CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIC EDUCATION
IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES

by
Professor C. Arnold Anderson
University of Chicago

Paper for the
Seminar on Civic Education and Development

conducted by
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
and
Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs

of
Tufts University
Medford, Mass.

with the support of the
United States Agency for International Development

May, 1970
Conceptual framework for civic education in developing societies; paper for the seminar, May 1-3, 1970. C. Arnold Anderson.
39 p.
Sponsored by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

1. Anderson, C. Arnold. II. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. III. Title.
"In a country the size of Canada, widely diverging regional attitudes are inevitable and, within very broad limits, highly desirable. With the trend toward greater provincial autonomy already well established and likely to continue, these regional differences will intensify in the future. If this inexorable trend is not well balanced by strong, mutually shared, positive feelings about the nation as a whole, it could destroy the basic consensus needed to ensure survival. The school systems of all provinces, working together and not in parochial isolation, must explain to young Canadians the sources of their diversities, encourage greater tolerance and understanding among them, and ensure their emotional and intellectual interest in preserving and enhancing their common heritage." 1/

"In the 1950's the African politician was a hero. He was fighting to bring an end to European colonial rule; he was leading his nation to independence; he was the voice and symbol of African aspirations for a glorious future. When independence was achieved, his people hailed him as father of the nation, paramount chief, redeemer, and living god. However, by the mid-1960's the African politician had fallen from grace and in many parts of the continent had turned into a villain. He was mismanaging the affairs of the nation, robbing the poor to enrich himself and his wealthy colleagues, and ruthlessly suppressing opposition and dissent. His people now often branded him as a criminal, a monster, a dictator, a vain fool." 2/

In these two quotations are embedded a large proportion of the basic issues relating to political socialization and political participation in developing countries.

The quotation referring to Canada could almost be transferred to Nigeria; the second comment might easily be used to
underline the dilemmas of school desegregation or of poverty programs in the United States today. By implication innumerable other topics emerge for our examination if one reads these two statements exegetically. Political socialization (or civic education) involves the whole life of a people, and our task in this paper will be to underline that fact while also tracing out a few of these relationships sufficiently clearly to facilitate discussion.

In every nation-state there are innumerable influences operating to generate a sense of common fate and shared aspirations: varieties of civic understanding. Of these many influences, some clearly will deserve to be called educational in the broadest sense, but many non-educational processes serve the same function. Of these educational activities, a few can be attributed to schools or to formal education; but what occurs in schools within the "social" part of the curriculum does not exhaust the "political" effects of instruction. Within any polity, innumerable supportive and also many subversive influences are at work; what we call "civic education" makes up only a small fraction of those influences and may well be the least important among them.
No one can gainsay that groups displaying unshakable solidarity have arisen within surprisingly short periods, before anyone was conscious that the schools might carry out "civic education." Contrariwise, societies that have withstood tremendous rending forces, as the United States, with seeming suddenness confront widespread insurrectionary activity or endemic sullen alienation. To identify some of the correlates of these opposite patterns of behavior is a task for this paper. To weigh and compare the effects, positive or negative, attributable to the schools is also part of the task.

The Multifunctionality of Schools

Every analyst of education has his own list of "functions" that schools perform in a society, a list varying somewhat from one to another type of society. I find it convenient to group the outcomes of formal education in six categories.3/

1. Always schools play some part in preparing individuals to participate in the ongoing changes of the occupational structure.
2. Schools instruct in various "specialties" of the culture (apart from occupations). Voluntary leadership in community activities can be an important example when we are examining the roots of viability for a given polity.

3. Schools perpetuate old and introduce new intellectual systems; not least, schools renew and perpetuate the educational system itself. But the practices of electoral participation -- so fundamental in western and "modern" societies of all political shades -- are immemorial clusters of sentiment and of civic efficacy.

4. In schools children are assisted to develop conceptions of their own identity and to realize their own untried potentialities; they assimilate new norms for their conduct and learn to value loyalties to new groups.

5. Schools always indoctrinate -- that is, they carry out at least a crude form of "civic education." Schools mold ideologies and define varied traditional and novel situations for the new generation, thereby preparing youth to share the "universals" of their culture.

6. The identification and selecting of individuals for membership in one or another elite is always shared in by schools. The culture creators and the rulers of the society
seldom become eminent without reliance upon the lessons of a school or without the experiences of success and failure in the tasks a school sets for pupils.4/

That schools can perform so as to enhance the vitality of political life in a society derives in large part from the fact that their functions are plural and not monolithic. The failures of schools in any given sector (as civic education) stem also from the fact that no educational system can have its activities confined to a narrow sector -- especially the formalized and bureaucratic systems of complex or dynamic societies. Moreover, the very forces that generate a demand for the products of the schools (trained individuals) hinder improvements in schools by enticing away the teachers or potential teachers who might lift the productivity of instruction to new heights. Indeed it is precisely the expansion of consumers' demands and their backward effect upon producers' demands for improved factors of production that makes the moving of superior teachers into schools through the mechanism of above-market pay difficult. The multiplication of mass media and of other society-knitting agencies is fostered by growing economic productivity, and this removes some of the task of creating "national consensus" from the schools. But the kind of society that
possesses a dynamic consumers' market and a productive apparatus to match is also the society that nourishes individuation, special-interest groups, locality differentials in rates of social and economic advance, and the many varieties of "particularism" that in certain contexts we call "tribalism."

One could go on specifying the dual effects of each function of schools to any length. Whether in the economic or in the political sector, the drawers of blueprints for schools can single out the capabilities of schools to serve particular ends: for example, the creation of a political consensus purified of the dross of xenophobia or elitism. But in other respects schools are expected also to qualify and motivate individuals to serve in elite positions where the claims of the masses seldom can penetrate. Moreover, the productivity that makes a society one around which loyalties focus tightly is also one possessing an economy in which for decades or generations visible disparities in levels of living are perpetuated, exacerbating the traditional tensions among regions or peoples now brought under one nation-state.
The Loosely Connected Matrices of the Factors of Development

For over a decade, supported by the tireless energies of the computers, statisticians have been supplying us with increasingly complex and definite pictures of the interconnections among economic, social, and political components of what is variously called "development" or "modernization." Perhaps the salient feature of this vast hoard of correlations is the looseness of the connections among any set of factors we choose to identify and measure. One might say what has been said of personalities: all positive traits are positively correlated -- but not very closely. Just as the multifunctionality of schooling has led some to assert that we never have a school system, so the dogma of a generation ago that every culture or society is an integrated whole has lost much of its meaning as we apply more precise instruments for the identification of linkages among the parts of a society.

Any reader may repeat my search through the correlation coefficients in recent reports. One is brought up short by observing that civil disturbances appear more often to characterize agricultural than urban life. Turning to educational indexes, one notices that over a decade national
differences in increase of literacy were unrelated to most other variables; indeed, it was not the least literate, but the most agrarian societies that made the largest gains. Primary-secondary enrolments appear to be more closely related to other indexes of development than is university enrolment. But high enrolment in college seems not to favor the spread of literacy, nor to accompany high levels of voting.

Harbison and Myers⁷ found that the proportion of national income devoted to education as a whole was rather closely associated with university enrolment, unconnected with secondary enrolment, and negatively correlated with primary attendance. Perhaps more striking was their demonstration that the proportion of students studying science and technology was uncorrelated with national income level, while employment in those sorts of occupations rose with level of national income. Should one then conclude that the familiar correlation among individuals of political participation and level of schooling is attributable less to definite political instruction in school than to many sorts of political influence opened up by persistence in school generally?

When one looks at the matrices for political data specifically, again the looseness of the structure of
relationships impresses one. But, seen against the recent discussion of "traditionalism vs. modernism" this finding should not surprise us. Clearly any "modern" pattern of economic life or of political behavior in the contemporary world is going to be affected by outside (mainly "western") models. Clearly also, a shift to use of modern technology and greater reliance upon market processes will induce some convergences among societies; e.g., inevitably they will have to rely more upon formal schools and specifically upon instruction in western-type science. To the degree that a country demonstrates discernible movement toward "modernization," it will become in some respects like the United States or England; along the way also Portugal will become more like Italy and Peru more like Mexico. But nevertheless, it will be many generations, not just decades, before ways of life over the world lose their distinctiveness. In short, serial correlations are almost always higher than cross-sectional coefficients.

Yet in these matrices of indexes for schooling, use of mass media, family history of political activity, occupational status, residence in modern rather than backwoods cities and other indices of personal modernity are positively associated with indexes relating to political participation.
and leadership roles. As Nie et al recently put it:
"economic development alters social structures, particularly the class structure and the secondary group structure. Expanding the middle class and increasing the organizational complexity of society changes political socialization patterns; greater proportions of citizens have those politically-relevant life experiences which lead to attitudes such as political efficacy, sense of civic duty, etc. These attitudes motivate the citizen to participate in politics, sensitize him to available opportunities, and provide him with political resources. Thus it is that economic development increases the rate of mass political participation." 

Now, while "information" is directly related to quality of school experience and while participation in "secondary group structures" surely reflects qualifications to which schools contribute, it is difficult to discern any direct and major effect of political instruction in schools within the complex pattern delineated by Nie and his associates. On the other hand, we have a growing number of studies of school pupils' political knowledge and attitudes. Yet in a recent summary of one of the more elaborate of these investigations, East and Dennis conclude that they can identify only
a trivial proportion of the variance among pupils in political sentiments.\textsuperscript{12/}

Indeed, more than one writer has remarked that observable variations among individuals or groups in political outlooks correspond to no identifiable or even imaginable pattern of experiences in schools. On the other hand, to anticipate a point that will recur, there indisputably is a gross correlation between political (or economic) modernity of outlook and amount and quality of experience of school.\textsuperscript{13/}

I am in part accepting Ross' distinction between change of attitude of individuals or groups and change in percentage of members of a group possessing a given attitude.\textsuperscript{14/}

Whatever the factors inducing a given pattern of viewpoint or behavior in hitherto traditional people, on both a group and an individual basis, those factors will be found correlated with both modern education in a general sense and the familiar pattern of academic formal schooling. Just as the passing of examinations in physics or biology goes along with membership in the ruling elite of a new nation while patronage of witch doctors or astrologers expands, so high examination scores in a well-designed course of study in civics need not enhance appreciation of the actual and tenacious manifestations of the difficulties of realizing cooperative unity among
leaders from different provinces. Moreover, one can with greater confidence award certificates for medicine or agriculture than for economics of political science -- greater confidence that what is taught has been learned to the point of exemplification in behavior. That comprehension of how government works undeniably accompanies more active and efficacious support of a government striving to organize itself for nourishing development does not warrant the conclusion that more systematic and sophisticated lessons for children in civic education is the principal means to widen and augment the practice of thoughtful participation in civic life. Or, again to anticipate, requiring local districts to pay half the cost of running elementary schools -- commonly today regarded as a step backward from "equity" -- may well produce more active habits of political endeavor for development than heavy investment in design of locally oriented lessons on how the new independent government is put together and carries out its tasks.

Conflicts between Tasks for Leaders and Motivations of Leaders

There hardly is space in this brief paper for even a summary of the manifold duties and responsibilities expected of the leadership cadres in developing societies. As we all
recognize, the promptness with which payoff from development is expected to materialize induces leaders of "new nations" to exalt their own importance and to acquiesce in only token responsibility remaining in the hands of the local leadership or the people who presumably are learning to experience the challenges and the successes of modernization. That this sense of urgency fosters a "father of his country" rather than a "servant of the public" conception of leaders' roles needs little demonstration. Insofar as schools are called upon to devote time to lessons about government, in such unleisurely circumstances one can anticipate that schools will focus in their civics lessons more upon expanding acquaintance with the symbols of nationhood than upon the behavior that undergirds and strengthens responsibility of individual citizens for carrying forward their share of the onerous tasks of development.

The foregoing comment clearly borders on the discussion by Myint\(^{15}\) of the dilemma between creation of social organizational patterns embodying flexibility and the imposition of necessary -- let alone excessive -- discipline upon a people whose leaders have committed them to pursuit of a virtually mythical end called "development." Because of the contemporary emphasis in the third world upon "leaders" there is a built-in
tendency to seek ways to "discipline" a people rather than ways to encourage flexible utilization of available circumstances and resources. Whether one chooses Myint's formulation or the one I stated in the preceding paragraph, these interlocked tendencies toward rigidity are encouraged by the contemporary vogue for the language and ideology of socialism. Here one must think not only of inclinations to await instructions from the capital (as may have gone on for generations under colonial rule) but also of the ideological emphasis upon "democratic centralism." Whatever one might have felt confidence in writing a couple of decades ago, today the retarding effects of "centralized" direction of national life must impress us. The sudden outpouring of rigorous analyses of the problems of agricultural development is supporting what only a few were saying two decades ago about the power of the market to induce development-fostering zeal among ignorant peasants. But with the almost universal stranglehold by central ministries upon the implanting and the operation of schools (not to mention other agencies with which the public comes into contact), one must emphasize that study units designed to foster "civic education" almost tropistically turn to verbal exhortation for citizenship while the civil service manifests its disdain for self-directed pathways toward higher production and local responsibility for
useful means such as schools. One has to suspect that the large investments in establishing and operating institutes for training in public administration around the world do much to encourage this mandarin outlook by civil servants. There is more instruction in such programs about efficient administration by civil servants than there is about how to draw out active and flexible manifestations of local and self-oriented behavior that adds to the GNP -- inevitably leading to widening of economic and other differences among fellow villagers. And, to reiterate, a large proportion of such training programs for officials -- even when run by the capitalist and states-rights United States -- tacitly or directly espouse the view that decisions for a whole society ideally are made by formulators of a "central plan." The whole cluster of situations alluded to in the preceding paragraphs combine to discourage civic education in the schools that emphasizes active and responsible behavior by citizens. The tendency rather is to "explain the national plan," "portray the benefits of freedom from colonialism," or warn of the dangers of neo-colonialism, talk about ritualistic performance of electoral support to national leaders in the manner of a 19th-century Gaspe priest exhorting his flock to attend mass, and so on. In short, the very emphasis upon the responsibilities of
national leaders to hasten development and complete the removal of all tokens of subservience to a former ruler or to more prosperous nations encourages a ritualistic style in designing lessons about political life for a nation's schools. Assuming for the moment that lessons in schools about politics can be effective, a frequent outcome of these circumstances is the discouragement of the rise of institutions that could embody local and citizen-operated activities that are the very texture of the development so eagerly hoped for.

An unintended but widespread hiatus in political thinking that is endemic throughout the "third world" exacerbates the problem discussed in this section. There is widespread discussion about the means for achieving "national unity" and about the necessity to turn out sufficient "high-level manpower" with which to staff the always expanding governmental establishments. Many of the underlying reasons for the prevalence of those views have already been set forth. But these preoccupations often lead to an overlooking of the fact that the principal aim of governmental agencies is to adjudicate and compromise the "real interests" arising out of (mainly economic) processes of development. It seems reasonable to contend that the main content of day-to-day political operations (apart from the routines of administration) is to balance the
competing claims of different regions of a country, or different sets of producers, of the haves against the have-nots. The boring details of appropriations committees in the legislature, the procedures for bringing the $1,000 cost per university student per year down toward the $10 cost per village child per year by challenging the unrealistic dogmas of international experts, the establishment of safeguards for the integrity of marketing-board funds so that farmers will have inducements to produce food at home and reduce the frittering away of foreign exchange — all these are the kinds of hard clashes of objective interests that presumably are the stuff of politics. But so long as national leaders indulge the dreams of home-grown variants of socialism and dragoon teachers into sermonizing about that or other dreams rather than encourage the kinds of development that put food in children's stomachs, no courses in civic education will tangibly foster modernization or discourage futile parroting of synthetic or so-called national traditions.

Some Dilemmas in the Institutionalizing of Effective Political Socialization

One might say that the immediately preceding section was concerned mainly with obstacles to the inauguration of serious civic education. Here I will discuss a few salient
ambiguities or dilemmas that arise as well-conceived efforts to orient pupils toward a pattern of political life are tried out in the actual schoolrooms of a developing society. To be sure, in every example the many developing countries display diversity, and their several experiences sometimes point in opposite directions when viewed as models.

It may be useful to begin with a theme that has received increasing attention among writers about development: the ambiguities in the concrete meaning of both "traditional" and "modern." This is not the occasion to resolve the debate over whether modernization must entail westernization: on the whole I see no escaping a broadly affirmative response. But as already said, each country's traditional way of life is a distinctive starting point on what may be a common journey toward an illusorily simple goal of modernity. Wherever the models for individual components in the new and more modern society be found -- West or East, in the recently ruling metropolitan power, in the world's most technological society, or in the neighboring country that started its journey a decade or a generation earlier -- how those components are fitted together inevitably reflects the particularities of the traditional way of life from which the journey begins. No one need fear that success in "development" will entail sweeping
sacrifice of familiar and distinctive customs and beliefs. For example, there is more than an exotic parallelism between the vicissitudes of Japanese universities today and how the Tokugawa government treated the Dutch hostages residing at Nagasaki two centuries ago, as there also is with the tactics by which the Meiji "restauration" was effected.

If one turns from these generalities to the down-to-earth tasks of designing a new school curriculum, the counterpoint of tradition and modernity is a refrain that the curriculum builders cannot block out, however revolutionary their aims may be. The features of "modernity" (whether economic or political) that are to be encouraged by the new lessons in school are comparatively few in number. Each, however, is difficult to state in terms that pupils can use as cues to their own behavior in achieving "success." Always, in this context, there is the dilemma of asking teachers to encourage behavior that will bring a "modernity" whose very nature can hardly be made comprehensible to young children or even to university students unless they have already seen that modernity incarnated in the life roles of parents or neighbors. It is really of little help, popular though the effort may be in the third world today, to assert that development will follow a new kind of socialism that embodies traditional
practices of consensus-decisions or of large-family cooperation. Almost never will the curriculum builders be so fortunate as to find definite social patterns in traditional life that can be transferred bodily into "modern" behavior that increases production of maize or demonstrates the way to operate an effective income-tax system. Traditional practices of consensus in a village -- seldom actually in a whole tribe -- provide few cues for using the ballot to choose a barely-known legislator who will effectively protect the peasants' hard-won marketing receipts against being raided to provide overseas up-grading stipends for older officials fearful that they will be unseated by younger and better-trained officials coming out of the new university.\(^{19}\)

But of even greater difficulty for the designer of teaching practices or textbooks is the absence of any relevant traditions for the many peoples now making up the new nation. "Build the curriculum on the local culture" is an exhortation as shrilly hurled at ministries of education throughout the third world as it is at curriculum planners for black pupils in central-city schools at our doorsteps. The cruel fact is that few nations have either shared traditions or a comprehensive "local" culture that can safely be made the basis of school lessons that combine traditional ideas with prescriptions for
an unrealized but hoped-for future. (I pass over without comment the odd fact that people speak of creating a "national" culture while aspiring to see truly Africa-wide organizations become effective, and at the same time exalt the tribal traditions that so often virtually destroy a nation while its ministry of education desperately searches for "national" folkways.) The traditional cultures seldom can be reinterpreted so as to facilitate development, as remarked above; thus the anti-capitalist appeal by Nyerere to alleged traditions of equality undercuts the emergence of laborers' jobs for unemployed school leavers on the farms of successful and productive peasants. The rationalization of the single-party state (even if competition within the party be vigorous) hardly encourages the preparation of textbooks stressing that a key role of political figures is the articulating of divergent interests. The implementation of beliefs that each region in Nigeria should have its own agencies for higher education surely reflected protection for local traditions more than a sense of "national" unity. The many universities would seem to have undercut effective national unification more rapidly than they trained a national civil service devoted to modernization at the expense of tradition. What conceivable kind of instruction about civic behavior could have been instituted in the actual
Nigeria of 1960 or earlier that would have retarded the slide into political chaos?

The issues surrounding "the language issue" are so tightly linked with those relating to the counterpoint of tradition and modernity that comment here may be brief. There are sharp controversies among men of good will on both what is pedagogically desirable and what is feasible. I remarked on another occasion that to test whether a nation was ready to absorb technical assistance in improving its schools the most diagnostic question is: "What proportion of pupils have no textbooks?" Leaving aside the instances of merely logistic inefficiency, a major problem is clearly in the tortuous language disputes.

Few would deny that pupils will learn more happily if they begin their school lessons in the mother tongue. (How great the efficiency of learning first in the vernacular as compared with going directly to a more widely used language is a question that need not be taken up here; initial gains in using those vernaculars for early grades may be smaller than we usually think.) But there are impressive obstacles to teaching in the local tongues. There is first the question of whether the government can produce or afford to purchase the inevitably more costly stock of school books in several languages. Furthermore, there is the horrendous problem (closely tied to
the preceding discussion about "national culture) of whether it is wise to ease pupils' learning at the cost of preserving, reviving, or even inventing innumerable fragmentary cultures or languages that objectively can have no future. Closely related is the concern that use of several vernacular languages rather than a single medium of instruction (even an adopted familiar French or English) will generate so many controversies about the place of each culture in the new national culture that agreement about syllabi and textbooks will be postponed for decades. Then there is the fact that since development inevitably is accompanied by large-scale migrations, a steadily growing proportion of classrooms will contain pupils speaking more than one unrelated vernacular -- and the teacher seldom will know more than one of them. Moreover, since teachers will emerge only some years after schools have taken root in a new area, teachers who come in from educationally more advanced areas will seldom know the local tongue. One can envisage an "imperial" imposition of one or a few languages of instruction. But one can hardly at the same time talk about linking the schools into the local culture so subtly as to persuade pupils their local culture should be surrendered willingly in order to spread a "national" culture the elements of which must almost always be initially incompre-
hensible to them. Alternatively, as said above, the "civic" lessons can focus on symbols in order to foster national unity -- acquaintance with the flag or with the ruler's picture, or the visible displacement of expatriate officials by local men -- but these lessons will contribute little to spreading prepotent attitudes linking individuals' political acts to national economic advance.

I have commented at several points on the questions of how to use schools to deal with the obstacles inherent in "tribalism." This problem is more manageable of course within a university (if there be one in a country) than it is in elementary schools for many reasons that need not be enumerated. So far as concerns the politically neutralized civil service, then, one can anticipate limiting fissionparous tendencies to modest levels. But as concerns the politically active elite (legislators, members of provincial councils, etc), one can expect ambitious politicians to seek private gains from reviving local and particularist rivalries and differences. How a ministry can introduce textbooks that explicitly discuss the drawbacks of such demagogic political behavior while politicians continue to have a voice in placing their fellow tribesmen in good civil service jobs transcends my imagination.
But there is a different sort of tension that lies along the vertical rather than the horizontal dimension, so to speak: gulfs between mass and leaders. With the emphasis upon pay-off in crude material or GNP terms so usual today whenever discussion focuses upon achieving "development," it is not surprising that we have seen the rise of a whole school of specialists on "high-level manpower requirements." (The merits of that viewpoint need not be debated in the present paper.) The result has been that while widespread literacy and elementary schooling is also seen as vital for economic development, stress has fallen mainly upon the more advanced forms of training and upon rapidly expanding at least one local university. This stress upon higher education and the accompanying financial starvation of village schools results in part from the fact that these analyses and proposals are written by university graduates or professors. The same focus emerges also from the already mentioned vogue for "socialism" and "planning" among technicians in international agencies and among their clients in the ruling cadres of the aspiring but not yet developed new nations. So far we have only a handful of studies comparing the contributions from different levels of education to economic advancement, for the difficulties in carrying out such investigations are many.

It is unfortunate, nevertheless that the well-placed university
graduates in the new governments can seldom be brought to face the fact that their preoccupation with university training (and the upgrading of earlier graduates) results in failure to consider the educational and instructional needs or desires of the vast masses in whose names development is being sought. It seems utopian to expect officials with such biases either to approve funds for or to participate in the preparation of school syllabi designed to give pupils a realistic understanding of either the basic processes of development or the ways in which decisions about such questions as distribution of educational resources should be worked out. Lest it seem that I am merely indulging a populist predilection, I mention that in nearly every non-advanced country expenditures per university student are many times those of a pupil in a village school -- often running to ratios well above 100 to 1. A second, "populist" query would ask why the fallacy that free university education is "democratic" cannot elicit even serious discussion from either officials or university students in most countries of the "third world." If one envisions civic education as embracing discussion of some of these sorts of issues of equity -- granting that most fundamental economic topics can be handled only at the higher educational levels -- then one has to think seriously about how to construct teaching units about concrete decision processes
while avoiding the generalities of the maudlin literature about "African" or some other imaginary socialism.

Finally I come back to a new implication of the earlier point about the frustrations of conducting civic education in a society devoted to "one-party" government. This form of rule -- even where countries do not have the enormous human resources of secret police found in Russia for over a century -- tends to be accompanied by chronic uneasiness among teachers and by controversy about the orthodoxy of all officials and particularly about the work of the schools. Not infrequently local party bosses have the right to walk into classrooms and to report upon the political orthodoxy of teachers. No doubt teachers in most classrooms over the whole world could benefit from sympathetic and wise counsel about how they teach. But to put the emphasis upon first insuring that one is faithful to the party edicts or the syllabus in civics (in the rare instances where such a syllabus and textbook exist) is virtually to guarantee that teachers will be cautious also about how they teach other subjects. An individual's teaching style is not a mixture of bits and pieces; a habit of caution in teaching civics (which by the terms of the problem as it is here discussed can hardly also be relevant to development) is going to recur when teaching science or English. Venturesome learning and enthusiasm for inculcating a liking for
"problem solving" is seldom going to emerge among pupils of a teacher who never knows what moment her work will be scrutinized by a political hack for political loyalty.

Without belaboring the difficulties of identifying all the circumstances in which civic education can be both relevant and inspiring, additional facilitating and inhibiting circumstances will be examined next in the context of the familiar debate about "practical" education. It is a basic article of faith within international agencies and among many specialists on "developmental education" that the schools of the third world can succeed where our schools have failed by developing patterns of instruction and learning that are practical rather than "academic" in the invidious sense. Examination of that creed and of a few of its implications for civic education will occupy the ensuing section.

Search for a More Practical Developmental Education

Discussions of the relationships between education and development are filled with assertions that a given school system contributes to economic and political modernization, or, contrariwise, that its effects retard development.21/ It is of course not very conclusive to enumerate the shortcomings of a school system, for one can draw up an indictment of the
schools in the most advanced country in the world by whatever
criteria of excellence you prefer. The difficulty is, for the
now-advanced countries, that the schools we now indict so
severely produced the very advancement that has taught us how
much more advanced we might be. Schools may indeed cease
being unadapted to the putative needs of a society as markets or
political contexts change, without any modification in the
schools themselves -- though of course that would hardly be a
typical situation. If residents acquire a new perception of the
opportunities open to them, their schools can become more rele­
vant and practical (either politically or economically) with
minimal change in operation of the schools or in the character­
istics of teachers. Indeed, we now have many well-documented
histories that show how readily "western" schools have been
implanted in new situations and with surprising speed become
heavily patronized and well supported by local families. As
already remarked, this often-repeated experience casts doubt on
the older dogma that "foreign" practices normally are resisted
by a culture. But the issues revolving around "localization" of
schools have been sufficiently dealt with in earlier pages and
here we are concerned more with practicality than with congruence
to local customs.
An educational system may serve some goals of a society comparatively well but serve others little or poorly; e.g., investment of black American youth's time in schooling is not markedly below that by white youth. However, informal association by the two groups in the learning process meets with strong resistance. Both situations reflect and in turn alter Americans' reactions to their political judgments and policies about education.

One can hardly dodge the question: how judge whether schools are adjusted to the character (or needs) of a society? Studies of political socialization emphasize the potency among small children of the image of the president whereas local and state officials are unheard of -- as they normally continue to be among adults. Nevertheless, civic education is hardly to be conceived as mainly exhorting pupils to hand over activities mainly to the distant and clumsy federal government; yet how make both the local governmental structures and the local problems (say, of pollution) vivid for an oncoming generation of voters?

Closely related are the debates about the pedantry or bookishness of schools. To be sure, memorization of facts about the political structure impresses one as being less relevant to life than memorizing the multiplication tables. But preparation
of pupils to be active citizens -- apart from the crucial experiences of extracurricular activity -- entails something more than evangelistic pleas for "participation;" there is also the indispensable digging in libraries, municipal records, and legislative minutes. But those activities will be mainly mindless participation unless accompanied by bookish analysis of the political economy of local tax systems or the importance of market incentives for eliciting vigorous productive activity by peasants. Unfortunately there are few outside the ranks of expatriate teachers with the self-confidence or the education to enable them to lead pupils or students into such activist forms of political instruction. Moreover, such undeniably superior ways of training pupils to be sensitive to the basic political problems around them call for resources that many educators contend would best be put into other lessons in the schoolroom. (It is important to underline that permissiveness toward local loyalties in choosing a language of instruction will rapidly consume large proportions of classroom time that might more suitably be spent on science or on civics.

A commonly overlooked obstacle to working out more practical and interesting forms of civic lessons lies specifi- cally in the strong role of the dominant party in deciding what shall be taught about civics and the manner in which pupils
shall learn the material. In most developing countries the factors that produce a shortfall in numbers of well-trained party officials and teachers also ensure that the party will be clumsy in expressing its wishes about civic education. Poor officials are more likely to be dishonest officials, whether in civil service or the party; such men will not welcome realistic explorations by pupils of how a new road from the village to the main highway was financed. Nor will they welcome zealous teachers leading their pupils into exploring any other governmental activity on the ground.

There is now a large literature relating to the development of practical vocational education. The history of such schools in the then colonial world was a succession of disappointments. Either the local people saw vocational training as "inferior" because it had not been the training of the officials over them or they saw that bookish lessons led to better-paying jobs with the colonial service. Moreover, such training (after initial years of building up a supply of carpenters and masons to erect schools or government buildings) proved to be out of date and little esteemed by employers. The whole problem has been revived recently as the number of youth with some schooling but no jobs in sight has mushroomed, and the trite proposal is now heard widely that village youth be taught farming so that they would be maladapted for any other sort of
employment. Here I am not interested in rehearsing this debate but rather wish to indicate the dangers of a dual school system. It is astonishing how many people talk about insuring equal opportunity of poor and rich for secondary school at one moment and in the next breath urge that village youth be given a segregated education that would in effect reserve not only the best-paying jobs but also the best chances to pass examinations admitting to secondary schools and university to those youth residing in towns. Such a pseudo-practical choice would certainly dramatize the difficulties in finding the most useful sort of schooling for a developing country. But it would also (even if it solved the problem of surplus migrants to towns) dramatically make clear that the whole discussion about democracy and fairness by national leaders was hypocritical and demagogic.

As I have pointed out several times when dealing with "practicality" of education from the economic viewpoint, there is too little attention given to specifying who had best receive this practical instruction. As to training for the life of a farmer, I view it as urgent to instruct all university students about the economics of agriculture and about its place in the total economy. It is mainly university graduates who will be legislators and civil servants making decisions about agricultural policy, tax policy, import or export tariffs, and so on.
So again I would urge that perhaps civic education beyond the simplest of lessons belongs mainly in upper-secondary or university courses. Again my reason is that these are the people who will make the policies. While they need followers and informed voters behind them, they need to understand the implications of different political structures or different ways of institutionalizing a loyal opposition to the reigning government.

Up to now it has proved difficult to demonstrate that any curriculum in civic affairs effectively changes the attitudes of pupils. To be sure, the pupils who have fewer non-school sources of information and who are generally disadvantaged do seem to be affected by civics courses. But one would hardly equate the typical elementary-school pupil of Peru to the Spanish-Americans in the schools of El Paso, Texas or the pupils of Kenya to the blacks of Boston. Undeniably, superior teachers supplied with abundant materials and good supervision could accomplish wonders. But the developing countries can hardly have many schools with such advantages. And, repeating a main theme of this paper, to introduce relevance or practical emphasis on examples into the schools will usually draw out opposition from the reigning party or rulers. It seems to me undeniable that more recalcitrance on the part of fiscal officers or party leaders will be met with in proposing effective new programs in
political education than for new science or mathematics curricula. This is not only because the putative interests of the "power elite" are aroused in the former instance; it is that the many facets of "nation building" under the auspices of one or of competing parties are touched upon by political or civic education. Moreover, the many effects of schooling that may be summarized under the broad rubric of "career payoff" are involved when one starts to propose reorientation of how schools serve to enlist the loyalties of pupils for "developmental aims." In short, we are now beginning to take up the "mobility effects" of schooling along with broader equity issues that inevitably arise when societies become self-conscious in using school systems for effecting the "social" aims of development.24/

**Education and Mobility Opportunities**

The broadest ramifications of the tension between goals of equity and of efficiency have been discussed by me at length.25/ Clearly, as has been enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, education has come to be in itself a political aim, apart from whatever ways it may also serve as instrumentality to diverse other political aims. In fact, many of the dilemmas or dualities pointed out in earlier pages draw upon deep wells of animus and contention just because they do reflect widespread predilections to view educational opportunity as a prime topic for
explicit working out of the goals of equity and/or efficiency. How excruciating the choices of policy in this area may be can be realized by taking the not-untypical figures for Tanzania.26/ Half of an age cohort born in the middle 1950's would never enter any school; a third would achieve bare literacy (4 grades); one in five could complete elementary school; three percent would enter secondary school though not all would finish or go further.

At the same time we are witnessing in many parts of the world a telescoping of our educational experience in that the employers' demands for schooling rise faster than parents feel they can raise the amount of time children stay in school. The anticipated mobility effects of schooling that have been startling in some of the developing countries in recent years are beginning to shrink as countries move toward the western pattern where relatively advanced schooling is necessary but not sufficient to assure mobility. After all (even in developing countries) opportunities in upper occupations expand slowly, in relative terms, after an initial spurt. Since opportunity and schooling specifically are likely to be lively topics in civics courses, the intricacies of the education-mobility link (that baffles a large proportion of western sociologists) will prove to be a dangerous topic for inclusion in class discussions. And as governments find it more and more essential (rightly or foolishly) to slow down the flow of pupils, teachers concerned
to offer relevant and lively lessons about opportunity and
nation building are going to find larger parts of their syllabi
firmly rewritten by representatives of the ministry. At the
same time the unexciting mechanisms by which discontented
citizens can use electoral campaigns to affect legislators' actions will receive little attention in those courses or syllabi because the use of political activity to achieve interests (rather than mainly to affirm unity) has not been a major part of political thought in most of the third world.

If, on the other hand, politics came to be viewed as a mechanism for balancing conflicting interests, the distribution of educational opportunities can become a salient political issue in several forms. Merely for illustration, I mention the contentions about the distribution of elementary schools among areas of the country. Here the "proof of intent" policy of laying most of the costs upon local people (easing the burden on hardship areas) becomes one of the most effective educational devices for inculcating some of the fundamental lessons about how development depends upon local and individual activity. Alternatively, a square facing of the need to force individuals (again with allowance for hardship cases) to decide individually whether it is personally worthwhile to continue into, say, upper secondary school or university or to take a job becomes a prime unit in any relevant course in political economy.
Conclusion

To have used even a tenth of the materials looked over before starting this paper would have produced a 200 page precis of recent literature on political socialization. Apart from the intrinsic limitations of pages available to any one participant, I have chosen to cut through the materials in what some readers may see as a rather unorthodox fashion.

An adequate summary of the correlates of education in the political sphere for a half dozen assorted countries can be found in the Almond and Verba report. A parallel report on many similar topics for different villages in one section of Tanzania can be found in Hyden's book. An overview of the whole topic can be found in the Dawson-Prewitt textbook. What can be said for the direct effect of schooling upon political attitudes and behavior is adequately represented in those sources, as in many others familiar to most readers. The specific embedding of the problem in the context of "modernization" can be found in the worldwide survey by Inkeles and colleagues. The indirect effects of education upon political action, complementing or offsetting other factors such as family or social status, has received less attention. Greenstein, for example, suggests that improved registration procedures probably would induce more added participation in political life than any
practicable increment in exhortation or instruction, of adults now or of children for the future. 31/

Tacitly, I have underlined several practical obstacles to civic education as they have emerged from my reading of the literature. One is the great difficulty in changing attitudes about any topic by deliberate and calculated verbal instruction. Another is the fact that a government eager to feel assured that it has popular support will usually be reluctant to allow schools to "improve" the political "competence" of its pupils or their families. Third, there appears to me to be at least a short-run conflict between the economic and the political means of attaining development of a secure base of economic viability. Finally, it is worth calling attention to the virtual absence of any discussion in the literature on political socialization of how to circumvent the general unpreparedness of teachers for their normal tasks without loading upon them also responsibility for insuring that pupils become self-directing and loyal citizens rather than turning their newly-won intellectual competence toward subversive activities.