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THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIZATION POLICIES ON  
PAKISTANI WOMEN'S LIVES

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Abstract: General Zia-ul-Haq's martial law regime in Pakistan has gradually reorganized many secular institutions to bring them into conformity with his advisors' view of Islamic ideology. The government's Islamization program, which many observers believe to be directed at political rather than religious ends, has touched women's lives in the areas of civil law, educational institutions, and employment. This paper stresses the concrete and symbolic consequences of the government's Islamization program for Pakistani women. The concrete impact of these policies has directly affected only a minority of women, largely articulate urban women. Their responses to government activities through both the Women's Division of the Zia Government and women's voluntary organizations are reviewed here. The author suggests, however, that government policies have indirectly affected all women through the minimal financial resources committed to women's potential role in economic development.

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## THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIZATION POLICIES ON PAKISTANI WOMEN'S LIVES, 1978-84<sup>1</sup>

General Mohammad Zia-ul-Ilah, leader of Pakistan since 1977, has based his government on what he has called the Nizam-i-Mustafa ("The Order of the Prophet"). Zia's government has gradually reorganized many secular institutions to bring them into conformity with his advisors' view of Islamic ideology. The Islamization program includes the teaching of Islamiyat (the history and cultural traditions of Islam) in all schools and colleges, the initiation of a system to collect zakat and ushr (contributions to the poor enjoined by the Qur'an), and efforts to revise the entire legal system, including the Constitution, to conform with the shar'iah (Islamic law).<sup>2</sup>

Many observers, both internal and external, feel that Zia's Islamization policies are largely symbolic, directed at political rather than religious ends. Nevertheless, many contemporary Islamic revival movements have had a major impact on women since women lack the political power necessary to resist the government's manipulation of their social position to please the conservative portions of the country's population. In particular, legislation regulating women's public participation in Pakistan serves the important function of diverting public attention from the much more difficult economic and political issues that leaders have not yet been able to resolve. This paper examines the effects of Zia's Islamization program on civil law, educational institutions, and employment, stressing the concrete as well as the symbolic consequences for Pakistani women.

### LEGAL ISSUES

#### Muslim Family Law and Women's Legal Access in the Recent Past

The overwhelming proportion of Muslim women are wives and mothers; their legal concerns thus center on laws affecting the family. Customary law defined family law under the British until 1937, when the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act was passed for all of India except the NWFP.<sup>3</sup> The shar'iah, or sacred law of Islam, accorded women certain rights which were not recognized by customary law, but not all of these rights were won in 1937.<sup>4</sup> For example, the Qur'an clearly states that wives, mothers, and daughters should receive specific portions of their male relatives' estates, but Muslim women in Pakistan were denied these inheritance rights even after 1937.<sup>4</sup> The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 extended restricted divorce rights to Muslim women, an improvement over their legal position under customary law. After Independence, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 and the West Pakistan Family Courts Act of 1964 potentially enhanced women's legal rights. These two laws, the acts passed by the British Government before 1947 which have been modified and amended by the Government of Pakistan, and Shariat Law as interpreted by the Courts of Law on points not already adjudicated upon or codified as statutory law, together form the family laws in Pakistan today.<sup>5</sup>

The legal issues addressed by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 include the following: rights of succession (specifically the right of grandchildren to inherit if their parents are dead); registration of marriages; polygyny; divorce (talag, khula, etc.); maintenance of the wife; dower (mehr); as well as the amendment of the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929; and the amendment of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939.<sup>6</sup> This Ordinance has survived challenges in the Provincial and National Assemblies but because it was linked to Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy system, the Ordinance shared the public dislike of that system. Enforcement of the Ordinance depended upon committees formed under Basic Democracy, and the discontinuation of that system complicated the enforcement procedures.<sup>7</sup>

The 1964 West Pakistan Family Courts Act made "provision for the establishment of Family Courts for the expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs."<sup>8</sup> No new courts have been established, however and the powers of the Family Courts have been delegated to Civil Judges. The existing Courts handle both civil and family matters, leading to considerable delay, a total lack of privacy for women, and large legal fees. As a result, the vast majority of women who start litigation have withdrawn, compromised, or not pursued their cases because of the protracted litigation or financial pressure.<sup>9</sup>

Some parts of the Muslim Family Laws are in conflict with Islamic injunctions. The 1961 Ordinance introduced the possibility of limiting polygyny and protecting women. Polygyny, while sanctioned by the Qur'an under certain circumstances, is an emotional threat for many Muslim women who fear that a first wife will be abandoned financially as well as emotionally if a man marries again. Section six of the Ordinance states "no man, during the subsistence of an existing marriage, shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the Arbitration Council, contract another marriage, nor shall any such marriage contracted without such permission be registered under this Ordinance."<sup>10</sup> The only restriction on polygyny, then, is that a man is supposed to submit an application for permission to marry another wife to the Chairman of the Union Council, stating the reasons for the proposed marriage and stating whether the consent of the existing wife or wives has been obtained.<sup>11</sup> The Chairman is required to set up an Arbitration Council, including representatives of both husband and wife or wives, and the Council is to decide if the proposed marriage is "necessary and just", to give permission if it is, and to "record its reasons for the decision." While section six prohibits additional marriages without permission of the Arbitration Council, it does not provide for the invalidation of the additional marriages. What has happened in the past when a man did apply for permission? According to a recent study of the implementation of family laws in Lahore, the Union Councils did not once refuse permission for a second marriage.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, should a man's application for a second wife ever be turned down, he has the power to divorce his first wife without paying any real financial penalty.<sup>13</sup> Thus, this attempt to protect individual women's civil rights has aroused the ire of conservative 'ulama without effectively protecting women.

The problems of implementing the existing family laws are not lessened when there is no conflict between civil law and Islamic injunctions. Although both the shar'iah and the provisions of the family laws in Pakistan require the husband to maintain his wife, a recent study of women involved in court cases found that 35% of them had received little or no financial support.<sup>14</sup> Only a quarter of these women sought redress either in the Family Courts or through a Union Council. Both the married and the separated women who did not take legal action were "either unaware that they could seek proper maintenance or were unwilling to seek any remedy for fear of divorce." The majority of divorced women who failed to pursue legal redress were "unaware of their entitlement to maintenance before the effectiveness of talaq (divorce initiated by the husband) and during the period of 'iddat (a waiting period after divorce to determine whether or not a woman is pregnant) as well as doubtful that the legal forums would provide effective relief."<sup>15</sup> Moreover, many of the wives who applied for maintenance in a Family Court either compromised, withdrew, or did not pursue their cases. Women who continued litigation faced frequent adjournments, long periods between hearings, and the unwillingness of the opposing party to attend the Court. The entire process averaged between one-and-one-half and three years, while the legal fees ranged from Rs. 1000 to Rs. 1500 (about \$77 to \$115 in 1983), including expenses. When contested, 42% of the women were awarded a decree in their favor. Then, if the husbands did not pay, only half applied for execution; the others were discouraged from pursuing their case because of the protracted litigation. Of those who applied only 19% got the decrees executed, and the execution process took between six and eighteen months.<sup>16</sup> These statistics demonstrate how few women actually benefit from the existing family laws. The patterns for litigation over maintenance of children, dissolution of marriage (khula), dower (mehr), custody of minor children, and the like all display trends similar to those described above.

The Family Courts thus provide little relief for women's legal needs. Other legal forums are likewise largely ineffective. The lawyers' study mentioned above found that while half of the women in their sample whose divorces were registered through a Union Council had participated (themselves or through an agent) in the proceedings of the Arbitration Council, there was not a single instance of any reconciliation during proceedings nor of any objection being raised by the Union Council.<sup>17</sup> The Union Councils "proved totally ineffective in protecting or assuring the rights of divorced women" and "merely serve as registration agencies where divorces are recorded."<sup>18</sup> Women's access to legal redress of their problems, then, is hampered by "lack of awareness, social and economic pressures, apathy, misconceptions, lack of faith in the legal machinery and faulty or inadequate implementation of the law;" such factors prevent women "from asserting or attaining the rights already granted to them by law."<sup>19</sup>

Education was the main factor contributing to women's increased awareness of the law.<sup>20</sup> But even when women were aware of their legal rights, poverty and financial insecurity often deterred them from exercising those rights. Fear of the social stigma attached to divorced women as well as

fear of their children being taken away were added to financial insecurity in many cases where women were willing to put up with deprivation and suffering to hold their marriages together.<sup>21</sup> Financial insecurities stemmed directly from the inability of these women to work, due to their burdens of child care, their lack of training, and the absence of employment socially acceptable for women. Overall then, lack of education and employment training left women helpless when their husbands would not or could not support them as required by the shar'iah and the Muslim Family Laws.

#### New Laws and Their Effect on Women

An important part of the government Islamization program in Pakistan is the attempt to bring civil law into complete conformity with the shar'iah. As H.A.R. Gibb put it, "the Western distinctions between civil, penal, private and other kinds of law are not recognized in the Muslim law-books." ("Muslim jurists use the term hadd, 'limit,' in the sense of 'legal ordinance.'")<sup>22</sup> President Zia proclaimed new Islamic laws concerning enforcement of Hudood in 1979. Zia also proclaimed orders concerning the constitution and procedures of a Federal Shariat Court in 1980 and 1981. Hadd crimes and penalties actually define relatively few criminal offences but they have received a great deal of publicity in recent months.

The new law that most affects women is the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. According to the law, "a man and a woman are said to commit zina if they willfully have sexual intercourse without being validly married to each other."<sup>23</sup> The law also covers rape (zina-bil-jabr). Some Pakistani women have found this law discriminatory in two areas. First, proof of rape acceptable to the courts under this law is very difficult to obtain. For rape liable to hadd (the penalty for which is stoning to death or severe whipping), the required proof is either confession by the accused, or the eyewitness testimony to the act of penetration of at least four Muslim adult males. Second and often more crucial, while the law does provide penalties for prohibited sexual activities (zina) not proven by confession or the eyewitness testimony described above, these penalties have not been applied equally to both men and women. Women have been found guilty of zina on the basis of their pregnancies whereas male culprits have been allowed to go free for lack of conclusive proof.

On February 21, 1983, The Muslim reported that the District Sessions Judge D.I. Khan sentenced a woman to undergo seven years imprisonment and twenty stripes on the charge of giving birth to an illegitimate child four months after marriage. Both her husband and her 'paramour' were acquitted by the court as the charges against them could not be proved.<sup>24</sup> A few days later, a letter to the editor about this news item asked, "Whereas [the woman's] pregnant state was apparent proof of her guilt, what factors determine the man's guilt?" The letter continued, "In the past few days many a learned religious [scholar] in T.V. programmes on Islamic laws of Evidence have said that in feminine matters the evidence of one woman is

sufficient. As e.g. they have quoted the birth of a child. Therefore the sentenced women knew who the father of her illegitimate child was, and yet the accused went unpunished. Maybe it is a question of one woman's evidence against two men."<sup>25</sup> The author of this letter concludes that God would punish all of the guilty on the day of judgment and rectify the inequities of this world. We do not know whether or not this person's pious belief also comforted the woman who received the prison term and whippings for a crime she could hardly have accomplished alone. It is clear, however, that the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance of 1979 is open to very one-sided application as long as illegitimate birth constitutes guilt for a woman while the evidence required to convict an accused male remains disputable.

Another step toward Islamization of civil law that created considerable public reaction was the draft Law of Evidence passed by the Majlis-i-Shoora (Federal Council) in February, 1983. The main controversy surrounding this draft concerns the number of witnesses necessary to establish evidence in a court of law. As reported in the newspapers, the draft stipulates that "the number and particulars of the witnesses would be in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah, the details of which are as under: in Hadood, according to the Hadood Ordinance. In qisas, according to the qisas and diyat ordinances. In other matters, two men or one man and two women. If the said witnesses are not available, the court shall decide on the evidence of one woman or such other evidence and circumstances as may be available."<sup>26</sup> In other words, women will be completely barred from giving evidence in hadd cases, i.e. cases of murder, theft, zina, and drinking; and otherwise their testimony will be worth half of a man's testimony.<sup>27</sup>

As of April, 1984, President Zia had still not signed this draft into law. It stands as a recommendation to him through the strictly advisory powers of the Majlis. However, he has sent it to the Law Division for "final approval" so that it will be ready for implementation when the Qazi courts start functioning on an experimental basis. Without the enactment of the Law of Evidence, the Qazi courts will not be able to function properly. The Law Commission is said to have made certain amendments to the recommendations submitted to the President by the Chief Justice of the Shariat Court.<sup>28</sup>

The draft Law of Evidence is only part of Zia's Islamization program which institutionalizes gender inequality. The Council of Islamic Ideology has recommended that in the case of diyat, where the murdered person is a woman (or a non-Muslim), compensation paid to the victim's family is to be one-half that paid to the family of a male victim.<sup>29</sup> The "Ansari Commission," appointed by President Zia to make recommendations for the future organization of the government, recommended that male candidates for election to the Shoora "should not be below the age of 25," while women should be "at least 50 years." And "If the husband is alive then the husband's written permission be provided."<sup>30</sup> Throughout the recommendations references are made to male candidates, or office holders.

In July, 1983, President Zia appointed the Pakistan Commission on the Status of Women under the leadership of Begum Zari Sarfraz. It is composed of 19 members, three of whom are men, and the commission is to continue for one year. Its major assignment is to "examine the Sixth Five Year Plan in order to give special attention to the programmes relating to women or those directly benefitting women." Its "first function is that it should be active and task oriented."<sup>31</sup> It will depend largely on studies already done by the Research Section of the Women's Division for sources. Its four major goals appear to be: 1) to safeguard women's rights in Islamic society; 2) the provision of health, education, employment and other social benefits to women; 3) their involvement in social development sectors; and 4) the integration of women in minority communities in Pakistan's social and economic development.<sup>32</sup>

Islamization policies which have changed civil law have directly affected only those women who possessed both the knowledge of their civil rights and the financial resources to pursue those secular rights in a court of law. In this narrow context, the government's Islamization of civil law has touched relatively few women. The symbolic issues involved are nevertheless extremely important because legalized gender inequality has many social ramifications beyond the law courts. Some upper-class, educated Pakistani women have articulated the symbolic issues involved and led protests of various kinds against recent legal changes, as will be discussed below.

## EDUCATION

The political leaders of Pakistan have been struggling with the problems of mass illiteracy since 1947. Many retired government officials still recall pre-Independence efforts for both village education of girls and adult education.<sup>33</sup> The trends in literacy are clouded by changes in the definition of a literate person and discrepancies among data sources, but the general direction, or non-direction, is clear. According to Naushin Mahmood's adjustment of the data from 1951 to 1975, the increase in population is greater than the increment of literates which has resulted in an absolute increase of illiterates.<sup>34</sup> Mahmood also noted that the literacy level of males increased four times more than the literacy level of females over this period. Estimates from the 1981 Population Census show an overall figure of 13% female literacy, with 33.7% of urban women and 5.5% of rural women literate.<sup>35</sup>

What are the current prospects for educating village girls when 95% of the rural female population is estimated to be illiterate? Iftikhar N. Hassan analyzed interviews with over 1700 rural adults (half women) and 400 minor girls, and found that not poverty itself but an attitude against investing money on girls' education kept parents from sending their daughters to school. In response to the question of why parents educated their sons and not their daughters, almost half of the sample (42%) saw no financial gain in educating their daughters, 16% argued that it was not customary to educate girls and 12% did not educate their daughters for lack

of proper arrangements (i.e. separate girls' schools or female teachers). Hassan found that only 4% didn't send girls to school because of poverty and less than 3% claimed purdah as the cause of keeping girls home. Hassan concluded that additional facilities for girls in the rural areas would not be sufficient to increase enrollment. When asked what they would like to see changed in the curriculum so that they would send their daughters to school, over 60% of the rural adults in Hassan's sample wanted to include religious instruction.<sup>36</sup>

The Zia Government also wants to increase the Islamic orientation of education in Pakistan. Several measures have already been adopted: compulsory study of the Qur'an up to class VIII and Islamiyat up to the post-graduate level; the opening of thousands of mosque schools; and the introduction of Arabic as a compulsory subject from class VI where Arabic teachers are available.<sup>37</sup> Mosque schools appeal to the Zia Government as a cheap way to coopt school buildings; they require no "heavy investment in infrastructure."<sup>38</sup> Supposedly, 11,751 new mosque schools were operating at the end of March, 1983, with over 300,000 children enrolled. These schools are supposed to accommodate classes I to III, with arrangements for classes IV and V to be made elsewhere in the community. Newspaper accounts of these developments did not break down the enrollment figures by gender but one suspects that the larger proportion of the students are male.<sup>39</sup> Several hundred muhalla (neighborhood or ward) schools for girls are also included in this program.

Islamization policies in the realm of education have an enormous potential to increase female literacy. As Barbara Metcalf has pointed out, no religion puts a higher value on education to know his or her responsibilities and rights, and to be able to fulfill a proper role in society. "To the question whether it is better for a Muslim girl to be able to read religious books, the answer can only be yes."<sup>40</sup> The immediacy of the need for female literacy has increased over the last century but the arguments used today parallel those of the past--education makes women better Muslims as well as better wives and mothers. The government might go much further than it has gone in using religion as a justification and incentive for both girls' education and women's literacy programs.

Government Islamization policies have not yet greatly affected programs for adult literacy. There are currently two main types of literacy programs aimed at adult women: 1) programs run by voluntary organizations, especially the All Pakistan Women's Association Headquarters in Karachi, PAFWA (Pakistan Air Force Women's Association) Headquarters in Peshawar, and the Girl Guides Headquarters in Lahore; and 2) programs run by the government. The Women's Division of Zia's government has financed pilot projects throughout Pakistan, combining adult education with income-generating skills whenever possible.<sup>41</sup> Barbara Metcalf reported that the major skill training imparted through programs supported by the Women's Division and run by the Small Industries Department is carpet making, "which affects little girls rather than women, and is financially a losing enterprise because of the current slump in the carpet market and the poor



quality of what is produced. Furthermore, the education component, one hour a day, seems often neglected or lost altogether."<sup>42</sup> Thus, there may be a tendency for skills training to overshadow literacy in both government and non-government programs.

The problems facing any literacy program in Pakistan are tremendous. Yet the Zia Government spent only 1.55 per cent of the GNP on education in 1980-81.<sup>43</sup> Apparently, the money allocated to this sector is to be shifted away from higher education toward primary education, but the level of support is not to be increased in proportion to the GNP in the Sixth Five Year Plan.<sup>44</sup> More money coupled with the experience gained in pilot projects over the last few years could lead to some success in this difficult area. For example, the Adult Education Society in Gujranwala has focused successfully on literacy without trying to include income-generating skills and might be used as a model.

Urban Muslim girls have had some opportunities for institutional education and, at present, approximately 7% of urban women have achieved an intermediate or higher college degree.<sup>45</sup> Most secondary educational institutions in Pakistan were gender-segregated before Independence and virtually all those established since 1947 have continued this tradition. Women's choices for education beyond the B.A./B.Sc. include M.A. classes at various women's colleges, graduate classes in home economics at several locations, and coeducation for all other graduate work.

One of the most controversial parts of Islamization policies, at least for educated women, is the Zia Government's commitment to a separate women's university. The Islami Jama'at-i-Talaba, the student wing of a conservative political party, the Jama'at-i-Islami, has long demanded separate women's universities.<sup>46</sup> Arguments for separate women's universities were recently compiled and published by the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad. Coeducation, which is said to be supported by neocolonialists in Pakistan, is charged with failing to bring many real benefits to American women and is declared unsuitable for an Islamic State. While "the Qur'an and the Sunnah make it obligatory for women and men to acquire knowledge . . . the Islamic principles of observing Hijab, segregation, maintaining modesty, morality and balance in speech, vision, even bodily gestures and movements" are also obligatory for both genders.<sup>47</sup> Gender-segregated education is thus obligatory at all levels. The author argues that women deserve the choice of gender-segregated higher education, and, if asked, a majority would prefer it even though they have not demonstrated in the streets for it. Finally, he argues that separate institutions would greatly increase female enrollment and cites enrollment figures showing that men outnumber women in coeducational institutions. Appended to these ideological arguments for women's separate universities is a "work plan" which addresses the financial issues involved. The plan suggests that: 1) the allocation for education in federal and provincial budgets should give women a fair share; 2) provincial governments should offer development funds equal to at least what should have been spent on a women's degree college; and 3) 50% of the Women's Division budget should be diverted for the women's university.<sup>48</sup>

The Zia Government, as a step toward creating a women's university, has declared Lahore College for Women to be a "university college," and encouraged the opening of new M.A. programs there.<sup>49</sup> In February, 1983, the recently appointed Federal Education Minister, Dr. Mohammad Afzal, discussed the proposed women's university in his first policy statement. Afzal declared that the proposed women's university would be in addition to existing facilities and "is not meant to drive women out of other places now open to them or to slam other doors shut on them."<sup>50</sup> Afzal's statement was welcome to educated women who feared that moves toward a women's university would eliminate coeducation at the university level in Pakistan.

According to newspaper reports, the separate women's university plan is now complete. The university will consist of a number of university colleges spread throughout the country. The home economics colleges of Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar will be upgraded and affiliated to the women's university, joining the Lahore College for Women which is already a university college. A board of trustees in Islamabad will plan and administer the project.<sup>51</sup>

#### EMPLOYMENT

Lee Bean noted in 1968 that about 15 per cent of all Pakistani women over 15 were in the labor force, one of the smallest proportions of paid female labor in the world.<sup>52</sup> Nasra Shah found evidence of overall increasing female work participation in urban areas and a doubling of the proportion of women in professional occupations from the early '60s to the mid '70s.<sup>53</sup> Rural women, however, still comprise the majority of wage-earning women in Pakistan today. Women working for a salary comprise less than two percent of the urban population, according to the latest figures.<sup>54</sup>

The overwhelming majority of female professionals continue to work in largely gender-segregated environments. The latest figures of the 1980-81 Population Census recorded about 90,000 female teachers and about 23,000 female medical professionals; together these two groups made up approximately 90 per cent of all women professionals.<sup>55</sup> Even women working outside of girls' schools and ob/gyn clinics often find their employment affected by norms of gender-segregation. Journalists, for example, find their reporting limited to women's functions and they are discouraged from reporting on politics or economics.<sup>56</sup> Professional women also face gender discrimination in top-level government jobs. This is particularly striking in education because of the concentration of women in this department.<sup>57</sup> The majority of women professionals, then, remain within traditionally acceptable female environments, either by choice of employment or by discrimination.

The Zia government's Islamization policies toward working women have dealt with fairly superficial issues so far. They have concentrated on the appearance of working women rather than the limits of acceptable women's work. Two type examples illustrate this point. In January, 1983, the press reported a government directive calling for PTV female newsreaders to stop

wearing make-up and to refrain from experimenting with fashions and hairstyles. Of course, these newsreaders had been appearing on TV with their heads covered modestly for some time. A Pakistan Times cartoon suggested that the next step would be female newsreaders wearing a burgah.<sup>58</sup> Again according to the press, PIA officials ordered the design of a more modest uniform for its female employees, along with a nationalized uniform for its male employees.<sup>59</sup> These two examples apply to women working in a gender-mixed environment but government directives have reached female teachers as well. Near the end of the 1983 Spring term, the Punjab government directed female teachers to wear the chaddar (a large shawl) while teaching in their classrooms.<sup>60</sup> Students, of course, have been directed to wear a chaddar for some time.

The concept of proper public behavior for Muslim women is of central importance to future trends in government Islamization policies. Should women be allowed to work with or even appear in front of men who are not their mehrams (spouses, or close male relatives with whom women are barred from marriage under religious law)? The government apparently made an informal negative decision against women's participation in public sports, as women were not allowed to participate in the National Games held in April, 1982, nor were Pakistani female athletes allowed to compete in the Asian Games held in New Delhi later that year.<sup>61</sup> The government did allow exhibition matches between an Irish women's hockey team and a Sind women's team in April 1983. Although only women were allowed to watch the matches, some 'ulama in Karachi criticized them because of male technical staff present and the possibility that male spectators would find their way into the stadium.<sup>62</sup> In addition to women's sports, women's cultural performances for gender-mixed audiences have raised criticism although they have not been banned. The newspapers reported a demonstration in Peshawar against women dancing in a local festival and the strong criticism offered by the leader of the Jama'at-i-Talaba when a touring Soviet Cultural Troup included women dancers.<sup>63</sup> Such isolated incidents may or may not influence government policy.

Government media pronouncements on proper public behavior for Muslim women have not prevented needy women from taking advantage of new employment opportunities as they become available. Poor Pakistani families cannot afford to observe the social niceties that might keep their women secluded at home. One way of allowing women to work and yet keeping them segregated from men is to provide separate factory shifts for each gender. At least one factory that makes cassettes in Islamabad already uses this system.<sup>64</sup> Other factory work appears to be informally segregated into women's and men's jobs.

The Zia government has not yet developed a consistent policy toward the enforcement of proper public behavior for Muslim women, nor has it developed a wide-ranging policy toward gender-segregated employment. This is at least partly because of the disagreements within the government itself as to how women should be treated. The government has committed itself to gender segregation in education (the separate women's university issue) and

informally blocked women's sports. While these elements of the government Islamization program appear to affect only a small minority of Pakistani women, government policies have indirectly affected all women through the paucity of financial resources committed to women's economic development.

#### EDUCATED PAKISTANI WOMEN'S REACTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT ISLAMIZATION PROGRAM

Educated Muslim women are primarily the ones who have enjoyed the individual civil rights that are now being curtailed or at least threatened by new government directives. Generally, they have been aware of the legal protections for women built into the Muslim Family Laws of the 1960s, and some of them are leading a campaign in the name of all Pakistani women against the cancellation of those civil rights. Educated Pakistani women have turned to two arenas, the Zia government's Women's Division and voluntary women's organizations, to respond to the government Islamization program. The following pages will assess the effectiveness of the Women's Division in championing women's rights and then briefly describe some of the voluntary organizations through which educated women have responded to various government policies since 1949. These non-government organizations cover a wide political spectrum and, thus, their current members have reacted to government Islamization policies in a number of different ways.

#### The Women's Division of the Zia Government

Since January 1979, the Women's Division has been part of the Cabinet Secretariat under the direct supervision of the President. It is composed of five wings, one each for administration, programs, women's rights, research and monitoring, and evaluation. The Division lists its functions as follows:

1. To formulate public policies and laws to meet the special needs of women.
2. To register and to assist women's organizations.
3. To undertake and promote projects for providing special facilities for women.
4. To undertake and promote research on the conditions and problems of women.
5. To represent the country in international organizations dealing with problems of women and bilateral contacts with other countries.
6. To ensure that women's interests and needs are adequately represented in public policy formulation by various organs of the Government.
7. To ensure equality of opportunity in education and employment and the fuller participation of women in all spheres of national life.<sup>65</sup>

In short, the Women's Division is to determine women's needs and then to assert and safeguard them in both government policy and everyday life. It is constrained by a small budget that covers basically its own offices and very limited pilot projects.

What has the Division achieved? For the first two years, the work of the Division was "essentially formative."<sup>66</sup> The research wing sponsored twenty-five studies by both government and non-government agencies. Very few reports on completed projects have actually been published by the Division, although short summaries of their conclusions are available. The women's rights wing sponsored four national conferences on women's issues in 1980, covering education, health, women in local government, and Islam. In 1981, it sponsored a conference of non-government women's organizations and continues to promote such conferences. The Women's Division has worked closely with non-government women's organizations and financially aided several projects, such as a working women's hostel in Karachi sponsored by the Business and Professional Women's Club and skill development programs launched by the Girl Guides. The development programs wing ran pilot projects throughout Pakistan, such as rural and urban women's centers, female adult education centers, and "new trades" training classes. To summarize, the Women's Division has channeled money into research and development schemes for women and has sponsored public forums for the discussion of women's issues. Still, for all its modest achievements, the Women's Division has been neither bold nor very successful in its representation of women's needs within the Zia Government.

The formulation and final shape of the Sixth Five Year Plan was a recent example of the limited help the Division could offer funding for women's projects. Without adequate funding, neither good intentions nor well-conceived projects will aid Pakistani women. In February, 1983, the Planning and Development Division of the Government appointed a Working Group of experts on women's issues, including the former Secretary of the Women's Division, to incorporate "the rights, interests and welfare of women" within the Sixth Five Year Plan."<sup>67</sup>

The Working Group recommended in its Report the expenditure of Rs. 5 billion on women's programs over and above the budgets of individual ministries and departments. The Report concluded that "unless a financial commitment is forthcoming, any public policy announcements, or international stance regarding the full mobilization of the productive and economic potential of the Pakistani women, would be more of a wishful pronouncement and would be very quickly seen through by the public."<sup>68</sup> Dr. Mahbubul Haq, Chairman of the Planning Commission, publicized the Report widely. He claimed that women must be given an "equal" role in development programs because a policy of segregation is a policy of "apartheid." Further, he "thought it possible to sanction" the amount of money called for by the Report.<sup>69</sup>

The budget maneuvering for the Sixth Plan was a clear-cut opportunity for the Women's Division to work for women's interests. The Division was hard pressed, however, to save its own budget, which was first reduced from a proposed Rs. 150,000,000 to Rs. 50,000,000 for 1983-84, less than its budget in 1982-83, but was finally raised to Rs. 160,000,000 per year of the Sixth Plan.<sup>70</sup> These funds will be used for education, health, family planning, as well as for the establishment of polytechnic and technical training centers.

The Women's Division, as a creation of the Zia Government, obviously must submit to its financial control. Some funds have been made available for research on women and a few pilot projects, but no large-scale redistribution of development money that would allow women equal participation in development programs seems to be forthcoming. Without adequate funds, the Division might have symbolic value for the government and actual value for a privileged few but little real value for the vast majority of women--whatever their status, class or educational background.

### Women's Voluntary Organizations

The Women's Division is a relatively new advocate for women's interests; non-government voluntary organizations have tried to represent and promote women's interests since Independence. The best-known and longest-lived is the All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA) which started work in 1949. Led by a few prominent women, APWA institutionalized informal social services for refugees and has had a long history of establishing girls' schools and undertaking other women's welfare work. APWA has also been successful lobbying for women's rights. For example, its members were very involved in passage of the Muslim Family Laws in the early 1960s.<sup>71</sup> While APWA has received government aid for some of its projects, its financial and administrative independence have allowed its officers and members relative freedom from government control. The organization rejected, on the grounds that APWA would lose this independence, a very recent attempt of the Women's Division to draw APWA into a government monitoring scheme.<sup>72</sup> Thus, APWA remains an important independent forum for educated women to express their views.

Women's organizations, like student organizations, play an important political role despite the official ban on political parties. Two relatively new women's voluntary organizations demonstrate the wide range of views espoused. In Lahore, the most outspoken new women's group is the Women's Action Forum (WAF). This voluntary organization currently is concentrating on the preservation of women's civil rights rather than sponsoring charitable projects. With branches in Karachi and Islamabad, WAF attracts women who are unwilling to accept the gender discrimination inherent in many aspects of the government's Islamization policies. WAF members, for example, led the Lahore demonstration against the draft Law of Evidence, which will be discussed in some detail below. Rather than take a stand against Islamization per se, WAF leaders attack specific policies piece by piece arguing that Islam protects women's rights. WAF leaders claim to be nonpolitical, but WAF actions contradict their claims. As one critic of the organization pointed out, "Women cannot achieve their rights out of the blue, unless the fundamental economic and constitutional rights are demanded and attained."<sup>73</sup>

Some women's organizations wholeheartedly support the government's Islamization policies. The Majlis-i-Khawateen-i-Pakistan (Pakistan Ladies Assembly), for example, is committed to work toward "Islamic social ideals" and to promote "a harmonious, complementary relationship between the two

sexes."<sup>74</sup> Its leaders campaign against social evils (defined as unIslamic customs, including extravagance, black marketing, obscenity, etc.) as well as promote Urdu-medium education for girls and various social work projects. The goals of the Majlis reflect the attitude of noble obligation, which has frequently characterized women's welfare work.

The political positions of Lahore's women's groups were clearly demonstrated in 1983. On February 12th, a relatively small group of women lawyers and other interested women met in front of the High Court buildings on the Lahore Mall to protest the draft Law of Evidence. Eye-witness accounts differ as to the number of women and the exact sequence of events but there is no disagreement over the outcome--the women protestors were subjected to a lathi charge and were tear gassed by the police. Several women leaders were arrested.

Reactions to the protest itself and the police measures against it took two forms. The All Pakistan Women's Association and other women's groups, as well as a few male-dominated groups such as the Lahore High Court Bar Association, condemned the police action. Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan, the founder and president of APWA, spoke out strongly against the draft Law of Evidence and called upon women "to resist efforts calculated towards limiting their roles as individuals and citizens."<sup>75</sup> The Vice Chairperson of APWA, lawyer Rashida Patel, issued a public appeal to the Majlis-i-Shoora, claiming that the controversy "was damaging to women and the concept of Islamic justice."<sup>76</sup> The Muslim ran a series of letters to the editor under the title "Lahore's Day of Infamy," all of which supported the protestors and condemned the police.<sup>77</sup> Those who supported the protestors used secular legal and individualistic arguments, as well as appeals to Islamic principles, to bolster their stand.

The opponents based their position squarely on Islamic fundamentalism. A great many articles in both the Urdu and the English dailies condemned the demonstration as "sacrilegious." According to the Pakistan Times, about 100 "renowned ulema . . . have described women's protest against the Law of Evidence as a proclamation of war against the God's commands." These ulama "passed a resolution [which] regretted the fact that the women concerned either belonged to the upper stratum of the society who were fond of Western culture or were the champions of secularism who wanted to demonstrate their loyalty to their foreign masters by staging demonstration against the commands of Almighty Allah."<sup>78</sup> These charges were often repeated against WAF and APWA members in the news media: as westernized society women, they are against Islamization and completely out of touch with the majority of Pakistani women. To condemn the women's procession, the Majlis-i-Khawateen-i-Pakistan held a meeting which featured an address by the Minister of State for Health and Social Welfare, Begum Afifa Mamdot, perhaps the government's most influential woman at that time. Her opinion was that "the procession taken out by a faction of ladies against Islamic laws [was] intolerable."<sup>79</sup>

The major strategy used by all parties for and against the draft law was to cite the Qur'an to support their position. Several claims were made that women lawyers were not competent to interpret the Qur'an. One article

declared, "It is surprising that a small group of westernised women who cannot even read Arabic consider themselves qualified to interpret the Holy Quran."<sup>80</sup> Dr. Israr Ahmad, well-known in Lahore for his controversial remarks on a wide range of subjects, commented that "the Quranic provisions with regard to women's posture vis a vis their evidence is clear and that two of them are equal to one man. This is a bitter pill which a modern and educated woman will have to swallow in an Islamic society . . ."<sup>81</sup> Not ready to start swallowing yet, the Islamabad branch of the Women's Action Forum planned to start weekly classes in Arabic and Quranic studies for "women must be prepared to fight their own battles."<sup>82</sup> Only a few 'ulama have been willing to support the WAF and other women's groups.

While educated women leaders who oppose many parts of government Islamization policies have been careful to challenge specific issues and not condemn Islamization wholesale, their opponents attack them on the general grounds that they hold a non-Muslim point of view. Supporters of the draft law of evidence and other institutionalized forms of gender discrimination describe the younger members of APWA, WAF and other organizations as Westernized women of questionable morality. As one journalist expressed it, they are "the liberated ones, who smoke in public, drink Coke and wear tight jeans, speak English with American accents, live in posh residential areas [of Karachi] or in [the] YWCA hostel and serve with some newspaper or an advertising agency or with some commercial organization as executives."<sup>83</sup> Responding to such stereotypes, Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan, founder and president of APWA, deplored the fact that "it has become the fashion to dub informed, courageous and educated women as 'social butterflies' and 'West-oriented'."<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless, as long as the Zia government finds the legislation of women's social roles a useful political gambit, the leaders of APWA, WAF and other organizations can expect an uphill battle in their attempt to limit institutionalized gender discrimination.

#### CONCLUSION

The Zia government's commitment to follow the Nizam-i-Mustafa ("The Order of the Prophet") has included "a reassertion of Islamic identity both in the personal and public spheres of life."<sup>85</sup> Seeking to turn back westernization and secularization of Pakistani society, government leaders assert that their Islamization policies are an authentic embodiment of the country's Islamic heritage. Thus, the government's Islamization program started with the reintroduction of the shar'iah, the embodiment of the "normative ideal for Muslim behaviour." The program has so far concentrated on political and social control and on taxation and banking policies.

The disillusionment with the West and the reaffirmation of Islamic values are not limited to government officials in Pakistan.<sup>86</sup> Further, women's civil freedom is connected in some Muslim minds with "the breakdown of the family and a dangerous relaxation of ethical and moral strictures." One example of this thinking appeared in a letter to the editor of Dawn. As part of a longer statement that Pakistani liberals were "brainwashed by Western education," the author noted "because of Sir Syed Ahmed's movement



one generation of Muslim males first adopted Western education . . . the next Western educated generation sent their daughters to convent schools . . . and [the] present generation is witnessing [this] Western oriented segment of female Muslim society desirous of taking up professional careers." He then suggested that this movement follows similar trends in Western society, where the concepts of individual liberty and human rights are considered "absolute entities." What, in his opinion, has occurred in the U.S. because of the emphasis on these concepts? "A recent judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court decided against the banning of strip-tease (naked dancing) in one of the provincial states on the ground that it infringed the individual rights as enshrined in the American Constitution."<sup>87</sup> The inference is clear: today Pakistani women want professional careers; tomorrow, if Western models are followed, they will want to dance naked.

The Zia government's Islamization program can draw on considerable public support for Islamic traditions as the symbols of national identity and pride. Educated Muslim women, far from the Westernized feminist clones they are sometimes depicted to be, struggle with the same issues of national identity as do Muslim men. As Jane Smith has observed:

It is . . . essential for those of us outside of the community of Islam to recognize that for the Muslim, critique of the words of the Quran--in regard to the relation of man and woman as in any other matter--amounts to rebellion not against a human system but against one that is considered to be divine. The traditions of men can be changed, but God's ordered plan for humanity cannot. The task of the Muslim woman will be to understand the difference, and to take her stand for self-identity within the divinely ordained structure of Islam.<sup>88</sup>

In the final analysis, economic factors may most effectively challenge the attitude that Muslim women working outside of their homes are a short step from leading immoral lives. More and more families caught in an economic pinch turn to their women to help meet rising expenses. Smith found opportunities for women to work "increasingly good" throughout the contemporary Middle East, especially in Syria, Kuwait, and Iraq.<sup>89</sup> Indeed, the perceptions of educated women I interviewed at Lahore in 1983 were that educational and employment opportunities are increasing for their daughters, that more girls than ever before are entering schools and colleges, and that women are now found in many new types of positions--in banks, in post offices, etc. They seemed to have little fear that government policies would halt the further integration of urban women into the work force. If and when the Zia government conceptualizes a solution to the economic problems that plague Pakistan, concerns other than male-female relations may take primacy since the contribution of all Pakistanis will be required for economic development.<sup>90</sup>

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Sophia Mohsen for her comments on contemporary Islamic revival movements at the Sixth Berkshire Conference on Women in History, June 3, 1984, when I presented some of the information in this paper under the title "Islamization and Women's Rights in Pakistan: Recent Legal Changes." J. Henry Korson, Barbara Metcalf, and Billy G. Smith all contributed comments on an earlier version of this paper presented at the Twelfth Annual South Asia Conference, Madison, Wisconsin, November, 1983.
2. J. Henry Korson, "Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, VI (Winter 1982), pp. 71-90, especially pp. 72, 81, 86-87. See also, John L. Esposito, "Law in Islam," in Yvonne Y. Haddad, Byron Haines, and Ellison Findly, (eds.), The Islamic Impact, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984), pp. 69-88.
3. Shahla Zia, Hina Jilani, and Asma Jahangir, "Muslim Family Laws and their Implementation in Pakistan" (unpublished research report, Lahore, n.d.), p. 1. The Women's Division plans to publish the report within a year.
4. For a general discussion of the shar'iah, see H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966 reprint), chap. 6, and Manzoor Ahmad Hanifi, A Survey of Muslim Institutions and Culture (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Pub., 1969), p. 3. Testate succession (i.e., through a will) and inheritance of agricultural land were left out of the purview of the 1937 Law. See Zia et al., "Muslim Family Laws," p. 1.
5. Zia et al., "Muslim Family Laws," p. 1.
6. Kazi Muhammad Ashraf, Family Laws in Pakistan (Lahore: Premier Bookhouse, 1974), pp. 8-25.
7. Rashida Patel, Women and Law in Pakistan (Karachi: Faiza Publisher, 1979), pp. 91-92.
8. Ashraf, Family Laws, p. 40.
9. Zia et al., "Muslim Family Laws," pp. 88, 93.
10. Ashraf, Family Laws, p. 16.
11. Patel, Women and Law, p. 93. The following information is from Ashraf, Family Laws, pp. 16-7. According to case law, "the Ordinance only penalises the person in respect of a marriage celebrated in contra-

vention of the provisions of the Ordinance by making him liable to imprisonment or fine or both but does not invalidate the marriage itself."

12. Zia et al., "Muslim Family Laws," p. 63.
13. Fazlur Rahman, "Polygamy and Divorce," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 4 February 1983, p. V.
14. Zia et al., "Muslim Family Laws," p. 80. A group of lawyers in Lahore analyzed statistical data from two Family Courts, three Union Councils, and the Guardian Court from January 1979 through 1980. Their field workers interviewed 150 women chosen from these court records to determine the specific problems women faced during the litigation process, the reasons women withdrew their claims before a decree, and the overall factors effecting women who tried to attain legal redress for their problems. Ibid., vi-viii.
15. Ibid., pp. 56-7.
16. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
17. Ibid., pp. 77.
18. Ibid., pp. 86.
19. Ibid., p. i.
20. Ibid., p. 70. Although the literacy rate of their sample was generally lower for rural women, the study found no "startling difference" between their legal awareness and that of urban women having the same level of education or literacy.
21. Ibid., p. 99.
22. Gibb, Mohammedanism, pp. 99-100. Within this quotation, Gibb cites G. Berstrasser's Grundzuge des Islamischen Rechts, ed. by Joseph Schacht.
23. New Islamic Law, (Lahore: Kausar Brothers, 1983), pp. 11. Information in the following paragraph is also from this source, p. 12. For a discussion of the effects of this law, see Najma Sadiq, "Punishment: Four Times," Dawn (Karachi), Star Supplement, 13 January 1983, p. III.
24. "Woman Awarded 7-year Jail [sic], 20 Stripes," The Muslim (Lahore), 21 February 1983.
25. "In the Name of Justice," The Muslim (Lahore), 2 March 1983, p. 4.
26. The Law of Evidence as passed by the Majlis-i-Shoora is not yet available for close study as it has not been signed by the President. See "Qanoon-i-Shahadat: Salient Features," Dawn (Karachi), 5 March

- 1983, p. 3. Also, Ashraf Hashmi, "Shoora prologued: Evidence Law with Substituted Clause Passed," The Muslim (Lahore), 4 March 1983, p. 1; "Shoora Adopts Draft: Qanun-i-Shahadat," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 4 March 1983, p. 1; and Anis Mirza, "Desk-thumping and Cheers: Evidence Law Passes," Dawn (Karachi), 4 March 1983, p. 20.
27. Yameema Mitha, "WAF Meeting: Women Reject Draft Law of Evidence," The Muslim (Lahore), 10 February 1983.
28. In January, 1984, the government announced that women would be appointed as Qazis (judges) to newly established women's courts, where women litigants could choose women lawyers to serve them. J. Henry Korson and Michelle Maskiell, "Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan: The Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women," accepted for publication, Asian Survey, April 1985, fn 23, p. 23. See also, "Women urged to elect their representatives," an interview with Dr. (Mrs.) Attiya Inayatullah, Dawn (Karachi), 12 April 1983, p. 7. Dr. Inayatullah reported about 30 women training to become qazis at Islamic University in Bahawalpur.
29. Korson and Maskiell, p. 17.
30. World Muslim Times, 15 December 1983. I am indebted to J. Henry Korson for this and the following two citations.
31. The Muslim (Lahore), 27 January 1984.
32. Ibid.
33. For a lucid and entertaining summary of one person's experiences, see Akhtar Hamid Khan, "Fifty Years of Literacy and Adult Education" (unpublished paper presented at the National Workshop on Female Literacy in Pakistan, Islamabad, February, 1983).
34. Naushin Mahmood, "Literacy and Educational Attainment Levels in Pakistan: 1951-1973" The Pakistan Development Review XVII, 3 (Autumn 1978): 291. Her figures are as follows:
- |        | Males | Females |
|--------|-------|---------|
| 1951   | 17.0% | 8.6%    |
| 1974-5 | 38.3% | 13.1%   |
- She defines "functional literacy" as all literates with 5 or more years of schooling. Mahmood, p. 372. Using this definition, her figures are:
- |        | Males | Females |
|--------|-------|---------|
| 1951   | 13.0% | 4.6%    |
| 1974-5 | 30.5% | 10.3%   |
35. Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, Population Census of Pakistan, 1981: Advance tabulation on Sex, Age Group, Literacy and Educational Attainment, Census Bulletin No. 7, (Islamabad, n.d.), n.p. Figures are from an introductory

section on literacy which has a table giving "comparative figures of literacy ratios of Pakistan and its provinces by male/female and rural/urban distribution."

36. Iftikhar N. Hassan, "The Portrait of the Rural Female with Reference to Her Position in the Existing Social Structure, Her Perceptions, Needs and Aspirations" (unpublished paper presented at the National Workshop on Female Literacy in Pakistan, Islamabad, February, 1983), pp. 4, 5, 11.
37. "Islamic Education System," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 7 February 1983.
38. "Mosque Schools: Thrust to Increase Literacy Rate," The Muslim (Lahore), 30 April 1983.
39. "Everywhere except Punjab education officials said they expected girls to attend the schools in large numbers and early estimates of their proportion ranges around 30%, slightly better than the proportion of enrolled girls of that age cohort overall." Barbara Metcalf, personal communication, October 1983. Dr. Metcalf visited a broad range of programs for female education and shared her findings with me informally.
40. Metcalf, personal communication.
41. Sabeeha Hafeez, "Female Literacy in Pakistan" (unpublished paper presented at the National Workshop on Women's Literacy, Islamabad, February, 1983), pp. 4-9.
42. Metcalf, personal communication.
43. Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1980-1 (Islamabad, June 1981), p. 199, item 7, quoted in Anis Ahmad and Muslim Sajjad, Muslim Women and Higher Education: A Case for Separate Institutions and a Work Plan for Women's University (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), p. 71, note 8.
44. Metcalf, personal communication.
45. Population Census of Pakistan, 1981, Bulletin No. 7, Table 2.1, p. 4 and Table 3.1, p. 9.
46. "IJT to Stage 'Silent Demonstration' on Friday," The Muslim (Lahore), 14 March 1983, p. 8.
47. Ahmad and Sajjad, Muslim Women and Higher Education, passim. The following quotations are taken from pages 47-8.
48. Ibid., pp. 98-9.

49. I worked at Lahore College for Women from January to June 1983 and interviewed a number of staff about the designation "university college." New M.A. programs include psychology and Islamiyat.
50. I attended the convocation at Kinnaird College for Women where he made these remarks. The quotation is from my notes.
51. "Women's University Plan Finalised," Dawn Overseas (Karachi), 22 September 1983.
52. Lee L. Bean, "Utilisation of Human Resources: The Case of Women in Pakistan" International Labour Review 97, 4 (April 1968): 391-410.
53. Nasra Shah, "Fertility of Working vs. Non-Working Women in Pakistan, 1973" in Rounaq Jahan and Hanna Papanek, eds., Women and Development: Perspectives from South and Southeast Asia (Dacca: The Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, 1979), pp. 279, 288.
54. "Women Only 3.79 in 30.31 per cent Labour Force," The Muslim (Lahore), 1 May 1983, p. 8.
55. Khalida Shah, "Women in Decision Making Positions in Pakistan" (unpublished paper presented at the Triennial Conference, Developing Human Potential with reference to women, Pakistan Federation of University Women, Peshawar, April 23-25, 1983), Table II, n.p. The exact figures quoted are: 22,651 medical professionals and 89,218 teachers, or 111,869 out of a total of 127,442 professional, technical, and related workers (which included journalists, lawyers, scientists, etc.). The exact proportion is 87.8%.
56. Fauzia Rafiq, "WAF Discussion on Working Women: I Am Not the Only One Suffering," The Muslim (Lahore), 31 May 1983, p. 3.
57. Khalida Shah, pp. 2-3, and Table I, n.p. "Women Officers Superceded in Ed. Dept.," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad) 17 March 1983, p. 5; and two letters to the editor of the Times on 31 March 1983 and 12 April 1983 both printed under "Women's Case."
58. Mohammad Idrees, "No Made-up Newscasters, No Made-up News," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 26 January 1983, p. 4.
59. Ahmad Hassan, "From Islamabad with Love," Dawn (Karachi), Star Supplement, 9 June 1983, p. II.
60. The staff at Kinnaird College were avidly discussing this directive when I left Lahore in early June, 1983.
61. Kauser S.K., "Women's Sports--What's Cooking," Dawn (Karachi) Star Supplement, 28 March 1983, p. III; and "What Policy Towards Women's Sports?" The Muslim (Lahore), 29 April 1983, p. 4.

62. "Ulema Criticise Women Hockey Matches," The Muslim (Lahore), 18 May 1983, p. 6.
63. "Peshawar Demo against Women Dancing in Jashn," The Muslim (Lahore), 30 April 1983, p. 1; and "IJT to Stage 'Silent Demonstration' on Friday," The Muslim (Lahore), 14 March 1983, p. 8.
64. "Factory with Women Workers," The Muslim (Lahore) 4 March 1983.
65. Government of Pakistan, Women's Division, Cabinet Secretariat, Programmes and Projects for Women in Pakistan (June 1980 to July 1981) (Islamabad, n.d.), p. 1.
66. Ibid., p. iii.
67. Government of Pakistan, Planning and Development Division, Report of the Working Group on Women's Development Programmes for the Sixth Plan, 1983-88 (May, 1983), p. ii.
68. All of the above, ibid., pp. 144-45.
69. Fauzia Rafiq, "Working Group on Women's Development," The Muslim, 15 May 1983, p. 1.
70. Fauzia Rafiq, "Women Division Budget Cut," The Muslim (Lahore), 6 June 1983, p. 8, and Pakistan Affairs, 16 November 1983.
71. Interview with Begum Z. Fida Hussain, Lahore, 1977. Also, Sylvia Chipp, "Tradition vs. Change: The All Pakistan Women's Association," Islam and the Modern Age, I, 3 (November 1970): 80-81.
72. "For achieving the set targets a coordination committee should be set up at the provincial level with members of the national non-Government organizations and the Government authorities for surveillance, monitoring and evaluating the programmes during the Plan period." Quoted in Dawn (Karachi), 15 May 1983, p. 1. APWA and other groups' rejection of this plan reported in The Muslim (Lahore), 14 June 1983, p. 1, "Women Bodies Reject Proposal."
73. "Is WAF Too Westernized," The Muslim (Lahore), 21 March 1983, p. 4.
74. "Majlis-i-Khawateen-i-Pakistan Stands for Moderation," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 7 January 1983, magazine section.
75. The press statements appeared as follows: "Police Action Against Women Slated," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 15 February 1983; Quotation from Begum Liaquat in Murtaza Malik, "APWA Presents Draft Law of Evidence," The Muslim (Lahore), 28 March 1983, p. 8; See also, "Begum Liaquat Urges Women to Remain Firm," Dawn, 11 March 1983, p. 17.

76. "Islam Gives Equal Status to Both Sexes; APWA," The Muslim (Lahore), 20 February 1983, p.
77. Letters to the editor in The Muslim (Lahore), 21 February 1983, p. 4; 25 February 1983, p. 4, etc.
78. "Women's Agitation Sacrilegious," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 16 February 1983, p. 3.
79. "Procession Against Islam Intolerable: Afifa," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 19 February 1983, p. 3.
80. N.A. Khwaja, "Women's Rally: The Slogan and the Motive," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 18 February 1983, p. II.
81. "Law of Evidence: Israr Decries Bid to Create Rift," The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 19 February 1983, p. 3.
82. Fauzia Rafiz, "Evidence Act a 'Forced Compromise,'" The Muslim (Lahore), 10 March 1983, p. 3.
83. Aey Aey, "Women's Day: Talking of Rights, Woes," The Muslim (Lahore), 20 March 1983, p. 6.
84. Begum Liaquat's remarks are from, "Begum Liaquat Urges Women to Remain Firm," Dawn (Karachi) 11 March 1983, p. 17.
85. Esposito, "Law in Islam," p. 84. The following is from pp. 85 and 86.
86. Jane I. Smith, "The Experience of Muslim Women: Considerations of Power and Authority," in The Islamic Impact, Yvonne Y. Haddad, Byron Haines, and Ellison Findly, eds. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984), p. 110.
87. "Liberalism," Dawn (Karachi) 12 March 1983, p. 5.
88. Smith, "Experience of Muslim Women," p. 110.
89. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
90. This possibility is suggested by Kay Boals in her insightful analysis of male-female relations in Algeria, "The Politics of Cultural Liberation: Male-Female Relations in Algeria," in Berenice A. Carroll, ed., Liberating Women's History: Theoretical and Critical Essays, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), pp. 194-211, especially p. 205.



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