Counter-Insurgency Programming

A Meta-Evaluation

Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency

Control

Security
- Military
- Police
- Human Security
- Public Safety
- Population Security

Political
- Mobilization
- Governance
- Extension
- Institutional
- Capacity
- Societal
- Reintegration

Economic
- Humanitarian
- Assistance
- Development
- Assistance
- Resource
- & Infrastruc
- ture
- Management
- Growth
- Capacity

Effectiveness x Legitimacy

Information
- Intelligence
- Information Ops
- Media Ops
- Global, Regional, Local

Establish, Consolidate, Transfer

Tempo
- Violence
- Stability

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Executive Summary

The following are the major conclusions attained from an analysis of primary sources including the responses to a survey of Iraq PRT members, recorded interviews conducted with Iraq and Afghanistan PRT members and recorded interviews conducted with participants in the Vietnam CORDS Program. The PRT survey and interview groups included both civilian and military workers. The CORDS interview group included only civilians. Findings and conclusions from secondary sources, including an analysis of the counterinsurgency and PRT literature and an analysis of CORDS research can be found on pages 29 through 48 and 65 through 67.

Conclusions from Surveys:

- A majority of Iraq PRT members perceive that their work is closely connected to the Mission of the military.
- A majority of Iraq PRT members believe that civilian and military elements are well integrated on PRT's.
- A large majority of Iraq PRT members believe that the PRT is an effective model for interagency cooperation.
- A majority of Iraq PRT members consider counterinsurgency their lowest priority.
- A majority of Iraq PRT members see their PRT's as either unsuccessful or only marginally successful in achieving primary goals.
- A majority of Iraq PRT members believe that the people of Iraq they encountered are generally supportive of their work.
- Most Iraq PRT members perceive that training has been the least helpful factor in PRT success.
- Motivation and security are considered by most Iraq PRT responders as the most relevant contributing factors to success.
- The majority of Iraq PRT members perceive that security is balanced well with other priorities but a significant minority (almost 30%) believe that there is too much security.
- There is a general perception in Missions with counterinsurgency experience that security and military support for development are the most relevant contributing factors to the success of civil/military projects.
- A majority of Mission responders from countries with counterinsurgency programs believe that a stronger military presence would assist them in their work.

Conclusions from Interviews:

- Counterinsurgency and the relationship between counterinsurgency and development are unclear to most PRT members.
- Neither civilian nor military PRT members see their activities as being under the rubric of counterinsurgency.
- Common objectives on counterinsurgency projects are understood only very generally and there is a lack of clear operational guidance in the field.
Training in language and culture is considered insufficient by most civilian and some military PRT members.
Training is insufficient to enable civilian and military PRT members to work effectively together.
Many civilian PRT members are unclear as to their mission and lack any coherent mission statement.
Military PRT members are unclear as to what constitutes “development” in the context of counterinsurgency.

Recommendations:
- Provide a clear mission, mission statement and, most importantly, effective and consistent reinforcement to achieve a common understanding of the mission between civilians and the military.
- Honestly assess the level of effectiveness that the host government is capable of achieving and program accordingly for sustainability.
- Prioritize unity of effort and link Military activities to civilian work.
- Assure that programs are or will be host country staffed and run from the outset and plan for this eventuality.
- Assure a secure operating environment as a prerequisite but balance security with other priorities—too much is as ineffective as too little.
- Develop an objective assessment scheme that balances data collection and analysis and includes indicators that measure joint counterinsurgency objectives (see Appendix III).
- Concentrate on training and mix military and civilians in training—consider joint deployments as well as joint trainings.
- Consider more extensive language and culture training, regardless of the level of proficiency the trainee can be expected to attain, as a useful background for in-country work.
Acknowledgments

Kevin Brownawell has been invaluable in his encouragement for this undertaking. In addition, Lyn Sauls and Michele Schimpp were both very forthcoming in sharing information that enabled the completion of the study. The author is also grateful to Ann Ralte, Christian Hougen and Elena Brineman for providing many insights that have been instrumental in the preparation of the report. Finally, the National Defense University’s Bernie Carreau, Christian Luehrs and Sara Thannhauser have been generous with both their time and data. Much of this report utilizes their analyses and, while this format precludes the addition of footnotes, the author wishes to state that the sections on PRT’s, in particular, including PRT survey data and surveys of the literature, have benefited greatly from access to NDU’s important work.
**Acronyms and Glossary**

**Counter-Insurgency Acronyms**

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. African Command</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combined Action Program</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Community Stabilization Program</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>DOCEX</td>
<td>document exploitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<td>FMI</td>
<td>field manual–interim</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host-nation</td>
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<td>ICMAG</td>
<td>Interagency Civil-Military Action Group</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>international displaced person</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
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<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUSMAG</td>
<td>Joint United States Military Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLO</td>
<td>logical lines of operations</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIST</td>
<td>Military Information Support Team</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multi-National Force</td>
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<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>OCR</td>
<td>Office of Civilian Response</td>
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<td>ODC</td>
<td>Office of Defense Cooperation</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Policy Coordinating Committee</td>
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PNSR Project on National Security Reform
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSYOP psychological operations
S/CRS State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SAO Security Assistance Office
SOCCENT Special Operations Command Central
SOF special operations forces
SSR Security Sector Reform
TSC Theater Security Cooperation
TSCTP Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership

CORDS Acronyms

ACTIV Army Concept Team in Vietnam
ADA Assistant District Advisor
APT Armed Propaganda Team
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CORDS Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
DEROS Date of Departure
Dist District
DOA Date of Arrival
DOICC District Office Intelligence Coordinating Centers
GVN Government of Vietnam
HES Hamlet Evaluation System
HEW Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet
IF Interview Form
Int Interview
MAC/CORDS Military Assistance Command/Civilian Office
MACV Military Assistance Command/Vietnam
MCA Military Civilian Analysts
NPA National Priority Area
PA Province Advisor
PF Popular Force
PFF Police Field Forces
PRU Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PTAI Pacific Technical Analysts Incorporated
Rch Research
RDT Revolutionary Development Team
RF Regional Force
RVN Republic of Vietnam
SDA Senior District Advisor
VIS Vietnamese Information Service
VIT Vietnamese Interview Team
Counter-Insurgency Glossary

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces.

assessment (Army). The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation.

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established.

civil affairs operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.

civil considerations. How the man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations influence the conduct of military operations.

civil/military cooperation. The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors that is necessary to avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals. Cooperation is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

civilian actor. Non-military personnel representing USAID, international organizations or non-governmental organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and development activities.

civil-military operations center. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.
civil-military operations. Activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.

clear. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area.

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (.Armed Forces.), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President.

commander’s emergency response funds (CERP Funds). CERP funds provide tactical commanders with a means to conduct multiple stability tasks that have traditionally been performed by U.S., foreign, or indigenous professional civilian personnel or agencies. These tasks include but are not limited to the reconstruction of infrastructure, support to governance, restoration of public services, and support to economic development.

community stabilization program. The CSP program is intended to complement military security efforts, and civilian local government development, with economic and social stabilization efforts. These efforts to rapidly stabilize strategic cities are comprised, in part, of short- and medium-term public works projects which provide employment for those groups in Iraqi society most susceptible to insurgent appeals.

complex contingency operations. Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that are assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

complex emergency. A complex emergency is a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country program.

counterinsurgency. In the context of an occupation or an armed rebellion, counter-insurgency (abbreviated COIN) is a military term combat against an insurgency, by
forces aligned with the recognized government of the territory in which the armed conflict takes place. Counter-insurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means.

counterstate. A competing structure set up by an insurgent to replace the government in power. It includes the administrative and bureaucratic trappings of political power, and performs the normal functions of government.

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT.

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission.

decisive point. Geographic place, specific key event, critical system or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack.

forward operations base. In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. A forward operations base may be the location of special operations component headquarters or a smaller unit that is controlled and/or supported by a main operations base.

full spectrum operations. The conduct of simultaneous combinations of the four components of Army operations (offense, defense, stability, and civil support) across the spectrum of conflict (peace, crisis, and war).

host nation. A host nation receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

host-nation support. Support by the host nation is civil and/or military assistance rendered to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.

humanitarian assistance coordination center. A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations at the strategic level.

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. As a model of Civil/Military cooperation, humanitarian assistance is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is
designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

**humanitarian operations center.** An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation, the humanitarian operations center is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the operation.

**information operations.** (Army) The employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect and defend information and information systems and to influence decisionmaking.

**insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

**interagency.** United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.

**intergovernmental organization.** An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union.

**joint civil-military operations task force.** A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or civil military operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater.

**joint special operations task force.** A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

**lines of operations.** Lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.
measure of effectiveness. (Army) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

measure of performance. (Army) A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.

military actor. Members of the United States Armed Forces who are subject to its hierarchical chain of command which may include peacekeeping troops, observers and other non-armed personnel as well as combatants.

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

military information support. MIST is the acronym now being used for psychological operations. PSYOPS, a term which is gradually being phased out, are defined as operations planned and executed to convey selected information and indicator to foreign audiences to influence their ambitions, motives, objectives, and reasoning.

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose.

narrative. An organizational scheme expressed in story form that is central to the representation of a group’s identity.

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts.

planning The process by which commanders (and staff if available) translate the commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results.

preparation. Activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement.

private sector. An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and, in foreign countries, to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations.
provincial reconstruction team. An interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services.

reachback. (Army/Marine Corps) The ability to exploit resources, capabilities, and expertise, not physically located in the theater or a joint operations area, when established.

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

section 1207 funding. Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer of up to $100 million per year for two years to the Department of State for programs that support security, reconstruction or stabilization. In passing section 1207, the Congress recognized the pressing need previously expressed by the Administration for a civilian response capability for stabilization and reconstruction activities in countries that are prone to conflict. The 1207 authority is intended to improve U.S. capacity and interagency coordination for immediate reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance to maintain peace and security in countries that are unstable. Section 1207 has a strong civil-military coordination and cooperation component, which means that it focuses on reconstruction and stabilization via civilian coordination with the security sector and civil society.

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of

special operations command central. Special Operations Command Central is a subordinate unified command of US Central Command (USCENTCOM). It is responsible for planning special operations throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR); planning and conducting peacetime joint/combined special operations training exercises; and orchestrating command and control of peacetime and wartime special operations as directed.

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.
special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment,

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials.

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

tempo (Army) The rate of military action. (FM 3-0) (Marine Corps) The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
**unified action** A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.

**whole of government.** A term usually used in connection with COIN planning, a whole of government approach integrates civilian and military capabilities across each of the four COIN strategy functions of security, politics, economics and information. This requires ‘whole-of-government’ planning to synchronize and sequence each department’s activities towards achieving the objectives of the COIN strategy.

**CORDS Glossary**

**armed propaganda team.** South Vietnamese psychological warfare group, composed of former Viet Cong.

**civilian irregular defense group.** Small unit GVN counter-guerrilla force.

**civil operations and revolutionary development support.** CORDS was designed by the NSC member Robert Komer in 1966 who argued that a pacification success could only be achieved by integrating three tasks. The first and most basic requirement for pacification had to be security, because the rural population had to be kept safe from the main enemy forces. If this was achieved, the insurgents’ forces had to be weakened both by destroying their infrastructure among the population and by developing programs to win over the people’s sympathy for the government of South Vietnam and the U.S. forces. The third point emphasized by Komer was that the new strategy had to be applied on a large scale in order to significantly turn around the situation.

**popular force.** Formerly Self-Defense Corps militia-like troops.

**provincial reconnaissance unit.** Small unit reconnaissance and reaction force.

**regional force.** Civil Guard, a South Vietnamese civil militia.

**hamlet evaluation system.** A system used as a reporting device for the entire country and for political divisions down to the district level. HES is a reasonably reliable method of estimating security trends. The reliability of the development factors is less clear.

**pacification.** In Vietnam this term specifically refers programs designed to identify and "neutralize" the civilian infrastructure supporting the Vietnamese insurgency.

**phoenix program.** The Program was in operation between 1967 and 1972, and similar efforts existed both before and after that period. In 1967 all pacification efforts by the United States had come under the authority of the CORDS program. Officially, Phoenix operations continued until December 1972.
vietnamization. Transfer burden of war from U.S. to ARVN, Policy of "Mutual withdrawal" of troops, no bombing of NV, Hanoi and Washington would negotiate military solution, Saigon and NLF would negotiate political solutions, "Carrot and stick" strategy - negotiate through strength.
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I. Introduction

Population security is the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency, but it is not alone sufficient to ensure long term results. Economic development, good governance, and the provision of essential services, all occurring within a matrix of effective information and assistance operations, must improve simultaneously and steadily if counterinsurgency programs are to be effective. Modern counterinsurgency programs integrate both military and civilian elements of the United States Government’s strategy into the effort to build stable and secure societies.

This meta-evaluation of counterinsurgency programming, aggregates findings from evaluations, assessments, studies, audits and other documents in order to focus on those aspects of counter-insurgency programming that have been corroborated by strong evidence and those that have been both under-theorized and unverified. This project began as a survey of available research and information from current and historical sources on the impact of counter-insurgency programming. As such it is not an evaluation of the effectiveness of such programming but rather an aggregation of both primary (interviews and survey responses) and secondary (research articles and books) sources on the topic of counterinsurgency.

The purpose of this assessment was to build on the base of existing knowledge and to avoid duplication of efforts. The review of research concludes with lessons learned and best practices drawn from the existing research as well as avenues for future research. To the extent that the following analysis presents evidence-based findings (the results of primary research) these will be highlighted throughout the report. This report attempts to present the data in a systematic and understandable format that can be used to aid in future evaluation, policy and programming decisions.

Much of the analysis that follows focuses on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although counterinsurgency is a term that has been used by many missions to describe programs in countries in which the military is not actively engaged in full scale conflict, in historical context, the term implies a situation in which the counterinsurgents are officially at war with the insurgents. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide for example refers to an “enemy centric” approach and a “population centric” approach clearly implying that an identifiable enemy is the primary target.

In reality, conflicts in the post-Vietnam era are ill-defined and, consequently, U.S. involvement in them may, similarly, lack definition. The implications of this study, which has concentrated on the most well defined counterinsurgency programs in which USAID participates, are not that counterinsurgency programs outside of Iraq and Afghanistan are not worthy of comprehensive analysis as well. Indeed, if nothing else, the following research should suggest that similar assessments across the whole spectrum of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counterextremism and stabilization programs in which USAID has become involved merit close study. The results and conclusions outlined in this report will be most applicable to situations in which there is no doubt that
our efforts are intended to contribute to counterinsurgency objectives but they should, hopefully, also provide some direction in looking at similar programs elsewhere in the world.

Map 1. Afghanistan PRT's.

Map 2. Iraq PRT's.
II. History of Counter-Insurgency in the United States

The identification and resolution of civilian needs in conflict situations probably began in the United States in the aftermath of the Civil War (1867-1880). The approach of the U.S. Government in rebuilding the capacity of the former Confederacy was to divide it into five military districts and grant the Army the power to remove and appoint officials, register voters, hold elections, regulate court proceedings, and approve state constitutions. In this situation, the strategy for combating insurgents was to create a troop presence that was so pervasive that there was no place left for insurgents to hide.

During the American Indian Wars (1865-1918), comprising a series of small wars, Native Americans usually made decisions about war and peace at the local level, though they sometimes fought as part of formal alliances. Political leadership formulated an Indian national policy which had as its objective, the placement of all Indians on reservations. The army, as an instrument to be used by the executive branch in executing this policy, was never able to develop a military strategy to achieve this political end state. A loose body of principles emerged from the Indian Wars, however—principles, it should be emphasized, that were not consistently followed. These were: 1) to ensure the close civil-military coordination of the pacification effort; 2) to provide firm but fair and paternalistic governance; and 3) to reform the economic and educational spheres. Good treatment of prisoners, attention to the Indians’ grievances, and the avoidance of killing women and children (learned by error) were also regarded as fundamental to any long-term solution.

![Photo 2. U.S. Military in the Philippines-1902.](image)

The first time that the United States Government employed a counter-insurgency strategy abroad was in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902. Practicing what was identified as “attraction and chastisement” (carrot and stick) and “oil spot” (concentration of counter-insurgent forces into an expanding, secured zone) strategies, small military units living in Philippine towns and villages conducted direct actions, trained local forces, collected intelligence, and worked on civilian projects to defeat the insurgency. The critical lesson in counterinsurgency doctrine from the Philippines example is the
fundamental requirement of a good government in order to defeat an insurgent force. This includes strong leadership, minimal corruption, and a bond between the government and at least a significant portion of the population it governs. Also important in the process of transforming the military force into a viable counterforce to insurgent warfare, was the strategy of having infantry forces limited to battalion-size, in order to locate and destroy insurgent forces and the use of military forces to achieve political objectives. Unity of effort between the military and the limited civilian actors employed in the Philippines was applied to separate the insurgents from the population and to fight and defeat the guerrillas.

During the Nicaragua “Banana Wars” (1925-1932), military interventions were carried out by the Marines. The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars Manual (1921) was created during this period. In Nicaragua, in the face of what became an unusual conflict situation, the U.S. Government sought the status of political arbiter. During this exercise it was explicitly recognized by the military that small wars, unlike conventional wars, did not present defined or linear battle areas and/or a theater of operations. While delay in the use of force might be interpreted as weakness, the Small Wars Manual maintains, the brutal use of force is not appropriate either. The Manual advises the strategy of employing as many indigenous troops as practical early on to confer proper responsibility on indigenous agencies for restoring law and order. The importance of focusing on the social, economic, and political development of the people more than on material destruction was also emphasized. The importance of aggressive patrolling, ensuring population security, and denying sanctuary to the insurgents were stressed. The overarching principle--not to fight small wars with big-war methods—was intended to gain results with the least application of force and minimum loss of civilian (non-combatant) life.

![Photo 3. Marines in Nicaragua](Image)
Massive aid was given to Greece by the United States between 1944 and 1949. Military aid in the form of equipment, funds and advisors were provided, allowing the government of Greece to raise an army that was capable of handling an insurgency. The economic aid under the Truman Doctrine bolstered the psychological state of the Greek people and gave credence to the belief that the Greek government was working to better the lot of its citizens. Greece was the first major police task which the United States took on in the postwar world. One of the most important consequences of the American involvement in Greece in the 1940's was the development of new bureaucracies specializing in military assistance, police administration, and economic aid, committed to an analysis of revolution and a set of responses for dealing with it that would be applied to many different conflicts in the next twenty years.

Although the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) was not a conflict that involved the United States, it became the impetus for an influential work on counterinsurgency that has had a substantial impact on U.S. policies. In 1966, Robert Thompson, one of the primary architects of British counter-insurgency success in Malaya and the head of the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam (BRIAM) in the early years of the Vietnam War, published one of the most acclaimed pieces of so-called 'classical' counter-insurgency literature. According to Thompson, victory over guerrilla groups requires more than just numerical military superiority. The most crucial part of Thompson's book is Chapter Four, in which he outlines his five 'Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency': the government, in effectively implementing counterinsurgency strategies must, according to Thompson: 1) have a clear political aim; 2) function in accordance with accepted law; 3) have an overall plan; 4) give priority to defeating political subversion; and 5) secure its base areas first. Thompson's extensive experience, albeit in countering a particular type of rural Maoist guerrillas, led him to acclaim these principles as the cornerstone of any successful COIN conflict.

Probably the first time Thompson's counterinsurgency principles were truly tested was in Vietnam. USAID participation in this program involved continuing to provide general economic and agricultural development support as it had been doing previously as well as providing educational assistance (especially building schools) and healthcare (often through the creation of health centers for local populations), assisting with refugees, working on the Revolutionary Development Cadre teams, and assisting with the Chieu Hoi (‘open arms’) program, which welcomed former insurgents and opponents back to the South Vietnamese fold. USAID contributed advisors to the police as well as local officials and also ran traditional development programs that fell outside of CORDS in fields such as education, health, and nutrition. However, the service delivery of these programs was done through CORDS.
CORDS was considered successful, in that the increased coordination among U.S. government agencies enhanced pacification efforts in the field. It also established that winning hearts and minds was a vital component of an anti-insurgency strategy. However, CORDS programs were only conducted in relatively secure areas. The U.S. military feared attacks upon civilian personnel in unsecured areas. Its peak year was 1969 (which roughly corresponded with the peak year of U.S. involvement in Vietnam), and activity declined in the years after as the United States slowly withdrew from that country.

The CORDS experience, as the first time in which USAID engaged in civil/military cooperation in pursuit of stabilization and development goals is considered in this report in a separate section. For the purposes of deriving lessons learned on the counterinsurgency and development front, the availability of interviews and data on the operation of CORDS presents a unique opportunity to evaluate the achievements and challenges of this program. Since the CORDS program, the most significant participation of USAID in counterinsurgency programs has been with respect to the activities of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Related operations aimed at stabilizing countries in post-conflict contexts in El Salvador, Colombia, Peru, Somalia. Rwanda and Bosnia, among others, can also provide some data and conclusions that can be of value in examining counterinsurgency programming. Evaluations of some of these programs are included in the survey of the literature detailed below.
USAID’s mission to provide humanitarian assistance and foster long-term economic and political development has become increasingly important in the evolution of a full-spectrum COIN response. Development has now become one of the key pillars of national security and this has caused internal and external changes at USAID such as new offices, new programs, and new interagency initiatives. Projects have been based upon the conclusions that a number of factors, including remoteness, porous borders, proximity to known terrorist groups, large marginalized and/or disenfranchised populations, and exclusion from political processes are key causes of instability (see Figure 2 below).

Programming recommendations have led to targeted interventions such as youth engagement, former combatant reintegration, education, rural radio and media programs, peace building/conflict management and small-scale infrastructure projects. Improved interagency communications have led to joint projects where USAID provides “software” (training, institutional capacity, healthcare) and Combined Joint Task Forces build “hardware” (schools, wells, physical rehabilitation of hospitals).
A number of axiomatic activities and attitudes that purport to contribute to successful counterinsurgency programming have evolved over the decades. These are:

- The importance of developing livelihoods and fostering economic growth particularly focused on young men;
- The need to ensure the allegiance of the local population through targeted and sustainable infrastructure projects;
- The significance of empowering legitimate, indigenous actors to engage in local and national government; and
- The essential requirement of recognizing that progress is incremental and goals are long term.

The question of how we measure progress in counterinsurgency programming has become crucially important. Only by tracking progress can we know whether these complex, and costly, strategies are working. Assessing progress is also important because the perception of progress has an effect on the sustainability of the development efforts. Given the political importance of measuring progress and the very limited set of agreed-upon benchmarks, the question of measurement has become deeply controversial.

The impetus for this study is the need to address the simple, but highly fraught, question of whether or not development activities undertaken as a part of counterinsurgency programming have had any degree of success in achieving the primary objective of those activities—that is, to reduce incentives for participating in violent conflict. The question of the degree to which secondary objectives, such as fostering economic growth, support for education, agricultural assistance and government reforms have been achieved is not examined here primarily because without the achievement of the primary objective there will be no foundation for sustainable future development.

While this important question inspired this undertaking, it should be stated that it cannot be answered by a study such as this one, which does not include primary research on specific counterinsurgency projects. A review of available sources can provide responses to the following secondary questions, however:

- How well have those who worked on these projects understood their primary mission?
- How well have those who worked on these projects been trained to perform their mission?
- How well has interagency cooperation on counterinsurgency programs functioned?
- What has the agency learned from the past experience of several decades of work on counterinsurgency projects?
- What best practices can be discerned from the agency’s experience with counterinsurgency?
An analysis of the perceptions of frontline counterinsurgents is an essential first step in evaluating how well the projects they worked on have succeeded and, most importantly, why they did or did not succeed.
IV. Objectives and Methodology

The traditional formula for counterinsurgency and stabilization tends to place a strong emphasis on tracking trends in the daily life of typical citizens. How secure are they, and who do they credit for that security? How hopeful do they find their economic situation, regardless of the nation’s GDP or even their own personal wealth at a moment in time? Do they think their country’s government is giving them a voice?

While many studies purport to answer the relevant questions, the lack of data to support those answers leads to a conclusion that more rigorous evaluation is needed in this area. Before undertaking the costly enterprise of an agency-wide evaluation of counter-insurgency programming, however, we need to assess what lessons learned and best practices can be gleaned from prior evaluations, assessments and studies. This study will entail both a synthesis of prior studies, assessments and evaluations and an analysis of the evidence-based conclusions and recommendations that have resulted from them.

The meta-evaluation has used several analytical tools and applied the related methodologies iteratively. These consist of the following:

1) Comprehensive desk review of relevant documents. Relevant recent and historical documents reporting on counterinsurgency programming including evaluations, assessments, audits, reports and studies were identified and reviewed. Particular attention was given to evidence-based impact studies and reports that assessed follow-up on recommendations of reviews and assessments. The quality of analysis and the recommendations of these reviews will be assessed in terms of their actual and expected impacts on counter insurgency programming.

2) Consultations with key informants. Consultations were made with key informants to provide background information. Further, several meetings and conferences at which key informants presented findings and studies on counterinsurgency programming were attended. In addition to USAID and DOD informants, the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations provided significant input.

3) On-line surveys. A detailed questionnaire to elicit views on key issues in counterinsurgency programming was sent to PRT personnel as a part of an inter-agency Lessons Learned Initiative (data provided by the National Defense University). Quantitative analysis of survey data and a synthesis of qualitative write-in comments and interviews have helped to sharpen the key findings listed below and the conclusions.

4) Interviews. USIP conducted interviews with returning PRT members from both Iraq and Afghanistan. For the purposes of this report the interviews were analyzed using key word analysis. For key word analysis it is important to note that words did not appear exactly as noted in the analyses and were counted if they were in any form of the key word. In addition, words appeared in positive, negative and neutral contexts. Therefore, these contexts were counted as separate occurrences. Given that all conversations and
comments focused on the same subjects, the frequency of key word use in comments and interviews provides some indication of the associations that respondents have with those terms and their inferences within the context of counterinsurgency programs. The strength of content analysis lies in its ability to quantify themes in communication that might otherwise escape the notice of the researcher. Ultimately, however, it is not an objective form of data collection as it is within the province of the analyst to select the words, phrases or themes that will be examined and also to select the questions they will be used to answer.

The selection of the contexts was not as straightforward as the above explanation might suggest. Ultimately this was also a fairly subjective categorization but, in consideration of the goals of counterinsurgency programming, the following guidelines were used: 1) a positive context was that which associated the concept/keyword with success, good management, consensus, knowledge and understanding and, also mention of the key word in connection with a positive follow-up or preceding statement; 2) a negative context was than which associated the concept/key word with the opposite of these (lack of success, poor management, superfluity, lack of consensus, lack of knowledge and misunderstanding) and, also, negative constructions of the key word and mention of the key word in connection with a generally negative follow-up or preceding statement; 3) a neutral context included references to the concept/key word within proper names and titles, in informal names and titles and in descriptions in which no opinions were implied or expressed.

These tools and methods were used to conduct a comprehensive survey of past reviews and to probe deeply into issues regarding the current and future mission, strategy and effectiveness of counterinsurgency programming. The data aggregated for the purposes of this evaluation include the following: 1) survey responses from 70 returning members of Iraq PRT's; 2) interviews collected by USIP from 52 Iraq and 65 Afghanistan PRT members; 3) survey responses from 50 staff members of USAID countries in the Middle East and Asia with counterinsurgency programs; and 4) data from 80 interviews with USAID and State Department CORDS participants.
V. Findings and Conclusions—Counterinsurgency Survey of the Literature

Findings and Conclusions from Literature Review:

The literature review for the purposes of this evaluation focused upon four classes of documents relating to stabilization and counterinsurgency: 1) audits and assessments specific to USAID efforts; 2) audits, assessments and reports on interagency counterinsurgency efforts; 3) non-governmental case studies of counterinsurgency programs; and 4) non-governmental PRT assessments.

A) USAID development efforts:

There are a limited number of assessments, evaluations or audits of USAID development efforts in the context of counterinsurgency programs. The following paragraphs summarize the most relevant conclusions and recommendations from these studies and statements.

1) James A. Bever, Director of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force provided the following assessment of USAID’s work on PRT’s in a statement before Congress: “A key lesson we learned from our experience in Iraq was the importance of joint training and orientation programs for PRT staff in order to provide the best possible preparation for new PRT employees so they can be effective members of their PRT teams from the first day of deployment. Consequently, if USAID staff assignments for Afghan PRT’s coincide with certain military unit deployments, these staff have participated in the military’s three-week predeployment training.” He further delineated several areas for greater coordination with the military including: (1) integration of military and civilian missions where appropriate; (2) some re-prioritization of current activities; and (3) the allocation of additional security/mobility assets.

2) The relationship between illicit agriculture and counterinsurgency was explored in a USAID assessment (2009) of the implementation of illicit crop reduction in Colombia. This assessment noted, with respect to the issue of population displacement and counterinsurgency, that a lack of support in local villages for illegal armed groups cannot be understood as success for counterinsurgency, state-building, or counternarcotics where significant displacement of the population occurs. The displaced population continues to be alienated from the state, and frequently winds up in areas threatened by illegal armed groups, once again caught in a web of insecurity and state absence. Moreover, displacement due to eradication as well as due to conflict critically jeopardizes access to legal employment and thus the displaced population is all the more vulnerable to resorting to coca cultivation as a coping mechanism. This dynamic is more pronounced where the displaced do not have access to the services provided by the state to other people displaced by conflict. Such internal migration also frequently generates new conflict over land, once again undermining security and state-building in rural areas as well as rural development in general.
The assessment recommended that, instead of focusing on the numbers of hectares of illicit crops cultivated and eradicated, the size and pervasiveness of the illicit economy and the effectiveness of counternarcotics policies should be measured and presented as a multi-year time-series composite measure that includes at least the following variables: 1) the numbers of hectares cultivated with illicit crops, 2) the numbers of hectares eradicated, 3) the numbers of municipalities free from illicit crop cultivation, 4) the percentage of the size of the illicit economy per GDP and per the size of the economy in every subnational region, 5) human development indicators of illicit crop farmers and populations vulnerable to illicit crop cultivation, and 6) the availability to illicit crop farmers of comprehensive licit livelihoods resources.

3) A USAID evaluation of a local governance and community development program in Afghanistan (2009) recommended that the agency carefully and clearly define local stability initiatives (LSI), accepting that in a conflict plagued setting like Afghanistan, the intent of LSI is to build counterinsurgency support while applying Community Development principles. (As opposed to merely the attempt to perform Community Development in insecure areas.) The ultimate goal can remain to transition LSI interventions into community development projects, but the immediate focus and goals of LSI should be to bring a modicum of stability to volatile areas, followed by development objectives. USAID should expect Local Stability Initiatives to be implemented as the Counterinsurgency Support projects using Community Development principles they are.

4) A 2008 USAID/Philippines evaluation of conflict and peace programs in Mindanao since 2000, suggested that the process of geographic concentration typical to counterinsurgency programs can be applied to sets of complementary programs, both in a local area and between local areas. A staged process can be undertaken in conjunction with security forces that is likened to the "Clear, Hold, and Build" sequence that is undertaken by the military in counterinsurgency strategies. First, remote areas need to be identified that have potentially exportable products and yet still present threats to project workers' security. These areas first need to made secure through the actions of GRP security forces. Early stages of development programming would likely comprise provision of basic infrastructure, such as roads and electrification, and building of the capacities of local inhabitants to grow more crops for marketable purposes. The subsequent steps entail expanding the capacity of transport, middlemen and trade relationships. Consequently, there is no necessary disjuncture between the need to develop centers of growth in urban coastal areas and the need to expand programming into more remote rural areas. Both can be done simultaneously through the identification of new or strengthening of old economic value chains that link agrarian areas to larger markets. What must be central to such value chains from a conflict mitigation perspective is that the linkages thus forged are deliberately designed to establish ties of economic interdependency between differing groups, such as between the two religious persuasions, warring ethnic groups or clans.
5) The Regional Inspector General in Baghdad conducted an audit (March 2008) of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program. The audit was unable to determine if the Community Stabilization Program was achieving its intended result—to help defeat the insurgency by reducing the incentives for participating in it—because they could not rely on one of the major measurements of the program (employment generation). Even though citizens’ perceptions of local government effectiveness seemed to have improved, short-term employment generated by the program was inadequately substantiated. Employment generation through public works projects has been the predominant focus of the Community Stabilization Program to date and is a key program element designed to reduce incentives for participating in the insurgency. Furthermore, the audit found evidence of potential fraud occurring in projects within a specific district of Baghdad. The potential fraud included the possible diversion of Community Stabilization Program funds to militia activities by means of overpriced trash collection contracts and related timesheets with irregularities, as well as possible phantom workers for the community cleanup campaigns funded by the program.

In response to the draft report, USAID/Iraq accepted the need to improve documentation and acknowledged the high degree of risk associated with a program like CSP in a war zone. However, USAID/Iraq indicated that, despite these challenges, the bulk of evidence was that CSP has been very successful. In its comments, USAID/Iraq indicated that it agreed with seven of the fourteen recommendations.

6) The Inspector General’s major audit of USAID and interagency programs is aggregated in the well known *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*
report which contains the following significant statements about USAID’s constraints and successes in Iraq:

- USAID officials first learned of their expected role in Iraq well after war planning had begun.
- The National Security Council conceived of reconstruction primarily in terms of bricks and mortar, but USAID viewed such rebuilding as only part of the long-term social and political transformation necessary to achieving a fully-democratic Iraq.
- In every aspect of the effort—in both the humanitarian and reconstruction areas—complex contracting regulations and time pressures pushed USAID’s capacities to the limit, exposing structural weaknesses in the U.S. government’s ability to mobilize for contingency relief and reconstruction operations.
- Once invited inside secret planning cells, USAID officials were asked to formulate a program of reconstruction that some believed was at odds with their agency’s institutional wisdom and ethos.
- A long-term strategy for building technical and area expertise in the government’s civilian agencies and creating mechanisms for deploying such capabilities abroad in times of crisis and peace should be considered.
- On-the-spot grant-making authority and the ability to let contracts without having to comply with some of the more cumbersome parts of the Federal Acquisition Regulation—mostly for projects employing people in the neighborhood—can lead to quicker results.
- Keeping the projects themselves safe means not advertising their location, even within the Coalition. The full impact of USAID transitional stabilization projects thus has remained hidden from both Iraqis and many U.S. officials.

7) Following this audit a formal evaluation of the CSP program took place (July 2009). The evaluation team determined that CSP is a viable program and experienced considerable success where program-internal coordination and broader integration took place. Ninety-eight percent of CSP participants polled during this evaluation reported that their communities are safer today than in 2006. While the extent to which CSP and aid programs in general are a part of this success could not be determined, given the number of variables influencing security, it is broadly accepted that aid, capacity building, training of local and national police and military forces, and other such activities are vital complements to direct action taken against an insurgent foe.

The report also found that although the different components of CSP should have complemented each other, this rarely happened. In fact, most of the time, each of the four program components operated independently. CSP operations worked well, according to this evaluation, when all stakeholders worked together at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) level to develop a common strategy and
utilize economies of scale to maximize United States Government (USG) resources. CSP objectives also benefited from regular coordination meetings held in some locations by those implementing the Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Program, (Vo-Tech), meetings that included various relevant USG stakeholders since such successes appear to be largely personality driven. Unfortunately, CSP, the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), and other initiatives were often not integrated; in some cases, interaction was so poor that CSP projects were completely unknown to other PRT and local coalition representatives.

The report concluded that using a reduction in violence as an impact indicator for the success of a COIN program can be misleading. The number of confounding variables in a theater make any firm conclusions, with respect to correlation or causation between the implementation of CSP and the number of violent incidents, a potentially misleading one (e.g., the effect of similar programs like CERP ongoing in the same Area of Operations (AO) or criminal activity not disaggregated from violent incident statistics). Interviewees questioned on this finding either believed no conclusion could be drawn given the amount of other aid and related ongoing activity, or personally felt that CSP aided in the reduction of violence, but they could not validate their impressions.

This report recommended that developing metrics that more closely capture changes in attitudes and behavior, which indicate a return to normalcy, would assist in determining the attainment of the ultimate COIN objective: stability. Examples of these indicators include: the number of people in markets, tea shops, and other public spaces at different times of the day, and the number of children attending school, among others. These data could be collected through surveys, focus groups and key informant interviews.

While concern that USAID personnel visiting CSP project sites may have security implications for contractors or other Iraqis associated with project efforts, it is restrictions regarding the safety of the USAID representatives themselves that pose the primary limitation on field monitoring. The result is an over reliance on local staff who may suffer pressure from host nation government officials or other sources that potentially impede objectivity. In addition, the impact of corruption undermined CSP’s effectiveness as it relates to and supports COIN.

The report further suggested that CSP components should be implemented as part of a system, considering each an integral and complementary part of the whole. “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities” must be improved within the components of programs such as CSP and integration must be improved between CSP and other USAID and USG funded programs, e.g., Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (IRAP), US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the host nation government efforts.
8) The challenges that limited U.S. and international efforts to stabilize Somalia were enumerated in a GAO Audit Report on February 2008. In seeking to improve the security situation in the country, mainly by funding an African Union peacekeeping operation, it was found that a shortage of troops hindered peacekeepers’ ability to achieve their mission. In addition, the most recent attempt at political reconciliation was limited, in part because several important opposition groups were not involved. According to many officials, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government lacked institutional structures and national acceptance, and these weaknesses have constrained U.S. and international efforts to establish the transitional government as a fully functioning central government. Ongoing insecurity constrains the international community’s ability to monitor its provision of humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia. Furthermore, U.S. officials’ inability to travel to the country has prevented them from independently monitoring assistance. The international community’s plans to increase development assistance to Somalia depend on political progress and stability, which have not yet been achieved.

9) A USAID report on “Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Nangahar, Afghanistan” in 2006, lists the following specific lessons learned with respect to PRT’s:

- Keep in mind the three mandates of the PRT, and the interagency representatives should work together to determine how to best achieve their mission in the next 6–9 months.
- The sooner a PRT can bring the GoA into the process at the provincial level, the better.
- Regardless of what a team decides, the issue of local government involvement should be a discussion point within the PRT in the early stages so they can decide at what point government involvement is appropriate.
• The parameters of the projects must be clear, and the PRT must have Afghan representatives present at meetings to manage community expectations.
• It is much more difficult and time consuming to have the GoA engaged, but it is a key factor in counterinsurgency, and the PRT must have a serious discussion about the cost-benefit analysis if it is considering bypassing the GoA to meet a deadline.
• If there are any doubts about the ability to fund at least one project in the area, then the GoA and the PRT or its proxy must not go to the area.
• The project nomination process should be explained in simple terms, so the community can know when to expect a project to begin and they must understand that the community will have the chance to work on the project.
• It is important to manage expectations of the beneficiaries during the project identification stage.
• Based on experience, it is not enough to do all of this hard work in the beginning--the PRT also must follow up as the project develops.
• It is the responsibility of the donor agency to constantly monitor and evaluate these projects and ensure they are being done well.

10) USAID learned several lessons within its own transition program in Mozambique, as reported in 1996, and articulated others that pertain to the international community. Among the most significant with respect to counterinsurgency and stabilization were: have operational projects and staff on the ground who were familiar with the country from the earliest planning stages; keep those staffing levels as high as possible but, in the absence of adequate staff, find creative solutions to compensate, by establishing task forces, relying on Personal Service Contractors (PSCs) and Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), and adapting the Mission’s organizational structure to meet new needs; use interagency task forces to facilitate cooperation and communication among staff in various agencies; assure leadership at the top encourages staff to work together, and emphasize information-sharing; have a range of flexible funding sources to draw upon so that if one funding source cannot be used for various reasons, others can fill critical gaps; be prepared to take risks even though it may mean proceeding with an activity before having complete confidence in its technical feasibility, a situation that would be unlikely in a more traditional development program; use a realistic timetable for measuring progress; understand that the limited capacity for executing grants and contracts slows program implementation; place a greater reliance on competitive bidding procedures; articulate roles and relationships between organizations working in the same programs or areas; implement many activities through both non-governmental and host government institutions; UN involvement should be based on an unambiguous command structure and tailored to the situation on the ground; and make maximum use of agencies and organizations already active in the country.

11) An evaluation of USAID’s program to promote reconciliation and the transition to peace in El Salvador (June 1994) demonstrated some important findings for other developing nations interested in strengthening local government and
promoting participatory democracy such as: local government is an effective vehicle for prioritizing and implementing multisectoral investments; mayors are willing to collaborate at a regional level to prioritize investments and plan strategically; the popular image of national government is enhanced by improving the image of local government; organized communities have a more positive attitude toward local government than do unorganized communities; a natural bridge is waiting to be built between local government and community organizations; and people want to participate in local government and the more they participate, the more willing they are to contribute their own resources to help maintain projects.

11) Although it is not an evaluation or assessment of counterinsurgency programming, the Africa Bureau’s considerable fieldwork devoted to identifying drivers of extremism should be mentioned in the context of this report. Adding to the creation of internal guidance to advance Agency thinking on these issues, beginning in 2007, USAID’s Bureau for Africa commissioned a series of studies including the development of a terminology paper and a paper that tested development hypotheses and their relation to counter-extremism. USAID/AFR’s work culminated in the February 2009, Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism and the November 2009 Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming. While most of AFR’s research has focused on the incipient insurgency phase, it highlights two main areas: prevention where the threat is low or low to medium and mitigation where the threat is medium to high (in high-risk areas the focus is on containing the threat and preventing its spread).

B) **Interagency counterinsurgency efforts:**
As an interagency effort, counterinsurgency programming has been assessed by the specific agencies involved. Their assessments, however, focus on the components that are specifically within that agency’s purview. Several interagency reports have been issued over the past few decades that reference the role of development in counterinsurgency efforts. These are summarized below.

1) An interagency report on the Guatemala insurgency issued in the early 70’s begins with the premise that “Guatemala, unlike Vietnam, is not a country at war and the direct threat of the insurgents is against public security.” This may account for the fact that the report rejects the efficacy of a CORDS type of approach in favor of strengthening military and civilian policing and ensuring the rule of law. The report suggests that assistance efforts focus completely on law enforcement, intelligence and military institutions and identifies the Guatemalan Army as the only force capable of countering insurgents and, therefore, the most important partner in the long-range development of governmental capacity.

2) Thirty years later, symptomatic of changes in perceptions that had taken place, the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of the Inspector General conducted an evaluation of Afghanistan’s Rule of Law programs in January 2008. At the time, important discussions were taking place on the role
of the police in Afghanistan as well as the police-prosecutor relationship. The report concluded that: without ROL the country cannot progress no matter what contributions are made by outsiders; Afghanistan’s formal civil code judicial system, like its frail police, corrections, and educational institutions, was destroyed in 30 years of conflict; consequently most Afghans only have confidence in, and prefer to use, different systems of justice; neither the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan nor western ROL innovators has adequately addressed the balance between the formal and informal systems; and Afghan public confidence in formal ROL structure is unlikely to improve without a significant reduction in the level of corruption in the country.

3) The most direct statement of policy by an interagency working group that includes a section on lessons learned from past counterinsurgency programming was issued in December 2009. This report states the position of the State, USAID, DoD and DoJ working group that because transformational development is ultimately a desired longer-term outcome in all cases, including the complex security and military environments, that no distinction should be made in overarching policy, if not practice, between cases where achieving development outcomes is the primary objective of U.S. policy, and cases where we use development assistance and other tools in pursuit of other more immediate strategic objectives in countries where sustainable development outcomes are less likely to be achieved in the short-term. Distinctions tied to the operating environment must be made in practice, i.e., to improve the efficacy of our efforts anywhere and such differences can be reflected in distinct policy implementation.

The report further states that past experience has indicated a tension in “complex security and military environments” between short-term stabilization and longer-term development goals and between development and foreign policy/security-related outcomes. With a growing realization of the close relationship between development and security, as the achievement of security objectives increasingly relies on responsive, accountable and transparent governance, rule of law, broad-based, inclusive economic growth, and meeting human development needs, policies and practices need to be tailored in these environments must support these outcomes.

The major challenges to effective counterinsurgency programming cited in this report are: still insufficient numbers of civilian personnel; unrealistic expectations; weak country partners; imperfect synchronization between reconstruction/development teams and military support elements; confusion between “unity of command;” “unity of purpose” and “unity of effort;” confusion between USG actors on roles and responsibilities; duplication of USG effort and USG efforts that contradict or undermine each other; tension, and occasionally confusion, with NGO aid providers and among multilateral donors; and frequent lack of integrated USG strategic development vision to guide programming.
Identified “Lessons Learned from Complex Security and Military Environments” listed in this report include: viewing state weakness as the “enemy,” as much as a particular actor, ideology, insurgent or combatant; looking at the social contract which links citizens to their governments at multiple levels as a “center of gravity”; beginning capacity-building efforts involving key priority host-country public and private institutions at all levels immediately to complement stabilization; and recognizing that short-term tactical gains achieved via civilian-military counterinsurgency operations will not be sustainable unless they are underpinned by longer-term institutional development gains.

The most significant best practices recommended are: better manage the transition from shorter-term stabilization to longer-term, larger-scale assistance programming; conduct more programming at district and community level, which are the center of gravity for many efforts in these environments; create and train community action groups responsible for identifying and prioritizing community needs, mobilizing community and other resources, and monitoring project implementation; emphasize establishing/restoring market access and local employment generation involving projects in rural areas; and integrate pre-deployment training of military and civilian personnel.

4) The Office of Transition Initiatives has outlined some key conclusions for counterinsurgency programming from its long experience. These are:

- Stabilization through confidence-building—building communities’ trust in local institutions, they will be less inclined to support the insurgency;
- Community security is paramount—in Colombia, OTI has seen that once a community comes to believe the army is there to stay and not just conducting periodic sweeps, a critical mass makes the collective decision to switch allegiances;
- Security, as locally defined, is contextual and complex—in places where ideology is important and where culture, traditions, tribes or clans are strong and deep, making a “rational choice” about security often involves more than personal security as is commonly understood in Western society;
- Quick, flexible, and adaptive programming is key—the need to quickly demonstrate results and actively address grievances is essential given the high expectations of communities;
- The community is the center of gravity, and must “own” the projects—sense of ownership is important;
- Think locally, act locally—every region has its own dynamics, every valley, every village;
- Coordination, coordination and more coordination—all three “D”s—defense, diplomacy and development—are equally important and must work closely together at various levels;
- Corruption is a killer—programs must be extremely cautious to ensure that the institutions or individuals supported are credible;
- Strategic communications—perceptions are more important than reality;
• Small amounts of resources at the community level can have a significant impact—by starting small, a greater calculated risk can be taken, allowing for innovative programming or working with untested local partners;
• Development is not the immediate aim, but links to longer term development are critical – COIN projects and traditional development or humanitarian assistance may look the same (e.g. school repair, water and sanitation) but the target beneficiaries, geographic locations and implementation methodology will likely be quite different; and
• Don’t neglect the justice sector – when local grievances fester without an outlet, the rapid “justice” offered by militant groups has greater attraction. Consider alternative dispute resolution, mobile courts, or other appropriate ways of speeding up legitimate grievance resolution mechanisms and connecting them to longer-term rule-of-law efforts.

C) Non-governmental studies of modern counterinsurgency;

Evidence-based non-governmental counterinsurgency studies are almost nonexistent. There is, however, a growing body of literature on the subject that includes conclusions and recommendations. Since these are based mostly upon secondary sources and the experiences of the authors they are summarized here as a whole rather than individually.

1) Twenty-first century scholarship by practitioners of counterinsurgency reinforces the enduring relevance of non-combatants. The most prevalent explanation for the importance of garnering popular support is that parties to insurgent conflicts use it to gain critical information and intelligence. This information increases the effectiveness of both defensive and offensive operations. Prescriptions for gaining popular support vary considerably. Some of the literature suggests that efficient counterinsurgency can reduce the supply of insurgents, reduce demand for them, or both. Political scientists studying civil war and insurgency have debated the relative merits of employing attractive versus coercive measures. Proponents of hearts and minds theories advocate reducing the demand for rebellion. They believe that in as much as the government can secure the population and address popularly held grievances, the local beneficiaries of these efforts will reciprocate and reward it with their support.

2) A number of researchers have concentrated on the limitations of an over-reliance by counterinsurgents on winning hearts and minds which has become increasingly apparent since the Vietnam War. Research on the supply of rebels suggests that popular support is largely irrelevant where states are weak and the government could not act on information if it had it. In such states, profits from insurgency outweigh any reasonable government effort to buy off individual combatants. In contrast, some researchers have found that increases in the prices of agricultural exports reduced insurgency in rural Columbia, interpreting their finding as the operation of an opportunity cost mechanism. Other researchers suggest that patterns of civil war are not well predicted by the nearly ubiquitous grievances that could, in principle, be addressed with economic
growth and better governance. Instead, civil war correlates with difficult terrain and low GDP per capita (which they interpret as a symptom of weak state capacity).

3) Community policing anti-gang literature can offer some effective models for looking at counterinsurgency. Gangs and rebel groups have three strong similarities: 1) both often enjoy community support; 2) both are extremely vulnerable to leaks and defection if their control over territory is weak; and 3) both often work hard to maintain the support of communities. Gangs’ efforts to maintain the support of communities is self-interested, an insight that can also apply to government.

4) Most previous scholarly efforts to model competition for popular support focuses on the interaction between governments and rebels and the competition between rebels and the government as it affects the ability of rebels to control their own fighters. A broader cross-section of the literature indicates that the division between coercive and attractive measures to combat insurgency is misconceived. Rather these can be viewed as strategic complements—the more security, the greater the efficacy of benign activities and vice versa. Effective signaling of both capacity and commitment to providing security is critical to increasing support, cooperation and information flow from the population. Following this, economic aid and service provision by government could be expected to contribute to the popular perception that the state is capable of maintaining order and enforcing security.

5) The literature stresses that noncombatants are responsive and active actors in the competition for their support. Support for government and for rebels varies at the individual level and shifts across space and time in reaction to both rebel and the state activities. It should never be assumed that noncombatants do not make rational decisions regarding the direction and degree of their cooperation. Taken together these findings suggest that the interaction of insurgents, counterinsurgents, and the populace whose cooperation they compete for is best understood by accounting for the preferences and incentives of all three.

6) Increasingly, newer research is emphasizing that facilitating counterinsurgency operations requires a high level of knowledge and understanding of the society and culture that produced the insurgency. For example, it has been suggested that identifying the most common roles, statuses, and institutions within the society should be a first priority in any counterinsurgency as individuals in any given society interact as in accordance with their social positions. Thus, understanding roles, statuses, and norms within an area of operations can clarify and provide guidance to counterinsurgency forces about expected behavior. Understanding the composition of groups in the area of operations has also been identified as being vital importance for counterinsurgency operations, especially because the adversary may organize around racial, ethnic, religious, or tribal groups. Furthermore, tensions or hostilities between groups in an area of operations may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgent control. A number of researchers agree that, by far the most important aspect of culture for counterinsurgency forces to
understand is the narrative. A cultural narrative is a story recounted in the form of a causally linked set of events in a group’s history, but which also expresses the values, character, or self-identity of the group. Narratives are, in fact, central to the representation of identity and by listening to narratives, counterinsurgency forces can identify the basic core values of the society.

7) Social scientists agree that, to conduct effective operations, counterinsurgency forces must understand how individuals and groups within a social system satisfy their economic interests through the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. As there are many varieties of economic systems including market economies, planned economies, and traditional economies, charting the local economic system both formal and informal is a necessary prerequisite to counterinsurgency programming.

8) Uniformly, researchers stress that during an insurgency or any period of political instability, the primary interest of the civilian population is physical security for themselves and their families. When government forces fail to provide security, or threaten the security of civilians, the civilian population will be much more likely to seek alternative security guarantees from insurgents, militias, or other armed groups. This process can drive an insurgency. When government forces provide physical security, civilians will be more likely to support the government against the insurgents. This process can derail an insurgency.

9) Other interests of a population include that which is necessary to sustain life, such as, food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. Stabilizing a populace requires meeting all these essential needs. Populations pursue these needs until they are met, at any cost and from any source. If an adversary source provides for the populace’s needs, the populace will support that source. Another interest of the civilian population is political participation. Many insurgencies begin because certain groups within the society perceive that they have been denied political rights. In order to satisfy their political interests, groups will use pre-existing cultural narratives and symbols to mobilize for political action. Very often, they will coalesce around traditional or charismatic authority figures.

10) During times of instability when the government cannot function, the groups and organizations to which an individual belongs will provide physical security, economic resources, and political identity. Counterinsurgency forces should therefore identify the interests of each group in the area of operations: who provides them with physical security? Who provides them with economic and social resources? What narratives mobilize political action within the group? Who are their traditional or charismatic authority figures? What are their grievances? Contributors to the classical COIN literature are in agreement with contemporary contributions that contend that achieving support among the local population is paramount to successful COIN warfare; that is, COIN warfare based on a primarily enemy–centric foundation is more likely to fail than are alternatives reflecting population–centric characteristics.

11) The research indicates that governments of counterinsurgent countries, regardless of their capacity or competence, are the most significant players but
there is disagreement as to what type of government is most effective. For example, some research suggests that authoritarian regimes can be relatively more effective in COIN because of the highly organized security forces common to these regimes, as well as authoritarian regimes’ natural facility with repressive, even brutal, tactics to deter would-be insurgents, as well as combating insurgencies that do emerge. In this same vein, other literature suggests that democratic regimes are more likely to encounter problems sustaining a COIN conflict, given taxation and casualty burdens as well as being normatively incompatible with the nature of revolutionary wars. Yet, while the basic thrust of this literature is that authoritarian regimes are superior counterinsurgents, there is other research that suggests that restraint-based COIN is more fruitful and as such, democratic regimes may be more capable of COIN warfare, or at least at no greater disadvantage relative to non-democratic regimes.

12) Some research and case studies on counterinsurgency have clearly delineated best practices and lessons learned. The National Bureau of Asian Research, for example, lists prospects and challenges for integrating development strategies into counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan in a November 2009 report. Their main findings were:

- Many of the challenges that confront post-conflict reconstruction processes similarly confound development strategies in COIN efforts, particularly with regard to satisfying the immediate needs of the population, building government capacity, and involving local communities in the development process.

- A successful COIN strategy requires a change in host country perceptions of the security situation, the government, U.S. and coalition forces, and the international community.

- Deteriorating security is preventing international organizations and NGOs from accessing many areas in Afghanistan, thereby requiring security forces to distribute aid and run development projects.

- Corruption is one of the greatest obstacles for development programs in Afghanistan because foreign aid is frequently misused and siphoned off for private gain.

- The economic crisis is affecting Pakistan’s political stability, which is already tenuous, at the same time as the Pakistani military is intensifying its fight with militant groups in the tribal areas.

Suggested future Best Practices outlined in this report include:

- Working with the priorities of local communities on a more sustained and regular basis.

- Tailoring development strategies to the specifics of local needs and circumstances and sensitive to the great variation in geography, economic profile, and security situation among the Afghan provinces and tribal areas of Pakistan.
Combating the corruption that currently weakens development strategies and delegitimizes national and local government.

13) From the 2007 Rand Corporation Occasional Papers Series are evaluations of past counterinsurgencies that identify a number of counterinsurgency lessons learned and best practices that have development applications. These include:

- Successful COIN requires unfettered adaptability and the ability to be an objective critic in the face of failure.
- Similarly, if a solution is successful in one counterinsurgency, it may be unsuccessful in another, possibly because of intervening variables. The reason for this paradox is that conditions differ in several places and, thus, solutions must be custom-made for each situation.
- Military and civilian agencies have to work together to create innovative and adaptive COIN programs and tactics.
- The population may be more likely to accept the presence of foreigners if it sees that they are contributing to progress rather than chaos.
- For COIN effort to attain lasting success, the host nation needs to achieve legitimacy. Politically, the presence of strong, competent, democratically elected leaders in El Salvador and Colombia allowed the regimes to maintain legitimacy and gave the population a viable outlet for possible grievances.
- Conversely, the presence of foreign combat troops, as in the Philippines, Algeria, and Vietnam, fans the flames of nationalism on the insurgent front.
- The more critical a situation is to U.S. national security interests and the more the United States pledges its support for the host nation, the less leverage it has over how its aid money is spent and how the war is fought.
- Although making the effort to learn language and culture is a valid activity in itself, it is a vital pathway to unlocking the social nuances of the local population and may reveal potential cleavages to exploit within the insurgency.
- Because COIN is a system of programs designed to react and adapt to insurgency, it is important to understand the nature of the conflict as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the insurgents.

Best practices identified in this report are:

- Granting counterinsurgents local autonomy to hasten the process of innovation and adaptability should be encouraged and accepted at all levels of bureaucracy.
- Rather than having a bureaucrat thousands of miles away making general decisions for all theaters of the insurgency, local authorities who have their fingers on the pulse of the population should assess the situation on the ground and then determine how best to combat local problems.
- Foreign counterinsurgents should support the wishes of the population above those of the host nation, so as to maintain the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent cause.
- Foreign counterinsurgents need to carefully determine how best to effectively bridge the gap between their interests and those of the host nation.
- Foreign counterinsurgents should diversify their sources of intelligence, possibly using NGO status reports and open source media to augment the volume and quality of information they are being provided, as well as consider gathering information on the ally’s intelligence collection and dissemination activities.
- Counterinsurgents should seek to create a competent indigenous police force free from corruption, accompanied by reforms in the justice and penal systems.
- In recruiting indigenous security forces, the counterinsurgents should seek to create a force that reflects the ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic makeup of the local population and should make a special effort to recruit a reasonable number of potentially oppressed ethnic minorities to increase their stake in fighting the insurgency.
- In this effort, the counterinsurgents should try not to cloud their perceptions with their prior belief systems or over-reliance on analogies, as this may lead to a faulty perception of the nature and origins of the conflict, as well as insurgent grievances.
- To most effectively manage the complexity of COIN, counterinsurgents need to think of solutions in terms of long-term effectiveness, not short-term necessity and this especially refers to the successes and failures from past COIN operations.
- Above all, although a multidisciplinary discussion drawing lessons from the past and present is certainly helpful in crafting a response to the threat of insurgency, creating a model for fighting insurgency can be destructive, as it may lead counterinsurgents to pigeon-hole their responses based on historical analogies that follow the model.

4) Non-governmental studies of PRT’s:

PRT’s have attracted a great number of researchers and commentators. Like the counterinsurgency literature, however, few of these articles and studies are based upon primary data. The following paragraphs summarize some of the major PRT assessments that have been done by non-government entities.

1) Literature on PRT’s suggests that there is an uncertainty as to the proper concept, role, and objectives of the counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several texts note that PRT’s were originally designed in Afghanistan to deal with the “spoiler problem” by co-opting and reconciling local power brokers, and that
other missions such as counterinsurgency (COIN) and post-conflict reconstruction were added on later. Thus, the basic understanding of what a PRT should be trying to achieve and what it realistically can achieve has been in flux.

2) Some authors stress that PRT’s should be focused on security (security sector reform, intelligence, force protection), only conduct very limited reconstruction, and stay away completely from governance. In this view, PRT’s can make a valuable contribution in areas where a lack of security makes “regular development work” difficult but not impossible. Beyond such broad mission statements, there is no agreement within the US government (or between the USG and its allies) on how PRT’s should be organized, how they should conduct operations, or what specifically they should accomplish. At the same time, no end state has been defined at which the PRT’s would be replaced by “regular development” teams, making it more difficult for personnel on the ground to appropriately balance the desire for rapid results with sustainable development and capacity building; all too often, this results in the pursuit of “feel good projects.”

3) Predictably, a lack of clarity on the objectives that PRT’s should pursue translates into a similar state of affairs with regard to strategy. Thus, virtually all analyses of PRT’s lament the lack of an overarching strategy and put forward a range of “strategic fixes” from civilianizing the PRT’s across the board, to limiting their role to “buying time” for kinetic military efforts and “development proper,” to setting up in-country interagency coordinating bodies with a mandate to fit PRT efforts into broader US foreign policy objectives.

4) The literature suggests that there are no clear lines of authority, let alone a single chain of command to ensure that military and civilian PRT efforts are effectively coordinated. The problem starts at the policy level and persists down to the tactical in a more or less severe form depending largely on circumstances in theater, personalities, and good will. Despite efforts to remedy the situation, this state of affairs persists as per the latest texts under review.

5) At the level of individual PRT’s, the literature particularly emphasizes the “clash of cultures” in addition to more detailed descriptions of command and control issues playing out at the tactical level. In Afghanistan, civilian PRT members have frequently complained that they were being treated as outsiders by their numerically stronger military counterparts. This issue was being compounded by poor synchronization of tours and team deployments. Beyond the – likely inevitable – persistence of unique organizational cultures, insufficient joint training and pre-deployment socialization exacerbate the problem and reinforce a lack of understanding of organizational cultures and modus operandi. Even where functional overlap exists between military Civil Affairs units and civilian experts, these assets are not fully integrated as teams and may therefore end up working at cross purposes.
6) Beyond the individual PRT’s, there is also a lack of coordination between PRT activities and Regimental Combat Teams and between PRT activities and non-kinetic military efforts. The absence of clear objectives and supporting strategies combine with interagency command and control issues to inhibit coordinated planning and sound assessments of PRT efforts.

7) Virtually all researchers cite the lack of an overall strategic plan and resultant difficulties of joint operational planning as major obstacles to successful PRT operations. As a logical corollary, USG agencies and PRT’s often struggle to establish metrics for progress: without a plan articulating specific objectives and measures to achieve them, measuring progress becomes a haphazard endeavor. In the Afghan case, the literature offers numerous suggestions as to how planning and assessment can be improved. For example, the Vietnam era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Hamlet Evaluation System has been held up as a model to improve the hitherto rather basic measurement tools.

8) Across the board, analyses agreed that PRT funding mechanisms are overly complex and that this leads to inefficiencies in the field. Many lamented that there is no “unity of funding” mirroring the lack of unity of command. As a result projects are too often based on how funds can be spent, rather than on an assessment of local needs. While recommendations cover a broad range, there are three common elements to all of them: 1) there should be a single source of funding for PRT’s, 2) civilian access to funds must be improved, 3) functional experts need more authority over funding to ensure money is spent wisely in different functional areas.

9) Throughout the literature, a lack of engagement with the host nation is cited as an impediment to PRT efforts in both theaters. Commentators agree that PRT members must “go outside the wire” and build relationships on a personal level even – and especially – if their host nation partners are more motivated by graft than long-term development goals, and struggle with US notions of budgeting and planning. Similarly, analyses on US PRT’s in Iraq stress the need to engage with Iraqis at all levels from the provincial government to tribal and religious leaders, as well as ordinary citizens and civil society organizations (and to make specific, detailed “tribal engagement” or “religious engagement” plans). It should also be noted that the confusing PRT structure makes it more difficult for host nation members to engage with the PRT’s.

10) Apart from the need to engage the host nation more, the literature shows general agreement that basic management issues need to be addressed if PRT’s are to be effective (once a mission/strategy has been sorted out). While this category covers myriad observations, many of them agency-specific, broad consensus exists on two key problems: lack of continuity between rotations, and information sharing/coordination between PRT elements.
11) Many researchers have made the case for improved procedures to ensure continuity between PRT efforts from one rotation to the next. They also suggested that this could be best addressed by developing standard operating procedures and publishing them for OPA as well as each individual PRT in Iraq and to develop “desk top procedures” or “continuity books” for each section or portfolio within each PRT in Iraq. However, it should also be noted that there are limits to “fixing” this problem. There will always be a steep learning curve for newly deployed individuals and the necessary building of relationships with key host nation individuals will take time.

12) The problem of “stove piping” is frequently mentioned in the research which describes instances in which the various elements of PRT’s failed to communicate and share information with the result that they were working at cross purposes. Specific issues raised in this regard range from a lack of joint meetings and briefings on the actual PRT, to breakdowns in communication between PRT members and their “home agency.”

13) Training is a major concern listed by almost all researchers who have looked at PRT’s. The topic is often discussed at great length, offering numerous detailed insights and suggestions on the specific content of various training programs and what should be dropped/added to make them more effective. All documents agree on two key points: 1) training has to become truly “interagency” to allow military and civilian PRT members to exercise together for their deployment as well as enabling socialization and familiarization with each other’s unique approaches and operating procedures; 2) there is a need to increase subject matter expert input into the design and execution of PRT training to ensure it is realistic and up to date.

14) Several suggestions were made to make PRT training truly interagency. Some texts recommend incorporating PRT training and actual S/CRS personnel into joint and interagency exercises. Others state more generally that some effort has to be made at standardized joint civil-military PRT training for all team members, or, at a minimum, to include briefings on the roles of all team members in-theater. While the issue has persisted into the most recent documents under review, there are also some signs that the problem is being addressed, specifically through US Army initiatives and the incorporation of US Marine Corps personnel into Foreign Service Institute training.

15) The second point is stressed just as frequently, and a number of suggestions have been offered to improve this. Most frequent is the call to include subject matter experts in the design and execution of training to ensure training is current and realistic. Some also recommend incorporating PRT veterans. Another suggestion is to include host nation nationals in the training process to ensure it is as realistic as possible.
VI. Findings and Conclusions from PRT Surveys and Interviews

An analysis of responses to the online survey of returning PRT members from Iraq has yielded a number of interesting findings with respect to the day-to-day operation of PRT’s. Some of these findings are specific to the situation in Iraq but a number of them are also revealing in the context of counterinsurgency operations in general. As shown in Figure 3 below the responders were fairly evenly split between civilians and military personnel.

![Characteristics of 70 PRT Survey Responders](Figure 3. PRT Survey Responders)

As to the representation of government agencies on the responders’ PRT’s, State and USAID were listed as having the most representation with Agriculture in third place and DoD in fourth as shown in Figure 4.

![Agencies Represented on Survey Responders](Figure 4. Representation of USG Agencies on PRT’s)
Figure 5 illustrates the responses to the survey question concerning major funding mechanisms. DoD, State and USAID were, predictably, ranked as the major agency sources of funding.

Figure 5. Funding Sources for PRT's.

Figure 6 shows the results of a question asking about the individual's perception of PRT priorities. Interestingly, counterinsurgency which is ostensibly the *modus vivendi* for the kind of interagency cooperation embodied in the PRT, is listed as lowest priority. Development and capacity building ranked highest with stabilization and construction coming in second. The question of how successful the PRT was perceived to be in achieving these missions (Figure 7) elicited responses that indicated that the highest levels of success were in development and the lowest in counterinsurgency. The majority thought that their PRT’s were only marginally successful in all three areas. There were only two responses that noted that the three priorities were basically interlocking. The reasoning behind asking the question in this way was to elicit the understanding of mission without directly asking PRT members if they “worked on counterinsurgency” to which question only a yes or no answer would be possible without further elaboration. One responder stated categorically in response to both questions that “COIN was not a PRT mission.”
Responders were asked to rate the relationship of their PRT’s work to the Military’s Mission in Iraq. Not surprisingly, 59 percent believed that the relationship was either supportive or complementary. Twenty-seven percent of the responders thought the connection was tenuous as shown in Figure 8.
The responders were asked to determine those factors that were most limiting and most helpful to them in fulfilling their PRT’s goals. As Figure 9 below indicates, structure and procedure, training (i.e., lack of) and security were listed as significant limiting factors. Figure 10, similarly, illustrates that PRT training ranked low among helpful factors while, not surprisingly, motivation ranked high with security in second place.
When asked specifically about the applicability and quality of their training from various sources, the Foreign Service Institute and Home Agency training were considered by most to be “good to excellent.” Training by other organizations, however, ranked considerably lower as shown in Figure 11-A and 11-B. About half of the responders specified what “other” training they had which included a three week training in DC and training at Fort McCoy, Fort Dix, DoD, Fort Bragg and Fort Lewis.

Most PRT members rated the host country buy-in for their programs as either good or excellent, with only about 12% rating it as marginal or poor. Figure 12 suggests that people serving on Iraq PRT’s were, for the most part, satisfied that the population they were supposed to assist was interested and involved in their work.
A series of questions on the PRT survey was designed to elicit responses to questions concerning coordination, communication and cooperation between PRT’s and military units and within PRT’s. Figure 13 illustrates responses to the question of how individual PRT’s related to local military maneuver units which, among other things, represented the primary source of security for PRT’s. Most respondents rated this relationship as good or excellent.

Communication within the PRT’s was listed as a problem in interviews so a survey question was designed to elicit responses as to which factors were the most consistent obstacles to communication. As shown, 60 to 80 percent of the responders found that the listed factors “rarely” or “never” presented obstacles to communication. However, 40
percent found that differences in organizational cultures “often,” “very often,” or “always” interfered with effective communication and slightly less than 40 percent found that systems incompatibility was an obstacle. Classification and/or clearance levels were listed by only 22 percent as an obstacle.

![Obstacles to Communication Within the PRT](image)

*Figure 14. PRT Obstacles to Communication.*

Communication within the PRT’s was ranked as “completely” or “largely” effective by 54% of the respondents but a sizable minority (26%) believed it to be only occasionally or not at all effective.

![Effectiveness of Information Sharing Within PRT](image)

*Figure 15. Effectiveness of information sharing.*

Figure 16 illustrates the responses to the question of how well civil and military members of PRT’s integrated their work. “Excellent” and “good” integration was listed by 58% of the responders while a minority of 20% found it to be “marginal” or “poor.”
Integration Between Civilian and Military Actors on PRT's

Security, as noted in the literature and also in interviews with PRT members is an essential element of success. Most individuals who responded to the question as to how they would rate their security providers rated the U.S. Military very high, followed by diplomatic security and private contractors. Security provided by the Iraqi Police was rated low by 13 respondents while security provided by the Iraqi Army was rated high by 9 respondents as shown in Figure 17 below.

PRT members responding to the survey included almost an equal number of military and civilians although it is clear that almost all of the civilian responders agreed that the U.S. Military provided the best security. With respect to the question of how much
security was needed, however, a surprising number (close to 30%) believed that there was too much emphasis on security in the PRT as shown in Figure 18 below.

![Balance Between Security and Other Priorities](image)

Figure 18. Did PRT achieve the right balance between security and other priorities?

One final question was asked of PRT members with respect to their experience which had to do with the overall impact and effectiveness of the concept. In response to the question of whether or not PRT’s were a “functioning model” for interagency cooperation, 38 out of 56 (68%) responders to this question answered “yes” as illustrated in Figure 19 below.

![PRT a Functioning Model for Interagency Cooperation?](image)

Figure 19. PRT as a Model for Interagency Cooperation.
A survey of Asia and Middle East Missions completed in 2009 included Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia and several other countries with experience in counterinsurgency programming. Although this survey related to Civil/Military cooperation, the responses of those Mission employees with respect to certain questions have a bearing upon the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. As Figure 17 below indicates, Mission personnel from these countries rate security and support fairly high insofar as the military presence in their countries is concerned. Funding, which is often seen as the most important aspect of Civil/Military relationships was considered a lesser priority in terms of positive perceptions of the military.

![Civil/Military Cooperation Benefits](image)

*Figure 20. Responses from Missions with Counterinsurgency Programs.*

The Missions represented in this sample have a substantial military presence already so it is interesting to note that almost 70% of the responders supported *more* military engagement in their countries (Figure 21).

![Military Support](image)

*Figure 21. Responses from Missions with Counterinsurgency Programs.*
Conclusions from Survey Responses:

- PRT members lack an understanding of the role of development in counterinsurgency (and/or the role of counterinsurgency in development).
- Despite this lack of understanding there is a general perception among PRT members that their work is closely connected to the Mission of the military.
- PRT members see their PRT’s as either unsuccessful or only marginally successful in achieving goals.
- PRT members believe that the people of Iraq they encountered are generally supportive of their work.
- PRT training was perceived to be the least helpful factor in PRT success.
- Motivation and security are considered by PRT responders as the most relevant contributing factors to success.
- There is a general perception in Missions with counterinsurgency experience that security and support for development are the most relevant contributing factors to the success of their work.
- A majority of Mission responders from countries with counterinsurgency programs believe that a stronger military presence would assist them in their work.

Findings from Written Comments:

The key words selected for analysis were “training,” “security,” "development," “insurgency,” “mission” and “interagency.” The chart in Figures 19 shows, in order, a comparison of key word counts from the survey comments.

![Key Word--Boxed Survey Comments](image_url)

*Figure 22. Results of key word analysis on PRT and Civ/Mil Boxed Survey Comments*
The comments from Iraq PRT members surveyed were compared with those from the Civil/Military Cooperation survey. Among PRT comments the terms “security” and “training” appear in more negative contexts than Civil/Military survey comments. Most of the “security” negative comments from Iraq PRT members were, not surprisingly, in reference to the situation in Iraq rather than the provision of security. “Training,” however, while not the most significant concern, appeared in more negative than positive or neutral contexts in PRT comments and most of these comments from PRT members were specifically critical of PRT training. A number of PRT members expressed confusion about the PRT mission which resulted in several negative comments such as, “Guidance from OPA and Embassy was poor as to overall mission and prioritization thereof.”

Little more than 2 percent of the respondents to the Civil/Military Survey were from the Military so it is not surprising that development was mentioned more frequently than in the PRT surveys which were about equal numbers of civilians and military members. The majority of negative comments from the Civ/Mil Survey related to development activities being performed by the Military of which civilian responders were critical. Representative of remarks from the Civ/Mil survey group was the following statement, “Military protection is necessary to facilitate development workers to carry-out their mission but this shouldn't result in Military people taking over the development role/task for which they are not ideally suited or trained. If they were primarily ‘development’ personalities they would have gone into development.”

Insurgency (which includes counterinsurgency) and interagency were mentioned with very low frequency which, if nothing else, is indicative of how rarely these terms are thought of by the respondents in relation to their work.

**Findings from PRT Interviews:**

Between 2005 and 2009, the United States Institute of Peace conducted a series of interviews with both civilian and military PRT members who had served in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraq interviews are the most recent and, therefore, the most likely to reflect current realities. In all, some 129 interviews were conducted with Iraq PRT members (73 civilian and 56 military) and some 103 interviews were conducted with Afghanistan PRT members (52 civilian and 51 military).

These interviews were scanned for key word instances in the same manner as the boxed survey comments above. Only a certain percentage of the interviews were made available by USIP because many of the interviewees were concerned about confidentiality. In the case of Iraq 47 civilian and 12 military interviews were examined. In the case of Afghanistan, 34 civilian and 12 military interviews were examined. The results of these examinations are illustrated in Figures 23 and 24. Key word counts from PRT interviews with Iraq and Afghanistan Civilian PRT members and key word counts from PRT interviews with Iraq and Afghanistan Military PRT members are shown.
Military representation in this interview analysis was less than a third of that of civilians so the cumulative number of instances of civilian references to the key words are expected to be greater. On the military side, only negative comments about security (again more in reference to the situation than the provision of security) outnumber the neutral comments. Military interviewees, however, expressed some significant concerns about training which are also reflected in the Iraq survey responses described above. There was a spectrum of negative comments between, in the words of one officer, retraining “Zero, we had none,” and that of another officer who stated, “I would say the training I received was not adequate.” None of the interviewees indicated that they thought the training was good or excellent.

Civilian Iraq PRT members made the most negative references about training and secondarily about security. Representative of the training comments from those who answered “no” to the interview question about the adequacy of training is, “The training I received was in Washington, like everybody going to Iraq, which was a little bit cultural. I had an Iraqi lesson for twenty minutes. I had some training in medical emergencies . . . I had some cultural awareness training, about how the country developed, the value structure, the tribes and so on. But that is about all.”

Development and Mission also were mentioned in a significant number of negative contexts. The content of these comments were most likely to refer to the short-term unsustainable nature of certain development activities and the fact there was little clarity of mission on the PRT’s.
Figure 24 shows the results of a similar analysis for the Afghanistan interviews which, as noted above, were conducted four years ago.

![Intervews--Military and Civilian Afghanistan PRT Members](image)

*Figure 24. Key word analysis military and civilian PRT interviews—Afghanistan.*

The ratio of civilian to military interviewees in the case of Afghanistan was less than that for Iraq (about 2.7 to 1) but in several instances the military references outnumber those of civilians. Military respondents were more likely to use the term “mission” than civilians and less likely to characterize the security situation in Afghanistan as negative.

Civilians expressed significantly more negative views of training, security and development. Many of these interviewees noted that the training situation was quite different for them than for later PRT Members. These views are characterized by remarks such as, “There was no such thing as PRT training. The PRT office, and I use that term loosely, at the time I was there consisted of one FSO (Foreign Service Officer), whom I had known previously. He was assigned as the PRT coordinator. That was it.”

As for development, many interviewees noted that these efforts were largely uncoordinated and that they were led to expect a different kind of operation. One interviewee expressed his expectations in historical terms, “I had in my own mind thought of the PRT’s as the logical next generation from the CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) program in Vietnam. And that’s how it had been described to me. That’s how I envisioned it . . . I knew how important a role they had played in Vietnam and, actually, how successful they had been. Afghanistan, of course, is quite different from Vietnam.”

Civilians expressed more concern than the military about the nature of their mission and most were unclear about it beyond a general statement that their objective was to
strengthen the central government and “bring it out to the provinces.” Again, as was the case with Iraq, insurgency and interagency are infrequently mentioned words by both civilian and military PRT members.

Conclusions from Written Comments and Interviews:

The following are conclusions (lessons learned) that can be drawn from the data analyzed in the forgoing sections:

- Counterinsurgency and the relationship between counterinsurgency and development are unclear to most PRT members.
- Neither civilian nor military PRT members see their activities under the rubric of counterinsurgency.
- Common objectives on counterinsurgency projects are understood only very generally and there is a lack of clear operational guidance in the field.
- Training in language and culture is considered insufficient by most civilian and some military PRT members.
- Training is insufficient to enable civilian and military PRT members to work effectively together.
- Many civilian PRT members are unclear as to their mission and lack any coherent mission statement.
- Military PRT members are unclear as to what constitutes “development” in the context of counterinsurgency.
VII. Findings and Conclusions—CORDS Research

Literature Review:

Authors who have written about CORDS have generally assessed the program as successful with a few notable exceptions (see below). Few of these studies, however, are evidence-based and most have relied primarily on secondary sources. The following is a list of findings drawn from the documents listed in the Annotated Bibliography in Appendix I.

- While the overall effort subdued and virtually eliminated enemy influence among the people through 1972, the program begun during the APC was resource intensive and ultimately dependent on American support that was badly cut in 1973 and beyond.
- The gathering weight of recent evidence is that the 1967-1970 “new model” pacification program, with all its flaws and weaknesses contributed materially to an at least short-run improvement in the GVN’s ability to cope with rural insurgency.
- This Hamlet Evaluation System allowed CORDS to monitor its effectiveness. There was, however, an excessive concentration of the system on the collection of data rather than the analysis—which made its results less reliable. The Concentration on data collection rather than on trend analysis leads to unreliable results.
- Data collection on the scale required by the HES during wartime requires high levels of commitment and the resources of a powerful government to undertake successfully.

Hindsight on the Vietnam pacification program in general and the CORDS program in particular has inspired a number of researchers to assess the overall impact of CORDS. Among the conclusions and recommendations that have been drawn from these analyses are the following:

- CORDS was successful for putting in place many of the management tools that made U.S. support to pacification as effective as it was—but for the South Vietnamese government, a deeply flawed instrument—it would have been more successful.
- CORDS achieved an unprecedented level of integration of US and South Vietnamese efforts towards the pacification of the countryside, largely nullifying the effectiveness of the communist insurgency in the overall conflict.
- The limited commitment of the military was a serious problem. Where the ultimate goal is couched in political terms and subject to pressures from the Public (U.S.) it is bound to fail regardless of achievements in social and economic terms.
- A secure operating environment is a prerequisite. Unity of effort, a single manager and good intelligence are vital. The focus should be on improving the quality of life for the local population in order to win their loyalty. Groups should be given access to opportunities that the enemy cannot or will not provide. One must establish a clear legal framework for pacification programs. Such programs, however, can’t succeed if the indigenous government is inherently defective and corrupt. Institution building is time consuming and can exhaust the patience of the American public.
- Reducing interagency bickering, creating a unified pacification effort under a single manager, placing that manager’s headquarters inside the military structure are all effective strategies.
- Although interagency programming is challenging, a single manager concept, resolving institutional cultures, planning, having an effective government for hand over are the most important factors in achieving goals.
- Establishing an effective chain of command is important as is achieving a flexible and coherent management structure and developing an objective assessment scheme.
- Five key Conclusions can be derived from the CORDS experience: unity of effort, the importance of devising an organization appropriate to the security challenge, the value of civilian leadership, the necessity for political will to bring forth the unity of effort, and the need for governance assistance for the target nation.
- Military activities need to be linked to civilian work as closely as possible.
- The CORDS model from Vietnam offers a good model of cooperation.
- COIN on the CORDS scale requires a cooperative, non-corrupt government that is at least minimally effective in combating corruption.
- CORDS was as successful as it could be in light of the deficiencies of the South Vietnamese government. Unity of effort works.
- CORDS was, on the whole, effective in establishing viable military and civilian aid initiatives—it’s major weakness was that the organization had to partner with the South Vietnamese government.
• Best results are achieved from host country staffed and run programs, though extensively subsidized by the U.S.
• CORDS not only brought people to support our side; it often led to actionable intelligence that helped root out enemy cadre hidden in plain sight.
• CORDS was an excellent example of the successful integration of civilian and military efforts at counterinsurgency through nation building.
• The greatest success of the CORDS program was that it not only established effective interagency coordination, but also succeeded in convincing the military to incorporate development projects into its overall security strategy.
• The CORDS Hamlet Evaluation Survey was, on the whole, a reliable tool for determining pacification. CORDS effectively integrated and disciplined the various U.S. Agencies contributing to pacification. It was the first valid counterinsurgency and development effort to emerge. Integration, good management and unity of effort are essential to success.
• Pacification failed because Vietnam villagers were exhausted with the war and it was too little too late.
• The CORDS efforts were not well organized and the personnel were turned over too quickly—especially on the military side.
• The military lacked enthusiasm for the effort.
• CORDS was at best a qualified success but it was too little too late.
• The HES is remarkably sophisticated relative to measurement standards in the field of conflict studies today.
• CORDS had significant success in a number of areas of its responsibility. It got off to a good start in 1967; however, the Tet Offensive of January 1968 dealt a setback to the pacification effort. CORDS’ peak year was 1969, with declines thereafter as the US withdrew resources from Vietnam.
• The most important lesson learned is that the military and civilian counter-insurgency and pacification efforts should be integrated within a single command structure. In this way, all of the USG resources can be brought to bear on the mission. The military and civilian functions are interdependent in a counter-insurgency situation, for all the reasons noted above.
• The US and South Vietnamese pacification efforts succeeded in the time-period from November 1966 until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.
• Lack of support at the highest levels, host country support, civilian leadership as well as the host country incapacity can make achievements unsustainable.
• No matter how many resources are expended, the failure to plan and follow through made pacification efforts ultimately futile. Before committing any resources, plan to fulfill commitment, otherwise don’t bother.
• CORDS achieved qualified successes in improving conditions but ultimately during its best years it was impeded by troop withdrawal. Don’t expend resources without military backup and American support.
• Implementation of the CORDS program is of relevance to the problems facing coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Findings from Interviews:
The Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, which is available online from the library of Congress, contains some 150 interviews with Foreign Service Officers who reference the CORDS Program in their interviews. Eighty of these interviews contained substantive comments on the program by those who served in it as shown in the attached table.

The following is a synopsis of those interviews with reference to specific areas of interest:

- **CORDS training**—18 of the 80 interviewees referenced the CORDS Training Program. Three of the 18 assessed it as good and one assessed it as bad. The other 16 simply noted that it was extensive and that it included language, cultural and military training.

- **CORDS Recruitment**—39 of the 80 interviews referenced CORDS recruitment. Most (95%) of these mentioned the fact that Foreign Service Officers were for the most part “forced” to work in CORDS or resign their posts. A small number (6) of the interviewees disapproved of this method of recruitment. Ten stated that, in retrospect, they were happy to have participated in the program.

- **Hamlet Evaluation Survey**—16 of the 80 interviews mentioned the survey. Half of those interviewed mentioned the problem of getting accurate information from Vietnamese counterparts. None of the interviewees were critical of the survey instrument itself but questioned the results as filtered through numerous layers of people who needed to make the numbers look better. One person served in an evaluation unit that independently assessed the findings from the HES and stated that “Our impression was that there were a lot more Viet Cong out there than the military was reporting. We were not unaware of the weaknesses of the reporting system and that is why we had this evaluation unit to travel all over the country.”

- **Management Effectiveness**—38 of the 80 addressed this issue but mostly from the standpoint of how management was structured. Five out of the 38 addressed the effectiveness. Two thought it was ineffective, one thought is was partially effective and two believed it to be effective.

- **Host Country**—22 of the 80 brought up issues concerning dealing with the host country. Over half of these were extensive comments indicating that the interviewees had substantial dealings with the Vietnamese. Ten of the interviews mentioned rampant corruption as a primary problem in dealing with Vietnamese officials.

- **Mission**—12 of the 80 interviews contained comments concerning the CORDS Mission. Two of these indicated that they were in disagreement with our policy in Vietnam but were able to serve on CORDS in good conscience. The other ten simply stated what they believed the mission to be. All of these comments indicated that the interviewees had a common understanding of the Mission.
• Interagency Coordination—28 of the 80 interviewees discussed interagency coordination—mostly with reference to Civil Military cooperation but ten of the interviewees stated that they had almost no relationship with the embassy. Only two of the 28 interviewees were critical of the Military. The others suggested that the relationship was a good one.

Seventy-nine out of the 80 interviewees assessed the CORDS experience as a good one personally. Only one of the interviewees assessed the effectiveness of the overall program but most indicated that they believed they had done some good in the country and that the program became more successful in its latter stages as the United States was withdrawing from Vietnam. Most interviewees felt that pacification worked for a time and that we “won the peace” despite the fact that we “lost the war.” Inevitably, as most interviewees noted, the government of South Vietnam was too corrupt and ineffective to take over from the CORDS program.

Figure 25. Key word analysis of CORDS Interviews (Civilians).

Key word analysis, similar to that for PRT members described above, was applied to the interviews with CORDS participants in the Library of Congress Foreign Affairs Oral History database. Figure 25 shows the results. Counterinsurgency was not a term in frequent use during the CORDS period. It was determined, however, that pacification, which was frequently mentioned by interviewees, had similar implications. It is not, however, a complete synonym so the comparisons in this respect should be approached with caution.
As these charts demonstrate, CORDS interviewees were more positive than Iraq and Afghanistan interviewees in every category with the most marked differences appearing in the areas of security and interagency relations. Interestingly, CORDS interviewees, in comparison to Iraq and Afghanistan interviewees, worked far more closely with the Vietnamese people and visited more remote areas where they could not be assured absolute security.

Figure 26-A through F. Comparison of CORDS Key Word Analysis with those of Iraq and Afghanistan Civilian PRT Members.

Conclusions from Interviews:

Any successes that can be attributed to the CORDS program were the product of:
• Relevant and intensive training in culture, language and interagency coordination with the military.
• A clear mission, mission statement and, most importantly, effective and consistent reinforcement to achieve a common understanding of the mission between civilians and the military.
• Working closely with host country organizations and, more significantly, host country people.
• Having support at the highest levels of government and effective coordination down to the lowest levels.
• Accurately assessing the needs of their communities by working with and in them on a regular basis.
• Developing an effective tool to measure progress and relentlessly pursuing data collection.
VIII. Synthesis of the Research—Best Practices (Recommendations)

A number of recommendations flow naturally from the forgoing analysis of the literature, survey and interview data. Some of the following may not be feasible given current strictures on PRT mobilization but attempts should be made to do the following:

- Use a single manager concept, resolve institutional cultural disputes ahead of time and engage in joint planning.
- Permit civilians to have input into rating military participants and give the military an incentive for engaging in peaceful activities.
- Provide comprehensive training in culture and language, regardless of whether or not the trainees obtain real proficiency, as preparation for the field.
- Back up whatever quantitative method is used to measure success or failure with periodic qualitative evaluations to keep monitoring honest.
- Assure good data collection but concentrate on trend analyses.
- Assure the involvement and interest of high level Civilian and Military officials.
- Honestly assess the level of effectiveness that the host government is capable of achieving and program accordingly for sustainability.
- Establish an effective chain of command, achieve a flexible and coherent management structure and develop an objective assessment scheme.
- Create a unified pacification effort under a single manager, placing that manager’s headquarters inside the military structure, thereby allowing it to gain access to vast human, financial and organizational resources in implementing an integrated program at the provincial, district, hamlet, and village level.
- Prioritize unity of effort and link Military activities to civilian work.
- Assure that programs are or will be host country staffed and run from the outset and plan for this eventuality.
- Assure a secure operating environment as a prerequisite but balance security with other priorities—too much is as ineffective as too little.
- Prioritize accurate intelligence as insurgencies can only survive if they can maintain a presence within the local population.
- Give target groups access to opportunities that insurgents cannot or will not provide.
- Establish a clear legal framework and disseminate information about it to the broader population as detention programs that are viewed as arbitrary and unjust are a major recruiting tool for insurgents.
- Recognize that the government, including the Military, will never be able to create government structures capable of winning popular support if the indigenous government is inherently defective and corrupt.
- Recognize that institution building is a time consuming effort that can often exhaust the patience of the American public although it remains a fundamental part of long-term success.
- Establish an effective chain of command that is made clear to all counterinsurgency team members from the beginning.
• Develop an objective assessment scheme that balances data collection and analysis and includes indicators that measure joint counterinsurgency objectives (see Appendix III).
• Concentrate on training and mix military and civilians in training—consider joint deployments as well as joint trainings.
• Consider more extensive language and culture training, regardless of the level of proficiency the trainee can be expected to attain, as a useful background for in-country work.

Photo 7. John Paul Vann in Vietnam. Vann served as Deputy for CORDS III (i.e., commander of all civilian and military advisers in the Third Corps Tactical Zone) until November 1968 when he was assigned to the same position in Four Corps, which consisted of the provinces south of Saigon in the Mekong Delta.

Suggestions for Further Research:
Additional research on the complex violent conflict problem set and the historical experience that will guide USAID field officers and implementing partners is clearly necessary. The role of development in mitigating incipient insurgency is also poorly understood. Comprehensive studies, as well as adapting best practices for local conditions, should be the number one priority in creating assistance programs in these situations. Context-specific evaluations will be one element of meeting the critical need for clear analysis and understanding of the political, social and religious dynamics of insurgencies in particular countries and regions.
Appendix I

Counter-Insurgency—Annotated Bibliography


4. Berman, Eli, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq, NBER WP #14606, December 2008. (Examination of the "Hearts and Minds" hypothesis using economic models._


44. West, Bing. The Village. New York: Pocket Books, 1972. (A first-person account of military advisors embedded with Vietnamese units.)

CORDS Annotated Bibliography

   CORDS successful for putting in place many of the management tools that made U.S. support to pacification as effective as it was. South Vietnamese government, a deeply flawed instrument—or would have been more successful.
   Lessons: interagency is hard, single manager concept, resolving institutional cultures, planning, having an effective government for hand over

   CORDS achieved an unprecedented level of integration of US and South Vietnamese efforts towards the pacification of the countryside, largely nullifying the effectiveness of the communist insurgency in the overall conflict. One major limitation: it could not substitute itself for the government of South Vietnam.
   Lessons: Five key lessons can be derived from the CORDS experience: unity of effort, the importance of devising an organization appropriate to the security
challenge, the value of civilian leadership, the necessity for political will to bring forth the unity of effort, and the need for governance assistance for the target nation.

   Pacification may be considered as one of those successes, and for this reason subsequent implementation of the CORDS program when in Vietnam, is of relevance to the problems facing coalition forces in Afghanistan.
   Lessons: Establish an effective chain of command. Achieve a flexible and coherent management structure. Develop an objective assessment scheme.

   While the overall effort subdued and virtually eliminated enemy influence among the people through 1972, the program begun during the APC was resource intensive and ultimately dependent on American support that was badly cut in 1973 and beyond.
   Lessons: COIN only works with cooperative, non-corrupt, and with a government that is at least minimally effective in combating corruption

5. Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq
   Ross Coffey Military Review; Mar/Apr 2006; 86, 2; Military Module
   As successful as it could be in light of the deficiencies of the SV government
   Lessons: Unity of effort works

   CORDS was, on the whole, effective in establishing viable military and civilian aid initiatives—major weakness was that the organization had to partner with the deeply flawed South Vietnamese government.
   Lessons: reducing interagency bickering, creating a unified pacification effort under a single manager, placing that manager’s headquarters inside the military structure

   CORDS able to successfully conduct counterinsurgency activities.
   Lessons: Unity of effort is essential. Military activities need to be linked to civilian work. The CORDS model from Vietnam offers a good model of cooperation

In sum the gathering weight of recent evidence is that the 1967-1970 “new model” pacification program, with all its flaws and weaknesses has contributed materially to an at least short-run improvement in the GVN’s ability to cope with rural insurgency.

**Lessons:** results achieved from Vietnamese staffed and run programs, though extensively subsidized

   Our work not only brought people to support our side; it often led to actionable intelligence that helped root out enemy cadre hidden in plain sight.
   **Lessons:** in the end, effectiveness is determined by the success of the “hand-over” S. Vietnamese government not sustainable

    CORDS an excellent example of the successful integration of civilian and military efforts at counterinsurgency through nation building—greatest success of the CORDS program was that it not only established effective interagency coordination, but also succeeded in convincing the military to incorporate development projects into its overall security strategy.
    **Lessons:** secure operating environment is a prerequisite, unity of effort, single manager, intelligence is vital, improve the quality of life for the local population in order to win their loyalty, groups should be given access to opportunities that the enemy cannot or will not provide, establish a clear legal framework for pacification programs, can’t succeed if the indigenous government is inherently defective and corrupt institution building is time consuming can exhaust the patience of the American public

    HES was, on the whole a reliable tool for determining pacification, the evaluation system did allow CORDS to monitor the effectiveness
    **Lessons:** American data could be as unreliable as Vietnamese, concentrating on data collection rather than on trend analysis leads to unreliable results

    CORDS effectively integrated and disciplined the various U.S. Agencies contributing to pacification, first valid counterinsurgency and development effort to emerge in three years.
    **Lessons:** Integration, management and unity of effort

Pacification failed because Vietnam villagers were exhausted with the war and it was too little too late, efforts were not well organized and the personnel were turned over too quickly—especially on the military side and lacked enthusiasm. **Lessons:** doesn’t work with a corrupt government, failure of intelligence caused too many optimistic projections


At best a qualified success but too little too late. Could not force host country government to reform itself—the major weakness.

**Lessons:** limited commitment of the military a serious problem, pressure from the public, ultimate goal couched in political terms thus it was bound to fail regardless of achievements in social and economic terms.

15. Have We Learned From Our Mistakes? Kenneth David Hall, Vietnam; Oct 2006; 19, 3; Military Module

CORDS was a qualified success but unsustainable.

**Lessons:** incapacity of host government made progress impossible

16. The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam: An Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), S. Kalyvas and M. Kocher, Department of Political Science, Yale University

Over the years, the HES came in for a great deal of criticism. Most of the objections turn on the inability of blunt quantitative indicators to capture complex social phenomena. We disagree, judging the HES to be remarkably sophisticated relative to measurement standards in the field of conflict studies today. Overall, we believe that the HES is a unique resource for the study of the dynamics of civil wars in terms of its scope, detail, and level of analysis.

**Lessons:** data collection on this scale during wartime requires high levels of commitment and the resources of a powerful government to undertake successfully.


CORDS had significant success in a number of areas of its responsibility, got off to a good start in 1967; however, the Tet Offensive of January 1968 dealt a setback to the pacification effort but CORDS’ peak year was 1969, with declines thereafter as the US withdrew resources from Vietnam.

**Lessons:** The most important lesson learned is that the military and civilian counter-insurgency and pacification efforts should be integrated within a single command structure. In this way, all of the USG resources can be brought to bear on the mission. The military and civilian functions are interdependent in a counter-insurgency situation, for all the reasons noted above.

18. Unraveling CORDS: Lessons Learned from a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF), Monograph by LTC Patrick V. Howell, US Army, School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009
US and South Vietnamese pacification efforts succeeded in the time-period from November 1966 until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. 

**Lessons:** support at highest levels, host country support, civilian leadership, host country incapacity can make achievements unsustainable


No matter how many resources expended, the failure to plan and follow through made pacification efforts ultimately futile

**Lessons:** before committing any resources, plan to fulfill commitment, otherwise don’t bother


CORDS achieve qualified successes in improving conditions but ultimately during its best years was impeded by troop withdrawal

**Lessons:** don’t expend resources without military backup and American support


The United States has neglected the lessons of Vietnam because due to cultural differences, agencies resist integration, the executive branch has not matched the prolonged attention of the Johnson administration that overcame this bureaucratic resistance and because societal conceptions of war tend to reserve the battlefield for the warrior alone

**Lessons:** unity of effort, coupled with capable government for handover is essential
# Appendix II
## CORDS Evaluation Question Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Possible Sources</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CORDS Training</strong></td>
<td>What were the elements of CORDS Training?</td>
<td>Training materials, memoranda and surveys, monitoring and evaluation reports on CORDS projects</td>
<td>CORDS training is considered to have been both comprehensive and practical. In order to assess this further, we need to look at actual cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>荡ricsTraining</strong></td>
<td>Was the training revised over the course of the program? If so, why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>荡ricsTraining</strong></td>
<td>What aspects of the training proved most useful/successful?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HES (Hamlet Evaluation Survey)</strong></td>
<td>How difficult was the survey to use on the ground?</td>
<td>HES survey manuals and other materials, HES reports, interviews with those who worked with HES, surveys of those who worked with it, independent verifications of HES results</td>
<td>HES was the primary system used to measure the success of Vietnam counterinsurgency programming. If there are aspects of the system that could be useful today it would greatly facilitate a better evaluation of current counterinsurgency programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>荡ricsRecruitment</strong></td>
<td>How were CORDS teams recruited?</td>
<td>Recruitment letters, posters, manuals, specific job descriptions, interviews, personnel file materials, surveys, recorded comments, evaluations of CORDS personnel</td>
<td>There is little information available on the qualifications of CORDS team members. This information could prove useful in current recruiting efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>荡ricsRecruitment</strong></td>
<td>What were the qualifications of CORDS team members?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>荡ricsRecruitment</strong></td>
<td>Were personnel requirements revised over the course of the program? If so, why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>荡ricsRecruitment</strong></td>
<td>Was there an assessment that the qualifications required were those that were most instrumental in getting the job done?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chain of Command and Management Structure</strong></td>
<td>Was the chain of command and management structure universally acknowledged/understood? Did the COC/Management structure extend to all aspects of the program?</td>
<td>Interviews, case studies, surveys, reports, material relating to complaints and dispute resolution, official documents establishing COC,</td>
<td>The CORDS COC is considered to be a significant factor in the success of the program. This information could prove very useful as confusion about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chain of Command and Management Structure</strong></td>
<td>How much autonomy was</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Host Country Coordination and Relationships</strong></td>
<td>left to CORDS implementers? Did CORDS member believe that there was a good balance between autonomy and support/guidance?</td>
<td>management guidelines, correspondence</td>
<td>chain of command and management structure has been cited by returning PRT members as a significant problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Host Country Coordination and Relationships</strong></td>
<td>How much technical assistance was requested by local governments? How often were CORDS teams deployed to handle local issues? How frequent were meetings with local officials to resolve issues? Was the host country mobilized in most cases to accomplish the work? How were any complaints or disputes resolved?</td>
<td>Case studies from independent evaluators, interviews with host country officials (if any), records of meetings with local officials, interviews with CORDS team members who worked with local officials, correspondence</td>
<td>CORDS was intended as technical assistance/hand-over program to enable Vietnam to govern itself effectively. The success or failure of this aspect of CORDS could prove useful in assessing current counterinsurgency programs focused on host country handover.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning</strong></td>
<td>How was project planning accomplished? Were there specific planning guidelines? If so, were these guidelines followed? Where did the impetus for beginning projects come from—Local request? Higher-ups’ requests? Consensus of team members? Other?</td>
<td>Interviews, meeting reports, requests for assistance, planning documents including guidelines, memoranda and field manuals, case studies by independent evaluators, project reports</td>
<td>CORDS is acknowledged to have been successful in its planning efforts but the information about planning is very general. Specific accounts and instances where planning worked/didn't work can aid in refocusing planning efforts in today’s counterinsurgencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On-the-Ground Achievements</strong></td>
<td>What were the major achievements of the CORDS program? How can these achievements be characterized—material/practical? Cultural? Social? Political? Psychological? How sustainable were these achievements—how long did they last (or would they have lasted if outside forces</td>
<td>Reports on project completions, interviews with project personnel, reports on the later condition of cited project successes (or failures), achievement awards and citations, interviews with host country officials, independent later case</td>
<td>CORDS was intended to assist Vietnam in achieving sustainable improvements. There has been little information reported on what those specific achievements were. This information could help to focus our efforts on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of Mission</td>
<td>How well did CORDS team members understand the principles of counterinsurgency?</td>
<td>Interviews, comments recorded, reports, memoranda, records of complaints, case studies, mission statements, official guidelines</td>
<td>CORDS has been cited as a good example of individuals focused on common goals. Understanding of a common mission is considered to be a particularly weak area for PRT’s. This information could help in revising training and support to achieve a sense of common purpose among team members.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Was there a common understanding between civilians and military on the mission and objectives? How was this understanding achieved and reinforced? Was stovepiping an issue or were team members successful in focusing their individual/sectoral efforts on achieving the common goal? Were there any major disagreements about mission and objectives?</td>
<td>studies/assessments, correspondence and memoranda</td>
<td>most likely areas where positive changes could be made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Coordination</td>
<td>How effectively were civilians incorporated/used? How were interagency disagreements resolved? What kind of team building support did each relevant agency offer? Which support was the most useful?</td>
<td>Interviews, comments recorded, reports, memoranda, records of complaints, case studies, policy documents, correspondence</td>
<td>CORDS is held to be a good example of fostering understanding between civilians and military personnel working together. Differences in organizational cultures and lack of understanding of those cultures are today a primary weakness in achieving the effective deployment of PRT’s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix III
CORDS Metrics

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)—Basic Characteristics:
1. Helped determine the overall progress of pacification
2. Included levels of security in the provinces and hamlets
3. Strong effort to collect and evaluate data from the village level
4. HES replaced a biased system
5. Final version required district advisors to answer 139 questions on pacification efforts
6. Advisor only answered the standard questions
7. Results computed in Saigon by a data processor
8. Program was not known by provincial advisors
9. Results were less likely to be biased or based on advisor guesses
10. Evidenced by consistently lower ratings than the earlier metric system

Development of the HES procedure for evaluating pacification progress at the hamlet level:
1. Need identified for comprehensive information on the main areas embracing pacification—security and community development
2. Prior to the implementation of the HES in January 1967, a traditional manual technique for monitoring pacification progress existed
3. That technique was aggregated at the province level, the information could not give a detailed picture at the district, village, or hamlet levels
4. Also, addressed pacification only from the physical security perspective—no scheme linking the available information to the local needs, desires, and satisfaction of the people existed
5. Concerns about pacification gradually expanded to include not only the physical security of the people, but also the political, economic, social, and psychological status of the people

Application of the HES System:
1. Collected detailed information on each of the hamlets in the RVN that exhibited some degree of GVN control
2. Mirrored the true state of pacification affairs to the extent that they were known or could be determined
3. Ascertained by the district senior advisor who recorded HES data
4. District senior advisor evaluated the status of pacification in each district hamlet, except those hamlets under Viet Cong (VC) control
5. Results of these monthly evaluations were processed by the Automated Data Processing (ADP) Branch of the MACV Rural Development Support Directorate (later CORDS)
6. HES rated population centers only, thereby leaving the population in large land areas unreported

HES Indices and Ratings:
1. Alphabetical index was derived for each hamlet that represented the status of pacification progress for each hamlet
2. Hamlet was evaluated in terms of the following six factors:
   - VC military activities;
   - VC political and subversive activities;
   - Friendly security capabilities;
• Administrative and political activities;
• Health, education, and welfare; and
• Economic development.

3. Each of these six factors were described or characterized by specific indicators
4. Indicators were activity-oriented with the degree of pacification progress
5. District senior advisor rated each hamlet by selecting, for each indicator of each factor, one of the five hamlet pacification status categories that most closely reflected the pacification environment within the hamlet during the month
6. The five hamlet pacification status categories were "A" (best condition) through "E" (worst condition) (See below)
7. Eighteen ratings for each hamlet were supplied by the district senior advisor
8. Ratings were processed electronically and each of the alphabetical status categories, selected by the district senior advisor, was assigned a numerical value
9. These numerical values were averaged and an overall alphabetical/numerical rating was assigned to each hamlet

The Five Status Categories of HES were:

1. "E" hamlet:
   • Enemy military activities are effective and attacks on friendly forces in the area are frequent;
   • Enemy political and subversive activities exist and the infrastructure is operating effectively;
   • Friendly security capabilities are inadequate and night defenses are lacking;
   • GVN administrative and political activities are temporary and ineffective (they are only present in the daytime);
   • Health, education, and welfare programs are nonexistent; and no economic development is in progress.

2. "D" hamlet:
   • Enemy military activities have been reduced and external enemy forces have been reduced up to 25 percent, but there is enemy activity in the hamlet at night;
   • Some enemy political cadre have been eliminated or neutralized, but terrorism occurs during the course of the month;
   • Day and night defenses by external friendly forces exist and voluntary informants are increasing;
   • Local participation in hamlet management has begun and a census grievance program has started;
   • Medical Civic Action Program visits are scheduled periodically, some formal education is available, and initial welfare activities have begun; and
   • Economic development has been initiated and planning for self-help projects has started.

3. "C" hamlet:
   • Military control of the enemy has been broken, external enemy units have been reduced up to 50 percent, and only sniping and booby-trap incidents occur on routes to the hamlet;
   • Most of the enemy political infrastructure has been identified and its effectiveness curtailed;
Local communications system is operative, friendly forces meet security requirements and hamlet chiefs are receiving useful information from informants;

GVN managerial groups are usually present at night, census grievance program has been completed, and civic associations are being developed;

Full-time medical support is rendered by external forces, formal full-time education is available, and some welfare needs are being met; and

Economic programs are underway—people are interested and have given their consent to self-help projects and some participation has been achieved.

4. "B" hamlet:
- The enemy can make only desperation raids, enemy bases near the hamlet have been destroyed, and no incidents in the hamlet have occurred during the month;
- The enemy political infrastructure is identified, most cadre and leaders have been eliminated, and no subversion occurs;
- Friendly defense force is organized, adequate plans and communications have been prepared for its use, and an effective informant system is operative;
-Complete GVN managerial group is resident, hamlet chief is elected, and people are participating freely in civic associations;
- A trained medic is resident, a trained mid-wife lives nearby, and all children receive primary education; and
- All programmed self-help projects are underway, advanced economic programs have been started, and popular support and participation have increased.

5. "A" hamlet:
- Enemy military remnants have been driven out and external enemy forces are ineffective;
- Enemy political infrastructure is eliminated and no subversive activity occurs;
- Adequate friendly defense forces exist, there is only a slight need for external forces, and the hamlet chief directs effective security apparatus;
- An elected GVN autonomous governing body exists, all GVN officials are resident, permanent grievance representatives are available, and public awareness of GVN personnel and programs exists;
- Effective medical and sanitation programs exist, all children receive primary education, and secondary schools are accessible;
- Welfare needs are satisfied and special benefits are being paid; and
- Some self-help projects are completed, local pride is evident, public works projects are underway, economic programs are well advanced.

Revisions to the HES:
1. CORDS, the organization responsible for management of the HES, initiated a revision of the HES.
2. Implemented on February 1, 1970, HES/70 addressed pacification as consisting of three broad areas: security, political, and socioeconomic.
3. Twenty-five lower-level functional areas at four hierarchical levels made up these three broad areas.
4. The objectives of the new HES included:
   - Increasing the objectivity and specificity of pacification progress data;
   - Expanding the functional areas of pacification;
• Centralizing the methodology for evaluation of pacification and standardizing it throughout; and
• Increasing the management utility of the system by designing reports specifically for field and command users.
5. Divided into four categories, based on the level and frequency of response for each hamlet and village on a monthly and quarterly basis.
6. Using Bayesian Statistics, combined the question responses for each hamlet to produce a series of ratings culminating in an overall hamlet rating

Results of final HES Assessment:
1. Feasibility study on modifying the HES scoring aggregation of HES/70 to reflect the increasing enemy emphasis on political activity
2. HES/71 became operational on January 1, 1971
3. New aggregation logic reflected the enemy's increased emphasis on VC terrorism and on the activities of the VC infrastructure
4. Another significant development in HES/71 was the beginning of Vietnamization
5. With the continuous drawdown of U.S. advisor teams, the HES was almost completely under the operation of the GVN by March 1973.
Appendix IV
Counterinsurgency Programming Strategic Framework

Assistance Objective 1: Governance capacities improved to diminish incentives to insurgency.
Intermediate Result 1.1: Public policies and institutions facilitate more equitable socio-economic development:

Indicators—Decrease in:
- Percentage of people in targeted groups perceiving corruption and abuse of office by government leaders.
- Number of practices by social elites that restrict mobility and voice/social-standing to less privileged groups.

Indicators—Increase in:
- Number of advocacy organizations in target communities advocating for more effective and equitable public policies and institutions
- Percentage of state-entity budgets/fiscal operations audited.
- Percentage of questionable financial practices investigated, prosecuted, and punished.
- Number of changes in local regulatory framework to promote more economic development
- Number of changes in local regulatory framework to promote more economic development
- Number of beneficiaries of socio-economic development plans created and implemented by government
- Number of local communications systems initiated, restored and maintained over a one year period.
- Number of infrastructure projects initiated, restored and maintained over a one year period.

Intermediate Result 1.2: Local governance and capacity for basic service provision improved:

Indicators—Decrease in:
- Number of essential government functions that are being performed by international actors.
- Number, duration, and extent of interruptions in delivery of essential services.
- Number of students leaving school for reasons other than matriculation.
- Percentage of the public expressing dissatisfaction with accessibility of essential government services and utilities.

Indicators—Increase in:
- Number of localities receiving distribution of government expenditures.
- Number of localities receiving distribution of government subsidized food.
- Percentage of the population and percentage of territory receiving essential government services and utilities.
- Percentage of youth graduating in target schools from vulnerable communities
- Percentage of youth attending sanctioned institutions from vulnerable communities
- Number of operational health facilities in target locations
Intermediate Result 1.3: Community-based institutions and mechanisms to ensure active participation in governance and locally-driven solutions strengthened:

Indicators—Decrease in:

- Number of complaints filed by civil society organizations before anticorruption agencies.
- Number of inconsistencies in substance or process between traditional/non-state justice systems and the formal legal system that lead to tension and confusion.
- Number of professionals, technical experts, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs leaving the country.
- Percentage of citizens who are unaware of their rights, responsibilities, and opportunities to influence the policies and actions of the government.

Indicators—Increase in:

- Number of training programs to improve standards of professional integrity and ethics in journalism.
- Number of grants to NGOs to increase civic advocacy.
- Number of instances of editorial criticism and news unfavorable to the government in power.
- Number of opposition and nonofficial media outlets and readership.
- Number of foreign journalists with access to government, security, and public information and persons.
- Number of external broadcast stations and services accessible in the state/region, including size of viewing/listening audience.
- Percentage of citizen participation in volunteer positions in local government, including service on unpaid citizen advisory bodies.
- Percentage of citizen participation in paid positions in local government.
- Percentage of citizens supporting active citizen participation in the public sphere and favorable to the growth of civil society.
- Number of civil society organizations capable of mobilizing members to protest against government abuse.
- Amount of resources of independent civic groups to educate citizens about the democratic process and lobby for democratic reforms.
- Number of organizations and diversity of issues/interests they represent, membership and funding.

Intermediate Result 1.4: Levels of conflict in vulnerable communities reduced.

Indicators—Decrease in:

- Percentage of people in targeted groups accepting exclusionary social practices.
- Percentage of people in targeted groups perceiving discrimination in government policies.
- Percentage of populations in target groups perceiving economic deprivation relative to other identity groups.
- Number of instances of inflammatory and exclusionary rhetoric in the discourse of political elites/leaders.
- Percentage of people in targeted groups perceiving that discrimination on the basis of tribal affiliation is acceptable.
- Percentage of people in targeted groups perceiving that divergent rates of population growth or the influx of migrants creates a threat (to way of life, job security, access to resources).

*Indicators—Increase in:*
- Percentage of cases using formal judicial and enforcement mechanisms to protect land/resources.
- Number of policies clearly distinguishing between formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms.
- Number of disputes resolved peacefully through traditional/non-state justice systems.
- Percentage of people participating in village management.
- Number of effective grievance programs initiated and implemented.
- Number of programs requiring the government to provide sustainable fiscal and human resources to upkeep refurbished clinics and schools.
- Numbers of projects instituted addressing needs articulated by the communities
- Percentage of youth engaged in extracurricular activities in targeted schools
- Percentage of youth engaged in community development activities
- Percentage of youth engaged in consultations with local and central government representatives
- Number of youth attending training/institutes to build leadership skills
- Number of youth actively participating in local youth association/NGO
- Number of youth attending training/institutes to build leadership skills.

**Assistance Objective 2: Livelihoods in conflict-vulnerable communities improved.**

**Intermediate Result 2.1: Employment opportunities increased:**

*Indicators—Decrease in:*
- Percentage of employment-aged youth who are unemployed or underemployed.
- Unemployment rates of politically disadvantaged identity groups relative to the national average.
- Percentage of public sector in centralized urban locations.

*Indicators—Increase in:*
- Per capita income of politically disadvantaged identity groups relative to the national average.
- Ratio of jobs in the formal vs. informal (i.e., unregulated) sectors.
- Number of business owners and entrepreneurs perceiving a match between laborers' skills and their employment needs.

**Intermediate Result 2.2: Access to and delivery of quality services improved:**

*Indicators—Decrease in:*
- Illiteracy rates of politically disadvantaged identity groups higher than the national average.
- Percentage of families reporting dissatisfaction with schooling among families with children in school.
- Number of primary schools, secondary schools, and colleges with higher student/teacher ratios, lower numbers of school hours per year and lower amounts of supplies than the national average.
Indicators—Increase in:

- Percentage of heads of households reporting that, under normal conditions, they are able to meet their food needs either by growing foodstuffs/raising livestock or purchasing food on the market.
- Number of health care providers willing to tend to a member of another identity group.
- Percentage of heads of households reporting that emergency food needs can be met through support from extended family, kinship networks, or village support systems.
- Percentage of households with easy access to potable water.
- Percentage of local population perceiving that health care is accessible.
- Ratio of practicing doctors, nurses, and health care workers to population and time it takes to reach a health care facility.
- Percentage of youth enrolled in primary schools, secondary schools, and college) (By identity group and gender).
- Percentage of essential public services to identity groups relative to their percentage of the total population.
# Appendix V
## Executive Summary of the Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>COIN Strategy</th>
<th>Lessons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>1867-1880</td>
<td>Dividing the former Confederacy into five military districts and granting the Army the power to remove and appoint officials, register voters, hold elections, regulate court proceedings, and approve state constitutions.</td>
<td>Combating the insurgency required the presence of troops so pervasive that there was no place left for insurgents to hide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian Wars</td>
<td>1865-1918</td>
<td>The Indian Wars comprised a series of smaller wars. Native Americans usually made decisions about war and peace at the local level, though they sometimes fought as part of formal alliances. Political leadership formulated an Indian national policy which had as its objective, the placement of all Indians on reservations. The army, as an instrument to be used by the executive branch in executing this policy, was never able to develop a military strategy to achieve this political end state.</td>
<td>A loose body of principles emerged from the Indian Wars: to ensure the close civil-military coordination of the pacification effort, to provide firm but fair and paternalistic governance, and to reform the economic and educational spheres. Good treatment of prisoners, attention to the Indians’ grievances, and the avoidance of killing woman and children (learned by error) were also regarded as fundamental to any long-term solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1899-1902</td>
<td>“Attraction and chastisement” and “Oil Spot” strategy (concentration of counter-insurgent forces into an expanding, secured zone)—Small units living in Philippine towns and villages conducted direct action, trained local forces, collected intelligence, and worked on civil projects to defeat the insurgency.</td>
<td>The critical lesson in counterinsurgency doctrine from the Philippines example is the fundamental requirement of a good government in order to defeat an insurgent force. This includes strong leadership, minimal corruption, and a bond with the population it governs. Also important to be able to transform the military force into a viable counterforce to insurgent warfare, have mobile infantry forces limited to battalion-size in order to locate and destroy insurgent forces, use of military forces to achieve political objectives. Unity of effort applied from all the IOPs to one of two purposes to target the population—1) the guerrillas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91
must be separated from the population; 2) all of the IOPs are used to fight and defeat the guerrillas; and 3) all the IOPs must be employed, not just the military one.

| Nicaragua \n“Banana Wars” | 1925-1932 | Military interventions carried out by the Marines. *Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars Manual* (1921). The U.S. as political arbiter. | Small wars, unlike conventional wars, present no defined or linear battle area and theater of operations. While delay in the use of force may be interpreted as weakness, the *Small Wars Manual* maintains, the brutal use of force is not appropriate either. Employ as many indigenous troops as practical early on to confer proper responsibility on indigenous agencies for restoring law and order. The importance of focusing on the social, economic, and political development of the people more than on simple material destruction. The importance of aggressive patrolling, population security, and the denial of sanctuary to the insurgents. An overarching principle—not to fight small wars with big-war methods—gain results with the least application of force and minimum loss of civilian (non-combatant) life. |
| Greece | 1944-1949 | Massive aid given to Greece by the United States. The military aid, in terms of equipment, funds and advisors, allowed the government to raise an army that was capable of handling an insurgency. The economic aid provided under the same Truman Doctrine. This aid bolstered the psychological state of the Greek people and gave credence to the belief that the Greek government was working to better the lot of its citizens. | Greece was the first major police task which the United States took on in the postwar world. One of the most important consequences of the American involvement in Greece in the 1940'S was the development of new bureaucracies specializing in military assistance, police administration, and economic aid, committed to an analysis of revolution and a set of responses for dealing with it that would be applied to many different conflicts in the next twenty years. |
| Malayan Emergency [U.K.] | 1948-1960 | The widely distributed and influential work of Sir Robert Thompson—Thompson's underlying assumption is that of a country minimally committed to the rule of law and better governance | The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies counted. There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla vision. Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision. Economy of force. Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. Aggressive mobility. Ground level embedding and integration. Cultural sensitivity. Systematic intelligence effort. Methodical clear and hold. Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. The counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done. |
Appendix VI  
Statement of Work—Counterinsurgency Meta-evaluation

Executive Summary

Population security is the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency, but it is not alone sufficient to ensure long term results. Economic development, good governance, and the provision of essential services, all occurring within a matrix of effective information and assistance operations, must improve simultaneously and steadily if counterinsurgency programs are to be effective. Modern counterinsurgency programs integrate both military and civilian elements of the United States Government’s strategy into the effort to build stable and secure societies. This proposed meta-evaluation of counterinsurgency programming, will aggregate findings from evaluations, assessments, studies, audits and other documents in order to focus on those aspects of counter-insurgency programming that have been corroborated by strong evidence and those that have been both under-theorized and unverified.

Purpose

The purpose of this Statement is to provide an overview of, and a perspective on, development assistance in counterinsurgency programming and to derive evidence-based findings and lessons learned from prior studies and evaluations to present them in a systematic and understandable format that can be used to aid in future evaluation, policy and programming decisions.

Background

USAID’s mission to provide humanitarian assistance and foster long-term economic and political development in the developing world has become increasingly important in the evolution of a full-spectrum COIN response. Development has now become one of the key pillars of national security and the results of this have caused internal and external changes at USAID such as new offices, new programs, and new interagency initiatives. New projects have been based upon the conclusions that a number of factors, including remoteness, porous borders, proximity to known terrorist groups, large marginalized and/or disenfranchised populations, and exclusion from political processes are key causes of instability.

Programming recommendations have led to targeted interventions such as youth livelihoods, former combatant reintegration, education, rural radio and media programs, peace building/conflict management and small-scale infrastructure projects. Improved interagency communications have led to joint projects where USAID provides “software” (training, institutional capacity, healthcare) and Combined Joint Task Forces build “hardware” (schools, wells, physical rehabilitation of hospitals).

A number of axiomatic activities and attitudes that purport to contribute to successful counterinsurgency programming have evolved over the decades. These are:

- The importance of developing livelihoods and foster economic growth particularly focused on young men;
- The need to ensure the allegiance of the local population through targeted and sustainable infrastructure projects;
- The significance of empowering legitimate, indigenous actors to engage in local and national government; and
• The essential requirement of recognizing that progress is incremental and goals are long term.

The question of how we measure progress in counterinsurgency programming has become crucially important. Only by tracking progress can we know whether these complex, and costly, strategies are working. Assessing progress is also important because the perception of progress has an effect on the sustainability of the development efforts. Given the political importance of measuring progress and the very limited set of agreed-upon benchmarks, the question of measurement has become deeply controversial.

Objectives of the Study

The traditional formula for counterinsurgency and stabilization tends to place a strong emphasis on tracking trends in the daily life of typical citizens. How secure are they, and who do they credit for that security? How hopeful do they find their economic situation, regardless of the nation’s GDP or even their own personal wealth at a moment in time? Do they think their country’s politics are giving them a voice?

While many studies purport to answer the relevant questions, the lack of data to support those answers leads to a conclusion that more rigorous evaluation is needed in this area. Before undertaking the costly enterprise of an agency-wide evaluation of counter-insurgency programming, however, we need to assess what lessons learned and best practices can be gleaned from prior evaluations, assessments and studies. This study will entail both a synthesis of prior studies, assessments and evaluations and an analysis of the evidence-based conclusions and recommendations that have resulted from them.

Methodology

The meta-evaluation will use several analytical tools and apply the related methodologies iteratively. These consist of the following:

1) Comprehensive desk review of relevant documents. The meta-evaluation team will review all available documents reporting on counterinsurgency programming including evaluations, assessments, audits, reports and studies. Particular attention will be given to evidence-based impact studies and reports that assessed follow-up on recommendations of reviews and assessments. The quality of analysis and the recommendations of these reviews will be assessed in terms of their actual and expected impacts on counter insurgency programming.

2) Consultations with key informants. Team members will conduct interviews with key informants and attend meetings and conferences at which key informants present findings and studies on counterinsurgency programming. In addition to USAID and DOD informants, the team members will consult with the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations on a regular basis.

3) On-line survey. A detailed questionnaire to elicit views on key issues in counterinsurgency programming will be sent to USAID and DOD personnel. Quantitative analysis of survey data and a synthesis of qualitative write-in comments will assist the team to sharpen its key findings and conclusions.
These tools and methods will enable the team to conduct a comprehensive survey of past reviews and to probe deeply into issues regarding the current and future mission, strategy and effectiveness of counterinsurgency programming.

The Team Leader will be responsible for finalizing and negotiating the study work plan, establishing study team roles, responsibilities and tasks, facilitating the team planning meetings, assuring that logistical arrangements in the field are complete; managing team in-country activities and assuring that team members are working to schedule, coordinating the process of assembling individual input/findings for the study report and finalizing the study report, and leading the preparation and presentation of key study findings and recommendations to USAID/ASIA/SPO.

**Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review background documents and other preparation.</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone and face-to-face interviews with key informants</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation and dissemination of on-line survey questionnaire</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of document review, interview and survey results</td>
<td>8 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of final report.</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of final report</td>
<td>5 months from commencement of study</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Deliverables**

The deliverables are:
1) a plan of work;
2) a debriefing/presentation of key preliminary findings to USAID Missions on departure;
3) a debriefing presentation of key preliminary findings to USAID/ASIA/SPO;
4) a draft report for review by USAID staff with findings and recommendations;
5) a final report incorporating, as appropriate, relevant comments by USAID staff; and
6) a plan for dissemination of the report via website and press releases.

The study report will include:
1) an Executive Summary of no more than two pages;
2) a Table of Contents;
3) an Introduction of one to two pages;
4) a Background section of two to three pages;
5) a Methodology section of one to two pages;
6) Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations of fifteen or more pages
7) References and Annexes