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Iraq Community Action Program 2003-2007

Cooperative Agreement No. AFP-A-00-03-00003-00

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
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Expanding Opportunities Worldwide

Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP)

Cooperative Agreement No. AFP-A-00-03-00003-00



Final Report
June 2007



ASSISTANCE
FOR IRAQ

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1. Glossary of Terms and acronyms

Note on place names

In English, there are many different spellings of place names within Iraq. For the purposes of consistency, names will be spelled according to the United Nations Humanitarian Information Centre standard – see [Appendix 1](#) for a governorate and district map of Iraq.

ACDI/VOCA	Agricultural Cooperative Development International / Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance
AoR	Area of Responsibility
CAG	Community Action Group
CD	Community Development
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation International
CICR	Center for International Conflict Resolution
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CST	Community Support Team
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
ICAP	Iraq Community Action Program
ICSP	Iraqi Civil Society Program
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Implementing Partner
IRD	International Relief & Development Inc.
LG	Local Government or Local Governance
MC	Mercy Corps
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSC	Overseas Strategic Consulting
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PRC	Project Review Committee
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PWDs	People With Disabilities
RFA	Request for Applications
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
SCF	Save the Children Fund
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

2. Iraq Facts and Figures

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2006

Location: 33 00 N, 44 00 E; Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf, Iran (1,458 km), Jordan (181 km), Kuwait (240 km), Saudi Arabia (814 km), Syria (605 km), Turkey (352 km)

Total Area: 437,072 sq km

Population: 26,783,383 (July 2006 est.)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 39.7% (male 5,398,645/female 5,231,760)

15-64 years: 57.3% (male 7,776,257/female 7,576,726)

65 years and over: 3% (male 376,700/female 423,295) (2006 est.)

Infant mortality rate:

total: 48.64 deaths/1,000 live births

male: 54.39 deaths/1,000 live births

female: 42.61 deaths/1,000 live births (2006 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

total population: 69.01 years

male: 67.76 years

female: 70.31 years (2006 est.)

Ethnic groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5%

Arabic is the official language, **English** is widely understood.

Kurdish is spoken in Northern Iraq called Iraqi Kurdistan.

Turkoman people speak **Turkish**. **Farsi** is spoken by some tribal people.

Religions: Muslim 97% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3%.

Sunnis enjoy higher social position and political status.

Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 40.4%

male: 55.9%

female: 24.4% (2003 est.)

Climate: mostly desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, cloudless summers; northern mountainous regions along Iranian and Turkish borders experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snows that melt in early spring, sometimes causing extensive flooding in central and southern Iraq

Land use:

arable land: 13.12%

permanent crops: 0.61%

other: 86.27% (2005)

Economy: GDP – composition by sector:

agriculture: 7.3%

industry: 66.6%

services: 26.1% (2004 est.)

Oil is the mainstay of economy which has been devastated. Many Iraqis are impoverished and undernourished. Many civil servants have 2nd and 3rd jobs. Arable land accounts for about 12% farmland with permanent crops 1%, meadows and pastures 9%, forest and woodland 3%.

Crops: Wheat, Barley and Rice are produced. Other crops include potatoes, tomatoes, cucumbers, watermelons, dates, olive and oranges. Livestock consists of cattle, sheep, goats and chickens. About 40% of the workforce is employed in agriculture. Fishing industry is small.

Industries: manufacturing sector is underdeveloped; the commonly produced goods include footwear, cigarettes, construction materials, processed foods and textiles.

3. Executive Summary

3.1. Highlights of Accomplishments During ICAP

The USAID-funded Iraq Community Action Program, initiated in June 2003, reached its completion in March 2007. Over the course of the three years of the program, ACDI/VOCA and the community boards accomplished the following:¹

- A total of 676 community development projects were completed in eight governorates in Iraq.
- Over 330,000 days of labor generated and more than 5,000 long-term jobs created, at a cost to USAID and ACDI/VOCA of just over \$4 per person per project.
- Community contributions to ICAP are approximately 22% of the value of projects.
- Forty-seven co-operatives were established, mostly in the Sunni triangle, providing jobs and income, and demonstrating a new model of democratic ownership.
- Ninety-three community boards, undertaking projects and promoting local democracy, were successfully established.
- Training in business management skills was provided to cooperative members, women, youth and community group members.
- One hundred and six water and sanitation projects brought much needed water to some of Iraq's poorest villages and provided villages, towns and cities with safe means of waste disposal.
- Twenty residential quarters and villages were connected to the power grid, providing electricity for homes and businesses.
- Thirty-nine road, bridge and embankment projects were completed, including installation of street lights and paving much of Ba'qubah city center.
- Over 180,000 people were provided with access to a telephone connection.
- Twenty-four public parks, gardens and sports fields were renovated.
- Twenty-one waste cleanup and environmental rehabilitation projects were completed.
- Twenty-five irrigation projects helped Iraqi farmers cultivate up to 80,000 acres of land.
- Nine livestock vaccination campaigns were conducted in 450 villages.
- Sixty-seven civil society projects involved in building women centers, cultural and community centers, renovating libraries, establishing community radio stations, sponsoring cultural events, were successfully completed.

¹ Note that 76 projects implemented by Counterpart International in Anbar Governorate and Baghdad are incorporated into all analysis in this report.

- Sixty-eight health projects providing essential medical care, including construction or renovation of 25 health centers, resulted in improved healthcare for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.
- Two hundred and ninety-three schools were assisted in eight governorates with \$3.5 million of funding, resulting in better attendance and performance, less overcrowding, and improved student health.
- Improved facilities, training and healthcare were made available to women, children, youth and disabled people. Additionally, long-term jobs were created for 2,000 women.
- Six hundred twenty-four Apprentices were trained for future employment.
- Amicable resolution of water and land disputes was attained, and a growing network of conflict resolution practitioners reaching thousands of Iraqis was established.

The Marla Ruzicka program for unintended victims of the actions of coalition forces proved equally successful:

- Out of 660 projects completed, 292 new businesses were established for individual victims or their families. Business training was given to help the new businesses succeed.
- Two hundred and ninety-one agricultural projects were funded, which included primarily livestock rearing businesses.
- Eighty-seven percent of project holders reported improvements in their lives as a result of the projects.
- Strong goodwill was generated through cultural resonance with the goals of the Marla Fund.
- Eight schools were rebuilt and 4,600 students were assisted.
- Over 60,000 women and girls were assisted.
- Ten health centers and hospitals serving disabled people were renovated or repaired and provided with equipment worth \$470,000
- Over 3,400 disabled people received direct medical care or aids (wheelchairs, crutches)
- More than 2,000 people were employed during the program, and 1,000 long-term jobs were created.

3.2. Need for Future Assistance

Despite the significant amount of assistance provided by the US Government and other donors in Iraq, significant needs still exist. With ongoing violence, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) and Iraqis leaving Iraq. According to UNHCR, there are 1.9 million IDPs in the country and two million refugees who have escaped to neighboring countries, especially Syria and Jordan. Unemployment and poverty have risen sharply. According to the United Nations Development Program, one-third of the population now lives in poverty. The education system is still underdeveloped and under-resourced. Furthermore, the Iraqi peoples' basic needs for drinking water, food, sanitation, healthcare and electricity are not yet being met.

As part of the ICAP II program that commenced in October 2006, a baseline survey² was undertaken among a sample of ICAP I stakeholders to assess the situation with respect to the areas of intervention that the program aims to address.

Overall, among the members of the communities surveyed, economic conditions were reported as poor. Over half of those surveyed said that these conditions are “bad” or “very bad” and over one-third said that their community economies are only in “fair” shape. Almost half of all the men and women surveyed are unemployed. However, poor community-level economic conditions and a nearly fifty percent unemployment rate may not be new phenomena: two-thirds of the people surveyed stated that their household’s economic status is the same or better than it was a year ago. The other one-third reported it to be worse.

Approximately one-third of the respondents reported that conflict is frequent in their communities. Men, women, youth, and adults all agreed on the three major causes of conflict:

- lack of social services,
- electricity,
- fuel (e.g. for vehicles and household use).

Among the factors reported as least likely to cause conflict are:

- access to food or food aid,
- IDP related conflict,
- water,
- ethnicity/tribalism,
- religion.

Insecurity is universally reported as the primary constraint confronting communities and humanitarian agencies trying to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis. It restricts mobility and communications; enables and promotes corruption; and generally inhibits program progress.

USG personnel generally are optimistic about the potential for local economic development and the potential of ICAP II to contribute to it. Their view is that the Iraqi economy is active and that ICAP II can help people acquire the skills and resources to participate in it.

Implementing Partner (IP) representatives of ICAP II are of the opinion that the potential for economic development is site-specific. Although the program can teach people basic business skills, two years is insufficient to help people move from a centralized to a market economy. They also agree that security is integral to development, in enabling project implementation.

Overall, the information from the baseline assessment indicates that CAP II’s opportunities to make progress toward its objectives are site specific and depend on an interplay of factors that include security, good relationships with local government and traditional leaders, the availability of Iraqi technical and administrative competence, and an adequate duration of

² Iraq Community Action Program II (CAP II) Baseline Assessment Report, February 2007

program. The survey of program participants shows that there is a gap between local government and community members, but that people are active and confident in their CAGs. Consequently, CAP II has a basis for working toward strengthening civil society's voice and its interaction with local government. Promoting local economic development in order to make a positive impact on social stability is perhaps the program's greater challenge.

3.3. Challenges and Lessons Learned

3.3.1. Security

The impact of security on the program cannot be understated – it remains the most significant factor in undertaking any activity within Iraq. This includes attracting and retaining key staff (both international and national), maintaining offices, choosing projects, conducting routine administrative activities, and financial and cash management. Poor security requires a flexible and innovative, yet patient, approach to working in Iraq.

In order to mitigate the threats to security that pervade all ICAP activities, ACIDI/VOCA adopted comprehensive security strategies that have been largely effective. Incidents have still occurred, but overall, ACIDI/VOCA's proactive and low-profile strategy has been successful in safeguarding the program and ACIDI/VOCA staff members. A related challenge has been the psychological effect violence, as most ACIDI/VOCA staff has either been affected by violence themselves or has friends and relatives who were affected.

High security vs. low profile – Acceptance, Protection, Deterrence: The basis of ACIDI/VOCA-Iraq's security strategy has been the classical security triangle of acceptance, protection and deterrence. ACIDI/VOCA built up its acceptance among communities through its various program activities, relying wherever possible on national staff capacity, while minimizing its profile through the use of unmarked civilian vehicles when traveling between projects and offices. Protection and deterrence were achieved through the use of dedicated security professionals and armed guards for office and residence compounds and when traveling. Additional satellite offices in Ba'qubah, Samarra, Tikrit and Mosul used local government infrastructure or home offices in order to reduce both risk and costs. Nevertheless, the continuing insecurity at times seriously affected program activities, with staff, particularly internationals, often spending the better part of their day on the road in order to attend meetings or to access areas that were not safe enough to live in permanently.

National staff security

"I hope you are fine. I'd like to inform you that the last 24 hours was hard on me because I have two of my best friends has been killed by terrorists and another one he's my neighbor. Besides there is a list of name from unknown persons published in the city, they want to kill them and for the bad luck my name is one of these names on the list. I'll try to be in my house as long as I can and finish my work."

*Regards,
Community Development Officer- Ba'qubah sub office
May 24, 2004*

Recruitment and hire of national staff was very challenging for ACIDI/VOCA due to the very real threats to the lives of Iraqi employees and their families if they were known to work for a US-based (or indeed, any "international") organization. Oftentimes advertisement of positions was

through word-of-mouth. All IPs in ICAP experienced staff losses due to violence or to resignation from fear of harm or death.

Staff members were sometimes denied entry into key cities like Samarra or Ba'qubah. Many community development staff had frightening experiences in life-threatening situations. For example, some staff got caught in crossfires because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. These experiences adversely affected staff morale and reduced staff productivity.

ACDI/VOCA instituted a number of careful and compassionate personnel policies for national staff which contributed greatly towards program success, such as:

- Keeping all personnel information extremely confidential;
- Allowing national staff to check in at IP offices at their discretion;
- Permitting national staff to work out of their homes as much as possible, and providing in-home internet access for them wherever possible;
- Holding meetings in places where staff would not be suspected of working for international NGOs;
- Continuing to pay salaries to staff who had to “drop out” for a time, while personal threats to them blow over;
- Helping threatened staff or murdered staff’s surviving family members to reach safe haven;
- Giving extra medical benefits or compassionate leave when a staffer or family member is injured or killed.

ACDI/VOCA’s partner, Counterpart International, successfully implemented its activities in Anbar Governorate, arguably one of the most insecure areas of Iraq. Their security protocols allowed them to continue operating even in times of insecurity, and they included:

- Using a localized approach and low operational profile;
- Employing exclusively Iraqis in its programs throughout the country, utilizing expatriate personnel only for short-term trainings and technical assistance as well as for regular program monitoring and evaluation;
- Employing ICAP Anbar staff members from Ramadi, the capital city of Anbar Governorate, with only two staff members originally from Baghdad;
- Using an Arabic name, Al Natheer (later became Al Matheel), to safely and effectively operate in Anbar, as US-based NGOs are still not accepted in the area;
- Using a low operational profile, with an office in a residential neighborhood, active relationship building with neighbors, the use of local cars and drivers, and local residents as staff.

International staff security: Recruitment and retention of international staff was a major challenge due to the security environment, difficult living and working conditions and limited pool of qualified individuals willing to go to Iraq. Despite the security challenges, there were no major incidents involving ACDI/VOCA international staff throughout the program, a result of stringent security protocols. The evaluation of ICAP conducted in 2006 made a number of recommendations with reference to recruitment of international staff in order to mitigate these challenges. These include:

- Recruiting continuously, even if no positions are vacant – because international staff turnover is such that there soon will be;
- Being prepared to shift field positions around to accommodate them and their skills when “really good people” are willing to work in Iraq;
- Casting the recruiting net wider by utilizing outlets to advertise positions besides job lists and websites;
- Tapping a candidate pool outside a Western network for skills such as finance and information technology (IT) (e.g. the Philippines and the Balkans);
- Promoting junior staff from other countries internally into higher positions in Iraq.

A number of these strategies were undertaken by ACDI/VOCA during ICAP.

Office security: ACDI/VOCA’s Iraq security management plan worked very effectively for the duration of the program. In order to increase community acceptance, particularly at the country-office level, the organization was properly introduced to its neighbors and various political actors in Kirkuk, emphasizing its international NGO character. A guard force consisting of both civilian guards and “police” guards was established, and various physical security measures were implemented, such as concrete “flower pots” to channel traffic around the office, the reinforcement of perimeter walls and protective plastic film for the windows at the office and all residential houses. Nevertheless, care was taken to maintain the organization’s low profile character. A radio room was also set up in order to control the movement of field staff, and an informal exchange of security related information with other organizations was established.

Program security – branding: Due to the hostility towards the coalition forces, and the US in particular, no branding activities took place on ICAP. This was supported by USAID, which issued a branding waiver for ICAP. Vehicles and assets were unmarked, projects did not carry signage with ACDI/VOCA or USAID logos, and all program activities were carried out discreetly.

3.3.2. Program Administration

Personnel and recruitment: In addition to the impact of the security situation on the program, other challenges included:

- The staffing impacts from the sudden addition of program components, such as the Marla Fund. This had the effect of overburdening staff with program responsibilities before additional staff could be recruited and trained;
- The lack of multi-year program commitment meant that staff members were not sure that they would have continuing employment after the end of an ICAP fiscal year. Some staff made alternative employment arrangements prior to program completion, only to learn that ICAP had been extended for an additional year on very short notice – thus creating a conflict of loyalties amongst staff, both national and international.
- Inconsistent personnel policies for local staff resulting from management turnover with insufficient handover.

- Lack of qualified community development staff in Iraq. Since ICAP was a new concept for our Iraqi staff, ACDI/VOCA had to provide extensive and continuous training to the staff on development theory and techniques.

A number of recommendations were made by the 2006 ICAP evaluation with regard to personnel:

- Write duration-of-cooperative agreement personnel contracts under ICAP II for all staff;
- Continue the trend to nationalize in-country management;
- Continue and, if at all feasible under the consortium, standardize HR policies for field staff based on best practices of flexible and compassionate personnel benefits under ICAP I;
- If new program components are added on to ICAP II, additional donor support should be provided, and existing budgets must be re-aligned to add more and properly skilled staff;
- Increase professional development training for staff (national or international) wherever competency and skills mix remain weak

Offices: The location and number of ICAP program offices was as much determined by security considerations as it was by program issues. ACDI/VOCA's main office in Kirkuk was established in June 2003 and sub-offices were opened in Sulaymaniyah, Ba'qubah, Tikrit, Samarra, Mosul and Baghdad. However, due to security concerns, most of these field offices were closed over time and staff began working from their homes.

At program closeout, there were two main ICAP office bases – Kirkuk was the primary office, with a secondary office in Erbil. The Kirkuk office was moved from its original location in Tiseen District to Arafa district in mid 2005, due to insecurity in Tiseen. The Kirkuk office was located in a secure compound, formerly occupied by RTI, just off the main highway to Erbil. While the moves to different offices did improve security, it was disruptive to the program as new equipment, systems, offices and accommodations had to be set up in each new location.

ACDI/VOCA offices in the Ainkawa suburb of Erbil were in a large secure compound in which a number of international NGOs, USAID and security firms were located. International staff generally lived in Erbil on the weekends and in Kirkuk during the working week. If the security situation became questionable in Kirkuk, operations were moved to Erbil. This dual-office system, though not optimal for program management (most non-field program staff were from Kirkuk) provided the best mix of operational efficiency and security.

Remote management: The deteriorating security situation throughout Iraq due to military operations in Fallujah towards the end of 2004 led to the redeployment of all expatriate staff to Amman until the end of November 2004. Subsequent to that, the Director of Security was based in Kirkuk, and all other expatriate staff ran operations remotely from Amman or Erbil, until the security situation permitted a return to Iraq in early 2005.

In retrospect, ICAP should have prepared to operate on remote management much earlier. Although international staff stayed in Kirkuk for as long as possible, the declining security situation obliged the project team to consider alternatives before the move became absolutely necessary. The first ten days on remote management were spent working out the kinks with the

internet, instant messenger, national staff sending attachments, etc.; a lot of teething problems that could have been avoided with more planning. A positive outcome of remote management was that it permitted national staff members who suddenly were trusted with considerable responsibilities to demonstrate their potential.

Logistics and procurement: The logistical aspects of implementing ICAP were very challenging, given the rapid start-up, the difficult security situation (International staff were severely constrained in their movements) and the shrinking pool of professional Iraqis from whom staff could be recruited. National staff hired for ICAP required a great deal of capacity building, for reasons which included:

- Many Iraqis had little exposure to computers and wrote English with difficulty;
- Drivers could not read maps, as maps were classified material under the previous regime;
- Staff knew little about the basics of community development, stakeholder groups and town meetings. They needed training in project proposal writing and budgeting;
- Concerns about associating with foreigners, stereotypes about westerners and perceived links to the American military, reinforced natural fears and isolationist tendencies.

In addition, the procurement of goods and services remained a challenge:

- It proved difficult to find qualified and reliable contractors, particularly in risky areas;
- Some contractors did not want to work with an American organization;
- Staff travel was essential during the procurement and payment stages of the project cycle but it was dangerous to travel from Kirkuk with tenders or to return with bids;
- Contractors had problems delivering goods, crossing borders, passing checkpoints and retaining workers.

Choosing good contractors was absolutely essential to the success of a project, especially given security concerns, rising costs and equipment delivery problems. Most problems with projects resulted from choosing lowest bid contractors who lacked the relevant skills or experience. Communities continued to ask for local contractors, even if they did not meet criteria or were not qualified. In addition, it was important that contractors understood how ICAP and ACIDI/VOCA operated before they started their work so that proper coordination and oversight by the community was conducted.

Documentation: One of the most important considerations for program documentation was that of security. Staff and beneficiaries usually operated confidentially and with anonymity, because knowledge that staff members were working for an American organization or that a community was benefiting from US funds could cause threats or violence from insurgents and criminals. Therefore, all program and administrative documentation which identified staff and beneficiaries was kept as confidential as possible. Digital techniques were often used to obscure staff faces in photographs for public dissemination, a necessary precaution which is commonly used by organizations operating in Iraq. In addition, any in-country movement or transfer of program documentation was thoroughly planned. In late March 2007, the ICAP Archive, consisting of all the individual project and departmental files, was moved from Kirkuk to Erbil under security escort, prior to onward shipment to ACIDI/VOCA HQ in the United States.

Communications - Technology: Communication with field staff was an ongoing challenge. It often required two to three days to communicate messages to and from community development officers, engineers or local contractors. The procurement of better communication equipment and Internet connections made field operations more efficient. ACDI/VOCA invested considerable resources in establishing strong communications both within Iraq and externally, through satellite uplink Internet systems and wireless networks. This was essential both for achievement of program objectives (both on-site and remotely), communication of program progress internally within ACDI/VOCA and to external stakeholders and also for security purposes. Moving forwards into ICAP II, the rollout of the Project Reporting System (PRS) means that project data will be updated into a remotely located database, necessitating strong IT and communications systems.

Interpersonal communication: Both the staff and members of the community boards required intensive communications training to enable them to speak and listen in a language of awareness. Communication skills were essential to ICAP staff work as they interacted within a diverse society under tense conditions. Multiple trainings helped staff members understand the nuances of communication that were strongly influenced by years of hardship, conflict and cultural mores and prejudices.

Management Information Systems (MIS): The implementation of an online MIS (the PRS) had been an objective of year 2 of ICAP, but technological difficulties meant that projects were only tracked using offline Microsoft Access databases for the duration of the program. These spreadsheets were forwarded to USAID on a weekly basis and updated manually, which was time consuming and prone to error. As mentioned, the rollout of the online PRS for ICAP II will mitigate many of these issues.

Monitoring and evaluation: Monitoring and evaluation of the program was an ongoing challenge due to the continual security constraints faced by the monitoring team, particularly as many of the monitors were not familiar in the areas they were visiting, and thus might have excited suspicion among local people. Despite the challenges, a Monitoring and Evaluation Team was established and regular monitoring was conducted on all projects. In year three, limited evaluations of program impacts were conducted among a sample of beneficiaries of the Marla program. The results of these evaluations are discussed later in the document.

3.3.3. Program Finances

Finding a dependable, efficient and secure means of receiving fund transfers from abroad, and also moving funds within Iraq, was an ongoing challenge to the program. The collapse of the Iraqi private banking systems in 2003 required that alternative approaches be developed for transferring funds. ICAP utilized a number of different channels to get funds to where they were needed – including several banks in different localities, as well as networks of exchange offices and money movers—but always with a view to ensuring accountability and security.

With the slow rebuilding of the Iraqi economic infrastructure, the use of banks became possible. But since most people and many companies did not have a bank account, nor did they wish to undertake the risks associated with patronizing banks located in crowded public places, ICAP needed to adapt itself to and operate within the cash economy that prevailed. This presented significant security concerns, as it usually meant that funds had to be moved in cash from one

location to another. Fortunately, ICAP was able to negotiate arrangements with an exchange office in Kirkuk to deliver the cash to our offices, so that project staff did not have to transport it themselves. This enabled us to invite vendors to collect their payments at our secure office compound, where ICAP staff could disburse the funds safely and without compromise. The same methods and procedures were used to pay national staff salaries in cash for the duration of ICAP-I, though ACDI/VOCA is exploring other possible procedures for use in ICAP-II.

Another payroll-related issue that had been pending since project commencement was discharging our legal obligations to the Iraqi Social Insurance system, without revealing to the government authorities the identities and personal details of our national staff. In March 2007, after prolonged internal discussion and with counsel from another USAID contractor in Baghdad (BearingPoint), ICAP succeeded in negotiating an arrangement with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) in Kirkuk, whereby we could fully discharge our Social Insurance obligations for the period July 2003 through January 2007, without penalty, without permitting inspection of our premises by Ministry authorities, and most importantly, without revealing the identities or personal details of our national staff. This payment was disbursed by ICAP and duly received by the Ministry of Labor and Social affairs in Kirkuk. Future payments will be made routinely on a monthly basis.

3.3.4. Program Implementation

Program continuity. ICAP consisted of a series of three incrementally-funded annual programs, with several no-cost extensions. These annual extensions were governed by modifications to the existing cooperative agreement.

Due to its funding structure, ICAP lacked the foresight of a multi-year funded program. Additional funding received on a year-to-year basis had the following negative impacts:

- Broad-based and sustainable program plans and strategies were not developed;
- Monitoring and evaluation systems measuring long-term impacts were not implemented;
- Staff retention was difficult since long-term employment could not be promised
- The high turnover of staff deterred program momentum due to resulting information gaps and inconsistent institutional capacity..

This issue has largely been addressed with the rollout of a multi-year ICAP II.

Community Action Groups (CAGs). While some CAG's required constant support in taking responsibility and ownership of their projects, other CAG boards performed extremely well in upholding democratic principles and procedures. The boards needed to be independent of local councils and municipal officials, but collaborated with them closely in project implementation. This proved to be a challenge in an environment accustomed to centralized and controlled governance.

Other challenges faced by CAGs were a lack of women members and a lack of confidence vis-à-vis municipal officials. Many communities were initially hesitant to elect women, and women were reluctant to serve on boards. ICAP sought to provide channels for women to actively shape community affairs. Nonetheless, both men and women board members were not assertive in

front of municipal officials; particularly officials who were also fellow board members. Over time, there was a notable rise in confidence of CAG members as project successes materialized.

Certain communities had very little trust that ACDI/VOCA (or any foreign NGO) would deliver on its promises, and only engaged with the project process *after* contracts were signed. As a result, municipalities often expanded the scope of work, changed the location of projects, added or changed major items, or decided to do major repair works first. This caused delays that impacted the livelihoods of people depending on the projects.

Assessing community needs and designing project objectives was a difficult task. Communities reached consensus very quickly on their priorities. Disagreement was more often related to the *how* or *where* to implement a project. For example, the community of Laylan, near Kirkuk, agreed quickly that their first priority was to build a school. However, a local family disputed the prospective school location, which was land they were using for farming. The community could not persuade the farmers to change their mind, and ACDI/VOCA refused to build it on disputed land. The community finally donated another piece of land for the school, but significant delays were incurred.

Water projects in water-stressed areas were a potential source of conflict as it was challenging to design projects that accommodated resource needs of all parties involved. Therefore, the consensual nature of CAGs had an important role to play in selecting beneficiaries. Many of the challenges in implementing projects were resolved through communication between all stakeholders. Most of them, however, were solved through better, stronger, more pro-active local officials who worked with CAGs in project design and implementation. Information sharing and early consultation in the planning process was essential.

Ethnicity, gender and culture. Initial gender targets were found difficult to achieve given the social culture in Iraq. Female participation in community boards and project activities was lower than anticipated. Strict gender roles in both Kurdish and Arab communities, coupled with a deteriorating security situation and general lawlessness, kept women within the confines of the household. Little change is expected until women can safely walk the streets.

Although the ethnic diversity of the region is apparent, its effect on every level of operation was underestimated. With three major ethnic groups (Arab, Turkoman and Kurd) and their respective languages in the AoR, language ability and ethnicity became important considerations in programming and staffing. Staff – engineers, community development officers, drivers, specialists – all needed to speak different languages in order to work effectively. Furthermore, recruitment policies needed to be proactive in hiring a wide variety of staff from suitable backgrounds as staff mobility was restricted due to ethnic tensions.

Community contributions. Soliciting community contributions for the cost of projects was particularly challenging. Initially, communities had difficulty understanding the concept of local contribution or could not come up with the required amount. As communities finally grew accustomed to the idea, the US Army and other NGOs occasionally offered to do similar projects without requiring any local contribution – thereby undermining ICAP's approach to community development.

Sometimes local contributions were overdue, slowing down or even halting the construction process. This was particularly true if the contribution was related to the start-up activity of a project, such as ground excavation, land clearing or the supply of goods.

Coordination with coalition and Iraqi forces. Given the geographic size of the area of operation, great efforts were made to coordinate with the CPA and the US military, especially in regions distant from Kirkuk. In year one of ICAP, weekly reports were sent to each CPA governorate coordinator, detailing project activities in each of the governorates. Regular visits and coordination meetings were also held.

As previously mentioned, some communities preferred to contract with the US military because they did not require a local contribution. Communities also held a widespread view that the military had more funds. The result was that ACDI/VOCA devoted energy and resources to preparation, assessment and tendering for projects that were eventually implemented by other organizations. Strong coordination was required to eliminate duplication and ensure better synergies.

Coordination with USAID: Coordination with USAID was regular and comprehensive, particularly given the following issues noted by the IBTCI ICAP evaluation team with respect to the USAID mission in Iraq:

- Substantial USAID staff turnover;
- An initially decentralized structure of ICAP oversight with five CTOs, followed by a centralized structure with a single CTO for all of ICAP;
- ICAP funding drawn from multiple and shifting USG sources/earmarks requiring different project categorizing and financial coding;
- A steadily deteriorating security environment since April 2004; and
- Frequent changes in or additions to ICAP program directions, all in the absence of a Results Framework.

Despite these challenges, good coordination took place with the USAID mission, including USAID representation at ICAP events and field visits to ICAP projects. USAID's stringent security procedures made it difficult to organize such field visits, as ACDI/VOCA's own security philosophy was low-key in comparison. Furthermore, the presence of armored vehicles or military vehicles at project sites drew attention and presented a threat to the local community.

Coordination with other development actors (NGOs, Iraq Civil Society Program): Coordination with other international NGOs was strong, through regular meetings and updates. As other IPs were operating in different areas of Iraq, there was little overlap between activities. ACDI/VOCA undertook joint training activities with the ADF's ICSP and RTI's LGP.

Bureaucracy: Obtaining the proper municipal and governorate approvals for projects was laborious, time consuming, and often political. Although bureaucracy is a problem in many countries, Iraq's local government has particular challenges due to years of mistrust, insecurity, decaying infrastructure, ethnic tension and overall poverty. Furthermore, local government in Iraq turned over a number of times during ICAP I.

In Iraq, corruption results from a system of paternalism, nepotism, tribalism and favoritism. Some of the challenges encountered by ICAP are summarized as follows:

- People were accustomed to obtaining contracts based on tribal loyalty and ties to the Ba'ath party;
- Community boards were often reluctant to accept bidders from outside their communities;
- Bidders would submit prices that were below cost, and then “apologize” and withdraw after they learned the true scope of work. Thus, a lot of projects had to be re-tendered;
- A number of projects were cancelled because officials requested bribes to sign the relevant approvals.

4. Overview of ICAP Activities and Accomplishments

4.1. Problem Analysis and Conflict Resolution (Background)

4.1.1. Background to the Iraq Community Action Program

The ousting of the Saddam Hussein regime in March 2003 heralded a new era for Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which temporarily administered Iraq after the fall of the previous regime, transferred full governmental authority in June 2004 to the Iraqi Interim Government and elections were held in Iraq on 30 January 2005.

Despite the rebirth of democracy in Iraq, the Iraqi people are still very vulnerable. Several wars and thirteen years of economic sanctions have taken a heavy toll on the nutrition of the population, on the social structure, on the economy and on the health infrastructure and services. This is well depicted in the morbidity and mortality rates of the population of Iraq, particularly for infants, children and mothers. The military conflict of March/April 2003, and the looting, sabotage and civil unrest that followed, led to a disruption of water treatment and supply plants, of sanitation facilities and power production plants and to the decimation of the remaining medical/health infrastructure. Continuing widespread insecurity and lawlessness constrain access to health facilities and sustainable economic development.

The last fifteen years in Iraq have seen the following:

- Poor sanitation and water supplies (population with access to safe drinking water was lower than 40% in some areas; about two-thirds of households are not connected to functioning sewage systems).
- Poor nutrition (one in five children were underweight in 2000, and one in three were chronically malnourished).
- A decline in school enrollment and attendance.
- High numbers of injuries and deaths from road traffic accidents and violence.
- Deterioration of preventive health programs.
- A serious decline in the accessibility and quality of health services

An extensive baseline survey conducted, between July and December 2003, by the World Food Program in collaboration with the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) and the Nutrition Research Institute of the Ministry of Health revealed that 11% of households (representing a population of about 2.7 million) were “extremely poor”. “Extremely poor” was defined by the survey as a household spending less than US \$ 30 per month

The damage inflicted on the education system from years of conflict, oppression, weak technical and management capacity, and lack of experienced personnel has further perpetuated stagnation in society. Of nearly 15,000 existing school buildings, 80 percent now require significant reconstruction. Hundreds of schools are built of mud or reeds particularly in the southern governorates and thousands of school buildings nationwide do not meet minimally acceptable health standards.

The disruption of the water and sanitation systems following the second Gulf war caused outbreaks of typhoid fever during the 1990s. More than 29,000 cases were registered in 2003³.

In May 2003, as part of overall relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded one-year cooperative agreements to five US NGOs as part of its Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP). The five NGOs were: Mercy Corps, International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD), Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), Cooperative Housing Foundation International (CHF International) and Save the Children USA.

Each NGO received initial funding of \$7 million, although in the case of ACDI/VOCA additional funding of \$7 million was pending approval by USAID subject to the availability of funds, satisfactory progress of the project, and continued relevance to USAID programs.

The Iraq Community Action Program (CAP) was designed to promote citizen involvement in community development efforts at the grass-roots level and to prevent and mitigate potential conflict by empowering individuals across gender, ethnic and religious lines. The program, initially for one year, was aimed to promote diverse and representative citizen participation in and among 250 communities and to benefit approximately 5 million Iraqis.

The goal of the ICAP was to foster stability and improve Iraqis' lives by ensuring that citizens' basic needs were met within their respective communities. The ICAP aimed to provide citizens with an opportunity to participate in decision-making related to the policies that govern their lives. The program focused on four areas:

- *Community mobilization and cooperation:* The program would establish committees to facilitate community participation and draw previously underrepresented groups into community action, including women, ethnic minorities, and religious groups. The program would rapidly support committee decisions with concrete activities in the three areas below. In addition, activities included community clean up and other preventive health programs, community-based education initiatives, and inter-community conflict management activities.
- *Social and economic infrastructure development:* ICAP would implement community infrastructure projects, including potable water, wastewater and irrigation systems, and the construction and rehabilitation of schools, health clinics, community centers, and roads. These activities would accelerate, extend, and complement USAID's local governance and capital construction efforts (See Appendix 2 for a comparison of ICAP achievements and USAID Iraq strategic objectives).
- *Employment and income generation:* The program would generate immediate employment and incomes through public works projects, local contracting, and the purchase of local materials, supplies, and services. Activities in agribusiness, small-scale industry, and local trade/service activities would support food processing, re-opened small-scale industrial enterprises such as furniture or shoe factories, re-opened shops and service businesses, and invest in home or cottage industries.

³ Iraqi Ministry of Health, Health in Iraq, 2004

- *Environmental management and protection:* Environmental concerns in Iraq included inadequate potable water supplies; air and water pollution; soil salinity and erosion; and desertification. Community environmental management activities were to mitigate pollution, protect health, and preserve natural resources.

In addition, all ICAP initiatives targeted under-represented and "at risk" groups, including promoting women's rights and facilitating the participation of youth and minority groups in political processes.

50-50-90 Quick Start Program: The ICAP Request for Applications (RFA) called for a quick start in which IPs would complete 50 projects with 50 CAGs within the first 90 days of the program. During the first three months of ICAP, IPs thus rushed to: recruit and hire (if not initially train) both international and national staff; establish offices; and quickly mobilize communities to form CAGs and complete projects rapidly.

Although the quick-start strategy, a result of political imperatives rather than best-practice development, was challenging to integrate with later longer-term programming, ACDI/VOCA quickly followed the 50-50-90 phase of ICAP with a phase of CAG consolidation and capacity-building.

It should be noted that the project and process paradigm had been used by USAID programs in similar post-conflict situations such as the Caucasus, Gaza, Lebanon, Central Asia, and most notably Serbia – where all five ICAP IPs had previously worked.

Following on from the one year initial program, USAID awarded the partner NGOs additional contracts based on modifications of the original program agreement. In the case of ACDI/VOCA, ten program modifications were signed, for the following:

- continuance of established program interventions and methodologies;
- additional sectoral areas, responsibilities and interventions;
- additional monitoring and reporting criteria;
- additional funding;
- adjust key personnel;
- no-cost extensions to the closing timeline.

The overall timeline for the ICAP as per the program cooperative agreement/modifications was as follows:

ICAP year 1: May 2003 – June 2004 (Cooperative agreement plus 1 modification)

ICAP year 2: March 2004 – June 2005 (5 modifications)

ICAP year 3: July 2005 – June 2006 (1 modification)

ICAP year 4 (No cost extensions): June 2006 – March 2007 (3 modifications)


As reported in the ICAP Evaluation of October 2006, total ICAP funding for all stakeholders totaled \$338,478,006, of which \$271,320,000 came from United States Government (USG) sources. The remainder (\$67,158,006) consisted of contributions in cash or kind raised by CAG

communities (who were expected to provide between 15% and 25% of their projects' costs) plus other monies and goods leveraged by the IPs, mostly from non-governmental international bodies. A total of \$50,190,000 of USG funding was committed to ACDI/VOCA over the course of the program.

4.1.2. Stakeholders and Partners

As mentioned, the original ICAP consisted of five major NGOs with responsibility for implementing the program in each of their geographical areas (see below). On signing of the cooperative agreement, ACDI/VOCA quickly moved to establish partnerships with local leaders, local government, local associations (such as Chambers of Commerce) and local communities.

In addition, ACDI/VOCA partnered with other international NGOs -- Counterpart International (CI) as a sub-implementer in one governorate (Anbar), the Columbia University Center for International Conflict Resolution, and Overseas Strategic Consulting (OSC) as another "sub" mainly for identifying and hiring international specialists to work on ICAP in Iraq. For the purposes of this report, all activities and projects implemented by Counterpart International will be rolled into ACDI/VOCA activities.



As the program matured, the local stakeholders maintained their primary role in the program, but vertical integration with the newly-appointed Iraqi Government occurred as possible. Meetings with government ministries (for example the Ministries of Education and of Cooperative Affairs) were conducted on an ongoing basis in order to support the transition to democracy taking place within Iraq.


ICAP is managed by USAID/Iraq's Democracy and Governance Office. The program is being implemented under USAID's Strategic Objective 4.2, "Increase Citizen Participation in Local Government Decision-Making."

4.1.3. Geographical Areas

From the start of ICAP the five implementing NGOs were assigned specific AoRs. ACDI/VOCA was assigned seven governorates in the north and west of Iraq. In February 2004, ACDI/VOCA partnered with Counterpart International to implement ICAP in Anbar Governorate. The initial agreement was until June 2004, but subsequent modifications resulted in close out of ICAP operations in Anbar Governorate in October 2006.

The governorates that were assigned to ACDI/VOCA are located in the northern, predominantly Kurdish, area of Iraq, or in the so-called Sunni Triangle area. Kurdish areas were severely underdeveloped due to discrimination by the former regime, and many Kurds suffered grave human rights abuses under Saddam Hussein’s rule.

The **Sunni Triangle** refers to a densely-populated region of Iraq to the northwest of Baghdad that is inhabited mostly by Sunni Muslim Arabs. The roughly triangular area corners are usually said to lie near Baghdad (on the east point of the triangle), Ramadi (on the west point) and Tikrit (on the north point). Each side is approximately 200 kilometers long (125 miles). The area also contains the cities of Samarra and Fallujah.



The area was a center of strong support for Saddam Hussein's government; starting in the 1970s many government workers, politicians, and military leaders came from the area. Saddam himself was born just outside Tikrit.

After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the area became a focus of armed Sunni opposition to Coalition rule. It was widely predicted in the Western press that Saddam would seek shelter from Sunni supporters, and on December 13, 2003, he was captured in a raid on the village of Dawr about 15 kilometers south of Tikrit.

The following is a summary of the populations per governorate in ACDI/VOCA’s AoR.

Governorate (Govt. of Iraq, UNDP, 2004)	Population
Tameem (Possible Kurdish Majority)	854,000
<u>Kurdish majority</u>	
Dahuk.	472,000
Erbil	1,392,000
Sulaymaniyah	1,716,000
<u>Sunni Arab majority</u>	
Anbar.	1,329,000
Salah al Din	1,119,000
Ninewa	2,554,000
Diyala.	1,418,000
Total	10,854,000

Program Management

Through the course of the program, logistical, programmatic and security considerations led to the opening and closing of a number of program offices for the IPs. Initially, IPs commenced operations in Baghdad, but with the delegation of the AoRs among the IPs, teams moved quickly

to open offices in their relevant governorates. Within one month, ACDI/VOCA had established its center of programmatic operations at Kirkuk, while Baghdad remained the coordination center.

In the second year of the ICAP, ACDI-VOCA operations were divided amongst three offices: Mosul, (with expatriate staff commuting from Dahuk), Ba'qubah (with expatriate staff commuting from Baghdad) and the main office in Kirkuk.

In late 2004, security tensions led to the brief withdrawal and redeployment of all expatriate staff to Amman, Jordan. Expatriate management oversaw operations remotely from Amman or Erbil, (where an office was opened). The Baghdad office remained closed at this time.

From early 2005 until the completion of the program, the majority of international staff were based in Erbil and traveled weekly to the Kirkuk office, which remained the main center of program operations.

IP AoRs and Field Offices, by Location

IP	AoR Governorates	Primary and Secondary Field Offices	
ACDI/VOCA CI (sub)	Tameem, Erbil, Dahuk, Diyala, Ninewa, Salah al Din, Sulaymaniyah Anbar	1o:	Kirkuk, Erbil
		2o:	Ba'qubah, Samara, Tikrit
		1o:	Baghdad
		2o:	Fallujah
CHF	Babil, Karbala, Najaf	1o:	Amman (Jordan)
		2o:	Hilla
IRD	Baghdad	1o:	Baghdad
MC	Qadissiya, Missan, Wassit	1o:	Sulaymaniyah
		2o:	Amara, Diwaniyah, Khanaquin, Kut
SCF*	Muthanna, Basrah, Thi Qar	1o:	Kuwait City (Kuwait)
		2o:	Basrah, Nasiriya, Samarra

* SC concluded operations in Iraq by May 2006

4.2. Program Partners

4.2.1. USAID

From June 2003 to October 2004, each IP was under the supervision of one Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO). These positions were covered by USAID/Iraq Regional Representatives, who were posted to USAID field offices around the country. Also supporting the program were a Private Sector Development Advisor and a Local Governance (LG) Specialist.

In late 2004 the number of CTOs was reduced to three -- one each in Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil, with multiple individuals holding the positions.

By June 2005 until program completion a single CTO and one activity manager (both in Baghdad) with no advisors or specialists, were responsible for ICAP. Beyond this two-person cadre, Regional Representatives still lent important general support and facilitation to ICAP and other USAID programs in their regions (Basra, Erbil, and Hilla). On occasion they also made field visits to CAG project sites.

The USAID plan is for Mission representatives to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to essentially assume the responsibilities of the formerly plural and decentralized CTOs. At ICAP close, however, the responsibilities, locations and structures of the PRTs were still in development. USAID/Iraq also hopes that the move to a consortium arrangement for ICAP II may lighten its administrative burden, thereby leaving more time for substantive interactions between Mission and IP managers.

4.2.2. State Department and Coalition Forces

Coordination and information sharing with coalition forces was an essential part of the ICAP. ACDI/VOCA staff, at program commencement, noted the quality and efficiency of the work done by the coalition forces in security, coordination, assistance and organizing, not only with respect to foreign nationals and organizations, but also with the Iraqi people.

As aid efforts in Iraq commenced, the coalition forces (primarily the US Army) also undertook efforts in coordinating NGOs and international business efforts. This was a substantial undertaking given the number of local population requests and needs; NGOs, both US and others; foreign businesses; USAID, UN and donors; plus non-US coalition forces.

The armed forces coordinated with ACDI/VOCA in the identification of specific projects in some communities/areas, particularly schools that were omitted from reconstruction contracts; ad-hoc efforts to assist victims of conflict with medical care; agricultural projects; and victims of violence or oppression at the hands of Saddam Hussein's regime.

ACDI/VOCA was also a joint participant in the Rural Village Revitalization (RVR) Program in Tameem governorate in partnership with coalition forces and the State Department as well as NGO partners in 2005.

It should be noted that, due to local sensitivities regarding cooperation with official USG representatives, coordination with coalition forces and the State Department were discreet and

unpublicized. However, ACDI/VOCA did stay in e-mail communication with the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and other US military officials.

4.2.3. Other Implementing Partners

As mentioned, there were five Implementing Partners for ICAP: ACDI/VOCA, IRD, CHF, MCI and SCF (US). In addition, a number of private firms were contracted by the CPA to undertake Iraqi reconstruction activities. ACDI/VOCA coordinated with two of these: Bechtel, a US-based international construction and engineering company; and Iraqi Reconstruction Group (IRG), a UK-based consortium. ACDI/VOCA took over a number of school reconstruction projects from Bechtel in 2003.

4.2.4. Research Triangle Institute (RTI)

Research Triangle Institute, the fourth-largest non-profit contract research organization in the United States, was responsible for implementing USAID's Local Government Project (LGP 2003 – 2005). In May 2005, RTI was awarded a second USAID contract, the Iraq Strengthening Local and Provincial Governance (ISLPG) project, to continue advancing Iraqi local governance.

RTI has four components under the projects, which include:

- 1) restoration of basic services,
- 2) citizen participation in local government,
- 3) institutional strengthening for effective government, and
- 4) civil society support, especially women, youth and other special groups.

Initial discussions between ACDI/VOCA and RTI established primary areas of collaboration in citizen participation and civil society support. Throughout the ICAP, ACDI/VOCA coordinated with RTI on sharing of information, joint workshops, and security strategies. In addition, a number of joint projects were undertaken in collaboration with America's Development Foundation (ADF) and the ICAP CAGs, in order to offer CAG members opportunities to increase their understanding of good local governance. A dedicated ACDI/VOCA Advocacy Officer, appointed in 2006, worked closely with RTI and ADF in training local councils, community boards and local NGOs and civic groups. RTI worked principally with local councils, ADF with NGOs while ACDI/VOCA engaged community boards.

In 2006, ACDI/VOCA collaborated with ADF and RTI on the enhanced training of six of the best-performing CAGs in peace building, civil society and local government systems. They were invited to observe at RTI training sessions on good governance and advocacy with local councils. The ultimate goal was to ensure that all agents for change in a democratic Iraq were linked.

4.2.5. Government of Iraq

From commencement of the Community Action Program, ACDI/VOCA strove to ensure that program beneficiaries, through the Community Action Groups (CAGs), engaged with sub-national government institutions to advocate on behalf of their communities' needs.

CAG processes are anchored in community driven-development action and advocacy. ICAP operated at the meeting point of such bottom-up processes with the top-down institutional strengthening of local government implemented through the LGP. Of concern was that ICAP

risked promoting parallel institutions to the government. This was addressed by providing guidance and training on how CAGs could work with their local governments to advocate for their needs, promote accountability and support good, responsive governance.

In order to mitigate this possibility, ACDI/VOCA solicited participation from local government officials wherever possible, not just as participants in CAGs, but also in terms of concrete contributions to projects. The table below details the levels of local government contribution to ICAP projects (these figures are accurate to October 2006).

Local Government Financial Contributions, by Province (as of October 2006)⁴

Province	LG Contribution	LG No Contribution
Dahuk	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)
Erbil	14 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Sulaymaniyah	43 (64.2%)	24 (35.8%)
Tameem	81 (42.4%)	110 (57.6%)
Diyala	52 (41.6%)	73 (58.4%)
Salah al Din	71 (28.4%)	179 (71.6%)
Ninewa	41(38.0%)	67 (62.0%)
Total	302 (40%)	454 (60%)

As can be seen, contributions were obtained from local governments in 40% of projects. This was a strong achievement considering that no formal provision for a government contribution had been made in the original program plans.

In addition, this total does not reflect local government participation and non-material support to the program. In many cases, the local government (either through relevant Ministry officials, town mayors or other officials or the Iraqi Civil Society Program (ICSP) was involved in the planning and preparation phases of projects and was instrumental in soliciting the community contributions to projects that were a condition of project implementation.

The ICSP’s targeted training and technical assistance in areas such as advocacy, community mobilization, awareness raising campaigns as well as in anti-corruption and transparency issues provided essential capacity-building support to the CAGs.

4.2.6. Community Action Groups

Aside from training for IP staff plus normal program management and administration, all ICAP activity took place with and through CAGs. CAGs are central to the success of ICAP.

Although CAG stands for “community action group,” CAGs are not limited to communities or villages per se. They may also be formed on the basis of a city neighborhood, existing or new farmers’ cooperatives or enterprises (like a women’s sewing or rug-making shop), civil society or affinity groups, or institutions like hospitals, retirement homes, or colleges. While the basis of CAG composition and coverage varied greatly, and while different IPs’ approaches to CAG mobilization differed somewhat, there was a common core.

⁴ Looking Back and Looking Forward: Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP) Evaluation, IBTCI, 2006

CAGs were encouraged to join together in clusters to work on projects of interest to several communities. Clusters can also serve as a vehicle for mitigating or forestalling conflict among diverse groups by bringing them together on projects of mutual concern. ACDI/VOCA, in contrast to other IPs, promoted much larger and less geographically based community boards. These were elected to serve as the primary link between ACDI/VOCA support teams and communities. Boards were required to be independent of local government, yet also to include representatives of local government agencies and to work closely with them in implementing projects. Over the course of the entire program, 93 boards were created.

4.2.7. Civil Society and Affinity groups (non-CAG)

Throughout the course of the ICAP, ACDI/VOCA sought to engage with and support Iraqi civil society organizations, whether formal NGOs or informal groupings. Many of the ICAP projects were geared towards supporting groups of the most marginalized – mostly informal women’s groups, youth groups etc. Over the three years of program running, 68 affinity groups were directly supported with project funding. In addition, ACDI/VOCA collaborated with a number of local NGOs on community development projects. More detail on the significance of the ICAP on civil society is given in Section 6.1.2.

4.2.8. Others

ACDI/VOCA also entered into collaboration with a number of additional training organizations and subcontractors, listed as follows:

Overseas Strategic Consulting (OSC): OSC is a US-based consulting firm that was subcontracted by ACDI/VOCA from August 2003 until December 2006 for the recruitment and hiring of international specialists to work on ICAP in Iraq. OSC began ICAP with one position for a specialist to develop ICAP’s civic participation activities. By the end of the program, OSC’s role expanded to three positions including the Deputy Chief of Party, Public Affairs Director and Monitoring and Evaluation Director.

Counterpart International: In partnership with ACDI/VOCA, Counterpart implemented the ICAP from February 2004 to October 2006, cooperating with residents in Anbar Governorate (including the population centers of Ramadi and Fallujah) to identify, select and approve projects for implementation in their communities.

Center for International Conflict Resolution (CICR), Columbia University: CICR is a network of professionals, scholars, and practitioners contributing to the resolution of international deadly conflict through research, education and practice. Located in Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs, CICR strives to increase understanding of international conflicts through innovative and collaborative research and is committed to offering courses that disseminate knowledge about conflicts and their causes. CICR’s partners also coordinate their efforts with academics and practitioners from governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations in joint research and action. In ICAP, CICR, through a series of training workshops in Iraq and Amman, Jordan for ACDI/VOCA staff, supported the creation of a regional network of conflict resolution educators and a group of community development staff with capacity to assess conflict factors in communities where they

Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding (CCRP), Lebanon: The Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding, a NGO founded in Beirut in 2003, is primarily devoted to promoting constructive, innovative and cooperative approaches for the management of conflict and the reduction of violence. Toward these ends, CCRP has brought together hundreds of young men and women to engage in inter-religious dialogue. The training workshops vary in length from a weekend to a month, but the aim is always the same -- to build long-term relationships. CCRP undertook training in participatory rapid appraisals, conflict resolution and peacebuilding for staff and stakeholders of ACDI/VOCA in November 2005, January/February 2006, and April 2006.

4.3. Methodology of Program Implementation

4.3.1. Needs Assessment and Mapping of Community Resources

4.3.1.1. Quick Impact Program

From the initial establishment of operations in Baghdad, ACDI/VOCA began its operations in Kirkuk in June 2003 and quickly expanded to neighboring Sulaymaniyah. The area of operation was limited but versatile in an unstable security situation.

In July and August 2003, ACDI/VOCA organized 45 public meetings in communities in Tameem, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah Governorates. Key to these public meetings was the participation of various stakeholder organizations in the region such as women and youth groups, farmers associations and other civil society groups. All of the public meetings resulted in the formation of a community board, selected from amongst the meeting participants. Of the first 45 boards formed, all had a minimum of 30% female/disadvantaged group members, and the overall average was 38%.

The procedure for community needs assessment and mobilization was as follows:

1. **First Contact:** ACDI/VOCA staff approach communities and organize an initial town meeting at which ICAP is presented to government officials and a rapid needs assessment is conducted.
2. **Stakeholder Meeting:** Stakeholder groups are formed from existing demographic, professional, civil society or other groups within the community. They are responsible for organizing further town meetings.
3. **Town Meeting:** The Town Meeting provides a forum for election of a representative community council which generates project ideas and forms working groups to develop ideas into proposals.
4. **Community Board:** The community board serves as the primary link between ACDI/VOCA and working groups, as well as the broader community. The council is given training in successful teamwork, project proposals and ICAP requirements (such as matching contributions and record keeping.)

Community Boards Mobilization:

- Mobilize community support
- Prioritize activities
- Oversee activities at local and regional (cluster) levels
- Ensure ongoing maintenance and operation of activities, equipment, supplies and staffing

This strategy was refined and mainstreamed into ACDI/VOCA's program implementation strategy through the formation of Community Support Teams (CSTs), teams of local community development facilitators and technical experts that would travel to communities to mobilize and support community councils and projects. The CSTs were the primary interface with the community.

4.3.1.2. Community Action Program


By October 2003, geographic coverage was expanded throughout Northern Iraq, particularly in the conflict prone areas of Diyala, Salah al Din and Ninewa. Sub-offices in municipal buildings or government ministries were established in Sulaymaniyah, Ba'qubah, Tikrit, Samarra and Baghdad. Each sub-office was managed by a community development officer, assisted by an administrative/accountant and a team of engineers and community mobilizers comprising the CST. The CSTs mobilized communities, organized public meetings, assisted in project development and oversaw implementation. Each of these sub-offices reported directly to the main office in Kirkuk.

By the end of December 2003, seventy-four communities had been approached. The number of women participating in activities diminished as ACDI/VOCA visited more remote farming communities, or more dangerous locations.

ACDI/VOCA ICAP Project Flow Diagram

This model of community mobilization brought together communities in a participative and inclusive manner, and contributed to building individual and local capacity, confidence and trust in democratic decision-making, reduction of conflict and ethnic, religious or gender tensions as well as addressing some of the most pressing physical needs of communities. As such, this model was adopted throughout the course of the program.

The Community Development Department provided a detailed manual for each community support team and community board listing the aims and objectives of ICAP, the processes involved in community development and a 'how to' guide to holding meetings in an inclusive and participatory manner. The Community Development Manual was translated into Arabic and Kurdish for dissemination amongst the community boards.



4.3.2. Community Selection Criteria

ACDI/VOCA teams used the following criteria in the selection of suitable communities in which to undertake projects:

Community Selection Criteria	Rationale
High population of impoverished or vulnerable citizens	Reaches the most vulnerable
Access to economic and natural resources or potential (agriculture, oil, minerals)	Achieves meaningful results toward economic self-sufficiency
Community negatively affected by war or the previous regime	Targets those whose opinions are more likely or important to be positively influenced
Regime comprised of heterogeneous, social, cultural or religious mix. History or potential for conflict	Targeting areas with greatest potential peacebuilding impact and challenges
Communities within close proximity to others or serving as transportation hub	Potential for cluster projects, plus logistical considerations given rapid timeframe
Activities and programs of other donor organizations	Provide complementary and not overlapping benefits to the communities.

4.3.3. Project Implementation

Following project selection by the community boards, proposals were prepared and submitted to ACDI/VOCA for review by the ACDI/VOCA Project Review Committee (PRC), which consisted of members of the Community Development Team and senior management. The PRC met approximately every two weeks to review project proposals and recommend for further review, approval or rejection.

Once a proposal was approved, a standardized procurement process was followed, depending on the type of project being implemented (whether a construction-type project or a supply project). A flowchart summary of the process is given in Appendix 2.

4.3.3.1. Infrastructure Projects

Infrastructure projects offered local employment opportunities for local people with local firms, a critical step towards building economic growth and recovery within Iraq. These projects required a high degree of professionalism in both technical and financial management. Where possible and prudent, ACDI/VOCA used short-term local supervising engineers and specialists for direct oversight of projects in their own communities. These specialists supervised implementation per local regulations and international best practices. This network permitted ACDI/VOCA to involve professionals from all fields, provided employment opportunities and solid work experience, and reduced administrative costs. In addition, partnerships with competent local institutions, professionals, and private companies helped communities to achieve their goals and vision.

Field engineers in the ICAP regional offices assisted the communities in designing their identified projects. When the project was approved, engineers reviewed the design, evaluated competing tenders, and supervised project implementation. The engineers also worked to build

capacity at the community level, by introducing modern systems in assessment, monitoring and evaluation of projects. This process that originally started with the ICAP engineers in a direct way, moved to the contractors or bidders in an indirect way. Once the project had started, the local engineers worked directly with the community boards and were in charge of the engineering process.

Moreover, the role of the ICAP engineers was also to share best practices and techniques among different communities within the same governorate or with other governorates across Northern Iraq. Since the success of the ICAP was measured (in part) by job creation and person-days of labor, engineers also reviewed public works projects that utilized direct labor, e.g. trash removal campaigns.

A further focus of the ICAP engineers was job creation for local contractors, engineers and skilled and unskilled laborers, a critical step towards building economic growth and recovery within Iraq.

4.3.3.2. *Public works projects*

Public works projects required minimal planning and only simple, locally available tools, materials and supplies. Workers were paid approximately \$10/day for a full day and \$5/day for a half day. The projects employed selected individuals as supervisors and assistants to oversee the project, supervise the labor force, maintain accurate worker logs and ensure full participation by the workers.

Public works projects were continued throughout the first year of ICAP, providing communities and stakeholder groups with opportunities to identify and participate in projects. In addition to quickly getting money into the hands of vulnerable population groups, they provided a mechanism for conflict resolution on two levels:

Planning: Planners or members of various stakeholder groups potentially in conflict with one another identified projects that all groups agreed on, or selected through a democratic process.

Implementation: The planning groups were tasked to select members of their constituency for implementing the project. Members of potentially competing groups worked side-by-side with members of other groups.

4.3.3.3. *Agriculture*

Throughout the ICAP, ACDI/VOCA placed strong emphasis on agriculture and rural development in order to re-build weaker sub-sectors in a community's market chain to create greater wealth for all. This reflects ACDI/VOCA's conceptual approach to sustainable development through support to market chains. A market chain is comprised of all persons or stakeholders (primarily private enterprises) that contribute to or participate in bringing a good to market. The stakeholders include producers (the source of the raw material), and the marketers (the wholesalers and distributors that communicate with the market or buyer) who facilitate the commercial transaction of the end product to the buyer.

A market chain approach means identifying the problems or gaps in a community's market chain, and working to fill those gaps. Communities were invited to:

- Prioritize sub-sectors for ICAP assistance

- Determine the scope of each target market chain
- Identify the existing and potential components of the chain in terms of capacity, needs and opportunities
- Promote business support services as an integral part of each market chain.

ACDI/VOCA CSTs included agriculture/income-generation specialists who helped fledging co-operatives get off the ground by assisting them in drafting their by-laws and electing their boards of directors. Staff also helped cooperative members to understand and benefit from market dynamics. Cooperative members were trained in simple bookkeeping and accounting. ICAP staff also followed cooperatives' progress in the market, providing advice and support as needed.

The cooperatives supported through ICAP were business-oriented, represented the production layer or link in the market chain, applied a democratic approach to farmers' decision making, and included multi-ethnic groups.

4.3.3.4. The Small & Medium Grants Program

This program aimed to provide small to medium start-up or business financing opportunities to individuals or groups who demonstrated the potential or capacity to start or expand their small business. It allowed ACDI/VOCA to target specific or vulnerable groups, for example disabled, women, young people or businesses that agree to employ these targeted populations. In total, more than 500 small businesses were supported by ACDI/VOCA grants.

4.3.3.5. Stimulation of Economic Growth

This was achieved through community-based opportunities in both urban and rural communities that stimulated environments for improved or increased trade or commerce. Such opportunities included job skills development, financing machinery for cooperatives, local market revitalization, wholesale and livestock market construction, and value-added community processing plants that could be leased to community members to produce products for consumption or sale.

4.3.4. Community Contributions

ACDI/VOCA committed, in its cooperative agreement with USAID, to a minimum 15-25% community contribution into project budgets, or 17% of overall budget. Generating community comprehension and participation in the concept and practice of community contribution (cost-share) was challenging at the beginning of the program. However, strong training of CST members and community development officers resulted in strong uptake of the concept at an early stage of ICAP.

Communities often found it challenging to obtain adequate (verifiable) documentation; nonetheless, they were extremely proud of their role in implementing projects, and contributed significant portions of the total project value. In accordance with the agreement, ACDI/VOCA was successful in obtaining \$6.5 million documented cost-share by the end of the program. In addition, ACDI/VOCA also collected "leveraging", defined by USAID regulations as a type of community contribution that is documented through the use of letters of intent or memorandums of understanding. Though not required to collect leveraging in its cooperative agreement, ACDI/VOCA felt that doing so would be advantageous in creating a sense of ownership among


partner communities, beyond the required cost share contribution. These additional contributions from communities also supplemented ACDI/VOCA’s funding from USAID to maximize the impact of the program funding.

In order to generate community support for local contributions, ACDI/VOCA implemented ICAP activities as investments in community life; in-kind contributions were investments that instilled a sense of ownership and stewardship of all community activities. Contributions to ICAP-sponsored activities came from the communities themselves; local, regional or national government agencies and institutions; private sources; and contributions through other international donor agencies. CSTs worked with Community Councils to develop procedures for collecting and verifying the accuracy of contributions. ACDI/VOCA developed internal reporting criteria and provided guidance on how contributions are to be valued and documented for accounting purposes.

4.3.5. Leadership, Communication and Advocacy Skills

ICAP’s overarching goal was to promote democracy and good governance -- including transparency, inclusiveness, and citizen advocacy with government -- and thereby help prevent and mitigate conflict. ICAP exposes Iraqis to the practice of democratic decision-making coupled with citizen action and advocacy -- all as part of the processes of identifying and implementing community-based projects. Therefore, the skills of leadership, communication and advocacy were of great importance to ACDI/VOCA’s program, more so than to any of the other IPs in ICAP.

The following chart illustrates how ICAP processes intersected with and complemented other development activities being undertaken in Iraq.



ACDI/VOCA’s approach incorporated increased capacity of community boards in advocacy as one of its five pillars, particularly as the program matured and ACDI/VOCA’s institutional

knowledge and experience in Iraq increased. The goal during the third year of ICAP was to focus on building community board capacity. To this end, numerous trainings on advocacy, intercultural communication, non-violent communication, including active listening, advocacy, creative problem solving, facilitation, and conflict sensitive project development for community boards and staff were held. In addition, advocacy training and disabled advocacy campaigns were focused on often-marginalized people with disabilities.

4.3.6. Capacity Building of Program Staff

From program inception in June/July 2003, a vital asset to ICAP was the commitment, dedication, energy, and persistence of the Iraqi mobilization staff, as well as a large number of the longer-serving members of CAGs.

Given that national staff members generally did not have experience with international development, staff training was essential. Key to ACDI/VOCA’s strategy was to ensure that the democratic development processes implemented by communities was supported by a responsive and technically adept team. To do this, it was necessary to broaden the technical knowledge of local staff through training from expatriate staff and consultants on a wide range of topics:


• Capacity building	• Community mapping and problem analysis (problem trees, SWOT analysis etc.)
• Advocacy	• Community selection criteria
• Conflict resolution	• Community contributions
• Conflict analysis	• Participatory needs assessments
• Financial and budgetary management	• Monitoring and evaluation
• Gender issues	• IT skills
• Community development	• English
• Office administration	• Security
• Contract bidding	• Photography
• General procurement	• Small business development
• Communication	• Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA)
• Self awareness	• Strategic planning
• Community needs assessment	• Establishing a cooperative
• Project proposal development	• Cooperative development
• Development of implementation plans	• Drafting feasibility studies
• Planning a business	• Sustainable development
• Basic business skills	• Income generation
• Training of trainers (ToT)	• Project cycle management
• Inter-cultural communication	• Training facilitation
• Creative problem solving	• 360 degree impact awareness
• Conflict sensitive project development	

More confident and better trained staff paid dividends throughout the program. Their project work became firmly grounded into a larger community development perspective and their newfound facilitation and participatory skills gave their work with community boards more depth and nuance.

Key to the delivery of successful and effective staff training was the use of experienced and skillful trainers. ACDI/VOCA partnered with a number of training institutions to deliver high-

quality skills training to staff in a number of areas. For more information on training partners, see Section 4.2.8.

Most importantly, the ACDI/VOCA security team conducted ongoing trainings for international staff throughout the program to ensure all new staff members were familiar with ACDI/VOCA’s security operating procedures. This training was extended to encompass ACDI/VOCA national staff. Field personnel face the greatest danger within the program, particularly Marla Fund Project Officers who make ‘cold calls’ in some of the most conflicted areas seeking potential beneficiaries for the program.



ACDI/VOCA Organizational Chart

4.3.7. *Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation*

It has been noted in the evaluation of ICAP⁵:

“...a major design flaw in ICAP I was the lack of a PMP and all that it implies: an RF linked to USAID/Iraq’s, and a clear Goal, SO, IRs, Outputs, etc. with equally clear corresponding indicators as per the PMP Toolkit’s indicator reference sheets.”

USAID had proposed a Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) as part of its strategy for Iraq. However, the PMP was not implemented within the ICAP timeframe. As such, program performance was measured in varying ways by ACDI/VOCA and other IPs.

As the initial focus of the ICAP was on Quick Impact projects – a rapid start up tightly oriented towards output of projects in communities -- monitoring systems were, by necessity, minimal. Due to both the obvious levels of need within ACDI/VOCA’s AoR and the limited time available, monitoring and evaluation were restricted to verification of project outputs only.

⁵ IBCTI Evaluation of ICAP, 2006

A dedicated monitoring and evaluation unit was created within ACDI/VOCA in July 2004. An Arabic speaking expatriate director was hired who developed an M&E framework and strategy and created a monitoring and evaluation manual including a monitoring toolkit and evaluation framework (see Appendix 4 for sample M&E forms). Once successful pilot testing of the M&E framework was completed, M&E officers were assigned to each program governorate. In addition, local partner NGOs were trained in basic M&E and subcontracted to undertake M&E on behalf of ACDI/VOCA. Local NGOs were able to reach inaccessible, dangerous areas with greater ease than ACDI/VOCA staff and provided an additional benefit as a source of community outreach. They were often welcomed and trusted and could generally enter communities easily.

“...as a civil society organization we are getting involved in our community and seeing whether these projects are doing what they are supposed to do, we are also building on our skills, it helps to see and understand why monitoring and evaluation is such an important asset to project design....”

ICAP NGO partner representative

4.3.7.1. Indicator Measurement

As part of the cooperative agreement with USAID, ACDI/VOCA recruited a local M&E specialist to develop a project database system and manage and report project status and indicators. ACDI/VOCA proposed a simple set of indicators to ease reporting during the rapid implementation schedule and high expectations of ICAP:

Participatory Indicators:

- Number of community councils
- Number of cluster councils
- Number of individuals participating in ICAP (councils, subcommittees, projects)
- Value of community contribution to projects
- Number of ICAP communities that utilize resources from other donor activities

Project and Impact Indicators:

- Number of individuals trained
- Number of ICAP projects per community
- Number of direct beneficiaries of ICAP projects
- Increase in employment created by ICAP projects, long-term and temporary

In addition to program indicators, ACDI/VOCA developed an ACCESS database specifically tailored to track community development projects. The Project Reporting System (PRS) tracked procurement, financial, and project status of all community proposals and projects.

The PRS was developed further in years two and three of ICAP. With the experience gained in ICAP year one, better monitoring systems were developed and staff were more thoroughly trained in monitoring the projects.

4.3.7.2. Project Performance Monitoring

All projects implemented throughout ICAP received some measure of monitoring. Those projects prior to the creation of a dedicated M&E department were supervised by an ACDI/VOCA engineer in order to verify delivery of outputs. With the commencement of

formalized monitoring and evaluation in mid 2004, regular monitoring and evaluation visits were conducted to assess project performance on a more systematic basis, and also to assess projects post-implementation to verify the activities of the CAG and the impact of the projects on the beneficiaries on a qualitative basis.

The following table illustrates the numbers of evaluation visits conducted throughout ICAP.

		CAP 1	CAP 2	CAP 3	Total	Overall total
Regular projects	Number of projects evaluated	130	156	100	386	703
	% of total projects that year	33.6%	70%	61.7%	50.1%	
Marla projects	Number of evaluated projects	n/a	164	153	317	634
	% of total projects that year	n/a	57.7%	41.0%	48.2%	1337

Note: The total number of projects monitored exceeds the total number of completed projects due to multiple evaluation visits to certain projects.

In total, ICAP employed up to five M&E officers, 24 external evaluators and the M&E Director. Monitoring and Evaluation activities for ICAP were completed by end-November 2006.

4.3.7.3. CAG Monitoring and Evaluation

In year three of ICAP M&E systems had achieved the sophistication to enable ACIDI/VOCA and other IPs to assess the performance of program partners. This was increasingly relevant with the likelihood of a second ICAP being undertaken in 2006/2007. The PRS was tracking regular information regarding the activities of CAGs, and in mid 2006 ACIDI/VOCA adopted a framework developed by IRD for evaluating the performance of CAGs.

The framework scored CAGs on the basis of their processes, characteristics, and performance. Using a scale of 1 to 4, CAGs are assessed across eleven dimensions (see figure below). An individual CAG's scores were summed to yield a single, composite score. This index score was then used to rank the CAGs.

#	Dimensions	Evaluation
1-	Self-confidence	
2-	Willingness to change	
3-	Direct effort in the program	
4-	Participation in meeting	
5-	Ownership	
6-	Strategic thinking	
7-	Attendance at meetings	
8-	Number of meetings without IRD	
9-	Gender balance	
10-	Inclusion	
11-	Community gender balance	
	Total	

Your evaluation of your CAGs should be measured according to the following criteria.

Score

Strong	4
Good	3
Fair	2
Weak	1

All ICAP CAGs were assessed using this framework in late 2006, and, with modifications, formed the basis for inclusion of CAGs in the planned ICAP II.

4.3.7.4. *Program Reporting*

As per USAID regulations, all program reports were to be in accordance with 22CFR 226.50-52. Reporting to USAID was done on a weekly, monthly, quarterly and semi-annual basis.

4.3.7.5. *External Evaluations*

IBCTI Evaluation: There was one overall (including ACDI/VOCA and all other IPs) formal external ‘final’ evaluation conducted of ICAP in mid 2006, with report submission in November 2006. Given that ICAP had received funding to continue for a second program (as well as no-cost extensions to March 2007), the evaluation was more akin to a mid-term evaluation, with recommendations in line for improvements to an ongoing program.

The focus of the ICAP evaluation was to examine the efficacy of the CAGs as tools to achieve the program objectives and vis-à-vis USAID’s Results Framework and Strategic Objective. The evaluation sought to understand whether or not the ICAP communities had become cooperative partners with their respective local governments and had been effective in promoting community-determined interests. The evaluation also sought to determine whether the communities had been able to achieve transparency while working to implement community projects. The evaluation team considered that ICAP’s achievements in the space of its three ‘tumultuous’ years were “nothing short of astonishing”.

The audit by the Regional Inspector General’s Office (see below) published in January 2005 (p. 5) found that ICAP “...achieved 98 percent of its intended outputs in the areas of citizen participation, inter-community cooperation, local government cooperation, employment generation, and...environment...” Based on all available data as of end July 2006, the evaluation team’s findings essentially re-confirmed the RIG assessment.

In addition to the largely positive findings, the evaluation team made many recommendations regarding the implementation, monitoring, reporting, management, staffing, interaction with communities, LG, USAID, coordination between IPs and CAG mobilization.

Some of the key findings reported are as follows:

- A total of 1,457 CAGs were mobilized.
- Community contributions amounted to nearly \$26.5 million worth of support to their respective CAG projects.
- CAGs solicited another \$27+ million in support from their LGs.
- A total of 4,854 projects were completed under ICAP, which equals greater than 30% of all projects in USAID/Iraq’s portfolio, second only to USAID’s Office of Transitional Initiatives.
- An unanticipated (and thus undocumented) positive effect of ICAP is that perhaps as many as 100 CAG members (including a few women) reportedly went on to stand for, and often win, elective local government office.

- Another “democracy dividend” was that some (again undocumented number) of CAGs formally re-structured themselves as non-governmental or civil-society organizations (NGOs, CSOs).
- A number of CAGs mounted successful projects on their own, without ICAP funding.
- In all AoRs, the ICAP paradigm and the CAG concept have become so widely known that citizen groups now approach IPs to become CAGs, instead of the other way around as in Year 1 of ICAP. By Year 3, many more groups were approaching IPs than could possibly be accommodated.
- In some areas, CAGs’ democratic ways of working -- e.g., with public input, oversight, transparency, plus capacity building in these and cognate skills -- have become so well appreciated by local governments that they are also instituting them.

While the report disaggregated certain findings regarding individual IPs to reflect their differing approaches to ICAP implementation, the thrust of the evaluation reviewed the overall performance of ICAP while keeping in mind the upcoming ICAP II. Therefore, analysis specific to ACDI/VOCA was not comprehensively covered. However, it is important to note that none of the IPs diverged significantly from the overall performance of ICAP – i.e. there were no ‘star performers’ *per se*, nor did the evaluation identify any significant underperformers.

USAID Audit: As part of its fiscal year 2004 audit plan, the USAID Regional Inspector General in Baghdad performed an audit of the ICAP with the objective of assessing ICAP achievements in its intended outputs.

The audit team assessed internal controls of 89 sample projects from all IPs for compliance with the terms of the cooperative agreements and for accuracy of the data reported in the PRS. These internal controls included reviewing the IPs’ quarterly work plans and interim and semiannual reports, field visit reports, and the financial reports for 2003 and 2004.

The audit was conducted at USAID/Iraq in Baghdad from September to December 2004. Field visits were conducted in Basrah, Chwarta, and Said Sadiq, Iraq. The team had intended to visit other ICAP project sites; however, they had to curtail the site visits due to the precarious security situation.

The audit team concluded that ICAP did achieve intended outputs. Based on the tests performed on the sample projects, the program achieved 98% of its intended outputs.

The Mission and the five IPs managed the projects in compliance with the requirements of the cooperative agreements. Specifically, they ensured that the implementation of the projects involved the following functional areas:

- Citizen Participation – The projects created a sense of community and involved the residents of the communities in their own governance.
- Inter-community Cooperation – The projects provided opportunities for the communities to review social and economic development plans from a regional perspective and to work together on shared economic and social priorities.

- Social and Economic Infrastructure – The projects involved the cooperation of the local government to ensure that the projects substituted or complemented government efforts.
- Incomes and Jobs – The projects generated local employment, increased income by hiring community residents to implement the projects, and improved the local economy by using local businesses.
- Environmental Condition and Practices – The projects’ design and implementation ensured that environmental impacts and health and safety issues were considered.

The audit also found that the data contained in the Weekly Project Status Report (PSR), which the Mission uses for monitoring and reporting purposes, did not always agree with supporting documentation. It recommended the development and implementation of a plan of action to improve the integrity of the data in the Community Action Program’s Project List in order for it to be a more effective monitoring tool and a more accurate and reliable data source for reporting purposes. ACDI/VOCA did implement measures to improve the data in this weekly report.

4.3.8. Baseline and Endline Data

As is not uncommon with rapid start projects in conflict areas, detailed quantitative baseline data proves challenging to collect for the following reasons:

- There is a clear and unmet need among beneficiaries that does not require verification
- Speed is of greater priority than time-intensive surveying
- Security issues militate against documentary surveying of conflict areas
- The human resources necessary (particularly skilled national staff) to conduct baseline surveys are either unavailable or are required in areas of greater priority

All of the above reasons applied to the ICAP in the early stage of its implementation. All efforts were focused on implementation activities – particularly given the 50:50:90 Program which imposed very strong limitations on ACDI/VOCA and the other IPs with respect to their priorities.

Additionally, ICAP was initially funded for one year. In general, a detailed baseline survey would be impractical for a program of one year duration. ICAP was subsequently funded for an additional year, and in 2005 for a final year, but the lack of continuity between years was a strong factor in the decision by ACDI/VOCA and the other IPs to limit the collection of baseline data to that which was generally available.

Therefore, baseline data that was locally available from stakeholders functioning in the AoR, was used to inform program priorities. In the early stage of ICAP, this consisted of qualitative information obtained from the coalition forces, other international NGOs, local government and, through the community mobilization process, from community members themselves.

Impact assessment was therefore focused on project deliverables and outcomes rather than project impacts on local communities. More detailed analysis of ICAP outcomes and impacts is given in Section 6.

As no baseline data was gathered for ICAP, it was not appropriate to expend program resources on endline data collection. However, as part of the preparation phase of the ICAP II program,

which will operate in the same areas and with many of the same partners as ICAP I, a survey was conducted of 70 community members, members and non-members of CAGs. The survey focused on the following topics:

1. current status of people's participation in and opinions about the CAGs that they formed (under ICAP) and will continue to work with under ICAP II;
2. community status in terms of economic conditions, conflict levels, reasons for conflict, and conflict resolution;
3. people's participation in local governance; and
4. household economic status.

4.3.9. Management Information Systems

All ICAP implementing agencies were required by the initial RFA and subsequent cooperative agreements to utilize a common computerized management information system to allow for full electronic tracking and reporting of project activities, performance indicators, and other modules. The system was designed to allow common formats across all recipients.

As previously mentioned, a local specialist was recruited by ACDI/VOCA to develop the initial Project Tracking/Recording System (PRS) in Microsoft Access.

The following indicators were measured during the first year of ICAP through the PRS.

- Number of community councils
- Number of cluster councils
- Number of individuals participating in ICAP (councils, subcommittees, projects)
- Value of community contribution to projects
- Number of ICAP communities that utilize resources from other donor activities
- Number of individuals trained
- Number of ICAP projects per community
- Number of direct beneficiaries of ICAP projects
- Increase in employment created by ICAP projects, long-term and temporary

In Year Two of ICAP, additional detail was mandated by USAID for the PRS:

- Location of project -- governorate, district, community, GPS coordinates
- Cost of project to recipient
- Total contributions to project – community, LG, other
- Status of project – i.e., under review, approved, underway, completed
- Dates of project – start, end
- Beneficiaries of project -- male/female, war victims, and indirect beneficiaries
- Days of employment generated by project – male/female
- Number of persons employed – male/female
- Sector of project
- Number of CAGs by governorate
- Number of CAG members by governorate -- male/female
- Number of media reports

Modifications to ACDI/VOCA's cooperative agreement in Year Three of ICAP made renewed reference to the PRS, weekly reporting requirements, and the need for online access to project data. The required information was as follows:

- Name of project

- Description of project
- Activity – construction, non-construction
- Identification code of project
- Location of projects --governorate, district, community, GPS coordinates
- Cost of project to recipient
- Total contributions to project – community, LG, other
- Status of project – coded as (1) identified/need more information, (2) approved, (3) tender released/proposal review, (4) contract awarded/project underway, (5) completed
- Dates of project – start, end
- Beneficiaries of project -- male/female, war victims, and indirect beneficiaries
- Days of employment generated by project – male/female
- Number of persons employed – male/female
- Sector of project – coded as electricity, roads and bridges, health, education, water and sanitation, youth, women, economy, agriculture, public spaces, civic outreach, humanitarian assistance, war victims, other
- Number of long-term jobs created – male/female
- Additional indicators as agreed
- Number of CAGs by governorate
- Number of CAG members by governorate -- male/female

These changes were primarily in response to the findings of the Regional Inspector General audit of ICAP (see Section 4.3.7.5 above). It recommended that IPs “...scrub their respective data for accuracy in reporting.”⁶ It further recommended that:

...USAID/Iraq develop and implement a plan of action to improve the integrity of the data in the Community Action Program’s Project List in order for it to be a more effective monitoring tool and a more accurate and reliable data source for reporting purposes.”⁷

The ICAP evaluation of 2006 found that data was reported inconsistently by different IPs. The evaluators concluded that this was because no PMP was in place for ICAP, complete with indicator reference sheets that would have made standard indicators operational.

However, In order to fulfill USAID’s need for accurate and timely reporting, IPs provided the ICAP CTO in Baghdad with weekly Project Status Reports of project data in MS Excel and Adobe Acrobat format.

With the commencement of ICAP II, the PRS has been redesigned to address many of the issues raised by the evaluation team. The ‘new’ PRS will be a fully-interactive online system that will enable the user to track all projects and generate



⁶ USAID, Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Action Program, Audit Report Number E-267-05-001-P, January 31, 2005. Page 10.

⁷ Op. cit. page 15

comprehensive reports. It came online in February 2007 and will include only ICAP II project data.

4.4. The Marla Ruzicka Fund

4.4.1. Background

Originally entitled the Leahy fund, the “Marla Ruzicka Fund” consists of programming and monies from the Civilian Victims of War Fund following its enactment by Congress in 2003 under PL 108-11, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act.

In Iraq, however, it is better known simply as “the Marla fund,” after Ms. Marla Ruzicka, a dedicated aid worker who lost her life in Iraq after founding the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict in 2003. The fund contains a provision sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy, authorizing the use of Iraq relief and reconstruction monies to aid Iraqi civilians who suffered losses from coalition military operations.

The Marla Fund was inaugurated in ICAP in June 2004, when \$2,000,000 was transferred to ACDI/VOCA in agreement modification 2. ACDI/VOCA received a total of \$5,000,000 for this program, of which \$725,000 was transferred to Counterpart International for Anbar Governorate. ACDI/VOCA initially established a program primarily across the area known as the Sunni Triangle to identify victims of coalition military operations and administer the fund. Since then, however, the program expanded north to the Kirkuk, Mosul and Talafar areas in Ninewa and Tameem Governorates.

Typical victims of the coalition fighting that the Fund focuses on were young Arab Sunni men aged 20-30. Many are married with small children. Others were single, living at home and often supporting parents, brothers and sisters. Those that had been killed were survived by young wives, small children, or elderly parents.



As most of them were Sunni Arabs, many of their fathers died in the Iran/Iraq war, meaning they may have been an important family breadwinner. The vast majority of victims were men (93%). They were more likely to be outside the house; they drove cars; they traveled after dark and were more likely to be mistaken for someone else. Most victims were aged between 15 and 40 years (64%) or more than 40 years (28%). Sadly, most injuries were fatal. Those who survived suffered the physical and mental scars of their injuries, and would, under normal circumstances, be a burden on their families for the

rest of their lives.

4.4.2. Methodology

The Marla Fund assisted those innocent individuals and families who suffered the most as a result of military actions. This included those who were severely injured or who lost a family member, particularly a family breadwinner. ACDI/VOCA sought to restore family economic

livelihoods by assisting them to establish small businesses through the provision of equipment and training.

The Marla Fund assisted people to establish or expand small businesses to help them regain economic security and create or sustain livelihoods by providing jobs and a modest income for the family. The victim identification and project development process was vigorous and time-consuming, but forged an early bridge between ACDI/VOCA staff and the affected family. Working in some of the toughest areas in Iraq, the ACDI/VOCA team, in conjunction with CAGs where possible, identified possible victims. They visited families to see if they met eligibility criteria. They worked with the individuals or their families to develop income generation projects that met family skills and aspirations. The types of business chosen were generally agricultural, workshops or retail stores. Well established business models are typically chosen, as people were reluctant to venture into unknown areas.

Step 1: Identification of potential victims of the coalition forces

Preliminary lists were collated from the complaint offices of governorates, hospitals and rehabilitation facilities, police stations, US armed forces, human rights groups, local NGOs and community board members.

Step 2: Visit individuals and families

These visits ascertained the number of people in the family and their general living conditions. Since many people did not have a written address, neighbors were asked about the whereabouts of the family and the nature of their problems. While anecdotal, the stories of neighbors helped to substantiate claims or raise early questions about the bona fides of claimants.

Step 3: Individual or family project proposals

Most individuals or their families wanted Marla funds to help them generate income. This was the number one priority of disabled individuals or families who had lost loved ones. Some had complete project ideas that simply required the purchase of equipment, such as a copying machine to open a printing store or cattle for rearing. Others had little ideas about what to do.

Eligibility criteria

- Innocent Civilians or their family
- Connection between military operations and suffering
- Injuries or death after March 20, 2003
- Only victims of coalition fighting

The Marla team might visit a family several times to discuss project ideas and does feasibility study. Sometimes, the ACDI/VOCA income generation specialists also visited the family. The goal was to find a project that met immediate needs and corresponded to a person's education level, experience and capabilities.

Proof of Eligibility (Where the victim had been injured)

In order to receive assistance, the following documentation was required:

1. Iraqi Identification Card
2. Medical Certificate describing injury
3. Proof of Causation between military operations and the injury

- police report
- town council report
- letter from US forces
- certification from community board

Family of Deceased (Where the victim had been killed)

1. Iraqi Identification Card of Deceased
2. Iraqi Identification of Family Members (showing family link to deceased)
3. Death Certificate
4. Proof of Causation between military operations and the injury
 - police report
 - letter from US forces
 - death certificate (if causation written)
 - certification from community board
 - town council report

In total, 660 Marla projects were funded between 2004 and 2007, and a total of \$5 million was disbursed over the course of the program.

5. Achievement of Program Objectives

5.1. Governing Program Documentation

The Community Action Program, although implemented over 3-4 years overall, was essentially a year-to-year program. New modifications to the original cooperative agreement were signed on a regular basis to reflect additional funding or changed programmatic priorities including the addition of the Marla Fund to ICAP in Year 2. This caused significant implementation challenges, as long-term planning was difficult due to uncertainties over remaining time and funding. It also created problems with staff retention near the end of each funding cycle, when uncertainty over job security caused ACIDI/VOCA to lose local and expatriate staff.

A complete listing of the program aims, activities/objectives and targets/indicators through the three year evolution of ICAP is given in Appendix 3.

A summary of the focus areas through the three years of the program are given below.

Shifts in ICAP Programmatic Foci

Year 1	Year 2	Years 3 & 4
<p>Four focus areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Community mobilization and cooperation 2. Social and economic infrastructure development 3. Employment and income generation 4. Environmental protection and management <p>Major program components:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Promote citizen involvement 2. Conflict mitigation 3. Promote diverse and representative citizen participation 4. Benefit 5 million Iraqis 5. Ensure that citizens' basic needs are met 6. Participate in decision making related to policies 7. Target at-risk groups 	<p>Areas for increased emphasis:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity building of community mobilizers and other local staff 2. Greater focus on the ICAP process and working more closely with the CAGs 3. Strengthening of CAGs 4. Income and employment generation 5. Women and youth participation 6. Conflict mitigation 7. Civil society development 8. Increased LG linkages <p>*Addition of Marla funding and programming</p>	<p>Five focus areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Direct citizen participation in the rehabilitation of Iraq and involvement in the political process 2. Increased focus on income and employment generation 3. Conflict mitigation and prevention 4. Increased Capacity of CAGs in advocacy and engagement of sub national government 5. Participation of women, youth and other underrepresented groups

After two years of experience in Iraq, plus the confidence generated by many successful projects, Year 3 incorporated all of the program objectives for the previous years. The enhanced expertise of local staff and demonstrated successes of the previous years led to an evolution of more specific targets by which the program's success could be measured. In addition, the introduction

of the PRS contributed greatly to the ability of ACDI/VOCA to track the specific indicators that were proposed.

Cumulative objectives and targets, as expressed in the year three program plan, will be provided in this report.

5.2. Comparison of Program Objectives and Activities

5.2.1. Interim Objectives for Year 1

The specific targets for Year 1 of ICAP, plus achievements for that year, are as follows:

Targets	Results
50 communities identified by September 30, 2003	53 communities identified by August
50 Quick Impact Projects completed by September 30, 2003	71 projects completed by September
50 community councils functioning by September 30, 2003	53 councils functioning by September
Impacted beneficiaries in Year 1: 1,000,000	1,174,868 cumulative* beneficiaries
Women participation in ICAP councils, subcommittees, activities: 40%	51% of beneficiaries were female
Youth participation & beneficiaries in ICAP projects: 15%	Not collected
12,000 days of employment generated (long-term and temporary)	85,298 days generated
Typical project value: \$30,000 with maximum not to exceed \$500,000	\$39,900 (inc local contribution). 2 projects >\$500,000
250 projects completed: May 31, 2004	280 projects completed

* People may have benefited from more than one project, thus leading to duplication of counts.

ACDI/VOCA projected program expenditure of \$9 million by year's end. Although this amount was not reached (approximately \$8 million was spent), this projected amount had been obligated in contracted work by the end of May 2004.

5.2.2. Combined Objectives for Years 1, 2 & 3

For a full list of objectives and activities for years 2 & 3, see Appendix 3.

Goal/Objective/Target	Overall
<i>A: Direct citizen participation in the rehabilitation of Iraq and involvement in political processes</i>	
<i>I. Infrastructure development</i>	250 infrastructure, public works or water and sanitation projects were completed
<i>II. Building the capacity of community groups in governance, advocacy, conflict resolution</i>	46 CAG trainings in Advocacy, Governance and Conflict Resolution were conducted
<i>B: Income and employment generation</i>	
<i>I. Agriculture</i>	
<i>a. Financial sustainability enhanced in 50 cooperatives,</i>	60 cooperatives assisted, one agricultural bank renovated
<i>b. business development training,</i>	Community development staff & consultants provided business development trainings to farmers, agricultural businesses and cooperatives.
<i>c. market linkage training</i>	Market linkage training in Beirut 2006, agriculture team worked closely with community boards to develop ideas for new income generating cooperatives. Agro-industry cooperatives were also established to market the produce of cooperatives, expand retail opportunities, add value to the

	final product and create local jobs.
d. other capacity building opportunities	Industrial co-operatives were created to generate local jobs, increase incomes, and use local skills and resources.
e. 5-7 cooperatives established	47 cooperatives were established throughout ICAP
f. Association building with Iraqi farmers	Through the cooperative system and joint trainings farmers from different areas met to exchange ideas and interact.
g. Improvement of agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation systems, agricultural feeder roads and greenhouses	25 irrigation projects worth \$1.7 million, including approximately 15% community contributions in cash and in kind. These projects benefited 110,000 people directly and created nearly 24,000 days of labor for local people who were employed in working on the projects.
h. Introduction of improved cultivation techniques	Agricultural cooperative in Chwarta, Sulaymaniyah received training in new and improved farming techniques; cooperatives were provided with improved equipment and technology to provide farmers with the tools and methods required to improve their production; 9 livestock vaccination campaigns reached 450 communities and three artificial insemination projects.
II. Youth and Short-Term Employment	
a. Provide short-term and high impact employment opportunities through agriculture infrastructure projects (small irrigation channels and small infrastructure repairs) and focus on strategic cities: Kirkuk, Mosul, Talafar, Ba'qubah, Tikrit.	Five major irrigation and infrastructure projects worth \$172,000 were undertaken that utilized young people as labor, creating 11,600 days of labor for young people.
b. Approximately 13,000 daily laborers in short term/seasonal employment for conflict-prone areas (\$250,000 in projects, at least 50% for labor)	617 community development projects (consisting of 90% of 679 completed projects in all eight program governorates) employed some form of daily labor. Over 330,000 days of labor were created over the course of the program (including Marla projects).
III. Enhancing Economic Opportunities for Youth	
a. Over 50 youth with increased skills, greater job opportunities	ACDI/VOCA organized 14 INJAZ trainings for more than 900 students.
b. Piloting courses and mentoring sessions in Northern Iraq	ICAP sponsored a total of 12 pilot courses in Northern Iraq covering a range of diverse subjects, from teacher training to health to computer courses for disabled people.
IV. Increased Opportunities for Women and Other Under-represented Groups	
a. Over 100 women and/or individuals from other under-represented groups with increased skills, greater job opportunities	ICAP funding 17 projects involving women, 8 for disabled people, and one project for care of the elderly, reaching 180,000 beneficiaries
b. Work with centers that provide basic skills training in both computers and English	ICAP funded ten centers that provide training in computers and/or English to 7,728 women and disabled people.
c. Establish specialized service training centers to create income generating opportunities.	Ten specialized women's unions and centers providing training to 11,351 women in a range of income generating skills were opened. Five training centers for the disabled were funded to provide them with skills training (primarily computers) that will enhance their chances of finding employment.
d. Train groups on how to proactively market and advertise and to negotiate contracts.	All centers that provide skills training for women and other marginalized groups received training from ICAP staff on marketing of their products, business management (including contract negotiation) and financial management.
V. Business Development, Vocational Training	

<i>and Apprenticeships</i>	
<i>a. 300-350 small and micro-enterprises established or supported.</i>	316 small and micro enterprises were established and supported through either training or through provision of essential equipment or raw materials; 55,000 beneficiaries reached; 1259 new long term jobs created
<i>b. 500 individual livelihoods assisted via apprentice program</i>	Eight apprenticeship trainings for 624 individuals (49% women) were conducted in six governorates: Erbil, Diyala, Tameem, Ninewa (Mosul), Sulaymaniyah and Salah al Din (Tikrit).
<i>c. Improve the quality and capacity of already-established businesses through Business Development Training (BDT)</i>	Seven business trainings given to 94 CAG members in order to reinforce the training already received.
<i>d. Assist existing enterprises to link up to microfinance institutions and other key economic development agents in the governorates north of Baghdad</i>	ICAP funded the upgrade of a small agricultural bank in Hawija District, Tameem Governorate. This bank will serve approximately 12,000 agricultural enterprises and their families.
<i>e. Work with Community Boards and Directorate of Education on strategic vocational direction</i>	Projects were undertaken through community boards and local government wherever possible to support the institutions of democracy and promote a smoother democratic transition for Iraq. ACDI/VOCA field staff met with community boards and local government representatives whenever monitoring in the field, and seek the support and approval of all local stakeholders when implementing projects.
<i>f. Provide apprentice incentive packages to current contractors and established enterprises in order to link to vocational institutions</i>	This activity was rolled into the apprentice program, see above.
<i>g. Operate an apprentice program in the ACDI/VOCA Kirkuk office, hiring youth to work 1-3 months in its technical departments for experience.</i>	Two local graduates were hired as apprentices in the ACDI/VOCA Kirkuk office in 2006 and were hired as full-time employees under the ICAP II program.
C: Conflict Mitigation and Prevention	
<i>I. Delivering and designing advanced workshops for each level of the ACDI/VOCA staff on the integration of peace-building into community development</i>	A series of extensive workshops and trainings on conflict resolution/peace-building was undertaken by ACDI/VOCA in conjunction with Columbia University's Center for International Conflict Resolution (CICR) and the Center for Conflict Resolution and Peace-building (CCRP). A total of 30 trainings were conducted for ACDI/VOCA staff over the course of 2005/2006 on conflict resolution. The skills learned during these sessions were transferred to the communities in which ICAP operated throughout the remainder of the program.
<i>II. Supporting the growth and consolidation of a network of Iraqi conflict resolution practitioners and educators.</i>	Trainings that were undertaken by CICR and CCRP were focused on the development of a network as a long-term output of the training. With funding and logistical support from ACDI/VOCA, network members delivered a series of workshops and trainings on conflict resolution and peace building to CAGs and community members.
D: Increased capacity of Community Action Groups (CAGs) in advocacy and engagement of sub-national government.	
<i>I. Participatory community strategic planning exercises in targeted communities</i>	Towards the end of ICAP, local officials such as the mayor, city council members and civil servants were attending CAG meetings for strategic planning purposes and to ensure that the proposed projects were not selected by board members alone, but also included LG officials and representatives from various government 'line departments', e.g. water and electricity.
<i>II. Promote awareness of the role and effectiveness of civic participation through trainings in</i>	ICAP program staff participated in technical trainings, provided either by either ICAP senior program staff, in-country consultants or

<i>leadership building, facilitation and capacity building.</i>	international consultants, that included a training of trainers (ToT) on Advocacy, Gender, and Project Cycle Management, Strategic Planning, Participation etc. Subsequently, the ICAP program staff used the knowledge and skills to train CAGs, community project stakeholders and local leaders.
III. <i>Provide tools and resources for start-up NGOs through the ICSP program for those community groups that wish to start NGOs.</i>	The ICSP trained six CAG members. Plans for further collaboration between ACDI/VOCA and ICSP in ICAP II were also explored. They will concentrate in the following areas: anti-corruption, women's advocacy, civil society capacity building and civic education.
IV. <i>Build advocacy skills through engaging other successful advocacy organizations in the Middle East to train staff and selected board members of community groups.</i>	All community development officers trained CAGs in the process of capacity building. 445 CAG members and people with disabilities received specific training in advocacy in 2006 in order to further develop their skills.
V. <i>Build community board capacity through increased knowledge and awareness of local governance</i>	Achieved through regular activities of the CAGs and the Capacity building activities and trainings given by the ACDI/VOCA community development officers to the CAGs.
VI. <i>Pilot a youth "Shadow Council" from schools and universities in the north to replicate local government</i>	Trained students in resume writing, interview techniques, the basics of small business management, shadowing of professionals in their work-place. Beneficiaries preferred to focus on the employment aspects of training rather than local government training.
<i>E: Participation of women, youth and other under-represented groups</i>	
I. <i>Further work with existing women's groups through provision of community training.</i>	Throughout the course of ICAP, 132 projects funded through the ICAP community development department specifically targeted women, youth or People With Disabilities (PWDs);
II. <i>Pilot "Youth in Parliament" and "Youth Business Club" in the Kurdish north for replication in more conflict-affected areas</i>	On discussions with the CAGs in the target areas, this activity was dropped from ICAP as the beneficiaries did not consider it to be viable.

Strategic Objectives of the Marla Ruzicka Fund

I. <i>Renovation and repair of social infrastructure that provide services to victims</i>	29 projects that rebuilt or renovated essential elements of social infrastructure for 117,500 people, such as schools, health centers (providing services to victims of violence), community centers, water supplies for disabled people, or rebuilding of homes that were destroyed in fighting.
II. <i>Provision of medical and health services</i>	Essential health services provided to 107,000 disabled people such as wheelchairs, equipment essential for physiotherapy services, laboratory supplies and medical examinations and treatment for disabled people.
III. <i>Addressing special needs for orphans, children and vulnerable peoples through services or products</i>	ACDI/VOCA worked closely with a number of local humanitarian organizations that supported orphans, widows, children and disabled people, for example the Iraqi Association for Widows, Orphans and Homeless in Mosul, the Iraqi Charitable Organization and the Childhood Organization in Tikrit. Education supplies were donated to schools for orphans and 12 education projects benefited 4,600 children in primary and special schools.
IV. <i>Provision of services and products for disabled people, including specialized equipment for acutely injured, including prosthetic limbs, wheelchairs, glass eyes etc.</i>	Eight separate projects provided wheelchairs, crutches and other mobility aids to more than 3,500 people disabled as a result of injuries from coalition fighting benefited from these projects. Six health centers were provided with funding to improve their physiotherapy services for disabled people, and a factory that manufactures prosthetic limbs was provided with essential equipment.
V. <i>Provide support for income and employment generation</i>	Five hundred and eighty-three Marla projects funded either the creation of a small retail or agricultural business. Extensive training was given to Marla Fund

	recipients on business management skills by community development staff members. A total of 15 training workshops for 266 project holders were held throughout the course of the program
<i>VI. Support home repair needs, including purchase of building materials for civilians whose homes were damaged, and limited home repairs, with priority and extra consideration given to elderly or infirm civilians who are unable to perform labor themselves</i>	Requests for rebuilding of houses were not common through the course of the Marla project. Only two home repair projects were undertaken during the program.
<i>VII. Support to targeted education activities and/or vocational training</i>	Fifteen education or vocational training projects completed. Three vocational training workshops were funded to provide training to disabled people in computers, sewing and handicrafts. Two training centers that provide young people with computer and English language training were also funded. Together, these projects will benefit 7,100 beneficiaries
<i>VIII. Support to social institutions that provide specific services to victims</i>	Renovation and provision of essential services to an estimated 117,000 beneficiaries in 22 social institutions (community, health, education services).
<i>IX. Work with five NGOs already-trained in marketing, finance, accounting, budgeting, cost projection and inventory to train businesses that have already been set up through the Marla Fund.</i>	Marla Fund staff and Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA) worked with five local NGOs to train most of the 254 project holders on individual or family projects.
<i>X. Increase the number of activities through expanding partnerships with local NGOs, particularly in Ba'qubah and Talafar</i>	A number of joint activities in partnership with local NGOs were conducted through the course of ICAP, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - support to a local NGO providing training to disabled people - trauma healing workshops with two local NGOs - ten conflict resolution trainings with local NGOs in five governorates - NGOs were trained in monitoring and evaluation techniques and partnered with to undertake monitoring of ICAP projects in areas where ACDI/VOCA staff could not go due to security concerns

6. Significance and Impact of Program Activities

6.1. The Community Action Program

6.1.1. Quick Impact Projects

As described in Section 4.3.1.1, the Quick Action Program was intended for rapid intervention in fifty communities over the first three months of the ICAP. ACDI/VOCA undertook a total of 71 projects in 53 communities. The quick impact projects were implemented through a participatory process whereby town meetings were called with community leaders to decide the most pressing needs.

Initial activities focused on logistics, administration and the implementation of the USAID strategy of quick-impact projects.

The ICAP RFA stipulated that during the first ninety days of the program each recipient would establish committees in 50 communities and complete at least one activity with a clear and felt impact in each community. This was known as the 50:50:90 approach.


In USAID’s view, a “quick start is critical to program success, and will establish a foundation of community trust that will be invaluable to the ongoing community development efforts.”

Key Achievements


- 71 projects in 53 communities in 90 days
- Immediate benefit to community members—money in their pockets for a day’s work
- Early impact in the community
- Involvement of community members in project implementation
- Uses primarily unskilled labor available within the community
- Requires minimal planning and design
- Requires only simple tools or equipment locally
- Available with no tendering process

Within the first month of program implementation, ACDI/VOCA had identified 57 projects in 27 towns, and by the end of the 90 day period a total of 71 projects in 53 communities were completed. A total of 46 community boards had completed projects worth \$186,200, with many more in the pipeline.

Governorate Breakdown of Quick Impact Projects - July to September 2003



The majority of the projects implemented in this first phase of the program were education and infrastructure, followed by water and sanitation projects.



The types of projects implemented were mainly focused on supply of material, rebuilding, repairs or renovations to schools, public halls, provision of water, electricity – geared towards the rebuilding of public infrastructure that had suffered from years of deprivation and/or the effects of the war.

Project results from this start-up period of ICAP could be perhaps best summarized in the following words from Save the Children’s Semi-Annual Report of June 2004:

“...the intent of the 50-50-90 target and design, of course, was to give...implementers and the participating communities a series of quick victories in carrying out early successful projects. These often small victories – some actually quite major – were...instrumental for instilling confidence and a sense of accomplishment in the...communities to encourage their further commitment and growth. Although often an untidy process, it can be said that it did achieve the purpose – communities were recruited, projects were completed, needs were met...”⁸

⁸ From ICAP Evaluation Report, IBCTI, 2006, pg 73

September 2003: Water Supply to Sosokan Village, Sulaymaniyah



Community: Tawela & Sosokan Villages
Total Beneficiaries: 700
Total Project Value: \$11,919
USAID ICAP Contribution: \$8,783
Community Contribution: \$3,136
Project Holder: Municipality of Tawela

Tawella is a community situated within sight of the Iranian border. From 1994 through 2003, Islamic groups restricted the movement of people in and out of Tawella and other communities in the area. No media was allowed in, food distribution was often cut or restricted, and UN agencies and NGOs were hampered to the point that they stopped activities in the area.

ACDI/VOCA rescued us, our village was about to be evacuated.

During this time the water supply to Sosokan village, three kilometers from Tawella, deteriorated, eliminating the entire water supply to Sosokan. The citizens of Sosokan began leaving the village; those who stayed carried water daily by hand or mule from Tawella. The citizens expected that within three years, the village would be completely evacuated. The citizens of Tawella recognized the problem of their neighbors as their highest priority and wanted it to receive immediate attention by the members of their community. Each household in Sosokan contributed cash payments for the purchase of materials to install a water supply pipe to Sosokan. ACDI/VOCA purchased the additional piping and hardware while the community began digging the trench for the pipe. In the end, over three kilometers of water pipe was laid in just 15 days, using volunteer labor from Sosokan and Tawella. One Sosokan resident said, "My village was not a real one. After implementation of this project, it is considered a village and it will be more rehabilitated by the people." Another man simply said, "Now I feel I live."



Over three kilometers of pipe laid in 15 days.

6.1.2. Community Development/Civil Society

The Quick Impact (or 50:50:90) Program was concluded in September 2003. Throughout this period, although there was an emphasis on the so-called 'burn-rate' of activities, the ACDI/VOCA team was also concerned with quality programming that would prepare the ground for longer-term projects in communities.

Within the first two months of programming, the team had held town meetings with key stakeholders from the communities that they had targeted with the help of various organizations in the region such as women and youth groups, farmers associations and other civil society groups. All of the public meetings resulted in the formation of a community board selected from among the meeting participants who were dedicated to developing project ideas into full proposals. The formation of these boards became the foundation of the remaining three years of the program. These boards were tremendously successful as a model for project implementation. Over 670 projects, ranging in size from \$100 for basic first aid training for 40 pregnant women to nearly \$850,000 for paving the road between Tikrit and Hawija, were implemented successfully through community boards. This created a sense of purpose and empowerment among previously disenfranchised communities that will have a long term impact on their futures.


The objectives of the activities related to community development and civil society were to:

- Engender a sense of community;
- Reduce inter-ethnic and social tensions by drawing underrepresented groups into community action, such as youth groups, sports clubs, arts venues;
- Urge communities to govern themselves through democratic processes and form the basis for lobbying government bodies for support.

In addition to the civic participation aspects of ICAP, discrete civic activities were designed to engage local NGOs and stakeholder groups, both public and private, to discuss issues, prioritize solutions and implement projects. While civic initiatives could be launched with external funds, a commitment was required on the part of the community both in time and funding to sustain it. The levels of community contribution (approximately 22%) to ICAP reflected this community commitment.

ACDI/VOCA assisted community groups in exploring the role of the local government and business community in supporting these types of activities, and promoted the concept of private sector sponsorship and a culture of civic duty among the local business community.

Numbers of Projects per CAG




Key Achievements

- Community Boards implemented 676 projects worth about \$23.6
- The majority of CAGs implemented more than one project
- Sixty-seven projects supporting civil society implemented
- Five public libraries rebuilt or renovated
- Twenty-two youth, cultural or women's centers established, rebuilt or renovated

Grants to local civic organizations and NGOs played an important part in the delivery of civic participation activities such as computer and agriculture training centers; women's crisis and legal advisory services; sports leagues; and reproductive health programs.

Khabat Cultural Center

When ACDI/VOCA asked the community members of Khabat, a town located 50 km west of the city of Erbil in northern Iraq, about their greatest development needs; they identified a cultural center for women and youth as a top priority. A small town with a population of about 45,000, Khabat is very conservative; women are not allowed to mix freely with men. In addition, local youth had no place to come together to participate in constructive activities. To deal with both of these issues, the community members requested ACDI/VOCA's assistance in constructing a community center.



ACDI/VOCA provided the materials and labor for the construction of a center with one large hall and six smaller rooms. The community members and local government also contributed to the project by providing the land, electricity and sewage connections and by fully furnishing the center.

Once complete, a full schedule of courses and activities were conducted at the center, directly benefiting more than one thousand women and youth. The activities currently offered include instruction in sewing, computers, nursing, languages, and handicrafts. To date, 35 trainees have found a variety of jobs in the community, and forty music trainees are now participating in local cultural festivals. Demand for these trainings continues to rise, and men are now also attending.

Through this project, the community was able to work together to achieve their ambition of increasing opportunities for women and youth. These groups now have more employment options and have a space to gather with other community members, which helps to unify the community, and encourages them to work together to achieve other common ambitions in the future.

The center has even served to encourage community and political activism. Soon after opening, a local political party (the PDK) believed it would make a good headquarters, and tried to take the center over. The community board believed the center should be used for the wider community purposes for which it was built. Several board members had received advocacy training by ACDI/VOCA which they put to good use by launching an advocacy campaign to "Save the Center". They gained the support of the mayor and municipality who together met with the PDK leadership. After discussion, it was agreed that the center would service the whole community.

6.1.3. Conflict Resolution

Salah Al Din Governorate - Hawija District

A dispute arose between a group of farmers in Hawija district after ACDI/VOCA supported the repair of irrigation canals in the area. Farmers on only one side of canal were benefiting from the new water supply, causing conflict between them and farmers on the other side. The conflict escalated to the point where local tribal militia became involved and wanted to use force to resolve the issue. They also threatened to close down a local cultural centre. In response, the nearby Al Siniea CAG negotiated between the two groups of farmers to provide water for both sides of the canal and avert conflict.

Over the first year of programming in Iraq, ACDI/VOCA trained select community board members and key Iraqi staff in basic conflict resolution concepts and techniques. In the second

and third years, this program grew exponentially to permeate every aspect of ACDI/VOCA's work.

A fledgling network of Iraqi conflict resolution trainers grew out of a series of "Training of Trainers" workshops given by the Columbia University Center for International Conflict Resolution. In September 2005, the network or "shabaka" took the final step in a series of three specially designed workshops that increased people's capacity to design and deliver conflict resolution seminars and workshops. Network members agreed to create a framework for communication and coordination. They implemented a system of regional subgroups and selected regional leaders as well as an overall

Key Achievements

- Thirty conflict resolution trainings for ACDI/VOCA staff
- Twenty-two training workshops for all CAGs in all governorates
- Strategic partnership with the Iraqi Peace Builder's Network
- Conflict resolution trainings from Columbia University and the Beirut-based CCRP
- Iraq's first conflict resolution network created
- Conflict resolution outreach activities with local leaders, journalists, farmers, students
- Local human rights associations supported to undertake conflict resolution activities
- Conflicts over water and power between communities mitigated through CAG activities

coordinator to facilitate information sharing and decision-making. With funding and logistical support from ACDI/VOCA, network members delivered a series of workshops and trainings on conflict resolution and peace building. For instance, network members trained the City Council of Tikrit, after a city councilman had been killed. They also trained journalists and NGOs in Mosul, farmers in Khanaqin and youth and university students in Kirkuk.

The Center for Conflict Resolution and Peace building (CCRP) of Beirut hosted two workshops on conflict resolution and advocacy for community board members in Shaklawa in November 2005. Fifty-two board members attended one of the three day workshops. The workshops covered intercultural communication, non-violent communication, including active listening, advocacy, creative problem solving, facilitation, and conflict sensitive project development.

The CCRP trainers found that building board members capacity was a long and gradual process that could not be hurried. CAG members had not been exposed to the outside world for 35 years, and had difficulty comprehending the changes around them. They were desperate to express their thoughts, hopes and fears concerning working in development, sectarianism and the political future of Iraq. Some talked about the danger of Western culture on the Iraqi culture and traditions especially on the Islamic traditions. It will take years to help board members overcome deeply held feelings of fear, anxiety, helplessness to become strong and effective community leaders.

Many community board members were also trained in basic conflict resolution techniques. This was new to them. Participants mentioned that they used only three ways to solve problems: tribal laws, religious laws and sometimes state laws. They found it difficult to accept alternative methods of conflict resolution.

Sadly, issues of conflict are becoming more, rather than less, prevalent in Iraq. By the completion of ICAP, violent attacks throughout Iraq have become more common. The optimism that surrounded the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein has been displaced by pessimism, and

in many cases, fear. The work that has been started through ICAP in resolving the conflicts between people in their everyday lives is needed more than ever.

6.1.4. Education

Although ACIDI/VOCA did not have a specific mandate to undertake education programming, it is an integral part of the development of Iraq's people and infrastructure, and was identified as a community priority through ICAP. The educational infrastructure in Iraq is in need of significant upgrading. Schools are in poor repair, funding for furniture, heating and teaching supplies is extremely limited and overcrowding is the norm. Whether through rebuilding, renovations or extensions to schools, provision of fittings and supplies to schools and students, or support to non-formal training institutions, ICAP took a hand in the development of this vital part of Iraq's future.



Expanding Yaychi Primary School, Tameem

Key Achievements

- 293 schools assisted in eight governorates with \$3.5 million of funding.
- Attendance improved through provision of schools supplies to schoolchildren.
- Overcrowding reduced by extensions and additional classrooms.
- Student health improved by provision of sports facilities and sanitation in schools.
- Performance and attendance improved by provision of furniture and heaters to classrooms.
- Improvement in academic standards through funding of revision courses for exam-takers.
- Funding of literacy courses for adults.

ICAP funded and supervised the renovations and expansion of schools in all eight governorates. The majority of schools assisted were kindergarten and primary levels, but many secondary and a number of tertiary institutions, including Kirkuk University, were also assisted.




Overcrowding in Rizgary Primary School, Erbil


Rizgary Schoolchildren in their new classroom

In addition to rebuilding and repairs, many schools in the North of Iraq, located in elevated rural areas, were assisted with supplies to make the pupils more comfortable. Schools were supplied with heaters, additional furniture to reduce overcrowding, stationery and teaching supplies, and

pupils were supplied with school bags, cloth for uniforms and stationery for studies. In all, 208 schools and their pupils were supported in this manner, thus increasing enrolment and attendance, and improving performance.



ACDI/VOCA's contribution was not confined to school buildings and equipment. A number of academic courses for students preparing for exams, for school dropouts and for adults were also supported through the course of ICAP.



Building six classrooms in Bazyan
Community: Bazyan, Sulaymaniyah
Total Beneficiaries: 435
Total Project Value: \$223,646
USAID ICAP Contribution: \$177,324
Community Contribution: \$46,694

Bazyan, a town of about 35,000 people is situated in Sulaymaniyah Governorate. Youth and students comprise more than 25% of the population, yet the town has only two schools. To cope with the severe overcrowding, each school had three shifts of classes, with up to 50 pupils per class, per shift.

6.1.5. Agriculture

Over the course of ICAP, ACDI/VOCA undertook and funded eighty-seven agricultural projects worth nearly \$4.5 million (not counting Marla Fund projects). These projects ranged from agro-business development, major irrigation projects, livestock vaccination campaigns, creating of artificial insemination systems, veterinary supplies, seed supply, improved agricultural technique trainings, and the establishment of 47 cooperatives in the governorates of Ninewa, Dahuk, Diyala, Tameem and Salah al Din. They focused on a range of group farming activities, like cattle and sheep fattening, bee-keeping, dairy and fish-raising. They allowed farmers to pool risk and financial resources and buy inputs like seed and fertilizer. The cooperatives are increasing

family income, introducing new farming skills, increasing the quality and quantity of local meat, and providing jobs.



Beekeeping cooperative, Shosh village, Dahuk

Key Achievements

- 47 cooperatives established
- 31,000 days of labor generated
- 3,700 long term jobs created
- 8,506 men and women employed on a short or long term basis
- Healthy livestock due to vaccinations in approximately 450 villages
- Eight veterinary clinics supported with training and supplies
- Up to 80,000 acres of land supplied with irrigation water, improving production by up to 50%

The cooperatives have also instilled a sense of democratic ownership and good management practices in Iraqi farmers. The coop members directly elect their boards who run the coop. ACIDI/VOCA staff worked throughout ICAP to improve skills of board members and the committees. They were given on the job management training, including good bookkeeping and accounting practices and marketing strategies. Several boards started to implement their marketing strategy, noting immediate increases in sales.

As many Iraqi farmers own several kinds of livestock, improving the quality and quantity of their livestock was a means to generate extra income. Without access to new breeds, animals are undersized and susceptible to disease. ACIDI/VOCA re-activated four artificial insemination centers across Diyala and Salah al Din. These centers introduced healthy genetic material into various livestock breeds, bolstering herd health and farmers' income.

Iraq and Iran were fighting over water...

Water melting off the peaks of the Zagros mountains on the border of Iraq and Iran was used by Iraqi farmers or escaping into the mountainside. Little water was reaching Iranian farmers on the other side of the mountain. Both sides wanted access to the mountain run-off, but was there enough water for everyone? ACDI/VOCA helped the town of Tawela, high in the mountains of Sulaymaniyah, to build a narrow concrete irrigation channel to ensure that there was enough water for farmers of both countries. The community provided the labor, ICAP provided the funds. When the project was completed, 170 farmers in Tawela had access to irrigation water, their Iranian friends on the other side of the mountain also had access, and the conflict was averted.




Under ICAP, improved methods of irrigation allowed for better water efficiency and increased the amount of land under cultivation. ICAP-funded irrigation projects have helped farmers work an estimated 80,000 acres of land. ACDI/VOCA cleaned and lined canals to save water and increase land productivity. After years of purposeful neglect, many canals and rivers were lined with mud and choked with vegetation. ACDI/VOCA helped communities to dredge rivers and canals and remove mud, rubbish and vegetation so water could flow clearly. Structural work such as raising the embankment of 20 kilometers of the Muqdadiyah canal in Diyala so that water could reach the villages at the end of the canal provided water for nearly 14,000 beneficiaries. Before ACDI/VOCA funded this project, water was overflowing at the head of the canal and not reaching the farms at the end. In addition to providing water for the farmers and their families, this project provided 200 local laborers short term jobs.



Muqdadiyah canal before...



...during...



...and after...

Close to the famous Kirkuk oil field in Tameem Governorate is Yaiche village. Under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein the Iraqi army systematically emptied Yaiche, leaving family members separated and the village vacant. The original inhabitants, of all ethnic groups, are only now returning to rebuild their village and restart their lives. To assist with the efforts ICAP helped the village to form a calf rearing cooperative.

In 2005 ACDI/VOCA, through ICAP, provided 150 calves and two months worth of barley fodder. The co-op members built a barn, a co-op office, and a fodder storage area. The new eighty member cooperative will be a catalyst for the Yaiche economy, generating jobs and raising local incomes.

When I was sitting with the head of CO-OP in Yaiche, my eye was attracted to an old leather bag containing soil hanging on the wall. After the meeting, I asked the head of the CO-OP about it and he said "I took this soil from my land when the ex-government forced us to evacuate our land where my father is buried. I swore to return to my land and bring the soil. But when we came back we were bankrupt and unable to renovate the farm. Now because of this project I will bring this soil back to the land of my grandfathers. He opened the soil bag and let the wind sprinkle the soil to every point of his beloved land.

-Waqas, Agricultural officer

Yaiche Calf-Rearing Cooperative
Community: Yaiche, Tameem
Total Beneficiaries: 80
Total Project Value: \$122,068
USAID ICAP Contribution: \$77,618
Community Contribution: \$44,450



6.1.6. Gender


One of the primary areas of focus with respect to the gender dimension of ICAP was in encouraging a gender balance in all program activities. However, establishing and maintaining such a balance among ICAP staff was much easier than among CAG members. ACDI/VOCA staff received several trainings on gender equality, which were disseminated to CAGs through a series of formal and informal trainings by community development officers. Despite this, CAG membership remained predominantly male due to deeply rooted cultural perceptions regarding women's participation. Even rudimentary gender training was beyond many CAG members, and trainers struggled to teach the most basic concepts. Sometimes tribal men had difficulty accepting a woman CD officer. In the sub-district of Rabeea, a conflict prone area outside Mosul, Ninewa Governorate, the local stakeholders would not listen to or take a woman CD officer seriously. It will take time for Iraqi women to effectively participate in developing and reconstructing Iraq.

Key Achievements

- 2208 long term jobs created for women
- 35 projects funded for women at a cost of \$1.2 million
- Seventeen women's income generation projects funded
- Two women's cooperatives created
- Nine women's health projects including six health trainings for 265 mothers
- Four women's centers built
- Twelve three-month literacy courses for widows conducted

Deep seated cultural mores impact activities involving women. Are women allowed to come to training? Can they sleep in a hotel? Who will care for their children? As one husband said, "I am very happy for my wife to go to training but who will make dinner for me and the children?"

Nothing substantial deters boys from participating in growth activities, but unmarried girls can be even more constrained than women in their choices.



women. Iraqi women (and their communities) wanted sewing machines to learn new skills and enhance the family income.

During the second and third years, there were additional efforts to mainstream gender issues and focus on gender in projects. Staff members were taught to analyze community needs and project proposals with gender perspectives (the roles and impacts for both sexes). Gender sensitive objectives and indicators were also introduced.

Staff encouraged community boards to design and prioritize projects for women. A number of boards suggested building women's centers to provide a safe place for women to gather, chat and learn new skills. Boards and local women's groups promised to develop ambitious training programs and fund the trainers. Therefore, ACIDI/VOCA built four women's centers, and funded eight training and income generation projects. Deliberate efforts were made to ensure that regular youth center, farming co-operative or other projects included women. Youth centers scheduled special days for girls, and new co-operatives aimed for 25 percent women membership.



6.1.7. Health

Medical projects became a substantial priority within ICAP, as communities sought to upgrade or better equip local health facilities which had suffered from years of neglect and the depredations of the coalition fighting. Sunni triangle communities particularly expressed a need for medical assistance. Due to the ongoing conflict, these facilities took on greater importance because of the number of conflict-related injuries and because curfews and checkpoints sometimes ruled out travel to distant hospitals.



New equipment at Dijel Medical Center


Key Achievements

- Forty-two hospitals and health centers supplied with essential equipment
- Twenty-five hospitals or health centers rebuilt or renovated.
- Nine women's health projects including six health trainings for 265 mothers.
- Public health improved through 106 water and sanitation projects worth over \$2 million.
- Conflicts in many villages over water resolved peacefully.
- Over 28,000 days of labor created

In Salah al Din, ACDI/VOCA renovated or supplied medical equipment to hospitals or health centers in Samarra, Muatasim, Tikrit, Dijel and Dawr. It added an x-ray department to the Balad hospital, and equipped the operating room in the Samarra hospital. It also built and equipped a new health center in the poor Arab community of Hasan Shami, outside of Mosul.

In multi-ethnic Tuz Kurmatu, open channels of sewage passed through the town's outdoor fruit and vegetable market. Children were falling into the mud, getting sick and missing school. ACDI/VOCA built a new sewage system. It divided the project between two contractors to speed up the process, and guard against one contractor getting bogged down. A sewage system was also installed in Hawija and several sewage projects were undertaken in Mosul.

ICAP Health Projects by Governorate



In total, 107 water and sanitation projects were completed. These projects are providing clean water and safe sewage disposal for hundred of thousands of Iraqis. In many cases, the competition for safe water between communities was leading to conflicts that threatened to erupt into violence. The provision of water supplies for each of these communities ensured conflicts were averted and in many cases the intervention of the CAG as the driving force behind the projects provided an example of the benefits of democratic action over unproductive conflict.

Experience in Anbar Governorate – Counterpart International

Hadytha District is located approximately 160 km to the west of Ramadi city center. Elders from the District and doctors of Hadytha General Hospital organized themselves into a community committee and then contacted the community mobilization teams

**Hadytha General Hospital,
Community: Ramadi, Anbar Governorate
Total Beneficiaries: 70,000
Total Project Value: \$82,700**

of ACDI/VOCA subcontractor Counterpart International. During meetings with the teams they prioritized their primary need as medical equipment and supplies for their general hospital, as the hospital is serving a large urban population as well as a number of surrounding sub-districts and rural villages. While the community and Counterpart were preparing the project, a joint military operation (Coalition and Iraqi Forces) was conducted in Hadytha to eliminate terrorist camps in the area. Unfortunately Hadytha Hospital was one of the sites of armed conflict between terrorists and Coalition and Iraqi Forces, resulting in extensive damage to the building and equipment. Following the conclusion of this operation, Counterpart considered the rehabilitation of this hospital to be a top priority, given the increased need for medical treatment of local residents injured during the conflict. Counterpart immediately provided seed funding for the procurement and transportation of advanced medical equipment (including radiological equipment) and supplies. The community committee accompanied and provided security for the shipment from Baghdad to Hadytha, ensuring that the newly purchased equipment and supplies were delivered safely to the hospital. Additionally, the community members organized themselves into teams to begin renovating the physical infrastructure of the hospital, beginning with the departments serving the needs of the critically injured. This process demonstrated the proper role of international NGOs, providing support to mobilized and committed community members, as they designed local solutions to their most urgent problems.

6.1.8. Livelihoods & Enterprise Development

Four female apprentices, with ICAP sponsorship, are working with the real estate tax department of the Kurdish city of Halabjah. Naseba Zorab, Aven Abdullah, Kawyar Muhamad, and Kalthoma Hussain are learning to calculate property taxes, organize financial records, and input information into databases. Their supervisor, Zahra Hasan said, “I feel so happy training such a smart group, they have become in no time a team I can count on. They are learning fast and maybe this is because they are young and they are really looking for a future job.”

INJAZ (“Achievement” in Arabic), Junior Achievement’s program in the Middle East, was started in 1999 with the goal of enhancing youth knowledge and awareness of the evolving world of work and building their skills to enter and succeed in the labor market. Established in 11 countries in the Middle East, *INJAZ* bridges the gap between the output of a traditional education system and the human resource needs of a modernizing private sector.

Key Achievements

- Trained 624 apprentices for future employment
- Introduced INJAZ to Iraq
- Trained 2,215 people in business and livelihoods development
- Created 555 jobs
- Formed 47 cooperatives

After a shaky start, ICAP’s apprenticeship program took off in 2005, especially in the volatile areas of Talafar, Ba’qubah and Mosul. The program linked vocational and technical schools to the private sector, providing recently graduated youth critical on-the-job training. At the beginning, the concept was new, and trainers and participants worried about the security implications of working for an American organization. People in Diyala and Talafar categorically refused but then changed their mind. No doubt, the benefits of recent graduates gaining paid work experience outweighed other considerations. By the end of the program, 624 youth were involved in the ACDI/VOCA apprenticeship program.


6.1.9. Infrastructure

Ba’qubah is one of the largest and most restive cities in Diyala. The city is divided by the Diyala river and a sub-river called the Kressain river. There are two bridges on the river, but one is usually blocked off for security reasons, and the other is very crowded. Previous efforts by others to construct a third bridge across the river failed. The Ba’qubah board suggested that ACDI/VOCA step in and complete the bridge.

ACDI/VOCA supplied the beams, plates, cast the bridge in concrete, made ramps and handrails and installed the curbstones. The municipality paved the bridge and installed electrical lights. All of this was done in the record time of less than 90 days! Now, local residents can easily cross to the other side of the river to visit the hospital, schools, markets and government offices.

Bridge over the River Kressain
Community: Ba’qubah, Diyala Governorate
Total Beneficiaries: 280,000
Total Project Value: \$126,660
ACDI/VOCA Contribution: \$84,260
Community Contribution: \$42,400

Types of ICAP Infrastructure/Public Works Projects



Key Achievements

- Completed 144 public works and infrastructure projects.
- Constructed two bridges to serve 285,000 people.
- Upgraded or extended 20 electrical networks serving 170,000 people
- Installed 23 road lighting systems contributing to security and road safety for up to 250,000 people

From building and supplying health-care clinics and kindergartens to constructing roads, bridges and water networks, one of the ICAP legacies will be the repairing and rebuilding of community infrastructure. Projects such as renovating public parks, installation of streetlights, telephone networks, building roads and embankments, cleaning up garbage from towns, provision of sports facilities, and even projects as simple as planting trees have gone a long way towards providing the Iraqi people with essential infrastructure, necessary for the long and short-term improvement in living standards. More difficult to measure, but also important, are the psychosocial benefits that go with public works projects. These rapid and visible projects aimed to fix decaying infrastructure, restore local services and meet community needs. In addition, they have provided valuable short-term employment for many unemployed people. Over the course of the three years of ICAP, 144 infrastructure and public works provided employment for nearly 3,000 people, created nearly 300 long term jobs and more than 66,000 days of labor.

Al Korea Market – Kirkuk, Iraq

Through the ICAP, ACDI/VOCA brought together Kirkuk community members in a town hall meeting to identify priority needs for development in their neighborhood. The rehabilitation of al Korea Market was identified as the top priority by the community. The al Korea Market is one of the major outdoor markets in Kirkuk and attracts many local families, who buy fresh fruits and vegetables, meat, and used clothing there. Unfortunately, poor infrastructure caused filthy water to collect around market stalls, breeding insects and rodents that spread disease. The road had many potholes, making the transport of goods to and from the market difficult and hazardous. The city government agreed with the community’s decision and pledged to contribute to its reconstruction.

The municipality supplied raw materials and construction supervisors, valued at approximately 20% of the total project cost. ACDI/VOCA contributed the remaining funds necessary to help the community pave the market roads with concrete, reconstruct the sidewalks, and dig a drainage canal for excess water.

The market is now an attractive and sanitary shopping center for approximately 50,000 merchants and shoppers. As a result of this project, community members of Kirkuk now have solid experience in working together across religious and ethnic line and with local government to achieve common objectives. This is particularly crucial in Kirkuk, which is demographically very diverse and conflict-prone



Korea Market before the cleanup...



...and after.

6.1.10. Public Outreach

ACDI/VOCA worked hard throughout ICAP to establish a reputation for good work, timely delivery and commitment to local development. This proven track record built a foundation of trust that paid dividends throughout the second year. ACDI/VOCA’s good reputation spilled over into new communities that saw or heard about projects in other communities. As the mayor of Makhmur in Ninewa said, “hundreds of NGOs came and promised but only ACDI/VOCA delivered.”

People are beginning to feel they have a voice in their communities. Some board members are getting noticed for listening to public views, and working to improve local conditions. A board member and coop member in Yaiche, Tameem Governorate, is widely touted as the next mayor of Yaiche because of his enthusiasm and ability to deliver on local needs.

The community mobilization approach is increasingly resonating with local residents and, more importantly, local governments. The local government in eastern Sulaymaniyah replicated the

community board model in more than a dozen villages in Sulaymaniyah. They set up the equivalent of boards so that communities could prioritize and voice their needs to the Sulaymaniyah government. Also, the project prioritization exercise done by the community board in Khanaquin was also used to select projects for funding requests to other NGOS.

Good staff training led to stronger boards and better project selection. Better understanding of ICAP and ACDI/VOCA goals and objectives was the first step in solid community development.


ICAP operated in some of the most dangerous communities in the toughest parts of Iraq. While every community was different, there were general techniques that were used throughout the area of operation. Hiring Iraqi staff from the community meant that they knew the community, enjoyed the community's trust, and had a network of friends and neighbors to provide security advice. They operated "under the radar" using a low profile security posture. ACDI/VOCA also used partners and local NGOs from the community when possible, which moved projects forward with fewer problems.

Most importantly, ACDI/VOCA emphasized a working partnership between the community board, the town council and the local government ministries. Working together, they can produce synergies. In Yaiche the agricultural department visited the fledgling co-operative twice a month to monitor and provide assistance. They also provided needed fodder for the first year. The local government told the new fish-raising co-operative in Rashad, Tameem, about an upcoming NGO training. Boards can contribute to publicizing the local government plan. For instance, the community board in Khabat was surprised to learn that the local government was already implementing its first priority-- building a slaughterhouse.

6.2. The Marla Fund

The Marla Ruzicka War Victims Assistance Program has been a highly effective means of reaching some of the most deserving people in Iraq – innocent civilians who have been injured, disabled or killed as a result of coalition forces fighting. In total, 460 families of people killed as a result of coalition fighting received assistance from the US Government through the Marla Fund. In most cases, the victims were men, and the primary income earners for the family, many left wives and children, or survived, disabled, and became a burden on their families. The average age for victims who (or whose families) were beneficiaries of the Marla Fund was 29.

Marla Fund Projects by Type



The Fund was responsible for supporting the launching of 292 new non-agricultural businesses for individuals or families harmed by fighting. It assisted communities with rehabilitation/construction of health facilities and medical equipment supply projects, mostly focused on victims disabled by coalition forces. In some cases, the fund paid for essential medical treatment for injuries sustained during battles between forces. The benefits of these projects were not confined to the civilian victims of the war, but also increased ACIDI/VOCA’s standing in the community, enhanced the security of Iraqi staff, and started not only families, but whole communities, on the road to long-term reconciliation.

The original Marla Ruzicka program goals were straightforward. The projects should help rebuild the economic foundation of injured families by providing a job and a long term income. The principal aim was to reach those families in dire straits, who were desperate when they lost their means of support. A secondary goal was to help women in the family, especially the wife of the deceased breadwinner. Project assets would enhance her status in the family, increase her potential in the marriage market, and enable her to support herself and her children without assistance.

But the projects appear to have exceeded their primary objectives. They resonate deeply with Iraqi tribal culture and mores. In Iraq, the payment of compensation is an age-old tribal means of settling disputes. One family pays compensation for damage done to opposing families, they are reconciled and they move on. Although the philosophy of the Fund is not that the USG is paying compensation, Fund beneficiaries have said that it helps the healing process, and promotes inner peace and reconciliation. It brings closure. Others have said they feel vindicated because they have successfully asserted their rights. The wrong that has been done to them has been acknowledged.


The Marla program strikes a peace chord at the community level. ICAP staff members have found that it allays a deep mistrust against American intentions. People are puzzled, because they can’t answer the question, “what’s in it for them?” People see it as a genuine offer of assistance, not a bribe for friendship or oil or strategic interests. Community projects are often viewed as fulfilling a routine government function, but helping unfortunate families is seen as real

humanitarian assistance. The Marla program has succeeded beyond many peoples' expectations, and some would say against the odds.

In early 2005, ACDI/VOCA recruited eight evaluators through the rehabilitation centers of Kirkuk, Tikrit and Mosul to evaluate businesses created during the first year of the Marla Fund program.

The evaluations aimed at learning three things:

1. How are the families coping, especially women and children?
2. Are the new Marla businesses successful?
3. What are the business or family needs that could benefit from targeted training?




The vast majority of the Marla beneficiaries were satisfied or very satisfied with their new business. Likewise, most thought that their life was "better" after receiving assistance.

For those whose lives had not improved since participating in the program, most cited the deteriorating security situation as the primary cause.

6.2.1. Agriculture

Agriculture projects were one of the mainstays of the Marla Fund – a total of 291 projects were funded, to a total of nearly \$1.4 million – an average cost per project of less than \$5,000 per project. A total of 2,500 people benefited from these projects.



Key Achievements

- 291 agricultural projects funded – the majority establishment of small livestock holdings
- 2,500 beneficiaries, 51% women
- 400 long term jobs created

The majority of Marla beneficiaries were women, a significant impact, especially given the physical nature of agriculture, traditionally a man's job. Of all agricultural projects, 84% were due to the death of a family member mostly men, often leaving his wife, children or parents without income.

Marla Fund Success Stories

Mr. Ahmed was grazing sheep near an arsenal used by the regime of Saddam Hussein outside of Tikrit, Salah al Din Governorate. The Coalition Forces bombed the arsenal, killing him. He left a wife, eight children, and was supporting another five extended family members. His brother, a university student began to support the fourteen family members with a small shop selling sweets and cigarettes. The local villagers were also helping out when they could. Ahmed's children left school because the family could no longer afford to send them.

In 2005, the Marla Fund provided Ahmed's widow, with twenty sheep to raise and sell. She is now a sheep breeder and trader. The children are returning to school. The entire village is happy that the family is now doing well.



Mr. Amin was killed during an air bombardment on Kobir village in Ninewa Governorate. The village was close to an Iraqi air base, and a missile landed on Kobir village. Mr Amin. had three wives. The first has seven children, the second has nine children and the third has ten children. One of his sons is married and has children of his own. All family members, including the son and his family, live in the same house. In 2005 the Fund supplied sheep to each of the three wives to generate income. On a follow up visit to the project site, the ICAP staff found that mothers and sons were each helping each other to make the project successful. One of the wives was milking the sheep. Another one was grazing them. The third wife was responsible for making yogurt. They are all hoping to rear rams for breeding and sell them. Shearing and selling their wool will also provide them much needed income.



6.2.2. Education


A number of education projects were also identified through the Marla Fund. In some cases, disabled victims of fighting elected to receive study materials, such as computers, and have the cost of their study at educational institutions covered. In other cases, damage to schools caused by coalition fighting was repaired, or the school reconstructed.

Key Achievements

- Twelve education projects funded
- Eight schools renovated or rebuilt
- Over 4,600 students assisted with study materials or schools.

ACDI/VOCA's ICAP implementation subcontractor, Counterpart International, also undertook a number of educational support projects under the Marla Fund in Anbar governorate

Marla Fund Education Beneficiaries



As shown, there were slightly more male than female beneficiaries of Marla education projects, reflecting the higher enrollment of boys in schools in some areas of Iraq.

Al Nargzlia village Primary School, Ninewa

On March 27, 2003, the primary school of al Nargzlia village in Ninewa Governorate was bombed and completely destroyed by coalition forces. They suspected the presence of Iraqi army fighters in the school. The school was empty at the time and no one was hurt. The primary and secondary school served four local villages. Over 500 local children attended the school. In order for the children to not lose their school year, villagers used a local house as a make-shift school but it cannot accommodate all of the students. The school is found in a poor Arab-Muslim community, located near the Mosul airbase. ACDI/VOCA will re-build the school and the Department of Education will supply the equipment and school books, and teachers.



6.2.3. Gender

Empowering and improving women's daily lives was integral to the ACDI/VOCA philosophy in Iraq. The wife suffers the most emotionally, culturally and financially by a spouse's death. She loses her lover and emotional ballast. She loses her breadwinner, and perhaps her home, especially if she lived in the home of his family, as was very likely. She loses her status as a wife and gains the lower status of widow. A single woman has a greater chance of marrying than a widow does. Her children will grow up without a father, in a male-dominated society.

Key Achievements

- 480 project holders women
- 60,000 women and girls assisted
- 2000 female students assisted with study materials or schools.

The principal beneficiaries of the Marla Fund were women – they comprised 73 percent of Marla project holders. Many received business development training and were assisted in running their own business. Women's groups received conflict resolution training. The women's centers built by ACDI/VOCA over the course of ICAP also affected change at the community level. Women have started to come together for family counseling, anti-domestic violence training and to learn new skills such as computers or weaving. The Marla projects gave them an income to raise their children with dignity, improve their status in the home and in society and raise their self-esteem.

On March 18, 2004 an American convoy came into contact with unknown fire and returned fire. A bullet struck Mr Talal Hazim Abid, killing him. He left a pregnant wife and six daughters. A young son was born three months after his death. His family lived with Mr. Abid's mother, with no means of financial support. The Marla Fund provided the family equipment, tools and supplies to start a sewing business. Mr. Abid's mother trained her daughter-in-law and six granddaughters in sewing skills and they now have a thriving local business and a means to make an income.



6.2.4. Health

People with disabilities were a central focus of the Marla Fund. A close relationship was forged with the rehabilitation centers of Tikrit, Mosul and Kirkuk after ACDI/VOCA built sport and recreation centers and supplied physiotherapy, occupational health, or vocational training equipment. With the cooperation of the rehabilitation centers, advocacy training has been given to people with disabilities.

Key Achievements

- 22 health projects implemented
- Ten health centers and hospitals serving disabled people renovated or repaired and provided with equipment worth \$470,000
- 3,400 disabled people receive direct medical care or aids (wheelchairs, crutches) worth \$440,000
- One prosthetic limb factory provided with essential equipment worth \$20,000

The US army supplied a new van to the Kirkuk rehabilitation center to bring disabled people to ACDI/VOCA-sponsored vocational training classes. Using the computers supplied by ACDI/VOCA, the rehab center is moving beyond teaching basic courses like Word and Excel, and is starting to teach advanced computer programs like AutoCad, Photoshop and desktop publishing. Most of the ICAP Kirkuk-based training activities, from business development, conflict resolution to monitoring and evaluation are given in the rehabilitation center.

Establishment of entertainment center in Tikrit for people with disabilities

The city of Tikrit is well known as Saddam Hussein's home town. The Dijla rehabilitation center in Tikrit provides medical treatment, occupational therapy, psychological counseling, and has a small factory to produce artificial limbs. Doctors and other staff at the center were complaining that patients were not coming or not staying long enough for their treatment. The atmosphere at the center compounded the feelings of depression of many young patients and they went home. ACDI/VOCA renovated part of the center to become a new recreation hall. It built and supplied a cafeteria, a play station hall, an entertainment hall with chess and backgammon, a library, an archery hall, and a billiards hall. Now, young PWDs are happy to spend time at the center. But what are doctors saying? The patients are missing their appointments because of the Play Station!

Kirkuk Rehabilitation Center for Children

For many years there was only one rehabilitation center in Iraq dedicated to children. The center in Sulaymaniyah opened in 1993 and treats approximately 16,000 children per year. It serves a population of roughly two million. There are five pediatricians on staff to treat the region's children – who suffer from a variety of ailments: cerebral palsy, polio, Down's syndrome, spinal bifida, club foot and missing limbs.

ACDI/VOCA recognized the need for additional facilities to treat children, and funded a similar center in Kirkuk in 2006. ACDI/VOCA provided funding for equipment and also to send 6 technicians to Sulaymaniyah for a six month training course to learn the skills needed to manufacture and fit the prosthetics.

Dr. Nabeel Najam Alden, director of the Kirkukk Rehabilitation Center, visited the training center in Sulaymaniyah with a team from ACDI/VOCA. He was very excited about the project and quite satisfied with the progress of his technicians. Instructors on site told Dr. Najam Alden his students were quick to learn and had a good grasp of the technology required to successfully do the job. The group of six told Dr. Najam Alden they were keen to go to work at his center. The training course finished at the end of 2006.

The highly specialized tools, machines and materials required to produce state of the art equipment are not available in Iraq at present. However, this is an innovative group, and everything here is literally made from scratch. Artificial limbs, walkers, wheelchairs are among a few of the aid devices designed and built by the technicians. Dr. Najam Alden opened his center in January 2007 to meet the needs of children in Kirkuk and surrounding regions.



6.2.5. Livelihoods & Enterprise Development


The overwhelming majority of Marla Fund beneficiaries opted to use the available funds to start some means of income generation for themselves – roughly equal numbers of people opted for small businesses and agricultural projects.

Key Achievements

- Started 292 non-agriculture related small businesses with \$1.45 million in capital funding.
- Trained 99% of project holders in business management.
- Held fifteen business development training workshops for 266 project holders.

To put small business projects on a solid business foundation and strive for long-term sustainability, extensive trainings, both formal and informal, were given to project holders. ICAP staff, as part of their ongoing monitoring responsibilities, trained project holders in a range of business management skills.

Types of Marla Fund Business



In addition to the informal trainings, ACDI/VOCA’s Marla and Community Development staff worked with five local NGOs to train most of the project holders on individual or family projects. While many factors work towards the success of a small income generation project, ACDI/VOCA wanted to ensure that projects were launched on a solid business footing to lay the groundwork for long-term sustainability.

Are the new businesses making a profit?

In 2005, ACDI/VOCA conducted an evaluation of a sample of Marla businesses to assess the impact on the lives of the beneficiaries. Most businesses were found to be operating with a small profit margin, ranging generally from 50,000 ID to 150,000 ID a month (\$35-\$107). Thirteen percent of businesses declared a profit of up to 300,000 ID (\$215) a month. Retail stores were more profitable than livestock raising projects. Businesses in Kirkuk were the most profitable, with Tikriti businesses placing second, and Mosul businesses placing third. Most businesses in Mosul cited the bad security situation as having a serious impact on profits.

Location was a deciding factor in the success of projects. A good location meant a commercial area, inside the market, a crowded place, or close to public transport. Many stores in homes were also doing well, with neighboring children and women being the principal customers.

The best selling products varied from store to store. Meat and dairy products, children’s candy always seemed to do well. Ramadan and other holidays were the best selling months for grocery stores and before school for clothes shops.

What were the main factors undermining the new businesses? Competition was number one. Most people cited rival shops selling the same products for less as their principal problem. Sewing businesses fared poorly across the board blaming competition from cheap imports and the high price of cloth. Many shop owners had problems with inventory management, from managing inventory turnover to logistics to supply chain management. Also, many were purchasing items weekly, without taking advantage of economies of scale.

Livestock raising projects were less profitable than retail outlets. Only 10 percent of farms had more livestock at the time of the evaluation than upon start-up. This may have been due to seasonal buying and selling, or it may signal more serious underlying problems. Almost all farmers stated high fodder prices as their main problem, with the lack of water running a close second. Many women were also selling animal by-products like yoghurt, wool, and cheese.

On a positive note, the evaluations raised a number of clear training opportunities that could reinforce and build on the nascent business skills of Marla Fund beneficiaries for the future. ACDI/VOCA economic development staff could help farmers with fodder purchasing—how to find the best deals, and in agriculture sales—what other by-products could be sold. While most beneficiaries are not interested in forming a cooperative, they might join together briefly to increase their purchasing or selling power. Retail stores owners might be interested in courses on increasing sales, decreasing costs and increasing profits, or learning to compete with other businesses.

Business training in Kirkuk

The training started with brief introductions. The participants were asked to introduce the person beside them. When the first person started to introduce his seatmate, he started to cry, the seatmate started to cry, and then all the participants started to cry. An unusual beginning for a class in cost accounting. The trainer let them cry for a few minutes and then said, “God have mercy on their souls. And let us also remember the living. And how we can help them by making our projects succeed.” The following three days were spent discussing finance, accounting, cost projections and inventory. The participants were all victims of the coalition forces in Kirkuk. They had been badly injured themselves or had lost a family member. ACDI/VOCA had helped to rebuild their lives by giving them an income generation project. ACDI/VOCA staff were now training project holders in basic accounting and marketing to ensure that their projects were a financial success. Participants stayed the full three days and left giving mobile phone numbers to other project holders. Learning new business practices was very useful, they said. But they also appreciated sharing their experiences and pain with other people who were just like them.



7. CAP Findings

7.1. ICAP and the USAID/Iraq Transition Strategy Plan (2006-08)

On initiation of ICAP in 2003, there was no governing USAID strategy for Iraq, and no associated performance monitoring plan nor results framework whereby progress and results of ICAP could be compared.

In 2005, the USAID transition strategy for Iraq for 2006-2008 was introduced, to provide “a focused approach to essential issues, addressing the root causes of instability and building the foundation for a prosperous Iraq. It bridges the transition from the short-term provision of essential services to long-term, integrated, and Iraqi-led development.”⁹

The strategic plan followed three broad areas of intervention as laid out in the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. These included the Security, Economic, and Political Tracks.

ICAP I objectives and activities were closely aligned with many of the objectives and activities in the USAID strategy. An analysis of ICAP achievements with respect to the USAID strategy is as follows:

7.1.1. Security Track

“Linking stability with development will reduce incentives for violence and integrate key cities into longer-term development initiatives.”

Strategic city stabilization:

Activity	Objective	ICAP Achievement
Short- and long-term jobs for infrastructure rehabilitation	To provide unemployed and disengaged young men – often a key recruiting ground for the insurgency – with opportunities for employment and economic advancement.	Five major irrigation and infrastructure projects in strategic cities worth \$172,000 undertaken that utilized young people as labor. 11,600 days of labor created for young people.
Restore urban infrastructure, including sewage lines and water mains	To show Iraqis concrete improvements while providing the foundation for local development	106 Water and sanitation projects completed,
Sponsor or support key projects such as neighborhood cleanups, garbage collection, and infrastructure rehabilitation	Build confidence, Capacity, and support for bigger efforts to follow.	144 public works (cleanups, garden & amenity restoration) and infrastructure (electrical & telephone networks, roads, bridges) projects undertaken.
Support community-level action programs	Promote dialogue and decision-making by bringing together different segments of communities prone to conflict	93 Community Boards implemented 676 projects worth \$23,600,000 The majority of CAGs implemented more than one project
Support public broadcasts that address conflict issues	Address conflict issues as well as groups and individuals that promote cooperation.	ACDI/VOCA staff trained in conflict resolution 22 training workshops for all CAGs in all governorates

⁹ USAID/Iraq Transition Strategy Plan, 2006-2008

		Strategic partnership with the Iraqi Peace Builder's Network Iraq's first conflict resolution network created Local human rights associations supported to undertake conflict resolution activities Conflicts over water and power between communities mitigated through CAG activities
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Local services and local government Capacity:

Activity	Objective	ICAP Achievement
Help provincial and local councils build the Capacity to deliver essential services – power, water, waste water treatment	Enhance the living standards of average Iraqis and promote the legitimacy of provincial and local government	20 electrical projects and 163 cities, towns and villages assisted with water and sanitation services through collaboration with local government.

Continuing to support Iraqi communities

Activity	Objective	ICAP Achievement
Increase employment, support community action groups, and encourage direct citizen participation	Rehabilitation of Iraq	More than 7,000 long term jobs created and over 130,000 days of labor generated through project activities
Support locally-driven efforts and help communities work together toward their own goals	Encourage inter-ethnic cooperation and build Capacity; Community action development programs have proven successful in improving public infrastructure, meeting critical needs such as securing potable water, and helping citizens to organize and address governance problems on the local level.	All projects work through community boards, thus enhancing local democracy and participation of community stakeholders in the development process.
Develop advocacy skills for members of civil society, including women's advocacy groups	Effectively represent the needs of certain segments of the population and serve as watchdogs to combat government corruption.	Advocacy skills were part of the core training for all community development officers who passed the training onto CAGs. 445 CAG members and people with disabilities received specific training in advocacy in 2006 in order to further develop their skills.
Support the vital role played by the independent media	Inform Iraqi citizens of democratic principles and processes, and foster a dialogue among government officials and their constituents	Two radio stations established with ICAP funding

7.1.2. Economic Track – expansion of private sector opportunities

Activity	Objective	ICAP Achievement
Provide assistance to financial services providers to target the most resource-starved Iraqi entrepreneurs – primarily small and medium-sized business leaders	Increase access to financial services	Development of one agricultural bank serving 12,000 farmers funded
Provide agricultural assistance to farmers and extension officers	Strengthen agricultural Capacity and productivity	47 cooperatives established 31,000 days of labor generated

		<p>3,700 long term jobs created 8,506 men and women employed on a short or long term basis Healthy livestock due to vaccinations in approximately 450 villages Eight veterinary clinics supported with training and supplies Up to 80,000 acres of land supplied with irrigation water, improving production by up to 50%</p>
Provide technical assistance and training to Iraqi business associations and Iraqi micro-finance organizations,	Ensure that the Iraqi private sector has the tools necessary to grow.	<p>624 Apprentices trained for future employment Introduction of the INJAZ franchise to Iraq 2,215 people trained in business and livelihoods development 555 jobs created 47 cooperatives created</p>

7.1.3. Cross Cutting Themes

Sustainability and Capacity-Building

Activity	Objective	ICAP Achievement
Support civil society and media	Provide the Iraqi people with tools to strengthen demand for accountability and transparency and to demand institutional reform.	<p>93 community action groups formed and implementing projects 73 projects supporting civil society implemented Five public libraries rebuilt or renovated 22 youth, cultural or women’s centers established, rebuilt or renovated</p>
Encourage small and medium business	Encourage competition	<p>316 small – medium enterprises created 2,215 people trained in business and livelihoods development 555 enterprise jobs created 47 cooperatives created</p>
Support the growth of a vibrant civil society	Increase public awareness, citizen participation, and civil society oversight of government bodies.	<p>73 civil society projects implemented All community development projects undertaken with local authority participation Most CAGs incorporate local government members.</p>
Create media watch-groups, advocacy efforts, and local outreach campaigns ranging from cultural events to radio and television shows.		Funding provided for the establishment of two radio stations.

- Global Development Alliance

Activity	Objective	ICAP Achievement
Provide an opportunity for private sector partners to engage in stabilizing the country and to address sustainable development issues through infrastructure, essential services,		All ICAP projects engaged stakeholders from the private sector.

economic growth, governance, education and health.		
Allow businesses to develop expeditiously	Establish networks, augment skills, build partnerships with Iraqis, and integrate Iraq into the global economy dialogue	624 Apprentices trained for future employment Introduction of the INJAZ franchise to Iraq 2,215 people trained in business and livelihoods development

8. Conclusion

ICAP I was completed on March 31st 2007. During that time, 1,336 projects were successfully completed in eight governorates of Iraq, reaching millions of people with essential services, employment, capital for business development, training and skills, clean water, personal development, basic needs. Many of the most vulnerable in Iraqi society: women, children, the disabled have been especially sought out for assistance. Many innocent victims of fighting between coalition forces and the former regime of Saddam Hussein – people who were injured or the families of those who were killed – have received assistance to help them bear the loss of their loved one, and often the source of income for their family.

Such a wide-ranging program could not have been possible without the assistance of the Iraqi communities themselves, and the local governments that represent them. From a former culture of paternalism and favors, a solid groundswell of participant democracy has been generated, where community members, local government and local leaders come to a consensus on what is needed for their communities. This is a hard-to-measure but vitally important aspect of ICAP’s legacy in Iraq.

But there is still much to do. The security situation in Iraq – increasing insurgency, increasing violence and the daily stories of death and destruction -- are taking a heavy toll on the hopes and optimism of Iraqis. Many are choosing to leave their homes rather than face the threats of terrorism that they are subjected to. If Iraqis are to be hopeful for their future, they need help from the outside world to provide them with the tools they need to overcome the legacy of Saddam Hussein’s rule and the trials of the ongoing violence.

ICAP II started in October 2006. This program is already learning from the lessons and challenges of ICAP I and working with the community groups that undertook tremendous work over the past four years. With the dedication and training of the ICAP program staff members who have achieved so much since 2003 with Iraqi communities behind it, ICAP II is well positioned to build on the achievements of ICAP I.

9. Final Fiscal Report

9.1. Accruals

The attached SF-269 contains ACDI/VOCA ICAP's expenditures. By the end of the program, ACDI/VOCA expended 49,594,584.41, or **nearly 99%** of the total awarded **\$50,190,000** million.

9.2. Cost Share

As of March 2007, ACDI/VOCA has documented **\$6,516,335.57 million** in cost share.


9.3. SF-269

Attached please find the interim final SF-269. The final SF-269 will be submitted after ACDI/VOCA's 2007 NICRA is finalized in 2008.

1. Appendix 1 – Iraq Governorates and Districts



2. Appendix 2: ACDI/VOCA ICAP project procurement & implementation



3. Appendix 3: Aims, objectives/activities & indicators/targets for years 1/2/3

3.1. Year 1

Program Area	Activity	Result/Indicator
1. Civic participation activities (focusing on community committees)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community clean-up and other preventive health and sanitation programs • Conflict management activities • Informal women's, men's, youth's, or children's groups • Community based pre-school activities • Local community advocacy • Multi-ethnic/religious/confessional/tribal child and youth programs • Development and support for parent-teacher organizations • Community-based provision of social services to vulnerable populations • Community support for people with special needs and disabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • number of community committees established, • ethnic, religious, and gender composition, • level of activity, • level of community contribution and participation in community projects, • number and type of project beneficiaries, • number and make-up of cluster committees, • level and type of committee activity, • number and type of joint projects implemented, • level of inter-group participation and cooperation. • Value of community contribution to projects • Number of ICAP communities that utilize resources from other donor activities
2. Infrastructure development and renewal that accelerates, extends, and complements USAID's reconstruction initiative.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drinking and irrigation water supply & distribution rehabilitation/expansion • Water storage • Leak detection equipment and training • Road grading, drainage and culverts • Road asphaltting • Road marking and safety rails • Landslide protection • Street lighting • Rehabilitation of markets • Renovation of Schools • Renovation of Clinics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • infrastructure projects completed, • number of projects that bridge ethnic, religious or other lines of division, • improved services, • increased number of beneficiaries, • improved cost recovery,

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land fills • Community center rehabilitation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • better management, and improved sustainability
3. Income and employment generating activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training and employment for youth and demobilized soldiers • Economic projects that build linkages between divided groups and regions and employ at risk-populations • On farm irrigation projects • Small horticultural and greenhouse projects • Food processing facilities • Canning facilities • Tanning and leather works • Agribusiness information and information centers • Development of agriculture cooperatives • Shoe or textile industry • Small metal works • Tire re-conditioning • Business skills training • Business planning and related support services • Formation and strengthening of business associations • Trades training/job skills training • Public works employment • Agricultural inputs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • agricultural, service, or industrial Capacity increased,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • jobs created (particularly for young people),
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • income generated,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • local businesses engaged in community dialogue,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • economic links forged between different groups and regions,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increased government revenue,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • household incomes raised.
Environmental management activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managing competition over access to land and water • Rehabilitation of drainage canals • Energy and water efficiency initiatives • Environmental education initiatives • Water treatment and testing programs • Environmental advocacy and training programs • Medical waste disposal equipment • Solid waste disposal equipment • Wastewater collection and treatment • Solid waste collection and treatment • Wetland and protected area management • Environmental clean-up, especially hydrocarbon pollution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • number of environmental impact mitigation activities,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • number of competing claims to natural resources mediated,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • equitable access to resources by all groups demonstrated,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • awareness raised,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • positive environmental change,
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • improved health.

Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management of the program from Baghdad and locations within their AoR • De-centralization of operation to the assigned geographic area and utilize staff, partners, and other resources from the locality. • The extent to which project staff and program recipients reflect the ethnic, religious, gender and other demographic characteristics of the served communities. • Staff training, mentoring and other staff development techniques to be employed. • Wherever possible, local materials, supplies, labor, and contractors should be used. • Follow international standards in the design, tendering, and construction management of significant construction projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and location of ACDI/VOCA ICAP offices
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender, ethnic, religious breakdown of ACDI/VOCA national staff
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and type of staff trainings
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion of projects using local contractors, supplies and laborers
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of quality involved and quality control of infrastructure and construction projects.

3.2. Year 2

Sector I. Community Development (CD)
<i>Objective 1: Direct citizen participation in the rehabilitation of Iraq and involvement in political processes; and</i>
<i>Objective 2: Increased Capacity of Community Action Groups (CAGs) in advocacy and engagement of sub-national government.</i>
Sector II. Economic Development (ED)
A. Agriculture
<i>Objective 3: Enhance the self-sufficiency and number of business development models, perhaps including cooperatives, utilized by ICAP stakeholders, which are based on local conditions that may vary between governorates/regions; contribute to the development of a business-minded culture by fostering greater opportunities for community projects through a value chain systems approach.</i>
B. Youth and Short-Term Employment
<i>Objective 4: Provide short-term and high impact employment opportunities, such as agriculture infrastructure projects and small infrastructure repairs, focused in the strategic cities.</i>
C. Enhanced Economic Opportunities for Youth
<i>Objective 5: Increase the skills of youth and participation in the economic development of Iraq; link youth to long-term job opportunities.</i>
D. Increased Opportunities for Women and Other Under-represented Groups
<i>Objective 6: Create an institutional framework in Iraq to create sustainable jobs for under-represented groups.</i>
E. Business Development, Vocational Training and Apprenticeships
<i>Objective 7: Enhance self-sufficiency through training, small enterprise support and job creating activities for small and medium-scale enterprise and vocational training</i>
Sector III. Marla Ruzicka War Victims Assistance Fund
<i>Renovation and repair of social infrastructure that provide services to victims</i>
<i>Provision of medical and health services</i>
<i>Addressing special needs for orphans, children and vulnerable peoples through services or products</i>
<i>Provision of services and products for disabled people, including specialized equipment for acutely injured, including prosthetic limbs, wheelchairs, glass eyes etc.</i>
<i>Provide support for income and employment generation</i>
<i>Support home repair needs, including purchase of building materials for civilians whose homes were damaged, and limited home repairs, with priority and extra consideration given to elderly or infirm civilians who are unable to perform labor themselves</i>
<i>Support to targeted education activities and/or vocational training</i>
<i>Support to social institutions that provide specific services to victims</i>

3.3. Year 3

A: Direct citizen participation in the rehabilitation of Iraq and involvement in political processes	
I.	Infrastructure development
II.	Building the Capacity of community groups in governance, advocacy, conflict resolution
B: Income and employment generation	
I.	Agriculture
a.	Enhance the self-sufficiency and number of cooperatives. Create greater cooperative opportunities while focusing on the market chain systems approach
i.	Financial sustainability enhanced in 50 cooperatives,
ii.	business development training,
iii.	market linkage training
iv.	other Capacity building opportunities
v.	5-7 cooperatives established
vi.	Association building with Iraqi farmers
vii.	Improvement of agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation systems, agricultural feeder roads and greenhouses
viii.	Introduction of improved cultivation techniques
II.	Youth and Short-Term Employment
b.	Provide short-term and high impact employment opportunities through agriculture infrastructure projects (small irrigation channels and small infrastructure repairs) and focus on strategic cities: Kirkuk, Mosul, Talafar, Ba'qubah, Tikrit.
i.	Approximately 13,000 daily laborers in short term/seasonal employment for conflict-prone areas (\$250,000 in projects, at least 50% for labor)
III.	Enhancing Economic Opportunities for Youth
c.	Increase the skills of youth and participation in the economic development of Iraq; link youth to long-term job opportunities.
i.	Over 50 youth with increased skills, greater job opportunities
ii.	Piloting courses and mentoring sessions in Northern Iraq
IV.	Increased Opportunities for Women and Other Under-represented Groups
d.	Create an institutional framework in Iraq to create sustainable jobs for under-represented groups.
i.	Over 100 women and/or individuals from other under-represented groups with increased skills, greater job opportunities
ii.	Work with centers that provide basic skills training in both computers and English
iii.	Establish specialized service training centers to create income generating opportunities.
iv.	Train groups on how to proactively market and advertise and to negotiate contracts.
V.	Business Development, Vocational Training and Apprenticeships
e.	Enhance self-sufficiency through training, small enterprise support and job creating activities for small and medium-scale enterprise and vocational training
i.	300-350 small and micro-enterprises established or supported.
ii.	500 individual livelihoods assisted via apprentice program
iii.	Improve the quality and Capacity of already-established businesses through Business Development Training (BDT)
iv.	Assist existing enterprises to link up to microfinance institutions and other key economic development agents in the governorates north of Baghdad
v.	Work with Community Boards and Directorate of Education on strategic vocational direction
vi.	Provide apprentice incentive packages to current contractors and established enterprises in order to link to vocational institutions
vii.	Operate an apprentice program in the ACDI/VOCA Kirkuk office, hiring youth to work 1-3 months in its technical departments for experience.

C: Conflict Mitigation and Prevention	
I.	Delivering and designing advanced workshops for each level of the ACDI/VOCA staff on the integration of peace-building into community development
II.	Supporting the growth and consolidation of a network of Iraqi conflict resolution practitioners and educators.
D: Increased Capacity of Community Action Groups (CAGs) in advocacy and engagement of sub-national government.	
I.	Participatory community strategic planning exercises in targeted communities
II.	Promote awareness of the role and effectiveness of civic participation through trainings in leadership building, facilitation and Capacity building.
III.	Provide tools and resources for start-up NGOs through the ICSP program for those community groups that wish to start NGOs.
IV.	Build advocacy skills through engaging other successful advocacy organizations in the Middle East to train staff and selected board members of community groups.
V.	Build community board Capacity through increased knowledge and awareness of local governance
VI.	Pilot a youth “Shadow Council” from schools and universities in the north to replicate local government
E: Participation of women, youth and other under-represented groups	
I.	Further work with existing women’s groups through provision of community training.
II.	Pilot “Youth in Parliament” and “Youth Business Club” in the Kurdish north for replication in more conflict-affected areas
<i>Strategic Objectives for the Marla Ruzicka Fund Year 3 :</i>	
I.	A: Marla Fund and Economic Development staff will work with five NGOs already-trained in marketing, finance, accounting, budgeting, cost projection and inventory to train business that have already been set up through the Marla Fund.
II.	B: Increase the number of activities through expanding partnerships with local NGOs, particularly in Ba’qubah and Talafar
III.	C: Continue business training in partnership with VEGA

4. Appendix 4: Sample M&E forms

Field Monitoring Form (Standard)

1. Project ID

Full project code	()		
A/ V code	(AVxxx)		
M&E Status	(nothing done/ on-going monitoring/ monitoring done/ on-going evaluation/ evaluation done)		
Project year	(CAP1/2/3)		
Program Department	(CD/ ED/ Marla)		
Thematic Category	(can be more than one from: Civic Services, Environment, Health, Infrastructure, Schools & Education, Marla individual, Marla Community, Conflict Resolution, Advocacy, Training, Agriculture, Economic Development, Youth & Short-term Employment, Economic Opportunities for Youth, Women, Apprenticeship, Others)		
Program Objective	(only ONE objective from objectives 1-9)		
Project name	(name)		
Project location	(Governorate)	(District)	(Community)
M&E officer	(name)		
CD/ED/Marla officer	(name)		
NGO name	(name)		
NGO representative	(name)		
Disabled officer	(name)		
Date of visit	(yyyy/mm/dd)		
Number of visit	(1 st / 2 nd / 3 rd / etc.)		
Time-in / Time out	(time-in)	(time-out)	

2. Document check (> source of info / means of verification!)

Document check	Project proposal	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Bill of quantities	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Timesheets	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Invoices	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Budget	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Other records	(Note if something missing or incomplete)

3. Project background info and log-frame

(> Homework: copy from project proposal!)

Project back-ground	(Background info from project proposal)
Problem statement	(Problem statement from project proposal)
Project goal	(Project goal from project proposal)
Project holder info	(Who is it? What does he think about the project? Is he doing his job?)
Target group definition	(Who is the target group/population?)

	Objectives	Indicators	Means of verification
Impact			
Outcome			
Output			
Input			

4. Qualitative & Quantitative Indicators

Picture check	(Yes / no; if yes, how many?)
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Person(s) met	(Name and position of person(s) interviewed, like beneficiaries, project holder or local government representatives; if the interviews are in group, note the names of all participants and their different opinions!)
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Start date	(expected date)	(observed real date)	(If difference, why? Source of info?)
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Target group identification	(Are the beneficiaries really the target group/population defined in the project proposal? If not, why? If yes, which? Source of info?)
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Under-Represented groups	(If applicable, what is the contribution for under-represented groups, such as women, youth, disabled, minorities, war victims, etc.? in which proportion?)
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Direct beneficiaries	m	(expected number)	(real number)	(If difference, why? source of info?)
	f.	(expected number)	(real number)	(If difference, why? source of info?)
	t.	(expected number)	(real number)	(If difference, why? source of info?)

Community Board involvement	(Is the community board really involved? How? How many members? How actively? Source of info?)		
Comm. Contribution	(expected cost)	(real cost)	(If difference, why? source of info?)
Local gov. contribution	(expected cost)	(real cost)	(If difference, why? source of info?)
Other contribution	(expected cost)	(real cost)	(If difference, why? source of info?)
Total local contribution	(expected cost)	(real cost)	(If difference, why? source of info?)
% local share	(expected share)	(real cost)	(If difference, why? source of info?)

Equipment supply / Construction	(Count items, if anything missing note, Is the equipment functioning? Is it used? What was provided by ACDI/VOCA, what by local people? Who is really using it? Who is servicing?)		
	(How long did the supply take? If longer than expected, note why? Source of info?)		
	(If any additional supply or construction, is it completed? Really necessary? Source of info?)		

<p>Implementation problems</p>	<p>(Problems encountered during project design or implementation? Source of info?)</p>
<p>Recommendation/solution proposed/adopted by community board or project holder</p>	<p>(Which are the recommendations or solution proposed or adopted by the Community Board or the Project Holder regarding the above mentioned problems? Has the problem been solved? Source of info?)</p>
<p>Complaints</p>	<p>(By project holder, community, contractor or other?)</p>

Satisfaction	(Is the larger community in general satisfied with the project? Why? How? Source of info?)
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Recommendations by M&E Officer	(Note for CD/ED officers your recommendations regarding the four above mentioned questions and about the project in general)
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New problem	(Is the project creating any new problem in the community?)
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Obstacles	(Any obstacles for the monitoring process itself?)
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Competition / Synergies	(Are there other NGO involved in the same area? If yes, in which sector? Possibilities of synergies? For this point, see also the "Community Profiles" hold by MIS!)
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Field Evaluation Form (Community Boards)

5. Project ID

Full project code	()		
A/ V code	(AVxxx)		
M&E Status	(nothing done/ on-going monitoring/ monitoring done/ on-going evaluation/ evaluation done)		
Project year	(CAP1/2/3)		
Program Department	(CD/ ED/ Marla)		
Thematic Category	(can be more than one from: Civic Services, Environment, Health, Infrastructure, Schools & Education, Marla individual, Marla Community, Conflict Resolution, Advocacy, Training, Agriculture, Economic Development, Youth & Short-term Employment, Economic Opportunities for Youth, Women, Apprenticeship, Others)		
Program Objective	(only ONE objective from objectives 1-9)		
Project name	(name)		
Project location	(Governorate)	(District)	(Community)
M&E officer	(name)		
CD/ED/Marla officer	(name)		
NGO name	(name)		
NGO representative	(name)		
Disabled officer	(name)		
Date of visit	(yyyy/mm/dd)		
Number of visit	(1 st / 2 nd / 3 rd / etc.)		
Time-in / Time out	(time-in)	(time-out)	

6. Document check (> source of info / means of verification!)

Document check	Project proposal	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Bill of quantities	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Timesheets	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Invoices	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Budget	(Note if something missing or incomplete)
	Other records	(Note if something missing or incomplete)

7. Community board evaluation

Picture check	(yes / no, if yes, how many?)
Person(s) met	(Name and position of person(s) interviewed, like beneficiaries, project holder or local government representatives; if the interviews are in group, note the names of all participants and their different opinions!)

Identification	(Name of board, location (community, governorate), names of all members)
Composition	(Composition of actual board: number, position/profession, age, male/female, religion, nationality))
History	(When formed? Circumstances? How many founding members? (number, position/profession, age, male/female, religion, nationality))

Changes	(Any changes in membership? Why? Where there any conflict amongst members?)
Training	(What training did they receive? When? Who participated?)
Activity	(Which is the project they conduct? Other projects done by the board? What was their role in the project proposal?)
Involvement	(How is their actual involvement in the project implementation? Are they following-up the projects?)
Feedback	(Do they have regular meeting? Are they providing us with feed-back information?)

Relation A/ V	(How is their relation with ACDI/VOCA? Who is their contact person?)
Relation Community	(How is their interaction with their community? Apart the project, do they have other projects? How they solve conflicts in the community?)
Relation Local government	(What is their relationship to the local and other government (Governorate, Ministries, etc.)? Do they get support?)
Relation other organizations	(Do they have relations to other organizations? Which? What activity?)
Cross-check	(Ask some members of the community about the activities of the board?)

Problems	(Note the problems that you identified)
Observations	(Note what you can observe during the Board meeting)
Opinion (CAP)	(opinion of CAG members about the ICAP program as a whole)
Opinion (project)	(opinion of CAG members about the implemented project)
Recommendations	(Note your recommendations regarding the board)

5. Appendix 5: ICAP Cooperatives

#	ICAP year	Cooperative Type	Governorate	District	Cooperative Community	ICAP Contribution	Community Contribution
1	1	Hawija Beekeeping Cooperative	Tameem	Hawija	Hawija	17,000	6,719
2	1	Riyad Cattle fattening Cooperative	Tameem	Hawija	Riyad	54,000	39,109
3	1	Imam Askar Sheep fattening Cooperative	Diyala	Balad Roz	Imam Askar	16,640	8,032
4	1	Mesodya Beekeeping Cooperative	Diyala	Balad Roz	Mesodya	37,360	3,197
5	1	Shifta Cattle fattening Cooperative	Diyala	Ba'qubah	Shifta	33,100	1,200
6	1	Khanaqin Sheep-raising Cooperative	Diyala	Khanaqin	Khanaqin	32,950	41,491
7	1	Bartila Co-operative Dairy Farm	Ninewa	Hamdaniya	Bartila	128,660	130,529
8	1	Bahzany Cattle fattening Cooperative	Ninewa	Mosul	Bahzany	58,975	94,258
9	1	Tilkef Sheep milk Cooperative	Ninewa	Tilkef	Tilkef	81,108	47,494
10	1	Balad Fish farming Cooperative	Salah al Din	Balad	Balad	77,400	8,000
11	2	Abassi Fodder factory Cooperative	Tameem	Hawija	Abassi	48,450	16,416
12	2	Hawija Sheep raising Cooperative	Tameem	Hawija	Hawija	55,300	16,500
13	2	Rashad Sheep raising Cooperative	Tameem	Hawija	Rashad	86,460	26,900
14	2	Rashad Poultry farm Cooperative	Tameem	Hawija	Rashad	43,269	13,000
15	2	Rashad Fish farming Cooperative	Tameem	Hawija	Rashad	82,105	44,695
16	2	Moshkat Tile Making Cooperative	Tameem	Kirkuk	Kirkuk Cluster	36,188	15,525
17	2	Al Mahabba's Women's Hand-made Carpet Weaving Cooperative	Tameem	Kirkuk	Taza	25,590	6,700
18	2	Yaychi Cooperative for Calf Fattening	Tameem	Kirkuk	Yaychi	77,618	44,450
19	2	Shosh Beekeeping Cooperative	Dahuk	Aqra	Shosh	60,150	13,276
20	2	Al-Khalis Juice Factory Cooperative	Diyala	Al Khalis	Al Khalis	59,998	13,338
21	2	Al-Hillal Cooperative for Fattening Calves	Diyala	Al Khalis	Mansoriya	53,350	25,022
22	2	Al Rihman Cooperative for Sheep Raising.	Diyala	Al Khalis	Mansoriya	28,500	9,049
23	2	Al Baraka Carpentry Cooperative Society	Diyala	Al Khalis	Mansoriya	42,110	12,885
24	2	Al-Shifaa Beekeeping Cooperative	Diyala	Al Khalis	Mansoriya	34,220	9,631
25	2	Al Bayader Livestock Cooperative	Diyala	Al Khalis	Mansoriya	53,938	28,107
26	2	Mandaly Beekeeping Cooperative	Diyala	Balad Roz	Mandaly	18,897	15,476
27	2	Al-Tadamun Calves Fattening Cooperative	Diyala	Ba'qubah	Al-Ambakia	40,500	19,157
28	2	Al-Ataa Cooperative for Sheep Fattening	Diyala	Khanaqin	Jalawla	74,350	30,690
29	2	Al-Ekhaa Fast Food Shop Cooperative	Ninewa	Mosul	Mosul	47,434	12,260
30	2	Al-Hadba Handicapped Cooperative	Ninewa	Mosul	Mosul	59,415	23,669

31	2	Mosul Calf Fattening Cooperative	Ninewa	Mosul	Mosul	57,145	24,650
32	2	Sinjar Sewing Cooperative	Ninewa	Sinjar	Sinjar	44,290	11,820
33	2	Al-Keder Cooperative Farm.	Ninewa	Sinjar	Talafar	51,831	21,206
34	2	Al-Abiadh Horticulture Cooperative	Salah al Din	Balad	Ishaqi	75,931	39,310
35	2	Dijla Fish Farming Cooperative	Salah al Din	Tikrit	Al Alam	32,680	29,577
36	2	Al Alam Calf Fattening Cooperative.	Salah al Din	Tikrit	Al Alam	75,575	63,531
37	3	AL Ekha Cooperative	Tameem	Kirkuk	Kirkuk	75,300	22,000
38	3	Happiness and Lovely Brotherhood Weaving Cooperative for the Disabled	Tameem	Kirkuk	Kirkuk	52,900	20,505
39	3	Al-Anwar Printing Cooperative	Tameem	Kirkuk	Kirkuk	66,994	17,300
40	3	Al Iraq Sheep Raising Cooperative	Tameem	Kirkuk	Taza	67,550	41,706
41	3	AL Khalis Date Packaging and Pressing Cooperative	Diyala	Al Khalis	Al Khalis	65,500	22,500
42	3	Al-Waled Smithy Cooperative	Diyala	Ba'qubah	Ba'qubah	44,950	20,150
43	3	Alezdihar Peanut Packaging Cooperative	Diyala	Khanaqin	Jalawla	90,550	33,210
44	3	Ninewa Strawberry Cooperative	Ninewa	Mosul	Mosul	72,000	4,410
45	3	Ninewa Cooperative for Visual Arts	Ninewa	Mosul	Mosul	78,770	6,770
46	3	Mosul Carpentry Cooperative	Ninewa	Mosul	Mosul	64,730	18,628
47	3	Tikrit Fast Food Cooperative	Salah al Din	Tikrit	Tikrit	48,400	16,200

6. Appendix 6: ICAP Trainings

6.1. Training for ICAP Office-based Professional/Technical staff

	Training Topic	Training Type	Mo/Yr	Duration (Hrs)	Modules or Other Materials Used	Types of Trainees	Number of Trainees		
							Male	Female	Total
1	Introduction to the Conflict Resolution 1	Workshop	Jan-04	6	Power point/flip charts	Office Staff	1	0	1
2	Introduction to the Community Development	Workshop	Sep-04	18	Power point/flip charts/group work	Office Staff	1	0	1
3	Procurement manual and Procedure	Workshop	Feb-05	6	Power point/flip charts	Office Staff	1	0	1
4	Finance manual and Procedure	Workshop	Feb-05	6	Flip charts	Office Staff	1	0	1
5	Conflict Resolution TOT 1	Workshop	Mar-05	30	Power point/flip charts/group work	Office Staff	1	0	1
6	Conflict Resolution TOT 2	Workshop	May-05	12	Power point/flip charts	Office Staff	1	0	1
7	Advanced advocacy training	Workshop	May-05	12	Power point/flip charts	Office Staff	0	2	2
8	Photography Training	Training	May-05	3	Power point/flip charts	Office Staff	1	2	3
9	Facilitation skills and A/V strategic planning	Workshop	Jun-05	30	Flip charts/group work	Office Staff	1	1	2
10	Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity ACDI/VOCA management workshop.	Workshop	Jun-05	6	Flip charts/group work	Office Staff	1	0	1
11	Capturing Vision (Conflict sensitivity)	Workshop	Jun-05	12	Flip charts/group work	Office Staff	1	2	3
12	Community contribution	Workshop	Jun-05	5	group discussion	Office Staff	2	2	4
13	Retreat workshop to build community staff skills	Workshop	Sep-05	15	brain storming/group work	Office Staff	2	2	4
14	Community needs assessment workshop PRA	Workshop	Nov-05	30	Flip charts/group work	Office Staff	2	1	3
15	INJAZ training In Lebanon and Amman	Conference	Dec-05	8	DVD, CD, Handouts, presentation, field visit	Office Staff	0	2	2
16	Participatory Strategic Planning Workshop	Workshop	Dec-05	18	charts/group work	Office Staff	1	2	3
17	Moving Beyond / TOT conflict R.	Workshop	Jan-06	16	Power point/flip charts/group work	Office Staff	2	1	3
18	TOT & Advocacy training	Workshop	Mar-06	28	Power point/flip charts	Office Staff	1	2	3
19	INJAZ Master class and volunteer recruitment and training	Conference and workshop	Apr-06	8	CD, Field visit, Handouts	Office Staff	1	1	2
20	Advanced advocacy training	Workshop	Apr-06	8	Power point/flip charts	Office Staff	1	0	1
21	Ninth INTRAC (M&E) Evaluation Conference in Holland	Conference	Apr-06	18	Presentations and workshops	Director (OS)	1	0	1
22	Study Tour to A-V program in Serbia	Workshop	May-06	40	Power point/flip charts/site visits	Office Staff	1	0	1
23	Value chain training, Beirut	Workshop	May-06	40	Workshop	CD Staff	2	1	3
23	INJAZ training on facilitation skills, company course, job shadow & entrepreneurial master class.	Workshop	June-06	42	power point groups, exercise	Office Staff	2	1	3
24	Gender Equity and mainstreaming for CD & ED staff	Workshop	July-06	36	Flip charts/group work	CD & ED staff	5	4	9
25	Project Cycle Management by Bourham Kreitem	Workshop	Nov-06	60	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CD & ED staff	7	4	11
26	Cooperative Development by Don Breazeale.	Workshop	Nov-06	60	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CD & ED staff	5	3	8
27	Orientation and training for INJAZ volunteer consultants in Erbil(2)	Workshop	Jul-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	Volunteers	19	1	20
28	Orientation /training for INJAZ consultants in Mosul	Workshop	Aug-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	Volunteers	10	0	10

6.2. Training for ACIDI/VOCA Field Staff

	Training Topic	Training Type	Mo/Yr	Duration (Hrs)	Modules or Other Materials Used	Types of Trainees	Number of Trainees		
							Male	Female	Total
1	Procurement manual and procedures	Workshop	Feb-04	6	Manual	Field Staff	5	1	6
2	Introduction to Community Development	Workshop	Sept-04	18	Manual	Field Staff	2	1	3
3	Introduction to Conflict Resolution 3	Workshop	Dec-04	24	Manual	Field Staff	4	0	4
4	Project Design and Community Mobilization	Workshop	Dec-04	99	Flip chart, small group working, exercise	Field Staff	23	8	31
5	Conflict Resolution	Workshop	Dec-04	27	Flip chart, small groups	Field Staff	5	12	17
6	Finance manual and procedures	Workshop	Feb-05	6	Manual	Field Staff	5	1	6
7	Conflict Resolution TOT 1	Workshop	March-05	30	Manual	Field Staff	2	0	2
8	Conflict Resolution TOT 2	Workshop	March-05	12	Manual	Field Staff	2	0	2
9	TOT for Small Business Management	Workshop	May-05	28	Flip chart, small group working, exercise	Field Staff	3	8	11
10	Photography training	Practical	May-05	3	Practical	Field Staff	19	5	24
11	Facilitation skills and A/V strategic planning	Workshop	June-05	30	Manual	Field Staff	3	1	4
12	Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity; ACIDI/VOCA management workshop	Workshop	June-05	6	Manual	Field Staff	3	1	4
13	Conflict sensitivity	Workshop	June-05	12	Manual	Field Staff	11	4	15
14	Community contribution documentation training	Workshop	June-05	5	Flip charts, small group, exercise	Field Staff	13	2	15
15	Community mobilization skill training	Workshop	Sept-05	15	Flip charts, Group discussion	Field Staff	11	4	15
16	Conflict Sensitivity in Community Development	Workshop	Sept-05	24	Group discussion, Flip charts	Field & Office Staff	17	9	26
17	Monitoring and Evaluation materials and theories	Workshop	Nov-05	11	Manual book and flip charts	Field Officers	5	3	8
18	Monitoring and Evaluation materials and theories	Workshop	Nov-05	6	manual book and flip charts	M&E NGO Staff	12	0	12
19	Participatory Rapid Appraisal Methodology Training	Workshop	Nov-05	30	Manual	Field Staff	13	5	18
20	Advanced TOT on Conflict Resolution and Advocacy	Workshop	Nov-05	24	Flip charts, small group, exercise	Field Staff	20	8	28
21	Participatory Strategic Planning Workshop	Workshop	Dec-05	18	Flip charts, small group, exercise	Field Staff	13	4	17
22	Introduction to Conflict Resolution I	Workshop	Jan-06	6	Manual	Field Staff	3	0	3
23	TOT for Conflict Resolution	Workshop	Jan-06	16	Manual	Field Staff	2	1	3
24	Basic and Advanced Adobe InDesign 1.5 Training	Workshop /Practical	Feb-06	15	Private Tutoring; Computer-based	MIS Office Staff	1	1	2
25	Monitoring and Evaluation materials and theories	Workshop	March-06	10	manual book and flip charts	M&E Officers & NGO Staff	8	0	8
26	Enhancing conceptual understanding about community development	Online training	March-06		Hand out	Field Staff	16	6	22
27	TOT on Conflict Resolution and Advocacy	Workshop	March-06	24	Flip charts, small group, exercise	Field Staff	22	8	30
28	Introduction to conflict resolution 2	Workshop	April-06	6	lecture, group exercise	Field Staff	3	0	3
29	Advanced Advocacy Techniques	Workshop	April-06	9	Flip chart, groups, exercise	Field Staff	7	2	9
30	Advanced advocacy training	Workshop	May-06	12	lecture, group exercise	Field Staff	11	3	14
31	Study tour to A-V Program in Serbia	Study Tour	May-06	40	CD materials	Field Staff	4	1	5
32	Value Chain Methodology	Workshop	May-06	27	powerpoint group exercise	Field Staff	3	0	3
33	Cooperative creation and management	Workshop	May-06	24	powerpoint , group exercise	Field Staff	3	0	3

6.3. Training for ICAP Beneficiaries

	Training Topic	Training Type	Mo/Yr	Duration (Hrs)	Modules or Other Materials Used	Types of Trainees	Number of Trainees		
							Male	Female	Total
1	Community Development Mobilization Skills	Workshop	Mar-05	6	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	6	2	8
2	Community Development Mobilization Skills	Workshop	Mar-05	6	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	5	3	8
3	Community Development Mobilization Skills	Workshop	Apr-05	6	Group exercise/flipcharts	CAG members	9	5	14
4	Community Development Mobilization Skills	Workshop	Apr-05	6	Power point/lectures/flip charts	CAG members	5	1	6
5	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Aug-05	6	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	8	4	12
6	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Sep-05	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	15	8	23
7	Advanced TOT skill building	Workshop	Nov-05	24	Power point/lectures/flip charts	CAG members	51	4	55
8	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Jan-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	13	3	16
9	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Jan-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	11	3	14
10	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	11	3	14
11	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	18	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	13	3	16
12	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	11	6	17
13	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	12	2	14
14	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	11	3	14
15	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	13	5	18
16	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	8	5	13
17	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	6	1	7
18	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Feb-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	5	3	8
19	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	12	4	16
20	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	7	3	10
21	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	9	0	9
22	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	14	0	14
23	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	6	2	8
24	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	9	1	10
25	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	30	0	30
26	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	6	3	9
27	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	Mar-06	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	11	2	13
28	Conflict Resolution-Introduction	Workshop	38842	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	16	2	18
29	Joint project efforts with LGP & ADF (Creation of an NGO)	Workshop	38851	12	Power point/lectures/flip charts	CAG members	20	5	25
30	Joint project efforts with LGP & ADF (Creation of an NGO)	Workshop	38853	12	Power point/lectures/flip charts	CAG members	27	6	33
31	CAG member participation in provincial council meeting for	Meeting	38930	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	2	0	2

	NGO and media promotion								
32	CAG member training by the Iraq Civil Society Program (ICSP)	Workshop	38930	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	6	0	6
33	CAGs participation in Local Community sessions with RTI.	Workshop	38991	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	50	0	50
34	Advocacy training seminar for CAG members	Workshop	38991	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	10	7	17
35	Gender training for CAG members	Workshop	38991	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	9	6	15
36	Advocacy training for CAG members.	Workshop	38991	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	400	0	400
37	Advocacy training for CAG members	Workshop	38991	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	20	5	25
38	10 conflict resolution trainings in 5 governorates conducted by Iraqi Peace Builders Network for different NGOs/ coops or groups	Workshop	38991	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	NGO staff & CAG members	150	95	55
39	Gender mainstreaming workshop for CAG members from three communities	Workshop	39022	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	14	4	18
40	Gender training for CAG members in 18 communities	Workshop	39052	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	135	110	25
41	Gender training for CAG members from two communities	Workshop	39052	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	9	6	15
	Establish INJAZ apprenticeship program for recent graduates		38921	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	Young Graduates	30	30	60
	Establish INJAZ apprenticeship program for recent graduates in Diyala		38902	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	Young Graduates	50	50	100
	Establish INJAZ apprenticeship program for recent graduates in Tameem		38902	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	Young Graduates	40	40	80
	Joint project efforts with LGP & ICSP-ICSP part.		38959	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	CAG members	60	0	60
	Establish INJAZ apprenticeship program for recent graduates in Mosul		38922	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	Young Graduates	50	50	100
	Second INJAZ entrepreneurial master class training for students in Mosul / Tilkef		39118	12	Lectures / Group exercise / flipcharts	Young Graduates	32	18	50

**7. Appendix 7: Counterpart International Final Report
COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM IN ANBAR**



**COUNTERPART INTERNATIONAL
COMPLETION REPORT
(February 1, 2004 – October 31, 2006)**

Submitted to:
Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in Overseas
Cooperative Assistance (ACDIVOCA)

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In accordance with Agreement AFP-A-00-03-00003-00 Counterpart International is pleased to submit its Project Completion Report for the Community Action Program (CAP) in Anbar to ACDI/VOCA. In partnership with ACDI/VOCA, Counterpart implemented this \$4.5 million program, which is part of the larger USAID-funded *Iraq Community Action Plan (I-CAP)*, from February 1, 2004 – October 31, 2006. Counterpart worked in cooperation with communities in Anbar Governorate (including the population centers of Ramadi and Fallujah) to identify, select and approve projects for implementation in communities that build upon, stimulate and strengthen local resources and capacities. From project launch to close-out, Counterpart remained one of the only international NGOs operating in Anbar Governorate (including Fallujah and Ramadi), perhaps the most insecure area of responsibility (AOR) in Iraq.

CAP Anbar had three primary objectives: 1) establishment and activation of representative Community Action Groups (including youth, women, and ex-combatants) with the ability to prioritize, mobilize, oversee and ensure sustainability of activities; 2) increased short- and long-term employment for skilled/unskilled labor; and 3) improved social infrastructure available to target communities. In order to accomplish these objectives Counterpart worked with citizens to: identify community development priorities; elect 8-12 member, representative Community Action Groups (CAGs); design appropriate responses to community-defined priorities in coordination with local government; and manage USAID-funded grants to implement these social infrastructure and emergency assistance projects, including the hiring of local contractors and community laborers. This process encouraged citizen participation, created job opportunities, facilitated cooperation with local government and renewed essential infrastructure such as schools, water and sanitation networks, access roads and medical facilities.

Despite pervasive insecurity in Anbar, ranging from intense conflict between terrorist/insurgent forces and Coalition/Iraqi Forces to massive internal displacement of residents, Counterpart's exclusively local staff exhibited a tremendous amount of determination and ingenuity and achieved a number of significant successes. Over the life of the project, Counterpart achieved the following results: 1) established and trained 51 Community Action Groups; 2) completed work on 76 *Community Action Projects (CAPs)* and *Marla Ruzicka War Victims Fund (MRWVF) Projects* for a total value of over \$2.4 million in grant funding; 3) secured over \$488,273 (nearly 20%) in community and local government contribution in the form of labor, materials, equipment and other locally available resources; 4) created over 7,000 short and long term jobs; 5) disbursed \$28,000 in micro-loans to 28 applicants (\$1,000 each) including entrepreneurs and small business owners from Ramadi and Fallujah; and 6) benefited over 300,000 residents of Anbar Governorate.

II. PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS BY OBJECTIVE

Objective 1 – Establishment and mobilization of representative Community Action Groups (including youth, women, and ex-combatants) with the ability to prioritize community issues, work in cooperation with local government, mobilize resources, design and implement appropriate responses and ensure sustainability of activities.

Snapshot of Accomplishments – Objective 1				
# of CAGs	Districts Targeted	# of PCAPs Conducted	# of CAPs and Marla Projects	\$ Value of Community/Local Gov't Cost-Share
51	Ramadi, Fallujah, Hadytha, Khaldiya, Anna, Heet	52	76	\$488,243 (20% matching)

The idea of an organization or group providing community development services not connected with the central government, especially one that was created from the community itself, was completely foreign in Anbar Governorate. This became immediately apparent as Counterpart hired and trained staff (i.e. community mobilizers, engineers, program officers) from Ramadi and Fallujah in February 2004. New employees initially expressed a great deal of skepticism concerning the objectives and activities of the Iraq Community Action Plan; their previous experience with the U.S. and Central Government-led reconstruction initiatives led them to believe that the US and national officials told them *what* their problems were as well as *how* they should “fix” them. However, as they received training in Counterpart’s community mobilization methodologies, *problem identification, participatory community appraisal and community action planning*, their apprehension quickly dissipated. They became enthused about being able to transfer these skills and opportunities for locally-led development projects to their neighbors and other community members in Anbar; enabling them to take responsibility for the issues affecting their lives. This transformation would repeat itself again and again, as communities received training in community mobilization from Counterpart staff and elected Community Action Groups (CAGs) to lead development initiatives.

Although Counterpart local staff were forced, in many cases, to carry out mobilization and project implementation activities during brief lulls in Coalition Forces/insurgent

conflict, they nevertheless succeeded in establishing 51 Community Action Groups in Anbar Governorate, including: 37 in Ramadi (and surrounding villages), 10 in Fallujah, 1 in Hadytha, 1 in Khaldiya, 1 in Anna and 1 in Heet. These CAGs are both geographically and technically defined, ranging from the residents of rural villages around Ramadi (i.e. Soora, Zangora and Sajariya) to doctors, nurses, teachers, students' parents, handicapped service providers and recent graduates of Anbar University. While security conditions and the type of assistance needed in Anbar dictated that many CAGs were established for the specific purpose of renovating a particular social service facility (schools, clinics, access roads, etc.), and were not able to transition to a formal NGO or social service provider, there are exceptions. For example, the Fallujah Handicapped Association, which consisted of only a few staff and a temporary shelter, before receiving training and grant funding from Counterpart, is currently taking steps to register as an independent NGO and formalize their operations.

In order to establish and activate CAGs, Counterpart utilized the following four steps:

Step One – Problem Identification Workshop and Participatory Community Appraisal.

For communities where factionalism was a serious constraint to effective participatory planning, *Problem ID workshops* were implemented as a prelude to the Participatory Community Appraisal (PCA) process. Problem ID interventions (initial interviews, workshops, and follow-ups) are also conflict resolution tools that help alienated and hostile groups work together on common interests, ultimately helping them trust one another and reconcile differences. Problem ID workshops lead community participants, which included residents (male and female), local tribal and religious leaders, local government officials (when possible) and youth, through a process of Counterpart-facilitated dialogue in which they identified the sources, actors and options for resolution of conflict in their respective communities. The CAP-Anbar project team employed problem identification



workshops in highly conflicted target communities, including urban neighborhoods in Ramadi and Fallujah, *prior* to introducing the PCA process. Community coping mechanisms tended to be overwhelmed and the propensity towards conflict was greater in these particular communities than their rural counterparts as they witnessed higher levels of conflict/violence between insurgents and Coalition Forces, endured travel restrictions and curfews, experienced high levels of unemployment and suffered from a significant strain on social services as IDPs temporarily relocated to these cities in the wake of sectarian violence in Baghdad.

The *Participatory Community Appraisal* (PCA) is a flexible mechanism to mobilize citizens, local government and community organizations to self-define and prioritize local issues and resources. The PCA included a series of activities facilitated by the CAP Anbar project team, generally over a three-day period, to assess public opinion on basic issues and communal identification of priorities. Activities included community mapping, trend lines, focus groups and historical timelines, among others. Collected PCA results were reported to the community group for discussion, consensus and prioritization. It is important to note that the duration and level of detail gathered during the PCA was highly dependent on both the security situation and whether or not the community had assembled to discuss an emergency need. For example, residents in Soora Village outside of Ramadi went through the entire PCA process, eventually prioritizing the digging and paving of an access road to Ramadi City Center; on the other hand, residents of Fallujah, meeting to discuss the massive influx of Sunni internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Baghdad, went through a shortened PCA as their priority need was obvious – responding to the emergency shelter and food needs of the IDPs.

Step Two – Community Action Group (CAG) Selection. As a product of the PCA, individuals selected by a community and representing its demographics, local organizations, government and businesses, formed a Community Action Group (CAG), usually comprised of 5-10 members, responsible for transferring PCA results into action. Attention was given to ensuring that CAGs reflected ethnic, religious, gender and age composition, with special emphasis on youth and women participants. Including youth (typically working-age) was quite easy to accomplish in Anbar, as Counterpart mobilized two CAGs of IT and English language graduates from Anbar University and a number of CAGs consisting of teachers, students and students’ parents and employed a large number of youth from target communities in the implementation of CAP and MRWVF projects. However, the inclusion of women in CAGs and in project implementation presented a problem; as security deteriorated in Anbar Governorate, women became increasingly confined to their homes – further isolating them in an already religiously conservative society. Counterpart addressed this challenge by mobilizing a number of CAGs according to profession, including those where women were the primary employees; for example, Counterpart mobilized and worked with the Ramadi Teacher’s Institution for Girls to renovate and expand their school, which taught and certified female teachers. The CAP-Anbar project team—with community consensus—imparted guidelines for CAG membership and duties, and ensured CAGs are representative. Skills were transferred to each CAG so that they understood and oversaw each of the steps of the Community Action Plan development (see below). Counterpart transferred skills to CAG members including: proposal design; project management; and participatory monitoring and evaluation.

Step Three — Community Action Plan. CAGs are responsible for the design and implementation of a *Community Action Plan*, which serves as a flexible planning tool to help communities build and sustain their capacity to work in harmony. The Community Action Plans detail concrete steps for addressing the problem, including: (1) purpose of the activity, (2) needed and available resources inside and outside the community (including from local government), (3) costs, (4) division of responsibilities, (5)

monitoring, and (6) follow-up procedures. In Anbar these plans included strategies for resolving a number of community-identified problems in the short- or long-term. The CAP-Anbar project team helped CAGs develop Community Action Plans and monitored their progress. Each CAG created its own management structure for implementing its Community Action Plan, as well as internal monitoring and review procedures. The CAP-Anbar project team made available engineering and other specialized staff to ensure that prioritized problems were addressed, and appropriate solutions selected.

Step Four — Putting CAP into Action. Utilizing the information generated by communities during the PCA and CAP, Counterpart staff worked with the CAG to apply for a Community Action Project (CAP) or Marla Ruzicka War Victims Fund (MRWVF) Grant, designed to support a project addressing the community's greatest self-prioritized need. In order to qualify for a CAP grant, the CAG must have conducted a participatory needs assessment at the community level, involving all stakeholders – including community members, local government (when possible) and religious and tribal leaders – to ensure buy-in and investment from the beginning, promoting a sense of ownership and sustainability of project inputs beyond the LOP. The Community Action Project grant thus reinforces the PCA and CAP promoting empowered citizens and an engaged local government. It should be noted that applications for, and implementation of, MRWVF grants are shorter based on the fact that communities are in need of emergency assistance, although MRWVF grants used to rebuild social infrastructure damaged by conflict goes through the same process as CAPs. The size of grant was determined by the resource needs identified and rationalized in the planning process, with an average grant size of \$32,000 and a minimum of an additional 15 percent to be contributed by community and local government in the form of labor and supplies. Although Counterpart required a minimum of 15% for Community Action Projects, we did not enforce this requirement for MRWVF Project, based on the fact that communities required emergency assistance and were not placed to make additional contributions. It is important to reiterate that even in the highly conflicted environment of Anbar, with soaring unemployment and a decimated social infrastructure, Counterpart received nearly 20% (or \$488,243) in cost-share from local communities and government.

Although the PCA and CAP processes and Community Action Project grants can be used to design a variety of interventions, experience in Anbar demonstrated that the greatest community need typically involved the construction or renovation of essential social infrastructure (e.g. health care facilities, schools, access roads and water and sanitation systems), with an impact on a larger number of beneficiaries. This primary type of intervention was followed by the need for emergency assistance provided to internally displaced persons (IDPs) or residents of severely war-damaged areas.

From project initiation through completion Counterpart staff provided the following support to the CAGs in Anbar, the larger community and (occasionally) local government: 1) grant funding necessary to implement the Community Action Project or MRWVF Project and assistance to the CAG, selected building contractors, local leaders and local government officials in managing these funds in an efficient and transparent manner; 2) assistance to the CAG in identifying and paying local laborers from the community to create needed jobs; 3) training and technical assistance to the CAG, local laborers and contractors in engineering and other technical areas of project

implementation; and 4) training in monitoring and evaluation (up to 3 months after project completion) to ensure that projects adhere to local construction and labor standards and funds are managed according to Counterpart standards and procedures (*please see Attachment 1 – Training Table*).

Counterpart will continue to work with a number of the CAGs established in Fallujah during the implementation of the Community Action Program Phase II (CAP II); however we unfortunately have to report that security has deteriorated in Ramadi to the point where CAG training and projects have become impossible; Counterpart mobilizers continue to reach out to these Ramadi-based groups when conditions permit, and hope to be able to re-establish formal contact and activities as security improves.

Objective 2 – Increased short- and long-term employment for skilled/unskilled labor.

Snapshot of Accomplishments				
# of CAP and Marla Projects	# of Employment Days	# of Persons Employed	# of Short-Term Jobs Created	# of Long-Term Jobs Created
76	1,400	7,743	7,684	59

Community Action Projects have a significant income generation component. Once the project, including contractor and laborer needs, was vetted by the CAGs, it was incorporated into the Community Action Plan. The Plan guided the economic development activities for the community. Small-scale CAPs (under \$25,000) and MRWVF Projects were focused more on immediate, short-term employment of relatively unskilled laborers; these projects typically involved the provision of resources and supplies to schools and health care clinics (e.g. school uniforms, teaching supplies and medical supplies) or, in the case of MRWVF Projects, food and non-food items to IDPs. Alternatively, large-scale CAPs provided more long-term job opportunities for skilled laborers in construction, electricity, plumbing, etc. and/or for project beneficiaries who will work as staff in completed public service facilities or small business projects (i.e. trainers for English language and IT training facilities in Ramadi and Heet). Although short- and long-term laborers employed during construction projects were exclusively male, current female employees of social service facilities renovated by CAPs or MRWVF Projects directly benefited from rehabilitated and places of employment and new female employees were hired as facilities were expanded (e.g. Ramadi Teachers Institution).

Thus, Community Action Projects not only renovated essential infrastructure, they provided needed short-term employment opportunities (7,743) and training in vocational skills (carpentry, masonry, plumbing, etc.) that could be used to seek long-term employment. Counterpart, working in partnership with CAGs, created 59 long-term jobs including trainers in IT and English language skills at centers established by graduates of Anbar University in Ramadi and Heet, as well as permanent staff at the recently opened Fallujah Handicapped Association. Further, it is hoped that investment in human capital through improved education and health services has had a long-term impact on the ability

of members of the community to seek gainful employment. Unfortunately, the economic outlook in Ramadi is looking increasingly bleak to the extent that markets and daily labor activities are nearly stopped; damage to public markets from insurgent/Coalition Forces conflict, criminal activity and intimidation of local entrepreneurs, travel restrictions and general insecurity have crippled the Ramadi economy. Under CAP II, Counterpart is continuing to follow a policy of labor-intensive projects, concentrating on Fallujah where markets are functioning (albeit irregularly) and the security environment allows for social infrastructure projects.

Micro Finance Fund for Entrepreneurs. The purpose of the loan fund was to provide start-up or expansion capital in the form of loans not exceeding \$1,000 to local businesses and entrepreneurs in order to create long-term employment opportunities and to stimulate local economic growth. The loan fund was based primarily on the “solidarity group” model, in which community members (as represented by a CAG) who trust each other and agree, as a group, to cover the debt should a member of the CAG or community resident default. This group guarantee is the only collateral required for these loans. Counterpart and the respective CAG also considered providing individual loans, under the same terms except requiring collateral, for existing small businesses that want to expand. There was documented demand for this type of loan product, which did not exist in the communities in and around Ramadi and Fallujah, prior to CAP Anbar.

In order to prepare staff for this new component within CAP Anbar, Counterpart hosted a training workshop in basic and advanced concepts of micro-finance lending in Amman, Jordan from July 14–22 2005. Senior management and newly-hired micro-lending staff received training in basic and advanced concepts of micro-lending, best practices in micro-lending in Islamic countries, contextualizing the micro-lending program specifically for the Anbar environment, complying with USAID regulations concerning this type of program and how to train CAG members in these skills. Following the training, Counterpart program officers, community mobilizers and micro-lending staff conducted introductory training courses for CAGs and interested entrepreneurs in Ramadi and Fallujah, while simultaneously pursuing letters of endorsement from local religious leaders, whose acceptance of the program, especially in terms of the use of loan interest or “administrative fees,” was necessary prior to starting these activities. Shortly, thereafter Counterpart disbursed \$1,000 loans to 28 entrepreneurs from Ramadi and Fallujah in September and October 2005, representing businesses such as automotive repair, beekeeping and grocery stores.

Counterpart’s local micro-lending specialist and loan officer worked in close coordination with CAGs in Ramadi and Fallujah to disburse, manage, and monitor 28 micro-loans of \$1,000 each (for a total of \$28,000) during Year 2. Although Counterpart had a total of \$200,000 in funding dedicated to micro-loans, we were unable to disburse the remaining funds due to a rapid deterioration in security in early winter 2005 in Ramadi and Fallujah. Following ACDI/VOCA approval Counterpart re-directed these funds to additional Community Action Projects. However, despite the fact that security conditions prevented Counterpart staff from disbursing additional loans, it is important to note that there was not a single case of default among the original 28 loan recipients

during this 10-month program component. This makes the micro-loan component significant in the sense that even during rampant insecurity, the “solidarity” (or CAG Guarantor) model, proved to be very effective; utilizing the importance of the individual loan recipient’s reputation among the (tight-knit) communities of Ramadi and Fallujah, recipients made every effort to make timely payments and coordinate with their respective CAGs.

Further, although residents of Ramadi and Fallujah were not able to apply for additional micro-loans, due to insecurity, they continued to express interest in receiving additional training in this area in anticipation of the availability of loan funds in the future. In response to these requests, Counterpart conducted a three-day training workshop in micro-lending for entrepreneurs from Ramadi on March 10, 2006. Counterpart worked with Al Murtaqa Institution for Human Development in Baghdad, a local NGO with World Bank- certified trainers (including Usama Al-Ani, Professor of Economy and Development at the University of Baghdad) to conduct the event. Twenty-five participants, including 11 women, received training in basic concepts of micro-finance, repayment options, how to develop a budget utilizing the micro-loan, developing a marketing strategy and lending within the Islamic context. This was followed by another three-day workshop from May 30-June 1, in which Counterpart again worked with Al Murtaqa to offer training in basic concepts of micro-lending for entrepreneurs from Ramadi. Dr. Usama Al Ani, an instructor from the College of Economy and Administration at Baghdad University, led a team of six trainers in carrying out this second training, which attracted 25 participants. Following these trainings, participants were encouraged and provided with relevant contact information to seek other available sources of micro-loans to start or reinvigorate their businesses, including the USAID-funded IZDIHAR Program implemented by Louis Berger.

Objective 3 – Improved social infrastructure available to target communities.

Snapshot of Accomplishments								
#/\$ Value of CAPs	# of Beneficiaries (271,142)		#/\$ Value of Schools Renovated & Supplied	#/\$ Value of Health Care Facilities Renovated & Supplied	# of Access Roads Paved	#/\$ Value of Envir. Rehab. Projs.	#/\$ Value of Wat/San Projs.	#/\$ Value of Handicap ped Asst. Projs.
	Male	Female						
53*/ \$1,677,679	153,793	117,349	23/ \$476,621	8/ \$420,386	4/ \$341,966	10/ \$213,400	5/ \$140,400	2/ \$84,906

*The total number of CAPs is one higher in this column than in the total from the sector columns due to the fact that one project included two phases.

The level of damage to social infrastructure in Anbar Governorate cannot be overstated. Insurgent activities and successive Coalition Forces’ military operations (i.e. November 2004 siege of Fallujah, “Tiger” Operation in summer 2005, etc.) resulted in the widespread destruction of schools, health care facilities, access roads, water/sanitation systems and community markets. Compounded by significant travel restrictions and

curfews, physical damage to infrastructure created major gaps in the provision of essential social services, rampant unemployment and widespread public discontent and fear. In this environment, CAGs unsurprisingly and consistently cited the renovation of social infrastructure and cash-for-work employment as their first and second highest priorities. Counterpart responded by providing nearly \$1.7 million in USAID grant funding for Community Action Projects, which rehabilitated a number of primary and secondary schools, community health care clinics, hospitals, access roads and water/sanitation systems, as well as provided community members with (typically) short-term employment opportunities in carpentry, plumbing and masonry. The following is comprised of summaries of CAP achievements by sector:

Education. The majority of Community Action Projects, designed and implemented through the PCA and CAP processes, were focused on the renovation of educational institutions including primary and secondary schools, vocational training centers, a school for the deaf and universities. Counterpart provided technical support and \$476,621 in USAID-funded grants to CAGs in the implementation of 23 Community Action Projects, which: renovated (and in some cases expanded) physical infrastructure of facilities; provided teaching (including laboratory) equipment, computers, school supplies, school furniture and uniforms; and installed adequate water and sanitation systems.

- **Illustrative Education CAP -** Heet Sub-District is located approximately 150km to the west of Ramadi City. The city of Heet is well known for the quality of its educational system, its academic groups, and its teacher education program at Anbar University. However, despite this reputation Heet continues to suffer from a lack of facilities and resources for education and training in IT and language, primarily caused by years of governmental neglect in this area. A group of young adults originally from Heet, who recently received undergraduate and graduate degrees in IT and English language from Anbar University, contacted Counterpart in order to address this problem. After completing the participatory appraisal and action planning and CAG formation processes, the group decided to design, implement and administer a professional language and IT training center in Heet to be located in El Mashtel quarter. This Community Action Project, valued at \$20,160 in physical infrastructure renovation of the proposed facility and equipment procurement, will provide long-term employment to 17 young adult and, through its services, increase the marketable skills of residents who use the center. Following the success of this project, Counterpart was contacted by another group of recent graduates, from Ramadi, seeking to replicate this CAP. Utilizing



\$21,786 in grant funding, this newly-formed CAG developed a similar training center in Ramadi city center, which will provide long-term employment to 30 young adults and skills in IT and English to Ramadi residents, enhancing their prospects for employment.

Health. Secondary to education, CAGs in Anbar Governorate identified the renovation of health care facilities as the primary need in their respective communities; this was due to the fact that community clinics and hospitals were (almost completely) neglected during the last 20 years of the Hussein Regime in Anbar Governorate, and many of these institutions were severely damaged recently during hostilities between Coalition Forces and insurgents/terrorists operating in Anbar. Counterpart worked with a number of CAGs comprised of doctors, nurses and administrators of local health care facilities, in addition to residents, and provided \$420,386 in grant funding to support seven Community Action Projects, which constructed a new Primary and Emergency Health Care Center in Khaldiya, renovated and expanded the General Hospital of Hadytha and supplied laboratory and other medical equipment to several health care centers and community clinics in Ramadi and Fallujah. In one instance, CAP funding was used to help build the capacity of the Fallujah Municipality to properly assess and respond to emergency needs of its residents; providing over \$22,000 to procure needed water testing equipment and computer software used to monitor aid distribution efforts. These interventions restored the health care capacity of several target communities, improved the quality and expanded the number of services available to patients and provided physicians with modern equipment.

- **Illustrative Health CAP** - Counterpart established a Community Action Group in Khaldiya Sub-District located about 50km to the east of Ramadi. Working with Counterpart's community mobilizers, the CAG identified their primary priority as the establishment of a health care facility in the area. Without a hospital or health clinic, local residents desperately wanted a facility to access primary and emergency medical care. The residents, working in cooperation with local government, provided over \$51,000 in cost-share contributions for the facility, in the form of a large plot of land, volunteer labor and construction materials and equipment. This two phase project began in May 2005 but was not finished until spring 2006 due to pervasive insecurity in the area; Counterpart Engineer Mushtaq Talib was shot and killed by U.S. Forces during a routine site inspection (*see below under Challenges*). Now completed, the Health Center is expected to provide critical emergency and primary care health services to approximately 9,000 residents of Khaldiya and its surrounding communities. The Ministry of Health in Khaldiya recently announced that the Center will be named the Mushtaq Talib Health Center in honor of our departed colleague who sacrificed his life while working to finish this project.

Access Roads. In eastern Anbar, where community economies are largely agriculture based and heavily dependent on Ramadi and Fallujah for selling their produce, as well as for health care and educational services, access roads are critically important. A number of CAGs in rural villages outside of Ramadi prioritized the digging and paving of access

roads as their highest priority. These communities often witnessed less conflict than their urban counterparts but nevertheless suffered from a severely degraded road system, the result of chronic neglect by the Hussein Regime. Counterpart worked with CAGs from the villages of Soora, Zangora and Zweeger to pave over 7 km of access roads (a total 4 CAPs valued at \$341,966) leading into Ramadi City Center, improving their ability to access markets, hospitals, schools and other services only available in the city.

- **Illustrative Access Road CAP** - A Community Action Group was established in the village of El Soora, approximately 7km to the east of Ramadi City. As a result of previous governmental neglect, citizens of El Soora did not have adequate access to Ramadi City; as the village's economy is almost exclusively agriculture-based, the lack of access severely inhibited farmers' and harvester's ability to transport their produce to the markets in Ramadi. Additionally, residents depend on Ramadi for their emergency and primary health care as well as secondary schools for their children. During the participatory appraisal and action planning process the El Soora CAG decided to respond to this need by paving the primary access road (2km by 3m) to Ramadi City, which has improved access for approximately 12,000 citizens.

Environmental Rehabilitation. Due to the cessation of public services (such as garbage collection) during periods of conflict in Anbar and the aforementioned decades of central government neglect of this large governorate, several CAGs of urban residents in Ramadi prioritized environmental rehabilitation as an urgent need. CAG members noted that uncollected trash led to higher incidences of disease, especially among children, and that even in a war-torn city it was important to rehabilitate parks in order to lift people's spirits. Several CAGs representing residents from eastern and western Ramadi, a large apartment block and the outlying neighborhoods of Hay Al Baker, Hay Al Shurta and Hay Al Thayla received \$213,400 in grant funding and designed and implemented ten Community Action Projects, which rehabilitated public parks, collected and disposed of trash in urban neighborhoods and the city center and generally cleaned up polluted water sources and abandoned buildings.

Water and Sanitation. Chronic neglect of communities in Anbar also resulted in inadequate and severely degraded water and sanitation systems, leading to high rates of water born diseases (especially during spring and summer months) and illnesses resulting from a lack of proper human waste collection and disposal. Further, the local authorities in Ramadi did not have the capacity to properly test water sources being consumed by the population. As a result, CAGs in and outside of Ramadi designed, during the Community Action Planning process, several Community Action Projects to improve water systems (for human consumption) and community sanitation systems. Counterpart provided grants totaling \$140,400 to CAGs from Sijariya Village and the Al Sufya Neighborhood of Ramadi, and those representing a group of



primary schools in Ramadi and residents of a large apartment block in Ramadi. These CAPs installed water and sanitation networks for the apartment complex, the target primary schools and the village of Sijariya. Counterpart also worked with a CAG comprised of faculty and staff of the College of Science (Anbar University) to provide technical expertise and water testing equipment to the local government’s central laboratory in Ramadi. **Illustrative Water and Sanitation CAP** - (Please see Attachment 2 – Sijariya Village Success Story)

Handicapped. During Year 3 Counterpart was fortunate to work extensively with the Handicapped Association for Fallujah to implement several valuable Community Action Projects and MRWVF Projects, which directly addressed the needs of citizens handicapped by fighting between terrorist/insurgent forces and Coalition/Iraqi Forces (please see Attachment 3 – Fallujah Handicapped Association Success Story). The Association was originally established in the mid-1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, as part of a nationwide system of rehabilitation and medical care facilities for the handicapped. In 2003, with the fall of the Hussein Regime, the Fallujah branch became wholly independent. However, the structure was destroyed during Coalition Forces’ counter-insurgency operations in Fallujah in November 2004. Simultaneously, the number of handicapped residents in Fallujah rose dramatically, as a number of civilians were physically disabled by explosions and shooting within the city center. As a result of the loss of their facility, the staff was forced to temporarily re-locate to an abandoned (and damaged) public building. At this location, Counterpart worked with the Association to implement three Marla Projects (see below) directly distributing wheelchairs to 250 handicapped residents of Fallujah for a total value of \$44,000.

After this initial success the Association’s administrative staff and physicians took a further step by working with Counterpart to form a CAG and design an appropriate action plan to re-establish the Center and improve their services. Further, the Center’s Director, Hussein Matrood, worked with the Fallujah Municipality to procure a two-story building for the project, valued at nearly \$115,000 in cost-share. Once the building (the former Directorate of Education near the Al Sediq Mosque) was secured, CAG members, local contractors and Counterpart staff began renovation activities: replacing tiles, refurbishing the WCs, installing an internal water and sewage network, installing windows and doors, plastering and painting walls and adding a large hall for physical therapy. Following the physical rehabilitation Counterpart then provided a range of equipment and supplies for the Center, including: laboratory equipment, crutches, wheelchairs, audiological equipment, office furniture and equipment, and exercise equipment for physical therapy. These two projects were supported through \$84,906 in CAP funding and will benefit over 9,000 handicapped residents of Fallujah.

Marla Ruzicka War Victims Fund

Snapshot of Accomplishments				
#/\$ Value of Marla Projects	# of Beneficiaries (20,413)	#/\$ Value of IDP Asst. Projs.	#/\$ Value of School Supply Projs.	#/\$ Value of Wheelchair Projs.

	Male	Female			
23/ \$726,280	9,518	10,895	16/ \$549,427	4/ \$132,853	3/ \$44,000

The need for Marla Ruzicka War Victims Fund (MRWVF) Projects was overwhelming during CAP Anbar due to several key events: 1) the military siege of Fallujah in November 2004 and subsequent, successive military campaigns for nearly a year; 2) insurgent/terrorist attacks and ensuing counter-insurgency operations by Coalition and Iraqi Forces along the Syrian border (e.g. Al Qaim) in fall 2005 displacing thousands of families to population centers further east (e.g. Anna, Rawa and Heet); and 3) sectarian violence in Baghdad, which displaced thousands of Sunni families west to Fallujah and surrounding villages. Following a year of sustained insurgent/Coalition Forces fighting in Fallujah, the city’s social infrastructure was decimated with primary/secondary schools’ and hospitals’ physical infrastructure severely damaged, health clinics unable to keep up with the rapidly increasing number of wounded residents and unemployment soaring. Fallujah’s capacity to employ and care for its citizens was further strained by significant number of families fleeing to the area from sectarian violence in Baghdad.

Although security conditions did not permit Counterpart to set up operations in Fallujah during 2004, Counterpart did respond to the needs of Fallujah residents who fled the city to Baghdad during the military siege in November of that year. By working with representatives of these IDP families, representing nearly 8,500 residents, and host community members and municipal officials in Baghdad, Counterpart utilized over \$145,042 in MRWVF funding to procure and distribute food (rice, flour, milk, cooking oil, canned foods) and non-food items (blankets, kerosene heaters, plastic sheeting, etc.) to the IDPs temporarily residing in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Redwanyah, Ameryah, Gazalya and at the University of Baghdad. These initial contacts with the citizens of Fallujah provided an entry point for Counterpart to start up activities in Fallujah city center during the beginning of 2006, as travel restrictions were eased, armed conflict decreased and residents were desperate for work and the immediate renovation of educational and health care facilities. Counterpart immediately mobilized two CAGs representing the students, students’ parents, administrators and teachers of several local schools, and then worked with these CAGs to design and implement four projects providing critically needed supplies (teaching equipment, laboratory equipment,



uniforms, desks, etc.) to Al Fao Primary Schools for Boys and Girls, Al Nahdah High School for Girls and Al Abed Secondary School for Boys totaling \$132,853.

Emergency assistance to families of IDPs, utilizing MRWVF continued throughout 2006. As previously mentioned, the ongoing conflict between insurgents and Coalition/Iraq National Guard forces along the Syrian border forced thousands of families to flee their homes in Huseiba, Karbala and Al Qaim. Thousands more fled from Baghdad to escape Shi'ite and Sunni militia-led violence, with huge numbers of Sunni families temporarily relocating to Fallujah. As a result of the growing need of these civilian victims of war, Counterpart directed \$97,860 to provide food and non-food emergency assistance to 2,625 IDPs from Huseiba, Karbala and Al Qaim who temporarily relocated to the city of Anna, as well as \$306,525 to provide emergency assistance to 7,775 IDPs who fled sectarian violence in Baghdad and were temporarily housed in Al Janabi Hospital and the Red Crescent Building in Fallujah. These projects provided critically needed food and supplies to IDP families (many of whom were children) and relieved pressure on officials in Fallujah whose social services were already overburdened by sustained conflict in the area during the previous year.

Finally (and as previously mentioned), Counterpart worked extensively with the Fallujah Handicapped Association to respond to the dramatically increasing number of Fallujah residents physically disabled during conflicts between Coalition/Iraqi Forces and terrorist/insurgent groups. In addition to the CAPs referenced above, Counterpart worked with the Association to implement three Marla Projects, distributing new wheelchairs to 250 handicapped residents of Fallujah for a total value of \$44,000.

III. CHALLENGES

Insecurity in Anbar. The predominant challenge faced by Counterpart in Anbar was (unsurprisingly) security. When Counterpart launched operations in February 2004 our local staff focused on Ramadi and villages surrounding the city; although security incidents did occur, occasionally disrupting activities, Counterpart did mobilize 37 CAGs in and around Ramadi and implemented 41 Community Action Projects during years one and two. During this same time, Counterpart was unable to work in Fallujah, which was the scene of frequent and high-intensity conflicts between insurgents/terrorists and Coalition Forces. Travel restrictions in and out of Fallujah, house-to-house searches by Coalition Forces, curfews, a significant presence of terrorist and insurgent groups, the siege of Fallujah in November 2004, counterinsurgent sweeps in summer of 2005 (e.g. Tiger Operation) and outright fighting between terrorists/insurgents and Coalition Forces (including Iraqi National Guard), prevented Counterpart staff from traveling to and mobilizing communities in Fallujah.

However, in the beginning of year three (summer 2005) this situation was reversed. While many insurgent forces had been rooted out of Fallujah and residents were battle-



fatigued, leading to increased receptivity to community mobilization and development activities, Ramadi had become a haven for organized criminal elements and insurgent/terrorist groups; Counterpart mobilized 10 CAGs and implemented 24 MRWVF Projects in Fallujah during this time. In fact Counterpart's satellite office in Ramadi was attacked by a group of criminals intent on robbery on November 19, 2004, during which our security guard Layth Ibrahim was shot and killed and several computers were stolen. Although this was the only such attack on a Counterpart office, criminals (many of whom doubled as insurgents) gained increasing control over the streets of Ramadi and counterinsurgency operations by Coalition Forces increased in intensity. One particular operation, carried out during May and June, necessitated the evacuation of Ramadi city center, displacing thousands of residents, including the families of Counterpart staff. These deteriorating security conditions forced Counterpart to relocate the CAP Anbar hub office to Baghdad in the summer of 2005, adopting a remote management structure.

In addition to the tragic loss of life of Layth Ibrahim in November 2004, Counterpart was deeply saddened to report that on November 20th, 2005 its staff member **Mr. Mushtaq Talib**, Engineer for CAP Anbar, was shot and killed by U.S. Forces at the Khaldiya Health Center in Khaldiya, Iraq. Mushtaq, along with a local building contractor and the community committee representative for Khaldiya, were unarmed and conducting a routine inspection of the Health Center, recently constructed by Counterpart International and the Khaldiya CAG when the incident occurred. An official incident report was sent to USAID and ACDI/VOCA on January 4, 2006, following an extensive internal investigation and verification of eyewitness accounts. In the aftermath of the incident the USAID Iraq Office in Washington, D.C. pushed for a thorough investigation by the U.S. Military into the shooting. Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS) are currently in the process of investigating the incident, although hampered by security conditions in Anbar, and regularly communicate with Counterpart field staff in an effort to resolve this tragic incident.

In another incident involving U.S. Forces on April 27th, 2006 Counterpart's staff member Mr. Ahmed Matny, Community Mobilization Officer for CAP Anbar, along with his father was arrested, detained and abused by U.S. Forces in Ramadi. Although neither he nor his father were the target of the military raid against their house, they were interrogated for three days and then released without explanation or further action. It should be noted that Ahmed presented the soldiers his Counterpart ID Badge, documents describing the work of Counterpart (a USAID implementing partner) in Iraq and contact information for Counterpart's Office in Baghdad, all in English. However these documents were summarily ignored. The USAID Iraq Office immediately submitted the Counterpart incident report to, and followed up with, military commanders in Iraq, and the NCIS continues to investigate.

Sectarian Violence and Displacement. Compounding the insecurity in Anbar, sectarian violence in Baghdad reached an all-time high in the summer of 2006 (and violence continues to increase). Since the bombing of two Shi'ite shrines in Samara in February 2006, attacks and counter-attacks by Sunni and Shi'ite militias escalated dramatically in Baghdad, which resulted in the deaths of 70 civilians per day (average) during this

period; this number is now higher. House-to-house searches and terrorist attacks by the Sadr Militia and other Sunni and Shi'ite armed groups spilled over to Al Mansour neighborhood where Counterpart's Baghdad office is located, making it very difficult for Baghdad-based staff to travel to communities in Anbar and for staff based in Anbar to travel to Baghdad. Sectarian violence also created an unprecedented swell in civilian displacement as families living in the neighborhoods of Doora, Abu Ghraib, Amrya, Sha'ab and Baghdad El Jadida were forced to leave their houses in Baghdad and escape to either the south (Shi'ites) or to the west (Sunnis) in Anbar governorate (typically Fallujah). Displacement to Fallujah created a severe strain on available housing/shelter, social services and employment in a city already severely damaged and made economically stagnant by armed conflict.

Suspicion and Distrust Among Communities in Anbar. The people of Anbar Governorate, especially in the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, have been and continue to be some of the fiercest opponents of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. As fighting between Coalition Forces and insurgent/terrorist groups has severely disrupted the economies of these cities, ravaged social infrastructure and restricted movement, discontent has grown even more. Although recent examples of religious and tribal leaders in Ramadi and Fallujah taking stands against foreign fighters (including Al Qaeda), and in certain cases dispatching their armed militias against these fighters, public sentiment continues to be both anti-U.S. and anti-national government – as they perceive the Shi'ite dominated government as anti-Sunni (the majority of Anbar). This point is illustrated by the fact that the Provincial Council for Anbar (which is over 70% Shi'ite) has only met once in the last six months and conducts its operations behind U.S.-defended military bunkers. Even city councils are often viewed with suspicion. Finally, residents are very reluctant (and occasionally opposed) to accept international aid, especially from the U.S. Government.

Obviously, implementing the USAID-funded CAP Anbar within this environment of suspicion has been a tremendous challenge for Counterpart. Unlike our operations anywhere else in the world, Counterpart has been forced to operate under the guise of a local organization (“Al Matheel” – “Counterpart” in Arabic), and has only been able to convey to communities that we receive a “variety of international aid.” Since the beginning of operations Counterpart has been eager for conditions to become permitting where we could announce that our funding is from USAID and that improvements in community decision-making, infrastructure renewal and job creation have been due in part to the generosity of the American people. Sadly, however the toll of fighting, absence of rule of law and increasing criminality (especially in Ramadi) have made this impossible, so Counterpart has continued to operate “under the radar,” attempting to build trust with communities, improve people's lives and reduce the propensity for conflict according to changing security conditions and residents' willingness to cooperate.

IV. OVERCOMING CHALLENGES – LESSONS LEARNED

Counterpart's successes in overcoming the challenges described above in Anbar Governorate are primarily due to an exclusively localized approach, flexible operational

capability and low operational profile. As a result of this approach Counterpart has been able to work with CAGs to implement a number of community mobilization and development activities even during high levels of conflict and has developed a reputation for responding directly and immediately to needs expressed by beneficiary communities.

During the two years and nine months Counterpart implemented the Community Action Program in Anbar, we gleaned the following lessons learned, which are currently being applied to other Iraq programs, including CAP II, as well as in other parts of the world defined by high levels of conflict:

- ***Localization, from the beginning, is critical.*** Since the beginning of operations in Iraq in March 2003, Counterpart has only employed Iraqis, utilizing expatriate personnel on a short-term basis for intensive training and technical assistance for local staff and for regular project monitoring and evaluation. This approach became even more important in Anbar where expatriate personnel would have immediately been in danger; due to pervasive levels of distrust of foreigners Counterpart would not have been able to implement community mobilization or development activities. The majority of the CAP Anbar staff is from Ramadi and Fallujah, with only two staff members originally from Baghdad. As previously mentioned, Counterpart utilized the Arabic name Al Matheel to safely and effectively operate in Anbar, as US-based NGOs are still not accepted in the area.
- ***In areas of high-level conflict and rapidly changing security indicators, flexibility and decentralized decision-making is paramount.*** As a result of utilizing local staff that are aware of security threats in their communities, we were able to flexibly and quickly change the focus of our operations to target areas, which have a relatively secure operating environment (e.g. Ramadi to Fallujah at the end of Year 2). Further, by equipping local staff with the necessary management skills and understanding of Counterpart security protocols through intensive training, local staff based first in Ramadi and then in Baghdad, had the capacity to respond immediately and in compliance with donor regulations, to the changing security environment in Anbar.
- ***Being able to travel freely and work effectively in Anbar demands a low operational and security profile.*** Counterpart's operations throughout Anbar were carried out using a low operational and security profile, with the use of local cars and drivers, local (and trusted) residents as staff and offices in residential areas. The use of expatriate personnel, compound-like office, bullet-proof vehicles or heavily armed security details would have made reduced Counterpart's security working in Anbar and would have immediately eliminated our staff's capacity to implement programs.
- ***Coordination between Counterpart field staff and Coalition Forces in Anbar is essential, within certain communication parameters.*** The tragic shooting death of Mushtaq Talib and detention of Ahmed Matny demonstrated a significant need for increased coordination between our field staff and the U.S. and Iraqi Military operating in Anbar. Although direct public interface with military personnel in the open or at the Forward Operating Base in Fallujah would put staff at great risk,

Counterpart scaled up electronic communication and occasionally met with military personnel, including investigators from the Naval Criminal Intelligence Service, in the Green Zone in Baghdad. Counterpart is applying this lesson learned through regular and detailed communications with the USAID Representative on the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) for Anbar; further, Counterpart hosted two commanding officers from the Marine Second Expeditionary Force, which is preparing to deploy to Fallujah in order to discuss both their and Counterpart's operational realities and recommendations for improved communication in Anbar. Upon deployment they will meet with selected Counterpart local staff to discuss the implementation of CAP II.

- ***Maintaining contact with CAGs during times of heightened insecurity and quickly providing emergency assistance (vs. formal CAPs) when needed is valuable in terms of enhancing Counterpart's reputation and ability to operate among local communities.*** Rapidly deteriorating security conditions in Anbar, as previously mentioned occasionally disrupted community mobilization and Community Action Project activities. These disruptions often occurred in the form of large-scale military operations, which either severely damaged social infrastructure and/or created massive displacement of IDPs into (and out of) Fallujah, Anna and other parts of Anbar. Staying in touch with CAGs, through home-based community mobilization officers, was invaluable in maintaining (and enhancing) Counterpart reputation with target communities. Further, by utilizing the MRWVF Counterpart was able to immediately reach out to these communities in need whether providing food and non-food items to IDPs or by immediately renovating a damaged school, health care clinic or other needed facility.
- ***Understanding the local context and timing interventions appropriately is important for integrating gender awareness and balance into programming.*** Conservative social attitudes and practices, especially concerning women, are prevalent throughout Anbar Governorate, in both rural and urban areas. Since the onset of conflict in 2003 and rising insecurity in Anbar, women have become increasingly isolated in their homes. Counterpart's local staff from Anbar, acutely aware of these conditions, did not immediately begin mandating that women be included in community mobilization and development activities. Rather, after gaining trust from communities through the successful implementation of Community Action Projects, Counterpart staff began discussing the needs of women with (typically male) CAG members, encouraging them to allow women in the community to participate in the same process. This gradual and collaborative approach worked well as women in the community and groups of female professionals (i.e. teachers, nurses, etc.) began approaching Counterpart staff to go through mobilization activities and implement CAPs directly addressing their own needs; men from the community or their professional colleagues participated in these initiatives but generally in a support (e.g. volunteer labor, liaising with local leaders, etc.) role.
- ***Including a variety of local tribal and religious leaders and representatives in community mobilization and development activities promotes wider community***

inclusion, combats confessionalist attitudes (loyalty based on sectarian ties), and avoids reinforcing traditional power relationships. Prior to beginning mobilization activities, Counterpart staff went to great lengths to identify all tribal and religious leaders/groups in target communities; this effort was made easier by the fact that most of the local staff were from Ramadi and Fallujah. Instead of working only with the most powerful tribe, imam or other leader, Counterpart made sure to include a range of these figures as well as their “constituents” in both the initial stages of participatory community appraisal, action planning and CAG formation, as well as in CAP implementation (including securing cost-share from various sources). By doing so, Counterpart promoted widespread inclusion in the decision-making process among all stakeholders and reduced traditional tendencies to rely on one figurehead associated with a particular tribe or religious sect.

V. CONCLUSION

The Community Action Program in Anbar experienced a number of significant challenges during the 2 years and 9 months, which Counterpart carried out activities in Anbar Governorate. The Counterpart Iraq staff, and organization at large, suffered the tragic loss of Mushtaq Talib and Layth Ibrahim as well as the unlawful treatment of Ahmed Matny. However, the fact that our exclusively local staff were able to mobilize 51 elected, represented Community Action Groups, create over 7,000 short- and long-term jobs, implement 76 Community Action and MRWVF Projects valued at over \$2.4 million in USAID grant funding, and secure nearly 20% in community and local government support is a testament to their bravery under dangerous conditions, innovative thinking in mobilizing and working with CAGs and commitment to the rebuilding of their communities and their country. Our staff’s success offers proof that with the right training and financial resources, Iraqis can and will identify and address their own needs, even in the most difficult of circumstances. The enthusiasm with which our staff from Ramadi and Fallujah embraced the participatory appraisal and action planning process was demonstrated again and again, from city neighborhoods in Ramadi and Fallujah to rural residents in western Anbar to groups of professionals such as doctors, teachers and local government officials. News of the success of Community Action Projects and MRWVF Projects continues to spread, as Counterpart still receives requests for mobilization and development activities from communities in Anbar. Of course, sectarian violence continues to force more IDPs from Baghdad into Anbar, the level of damage to social infrastructure in Fallujah remains daunting and Anbar will require many more resources to make up for the decades of neglect under the Hussein



regime. Under the auspices of CAP II Counterpart will continue to work with trusted and qualified CAGs in Anbar, capitalize on the multiplier effect created by successes in CAP Anbar and remain committed to promoting participatory decision-making, creating jobs and renewing social infrastructure in this war-torn region of Iraq.