and other favors, as well as the gerrymandering of legislative districts. Such situations, combined with a region-wide tendency to regard everything and every organization as "political" (i.e., aligned with one or another party) has made politics a winner-take-all game; this can have disturbing consequences if a major group feels it is excluded permanently from power. With labor unions, business organizations, and other NGOs divided along party lines, they are unable to play the balancing and representational roles that we expect in modern democracies.

G. Weakening Political Leadership

The Caribbean states came to independence with well-trained leaders and extensive experience with parliamentary democratic systems. These leaders also benefitted from identification with the process through which their peoples achieved independence from colonial rule. As a result, to a considerable extent they were respected by people throughout the society, even those in opposition parties. The next generation of leaders is said to be less well-trained, and less likely to command the general approbation of the society as a whole. To some extent this is true of all new democracies, but the problem may be exacerbated here by the continual migration of the "best and the brightest" to larger societies and the smallness of the pool of persons from which these societies have to draw. Unfortunately, some first-generation leaders have so dominated their societies and parties that they have not been able to develop ably replacements.

H. Insufficient Decentralization of Political Power

At independence many Caribbean states had well-developed local governments. For several reasons, including a desire by newly elected chiefs of state to concentrate their power and eliminate rivals, accusations of corruption and incompetence at local levels, and a feeling that efficiency would be served, local government has in many states been abandoned or greatly weakened. Even though the societies are mostly quite small, this movement of government away from the people reduces their opportunity to participate directly in their political system and thus weakens their attachment to it,
and creates excessive reliance on patronage and opportunities for corruption at the center. The use of local government for the identification and training of future leaders has also been forfeited by this tendency.

I. Inadequate Regional Mutual Support System

The British attempted to leave behind a federal structure for their West Indian colonies. Unfortunately, this structure collapsed at or before independence. Attempts to redevelop a regional community through institutions such as the University of the West Indies and CARICOM have played a useful part in holding the states together, and present efforts, especially negotiations for a federation of the Windward Islands, hold promise. However, events in Grenada, Jamaica, and Guyana, as well as problems in Antigua, Dominica, and Bahamas suggest that a unified community response to deteriorating democratic conditions has been notable by its absence. Democracy is unlikely to be entirely stable in the area until something like the mutual concern exhibited by European states and peoples for the political conditions of their neighbors characterizes the region. It would be particularly important for Suriname's future if its psychological and institutional isolation could be reduced through stronger formal and informal links with the region.

IV. Proposed Strategic Objectives and A.I.D. Programs

The preceding description of threats to democratic stability in the region is not meant to raise undue alarm or suggest the need for a major program of democratic assistance by A.I.D. With the notable exceptions of Guyana and Suriname, democratic institutions and values in the region are quite strong. However, there are enough indications of vulnerability to rapid deterioration, and erosion in some areas since independence, to suggest the need for a modest regional program to help prevent further deterioration and maintain the existing strengths that exist. An ounce of prevention now may guard against the need for costlier and more difficult curative efforts if and when democratic breakdowns occur. Apart from the administration of justice sector, where continued bilateral projects by USAID/Jamaica and RDO/C seem justified, all of the program areas proposed below can probably be addressed adequately through ongoing or planned LAC/DI regional projects, if their funding is augmented by modest amounts from RDO/C and USAID/Jamaica budgets. The following section proposes certain objectives and ideas for programs to be supported in such fashion.

To stabilize and enhance democracy in the region, and address the threats to democracy outlined in Section III, the following objectives are suggested:
Objective 1: Improve Information Flows and Public Policy Dialogue

Program Components:

1) Provide limited support to encourage the development and extension of regional media outlets.

Training in journalism would be of benefit, particularly in separating news from commentary, investigative journalism, and ethics.

The print media in most of the region fail to provide adequate information on the Commonwealth Caribbean or the outside world. The only generally available regional publication is Caribbean Contact, a church related and highly partisan publication that now appears very infrequently. On the other hand, in Jamaica, at least, the Daily Gleaner provides more than adequate information on both international and regional affairs. This suggests that the Gleaner, or perhaps even the Miami Herald (although this would be less desirable) could form the basis for improving the situation in the smaller countries. A.I.D. should investigate whether the Gleaner or another paper might publish regional editions, similar to those provided in the US by the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times. Alternatively, the Gleaner might be the basis for a regional and international insert that could be inserted into small regional papers at relatively low cost.

On a smaller scale, the four small Windward Island nations have good relations and are moving forward toward a federation. It might help strengthen this process, as well as serve some of the informational needs discussed above, if a publication specifically devoted to these states were to appear. Alastair Hughes has published the high quality Grenada Newsletter in one of these countries for 17 years. He now intends to sell it in the next year or two. Since he is intimately connected with all four states, before he sells out he might be encouraged to transform it into a publication serving all the Windwards.

Before it was destroyed by a hurricane, Radio Antilles was a popular source of information throughout the Eastern Caribbean. Because of inadequate funds it has not yet been able to go back on the air. A.I.D. should investigate the possibility of providing limited support to those who are now attempting to put the station back in operation.

Call-in programs have become an important source of public information and discussion throughout the region. Any programs to improve the general level of information, or improve the level of the public discussion would do well to build on the beginning provided by these programs. In some cases this might be done by upgrading the education of those responsible for the programs, in
others it might be possible for to support changes in the format that would increase the civic education or regional identification components.

2) **Strengthen public policy-oriented research and educational organizations.**

There are a few think-tank-like organizations in the region, the support of which could expand and improve the flow of informal information and opinions. In Jamaica, the Jamaican Institute for Political Education is a possible candidate for assistance in research and policy formulation, although it receives some support from the Adenauer Foundation (Germany). The Bustamente Institute of Public and International Affairs, also in Jamaica, also receives German aid. Support for seminars on comparative political systems and other topics through the University of the West Indies or other means could help balance the still very left-wing orientation in the University. In Belize, the Society for the Promotion of Education and Research (SPEAR) already has substantial staff and international support, but seems little known elsewhere in the Caribbean. In Grenada, CARIBCARE is a regional organization that presents seminars on various topics of public concern; this might be expanded (although they get some support now from the Bustamente Institute). Public opinion polling efforts by Karl Stone and others in Jamaica and Barbados could be extended.

Some of these organizations are strongly identified with political viewpoints, conservative or left-wing; since the objective is to increase objective, non-partisan information and opinion flows and help counter the currently over politicized dialogue, any A.I.D. support will have to be provided with this in mind.

Extension of the Central America Journalism project to the Caribbean could be a vehicle for addressing the identified media-strengthening needs. The think-tank component might be addressed through this project also, or through LAC/DI's forthcoming Democratic Development Support project.

**Objective 2: Strengthen the Administration of Justice**

Both USAID/Jamaica and RDO/C have ongoing projects in this area that address priority problems. USAID/Jamaica is designing a needed follow-on project. RDO/C plans to evaluate its project in the spring of 1992 and base its decisions regarding any follow-on activity on that evaluation. Without prejudging the outcome of that evaluation, it would appear from our brief survey (a) that the present project is having positive effects, and (b) that follow-on assistance is required in such areas as: sector financing needs analyses; continued provision of material support for courthouse repairs in rural areas, books, word processors, and staff (e.g. court reporters); legal aid; strengthening local bar associations
and their capacity/willingness to do pro bono work; alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; court administration, including registry bottlenecks, updating law reports, and reducing case backlogs; and additional training for judges. Policy dialogue is needed to improve judges' pay and tenure arrangements. Special attention is needed to police deficiencies, which include: attempting to eliminate or redress current statutory constraints on permitted assistance (e.g. so ICITAP can work on the problem of lock-ups in Jamaica), and the possibility of expanding the educational and training functions of the Caribbean Rights network that has been particularly concerned with problems in police behavior and incarceration. The Belize Human Rights Commission has developed an educational component for the Belize police forces that could perhaps be extended to the other countries.

Augmentation of the planned Jamaica and RDO/C projects, together with regional assistance through ICITAP should address these needs.

Improvement of the legal/regulatory/judicial (LRJ) climate for investment, though not a requisite for political democracy, is also worthy of mention given its importance to growth objectives and its relationship to criminal justice improvement (i.e., certain improvements in legal systems benefit both criminal and civil justice). Despite the large amount of foreign investment in the Caribbean, there still appear to be LRJ areas in need of improvement. These are being addressed by USAID Jamaica through its Export Development and Investment Promotion project, and regionally through the Caribbean Law Institute, though there are some implementation problems with the latter project. Assuming these can be resolved, continuation of the work being done by the CLI to update and harmonize investment and trade laws throughout the region seems warranted. Whether additional efforts in this area are needed was beyond the capacity of this limited survey to investigate.

Objective 3: Strengthen Financial Management/Accountability, and Reduce Corruption

It is not A.I.D.'s role nor within its capabilities to address directly the drug trafficking and related corruption problems in the region. Financial management/accountability problems can be addressed, however, and to a limited extent have already been addressed through the Regional Financial Management Improvement project, which might usefully be applied to Antigua, possibly Guyana, and Surinam if the political will exists in these countries for meaningful improvements. Guyana reportedly receives assistance in this area from the IDB and Jamaica from the IBRD, though the latter project is experiencing difficulties and the USAID is designing a bilateral project. It is recommended that RDO/C and USAID's Jamaica and Belize consider to what extent RFMIP II might usefully be applied.
Corruption can be addressed indirectly by increasing public demand for honest and accountable government. Civic education programs (discussed below) can help by emphasizing concepts of accountability and by educating the public on the corrosive, corrupting impact of drug trafficking on government and society generally.

**Objective 4: Strengthen Democratic Culture through Civic Education and Leadership Training**

The incidents of political breakdown or near breakdown cited above reflect the willingness of many people in the Caribbean Commonwealth to pursue personal or group objectives with little regard for the effects of their actions on democratic political traditions. These actions include violence against political opponents, the misuse of position for profit, and the denial of equal rights to expression of others. On the other hand, many ordinary citizens seem insufficiently aware of the rights that their systems guarantee to them both individually and collectively, and the civic duties of citizens in a democracy.

To address these problems of democratic values, various kinds of formal and non-formal civic education and leadership training are recommended through ongoing and planned projects.

Basic education is critical to develop the informed electorate on which democracy depends. From a democratic development perspective, therefore, support for basic education is always a high priority, and it is hoped that the approved RDO/C initiative in this area will proceed. If it does, it is recommended that a strong civic education/social studies component be included in it. Where A.I.D. is involved with the formal education system, one can also promote changes in customary practices such as electing rather than appointing school leaders, and develop case study material on instances of breakdown or near-breakdown of democracy in the region that help serve to indigenize the curriculum (a felt need in many quarters) as well as instill democratic values.

Various possibilities for non-formal programs were also identified, including:

-- Investigate reviving for the region's schools a weekly news magazine with a high civics component (undertaken formerly in the Eastern Caribbean by *The Nation* in Barbados).

-- Support region-wide publication of information on national governmental systems and democracy for adult education (in cooperation with the Law and Justice project, USIS, etc.)

-- Support educational efforts in ethnic relations (especially important for Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname, and Belize).
-- Develop material for use by 4-H, scouts, and other youth organizations (this can address problems such as drugs, and AIDS, as well as democratic values).

-- Support for civic organizations with democratic agendas (such as the former "Agenda" group in Barbados, extension of the Central American "libro libre" program).

Such activities can be supported through the civic education/citizen participation component of the regional Democratic Development Support project being designed for a FY 1992 start.

In leadership training, continuation of PTIIC will be of value, though we should explore the possibility of substituting or adding an "experience Canada" to the current "experience America" component of the program, to make it more relevant to the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Continuation of education for labor leaders through AIFLD is also recommended as a particularly relevant way of informing debate on economic issues as well as democratic values in a region with a very strong labor tradition. Youth exchange programs through the Peace Corps might be explored as a complement to the Commonwealth Youth Leadership Training Program which reportedly still receives CIDA and UK support. RDO/C's Caribbean Leadership Development Training project is also important in this context. Together, these programs can help remedy the "second-tier" leadership problem identified as a regional problem.

Although long-term in impact, these programs aimed at strengthening the democratic culture are as important as anything else recommended herein, since the strength of democracy depends ultimately on the values of its citizenry and their understanding of the nature of effective democratic performance by government.

Objective 5: Strengthen local/municipal government

Several countries in the region are actively debating whether or how to reactivate and strengthen abandoned or neglected local government structures (e.g. Jamaica, Grenada). The regional Local and Municipal Government project, planned for start-up in FY 93 (or 92 if funds are available) can support the planning and implementation of these efforts. It is recommended that a diagnostic survey of the current situation in the countries of the region be carried out by RHUDO/Jamaica to determine how this project might best address the region's needs.

Objective 6: Strengthen the Caribbean Democratic Community

Although there is a general realization, especially among elites, that the Commonwealth Caribbean states have a common background and
common interests, and regional institutions such as CARICOM and the University of the West Indies are widely accepted, events and observation suggest that the peoples of the region and their political leaders generally are not willing to exert even psychological pressure on one another to improve democratic or human rights performance. In this situation, threats to democracy are more likely to develop in the future beyond the point at which their resolution can be achieved within the region itself. In addition, the relative isolation of the societies makes more difficult benefitting from the interstate exchange of democratic experiences or the economies of scale that might be achieved in areas such as communications.

Most approaches to achieving this objective by A.I.D. must be somewhat indirect, but could include the following:

1) The support for regional communication development proposed under objective 1 above.

2) Investigate how A.I.D. might assist USIS to sponsor educational videos on each state in the Commonwealth Caribbean (comparable to that on Belize by 60 minutes) for distribution and use in the other states.

3) Investigate how A.I.D. might assist the Peace Corps to establish youth exchanges among Commonwealth Caribbean states (eventually perhaps a Caribbean Peace Corps).

4) Support links and exchanges among Caribbean NGOs, such as Caribbean Rights. These might include, for example, sponsoring trips by Belizean human rights workers to explain in other countries their work with the police, or Dominicans to discuss how their local governments work, or Grenadans to discuss the processes of public consultation that they have developed.

This area is not presently covered by existing or planned regional projects. Either RDO/C would have to develop one, or the scope of LAC/DI's DDS project would have to be expanded to include it.
V: Resource Requirements and Implementation Modes

A. Resource Requirements

1. Budget

The following is a rough estimate of the cost of the proposed program:

Administration of justice.......... $2.0 million per year
Media/think-tank strengthening.... $1.0 " " "
Financial mgt./accountability..... $ .35 " " "
Civic education/leadership trng\textsuperscript{1}.. $ .65 " " "
Local/municipal gov't strength ... $1.0 " " "
Total.........................$5.0 million per year

This would be divided approximately equally between the USAID Jamaica and RDO/C budgets.

This estimate does not include requirements for Guyana, to be studied separately after successful conclusion of the planned election, or for Surinam, where a one-time program of around $500,000 is planned in FY 92 but where the Government of the Netherlands will be the principal donor (see Appendix 1).

This modest expenditure over seven years (FY94-2000) should help ensure that by the year 2000 democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean will be no weaker than it is today, i.e all countries (except Guyana and Suriname) are still ranked "free" by Freedom House with an average rating for the region of around 4 (see Table I).

2. Staff

The proposed program will require assigning a full-time DI officer to RDO/C, since it will no longer be adequate to rely on the part-time services of the Regional Legal Advisor. Present USAID Jamaica staffing (one full-time BSC DI officer and part-time involvement of the legal advisor) should be adequate.

\textsuperscript{1} Does not include PTIIC. Includes $150,000 for AIFLD leadership and union membership training.
B. Implementation Modes

The AOJ component of the program would be implemented through follow-ons to the current Mission (Jamaica and RDO/C) projects. For the other components, it is recommended that USAID/Jamaica and RDO/C develop umbrella Democratic Initiative projects that could be used to access through buy-ins the several ongoing and planned LAC/DI regional projects in the recommended areas. Development of these umbrella DI projects would provide the occasion for the additional analysis needed to confirm or modify the priorities and program areas suggested herein.

C. Coordination and Collaboration with Other U.S. Organizations and Other Donors

It is important that the recommended program be developed in consultation and coordination with the many other U.S. organizations and other donors that are active in the area and have a potentially important role to play. Aspects of the program might usefully be implemented by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which already has a small project supporting the Caribbean Public Broadcasters' Association. USIA clearly has a role to play in certain areas of training. Peace Corps involvement needs to be explored. Other donors, public and private, are active in the region. UK and Canadian (CIDA) programs need to be investigated. Other European donors, such as Germany and the Netherlands, are active. Obviously, AID's program should be developed so as not to duplicate other-donor programs. To coordinate USG and other U.S. inputs (e.g. NED), it is assumed that Country Team coordinating mechanisms exist in Jamaica and Barbados.
Appendix 1: Suriname

The Situation

Suriname has much in common with the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. The dominant ethnic groups are Creoles and East Indians, as in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Among most ethnic groups the Christian religion has come to occupy a dominant position comparable to that in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The colonial background to Suriname's democracy is similar in that the Netherlands, like England, was one of the first countries to develop democratic institutions. Dutch institutions were extended to the Caribbean somewhat later than the British, yet Suriname came to independence in the mid-seventies with a fully functioning democratic system, buttressed by a literate, largely urban, and comparatively prosperous population. Labor unions were well developed and closely integrated with the political process. And like much of the Caribbean, its small population suffered from a continual drain of talent to larger and wealthier countries.

In important ways Suriname also differs from the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean. First, as a former Dutch colony, its relations have been with the Netherlands and the other Dutch West Indian colonies: its lingua francas are Dutch and Creole. Secondly, the population mix contains a significant group of Javanese background. In addition, about 10% of the population is "Bush Negro". Living in the interior and little affected by Western civilization, this group does not identify with the larger Creole or black population. In both Suriname and Guyana, the unassimilated Amerindian population, while small in numbers, dominate extensive areas.

The political and economic condition of Suriname has deteriorated more rapidly than that in Commonwealth Caribbean states. In this respect its record is like that of Guyana, though for different reasons. After independence, Suriname's ethnically based political parties muddled through several years of not very effective coalition government. Finally, their inattention to the country's small army, and particularly their inability to respond to the demands of its rank and file, led to a coup by noncommissioned officers in 1980. In 1982, this group assassinated 14 of the leading political, labor, and educational leaders of the country. Since then civilian leaders, journalists, and the police have lived under continual threat and intimidation, punctuated by sporadic murders. There is evidence of massive involvement by military leaders in corruption and the drug trade. Revolutionary movements and terrorism in the interior (partly under military direction) have driven thousands of people out of the country and effectively removed large areas from civilian control.
Nevertheless, civilian governments were elected in largely free elections in 1987 and, after another military coup, in 1991. But it remains doubtful that the present government will be able to assert its authority effectively, even though the great majority of the people wish it. In addition, civilian leaders have shown themselves relatively ineffective in dealing with a wide range of development and financial management issues.

A.I.D. Democratic Initiatives

In this situation, the most that a small A.I.D. support program can hope to accomplish is to marginally strengthen the civilian government's effectiveness. This support may be either direct or through helping to increase the involvement of both elites and the general public in the governmental process. In the absence of external intervention, only a confident alliance of the people with their government will be able to overcome the continual and debilitating intimidation and occasional direct interference of the military. In theory, improving the training of the military both in regard to human rights and acceptable civil-military relations could help. If the opportunity presents itself, such a training program should be tried. However, it is realistic to note that such training is only likely to take place and be effective after the civilian political structure has become significantly stronger.

To strengthen that structure, it would help if appropriate USAID regional programs could be extended to Suriname or maintained and expanded in Suriname in the areas of democratic and economic development. In particular, the following opportunities should be urgently explored:

1. Expanding the activities of the two major human rights/political action organizations in the country. While one of these receives help from A.I.D. at present and both seem able to maintain their present level of activities without further aid, their track records suggest that A.I.D. should encourage requests from these organizations to increase their public activities and publications and broaden their membership base.

2. Political party structures are generally very weak, making it difficult for the people to put great confidence in civilian leaders. A.I.D. should investigate how it might directly or through NED and its agencies provide across-the-board training in party activity and program development for those democratic parties that desire it.

3. The ineffectiveness of national financial and accounting systems continually undermines confidence in the political system both at home and abroad. Since the main donor nation in the near future will be the Netherlands and Dutch representatives are well aware of this difficulty, it is expected that the Netherlands will undertake efforts in the area, or can be encouraged to do so. If aid from
this quarter appears on examination to be unlikely, then A.I.D. should consider how Suriname might be involved in its regional financial management improvement program.

4. The media are timid (for obvious reasons) and journalists are largely untrained. In the broadcast area, only government stations exist. Programs assisting in the education of journalists should be undertaken where feasible. Since English is widely understood, increasing the availability of regional media might increase the pluralism of news sources and reduce the sense of regional isolation the country suffers.

5. The voice of the people must be made more clearly known; people need the support of knowing others think as they do. To meet this need, A.I.D. should investigate the possibility of developing credible and regularly appearing polls on subjects of political relevance. Good work has been done at the university and elsewhere in this area. How this could be expanded and regularized should be investigated.

6. In the course of undertaking programs such as the above, it should be remembered that the Surinamese people need to feel that they are supported by both nearby democracies and those further afield. For this reason alone, they should be included where feasible in Caribbean and Latin American programs.

7. The Surinamese people particularly need to feel (10UtMaye) are supported by the United States. For this purpose even a minimal A.I.D. program may be helpful. One way to increase the impact of the program would be to help the Partners of the Americas to develop a relationship between a state in the United States and Suriname. Such a program would lead to a greater U.S. presence than would otherwise be possible. This would serve essential developmental, educational, or infrastructural ends as well as psychological needs.
Appendix 2: A Note on Guyana

Since the study team did not visit Guyana, and Guyana's recent political experience has been quite different from that of the rest of the region, no attempt will be made to describe the situation in this country in detail, or to suggest how A.I.D. may help in what we hope is its current movement toward the establishment of a working democratic system.

Although under British rather than Dutch colonial rule before independence, Guyana's ethnic and historical heritage is very similar to Suriname's. Like Suriname, its health and literacy standards before independence were relatively high; and, like Suriname, the post-independence period has seen stagnation and even decline. Independence came ten years earlier to Guyana, but like Suriname its experience with democracy was tempestuous and dispiriting. British intervention in the evolving political system before independence led to the development of ethnically based parties that increasingly divided the country into hostile camps. Perhaps in order to maintain its control, even though it represented a minority (Creole) population, the governing party in the 1970s turned sharply to the left, modeling its behavior on the Marxist-Leninist one-party state (ostensibly in imitation of North Korea). The decline in civil liberties in Guyana and the absence of fair electoral processes became well known in the early eighties. More recently, under new leadership, civil liberties have become more generally respected and the ruling party has promised free elections.

The experience of Guyana suggests that a working and democratic political process inherited from the colonial powers may be unable under conditions of stress, and particularly in the presence of deep ethnic tensions, to prevent the collapse of democracy. Beginning from a point in the 1950s politically more advanced than many Caribbean Commonwealth democracies, political behavior in Guyana fell in the 1970s and 1980s into a pattern of petty repression little different from that in most of the third world.
Appendix 3: The Causes of Democratic Failure
with Special Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean

From the most general perspective, democracies fail when they encounter a challenge that they are institutionally unable to overcome. Stephen Haggard has pointed out that the likelihood of the overthrow of any political system is increased by economic failure -- the failure of the economies of nondemocratic states has played a large part in the present world movement toward democracy. The broader work of Linz and associates on why democracies fail suggests that economic failure is only one of a much longer list of potential shocks that may undermine democracy. Democracy in Ulster, for example, has been undermined by a persistent inability of the parties involved to solve the problem of how to divide power among ethnic groups; the same problem ultimately destroyed democracy in Lebanon. In some European states, democracy has been undermined in the past by a fragmentation of political power that made the resolution of pressing social and economic issues impossible.

The more general point of the Linz work, as well as more recent analysis, is that in most cases democracy appears to be at risk in crises only if important segments of the population fail to accept democracy as the sole legitimate way in which their political unit may be governed. In the "traditional" modern democracies of Western Europe and North America, even the severe dislocations of war, economic distress, and class conflict failed to destroy or seriously threaten democracy between the wars or immediately after World War II. On the other hand, in states with new democratic institutions, or where large elements of the population had never accepted elements of democracy or of a modern democratic culture (notably Germany, France, and Italy), democracy was threatened or overturned.

While Linz makes a sound argument, his proposition has little predictive value for much of the world because the strength of democratic institutions is often understood only after the fact. For example, one would have thought before they were undone that the democratic traditions of Uruguay and Chile would insulate those societies from antidemocratic revolutions, but they did not. After the fact, we can point to the problems in the democratic commitment of such societies, but this would have been problematical beforehand. Similarly, in the Caribbean, it would have been difficult to find in the traditions of Grenada and Dominica those elements in their social structures, cultures, or belief systems that would make their post-independence problems more severe than those of their neighbors. In the cases of Chile, Uruguay, and Grenada, an ideological struggle might be said to have so torn the fabric of political life that the compromises necessary for a democracy to function were no longer acceptable to powerful
elements in the society. Yet in Dominica and Suriname, or Guyana, this explanation does not seem to apply.

As mentioned, the legitimacy of democratic institutions must be consistently accepted by all major groups in a society if democracy is to be secured. This must include the elites of business, bureaucracy, and academia, as well as the bulk of the general population. It must particularly include military leaders and the military rank and file. It must include all major political parties. Since a small group can sometimes use weapons to take over a society, this commitment must be more than passive for some major groups, especially the security forces. Perhaps it was such a commitment, unfortunately not including its recently established army, that preserved Dominica against the challenge of Patrick John and his supporters.

A somewhat different approach to the problem is suggested by Samuel Huntington's discussion of the three "waves" of democratization and the "reverse waves" that followed the first two. Seeing the world nearing the crest of the third wave, he warns us of the possibilities of a following reverse wave. Huntington suggests that the reasons for democratic reversals in the past have been the weakness of democratic values among major sectors of the population, economic setbacks, social and political polarization, overconcentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few, a breakdown of law and order, and the "snowballing" of moves toward nondemocratic alternatives. He adds that the inability of ethnic groups to work together, and particularly for a formerly dominant ethnic group to accept its displacement by a rising group, may lead to the decay of democracy (a process that may have played a part in the decline of democracy in Guyana and could play this role in Belize).

Two points should be emphasized in this discussion. First, the challenge to democracy will be greater to the extent that a new or revived nondemocratic ideology becomes widely accepted. Presently, only Islamic fundamentalism and a modernized Confucianism challenge democracy, and both are largely irrelevant to the Caribbean (although the former may have led to the recent insurrection in Trinidad and Tobago). Democracy is now profiting from what may turn out to have been an interlude of ideological exhaustion. Not being itself an ideology -- democracy does not explain the nature of society or history -- democracy remains exposed to future ideological movements. Secondly, the importance of fad and fashion, irrespective of ideology, cannot be overemphasized. Latin America was all but swamped a few years ago by an authoritarian wave that produced regimes that frequently had little developed ideology. Yet democracies fell like dominos. Now the opposite is occurring. The current task of Latin American democrats is to utilize present opportunities to (1) complete the swing away from dictatorship and (2) so enhance democratic values and performance in the short-term that reverse swings become increasingly
difficult. The Caribbean states have not had time enough to develop a record of "pendulum swings" comparable to that in Latin America, but one can imagine a number of ways such a swing might be ignited by a leader building on the cultural resentment of the powerless and the ineffectiveness and growing corruption of some regional societies.

Thinking primarily of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski identifies the rapid worldwide rise in expectations as perhaps the greatest threat to the stabilization of current democratic progress. Economic growth, and the growth in media carrying the message of growth to everyone on the globe, has produced a "mentality of endless expectations", economic as well as social. For most, these expectations are bound to lead to bitter disappointment, revulsion against those who seemed to promise their fulfillment -- and the systems they represent. This danger also concerns many thinking persons in the Caribbean, particularly in the face of the flooding of the region by American television. In such an environment, it may be impossible for any government or system to satisfy the public for long.

After this recitation of dangers, it is well to close on a hopeful note. Much of the progress that has been made in recent years is real progress, both economically and socially. More people understand democracy and its assumptions in more countries today than ever before; more people understand the standards of international human rights and what these rights mean to them personally. S. M. Lipset also points out that the "end of ideology" discussion has an empirical foundation. Studies of political parties in leading states have shown that party positions have tended to move closer together since the 1950s. This weakening of ideological extremes could be thought to have ultimately played a part in the collapse of Soviet communism. One can hope that this growing rationalization of politics reflects an ever more scientific and educated world; in such a world reverse waves are likely to be progressively weaker.

Notes to Appendix 5:


(2) Juan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).


Appendix 4: Persons Consulted

Washington:

Edward Campbell, Desk Officer, LAC/CAR
Don Harrison, economist, LAC/DPP
Jeffrey Brokaw, environmental officer, LAC/DR
Joseph Salvo, rural development officer, LAC/DR
Nicholas Studinsky, health officer, LAC/DR
Elena Brineman, deputy director, LAC/DR
Gene Wilkin, regional Caribbean environmental advisor, RDO/C
Leslie Anderson, education officer, LAC/DR
Barbara Haig, National Endowment for Democracy
Joseph Bicelia, director, ARA/CAR
Roy Sullivan, Suriname Desk Officer, ARA/CAR
James Wesberry, Financial Management Advisor, LAC/DI
Thomas Haran, USIA
Charles Wood, Labor Advisor, AIFLD
Jo Ann Cotter, USIA
Rodney Johnson, AID/GC/Asia
Roy Grohs, Economist, AID/ENE

Barbados

Drew Luten, regional legal advisor and DI officer, RDO/C
Larry Armstrong, deputy director, RDO/C
Darwin Clarke, program specialist, RDO/C
Dennis Darby, CJIP project manager, RDO/C
Mosina Jordan, Mission Director, RDO/C
A. Philip Hughes, U.S. Ambassador to Barbados

Richard T. (Terry) Miller, political/economic officer, American Embassy, Barbados

Trevor Carmichael, attorney, Barbados

Gladstone Holder, columnist (The Nation)

John Wickham, former Senator, columnist (The Nation), CCD

Leonard Shorey, consultant on management and adult education (formerly UWI)

Wendy Singh, coordinator for Caribbean Human Rights

Nicholas Liverpool, UWI CJIP Project, law professor

Annette Veler, Chargé, Grenada

Antigua:

Bryant Salter, Chargé, US Embassy

Eden Weston, Minister of Economic Development

John St. Luce, Minister of Information

Dave Byron Narferd Looby, Director General, Broadcasting and Public Information

Baldwin Spencer, MP, leader of Opposition, and labor leader

Senator Keithlyn Smith, General Secretary, Antigua Workers Union (with associates)

Lionel Boulos (president) and Francis Lemas (VP), Antigua Chamber of Commerce

Grenada

Alister Hughes, editor, The Grenada Newsletter

Alexis Francis, Minister of Legal Affairs, Minister of Local Government, and Attorney General (with by Miss Velma Hylton, the Public Prosecutor, and Mr. Lambert, the Solicitor General)

H. Richard Pyle, Director, Peace Corps, Eastern Caribbean
Guyana

Kurt Schaeffer, USAID consultant
Dennis Hays, Charge', Guyana

Jamaica

Dorothy Lightborne, former Senator, former dep. Pres., Jamaica Bar Council, CCD International
Richard Small, President, Human Rights Council of Jamaica
John Tennant, AID/OPPD Jamaica
Carl Stone, Political Scientist, UWI, well-known columnist
William Gelman, AID/Rhudo
George Ramacon, Director, Jamaican Institute for Political Education
Hector Wynter, Exec. Dir., Caribbean Democratic Union, Press Sec., JLP (former head of Bustamante Institute and Editor of Gleaner)
Rob Proctor, Political Officer, American Embassy
Ed Dragon, Regional Legal Advisor, USAID/Jamaica
Robert Queener (with Jerry Wood), Mission Director, USAID/Jamaica
Roz Bazala, USIS/Jamaica

Belize

Paul Bisek, Program Officer, USAID
George LeBard, Associate Director, Peace Corps
Peter Swavely, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
Barbara Sandoval, A.I.D. Representative in Belize
Alvin Edgell, Lecturer University College of Belize
David Runkle, Instructor in Journalism, St. John's College
Norris Hall, Chairman, Broadcasting Corporation of Belize
Brad Paddico, USIS representative
Dennis Jones, Director, SPEAR (NGO public policy group)
George Frazer, Administrative Secretary, National Teachers' Union
Manuel Esquivel, Leader of Opposition (previous PM)
Emory King, Writer, historian, "Father of Belize"
Jose Coye, Vice-mayor of Belize City
Antonio Gonzalez, Director, Human Rights Commission (by phone)

Suriname:
John Schlosser, Political Officer, U. S. Embassy
John Hope, DCM, U. S. Embassy
John Leonard, Ambassador to Suriname
Henk Reichert, Conservationist, A.I.D.
Linda Specht, Economic/Commercial Officer, U.S. Embassy
Hans Prade, Director, Audit Office, Government of Suriname
Frau Rosenblad, Senior Public Prosecutor
Bastiaan Koerner, Embassy of The Netherlands
Edwin Sedoc, Minister of Finance, leader of NPS party, (expected to head plans department)

Other private-sector individuals whose names are omitted in order not to expose them to possible danger.
Appendix 5: Written Materials Consulted:


Abraham Lowenthal (ed.); *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America* (2 volumes); (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1991).


Stanley Reid, "Chapter 2, An Introductory Approach to the Concentration of Power in the Jamaican Corporate Economy and Notes on Its Origin" (Note to Peter Sellar: Peter I included a copy of this in your shipment from Jamaica; see if it is a chapter in the Stone edited volume you carried back.)

Vivien Stern; "Deprived of Their Liberty" (Barbados: Caribbean Rights, 1990).

Carl Stone; *Class, State, and Democracy in Jamaica*; (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1986).

Carl Stone, "The Political Opinions of the Jamaican People (1976-81)", (Apparently published; no date or publisher on the USAID/Jamaica copy)


USAID, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Data", July 1991.

U. S. Department of State "Belize: Post Report", "Background Notes" and various other materials.


U. S. Department of State, "Suriname: Background Notes", 1991 (?)


World Bank; Long-Term Economic Prospects of the OECS Countries, February 1990.


Newspapers and Newsletters: The Barbados Advocate, The Nation (Barbados), The Nation (Antigua), Grenada Newsletter (many issues, 1991) Stabroek News (Guyana), Die West (Suriname), The Daily Gleaner (Jamaica), Belize Times, The People's Pulse, Reporter, Amandala, SpearHead (Belize).
Appendix 6: Methodology

This paper is based on a survey of the region carried out by Dr. Raymond Gastil, a political scientist, and Mr. Peter Sellar, AID/LAC/DI Program Officer, from September 26 to October 15, 1991. During this period they visited Barbados, Antigua, Grenada, Surinam, Jamaica, and Belize (only Dr. Gastil went to Belize). Time available for the survey was constrained, permitting only one to three days per country and preventing visits to all the countries of the region. Comments on countries not visited are based on readings and Dr. Gastil's knowledge accumulated during the 13 years (1973-1987) that he authored Freedom House's annual survey.

Messrs. Gastil and Sellar interviewed approximately 70 people in the countries visited, from various walks of life: government, the press, academia, business and law, human rights organizations. In interviewing them, a checklist was used, drawn from the draft Regional Democratic Development Strategy Framework for Latin America, of important requisites for democracy; interviewees were also encouraged to raise any other factors not on the checklist that they felt were important.

The sampling of interviewees clearly was skewed toward the elite (100%), toward the legal profession (because of present involvement by both RDO/C and USAID/Jamaica in the administration of justice sector), and probably toward persons with a somewhat more negative view of developments in the region than the norm, though this last is speculation. In any event the sampling was much too thin to have any statistical significance.

Messrs. Gastil and Sellar also acquired and read as many newspapers as possible during their brief trip, as well as the materials cited in Appendix 5.

Appreciation is expressed to those who organized a fruitful schedule of interviews on short notice, especially Drew Luten, Darwin Clarke, and Dennis Darby in Barbados; John Tennant and Beth Hogan in Jamaica; Paul Bisek in Belize; Bryant Salter in Antigua; and John Schlosser in Suriname.
that have collapsed, introducing mission/results-oriented management techniques and reward systems based on them; and

- emphasizing complementarity with Mission programs in technical sectors.

LAC/DI will develop these initial investigations into a regional proposal for rapid response to Mission/country needs and assistance in designing bilateral projects. In doing so, LAC/DI will organize a workshop in Latin America bringing in LAC experts and Mission personnel. In addition, S&T/RD is developing an IQC and has its Implementing Policy Change project, announced in January 1991 (see State 028364), available for interested Missions.

Meanwhile, USAIDs are encouraged to develop their own analyses and proposals. A tentative budget is proposed of $2 million annually for regional activities starting in FY 93, and a bilateral budget increasing from $10 million in FY 93 to $40 million in FY 97, recognizing that this is an area that in all likelihood will require significant resource levels given the magnitude of the problem, and one in which significant policy reform may be achieved if adequate resources are brought to bear.

4. **Strengthening Local and Municipal Government**

LAC has renewed and expanded efforts to strengthen local government. LAC has recently approved a major municipal development project in Honduras, and has been supporting for several years a "municipalities in action" program in El Salvador that has proved very popular and successful in empowering local officials and communities and delivering development services. In Nicaragua and Ecuador, LAC is training mayors and members of city councils.

LAC intends to re-enter this area mindful of its considerable experience with municipal development programs during the 1950s, '60s, and '70s. Assistance during this era was not particularly effective in giving greater autonomy and decision-making power to local governments, probably because of an excessively technocratic approach to the subject that sought to avoid issues of political power sharing and reflected A.I.D.'s greater comfort in working with central rather than local government.

Among the areas in which LAC proposes to expand its support are: strengthening local election and government decision-making processes; decentralizing urban development finance and management; assisting in program/project planning and evaluation; and strengthening service delivery capabilities.
and work with citizen groups to enhance awareness of the need to pay for implementing local decisions.

5. Democratize municipal government decision-making processes. Ensure a participatory decision-making process; support community-led planning efforts; provide training for newly elected municipal officials with an emphasis on participatory management styles and their roles and responsibilities in the decentralization process; and foster and support community groups, cooperatives, chambers of commerce, and a dialogue between groups.

See Table 1, Annex VII for the estimated budget breakdown for this program. Specific program emphasis would be determined in cooperation with the Missions and the Bureau.

In addition to this "core program," budget, it is estimated that individual USAIDs will launch larger projects/programs supporting major host country decentralization initiatives.

5. Strengthening Civilian Control of the Military

Through a LAC-funded study project, The American University's School of International Service and a private Uruguayan organization have developed new information on civil-military relations in Latin America, and have also significantly increased dialogue among military and civilian leaders in the region. A May 1988 conference in Washington, attended by more than a hundred internationally recognized scholars, civilian and defense experts, and military leaders from North and South America, created a new network among the participants. In addition, an important regional conference was held in June 1989 in Guatemala, hosted by the Defense Minister, which brought together Central American military and civilian leaders and academics to discuss their respective roles in transition to democracy. A second regional conference focused on South America was held in Uruguay in March of 1991.

In the FY 1993-97 period, LAC plans to utilize both policy dialogue and project assistance to build on and move well beyond these initial efforts. Areas planned for support include: helping civilian scholars and policy specialists to acquire credible expertise in military and intelligence affairs; helping civilian executive and legislative branches of government develop the institutional capacity to monitor military and intelligence systems effectively and routinely (e.g. establishing force structure levels and budget oversight; ensuring the appropriate divisions between civilian and military court systems; and helping civilian leaders design and implement strategies and programs to narrow military involvement in conflict resolution and economic activities, to enhance military professional capacities, to build effective procedures for
civilian control, and to continue to improve consensus on appropriate civilian-military roles.

Regional activities will be continued and initiated to train civilian personnel in key ministries and legislatures, to continue relevant research and conferences, to provide technical assistance to host governments in devising necessary legislation and programs, and to train Latin military personnel in democratic values (in collaboration with DOD). Bilateral programs will be encouraged and developed wherever possible and necessary, either discretely or as a component of other programs (e.g. legislative strengthening, public sector management, or think-tank support).

6. Strengthening Legislatures

Although in the 1960s and 1970s A.I.D. studied the issue of weak legislative institutions in LAC under Title IX programs, little was actually done to strengthen host country legislatures.

LAC now seeks to strengthen legislative capacity by providing technical assistance directly to host-country legislatures. The initial focus is on enhancing legislatures' institutional capabilities to draft legislation and improve their analytical and management capacity through training and promotion of research and dialogue on major policy issues. In addition, recognizing that an independent, professional legislative auditor general is important to ensure that legislators have the necessary information on government programs, A.I.D. is also training and strengthening the Offices of the Comptrollers General of Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama. Auditing courses developed for them will become available to all legislative audit offices in Latin America.

A three-year regional project in legislative development commenced in September 1990, with $3 million in regional funding and up to $4.25 million in Mission buy-ins authorized. The project has five interrelated components: 1) collaboration with Latin American legislators and staffs to diagnose training, technical assistance, and equipment needs of each legislature; 2) regional seminars that will address legislative operations and common public policy issues; 3) providing technical assistance at the request of individual legislatures; 4) design and installation of legislative and management information systems; and 5) professional staff development through graduate training in legislative administration at the State University of New York/Albany (SUNY/A), or six- to twelve-month internships at a state legislature in the U.S. The project is being implemented by a Consortium for Legislative Development (CLD) consisting of the Center for Democracy, SUNY/A, and Florida International University (FIU).
Training programs in this area must be offered to all members of Congress regardless of party affiliation, to avoid the appearance of partisanship.

A follow-on project will be required upon completion of the current project in FY 92, to carry the effort through FY 97 and probably beyond. Continued regional support will be needed for CLD's networking and common problem-solving activities, and probably for additional work with sub-regional organizations such as the Central American and Andean Parliaments, the Indian Parliament of the Americas, and expansion of ATELCA (the Central American Association of Clerks and Legislative Staff) beyond Central America. NDI and IIDH have also requested modest levels of support for legislative strengthening activities. IIDH proposes $125,000 per year for support of electoral reform-related assistance: a five-member team of legal experts; an annual seminar to study existing electoral laws and reform models; and a comparative electoral legislation research project which annually updates and systematizes electoral legislation from throughout the hemisphere. NDI seeks $300,000 a year in support for seminars that can offer models of parliamentary procedure and organization to assist the process of legislative reform, focussing on "nuts and bolts" issues such as committee systems, selection and functions of parliamentary leadership, executive-legislative relations, constituency services, staff recruitment, and office management.

Mission projects (including ROCAP support for Central American regional institutions) will expand: the needs assessments currently being conducted are stimulating demand (e.g. in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay); Mission buy-ins for FY 90-92 are already estimated at $12 million versus the $4.25 million authorized. Consequently, funding requirements are estimated at $1 million annually for regional activities and an ascending level of bilateral funding, from $3 million to $10 million, during FY 93-97.

7. Strengthening Political Parties

LAC leaves support of political party strengthening primarily to the National Democratic and Republican Institutes, with support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). A.I.D. did, however, provide in FY 1990 a $100,000 grant, through the National Democratic Institute, to strengthen the three major political parties in Bolivia after the May 7 elections. The technical assistance and training was focused on institution-building and technical problems, such as organization, use of the media, and fund-raising. It is anticipated that similar assistance to political party development may be provided in Haiti and other selected cases, when needed,
augment the assistance provided by NED. Such assistance will include organizational development, fundraising, issues research, candidate education, and campaign techniques.

LAC/DI has also supported since 1986 a project with the American University to study the role of political parties in democratic development in Central America (including Belize and Panama). This activity has generated useful networking and information, including a book being published on the subject.

LAC also reaches political leaders through legislative and electoral assistance programs, given their very active involvement in these processes, through AIFLD’s labor leader education programs, and through the training programs described under the "Strengthening Democratic Values" section below.

It is critical to ensure that assistance to parties, if government-funded, is provided to and is perceived as being provided on a non-partisan basis to all democratic parties. Otherwise the assistance will legitimately be viewed as interfering in the internal affairs of another sovereign country.

NDI and IIDH have requested assistance during the FY 93-97 period for party building and political training. Both organizations note that further democratization and institutional development is needed of parties that often lack ideological focus, remain largely personally followings, and are comprised of elites. IIDH proposes support for an annual meeting of party members to diagnose the issues confronting these parties and develop programs, and for continued research. NDI proposes training-assistance focussed on developing grassroots organizing skills, issues development, communication, research and public opinion surveys, and resource development. LAC/DI proposes $500,000 annually in regional funding for such activities. Bilateral funding is not envisioned, given the sensitivity of the area and hence the preference for working through regional instruments.

Helping Create a Vigorous, Pluralistic, Autonomous Civil Society

8. Promoting and Strengthening Alternative Information and Opinion Sources

LAC initiated in FY 1988 a grant to Florida International University (FIU) to strengthen journalistic professionalism and improve mass media education and research capacities in Central America. This is being done through training, creation of regional associations of media professionals and owners, strengthened and more appropriate university journalism education programs, and the establishment of self-sustaining centers for mass media training in Central and South America. LAC is also
supporting improved journalism education, with adaptation of U.S. textbooks to the Latin environment, and long-term training in the United States in specially adapted journalism courses. Rural radio journalists are being trained to broadcast news programs that focus on local issues and impart information of practical use to farmers and other rural residents.

In addition, through the Regional Technical Activities Center (RTAC) in Mexico, LAC is supporting the translation of a wide range of inexpensive U.S. academic and technical texts into Spanish for university students, to counter the Marxist orientation so prevalent in Latin American universities. This program has proved extremely popular, with demands for texts far outstripping original estimates.

LAC has provided support to the Institute for Liberty and Development, Hernando de Soto’s research institute in Peru, and plans to expand this pilot program for support of policy-oriented, indigenous think tanks with a practical orientation.

Finally, LAC is supporting an economic policy research and education project to train competent economists in Central America and to raise the level of public understanding of economic issues.

These activities are all proceeding successfully. Similar and follow-on activities will be supported during the FY 93-97 period. Specifically, FIU has proposed and LAC will consider expanding the Central American Journalism Project to include the Andean countries and perhaps Haiti.

9. Strengthening Private Groups and Citizen Participation

To date, LAC has sought to promote pluralism primarily through civic participation and labor programs.

a. Civic Participation

Two current programs have been operating in Central America since 1985. The Education for Participation (PEP) training program in Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica helps citizens learn and use leadership and organizational skills to address local problems. Training manuals, videos and other materials have been developed and used to train more than 350 trainers in their own communities and civic associations. The training has reached more than 160 community-based organizations. The project staff has created a new organization, Fundacion ANDAR, with legal status in each of the three countries, through which they will continue to provide training and advisory services after termination of A.I.D. funding in September 1990.
A grant to the Partners of the Americas provided support for Central American Partner Committees to carry out activities aimed at strengthening the democratic leadership of public and private institutions, including their own. A recent evaluation concluded that the capacity of the partnerships to plan and conduct programs, to function democratically, to obtain and administer project resources and to collaborate with other NGO's had been strengthened considerably. An emphasis on leadership development has resulted in more training activities, development of more youth leaders and expansion of the Partner Cities concept that extends Partners programs to small towns and rural communities in each country. In addition, members of community organizations and of public institutions (e.g., fire departments, town councils) were given training and access to valuable materials and professional resources.

Another area of support is non-partisan voter education, as illustrated by the highly effective programs carried out by local organizations in Chile and Nicaragua in preparation for their last elections. Both programs heightened voter confidence in the electoral process and significantly increased participation at the polls. The Chilean organization, Participa, has taken steps to become a permanent, non-partisan citizens' organization to continue educating citizens about their rights and responsibilities and to reinforce restoration of a democratic culture. A.I.D. will continue to help Participa strengthen its institutional capacity.

A new regional project, Civic Education and Citizen Participation, is being designed for a FY 93 start to focus on citizen participation and civic education in urban and rural communities. Participants from all economic levels will be prepared for leadership roles in politics and government, business, cooperatives, civic and community groups and other voluntary associations. The project will also offer workshops in the practice of democratic decision making. One component of the project will build upon a successful pilot civic education program in Guatemala that teaches democratic values and practices to primary school children and, indirectly, members of the adult community surrounding the schools. Another will work to continue strengthening grassroots groups and organizations.

LAC will also assist the Partners of the Americas to expand its Partner Cities concept, through which people outside the capital receive training and assistance to form and operate local democratic committees. It is hoped this program will encourage other volunteer organizations to increase their services and activities in rural communities. The program will also increase the level of training and technical assistance Partners provides to municipal-level public officials in Central America.
b. Labor Development

Strong democratic free labor unions contribute to a pluralistic society by helping workers and peasants to resist repressive governments, by providing a mechanism by which workers' grievances can be addressed, and by combating the use of organized labor to achieve undemocratic political objectives. For these reasons, LAC for many years has supported the programs of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), one of the overseas arms of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).

AIFLD provides assistance to Latin America and Caribbean labor movements in their educational activities, social programs, and union organizing campaigns. Educational activities are varied and depend on the specific needs of each country and the level (national, regional, or hemispheric) at which the courses are being taught. Special emphasis has traditionally been placed on collective bargaining, labor-management relations, organizing techniques, and other such trade union themes. AIFLD support of worker representation through the political process and worker ownership as a response to structural economic change has in recent years become an important contribution to union development, to the social and political status of workers in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to the development of democracy in the hemisphere. LAC also supports union-to-union programs, coordinated by AIFLD, which provide similar assistance and direct linkages between Latin American and U.S. unions. LAC support for AIFLD programs is both regional and bilateral; AIFLD also receives support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

Past evaluations indicate that AIFLD has made effective use of its resources to support and strengthen free democratic labor movements, and that its efforts have increased worker well-being in the areas of wages, working conditions, security and dignity of workers, and ancillary development benefits. Inadequate coordination has been noted in some cases between AIFLD and USAID Missions, and between the union-to-union and other AIFLD programs.

LAC plans to continue support for AIFLD programs during the strategy period and support AIFLD's efforts to tailor their programs to the changing needs of the labor movements of Latin America and the Caribbean. An effort is planned to help AIFLD articulate its objectives more precisely, improve its system for measuring progress toward achieving them, and reduce its dependence on LAC support.
c. Associations and Networks

To encourage the growth of a strong and independent civil society LAC plans to support grass roots, civic, professional, family based, and other associations that democratically influence government policy and provide additional means for democratic participation and expression. It will also seek to support those neglected segments of society attempting organize into associations that would be capable of making their demands heard at the municipal or national level. NDI has proposed support for the Center for Democratic Studies in Paraguay and PARTICIPA in Chile; support is planned for the establishment of an Andean Bar Association; and proposals have been received from ANDAR and a number of other indigenous organizations.

Making the Political Culture More Democratic

10. Strengthening Democratic Values and Leadership

a. Leadership Training

Numerous leadership training projects were generated by LAC in the 1960s and 1970s. The Loyola University program, funded from 1964 through 1971, was in some respects a precursor to the current CLASP program. The Rafael Landivar University's Rural Community Leadership and Modernization Center for Training Social Promoters, an in-country Guatemalan outgrowth of the Loyola program, was funded from 1964 through 1974, and the OEF project described above trained leaders from 1963 until 1972.

To help instill democratic values in, as well as technical training for, the present and prospective leadership of assisted countries, A.I.D. launched in 1985 a Caribbean and Latin American Scholarship Program (CLASP) that will provide training in the U.S. to over 15,000 individuals between 1985 and 1993 (12,200 from Central America plus another 3,000 funded by USIA, 1,785 from the Caribbean, and 1,740 from South America). Most of this training (about 75%) is short-term (i.e. no more than nine months), focussed on the socio-economically disadvantaged (80%), on women (over 40%), on rural areas (over 70%), and on present or prospective leaders (about 90%).

Evaluation of the program to date indicates that it is very popular; more effective where clear policies and procedures exist for recruiting, selecting, programming, placing, and monitoring trainees; and in need of more intensive follow-on activities as trainees return.

LAC will certainly continue this type of training, albeit at a reduced level, after the present project ends in 1993. However, given the expense of training in the U.S., the culture shock many trainees experience, and the English language
problem, LAC will consider whether some or all of the objectives of the program might be as well accomplished using facilities within the LAC region. LAC will also do proportionately more training for Mexico and South America and less for Central America.

b. Civic Education and Other Innovative Activities

In addition to leadership training, LAC will expand support for civic education programs, formal and non-formal, that will enlarge democratic values and knowledge and, in cooperation with USIA, for use of the media to reach mass audiences with programs on democratic values and practices. LAC will also support and encourage innovative and cross-disciplinary educational and other activities that promote democratic values, tolerance of others' opinions, willingness to compromise, respect for the rule of law, etc. Such activities might include: participatory, interactive learning and socialization experiences in elementary and secondary schools; introduction into health programs of non-authoritarian child-rearing and family life techniques; and greater attention in management training to team- and consensus-building techniques.

Ideas for incorporating civic education into school curricula at the elementary, secondary, and university levels include: assisting PVOs to sponsor mock parliaments and stimulate debate and public speaking in high schools on civic topics, with televised regional contests; developing pamphlets for use in school on civic responsibilities in school, home, and community; and training teachers to introduce role-playing activities involving being teachers' helpers, voting on alternative school-related activities, and creating teams to carry out school and community projects. IIDH proposes support for civic education projects in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, and Paraguay that educate people about the new political process and reenforce the transition to democracy.

A variety of indigenous and U.S. private organizations can be tapped for involvement in this area if resources are made available. LAC/Dr will provide pump-priming funding for pilot activities and seek to ensure replication of successful ones to other countries. The Civic Education and Citizen Participation project planned for FY 93 start-up will provide the vehicle for such support. However, most the activities would be funded and managed in-country through existing indigenous organizations.

c. Overcoming Ethnic and Regional Divisions

In an effort to help countries overcome destabilizing ethnic and regional divisions, LAC will look at such options as:
sponsoring research on the application of federalism to problems in LAC; sponsoring regional and sub-regional exchange programs for tribal/ethnic leaders; and supporting the use of national and regional organizations as fora for dialogue and dispute resolution among opposing factions. The planned DI Technical Support project will provide the funding vehicle.

d. **Suffusing Democratic Approaches Throughout the Portfolio**

The Administrator's Democracy Initiative urges regional bureaus to increase emphasis on integrating popular participation and democratic practices into the full range of their development programs. This paper has already proposed introducing certain innovative techniques for civic education and participation into our formal education programs. Another area ripe for consideration is the introduction of consensus-building management training techniques (team-building, organizational development, mediation and conciliation techniques, etc.) into existing public and private sector programs (e.g. cooperatives, business associations, agribusiness activities). Missions are encouraged to explore these possibilities; LAC/DI and DR/EHR will help identify sources of expertise.

e. **Research and Analysis**

Democratic development is an area relatively new to A.I.D., in which we still have much to learn. It is appropriate and necessary, in conjunction with a program that is now of high priority, that we build into it a modest applied research component. Illustrative topics include: further work on country and program performance indicators and systems of measurement; analysis of federalist, confederalist, and consociationalist approaches to problems of ethnic and regional divisions; study of parliamentary versus presidential systems; how patterns of growth can be encouraged that promote political as well as economic democracy, and their relationships; and the cost-effectiveness of various kinds of public sector management interventions. Other topics of importance will doubtless suggest themselves as LAC moves further into this program. LAC/DI will develop agendas in collaboration with the Missions, and with PPC and the other Bureaus through the "Tuesday Group" coordinating mechanism to avoid duplication of effort, with approximately $500,000 per year in funding under the Technical Support Project.
V. Organizational and Management Considerations

A. A.I.D.'s Role vis-a-vis NED and Other USG Agencies

1. NED and A.I.D.

NED works with NGOs abroad, chiefly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and responds to initiatives arising from groups in those regions. As an NGO, albeit supported with U.S. Government funds, NED is able to support projects for which direct U.S. government funding may not be appropriate, or projects that reflect more immediately the concerns of NED's constituent organizations. NED has only a small Washington office and no field staff. (Its labor affiliate, the Free Trade Union Institute, does have field staff.)

NED grants in Latin America are generally in the $50,000 to $150,000 range. NED can respond to emergency situations quickly. While many NED projects are of limited duration, or targeted to take advantage of specific circumstances (e.g. the plebiscite in Chile), NED maintains continuing relationships with nongovernmental groups with the long-range goals of promoting democratic culture and fostering "bonds of cooperation and solidarity" among democratic groups throughout the world.

A.I.D., as a government agency, has an approach to democratic development more heavily focussed on long-term institution building, although there are areas of overlap. Nevertheless, A.I.D. and NED have on occasion worked together. LAC provided $140,000 to support international election observer programs in Haiti and Chile through the National Democratic Institute. In FY 1989, A.I.D. reprogrammed $750,000 for NED activities from a DI budget of $12.9 million.

Other organizations with which A.I.D and NED work jointly include civic action groups such as the Dominican Association of Women Voters in Dominica, regional organizations such as the IIHR, and the foundations of European political parties such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The mutual support and cooperation among these groups--and between A.I.D. and the NED--were evident in the Chilean plebiscite in October of 1988 ($1 million of ESF funds to NED for plebiscite-related activities); and in Paraguay ($500,000 in A.I.D. funds to NED for election-related projects).

Depending on the circumstance, LAC can supplement NED/USIA funding with short-term grants for strictly nonpartisan, technical support to actively pro-democratic NGOs, and for political party development, the latter preferably during non-election years. However, the percentage of resources allocated to such support will be limited during the strategy period.
2. Coordination Between A.I.D. and Other USG Agencies

In the field, close coordination is required between the Embassy, A.I.D., USIA, and any other USG agencies involved in the democracy sector. A Country Team approach is essential in politically sensitive areas. For some countries, an inter-agency working group for democratic activities has been established, chaired by the DCM, the A.I.D. Director, or other designee of the Ambassador. This model is commended to all Missions.

In Washington, recent augmentation of LAC/DI staff is permitting closer coordination with State, USIA, the Justice Department, and other agencies. There is still a need for closer coordination of the AOJ program with the investigative training activities of the ICITAP program managed by State.

B. Donor Coordination

One of LAC/DI's objectives during the strategy period will be to attract increased donor support to the democracy sector. Considerable other-donor activity now exists. IIDH, for example, gets support from Belgium, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, and others. However, more can and should be done to involve other donors. LAC prepared a paper describing its program, plans, and lessons learned to date, to inform and hopefully attract other donors at a DAC review of Latin America in November, 1990. LAC/DI will follow up on this initial effort, and in collaboration with Missions will focus on trying to identify specific program opportunities for investment by other donors. Potential collaboration on public sector management projects has already been discussed. In addition, development of co-financing arrangements between A.I.D. and the IDB in municipal development has the potential of linking a rich source of experience and technical expertise through U.S. state and local governments with the substantial capital resources presently available to the IDB. Such cooperation could serve as a model for other donors such as Canada and member countries of the EEC, which also have well-established traditions of local governance.

C. LAC/DI-Field Relationships

In Washington, LAC/DI will continue its general coordinating and program oversight role, and its role as conceptualizer and advocate of the program and the resources (money and staff) needed to implement it.

With respect to project activity, LAC/DI will continue its lead role in developing and managing regional projects. In consultation with Missions, LAC/DI will launch new initiatives and implement those activities more appropriate for regional rather than bilateral intervention. LAC/DI is also developing a
quick response capability through a DI Technical Support project to support Missions when new circumstances and opportunities arise, and where funding may not be immediately available.

It is expected, however, that as the DI program continues to mature, a progressively higher percentage of the total program will be designed and managed in the field. See the resource requirements table (Annex III, Table 1) for a projection of this trend.

ROCAP plans to enter the DI sector in legislative and municipal development. LAC/DI has participated in developing ROCAP's DI strategy and will continue to coordinate closely with ROCAP.

D. Country-Specific Needs Assessments and DI Strategies

Most LAC Missions either have prepared or are preparing needs assessments and/or DI Strategies. In some cases these are rather narrowly focussed and need to be made more comprehensive, in light of the new Agency and Bureau priority being given to this sector, and in light of the analysis and recommendations in this paper. During the past year, LAC/DI has supported the preparation of DI country strategies/programs in Peru, Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and ROCAP. LAC/DI will continue to provide assistance to Missions in defining the scopes of and carrying out new or updated assessments, which are basically similar to any other sector assessment/strategy paper. Missions that have not already done so will be expected to complete these within the next year.

VI. Resource Requirements

A. Program

Tables in Annex III summarize funding requirements for the FY 93-97 period. Table 1 depicts requirements by each of the eleven program areas; Table 2 itemizes AOJ requirements. The total cost of the program from FY 1993 through 1997 is estimated at $858 million.

Table III lists currently active and planned DI projects during FY 90-92. Expanded programs not yet reflected in the table are being designed in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and ROCAP.

The total DI program is projected to increase from 13% of the total LAC Bureau budget in FY 92 to 19.6% in FY 1997. Although strengthening democracy is one of two Bureau goals and equal in importance to achieving broad-based economic growth, this small percentage of total estimated available resources should be adequate, since most program components are not
"big-ticket" programs. Certain major components of the program (e.g. public sector management and local/municipal government) will also contribute significantly to economic and social as well as democratic development.

B. Workforce

1. Direct-Hire Levels

Direct-hire field staffing will have to more than quadruple, from approximately 8 to 36 positions, to carry out the proposed program. DI programs generally do not cost a lot but are considerably more staff-intensive than ordinary A.I.D. programs. Most Missions are inadequately staffed to manage expanded or even their current DI programs. The attached table (Annex VII, Table 2) projects estimated direct-hire (DH) ceiling requirements when DI programs are fully developed, as compared with current levels. The average Mission will require an Office of Democratic Initiatives staffed with two to three DH staff, and program- or OE-funded PSCs. Programs are too important and sensitive to rely on PSCs entirely.

If the LAC Bureau cannot anticipate increased DH ceiling despite the importance and high Administration priority being given to this program, these positions will have to be carved out of existing ceilings by reducing certain Missions and/or the level of current activity in other sectors of involvement. LAC/DI believes that lower-priority areas can be identified to cover part of the requirements.

For implementation of the local/municipal government component of the program, LAC expects support from existing RHUDO staff and APRE/HUD.

2. Secondment/Collaboration and PASAs with Other USG Agencies

A potential supplement to DH/FTEs is other USG agencies interested in democratic initiatives, through secondment or PASA arrangements. This can be done both at the country level and in Washington. Staff from the State and Justice Departments, USIA, and Congressional Committees could be detailed to work in LAC/DI for periods of up to two years. At the country level, the part-time secondment of Embassy Political Officers and USIS Public Affairs might be considered.

3. Personal Services Contractors: Use of Program Funding

Another possible supplement to direct-hire resources is the use of personal services contractors and IPAs. The major constraint to this approach is likely to be OE budget limitations,
where PSCs cannot be project funded. Given the importance of the democracy initiative, the Agency should seek a provision permitting the use of program funding for DI staff, as was recently done for environment/natural resources staff.

Although all these options should be fully explored, there is no substitute for a permanent cadre of professionals with both the requisite academic background and operational A.I.D. experience. LAC/DI believes that the priority given to an expanded DI program by the present Administration warrants prompt assignment of adequate ceiling, in the field and in Washington, to implement the strategy and program proposed herein.

4. LAC/DI Staffing

LAC/DI's role is essentially two-fold in implementing the proposed strategy and program: it has a catalytic, pump-priming role in identifying needs and developing regional instruments as required; and a support role in providing assistance to Missions in designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies and programs. Both roles are unusually staff-intensive because of the gamut of Missions being assisted, especially the thinly staffed ADCs, and because of the newness and the broad range of activities into which the strategy is necessarily moving. Field expertise is slowly building but is still very limited in most of the areas targeted. LAC/DI has developed some expertise in several of these areas, but lacks it in others, notably public sector management and local/municipal government. Much of the expertise in working on human rights, political parties, legislatures, civil-military relations, and civic participation, and much of the project management workload involved in these areas has resided with one employee, now a re-employed annuitant whose contract expires May 31, 1991.

For LAC/DI's current staff and project/program workload distribution see Annex VII, Table 3.

LAC/DI's current staff also includes one Program Operations Assistant who spends half-time providing clerical support to three officers and half time assisting the Program Officer, and one clerical support person for the four remaining officers. The current clerical/officer ratio (1.5/7.5) is inadequate.

A recent consultant's report recommends adding to the LAC/DI staff: a municipal development/local government specialist, a full-time AIFLD project manager, and a part-time elections officer. (The report did not address clerical requirements). LAC/DI does not agree fully with these recommendations but does believe that to develop and implement the strategy adequately, it will need a full-time public sector management officer with experience in local/municipal government, and an additional
clerical position, which will free the Program Operations Assistant from clerical duties and enable him/her to handle some of the project workload. Even this augmented staffing, an increase from 9 to 11 FTEs, will only prove adequate if Mission and especially ADC staffs are increased to more adequate levels; and LAC/DI's clerical/officer ratio will still only improve slightly (from 1/5 to 1/4.5). These levels should, however, provide minimally adequate staffing to carry out the expanded program.

5. Overcoming Technical Shortcomings

The LAC Bureau faces technical/qualitative as well as quantitative shortcomings in staffing. There is no AOSC code for democratic development officers, and with rare exceptions all those who now perform this role were originally hired on the basis of qualifications other than those required for their present positions. In particular, political science and public-sector management background is lacking, as well as familiarity with the technical specifics of many program areas. Although legal and institution-building expertise, and work with PVOs on local-level programs, is readily transferrable background possessed by many A.I.D. officers, there are gaps that must be remedied through training; and new hires with background in political science and public sector management need to be brought in. A democratic development AOSC code should be established to provide a career path for officers in this field, and long-term as well as short-term training for on-board officers needs to be developed and funded. (LAC/DI has worked with PM/Training on the design of a short-term course, the first of which will be held in May 1991). These are Agency concerns that must be addressed to ensure success of the Agency's democracy initiative.

VII. Evaluation and Measurement of Results: Performance Indicators

A. Country Performance

The Agency is currently debating how to measure democratic performance, and how to translate such ratings into an overall Agency system for rating country performance for resource allocation purposes. Currently, LAC is the only Bureau that has already incorporated democratic performance into its overall country performance rating system. Although PPC and Bureaus are considering developing in-house systems for measurement, LAC has opted, for the current year at least, simply to use Freedom House's ratings. Although some methodological issues exist with their system, as would be the case with any system, LAC sees advantages in using an independent observer, believes that the reputable Freedom House's system is far superior to any present
operational alternative, and believes that Freedom House's ratings will prove at least as accurate as any alternative that could be developed in-house with expenditures of scarce funds and staff time. A PFC-organized workshop will be held shortly under NAS auspices to consider these measurement issues. Over the coming year LAC will be able to gauge whether field Missions (Embassy and A.I.D.) have serious issues with Freedom House's ratings, and to assess any alternatives that may be created within the Agency.

B. Program Performance

In June of 1990, LAC/DI contracted with Management Systems International (MSI) to assist in developing indicators for measuring achievement of the strategic/program objectives outlined in this paper. The MSI team visited six Missions with ongoing DI activities in the course of completing their report, which was submitted to LAC/DI in January 1991. This is the first systematic effort, to our knowledge, to develop such indicators. Given the difficulty of identifying suitable indicators for which data is available or can be obtained at reasonable expense, there will undoubtedly be follow-on work required to improve and refine this initial effort. However, it is hoped that the indicators developed by MSI will be useful to Missions and to LAC/DI in measuring program progress. They are attached at Annex V. LAC/DI plans follow-on work to conform these more closely to the strategy and improve their utility to Missions.
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* NOTE: Ranking scale runs from 2 - 14. Within this spectrum, countries ranked 2-5 are considered "free," countries ranked 6-11 are considered "partly free," and 11-14 countries are considered "not free." See attached checklists of political rights and liberties that are used in determining countries' rankings. These were developed by Dr. Raymond Gastil and have been modified somewhat by current Freedom House staff.

** ADCs
FREEDOM HOUSE
CHECKLIST FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS

1. Chief authority recently elected by a meaningful process

2. Legislature recently elected by a meaningful process

Alternatives for (1) and (2):

a. no choice and possibility of rejection
b. no choice but some possibility of rejection
c. government or single-party selected candidates
d. choice possible only among government-approved candidates
e. relatively open choices possible only in local elections
f. open choice possible within a restricted range
g. relatively open choices possible in all elections

3. Fair election laws, campaigning opportunity, polling and tabulation

4. Fair reflection of voter preference in distribution of power
   — parliament, for example, has effective power

5. Multiple political parties
   — only dominant party allowed effective opportunity
   — open to rise and fall of competing parties

6. Recent shifts in power through elections

7. Significant opposition vote

8. Free of military or foreign control

9. Major group or groups denied reasonable self-determination

10. Decentralized political power

11. Informal consensus; de facto opposition power
FREEDOM HOUSE
CHECKLIST FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES

12. Media: literature free of political censorship
   a. Press independent of government
   b. Broadcasting independent of government

13. Open public discussion

14. Freedom of assembly and demonstration

15. Freedom of political or quasi-political organization

16. Nondiscriminatory rule of law in politically relevant cases
   a. Independent judiciary
   b. Security forces respect individuals

17. Free from unjustified political terror or imprisonment
   a. Free from imprisonment or exile for reasons of conscience
   b. Free from torture
   c. Free from terror by groups not opposed to the system
   d. Free from government-organized terror

18. Free trade unions, peasant organizations, or equivalents

19. Free businesses or cooperatives

20. Free professional or other private organizations

21. Free religious institutions

22. Personal social rights: including those to property, internal and external travel, choice of residence, marriage and family

23. Socioeconomic rights: including freedom from dependency on landlords, bosses, union leaders, or bureaucrats

24. Freedom from gross socioeconomic inequality

25. Freedom from gross government indifference or corruption
Partial List of Elections
scheduled in LAC During 1992-1996

During the FY 92-96 period, there are 31 elections tentatively scheduled to be held in Latin America:


Bolivia: Presidential and parliamentary elections, 1993; municipal elections, ?.

Brazil: Municipal elections, 1992; general plebiscite, 1993; presidential, governor, and legislative (first and second rounds), 1993; municipal and governor, ?.

Chile: Presidential and legislative elections, 1993; municipal elections, ?.

Colombia: Municipal, legislative, and departmental elections, 1992; presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections, 1994; municipal elections, 1996.


Ecuador: Presidential (first and second rounds), legislative, provincial, and municipal elections, 1992; legislative elections, ?.

El Salvador: Presidential, legislative, and municipal elections, 1994; legislative and municipal elections, ?.


Paraguay: Presidential elections, 1994; municipal elections, ?.


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* Represents 1/3 of estimated costs, with other 2/3 attributed to growth and social development objectives.
# Resource Requirements, FY 1993 - 1997

($000,000s)

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**Grand Totals**

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**Estimated LAC AAPLS (DA & ESF)**

| BF      | 1,087.0   | 1,103.0   | 1,118.0   | 1,134.0   | 1,150.0   | 5,592.0   |

- DA AS % OF BUREAU TOTAL | 9.52% | 10.18% | 11.74% | 12.66% | 13.83% | 11.58% |
- LAC REGIONAL AS % OF TOTAL PRM | 33.72% | 31.91% | 27.67% | 24.67% | 21.08% | 27.11% |
- AOJ AS % OF TOTAL PRM | 43.86% | 28.76% | 28.03% | 22.98% | 21.38% | 27.96% |
- CLASP AS % OF TOTAL PRM | 13.43% | 11.84% | 9.52% | 8.22% | 7.02% | 9.65% |
- AIFLD AS % OF TOTAL PRM | 16.33% | 13.80% | 10.74% | 8.84% | 7.21% | 10.89% |
### Table 2

#### Administration of Justice
Resource Requirements, FY 1993 - 1997

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<td>600</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504-0100</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Elections Assistance</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>302</td>
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<tr>
<td>521-0227</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>CLASP II</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>164</td>
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<td>(25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>521-0232</td>
<td>Election Support</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>600</td>
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<td>521-0236</td>
<td>Democratic Enhancement</td>
<td>2,845</td>
<td>2,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>521-0540</td>
<td>PTTIC</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>(50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT NUMBER</td>
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<td>ACTUAL FY 90</td>
<td>OYB FY 91</td>
<td>CP FY 92</td>
<td>ACSI % DI (IF &lt;100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>522-0296</td>
<td>STRENGTH. DEMOC. INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>522-0329</td>
<td>PEACE SCHOLARSHIPS</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>(25%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>522-0340</td>
<td>MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>522-0364</td>
<td>PEACE SCHOLARSHIPS II</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>532-0162</td>
<td>CARIBBEAN JUSTICE IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>532-0169</td>
<td>CLASP II</td>
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<td>342</td>
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<td>(25%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>524-0308</td>
<td>AIFLD</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>524-0309</td>
<td>NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOC. (NED)</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>524-0330</td>
<td>PUBLIC SECTOR FIN. MGMT.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>524-0316</td>
<td>STRENGTH. DEMOC. INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>525-0305</td>
<td>IMPROVING POLICE SERVICES</td>
<td>6,630</td>
<td>6,570</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>525-0306</td>
<td>FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>525-0307</td>
<td>DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>525-0312</td>
<td>JUDICIAL REFORM</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6,900</td>
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<td>IMPROVING LOCAL DEMOCRACY</td>
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<td>525-1000</td>
<td>PEACE SCHOLARSHIPS</td>
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<td>138</td>
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<td>(25%)</td>
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<td>527-0313</td>
<td>ANDEAN PEACE SCHOLARSHIPS</td>
<td>272</td>
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<td>(25%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>527-0340</td>
<td>ANDEAN PEACE SCHOLARSHIPS II</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,155</td>
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<td>ANDEAN AOJ ACTIVITIES</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>596-0162</td>
<td>REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT</td>
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<td>348</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
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<td>596-0167</td>
<td>LEADERSHIP TRAINING</td>
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<td>400</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>(80%)</td>
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<td>47,401</td>
<td>59,010</td>
<td>53,584</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL REGIONAL DI PROGRAM</td>
<td>30,305</td>
<td>28,582</td>
<td>33,640</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>77,706</td>
<td>87,592</td>
<td>87,224</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL EXCLUDING CLASP</td>
<td>65,518</td>
<td>76,973</td>
<td>75,870</td>
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A SHORT HISTORY OF A.I.D.'S EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A.I.D. spent large sums of money in the 1950s and '60s on public administration, to help governments in developing countries create the managerial and institutional capacity to formulate and implement their development strategies and programs. During the 1950s, assistance was "focussed primarily on transferring managerial techniques and organizational structures that seemed to be successful in the United States... The aim was to create rational, politically impartial, and efficient national bureaucracies... U.S. foreign aid was invested heavily in establishing institutes of public administration... that would teach "modern" methods of management and through which the techniques and tools of western administration would be disseminated. During the 1960s, the emphasis shifted from merely transferring the tools of U.S. public administration to promoting fundamental political modernization and administrative reform... A.I.D... spent large amounts of money to bring people from developing countries to the United States for professional education in schools of public administration and political science, and to strengthen the capability of foreign schools of public administration." However, these approaches "came under increasing criticism during the late 1960s and early 1970s for being ethnocentric and for attempting to transplant western concepts of administration that were often irrelevant or inappropriate in developing countries." Evaluations by A.I.D. and the Ford Foundation, also heavily engaged in public administration improvement, found that the methods used were too academic, abstract, and theoretical to be operationally useful, and that the universities providing the assistance had "spotty recruitment records in terms of continuity and quality."

The universities usually "created a separate U.S. contract team presence, with excessive reliance upon expatriate heads of assisted institutions. Inadequate attention was given to expanding the pool of trained manpower and their approach to institution building did not effectively strengthen the linkages of the assisted organizations to leadership, support, and the political environment." The "training institutions, created at high cost, were able to provide services only to a small percentage of the civil servants needing training and... few were able to carry out research effectively or to provide consulting services to the government. By the end of the 1960s, little evidence existed to document their impact on improving administrative capacities or performance in the governments of countries in which they were established."
Consequently, A.I.D. "decided at the beginning of the 1970s to cut back both its funding for public administration training and for research and technical assistance in administrative reform and institution building." 56

This is the basis for the conventional wisdom within A.I.D. today that the early public administration programs failed. At the same time, Rondinelli notes that "few systematic evaluations have been made of the results of these investments on administrative performance in developing countries, and observers... disagree on their effectiveness. Some argue that in many developing countries, public administration is more effective and efficient than in the past and better than it would have been in the absence of aid." 59 Though a number of the assisted IPAs have deteriorated into lower-level training schools over time, some claim that they were nevertheless invaluable to early civil services, especially in newly independent countries. It is asserted that much was accomplished despite the above-cited criticisms; in Latin America, "the best showcase is Brazil, where major achievements were recorded in civil service development, financial management, and municipal administration. In addition, national, state, and local institutions were created through technical assistance that over the years have had a most pervasive influence on governmental performance. Two in particular [are] the Vargas Foundation Brazilian School of Public Administration (FBAP), and the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM). Administrators trained in FBAP are to be found in key government positions all over Brazil, and the influence of IBAM on municipal performance has been outstanding." In addition, "vast improvements were achieved in the administrative systems of other Latin American countries through technical assistance in public administration. Notable examples include Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and El Salvador.... In each of these countries there is an administrative culture: a set of people throughout the government who understand the language of administration and who know what good administrative practice is." Although "they are not always able to utilize their knowledge or put good management into practice for reasons beyond their control, a generation ago no such culture was to be found in most of these countries." 60 If accurate, these observations could lead to the conclusion that A.I.D. may have, as it has done in other areas, abandoned its efforts prematurely for lack of easily measurable results and/or because its evaluative time frame was not sufficiently long term.
During the 1970s and 1980s A.I.D. continued some development management activities and research, largely through S&T. The focus shifted to improving systems management in the technical sectors and, with the advent of the "New Directives" legislation in 1974, to "bottom-up" management assistance intended to bring about more equitable distribution of benefits as well as the capacity of organizations to manage more efficiently and effectively. "The focus of training shifted from transferring 'objective knowledge' to promoting action-oriented, organizationally based skill building in which on-the-job instruction, problem solving, and behavioral changes were emphasized." During the 1980s, "a learning process approach emerged as a major strategy for managing social development programs and reorienting bureaucracies toward implementing 'people-centered' development activities more effectively." Through a contract with the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) and work by David Korten, a NASPAA field staff member assigned to USAID/Manila and then Indonesia, a new management theory was developed, "based in part on the principles of community development, in part on theories of social learning, and in part on field assessments of successful local programs that were planned and managed in ways far different from A.I.D.'s usual projects.... At the heart of Korten's work was the concept of the learning process, in which programs are not planned in detail at the outset, but only the strategy for mobilizing, using, and sustaining local organizational capacity is pre-planned.... Korten insisted that leadership and teamwork, rather than blueprints, were the key elements.... An essential part of the learning process for managing social development... is coalition building. Change can be stimulated and sustained only when a coalition--which cuts across formal lines of organizational authority and is composed of individuals and groups who are directly affected by the project or program, or who have the resources to plan and implement it--can be formed to take responsibility for initiating and guiding action in innovative ways.... In order to adopt a learning-process approach, Korten and Uphoff argued, government agencies and international assistance organizations would have to undergo bureaucratic reorientation... changes in... structure to allow organizations to manage development programs through social learning and to increase their capacity for people-centered planning and innovation.... The elements of bureaucratic reorientation would include," inter alia: strategic management; a responsive reward structure in which incentives are provided on the basis of effectiveness in meeting strategic objectives; flexible and simplified planning systems; results-oriented monitoring and evaluation; participatory training that would teach organizing as well as technical skills, and use participatory methods to
strengthen problem-solving and interaction abilities; a well-defined doctrine that would promote a widely shared understanding of the organization's mission; and use of applied social science to improve the capacity to gather and use data crucial to increasing effectiveness. Other research during the 1980s, similarly, sought to identify the factors that explained the success of those development projects that were successful, and identified such characteristics as: a results orientation; dedication on the part of staff, reinforced by personnel practices that rewarded them for actions resulting in success; arrangements that held all parties accountable for achieving intended results; a high degree of local participation in design and implementation; flexibility to redirect efforts as needed and delegate authority; processes developed for continuous learning; and maximum decentralization and improvement of local communities or organizations. Many of these lessons learned were reflected in A.I.D.'s 1982 Development Administration Strategy Paper, and S&T's recently ended Performance Management Project (1983-1990). Rondinelli feels that this applied research has developed a strong, coherent new theory of development administration, "away from central-oriented approaches and toward adaptive learning, local action and assisted self-help," but that A.I.D. itself still represents a rigid, centralized, central-oriented type of management, and that one of the important challenges facing development administration theorists and practitioners is how to close the large gap that now exists between what is known about effective development management and current practice.

Rondinelli also notes, however, that "additional research on the conditions under which management systems and control techniques are effective is also needed for improving project and program performance and those under which the learning process, local action, and 'adaptive' forms of administration are more appropriate."

Meanwhile, S&T's development administration portfolio has withered away to one "Implementing Policy Change" project, and staff has diminished as noted, although the occasional public sector management project is still developed in the field (e.g. the important fiscal administration project in Guatemala).
Performance Indicators for Strategic Objectives

I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
11 Degree of control by the Judiciary of its budget
12 Judicial officers represent the broad cross-section of parties, national, ethnic, religious, and regional divisions found within the country
13 Implementation of a Judicial career law
14 Increase or decrease in the numbers of act of intimidation aimed at the judiciary
15 Judicial system's ability to reach decisions on all types of cases
16 Degree to which judicial decisions are enforced

II. JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALIZATION
17 Establishment of merit selection procedures as part of judicial career law
18 Judicial salaries are established by law to be comparable to private sector positions of similar qualifications
19 Establishment of active professional organizations for judicial officers

III. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY
20 Establishment of a court administration office
21 Establishment of training programs for judges
22 Existence of training programs for non-judicial court employees
23 Unification of documentation for all laws, decrees, legal codes, and procedures

IV. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
24 Establishment of case management and tracking systems
25 Establishment of a modern system of judicial statistics and records

V. ACCESS TO THE JUDICIARY
26 Effective procedures for the supervision of investigations
27 Use of oral procedures
28 Reduction in time required for processing criminal cases
29 Establishment of a system of bail and pretrial release system

VI. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
30 Local availability of courts throughout the country
31 Availability of legal representation through private attorneys and public defenders
32 Availability of legal education
33 Structure and fairness of court costs and fees
34 Increased public confidence in the justice system
35 An effective public education program on the justice system
36 Establishment of effective justice monitoring and policy research organizations

1. Selection process for selecting local leaders
2. Scheduling and holding of regular elections at the local level
3. Level of competition for leadership positions in local government
4. Responsiveness of local officials to public concerns
5. Amounts and sources of revenues available for local programs
6. Number and types of services provided by the local government
7. Percentage of population served by basic services provided by local government
8. Criteria used for determining priorities in service and resource allocation decisions
9. Improved institutional capabilities of local government
Performance Indicators for Strategic Objectives (cont'd.)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 3
STRENGTHEN THE CONTROL OF CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OVER THE MILITARY

31 Existence of governmental institutions controlled by the military that are unregulated by elected officials
32 Number of military officers, both active duty military officers serving as cabinet officers
33 Enactment of laws that prevent military officers from serving in key political positions to help avoid conflict of loyalty between military duty and political office
34 The degree to which elected civilians control the size of the military budgets and expenditures
35 The degree to which elected civilians control the size of the military forces
36 The degree of military control in areas other than international security
37 The ability of civilian authorities to access information in decisions of military officials
38 The ability of civilian authorities to investigate allegations of illegal or inappropriate behavior of military officers
39 A growth in public opinion that military power is increasingly under civilian control

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 4
IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY IN THE COUNTRY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

41 An electoral selection process that assures representation from the major cleavages of society
42 Degree of responsiveness to the problems, preferences and proposals of their constituents
43 Degree of legislative control over executive budgets
44 Legislature's role - to approve or disapprove major executive decisions
45 Ability of a legislature to enact laws for the society
46 The degree of legislative oversight of governmental operations
47 Improved institutional capacity of the legislature
   * policy and legal research
   * support and investigative staff
   * communication with constituents
   * publication of documents, reports & proceedings

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 5
STRENGTHEN THE DUAL INSTITUTIONAL PARTY SYSTEM

61 Level of party identification on the part of political activists
62 Level of party identification by the voting public
63 Party legal status
64 Ability of the party to maintain an institutional capacity to
   * research
   * manage mass communications
   * train workers
   * maintain election expertise
   * raise funds
   * access candidates
65 Presence of political organizations (either clubs or precinct type organizations) in urban areas
66 Ability to bring to office skilled, competent officials
Performance Indicators for Strategic Objectives (cont’d.)

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 7**
IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STRENGTHEN THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE COUNTRY TO ADMINISTER FREE, FAIR AND OPEN ELECTIONS

1. Scheduling and holding of regular elections at the federal and local level
2. Percentage of the public believing that the elections were fair, open and free
3. Independent electoral tribunal, selected in a manner that either balances party representation or is non-partisan, with appropriate budget support, trained career staff, and logistical capabilities
4. The existence of a functioning impartial system to investigate and adjudicate charges of fraud in either the registration or voting process

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 8**
STRENGTHEN CIVIC, PROFESSIONAL AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AS A MEANS TO INCREASE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING IN THE COUNTRY

1. An increase in the number of different civic, professional and community organizations
2. An increase in the membership of the civic, professional and community organizations
3. An expansion of the financial resources available to the civic, professional and community organizations
4. An increase in the number of meetings held by civic, professional and community organizations
5. An increase in the number of policy institutes associated with civic, professional or community groups
6. An increase in the institutional capabilities of the civic, professional and community organizations
Performance Indicators for Strategic Objectives (cont'd.)

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 9**
Improve the effective exercise of internationally recognized human rights in the country

9.1 Ratification of international human rights instruments
9.2 The establishment of an independent human rights commission
9.3 A government-organized and funded human rights education program
9.4 The decrease in the number of abuses according to categories established by international human rights conventions
   * Torture
   * Incommunicado detention
   * Detention of persons solely for the non-voluntary expression of their political views
   * Prolonged detention without a trial
9.5 The number of cases of human rights abuses—politically motivated crimes—brought before the justice system and the disposition of those cases
9.6 The number of government officers punished for violent criminal acts

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 10**
Strengthen the free, democratically oriented trade unions in the country

10.1 Number of unions affiliated with democratic confederations
10.2 Number of dues-paying members
10.3 Quality of collective bargaining agreement
10.4 Increase the number of labor leaders

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 11**
Strengthen the free media in the country (print and electronic)

11.1 Increased number of consumers of media products
11.2 Increased public confidence in media information
11.3 Increased journalistic, editorial, and managerial skills in the media
11.4 Increased autonomy of the media from government control
11.5 Increase in media investigative reporting
11.6 Increased journalistic stature
11.7 Increased profitability of media outlets
In addition to the specific lessons learned in connection with each of the above-described programs, there are overall or generic lessons learned since FY 1985 with the expanded democracy program. They are as follows:

1. The programs are working, despite their political sensitivity and, in particular, Latin American sensitivity regarding "Uncle Sam." But they work only if they are designed and implemented collaboratively, so the host country institution feels it has ownership of the activity. The programs must be conducted openly with all parties involved fully aware of the source of the funding (i.e., USG).

2. The program has been deliberately situational and opportunistic, supporting and building upon initiatives taken by Latin Americans and responding to their expressed needs. The current rather substantial program evolved from earlier A.I.D.-funded human rights activities that established relationships of cooperation and trust between A.I.D. and host country institutions. Thus smaller efforts laid the foundation for today's larger programs.

3. Because of their political sensitivity and high visibility, U.S.-funded programs are best implemented using a coordinated approach involving all interested agencies. Inter-agency committees at both the Washington and field levels are useful mechanisms for ensuring the necessary coordination in project design and implementation. In addition, it is important to be aware of similar or related activities supported by other donors, to assure adequate coordination.

4. Successful projects must be based on strong host-country commitment to strengthening democratic institutions. For example, the judiciary and related elements of the government or private sector must be actively working for judicial reform before substantial funding is provided for administration of justice projects.

5. Programs require a long-term commitment by both A.I.D. and host-country institutions. The strategic objective is almost always focused on institution-building and will not be achieved in a 2-4 year time frame. Supporting the evolution of democratic societies is a non-partisan, long-term effort.
6. Flexibility is key to effective assistance. It is important to be able to take advantage of opportunities as they arise, and to change direction or emphasis as circumstances dictate. A.I.D. developed and applied new internal mechanisms for the review and approval of democracy programs in order to increase flexibility and the capacity for rapid response. The program has also required exemptions from legislative restrictions on providing police assistance, the ability to work in countries where A.I.D. is otherwise prohibited (i.e. Nicaragua before the transition, Panama before May 1989 elections).

7. Because of the program's purpose, it is necessary for a donor agency to be reactive as well as proactive. The most successful and effective A.I.D.-funded projects originated from proposals received from Latin American institutions or from U.S. private organizations having established relationships and credibility with Latin American entities. Conversely, the projects that have missed the mark or face continuing implementation troubles were usually designed by A.I.D. staff or consultants, with less than adequate collaboration with host country institutions.

8. Care must be taken not to politicize the program by using it as a weapon to achieve short-term political objectives. Suspending project funding to demonstrate U.S. unhappiness on a given bilateral issue jeopardizes long-term efforts to support democracy-strengthening activities.

9. While it is true that democracy must be established and nurtured in each individual country by its own citizens, regional programs can help accelerate that growth by sharing and adapting ideas and experience, reducing feelings of isolation and hopelessness, raising the level of mutual acceptance of democratic values, and stimulating achievements through peer pressure. Regional programs can also offer training and technical assistance to a wider audience on an efficient, cost-effective basis. In addition, some institutions (legislatures, for example) are naturally drawn to associative relationships.

10. Small regional grants have proved useful as pilot efforts that laid the groundwork for more ambitious programs. Examples include support to the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, CAPEL and ILANUD, as described above. Support for
issue-oriented conferences sometimes led to longer-range projects. These activities had specific, relatively limited, achievable objectives and expectations. The regionality of the activities allowed participants to share experiences, discover common goals and seek solutions to common problems. This, in turn, stimulated ideas for future collaboration and follow-on efforts on a larger scale.

11. Highly sensitive matters can be approached effectively in an academic environment. Scholarly institutions can provide neutral, non-threatening fora where expression of differing views is welcome and often constructive. The advances made by the IIHR and the civil-military project in a relatively short time demonstrate the value of an academic approach.

12. Prior to designing a full-scale program, a needs assessment should be carried out to develop the analytical basis for the program. This assessment should be developed jointly with appropriate counterparts with a view toward developing a national consensus on needed democracy-strengthening activities.

13. In the design of projects, it is important to aim at a single strategic objective rather than a multi-purpose project. Otherwise, measurement of impact and project management become too complex. It is also difficult to provide technical services from a single contractor covering multiple areas.

14. Consultants must be completely fluent in the local language and experienced in the workings of host country institutions. Whenever possible they should be natives of the region, not North Americans.
### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
<th>Avg Per RHUDO</th>
<th>Total Per Year</th>
<th>Per 5 Years</th>
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<td>Training/Research/</td>
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<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$4,500,000</td>
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<td>Promotion/Publication</td>
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<td>198,000</td>
<td>990,000</td>
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<td>Analysis/Design</td>
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<td>Staff/Visiting Experts</td>
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<td><strong>$2,500,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$12,500,000</strong></td>
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<td>NDI Seminars</td>
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**ANNUAL TOTAL:**
$3,100,000

**5-YEAR TOTAL:**
$15,500,000

### TABLE 2

**Configuration of DR Staff Levels**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Now</th>
<th>Needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central America</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCAP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South America</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile/Argentina/ Uruguay</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caribbean</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RDO/C</strong></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## TABLE 3

### LAC/DI Staff Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Director</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Director</strong></td>
<td>Elector assistance; human rights; donor coordination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Program Officer**         | (1) Program: strategic planning, budget management, evaluation, MIS, Action Plan, CP, etc.; keep current on literature and program performance.  
(2) Projects: labor, civil-military, other innovative approaches. |
| **AOJ Officer**             | AOJ (ILANUD, private sector grants, country activities); property rights. |
| **AOJ/Project Officer #1**  | AOJ level-of-effort contract, leadership training, press/think tanks. |
| **Project Officer #2**      | Political parties, legislative development, civic education and participation. |
| **Project Officer #3**      | Financial management. |
| **Project Officer #4** (new position) | Public sector management, local/municipal government (with PRE/H). |
| **Assistant Program/Projects Officer** (convert half-time to full-time position) | Support Program and Project Officers. |
| **Secretary #1**            | Support 4 officers |
| **Secretary #2 (convert half-time to full-time position)** | Support 5 officers |
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 9.


4. Ibid., p. 22.


12. Ibid., p. 19.


15. Diamond, Lawrence, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Vol. 4, Latin America*; also, *Volume 1, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, Chapter 1; and "Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings."


17. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

18. Diamond et al, op. cit., vol. 4; p. 13


28. Diamond et al also believe their cases demonstrate that "moderation, prudence, and consistency in economic policies contribute to democratic success." Colombia, for example, "has achieved one of the highest economic growth rates in the region over the past two decades, with relatively low inflation ... by pursuing a moderate, stable mix of policies emphasizing simultaneously steady (but not spectacular) growth and the limitation of fiscal deficits and inflation. Countries following such a policy approach (including pre-oil boom Mexico and Venezuela) ... 'have generally avoided extreme populist policies--with high inflation, extreme protectionism, dramatic wage increases and extensive fiscal deficits--or radical neoliberal ones--brusquely eliminating state subsidies and fiscal deficits, imposing massive devaluations, sharply curtailing wage increases, clamping down on the money supply, and slashing tariffs.' Many of our cases--notably Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and, recently, Brazil--show the high costs to long-term economic vitality and political stability of abrupt and repeated swings between such policy extremes. Populist and radical protectionist economic policies, by ignoring the imperatives of fiscal responsibility and economic competitiveness and by confronting rather quickly (given the small domestic markets in most Latin American countries) the limits and contradictions of import-substituting industrialization, eventually make inevitable a swing toward radical austerity and liberalization measures. To the extent that the latter policies are pursued single-mindedly, however, they may depress popular wage levels and welfare to a degree that builds up irresistible pressure for a new burst of economic populism. As Waisman shows, once competing sets of economic interests and political actors converge around these policy extremes, it may be very difficult to break the debilitating pattern of cyclical alternation between them.

"A related lesson of policy and strategy ... is the cost of excessive state expansion, employment, and regulation.... The tension between statism and democracy in Latin America derives not just from the intrinsically illiberal features of a domineering state but also from its economically stultifying consequences: inefficient use of capital and labor; unprofitable public enterprises; persistent fiscal deficits; corruption,
inflation, and massive indebtedness. The shift toward leaner, more efficient state sectors and more competitive, export-oriented economies thus seems to be an important dimension of the democratic project in Latin America.*


32. Political scientists have long debated the ideal number of parties. Lipset considers the two-party system most likely to produce moderation, accommodation, and aggregation of diverse interests.

However ... if the two-party cleavage coincides with other accumulated cleavages (such as ethnicity and religion), it might so further polarize conflict as to produce democratic breakdown and civil strife. Linz and Giovanni Sartori draw the distinction instead between moderate (with fewer than five relevant parties) and extreme, polarized multi-party systems, the latter increasing significantly the probability of democratic breakdown. Yet Powell argues, from empirical examination of twenty-nine democracies over time, that a "representational" party system, in which numerous parties exhibit strong linkages to distinct social groups, may contribute to democratic stability by facilitating the involvement of potentially disaffected groups in legitimate politics--provided that extremist parties are unable to gain significant support. *c60E*

"It is difficult and probably inadvisable to derive a single, general rule about the ideal number of parties," since this depends importantly on country-specific circumstances. But:

because the party system is a crucial institutional device not only for representation but for conflict
management, what appears most important is that the party system suit the social and cultural conditions, and that it articulate in a coherent way with other political institutions. Thus, if the constitutional system is designed to induce a two-party system—as tends strongly to result from a presidential system with election of legislators from single-member districts, by simple plurality and single ballot—it makes sense to have in place other institutional inducements to cross-cutting cleavage, such as federalism... If the "representational" system is sought, proportional representation (in a parliamentary system) is its electoral means, and the encouragement of cross-cutting cleavages becomes a less pressing concern.

The DLL 26-country study does offer some support for the proposition that a system of two or a few parties, with broad social and ideological bases, may be conducive to stable democracy.... Certainly, fragmentation into a large number of parties ... is associated with democratic instability and breakdown. This is not only because such party systems tend toward ... conditions of polarized pluralism ... but also because parties in such systems are poorly institutionalized.

A critical consideration for democracy is not just the number of political parties but their overall institutional strength, as indicated by Huntington's criteria of coherence, complexity, autonomy, and adaptability. Among the 26 cases ... where at least one and eventually two to more parties were able to develop some substantive coherence about policy and program preferences, some organizational coherence and discipline, some complexity and depth of internal structure, some autonomy from dominance by individual leaders or state or societal interests, and some capacity to adapt to changing conditions--incorporating new generations and newly emergent groups--democracy has usually developed considerable durability and vitality.

33. Ibid., p. 36.


37. Edward Muller, on the other hand, concludes that the level of economic development has no direct effect on democratic stability after controlling for income inequality. See Muller, Edward N., "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality," American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, 1988, pp. 50-66.

38. Muller, op. cit., pp. 50-66.


41. Those edited by Linz and Stepan; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead; and Diamond, Linz, and Lipset.


43. Harrison, Lawrence; Under-Development is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case; Harvard Center for International Affairs and University Press of America; 1985; p. 165.

44. Ibid, pp. 146-147.

45. Ibid, p. 142.


52. For further details on this, as well as previous experience with strengthening legislative capacity, civic education, and leadership training programs, see "A Retrospective of A.I.D.'s Experience in Strengthening Democratic Institutions in Latin America, 1961 - 1981," September 1987 report prepared by Creative Associates, Inc. for AID/LAC/AJDD; p. IV.


55. See footnote 52.


58. Ibid., p. 4.


60. Rondinelli, op. cit., p. 144.

61. Ibid., p. 145.
62. Ibid., pp. 116-120.
63. Ibid., pp. 119-122.
64. Ibid., p. 146.
65. Ibid., p. 156.