The role of local government in Turkey's rural and agricultural development gives complex and instructive illustration of the problems of overall institutional change in developing countries. Turkey's considerable economic and social growth since World War II must be viewed against the background of her large farm population. This was estimated at 77.7 percent of the employed population in 1962 and 72.3 percent in 1967, and was expected to be roughly 68 percent of the employed population under the Third Plan (1973-1977). Although the agricultural sector is in many respects declining in Turkey, the farmer remains the key figure in Turkish political and economic life. From 1955 to 1967, in fact, the number of Turks employed in agriculture has increased from just under 9.5 million to nearly 10 million. When one considers also the number of partially employed persons supported in the rural society and the vast numbers of Turkish children in the countryside; when one considers also the controlling vote of the farmer in Turkish politics, not to mention the vital economic contribution of the rural sector to Turkey's continued industrial and economic growth; one begins to see the significance of the organization and operation of rural local government and its related agencies.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY

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This monograph was written as part of a comparative study of Rural Local Government organized by the Rural Development Committee of Cornell University. The study aimed at clarifying the role of rural local institutions in the rural development process, with special reference to agricultural productivity, income, local participation and rural welfare. An interdisciplinary working group set up under the Rural Development Committee established a comparative framework for research and analysis of these relationships. A series of monographs, based in most cases on original field research, has been written by members of the working group and by scholars at other institutions and has been published by the Rural Development Committee. An analysis and summary of the study's findings has been written for the working group by Norman Uphoff and Milton Esman and has been published separately.

This study of Rural Local Government is part of the overall program of teaching and research by members of the Rural Development Committee, which functions under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at Cornell and is chaired by Norman Uphoff. The main focuses of Committee concern are alternative strategies and institutions for promoting rural development, especially with respect to the situation of small farmers, rural laborers and their families. This particular study was financed in large part by a grant from the Asia Bureau of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The views expressed by participating scholars in this study are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of USAID or Cornell University.

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The preparation of this monograph has been a constant source of pleasant encounters and generous support from many people. Perhaps the most memorable of these has been my introduction to the Turkish people over the summer of 1973. There are many Turks I did not have time to see, and many whom I look forward to seeing again, but my impression is one of a dedicated, open and determined people in many walks of life—the government, the universities, the provinces, and simply on the streets of cities, towns and villages. The Turks are justifiably proud of their achievements, but not so proud that they cannot discuss their problems freely and recognize the conflicts in their own society. Having studied several other countries at earlier stages of development than Turkey, I feel there is much to be learned there.

The process of complex institutional change is only dimly understood, but the Turks have demonstrated their success in the most persuasive way possible, by achieving a high degree of success itself. Their readiness to meet and to help an interested person such as myself is, I think, an indicator of their progress and their understanding of themselves. While I cannot claim to have seen the process of institutional change in Turkey as they might, and apologize for any violations of their thoughts and for omissions from their experience as they see it, I can only admire and respect a people who have kept a substantial degree of individual and institutional freedom alive during a harrowing, difficult process of growth.

As a newcomer to the Turkish scene, I am indebted to numerous friends for making the trip and the preparation of the monograph an exciting and rewarding experience. A number of American Turkish scholars were unreservedly generous in offering introductions, advice and encouragement. My longstanding friend and colleague from Princeton days, Prof. Fred Frey, literally emptied his shelves of background material, and of his own carefully prepared manuscripts and writing. He also provided a number of introductions to his friends and colleagues in Turkey. Prof. Dankwart Rustow, another colleague and friend since his labors as my thesis supervisor over a decade ago, also provided advice and introductions. Prof. Frank Tachau and Walter Weiker, both of whom have done ground-breaking work on local government and politics in Turkey, were equally cooperative. My Cornell
colleague, Prof. Fred Bent, made helpful suggestions from his Turkish experience. My brother, Howard Ashford, who has spent many years in Turkey as a diplomat, also gave generously from his experience and will, I hope, be pleased to know how well remembered he is by many Turks. Both Turkey and the United States are, I feel, fortunate that there are so many Americans sensitive to Turkish life and genuinely concerned with her development.

In Turkey I was overwhelmed with support and cooperation, possibly a function of having worked in many other countries where officials find it difficult to understand and to accept scholarly poking-about. The Minister of the Interior, Mukadder Öztekin, provided full cooperation from his staff, and his General Director of Local Governments, Turgut Kiliçer, spent time smoothing my way and explaining fundamentals. An official from the Ministry with a long history of work and research on Turkish local government, Arslan Başarır, spent days with me and personally helped with all kinds of arrangements and document searching in Ankara. A much longer list could be composed of persons at the Institute for Public Administration for the Middle East and Turkey, the State Planning Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Central Statistical Office and other government offices who gave time and help.

An active and alert scholarly community is, I feel, one of the best indicators of development. Meeting so many fine Turkish scholars and teachers was one of the most pleasant parts of the project. Prof. Müuhan Soysal, who wrote a superb thesis with me at Cornell, was lavish with hospitality and with help in arrangements. With him at the Middle East Technical University is Prof. Tahir Aktan, a pioneer in local government writing on Turkey who helped immensely, and Prof. Mübeccel Kiray, a truly provocative and exciting scholar. The Faculty of Political Science, University of Ankara, was equally generous. Dean Rusen Keles, whose office seems as harassed as that of counterparts elsewhere, took time to talk about his work on urban and local government. Prof. Cevat Geray spent many hours discussing his research and ideas about local government in Turkey, as did Profs. İbrahim Yasa, Nermin Abadan-Yunat, Mümtaz Soysal, and Fehmi Yavuz. Prof. Suna Kılı at Boğaziçi University did much to put the problem in perspective and introduce me to her friends. Few American universities could integrate an able agricultural economist on a political science faculty, but Prof. Reşat Aktan, who also works at the University of Ankara, gave essential background material and advice. These are only those Turks whom I inconvenienced the most, and seeing five or six persons a day I am indebted to numerous other scholars which space does not permit listing.
A final word must be added for those at Cornell who so
ably organized and integrated the individual efforts of the
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Uphoff undertook the heroic task of directing the project
and was, as always, a constant source of ideas as well as
truly adept in seeing that each of us had complete support.
I believe I share with the rest of our working group a
strong feeling of accomplishment—much due to Norm's patience
and thought—in having experienced a thoroughly cooperative
and integrated research effort. With fairly short notice,
all the members of the project marshalled their ideas and
their knowledge with good-will and enthusiasm, in a way that
universities, for all their idealism, rarely do. Dave
Robinson suffered through some tedious compilation for my
monograph. Halil and Ulker Çopur nobly performed translation
under pressure of time. I have long been persuaded that there
is no truly original piece of work, and am pleased to have such
ample evidence for this from the rewarding experience of work-
ing with all my friends and colleagues at Cornell.

Douglas E. Ashford
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN TURKEY

I. Background and Analysis

The role of local government in Turkey's rural and agricultural development gives complex and instructive illustration of the problems of overall institutional change in developing countries. Turkey's considerable economic and social growth since World War II must be viewed against the background of her large farm population. This was estimated at 77.7 percent of the employed population in 1962 and 72.3 percent in 1967, and was expected to be roughly 68 percent of the employed population under the Third Plan (1973-1977). Although the agricultural sector is in many respects declining in Turkey, the farmer remains the key figure in Turkish political and economic life. From 1955 to 1967, in fact, the number of Turks employed in agriculture has increased from just under 9.5 million to nearly 10 million.¹

When one considers also the number of partially employed persons supported in the rural society and the vast numbers of Turkish children in the countryside; when one considers also the controlling vote of the farmer in Turkish politics, not to mention the vital economic contribution of the rural sector to Turkey's continued industrial and economic growth; one begins to see the significance of the organization and operation of rural local government and its related agencies.

The dimensions of rural development in Turkey cannot be understood without tracing the progress of the farmer since the founding of the Republic in 1923. Atatürk won the unswerving loyalty of the peasant society by liberating Turkey from European oppression, but his reforms had little or no direct impact on the village. His aim was to build an independent country with the resources and talent at his disposal. Turkey first needed an effective central government, a loyal and modern army, and the elements of an industrial society. Before World War II local government was generally regarded by the peasants as repressive, extracting meager taxes and conscripting peasant sons for the army.

The record of agricultural production during the 1920's is

poor, fluctuating abruptly with weather and confined to the
most rudimentary forms of cultivation.1

With the approach of World War II Ataturk turned with
even more determination to the achievement of industrial
self-sufficiency and to military preparation. Thus, Herschlag
concludes that what increase in agricultural production took
place from 1929 to 1939 is mainly due to expanded cultivation,
while rural population grew 20 percent and net income per
earner remained virtually constant. No substantial agricul­
tural investment took place, no irrigation was initiated.
There were experiments with agricultural instruction, co-
operatives and model farms, but these were "only a drop in
the ocean of poverty, illiteracy and want. The seed of
development fell on stony ground, and so far failed to bear
much fruit."2

Mobilization for World War II had even more disastrous
effects on agriculture. In 1945 agricultural production fell
to 70 percent of the 1939 level, and by 1946 had recovered
to only 90 percent of pre-war output. In 1945 the post-war
Inonu government passed a mild land reform law and abolished
all taxes on income from agriculture. The first had negli-
gible effects, largely because the affected state and communal
lands were mostly given to an influx of Bulgarian refugee
Turks. The second ultimately had a negative effect because
the rapid growth of agriculture over the past twenty years
has consequently escaped taxation and remains one of the more
perplexing problems of Turkish politics.

Until the first free elections in 1950, which brought
the Democratic Party to power under Menderes, it is probably
correct to say that neither the isolated village nor the out-
lying arm of the government in the provinces and towns under-
went significant change. A heavy-handed rural administrator
was for the most part confronted with a suspicious and un-
skilled peasant. Like many countries in the early stages of
development there was neither an impetus nor an incentive to
change the rural society. The central government was pre-
occupied with immediate needs and the urban sector had not
yet formed intricate lines of dependence on agriculture.

Perhaps the key event shaping the present interrela-
ship among rural development, agriculture and local govern-
ment, was the national election of 1950. Following the

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1A. Y. Herschlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transition, The
Hague, Netherlands, Van Kulent, 1958, pp. 53-60 and pp. 143-
151.

2Ibid., p. 151.
Ataturk revolution, Turkey had been ruled by a single party, the People's Republican party. Even when a multi-party structure was permitted after the war, the regime still abused the electoral process in 1945 to prevent the major new party, the Democratic Party, from gaining power. The expectation now of popularly-controlled government in Turkey stems from the decision of a tolerant and confident ruling elite in 1950 to hold open elections. With 88 percent of the eligible voters going to the polls, the People's Party of İnönü was massively defeated by the newly-formed, liberal Democratic Party under Menderes, which won 408 seats in the National Assembly of 487 seats.

Many factors contributed to the defeat of the party which had single-handedly ruled Turkey since 1923, but the peasant vote accounted for the stunning victory. It constituted what Huntington has called a "ruralizing election." The political mobilization of the peasant and his gradual evolution into a modern farmer over the past twenty years is the most important single factor in Turkish politics since the war, but the explanation of these changes is much more complex. A recent study has suggested that the election of 1950 might more accurately be labeled the "provincializing election" which conveys the immense structural effects that followed. The peasant and farmer have by no means charted the course of Turkey's development for the past generation, but the election made unmistakable the sweeping structural changes that were needed in Turkish society. Thus, agricultural development which did indeed follow rapidly after the 1950 election involved the changing relationship of state to private enterprise, the vagaries of an unstable world economy, the slow and often painful reorganization of the government and bureaucracy, the uncertainties of a strong military elite, and the shifting alliances and leadership of the parties. There is no direct line of causality between the election and Turkish development since 1950, nor is there any clear relation between the structural changes that occurred in rural Turkey and the operations of Turkish local government.


This thesis is applied to the Turkish case by Leslie L. Roos, Jr., and Noralou P. Roos, Managers of Modernization: Organization and Elites in Turkey, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971.

3Ergun Ozbudun, Political Participation in Turkey, manuscript, p. 17.
A. Comparability of the Turkish Case

The applicability of the analysis to follow depends heavily on how appropriately one can generalize from Turkish experience to that of other developing countries. The fact that Turkey has had a number of distinct advantages in attacking her problems of development should not preclude learning from this experience. Social and political analysts are not capable of inferring definite causality nor is there any way of telling whether the historical good fortune of Turkey may in fact be a developmental prerequisite for another country. The position taken in this paper is that because Turkey indeed confronted, and still confronts, a number of difficult institutional changes, the lessons to be drawn from her progress since World War II are most important. A number of analysts of change in developing countries have made very clear that institutional transformations are themselves the most difficult aspect of growth, not the matter of founding institutions.¹

(1) Atatürk's revolution gave Turkey a national identity, which appears to be reinforced by the Turks' own cultural tradition of loyalty. The history of the Ottoman empire from the late nineteenth century to 1923 shows gradual reformulation of the identity of the Turkish people, something of which Atatürk was acutely aware. His early reforms to make Turkey a secular state are well known. Their importance was to provide Turks with a clear, contemporary national identity, even though events in more recent years indicate that Islamic feeling was never as submerged as official policy suggested.² Nonetheless, Atatürk dismantled a corrupt and inefficient government, replaced the foreign rulers with both Ottoman and European connections, and actively stimulated pride in the Turkish nation.

(2) Atatürk and the Turkish leadership were concerned from their earliest days with lasting institutional development of the country. Though controversial, Atatürk's etatist policies gave support to basic industries via the State Economic Enterprise, and a loyal army was developed which provided continued support for the new Republic.³ The


National Assembly, the Republican People's Party, the administration and the professions were supported by government and over the years developed their own bases of influence in the system.

(3) The timing of Turkey's development has been extremely fortunate. Between the wars, Turkey, at least until the rise of fascism, could develop free from foreign interference. Though subject to various interpretations, the cold war made it possible for Turkey to acquire massive foreign aid, estimated to be over 4 billion dollars to 1962. This includes $800 million in grants; $1,600 million in loans and P.L. 480 funds; $40 million in technical assistance; and over $2 billion in military aid, much of which had civilian use. Views may differ on the effects of aid to Turkey, but few countries can obtain this kind of support today.

(4) Compared to many new nations, Turkey enjoys remarkable cultural homogeneity. The Turkish Republic has not been torn apart by ethnic rivalries and minority problems, partly because of the circumstances of the revolution which drove Greeks out of the country. Though there is a large Kurdish minority in the east, a substantial effort has been made and the need is continually acknowledged to advance the development of the less developed regions. The small minority of Sufi (Alevi) Muslims has not been able to make religion a political issue, but is not suppressed.

It would be wrong to interpret these advantages as happy accidents of Turkish life, unrelated to the determination and character of the Turks themselves. The generations of Ottoman decline, the Islamic feelings of Turks, the difficult border problems and the various obstacles to economic growth might easily have generated a xenophobic reaction, such as developed in many countries. Where these forces take control, either by intentional actions of the elite or through stimulation of mass resentment, the possibilities for continued institutional development are greatly reduced. The forbearance and pragmatism of the Turks are a central feature in all areas of institutional development in Turkey, including local government and administration. Most important for understanding Turkey's experience in using local government for development is the fact that no combination of forces has arisen in the recent past to retard institutional development in Turkey. Thus, the critical problem of disaggregating power, sharing it more widely in society as more and more groups have an interest and capability for sharing in it, is

very much a present one, not having been postponed as it might have been under other circumstances. Local government, then, is an important indicator of the readiness of a central government to construct the complex decision-making procedures and to assign both laterally and vertically the authority needed to engage in social and economic change.\(^1\)

B. Analytical Considerations

Analyzing local government and administration as it relates to rural development is an intricate problem focusing on both the uses of power and the process of social change. An attempt to reorganize local authorities or to engage in widespread rural change that did not acknowledge these complications would be naive in conception, and likely to fail. Changes of this kind are commonly referred to as "structural" changes because they do deal with definable, on-going units of society such as provinces, families, villages, etc. and with the relations among them. The nature of structural change is difficult to study precisely because it cannot be broken down into easily aggregated properties or into properties for which equivalence is safely assumed, as in the case of most economic analysis at the macro-level.

To assess the meaning of local government as a problem of structural change we must make a certain distinction. Social change generally involves (a) multiplying the differences among people, i.e., increasing differentiation and thereby enhancing productivity, and (b) fashioning new relationships so that these differences can be combined and coordinated in society, i.e., integration. The position taken in this paper is that the local government system or the rural development plan that does not acknowledge both of these problems is likely to fall short of expectations, either because progress in terms of increased differentiation cannot be channeled into the overall process of social change or because the forms of integrating differences are inappropriate, becoming obstacles to other changes occurring in the society or becoming the base of resistance to continued change in the immediate area of activity. An example may help. Farm cooperatives must generate both new skills among their members, i.e., differentiation, and find new markets, i.e., integration. They may fail either because members reject new production methods (differentiation) or because their own successful integration in turn places limits on adopting other forms of agriculture or becomes a constraint of a more

general kind on the economic system, such as by fostering artificially high farm prices.

These distinctions are essential in order to avoid simple-minded evaluation of complex, structural changes in developing countries. Thus, Teune has sketched out three basic forms of structural change which might be applied to any complex, interacting component, such as local government, in a social system. A system may change, first, by a simple process of segmented change, that is, by creating more structural units identical to those already existing. This would be a linear form of change, expanding the absolute size of the system but not bringing about change in the internal character of the units or in the relationships among them. Secondly, a system may change under exogenous influence such that uniform change takes place in internal relationships or in the interaction of units. It is important to note that in both of these forms of structural change there is increased differentiation (and according to the economist's basic tenet, increased productivity takes place) but the form of interdependence among the structural units as a system is unchanged. Both of these models have plagued developing countries faced with complex social change, in large part because attempts to increase productivity without facing up to integrative problems have been extremely attractive to elites and planners. If change could be induced without integrative problems there would be no sticky questions of income distribution, social welfare, decentralized power or ideological conflict. In fact, there are always constraints that make these painless forms of structural change impossible, such as limited amounts of land, limited resources, geographical differences, population differences, political organizations and beliefs, to name only a few.

The realistic, but much more complex model of structural change takes into account both the differentiation and integration problem, a process labeled "organized diversity" by Teune. Abstractly, there is probably some "path" describing the limits of integration to be achieved for any particular level of differentiation. The theoretical implications of this are not as important for our analysis here as is an understanding that very little change in differentiation, e.g., agricultural development, is possible without changing

the relationships among the basic units of differentiation, i.e. farms, and the larger patterns of integration in the society, i.e., credit facilities, marketing operations, local government support, etc. Simple as these distinctions may seem on paper, there are few developing nations that have fully accepted the intricacy of structural change. Indeed, Turkey, as suggested above, has a remarkable record of anticipating problems of structural change and compared to most new nations has dealt with them relatively well. That local government is one problem handled less well in the Turkish system makes it an even more interesting subject for analysis, particularly because massive structural change has taken place in Turkish farming since the war.

C. Structures Relating to Local Government

Understanding the integrative role of local government during a process of rapid social change, such as Turkish agriculture has undergone since 1950, involves a more demanding assessment of a society than would simply measuring segmentary or externally induced change of a highly uniform character. Though harder to analyze, it is also a realistic approach to the assessment of change because no political order can afford to exercise for very long the control needed to bring about uniform change and thereby to avoid accommodating structural changes of a complex nature. To make such an assessment, however, one must have a set of concepts specifying at least in rough form the major forces at work in bringing about new forms of integration. How these forces impinge on a structural problem, such as local government and agriculture, tells us more about the dynamics of change in the society than analysis with static, linear assumptions.

Some illustration from the Turkish case should illuminate the problem. Most analysis at the national level of Turkish agriculture is done with the common aggregate statistics of macro-economics. Change in Turkish farming can certainly be measured by fertilizer consumption, irrigated acreage, tractor utilization, and the like. But these figures tell us little about the micro-level problems of the cotton farmer in the Adana region, the wheat farmer in Central Anatolia, or market gardening in the Aegean or Marmara regions. Planners naturally think in terms of overall change aggregated to the national level and it is indicative of the progress of Turkish analysts that they have been criticized for this kind of simplification.¹ That agriculture has

changed in absolute terms in Turkish society is unmistakable, but how this change has interacted with the actual policies and preferences of Turkish leaders and citizens escapes aggregate analysis. To relate these figures in any meaningful way to the country's progress, elements in the process of change must be specified. Both practical and theoretical obstacles make such interpretation difficult. No single agency of government has authority to trace and analyze lines of integration for the society as a whole, nor are the ways of doing so entirely clear. The unavoidable result is that responsibility for structural interpretation rests with a variety of groups in every society. Unless the various components of change are explicitly considered as they interact to produce institutional answers to aggregated goals and plans, no change can be understood.

In order to link aggregated change to the actual processes of government and society, then, certain corollary structures must be specified. These will vary from country to country when assessing local government, but for the Turkish case three structures are crucial to understanding the integration of local government with agriculture generally. These are (1) the parties and representative institutions, (2) the bureaucracy and particularly the Ministry of the Interior, and (3) the military. These are the forces in Turkish society that have determined how local government would relate to the farmer, and the transformation of their roles in Turkish society over the past 20 years will be traced to explain how the Turks have managed to adjust, or failed to adjust, local government to the changing rural society.

(1) Parties and Representative Institutions. Turkey has seldom wavered in its determination to devise a party structure that would provide effective representative government. The principles of a democratic and secular republic from Ataturk's doctrine were renewed in the 1961 Constitution. The Political Parties Law of 1965, required under article 57 of the Constitution, makes it easy to form parties, though their creeds must incorporate republicanism and nationalism and they are obliged to protect the achievements of the Ataturk and 1960 revolutions. For present purposes, one of the salient parts of the law is that parties are forbidden to organize below the sub-province (kaza) level except for a single person and his assistant. Though parties are expected to formulate national legislation they are barred from grassroots organization, Dodd feels because the military felt "that

political party rivalry at the village and neighborhood levels leads to disruption of basic social units."

The Justice Party, which is regarded as the heir to the outlawed Democratic Party of the 50's, had a strong influence in the 60's, first in coalition governments and later winning the national elections of 1965. Though it has endorsed local government autonomy, this is probably due more to the views of its supporters in urban centers than to its conscious cultivation of rural sentiments for self-government. The Justice Party mildly supported land reform in its early platforms following the 1960 revolution, but this plank disappeared after 1965. The Republican People's Party entered politics in the last decade with the handicaps of being associated with a heavy-handed state machinery for many decades and of apparently being propped up by the controversial military coup of 1960. Though the strongest party in coalition governments up to 1965, its early efforts to appear left-of-center seem to have failed. Its attempt to campaign on a revived, but ambiguous, platform of "populism" did not persuade farmers, and its reliance on local notables proved increasingly ineffective as the rural population has been mobilized directly into national politics.

The reaction of the Turkish voters to these parties and to the minor parties is a critical link between local affairs of any kind, including rural change, and the central government. In an analysis of participation in the national elections of 1961, 1965 and 1969, it can be noted that overall turnout has declined in the more developed regions (Marmara and the Aegean) and increased in the least developed regions (Northeast and Southeast Turkey). In the 1969 elections the Justice Party continued to draw strong support from more developed regions, but the Republican People's Party also gained strength in developed regions. On an urban-rural dimension the Justice Party tended to gain support in the more neglected eastern regions, while the Republican People's Party gained more in urban areas. A full analysis of the trends in Turkish voting is not possible here, but the general conclusion is that the social and regional base of Turkish parties is becoming more heterogeneous and that traditional party strongholds are being eroded as rural electoral participation increases.

These trends are extremely important in assessing the integrative capability of representative government in Turkey. Though the parties and the National Assembly are the proverbial scapegoat of the administration, and a constant source

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1Ergun Ozbudun, Political Participation in Turkey, op. cit., ch. IV.
of irritation to the military, their record over the past decade is not bad relative to similar institutions in other developing countries. In addition to enacting the new law on parties, basic legislation has been fashioned reorganizing the civil service system, local elections, trade unions, and—under the military's supervision since 1969—land reform and local finance laws. The dispersal of the social base of the parties suggests that each will need to respond more specifically and more competitively to citizens across the country, the majority of whom are still rural and occupied with farming. The chances of a polarized National Assembly appear to have been reduced, though politicians may still deviate sharply from the view of the military and the bureaucracy as to how national progress should take place.

(2) The Bureaucracy. Turkey has also been favored with an effective high-level administration, though its lower levels and field operations have been criticized. As a result of Atatürk's influence, and consistent with Ottoman tradition, the Turkish official has been highly esteemed, though sometimes patronizing and aloof. The central feature of bureaucratic change over the past decade has been the declining prestige of government service combined with the rapid multiplication of government operations as a result of more active, direct state intervention in the development process. Thus, there is an unmistakable trend for elected officials to play a smaller role, both at the national and local levels, while more complex duties and additional authority have been assigned to the state. During the 50's the bureaucracy also suffered from sharp loss of income because of the antiquated system of pay and classification, now remedied by a Personnel Law passed in 1965.

One of the first acts of the military after the 1960 revolution was to create a State Personnel Office and to appoint a commission to study the organization of the central government. Closely related to this determination to forge a modern administration was the establishment of the State Planning Office in 1960, which was also given authority to

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recommend administrative changes to ensure the successful implementation of plans. The commission's report is extremely critical of the organization and operation of Turkish administration, and the gradual implementation of its recommendations has led to major institutional development in Turkey over the past decade. Turkey remains a tightly centralized administrative state on the French model, but certain problems have been delineated with respect to lower level effectiveness, research and evaluation of the bureaucracy itself, indirect and overlapping forms of employment, and general governmental disorganization. Few developing countries have engaged in so searching an inquiry into their administrative needs and operations in order to further national development.

The Turkish bureaucracy has grown rapidly over the past decade. In 1961 there were 449 thousand civil servants and in 1967, 593 thousand, an increase of slightly more than 30 percent. Officials are organized in over 40 ministries and agencies, of which the Ministries of Finance, Interior and Foreign Affairs are regarded as the most prestigious and they tend to recruit the most able university graduates. Despite its growth, the state machinery remains heavily elitist, recruiting nearly half its members from the sons of former civil servants, military officers and professionals. The character of Turkish administration is also affected by the predominance of higher civil servants from the major urban centers, Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul, and from the more exclusive lycees in these cities; The Faculty of Political Science remains the major channel for entering the higher civil service, especially in the Ministry of Interior where roughly two-thirds of provincial governors are graduates of the elite civil service university. Though the details cannot be given here, there is an excellent study of organizational motivation and incentives, dealing heavily with the most prestigious ministries. The study indicates that the esteem given the Ministry of Interior has diminished over the past decade, partly due to the growing attractions of

1Organization and Functions of the Central Government of Turkey, Ankara, Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, 1965.


employment in the private sector and partly due to the diminished importance of local administration.¹

The transformation of the Turkish bureaucracy over the past decade has numerous implications for the structural relation between local government and agriculture. The official still enjoys prestige and authority in Turkey, but his role has been redefined as an agent of government rather than a representative of the state. The development process nurtured over the past decade has done much to reduce ministerial rivalries and to underscore the need for defined, continual coordination among agencies of government. The proliferation of developmental activities will be considered in more detail below in relation to the emergence of regional and field organizations. But it has softened the posture of the bureaucracy and brought about the realization that government employment is justified more by the developmental contribution of administration than by assigned powers. In a word, Turkey is well on the way toward institutionalizing the administration as one arm among several for development of society, rather than permitting administration to become the arbitrator and determinant of development. Perhaps more than are politicians or the military, the officials are willing, if not fully prepared, to deal with problems of disaggregating power in Turkish society.

(3) The Military. The military have been the self-appointed guardians of Turkish society, heavily imbued with Atatürk's memory and influential in all walks of Turkish life.² But national institutional growth in Turkey has surpassed their capacity to govern, and this has been repeatedly recognized despite their intervention in 1960 and again in 1971. Events of the past decade have also eroded the solidarity of the military, as younger officers have begun to dissent from senior officers' views and as political motivation has entered into military conduct. In many ways, the army has become the victim of its own success for the intricacies of Turkish government and society today surpass its capacity for control.

The influence of the army in affecting how power may presently be dispersed in Turkey stems largely from the values it has institutionalized in the 1961 Constitution and related legislation. In talks with party leaders leading to

¹Roos and Roos, Managers of Modernization, op. cit.
²Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, op. cit.; Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World Politics, July 1959, pp. 513-553.
the restoration of civilian rule, military officers insisted on respect for the May 27, 1960 revolution and on banning the Democratic Party, whose cavalier treatment of Ataturk's principles of government deeply offended them. In addition, Islam was to be excluded from politics and the trial of Democratic Party leaders was to be conducted without criticism from parties. Most important, extreme left and right views were to be avoided in politics, including "regionalism, opportunism, separatism, revanchism, and other destructive movements." Throughout military commentary on Turkey runs the theme that class politics and conflict must be forbidden, not simply avoided. Thus, articles 141 and 142 of the Criminal Code forbid class struggle and prescribe stiff penalties for those who promote it. Whether class politics will enter into Turkish life by another name remains to be seen, of course, especially given the voting power of the rural population, but the military seems insistent that class differences in Turkish society remain submerged. Nonetheless, their 1960 revolution made important steps toward the institutional differentiation and development of Turkey, the creation of a strong State Planning Organization being their major innovation.2

The inability of the military to have their way completely has been repeatedly spelled out in Turkish events. The army was disappointed that only 81 percent of the voters turned out to vote on the 1961 Constitution, and of these only 62 percent voted "yes." In fact, the elaborate document was approved by slightly less than a majority of Turkish voters. Again, in the 1965 national elections, the officers saw the Justice Party, the party inheriting the mantle of the despised Democratic Party, come to power, it having previously made important gains in the 1963 local elections. The complexities of politics have not escaped the military; we find, for example, Premier İnönü himself sponsoring a bill in 1962 to imprison for up to five years those writing in such a way "to injure" the democratic regime. Despite the righteous tone of the military, their dedication to individual rights in Turkey has remained strong and their readiness to restore civilian rule has been preserved.

1Frank Tachau and A. Halik Ulman, "Dilemmas of Turkish Politics," Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1962, Ankara, Faculty of Political Science, 1964, p. 20.

The army's relation to the problem of disaggregating power in Turkey is in some ways more complex than that of the official and political. Because their role is ambiguous and their control surprisingly limited. Their principal role appears to have been to set a high moral standard for Turkish political life, though it may be one in many respects idealistic and remote from Turkish problems. Their internal conflicts over the past decade tend to disqualify them as impartial spokesmen and the complex nature of Turkish government now exceeds their capacity to govern (though this has not prevented a military elite from seizing power in some other developing countries). Their main contribution has been to defend the representative institutions of Turkey against the growing abuses of the Democratic Party and to deal with a number of institutional problems that exceeded the capacity of party government to unravel in the 50's. The reorganization of the central government, the establishment of a strong planning agency, the reform of the civil service were all preconditions to preparing the government to deal effectively with local government reform and to integrate a modernized agricultural sector into Turkish society.

D. Decision-Making in Turkey

Local government and agriculture are only two aspects of change in Turkish society. The framework proposed here views the role of local government in relation to agriculture as one of many elements in the integration of the society. How the society uses its institutional capabilities for developmental change can only be realistically evaluated by taking into account the major forces at work in shaping authoritative decisions. In the case of Turkey, these are the capabilities and preferences of the politicians, the administrator and the military. The complex inputs into the organization and operation of local authorities can only be superficially understood by seeing local government solely as an arm of the Ministry of the Interior, or by viewing agricultural modernization simply as the aggregate growth of one sector of the Turkish economy. We must see also the role played by these three sets of actors in the Turkish scene, and how this complex governing process has or has not integrated with internal change in Turkey.

The direct link between local government and agricultural growth in Turkey is obscure, most obviously because it has in fact been carried out in diverse ways and under a variety of social pressures. Some of these forces have been irresistible, such as the farmers' demand for more inputs into agriculture, for more education for their children, and for a voice in politics generally. Each of the three
national elements in decision-making has its own role in integrating the rural society into a changing society. National and local elections do contribute to a National Assembly and party structure that is responsible for major reforms in Turkish institutions. The administration continues to have an important role in designing legislation, implementing programs and budgets, and in national and local planning. The military remains a check on excess in Turkish politics, paradoxically a defender of civilian rule, and an independent, though somewhat bewildered, judge of institutional performance in Turkish society. The effect has been that of maintaining moderation among the forces participating in making decisions, each gauging carefully its own interests and those of its competitors. Their interaction is itself a major integrative force in Turkish politics, and through this interaction Turkish institutional development, however chequered it may appear to Turks, has steadily progressed.

None of the major actors on the Turkish scene have insisted on or gained a monopoly of power. Their restraint has been rewarded by arriving at a stage of development where probably no single force could now govern Turkey. Few developing countries have made such progress, and those trying to assess the possibilities of local governance should take into account the mix of forces going into decisions for reform and expansion. Where there is no need for combination, one is more likely to find a single-minded, arbitrary use of local administration serving the interests of a small elite or narrow interest. Despite the historic emphasis on industrialization in Turkey, the agricultural sector has been recognized since the First Plan as an integral part of the Turkish economy. As will be described below, the reorganization and reform of local government from the center in Turkey has displayed procrastination and uncertainty. The unintended virtue of this approach has been that in fact multiple alternatives have been developed in a variety of institutions to link the farmer to the political system. Turkey is an institutionally diverse society largely because no single source of power has insisted on dominating all decisions, playing zero-sum games.

To employ the terms introduced above, diversity has increased in Turkey while numerous integrative devices have been introduced. The farmer is not alienated from the center in Turkey and the agricultural sector is playing a key role in Turkey’s economic development. Problems abound, but so also do institutional alternatives for dealing with problems. The farmer has access to influence through his production, his local organization in cooperatives and marketing, his preferences communicated through local administrative machinery, and ultimately his vote in local and
national elections. The numerous channels for integrating rural Turkey into the process of social change defy easy formulation, but the achievement is reasonably clear and the balancing of forces that have effected this transformation can be readily observed. A less complex situation would not have been able to achieve the sustained institutionalization of decision-making that is Turkey's most important accomplishment.

II. Agriculture in the Turkish Economy

Although the importance of agriculture in a nation's economy is commonly expressed in sectoral terms, it must be repeated that sectoral projections and estimates do not constitute a workable basis for designing or anticipating structural change. Turkey's First Plan was prepared under severe constraints and went little further than outlining goals and capabilities in conventional sectoral economic terms. One critic of the First Plan (1963-67) has gone so far as to suggest that there was nothing but "trial and error" proposed to relate economic development to Turkish social structure.1 The First Plan did include major provisions supporting community development and endorsing administrative reform, both central aims of the military and both affecting rural society. But an analysis of sectoral interdependence in structural terms vis-à-vis the social and political relationships to be effected was not forthcoming until the present Third Plan (1973-77). In launching Turkey's vigorous planning activity in the early 60's, Turkish and foreign officials appear to have ignored the cautionary comment of the World Bank some years before, suggesting that while industrialization should be pursued "the quickest path to that goal is through increased emphasis on agricultural development."2 In fairness, it must be noted that in 1960 Turkey lacked many of the rudimentary economic tools of analysis, not to mention the statistics and organizational capabilities to deal with intricate social processes. 3

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2 IBRD, The Economy of Turkey, Washington, D.C., 1951, p. 76.

difficulties in preparing the First Plan notwithstanding, it
must be said that agriculture has never figured very heav­ily
in Turkish economic plans. Herschlag's careful study of
Turkish development from the founding of the Republic until
the Menderes government notes that indeed there was no ac­knowledgment of agriculture in early planning documents
until 1946.

The Second Five Year Plan (1968-72) went much farther
toward recognizing the structural problems of integrating
Turkish agriculture with the economic and social system. A
number of examples can be found in the Plan: a much more
detailed analysis of employment needs by sector; a structural
analysis of the educational system; a whole chapter devoted
to village and peasant problems; and specific recommenda­
tions having wide structural effects, such as land reform, social
security and tax reform. The Second Plan is also much more
specific on the administrative weaknesses of government and
business, noting for example, that local administration had
fallen short of its planned investment largely due to the
failure to achieve local tax reform. The Second Five-Year
Plan made the protection of agriculture against an adverse
climate one of its general aims, and stated clearly that
the planned rate of growth of 4.1 percent per year was essen­
tial, not only to provide investment for the non-agricultural
sector, but to increase standards of living, control inflation,
reduce foreign currency needs, and improve food supply.

The Third Five Year Plan (1973-77) is only available in
summary form for this analysis, but the aims for agriculture
appear to be relatively unchanged. Emphasis continues to be
placed on improving techniques in farm production and expand­
ing production through irrigation. A strong plea is made for
land reform, and a law was passed in early 1974 that will be
discussed below. The projected rate of growth of agricul­
tural production remains just over 4 percent. The Third
Plan has received favorable comment from one of the severest
critics of earlier planning exercises.

1 Second Five Year Development Plan, 1968-1972, Ankara, State

2 Ibid., p. 4.

3 Ibid., p. 76.

4 A Summary of the Third Five Year Development Plan, 1973-1977,

5 M. B. Kiray, "Some Notes on Social Planning Objectives and
Strategies in the Third Five-Year Plan of Turkey," ms.
Under the Third Plan very sizable shifts of population from rural to urban society are expected to begin, and the major weakness of the Plan seems to be the problem of applying planning efforts to the regional and urban development of Turkey. The fact that spatial and land problems are beginning to loom larger in Turkish plans is most important from the perspective of this analysis, for local administrators and regional authorities will have a key part in regulating housing, settlement, land use, land speculation and municipal growth. The success of continued Turkish development depends on fostering ever increasing intricacy and detail of policy in dealing with structural changes of these kinds, and much of the guidance needed, if it is to appear, will need to come from local government.

The economic trends identified in the three Turkish plans should be taken seriously because the Turkish government is constitutionally obliged to meet development objectives. Under the impetus of the 1960 revolution, development objectives were embodied in articles 41 and 129 of the Constitution. The first article endorses full employment and development "through democratic processes" to promote the general welfare. The second article enshrines the State Planning Organization's special authority, and after debate in the National Assembly and consideration by the Higher Planning Council and cabinet the plan becomes law. This does not mean that the design of the plan is arbitrarily or automatically enforced, and serious conflicts have existed within the government about planning policies.

Another stumbling block has been the State Economic Enterprises, which account for nearly half of all public investment. A law was passed during the first planning period to reorganize these industrial monopolies that have steadily grown under both the Menderes regime and since the 1960 revolution, but productivity and coordination among them remains poor. Planning is


2 The most serious of these has been a continuing controversy between the Planning Organization and the Ministry of Finance over credit, the latter taking a more conservative view on deficit financing. Some attempts to unravel this problem are contained in the Implementation Section of the Second Five Year Plan, pp. 665-666.

3 See the Summary of the Third Five-Year Plan, pp. 16-18. They are not being discussed at length in this analysis since they have only a minor role in agriculture.
important to Turks, in a word, because they take planning seriously, perhaps too seriously. Nevertheless, Turkey is still much more an administrative state than a parliamentary republic, in part because of the confluence of decision-making centers outlined above. Planning decisions are authoritative decisions in Turkish political life and nearly all the major reforms accomplished in Turkey since 1960 have their origin in the country's planning operations. In this respect, Turkey differs greatly from many developing countries where the Plan is only vague aspiration or, worse, rhetoric.

A. Agricultural and Investment Growth

The State Planning Organization estimates that Turkey's average annual rate of per capita GNP growth since the First Plan has been 2.7 percent allowing for population increase, a rate of growth which compares favorably with most OECD countries. Although Turkey did not fully meet its planned rates of growth, overall performance has been good and agriculture, unlike this sector in many developing countries, has made substantial contributions.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Summary of Third Plan, p. 6.

As Table I indicates, Turkey is making important strides toward becoming an industrial country and the structural implications of these changes are recognized by the Planning Organization. Whether the full import of the shifts over the coming decade is fully understood by other agencies of government, especially as they affect cities, housing, education, savings, and by many other structurally imbedded institutions in Turkish society remains an open question. The shortfalls in the first two planning periods, more serious in industry than agriculture, are not large, and Turkey has been able to achieve an impressive 6.9 percent rate of growth in this sector, which becomes a 4.3 percent per capita increase.
Growth depends on a society being able to mobilize investments and to direct them effectively to the preferred sectors of the economy. The shortfall in agricultural growth seems to be the result of inability to direct desired investments into the agricultural sector. The overall investment performance and expectations under the three plans is contained in Table II.

Table II: Sectoral Distribution of Investments as Percentage of Fixed Investments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Plan</th>
<th>Second Plan</th>
<th>Third Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp/Comm.</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Targeted investment figures for agriculture were somewhat higher for agriculture in the Second Plan, 16.9 percent, p. 15. Estimates taken from Summary Plan, p. 10 and 69.)

Thus, there appear to be serious structural obstacles to achieving the amount of investment in agriculture that is desired, a problem the Planning Organization feels is due to antiquated agricultural tax policy, and, more generally, to problems in organizing the capital market. The importance of the state in growth efforts is amply demonstrated in the extent of its capital investment. This amounts to 48.1 percent of investment in the "mixed" (private-public) sectors where some 231 billion lira are invested; and it accounts for 50 billion lira in wholly public activities, including power, education, health and other government services.

Changes within the agricultural sector can be best viewed in actual production proportions, which show some shifts toward more specialized, more productive forms of agriculture. Thus, 65 percent of the value of gross production (at 1965 prices) came from food crops in 1967, diminishing to 63 percent in 1972 (at 1971 prices) and projected to diminish further to 61 percent in 1977.1 Livestock production is

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1 Second Plan, op. cit., p. 337 and Summary of Third Plan, op. cit., p. 66.
increasing, being 30 percent of the value of agricultural production in 1967, increasing to 35 percent in 1972 and projected to approach 36 percent in 1977. The clear aim of the plan and of the Ministry of Agriculture is to concentrate on more specialized agriculture, indicated by the pattern of investment. In the Second Plan, 53 percent of investment was for soil and water resources, largely irrigation. Out of a total investment in agriculture of 16.9 million lira, over 9 million lira were planned for water development. The next highest amounts were for tractors and equipment, 3.6 million lira, and for forestry, 1.6 million lira. In the Third Plan the same basic strategy remains, giving priority "to those branches of production which provide raw material for industry and to those which will increase the production in such fields as cattle-breeding, fishing, fruit and vegetable cultivation which, besides responding to the needs for nutrition, are closely related to the development of exports." As Turkish agriculture becomes more specialized, more integrated with the industrial economy and with export needs, the structural problems multiply and the necessity of close coordination increases, placing even more responsibility on local agencies and the farmers.

B. Agricultural Employment

This overall macro-effect is familiar from the experience of industrialized nations like the United States. Growing consumption, urbanization and industrialization make the close integration of agriculture with the economy essential, even though the sectoral importance of agriculture in the economy as a whole is declining. The strategic importance of agriculture in maintaining political stability and supporting development probably increases, especially for transitional states such as Turkey. Agricultural products constituted roughly three-fourths of the dollar value of all exports from 1963 to 1971. In the Turkish balance of payments, apart from capital transfers, agricultural exports and workers' remittances are the two most important sources of foreign currency. Total exports in 1971 were 677 million dollars, nearly double 1963, and workers' remittances were 471 million dollars, starting from 93 million dollars in 1967. The labor migrants to Europe come heavily from excess rural population, or people in the flow toward towns and cities.

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1 Summary of Third Plan, op. cit., p. 198.
The combined importance, both economic and social, of this contribution to the Turkish economy cannot be underestimated.

As noted in the introduction, the actual number of Turks employed in agriculture has increased slightly throughout the 60's, to include nearly 10 million of 13.7 million persons constituting the employed population in 1967. For more than at least a decade, rural employment will account for over half the employed population. The share is projected at 50 percent of employment at the end of the Third Plan period (1977), when there will be roughly 22 million Turks living in the rural sector out of an estimated total population of 42.6 million persons. Of course, not all these persons will be directly engaged in farming, but operating services and agro-business integrated with more specialized, intensive agriculture.

The Turkish planners estimate, probably with good reason, that agricultural employment revolves around problems of unutilized manpower, especially in crop farming. However, from the viewpoint of the transition to an industrial economy and of rapidly growing urban problems, the retention of large numbers of seasonally employed persons on the land can be an advantage. Unemployment in the agricultural sector is not reliably estimated, but the Plan acknowledges non-agricultural unemployment at nearly 10 percent and it seems reasonable that agricultural unemployment must be at least comparable and probably greater.

On the whole, development in Turkey has not increased employment as anticipated. The First Plan was to create 2.1 million new jobs, and achieved only 1.2 million new jobs. Although the Third Plan estimates that there will be 1.3 million unemployed persons in 1977, and boldly states that "unemployment will continue to rise until 1987," there seem to be no clear ideas about how the social dislocation and potential protest stemming from such inequities will be minimized or avoided. Clearly, not much has been done to find employment in rural towns and to ensure that more intensive farming methods utilize labor. The record of the agricultural sector in this regard is poor. Under the First Plan, 700,000 new jobs were expected in agriculture, but only

1 Second Plan, op. cit., p. 147.
2 Ibid., p. 146.
3 Summary of Third Plan, op. cit., p. 156.
4 Ibid., p. 53.
213,000 materialized. The planners recognize that 7 percent of the agricultural work force are day-laborers, and that some 30 percent is probably under 14 years of age and thereby excluded from their employment estimates, but no definite proposals are made to alleviate the potential or real abuses of these groups in the countryside. The Trade Union Law of 1963 does not apply to day-laborers in agriculture.

C. Agricultural Inputs

Turkey has made enormous strides in improving the inputs into the agricultural sector since 1950, and the remaining problems are now more structural than a matter of failing to mobilize new resources and methods. A leading agricultural economist summarizes the problems as those centering on improved technology and farm management, those involved with the availability of credit, particularly to small enterprises, and those that are basically institutional, such as improving marketing, consolidating land holdings and improving agricultural training and education. It appears that the critical initiatives in modernizing agriculture may have taken place before 1960, which the following section on land use and land reform will consider. Thus, the problems are more and more those of sensitive coordination and on-the-scene supervision, rather than simply giving impetus for modern farming. The fact that increasing farm productivity has become a more delicate and localized problem tends to enhance the need for effective local government and support, though Turkish plans still leave many such questions unanswered.

One of the widely recognized indices of improved agricultural inputs is mechanization of farm production. Until the end of the war, tractors were virtually unknown in Turkish agriculture. In 1936 there were 961 tractors in Turkey; in 1948, 1,756. With massive U.S. assistance, thousands of tractors were imported. By 1950 there were over 16,000; by 1962 over 30,000; by 1954 over 40,000, cultivating roughly one-fifth of the land. By 1955 there was a tractor for every

1 Second Plan, op. cit., p. 142. In contrast, 316,000 new jobs were planned in industry and 375,000 achieved.

2 Ibid., p. 152.

3 Rejat Aktan, "Basic Characteristics of Turkish Agriculture and Problems of Productivity," in Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1969-70, Ankara, Faculty of Political Science, 1971, pp. 50-98.

4 Rivkin, Area Development and National Growth, op. cit., p. 103.
555 cultivated hectares, compared with one to 6,000 hectares in 1950.\(^1\) Tractor utilization has continued to grow in the 60's, especially with the stress being put on irrigation and the use of modern drills and combines. The number of tractors increased from 45,000 in 1962 to 125,000 in 1972.\(^2\) More important from a general developmental viewpoint, Turkey now produces most of its own tractors, production increasing from about 2,500 per year in 1962 to 20,000 per year in 1972.\(^3\) Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture now estimate there are 150,000 tractors in use in Turkey, and that local production falls about 5,000 short of annual demand for about 40,000 tractors.\(^4\) About one-fourth of the cultivated land in Turkey is now farmed under mechanized methods.

Progress in the use of fertilizers is equally impressive. In 1938 Turkey used only 200 tons of nitrogenous fertilizer, 200 tons of potash and no phosphoric fertilizer.\(^5\) By the mid-50's fertilizer applications increased to roughly 10,000 tons in all categories, but the dramatic increases have been since the 1960 revolution. According to the Third Plan, net nutrients per hectare increased from 33.0 kilograms per hectare in 1962 to 41.1 kilograms in 1972.\(^6\) Application was 295,000 tons in 1962, 1,537,000 in 1967 and 3,500,000 in 1972.\(^7\) Production of nitrogenous fertilizer reached 2,563 thousand tons in 1972, and phosphoric fertilizer 2,544 thousand tons.\(^8\) Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture estimate that Turkey now produces about 1.5 million tons of fertilizer a year, and it was expected (before the world energy crisis) that Turkey should be self-sufficient by 1977, the end of the present Plan period.\(^9\)

The physical ingredients of agricultural production are

\(^{1}\)Herschlag, Turkey, op. cit., p. 219.
\(^{2}\)Summary of Third Plan, op. cit., p. 99.
\(^{3}\)Ibid., p. 30.
\(^{4}\)Interview.
\(^{5}\)Herschlag, Turkey, op. cit., p. 220.
\(^{6}\)Summary of Third Plan, op. cit., p. 31.
\(^{7}\)Ibid., p. 99.
\(^{8}\)Ibid., p. 92.
\(^{9}\)Interview.
available in Turkey, but yields appear to be leveling off in most crop cultivation. The Plan indicates that Turkey will aim at self-sufficiency in food and expansion of crop cultivation to meet population growth. Nonetheless, Turkey has accepted the fact that climatic uncertainties make heavy investment in dry farming extremely risky. Per hectare plant crop productivity in Turkey in 1965 was approximately one ton, lower than the average of all continents including Africa.¹ Plant crop production in Turkey has been estimated to be increasing at roughly 4.5 percent per year, largely owing to expanded area of cultivation. Allowing for population increases, this represents a net growth of about 1.5 percent.² When rates of growth are compared with increasing demand, the rate of change in agricultural production seems to be slightly negative. Table III provides the overall picture of wheat production since 1952.

Table III: Wheat Production in Turkey 1952 to 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area (000 hectares)</th>
<th>Production (000 tons)</th>
<th>Yield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>9,868</td>
<td>12,242</td>
<td>1,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>12,078</td>
<td>12,433</td>
<td>1,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>12,546</td>
<td>15,077</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>12,865</td>
<td>12,635</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>12,930</td>
<td>14,388</td>
<td>1,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>13,013</td>
<td>16,869</td>
<td>1,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>13,239</td>
<td>15,882</td>
<td>1,199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These and other statistics make clear that the rate of return on most unirrigated farming in Turkey is very low, and the planners have clearly opted heavily for irrigation to encourage more specialized production in cotton, fruit and vegetables. This strategy meshes well with the intention to provide agricultural support for industry, to maintain exports, and to prepare for further integration into the

¹Akta, "Basic Characteristics of Turkish Agriculture," op. cit., p. 73.

Common Market. It does not seem to take fully into account the potential disaster for Turkish development if large amounts of food have to be imported after a natural catastrophe, a problem now plaguing much of Asia, nor the fact that caloric intake of Turks appears to have remained constant for a number of years. However, the more diversified agricultural output may well mean more protein and nourishment generally, and this can only be achieved in Turkey by irrigation and more specialized agriculture. Thus, there is good reason to concentrate on increasing irrigation, already about half of all agricultural investment, and on improving the quality of both livestock and forestry production.

The impetus for irrigation has been forthcoming since the 1960 revolution, in part stimulated by the highly inflationary agricultural price supports of the Mendes regime, designed to keep farmers loyal to the Democratic Party. The 1951 World Bank report did not encourage the Turkish government to enter into bold irrigation schemes, but two large projects, Seyhan and Sariyar, were begun before 1960, partly in response to increased electricity supplies which could be used for irrigation. In 1954, about 3,500 square kilometers were irrigated, about 2 percent of the cultivated land, and it seems clear that the Mendes regime was content to provide high incomes for farmers while providing few, and perhaps even negative, incentives to change their dry-farming habits. Of the 23.5 million hectares of arable land in Turkey, about 12 million hectares are potentially irrigable and 7 million ready for irrigation. Under the First Plan over 400,000 hectares were brought under irrigation, about 100,000 hectares less than the Plan target, and bringing the total to slightly over 1.5 million irrigated hectares. Under the Second Plan, irrigation was to be extended to another half million hectares, and Ministry of Agriculture officials estimate that about 2 million hectares will be irrigated by the end of the Third Plan period (1977).

The newly irrigated land is encouraging more intensive,
diverse agriculture. Nearly 43 percent of the irrigated land is devoted to industrial crops, including cotton, which uses 26 percent of all irrigated land. Cotton yields in Turkey over the past five years have been more than twice the world average, exceeded only by the USSR, Mexico and Egypt. Twenty-four percent of all irrigation is for grains, 11 percent for fruits and 16 percent for vegetables. As irrigation has increased, the Turkish government has more fully realized the extent of structural difficulties, which include problems of erecting field irrigation systems to link to state water canals, of forming irrigation associations among farmers to regulate the use of water regionally, and of consolidating land holdings to permit the most efficient use of the water.

Another indispensable input to increased agricultural production in Turkey has been the development of roads and rail transport, much of it justified under Western defense arrangements during the Menderes period and supported through military assistance from the United States. The improvements were first outlined by a special mission from the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads in 1947 and organized under a semi-autonomous authority in the Ministry of Public Works. Throughout the 50's nearly 10 percent of government investment went into roads, and the program generated such enthusiasm among farmers that the Democratic Party was pressuring the road construction unit to build some 200,000 kilometers of rural roads, about six times the estimated need. This was not done. In a decade, however, Turkey doubled the mileage of all-weather roads, most national highways had been hard-surfaced, and 11,000 kilometers were added to provincial farm-to-market roads. Although skewed to meet military needs, the expansion provided vastly improved links between the more isolated Eastern provinces and the rest of Turkey and brought the more remote Anatolian farmers into closer contact with towns and cities. By 1960, all but one of the cities over 25,000, and all but 20 of the 91 cities between 10 and 25 thousand were connected by national highways.

Credit is another essential input in agricultural production. Second Plan, op. cit., p. 343.


3 See Malcolm R. Kivrin, Area Development and National Growth, op. cit., pp. 104-114; for policies under earlier years, see Herschlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transition, op. cit., pp. 299-312.
production. The etatist principles of the Republic led to the establishment of an Agricultural Bank in the 30's and credit cooperatives have been encouraged since 1930 in an effort to rescue the peasant from money lenders, though not too successfully. Nonetheless, credit cooperatives displayed a steady growth up to the 1960 revolution as shown in Table IV.

Table IV: Development of Credit Cooperatives, 1937-1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Capital and Reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>101,535</td>
<td>3,638</td>
<td>3,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>438,410</td>
<td>8,775</td>
<td>32,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td>786,763</td>
<td>13,563</td>
<td>94,331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Herschlag, Turkey, p. 227.

Because the credit cooperatives are closely tied to the Agricultural Bank, they tend to fall outside the concerns of the Ministry of Agriculture and very likely have been little utilized to initiate change in Turkish agriculture. On the whole, it appears that they tend to favor the larger, more commercial farmers. The Second Plan indicates that agricultural credit has continued to grow in Turkey, reaching over 5,171 million lira in 1965, of which about a fifth was extended directly to farmers as loans by the Agricultural Bank. However, the number of operations benefiting from loans remained unchanged from 1962 to 1965. The Plan estimates that about 40 percent of Turkish farms are unable to benefit from credit facilities. Credit is clearly extended more easily to larger operations as the loan statistics indicate: 91,000 farms received nearly 500 million lira in funds (about a tenth of the total credit) and the next million farms received slightly over 500 million lira. The Plan concludes that "the majority of the agricultural operations received credits hardly sufficient to develop agricultural production, and that the existing credit system is inadequate."

The administration and selection of loans seems to have

1Herschlag, Turkey, op. cit., pp. 146-147.
2Ibid., p. 267.
been a serious problem in Turkish agriculture, though no very clear proposals for dealing with it are to be found in the Second or Third Plans, partly because of the aggregate nature of the plans themselves.\footnote{Another important reason may be continuing differences of opinion between the Central Bank and the State Planning Organization over the use of deficit financing, an issue that overshadows nearly all credit and monetary analysis in the Summary Third Plan and in the Second Plan. New Central Bank legislation was passed in the early 60's, but its effect on agricultural credit is not known.} The Third Plan simply notes that priority will be given to loans improving agricultural technology and to livestock feeds, oil-seeds, fishing and export crops.\footnote{Summary of Third Plan, op. cit., p. 106.} The Plan also notes that because agricultural credit must be financed from deposit increases and Central Bank credits, sufficient credit for farmers cannot be found. After the credit needs of the agricultural price support policy are met, very little remains for selective application of credit for innovation and change. Thus, the entire issue of how agricultural credit is to be used in Turkey is imbedded in several basic policy decisions at the center, and appear likely to remain unchanged, favoring the large, commercial farmer who has already found credit sources.

D. Agricultural Incentives and Income

By far the largest incentive to Turkish farmers remains the exemption of agricultural incomes from taxation, a policy dating from 1945 when the Republican People's Party hoped to establish support in rural Turkey. Though farmers pay the same indirect taxes as all Turks (which amount to about 70 percent of taxes collected in Turkey), the increased growth and prosperity of farm incomes, especially among rich farmers, goes untaxed. Very little is said about agricultural income tax in the Second Plan, but the Third Plan specifies "insufficient taxation of agricultural incomes above the minimum allowance level" as a major tax problem.\footnote{Ibid., p. 170.}

In 1970, total income of the agricultural sector was over 38 billion lira in current prices or about 31 percent of national income, a dramatic drop from early income records which show agriculture accounting for two-thirds of Turkish income in 1927. The proportional decline has not been continuous, but sporadic, hovering around half the national
income in the late 50's and then declining in a fairly linear form since 1960. Per capita income is given as $243 in 1962 and $364 in 1972, but given the population and income disparities between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, the aggregate figures alone suggest that per capita income in agriculture must be around half the national average. Rough estimates for 1955 and 1965 indicate that per capita agricultural income is about half the national average, and less than a fourth of that in the industrial sector. The details are given in Table V.

The most complete study thus far on Turkish farm income is based on data from the early 1950's, a period of high farm prices and agricultural expansion. The Hirsch study shows that the lowest 10 percent in terms of income (averaging 278 lira per farm family) received about 1 percent of total agricultural income, while the highest 10 percent (averaging 9,926 lira) received nearly 53 percent of farm income. If farm family incomes are broken between the lowest 80 percent and the top 20 percent, the lower group receives a third of farm income, and the top fifth receives two-thirds of farm income. Up to 1960, the Hirsch data indicate that the small farmer shared little of the long-run increase, largely because increased output depended on mechanization which the small farmer could not afford. The trends suggest that, if anything, income disparities have increased over the past decade, in part because expansion of production by increased cultivation has reached its limit, because the small farmer sells only half his output and cannot derive benefits proportional to price increases, and because the majority of small farmers cannot in fact afford to sell even half their output.

1. Like many developing countries Turkey has very poor and unreliable income statistics, so welfare and income decisions are made largely on a programmatic basis. See the commentary in the Second Plan, p. 666.


| Year | General Economy | | Agricultural Sector | | Non-Agricultural Sector | |
|------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1962 | 11,951 | 66,267.1 | 5,545 | 9,216 | 24,797.5 | 2,691 | 2,735 | 41,469.6 | 15,163 |
| 1963 | 12,055 | 72,431.8 | 6,008 | 9,267 | 27,163.6 | 2,931 | 2,788 | 45,268.2 | 16,237 |
| 1964 | 12,265 | 78,485.1 | 6,234 | 9,370 | 27,859.2 | 2,973 | 2,859 | 48,625.9 | 16,773 |
| 1965 | 12,600 | 86,605.9 | 6,839 | 9,287 | 26,832.9 | 2,889 | 3,205 | 51,792.8 | 16,160 |
| 1966 | 12,732 | 90,746.2 | 6,127 | 9,167 | 26,536.5 | 3,222 | 3,433 | 57,267.4 | 16,681 |
| 1967 | 12,835 | 97,670.0 | 7,595 | 9,090 | 29,664.6 | 3,272 | 3,658 | 61,061.5 | 16,688 |
| 1968 | 12,971 | 102,804.9 | 7,926 | 8,774 | 30,397.5 | 3,464 | 3,986 | 67,550.1 | 16,947 |
| 1969 | 13,059 | 108,161.8 | 9,283 | 8,763 | 31,984.6 | 3,650 | 4,196 | 72,407.4 | 17,256 |
| 1970 | 13,260 | 116,653.4 | 8,797 | 8,763 | 34,976.2 | 3,991 | 4,497 | 81,677.2 | 18,163 |

Source: Table provided by Research Section, Ministry of Agriculture.  
1970 and 1971 figures are provisional.  
Amounts calculated at 1968 factor costs.
These basic results are confirmed in sample studies done by the State Planning Organization\(^1\) and a more recent independent study.\(^2\) The Planning Organization has classified farms by size (unfortunately not specified in the available statistics):

**Table VI: Farm Size and Income in Turkey in 1963**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Farm Units</th>
<th>Ave. Income &amp; Income per Unit</th>
<th>Ave. Income per Worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>2,900 TL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>10,300 TL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>44,510 TL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Reşat Aktan, "Basic Characteristics of Turkish Agriculture and Problems of Productivity," in Turkish Yearbook International Relations, 1969-70, Ankara Faculty of Political Science, 1971, p. 67.

The Planning Organization's research has also indicated that the disparity in farm family income may be even greater than that shown in the Hirsch study. In their survey, the top fifth of Turkish farmers accounted for half the total agricultural income, and the lowest fifth, 6 percent. The Bulutary study showed even greater disparities, with the highest 10 percent of farm income families earning just under half of total farm income. However one wishes to interpret these various studies, which are not strictly comparable and derived from small samples, the income differences among Turkish farmers are very large. Though probably not as large as those in some other less-developed countries, given the state of political and educational mobilization of the Turkish farm population such differences could easily become significant in Turkish politics.

Agricultural price policy is another important incentive to the farmer, particularly in Turkey where price supports have existed since the rapid expansion of agriculture in the


\(^2\)Tunçer Bulutary, et. al., Türkivade Gelir Dağılımı (Income Distribution in Turkey), Ankara, Faculty of Political Science, 1971.
50's. Given the political realities confronting the Turkish government, and numerous other industrial nations as well, adjustment of this inflationary practice has proved extremely difficult. In the early 50's Turkey had difficulty marketing her agricultural surpluses of 1952 and 1953. An arm of the Ministry of Commerce, Toprak, intervened to buy surpluses and to make advance payment for accumulated grain. The inflationary effect of its purchases was compounded by the failure to tax agriculture income and by the financing arrangements for import of large amounts of American wheat to acquire counterpart investment funds. No budgetary provisions were made for the huge subsidies going to farmers, especially large farmers, and Toprak was authorized to draw freely from the Central Bank. In 1955, for example, grain subsidies amounted to 960 million lira, three-fourths of the increase in circulating currency for the year. The huge debts accumulated by Toprak were liquidated as part of the basic reorganization of the economy after the 1960 revolution, but the subsidies remain.

Unfortunately, careful analysis of the income effects of agricultural subsidies does not appear to have been done, no doubt partly due to the inadequate income statistics for Turkey as a whole. The Third Plan simply states, "In order to maintain reasonable income for farmers along with low prices to consumers and to improve the competitive position of export products (the) government's agricultural price intervention programmes will be selective and purposeful both in respect to the kind and coverage." The abuses of the price support policy can only be inferred from subsequent cautions that supported prices should be announced before planting or at harvest, and that regional differences and qualitative aspects of production can be taken into account. The conclusion of the Plan also notes that many benefits of price supports have been going to middlemen rather than farmers, but repeats that price supports remain a "necessity." Without agricultural income tax, price supports are the only general control on agricultural incomes directly accessible to the Turkish government, and the failure...

1Herschlag, Turkey, op. cit., pp. 224-226.


3Summary of Third Plan, p. 106.

of the government to utilize this control suggests the power of the farmer in Turkish society, particularly the more prosperous farmer who must benefit disproportionately from these policies.

The array of incentives and rewards for Turkish farmers is, of course, much greater than the above aggregate figures on income indicates. The Turkish farmer also receives benefits from government in the form of education, health and social security. These more direct, structural influences on the relationship between farmer and government will be discussed below in considering the relation between farmer and the state. The national plans are exceptional among those of developing countries in acknowledging the structural character of this relationship, and in noting a number of specific programs related to broad needs of the rural population. The plans are also typical of most aggregate accounts of how change is to take place in that their emphasis on production, investment and monetary policy is not addressed to structural problems.

E. Land Ownership and Land Reform

There are numerous lessons for developing countries in the Turkish experience with land reform. A weak bill passed in 1945 has had virtually no effect on the overall pattern of land use and ownership in Turkey. Since then, land reform has remained a prime issue in Turkish politics, and nothing was accomplished until 1973, when a bill was finally passed. The new law is the result of five draft laws devised over the past dozen years, and eleven attempts to overcome the obstacles arising from coalition governments, procrastination in the National Assembly, party differences, and ministerial indecision. In no other aspect of rural development are the interactions of politics, administration and development more apparent.

Whether the implementation of the new law over the coming decade will steadily work toward a solution of Turkey's land problems remains to be seen, but these problems have steadily worsened over the past decade and are by and large admitted by all informed Turks. Agricultural growth in the 50's and since has been heavily dependent on cultivating new land, much of it fallow and pasture land. The result has been more

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soil erosion, less effective conservation practices, intrusion into forest preserves, and, eventually, costly losses in productivity. The common practice of land division among Turkish families has led to more and more small farms, and within farms more and more parcelization of cultivated land. The entire planning strategy since the revolution of 1960 has been to improve productivity, add technology to farming, and convert farming to industrial use. All the aims are to some extent frustrated by the pattern of land ownership in Turkey and pose a formidable threat to development generally as well as to the smooth transformation of the agricultural sector of the economy.

At the same time that smaller farms have become less effective units of production, there has also been an increase in small farms, many of them operated by absentee owners and actually farmed by sharecroppers. Wealthy Turks have invested heavily in land, in part due to inflationary experiences of the past, and this has contributed to sharper class divisions between farmers and farm workers. The most frequent estimate is that about one and a half million rural dwellers are now landless. Nonetheless, Turkey remains a country of small landowners, the percentage of farmers owning land they till increasing from 73 percent in 1950 to 87 percent in 1963, then dropping slightly to 84 percent in 1970. The overall situation is described in Tables VII and VIII.

Table VII: Distribution of Agricultural Land
According to Farm Size, in Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- 50</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51- 100</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101- 200</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201- 500</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 1000</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data provided by Research Section, Ministry of Agriculture; last column does not add to 100 percent.
Table VIII: Parcels of Land per Farm, 1950 to 1970, Percentage Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Parcels</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 10</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data provided by Research Section, Ministry of Agriculture; 1970 figures do not include farms over 100 ha.

There are many ways of stating the land distribution problem in Turkey, and in developing countries generally. Whether emphasis is placed on income distribution or land distribution makes a great difference. Thus it is known that nearly half the agricultural income is received by 10 percent of the agricultural population, and that slightly less than half the arable land is owned by 10 percent of the farmers. The use of land distribution to adjust incomes in the agricultural sector is severely limited for most of the unused arable land has been cultivated over the past 20 years, and perhaps as much as an eighth of the cultivated land is either in danger of, or in the process of serious erosion. An additional danger sign is that pastures and meadows decreased by nearly one-fourth in the 50's, from 38 million to 28 million hectares, affecting both the restoration and conservation of soil, and also badly needed livestock production. On the other hand, the numbers of poor and landless appear to be increasing. In addition to the estimated million and a half landless persons, 1950 estimates are that perhaps one-fourth of the farmers rent or sharecrop all or part of their land, and about 300,000 are agricultural workers, full-time or seasonal. These persons appear in more recent planning estimates as "disguised unemployment" or "unutilized labor," varying seasonally from three to nearly eight million people from 1962 to 1967.


2Second Plan, op. cit., p. 147.
Redistribution of large landholdings to small farmers might have some short-term negative effects on production, though in the longer run, more intensive cultivation of this land area could well boost output. In larger terms, the amounts of land to be acquired from large landholdings are not sufficient to solve the problems of the over-populated countryside in the long run. There are about 3,000 farms in Turkey classified as estates, of which about 50 are huge model state farms used for experimentation, seed production and demonstration. Most of the large estates, and a large portion of middle-sized holdings are rented or sharecropped. The Second Plan shows roughly one-fourth of the 2.3 million farms in Turkey being cultivated under some combination of tenancy and sharecropping.\(^1\) In terms of human oppression, however, it is problematical whether many of these farmers are worse off than those living in the most remote and forest villages. Precise data are not available, but the Second Plan estimates that 13,000 of the 35,000 Turkish villages, including about 7 million people, are in forests or on the edge of forests.\(^2\) These people receive few, if any, state services and cannot be helped by land redistribution.

Very few of the agricultural areas have been surveyed and mapped. Shortly after the 1960 revolution it was calculated that at the present rate of progress of the cadastral survey, 100 to 200 years would be required for completion.\(^3\) Both the First and Second Plans underscored the need for a special effort to hasten land registration, but progress has been slow. The Third Plan sets aside over 700 million lira for the cadastral survey,\(^4\) noting that over two-thirds of the civil suits in Turkey are over land ownership disputes. An outdated prison study showed that half the murders in Turkey are over land disputes. Both improved taxation in the countryside and the implementation of the land reform law depend on accurate land records. The report on reorganizing the Turkish government notes that only a tenth of the land survey was complete in 1963, after nearly 40 years' effort.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Second Plan, p. 266.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 262.


(The Second Plan also notes that only about 30 percent of immovable property is registered in Turkey. No estimate is given of how much of this tax loss is incurred in the rural sector.)

The 1945 Land Reform Law did not have much effect and very few large holdings were ever expropriated under its terms. From 1947 to 1962 about 1.8 million hectares of farmland were distributed to 360,000 families, many of them refugees from Cyprus. Most of the land distributed was state land, except for 75,000 hectares taken from local government, religious trusts (yaıı) or private ownership. The array of problems already outlined make clear that land reform is long overdue in Turkey, not so much because of inequities but because land is simply running out and must be more carefully managed and cultivated as a scarce national resource. Like many changes, the necessity of land reform legislation was recognized in the 1961 Constitution. Article 37 states that "The State must take necessary measures to achieve efficient use of agricultural lands and to provide land for landless farmers or to farmers with insufficient land. With these aims in mind, the law may delimit individual farm land holdings depending on different agricultural regions and crop patterns. The State assists the farmer with obtaining production means. The distribution of farm land cannot be done at the expense of diminishing forests and other resources."

The National Unity Committee of the 1960 revolution instructed the interested ministries to prepare a draft law in 1960, but action was postponed in deference to the Constitutional Assembly. Five subsequent draft laws were prepared during the 60's by various coalition governments, none of them succeeding in getting approval from the National Assembly. When the Justice Party gained control of the Assembly in 1965, a law was prepared secretly in the Ministry of Agriculture but never came before the parliament. Again, in 1970 another secret draft was prepared based on the 1965 preparations, but no action took place. In general, the Justice Party has been aligned with liberal economic policies, which tended to ally it with larger, more commercial farmers. The People's Party has taken a more progressive view of economic change, though remaining more firmly attached to the early principles of Ataturk. The history of land reform legislation gives

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1 Aktan, "Problems of Land Reform in Turkey," op. cit., p. 321; see also Regat Aktan, "Land Reform in Turkey," op. cit., pp. 89-93, for a full account of the bill and its origins. In this article he estimates 445,000 families benefited from the law.

2 Aktan, "Land Reform in Turkey," ibid., pp. 93-98.
revealing insights into the inner workings of Turkish government. In actuality, it appears that the law passed in 1973 came about largely due to the intransient and deteriorating conditions in rural Turkey, which the legislators could no longer ignore despite their differences. A reading of the law suggests that it conforms very much to the most recent draft law prepared in the Ministry of Agriculture in 1971, when Turkey was ruled by a coalition government of fairly neutral political figures and respected technicians.

The new law is a complex document of 17 chapters, 237 articles and five tables that cannot be fully analyzed in this essay. The aims of the law display the instructive effects of nearly a decade of experience with agricultural development, and suggest that the long delays in formulating a law may well have been beneficial. The aims are to assist national development, to provide land to those with little or no land, to establish cooperatives, to prohibit subdivision of land, to establish new Agrarian Reform Cooperatives, and to improve agricultural technology. A General Directorate of Land and Agricultural Reform is to be organized under the Prime Minister. Provision is made that no land transactions are to be made for three years, an important check against further subdivision to evade the effects of the law. A detailed listing of land coming under the law is made, covering virtually all land in Turkey. The most controversial section, of course, is what lands may be nationalized, and the new Directorate appears to have been given substantial authority. These include the public lands now under a variety of authorities in government, land now collectively owned and cultivated under earlier laws, land owned by State Economic Enterprises, land that is "inefficiently used" or deteriorating under sharecropping, lands purchased with state money and now farmed under absentee conditions, and all pasture land beyond the minimum determined by the law. The upper limits of land ownership are described in a complex formula taking into account the quality of land, whether it is irrigated or non-irrigated, and developmental priorities.

The most innovative part of the new law is its proposal for Agrarian Reform Cooperatives, a measure clearly intended to prevent further division of land, to concentrate agricultural investment and technology more effectively, and to smooth the transition toward an agricultural sector better geared to industrial and other developmental needs. The law lists improving extension education, marketing practices, credit distribution, housing and living conditions among the

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1 Agrarian Reform Law, Ankara, Prime Ministry, Agrarian Reform Secretariat, n.d. [1973].
purposes of the land reform coops. The cooperatives will be supervised by the regional offices of the General Directorate. Where scattered farmers choose to join in such a cooperative, the General Directorate has the power to nationalize adjacent and enclosed private land if a majority of the farms in the village have joined. The cooperatives will have a board of seven members, at least four of whom are farming members.

The law also contains strong and detailed provisions for the expropriation of land and payment of owners. There are several approaches to nationalization. First, on demand of a fourth of the landowners and with the consent of farmers owning a majority of the land in a village, nationalization may be voluntary. Second, the General Directorate can nationalize without consent where plots are scattered and "not convenient for profitable application of modern production techniques, of soil conservation and irrigation methods." A third, exceptional procedure is outlined whereby the General Directorate proceeds with the approval of the Council of Ministers. Nationalization may include all the land of a village, district or region, and may proceed even where land registration has not been completed. The General directorate may adjudicate land disputes with the consent of the owners. There seems little doubt that the new land agency has sweeping powers, though the implementation and strategy used in the land reform and reorganization remains to be seen.

The intent of the law is clearly to reduce absentee ownership, sharecropping, and tenancy by totally reorganizing land ownership in Turkey. The provisions for redistribution make this clear. Highest priority in redistribution goes to farmers (defined as actual cultivators with families on the soil) with inadequate land, or those with no land who have been sharecroppers or tenants for at least three years (art. 52). Second, a "family leader," a person who has worked in the region at least three years as a farm laborer. Land distribution is to provide "sufficient income" (15,000 TL/year/family, adjustable to family size).

The law permits the Prime Minister himself or his appointee, a Minister of State, to head the Agrarian Reform Secretariat, an indication of the priority given the reform (art. 102). The Director will also be a member of the Supreme State Planning Council and the Supreme Regulatory Board of Credits. He will also be Chairman of the Central Coordination Council, supervise a Research and Training Institute, and appoint Regional Directors of Agrarian Reform. Thus, the land reform agency is established outside the Ministry of Agriculture, a decision that was resisted in earlier efforts to pass land reform legislation and one that
suggests that the Ministry will be relegated to a more technical support role in the reorganization of Turkish agriculture. Given the unresponsiveness of the Ministry to organizational and village-level problems in the past, this is probably a wise decision, though it does not preclude the inter-ministerial infighting that has often delayed or handicapped other developmental programs over the past decade. The formation of a cabinet based on the Republican Peoples' Party, which has taken a more progressive position on land reform, opens the way for effective implementation of the law.

F. Conclusions

Translating aggregate change in the rural sector of Turkish life into a model of how local government and agriculture have interacted is clearly a complex matter. Theoretically, the lines of dependence are many and complex; practically, Turkey has followed a strategy of industrialization since 1923 and at least since the war has worked on the principle of a "mixed economy." In many respects, agriculture has developed in Turkey without strong governmental intervention of any kind except the general effects of price and market working through the economy. At least one respected Turkish scholar argues persuasively that modernization of agriculture pre-dates the move to more liberal economic policies in 1950, and the inflationary period of high wheat prices thereafter when much change did occur. According to him, the end of the war not only meant pent-up demand, but brought about labor shortages in the countryside and induced farmers to consider more efficient forms of cultivation.

Local government activities changed little in the decade following the war and it is virtually impossible to attribute advances in Turkish agricultural policy and performance to local government initiative. It is more difficult to attribute progress since the May 1960 Revolution to local government and administration, at least through any direct link.

Reflection on the overall nature of agricultural change, as outlined in this section, should make this reasonably clear. Arable land has gradually disappeared over the past decade, and, in fact, overpopulation in the countryside may have started the erosion of land resources by reducing fallow and pasture land. Farm size has tended to diminish and parceling remains an acute problem. Through the market mechanism most Turkish farmers are today dependent on cash crops and for practical purposes are part of the modern commercial economy. For reasons that had little to do with either local government or agriculture, an extensive road network was built,
thousands of tractors were imported and later produced, and a more diverse, specialized agriculture emerged in regions able to increase agricultural productivity—especially the Aegean, Marmara, Black Sea and Cukurova (Adana) regions. National planning did not begin on a large scale until midway in developments since the war; there was no regional planning except for several intensive projects with industrial justification; and generally speaking, project design and implementation in rural Turkey has lagged. One cannot escape the conclusion, however inapplicable this may appear for other developing countries, that Turkish agriculture modernized because the individual Turkish farmer modernized. The resources and incentives were placed before him and he responded, on the whole it appears, very well given Turkey's diminishing opportunity for new cultivation and the rapidly growing rural population.

Now, then, does government fit into this picture of relatively successful, if somewhat unplanned, agricultural development? Given the experience of many developing countries, it is no distraction from the accomplishments of Turkish government to suggest that its main contribution was not to stand in the way of self-initiated change. Turkey has not underestimated the capacity of her farmers to utilize and, at least in the early stages of development, to organize modern inputs into agriculture. Nor has the interaction of the major decision centers, described in Section I, placed impossible ideological or political constraints on the rural population. On the whole, the posture of the parties, bureaucracy and military has been to let the Turkish farmer and peasant respond as they will given the important condition—seldom found in other developing countries—that the farmers' votes might determine the basic political character of the government.

In a curious way, Turkey has gone well down the road to modernization, just as she achieved independence and was governed by Ataturk, with the peasant and farmer being an absolutely crucial support, but not an active participant. The institutional constraints on the use of power always left room for the peasant and farmer, such that the interaction of the urban, active population with the countryside was indirect and detached. Extremism did not trigger excessive demands from the countryside nor was the farmer simply forgotten. Conservative elements did not idealize or exclude the countryside. Progressive elements did not generate urban-rural antagonism. But all these things took place in an institutional framework that politicians, officers and administrators alike accepted and, except for brief periods, have worked within. One does not need to search for elusive subjective characteristics of Turks, such as their loyalty and patience, in order to explain this transformation. The local
administration was one key component in these institutions and was the most visible link between farmer and government, but behind the governor and sub-governor (kaymakam) was a political framework with durability and consistency of decision-making power. The most irreproducible ingredient in Turkey's agricultural development may not be some unique advantages, but rather the ability to sustain and build effective national institutions in a predominantly rural society.

III. Local Government and Administration

Turkish local government and administration displays all the institutional anomalies of local government in most nations, new and old. From an official view, the system of local government is well-defined and basically as an administrative arena of the state. The 67 provinces (il) are organized much like French prefects, and, indeed, the Provincial Administration Law was modeled on the French system when it was adopted in 1913, ten years before the founding of the Republic. The province, like France, constitutes both the basic unit of central administration at the local level, and the main unit for local territorial organization. But like most local government frameworks the Turkish system has undergone immense adjustments as economic, social and political changes have occurred over the past fifty years. Essentially, what we find operating in Turkey is the basic concept of an administrative state, indicative of the strong integrative grip that such local government systems have on rural people wherever this concept is operationalized. At the time of the 1960 revolution, the Ministry itself produced a report on local government reorganization, but the study has had no acknowledged effect. A professor active in local and community research suggested at a conference in 1969 that the sub-province (ilce) be made the "legal personality" of the local government system, but the community development justification for such a change diminished as Turkey learned, like many developing countries, that rural problems were not easily solved by this strategy.


Turkey differs from many developing countries in that many parts of central government are concerned with the operation of local government. As will be outlined in more detail below, there are defined budgetary, taxation and service obligations at all levels of the system. The local administrative system appears as a separate category in personnel and budgetary accounts of the central government. The Governor, though declining somewhat in prestige compared to other major positions, occupies one of the most sought-after positions in Turkish public life and is generally regarded as the pinnacle of the civil service career. The sub-province level position of kaymakam is looked upon as an important nurturing ground for innovative and energetic young civil servants, and they are to be found in many parts of the government after their original stint in Turkish towns and villages. Though social and economic change has to some extent flowed around local government, more than through its channels, few would argue that the development of Turkish towns, cities and villages over the past twenty years would have been possible without an orderly, dependable administrative structure at the local level. A strong argument could be made that one of Turkey's indispensable assets in attacking her problems since the war has been the framework institutionalized over 50 years in the Republic. As will be argued in more detail below, it is the absence of a framework bringing some form of national authority to the locality and some established channel of communication between subordinate units of government and the center that increasingly plagues developing countries. Whether such infrastructure is designed and implemented to meet political or developmental expediencies, experience suggests that local authority to be effective must have an institutional life of its own, not one at the mercy of political opportunists or disinterested officials.

Like nearly every facet of government in Turkey, local government was redefined in the 1961 Constitution. Article 116 defines local administration as "public corporate entities --created to meet the common local needs of the people in provinces, municipalities and villages, and their organs of general decision are elected by the people." The bureaucratic tone of this definition is, in fact, consistent with Turkish thinking about local governments. They have never been

1 See Roos and Roos, Managers of Modernization, op. cit.

2 The argument is developed more fully with contrasting examples in Douglas E. Ashford, Local Reform and National Development, op. cit.
autonomous in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, though this distinction in the actual dynamics of day-to-day government and politics is less real than constitutional lawyers often consider it to be. The new Constitution did make one important legal provision toward further autonomy in that local authorities can now lose their status only by court action, an advance over the previous status of local units which permitted dissolution of local councils by the Council of Ministers or the Minister of the Interior. This protection has been strengthened by two laws passed in 1963 giving the Council of State, the highest judicial body of system, the sole power of dissolving or dismissing elected local organs.\(^1\) Important as these legal provisions are to prevent intentional abuse and manipulation of local government, the significant changes in the system have come about under the pressure of urbanization, regional growth, and developmental needs. Adjusting to these pressures has been the major task of the local government framework over the past twenty years.

The physical characteristics of local government represent the spatial arrangement of people in a society. Whether one looks upon the centralized character of the Turkish system as an asset or a liability, the most noteworthy aspect of change affecting provinces, towns and villages has been the huge absolute increases in population organized in the system, and the spatial shifts, both in the country as a whole and among the various units of the system. The proportions of these changes are conveyed in Table IX.

Every part of Table IX reflects the enormous adjustments which Turkish local government and administration have had to make. Taking settlements up to 2,000, roughly the cut-off point for villages, the absolute number of villagers has increased by about 60 percent and the number of larger villages has almost doubled since 1935. The most phenomenal growth has been in intermediate sized towns, those between 2,000 and 50,000, which have also doubled in number in the past two generations and where the population has more than doubled. As might be expected, cities have also shown rapid growth, almost entirely since 1950. In 1960 Turkey was well on the way toward becoming basically an urban society, with more than 20 percent of her population in units of over 20,000 persons and nine major cities of over 100,000. If units over 10,000 are used as a measure, Turkey was nearly one-third urban in 1960. These changes alone should make clear that the formal representation of the Turkish local government system, either

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\(^1\)Mümtaz Soysal, Local Government in Turkey, Ankara, Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, 1967, p. 11.
Table IX: Urban and Rural Settlement Units by Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Over</td>
<td>No. of</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Places</td>
<td>(000)</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Places</td>
<td>(000)</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-150*</td>
<td>7,804</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3,749</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151-500</td>
<td>20,315</td>
<td>5,897</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>20,130</td>
<td>6,186</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-2,000</td>
<td>6,697</td>
<td>5,239</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>10,187</td>
<td>6,255</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-10,000</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>2,905</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001-20,000</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001-50,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,001-100,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,001 &amp; over</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (+)</td>
<td>35,279</td>
<td>16,098</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>34,737</td>
<td>21,684</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census data published by the State Institute of Statistics.

*Does not contain settlements where village law is not applied.
in law or even as it is represented in the minds of many Turks, is likely to fall far short of accurately representing the adjustments that have in fact taken place. Despite the many criticisms that can be leveled against the Turkish local government system, an impartial evaluation must also take into account the unmistakable elasticity of the system working under severe stress.

A. Provincial Government and Administration

The basic structure of the provincial government has changed little since the Ordinance of 1913, although a Province Administration Act was passed in 1949 to clarify accumulated administrative confusion in the operations of provincial government. In fact, more and more functions have been transferred to central or regional authorities, though the work of these interstitial bodies is supposed to be coordinated with the Governors. Thus, initial efforts to improve highways, water works and village development often escaped consideration by Governors, though they assumed responsibility for the maintenance and support of projects under these ministries. As social services grew, they too were partially removed from direct provincial administration; since 1948 the construction of primary schools is regulated by the central government, and since 1950 provincial hospitals and clinics have come under more direct ministerial supervision. Though these changes do not compromise the principles on which Turkish local government is based, they have in fact meant that the developmental role of the provincial and other local governments has not expanded as rapidly as might be expected, and in some respects local authority is more confined to routine tasks while new activities tend to be controlled from their respective ministries.

Nevertheless, the Governor (vali) remains a powerful figure at the provincial level. He represents not only the Ministry of the Interior in each province but also each ministry (see Figure I). He coordinates the work of other ministries, reviews all budget requests from the province to the center, and prepares evaluations of government personnel attached to the provincial government. Through the sub-governors (kaymakam), he is responsible for maintaining order in the province, supervising the police, population movements and political relations in the province. The Provincial Council and Standing Committee seldom operate as an effective check to his power. The Local Election Law of 1963 provides for a Provincial Council elected for four years from each sub-governorate (often called "counties" or kaza), proportionate to population and using proportional representation. The Council normally meets only 40 days a year, is presided over by the Governor and has an agenda prepared by him. The
Figure I: Organization of Local Administration
Governor must approve all their decisions and where disagreement occurs, which is rare, he has twenty days to register the conflict with the Council of State for resolution.

The Governor is required in the beginning of each annual session to report on the programs and progress of the local administration. If the report is declared unsatisfactory by two-thirds of the Council, the proceedings and the report are sent to the Minister of the Interior, who then may appoint a new Governor. According to Soysal, there has never been a case of direct conflict between a governor and a council. Although parties exist in the Councils, and turnout is fairly high as local government elections go—78 percent of eligible voters in 1963 and 66 percent in 1968, the Councils have not become a link in national politics, nor a source of political pressure at either the provincial or national level. In the 1963 elections, the Justice Party won 45 percent of the seats and the Peoples' Party 36 percent; in the 1968 elections, the Justice Party increased its hold with 49 percent of the seats, and the Peoples' Party dropped to 28 percent.

Numerous explanations might be offered as to why there has not been more political activity at the province level. Most important is the tutelary character of local administration itself, which has never cultivated the notion of political representation at subordinate levels of government, nor is the organization of government itself suited for this kind of control. Moreover, the members of the National Assembly are fairly active at the local level, interceding on behalf of their constituencies and villages at the center where most decisions are made. There are too many councils and too many members (nearly 1,800) for them to become a recruiting ground for parties, and under the new election law, party organization at the grassroots is severely curtailed. Though hardly the deterrent to political activism that it is sometimes thought to be, the educational level of the members of the Councils is fairly low: 16 percent illiterate, 20 percent literate only, 44 percent primary school only, and 20 percent some higher or secondary education. Though the passive role

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1Soysal, Local Government in Turkey, op. cit., p. 36.


of the Councils raises interesting contradictions given other Turkish goals, raising more local revenue, for example, there has been no effort by any major power group to increase the Council's activity or power.

There seems little doubt that the intent of the Committee on Reorganization of the Central Government, and most other governmental advisors, in the early 60's were favorably inclined toward more autonomy for local government, but more within the French concept of "deconcentration" rather than an aggressive form of decentralization. In many respects, the entire issue remains a moot question until the central government decides to provide provincial and other local authorities with sufficient financial resources to engage in developmental activities on their own initiative, or unless a major, and very unlikely, shift were to take place in Turkish developmental strategy putting major developmental programs and projects more directly under local control. Numerous Turkish experts have noted that the share of public revenue handled by provincial and other local governments is only 10 to 15 percent, and the trend has been for it to decline.1 The general situation on expenditures can be seen in Table X, showing that total revenues of provincial authorities have multiplied two and one-half times in the past decade, approaching a billion lira in 1972. A rough idea of the proportionate importance of this expenditure, much of which is for operating needs, can be seen in comparing this with overall growth of public expenditure and investment, given for 1967 to 1972.

Although provincial budgets have been increasing at a much faster rate than overall national expenditure and investment, a large portion of this increase has come about because of personnel reforms. As noted above, civil servants were severely underpaid until the past decade. The civil service reforms following the 1960 revolution made increases in pay obligatory for all civil servants, which, of course, included the local administration (not including teachers who are paid directly by the Ministry of Education). Thus, total personnel expenditure by provincial authorities were 211 million l. in 1970, 337 in 1971 and 411 in 1972. The actual percentage of budgets devoted to personnel has increased, being 34 percent in 1970, 49 percent in 1971 and 44 percent in 1972. In percentage terms, current expenditure is by far the largest cost of provincial administration: 68 percent in 1970, 30 percent

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Table X: Provincial Authority Budgets and National Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Prov. Budget (Mil. TL)</th>
<th>Public Current Expend. (Bil. TL)</th>
<th>Public Investment Expend. (Bil. TL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1971 and 77 percent in 1972. If provincial, municipal and village budgets are totaled, coming to 5.7 billion lira in 1972, of which 4.3 is municipal, the entire local government system accounts for 10.9 percent of public expenditure.

Provincial expenditures are covered from three sources: their own revenues, their share of taxes collected by the central government, and grants-in-aid from the central government. Local revenue is based largely on land and building taxes, but assessments have not been revised since pre-war days and local revenue is meager. The national government contributes a share of both the petroleum tax (22 percent) and road taxes and fines (3 percent). Grants-in-aid are by far the most important. Though time series breakdowns are not available, Soysal notes that in 1963 over two-thirds of provincial local administration budgets came from this source.

1Mahalli İdarelerimiz İle İlgili Bazı Genel ve Sayısal Bilgiler, op. cit., p. 38.
After years of political and administrative conflict over how to increase the incomes of local authorities, a Fiscal Law was passed in 1973, the first major reform in local finance since the founding of the system. Land and building taxes will no longer be collected by provinces, but by the Ministry of Finance. There will be a new assessment, which in many instances has meant that new buildings decreased in value and older buildings increased. The property tax will be divided approximately 35 percent for provincial and village government; 45 percent to municipal governments; and the remaining to stay with the central government. When the bill went to the National Assembly, its potential impact was considerably reduced by amendments exempting taxation on agricultural land and houses up to 50,000 lira. The full effects of the reassessment, even with considerable exemptions, have not yet been analyzed. The result is again a compromise of the various centers of power in the Turkish system, including parliamentary reluctance to tax small property owners, administrative infighting over methods of tax collection, and the struggle for budgetary survival of the local governments.1

The censuses of state personnel in 1963 enable us to make some rough inferences about the importance of provincial government in relation to central government, and about how the provincial and village system has allocated its human resources. From 1961 to 1967 the total number employed in the system increased from 16,437 to 20,593.2 As a proportion of all state employees, the provincial system has remained exactly the same, accounting for 6 percent of all civil servants, which increased from 449,000 to 593,000, a 30 percent increase while the provincial structure increased by about 25 percent. The 1964 census gives further detail on the quality and utilization of provincial personnel.3 The census showed 16 percent of these employees illiterate, 20 percent literate, 44 percent with primary education, and 12 percent with "middle school" or the first phase of secondary education. Only .9 percent or 141 persons in provincial administration had a university education. Over 7,000 of the 16,283 provincial administrators work in general administration and education, respectively. About 1,000 are in public works, leaving

1 Interview.
2 Kamu Personeli Kadro İstatistikleri, op. cit., p. 7.
very small numbers for other services such as 109 in public health, 244 in agriculture and veterinary medicine.

The intermediate level of administration for the provinces is the sub-governorate, also called counties or ilçe (formerly kaza). There are from five to 20 ilçe per province, with high numbers located mainly in Central Anatolia (Ankara has 27) and in the eastern provinces (Erzurum has 22). There were 527 sub-governorates in 1965, each having a kaymakam, who acts in much the same capacity as the Governor. He represents central authority through the Ministry of the Interior and the Governor, to whom he reports. As at the provincial level, there are representatives of various ministries, usually including the Ministries of Health, Finance, Agriculture, Education and Village Affairs. The kaymakam also works through an administrative board and serves as budgetary officer for the ilçe, much like the Governor.

One of the important services of the Institute for Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East has been to conduct a special program to train young career officers of the Ministry of the Interior, who usually start as kaymakam, in developmental planning and project design.

The opinion is often expressed among government officials that the influx of new, more highly motivated kaymakam in the 60's has created a particular problem in the Ministry of Interior, as numerous talented young officials have left the Ministry to work in the State Planning Organization and elsewhere because the chances of promotion to Governor are limited. A study of the Faculty of Political Science has shown rather divergent role perceptions expressed by governors and sub-governors; kaymakam indicated that village affairs occupied them most, while governors were more concerned with security, administration, public works, etc. This is, of course, partly a function of the level of their positions, but nonetheless the kaymakam is clearly a key, and possibly neglected, link to the village. Over 90 percent indicated they visited each village in their area at least once a year.

The diversity of the ilçe is well known and their aggregate characteristics well analyzed by Professor Geray.

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1In addition, the 67 provincial centers are also designated as "central ilçe." They were, until recently, administered by the Governor.

2Kaza ve Vilayet İdaresi Uzerine Bir Arastirma (Research on Province and District Administration), Ankara, Faculty of Political Science, 1957.

Using the 1960 census, 60 percent of the ilçe have a total population from 10 to 40 thousand, and another 25 percent have a population from 40 to 70 thousand. There are 19 with less than 10,000 persons and 20 percent in units between 40 and 70,000. From a developmental and administrative perspective, the number of villagers per ilçe is more revealing. The average is approximately 50 villages per ilçe, though 80 have 20 or fewer villages, and 50 have over a 100. The Geray study showed that only 519 ilçes had an agricultural expert, although 899 were recently removed from the next lower level, the district or bucak. He calculated that if one takes a ratio of one agricultural technician to every 12 villages, 3,100 agricultural personnel are needed. If one adds to this the Ministry of Agriculture’s estimate of 7,700 extension agents, it appears that over 4,000 additional field personnel are needed in agriculture.

The survey of Professor Frey in 1962 made very clear the important role of kaymakam as a link to rural Turkey. Thirteen percent of the sample indicated the President to be most important in village matters, 9 percent, the Governor, and 43 percent, the kaymakam. The report on reorganizing the Turkish government calls for the “realignment of counties in proportion to the need for services” and suggests that better administration at the provincial level could relieve the county of much of its administrative routine, presumably to leave the kaymakam to work more closely with communities and local level development. There is no indication that this suggestion has been implemented, although the kaymakam does appear to be the official best placed to contribute in specific and concrete ways to rural and agricultural development.

Beneath the ilçe is the district or bucak, of which there were 887 in 1965. They are not corporate bodies, and have no property, budget, or state personnel. Their functions are limited to liaison with the kaymakam, registering births and deaths, and helping settle local disputes. At a time when communications were poor in Turkey they may well have served as the sole, if not very effective, link to the grassroots, but development over the past decade has made very clear that villages and towns in most regions now have their own exchange with government at higher levels or through the markets and other private sector links. The report on reorganizing the Turkish government recommends that the bucak be abolished, while others feel that it should be rescued in an expanded community development program.

1Organization and Functions of the Central Government of Turkey, op. cit., p. 46.
Although the government has not enlarged community development programs since the First Plan, the bucak has not yet been abolished.

B. Village Government and Administration

Villages are subordinate to the provincial administrative structure, organized under the Village Law of 1924, which defines a village as any settlement of less than 2,000 persons. The law also states that it applies to all villages of over 150 population, though smaller communities may apply to be attached to existing villages by Governors. Given the social complexities of rural Turkey, uniform application of the law has been impossible. Thus, there are 35,441 communities in Turkey classified as villages for population purposes, but in addition there are 29,636 settlements of various kinds, making a total of 65,277 communities where the law may be applied.1 Despite urbanization trends in Turkey, the administrative problem remains immense. The percentage of villagers to total population has decreased from 75 percent in 1927 to about 60 percent in 1970, a reduction of one-fifth. However, the number of units has not decreased proportionately, there being 40,991 formally classified villages in 1977 compared to roughly 36,000 today, or a decrease of 10 percent and still a large absolute number of communities.2 Though it has not been statistically analyzed, there is wide variation in their distribution among provinces, the largest number being in Sivas (1,217) and the smallest in Hakkari (143). A general notion of these complexities can be seen in Tables XI and XII.

The village in Turkish historical development is a good example of how low levels of administration can be overburdened. The Village Law of 1924 lists numerous obligatory duties, including clean water, road repair, swamp drainage, village schools, tree planting, etc., in such abundance that most village governments can barely meet their legally established requirements. Numerous studies of village administration have concluded, as does Professor Yasa, that the law requires "the performance of duties too numerous, vast and varied" and presupposing "a culture and experience which the

1 Second Plan, op. cit., p. 262.
Table XI: Actual Numbers and Percentages of Population and Headmen in Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>No. Headmen</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-150</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151-500</td>
<td>19,442</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>6,148</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000</td>
<td>9,829</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>6,78'</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-2000</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 and over</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the 1965 census and collapsed in Soysal, Local Government in Turkey, p. 15; for more detail see Mahalli İdarelerimiz İle İlgili Bazı Generel ve Sayisal Bilgiler (1972), (General and Political Statistics on Local Administration), Ankara, Ministry of the Interior, 1973, p. 90.

Table XII: Average Village Population and Percentage Non-agglomerated by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Average Village Population</th>
<th>% Village Population Non-agglomerated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

headman (muhtar) and the elders do not possess.\textsuperscript{1} Nothing was done to adjust requirements to the highly diverse nature of Turkish rural society, or to relieve the villages of their obligatory and somewhat stultifying obligations, until the "central village" plan began to be implemented over the past year. How well this plan will be coordinated with rural needs and administrative realities remains to be seen.

The Village Law makes the village council the basic unit of administration and includes the entire adult population. The council in practice is largely confined to male adults in most villages and there are, of course, wide variations on how different kinds of villages arrive at agreement. The council elects the headman (muhtar), village priest (iemam), and decides how obligatory and optional duties will be accomplished. The councils range in size from eight to 12 members, the members must be at least 25 years of age and are elected for four years. A 1963 law also requires that the headman be literate. The village teacher sits as an ex-officio member of the council, and more recently the village priest has been added ex-officio. The headman's position in the village is clearly a potential focus of great conflict, not only because of the intricacies of village society, but also because he, like the Governor, has a dual role as executive of the central administration and representative of the village council and population. In most cases, headmen can only spare a portion of their time for their duties since they receive only small salaries. Their decisions are reviewed by the kaymakam, who can arbitrarily annul expenditures, and then are sent up the chain of provincial administration to be reviewed and approved by the Governor and the Ministry of the Interior.

As noted in the discussion of provincial finances, the amount allocated to village budgets barely covers their obligatory expenses, including the required services and small amounts for the headman, imam, clerk and guardian. (An extremely controversial decision was the law passed in 1965 to place imams on the public payroll and to integrate them into the civil service with regular government benefits.)\textsuperscript{2} Although village budgets have more than doubled from 1962 to 1971,\textsuperscript{3} the total remains infinitesimal, slightly over 400,000

\textsuperscript{1}Ibrahim Yasa, "The Village as an Administrative Unit," in A. H. Hanson, et. al., Studies in Turkish Local Government, Ankara, Institute for Public Administration in Turkey and the Middle East, 1955, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{2}See Soysal, Local Government in Turkey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{3}Mahalli, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 93.
lira in 1971. As with the provinces, the village revenue sources are also defined by law and have remained unchanged since 1924. At that time a household tax (salma) was imposed of 20 lira, which provides an estimated third of village revenues, even though the base tax has been at this level since 1939. The second largest revenue source is collective labor or imece which predates the founding of the Republic and provides about a tenth of the village budgets. At the discretion of the village Council tasks can be required of all villagers, who contribute either labor or money to pay others if they are unable to do so.

Although considerable improvements have been made in village infrastructure since the war, the facilities remain meager. The most popular improvement is a mosque; over 23,000 of the 35,000 villages have built one of these. Roughly a third have rudimentary facilities such as a barbershop, small grocer, coffee shop or miller. The primary educational system has been extended to most villages and there were 32,160 primary schools in villages in 1965. Although literacy is steadily rising in rural Turkey, it must be much lower than the 48 percent literacy given for Turkey as a whole in 1965. Since 1961, school attendance has been obligatory from seven to 16 years of age. The Ministry of Education has claimed since 1971 that all eligible primary school children, nearly six million students, are attending class. Nevertheless, the French-modeled system virtually excludes village children from secondary and high school opportunities, due to the severe reduction in students advancing upward. To alleviate this inequity the Ministry undertook the construction of regional boarding schools during the Second Plan to provide the first half of the secondary cycle to rural youth, and 15,000 students were thus enrolled in 1967 with the aim to increase enrollment to 30,000 by 1972. In other respects, villages have done less well. There are only 242 health centers and 2,271 clinics in villages. The ratio of doctors to population is 1:93,000; of nurses 1:11,500; and of midwives 1:3,800.1 About 24,000 villages can be reached by vehicle and about 5,000 have telephones.2

1 Mahalli, op. cit., p. 102.

C. Municipal Administration

Although municipal administration might be excluded from consideration here as dealing with urban rather than rural components of local administration and government, very good arguments can be found for carefully including urban issues in any analysis of how power is disaggregated in a society. Despite the large agricultural sector, Turkey is an urbanizing country and her industrial strategy means that urban problems will multiply. In 1927, 16 percent of the population lived in towns and cities over 10,000 and about 18 percent lived in this way in 1950, not a very great change in over 20 years; however, almost 30 percent lived in large centers of this size by 1965, a large increase in only a decade and a half. The overall urban structure of Turkey is given in Table XIII.

Table XIII: Percentages of Total and Urban Population 1945 and 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City Size</th>
<th>% Total Pop.</th>
<th>% Urban Pop.</th>
<th>% Total Urban Cities</th>
<th>% Urban Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-50,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-100,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 100,000</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Given the land scarcity and agricultural development strategy of Turkish planners, there is every reason to think that this flow to cities will continue, though the Turkish development plans deal very inadequately with this difficult structural problem, as with many others. (The Second Five Year Plan, a document of 695 pages, gives five pages to urbanization as a general question, and this does little more than sketch in the aggregate nature of the problem.\(^1\) There

are other sections on housing and urban related issues, but they are not linked to actual patterns of urban growth, land use or social change.) Local administration and government has a key role to play as population movement continues, and it may be, in fact, the highly centralized nature of Turkish local government that facilitates neglect of the problem.

Municipal government in Turkey is based on the same principles as provincial and village administration, though the diversity of collectivities placed within this uniform framework is no less than that of villages or provinces. Indeed, were size alone used as an indicator, it would appear that many municipalities are extremely rural and probably more closely linked to rural society than to industrial society. There were 1,571 municipalities in 1972, of which 1,090 had under 5,000 residents.¹ On the other hand, some provinces, such as Marmara were 47 percent urbanized in 1965 and very likely need a very different kind of local government than Anatolia, for example, which was 17 percent urban in 1965, or the Black Sea region which was 14 percent urban then. All provincial headquarters are classified as municipalities, 554 of the 572 sub-governorates are municipalities, and 332 of the 887 districts are municipalities. This leaves 618 municipalities that are not directly in touch with the provincial administration system.² Very little research has been done on how Governors, kaymakams and district officials relate to the municipal governments where the two systems overlap, though their interaction would be useful in understanding how the central administrative system and the more autonomous towns and cities manage, or fail to manage, to cooperate. The predominance of the municipality system of local government is clear from total figures; of the 36 million persons in Turkey, roughly 17 million come under this form of administration or 49 percent of the population.³

The overall pattern of migration to cities is known, though it has not been addressed in Turkish development plans. Since 1950 the three largest cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, have accounted for two-thirds or more of internal provincial migration, Istanbul alone accounting for nearly half.⁴

¹ Mahalli, op. cit., pp. 9 and 49.
² Ibid., p. 47.
³ Ibid., p. 6.
Special urban authorities are being discussed, and Istanbul has begun to organize a metropolitan authority to overcome the highly divided structure of local administration in the region. The provincial and municipal administrations are more concerned with migration occurring outside these major urban centers, but migration to these centers is far from negligible, involving nearly 200,000 persons in 1950 and 1955, and over 300,000 in 1960. Geray also provides a regional breakdown of urbanization that helps reveal the diverse nature of the administrative problem. Using the 10,000 and over definition of urbanism, Marmara was 43 percent urban in 1960; Southern Anatolia, Aegean and Inner Anatolia from 25 to 30 percent urban; while the South Eastern, Eastern Anatolian and Black Sea regions were from 10 to 15 percent urban. These differences and their social implications will be discussed further in the section below on regional planning.

The Municipalities Law was passed in 1930 and has not been significantly changed since that time. Under the law, a village or town can apply for municipality status if it has a population of 2,000 or more, although petitions to become municipalities are filtered through a number of agencies of government, starting with Governors and continuing to the Council of State and the President. The reason for this is that by achieving municipal status a community qualifies for additional grants-in-aid and funds from the Bank of the Provinces, considerably altering the financial disadvantage that most communities classified as villages encounter. Though no careful study has been done it is generally recognized that political pressures, often through parties, are important in having municipal status granted by the central administration. Over the past ten years from 20 to 60 new municipalities have been created each year. Granting municipality status cannot be entirely due to party pressures, since from 1970 to 1972, a period of coalition government under martial law constraints, 204 municipalities were added, the largest rate of increase since 1960. No doubt, much of the pressure also comes from the severe multiplication of urban problems as a result of the urbanization pressures described above, and within the Turkish system elevation to municipal status is the sole alternative to providing some measure of local autonomy in order to work out solutions to local problems. No detailed analysis of the additions has been made, much less the justifications, but Soysal notes that "almost all" of the municipalities added were below 20,000 persons, while the proportion of population living in larger municipalities has increased.

1 Mahalli, op. cit., p. 48.
2 Soysal, Local Government in Turkey, op. cit., p. 23.
Like the provincial and village laws, the Municipal Law carefully enumerates the obligations of the municipality under the general aim "to regulate and meet the civilized and common needs of the urban population, to provide for their health, safety and welfare and to prevent the deterioration of the urban discipline." The main compulsory duties are to control public places (bars, coffee houses, hotels, cinemas, etc.); to cooperate with central government in preventive disease measures; to manage burials; to ensure sanitation in slaughter houses, restaurants, etc.; to provide public transport; to provide building inspection, fire protection and street cleaning; and to prepare plans for expansion and investment for at least five years in the future. Where annual revenues exceed 50,000 lira, obligations increase to include construction of slaughter houses and wholesale markets; where revenues reach 200,000 lira, orphanages, maternity hospitals, day-nurseries and other facilities become obligatory. At the luxurious level of 500,000 lira, stadiums and race tracks are required. The wholly unrealistic nature of the law has long been recognized, and legislation was pending in 1973 to revise the Municipal Law.

Each municipality has a mayor, municipal council and municipal committee. The members of the council are elected for four years by direct vote and under proportional representation by party. Voters must be literate, resident for six months, 25 years of age or more, and under no obligation to the government (have done military service, not hold a municipal contract, etc.). The 1963 Law on Municipal Elections also provides that civil servants running for office must first resign their posts; nor can a candidate for the council hold any other elected post at the village, provincial or national level. This is an intriguing departure from the basically French character of Turkish local government, and in practice it eliminates one of the important political links between lower levels of government and the center that operates in the French system. Unlike with the provincial council, ministerial approval is not required for all decisions of the municipal council. Some decisions, such as budget and finance (municipalities can issue bonds) require provincial authorization; some go to the Council of State (loans for over 25 years); some issues, such as boundary disputes may be decided by the Council of Ministers. It is not a strict ultra vires requirement, for acts of the municipality not explicitly qualified by law are legitimate unless challenged in the courts by the "tutelary" authorities, meaning in most cases the Ministry of the Interior.

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The municipal council elects its own municipal committee, which also includes the appointed heads of municipal services. It oversees the daily workings of the mayor, and the possibility of deadlock is forestalled by giving the mayor the right to bring such issues before the highest local representative of the central government, in most cases this would be the Governor. Until the electoral reform of 1963, mayors were elected by the councils, but now they are directly elected for four years. Rather more than the Governors, whose dependence on the center is quite clear, the position of the mayors is more demanding and potentially it involves more conflict. Increasingly, the mayoralty has become a position of acknowledged influence and probably is the most fully politicized post below the national legislature. A survey done in 1964 indicates that compared with those occupying administrative positions in provinces and villages, the municipalities, as one might expect, have more highly educated personnel. Of the mayors in 1964, 55 percent have only primary education, but 22 percent had secondary education and 23 percent lycée or university education. In 1972, only 11 percent of the mayors had less than primary education or less, 60 percent secondary school education, and 29 percent lycée or university education. Thus, the increase in the number of municipalities in the late 60's seems to have added a number of less educated mayors, but there has also been a spread in the direction of more highly educated mayors as well, no doubt in the larger towns and cities.

Interest in municipal elections appears to have diminished between the 1963 and 1968 contests, though the overall level compares favorably with local elections in many more industrial nations. Sixty-nine percent of the eligible voters went to the polls in 1963, and 59 percent in 1968. The results for most recent municipal elections for the two major parties are given in Table XIV. The results confirm the often recognized loss of support of the Peoples' Party in municipal politics, though the total figures tell nothing about loss in more rural or urban municipalities. Nor do the figures tell whether the growing influence of the Justice Party in urban politics can be attributed to its more liberal, business orientation, though this would be consistent with the results. The overall trend should be qualified with Ozbudun's analysis of national voting according to a different urban-rural breakdown. Despite the Justice Party's rural traditions,

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1. Rusen Keleş and Cevat Geray, Türk Belediye Baskanları (Turkish Mayors), Ankara, Turkish Municipalities Association, 1964, p. 17.
Table XIV: Mayorality and Council Elections in 1963 and 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of Votes Received (000's)</th>
<th>Percent of Votes</th>
<th>Number of Mayors/Councillors</th>
<th>Percent Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1963</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples'</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7,469</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples'</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6,485</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1968</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples'</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9,957</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples'</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6,575</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mahalli, p. 54.

it did better in cities than in the countryside in all three national elections in the 60's. Nonetheless, at the same time, it did lose urban support across the country except in the East Central region. The Peoples' Party made small gains in all the more developed regions, except in the three eastern regions and the South Central region, where both urban and rural support declined. The comparison indicates that the national loss of strength of the Justice Party has not been proportionately reflected in municipal elections. The reasons for this difference in the voters' perception of national and local representation deserve more careful analysis than is possible here.

All municipalities have the same revenue sources as defined by law. These include a share of national and provincial taxes, involving income, customs and excise taxes

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Ozbudun, Political Participation in Turkey, op. cit., Ch. V.
which are much larger than funds shared by provinces and villages; direct taxes, including income from levies, licenses and fines; income from municipal utilities. In 1962, roughly a fourth of municipal revenues came from national and provincial taxes, nearly half from municipal levies, fees and fines, and about a fifth from public utility profits. The total income of the municipalities for 1962 was over 900 million lira and nearly 3,000 million lira in 1972, more than triple the earlier figure. Compared to provincial and village budgets, the municipalities in 1972 were spending about three times as much as the provinces and about six times as much as villages. To provide a rough comparison, Table XV has been devised to compare overall finances at two levels in the Turkish system.

Table XV: Amounts and Percentages of Current, Development and Transfer Funds for Provinces and Municipalities in 1972 (million TL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mahalli, pp. 23 and 62. There is a choice between taking the total revenue of municipalities (2,856 million lira) or the total budget, as used.

As the table indicates, municipalities have fared well in acquiring a large share of developmental funds. The budgeted figure does not include loans from the Provincial Bank of over one billion lira. The municipalities have benefited from their degree of autonomy and had accumulated large deficits, which has also multiplied their income more than is possible for provinces. In 1965, the government decided that municipal finances were in such irreparable condition that, like the State Economic Enterprises, the municipalities had

1 Soysal, Local Government in Turkey, op. cit., p. 28.
2 Mahalli, op. cit., p. 72.
their debts deleted and transferred to the Treasury. There is a certain irony in this debt consolidation for in effect it has permitted the municipalities to benefit from deficit financing, while the Ministry of Finance has held the line against deficit financing for the central government and the more directly controlled provinces.

Only 80 percent of nationally collected taxes shared with municipalities are distributed directly. Their balance is held by the Ministry of the Interior in the Municipal Fund and used to finance interest-free, long-term loans to municipalities under 50,000 persons for the improvement of local services, such as water, sewerage and electrification. Thus, there is some redistribution of income within the municipality system, though the use of the fund has sometimes produced partisan political controversy and generates considerable lobbying by mayors of any political persuasion in the Ministry of the Interior. In most countries, property taxes provide the major share of local income, but in Turkey they furnish only from 2 to 4 percent. Property taxes are collected under the new Fiscal Law by the Ministry of Finance, previously by the provincial administration and Ministry of the Interior. The municipalities received back one-fourth of the property tax, so the total amount raised, at least under the old tax assessments, was minimal. To a remarkable extent, then, the local government system has been energetically fostering development over the past decade with no effective means of taxing the expanding property base except as it may be reflected in individual incomes.

Municipalities come under national civil service requirements, a condition that municipalities have tried unsuccessfully to revise. This means that the increased incomes and benefits passed on to civil servants under the reforms of the 60's placed a large burden on local government, but, of course, this also protects municipalities against the loss of personnel to higher paid jobs at the center. From 1961 to 1967, the total number of municipal employees increased from 37,263 to 45,432. As a proportion of all state employees the municipal system, unlike the provincial system, diminished slightly in relative importance, accounting for 15 percent of all state employees in 1961 and 13 percent in 1967. However,

the most rapid increase in municipalities came after 1967 so that more recent figures would probably show that municipal personnel have actually remained about the same proportion of all state employees. For the period available, municipalities were adding employees much more slowly than the government as a whole, experiencing a 22 percent increase over the six years while the total increased by 30 percent.

The 1963 census helps show the quality and utilization of municipal personnel. Like the provincial figure, the census records a larger number than the personnel account, 45,131 as compared to 39,908 for 1963. Very likely the frequent practice of part-time and extraordinary employees account for the survey arriving at a higher number than the official budgets. As might be expected, municipalities have been able to employ significantly better educated people than the provincial administration, a differential in the working of the two systems that may enhance the development of the more urban centers. The census showed 11 percent of the employees illiterate, 17 percent literate only, 47 percent with primary education and 5 percent with "middle school" education. Nearly 2,000 had a lycee education (as compared with nearly 500 for the provinces), and 1.7 percent or 1,685 had a university education (as compared with .9 percent or 141 for provincial administration). Some rough idea can be gotten of their impact on more rural areas by examining their location among types of municipalities. Nearly 30,000 of the 45,000 employees were in provincial centers, all of which are classified as municipalities, and about 15,000 or only a third of these personnel work in district, sub-district or village level municipalities. Compared to the provincial administration, municipal administration seems somewhat less competitive. Over 5,000 of the 16,283 civil servants in provincial government entered through competitive examination, about a third; in the municipalities, despite the higher educational level, about 13,000 or 29 percent entered by competitive exam. Personnel expenditures account for 36 percent of municipalities' total expenditure, and 64 percent of current expenditure.

Geray has pointed out that the smaller municipalities have greater need for governmental support, for most are in transition between being a village and becoming a town.

1 Deylet Personel Sayimi: Özel İdareler ve Belediyeler, op. cit.
2 Mahalli, op. cit., p. 79.
Much the same conclusion would be made in reasoning about the
relation between moving from agricultural products into com-
mercial crops and light industry, where consumption is fairly
well organized, and the surrounding regions have in most cases
reached a high level of commercial agriculture so that farmers
are able to utilize urban services and meet urban demands.
The situation is much different in the 1,090 municipalities
under 5,000 persons, which are in many ways advanced villages,
or possibly communities that have exercised their political
influence more successfully to get the advantages of municipal
status. Another 217 municipalities fall between 5,000 and
10,000 persons. The Geray case study points out that where
small communities become municipalities, budgets usually
double from their village level, nearly all the increase being
absorbed by the central government. In the communities he
studied, 70 percent of the budget came from the center. In
addition, the improvement loans from the Provincial Bank
have gone almost entirely to municipalities, and the Ministry
of the Interior has its own long-term, interest-free loan to
help smaller municipalities. All these facts underscore both
the need as well as the capabilities for assisting and co-
ordinating change in growing communities. Under the present
system, however, neither needs nor resources seem to be
brought to bear on local problems in terms of these struc-
tural difficulties. The Turkish government has made several
efforts to develop a more integrated approach to social and
economic change, and their experience will be reviewed before
turning to the vital national-local link.

D. Structural Alternatives

As has been suggested in earlier parts of this paper,
bringing together the aggregate effects of rapid agricultural
change, which Turkey has surely managed to achieve whatever
her intentions may have been, and the spatial, social and
political elements of development in some geographic focal
point is a difficult task, both conceptually and practically.
This analysis is not as concerned with the conceptual problem
as with Turkey's actual behavior, though the problem of con-
ceptualizing how structural units are fashioned to facilitate
control and encourage basic change in a society is as much a
problem for real world planners as it is a problem of social
science theory. It is perhaps worth underscroring this point.
The State Planning Organization, the Ministry of the Interior
and other nation-building institutions lacked an overall con-
cept of how social units would emerge from several decades
of intensive developmental effort, although in fact they had
a very sophisticated model of how aggregate economic change
would occur. Turkey is by no means alone in this regard, for a singularly striking characteristic of planned developmental efforts in nearly all developing countries since the war has been the formulation of a national plan, derived largely from macro-production and financial estimates, and little else in the way of explicit measurable aims. Because plans of this kind have the sole virtue of telling the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury how the country is doing, they are of little use in judging a country's accomplishments in other regards, and practically useless in dealing with structural problems of any sort.

Therefore, it is no reflection on Turkey that the structural alternatives have been selected sometimes almost inadvertently through the interplay of ministerial interests and conflict, with a small amount of party and military politics on the side. To assume that the various parties to the decisions affecting structural transformation of Turkey had no overall vision of the meaning of their decision would be naive, and more than a little demeaning to Turkish government officials. Each had their vision, but unlike for the balance of payments, foreign loan and production targets, their visions were neither systematically assembled nor collectively discussed. Any country entering into a rapid transition undergoes this experience, and many problems are no better analyzed in highly industrial countries. The point is that the problems raised in studying local administration and agricultural development are amenable to generalization, and policy-makers do indeed have generalizations in mind, even where data are scarce and institutions not well coordinated. Where such generalizations are founded on weak grounds they may be even more disastrous than the systematic, if often ambitious, schemes of macro-economic planners. Oversight, convenience and negligence often result in decisions which are such only in a formal sense.

Two illustrations may suffice before looking more closely at three structural alternatives that were indeed introduced in Turkey to bring the process of agricultural transformation into some ordered relationship with government. In the discussion of municipalities there was an outline of the scale of urbanization which Turkey has undergone over the past 20 years. Reasonably good statistics exist on the

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1 An economist of no less repute than J. Tinbergen provided the elements of the economic development model. For details see his essay, "Methodological Background of the Plan," and also Y. Kıcık, "The Macro-Model of the Plan," in Ilkin and İnanc, Planning in Turkey, op. cit., pp. 71-77 and 78-95, respectively.
overall dimensions of the problem, that is, population flows, urban facilities, employment needs, education requirements, all processes that are overseen by government. Urbanization is in many ways no more enlightening a notion than is economic growth, but the structural needs of cities and towns might have been assembled and at least a rough exercise done to relate the human implications of urban growth to the overall process of economic growth. Another example that rests almost wholly within the bureaucracy and is more specific is the long-standing issue of civil service reform. The military were undoubtedly correct that the rapidly decreasing real income of administrators led to a variety of abuses and subterfuges in the world of the bureaucracy. However, the legal stipulations placed on local government meant that huge additional burdens were placed on municipal and provincial budgets at precisely the wrong time. The central government was then forced into the expedient solution of providing personnel subsidies. The Turkish government is quite capable of estimating the various effects of budgetary decisions of this kind. Moreover, it remains doubtful whether the improved incomes of officials have indeed changed administrative behavior. The benefit was not linked to any incentive to change the acknowledged evil. In the immediate area of interest for local government and agricultural development, there have been three experiments, all seeking structural answers to the complex interaction of transforming agriculture.

(1) Community Development

In the enthusiasm of the first major planning exercise in Turkey, community development was endorsed as "one of the best methods of achieving long term planned development, to create conditions which are conducive to the growth of community structure and to help in promoting correct values in people." Whether or not these terms were ever described in a form that would permit assessment of any specific community development project is not known. However, the First Plan did specify that community development would be undertaken on an experimental basis. No special provisions were made for additional personnel or finances. The aim appears to have been to utilize more effectively the administrative and technical

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1 This argument has been put forward most clearly by M. C. Kiray, "Some Notes on Social Planning Objectives," op. cit.

personnel already in sub-governorates (ilçe) and districts (bucak). Indeed, it was at this time that the Ministry of Agriculture, which would certainly have a key role in any effective community development program, relocated its agricultural technicians to the sub-governate level. The experiments began in six districts in six different provinces in 1963 and a second set of six projects were started the following year. As has been the experience in many other developing countries, the community development proposal readily found a number of enthusiastic supporters in government, most of them deeply dedicated to the village, but the scheme never materialized, nor were the early projects ever evaluated.

Like many attempted structural solutions, community development presupposes effective coordination and cooperation among the various ministries. Though not spelled out in the available reports, the Ministry of Village Affairs, which was created in 1964 to press the community development program, never succeeded in gaining momentum. Geray notes that the ministry was established for "political reasons" and in opposition to the views expressed in the central government reorganization project and the Plan. Coordination was never achieved at the national level and technical ministries never fully cooperated. At the end of the First Five-Year Plan, most of the programs under the new ministry were reassigned to the Ministry of the Interior. Some partial adjustment was made to the needs of communities by establishing within the Ministry of the Interior an Incentive Fund for provinces with pilot projects, but these small allocations were never made a regular part of the central government's budget. Whatever may be the shortcomings of the entire community development concept, and there are many, the experience is instructive. Bringing a collective governmental effort to bear at the lower levels of local government was impossible in Turkey unless the highly centralized ministries could be persuaded to cooperate. Even if they had, the effective implementation of the program assumed that effective policies existed for reallocating resources, bolstering the local governments' strained finances, dealing with land use and land reform, and selecting villages.

1. The locations are given in Fehmi Yaza, Problems of Turkish Local Administration, Ankara, Institute for Public Administration in Turkey and Middle East, 1965, p. 21.

2. Geray, "Turkish Experience in Community Development," op. cit., p. 16.

and towns for such privileged treatment. None of these things had been done, and the community development program would very likely have collapsed even if it had not run into political disfavor for its progressive leanings.

(2) Regionalization

The search for an answer to structural problems almost inevitably becomes the search for an appropriate unit of action. The community development program was in many ways the first groping effort to define how the impressive resources of personnel at the local level could be more effectively brought to bear on rural problems. Had not most other developing nations tried the same approach, Turkey's effort would be easier to criticize. The regional problem is somewhat different, for Turks have known for decades that the eastern regions have lagged behind the growth of the rest of the country, and lurking in the background has been the difficult ethnic question of the Kurds. An early publication in the more intensive planning period of the 60's points to the eastern provinces as a region. The Keban dam was undertaken in part to help the region acquire electric power as the basis for industrial development. The region, including about 10 provinces and 20 percent of the Turkish population, suffers from a recognized disparity in Turkish development. Studies have established that per capita incomes there are about half those of the rest of Turkey.

When regional planning is discussed in Turkey, then, it is often with eastern Turkey in mind, although several of the analyses cited above also raise regionalization in the context of finding the most suitable unit generally for local development. Early efforts included specific projects planned under the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement: the Dalman project to repair the damage of the 1957 earthquake; a metropolitan-regional effort to respond to the rapid growth of the Istanbul-Marmara region; and the Zongulak steel and coal complex in the north. Under the First Plan, the State Planning Organization intervened to try to improve existing regional projects, and to give regional planning a more


2For a severe criticism of the failure to achieve good urban-rural integration on a specific regional project, see the Zongulak analysis by Rivkin, Area Development and National Growth, op. cit., pp. 144-190.
comprehensive form. These efforts do not appear to have led to rewarding results, although regional studies of the more conventional form were begun for the Antalya region under FAO sponsorship, for the Curkurova irrigation expansion under AID, and renewed efforts to explain the regional benefits of the Keban dam under the Regional Planning Bureau of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement.¹

Turkey has had, then, a number of specific regional projects, designed to achieve more coherent development around specific problems in delimited areas. There has not been regional planning used as a comprehensive technique to convert the economic plan into human terms or to link more carefully Turkey's administrative resources with its developmental needs. In Tekeli's terms, the "socio-political content of regional policy has not yet been determined."² The Second Plan is rather vague about the role of regional planning in the future, noting that "regional balanced growth and systematic resettlement" are its major functions.³ But the State Planning Organization is quite clear about the priorities assigned to regional plans, which are described as a "complement to national planning studies" and "not (to) be considered in a different context from the implementation system of the Plan." The SPO will decide which regions are to receive the rather piecemeal treatment used in the past, will evaluate the results, and will determine how well proposals meet national planning targets. The approach explicitly adheres to the sectoral-productivity strategy of national economic planning as practiced in most developing countries. The Plan's summation states clearly that public investment funds will be allocated to regional efforts to alleviate income and employment imbalances only on the condition "this can be achieved without sacrificing the productivity of such investments."⁴

(3) Cooperatives

The previous discussion has made fairly clear the market orientation of Turkish development strategy and the difficulty

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²Ibid., p. 262.
³Second Plan, op. cit., pp. 299-300.
⁴Second Plan, op. cit., p. 680
the Turkish government has had in devising intermediate-level institutions for guiding development. As the agricultural sector has grown, however, Turkish farmers have adjusted to this strategy, and their response may well be as effective, or perhaps more effective, than an ambitious program to organize lower level echelons through the local administration or other agencies. The Ministry of the Interior estimates that there are 8,036 cooperatives in villages, not a large number given the diversity and growth of Turkish agriculture, but nonetheless a substantial number.¹ They are divided among village development cooperatives (3,600), agricultural credit cooperatives (2,036), agricultural marketing cooperatives (690) and various others dealing with animal husbandry, forestry production, sugar beet production, soil and water conservation, and tea production. No geographical analysis of these cooperatives is available, but it seems that they have been established for the most part where new agricultural opportunities have appeared. In this way, they are basically production-oriented and not instruments of self-help or income redistribution. These cooperatives operate under the supervision and encouragement of the various technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture distributed at the provincial and sub-governate offices.

The Second Plan is quite outspoken in regard to the shortcomings of the cooperatives. As noted above, about 40 percent of the agricultural holdings do not receive sufficient credit, undoubtedly those of the smaller and more remote farmers. In 1965, there was an estimated million farmers in credit cooperatives, 143,000 in marketing cooperatives and 352,000 in production cooperatives. While it appears that organizations to improve village amenities, schools, and roads have multiplied, state organizations have not been "very effective in orienting and strengthening these organizations."² In the Third Plan, the criticism is reiterated, although the numbers involved have increased. The Plan notes that the local initiatives have not received adequate administrative support. "Lack of coordination between the public organizations encouraging cooperative movements and the encouragement of these movements at the phase of establishment only, are also among the factors preventing the development of cooperative

¹ Mahalli, op. cit., p. 103.
movements." Basic legislation covering the activities of cooperatives, excluding agricultural credit and marketing cooperatives, was accomplished during the Second Plan period. With support of the Central Cooperative Bank, it is hoped that the credit cooperatives can be converted into multi-purpose farm cooperatives in the Third Plan period.

The most spectacular occurrence in recent years has been the emergence of development cooperatives, largely without government support. Migrant workers in Western Europe purchase shares in multi-purpose cooperatives back home, many of which engage in light industry, by sending back foreign currency; the cooperative not only invests this money, but cares for the worker's family and provides a location for the worker's future employment. These cooperatives are also called "German cooperatives" since most of the workers contributing are working in Germany as part of the million or more migrants to that country. The estimate is that there are about 1,000 such cooperatives with an investment capital of roughly a billion lira. The new cooperative has unfortunate implications for income distribution nonetheless, for 38 percent of the migrant workers are skilled and 60 percent come from Western Turkey, the most rapidly growing region. In effect, this means that industrial initiatives within Turkey are to some extent biased, inasmuch as the flow of additional income is not to the rural regions having the greatest need. Given the importance of the foreign currency returned by migrant workers—$115 million in 1966 or nearly a fourth of total export earnings—measures that might discourage labor migration are most unlikely.

(4) Central Villages

For many years there have been proposals afloat to consolidate villages in a more rational manner, largely because of the dispersal of village population and the grim state of village finances. After the 1960 revolution there was extended discussion in the Ministry of the Interior and in a report on reorganization of the central government on how local administration might more effectively assist with local development, including agricultural development. Officials are aware that Turkey possesses a vast field organization with

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1 Summary of Third Plan, p. 218.
2 Interview.
some 21 of the 45 ministries having some sort of regional office or local level representation through the province. In the rapidly growing regions of the country, most notably Istanbul and Izmir, improvised steps have already been taken to merge local authorities and to extract more service from the dispersion and multiplication of local government activities. There is every reason to expect that problems of this kind will increase.

At the same time, the political and administrative decision-makers have had severe problems arriving at agreed solutions, which accounts for the diverse approaches described in the preceding section. Though few details are given, the Third Plan proposes that a special program be launched to consolidate government services in about 2,000 "central villages." Over the past two years the Ministry of the Interior has been conducting surveys, largely through the governors, to locate the villages that would most readily fit into such a plan. The 571 headquarters of counties (kaza) would most surely be included for they already serve as the focal point for numerous ministerial services to the village. The controversy revolves around how to select the additional 1,500 or more. Given the depressed state of finances and the paternalistic tradition of the central government, there is little doubt that every sizeable village will feel that it should be designated a "central village." Provincial surveys are now complete and over the summer of 1973, consultations were being held with provincial and county staffs to make the final decisions. The support for new facilities and infrastructure in the counties would thereafter be directed to conform to the plan for central villages. Whether such a highly administrative view of the problem can indeed withstand the political forces that will undoubtedly be unleashed against it with the return to full parliamentary rule remains to be seen.

The proposal reveals a central feature of structural reform in Turkey, though the tendency is by no means unique to that developing country. The Constitution and other legal requirements are the starting point for the reform, like most others. Thus, it is pointed out that Article 115 of the Constitution only mentions the provinces explicitly as follows, "Turkey is divided into provinces based on geographical and economic factors and on the requirements of public services, and provinces are further divided into smaller administrative

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1 Cevat Geray, "Problems of Local Administration at the Regional Level in Turkey," op. cit., p. 4.
2 Interview.
areas." The exclusion of legal provision for the existing lower echelons of local government must be regarded as a key omission, and it is used to justify a highly administrative resolution of an issue whose implications are much more complex. At the same time, it must also be acknowledged that the central administration is under constant pressure to upgrade local units so they can receive additional central support. One analyst mentions that 80 of the 575 counties would like to become provinces, and the large increase in municipalities, especially in the past two years, shows that even a resolute central government cannot hold back the demand for more services and support for rural towns and villages.

(5) Regional Organization

Structural changes almost always imply significant changes in the working of major social institutions. The description of Turkish local government and administration makes clear that reorientating local government toward any specific developmental goal, such as agriculture, or modifying its basically centralized character would have been virtually impossible even if Turkish leaders, who are in fundamental agreement on the centralized nature of the regime, had tried to do so. This being the case, institutions are molded more than changed, and perhaps the key force in bringing this about in Turkey has been the emergence of far-flung regional organization of the ministries working in the countryside. They provide an institutional weight that has gradually eroded the governors' authority and also the usefulness of the province itself, especially as a developmental vehicle. Considering only those regional offices that evade the usual administrative review of provincial governors, the numbers affecting provinces vary from four to 21. Each ministry has devised its own nomenclature so comparison is difficult, but Adana province, for example, has 13 regional authorities working within its boundaries but including parts of other provinces: three regional bureaus, six regional directors, one regional manager, one local managing director, one regional headquarters, and one local director, all regional extensions of various ministries superimposed on provinces. The distribution of regional offices, of course, also varies greatly with their function. Thus, the General Directorate for Electricity, under the Ministry of Public Works, has only three regional offices, while the Ministry of Agriculture has 57 regional directorates, 13 regional

1Erhan Köksal, "Central and Field Organization in Turkey," ms, p. 2.
headquarters and 14 other assorted regional offices.¹

The diversification of the society has, thus, led to the diversification of the administration. Ministries are well on the way to establishing their own direct working links to the society, not so much because the provincial system is inadequate, but because the units and functions assigned to it do not fit well with their operations and plans. In a very real sense, the administrative distance between farmers and other citizens, and the most relevant organizations of government is increasing, as might be expected in a more specialized society and economy. Local government in Turkey, with some exceptions, no longer even involves extracting (minimal) taxes, for the entire tax system requires reform and rests on a very different base than at the close of the war. The diversification of the society has brought with it countless new ways of integrating and regulating social needs and conflicts, most of which simply by-pass the formal machinery of local government. Whether or not Turks decide to reorganize local government, local governing has changed and changed dramatically. The extent of "centralization" in Turkish government is an increasingly complex question now that each agency of government, like those in industrial societies, is beginning to have its own power structure and its own way of communicating policy. Local government is not bankrupt, for there remains much for it to do, but developmental change has in many important respects simply superceded the formally centralized structure of government itself.

There are no formulas for resolving structural problems unless the society itself is able to state the values which are to be maximized. The best the aggregate economic planner can do is to specify difficulties in his own terms. For example, the Second Plan observes that for the second planning period as in the first, the local administration failed to generate the expected amount of public investment.² Although there is virtually no analysis available on how aggregate targets relate to governmental sub-structures, a study of the first three years of intensive planning activity shows no regional variation in public investment expenditure. Thus, the aggregate plan does not appear, at least in its initial states, to be doing anything to redistribute investments in the public sector.³ As noted above, the entire

¹Data provided by the State Planning Organization.

²Second Plan, op. cit., p. 23.

³N. Olcen, "A Follow-up Study: The Implementation of the Investments Foreseen in the First Five-Year Development Plan,"
The public sector of Turkey has fallen short of its investment program, while the private sector has more than fulfilled its goals under the Plan. Turkey is by no means atypical among developing countries. We should not infer from these aggregate figures that the administration itself is at fault, and propose "reforms" for local government, State Economic Enterprises, etc. How these reforms come to bear on citizens, however, is seldom specified and probably cannot be specified in any useful way in aggregate terms. To take a structural viewpoint produces an alternative approach which is often neglected, and unfortunately not simple. There is no single unit of administration, no defined area, no specified range of authority that responds to all the structural problems encountered by a developing country. Building schools has one criterion, consolidating land another, distributing fertilizer another, and so on. Perhaps the best that can be expected is that the major structural problems be specified and that rough attempts be made to relate changes in the aggregate to units of change.

Despite the ambiguous nature of Turkish experiments with community development, cooperatives, regional development and now central villages, all denote a society actively searching for structural, i.e., organizational solutions. The remarkable thing about Turkey is how much of this kind of experimentation goes on without being subject to review and abortion by the comparatively well developed institutions at the national level. The central government, embracing as it does the countervailing forces of parties, bureaucracy and military, has been stable and purposeful, at least much more so than that of many developing countries. Although the basic values that would resolve controversy about structural solutions have not been forthcoming from these national institutions, neither have they blocked change once the necessity became apparent. As noted in the introduction, the record of legislation on electoral procedures, civil service reform, fiscal reform, state enterprise reorganization, central bank regulation, and finally land reform, is hardly a poor record for a society changing so rapidly. There is no intent to minimize Turkey's accomplishments by suggesting that the most important contribution of local government, and central government as well, has been to provide a reasonably coherent and stable framework within which individual farmers were able to seek answers to their agricultural problems.

In Tilkic and Tang, Planning in Turkey, op. cit., pp. 274-275. Amounts varied from 280 lira/capita in Istanbul to 22 lira/capita in Cankiri. The calculation was of "point investments" such as schools, hospitals, dams, etc., not including investment with no defined regional allocation such as irrigation, roads, etc.
There is no way of demonstrating that agricultural growth would have been less under less encouraging conditions, but the Turkish record of a growth rate in agriculture slightly over 4 percent is a respectable and even enviable record. The last section of the analysis will deal in more detail with national-local linkage, a relationship that appears to operate reasonably well in Turkey, however difficult it may be to specify its nature.

IV. National-Local Linkage

Administrative systems are notoriously bad in altering complex linkages to accommodate or support desired policy changes. For different reasons, this seems generally correct about both more and less developed countries. In highly industrial democracies, the bureaucracy and the military are carefully differentiated from legislative and political activity, which is not to say, of course, that there is not a great deal of political activity by administrators. In less developed countries gradually establishing democratic decision-making machinery, of which Turkey is a prime and fairly successful example, the fragility and alleged ineffectiveness of political institutions justifies, correctly or incorrectly, attitudes that political support and more general social interaction cannot be given a specific role. Analytically, the problem is fascinating because in most developing countries the influence of the administration is such that little can happen without its support. Its effectiveness is a necessary but hardly a sufficient condition of change. On the other hand, much more happens than can be accounted for by the activities and policies of the administration. The aggregate change in agriculture outlined in Section II could hardly have occurred without roads, fertilizer, etc., but it is equally true that a multitude of informal processes, political interactions and individual concerns entered into the effective combination of the inputs provided by the administration.

Although the causal links cannot be specified, local government and agricultural development reflect the ever-increasing institutional complexity evolving in Turkey. In institutional terms the process can at least be described, if not explained to the satisfaction of either policy-maker or social analyst. The decision-making process has become increasingly complex in Turkey, revealed in part by the administrative complaints about legislative inadequacies and by political sensitivities to complacently accepting the formal plans of the bureaucracy. Thus, there are three possible explanations of Turkey's relative success in agriculture. First, the governmental machinery initiated it and effectively responded throughout the transition, an argument
which even the most enthusiastic étatiste of the Atatürk tradition would find hard to defend. Second, the peasant somehow compelled, coaxed, and induced a reluctant government to modernize agriculture, an equally indefensible position. Third, that as Turkey tried to do more and more complex things, such as diversifying agriculture, the society was also able to develop more complex institutions. Evaluating the relation of local government to agriculture, and probably to any other economic sector, involves assessment not only of the capability of both administration and farmer to achieve differentiation of the capabilities of each to bring their increased productive capacities into a working whole, into an institutionalized process that makes change intelligible and manageable. In a word, differentiation is easy and integration is difficult.

In my view, to ask whether local government determines agricultural development or vice versa is not only misleading, but a meaningless question. Each in its own mysterious way accounts for some of the change in the other, and it is precisely the capability of dealing with such complex change, i.e., institutionalized change, that should be the critical test of a country's readiness to modernize agriculture or to undergo any other major social change. Measuring this potentiality is not easy for the process is in fact unique in all its detail for each society. In general form, however, it is far from unique or obscure. Though it has seldom been a radical process, Turkey has unmistakably been able to devise new kinds of institutions such as expanding the private commercial sector to the point where it begins to overtake the public sector, displaying sufficient political resilience to endure two periods of martial rule, and working her way toward major legislation in a variety of fields.

Overused as the term "linkage" may be in social science jargon, the best approach to measuring institutional complexity or the capacity for institutional change, seems to be that of expanding our understanding of how reciprocity between farmer and government actually occurs. The conduits for such interaction are in fact the effective institutions of change. Much of this change in Turkey has actually taken place in the private sector and has been inadequately studied. The small merchant, grocer and cab-driver have all contributed, but the links between them and the aggregate figures of the planner are almost unknown.1 With this important qualification, there are perhaps three foci that can be examined in

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1 A noteworthy exception is the work of M. B. Kiray, "Values, Social Stratification and Development," Journal of Social Issues, 14:2, 1968, pp. 87-100.
more detail. The first is the village itself and how the farmer appears to have adjusted to change. The second is the politician mediating between local and higher levels and how his role has been transformed over the past decade. The third, and possibly most ambitious, is the overall relation between the voter and national institutions as reflected in patterns of participation in Turkish politics. Each of these factors points to a mediating institution: the village as the grassroots unit of societal change; the role of politicians as the most active person communicating between the grassroots and the center; and the systemic constraint exercised by the populace as a whole through electoral activity. Final authority in Turkey has rested with the military, the bureaucracy and the national politicians, but without these channels for bringing about complex institutional change, their accomplishments would have been difficult, if not impossible.

A. Villages

Most Turkish experts agree that the integration of the village with urban society began in the 1950's. Ataturk was certainly a hero in the countryside, but the institutions he needed first were to organize power nationally as it existed between the wars in Turkish society, and the institutions that he put in motion were, for the most part, related to the mobilized sector of the population. It is important to note that significant changes in the relationship of village to government are easily traced to the Menderes regime. Before 1950, the government and urban society by and large had little impact on the countryside generally or on agriculture specifically. Stirling speaks of the villages in Sakaltutan, an Anatolian community near Kayseri, as "indifferent or ineffectively hostile" to Ataturk's reforms.1 Szylowicz describes the impact of the Village Law in Erdenli, near Adana, as minimal. "Although the measures which were designed to improve the physical, educational, and social well-being of the populace were largely ignored, the villages paid [only] lip service to the specific administrative, legislative, and financial procedures listed therein."2 For the villager,


perceptible change began with the 1950 election when officials became "noticeably more polite," and the cruelty of village police was brought under control. The first credit cooperative appeared in Sakaltutan in 1950, and Ertemli joined with neighboring villages to form a municipality in 1957, after the Democratic Party helped have a road built to the nearby town.

There are a number of excellent village studies on Turkey, some of them based on longitudinal analysis. Without describing them in detail, it is clear that the transformation of village life began after the war, and accompanied, rather than followed, the agricultural prosperity that Turkey enjoyed in the early years of the Menderes regime. Though the villager, like most of us, is fatalistic about death, he is not fatalistic about the future of his children or about his ability to influence his own life. Indeed, one study showed that on a political efficacy scale, the villager seemed more confident of his ability to affect his political setting than did more privileged urban Turks, a finding that is indirectly confirmed by voting patterns in Turkey. Many an "insulated" or "neglected" villager, however one prefers to pose the situation, responded to new agricultural inputs, formed cooperatives, engaged in commercial agriculture, and generally made himself into a modern farmer once the infrastructure was in place and the intentions of the government were clear. As will be elaborated further below, it is the latter of these conditions that seems most often lacking in attempts at rapid agricultural change elsewhere.

The most complete study of how the villager related to the Turkish government is a survey conducted by Professor Frey in 1962 and including approximately 8,000 villagers from 446 villages in all the provinces. The position of the village headman (muhtar) is virtually unchallenged, though

1 Stirling, Turkish Village, op. cit., p. 269.


the perception of local elites' role is remarkably differentiated. Nearly three-quarters of all respondents designated the headman as the most influential villager; roughly half found him to be the farming leader in the community and the most prestigious member of the community. Though the tendency to attribute leadership values to the headman diminishes slightly as villages acquire closer communication with the outside world, it is interesting that this re-evaluation does not seem to depend heavily on how often the kaymakam visits the village. Neither does the organization of a party cell appear to affect the attributes of the village headman. Considering all three forms of mass media exposure in Turkey, radio, newspaper and cinema, there appeared a tendency for the headman's position to be enhanced by these intrusions of modern life. Frey concludes that "traditional elites need not be threatened by modernization nor be an obstacle to modernization."2 His findings indicate that, for purposes of this analysis, an examination of local government and agricultural development may be more accurately described as viewing parallel phenomenon rather than clearly interacting or reacting behavior.

Though headmen tend to be older, more literate, and more affluent than their colleagues, they share the same roots. Villages have remained communities despite the inroads of modern influence. Almost all the headmen stated they knew every adult in the village, and 60 percent visited the main meeting place of the village daily in the winters. When responses of headmen, religious leaders and village males are compared there is virtual unanimity in their judgment of the desired characteristics of the office,3 and even in their evaluation of how outside forces related to the village.4 These findings are especially important for those wishing to understand how the vast majority of Turks have undergone rapid change for the past generation. The growth in agriculture does not appear to have eroded village feelings of solidarity, and may likely have enhanced them. If modernizing agriculture is thought usually to undermine villages, it does not seem to have done so in Turkey, at least by 1962. The

2Ibid., p. 24.
3Ibid., p. 30.
4Ibid., p. 33.
effect has been much more one of successful adaptation to modernity at the village level, while diminishing the attitudinal and behavioral distance between villages and authority in Turkish society. In this specific sense, Turkey is today more cohesive, more integrated in terms of the units of social and political action, while also being vastly more differentiated.

A good deal can be said about how well Turks themselves understand these changes because a study of 306 sub-governorate officers (Kaymakam) was made in 1965 and its findings can be compared with the corresponding village responses. The results are important in looking for the integrative mechanisms at work in Turkish society for they show on the whole that the perception of village problems by the Kaymakam as opposed to the headmen and villagers is very different. The officials see education and poverty as the main problems of the villages, while the village members find roads, water and land as most important. It is significant that the actual administrative results may be more consistent with village preferences than these findings suggest, for the Roos study later showed that nearly half the provincial governors were preparing road projects and two-fifths water projects, while educational projects were underway in about a fourth of the cases. Thus, the open category "poverty" may be accurately translated into the projects desired by villagers. Even so, the paternal quality of Turkish local administration is shown by the 81 percent of Kaymakam who felt village problems must be resolved by the government, while only 15 percent thought joint efforts of government and villagers were needed. In contrast, only 44 percent of villagers thought government alone should resolve village problems. Frey speculates whether or not "the villager may be ready to assume more initiative than the elite is ready to give him credit for, at least in some areas."

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2 Frey, Report 10, op. cit., p. 45.

3 Ibid., p. 47. The full analysis of the elite study can be found in Roos and Roos, Managers of Modernization, op. cit.

4 Report No. 10, op. cit., p. 49.
The integration of the grassroots of Turkish society with the complex changes described in the previous sections can be observed from another perspective, that of the rapidly mushrooming associational activity in Turkey. Under the First Republic the most viable basis for group activity, religious associations, was banned, but the 1961 Constitutions, while adhering to the principle of "secularism" goes much farther toward promoting pluralist activities. The most striking result of Yuçekok's survey is the enormous multiplication of associations in Turkey since 1950. He finds that Turkey had about 2,000 associations in 1950, 17,000 in 1960 and over 37,000 in 1968. Tabulations by category, not complete, are listed in Table XVII.

Table XVI: Growth of Associational Activity, 1950 to 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1968</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Religious</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings are not described in terms of the social units of observation, so it is impossible to make inferences about villages as such, though Yuçekok does argue that the religious associations are heavily correlated with the emergence of small business associations. The categories are not well described in the available versions of his study, but


assuming that the standards of measurement remain the same at all time points some judgment can be made about the relative strength of kinds of group activities, and gross linkage to rural society suggested. The growth of "local" associations is in itself indicative of the change of the past decade, and the rate of growth of agricultural associations is impressive. Even this crude finding also gives grounds to argue that the middle class character of Turkish society has been profoundly affected, and by no means confined to the more advanced provinces. Kuçükok does break down religious and small business associations by more and less developed provinces, and many more less-developed provinces exceed the national average per province for both types of organizations.

B. Local Politics

Notably absent from most official proposals and programs for rural development is any consideration of the transformations taking place in the village power structures, or of how these changes relate to politics more generally in Turkey. The centralized, universalistic orientation of the entire Turkish administrative and political system is one that makes such recognition particularly difficult. To assert that this inadequacy may become a major crisis in Turkish society would be overly apprehensive, but even the scattered case studies of local change indicate how conflict is becoming more structured in localities and less amenable to moderation by the traditional patterns of oligarchic or paternal solidarity. The local political figures, headmen, landlords, even tractor drivers and merchants, are all part of the complex mosaic of relationships relating the farmer to the larger society. The Turks are not unique by any means in their reluctance to incorporate the rapidly differentiating forms of local power into the bureaucratic process. There is no reason to argue that it must be done, but there is every reason to argue that to the extent the highly uniform and somewhat resistant local government system ignores these forces they will reemerge in other aspects of Turkish society and politics. The purpose of this section is to provide some insight into what has been learned about integrating forces at the local level, most of which are largely outside the administrative--if not the political--linkage now existing or planned for the society.

The central government has not been neglectful of rural change as such but rather it has not yet showed an interest in devising local government structures that can respond to the array of local power structures actually found in towns and villages. This is not a shortcoming in a general form, for the superstructure of the society has provided immense support for rural change, but nearly always in a uniform,
non-directed manner. Thus, Szyliowicz notes that agricultural price supports have perhaps been "the greatest single benefit that government has conferred on Turkish village agriculture." But price supports leave the structural decisions to the forces of the market place and to the unforeseen social conditions of each village and farmer. The result has been that larger landholders and more favorably located communities have benefited, while small landholders, the landless and the geographically remote have not. Again, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such a development strategy, but the result has probably been to make conflict at the local level more difficult to resolve using official machinery. More pronounced differences in standards of living are beginning to appear. In a number of ways the new political roles at the local level, the product of 20 years of developmental change, are only accommodated in accidental ways. In effect, the local election remains the sole integrating mechanism at the local level that is officially recognized.

Some examples may help clarify this point. The overall transformation of agriculture in the Çukurova region has been one of the major success stories in Turkish agriculture, now a major irrigated area producing very high quality cotton. But development in agriculture has produced a variety of local power structures. In Karaçaoren, sharecropping has become a business-like relationship, where large landholders may claim up to two-thirds of the crop. Absentee landowner practices have multiplied in more favored villages, while in less hospitable parts of the region, in a poorer village like Oruçlu, sharecropping remains on a family basis and landholders are more evenly distributed. When these two villages undergoing agricultural modernization are compared with two villages already heavily commercialized, the incomes of the more developed are nearly double in the aggregate. But how these increments have been distributed in the various stages of development varies a good deal, and the richer communities have some of the poorest, most marginal families. In the rich villages mechanization has reduced the demand for seasonal labor and tended to depress wages for agricultural laborers. In the poorest village, Oruçlu, the investigators report that household heads "can objectively evaluate their places, that they are dissatisfied with them, and are searching

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1 Szyliowicz, Erdemli, op. cit., p. 75.

for channels of mobility."¹ In the two wealthy villages, where traditional, kinship political relations have virtually disappeared, one finds the "ultimate form of a polarized power structure,"² where large landowners dominate the community and the majority of inhabitants are now agricultural laborers. Those who failed to improve their lot in the growth and modernization of the past 20 years have little opportunity to benefit from the changes now taking place.

Villages that have experienced rapid agricultural growth, then, have very different power structures from those still heavily involved in conventional wheat culture, such as Sakaltutan. Though these Anatolian farmers are much more prosperous from the overall improvements in farm prices and the like, kinship relations still figure heavily in village interaction and "reciprocity is the main sanction."³ Resort to courts to settle disputes is regarded as shameful and on the whole, village relations to officials are carried on with careful distance reflected in the survey. Nonetheless, there is constant talk and interest in national politics and the world for these farmers has been, in Stirling's term, "foreshortened." Like Erdemli in the Black Sea region, the Anatolian village is not isolated from national politics, but its restructuring has not yet taken a form that has clear implications for national politics and administration. Erdemli is similar in that the Democratic Party was active in opening up new links to the outside world, providing investments for a new market and roads. There are indications that the traditional power structure is declining, such as the discontinuance of arranged marriages. Villagers were well aware of their direct political influence through the party, and the kaymakam found himself engaged in a much more tactful and intricate governing relationship after 1950.⁴

The interface between the administration and the farmer involves two political cultures, that of the bureaucracy and the much more diverse one of rural community. The two cultures become "fused at the level of local politics."⁵ When

¹Ibid., p. 523.
²Ibid., p. 525.
³Paul Stirling, Turkish Villages, op. cit., p. 149.
⁴See particularly the bargaining process to acquire new schools, etc. in Szyliowicz, Erdemli, op. cit., pp. 132-138.
The Justice Party won the 1950 election in the Yeshilyurt district, "cleavages between groups became more apparent because they could be expressed openly in political competition." The factions had traditional histories in the agha clans of the eastern Black Sea region, but choices soon gravitated around the ambitions of a more modern and a more traditional tea farmer. The transformation of agriculture did much to bring the area into contact with national politics, but the local leaders still see themselves "as public servants attentive to the needs of the people and sacrificing their own self-interest for the common good." These observations are confirmed in the much larger sample of the Frey peasant survey. The integration issue centers on how diverse change, much of it stimulated by agricultural development, will impinge on the nation as local political differences multiply.

The nature of the political link between villages and towns and the central government is of special interest precisely because it does not figure heavily in most official discussions of local government and administration. The view of the military, at least at the time of the 1960 revolution, has been clearly to discourage national parties from intervening at the local level, and the new electoral laws prohibit parties from having anything more than agents below the provincial level. Although this is probably a naive demand, it also denotes the attitude of one influential block in Turkish politics. In general, it is echoed by bureaucrats who tend to adhere to the stereotyped view that local politics is an obstacle to solving major national problems and mobilizing national resources. As has been suggested before, this is a very narrow concept of what constitutes national resources and capabilities, for the loyalty and support that the Turkish government has received from the rural citizen should not be discounted lightly. Given the present diversity of the agricultural sector, the growing disparities of income, opportunity and education between rural and urban life, and the variety of political formulas operative in communities undergoing the stress of rapid change, the political system seems quite ill-advised to take a complacent, let alone a negative, view of the linkage between government and villager.

Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 263.

1 Ibid., p. 251.
2 Ibid., pp. 262-263.
A reasonable amount is known about local politicians, the link between the headmen described in the previous section and the parties. Though hardly qualifying as rural, one study has been done of candidates for local office from provincial capitals and other towns over 30,000, a total of 238 persons of whom 160 responded to the survey. One of the most interesting findings of this, and an earlier study of mayors in 1958 and 1964, is the high proportion of ex-officials taking elected positions. Among mayors, 11 percent in 1958 had been public servants, 10 percent in 1964, and 27 percent in the Tachau study. In the earlier study, farmers were by no means unimportant, being 35 percent of the 1958 municipality study, 29 percent in 1964, although hardly visible in the less representative sample of Tachau. The indication of these surveys is that local and official views are hardly absent from the prevailing pattern of local election results. The very clear overlap of background and experience makes even less understandable the reluctance or disinterest of the central government in adapting the local government system to the diverse influences to be observed at the local level. The Justice Party, though often regarded as unsympathetic with the bureaucracy, had a larger proportion of civil servants running for office in 1963, an indication that the dishonored officials from the old Democratic Party regime were in fact using the electoral system to return to positions of influence.

Though the wider implications of this trend do not directly concern this analysis, it is important in assessing the future of local government to see that it has already become a structure responding to countervailing forces in Turkish politics, providing an escape valve for rejected parties and means of reestablishing a political base as such groups reconstruct their power. This kind of phenomenon indicates that the local political process developing in Turkey is by no means the subordinated, passive institution that some official views suggest, or may even prefer. It may also suggest why the incumbent regime has not taken a more positive view of extending more authority to local institutions. The implications of this use of local politics as parties again renew their base in what are now even more mobilized and better informed villages and small towns must

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1 Tachau, "Local Politicians in Turkey," op. cit., pp. 91-132. The sample includes 78 towns and cities of which about a third were over 50,000; a third 25 to 50,000; and a third under 25,000.

2 Rusen Keleş and Cevat Geray, Turk Belediye Baskanlari, op. cit.
be taken into account. The national representative institutions have been insulated from these changes, in part by a military elite who resist the interplay of politics at various levels of the system, and in part by a legalistic tradition shared by most educated Turks which prefers to ignore the actual dynamics of highly politicized society. But however dimly understood given present analytical capacities, political forces tend to find indirect means of expression where more direct channels are closed. The villages, like the towns and cities, have steadily added to these capacities in the course of the agricultural transformation of the past 20 years.

How these local level forces will merge in Turkish political life cannot be predicted, but their presence is implicit in much of the aggregate data already presented. The earlier peasant surveys show that many farmers do feel politically efficacious, that is, about two-thirds feel that they can influence their political future. At the same time, other changes in the society are less assuring. Choices are becoming more constrained in rural Turkey as arable land is used up, as agricultural incomes show rather larger disparities, and as the agricultural landless class grows. A repeat of the Frey survey showed that 52 percent of the farmers regard their incomes as inadequate, a rather vague category of response, but one potent with meaning nonetheless. The available community studies provide ample evidence for the restructuring of local power as development takes place, possibly in the direction of increasingly oligarchic leadership in the rural villages, as the Frey study suggests, and adjusting to the interplay of national politics in the larger towns and villages. To see something of how these changes relate to the larger political system, the national electoral process will be examined next.

C. National Political Participation

The nature of national-local interaction in developing countries must be put in larger perspective in order to assess its meaning in the local government context. In nearly all developing countries urban-rural relations are basically governed by inertia, that is, a modicum of support is needed and very marginal resources are required for rural localities to carry on a fairly stable relation to the center of power. Nearly all Turkish experts would probably agree with Frey's observation that the national elite has always been weak

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1Ahmet Tüg่า, Kirsal Topluluklarda Degismeler (Changes in Rural Communities), Ankara, 1971, p. 300.
outside the cities and "their grassroots control quite limited." The same thought is found in Mardin's notation of the Republican Party's reaction to the opening up of full participation at the time of Atatürk's death in 1946. "Do not go into the provincial towns or villages to gather support: our national unity will be undermined." The disinterest of Turkish officials in the peasant is on the whole characteristic of most developing countries, and the radical restructuring of this relationship is a major crisis in the development of new institutions. In Turkey this transformation was set in motion by the 1950 election, when the appeal of the Democratic Party "intervened at just the right time to provide many transitional rural areas with the belief that they were not inferior." The Democratic Party "relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values" and was a blow to the major power centers of the Republic. Whether the Constitution of 1961, as Mardin argues, is an effort to restore the supremacy of the traditional, urban ruling classes cannot be settled here, but it is apparent that the past decade has been one of momentous institutional restructuring in Turkey, beginning with the mobilization of national power among farmers and peasants and now reinforced by their economic modernization.

The evidence of aggregate agricultural change, presented in Section II, is not too helpful in seeing how local government has developed unless the transformation in farming is viewed as the addition of highly important economic power to a rural class already on the way toward exercising political power. The task of local government and administration, then, is not so much that of enhancing agricultural modernization, which appears to have had its initial impulse prior to governmental support and interest, but that of finding ways of integrating the increased differentiation of rural society with national institutions. How or when this will be necessary in developing countries must be worked out in the cultural and historical experience of each nation, but this much is clear: Turkey's relative success in maintaining a stable, integrated society came about where the political mobilization of rural society preceded economic change, and where an administrative class stood ready to organize and support the consequences of such a mobilization.

1Frederick W. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," ms., pp. 31-32.
2Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," op. cit., p. 182.
3Ibid., pp. 185-186.
Whether the Turkish elite, including the military, the bureaucracy and the politicians, understood and intended such transformation is unclear, though it is by no means unusual for elites to prefer as direct and reliable forms of control as possible. Nonetheless, the elites did genuinely accept the uncertainties and diversion of national elections, a concession that placed political power in the countryside and a process that was possible because provincial and local government were prepared to act as impartial organizers of the electoral process.

Ozbudun's study of political participation provides an excellent analysis of how electoral participation relates to the difficult process of integrating urban and rural Turkey. The 1950 election found the Republican Party still gaining more votes in the least developed, eastern regions of the country, where their strategy of relying on local notables to turn out the vote still worked. The Democratic Party did better in the more modern regions despite the fact that it is generally regarded as favoring, as it did, the interests of farmers in the subsequent decade. The cleavages of social forces in the early stages of mobilization, then, were not so much along class lines, as along channels of communication through rather divergent forms of grassroots control. Ozbudun concludes that "Just as in the late Ottoman Empire the peasants and the local gentry were driven into the same camp because of their common enmity to government officials, the common grievances against the R.P.P. elite brought about an alliance among the businessmen and the workers, landlords and landless peasants, clerics and urban professionals." This was an unstable and delicate alliance. Its decline and reformulation around the 1960 revolution, given the rate of economic change, should not have been unexpected.

The structural transformation of Turkish elections can be followed through the elections of the 1960's. Dividing Turkey into nine agricultural regions, it appears that the Republican People's Party kept its hold on the less developed regions until the national election of 1969. During this period three national elections occurred, revealing two important trends. First, in the 1961 and 1965 elections, there was no more than a 4 percent difference in turnout between more and less developed regions, but in 1969 there was nearly a 13 percent difference with the less developed regions voting at the higher rate. Those who felt deprived by a decade

1Ozbudun, Political Participation in Turkey, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
2Ibid., p. 18.
3Ibid., p. 8.
of development appear to have been voting more heavily, and shifting their vote to the successor of the Democratic Party, the Justice Party. Their behavior is confirmed in attitudinal studies, which show the voters in less developed provinces having a higher sense of political efficacy, though less knowledge of political parties. The second effect is the steady recovery of the Justice Party in less developed regions, starting from 16 percent or less in the three least developed regions in the 1961 elections, and growing to 30 to 40 percent of the vote there in 1965 and 1969. Simultaneously, the People's Party began to build new strength in more developed regions, such that the region where it was weakest in 1950 (Marmara) was its strongest outpost in 1969. The support for land reform by the People's Party appears to have sharply reduced the help it received from local notables and landlords in less developed regions, while its stronger social welfare orientation appears to have acquired support in more developed regions.

The readiness of the rural voter to express his political preferences seems well established in Turkey. In an urban-rural breakdown of voting, rural turnout was consistently higher in all national elections since 1961. Moreover, in the 1968 provincial elections, participation involves some 66 percent of voters, while municipal elections for mayors and councils drew slightly less than 60 percent of the voters. Given the fact that the rural voter is generally more inconvenient in voting than the urban resident, these differences are strong evidence of the determination of the rural voter to use his franchise and to look to parties to advance his interests. Although voting in local elections has declined in absolute levels in national elections, the rural vote remains higher in all three national elections of the 60's, reaching its greatest difference (over 13 percent) in 1969. Regionally, the greatest differences are in the least developed provinces. In the most feudal and least developed region, the Southeast, the percentage difference was nearly 16 percent in 1961, 24 percent in 1965, and over 31 percent in 1969. Thus, the urban-rural trends in voting parallel the regional trends, with the Justice Party doing better in cities, though the People's Party also made urban gains. In the east, the People's Party losses were felt in both cities and countryside, while the Justice Party improved its rural

1 Frederick W. Frey, Regional Variations in Rural Turkey (Cambridge, MIT, Rural Development Research Project, No. 4, 1967.
3 Ibid., Ch. V, p. 4.
support. The rate of urbanization does not correlate strongly with changes in the vote for either party.

Ozbudun attributes the reversal of expected changes in voting to the success of the Peoples' Party in changing its image to a "left-of-center" party. The party can now appeal to lower classes in both cities and countryside, thus giving it a more heterogeneous social base and breaking the historic strength of the Justice (or Democratic) party in the rural areas. Where local power structures remain in the hands of local notables, this more progressive strategy has not yet been directly communicated to farmers and sharecroppers. His argument centers on the growing autonomy of the voter in various regions of the country, combined with the class appeal the Peoples' Party can make to the socio-economic "underdog" after a decade of development. His argument is buttressed by evidence showing that the combined vote for the two major parties is greater in the more developed provinces, and that the splinter parties have grown more in less-developed provinces where single issues or traditional manipulation are more readily applied.

Eight of the 10 provinces where the combined vote for the Justice and Peoples' Party was lowest were in the least-developed Southeast and East Central regions. In a not too curious way, then, the concern of the military and the officials that a special effort be made to improve the depressed regions is echoed in the experience of the politician. The most apparent risk to political stability in Turkey is not nearly as much a straightforward urban-rural cleavage, but a more regionally based resentment toward a system that has allowed a major area of Turkey to be by-passed in the course of development. Whether voters in such areas are aware of their comparative neglect, or vote under historic forms of manipulation, the implications for the system as a whole are the same. In this way, the penetration of eastern regions by the Peoples' Party may be an important step toward maintaining the effectiveness of representative government in Turkey.

An important indicator of future tasks for local administration in rural Turkey is the clear indication that even among villagers, voting turnout is negatively associated with development. In the 1969 elections in particular,

1Ibid., p. 7.
2Ibid., Ch. VI, p. 9.
3Ibid., pp. 16-17.
4Ibid., Ch. VII, pp. 9-11.
turnout was negatively associated with the existence of a primary school in the village and with the use of Turkish as the main language. Higher rates of turnout among less modern farmers may indicate, as Frey has suggested, that less privileged farmers and peasants are "more voted than voting."¹ It also denoted the growing responsibility of the developmental machinery of the state to redress the imbalance of their efforts. One interesting implication of the less autonomous voters' behavior in Turkey is that dismembering party organization below the sub-governorate, as the military has insisted, may be destabilizing. Thus, Özbuğun finds that villages that had no party cell prior to 1965 had the highest rate of turnout.² If one considers party organization as one indication of overall socio-economic development, depriving the less developed regions and villages of active party structures may well enhance the control exercised over less aware, less informed citizens through the traditional power structures. Another sign of how less developed villages are more readily manipulated in elections is Özbuğun's finding that the least developed villages were those most likely to be dominated by a single party.³ One-party villages tend to be less literate, less educated, more isolated from the outside world, to have more landless peasants, and nearly half have Kurdish as their native language.⁴

Though the choice is by no means this simple, there is a limited sense in which electoral institutions in Turkey may be in the process of choosing between a moderated class division in voting or enhancing the strength of ethnic voting. The most important service the politicians may be providing the military and the bureaucracy is to make apparent the possibility of more intransigent political divisions before the conflict becomes intense. On the other hand, one might also argue that the disposition of the military to discourage local level party organization, with the acquiescence of the bureaucracy in a production-oriented development strategy, largely responding to market forces, has been to risk the introduction of serious political conflict. More positively, the voting data also show that the two major parties have developed more evenly distributed public support across the country in the past decade, and

¹Frederick W. Frey, "Themes in Contemporary Turkish Politics," ms., p. 17.
²Ibid., p. 19.
³Ibid., p. 22.
⁴Ibid., pp. 25-26.
that they have more similar social and economic roots in Turkish society than they did in the early era of representative government. These are forces suggesting that the bi-party system can respond to a wide range of needs, and that given an opportunity, urban-rural or even regional polarization of voting can be avoided, thereby enhancing the possibilities of effective representative government. The politicians like the administrators and officers have an important role in the political integration of Turkey.

There have been important changes in the political elite in the past decade, some of them stemming from the invigoration of party politics after 1950. The proportion of deputies from the traditional military and administrative elite has constantly declined, with lawyers replacing ex-officers and officials as the leading group after the 1950 election. Another striking change has been the much larger proportion of deputies born in the region they represent, reaching two-thirds of the representatives in 1957 and consistently being nearly four-fifths of the deputies over the 60's. Patterns of recruitment to parliament have also changed, and since 1950 no more than half of the legislature have had previous experience. But the choice to run for national office still appears to be divorced from work in the party ranks and local organizations. Neither local elective office nor local party office seem to figure heavily in obtaining parliamentary seats. The overall trend conforms to the pattern of voting itself, for the two major parties appear to be increasingly homogeneous in terms of their representatives, their levels of education being nearly identical in 1969. These trends could, of course, be read as a watering down of political competition, but they also indicate that in the judgment of both parties, the electorate responds to very similar kinds of men. The inference can be made that the similar background of deputies reflects a homogeneity in the legislature itself which may contribute to its effective functioning as a legislative body.

The importance of an effective national assembly should not be underestimated in a country at Turkey's stage of development and historical experience. Nearly 70 percent of the population remain rural citizens, however much industrial and urban progress has been made in the past 20 years. In numerous developing countries, the reconciliation of urban and rural preferences and needs remains a serious obstacle to


2 Ibid., p. 558.
continued, stable institutional development, a problem the Turks, despite periods of turbulence, seem to have been able to resolve. Of the three centers of power described in the Introduction, the bureaucracy and the military are probably least sensitive to the integrative problems confronting the society, though they have shown more ability to adjust to change and to exercise restraint than their counterparts in many other developing countries. Nevertheless, it is the electoral process in Turkey that has brought to the surface underlying, potentially deeply divisive conflict in the society, and placed the bureaucracy and the military in a situation where they needed to recognize their own elitist, urban tendencies. The agricultural modernization of Turkey made this link to power necessary, and in many ways essential to the continued growth of the economy. The centralized nature of the local government system, often buttressed by administrative policies that diminished its role in politics, has not contributed as much as possible to the integration of the society. The potentially serious dislocation between the rural society and effective control power has been avoided because of the electoral institutions that Turkey has managed to keep alive. In this way, elections are a vital link between agricultural development and political power.

V. Conclusion

Attributing the agricultural development of Turkey over the past 20 years to local government would obviously be excessive, but so also would be the assertion that the transformation of rural society would have been possible without an effective government at the local level. Clearly, the administrative and military elite never saw the transformation of rural Turkey as a prime goal, whether one is thinking of Ottoman Turkey, the Ataturk era, or the developmental efforts since the 1960 revolution. The push came from the farmers themselves, most of them undoubtedly the more privileged in terms of physical and human resources. But the nationalist identity of the society never permitted even the more reluctant members of the elite to disown rural Turkey, nor did it erode their determination to make representative government work. Local government never developed to become a major channel for rural and agricultural change, but once the political influence of rural society was manifested in the 1950 election the institutions of national and local government did not resist the transformation of the countryside.

As this analysis tries to underscore, the elite groups worked hard and with a high degree of success relative to most developing countries to fashion institutions that could integrate the rural majority into Turkish society. Moreover,
this transformation of the major institutions of the society would very likely have been much more difficult were it not that countervailing groups—the military, the bureaucracy and the politicians—each felt that the other had an important role to play. Put differently, had any one powerful group in the society decided to resist agricultural modernization, and the subsequent integration of rural Turkey into the political system, there would almost certainly have been no agricultural progress.

Those looking for answers to the part local institutions have to play in agricultural development, then, have a choice between narrow and broad conceptions of what the entire process means. In the narrow sense, local institutions do not have an untarnished record. Much of the diversification and most profitable agriculture in Turkey has emerged without stimulation from local agencies, but it was soon provided with the roads, communications, agricultural inputs, and so forth, needed to make new kinds of agriculture attractive. The public sector has on the whole failed to meet the investment targets set for it, but richer farmers have invested heavily in tractors, fertilizer, seed and machinery. Cooperatives are numerous and used frequently to support agriculture, but the government has not been able to provide aggressive support for expanded cooperatives, and innovation in this area has come heavily from individual Turks.

In terms of access and responsiveness, the most important change took place very quickly as the bureaucracy learned in the Menderes period that its heavyhanded methods would no longer be tolerated. Nor did the elite groups ever attempt to withdraw from the urban or rural voter the genuine concessions made to their power. Municipal government, much of it in small towns and cities, has become increasingly vigorous and has received sizeable government investment. Provincial government, still ensconced in a framework designed for law and order, has been increasingly displaced by new regional administrative units and market forces. The narrow view of the role of local government might conclude that things would be much the same in Turkey today without the administrative and political efforts of local government. This argument would be more persuasive were it not that local government was also the vehicle of national presence in the village, the final arbiter of law and order, and, however belatedly, the channel for a sizeable amount of direct support for peasant and farmer.

The broad view is perhaps more difficult to argue, but it is the one within which the relation of local government to agriculture must ultimately be judged in any society. Without succumbing to populist sentiments, it is obvious that Turkish society could not have developed to its present state
without the support of the rural citizen. Simple as this statement may appear, very few developing countries are as aware of the momentum, if not the impetus, to be derived from the countryside. Turkey is more and more an integrated economy, the rural sector providing industrial raw materials, food for the cities, and a steady flow of labor for a growing industrial sector. The farmer has not enjoyed the income, the education nor the social welfare of the urban dweller, but he has also extracted substantial tax benefits from the system and clearly is aware of his political influence. Neither the effective exchange of goods and services, the gradual construction of respected national institutions nor the constructive use of power would have been possible without the security and coherence brought to rural Turkey by local government and administration, which did represent a genuine and real effort by national government to remain in contact with farmers and peasants. Through this link have developed institutions of national government far more successful in integrating the society than those found in most developing countries, a notable achievement among the countries of Asia and Africa.
Peasant and Bullock by Chuah Theah Teng
From the collection of Dr. and Mrs. Clifton R. Wharton, Jr.