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LOCAL ORGANIZATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
The State of the Art

Milton J. Esman and Norman T. Uphoff

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LOCAL ORGANIZATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:

THE STATE OF THE ART

Milton J. Esman and Norman T. Uphoff

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Interest in local organizations has grown in recent years as experience with them accumulates. When they "work," they accomplish things in the midst of poverty and disarray which prompt praise from diverse observers such as those cited below. When they "fail," of course, they are chalked up as one more piece of evidence that development will be slow in coming or, if it comes at all, it must be a top-down process.

In undertaking an extended and systematic analysis of experience with local organizations in rural development, the discussion may sometimes become abstract, even though the subject matter remains utterly concrete. So, we would like to begin with some tangible, visible evidence in the reports of some very dissimilar observers, a business executive, a famed writer, and two social scientists.

The first is Peter T. Jones, senior vice president and general counsel for the manufacturing firm of Levi Strauss & Company. In his other role as chairman of the Board of Directors for the Inter-American Foundation he has had occasion to visit and observe grassroots development in Latin America in recent years. After a trip in 1981 to the Dominican Republic, he wrote:

What struck me most on this visit was the contrast--not between the rich and poor--but between the hope and accomplishments of poor people who have effectively organized themselves, and the fatalism and difficulties of those struggling alone. I talked to small landowners producing coffee and rice, to small entrepreneurs who make inexpensive clothing and shoes, and to fruit and vegetable vendors who, with Foundation help, have acquired their own tricycle pushcarts which they formerly rented at exorbitant rates.

By any standards, these are poor people. But they are successfully managing their own farms and businesses, and they have formed cooperative organizations to achieve what they are unable to do alone. Through their organizations, they have gained access to credit; jointly purchased tractors and facilities for drying their produce; reduced the costs of raw materials; and expanded their markets.

In 1979, farmers in the Dominican Republic saw their homes, land and equipment devastated by Hurricanes David and Frederick. (Some) were able to rebuild quickly and efficiently because their cooperative
organizations were in place. These small landowners show pride and self-confidence in managing their own affairs, and they are determined in their joint efforts to create better lives for their families and their community. They know they are doing it for themselves, but they also acknowledge the importance of the credit that was made available to them through their federation's loan fund.

The IAF's contribution to that loan fund helped the federation to mobilize local resources four times the amount of our grant...

The contrast with another farming community we visited was stark. This community, which had also suffered severe hurricane damage in 1979, lacked any strong local organization that could stimulate and reinforce individual efforts. The existing farmers' association was loosely structured and required little financial commitment or other involvement from its members.

According to the farmers themselves, hundreds of thousands of dollars had been made available in the aftermath of the hurricanes, but local participation and initiative was not encouraged in rehabilitation activities. Loans were not paid back, nor was there much expectation by donor agencies that they would be. The money provided, whether in loans or gifts, was largely squandered. (IAF 1982:4-5)

By background and vocation, V.S. Naipaul differs almost entirely from Jones. Descended from sugar plantation workers brought to Trinidad from India, he is a writer who has travelled widely throughout the Third World. In his book India: A Wounded Civilization, he tells of a visit to a squatters' settlement in the slums of Bombay, to observe the work of the Shiv Sena organization which sought to improve the lives of thousands otherwise bereft of opportunity and security:

A squatters' settlement, a low huddle of mud and tin and tile and old boards, might suggest a random drift of human debris in a vacant city space; but the changes now were that it would be tightly organized. The settlement in which the engineer (Naipaul's guide) had stayed, and where we were going that morning, was full of Sena "committees," and these committees were dedicated as much to municipal self-regulation as to the Sena's politics...

The bus stopped and we were just outside the settlement. The entrance lane was deliberately narrow, to keep out carts and cars. And, within, space was suddenly scarce... But the lane was paved, with concrete gutters on either side; without that paving—which was also new—the lane, twisting down the hillside, would have remained an excremental ravine... (1977:63-64)
Naipaul meets with one of the committee groups--in its "stuffy little shed with a corrugated iron roof; but the floor, which the engineer remembered as being earth, was now of concrete"--and then walks through the slum. The crowded conditions are not pleasant as there are few facilities for hygiene or sanitation. But the committees have been able to build washing sheds and latrine blocks, to install dustbins and get them used, and to establish some open spaces for community use and aesthetics. They also help residents find employment. It is a continuing struggle to bring some order and progress out of the potential for filth and despair. But Naipaul is able to tell by sight in which areas of the slum the committees are operating. Where they are not, he reports some miserable scenes.

At the end of his rounds, Naipaul writes:

We were now back where we had started, at the foot of the hill, at the entrance, with the washing sheds full of women and girls, and the latrine blocks full of children. slum life from the outside, from the wide main road, but, approached from the other side . . . evidence of what was possible. (1977:69)

The committee system had not been able to organize and improve the whole slum--"perhaps (for) internal political reasons, perhaps a clash of personalities, or perhaps simply an absence of concerned young men." Local organization is not always possible or always effective. But this "evidence of what was possible" is one of the few notes of optimism in Naipaul's survey of contemporary India.

Moving to a pair of communities in the Philippines, we see the following contrast in provision of water supply documented by Gerald Hickey and Robert Flammang:

The importance of strong local participation in AID-assisted projects is underlined very well in the cases of two Frankel-type water purification plants near Naga City, Camarines Sur. The first, near Milaor, just south of Naga, is a great success. There is a constant stream of people coming to use it. Some come from as far as 6 or 7 kilometers away. The local people marvel at how this plant can extract the filthy, stinking water from the watercourse next to it and convert it into clear, sweet-tasting drinking water.

The barangay chief was a young dynamo of a person who was clearly just as poor as the other clients of the project; he showed us how the barangay financed the operations of the plant with a P1.50 assessment per month. There were a few families in arrears, but some had paid as far ahead as December. People came out of their homes to tell us what they thought of their water system, and it was uniformly favorable. They said they no longer have to haul water so far, or buy it from vendors along the highway. They don't have to worry about getting sick from drinking the water. Their lives are better than what they used to be.
A twin water purification plant was constructed just north of Naga City in Magarao. It is standing unused, rusting. Children are swimming in a nearby creek that looked just about as dirty as the one at Milaor, but they told us that they did not get their drinking water from the creek. No, they said, they bought their water from a nearby owner of a private well (who had a nice house and car) for P2.00 a month. The children said that there was not always enough money to buy gas for the engine powering the (Frankel) unit; while it was shut down, apparently, the spark plug rusted and the local people couldn't get it started again.

At any rate, there was no great urge on anybody's part to fix it as long as the private well water was available. No one came out to talk with us as we inspected the unit except the children. With no apparent local support, the project appears to be a failure, benefiting no one except the firms and workers which built it. We conclude again that the grassroots rural poor can make or break an AID-supported project intended for their benefit, depending on how much they feel themselves to be a part of the project (Hickey and Flammang, 1977:59).

* * * * *

We do not believe that local organization is sufficient in itself to eliminate the burdens of poverty or the deprivations of status and opportunity. But these observations make more vivid the possibilities that exist in such mechanisms for development from below. These can in many circumstances and with circumspection as well as sympathy, be facilitated by government or private agencies. The extent of such possibilities, the problems impeding them, and the means for taking advantage of this potential are the concerns of this study.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strategies of rural development which enhance the productivity and improve the living conditions of the majority of rural families include four components: supportive government policies, public investments in physical and social infrastructure, appropriate technologies, and effective systems of organization. The latter include (1) networks of government agencies which provide needed public services, and (2) associations of rural people which are accountable to their members and which we designate as local organizations (LOs). We focus especially on local development associations based on common residence, on cooperatives based on the pooling of resources, and on interest associations based on common ethnic, occupational or other characteristics of their members.

Three basic functions performed by local organizations can contribute directly to rural development: (a) they can facilitate the provision of public services, (b) they can activate mutual assistance and resource mobilization, and (3) they can enable rural people to communicate information, needs, demands and opportunities to government more effectively. Although some governments refuse to deal with LOs except those they directly control, the majority find it in their interest to tolerate, work with and even encourage and support LOs unless their activities appear to threaten the regime. Likewise, international development assistance agencies have come to recognize LOs' utility and to incorporate them into agricultural and rural development projects.

This study reviews and evaluates what is known about this neglected dimension of rural development strategy and indicates what policies and measures can strengthen and support LOs on behalf of rural development goals. Our discussion draws on analysis of 150 case studies which were treated statistically plus a survey of case and general literature on rural organizations. We drew further on our experience and observations extending over many years, most recently as directors of the Rural Development Participation Project at Cornell University, funded under a cooperative agreement with USAID.

Our statistical findings indicate certain probabilities which are associated with successful LO performance and which should be taken into account by those who design and implement rural development projects:

1. While environmental factors have some bearing on LOs' performance, such as which tasks are most needed or most practical, in general environmental constraints do not shape LO success or failure. Instead what LOs make of their situation is much more important than any particular environmental asset or liability. Indeed, we found that in some respects, LOs performed better under adverse physical or social circumstances. The implication is that LOs may further development objectives under a wide variety of conditions.

2. Certain structural features are associated with LO success. Relatively small, informal base-level organizations, linked vertically and horizontally with other LOs, offer greater promise since they combine the benefits of solidarity and of scale. Although performance of multiple functions may be sought as a long-run objective, it appears wise to start with a single function which is clearly valued by members. LOs are more likely to succeed if their roles and values are participatory and egalitarian, if they are relatively informal in their workings, and consensual in their mode of decision-making. Voluntary membership combined with some definite obligations, preferably decided upon by the members themselves, is associated with success.
3. Locally-initiated LOs seem to perform better on average, though at least half the "best" LOs we analyzed were started by outsiders. Many of the adverse features associated with government-instigated LOs can be avoided and thus can increase the likelihood that officially-sponsored LOs will contribute to development objectives. Government or private agencies can increase their chances of establishing effective LOs by using promoters, organizers or facilitators in "catalyst" roles.

4. Systematic and participatory efforts at planning and goal-setting help to build knowledge and commitment among members. Some internal conflict should be expected, and agencies working with LOs should try to help them cope with and channel it constructively. LOs can mobilize and manage significant resources, and the availability of outside resources to supplement locally-generated ones can be an important incentive. At the same time it is crucial that the amount, kind and timing of outside resources be provided as a stimulus and support for local initiative and not smother it. Pressure on bureaucratic agencies from below helps to improve and integrate public services and can supplement, though not replace, oversight by political and administrative superiors.

5. LOs exhibit vulnerabilities which limit their overall performance. Frequently they encounter resistance from local elites, governments or even from among the rural poor themselves. They are in chronic danger of subordination to the interests of dominant elites, officials or even their own leaders. The "iron law of oligarchy" was formulated with reference to organizations of, by and for the poor. Those LOs that avoid such perils may fall prey to internal cleavages among members arising from social, political or economic differences. LOs are also vulnerable to ineffectiveness which often results from lack of appropriate business skills and to malpractices, including corruption or default by leaders.

Experience has evolved a number of practical means, discussed in the study, for neutralizing or overcoming these various "pathologies" of local organization. For example, the risks of subordination or domination by more powerful persons can be reduced by prohibiting government officials from holding office; by limiting membership, officeholding and access to benefits to cultivating farmers; by requiring regular periodic elections; and by providing technical and management training to rank-and-file members as well as leaders. Internal cleavages can be reduced by keeping base-level organizations small and relatively homogeneous, emphasizing open representative decision-making processes, and enforcing equity and fairness in the distribution of burdens and benefits.

There are a number of dilemmas encountered in attempts to strengthen LOs. Among them is the choice of working with existing groups or building new ones. Though the choice must be context-specific, there are pronounced advantages to identifying and working with and through existing groups, building on familiar roles, procedures and networks of trust. New organizations should not be established unless careful investigation indicates that existing LOs are unavailable or clearly inappropriate. Another dilemma is the mixture between government-provided resources and those generated by the LO itself. When governments grant material assistance without requiring counterpart contributions and local responsibility for management and maintenance, or when loans are provided without requiring repayment, the consequence is to undermine any established patterns of self-reliance, create debilitating dependency, and corrupt local leadership. LOs usually require material help from government, but a balance must be retained between outside assistance and local contributions and responsibility.

Governments can help LOs in many ways. They can sponsor support and protect them, while allowing them sufficient latitude to make their own decisions and learn from
their mistakes. Those assisting LOs can provide material aid, technical help, and training to leaders and members in technical subjects and especially in the skills required to maintain and manage LOs. The structures and administrative procedures of field organizations can be modified and the incentives of field staff revised so that their records depend on their success in working compatibly with rural people through their LOs. Some such reorientation of the bureaucracy, not just by exhortation, is needed to help strengthen LOs. The resources of government can be used, if this is done sympathetically and sensitively, to foster accountability of leaders, enforce internal discipline and vindicate the legal rights of members. In sum, governments can provide a climate of support for LOs which symbolizes their legitimacy and compels local officials and local elites to recognize and to deal with them.

Development assistance agencies are strategically situated to help governments take the necessary steps to strength and work with and through LOs in their rural development activities. They can persuade governments to incorporate LOs into rural development projects and insure that the design of LOs is consistent with successful experience. They can finance facilities for training the leadership, staff and members of LOs and help governments to undertake the administrative reforms needed to adapt their service delivery systems to the requirements of active and participatory LOs. Since there are no established technologies for strengthening LOs or for the parallel processes of bureaucratic reorientation, development assistance agencies can help governments to appreciate the need for experimentation, for monitoring and learning from experience, and for maintaining an appropriate time perspective in building local action capabilities attuned to their distinctive tasks and circumstances.

Achieving the potential of grassroots organizations depends in large measure on how they are built and developed. They must reflect the experience, capabilities and preferences of their members. Neither their structures nor their procedures can be designed and installed by outsiders in uniform, "blueprint" fashion if they are to be accepted and used by their members. The development of LOs must be treated as a "learning process" for all parties involved. Each intervention should be considered an action hypothesis based on the best possible judgment of local people and cooperating outsiders about what is likely to work under local conditions. These efforts should be monitored and adjusted until some pattern emerges which enables the particular LO to act effectively in pursuit of the common interests of its members, jointly with government and private agencies to the extent this is mutually satisfactory. Development assistance agencies can help all parties to work in this inductive mode so as to build local membership institutions that effectively complement the activities of government agencies, that enhance productivity and improve living conditions among the majority of rural people.

The focus in this study on building local organizations does not presume that they are the only, or always the best channels for promoting rural development. Many tasks can be done competently by government, and still other tasks are best handled by private enterprises and initiatives. LOs are not substitutes for public or private sector channels of investment and activity. Rather, LOs complement both sectors and will often make each function more efficiently. LOs can articulate non-governmental interests and perspectives to make government more responsive to individual and group needs. LOs represent collective activities to meet needs not satisfied by individual, profit-oriented activities. Thus, they constitute a "third" sector, balanced between the "public" and the "private" sectors. The development experience of the U.S. and Western Europe as well as Japan indicates the importance of such organized local capabilities. Introducing and augmenting such capabilities in Third World countries should be a significant element of rural development strategy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This state-of-the-art paper represents a summation of research and field experience undertaken under a cooperative agreement with USAID's Office of Rural Development and Development Administration (now Office of Multi-Sectoral Development) in the Bureau of Science and Technology. The Rural Development Participation Project (RDPP) carried out under this cooperative agreement was, we think, an unusual example of collaboration between an academic group and a government agency. Over the period 1977-82, it mobilized the efforts of 30 Cornell faculty members, more than 75 graduate students, and two dozen associates from other American and LDC institutions in applied research, consulting, and the generation and dissemination of knowledge.

This state-of-the-art exercise is the fourth under the RDPP. It was preceded by analyses of rural development participation (Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, 1979), of the use of paraprofessionals in rural development (Esman, Colle, Uphoff and Taylor, 1981), and of participatory approaches to agricultural research and development (Whyte, 1982). More than 50 other research publications were issued under the Project's sponsorship, many of which are listed in the bibliography. In almost all of the RDPP activities, there was or needed to be a local organizational dimension, so it became apparent that a systematic analysis of LOs was the appropriate focus for our concluding paper.

This undertaking represents an extension of our earlier comparative analysis of the role of local organization in rural development which dealt with systems of local organization in Asia (Uphoff and Esman, 1974). Here we extend our analysis to all parts of the Third World and focus on the performance of specific local organizations, taking a micro view to complement the earlier macro view. We first prepared a book-length manuscript, analyzing in considerable detail and drawing conclusions from the data and relationships found in our sample of 150 cases of rural local organization ranging from the most to the least successful. Then we condensed the analysis and conclusions into this state-of-the-art paper for readers who would be interested not so much in the full range of findings as in the essence and implications of those findings for application in practice.

We wish to acknowledge and thank the research assistants who participated actively in our Working Group on Local Organization during the past two years. Forrest Colburn was the first coordinator of the group; Virginia Haufler took over this responsibility when Colburn left for dissertation research in Nicaragua; Farhat Haq, Cynthia Moore and Nancy St. Julien together with Colburn and Haufler did the data searches and drafted the case analyses; Katrina Eadie and Darryl Roberts served as statistical consultants and helped with the computer data processing. Chris Brown participated in the early stages of the Working Group deliberation, and then was engaged in studying local organizations in Botswana (Brown, 1982). During the summer of 1982 he assisted in preparing this state-of-the-art paper from the larger manuscript.

We want to thank our colleagues who have provided helpful criticisms of the larger manuscript: Harvey Blustain, John M. Cohen, David Leonard, Elliott Morss, Emery Roe, Mitchell Seligson, William F. Whyte, and Frank W. Young. We wish also to express our appreciation to John Harbeson, the AID project manager for the RDPP (1979-82) while on leave from the University of Wisconsin-Parkside, and with whose cooperation and encouragement this study was carried out. We wish to thank Barbara Williams Smith, Debi Ostrander and Krishna Mukherjee for their indispensable help in the production of this manuscript.
PART I:

OVERVIEW OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
When looking at the rural areas of the developing countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, one finds significant differences both between and within countries. There are natural differences in soils, rainfall, and other agronomic conditions and differences in population density and social structures. More importantly, there are complex differences in land tenure, in the commercialization of production, in occupational structure and income distribution, in public services and in access to these services, in the orientation of political regimes and in government policies relevant to the rural economy.

Any concrete measures to facilitate rural development must take into account the distinctive features of each society. This does not mean, however, that environmental factors are deterministic of rural development outcomes. Some general statements can be made which address trends and facilitate understanding of the political economy of rural areas in developing countries. The most significant general statement is that the populations of rural areas, with some exceptions in Latin America, continue to increase in absolute numbers, despite massive migration to urban areas. These growing numbers of rural people must somehow earn livelihoods on a land base which is not expanding; indeed, in many cases intensive exploitation is destroying the physical environment on which the livelihood of future generations depends. Though migration has transferred a portion of rural poverty to the shanty towns of urban areas, the greatest concentrations of severe poverty remain in rural areas.

In contrast to the more obvious but less acute poverty and deprivation in urban centers, the rural poor tend to be invisible to national planners and to foreign visitors alike (Chambers, 1980). This situation is exacerbated by the well documented phenomenon of "urban bias"—the tendency of governments to favor urban areas and publics in the provision of services, in the investment of public funds, and in incentives for private investment (Lipton, 1977). The discovery of "small farmers" by donor agencies has not yet greatly altered patterns of public expenditure. Even the more substantial landed farmers must often struggle for policies which meet their economic needs. Small and marginal farmers, tenants at will, landless workers, and such weak and disadvantaged groups as female-headed households, who together comprise majorities in most rural areas, have limited access to public services and tend to be overlooked by governments (Esman, 1978).
During the past decade it has become increasingly clear that economic growth alone cannot eliminate and may not even reduce rural poverty. Many countries which have enjoyed rapid and sustained economic growth continue to experience widespread rural poverty, as the majority of rural residents have experienced little or no improvement in their productivity or quality of life. Thus, attention has been shifting to strategies that benefit larger numbers of people, that emphasize increased employment and productivity, and that improve health and welfare for the disadvantaged majority, most of whom continue to live and to earn their livelihoods in rural areas. Such broad-based development is the policy objective toward which this study is oriented.

Elements of Rural Development Strategy

There are a number of essential components of broad-based rural development strategies. We would identify four major categories:

1. **Public investments** in physical and social infrastructure. This includes roads, water supply for irrigation and household consumption, and such facilities as schools and health clinics. Infrastructural investments sufficient to deal with rural needs usually require a substantial shift in expenditure priorities from urban to rural areas. They include not only the construction of facilities but also their operation and maintenance. Though such costs can and should be shared with organized local publics, major and continuing governmental expenditures are required.

2. A **policy environment** which is sensitive and responsive to the interests of rural constituencies including the poor. This includes, for example, a structure of market prices that provides production incentives to farmers and small entrepreneurs, a set of import duty, tax, and credit policies that discourage premature labor-displacing mechanization in areas of high underemployment of labor, or programs aimed at employment creation among landless laborers and marginal farmers.

3. **Technologies** suitable to the circumstances and the capabilities of small farmers and other rural producers. Such technologies and farming practices should foster improved productivity, yet be within the financial means of small operators. Similar technological improvements can increase the productivity
of craft and other small rural industries. These are important because an increasing proportion of rural employment and income will have to come from non-agricultural activities.

(4) Effective institutions. Two kinds of institutions are required for rural development.

a) The first are units of government agencies which provide the public services that have come to be associated with higher productivity and improved quality of life in all countries which have experienced successful rural development. These range from production-oriented services like agricultural research and extension, credit and marketing agencies, small industry advisory services, and irrigation departments, to social service organizations like school systems, health, sanitation, and family planning agencies. Some of these activities can be handled by private enterprise through market channels and others by private voluntary agencies. However, in all countries the main burden of providing these services falls on governments acting through bureaucratic networks.

b) The second set are local institutions, including local government and rural enterprises, but especially a variety of membership organizations such as cooperatives, farmers' associations, mothers' clubs, ethnic unions and tenant leagues. Grassroots political organizations may also be included. Not all are equally accountable to their membership and not all are equally involved in rural development work. This study focuses on what we designate as local organizations (LOs), defined as organizations accountable to their members and involved in some development activities. This distinguishes them from organs of the state and also from purely social groups.

All four of these components -- public investments and expenditures, government policies, appropriate technologies, and more effective institutions -- are necessary for rural development. Yet government planners and development assistance organizations as well as most academic writers on rural development have emphasized the first three, by and large neglecting the institutional dimension, and at very great cost. For without institutions, bureaucratic or participatory, infrastructure will not be efficiently built or adequately maintained, public services will not be provided or well utilized, and governments will not be able to maintain satisfactory informational exchanges with the publics that must be served if broad-based rural development is to become a reality rather
than a mere slogan. This study addresses the institutional dimension of rural development which has been least systematically studied: local organizations which include, represent, act on behalf of, and are accountable to the various publics who are the intended beneficiaries of rural development policies and programs.

This focus on local organization expands upon an overly narrow, two-sector conception of alternatives for promoting development. Most discussions counterpose the options of the "public" sector and the "private" sector. But local organizations present, in effect, a third sector, following the distinctions offered by Hunter (1969) among "administrative," "economic" and "political" approaches to rural development. The first relies on bureaucratic mechanisms and seeks enforced compliance with government decisions in a regulatory mode. Decisions are made by experts according to technical principles and criteria, though the policy objectives are set by senior political officials. The second relies on market mechanisms and seeks to promote desired behavior through price incentives. Decisions are left to individuals making calculations of private advantage without reference to broader interests or the public good. The "political" alternative is perhaps misnamed because there are no necessary partisan connotations. It covers approaches relying more on voluntaristic mechanisms, where cooperation is gained primarily through processes of discussion and persuasion. Decisions are taken with reference to both group and individual interests, and neither state authority nor profit-maximization is seen as controlling behavior, though both regulatory and price inducements may be invoked. The approaches are contrasted in summary form in the following figure.

**Figure 1-1:**

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These three approaches constitute alternatives rather than a continuum in as much as they have some important qualitative differences. But as discussed below, none of them can be adequate in itself for promoting rural development. The first and third approaches are similar in that they seek to solve problems through collective action, making efforts to achieve objectives which transcend individual interests. In this sense, the third is an extension of the "public" sector. On the other hand, the second and third do not wield state authority to gain their objectives (though they can influence it). They are less able to coerce and thus are more likely to be flexible and accommodating in seeking solutions. In this sense, the third approach represents "private" interests vis-a'-vis the state and its bureaucracy.

No rural development effort, as Hunter points out, can succeed by following only one of these approaches. Indeed, a well-rounded strategy includes some combination of all three, since each by itself eventually produces diminishing returns. There are some things which each does better than the others, such as amassing resources for long-term investments, modifying programs to meet local conditions, or promoting innovation to raise productivity levels. Each has weaknesses as well as strengths. The temptation to justify one by pointing to the deficiencies in the others should be resisted. Instead they should be regarded as complementary.

In the past there may have been too much readiness to assume that governmental solutions would be most effective for promoting rural development. At present we sense a similar inclination to see the private sector as having more beneficent effects than can realistically be expected. Particularly where one wishes to raise the productive capacities of poorer households, communities and regions, reliance only on private enterprises is unlikely to produce such results. Profit-oriented activities cluster where there are the greatest and most immediate returns. Thus, while recognizing a useful role for private sector initiatives in rural development, we do not see the market as the solution to all or most of the problems of the rural majority, even if they would benefit from less distortions of the market. Market "imperfections" come from private as well as governmental sources.

In any case it is unnecessary to choose between "public" and "private" sector approaches, since both are needed and since local organizations as a "third sector" can serve to make the other two more effective.\(^1\) The development of strong local organizations has important implications for extending the outreach of public

\(^1\) In this regard, local organizations have been characterized by Berger (1977) as important "mediating" institutions.
administration and for improving the performance of government agencies and their personnel, a theme we shall explore in some depth. Local organizations, by aggregating the demands and resources of private citizens, can make more effective the efforts of individuals who make up the "private" sector. By representing needs more persuasively and solving local problems in appropriate ways, local organizations can liberate productive potential.

In discussing what local organizations can contribute to rural development, we do not suggest that they can replace government or business activities, nor do we assume that they are sufficient to handle all the problems and tasks of development. Rather, we argue that they have been overlooked or neglected, and even where accepted and engaged, the efforts too often have been poorly informed or misdirected. Local capacities for collective action can be a vital and indispensible part of the network of institutional channels that link individuals to regional and national centers of production and distribution. Until such local capacities exist, no "optimum" development strategy based on all three sectors can be pursued.

The Tasks of Local Organization

Local organizations (LOs) can perform three major functions in rural areas. The first is the facilitation of public services by providing government agencies with more accurate information on the needs, priorities, and capabilities of local publics and more reliable feedback on the impact of government initiatives and services. Public services often fail to be effective because program designers are uninformed of the circumstances of the publics they intend to assist. Only through organization can these needs, which are often locally distinctive, be effectively summarized and expressed. LOs are also needed to extend services directly to their members, "retailing" to individual households information and material resources which governments are able to provide only on a "wholesale" basis.

A second function is the undertaking of mutual assistance by collective action. This includes the mobilization, deployment and application of local resources such as labor, funds, materials and latent managerial skills that would otherwise be unused. Even if communities are generally poor, they usually have some resources that can be applied to meeting pressing needs. In doing so, they can create some leverage with government for matching resources and for improving existing development assistance.

2 This is suggested by Cernea (1982) on the basis of his work with the projects of the World Bank and his review of experience of other donor agencies.
There are limitations to what can be accomplished by self-help, yet especially for the poorest communities, isolated and neglected as they are, such efforts are often essential to initiate development processes.

A third potential task of LOs is the empowerment of local publics, equipping them with the voice and the capacity to make credible demands on government and on others who control resources. They can then influence the content of public policy and affect the terms of access to needed services, countervailing the "urban bias" noted earlier. Better policy and more energetic, appropriate, responsive performance by bureaucratic agencies should result from involving local publics in political and administrative processes.

One of the first efforts to assess systematically the relationships of local organizations to rural development was our study in 1973-74 of 16 Asian countries (Uphoff and Esman, 1974). Our findings demonstrated "a strong, empirical basis for concluding that local organization is a necessary if not sufficient condition for accelerated rural development, especially development which emphasizes improvement in the productivity and welfare of the majority of rural people." The case for local organizations emerging from these findings was that rural publics which have experienced significant improvements in their productivity and welfare have networks of organizations that perform the above functions. By contrast, rural societies characterized by persistent or increasing poverty, inequality, exploitation or neglect tend not to have such networks. Simply put, the case for rural local organizations is that they are an evident means of achieving rural development goals.

Our earlier study, representing a "macro perspective," dealt with whole systems of local organization and examined relationships between countries' overall development performance and their organizational structures. It did not deal in any detail with the varieties, activities and functions of specific local organizations, or their internal dynamics and governance. The latter we might call a "micro perspective." In this study, which is complementary to the 1974 work, we further explore macro issues, but concentrate more at the micro level. This analysis tests and amplifies the case for local organization by providing a more comprehensive examination of recent writing and experience on participatory local organizations, their strengths and their limitations, and various measures by governments which affect their prospects for success in promoting rural development.

To this end, we present in Part II, a description and analysis of rural local organizations -- their structure, performance and problems. This discussion draws on our statistical analysis of 150 case studies from developing countries. It is supplemented by
the findings from several research projects on local participation in rural development undertaken by the Cornell Rural Development Committee and by our survey of secondary literature.

It is quite clear that local organizations are a highly pluralistic phenomenon. No assumptions can be made about the value or viability of organizations, existing or potential, in any rural society without specific investigation. Some organizations which serve the survival needs or promote the cultural or economic interests of rural publics may be unknown to the planner in his urban office, and inconspicuous to the visiting investigator. Some communities may be organizationally rich with various structures coexisting to meet the specific needs of differentiated publics. Individuals may belong to several organizations, each contributing to a different dimension of his or her livelihood or well-being. Other communities may be impoverished organizationally, with individuals or households atomized and forced to cope largely on their own. Moreover, rural communities are frequently decorated with "paper" organizations, conceived for external or factional purposes but having little real function or effect.

Given this variability of LO environments, structure and performance, we reject categorically any "blueprint" concept of organizational design for LOs. This approach to organizational design has proved to be fallacious for two reasons. First, the great variability in local conditions and experience means that local structures must vary with the specific needs and concrete experiences of their members. Second, rural people need the opportunity to adjust the activities and management of their LOs to what they learn from their experience, in what Korten (1980) calls a "learning process" approach. To the extent that this learning and these adjustments are inhibited by standard structural prescriptions and uniform procedures, the organization is likely to become stultified. Both the form and procedures of rural local organizations need to be flexible, adapting to local experiences and responsive to local needs and preferences. Governments make a major mistake when they attempt to prescribe or enforce uniform, formalistic patterns for the LOs they sponsor.

With this guiding principle in mind, several issues of current debate are discussed in detail in Part II. For instance, how important are environmental constraints in determining LO performance? How important are internal management tasks compared to more external ones for achieving LO goals? What effect does the size of the base-level organization have on outcomes? Is it better to aim for organizations with a homogeneous membership, in order to increase the likelihood of cooperation among members, or should LO membership reflect the heterogeneity of society at large? What degree of government involvement in the creation and running of LOs produces optimal results?
What internal organizational forms, executive or consensual, formal or informal, are found to be effective? Our study of 150 local organizations gives us some basis for answers to these and other questions concerning LOs.

The discussion in Chapter 6 concludes Part II with an examination of the problems confronting local organizations, the "pathologies" which can cause them to fail. Commonly encountered problems which we discuss are: (1) resistance to organization by governments, local elites or the poor themselves, (2) subordination of the organization to more powerful interests, (3) internal cleavages due to factional or other disagreements, (4) ineffectiveness due to members' and leaders' lack of appropriate skills, and (5) various malpractices such as corruption. Consideration of these pathologies is necessary in order to have a well-rounded understanding of local organizations, appreciating both strengths and weaknesses, possibilities and limitations.

In Part III we turn to policy issues. What can be done, and has been done, to activate and strengthen LOs? This should be of particular interest to those who are working on a day-to-day basis with local organizations, or who wish to pursue development goals with local participation in the creation and distribution of benefits. We examine in Chapter 7 various innovations and practices of some LOs which have prospered in spite of impediments that appear to be fatal in other circumstances. We then consider in Chapter 8 strategic issues at the local level, such as whether it is better to work through new or existing channels and what role local leadership can play. We analyze and evaluate the sometimes decisive contribution that an outside "catalyst" can make in stimulating local organizations. Finally, we consider in Chapter 9 the role of governments and development assistance agencies. Outsiders are in a somewhat paradoxical situation with regard to LOs: their assistance is often vital for LO success but too much intervention, especially from governments, can destroy the local initiative and self-reliance on which so much LO success depends. We suggest some ways that outsiders can help LOs achieve rural development goals without at the same time smothering or subverting the very organizations they seek to assist.
Chapter 2

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL ORGANIZATION

Though most initiatives for development can be described, at least nominally, in technological or economic terms, one must be clear about the political aspects and implications of local organization. "Development" itself, of course, is not just a matter of technical or economic changes. Such factors as individual opportunities, social stratification, relations between men and women, cultural values, and the distribution of influence over government policy are all bound up in this process. It has often been convenient for participants and analysts to treat development decisions as if they were devoid of political elements. And it has also been true that various failures of development efforts can be traced to ignoring political considerations. We are not arguing in favor of the " politicization" of development programs, but rather seeking to take a more realistic and rounded view of what is required to promote broad-based development.

In the first chapter we noted technical and economic as well as political justifications for accepting a larger role for local organization in development programs. We expect that some planners and decision-makers will nevertheless prefer to shy away from such a role because they view it as too risky or controversial, possibly arguing that governments will never accept more active and effective local organizations. Because this perception exists, we need to address it directly.

Some regimes do not tolerate rural local organizations of any kind. They regard all such associations as actually or potentially subversive. Other regimes, on the other hand, foster local organizations and make membership compulsory in order better to control and perhaps better to serve their rural publics. Under still other regimes which neither proscribe nor require organizations among rural groups, local organizations can come under heavy pressures to succumb to patronage and be directed by the state rather than by their members. The majority of regimes, however, are not able or do not desire to exercise tight control over rural local organizations, but are prepared to recognize or even to engage in active exchanges with them. Our observations of trends in the "centers" and "peripheries" of developing countries persuade us that this survey and analysis of LOs may be especially timely because many governments have begun to recognize that it is in their interest to tolerate and even assist rural local organizations.
Why Governments Accept Local Organization

Why should and why do many governments, including most of those in countries from which our 150 cases originate, accept the reality of rural local organizations without suppressing or subverting them? Why do they consider them as inevitable and even legitimate? There are several reasons why supporting, or at least tolerating, rural local organizations is in the self-interest of most governments:

1. **Pragmatic Politics.** Since some governments have no real choice, their political leaders take a pragmatic position. To attempt to repress or to control every local organization, some of which have deep and long-standing roots, would deplete their coercive resources and their legitimacy. And to what end? Except where LOs threaten the regime, the prudent policy is to live and let live. If local people organize, government can deal with them to mutual advantage so long as they work within the rules of the system. Since they represent rural constituencies, they can even be helpful, providing services and support that the regime may find valuable in exchange for the right to operate and draw some benefits from the system.

2. **Control of Bureaucracy.** Some political leaders have more positive reasons for working with local organizations. There is often some tension based upon less than perfect trust between politicians and the specialized bureaucracies on which the former must rely for the implementation of policies and programs. Politicians often worry that bureaucrats are out of control and are not implementing public policy as they intend. Political leaders may find local membership organizations a means for keeping their bureaucracies responsive both to the priorities of government and to the needs of rural publics. Moreover, LOs can help to reduce the regime's problems of bureaucratic corruption or non-performance of duties.

3. **Information Exchanges.** Resources and services provided by government are likely to be wasted unless appropriate to the intended publics. This requires reliable flows of accurate information about the needs, priorities and capabilities of specific rural publics. Such information is much more likely to flow and to be representative from organized publics than from atomized individuals. Thus government agencies may wish to have their rural "clients" organized not necessarily to control them --though this may be either a motive or a consequence -- but to enable the agency to perform its activities more effectively. For efficient program performance, governments may feel that they need organized publics.
4. Resource Mobilization. Governments in most developing countries are short of resources, especially for rural areas, since their priorities often lie elsewhere (Lipton, 1977). Organized publics can, if the incentives exist, mobilize considerable materials, funds, labor, and even managerial skills, thus stretching the government's own limited resources and producing both economic benefits and political satisfactions to rural publics at relatively low cost. Actually, as we shall show, there are also valid reasons for governments to require counterpart contributions from local publics, so as to have more vigorous and responsible local organizations. Governments can multiply their resources allocated to rural development by working through local organizations which evoke sufficient membership support to elicit matching resources and contributions.

5. Political Support. Most regimes are interested not only in maintaining, but also in expanding their political support base. While this applies certainly to those with competitive political parties and periodic elections, authoritarian regimes must also take account of their standing with rural publics. To be recognized as helpful to local membership organizations, to move resources through these organizations, to accord them legitimacy and respect may be a relatively low-cost way for politicians to protect and expand their support base among the majority of their rural constituents.

6. Social Order. A further consideration is that politicians and senior bureaucrats in power are concerned with avoiding trouble. Rural discontent frequently flares into violence which can be economically costly and politically destabilizing. The price of a reasonably contented countryside may be the demonstration of interest in the welfare of disadvantaged publics, including the ability to communicate with these publics and to cater to their most pressing needs, to stimulate self-help among them, to exchange services for support. For this process to work, rural publics must be organized and capable of reflecting the interests and responses of their members. Regimes which desire to maintain social order in the countryside may find it more profitable to work with and through organized rural publics than to rely primarily on the selective distribution of patronage or on coercion.

7. Donor Agencies. Many LDC governments are interested in a favorable image among development assistance agencies on whom they depend for important financial contributions to their development budgets and for technical assistance. There has been a shift in the priorities of development assistance agencies, including USAID and the World Bank, from urban infrastructure to
agricultural and rural development, and especially to activities that are more likely to benefit the poor rural majority. One ingredient of a broadly-based rural development strategy is local organization. Governments therefore may have an incentive to support local organizations in order to strengthen their claims for foreign assistance.

Changing Views of Rural Local Organizations

The past decade has witnessed growing recognition among scholars and government officials of the importance of popular participation and of local organization in any broadly-based strategy of rural development. This has not always been the case, nor does it represent a firm consensus even now. In the past it was often politically convenient to neglect LOs, and the prevailing theories of development gave suitable rationale for this.

A wide range of social science theorizing which launched development efforts of the 1950s and 1960s emphasized the role of the central government and of non-local agents of change. At the outset, a "technology gap" was identified between the so-called advanced and backward nations, to be filled by the transfer of technology from the former to the latter. When this by itself did not seem to be producing much progress, attention turned to various "resource gaps"--the budget gap between government expenditure and revenue, the foreign exchange gap between imports and exports, the capital formation gap between desired levels of investment and the actual levels of national saving. These were to be filled by transfer of resources from richer to poorer nations, it was hoped in sufficient amounts to enable the latter to "take off" into self-sustained economic growth (Rostow, 1960; Chenery and Strout, 1966).

There was little place for local organization in any of these theories. Rural communities were seen as "traditional" (Riggs, 1964; Apter, 1965) and thus unable to transform themselves; indeed when they were regarded as uncooperative, a dominating role for the "center" was justified (Myrdal, 1968; Binder et al., 1971). If local communities were classified as technologically backward (Poats, 1972), they would have nothing to contribute to the "modernization" of their production. If they were disposed to consume rather than to save and invest (Kindleberger, 1958), or to make excessive claims on government, one would want to reduce their voice in government decisions in order to accelerate capital formation and maintain political stability (Huntington, 1968). The leading development "theorists" of this era approved at most a role for local organizations as "transmission belts" for the center to reach the periphery, and no autonomous capacity for organized rural constituencies was welcomed.

As the 1970s began, a new development agenda was formulated, giving more thought to appropriate technology, labor-using strategies, self-reliance, equitable growth and
income distribution, as well as participation. With this concern for more broadly-based rural development, it became clearer that there was an "organization gap" between central government agencies and the rural communities they were supposed to assist in development (Owens and Shaw, 1972; Uphoff and Esman, 1974; Montgomery, 1974; Lele, 1975; Johnston and Clark, 1982, Ch. 5). Concepts and principles borrowed from the field of organization theory supported this new emphasis. As long ago as 1915, Robert Michels had written that "organization is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong." Building on the base laid by Michels, contemporary organizational theorists evolved theoretical statements about organizational structure, capability and membership participation (e.g. Olson, 1965). This has been extended by political scientists such as Migdal (1974), Paige (1975) and Popkin (1979) to peasant collective behavior.

This new appreciation of the role of organization was seldom challenged directly, but uncertainties and difficulties in starting or sustaining effective local institutions kept many agencies from making this a central part of their development strategy. The fact that establishing local organizations was more an organic than a mechanical process, that it was not predictable and often slow, and did not obviously "move money" in large amounts, kept government agencies and international donors from developing much enthusiasm for the approach. Technology, economic policy measures, and resource transfers, for all their demonstrated limitations, remained more programmable and thus more popular with planners and budgeters.

At the same time scepticism or opposition to local organizations came from another direction, from those who saw official development efforts as fated or intended to fail (Hayter, 1971; Petras and LaPorte, 1971; Paddock and Paddock, 1973). From left circles there were vehement critiques of the whole "development" enterprise, regarding it as a palliative at best and as a deception at worst, masking forces of concentration and exploitation which doomed the Third World to underdevelopment unless and until radical, revolutionary transformations were achieved (Frank, 1968; Cardoso, 1972; Rodney, 1972). For opposite reasons, fearing that local organizations might indeed empower rural people and lead to social instability or to structural changes, there was some continuing resistance to LOs from the right, though it was not expressed so publicly in print as from the left.

There have been expressions of support for a local organizational approach from across the political spectrum. Both left and right could view LOs favorably as a means for giving the poor a voice in public deliberations, as channelling resources to the most needy, and as promoting self-reliant efforts. The value of having "mediating organizations" which protect and empower individuals vis-a-vis the state was endorsed by conservatives as well as liberals (Berger, 1977).
To summarize, local organizations have become an issue on the rural development agenda, though the importance attached to them by different commentators varies considerably. This disagreement in the literature is in part a reflection of the varying orientations of those who write on agricultural and rural development. We feel that we should make our own perspective clear. We differ with the Marxists and their intellectual associates who believe that only radical structural changes can benefit the poorer classes and that any lesser measures can only be palliatives doomed to failure. Our working hypothesis is that real economic and institutional improvements are possible in most developing countries even without revolutionary change, which is in most cases unlikely. At the same time, we differ with those who still take a technocratic approach and believe that rural progress depends on economic growth and technological improvements alone. These writers have not faced up to the realities of landlessness, fragmentation and concentration of land holdings, and persistent rural poverty.

Governments in most, if not all, developing countries are not monolithic. They do not necessarily, or in all matters, serve the interests of local elites at the expense of the poor, and their bureaucracies are not invariably corrupt, incompetent, exploitative or self-serving. These tendencies may or may not be present in individual countries at particular times, and their presence is a matter of degree rather than absolutes. Regimes tend to protect the social and political status quo but most of them are coalitions containing varying and sometimes conflicting ideological, regional, bureaucratic and factional interests. Their attitudes toward rural development and toward rural associations are thus not necessarily predetermined or fixed, so long as local organizations do not appear to threaten the regime. Within the political framework of most regimes, there may be opportunities for local organizations to function, to serve the social and economic interests of their members, to make claims on government, and even to be encouraged and patronized by government or by factions of the regime which for different reasons may advocate or be sympathetic to a "bottom-up" approach to rural development. Where the opportunity to organize exists, as it does in most developing countries, rural publics can enhance their individual economic and social interests and collective well-being in significant ways by taking advantage of these opportunities.

The ongoing activities of local organizations in rural areas of many Third World countries are often successful enough to suggest that the approach described here is an appropriate one for rural development. Some writers are convinced that only revolutionary transformations can rescue the rural poor and dismiss "half-measures" as undermining such outcomes. On the other hand, those actually experiencing poverty will find little virtue in failing to capitalize on any realistic opportunities available to them.
to achieve direct improvements in productivity, welfare, security and dignity by their own collective efforts. A "reformist" approach does not expect governments to be benign, or bureaucracies to be sympathetic. But neither does it rule out the possibility that governments may find it useful for their own reasons to work with and through local organizations of rural publics. It recognizes some leeway both for regimes and for local publics. Some tactics at some times in some systems will be unavailable or unavailing, but in most countries, opportunities for local organization are not foreclosed. Pursuing these opportunities with some success can alter society in ways that are beneficial to the disadvantaged majority.

These are the premises that underlie our analysis of rural local organizations. The material we present and analyze should clarify the substance and utility, as well as the limitations, of this orientation.
PART II:

ANALYSIS OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS
Chapter 3
TYPES OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
A STRATEGY FOR STUDYING THEM

Local organizations (LOs) have been increasingly identified as important, even as necessary if not sufficient elements in a broadly-based rural development strategy (Gow et al., 1979; Griffin and Ghose, 1979; Korten, 1980). In the process, however, the idea of "local organization" has often become quite abstract, and generalizations flow freely about what LOs can and cannot accomplish. Almost anything that one can say about LOs is true -- or false -- in at least some instance, somewhere.

Rural development analysts and planners face a real difficulty because the term "local organization" encompasses such a wide range of structures and results. Our task is to map and assess the variety of LO experiences in Africa, Asia and Latin America in order to provide a guide to those wishing to institute or improve LOs. Part II presents the first half of this effort -- a description and assessment of LOs and experience with them. We first describe our research strategy and methods in this chapter. We then examine in Chapters 4 and 5 the tasks and environments of LOs, the kinds of structural arrangements observed among LOs, and how these variables are related to their overall rural development performance. Finally, we discuss in Chapter 6 the various problems which can impede LO performance.

Typology of Local Organizations

The kinds of institutions, formal and informal, that could be regarded as "local organizations" are numerous. An initial task is to delimit and define the universe of organizations to be considered under this heading. In our previous study for Asia, we looked at a variety of institutional channels that could facilitate communication and cooperation between central governments and local communities: government agencies, local government bodies, cooperatives and other associational institutions, political or party organizations, and private sector mechanisms (Uphoff and Esman, 1974). These channels can be arranged along a continuum (Figure 3-1 on the next page) with purely governmental, authoritative institutions at one end and purely private, non-authoritative ones at the other. Political organizations tied into the apparatus of a government party, of course, can appear toward the authoritative end of the spectrum, but in so far as they are pressing their interests upon government or seeking to take over the government, they are located at the "private" end.
In this study, we have focused on the complex middle range (C). The local organizations it subsumes are not the only ones important for development, but we focus on them because they are membership organizations unlike (B) and primarily development-oriented unlike (D). As such, they are potentially useful vehicles for augmenting rural development efforts from above or from below. To make some sense of the variety of organizations in this broad middle range, one needs to distinguish various types of local organization, grouped according to some of their basic characteristics and using common designations.

The descriptive typology which we developed to guide our sampling and discussions consists of: (1) local development associations (LDAs); (2) cooperatives; and (3) interest associations. We did not follow the conventional distinction between formal (or "modern") and informal ("traditional") LOs, as the degree of formalization is a variable cutting across all other types. The cases in our sample did not include many of the most informal groups, since direct involvement with development activities was a criterion for selection, but all three of these categories include relatively informal as well as formal associations.

The first type, local development associations, shares various characteristics with local government (B). LDAs are area-based, bringing together most of the people within a community, area or region to promote its development by direct self-help or other means such as lobbying government to get needed services or raising funds to pay for new construction. Membership in LDAs is as heterogenous as the communities involved, since the only common characteristic that members need share is their place of residence. The organizations are multi-functional in that they usually undertake a wide variety of tasks. They differ from local governments in that they are not comprehensive in their responsibilities and do not have the same legal powers. They are extensions more of the community than of the government, though they may be government instigated and assisted. The servicios of the National Community
Development Service and the village organizations of Ayni Ruway in Bolivia (Healy, 1980) are representative of this type, as are the Village Development Committees in Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia (Chambers, 1974), the Local Development Associations in Yemen (Cohen et al., 1981), and the Sarvodaya organizations in Sri Lanka (Ratnapala, 1979).

The second type, cooperatives, is extremely varied, with many sub-types. At one level it is a purely nominal category, as thousands of LOs around the world are called "cooperatives." To distinguish them analytically from other LOs, we underscore their economic functions for their members. The defining characteristic of cooperatives is that members pool resources (Galjart, 1981), whether it is their capital (savings societies), labor (rotating work groups), land (production cooperatives), purchasing power (consumer coops) or products (marketing coops). There is a democratic principle operating in most cooperatives which presumes that even if resource inputs are not equal, all should have an equal voice in decisions. Coops are distinguished from LDAs by the fact that their benefits accrue directly to their members in a "private" way, whereas LDA members contribute mostly to "public goods" accessible to all.

The third type of LO, interest associations is even more diverse than the second. They are not defined by geographic boundaries as are LDAs or by economic functions as are coops, but by certain common features of their membership. In interest associations, persons come together to perform a particular activity like water management or public health protection, or to promote common interests based on some personal characteristic like sex (women's associations), ethnicity (tribal unions), religion (mosque committees), or economic status (landless laborer organizations). Whether defending or promoting the interests of their members, interest associations are less encompassing than LDAs, which are inclusive and multi-functional, and broader than coops since they are concerned with social as well as economic interests and with public as well as private goods.

One can hardly pass judgment on any single type of local organization because of the diversity of performance registered under any nominal category, though it may be said, for example, that cooperatives are more often than not unsuccessful in less-developed countries (e.g. Hyden, 1980). If any set of LOs achieve their stated goals, they are likely to be quite desirable. But performance is often below what is expected or claimed for them. So we need to push beyond nominal characteristics and get at factors which are likely to relate more directly to the functioning of such organizations--what appears to make them more or less successful?
Research Strategy

With this broad descriptive typology in mind, we set out to analyze a cross-section of LOs from all parts of the world. It was virtually impossible to undertake a systematic "sampling" of the universe of developing country LOs since no complete inventory of them exists. Instead, we took the bibliographic equivalent of a "random walk" (Mitchell, 1965). We searched through bibliographies, journals, books, and theses on the subject of local organization and rural development to pick out cases that had enough data to permit systematic comparison.

We were able to select and analyze 150 reasonably complete case studies, of which 21% come from Latin America, 42% from Asia, 34% from Africa south of the Sahara, and 4% from the Middle East and North Africa. In terms of our descriptive categories, 20% are local development associations, 35% coops, and 45% interest associations. As might be expected, the literature contained relatively more material on successful LOs than on failures. (Below we discuss how we arrived at scorings of success or failure.) The cases gathered displayed a wide range of outcomes. Our sample appeared to reflect the distribution in the literature--16% outstanding, 23% very good, 29% good, 19% poor, and 13% very poor--which is somewhat skewed toward better performance, in contrast to what we think is the distribution in the real world. For our purposes, however, this posed no problem since we were not trying to determine what proportion of LOs were successful, but rather how LOs could be made more successful. For this we needed to have sufficiently large sub-groups of LOs performing with different degrees of success.

There are many possible explanations for why some LOs make a greater contribution to rural development than do others. We began by identifying the major sets of variables, and the general relationships among them, as sketched in Figure 3-2.

Environmental variables are regarded as given or fixed, at least in the short run, for any particular case. For example, topography may be favorable or adverse, social structure may be heterogeneous or homogeneous, a legacy of partisanship may affect group behavior or not. Such factors may affect what structural characteristics of LOs are most common, or how suitable they are for promoting effective performance. A low level of literacy in the environment, for example, might make formalization of LO

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1 This section summarizes our research strategy. Further details are contained in the Appendix (pages 99-106), with more elaboration in the book-length study to follow.

2 These cases are listed in the Appendix on pages 107-111. Many of the studies from which the data were drawn are cited in the chapters that follow and in the Bibliography beginning on page 113.
Figure 3.2:
RELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES AFFECTING OR INDICATING CONTRIBUTIONS OF LOCAL ORGANIZATION TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT

1. **Environment Variables**, e.g. topography, social heterogeneity, partisanship
2. **Local Structural Variables**, e.g. formalization, horizontal linkage, incentives
3. **Local Operational Variables**, e.g. planning and goal setting, resource mobilization, claim-making
4. **Participation Variables**, e.g. selection of leaders, contribution of labor, financial management
5. **Exogenous Variables**, e.g. effective government programs and policies, foreign assistance, new technology, regime ideology
6. **RD Performance Variables**, e.g. growth in income and employment, educational improvement, access to services, participation in government decision-making, summarized as TOTAL PERFORMANCE
operations less likely, or less likely to produce positive results. Both of these sets of variables -- environmental and structural -- affect participation. In turn, structural factors and participation would be expected to affect the degree of LO effectiveness in performing tasks like planning and goal setting, resource mobilization, or claim-making. Finally, success in carrying out such operations, along with the influence of "exogenous" variables outside the control of local organizations, would affect rural development performance in the respective communities.

Of these sets of variables, participation turned out to be the most difficult to measure for the purposes of comparative analysis. The case studies from which we could draw data were too uneven in what information they gave on participation variables to permit detailed consideration. For each of the other sets of factors, however, it was possible to identify and measure a number of discrete variables. For our analysis, we selected and scored a total of 18 environmental, 13 structural, 8 operational and 14 performance variables, as well as a separately calculated summary score of overall LO performance called Total Performance. These variables are listed in the methodological appendix (pp. 100-104) and are discussed in the following two chapters.

To the extent that sufficient information could be found in our source materials, we scored each of the 150 cases on each of these 54 variables. Our strategy was to record from the materials all available quantitative information and any relevant descriptive information, and on the basis of this to score each case on scales of 1 to 5, using ordinal categories that were reasonably distinct if cardinal ones were not possible or appropriate. On these scales, 3 indicated an average, typical or neutral value.

For example, the scoring protocol for our Total Performance variable was as follows:

5 = outstanding, multiple successes, no significant failures
4 = very good, a number of successes or a few solid successes, no significant failures
3 = good, some successes, few if any failures
2 = poor, few successes, some obvious failures
1 = very poor, no real successes, multiple failures

Once the cases had been scored and checked they were entered for computer analysis. We used a variety of standard statistical techniques to probe the relationships among the variables. The principal methods of empirical analysis were cross-tabulations, taking sub-samples to introduce controls, and simple correlations. Where appropriate, we also used multi-variate regression analysis.
One caution is in order concerning the limitations of the statistical relationships we infer from the data. Statistical results can only indicate probabilities; they do not produce fixed rules or laws of behavior. Correlation does not establish causation, though this may be cautiously inferred where one variable is logically or empirically prior to the other. We identify positive or negative associations between and among variables, and suggest what implications these may have for planning and action. The nature of our data and reasonable statistical techniques do not allow us to do more.

Notwithstanding this caution, we believe that the results from the statistical analysis contribute a useful background and base for our conclusions about local organizations and rural development. Our analysis has also been shaped by our reading of the literature for more than a decade and by our extensive field experience under the Rural Development Participation Project. This gave us and our colleagues direct involvement with LOs particularly in Botswana, Jamaica, Sri Lanka and Yemen. In this version of our study, the arguments are presented primarily in a descriptive, qualitative manner. Of the empirical findings, only the simple correlations between LOs' overall rural development performance and the various environmental, structural and operational variables are presented. Readers who are interested in a more detailed quantitative discussion should refer to the longer version of this study, which analyzes the empirical evidence at some length.
When entering data and coding the variables for each case, we considered the record of performance for each local organization or set of LOs last, to reduce any bias in scoring. First we looked at what tasks the LO set out to perform and how well it performed these operations; next we took note of the environmental factors listed in the previous chapter; then we examined the structural variables which characterized the mode of organization and operation of the LO; finally we assessed how well, if at all, the LO appeared to have contributed to specific development outcomes.

This sequence should be reversed, however, when discussing the experience analyzed. Readers will want to know first what were the criteria by which we assessed performance before we account for observed differences in LO effectiveness. Therefore in this chapter, we will first go over the measures of LO performance which were used and then the task or operational variables we analyzed and the environmental factors considered, discussing what relationships we found among them. Structural variables, which constitute the "building blocks" of local organization, are of most interest for policy purposes, and we go into them in more detail in Chapter 6.

**LO Performance Criteria**

The most tangible and often most urgently sought benefits of local organization are improvements in economic productivity and income -- agricultural and/or non-agricultural -- for members, their families and others in the community. We took note of any evidence of increases in crop yields, in area cropped, in crop diversification and/or increased income, resulting from better marketing arrangements. Also considered were any new lines of economic activity, employment and income apart from agriculture that were associated with LO activity. Some LOs, of course, contributed to neither, though if they made attempts in either direction and were unsuccessful, this was reflected in their score on these specific variables.

We looked also at possible contributions in access to services -- education, health, nutrition, water supply, transportation and other public facilities. Where there was some increase in educational level, literacy, school enrollment or attendance in the community attributable at least in part to efforts of the local organization, this was recorded, as were any improvements in health, nutritional status or in access to health services associated with the LO's program. Better water supply, roads, bridges, bus
service, or other amenities such as community centers or temples, mosques or churches were similarly noted and then assessed according to the degree of improvement connected with LO activity.

Since it has been argued by some that local organizations are not necessarily beneficial for the poor, and since development assistance by governments and donor agencies is most justified when it improves the situation and productive potential of the poor majority, we took note of distributive effects associated with LO programs. Specifically we looked for any evidence that there was an improvement or worsening in the distribution of (a) income, (b) assets, and (c) access to public services. Employment effects could be included under (a) so were not separately recorded. Assisting the poor to get title to land or in purchasing draft animals or rickshaws would be examples under (b). Getting schools or clinics located where the poor could use them more readily was considered under (c).

We further looked for any evidence that a LO contributed to reduction in discrimination against women or against disadvantaged social groups (racial, ethnic, religious or other), improving opportunities and mobility (economic, social, even locational). This is an often neglected aspect of development which is nevertheless of great importance, and difficult to achieve just by central government measures, since attitudes and behavior at the micro level need to be changed for both privileged and underprivileged persons. This is not just a matter of "welfare" but of helping to release talents and energies otherwise shackled by social disabilities.

Finally we looked for changes, if any, in local people's ability to contribute to planning and policies for development -- did the LO as it actually operated increase members' participation in decision-making at the community level and at higher levels? Some of the arguments in favor of this have been reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2. We did not take it as automatic that such increase would result and, indeed, we found that many LOs did little to enhance such participation.

These different kinds of performance could be regarded, if taken together, as the composite goal of development at the local level. One difficulty in aggregating them is that the 15 probably should not be weighted equally, yet no universal agreement is possible on how much relative importance to attach to each. In our extended analysis, we looked at factors associated specifically with each of these kinds of development performance. For the sake of more summary analysis and conclusions, we scored each case in terms of what we called Total Performance, the criteria for which were stated in the previous chapter (page 26). This categorized the sample into five groups ranging from Outstanding to Very Poor performance. The scoring sought to represent degrees
of desirability in LO performance such that governments or agencies would be happy (or not) to be associated with the set of outcomes attributable to that particular LO. (The scoring of cases is given on pages 107-111.)

Operational Tasks and LO Performance

The effectiveness of LOs in promoting rural development has two aspects: (1) how well they function in carrying out various activities or tasks which amount to operational variables, and (2) how much the accomplishment of these tasks contributes to the achievement of developmental results, such as those just discussed. This distinction corresponds to that made between the outputs of an organization and their outcomes. We should not expect perfect correspondence between the two because, as indicated in Chapter 1, LO activity is only one of the factors contributing to rural development outcomes. In this section we are interested in factors associated with success in performing various LO operations and in the correlation of these functions with overall rural development gains.

We begin with a consideration of what basic tasks LOs may perform. We identified eight tasks, which can be viewed as four sets, as shown below:

(A) Intra-Organizational Tasks
   Planning and Goal Setting
   Conflict Management

(B) Resource Tasks
   Resource Mobilization
   Resource Management

(C) Service Tasks
   Provision of Services
   Integration of Services

(D) Extra-Organizational Tasks
   Control of Bureaucracy
   Claim-Making on Government

These constitute a continuum from initiating and maintaining organizational activity at one end, to attempting to influence the political-administrative environment at the other. Resource and service activities are intermediate.

The correlations between these Operational Tasks and Total Performance are shown in Table 3-1. All these correlations are positive and reasonably high, indicating a strong general association between successful completion of the operational tasks and contributions to rural development goals. What was not necessarily expected was that the correlations in the left-hand column, representing more "internal" tasks of organization, would be somewhat higher than those on the right hand. Because we knew fairly high and positive correlations were to be expected, given the nature of the
variables, the focus of our analysis was on the respective tasks, to try to understand their significance for LO contributions to rural development.

Table 3-1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Variables</th>
<th>Total Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Goal Setting</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Mobilization</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Management</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Services</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of Services</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim-Making on Government</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Planning and goal setting is a crucial task in as much as it determines the relevance and precision of other tasks undertaken. We were impressed with how some of the most successful LOs made explicit and thorough surveys to guide their efforts. In particular, house-to-house interviews supplemented by group discussions could ascertain the most urgent needs of individuals and groups, what resources they controlled, and what they would be willing to contribute toward collective efforts. Few LOs had formal plans such as would please the eye of a Planning Commission member, though some which scored highest on this had fairly detailed plan documents. The most important result when LOs took this task seriously was a shared knowledge among members and a grounded consensus that buoyed the performance of other tasks.

It is tempting for outside agencies to attempt to do planning for the LOs, intending to leave decision-making about implementation to the organization after initial decisions about priorities and program support have been made by outsiders. Indeed, one of the few previous empirical studies of local organization concluded that project success was more positively affected by the resource contributions of small farmers than by their participation initially in project design (Morss et al., 1975). We found the same correlation with Total Performance for both Planning and Goal Setting (.71) and for Resource Mobilization (.71), suggesting that "initial decisions" be treated as seriously as "resource contributions." The process of such planning and goal setting may indeed be more important to the success of LOs than any specific outputs of that process.

Of particular interest is that we found no correlation between Literacy or per capita Income Level and success in Planning and Goal Setting. At the local level, planning need not require many technical skills or resources; rather it involves efforts at information gathering and consultation. Local rather than formal or expert knowledge is needed. Technical knowledge can be added to local planning efforts to
enlarge the range of alternatives, achieve some internal consistency in plans, and reconcile them throughout a large area. But assistance from a higher level organization (LO federation or government agency) is more effective once the planning process has been started with a firm local foundation.

**Conflict Management** is probably the most "internal" of tasks in that its purpose is to maintain group solidarity for achieving common purposes. Accounting for degrees of success in this task is difficult because effective Conflict Management is not as evident an activity to outside observers as is Planning. Indeed, when explicit efforts at Conflict Management come into operation, it may mean that the more informal, tacit measures have failed. Thus, Conflict Management may be performed best where it is least visible. We presume that in most settings there is potential for conflict, though how great it is will vary.

Conflict Management is undoubtedly an important factor, as signified by its higher correlation with Total Performance (.75) than either Planning or Resource Mobilization. We found, however, that it is not a factor readily amenable to outside intervention. The two environmental factors most directly associated with effective Conflict Management, for instance, are the quality of local leadership and the existence of egalitarian and participatory community norms, neither of which can be easily manipulated from outside. There is relatively little which outsiders can do directly to improve Conflict Management within an LO.

What can be said is that conflict within LOs should be regarded as a normal occurrence, and within limits, useful. Social scientists who study conflict have shown how conflict, if successfully resolved or limited, can mobilize resources and build larger, broader and deeper commitment to common purposes (Coser, 1956). This relationship represents a recognition that within any organization interests are in some respects divergent, yet sufficient common interests should exist which, if activated, can compensate constructively for differences. Acceptable rules and legitimate procedures for dealing with conflict can serve to protect and accommodate divergent interests. Outside agencies assisting LOs should be prepared for conflict to emerge. Working closely with the LOs, they may provide some training in group dynamics to enable groups to cope more effectively with internal conflict.

**Resource mobilization** is the task which government agencies most value in LO performance. There are some difficult issues concerning the balance to be struck between the contribution of outside and local resources. Generally speaking, we found that self-help activities were the more important part of LO performance. We found that if only outside resources were received, performance was relatively poorer except
in the area of providing services. Relying entirely on outside resources creates dependency. The concomitant paternalistic relations inhibit self-help and discourage participation in decision-making, and may even undermine long-standing patterns of community initiative. The total volume of resources for local problem-solving is thereby less than it could be, and the use of what resources are made available is less likely to meet priority needs efficiently or to be providently managed for lack of local involvement. At the same time, it is also true that communities, especially poorer ones, can benefit from external provision of resources that are simply not available within the community. Clearly, a balance needs to be struck, with some combination of local and outside resources such that there are enough outside resources to encourage and extend local ones, and enough of the latter to justify the former.

Resource management turns out to have the highest correlation with Total Performance (.80). Resource Management is one of the least glamorous activities of LOs. It involves keeping track of funds, collecting loan repayments, maintaining buildings, operating irrigation structures, repairing roads, and the like. Most of the reported experiences of poor resource management involved ineffective or dishonest management of financial resources. This area is one to which government and outside training and support efforts could usefully be directed. Training, of course, is likely to be more effective with regard to skills, like bookkeeping or maintenance of equipment, than to attitudes like honesty. But skills and attitudes are often reinforcing. Remedies can be considered with relatively few environmental constraints, as indicated by our further finding that none of the environmental variables had a significant correlation with LO success in resource management.

Provision of Services is the "bread-and-butter" task for most LOs, occurring in about 90 percent of the cases we studied. Exceptions are interest associations concerned mostly with lobbying or legal redress (though access to the legal system itself was sometimes a service usefully performed), or LDAs involved in planning, and even coordinating, but not delivering services. Our analysis of this task did not produce any unanticipated relationships and did not raise such interesting policy issues as did the other tasks. Integration of Services, by contrast, was attempted in only about half of our cases, and only 9 percent of these were judged "quite effective," compared with 25 percent being "quite effective" in Provision of Services. This may reflect the resistance of bureaucratic hierarchies to horizontal coordination of their activities, especially at the local level. We found at least some LOs able to increase the relevance, timeliness, convenience and efficiency of services by being involved in their coordination. One of the best means available to government or private agencies to
improve the beneficial impact of their services would appear to be engaging appropriate LOs in tasks of Service Integration. This would include not only decisions on timing and amount of services but also evaluation and modification of services in relation to local needs.

Control of Bureaucracy and Claim-Making did not correlate as highly with Total Performance as did the other pairs, but there is still quite a substantial association. In policy terms, these are the most difficult tasks to address, since strengthening LO performance along these dimensions is likely to constrain government operations in some way. There can be differences of interest, of course, between a government (the political leadership) and its agencies. In so far as priorities and resource allocations are already set, the government has an interest in the most efficient administrative implementation possible. Are extension agents actually visiting the farmers and as often as they are supposed to? Do medical assistants show up for their clinic work as expected? Are loan officers insisting on bribes before they will certify creditworthy farmers?

Local people and leaders can know more precisely than central government officials just what lapses or misdeeds are occurring in program operations. And while individuals by themselves may not be able to get improved performance from local-level staff, LOs are in a much better position to attempt it. Perhaps the most instructive case of LO control of technical and administrative staff has been that of Farmers' Associations and Irrigation Associations in Taiwan, where the LOs actually hire and supervise field-level staff (see Stavis, 1974; Abel, 1975; Bottrall, 1977; and earlier study by Kwoh, 1964). Local control over bureaucracy can be indirect rather than direct if a government solicits the opinions of farmers, mothers, or irrigators on a systematic basis through their organizations. Idiosyncratic views can be sifted out through LO deliberations to get more representative assessments, which deserve to be treated seriously by higher political and administrative echelons. The limits of control and coordination of bureaucratic behavior from above are increasingly apparent, however neat is the logic of hierarchical direction according to Weberian theory. Our reading of cases indicated that control and coordination "from below" are feasible to supplement--if not replace--the oversight of political and administrative superiors.

The relevance of such a strategy for improving governments' development performance depends, to be sure, on the goals and values of the top political leadership. To the extent that the goals of national leaders and local communities are compatible--i.e., leaders want for the communities what the latter want for themselves--the exertions and representations from below contribute to the center's achievement of its
purposes. One cannot look at Claim-Making as an LO activity without reference to the orientation of the regime's leaders. Enhanced claim-making ability should be positively regarded by political leaders insofar as they desire greater satisfaction of rural people's needs and approve of greater capacity of rural people to articulate and meet those needs, by self-help and in cooperation with the government.

Any effective local organization will have to perform in some satisfactory manner at least the Resource Mobilization and Management tasks. How much Planning and Goal Setting needs to be done depends on how innovative the LO seeks or needs to be and on how much consensus there is among members; the same applies to how essential Conflict Management will be. The importance of the other functions depends on the nature of the organization, how central are services to its operation and how much involvement with administrative and political echelons is useful. Our main point is that these tasks are not ends in themselves, however critical they may be to LO maintenance and growth. We have already set forth the development performance indicators which are of direct concern. Before considering how LOs' structure may relate to development outcomes, we should assess the impact, if any, of environmental factors on LO performance.

**Environments and LO Performance**

While simple environmental determinism—attributing LO outcomes directly to economic, social and political factors in the surrounding community or wider society—is not often found in the literature, there is much discussion of environmental "constraints" which prevent LOs from being as successful as their sponsors intended. It is often contended, for instance, that poor natural resource endowments or low literacy levels impede effective functioning of LOs. It is assertions such as these that we consider in this section.

Obviously we could not analyze all relevant environmental features. Some are impossible to distinguish clearly from one another while others are impossible to measure or have not been adequately studied. The 18 environmental variables we did look at are some of the more common ones studied in social science. They fall under these groupings:

(I) **Physical and Economic Factors:** Topography, natural resource endowment, infrastructure, economic diversification, income level, distribution of income.

(II) **Social and Societal Factors:** Settlement patterns, social heterogeneity, social stratification, sex discrimination, social discrimination, literacy.
(III) Political and Administrative Factors: Partisanship, group patterns, community norms, societal norms, government orientation toward LOs, bureaucratic capacity to assist LOs.

Our principal finding is that environmental factors are not significantly associated with overall LO performance. Of the 18 environmental factors analyzed, most correlated less than .15 with Total Performance (see Table 3-2).

Table 3-2:
CORRELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND TOTAL PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th></th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Diversification</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topography</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>Income Level</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Endowment</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>Income Distribution</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Patterns</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>Sex Discrimination</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Heterogeneity</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>Social Discrimination</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Stratification</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>Societal Norms</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Patterns</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Norms</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>Administrative Support</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at .05 level

Of the three correlations which were statistically significant, though still not high, Social Heterogeneity (.18) and Social Stratification (.20) are unlikely to be causal factors for good LO performance since our measure of performance includes achieving benefits specifically for the poor. Rather, success in more heterogenous and stratified environments appears to have been achieved in spite of such characteristics, usually by groups with restricted, homogeneous membership from disadvantaged sectors. We see signs of a relationship proposed by Boer: "The setting up of organizations within the framework of a participatory project will have the greatest chance of success in a somewhat polarized context" (1981:27). The other factor which correlated significantly was favorable Community Norms (.20). This was not surprising since one would expect LOs to work better in communities where predominant values favor participation and egalitarian outcomes.

The more tangible environmental factors like Resource Endowment, Infrastructure, Economic Diversification, Literacy, and per capita Income Level did not correlate significantly with overall LO performance. Neither did Sex Discrimination nor Social Discrimination, though if the association is in fact positive, as suggested by the figures in Table 3-2, this implies that LO success in these directions was achieved in spite of such adverse biases in the environment.
Though there is not much association on average between environmental characteristics and how well LOs contribute to rural development outcomes because of the many exceptions to any generalization, there is quite plausibly some relationship between environment and what LOs may choose or need to do. Our colleagues Young, Hebert and Swanson (1981) in their analysis of Local Development Associations in North Yemen found road-building by LDAs strongly associated with a mountainous environment, when distance to an urban center was controlled. In the mountains, roads are much needed, especially to transport cash crops, while in the desert-like lowlands, they are not needed or have already been provided. This would caution against prescribing national priorities for all LO activity, as was done in Yemen by mandating that LDAs give priority to roads over other kinds of investment. It would have been better for the government to encourage LOs to select those activities that most reflected their needs, which are often conditioned by their physical situation.

That there is little overall association between environmental factors and LO performance is a significant and encouraging finding. It indicates that although the environment can present limitations or hindrances, these can be overcome by combinations of local and outside efforts. There are, to be sure, limitations to statistical inference as applied here. There could be a particular environmental factor which hinders performance in one instance but not in another, where a different factor could be adverse and decisive.

We did find specific cases where factors in the environment made LO performance more difficult (or easy), such as the clientelistic political system in Jamaica which in our observation undermined incentives for local self-help (Blustain, 1982; Blustain and LeFranc, 1982, Chapter 8). But seldom were such factors in themselves invariably determinant. We frequently observed unfavorable physical or social conditions eliciting extra effort to promote development. So whether an "adverse" environmental factor has a negative or positive outcome usually depends on what people in private and public roles decide to do about it. A benign environment can dissipate local efforts rather than encourage them, just as a hostile one can evoke or crush initiative to counter it.

Many discussions of LOs in the literature have sought causal connections between environmental factors and positive or negative outcomes. But we find no evidence supporting any notion of environmental determinism. That finding means that there are many "degrees of freedom" as to where, if not how, LOs may be introduced or strengthened.
Chapter 5
STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND LOCAL ORGANIZATION PERFORMANCE

It is encouraging that environmental factors are not strongly associated with the overall performance of local organizations. This suggests that design and structure -- factors that can be influenced by sympathetic governments, voluntary agencies and international donors -- can contribute to rural development by working with LOs, taking advantage of environmental influences or operating in spite of them. We shall investigate these structural factors here to arrive at conclusions about more effective ways to design LOs. In particular we are interested in ascertaining the best ways for outside agencies to proceed when trying to initiate LOs or to work with organizations already started by local initiative.

Structural factors pertain to the operations, linkages, internal workings and composition of LOs. Each of our 13 structural variables ranges along one dimension of organizational design. For instance, our first structural variable, "functions", represents a continuum from single-functional, to multi-functional, to comprehensive organization. The structural variables can be considered under the following four headings, with the extreme ends of each variable's range shown in parentheses:

(I) Structure: Functions (comprehensive vs. single), formalization (formal vs. informal), decision-making style (executive vs. assembly) size of base organization (large vs. small).

(II) Linkage of Base Organization: Vertical linkage of LOs (federation vs. none), horizontal linkage among LOs (cooperation vs. none), official involvement (direction of LO by officials vs. complete autonomy).

(III) Basis of Formation and Operation: Initiative to start LO (local vs. outside), incentives (voluntary vs. compulsory), normative orientation (egalitarian vs. inegalitarian).

(IV) Composition of Membership: Economic composition (heterogeneous vs. homogeneous), social composition (heterogeneous vs. homogeneous), sex composition (all female vs. all male).

Most of these structural variables were significantly correlated with Total Performance, as shown in Table 5-1, though none were extremely high, and some were non-linear. We found, for instance, that on the dimension of Official Involvement, some linkages to government were to be preferred to the extremes of either complete LO autonomy or strong government direction. In other words, up to some point, increased
Official involvement is associated with better overall performance but after that point it begins to be associated with poorer performance. Where they occur, we indicate examples of such non-linear relationships.

Table 5-1:
CORRELATIONS OF STRUCTURAL VARIABLES AND TOTAL PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>.30</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>-.37+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formalization</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>Incentive</td>
<td>.23+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-Making</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>Normative Orientation</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Base Organization</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical Linkage</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>Economic Composition</td>
<td>.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal Linkage</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>Social Composition</td>
<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Involvement</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td>Sex Composition</td>
<td>.01*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*coefficient not significant at .05 level
+coefficient for structural variable analyzed according to 3-interval rather than 5-interval scale, to approximate more linear relationship, as discussed in text.

A second difficulty with the summary statistics in Table 5.1 is that they aggregate many separate relationships. Among other things, we examined the relationship of the structural variables with each of the 15 respective performance variables and with the 8 task variables. This more detailed analysis highlighted some interesting variations in the overall pattern indicated by the figures in Table 5.1. Where these detailed variations are particularly interesting, we indicate so in our discussion of the general relationship of each of the 13 structural variables with LO performance.

Functions. How specialized or multi-functional LOs ought to be for development effectiveness is much debated. On the basis of our analysis of national systems of local organization for rural development (Uphoff and Esman, 1974), we concluded in favor of multi-functional organization. Other analysts have argued the opposite position. Tendler (1976) argues in favor of specialization, based on her study of cooperatives in Ecuador and Honduras. There she found that LOs focused on a single, clearly-felt need were more likely to be successful than those with broader responsibilities. We do not find this latter position supported by the comparative data. There is a correlation between increased number of functions and overall performance (.30), and detailed analysis found this to be a linear relationship.

1The coding was done emphasizing quality not quantity of outcomes so this relationship is not simply tautological. If the scoring were a matter of such circularity, the coefficient should have been much higher.
In interpreting these results in light of our reading of the cases, it becomes clear that the number of functions is more often a consequence than a cause of success. We were struck by the number of very successful LOs which started with a single function, especially one of high significance and payoff to its members. As this was performed well, the organization took on an increasing number and variety of functions. For instance, the Sukuma cotton cooperative in Tanzania, once marketing was performed well, went into processing and then agricultural improvement. The Ecuador cooperatives which Meehan (1978) studied started with consumer goods and moved into various lines of production and into literacy programs. This time dimension of organizational development, missed in purely cross-sectional analysis which ignores the history of organizations, thus could account for at least some of the difference of opinion found in the literature. Tendler's argument for single-functional organization may be correct for the initiation of LOs, whereas our previous argument concerning multi-functional LOs appears to reflect the characteristics of more sustained systems of organization.

**Formalization.** The controversy over whether "modern" groups can contribute better to rural development than more "traditional" ones probably will not be ended by our analysis. There are enough examples of success or failure in specific instances to which either side can refer in support of its argument that neither side need concede. The debate is paralleled by a concern with the extent to which more formal or informal organizations function better for development purposes. "Modern" and formal features of organization generally go together (though some "traditional" LOs can be quite formal in the degree to which organizational membership is specified, roles are clearly defined, and rules codified). "Traditional" organizations tend to be more informal than very modern LOs.

The variables involved are complex, but important for our consideration. We concluded that measuring "modern" versus "traditional" features of organization was too subjective an undertaking. Instead we focused on degrees of formalization. This was generally equivalent to how "modern" the LO was but we left that determination aside. The degree of formalization was judged in terms of explicit roles and rules of the organization, whether it had legal status and was recognized by government, whether it had a written constitution and by-laws, whether its officers were assigned essentially "Western" titles and responsibilities. More informal organizations, on the other hand, incorporated various elements of indigenous roles like chiefs or elders, long-established sanctions between leaders and followers, implicit membership norms and obligations.
We found a consistently negative association between the degree of formalism in the LO and its contribution to rural development (-.21). Disaggregated performance measures were also negatively correlated with Formalization, and the average correlation with LO operational variables was also negative. This is one of the stronger relationships observed in the data and suggests that informal modes of local organization, at least at the base level, are more likely to be successful than formal ones.

The relative success of LOs with informal modes of operation, relying on "traditional" roles and sanctions to a large extent, supports the arguments of Saunders (1977) and others. It encourages working with informal groups rather than presuming that more "modern" ones are necessarily preferable. It further gives credence to working with existing LOs where possible instead of instituting new ones. This finding is not new. It has previously been noted by many practitioners and particularly by anthropologists who tend to take informal organization more seriously than other social scientists. Nonetheless, it is a finding which governments and others have all too often tended to ignore, as they try to impose formalistic and uniform patterns of organization on the LOs they sponsor.

**Decision-Making.** This is one of the more visible structural characteristics. The three main alternatives parallel Aristotle's classification of political systems -- rule by one person, by a few persons, or by many. Thus LOs may be governed by an executive, by a committee (or committees), or by an assembly of all the members. Of course, there can be combinations, of these two roles.

There are two lines of argument: one contends that LOs need strong executive leadership to deal decisively with their socio-political environments. Moreover, the more an LO is oriented to changing the status quo, and the more resistance it is likely to face, the more it must "speak with one voice" and pursue a coordinated course of action. The opposite view is that such situations demand maximum consensus and individual commitment to the enterprise, such as can be generated only through broad participation in decision-making. This implies greater reliance on assemblies or committees-of-the-whole.

As seen in Table 5-1, there is significant positive correlation (.22) between more consensual forms of decision-making and overall performance. This relationship also

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2It is also possible, as Willett (1981) has argued with regard to rangeland and water supply management in Botswana, that seasonality of population movement makes assembly decision-making moot or biased and that therefore an appointed or elected manager on behalf of the community is preferable.
holds for the various operational measures we studied. The relationship is not exactly linear, however. Although the data do not support a strong executive form of decision-making, our detailed analysis indicate that the combination of committees to manage day-to-day affairs and a committee-of-the-whole for major decisions is preferred to situations where all decisions are made by an assembly. A good example in this regard is the Mraru women's organization in Kenya (Kneerim, 1980). Decisions such as whether to invest in a new line of activity are discussed within a nine-member executive committee which formulates alternative courses of action. These are presented to the membership as a whole for final decision. Usually the executive committee recommendation is approved, but only if members are satisfied with it. Such a decision-making structure combines the advantages of both modes of deliberation, a smaller group for working out details, and a larger group for eliciting divergent views and building consensus through participation.

There is a relatively consistent association between more participatory modes of decision-making and LO performance in the disaggregated analysis. This relationship is not equally strong for all development outcomes, however, and totally consensual decision-making is not optimal. Still, in our analysis it is generally true that the broader the participation in decision-making the better the outcome.

Size of Base-level Organization. This is another variable about which there are divided opinions, some arguing that larger LOs are better because they offer more economies of scale and more clout, whereas others argue for small size because of the greater solidarity and commitment of members. In our previous study (1974), we concluded from Asian experience that a multi-tiered system of local organization was preferable, combining the advantages of solidarity in smaller base-level organizations with those of scale in larger organizations at a higher level to which the base units were linked. This will be considered when we take up Vertical Linkage as a variable, restricting our analysis here to Size alone.

We see from Table 5-1 that the correlation of Size with Total Performance (.09) is not significant. A result worth noting from our detailed analysis is that Size correlates significantly with Control of Bureaucracy and Claim-Making, two operational tasks where clout probably makes a difference. The slight positive association between Size and Performance which emerged overall is due largely to the fact that none of the least successful LOs were large. It makes sense that there would be no very large and ineffective LOs, since extensive membership could hardly be sustained with very poor performance. What association we observe between Size and Performance is thus probably more a result of successful LOs growing in membership than of large
membership causing success. We have seen from the case studies that most of the larger LOs started fairly small and grew with their success.

Vertical Linkage compares LOs' connection to higher level organizations, from those LOs with no connections through those linked in a two or three-tier structure, to LOs which are part of a regional or national federation. The relationship between Vertical Linkage and Total Performance turned out to be strong and positive (.22), indicating that increasing connection to higher levels of organization is associated with success. That regionally or nationally federated LOs tend to be found in the more successful categories probably reflects certain evolutionary processes. Relative success in performance can strengthen LOs' affiliation with higher-level bodies, or give them reason and resources to form such bodies. At the same time, the process is interactive, since higher-level bodies can contribute to the further success of their constituent organizations. The conclusion we draw is that Vertical Linkage, up to and including possible federations at a regional or national level, is a desirable design feature. But as with other characteristics of LOs, the role of "outside" actors must be handled with deftness and sensitivity, so that the linkages proposed are well understood and supported by the membership and leadership of the organizations involved.

One of the most substantial relationships we found in the analysis involved the combination of Size and Vertical Linkage variables. As noted already, there was a low correlation (.09) between Size and Total Performance. While this was not great enough to be taken very seriously, it did indicate that on the average, smaller LOs were not as effective as larger ones. At the same time, vertically-linked LOs were definitely more likely to be effective. When we partitioned the total sample to examine only the smaller LOs (those with under 100 members), and even the smallest LOs (under 50 members), we found a stronger and more positive association between Total Performance and Vertical Linkage than in the whole sample. The correlation when controlling for Size was .30 for small LOs and .40 for the smallest LOs, compared with .22 for all sizes. Thus, if there is vertical linkage, smaller LOs are more contributory to developmental outcomes, rather than less. This is the reverse of the correlation for the sample as a whole. This finding strongly supports the conclusion of our 1974 study that there are advantages in multiple tiers of organization with small units at the base. These have the advantages of solidarity and can be augmented by the advantages of scale which a higher level organization can provide.

Horizontal Linkage turned out in our statistical analysis to be even more associated than Vertical Linkage with LO success (.29). It represents cooperation between and among LOs at the same level, e.g., among cooperative branches or
mothers' clubs, or possibly between a cooperative branch and a mother's club at village level. Three-quarters of the LOs in our sample were not horizontally linked with other organizations, but those which were, either occasionally or on a regular basis, registered considerably more success in a variety of development tasks. Of all the structural variables we have examined, this seems to be the most clearly associated with development performance and the one which outside agencies could most unambiguously encourage when working with LOs.

One of the other interactive relationships we found in analyzing the data is the reinforcement between Horizontal and Vertical Linkage. Our conclusions have to be qualified in light of the small size of some of the sub-samples we examined. But when we subdivided the total sample into those LOs having neither, either or both kinds of linkage, we could see a marked improvement in Total Performance for LOs having both, with horizontal being more important than vertical linkage. Thus while both forms of linkage are important and make positive contributions to LO performance, Horizontal Linkage appears especially valuable.

Official Involvement. This variable also represents a "linkage" for the LO, though it differs from the two just discussed. Horizontal and Vertical Linkage refer to communication and cooperation with other organizations which are in some sense "local" or at least in some way accountable to local communities. Official Involvement refers to the on-going interaction between LOs and one or more government agencies. These agencies are accountable to their bureaucratic superiors, not directly to any local community. Government linkages to LOs increase over a range from LO autonomy to government direction of the LO, with low, moderate or high linkage in between. We found the relationship between Official Involvement and Total Performance to be non-linear and, in fact, one of the most complicated in our study.\(^3\)

As can be seen in Table 5-1, the overall correlation between Official Involvement and Total Performance is insignificant. This indicates that there is no direct relation-
ship, either positive or negative, between government involvement and overall performance. More detailed analysis revealed the conflicting tendencies which underlie this observation. At one end, an extreme degree of official involvement which subordinates and suppresses local initiative and independence is associated with extremely poor organizational performance. At the same time, the opposite condition, complete local autonomy, is not the most successful relationship either. Low official involvement seemed to be most favorable. However, even high official involvement, which represents a great deal of interaction and assistance by government but not so much as to discourage or preempt upward flows of information and resource, scored as well as autonomy. This indicates that the extremes of autonomy or direction are not promising positions for an LO. The implication is that it is desirable for otherwise unlinked LOs is to have at least some official involvement. Probably, the value to LOs of official involvement depends more on its nature than its extent, on the kind of stimulus which government resource contributions, suggestions, rules or guidelines represent. Do they induce greater and more productive activity or instead, dependency and subordination?

Initiative. Who initiates the LO is a key consideration since it is one of the variables most susceptible to policy choices. We considered a continuum ranging from "local" to "outside" initiative: (1) Local Residents or some number of them, acting mostly on their own without previously recognized leaders, (2) Local Leaders, (3) Shared Initiative between local and outside actors, (4) Government Staff, and (5) Non-Government Agencies. The correlation between outside initiative and Total Performance was negative (-.37). LOs created from outside are more often associated with poor performance than are locally generated ones. The clear implication is that government and other outside agencies should attempt, where possible, to work with and through local organizations which local people themselves have created, rather than try to create new organizations to respond to rural development needs.

More detailed analysis provided further insights on the question of initiation. Local initiative is more likely to lead to successful LOs, but we did find some striking failures among locally-initiated organizations. The strength of locally-initiated LOs in terms of development success seems to rest on their association with a greater degree of autonomy, assembly forms of decision-making, and informal operations. Interestingly, local initiative is not significantly associated with participatory orientation, which suggests that outside-initiated LOs can be as participatory and egalitarian as those locally established. The most significant structural problem we
found with locally-initiated LOs is that while they tended to have horizontal linkages, a very desirable feature, they less often had vertical linkages, another desirable feature. This is one structural feature which outside agents could support to improve the performance of locally-initiated LOs.

After locally-initiated LOs, the next set of LOs most likely to succeed were those instigated by outside "catalysts." These are persons or groups who approach communities to assist them in self-help activities and in advocating group interests, not as part of regular government programs or as agents of line ministries but as facilitators or promoters who help articulate and achieve the goals of their members. The relative success of such "catalyst" agents has important policy implications, as will be discussed in Chapter 7.

The least likely to succeed are purely government-inspired LOs. Government initiative is associated with the features of top-down direction, executive decision-making, paternalism, and formalization, all of which are negatively related to total performance. Government-sponsored LOs need not display these features, however. We found some cases, such as the Malawi self-help water supply committees (Liebenow, 1981), the Taiwan Farmers Associations (Stavis, 1974), and the Kenya Tea Development Authority (Steeves, 1975), in which government initiation resulted in quite successful LO structures for development. One common feature of these cases was small base-level units linked up to larger district, regional and even national organizations. Thus the features of paternalism mentioned above, which so often manifest themselves in government initiated LOs, were reduced. It therefore seems that the kind of LO created through government initiative can be more important than the fact of government initiation itself. Unfortunately, the kind usually instituted by government agencies fails to enlist the confidence or talents of local people.

Incentives for membership have been analyzed in terms of the extent to which becoming and remaining a member is voluntary or compulsory. There are both subjective and objective consequences for a local organization which appear to have contrasting effects. Attitudes of members toward the LO will presumably be more positive if voluntarism forms the basis for membership, with free entry and exit. On the other hand, the LO's resource base and strength may well be greater if it can enforce some discipline on members so that they cannot simply contribute or not as they please. This variable is an important issue in the design of LOs because there are differences of opinion over whether LOs should be purely voluntary, in the Western tradition of "private voluntary organizations," or should have more discipline so they can act more cohesively in pursuit of their objectives.
The relationship of this variable with performance was also not linear, though there is a positive association between relatively voluntary incentives and overall performance. When we probed this relationship, we discovered that it is LOs with quasi-voluntary incentives which perform best, though compulsory or quasi-compulsory LOs perform better than those which are purely voluntary. The example of the AMUL milk coop in India is illustrative in this regard. In this LO there needed to be some degree of compulsion to ensure the quality and promptness of the milk delivered for processing. Recognizing this, stiff penalties against adulteration or delay appeared quite reasonable to the majority of members.

Such findings support the contention that some membership "discipline" is important for success. Pure voluntarism with easy entry and exit is not advisable. The problem of "free riders" has been persuasively commented upon by Olson (1965), Popkin (1979), and others. Organizations have a difficult time surviving unless all who benefit from them share in the costs. Even if the LO could manage financially without the contributions of all members, a feeling that burdens are unfairly shared will undermine its effectiveness.

As a rule, membership requirements should be decided by the members themselves, though some restrictions or obligations based on experience elsewhere may be suggested by outside agencies, government or private. It is also important that members be involved in the enforcement of the rules, though we note that their willingness to invoke sanctions against friends and neighbors may be strengthened by some outside involvement. The enforcement of rules becomes an indicator of the value of the LO to its members, and a sign of organizational viability (or of decline, if discipline is not being enforced), provided of course that the rules are reasonable. Efforts by outside agencies to maintain high levels of attendance or dues payment are likely to be misdirected, since such indicators if not achieved willingly by members represent hollow progress and may even hasten the LO's decline.

**Normative Orientation** refers to the organization's rules and values regarding participation and egalitarian outcomes. LOs can be structured so as to encourage and reinforce this orientation in their operations internally, or can be indifferent, or even unsupportive of such outcomes. The correlation between Normative Orientation and Total Performance (.28) was relatively high and positive. This general finding, that LOs contribute more effectively to rural development goals if they are structured to be participatory and to distribute benefits more broadly, is not surprising. Perhaps of more interest is our further finding that, in community or social environments that are hostile or indifferent to participatory and egalitarian outcomes, more highly
participatory and egalitarian internal operations are more strongly associated with LO success. This should be a clear signal to any organizations, government or private, seeking to promote development in such unpromising situations. Even under indifferent or adverse conditions, LOs which are participatory and egalitarian can register an impressive degree of success.

**Economic, Social and Sex Composition** of membership are three aspects of organizational structure for which we had expected to find more definite associations, especially since our Total Performance measure was constructed to reflect possible gains in income, assets or access to services for the poor. One of the suggestions in the literature is that to promote the interests of the poor, it is important to have economically homogeneous LOs which include the poor but exclude other classes (Morss et al., 1975; Landau et al., 1976; Schiller, 1979; Buijs, 1981a). Where the environment is socially heterogeneous, due to social, caste, or ethnic divisions, socially homogeneous LOs would be expected to be better for the poorer sectors. An argument in favor of heterogeneous LOs could be that larger and more effective organizations, drawing on more established and experienced leadership, would benefit even the poorer members more than would smaller groups that were homogeneous but not so effective. As it turned out, however, these three structural variables do not correlate significantly with Total Performance (coefficients are .07, .05, and .01, respectively). Composition by itself does not appear to account for degrees of LO success.

These relationships have been probed further by more detailed analysis. But the discussion here summarizes the characteristics of LO structure, ranging from initiation and linkages to composition and internal decision processes, that were statistically associated with a higher probability of rural development success. That the correlations were not higher indicates what should be evident at least to practitioners, that some ventures succeed "against the odds," while others fail even when the odds are "in their favor." To be sure, it is usually preferable to start out with the more likely favorable situation. But there is also the important element of how things are done which contributes to success or failure, and these are the subject of the chapters in Part III. Before we get into such prescriptive analysis, we need to consider the experience of existing LOs in terms of the problems they are likely to encounter in their operation. These might be regarded as the pathologies or vulnerabilities of local organization.
Chapter 6
VULNERABILITIES OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

One may ask why, if rural local organizations are able to enhance the productivity and well-being of their members, they are not more often effective, and why they are not more widespread. In this chapter, we conclude our description and analysis of LOs by assessing the major obstacles to their establishment, maintenance and effectiveness.

In our review of the case studies, we were able to glean considerable information on the barriers facing local organizations, but it is not as ample as we would like. In particular, the evidence does not lend itself to statistical analysis because it is so incomplete. When problems such as internal division or financial mismanagement are not reported for a particular case, we have no way of knowing from the literature whether these are non-existent, simply not observed by the author, or possibly screened out. In our experience we have noted an inverse relationship between the number of problems an organization acknowledges and the forthrightness with which it tackles them. Put simply, those who have the most problems often say the least about them. For these reasons, quantitative modes of analysis are not appropriate and our discussion of the vulnerabilities of local organizations is entirely in qualitative terms. These vulnerabilities can be grouped into five categories: resistance, subordination, internal divisions, ineffectiveness, and malpractices.

Resistance

Local organizations, particularly those involving the rural poor, can encounter active or passive resistance from many sources. These include local and regional elites; national government leaders and administrators at local or higher levels; and rural people themselves.

The most frequent and most intractable opponents of local associations of rural residents are usually local and regional elites, such as large landowners, merchants and their retainers, all of whom tend to dominate local government and maintain commercial and political links with regional and even national centers of power. They tend to regard any organization of tenants, laborers, or marginal farmers, however benign the stated purpose, with as much enthusiasm as mill and factory owners in the United States and Europe greeted the appearance of labor unions a century ago. They look upon such organizations as a threat to their economic and political control, especially over the terms and conditions of tenancy, employment, credit, and marketing, and often as the work of subversive "outside agitators."
Resistance by local elites takes many forms. Direct measures, such as economic sanctions and even violence, may be used to discourage tenants, workers or customers from participating in mutual assistance associations. In Nepal, for instance, a few group leaders for the Small Farmer Development Project were subjected to harassment. The first year this included the theft of their cattle and home grain stores; the third year, a bigger farmer engineered a rape charge against one of the emerging leaders (Clark et al., 1979). More subtle means of discouragement may also be used, such as undercutting the prices offered by coops or offering lower interest rates on credit. The MODECBO cooperative in Haiti, for example, found landlords raising rents when they learned that members wanted to start some communal cultivation of vegetables (Maguire, 1979). Because local elites are in positions of influence, they also may resort to the courts and legal measures to insure that their tenants or laborers do not organize for any purpose.

The hostility of local elites is often reinforced by the hostility of government. Authoritarian regimes are as a rule unwilling to tolerate organizations that are not directly controlled by the state, preferring atomized publics which are easier to control. Even under more hospitable governments, local organizations may face the resistance of some civil servants, who fear loss of control and lowering of technical standards, less uniformity in implementation and results, and possibly corruption. In Ethiopia, for instance, the mahabar local development committees had problems with the governor of their area and with the courts when they sought to settle all disputes within communities through their own local courts; this was construed by local administrators as a challenge to their authority (Hamer, 1976, 1980). Although we found fears such as these to be unjustified in most cases, they are real in the minds of many civil servants.

Authorities who see a local organization as a threat to the established order may dissolve it, and its leaders may be intimidated or even imprisoned. Government hostility and suspicion, combined with the opposition of local elites, can doom most local organizations. Without any channels to express their needs and seek redress of their grievances, the rural poor may withdraw completely from contact with government or turn to extra-legal methods of expressing their frustration and anger at an indifferent or hostile government.

Local organizations may also encounter resistance from within the ranks of their potential membership. Since local societies are seldom homogeneous, divisions based on kinship networks, on residence patterns, on ethnic or religious affiliations, or on political party allegiance can inhibit effective organization. Efforts to establish a
vegetable-growing cooperative among the poor in Barpali, India were resisted, for example, by members of a low caste (gardeners) who felt they should have a monopoly on such activity (Thomas, 1968). Members of social groupings that are poor may share so little trust that they are unable to cooperate, especially if the organization appears to be unduly influenced or controlled by one faction at the apparent expense of the other. These divisions may be independent of class alignment, but they represent vulnerabilities that can be exploited by local elites.

Subordination

Local organizations are in chronic danger of losing their freedom of action and falling under the control of more powerful outsiders. Such subordination or dependency may result from intrigue or from the exercise of superior power by local elites or officials; or it may reflect the price of relying on the services and resources provided by government agencies or voluntary organizations. In general, we find main kinds of subordination: from government, from local elites, and from local leaders even if they come from among the organization's membership.

Local organizations should represent the interests of their members as they define them. Once government intervenes, even with beneficent intentions, this self-determination is at risk. This is one of the major dilemmas in rural local organizations: government assistance may be helpful and often necessary, yet that same assistance may lead to dependency and control which undermine the organization. The price of government-derived benefits is inevitably some loss of local control. There are always some strings attached to loans, grants, and services. At a minimum, records must be kept in certain ways, reports must be written and filed, and government officials must enforce regulations and policies enacted not by the local members, but by a remote and impersonal presence called government. The benefits may be worth the limits they impose on self-determination, but they are in any case controls.

One danger is that government regulations may suffocate local organizations with paternalism. Standard rules on how to conduct business, conditions on the use of resources, and prescriptions about the activities to be undertaken by the organization may be closely supervised by resident bureaucrats and technicians. Services are provided on terms that they set, rather than according to the priorities and convenience of the members. In Thailand, officials of the Department of Cooperative Promotion virtually operated the cooperatives through detailed enforcement of regulations (Thai Khadi Research Institute, 1980), while in India, we know of government auditors refusing to accept a panchayat's expenditure of one rupee to
replace a drinking glass because the pieces of the broken glass were not submitted with
the voucher (Haragopal, 1980:45). Another pitfall is that local organizations may lose
control of decisions about what the organizations should do. Once subordinated to
government, it is more difficult for LO members, or even their leaders, to make
program decisions. Government officials assume that members will naturally agree
since they are to benefit. The consequence is that the priorities of local organizations
become distorted, no longer reflecting the preferences of members or their knowledge
of local conditions. As they lose their sense of control, their participation diminishes,
and the organization is regarded as the instrument and responsibility of the state.

Local organizations which manage to avoid subordination to governments
sometimes fall victim to local elites -- the more prosperous farmers, merchants,
moneylenders, and resident government officials -- whose status, education, economic
power, and organizational skills enable them to assume effective control. Where this
occurs they are free to pre-empt, for their own use, the resources provided by
government, such as subsidized credit, and to deny them to the smaller farmers for
whom they were intended. The organization is thus converted to the service of rural
elites. Small and marginal cultivators drop out, become inactive, or remain just to
receive what residual benefits remain after major resources have been appropriated by
more powerful members. In the Swanirvar movement in Bangladesh, representatives of
the local elite insinuated themselves into the leadership of the organization and
gradually monopolized the benefits derived from membership (Hossain et al., 1979).

Even when the leadership of local organizations comes from among the more
typical members, or from among the poorer strata, there is no assurance that a form of
subordination will not result. This was, after all, the experience which prompted
Michels (1915) to propose "the iron law of oligarchy." Even democratic organizations
intended to champion the interests of the poor tend to be taken over by their
leadership. The Small Farmer Development Programme in Nepal, for instance, has
noted an incipient problem of "leaderitis," where those first chosen to head the small
groups tend to remain in control and to take advantage of their position, if only in small
ways. Local organizations are always in need of effective leadership, but there is the
ever present danger that today's leaders may become tomorrow's oligarchs.

Internal Cleavages

Since few collectivities are free of factionalism and internal politics, this is
another common source of vulnerability for local organizations in rural areas. The
larger the organization, indeed, the more likely that such cleavages will emerge and
manifest themselves in competitive claims for control of the organization and its benefits. The basis of rural social cleavages may be communal -- ethnic, racial, religious, or caste. In these cases, the level of trust, the ability to communicate, and the willingness to share obligations and benefits are so tenuous that cooperation may not be possible within the same structure. The Morningside/Delightful Buying Cooperative in Jamaica split in half over the issue of doing business on Saturday, the holy day of the Seventh Day Adventists in the organization (Gow, 1979: 327-340).

Cleavages may also be based on political affiliation. Members of different parties may be unable to coexist and work for common goals within the same organization. Political parties may also attempt to use LOs to promote party interests, provoking conflict and risking the participation of large numbers of members and prospective members. The coops in Zaire reported by Janzen (1969) were ethnically homogeneous but were linked to political parties, so that when the multiparty system collapsed after independence, many of the coops did too.

Economic diversity can, of course, produce serious cleavages. Alexander (1980) describes how the tension in South India between landed farmers and their tenants or laborers debilitated agricultural LOs. A common problem found in irrigation groups is the division between upstream and downstream farmers. The Philippines irrigation group at Banes was unable to deal with this problem, and had to post guards to protect individuals' water supply. Despite local sanctions such as ostracism, witchcraft and public beating, water stealing was a big problem (de los Reyes and Viado, 1979: 18).

Closely associated with internal divisions is differential participation in local organizations, usually at the expense of socially and economically marginal groups which have much at stake in rural development. One such group is women. In most rural societies, women in low-income households not only raise children and maintain the home; they also perform essential economic functions including farming, tending livestock, marketing, and producing handicrafts. Yet they are often excluded from or are consigned to minor, inconspicuous roles in local organizations. When it was suggested that women be included in the management committee for the Sukhomajri Water User's Association in India, village elders rebuffed this, saying they wanted the committee to be "a serious body, not a modernistic frill" (Franda, 1981). The same is frequently true of low caste and low status persons who may be permitted to provide labor, but not to participate in decision-making or in the management of local organizations. Their distinctive needs are consequently given little weight. Residents of more remote and isolated settlements may similarly be underrepresented, less
because they are deliberately excluded than because their opportunities for participation are limited by the costs involved in transportation and communication.

To a certain degree, vulnerabilities such as these based on internal cleavages are inevitable in rural local organizations. Since LOs can make a significant contribution to improving people's welfare and productivity, those whose participation is limited by discrimination and social taboos are severely disadvantaged. Often there is little that can be done about existing social discrimination, at least in the short-run. The issue therefore becomes how to design and manage LOs so as to minimize the harmful effects of such discrimination. This is one of the matters that we discuss in the next section.

Ineffectiveness

Political skills, organizational skills, and technical skills are often in short supply among disadvantaged groups in rural areas. The underdevelopment of these skills due to low levels of education and to inexperience with formal association can reinforce low self-esteem and lack of confidence. These deficiencies inhibit organization, even when it is encouraged by government. In smaller and more informal organizations, which encounter officialdom and local elites less often, these scarce and untested skills are less important, and their absence will have less adverse effect on lower status, less educated, rural people.

The most obvious shortage of skills is in the area of business management. This includes simple bookkeeping, the ability to manage and account for funds which flow through the organization, for which the organization must accept stewardship and against which members have legitimate personal claims. The literature is replete with small cooperatives whose failures are imputed to incompetent record-keeping and management of funds, many times linked to corruption. In the case of Sukuma Cattle Cooperative in Tanzania, its failure was due in part to the inability of members to understand the accounting system and the resultant mistrust of bookkeepers (Lang et al., 1969). Even when clerical and record-keeping skills are available, skills in basic business management may be wanting, leading to imprudent investments in equipment, incurring of heavy debts, or launching ventures which fail and discredit the organization among its members. Helping to overcome these common shortages of business-type skills through training and avoiding unwise ventures through legal regulations, tutelage, and other forms of technical assistance provides a major rationale for government intervention and assistance to local organizations.

It has become a truism in the study of rural poverty that marginal farmers tend to be risk averters, because they are too close to the margin of subsistence to sustain
failures. By the same token, the rural poor can ill afford the luxury of investing their time and resources in organizations that seem likely to be ineffective. Ineffectiveness in LOs may be the consequence neither of leadership nor of membership failures, but rather of the uncertainties surrounding rural life, the difficulties of maintaining cohesive social organization in severely resource-poor environments, and the high cost of organizational learning when the margin of resources available to an LO's members is so meager and their self-confidence so limited by experiences of failure. Ineffectiveness and the fear of ineffectiveness thus can be a serious impediment to the organization of the rural poor. It is for this reason that when attempting to start or improve LOs, care must be taken that there be some evident success fairly quickly. The corollary of this is that programs may need to start fairly small and on an intensive basis, so that there can be a visible "demonstration effect." Then rural people can literally see for themselves the benefits from cooperative effort.

Malpractices

Individuals frequently use organizations to pursue personal goals which violate the goals of the organization and the collective interests of its members. Those who achieve positions of leadership may appropriate the resources of the organization for their personal use, or for the benefit of family, friends, or factions. They may even betray the interests of the membership for personal profit, colluding with politicians, officials, or local elites. Funds may be diverted from organizational to personal purposes, ranging from subsidized credit to contracts for the provision of equipment and services. Such corruption and betrayal is not uncommon, even in organizations that survive, because the benefits to members can still exceed their costs of membership. Frequently, however, the recognition of corrupt practices discredits the organization, destroys the morale of members, and results in its demise.

Outright dishonesty appears to be more often a problem for LOs than simple lack of skills. The Thana Irrigation Programme in Bangladesh became notorious for larger landowners submitting bogus membership lists to set up a coop which would be eligible to get and operate tubewells at highly subsidized prices (Blair, 1974). A sociologist working with local infrastructure projects in El Salvador found that a local administrator, having reported that a road project had "run out of money," was actually pocketing the remaining balance himself (Huizer, 1963). Corrupt practices such as these are not confined to organizational leaders. The temptation to pocket LO funds, especially if they come from the government or a foreign donor and are not really "local" funds, is very great among the poor. In the case of a Bangladesh paddy
processing group, for instance, women members misused their earnings until this destroyed the group (Raha, 1979).

One should keep some perspective on the problem of corruption. It does not necessarily affect in an unfair way who gets services or rewards, as Stavis (1974) found with Taiwan Farmers Associations. The important question is what adverse consequences such malpractices have on LOs. It is when the negative consequences become obstacles to development that sanctions or penalties are required. When LOs do impose such sanctions the consequences may be unexpected. In the case of The Ngok Dinka consumer cooperative in Sudan, which was beset by factionalism based on tribal differences and personalistic allegiances, the jailing of an embezzler led to a split in the group (Huntington, 1980). On the other hand, when one of the small farmer groups sponsored by the Puebla project in Mexico gave up trying to convince three irresponsible members to repay their loans in 1972 and took the "extreme" measure of having them jailed, membership in this group climbed from 111 to 200 (CIMMYT, 1974). The majority of members and residents in the community may appreciate strict control of malpractices.

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It is a very rare LO that does not encounter at least some of the vulnerabilities described in this chapter. Our information does not enable us to trace these vulnerabilities over the life cycle of LOs. It is evident, however, that when an LO falls victim to several such problems at the same time, for example, resistance from officials and factionalism among members, or subordination to local elites and corruption among leaders, its chances of survival and effective performance are very poor. The more successful and long-lasting LOs are those which are fortunate enough to experience serious problems one at a time so that leaders, members and outside supporters can cope with them without being overwhelmed. In surmounting one set of problems, they benefit from organizational learning and develop the capacity and confidence to deal with successive challenges. We shall further develop this theme in Part III.
Summary Conclusions

This completes our description and analysis of rural local organizations. We have seen that LOs can, and do, make an effective contribution to achieving rural development goals. It is hazardous to attempt to summarize what is already a summary presentation of our analysis. Nonetheless, for the sake of easy recall and reference, we would list the main findings discussed in this chapter as follows:

1. **Environmental constraints** do not seem to be deterministic of LO performance. Instead, what LOs make of their situation is much more important than any particular environmental asset or liability.

2. Certain **structural features** are associated with LO success. Relatively small base-level organizations which are linked vertically and horizontally offer greater promise, since they combine the benefits of solidarity and of scale. Although multiple functions may be sought as a long-run objective, it is wise to start with a single-function organization. Locally-initiated LOs seem to perform better, though some official involvement is probably beneficial. Internally, LOs are more likely to succeed if their rules and values are more participatory and egalitarian, if they are more informal in their workings, and more consensual in their mode of decision-making. Finally, voluntary membership, combined with some definite membership obligations, preferably decided upon by the members themselves, is associated with success.

3. **Operational tasks** represent LO outputs which may contribute to favorable rural development outcomes. Being involved in the process of planning and goal-setting helps build knowledge and commitment among LO members and contributes to group consensus. Some internal conflict should be regarded as normal within most LOs; the emphasis of outsiders wishing to help should be upon helping LOs cope with conflict and channel it constructively. LOs can mobilize and manage significant amounts of resources, but there needs to be a balance between local and outside resource contributions so that the latter do not smother local initiative. Finally, control and coordination of the bureaucracy from below seems to be feasible to improve and integrate public services and to supplement, though not replace, oversight by political and administrative superiors.

4. LOs exhibit **vulnerabilities** or pathologies which limit their overall performance. Frequently, they encounter resistance from local elites, government or even the rural poor themselves, all of whom for some reason may fear their activities. LOs are also in chronic danger of subordination to
the interests of dominant elites, government or even their own leaders. Those that escape these perils may fall prey to internal cleavages among members, whether these be based on social, political or economic differences. Other problems include ineffectiveness, which often results from lack of appropriate business skills, and malpractices, which unfortunately are all too common.

Implicit in our discussion of these features of LOs have been policy recommendations concerning, for instance, the proper role for governments wishing to sponsor or support local organization. Now that our description and analysis of local organizations is complete, we turn in the next part to an explicit discussion of these policy issues.
PART III:

STRATEGIES FOR STRENGTHENING LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS
Chapter 7

INNOVATIONS AND PRACTICES TO IMPROVE LOCAL ORGANIZATION PERFORMANCE

In Chapter 1, we identified four components in a rural development strategy oriented to increased productivity, greater security, and enhanced quality of life for the majority of families in the rural areas of developing countries. These components are: (1) public investments in physical and social infrastructure, (2) a policy environment responsive to the needs and interests of rural households, (3) improved technology suitable to the circumstances and capabilities of small farmers and other producers, and (4) more effective organizations, both government agencies which provide essential public services and associations of rural publics, which we have designated as local organizations (LOs).

All these components are necessary for a broad-based rural development strategy but our analysis has focused on local membership associations -- those whose leaders and staff are in some measure accountable to their constituents -- because far less is known about them than the other components. Strong institutions are essential to supporting and sustaining any process of development, but this is especially the case for the rural poor who as individuals control little in the way of economic resources, whose individual political influence is ineffective, and who must therefore rely on group action for mutual assistance and for exerting influence on those with more power. We have not analyzed bureaucratic organizations, since their personnel are accountable through their hierarchies to their political superiors, rather than to the local publics whom they regulate or serve. We have, however, commented on the critical relationships between bureaucratic agencies and local organizations in rural areas, for the quality of this relationship determines the effectiveness of government efforts of rural development.

How to support local organization is the question addressed in this and the following chapters. We consider first various innovations and practices that have been evolved to deal with the vulnerabilities discussed in the preceding chapter. With these practical examples in mind, we then examine elements of strategy at the local level, focusing on roles which can be played by local residents and leaders plus supportive "catalysts." Finally, our attention shifts to what governments and external agencies can do, expecting that some combination of local and national, as well as international efforts, will be needed to achieve the cumulative local institutional development needed but lacking in so many developing countries.
There are various measures, tactics or principles which may be supportive of better LO performance. Their effectiveness depends on the context in which they are invoked as well as the skill and persistence with which they are pursued. In our review of case studies, we have looked for social inventions and organizational techniques that can reduce the likelihood or seriousness of the failings to which LOs are vulnerable. These cannot be relied on always to work by themselves. The policy framework of government, the quality of local leadership and the strategy of outside support, if adverse, can negate almost any innovation or practice that might be introduced to offset elite capture or internal cleavage. Nonetheless, before turning in the next two chapters to broader issues of strategy and policies for working with local organizations, we wish to take note of what experience suggests as practical tactical approaches to improving LO operations.

**Overcoming Resistance**

What measures are effective will depend on what kind of opposition the LO is encountering -- from what source and how intense. If it comes from the public whose participation is sought, this may be debilitating. But so long as the new technology or opportunity being offered is truly advantageous, such resistance can be circumvented. Perhaps the best example of a planned effort to overcome public opposition was observed with the Banki water project in India (Misra, 1975). The Planning, Research and Action Institute of Lucknow worked with the head of the panchayat in Banki to organize a piped water supply, but there was little response from the villagers at first. The public had misconceptions about the cost of the program and the quality of water they presently used, and favored continued use of the existing wells. By making house-to-house surveys on sickness and water use and then discussing the findings in informal "evening sittings" in the village, people were persuaded that they would benefit from a clean supply of water and that the cost would be reasonable. The panchayat set up a Waterworks Executive Committee consisting of one member from each village, and this evolved into a committee elected by the people and responsible for collecting water charges and managing the system. After seven years, there were no overdue charges, and a substantial savings fund had been built up. Most impressive, there was a definite reduction in diarrhoea, dysentery and typhoid within three years, reinforcing the educational campaign on the connection between the use of clean water and better health. Not all development efforts can produce such dramatic results, but the approach used by the Lucknow Institute in conjunction with supportive local leaders is exemplary as a technique for winning the necessary public acceptance.
Where the activity is broadly beneficial, public resistance is seldom reported in the literature. More often LOs are resisted by local notables such as elders or chiefs who fear it will upset the community and their prerogatives. If such local elites are merely conservative rather than exploitative, overcoming their opposition is usually possible with some combination of patience and cooperation. The village elders at Pelebo in Liberia at first opposed formation of a health committee to carry out a program of health education, preventive and curative health care. Over a year's time they were won over through contact with project staff, and the village herbalist was sent for 6 weeks' training as a health paraprofessional. Once the initial activities were launched, the group also undertook construction of a school and digging of a well (Shepperd, 1981).

Resistance is less easily overcome when it emanates from advantaged class or caste interests. Just possibly such opposition can be neutralized by public confrontation if privilege cannot be defended in open forums. When the SFDP marketing group of petty vendors in Fakirakanda in Bangladesh was set up with group credit provided to escape the control of local moneylenders, the latter tried to defeat it. In this case, open criticism by members in public meetings -- an act bolder than they had dared before but encouraged by their coming together as a group -- neutralized the resistance of the moneylenders (Chowdhury, 1979). Truly "hard-core" resistance was encountered and overcome in a number of cases. The key element was group solidarity, often based on common ethnic identification. The tribal leaders and members of the Bhoomi Sena in India successfully challenged exploitation by the dominant sawkar caste. When their claims for return of land illegally taken had been ignored too long, they occupied the disputed fields and seized the standing crops. This forced officials to come out and adjudicate in the fields, subject to the scrutiny of an aroused public. The tribal claims were upheld in almost all of the 800 cases and the land handed back. This was only one round in a protracted struggle for tribals' rights, but it was won so decisively that the momentum shifted in their favor (Rahman, 1981). The Chipko movement also among tribals in India required similar willingness to go to jail, in this case to stop the clearcutting of forests on which the people depended for livelihood and which was contributing to flooding. Having halted the deforestation (by clinging to trees marked for felling), the cooperative also undertook to replant vulnerable hills slopes, earning legitimacy by their productive acts (De, 1979).

We would also note a more conventional method, which requires that the group in question be at least a substantial minority. That is the use of the electoral system to counter elite or governmental resistance. In the Small Farmer Development
Programme in Nepal, there was initially strong opposition in Nuwakot district from landed families who controlled the panchayat (local government) system. Using electoral power, however, this control was broken (Shrestha, 1980). In many of the SFDP communities such a change was not possible, partly because the social structure is divided according to caste. But even these divisions have been mitigated at the lower levels under the impact of the program, as some of the small groups with higher caste majorities have elected low caste leaders. The factor of "solidarity" thus shows up also in the use of electoral means to advance LO interests.

Finally, we would note that sometimes resistance is affected by events beyond anyone's control. Our own project's experience in helping introduce farmer groups for water management in Sri Lanka found that a failure of the rains created a situation where farmers accepted group action to conserve water more readily than expected (Uphoff, 1981). When introducing or assisting LOs, one needs to be prepared to take advantage of whatever events occur to gain support and counter opposition.

Overcoming Subordination

What measures or means are appropriate to avoid or minimize domination of LOs depend largely on its source. The most direct and powerful challenges come from government officials and/or local elites. As we saw in Chapter 5, official involvement to the point of domination has negative consequences for LO performance. "Capture" by more privileged elements of the local community will usually be equally unfortunate. Yet, beneficent government assistance is not impossible and domination by elites is not inevitable. The question for LOs is how to reduce the risks of subordination while still maintaining external assistance of a scope and kind that is productive for the LO members. One of the most striking common features of the "most successful" LOs in our study is that almost all in some way or other were able to reduce the effects of "the iron law of oligarchy," keeping leadership accountable or turning it to local advantage.

When a government is determined to dominate or subordinate an LO, the latter usually succumbs or disappears. Nonetheless, subordination to government is less likely where the rural community, or at least the sub-set which constitutes the LO's membership, has firm egalitarian values and traditions, like the Sidamo in Ethiopia (Hamer, 1976, 1980) or the people in Daudzai, Pakistan (Bhatty, 1979). One small step which seems to have helped to preserve the independence of the Subak irrigation associations in Indonesia was to prohibit government officials from holding office even though they might be cultivators within the association's jurisdiction (Birkelbach, 1973). If government domination becomes particularly oppressive, as with the sugar plantation
cooperatives in Peru, a strike may be the best and only remedy (Alberti, 1976). In that case, members regained control over their cooperative, instituting elections where previously a majority of the delegates to their general assembly had been appointed by the government. Overall it is unlikely that LOs can resist the embrace of government if it wishes to control them. The most likely consequence is that the LO becomes an extension of government and loses the support and participation of its members.

Perhaps the most significant measure to curtail the influence of local elites is to bar them from membership in the LO. The Taiwan Farmer Associations, for example, give only cultivating farmers a full vote and the right to serve on the board of directors (Stavis, 1974). The Small Farmer Development Programmes sponsored by FAO in Nepal, Bangladesh and the Philippines have permitted only households with incomes below the average for the rural population and with less than some maximum size of owned or rented land to become members. The SFDP has some examples of unusual success with little direct investment of funds, though with considerable investment of supervision and training through Group Organizers.

An outstanding example of an LO structured to minimize the influence of elites is the Amul dairy cooperative in India. In this organization, village-level cooperatives form the basis for daily purchases and payment. These are amalgamated into a large apex organization with 200,000 members, most of whom own only one or two cows or buffalos (Hunt, 1974; Somjee and Somjee, 1978). Participation in operating the organization at higher levels is minimal, but there is considerable local responsibility. The distribution of benefits, within an organizational framework admittedly set up from above, is demonstrably broad. Low caste and even untouchable households have been able to participate in the economic benefits. The way Amul has operated, poor households can participate in a cash-earning activity, and the premium it pays for members' milk compared to the price given by private buyers represents a substantial improvement for them. In addition, with its profits from large-scale processing of cheese and butter, Amul has been able to provide veterinary services, road improvement and even scholarships for qualified children of members. The philosophy of Amul's founder, A. L. Kurien, has contributed to this "bias" in favor of the poor in distributing benefits from milk production through this multi-tiered cooperative mechanism (Dorsey, 1978). The staff continues to be oriented to helping poor rather than rich households. In many villages the coop has reduced the exploitative hold of the rich over the poor.

Besides excluding the rich, other measures may be adopted to overcome the "iron law of oligarchy," i.e. the domination of an organization by a self-perpetuating
leadership. Merely holding elections for LO officers does not assure responsive and accountable leadership, but the absence of elections makes this outcome even less likely. In the case of the Bangladesh SFDP group of landless laborers going into fish raising at Fakirakanda, the absence of regular procedures for elections made it difficult for members to dismiss a leader who was divisive and irresponsible (Chowdhury, 1979). The Multi-Purpose Cooperative Societies in Sri Lanka had never been fully participatory organizations, being subject to the competing claims of party adherents in each community. But after the government in 1970 abrogated elections for their boards of directors, so that a majority of members were appointed by the Minister of Cooperatives, oligarchic tendencies within the coops became stifling.

One of the frequent proposals for controlling the accumulated power of leaders is rotation in office. We have found a number of examples where this seems to have had desirable results, though there is the contrary argument that it is unwise to replace effective leaders. Still, there are often good arguments for rotation. One of the most elaborate but apparently workable systems is used by the market women's cooperatives in Nicaragua, which were set up despite opposition from the traditional moneylenders who spread rumors that the coop would steal its members' money. Eleven directors are elected by the membership, with five composing a committee for administration, three a credit committee, and three an oversight committee to assure the correctness and honesty of operations by the other two committees. Membership on the credit committee rotates in order to minimize favoritism (Bruce, 1980). These coops backed by an independent foundation (not the government) have grown rapidly, with over 12,000 members in the 58 coops by 1979. Savings have grown from $75,000 in 1975 to $1.6 million four years later, and total assets from $125,000 to $625,000, an indication of the vitality and participation of these LOs. Whether or not to require rotation may be a decision best left to the members, though if this possibility is raised by outside agencies, it is easier for members to adopt this rule in the presence of local notables.

One major measure for controlling elites is training, for members as well as local leaders, to spread skills of administration, accounting, and communication, as well as technical knowledge throughout the organization. One of the factors which leads to oligarchy is the widening of the skills gap between leaders and followers as the former gain expertise, mostly through experience. The German Catholic development agency assisting the Manyu Oil Palm Cooperative in Cameroon undertook to provide organizational and technical training specifically to reduce the probability of its domination by government or its own leaders (Gow et al., 1979, II: 53-66). In the Comilla program in Bangladesh, Akhter Hameed Khan emphasized training for small
farmers and landless laborers; indeed the whole enterprise revolved around training centers at the thana (sub-district) level. So long as the training, with attendant supervision, was sustained and concentrated on the operating LOs, they performed reasonably well and equitably. When this was relaxed, standards of probity and member control rapidly diminished; the effect of training without supervision and follow-up was thus limited (Blair, 1974).

All these practices can help prevent subordination of the LO. Ultimately, however, the most important factor in preventing LO subordination from whatever source -- the government, local elites, its own leaders -- is the level of activity and concern by members. Where we find LOs functioning without excessive outside interference or control, there is usually a mobilized membership. The reasons why an LO is important enough to command their sustained efforts will vary. In the case of an irrigation association, members depend on the water it distributes to produce their crops and feed themselves. Sometimes needed public facilities or services are at stake -- such as bridges in the hills of Nepal or water in the plains of Malawi. Often the material interest, however, is reinforced by a common group identity such as ethnicity or caste. On the other hand, avoiding excesses of subordination may be a result of tactful government action or even due to local leadership which maintains a relatively open and participatory style of organization.

Overcoming Internal Cleavages

Although resistance and subordination are usually external in origin, the difficulties they produce depend partly on internal factors. Conversely, while factionalism, partisanship or other kinds of cleavage are definitely internal, the attitude which outside actors -- officials, party cadres, ethnic leaders and others -- take toward them will affect their severity. These divisions have to be resolved within LOs, but certain structural or procedural features can help in their resolution.

Governments and donor agencies need to be tolerant of divisions, knowing that these often exist within their own corridors. To some extent, conflict and competition are signs of vitality, or even spurs to performance. The LO with no such signs may indeed be inert. Where divisions do exist, it should not be assumed that they are a sign of incipient failure. Indeed, outside efforts to eliminate such conflict may well be counterproductive if the perceptions or inequities giving rise to tensions are not resolved. At the same time, we would not minimize the damaging potential of internal divisions. Those who would assist LOs in overcoming internal cleavages should proceed with great care.
The most basic measure to minimize divisions is to keep local organizations small, and relatively homogeneous. The case of the Carrizo Valley ejido in Mexico is instructive in this regard (Winder, 1979). When first established, all members were landless peasant households with no class or ethnic differences, but they came from different villages. Under the stress of starting a new enterprise under difficult conditions, and in a collective mode of production, many conflicts arose. When the ejido was divided organizationally into four units according to previous communities of residence, conflict subsided and production increased. This permitted more individualization of plots, but also the collective aspects of production were more manageable.

Another major factor which can mitigate divisions is to make equity and fairness manifest features of LO operation. The bridge construction committees in Baglung district of Nepal have dealt with a potentially divisive issue -- the sequence in which bridges will be built -- by making a plan which was widely publicized and carefully deliberated to achieve consensus. All communities in the district were invited to submit requests for bridges across the ravines and chasms that criss-cross Baglung in the middle Himalayas. About 120 requests were submitted with justification based on the amount of potential traffic, time saved compared to present means of crossing, amount of labor and materials that would be contributed by the community and potential safety improvements (lives can be lost at dangerous fords). A multi-year plan was worked out giving priority to half of them. Various trade-offs among considerations of cost, use, ease of construction, and safety were made by discussion and compromise. All in the district apparently could support the final plan. Even those communities not within the first set of 62 had some expectation that their claims would be attended to in some fair sequence (Pradhan, 1980).

The structure of decision-making can also contribute to reducing internal divisions, if all relevant groups are represented and can expect that their views and interests will be considered. Even if the resulting decision goes against them, to the extent they have received a fair hearing, conflicts are less likely. If existent factions are not a problem but the danger of internal divisions needs to be avoided, a broadly participatory structure of decision-making may be advisable. The Mraru women's association in Kenya presents an interesting innovation in this regard. Policy decisions are made by a full vote of the membership (by secret ballot) after having heard the recommendations of an elected executive committee of nine who consider and present the issues to the group (Kneerim, 1980).

Effective performance of an LO, in the face of whatever factionalism surfaces, is likely to be one of the best ways to reduce divisions, by giving all groups a stake in
maintaining the organization. An example is the Farmech project in Lesotho, where conflict between adherents of the government party and followers of the opposition party immobilized agricultural improvement activities. What finally broke the stalemate was the appointment of an effective manager who was able to induce enough cooperation and show enough positive results from the new practices that previous tensions were undercut. Part of the transformation was attributed to making the manager responsible to a control board composed of representatives of the district council (politicians), chiefs and central government. A staff board was also set up to give employees a voice in operation of the project and to introduce self-evaluation. Such a set of organizational initiatives coupled with administrative leadership put the development effort and the LO back "on track" (Wallman, 1969).

The elements we have identified for reducing the effects of internal cleavages -- working with small, relatively homogeneous groups; emphasizing equity and fairness in performance; open, representative decision-making processes; effective performance of LO tasks -- should reinforce each other when dealing with a legacy of ethnic, religious, party or kinship differences. We found a number of LOs operating quite successfully in spite of considerable social and even economic heterogeneity in their membership. Thus, while we would not want to underestimate the destructive potential of internal divisions, and we recognize that they are common in local organizations, they need not be regarded as fixed obstacles to success.

**Overcoming Ineffectiveness**

Since the large majority of LOs are not as effective as they could be, we want to know how to contribute to their improvement. Two of the suggestions often made to remedy ineffectiveness are that organizations should become larger, to be more efficient or more powerful, and that they should be made multifunctional to provide "integrated" services. As discussed in Chapter 5, we find suggestions along these lines misleading. Our analysis indicates that large size and multiple functions are more a consequence than a cause of success. We feel that LOs should generally start with some undertaking that is of high priority to their members and master it first, before considering new functions or an expanded membership.

One category of measures that are likely to prove worthwhile in increasing LO effectiveness is efforts to mobilize more resources from the community itself. A survey of members, house-to-house if necessary, has been helpful in a number of cases. These can break down misunderstanding and opposition and help to identify both local needs and local resources. This helps leaders and organizers match up what they may
suggest doing with what people are most willing and able to support. In an experiment in Thailand, such a survey "discovered" three potential leaders from among the poor rice farmers of Tambon Yokkrabat. These were persons with innovative ideas about how to solve village problems, and who were sought out by others for advice. Their base of support was due to their popularity and community-mindedness rather than wealth or formal position. The local organization which emerged was headed by these persons, who could easily have been by-passed if the organizers had not known of their presence and capabilities (Rabibhadana, 1980).

Another method for mobilizing resources is to spread leadership responsibilities more broadly. It is a general, even if mistaken, conception that there is a lack of leadership capacity in communities. In fact, a number of cases indicate that effectiveness results from dispersing rather than concentrating responsibility. In the Small Farmer Development Programme in Nepal, it was found that most farmers were reluctant to accept leadership positions because these demanded so much time, and they needed to use almost all of their time for family survival. The solution was to create committees even within the small group of 12-15 members -- one for the agricultural improvement activities such as buffalo raising, one for supplementary income such as from beekeeping, one for adult literacy and social programs, one for handling group credit and repayments (Clark et al., 1979).

Holding regular meetings is another method suggested in some cases. When things are not going well for an organization, there is a temptation not to meet, but regular meetings are often an essential element of LO development strategy. The interesting situation with the Lirhembe multi-service cooperative in Kenya is that they held only one formal meeting every two months but in fact had informal meetings almost weekly at the social center built in the community as one of the first undertakings of the organization (Morss et al., 1975, II: D20-D30). Finally, we would underscore the contribution of elections. In the Saemaul Undong movement in Korea, elections, with the expectation of eventual rotation in office, introduce an element of competition among leadership cadres which is positive for LO performance, since good leadership can be rewarded by re-election. There is no direct financial reward for local Saemaul leaders, but there are substantial status benefits and some perquisites which help to attract energetic leadership (Goldsmith, 1981).

Another means of improving effectiveness is to simplify regulations, applications, and reporting requirements for local organizations. In the SFDP in Bangladesh, the Group Organizer at Boyra started helping members prepare loan applications for the bank and discovered how the pro formas could be greatly simplified, while still
satisfying bank requirements. Consequently members have been able to handle their own applications and have set up their own savings fund. All the loans have been used for profitable projects, have been repaid and more are in process (Islam, 1979). While the group has had excellent leadership, has enforced considerable internal discipline (compulsory savings, times for not attending the monthly meetings), and has diversified into family planning efforts, one of the elements contributing to its success has been the increased accessibility of credit on terms members can understand and manage themselves.

We have argued that the more "informal" an organization's practices, the better its performance is likely to be. But we note that several LOs have benefited from introducing, on their own, a degree of specificity into role definitions and procedures which are quasi-formal. The successful rickshaw pullers group at Digharkanda in Bangladesh, for instance, developed its own rules (Raha, 1979). What was more important than the rules themselves, however, was the fact that these were the members' rules. For an outside agency to have prescribed the rules, even the same rules, would probably not have been as effective. One remedy for LOs having difficulty in operating coherently may be to encourage them to develop rules, but not to impose them. Providing "model" rules or guidelines may be useful, but this must be carefully done since anything emanating from the government or from more educated sources may be taken as mandatory. If an agency is giving assistance in this regard, it should probably offer several models or alternatives, conveying the sense that the group must itself make these decisions and that there is not one best or required way for all groups.

One of the most commonly proposed solutions to LO ineffectiveness is training. Indeed, we have found many cases where it was important for success, such as the Saemaul Undong movement in Korea, the Small Farmer Development Programmes in several countries, the Tiv coops in Nigeria and the peasant federation (FCV) in Venezuela. On the other hand, training is too often a top-down operation, assuming that the trainers know exactly what the trainees need to know. This one-way transfer of knowledge is seldom effective for LO development.

There is some debate whether training should focus on how to make the organization operate more effectively or on the technical skills which members need as farmers, rickshaw pullers, or handicraft makers. As far as we can determine from the case studies, no priority can be generally assigned, as both are important. One of the benefits which members may derive from an organization is technical training. At the same time, there are many things about running an organization which leaders and members should know. If this can be presented in a less didactic way than is found in
most training programs -- if it can engage participants' interest by relating the subject matter to their own situation and needs -- this will generally be well, even avidly received. Training sessions can also have a social quality which makes them enjoyable settings for imparting knowledge. Also, receiving training, especially for uneducated persons, enhances their sense of worth and efficacy.

These experiences suggest that well-conceived government assistance can improve LO effectiveness. We have noted how often government initiative and intervention can be negative for LO effectiveness, but official involvement can be positive and even needed. Hamer's account (1976) of the mahabar associations in Ethiopia concludes that without state support, many associations lost effectiveness. They were started by local initiative, but part of their success hinged on assistance from community development workers of the government who gave good technical advice, help in processing loans, and access to labor contracts for earning money for the LOs. This and similar examples demonstrate that government assistance is often necessary for LO success. When government assistance is given too manipulatively or arbitrarily, as it all too often is, then it can become counterproductive.

Overcoming Malpractices

Among the failings of local organizations which most often undermine their performance are undesirable behavior such as misuse or misappropriation of funds, nepotism and other kinds of favoritism in allocating jobs, services, or other resources. These can be destructive to the functioning and longevity of local organizations. Some of the remedies proposed for other LO deficiencies also can contribute to reducing malpractices. We shall note some of these and also look at more specific remedies.

Smaller groups can more easily discourage abuse of funds or favoritism. Since all members can know the details of group finances, there is more pressure from the group to handle funds honestly. Where there are intimate connections among the members, there is a sense of group responsibility enforced by social control. In the Njiangi rotating credit societies in Cameroon, if a member defaults, members of his or her family make good the obligation (Delancey and Delancey, 1982). This protects the group, but there is also social pressure on an individual to meet obligations since those who would suffer by his or her misconduct would be close relatives. The larger the organization, the easier it is for members to rationalize malpractices as harming some abstraction or only individuals to whom they feel no personal obligation.

The principle of division of responsibility, delegating authority to numerous members in some official capacity, can not only offset the tendency to oligarchy, but
also serve as a check on malpractices. With financial matters handled by a committee, irregularities are harder to cover up than if one person has full responsibility. One of the most interesting and effective examples of delegation of responsibility to check malpractices was the Quality and Quantity Committee set up by the Irrigators Service Association at Laur in the Philippines. In this case, the malpractices were on the side of technical staff constructing a dam. Farmers were helping to build this dam with contributed labor and materials, since they were obligated to repay eventually the government's investment in the dam. The Quality and Quantity Committee monitored the materials delivered to the construction site, returning inferior materials and equipment for replacement, and kept tight control over the use of equipment and fuel since they had to pay the costs of any waste themselves. One of their most decisive measures was to stop engineers from using project vehicles and fuel for personal matters, such as driving into town for lunch when farmers brought their own lunches to the work site. The committee appointed its own warehouseman and monitored prices to assure that bids were awarded to the lowest-cost suppliers. The resources at stake were, after all, the farmers' (Isles and Collado, 1979; Coward, 1979; Korten, 1980).

Simplification of procedures is also likely to help control malpractices since more members as well as officers are likely to be able to understand the financial situation of the organization. A simple but effective bookkeeping system was introduced for the Mmangkodi Farmers Association in Botswana. Responsibilities were also made quite clear in formal, legal terms, as the Associations' constitution spelled out financial accounting procedures and thereby made problems in this regard less likely (Kloppenburg, 1982). Complicated provisions may give government auditors more control over accounts, but this forfeits the assistance of members and other officers who, if they understand the LO's financial dealings, can be more effective than outside auditors in checking on misbehavior.

It is also advantageous to have regular, open meetings. The Subak irrigation associations in Indonesia prevent misappropriation of the water fees collected from members by the klian (water headman) by assessing all the fees at a public meeting. That way, everyone knows how much he and all others are supposed to pay, and how much should be collected and accounted for in total (Birkelbach, 1973).

This points to the utility of what has been called the "goldfish bowl" approach, (ILO, 1974:37) in which public exposure through open information channels can be used to deter diversion of group resources. A study of an experiment with decentralization and open decision-making for allocating rural electrification to villages in the Indian state of Rajasthan (only 2 percent a year could be electrified given resource con-
strains) found that such a "goldfish bowl" approach even increased the technical efficiency of decisions. The extent of corrupt influence in determining which villages would be hooked up first to the state electricity grid was reduced when district panchayats were given guidelines for identifying which villages would make most productive use of the connection (groundwater supply for tubewells to increase agricultural production) and which could be connected most cheaply (minimum distance from grid transmission lines). The government's own criteria for proper allocation of hook-ups were better met by the panchayats than by the previous process of administrative decision-making, subject as it was to higher-level political influence. Politics and favoritism could not be eliminated with the LO approach, but each village through its spokesmen could contend publicly against any other which was less qualified by the objective criteria (Hadden, 1974).

Another measure which is likely to prove useful for controlling financial misconduct is to provide outside support in kind rather than in cash. The Baglung bridge program in Nepal had a high ethic of leadership integrity and of popular participation, but the relatively unblemished performance of the committee is attributable partly to the fact that most of the resources they handled were labor contributions or materials, particularly steel cable, donated from the government (Pradhan, 1980). Cash grants from the district panchayat were a small share of total resources and were used mostly to pay the skilled workers (in this case, interestingly, lower caste persons).

This brings us to a general observation, that malpractices seem to increase as a larger proportion of LO resources come from outside sources. There can be thefts of members' own resources by their leaders, but this is less common. Members are not likely to keep contributing resources that are diverted to improper uses. On the other hand, it can be presumed that "outsiders" will not know about the diversion or will be forgiving since they have abundant resources. Inasmuch as outside agencies may validly seek to increase the resources available to LOs for development work, this poses a dilemma. There will always be some risk of corruption whenever funds are expended, whether through bureaucratic or local organization channels. The "matching" or "mixing" of resources as in the Laur irrigation scheme described above or the Malawi self-help water supply program resulted in little misuse of funds. Cost-sharing is widely practiced in public finance and it should be useful as well in the "third sector," local and voluntary organizations which are neither public nor private.

Finally, where there are malpractices, it is important to take proper and effective legal action. Sometimes, LO members themselves may take the initiative. In the San Jose credit cooperative in the Philippines, local officials were reluctant to expose the
corruption of coop officers, but they were eventually routed by the insistence of members. In the process, the LO itself was transformed. In a new election by secret ballot, "the winners were those men and women who had emerged as effective leaders in the previous months of countless meetings and mobilizations. They showed markedly different characteristics from the old officers. With the exception of one teacher, a former president, all lacked a completed high school education." (Hollnsteiner, 1979). From the struggle, the LO emerged much stronger, with a membership representing 60% of all households in the community, many of them among the poorest. If local organizations do not take the initiative when crimes or misdemeanors have been committed, the regular processes of the law should go into action. Lamb, in his case study of the Murang'a coffee cooperative in Kenya, recounts some crude frauds, but reports that discipline greatly improved once a few offenders were convicted and there was a general tightening up of supervision (1974: 115).

These examples of innovations and practices to overcome the vulnerabilities which can plague local organizations have emphasized the value of small, informal organizations with open, face-to-face procedures. Separate, homogeneous organizations of the rural poor are also useful as a means of minimizing the influence of hostile elites and governments. Finally, government protection and support, though it presents some dangers, is useful and often essential, particularly for providing training and augmenting local resource contributions.

Obviously there are no fool-proof remedies for the shortcomings of LOs. Solutions need to be continually assessed to see if they are achieving their intended purposes and to be modified to deal with undesired side-effects. More important, they probably should be introduced in combinations so that there are some mutually reinforcing effects. Nonetheless, the experiences of the large numbers of local organizations that we have studied indicate that the maladies so often observed with local organizations can be mitigated or even eliminated. We would stress that insensitive or arbitrary efforts to "cure" LO pathologies may only worsen them. The challenge is to encourage and reinforce members' commitment to their organization and their sense of responsibility for its performance. Paternalistic initiatives which do not involve members and leaders in finding solutions to problems that they themselves recognize and understand will weaken subsequent capacity to mobilize and utilize resources for development.
Chapter 8
APPROACHES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

The main focus of effort for establishing or strengthening rural organizations is necessarily at the local level, though as elaborated in the next chapter, initiatives and policies from the national government and external agencies can have a major influence on LOs' success. In this chapter, we elaborate the implications of our analysis with regard to efforts at the local level, examining in particular three areas of programmatic development which emerge as critical for improving LO prospects and performance.

Starting New Groups or Working with Existing Groups

One of the leading controversies in the study of rural local organization, as noted in Chapter 3, is the advisability of working with existing LOs, compared with establishing new ones. Certainly there will be circumstances where the latter alternative offers more prospect of furthering rural development objectives. But on balance, we find that the burden of proof should be on those who would set up new groups. We say this despite our encouraging experience with introducing new farmer groups for water management in the Gal Oya project of Sri Lanka, a settlement scheme which included no long-standing social organizations (Uphoff, 1981). Nevertheless, the most fruitful approach is to begin by considering what organizations already exist.

Unfortunately, existing organizations are too readily ignored in most project planning. The presumption usually is that since the present situation is deficient, it must be changed with all-new efforts. Too often, little is known in detail about the present situation. This applies particularly to local groups, which if recognized at all are likely to be viewed in stereotyped terms by outsiders. A large-scale irrigation project undertaken by the Japanese government in the northern Philippines illustrates the common neglect of existing LOs. In the project area of 10,000 hectares, about 130 zanjera irrigation groups were functioning. As documented by Coward (1979a) and Siy (1981), these LOs are some of the most effective organizations to be found for managing water distribution efficiently and equitably, for handling maintenance and system improvement, and for resolving disputes. But the engineers designing the new project proceeded as if these LOs and their intricate system for apportioning responsibilities along with landholding did not exist. The new channels planned would have eliminated well-functioning systems of channel operation and maintenance by
scrambling holding patterns and sizes, thus "disinvesting" in the social infrastructure built up by local farmers over generations.

A slightly different situation occurred in Jamaica, where researchers from the Cornell Rural Development Committee were asked to assess the existing LOs in the area for an integrated rural development project. Although there seemed a sound basis for working with and through the existing Jamaica Agricultural Society (JAS) branches in the project area, an official decision was made to set up new Development Committees. In practice, the project ended up working through the JAS branches to call meetings and form the new Committees. Since the latter were really reflections of the former, it would have been better to save the effort of creating new committees. Indeed, the project later redefined its objective to be that of "revitalizing" JAS branches (Goldsmith and Blustain, 1979; Blustain, 1980).

Even when the potential of existing organizations is recognized, it is not always easy for outsiders to cooperate effectively with them. A study of 164 World Bank agricultural projects determined that local organizations were involved more than 40% of the time. In spite of the absence of a formal World Bank commitment to working with LOs, project planners apparently felt that "the development process needs to rely upon and promote the structured self-organization of the small producers for their own interests." Nevertheless, this same report observed that there was an "absence of a practical methodology... for identifying and effectively supporting existing traditional organizations" (Cernea, 1982: 132-133).

The difficulty of establishing such a methodology is illustrated by the findings of researchers from the Cornell Rural Development Committee working in Botswana. Their task was to determine why the government-sponsored Small Dam Groups set up to operate and manage the small catchment dams being constructed by the Ministry of Agriculture were not functioning better by the Ministry's criteria. The groups did not meet regularly, did not do regular maintenance of the dam bunds, did not regularly use the dams, and did not collect the agreed fees from users. Assessing this turned out to be difficult not so much because the rural area was unknown -- Botswana has been one of the more "studied" LDCs -- but because of ambiguities and false explanations resulting from inadequate government understanding of the highly varied and seasonally changing ecological relationships governing the use of water and rangeland (Roe and Fortmann, 1982).

Actually, the Dam Groups did function reasonably effectively during the few months in a year when the dams were important to herders as part of their "fall-back" strategy following the cyclical pattern of water and pasture availability. Herds would
be moved out into the veldt to graze after the annual rains began, to take advantage of ephemeral sources, and would return eventually to the base villages which have deep boreholes to survive through the driest months. For a number of reasons the small dams could and should not be used year-round. From the users' viewpoint, it was therefore not necessary that they be managed continually or that the dam groups have any continuous activity. Moreover, the fee prescribed by the government for water use was not collected by the LOs because it was too high and was anyway unnecessary, since maintenance could be done by group labor (Roe and Fortmann 1982). As this case makes clear, the need for methodology goes beyond identifying and assessing existing groups, but should include also an understanding of their task environment in its various dimensions. We would underscore the significance of seasonality, a factor commonly ignored by city dwellers shielded from the forces of nature (Chambers, 1980).

Given the complexity and variability of LO tasks and environments, the choice between working with existing organizations and establishing new ones has to be context-specific. If it is decided to support the establishment of a new LO, there are various possible pitfalls. One should presume that "introduced" LOs will not be initially understood by members or potential members, and will not necessarily engender commitment from them. Understanding and support can be built up, but the performance which would elicit such support is likely to depend in part on members' having some commitment. This creates a chicken-egg situation where progress depends upon support, and vice-versa. If the new LO meets some clearly recognized need and if the activities involved are reasonably familiar or simple, progress can be accelerated, as we found with the water management groups in Sri Lanka mentioned above.

A second difficulty occurs when the LO provides valued goods or services which are channeled to it from government, donor or PVO sources. According to our reading of dozens of case experiences, "pump-priming" of LOs based primarily on outside resources seldom results in effective, sustainable organizations. The leadership that emerges is likely to be less well-motivated and may indeed be bent mostly on self-enrichment; members will take what is free without developing a sense of responsibility for the LO. The twin evils of corrupted leadership and a psychology of dependency among members are the most probable outcomes of introducing new LOs through large resource transfers from the outset.

These dangers associated with introduced organizations are familiar to all observers of LOs. We would add an additional reason for caution: when LOs are introduced from outside the community, the roles specified (president, chairman, secretary-treasurer) appear to members and officers alike to have outside authority
behind them. As such, the roles are likely to be exercised with less restraint and consideration than if they were created -- not just filled -- by the members. "Traditional" LOs differ from "modern" ones not so much because they are more informal, but because they are more consensual. Majority voting is less common because members understand that agreement needs to be fashioned by discussion and persuasion if implementation is to follow. Local leaders can be more effective functioning as intermediaries rather than as "authorities" (Duewel, 1982: 28-29). "Modern" officer roles may be exercised more peremptorily because there appears to be influential backing for the positions and for the decisions taken. This relates to the concerns of leader-member relations discussed below, and to the issue of accountability. If accountability can be maintained in introduced organizations, they differ little in effectiveness from existing groups.

Understandably, one would like to have the best of both worlds. This may mean adding new functions to existing organizations, or patterning new LOs after familiar modes of operation (March and Taququ, 1982). We would look first at existing LOs, recognizing that there are limitations on what new tasks they can or will engage in. A LO may not be suitable for development activity because its structure is not appropriate, its mode of operation would bias the results, or its norms of cooperation would not support the new effort. But if an existing LO's lack of interest keeps it from engaging in a project, one might question the project and consider adjustments in its objectives and activities, rather than dismiss the local organization. Where existing organizations are not suitable, or there are none, the introduction of new LOs should build as much as possible on accepted roles, principles of obligation, group sanctions, criteria of status and success, and patterns of work and responsibility.

Local Leadership and Membership Participation

Leadership and participation are two sides of the same coin, though leaders and members may be juxtaposed analytically and may have different interests and needs. One can say that without leadership there is no sustained or sustainable participation, but the reverse is equally true. We cannot deal with all the theoretical arguments surrounding the analysis of leadership. The question which particularly concerns us here is the operational choice of working with existing leaders in a community or of trying to elicit new leadership, a decision paralleling that just discussed regarding existing or new LOs. We need to address also the question of accountability, as it links the factors of leadership and participation.
As should be expected, one cannot generalize about all existing or new leaders at the community level. We identify three criteria for "developmental" local leadership, and the first question is how well the existing leaders meet them: (1) ability to mobilize local resources for development efforts, (2) capacity to acquire outside resources to complement local resources, and (3) willingness to use resources mobilized for broad-based benefit in the community. No leadership is likely to be fully or equally successful in all three dimensions, so the assessment is a matter of judgment. We assume that there is potential leadership talent in all communities, unless they have a high out-migration drawing off the most energetic and inventive people. But the conditions attracting such talent into positions of responsibility may be highly variable, and communities can lack leaders who have sufficient ability and or are willing to serve interests broader than their own.

Rather than try to make any general judgment on all existing leadership, it makes more sense to try to seek conditions of leadership selection that permit members to assess the performance of present leaders and the potential of possible alternatives. One basic suggestion is that leadership selection, even with continuing LOs, be preceded by as much discussion as possible about the purposes of the LO and of what members want and need in their leaders. This communicates expectations to whomever is chosen, but it also gives cues that new leaders might be selected who meet the criteria better than existing ones.

An approach to leadership selection used by the Agrarian Research and Training Institute in Sri Lanka with which we have worked elaborates on this principle. The task was to establish farmer groups for water management in a major irrigation scheme. "Organizers" were trained and fielded in the role of catalysts, as discussed below. The boundaries of the functional group were determined hydrologically, to include all those farmers drawing irrigation water from a single field channel. These constituted a nominal group with a history of some past cooperation, even though the majority had at most sporadic collective activity. By starting the process of group formation from the bottom up, talking first with farmers individually, and then in small groups before the whole set of 10 to 25 (or more) farmers on the field channel were called together, the expectation that this new group would operate in an egalitarian, participatory manner was clearly communicated by the organizers to all potential members (and leaders) in advance. The process might well be characterized as a kind of "non-formal education." What resulted was an unexpectedly high level of activity and cooperation, with leaders working more capably and conscientiously than anticipated. Our best explanation for
this outcome is that the groups started from below were willing to bypass the leaders if they did not cooperate, thus forcing them to join on the members' terms (Uphoff, 1982).

Our concern is with the principle that the group creates the leaders. In order to achieve ostensible economies of scale and speed when starting local organizations, outside agencies frequently choose to call people together to "elect" leaders. The most prominent leaders are selected and then given training and control over resources for the community, without any detailed and extended communication with members about objectives, rights, or duties. When the groups are in effect created through these leaders, this establishes a power relationship that is open to abuse. The agency has little or no communication with the community except through these leaders. The more training and resources they are given, the more distance is created between leaders and members. The "short cut" of trying to mobilize rural people from outside through leaders, rather than make the necessary investment to gain direct understanding and support from members as the starting point of organization, is likely to be unproductive or even counterproductive, entrenching a privileged minority and discrediting the idea of group action for self-improvement.

That there should be leadership roles with delegated authority and responsibility is not in question. All LOs of any size and significance need some specialization and division of labor, though authority and responsibility may be more or less broadly shared, and incumbents may have limited or unlimited terms of office. The problem which Michels (1915) identified is that delegation creates the potential, even the tendency, for leadership to rise above the members and pursue its own interests, against or simply in addition to the interests of the membership.

Leadership training is sometimes suggested as a means of overcoming this tendency. We feel that leadership training can be useful, but that it cannot substitute for the memberships' gaining knowledge and experience in the LO's affairs. A promising approach which combines informal training of leaders with membership involvement is the periodic "evaluation" meetings held by the Small Farmer Development Programme in Nepal. The groups of 10-15 members (including their leaders) evaluate their progress as a group every month or so. Leaders chosen by the members meet together on a quarterly basis to discuss first the problems they are experiencing, then what successes they have achieved, in a self-criticism and problem-solving context. Discussions are reported back to members. Such training keeps leaders linked more closely to members. Such a combination of participatory evaluation with training through group problem-solving could probably be worked out for most LO programs.
One of the themes which we find running through the case studies is that the performance and accountability of leaders depends very much on active participation by members. Leaders accomplish group goals through the work of members, and having more persons willing and able to take initiative and responsibility multiplies group capacity. A variety of mechanisms for holding leaders accountable, such as regular elections, secret ballot, frequent meetings, rotation of officers, and management or vigilance committees overseeing performance, can provide institutionalized means whereby poor performance can be constrained. Such mechanisms may deter malpractices, or at least facilitate criticism of faults and replacement of leaders. The membership needs to know how to use such mechanisms and to be motivated to utilize them when necessary.

The aims of membership participation need to be realistic. As we have suggested elsewhere, there are many different kinds of participation, not all of them relevant or effective in all situations for all tasks (Cohen and Uphoff, 1977; Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, 1979). It makes no sense to think in terms of achieving maximum participation, since participating in decision-making or implementation, for example, entails costs as well as benefits to individuals. What is more reasonable is to seek some optimum participation, which justifies to members their expenditure of resources or time because the benefits are greater, more prompt, more appropriate, better distributed. Some delegation of decision-making and some specialization within the group can contribute to better performance so long as inefficiencies equivalent to "monopoly" do not result. Sadly, the poorer and less educated an organization's members, the more likely that leaders will become self-serving, even though it is precisely such members who most need the benefits of organizational initiative on their behalf. But we find that some LOs with norms of participation and egalitarianism -- whether derived from "traditional" ethos of tribe, caste or clan, from ideological commitments accepted by members and leaders alike, or from programmatic communication by outside "catalysts" -- have kept leadership autonomy and rewards within an acceptable range.

The Paradoxical Role of "Promoters"

To get local organizations started or strengthened, it is often necessary to have some outside person involved in initiating or encouraging LOs. We would not attribute all effective local efforts to outside initiative (Buijs, 1981), since a good number of the successful LOs in our sample of 150 stemmed from purely local initiative. Nonetheless, in the absence of local initiative, there must usually be some outside initiative if the
status quo is to change. A government or private agency could simply communicate a willingness to work with any LOs a community might set up, perhaps offering some inducements in the form of building materials, subsidized credit, or technical assistance. But a more active role can be effective, subject to the cautions we have expressed already. It is paradoxical but true that "top-down" efforts are often needed to promote "bottom-up" development (Stiller and Yadav, 1979; Lassen, 1980).

The best channel for such efforts appears to be a person engaged by an agency, private or public, to promote and assist local organizational development. In general, it seems that such promoters or "catalysts" should be selected from outside the community. Such persons are likely to be more educated and to be less vulnerable to attacks on their person and reputation (Grijpstra, 1981:2). They are not tied up with the local structure or involved in feuds and factions, and such independence can make it easier for them to work with less advantaged groups (Devitt, 1977). Additionally, such outsiders may have more standing and credibility with a funding agency than would community insiders. A compromise solution which may be feasible and useful is practiced by the National Community Development Service in Bolivia (Savino, 1982). Local residents are recruited competitively from the target communities, though usually assigned to communities other than their own. Those who have shown leadership in their own community organizations have proven particularly effective in stimulating such development elsewhere. These highland communities, it should be said, are relatively homogeneous ethnically and relatively equal socio-economically. In more stratified circumstances "locals" might have more difficulty in such roles, suggesting a greater need for "outsiders" as catalysts.

The overall approach is one of sending the promoter into the community (or set of communities) to become acquainted with the people and their problems, and to initiate discussion of these problems and the people's capabilities and expectations. Together with the emergent or existing group, the promoter identifies measures which can be taken by the group on its own, or with outside help, to deal with problems of highest priority or those most amenable to solution. In the process, the basis for self-sustaining organized activity is laid by demonstrating local capabilities, bringing forth local leadership, and motivating members to become and remain involved.

The first step may be a village survey (e.g. the Banki water supply project—Misra, 1975) or preparing a community profile (e.g. the NIA program in the Philippines—Korten, 1980). In doing this, the promoter can become personally acquainted with all the households which might join the LO. The purposes of the effort can be explained directly, without intermediation, distortion or suppression by local elites. Personal
rapport is a key to the effort. As Buijs puts it: "By this willingness to live in the village and to take part in village life, discussing and advising often till late in the evening, the field worker builds up a trust relation. Through this trust, people are willing to accept his ideas about a project" (1981:7).

What is sometimes called "consciousness-raising" in such a process is probably more appropriately understood as trust-building. The ideas that are communicated are important, but the non-verbal communication of attitudes and values through such signs as dress, posture, tone of voice, and eating practices may be more important in creating a positive (or negative) attitude among rural residents toward the new program. The qualities for which promoters might be selected are so varied that no fixed criteria appear, beyond commitment to program goals and willingness to live in the village. As Oakley (1980) observes, no candidate will have all the ideal qualities, and we find that persons with quite different personalities can achieve similar results -- good or bad. Even verbal facility, which is often seen as a requisite for organizing, does not appear to be universally needed. Some organizers who are reserved and quiet can be quite effective, particularly among farmers who may be as impressed by what is not said as by what is said. Promoters must learn the simple truth that listening is a communication "skill."

The time required for the first phase of getting mutually acquainted appears to range from a minimum of three months to an average of six months, though in the Gal Oya project in Sri Lanka six weeks were sufficient under "crisis" conditions (Uphoff, 1981). How long before the promoter can leave the community is highly variable. With the Small Farmer Development Programme in Nepal, it was estimated that 6-7 years would be needed before the small farmer groups would be completely self-sustaining (Ghai and Rahman, 1979:22). In Gal Oya, farmers and organizers think 1-2 years will be enough to get viable organizations launched, at which time most of the organizers can move on to other communities. For a program to be cost-effective, a gradual thinning out of involvement is probably necessary, at a rate and to an extent that the LOs do not collapse. If at some point it appears that an LO can never become self-sustaining, the decision should be taken to disengage, since one of the goals of the effort must be to avoid creating "dependency" relationships that are the antithesis of development.

The promoters must be carefully coached and supervised so that they help the LO gain experience and capacity for self-management. They are not to become permanent fixtures in the community, which means they must assiduously avoid assuming "leadership" roles. Some "pump-priming" in terms of planning activities with more
interested members and setting up initial meetings may be appropriate. But all should be done in ways that bring forth community leadership. Local-level workers must guard against what Gow and Van Sant (1981:23) call "the Lawrence of Arabia syndrome," the assumption by a benevolent outsider of paternalistic responsibility for the welfare of a group. It is a fine but vital distinction for promoters to make: to take more satisfaction in the emerging capacity of the group than from its visible accomplishments.

As we have pointed out, some LOs have started and sustained themselves without outside promoters or catalysts, though most of the successful ones did subsequently create linkages to sympathetic and supportive public or private agencies. In situations where local initiative seems to be absent or lagging, outside catalysts can play an important role in supporting what we call "assisted self-reliance." The effects of such efforts can spread beyond the local level, moreover. Properly conceived and executed, top-down assistance helps create bottom-up rural development efforts. Once local organizations become established and confident, they can induce or compel government staff to perform their duties more regularly and conscientiously, because there is initiative, capacity and pressure "from below." What results is often a more concerted and balanced effort on three levels of action -- local, joint, and government -- in pursuit of agreed rural development goals, all as a consequence of the original effort of the promoter.

In this discussion of "catalyst" roles, as in the preceding sections of the chapter, we have been focusing on what can be done at the local level, always noting where and how a constructive role can be played by government or other agency personnel. Apart from such direct initiatives, we need to consider in broader terms the posture and policies of "outside" agencies which can support a growing effort to build local capacity for development. This is the subject of our concluding chapter.
Chapter 9
CONTRIBUTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS AND EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AGENCIES

We are confronted with a paradoxical situation: local organizations are most likely to be effective for development when they originate from the initiatives of local people; but if local organizations are to expand the range of their services, they are likely to require assistance from governments and even international agencies. This represents a special challenge. In the preceding chapter, we considered means by which local efforts can be focused with greater probability of success. Here we shall examine supportive activities by governmental and non-official agencies.

Some writers on rural development cling to a lingering nostalgia for the simpler days when rural life was uncontaminated by government and bureaucracy. Others retain a deep suspicion of the state, considering it at best incompetent or irrelevant to the needs of the productive members of rural society, at worst as the corrupt and inveterate exploiter of the rural poor, usually in league with local elites. From different points of departure both schools of thought fear and distrust the state. When they do not entirely reject it, they emphasize autonomy and self-reliance for rural local associations.

Neither of these perspectives provides a useful general orientation to the development of local organizations in rural areas. For better or worse, official involvement is here to stay; whether leftist, rightist or reformist, government activities in rural areas are likely to increase, not diminish. Local organizations therefore have to make major strategic decisions concerning the circumstances under which to relate to government; they can rarely afford the luxury of avoiding government altogether. In any case, avoiding government is likely to be a poor strategy; as we have already argued, the ability of local organizations to help their members partially depends on linkages worked out with institutions, such as government, that control and allocate services and resources.

For their part, as we argued in Chapter 2, governments have definite reasons to tolerate, and even to support, rural local organizations. From the perspective of both government and LOs, therefore, mutual cooperation is often likely to appear advantageous. How, then, can interested governments help to foster and sustain local organizations? We would identify five critical areas for government policy toward LOs: financial allocations, strategy of assistance, special organization for disadvantaged
publics, reform in the provision of public services, and reinforcing accountability within local organizations.

Financial Allocations

Urban bias is a well-recognized feature of public expenditures and investments in most developing countries (Lipton, 1977). Weaker and disadvantaged groups have suffered especially from government neglect of rural interests. There is growing evidence, however, that lagging agricultural productivity, the urgent need to increase food production, and the chronic poverty affecting large and growing numbers of rural residents are inducing governments to shift their expenditure priorities to discriminate less against rural areas. Favorable price incentives to stimulate agricultural production and thereby relieve pressure on the balance of payments are now more often observed in developing countries. Encouraged by a growing consensus in international development circles on the importance of agricultural and rural development, this desirable shift in budgetary priorities is likely to continue.

Increased investment in rural programs is limited, however, by the chronic resource shortages facing most governments in less developed countries. This makes it all the more important that increments in public expenditures and new and expanded programs oriented to rural development be buttressed by an appropriate set of policies and institutional infrastructures. Scarce resources are often wasted on well-intentioned activities which are nevertheless unproductive because they fail to respond to the specific needs, priorities, and capabilities of rural groups. To avoid such unnecessary dissipation of resources, it is important that government agencies know what these needs and priorities are and their likely impact on intended beneficiaries.

Educated technicians and senior officials are often ill-informed of the real conditions, needs, and preferences of small-scale rural producers; their backgrounds and experience provide little reliable insight into these needs. If services resulting from revised budget priorities are to be relevant to the specific needs of intended beneficiaries as they experience them, the rural poor must have a voice in the choice of services and how they are provided. This voice requires local organization.

There is great temptation on the part of governments eager to demonstrate their solicitude toward rural publics to provide services in paternalistic ways that foster dependency rather than self-reliance. For governments constrained by very limited resources this can lead to perverse outcomes. For example, the indiscriminate use of Food for Work, in which rural residents are compensated for community work, has undermined local self-help traditions in many areas. Such was the case in many of the
Village Development Committees in Botswana, where the food given for work became
the only incentive for contributing labor to build roads, schools and hospitals (Vengroff,
1974: 303-309). In the absence of a requirement that beneficiaries also contribute
within their capabilities, local publics are likely to sit back and wait for government to
deal with their problems.

Where governments neither consult local publics nor ask for counterpart
contributions to development projects, local organizations limit themselves to
petitioning and otherwise making claims on already over-burdened governments, rather
than engaging in collective self-help, mobilizing and contributing resources, and
participating in the management and maintenance of programs and facilities. To be
effective, therefore, government financial allocations should respond to needs as
expressed by local people themselves and should be channelled in such a way as to
encourage local publics to mobilize resources which complement those provided by the
state.

**Government Support for Local Organization**

Local associations of rural publics can greatly facilitate program management,
but they run into difficulty unless supported or at least tolerated by government.
Hostility or indifference by government encourages local elites and locally-based civil
servants to undermine or bypass local associations, relegating them at best to small-
scale activities and contributing to their dormancy. Well-disposed governments, on the
other hand, can support local organizations by direct sponsorship, by targeting services
to disadvantaged publics through their membership associations, by counteracting the
opposition of local elites, by requiring government agencies and staff to protect such
organizations and the rights of members to participate in them, and by providing
technical assistance and specialized training to leaders, members and staff. As the
counterpart for support and assistance, a government can require local organizations to
contribute a share of jointly provided services and to participate in their management
and maintenance. It can make legal institutions and procedures available to
associations to apply sanctions against defaulting members or corrupt officers, and as a
back-up can prosecute any breaches of law the LOs cannot or will not deal with.

Of various supportive measures, one of the most useful services is the training of
leaders, both in technical subjects and in the skills associated with maintaining and
managing organizations subject to the qualifications raised in Chapter 7. Such simple
skills as operating a meeting, bookkeeping and letting contracts, as well as how to
benefit from the services offered by government departments and voluntary agencies
are included in the more successful training activities. It is useful to reinforce formal training with periodic meetings and newsletters or other communication media. Different training activities should be available for persons with different needs; the unpaid chairman of a small local unit needs different skills and information than the full-time accountant of a federated center. Training blends into technical assistance as government staff or PVO personnel working with government visit local organizations to learn more specifically about their needs, to impart information, and to mediate between a local organization and a government agency where linkages are not working effectively.

Special Organizations for Disadvantaged Publics

Government-supplied resources intended for disadvantaged publics are vulnerable to preemption by local elites, often with the connivance of opportunistic, corrupt or unsympathetic officials. The diversion of resources is especially likely when such services are provided through bureaucratic agencies whose primary clientele is the non-poor. If resources and services are to reach specific disadvantaged publics, they should be targeted through delivery vehicles specially committed to the task, to organizations controlled by the intended beneficiaries. The Small Farmer Development Programmes operating in several Asian countries use membership rules to keep wealthier farmers out of the organization, and then funnel resources through the organization only to members. Even with such precautions, some resources may still be diverted by landowners or merchants. This can be diminished, if not entirely prevented, if the services provided are of little interest to more advantaged groups (such as primary education), cannot be hoarded and resold (such as inoculations), or represent no financial subsidy (Uphoff, 1980:43-48). Intensive management can oversee and reward staff to ensure that services reach those for whom they are intended.

Administrative Reform

For the provision of services to rural publics, governments rely primarily on bureaucratic agencies, but in most developing countries public bureaucracies are ill-equipped to serve the rural poor directly or to interact with local organizations (Korten and Alfonso, 1981). Staff members are often too few, insufficiently trained, poorly motivated, inadequately equipped; structures are too centralized and procedures too rigid to permit timely service in response to needs that vary greatly with specific and distinctive local conditions. Recognizing the importance of linkage with rural communities, governments cannot seriously consider helping local organizations without
improving the capacity, motivation, and skills of bureaucratic agencies and their staff members who are in direct contact with rural publics.

A number of measures can be combined as elements of a strategy to reorient public administration to the needs of rural publics.

**Alternatives to Bureaucracy.** The first involves the search for alternative means of reaching rural publics, relieving the strain on bureaucratic structures and drawing on other capabilities that may be better suited to serve them. Some activities, especially those involving the supply of production inputs and marketing, can often best be handled through commercial channels. The main limitation of this approach is that small farmers, tenants and landless workers are seldom a profitable market for legitimate business enterprises. Frequently, disadvantaged rural publics may be victimized by unscrupulous merchants and money-lenders. Governments can attempt to protect them from this form of exploitation through regulation, which is inexpensive in terms of scarce administrative resources. We found that the effectiveness of such regulations is considerably increased when they are policed by local organizations. LOs increase the bargaining power of the rural poor, which helps insure that regulations designed to protect them are enforced. Another way to keep unscrupulous merchants or lenders in line is to increase competition, possibly by supporting commercial or lending activities by local organizations. These will probably face resistance such as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 and are liable to subversion or sabotage. Regulation is easier to effect when there are alternative sources of supply available locally.

For many activities, especially those requiring experimentation and the patient development of local leadership and local participatory institutions, PVOs are a useful alternative to governmental bureaucratic agencies. Some of the more successful small-scale cooperative movements have been initiated through the efforts of private voluntary groups. An example of beneficial interaction between a private entity and the government is the Banki Water Project in India, discussed in Chapter 7. Initiated through a local leader who requested assistance from a non-governmental institute, it eventually tied together funds and technical assistance from the institute, WHO, and the Indian government. The project successfully supplied a target area with piped water, which eventually was operated entirely by a local organization (Misra, 1975).

To complement and exercise surveillance over bureaucratic agencies, some governments may rely on political channels. Party organizations can provide sources of information to the political leadership on how government-sponsored programs are working, and channels for the ventilation of grievances by organized but unsatisfied publics. Politicization can undermine administrative discipline, but it can also provide
a safety valve for public grievances, a means of mitigating the rigors of impersonal rules, and a channel for identifying and reporting inadequacies and breakdowns in bureaucratic performance. Political channels do not substitute for bureaucratic operations, because they are unable to deliver services or resources on a regular basis, but they can be used as a means of pressure to monitor and improve the quality and the responsiveness of bureaucratic services.

Decentralization and Integration of Services. Even when a particular public service is provided efficiently by a specialized government bureaucracy, its consumers may not be able to use it because complementary inputs that they require are not available on time from other agencies. To overcome this, local staffs need sufficient discretion to adjust their activities and schedules to accommodate local conditions. Governments therefore should relax the prevailing centralization of decision-making, allowing and indeed requiring local staff to interact more responsively with organized publics and with other agencies providing services to those same publics.

What is widely regarded as the most needed structural reform of administration is to deconcentrate decision-making and action within specialized bureaucratic agencies. Agency rules, financial management practices, reporting systems and supervisory methods must be revised and training must be upgraded, so that the field staff can be entrusted with increased responsibilities to act in response to local requirements. A more thoroughgoing form of decentralization is the devolution of functions to local government authorities or to local associations, accompanied by access to financial resources that permit local organizations to assume greater responsibility for program management. Devolution affords rural people the opportunity to exercise direct influence over locally-based staff as well as over program activities. The main risk for national governments seeking to benefit the rural populace in this way is that when local elites assume control over resources and programs devolved by government, they may divert the resources to their own benefit, at the expense of the intended beneficiaries. This is less a risk when local authorities, particularly local governments, are involved with public goods and social services rather than economic activities. Elite control can also be mitigated by the reservation of positions on governing councils to disadvantaged groups and by measures such as those discussed in Chapter 7.

The ability of locally-based technicians and administrators to make decisions on their own initiative is a necessary step for another administrative improvement, integration of complementary and interdependent government services. Governments can move in this direction by assigning a special field coordinator, or merely by fostering informal accommodation among field specialists. Integration can be greatly
facilitated by active local organizations demanding coordination to suit the needs and convenience of members and the requirements of efficient production. Finally, field coordination can be facilitated by service centers located in market towns, where all government officials have their offices in close proximity to one another and in an easily accessible location.

**Designing Interdependencies Between Specialized Bureaucratic Agencies and Rural Publics.** One means of encouraging bureaucratic performance which is supportive of rural people is to make the success of technicians and administrators dependent on securing the cooperation of the proposed beneficiaries. The approach suggested here can be illustrated with reference to experience in Mexico. In connection with the PIDER rural development project, a special office for labor-intensive construction of rural roads, Dirección de Caminos de Mano de Obra (DCMO) was set up within the Ministry of Works (Cernea, 1979). Since it did not have much machinery assigned to it, DCMO had to rely heavily on rural communities if it was to achieve its goals. Road committees were set up in the communities eligible for assistance. Plans for new or improved roads were worked out jointly with the road committees, since the engineers knew that if the plans were not acceptable to the community, no labor would be forthcoming. There were no funds for paying the labor and, as noted, there was not enough heavy machinery to do the job in a capital-intensive way.

As it turned out, the rural roads component was the most successful part of the larger project. As a separate unit which did not have the means to achieve its goals except through cooperation with the local committees, the technical staff of DCMO had to take a different approach if they were to meet their bureaucratic targets. This principle of creating structural interdependence between administrators or technicians on the one hand, and rural local organizations on the other, seems a generalizable one for promoting more effective participatory organization. Something similar has been seen with the National Irrigation Administration in the Philippines (Korten, 1980). The terms on which officials relate to rural people can be changed by making officials' success, according to established bureaucratic criteria, depend on actions which require the cooperation of local groups.

**Improving Personnel Skills and Reward Systems.** Improved technical, organizational and communication skills for government field staff working with local organizations can be cultivated by training. Such training should emphasize responsive service to disadvantaged publics and the responsibility of field staff to assume greater initiative. Training is likely to be ineffectual, however, unless followed up. Reinforcement can be provided by subsequent training experiences, formal or informal,
which refresh the original training messages and help the staff members upgrade their technical and communications skills. The practice of human relations skills can also be reinforced by supervisory practices which emphasize the ethic of service to rural publics and reward both the substance and the style of performance which is responsive to local needs. Management incentives for more competent and service-oriented staff performance can be strengthened by the influence and activities of local organizations; government technicians and administrators in the field work more efficiently and responsively when they interact with rural people through their LOs. Thus LOs can provide a decisive supplement to the government's incentive and reward system.

Governments can help to ensure better staff performance by recasting incentive and reward systems which have been heavily biased in favor of detailed compliance with rules, procedures, and centrally-prescribed targets. Rewards to field staff in the form of promotions, pay increases and recognition should emphasize successful performance in working compatibly with local publics and in achieving rural development objectives. Requiring field personnel to accept greater responsibility to act on their own and to integrate their activities with other government agencies and with LOs, and then rewarding them with greater recognition for jobs well done, can help to sustain their morale and their sense of personal worth and achievement (Korten and Uphoff, 1981).

Fostering Accountability and Internal Discipline in Local Organizations

While it is important to avoid imposing formal procedures on local organizations, governments can help to maintain the confidence of members by enforcing standards of probity, by periodically auditing accounts, and otherwise helping to foster and preserve the accountability of officers to the body of members. Accountability of leaders and employees, especially of larger organizations and of federated units which control substantial resources, should be both downward to their members and upward to government. In this way, governments can help to protect the interests of LO members and the integrity of their organization.

Government must draw a fine line here between too much and too little. There should be sufficient oversight to prevent and correct serious abuses, but not at the price of domination or of preventing members from learning from their mistakes and solving their own problems. It is better that some local organizations should fail than that the survival of all should depend entirely on the patronage and protection of government. Government assistance should therefore be predicated on practical self-help by local organizations and their members, and governments should maintain business-like relationships, whenever financial considerations are involved.
There are several specific measures which governments may find useful in fostering greater accountability and internal discipline. The police and judicial machinery can be made available to enforce the collection of loans when social control fails. Governments can make membership a condition for certain benefits, when free ridership would inflict an unfair burden on the organization and its members. Official initiative and support may be especially useful when the local power structure and social norms are unfriendly to local organization among disadvantaged groups. Governments can help local organizations, especially those among socially and economically depressed groups, to vindicate the legal rights of their members, for example, to minimum wages, tenant security, or public services to which they are entitled by law, and to protect the organizations themselves from the pressures of hostile interests when the latter resort to physical or economic intimidation. Governments can provide a climate of support for LOs which symbolizes their legitimacy and can require local officials and local elites to recognize and deal with them --so long as they too work within the law.

**What Can Development Assistance Agencies Do?**

Bilateral and multilateral assistance agencies usually work in developing countries in direct support of government-sponsored projects and programs. Voluntary agencies are sometimes allowed to work outside the framework of government sponsorship, but only with the acquiescence of governments. During the past decade, development assistance agencies have shifted their interest and their priorities away from urban infrastructure and industry in the direction of agricultural and rural development. This trend is likely to continue as both governments and donors confront the prospects of chronic food shortages, continuing poverty, and unremitting growth of the labor force in rural as well as urban areas. Since rural local organizations are a component of successful rural development strategies, they are therefore likely to attract increasing interest and support from donors.

One way donors can express this support is by using their influence with governments to emphasize the importance of local membership organizations for rural development. They can help with the formulation of projects that incorporate local organization and insure that the designs of specific LOs are consistent with successful experience. Donors can encourage governments to maintain an appropriate time perspective, recognizing that the building of new institutions and of local action capabilities on a sound foundation is a learning and adaptive process for all parties involved and that the expectation of too early and too dramatic results may undermine the process of institutional development (Esman, 1972).
Donors can contribute resources to development projects that include a local organization component. One common use of external assistance is for facilities that train the leadership and staff of local organizations. Governments are seldom inclined to be generous with training opportunities even for their own civil servants, much less for non-governmental personnel. It is not that they oppose such training, but that they are reluctant to assign scarce resources to this purpose. This is an area where the assistance of international donors can be beneficial and at relatively low cost. The development of training materials and of training methods in conjunction with a government agency or a non-governmental training and research center can contribute both to leadership and staff development.

Associated with training should be donor assistance for technical support to local organizations. The tasks of assisting LOs are not yet sufficiently documented or predictable that routine efforts are likely to suffice. This means that serious and sustained efforts involving experimentation, continuous evaluation, and innovation are needed. Government departments seldom have enough staff to be able to promote these learning processes without some added personnel who have more than routine skills. The government agency working with LOs should not, however, be displaced by outside assistance from carrying out its own action and evaluation. Its active involvement with the experimental aspects of the enterprise is vital, so that staff acquire not only knowledge and skills but also commitment which will carry the effort through. Technical assistance should be treated as an investment and a supplement, but certainly not as a substitute for the participation of the relevant line agencies.

Institution Building, Inductive Planning and Rural Development

We began this study with the observation that there are four essential components to any successful rural development strategy -- public investments, economic policies, appropriate technology and effective organization. During the decade of the 1960s and 1970s, the governments of developing countries, often with foreign assistance, made large investments in the first three of these components. This choice of priorities reflected the prevailing academic wisdom of the time, which misread the development experience of countries that had achieved agricultural and social progress in part through the dynamism of local organizations (Aqua, 1974; McGrath, 1978).

As we have tried to show, however, other investments and expenditures are likely to yield a low return unless their intended beneficiaries are brought together in local organizations. Such organizations allow rural publics to benefit from favorable public policies and services, contribute to their costs, participate in their management,
promote and defend their common interests, and influence the action of government on their behalf. Very briefly put, this is the case for local organization.

Institutions such as local organization do not simply appear out of nowhere or flourish without support, however. As we have elaborated in Chapter 6, there are many vulnerabilities to which local organizations are prone, not the least of which is the hostility of local elites and even governments. Establishing successful local organizations which make an effective contribution to rural development therefore requires a long and careful process of institution building.

We are convinced that it is in the self interest of most governments of developing countries to support such a process of institutional development at the local level. In this Part III we have identified measures which can be adopted, at both the local level and by outside actors, to support this process. We would conclude our study by noting that most of our recommendations converge on a process of inductive planning and action in contrast to the usual deductive approach which assumes full prior knowledge of both ends and means and of the connections between them.

An "inductive" approach represents a synthesis of what LO members and leaders and assisting outside personnel can do to support the development of LO capacity. It emphasizes flexibility and the need for continual assessment and reassessment. It corresponds in large measure to what Korten (1980) calls a "learning process" approach to development planning. This approach rejects the "blueprint" concept of organizational design for LOs. Instead, it recognizes that with the great variability in local conditions and experiences, local structures must vary with the specific needs and concrete experiences of their members. It also recognizes that rural people need the opportunity to adjust the activities and management of their LOs to what they learn from their experiences.

This approach requires planners and implementers to formulate in advance the action hypotheses they think are reasonable to guide LO decisions, and then to monitor and reconsider them continually. An example from our on-going work in the Gal Oya project is the proposition that LOs for water management are best promoted if initiated in conjunction with the physical rehabilitation of an irrigation system, rather than independently of such work. Otherwise the LOs would be expected to take over management of water at the field channel level once it was redesigned and rehabilitated, without any prior involvement in the new system. This proposition seems well-founded based on what is known from other experiences; but we cannot be certain it is correct in this situation. The unpredictability and urgency of rehabilitation efforts in the particular instance might impede organizational development enough that separate activities would produce more viable LOs.
In support of such a flexible approach one needs what Korten and his associates in the Philippines have called "process documentation." This involves some specially designated persons with some training and reporting skills who regularly write down and transmit observations on how LO formation and functioning are progressing. They speak specifically and privately with LO members to get their views of the process, and with officials interacting with the organizations. All meetings of the LO and with officials should be observed by the process documentor, who plays a less active role than any person acting in the role of promoter or "catalyst."

Such information helps persons having responsibility for the program to assess what is going on in the field and to make judgments about the validity of the hypotheses on which the program rests. The documentation helps to determine and calibrate rates of change, to isolate patterns of causation, to pinpoint weaknesses in the program, to pick out the most effective promoters and local leaders, and to develop materials for training subsequent promoters. To the extent the program is proceeding with multiple organizational models, it can show which are probably better under varying conditions and thereby increase the prospects for successful institutional development.

In this study we have sought to illuminate the role of local organizations as a neglected dimension of rural development and to indicate how governments and international agencies can promote and strengthen such institutions. We are persuaded that the recommendations emerging from our analysis, grounded in considerable experience and observation, are both politically and administratively feasible. Development assistance agencies and increasingly officials in developing countries who are responsible for rural development can profit from strategies that benefit the rural majority not only because they are just but also because they are economically rational and politically wise. Local membership organizations such as those treated in this study are indispensable to such a strategy.
Appendix

METHODOLOGY OF CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

It is difficult to determine what size sample is appropriate, or necessary, when dealing with such an open universe as that of local organizations. We set a target of 150 cases, expecting this to give us sufficient size of sub-samples for multivariate analysis. As it turned out, to get 150 reasonably complete cases, we had to do 175 case analyses; 25 could not be used because they contained insufficient information on the workings of the organization and its performance.

Since the universe of LOs had not been previously described or mapped, we could not know what were or were not representative proportions within it. After completing 150 cases, we compared them in three sub-samples of 50 cases each: (A) the first 50 cases coded, (B) the second 50; and (C) the third 50. As it turned out, for only one of the 55 variables under consideration was there a possible "trend" between sub-samples A and C and this could be purely a chance occurrence. Statistical tests did not show chi-square differences significant enough (greater than .05) that expanding the sample by another, say, 50 cases would affect the analysis substantially.

One basis for judging a sample is its geographic representativeness, though it is not clear whether to compare the distribution of cases from a region with the region's proportion of developing country population (leaving aside China, which was not included in our analysis because of its unique situation of size and political system), or with the region's share of the total number of developing countries. The regional breakdown of our sample turned out to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>N. Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of population</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of countries</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of case studies</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latin America's share of the sample (21 percent) is about right by either criterion, whereas the Asian share (42 percent) is underrepresented by population but overrepresented by number of countries; Africa's share (34 percent) is the reverse; only the Middle East and North Africa (4 percent of the sample) are definitely
underrepresented by both criteria. We made an effort to find more cases from the Middle East and North Africa, but they were relatively more difficult to find, at least in the English literature. That may be for a combination of reasons, such as less "Western" influence, more state dominance and possibly cultural factors, rural local organizations as we define them are less common there. Since we were not intending to make generalizations about countries or regions of the world, but rather to draw out principles for the functioning of local organizations, the sample composition by country and region seemed satisfactory.

The cases are listed on pages 107-111 below. With regard to the types of organizations discussed in Chapter 3, our sample included 30 local development associations (20%), 55 cooperatives (35%) and 65 interest associations (45%). From what we have read of the general literature on LOs, this division within the total LO sample is reasonable. As mentioned in Chapter 3, cases of successful performance are somewhat over-represented in our sample. The 150 cases in our sample had an average total performance score of 3.15 (1=very poor: 13%; 2=poor: 19%; 3=good: 29%; 4=very good: 23%; 5=outstanding: 16%). The slight skew toward higher performance reflected, we think, the distribution in the literature, in contrast to that in the real world as stated in Chapter 3.

The Variables

Each of our variables represents a hypothesis about LO performance. The complete list of variables used in our analysis is as follows:

Environmental Variables. We wanted to see what, if any, associations would emerge between particular features of LOs environment and other variables. There are many possible factors commented on in the literature, such as "resource endowment" and "literacy," which could be considered. The factors we analyzed can be grouped in three sub-sets, all easy to describe, but more difficult to measure and interpret.

(A) Physical and Economic Factors
(1) Topography - physical terrain favorable or not
(2) Natural Resource Endowment - soils, climate, etc. favorable or not
(3) Infrastructure - transportation, communications, etc. developed or not
(4) Economic Diversification - percent of labor force in non-agricultural employment
(5) Income Level - per capita income
(6) Distribution of Income - degree of inequality
(B) Social and Societal Factors
(7) Settlement Patterns - clustering or dispersion of residences
(8) Social Heterogeneity - differences of ethnicity, religion, etc.
(9) Social Stratification - degree of status hierarchy and immobility
(10) Sex Discrimination - limitations on opportunities for women
(11) Social Discrimination - limitations on opportunities for disadvantaged social groups (ethnic, religious, etc.)
(12) Literacy - percent of population estimated as literate

(C) Political and Administrative Factors
(13) Partisanship - extent of factionalism affecting social and political relations
(14) Group Patterns - basis for group activity: caste, tribe, family, patron-client or voluntary associations
(15) Community Norms - prevailing attitudes in the immediate community toward egalitarian outcomes and participatory means
(16) Societal Norms - prevailing attitudes in society at large toward egalitarian outcomes and participatory means
(17) Government Orientation - attitude and assistance of government toward LO performance, favorable or not
(18) Bureaucratic Capacity - disposition and capacity of bureaucracy to assist LO performance, favorable or not

Unfortunately, few LO case studies examined all elements of the environment in much detail. Often we had to estimate them from what was known about the particular country or region, consulting sources such as the World Bank Atlas for comparative statistics on literacy or income level, or published studies on income distribution. Since the scoring, as discussed below, was done on a rank-ordered scale rather than according to precise numbers, the data available seemed adequate to characterize environmental differences.

Structural Variables. These variables, listed below, are the most interesting ones in that they are the most amenable to policy choices. The design of LO initiatives, whether, and in what way, a government or non-governmental agency should encourage LOs, is a matter to be decided in specific instances. Knowing what features of organizational linkage, membership composition, or decision-making are more likely to be fruitful, for what tasks and under what conditions, is potentially the most useful information on LOs.
The variables studied, pertain to the internal workings and composition of LOs, and present the following ranges for analysis:

(A) **Structure of Organization**
   (1) Functions - ranging from single-function to multi-functional LOs
   (2) Formalization - ranging from highly informal to highly formal LOs
   (3) Decision-making - forms of decision-making within LO ranging from executive to committee to assembly
   (4) Size of Base-level Organization - ranging from small units (under 50 members) to medium to large (over 500 members)

(B) **Basis of Formation and Operation**
   (5) Initiative - impetus for starting LO ranging from local members and leaders to government or "outside" agencies
   (6) Incentives - ranging from compulsory to voluntary bases for joining LO and continuing membership
   (7) Normative Orientation - degree to which LO doctrine and practices are egalitarian and participatory

(C) **Linkages of Base Organization**
   (8) Official Involvement - ranging from none to extreme (from LO autonomy to direction by officials)
   (9) Vertical Linkage - ranging from individual (unlinked) LOs to nationally federated ones
   (10) Horizontal Linkage - from separate (unlinked) LOs to full cooperation with other LOs

(D) **Structure of Membership**
   (11) Economic Composition - ranging from homogeneous to heterogeneous LOs with respect to income and assets of members
   (12) Social Composition - ranging from homogeneous to heterogeneous LOs with respect to status and characteristics such as religion, language and ethnicity of members
   (13) Sex Composition - ranging from all male to mixed to all female LOs

**Operational Variables.** We compiled a set of eight variables representing the basic functions which local organizations are likely to perform, and which if performed, LOs may handle well or not so well. Our interest in this set is in ascertaining what kinds of organizational tasks LOs perform more effectively, under what conditions, and which are most important for more specific rural development goals. The tasks we examined were:

(1) Planning and Goal Setting
(2) Conflict Management
(3) Resource Mobilization
(4) Resource Management  
(5) Provision of Services  
(6) Integration of Services  
(7) Control of Bureaucracy  
(8) Claim-Making on Government

As operating processes of LOs, they represent immediate outputs of LOs which can contribute to desired development outcomes such as off-farm employment opportunities or reduction in sex discrimination. Whether or how much they contribute is an empirical question. These were recorded and coded before performance was assessed.

Performance Variables. This set of variables was identified to determine what developmental contributions, if any, were associated with LOs of various kinds under differing environmental circumstances. Standard economic, social and political outcomes were looked for in the case studies, with special attention to those which benefited the poorer or more disadvantaged sections of society. Along with the more usual concerns for economic improvement and social services, we were interested in how LO efforts might affect equity and participation at the community level and beyond. The community, because of controversy about whether or not LOs can help the poor (UNRISD, 1975; Fals Borda, 1976; ICA, 1978; Lele, 1981).

(A) Economic Performance  
(1) Agricultural Production and Income  
(2) Non-Agricultural Production and Income

(B) Social Services  
(3) Education/Literacy  
(4) Health  
(5) Nutrition  
(6) Water Supply (domestic water)  
(7) Transportation (roads, bridges, bus service, etc.)  
(8) Public Facilities (community centers, churches, etc.)

(C) Distributional Effects  
(9) Distribution of Income  
(10) Distribution of Assets  
(11) Access to Public Services

(D) Reduction of Discrimination  
(12) Reduction of Sex Discrimination  
(13) Reduction of Social Discrimination (caste, race, etc.)
(E) Participation in Decision-Making
(14) Participation in Community Decision-Making
(15) Participation in Government Decision-Making

In addition, on the basis of an LO's performance on these respective variables, a Total Performance score was assigned, dividing the sample into five categories: very poor, poor, good, very good, outstanding. This constituted a sixteenth and summary measure of performance, according to which much of the subsequent analysis was oriented. The "outstanding" and "very good" groups represented LOs which most governments and/or development agencies would be very pleased to have in operation, whereas the "very poor" and "poor" groups would not be judged generally worth the effort of assisting them.

Scoring

Each of these 55 variables, for each of the 150 cases, was scored on a scale of 1 to 5. Generally, in constructing scales, the value 3 was an average, neutral or typical value, though not all distributions were normal. A look at the first variables in each set of variables should clarify the scoring process and criteria.

The environmental variable Topography included "terrain, rivers, valleys or other natural features that would appear to make operation of LOs easier or more difficult," with 3 considered a neutral score. The 1 end of the scale represented "quite unfavorable natural features, marked impediments to LO such as difficulty of transportation and communication," whereas 5 represented "quite favorable natural features, no impediments to LO." The distribution from 1 to 5 was: 1%, 22%, 73%, 3%, 1%, with most cases piling up in the middle, because there was seldom evidence in the case write-ups of particularly favorable or unfavorable topography. In about one-quarter of the cases, due to mountains, rivers that flooded, etc., a score of 1 or 2 was given, and only a few cases indicated anything particularly favorable about topography. (Topography differs from infrastructure or settlement patterns, which were assessed separately).

The structural variable of number of Functions was relatively straightforward, though denominating functions is not as unambiguous as it might appear. Are providing seeds and providing fertilizer different functions, or part of a single function of providing agricultural inputs? We took the latter view, regarding a function as something requiring a particular kind of LO operation and specialized skills. Thus, imparting extension information was regarded as different from providing agricultural
inputs, because the routine of work and the training and skills of staff are different, but input provision was considered as a single function, given the similarity of routines and roles.

1 = single function (e.g., domestic water supply)
2 = dual functions (same sector, like agriculture: if in different sectors, like agriculture and health, would score as 3)
3 = multi-functions (many functions in one sector, or several functions in two sectors
4 = multiple functions (more than three, and more than one sector)
5 = comprehensive functions (more than six, and various sectors)

The distribution was 35%, 21%, 22%, 15% and 7%, not surprisingly a J-curve rather than a normal distribution, probably reflecting the real-world distribution among LOs.

The operational variable Planning and Goal Setting was defined as "efforts to assess community or group needs and problems, means and strategies; formulation of plans to deal with group needs and problems; implementation of plans is included under other task variables." The scale read as follows:

1 = evidence or indication of quite ineffective performance of task;
2 = evidence or indication of ineffective performance of task;
3 = apparently average, typical or unexceptional performance of task;
4 = evidence or indication of effective performance of task;
5 = evidence or indication of quite effective performance of task;

The distribution in our sample among these categories was: 3%, 14%, 28%, 45% and 10%. The distribution is skewed toward the high end for two reasons. First, as noted already, our sample contains a somewhat higher proportion of more successful cases than found in the real world; failures are written up much less often than successes. Second, LOs can be relatively successful in planning and goal setting and still fail in implementation. How well and thoroughly they set about this latter part of their operation should be assessed separately from the outcomes.

The performance variable Agricultural Productivity and Income was a compound one. We looked for data on changes in yield, on changes in output, on changes in cropping pattern, and on changes in income from agriculture, as separate measures, but in only a minority of cases were there comparable quantitative data on these respective indicators of performance. We ended up specifying this variable to include: (a) increased yield per acre, (b) increased area planted, (c) diversification of production, and/or (d) increases in income through LO involvement in marketing, infrastructure (e.g., irrigation), labor-pooling, capital-sharing or any of the above (a, b or c). The scoring was then done as follows:
1 = decline in these measures attributable to LO activity
2 = no improvement
3 = some gain in at least one of the above categories
4 = identifiable gains in one or more of the above categories
5 = significant gains in several categories attributable to LO

On this variable, the distribution was skewed toward the high end (the percentages from 1 to 5 were: 5%, 7%, 30%, 36% and 32%) largely because we had no way of assessing the efficiency of agricultural gains (cost data were even scarcer than data on benefits). Since many LOs with positive agricultural performance enjoyed subsidized credit, or government investment in irrigation, we could not ascertain net productivity attributable to the LO. We could only indicate whether gains were associated with LO activity. For our purposes, we could settle for estimates of the effectiveness of LOs in supporting agricultural improvement, to see what kinds of LOs were appropriate, or under what conditions they can be effective for this development objective. The scoring of performance on this variable took into account any evidence in the case materials on efficiency, by not counting as a success any change, like crop diversification, which required more expenditure than it produced in value.

**Statistical Analysis**

Once the cases had been scored and checked, they were entered for computer analysis. The principal method of analysis was cross-tabulation, taking sub-samples when appropriate to introduce controls on the influence of a particular variable. Simple correlation was also examined, as were chi-square results. After consulting statistical references, we decided to use product-moment correlation (r), which is a common statistic and widely understood, unlike many of the non-parametric measures that could have been used. Because our scoring was limited to five levels, using r with such ordinal data is generally judged reasonably valid in the methodological literature. Comparing our results of r with non-parametric correlations such as gamma and tau indicated that differences were minimal anyway. So we preferred r for its simplicity, giving what we take to be reasonable results for this study.
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