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**FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF REPORT REPRINT**

P581

**EMERGENCY  
RELIEF IN  
NIGERIA  
AND THE  
BIAFRAN  
ENCLAVE**

A I D.  
Reference Center  
Room 1656 NS

**July 1967  
Through  
June 30, 1969**

REPRINT FROM Ninth Report, Fiscal Year 1969  
Foreign Disaster Emergency Relief  
issued by  
Disaster Relief Coordinator  
Agency for International Development

2

NIGERIA

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISASTER

|                  |   |                          |
|------------------|---|--------------------------|
| EVENT            | Civil Strife  |                          |
| DATE-TIME        | July 1967 through June 30, 1969                       |                          |
| LOCATION:        | Eastern Nigeria                                       |                          |
| DISASTER VICTIMS | Estimated Deaths                                      | Estimated People in Need |
|                  | Exact figures not available.                          | 1.5 million (FMG)        |
|                  | Possibly as many as -                                 | 2.0 million (Biafra)     |
|                  | 1 million   | 3.5 million              |
| DAMAGES          | Estimated War Costs *                                 |                          |
|                  | Physical Damage .....                                 | \$ 700 million           |
|                  | Foreign Exchange and local<br>currency expenses ..... | 756 million              |
|                  |   | \$1.456                  |

\*Based on figures released to the news from Nigeria in April of 1969.

This case study replaces the one in the Seventh Report. The emergency in Nigeria continues. The AID Disaster Relief Coordinator took a major part in USG disaster relief operations through December 31, 1968. On February 22, 1969, President Nixon announced the appointment of Ambassador C. Clyde Ferguson as Special Coordinator for Relief for Nigeria/Biafra. Information in this study contains data received from many sources through June 30, 1969, to complete the fiscal year. Those parts bearing upon the political conditions and situation are based upon reports issued by the Department of State.

SYNOPSIS

The declaration of war by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) against the Biafran secession was issued July 6, 1967. By the spring of 1968 the spectre of widespread famine caused worldwide concern. In the fall of 1968 reports of thousands of people starving daily put great pressure on many governments and relief organizations to save civilian lives, particularly the children.



Enugu - October 1968

Large amounts of publicity and propaganda were generated in the United States to help Biafra. Most of it ignored the fact that starvation was occurring not only in Biafra, but also in Federal Nigeria. Many of these news items mentioned the threat to continued existence of the Ibo tribe. People were urged to write to the President and members of Congress to do something for the Biafrans.

During the winter and spring of 1969 resolutions were introduced in both the Senate and the House

calling for large contributions by the USG as well as greater involvement in ways and means of getting the food to Nigeria/Biafra. Several members of Congress went to Nigeria and Biafra and many reports on their findings were issued.

The USG was urged to take such steps as (1) exerting pressure to obtain a cease fire; (2) seeking ways to have the matter placed before the General Assembly of the United Nations; (3) using its noncombat planes to deliver relief supplies to Biafra;

(4) developing and obtaining an alternate land or sea route acceptable to both sides; and (5) becoming more and more involved in this internal struggle. All concerned were anxious that the tide of starvation be turned back in Biafra. A few cautious observations were made against the type of involvement that could develop into another "Vietnam situation".



Uyo - October 1968

U. S. Government officials worked unceasingly to meet the

humanitarian needs. Through diplomatic channels, efforts were made to get a cease fire. There was some success with the former but not with the cease fire. All the time, the pressures exerted by many groups for the US to do more and more continued. By the end of June 1969 the Agency for International Development had allotted \$28 million in cash, and food valued at \$38 million was committed by AID and the Department of Agriculture. Four stratocruisers were sold by the U. S. Air Force at nominal cost to the ICRC and JCA International, and a special coordinator for the Nigeria relief operation was appointed by the President.

Throughout this report, readers should be aware of the subtle but guiding influence of the USG in encouraging, assisting and financing many of the relief operations performed by international organizations. In many respects this was good. It was a factor in bringing 30 other nations in as donors and sponsors. It left open significant and meaningful roles for individuals, groups of volunteers and other nations. It encouraged donations of funds, things and services. As well as can be recorded by DRC, the value of this assistance from the rest of the world up until June 30, 1969 was \$83 million. Together with the USG contribution of \$66 million and U. S. voluntary agency aid valued at \$11 million, the total world-wide was \$160 million.

Relief operations from the start were complicated by military, political, economic and local factors. Complex problems of logistics affected every movement of relief supplies.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) used air, sea and land transport to aid the people in FMG areas. Food and medical supplies for Biafra were delivered by airlift conducted at night from Fernando Po and Dahomey by the ICRC and from Sao Tome by Joint Church Aid (JCA).

By June 1, 1969, ICRC, JCA, other relief groups and nations had sent sufficient high protein type food to avert starvation and drastically reduce kwashiorkor and malnutrition in FMG areas and in the Biafran enclave. Local food production, particularly carbohydrates, was increased on both sides. Stockpiles of these foods exist in several forward areas of the FMG. No stocks of imported foods were or could be built up in Biafra because of the inability of the airlifts to exceed the current demands.

Alarming developments during the first week in June 1969 brought new fears of impending famine for the Biafran enclave. An ICRC relief plane was shot down during a night flight to Uli airfield in Biafra, forcing ICRC to suspend its airlifts from Dahomey and Santa Isabel as of June 15, 1969. JCA severely curtailed its airlifts from Sao Tome at the same time. The ICRC was summarily relieved of its coordinating and operational relief role in Nigeria by the FMG on June 30, 1969. The function was assigned to Nigeria Commission for Rehabilitation, now titled Nigeria National Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation, which began negotiations with ICRC for phasing out its operational role in FMG areas. The FMG declared again its opposition to night relief flights to Biafra warning of further military action if they continued. It indicated that it would accept daylight flights into the rebel area if the planes touched down in Lagos or were inspected by the FMG.

As this reporting period closes, the Biafran-held area has shrunk from 29,000 square miles and 13 million people to 3,000 square miles with about four million population. Despite the success of the local food production, the need to find an acceptable means for supplying high protein food to Biafra was becoming more and more urgent. Again, foreign governments, international organizations and voluntary agencies were imploring both sides to agree to daylight flights and to surface delivery of food by the USG proposed Cross River route, and to undertake cease fire negotiations.

#### DESCRIPTION OF THE DISASTER

In any consideration of this disaster, it is important to know the background and history of the African continent as a whole and of Nigeria in particular, attitudes toward territorial change and the reaction of foreign governments and international organizations to the secession of Eastern Nigeria. These can be found on pages 77-83. Details on the relief problems, operations and international aid follow.

#### RELIEF SUPPLY PROBLEMS

The nature of the war complicated the delivery of supplies to both sides but especially to the Biafran enclave. The needs of civilian victims were subordinated to political and military advantage by both Federal Nigeria and Biafra. These problems continue. Many sacrifices were made by relief workers and air crews to bring food to the hungry people and sixteen of them died in this cause as of June 30, 1969. A list of these people is contained on page 83. Their work and that of the many governments and people who contributed to the relief operations meant another year of life for millions of people. New threats of famine face the people in the Biafran enclave due to the severe reduction in night flights and lack of agreement between the two sides on procedures for daylight flights or implementation of the USG proposed surface delivery route on the Cross River.

#### Political and Military Influences

For approximately two years, both sides accepted food and medical assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross, other nations, voluntary organizations and church groups--provided the relief operations did not interfere with their primary military objectives.

On the FMG side, land, water and air routes were available. There was constant difficulty in determining relief requirements. Military action would shift people from one side to the other. Lack of road maintenance, inadequate roads, and destroyed bridges created logistical problems in movement of large quantities of supplies. The volume of food arriving at Lagos brought pressure for clearances, storage and prompt movement resulting in bottlenecks and delays.

For Biafra, night airlifts by the ICRC and a consortium of religious organizations known as Joint Church Aid (International) was used to deliver food and medicine starting in March 1968 to June 15, 1969 when ICRC flights


were suspended. Repeated attempts to get mutual agreement for other methods of delivery to Biafra have not yet succeeded. Daylight flights to Biafra were proposed as being more effective in bringing in relief supplies and less hazardous than night flights. The FMG agreed to daylight flights provided no arms flights occurred at the same time. Biafra would not agree because of fear of FMG military action in conjunction with the relief flights and contamination of the food. Biafran proposals were for a water corridor up the Niger River and an additional airstrip built solely for relief inside Biafra. The many restrictions, military and physical, placed by both sides, rendered these proposals impractical.

In early November, 1968, after proposing that all relief flights to Biafra be made to Uli by day, the FMG declared that it would interdict night flights into Biafra because the Uli airstrip was being used for delivery of arms and ammunition as well as relief supplies.

There were periods of time when the FMG did little to prevent the night relief flights into Biafra by ICRC and JCA from the off shore islands and Dahomey. During one of these periods beginning in April and through the first two weeks in May of 1969, there was a remarkable airlift performance by ICRC and JCA. They averaged over 300 tons a night of food, medicines and relief supplies and on one night the amount was 400 tons. For the purpose of these flights, night for the pilots began before sundown and continued until after sunrise.

Military action stepped up in the Spring of 1969. Umuahia, the Biafran headquarters, fell to the FMG, while Owerri was retaken by Biafra, becoming its new headquarters. Following this there were further reports of harassment of relief flights by the Nigerian Air Force. In late May, 1969, air raids were made by Biafra in FMG territory under the command of a Swedish pilot formerly connected with relief flights. The raids were performed

with very small planes and were effective. Angered by these air raids, the FMG began more and more to denounce night airlifts into Uli. On June 5-6, the Nigerian Air Force shot down an ICRC relief plane, killing all four crew members. Only a few ICRC flights were made after this incident, and in mid-June ICRC halted its airlifts. ICRC initiated efforts to reach an agreement on relief flights. JCA continued to fly but the number of flights was reduced.



#### Famine Relieved

Despite very difficult and dangerous circumstances, ICRC and JCA delivered sufficient protein-type foods to halt starvation deaths and reduce malnutrition and disease to manageable proportions on

both sides. This was acknowledged by Biafran leader General Ojukwu on May 30 and June 1, 1969, when he publicly stated the food problem had been solved. U. S. Ambassador Ferguson, on a visit to Biafra in early June, confirmed that there were no new cases of starvation or severe malnutrition. Disastrous events in June and hardening of positions may wipe out this success.

#### Situation and Political Stalemate as of June 30, 1969

On June 18, 1969, it was reported that both sides had agreed in principle on a river route that would involve the use of a 900-ton capacity former World War II landing craft under private charter to ICRC to go up the Cross River to deliver food into the Biafran enclave. This was a USG proposal which offered great promise but as of the end of June attempts to get agreements from both sides on its operation remained frustrated.

The FMG issued a statement at a meeting on June 30 attended by international voluntary agencies working in Nigeria/Biafra which in effect said that ICRC would no longer be needed to coordinate the relief program in Nigeria, nor to solicit funds or supplies on its behalf. The FMG emphasized that this role would be taken over by the National Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation, which would assume responsibility for relief to both sides. The FMG's statement indicated that relief supplies to rebel-held areas, whether by air, sea, river or land, must be cleared through inspection in Lagos or other approved points. Biafra rejected daylight flights from FMG territory but indicated it would agree to such flights from outside Nigeria with inspection of cargoes by neutral observers.

#### BIAFRA

##### Actions Leading to Secession

Following the mass slaying of Ibos in the fall of 1966 and before the FMG blockade which began in May of 1967, Biafran authorities had had about six months to make preparations for war which was declared in July 1967. It was able not only to build stocks of war materiel but also to import reserve supplies of medicines and other necessities and to increase the food supply. Also, for some months during the blockade, fish, cattle, salt, and other foods were smuggled in through creeks and back roads along the permeable borders. Consequently, the blockade by the FMG did not immediately have a serious effect on the food intake of the people.

##### Famine Reports Increase

By spring of 1968, the protein intake had declined. Caloric intake had also dropped more than was usual during the "hungry season" (March through May or June).

Port Harcourt was taken by the FMG in May of 1968. This was the beginning of the truly critical food problem inside the enclave of Biafra. International relief organizations had begun airlifting medicines and some food

into the area starting in March, 1968, as reports reached the outside world of increasing numbers of civilian victims. The fall of Port Harcourt caused considerable reduction in the amount of food that could be smuggled into Biafra. Also, there was a sudden influx of large numbers of persons who had fled from Port Harcourt. As Federal forces advanced northwards, thousands of Ibos fled from the captured towns into the bush or into the now greatly reduced Biafran enclave, thus compounding the food problem.

By summer of 1968, the death rate reportedly rose well above the normal death rate of about 500 per day for a population of 7 million. No firm figures on number of people dying daily from starvation were available but there were statements by Biafran authorities and numerous organizations which gave estimates ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 deaths per day. Extensive press coverage and public relations activities put pressure on the world to help the Biafrans. During the period from July to November 1968, estimates of the total number who died ranged from 500,000 to over a million. The death rate began to decline in November, and by December deaths from famine were considered to be well below the early autumn levels. Although improved conditions were reportedly credited to the airlift of protein foods by Joint Church Aid and the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the supply of cassava and yams from the fall harvest, the full facts on what happened inside Biafra may never be recorded. A relatively quiet military situation allowed the civilians to work out better means for distribution of food supplies and to apply self-help measures to increase food production.

#### Relief Action Taken by Biafra

The civilian emergency developed slowly following the outbreak of the war, but by the summer of 1968 it had become a disaster of major magnitude. Biafran officials established a rehabilitation commission, set up relief camps, nutritional clinics and feeding centers, accepted international donations of food and medicines, initiated an intensive food production program, carried out health treatment and disease prevention programs, and reluctantly allowed the evacuation of some of its children for treatment in nearby countries.

#### Biafra Rehabilitation Commission

In 1966, a Rehabilitation Commission was established primarily to aid in rehabilitation or resettlement of the Ibo people who returned to eastern Nigeria from other parts of the country. When Biafra decided to announce secession in May of 1967, this commission was expanded to include responsibility for the care and welfare of all the people in Biafra who were in need as a result of the secession and blockade.

Resident Commissioners were appointed for the following zones: Aba/Annang, Umuahia/Abakaliki, Oji River, Orlu/Okigwi, Onitsha/Awka and Owerri/Port Harcourt. Cooperating with the members of the commission were representatives of the Catholic Mission, World Council of Churches, International Committee of the Red Cross, and a representative each from the Biafran Directorates for Food Supply, Food Production, Fuel Supply, Medical Supply, Clothing and Housing.



The Resident Commissioners were responsible for surveying their particular zones to report progress or failure in relief operations to the whole commission and to suggest methods of improvement in the care and welfare of the refugees.

### Refugee Camps, Nutritional Clinics, Feeding Centers in Biafra

Community development projects, especially schools and town halls, had been numerous in Biafra. Therefore, when the war broke out, many public buildings in the towns and rural areas were available for use by the homeless and for provision of other essential services. Shelter for many months after the onset of war was not a major problem.

In general, refugee camps were set up in schools with not less than 250 persons per camp. Essential dormitory facilities, kitchen, latrine, bathroom, lights, etc., were provided by voluntary community effort, refugees' labor and from official Biafran administration sources. Each camp had a register showing names, sex, and family units of people in the camp and also a visitor's register. Camp directors were charged with providing necessary information on requirements of the refugees such as food, clothing, transport, fuel, accommodations, medical needs and sources of personal income.



Biafran child on arrival Gabon for treatment 4/69

Camp storekeepers maintained registers of food received and daily rations issued. Each camp was expected to be closely integrated with the community in which situated, since this policy had enabled many to meet some of their problems by obtaining land for vegetable gardens and firewood for cooking.

In May of 1968, when kwashiorkor (severe protein deficiency) became prevalent among refugees in and out of the camps, the Rehabilitation Commission appointed a Special

Committee to study the situation and recommend appropriate remedial measures. The Committee recommended establishment of Nutritional Clinics or Feeding Centers in all Biafran villages to offer protein-rich meals to all destitute children. Village relief committees were set up to stimulate local food contributions and to administer imported protein-rich food brought in by the existing air bridges. The Biafran administrative machinery throughout the enclave was involved in the civilian relief program. Every Provincial

Secretary appointed a high administrative official as the Refugee Officer to take charge of relief activities throughout the province. The village relief committees were committed to uniform and equitable distribution of relief supplies in all parts of Biafra.

Following is a report on the number, location, and population of refugee camps and feeding centers in Biafra as of January 4, 1969

| Province<br>Location | Number of<br>Camps | Population<br>of Camps | Feeding<br>Centers | People Fed<br>at Feeding<br>Centers |
|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Aba                  | 168                | 121,000                | 123                | 144,196                             |
| Abakliki             | 96                 | 78,866                 | 74                 | 55,866                              |
| Amnang               | 8                  | 24,714                 | 67                 | 49,179                              |
| Awka                 | 127                | 60,000                 | 140                | 70,000                              |
| Oji River            | 58                 | 45,506                 | 15                 | ?                                   |
| Okigwi               | 143                | 134,673                | 159                | 155,527                             |
| Onitsha              | 199                | 50,331                 | 335                | 94,526                              |
| Orlu                 | 154                | 48,752                 | 218                | 132,000                             |
| Owerri               | 227                | 106,303                | 222                | 570,000                             |
| Umuahia              | 95                 | 32,017                 | 150                | ?                                   |
| Uyo                  | 5                  | 5,785                  | 25                 | 6,802                               |
|                      | 1,280              | 707,947                | 1,528              | 1,278,096                           |

#### Emergency Food Program Inside Biafra

Early in the emergency, Biafrans used self-help measures in the battle against malnutrition. At the instigation of the Rehabilitation Commission the people planted beans, ground-nuts and vegetables where they lived and in school farms. These foods played an important part in reducing incidence of malnutrition. The people also ate grasshoppers and other exotic sources of protein, as they have in other periods of food shortages in and outside Biafra.

On January 17, 1969, General Ojukwu launched an Emergency Food Production Program called the Land Army. The program was aimed at mobilizing all available resources in Biafra for increased food production and elimination of malnutrition and death by starvation. Although relief organizations were airlifting needed protein foods into the enclave, by January 1969, Biafra was also threatened by a shortage of staple and bulky carbohydrate foods. The Emergency Food Production Program was established to increase food production of these kinds of food over a two-year period by bringing new land into cultivation and encouraging or requiring farming and gardening by the following: (a) individuals and family units, (b) communities and cooperate societies, (c) a land army of men and women mobilized for food production only, (d) governmental and quasi-governmental food producing agencies, (e) institutions, organizations, and various Christian missions.



Ambassador Ferguson  
in Biafra June 1969



Emergency Food Production  
Biafra - June 1969

Based on reports received in June of 1969, the Land Army in Biafra is a success. The first crop of maize was ready the last week in May and was better in quantity and quality than normal. Indications were that it might be possible to have a second maize crop.

Other factors improving the food situation were the food being brought into the enclave from adjacent areas by "bush traffic by head", the cassavas and yams which began to appear in the local markets, and a reinstatement of commercial transactions. Chickens brought in by airlift in April were thriving throughout the enclave. Still another factor was the capture of Owerri by Biafra. There was a large food crop in the ground in Owerri that gave immediate help to those inside the enclave.


## Health Treatment and Disease Prevention in Biafra

Because of the reportedly high death rate and ill health among displaced persons early in 1968, the medical care and welfare of the people were accorded top priority by the Biafran Rehabilitation Commission. A meeting was held on March 28, 1968, attended by representatives of the Ministry of Health, Rehabilitation Commission, voluntary agencies, and relief bodies. A sub-committee of the combined group was appointed to advise the Rehabilitation Commission on medical matters. The Sub-committee effected the assignment of one resident nurse to each camp. The Biafra National Red Cross assigned a team of voluntary workers to each camp, improving hygiene, organizing transportation of seriously sick refugees to the nearest hospitals, and bringing drugs to the camps. Red Cross personnel also were effective in identifying children with kwashiorkor and bringing them and other needy persons to the nutritional clinics for attention. Medical work in the camps was supervised by a medical officer and a nursing or health sister for each zone. They held at least one clinic a week in each camp.


Mobile medical clinics provided medical support at the feeding centers. Medical and health officials administered vitamin and iron tablets to those requiring them at the feeding centers and referred all serious cases of kwashiorkor to sickbays or hospitals. Facilities available for the treatment of Biafran children in hospitals had been reduced by war, and at the height of the kwashiorkor crisis, the need for makeshift hospitals for the intensive treatment of the disease became imperative. The first kwashiorkor sickbays were set up by voluntary agency workers, and the Rehabilitation Commission Medical Sub-Committee extended the idea to all provinces, stimulating local interest in their institution and suggesting one sickbay for every 15 refugee camps. They also laid down nominal requirements in staffing and equipment before establishing the sickbays, for example 92 kwashiorkor sickbays had been established by December 1968, caring for 6,620 persons. In the camps, feeding centers, and sickbays, there were about 600 nurses, 60 nursing/health sisters, and 25 senior medical students. Their work was supervised by 40 doctors.

Inoculation programs against smallpox were carried out in many of the Biafran camps early in the war, but vaccinations against measles, polio, pertussis, and tetanus were delayed. In January, 1969, inoculation programs for measles and smallpox for Biafran children were begun, with the joint participation of pediatricians of the University of Biafra Medical School, Biafran Ministry of Health, UNICEF, and ICRC (through which the U S Agency for International Development provided funds for the immunization programs). Although there had been some outbreaks of measles, no major measles epidemics had occurred in Biafra through December, 1968. By June 15, 726,851 had been vaccinated against measles and 1,826,131 against smallpox.

Common diseases among the displaced persons included malaria, dysentery, infectious childhood diseases, tuberculosis, undernutrition, malnutrition, hookworm, worms, and others.



Biafran children receiving treatment at French Military Hospital in Gabon - April 1969



Biafran children at Caritas Camp in Gabon  
April 1969

that child care programs should be operated within Biafra and that children should not be taken out of the country under anyone else's juridical control. They permitted some children to leave with the understanding that this was only on a temporary basis.

The work of the kwashiorkor sickbays would have been impossible without the relief supplies provided by ICRC, Caritas, and the World Council of Churches, and other voluntary organizations, the devotion to duty of Biafran nurses and medical officers, and the support in cash and local food supplies of the Biafran population

Despite internal transportation difficulties, Biafra made optimum use of indigenous medical staff, as well as of the small number of foreign volunteers. Biafran authorities made few official requests for outside professionals or doctors but accepted those who volunteered

#### Evacuation and Care Outside Nigeria of Biafran Children

There was no wholesale evacuation of Biafran children outside the enclave, although several thousand of them were airlifted to Gabon and Ivory Coast and Sao Tome for medical care

In Biafra, the regime consistently maintained

Policy statements on concern for children of Nigeria/Biafra were issued in October and November 1968 by Church World Service and Caritas International. These emphasized the importance of respect for the wishes of the families, return of evacuated children to their own families and environment, programs for nutrition, medical care, and rehabilitation treatment in Biafra, and lastly the consideration of individual problems of homeless children that could be effectively met by temporary institutional care in neighboring countries when in the child's best interest medically, psychologically and socially, and when his right to return is assured.

Generally, child welfare specialists recommend children not be removed from the environment in which they will have to live and grow up. There had been little or no evacuation of children from Biafra until the circumstances of relief and arms planes made transportation available. First came reports from pilots and crews who told of people thrusting babies and small children into the planes. This resulted in children arriving outside Biafra with neither their names nor village of origin known.

After this, the Biafran regime allowed small numbers of properly identified children to be transported to nearby countries which had recognized Biafra, such as Gabon and Ivory Coast, for care until the end of the hostilities.

Even though the agencies representing Joint Church Aid are in principle against the evacuation of children from Biafra, they are providing airlift to Sao Tome and back and help with facilities there. The Governor of Sao Tome has agreed to the entry of 150 children at one time. All children are received at a hospital. When they are able, they are transferred to rest centers--several are in operation. As the children reach a good degree of health, many of them are taken back to their families and villages in Biafra and additional children are brought to Sao Tome for medical and rehabilitative care and return. Some of the rest centers are being supported by the Joint Church Aid, Catholic and NORDCHURCHAID groups. Reports indicate that these organizations are making a contribution equivalent to \$2.50 to \$3.50 a day each for the children.

Following is a report on children evacuated up to May 17, 1969.

|   | <u>Gabon</u> |       |
|---|--------------|-------|
| French Military Hospital (largely financed by French Red Cross - Libreville)    | 246          |       |
| Joint German Caritas-Diakonischeswerk Center (11 kilometers East of Libreville) | 1,120        |       |
| Two Caritas International Centers in Libreville                                 | 499          |       |
| Several small Caritas centers   | 166          |       |
| Placed by Caritas in private families   | 17           |       |
| Schweitzer Hospital, Lambarene  | 20           |       |
| Two Terre Des Hommes Centers in Libreville                                      | 480          |       |
| Diocese of Mouila   | <u>48</u>    | 2,596 |

Since the beginning of the program in October 1968 in Gabon, an additional 103 children evacuated from Biafra died

|  |                    |              |
|--|--------------------|--------------|
|  | <u>Ivory Coast</u> |              |
| Children removed from Gabon to Ivory Coast | 500                |              |
| Others flown to Ivory Coast in May         | <u>1,600</u>       | <u>2,100</u> |
|  |                    | 4,696        |

Organizations involved in assistance to these children were German Caritas and Diakonischeswerk, Caritas International, French Red Cross, Gabonese Red Cross (largely symbolic), French Committee for Struggle Against Hunger, French Ministry of Defense, Terre Des Hommes, French Association of Order of Malta, and the Schweitzer Hospital

#### FEDERAL NIGERIA

Following the secession action by Biafra in May 1967, the Federal Military Government (FMG) declared on July 6, 1967, that it would reunite the country and open hostilities commenced. This led to the dislocation of populations along the northern and southern fronts and the beginning of food shortages in these FMG areas

#### Development of the Emergency in FMG Areas

As FMG troops occupied more and more of the secessionist area, large numbers of people were caught behind Federal lines and cut off from their homes and sources of supplies


The civilian emergency was slow in being recognized by the FMG. In the spring of 1968 it had reached such proportions that the Nigerian Red Cross and International Committee of the Red Cross were brought together to plan a relief program. The FMG favored this plan and indicated that its major function was to stop the secession and bring Nigeria back together again. Subsequently, the FMG raised relief to a high priority operation.

In August 1968, most of the homeless were found to be living in squalid, temporary shelters, including storage sheds, public buildings, workers' housing, markets and a variety of structures not intended for human habitation. A number of relocation camps were set up but the civilian victims of the war suffered from food deprivation and malnutrition. Many of them, especially children, had kwashiorkor (malignant protein malnutrition) or marasmus and other hunger-caused diseases. Medical services and facilities were lacking. The number of people threatened by famine climbed to one million.

#### Relief Action Taken by Federal Nigeria

On July 10, 1968, the FMG announced the establishment of a National Rehabilitation Commission and set aside \$2,800,000 as a first installment to carry out a program of emergency relief and rehabilitation. Commission members included permanent secretaries of the FMG and other chief executives

The Commission was given the responsibility of obtaining food, clothing, medicine, and shelter for the needy affected by the war, including Ibos remaining in "liberated" areas, and with determining priorities for emergency relief operations in all parts of Nigeria. FMG funds enabled the Commission to purchase and distribute local foods and medical supplies to displaced persons in war area relief centers and camps. Each of the four States affected by the civil war—East Central, Rivers, Mid-Western, and South Eastern—established a State Rehabilitation Commission. These commissions worked in cooperation with the National Commission on local food procurement. They organized local distribution teams, coordinated Nigerian Red Cross staff and volunteers, and opened public buildings and areas for use by displaced persons and for food distribution.



Orphan camp in Uyo - October 1968

Prior to establishing the National Rehabilitation Commission, the FMG had authorized the Nigerian Red Cross to ask the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as a neutral intermediary, to issue an appeal to all national Red Cross societies and other governments for help in meeting the needs of the victims. ICRC accepted the major responsibility for bringing food and medical assistance to Nigeria in cooperation with the Nigeria Red Cross and the National Rehabilitation Commission.

In October of 1968 the Commission sponsored a joint medical/relief operation for areas north of Port Harcourt. Two ICRC teams were provided assistance by 25 members of the Nigerian Red Cross, the State Rehabilitation Commission, and the FMG military forces. The Nigerian Red Cross under Commission auspices inaugurated a series of orientation courses for expatriates and Nigerian relief workers to give realistic training in the over-all relief program and to enable Nigerians to assume more of the work done by expatriates.

The Commission coordinated its operations with those of the Nigerian Red Cross and ICRC, and made plans for taking over from the international voluntary agencies at the end of hostilities. (See ICRC section of this report for further information on their coordinated program.)



Even though the end of the conflict is not in sight, the FMG has already taken a look ahead to post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation. At a conference in Ibadan, Nigeria in April of 1969, planning was initiated for a new four year period from 1969 through 1972 which contemplated an investment of \$3.26 billion from federal, state, and private sources, not including the oil industry. About \$500 million of this was anticipated as needed for a variety of projects from emergency relief through road reconstruction to education and agricultural credit.

For some of the current reconstruction and relief, however, the FMG sought and obtained assistance from the U. S. Government for road repairs, operation of refugee schools, repair of damaged bridges, equipment and staff for restoration of hospital services, improvement in water systems, food production, community development and physical rehabilitation projects.

On June 30, 1969, the FMG relieved ICRC of its over-all coordinating and operational relief role and assigned this responsibility to the National Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation. ICRC humanitarian relief is continuing but plans for its phasing out are underway.

#### ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE U S GOVERNMENT

The United States Government has made commitments of food, medicines, vehicles and cash for relief operations totaling \$65,996,300. The following covers U S policy on assistance to Nigeria, a chronology on USG emergency relief operations, the role of AID Disaster Relief Coordinator (AID/DRC), appointment of a special coordinator, and a record of Agency for International Development contributions.


#### Policy

The policy of the United States is to provide relief to civilian victims on both sides of the conflict, regardless of political association or physical location. USG emergency aid has been channeled through international organizations and U S voluntary agencies. In addition, direct support was provided for the International Committee of the Red Cross, as the major coordinating agent for relief to both sides.

#### Chronology of U S Relief Operations

United States assistance to the victims of the civil war in Nigeria began in 1967, when Catholic Relief Services diverted 187,800 pounds of P L 480 food valued at \$17,589 to the displaced people. During the same period, the USG paid airlift costs of \$385 for antibiotics and other medicaments donated by the American Red Cross.

Early in 1968 as conditions worsened and reports came in about the increasing numbers of victims in need of food, the USG made plans with Catholic Relief Services, UNICEF, and Church World Service for a large scale P L 480 emergency food program to be operated through the International Committee of the Red Cross.



Storage facility at Enugu - February 1969

On May 26, 1968, the U. S. Ambassador officially declared a disaster in Nigeria and authorized use of AID contingency funds for disaster relief. Subsequently money was allocated to the International Committee of the Red Cross to support its relief operation budget. Many other nations and organizations also contributed to the ICRC budget, but the U S Government was by far the largest contributor. While most of the allocations to ICRC were to support

general relief operations, some of its cash donations were specifically labeled for the purchase of large quantities of stockfish (a high protein product especially acceptable to Nigerians) and for measles and vaccine inoculations. ICRC used USG and other funds for a variety of relief activities, including charter of air, water and road transport, purchase of high priority food items, trucks, equipment and medical supplies. Also, cash was used to pay for personnel services and travel expenses of outside professionals, and technicians and local employees. Dates and amounts of contributions to ICRC were June 12, 1968 - \$100,000, July 1968 - \$1 million, November 1968 - \$2.5 million, February 1969 - \$620,000, March 1969 - \$6 million, April 1969 - \$1 million, May 1969 - \$5,450,000, June 1969 - \$3 million. As of June 30, 1969, the USG had donated to ICRC relief operations cash totaling \$21,970,000.

AID/Washington also allotted money to the U. S. Mission in Lagos for purchase of vehicles used in distribution of relief supplies, internal transport, charter airlift from Europe to Lagos, local purchase of drugs, medicaments, other disaster supplies, for payment of transport cost of donated items, procurement of cloth from U. S. excess property and expenses of personnel furnished by the American Red Cross and U. S. Public Health Service. Other funds were allocated for use in AID/W on Nigerian operations.

Dates and amounts of these cash allocations were June 1968 - \$100,000, August 1968 - \$250,000, October 1968 - \$250,000, April 1969 - \$19,600, June 1969 - \$579,400. These were for the emergency activities. In addition USAID was allotted \$3 million for a relief and rehabilitation program. Total allotment USAID and AID/W - \$4,199,000.

Early in the emergency relief program, the U. S. Mission reimbursed U. S. voluntary agencies for transportation expenses of high priority supplies

donated by them which in most instances were transported by air to Nigeria. Beginning in January the procedure was changed and funds were allocated to the Voluntary Agencies Division of the Office of Private Resources for this purpose and also for assisting with the JCA airbridge costs from Sao Tome. Total allotment to PRR/VAD from the contingency fund through June 30, 1969 was \$1.9 million.

In mid-summer of 1968 USAID representative Edward Marks and an ICRC convoy of landrovers and trucks with seven team members and medical supplies went from Lagos to Enugu to Uyo via Ikom. For one week Mr. Marks and the team went to relief centers at Nsukka, Enugu, and Agwu in the East Central State, and Uyo, Babk, Nwaniba, Ikot Ekpene, and other areas in the Southeastern State. Mr. Marks observations and reports from UNICEF, CRS, and ICRC recorded the ever increasing numbers of people in need and gave proof that the starvation death rate in the federal controlled area was steadily climbing. All indications pointed to the urgency for a massive relief undertaking.

In August of 1968, Ambassador C. Robert Moore, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, flew to Geneva for urgent consultations on the relief operations. He was accompanied by Mr. Ramone Eaton, Vice President for International Relations of the American Red Cross, Mr. Frank Sieverts, Special Assistant to Ambassador Averell W. Harriman, and Mr. Stephen R. Tripp, AID Disaster Relief Coordinator. During this period of two weeks, the team met with officials of the ICRC and with representatives of other governments and organizations who shared the U. S. concern over the starving victims throughout Nigeria. One of its purposes was to find an effective system for distributing foods and supplies to the victims in Nigeria and Biafra, and to urge both sides to accept daylight flights and a land corridor and a cease fire for humanitarian reasons.

At that time, the USG in response to an ICRC request sent an FAA airport expert to Geneva to advise on the feasibility of completing an airfield in Biafra to be used solely for delivery of food and medicines. This turned out to be the Obilago airstrip which was captured by the FMG less than a month after it became operational.


The U. S. Public Health Service, National Communicable Disease Center began work with ICRC in September 1968 on a nutrition/health survey plan. By June 30, NCDC had sent 12 doctors who worked four at a time generally for a period of three months each on this program. Details on this are given in the next section under ICRC. AID/W designated \$620,000 of the funds donated to ICRC for measles/smallpox campaigns in Biafra and also maintained its ongoing measles/smallpox program in Nigeria.

On October 1, 1968 a group of State/AID officials arrived in Lagos to make a first-hand study of the relief situation and Nigeria's need for reconstruction and rehabilitation assistance. Leading the group was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Palmer II. He was accompanied by W. Haven North, Director of AID's Office of Central and West African Affairs and Mr. Tripp. Mr. Marks and William B. Wheeler, Assistant Director Programs for USAID in Nigeria, made up the rest of the study group.

Their recommendations included. (1) appointment to the U. S. AID Mission in Nigeria of an Assistant Director for Relief and Rehabilitation to help coordinate USG relief efforts, and to work with the Nigerian Red Cross, ICRC, voluntary agencies, the National Rehabilitation Commission of the FMG, and other nations, (2) the allocation of \$3 million to be used for a variety of projects such as emergency medical relief, community rehabilitation fund, emergency road repair and transport, assessment of food requirements, Nigerianization of relief and rehabilitation and USAID Mission support to relief agencies.

### AID Disaster Relief Coordinator Role in Relief Operations

The AID Disaster Relief Coordinator's office took a major part in coordinating relief activities for Nigeria/Biafra from May 1968 to December 1968. AID/DRC was in daily contact with the Director, Central and West African Affairs, AID, the State Department Country Director's office for Nigeria in the office of the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, and also served as a technical advisor to the Nigerian Task Force.



FMG, ICRC, Nigeria Red Cross and USAID officials at Enugu - October 1968

The ever increasing number of victims, magnitude and severity of the civil war, and difficulty of the relief operations required the assignment of a specific full time staff to be responsible for Nigeria/Biafra relief.

During November and December, the Nigerian situation changed from a short term disaster emergency to long-term relief and rehabilitation, and was assigned to special personnel in State and AID. AID/DRC continued its reporting through February 15, 1969, and then summarized available information through June 30, 1969 for inclusion in this report.

### Special Coordinator and Staff

In February 1969, the National Security Council completed a review of events in Nigeria and Biafra. Recommendations were made to President Nixon, who immediately appointed C Clyde Ferguson as Special Coordinator for Relief for Nigeria/Biafra with the rank of Ambassador. The President gave him a special mandate to devote his full time to mobilizing humanitarian forces to break the relief impasse.



Ambassador Ferguson (right) and Colonel Dewey of his staff in Biafra 6/69.

Ambassador Ferguson and his staff provided guidance to the ICRC for upgrading the entire relief operation. Specifically they gave leadership to ICRC on an integrated logistical set-up, including a technical assistance plan and provision of landing craft for a possible river opening into Biafra.

Ambassador Ferguson became a leader among world leaders on humanitarian relief for Nigeria/Biafra. He was present at conferences at any place at any time that could offer any hope for a solution. His proposal for a surface route

up the Cross River into the Biafran enclave won wide acceptance, but its implementation remains hung up on political/military entanglements of both sides.

Ambassador Ferguson sought to develop and secure approval for other means than night airlift in getting supplies into Biafra. He urged the improvement of all relief programs to victims on both sides of the conflict. He made numerous trips to Nigeria, the Biafran enclave, Geneva, and to other countries in order to coordinate and stimulate adequate world-wide humanitarian response to the needs of the civil war victims. He assigned qualified administrators and logisticians to work in Geneva and Nigeria to advise on critical decisions involving better ways to get supplies and services to those in need.

AID office of Central and West African Affairs under the direction of Mr. North gives administrative, technical support to Ambassador Ferguson and his staff and coordinates field operations of USAID.

RECORD OF FOOD AND CASH  
DONATIONS BY THE AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Food

160,413 metric tons of corn/  
soya/milk (high protein mix),  
nonfat dry milk, bulgur and  
other grains donated under the



Messrs. Flanagan and Dewey among Nigerian children along front lines.

coordinated effort of the U. S. Department of Agriculture and AID. The food had a Commodity Credit Corporation value of \$29,645,300 plus ocean freight charges estimated at \$8,282,000, for total value of.. \$37,927,300

Note: The \$8,282,000 represents total estimated transportation charges for both P. L. 480 food and donated items by voluntary agencies of \$10,500,000 less the cash allocations below of \$1.9 million to PRR/VAD and \$318,000 of the USAID allocation set aside for volag transport.

| <u>Cash</u>  | ICRC         | US Mission<br>or AID/W | PRR/VAD     |              |
|--|--------------|------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Contingency Funds<br>Disaster Relief<br>PRR/VAD          | \$ 1,100,000 | \$ 600,000             | \$1,900,000 | \$ 3,600,000 |
| Support Assistance Funds                                 | 20,870,000   | 3,599,000              |             | 24,469,000   |
| Total - Cash   | \$21,970,000 | \$4,199,000            | \$1,900,000 | \$28,069,000 |
| Total USG Commitment as of June 30, 1969 - Food and Cash |              |                        |             | \$65,996,300 |

#### ICRC AND NIGERIAN RED CROSS RELIEF OPERATIONS

This section tells how and when ICRC became involved in Nigerian emergency relief. It describes separately the relief operations in Biafra and Federal Nigeria, including details on air, sea and land transportation, distribution, stockpiling and use of personnel and equipment. It gives special attention to the medical program on each side. Some of the efforts of foreign governments and voluntary agencies have been interwoven to such an extent that the separate identities of the participants and their activities have been submerged by the unity of purpose and operation which marked their dedication to their tasks. Relief action continues. The work described herein is an interim tribute to the enormous effort and significant accomplishments achieved.

#### How and When ICRC Became Involved

ICRC became engaged in humanitarian work in Nigeria in a limited way soon after the outbreak of the civil war on July 6, 1967. By July 11, it had a delegate in Lagos and was providing assistance under the terms of the Geneva Convention. Delegates were sent to oversee prisoners captured on both sides. During July, ICRC established two medical teams--one in FMG territory and one in Biafra. It provided medicines and bandages sufficient for needs of the troops and prisoners of war. As the war worsened the medical aid program was extended.

Soon there were ever increasing numbers of civilians in need of assistance. In October, 1967, the Nigerian Red Cross reported that it would need \$140,000 per month to care for the 100,000 persons made homeless. A relief plan was prepared and the Nigerian Red Cross was given authority by the FMG to expand its activities. The FMG also announced that an Ad Hoc National Relief Committee had been formed to coordinate activities of participating voluntary organizations such as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), Catholic Relief Services, Christian Council of Nigeria, and others. The Nigerian Red Cross expressed its willingness to work wherever need existed. The NRC invited ICRC to visit already established relief camps and began plans to establish more temporary camps in FMG areas. It also made a national appeal for funds. ICRC chartered a plane to bring in donated medicines to Port Harcourt in December of 1967 and indicated it would try to work in Biafra as well as FMG, allocating money and personnel to both sides. ICRC promptly issued an appeal to other countries for funds and medical supplies, and later the Nigerian Red Cross appealed to sister Red Cross Societies for cash and relief goods.

In March 1968, there were indications that the relief situation on both sides was becoming crucial. The number of victims needing food and medical aid was rapidly increasing and movement of supplies into the war-torn areas on both sides became more and more difficult.

On April 10, 1968, with the approval of the FMG, the Nigerian Red Cross called on the ICRC to assume major responsibility for relief operations. During May and June, ICRC/NRC formulated emergency plans for large scale relief operations.

At the same time the mushrooming relief needs in the Biafran enclave called for direct and prompt action by ICRC. In order to extend its humanitarian aid to both sides, ICRC pulled together a fleet of planes, boats and vehicles to deliver supplies. It located medical personnel, organized and staffed medical and relief teams. In FMG areas it coordinated the relief activities of other voluntary agencies. ICRC engaged in fund raising and obtained donated services, things and supplies from governments and Red Cross Societies around the world. In order for ICRC to handle this massive program, the USG and other governments urged it to develop a budget and to plan for months ahead on food and other requirements. With high purpose and dedication, ICRC operated above most of the divisive forces that it encountered. It succeeded in establishing an impartial relief program and provided foods, services and medical care wherever needed and under very difficult circumstances. It conducted its relief operations in a neutral, non-political manner. It earned financial support from the U. S. and other governments. While it began with the full acceptance of the Nigerian Red Cross and the FMG, political pressures caused the FMG to advise ICRC on June 30 that it was transferring the relief operation responsibility to its National Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. The complete story of ICRC's many services and its compassion and the complexity of the herculean relief program may never be written, but the results in terms of lives saved and suffering relieved are plainly evident.

Specifics on ICRC relief operations for Biafra and Federal Nigeria follow.

## ICRC - BIAFRA

### Airlift


Because neither side could agree on how to move large quantities of supplies, night airlift became the method for importation of high protein food and medical supplies into the Biafran enclave. Although inadequate to meet the total food needs, the airlifts served well in feeding the hungry, reducing the threat of famine and controlling kwashiorkor.



ICRC C-97G at Cotonou airfield

In June/July 1968, ICRC began its first airlift into Biafra from the city of Santa Isabel on the Spanish island of Fernando Po, which got its independence in October 1968. At first only intermittent flights were made. In September ICRC launched a full scale airbridge. Airfields at Uli and Obilago were used to land the supplies in Biafra. ICRC had built the air-

field at Obilago with Biafran help for the sole purpose of humanitarian aid, but its early capture and closure by the FMG ended its short period of usefulness.



Obilago airstrip

All relief flights were extremely dangerous because of the physical limitations of the airstrip, the need to land under cover of darkness, and the menace of military intervention. The FMG did not give approval for night flights on the grounds they were used for delivery of arms as well as relief goods ICRC planes confined



themselves to relief cargoes, but the Uli strip was also used for military deliveries by Biafran authorities. There was little done by the FMG to hinder ICRC flights early in the airlift operation but serious incidents occurred during the first six months of 1969.

The ICRC airlift from Santa Isabel operated on a steadily increasing tempo until January of 1969. By then 713 flights had been made with delivery of 6,670 tons of food, medicine, relief supplies, and personnel. At that time the ICRC airfleet consisted of four DC-6B's, two DC-7's and one Transvaal, each having a payload capacity of from 9 to 10 tons.

Many difficulties prevailed for these ICRC flight operations. In a nutshell, they reached their height when on January 6, 1969, the newly formed Republic of Equatorial Guinea (REG) halted the ICRC airlift. The REG charged that fuel was a military item and could not be termed as relief goods. ICRC contended that it could not procure fuel in Biafra and had to bring it along to use in trucks for delivery of food to the camps and distribution centers. This order by the REG caused a serious disruption of the flights. The ICRC Commissioner-General reluctantly negotiated with the REG for temporary, special flight approvals and on February 12 obtained reinstatement of the airlift from Santa Isabel.

During the Santa Isabel hiatus, negotiations for an alternative airlift from Dahomey were undertaken. On January 28, the Government of Dahomey authorized ICRC to airlift relief goods from Cotonou to Biafra.

To augment the ICRC airbridge, the USG in January 1969 transferred four C-97G's from the United States to ICRC at a cost of \$3,670 each. These planes have a payload of 14 to 15 tons compared to the 9 to 10 tons of each plane then used by ICRC.

As of May 19, 1969, ICRC had the following aircraft in operation at Cotonou one DC-6B, three C-97 Stratofreighters, one Beechcraft-Kingair, and at Santa Isabel, four DC-7's. By June 11, 1969, ICRC had completed 1,161 flights from Santa Isabel and 867 from Cotonou. Through these flights 21,000 tons of relief supplies were delivered to Biafra.

During May, ICRC lost a DC-6 aircraft in a crash several miles from Uli airfield killing the entire crew of four. On June 5-6, FMG forces shot down an ICRC DC-7 relief plane. Again all four crew members were killed. ICRC protested to the FMG. There ensued a series of charges by the FMG and counter-denials by ICRC. ICRC Commissioner-General August Lindt was refused permission to return to Nigeria by the FMG. ICRC refuted the FMG accusations and praised Dr. Lindt's work. While maintaining its worldwide reputation and responsibility to aid those who suffer from war, ICRC respects the sovereign rights of states. ICRC issued a statement which is quoted in part "... the ICRC have been the object of unjustifiable and unacceptance attacks. Engaged in relief actions on behalf of the civilian populations in the war stricken areas on both sides of the front in Nigeria, the ICRC have consistently taken every precaution against adopting any position of a political character." The statement emphasized that ICRC had

never under any circumstances transported arms or ammunitions or other equipment that would further the conduct of military operations, nor had it transmitted military information or intelligence, its only aim being the open transportation and distribution of relief supplies.

Recalling that it had never ceased to stress the need for daylight flights, ICRC pointed out it had nevertheless proceeded with the night flights of relief at its own risk and peril during the protracted negotiations on daylight flight arrangements, this being consistent with its dedicated humanitarian mission. The military and political actions on both sides forced the stoppage of the ICRC airlifts from Dahomey and Fernando Po.

Extensive international efforts by the USG led by Ambassador Ferguson and his staff over a period of several months this spring brought about an agreement in principle between both sides to a surface route into the Biafran enclave by way of the Cross River. At this writing, the enterprise is imperiled by differences between the two sides on details of the operation and the decision of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria to take over the relief work of the International Committee of the Red Cross for both sides.

#### Distribution of Supplies, Stockpiling, Personnel, Equipment

During the month of April 1969, ICRC reported it was cooperating in the operation of 11 distribution centers within Biafra and was helping to feed about 1,500,000 people who were receiving about 4,900 tons of ICRC air-lifted supplies. As of May 1969, ICRC had 650 nationals and 88 expatriates working for it inside the enclave, using 156 ICRC trucks, landrovers, and other vehicles.

The 21,000 tons of relief supplies delivered to Biafra through June 11, 1969 can be divided into the following categories:

|   |       |
|---|-------|
| Dried Fish                              | 40.0% |
| Dry Milk                                | 25.0% |
| High Protein CSM (corn, soya, milk mix) | 24.0% |
| Other Foods                             | 4.0%  |
| Salt                                    | 2.5%  |
| Sundry                                  | 2.0%  |
| Fuel                                    | 1.5%  |
| Medical Supplies                        | 1.0%  |

Food delivered into Biafra was consumed promptly. As of May 19 there were 2,500 tons of supplies for Biafra stockpiled at Santa Isabel and 10,800 at Cotonou. Working at Cotonou, ICRC had 28 nationals and 40 expatriates and at Santa Isabel 104 nationals and 13 expatriates.

#### Medical Assistance

An important part of ICRC relief in Biafra was its medical assistance. The monthly total of hospital cases averaged 10,000. In addition, thousands



Stockpile at  
Santa Isabel

received preventive treatment at the feeding centers. From September 1968 to February 1969, ICRC disbursed approximately \$800,000 for the purchase of medical supplies. From January 1 to May 19, 1969, it had transported 146.8 tons of medical supplies to the enclave.

ICRC reported that by June 15, 1969 in cooperation with Biafran health officials it had vaccinated 726,851 Biafrans against measles and 1,826,131 against smallpox, for which AID had made a direct contribution to procure the vaccines and to furnish professional assistance.

ICRC has established a budget for the period from March to August 1969, providing for an expected monthly expenditure for Biafra, other than from donations in kind, of 5.5 million Swiss francs or about \$1.3 million.

ICRC - FEDERAL NIGERIA

#### Air Transport

ICRC originally had four aircraft based at Lagos which brought priority supplies from there to Calabar and Enugu. These were reduced to two—a DC-4 and a Cessna 360—which in recent months were used mainly to transport personnel.

#### Water Transport

Supplies were also brought into Port Harcourt and Calabar from Lagos by boats chartered by ICRC, Netherlands Red Cross, or German Red Cross. There were five of these Coasters, with the following capacities: two of 240 tons each, two of 1500 tons each, and one of 600 tons. The steaming time to Calabar from Lagos was 36 hours, plus 2 days of loading and unloading.



Cross River near  
Calabar

One of UNICEF helicopters  
which operated between  
Calabar and Uyo  
October - 1968



### Rail Transport

The FMG made available to ICRC free of charge the use of one railroad which goes from Lagos to Oturkpo, via Ibadan, Minna, Kaduna, Kafenchan, Lafia, and Makurdi once a month. The trip takes from 3 to 4 weeks, and ICRC could transport 1600 tons of food free each time.

### Road Transport

Due to the war which destroyed one section of the bridge at Nsukka there are only a few land routes of limited capacity open to the East. The shortest via the Lakojo Ferry across the Niger River makes only about three trips a day and can carry 14 cars or six lorries. It is usually jammed



ICRC vehicles

with military vehicles and supplies. An alternate route involves driving further north, crossing the bridge at Jebba, then back across the Benue River at Makurdi. Roads are in poor condition. It takes about a week for a truck to go from Lagos to Enugu.

ICRC obtained and stationed trucks, land-rovers, and other vehicles in forward areas to bring food and other supplies to distributions points.

Lorries were also used

for delivery from the rail depot at Oturkpo to Enugu, a distance of 60 miles. When possible, ICRC hired contractors with 7-ton to 25-ton trailers for this heavy duty hauling. As of May 19, 1969, ICRC had 437 vehicles at Enugu, Calabar, Lagos, Port Harcourt, Uyo, Asaba and other locations.

#### Distribution of Supplies, Stockpiling, Personnel

ICRC had 25 distribution centers within FMG territory. Although it had been feeding about one million people up to April of 1969, by June this had dropped to 750,000. It was expected, however, that this drop was temporary. Monthly food distribution for one million people was about 4,000 tons per month of imported food and 600 tons of local food. Food distributed in FMG areas by ICRC consisted of the following



Food distribution at Uyo

|  |       |
|--|-------|
| Yams   | 20.0% |
| Palm Oil   | 6.0%  |
| Groundnuts   | 3.0%  |
| Garri  | 20.0% |
| Cereals (including large quantities of high protein CSM & enriched bulgur) | 45.0% |
| Beans  | 3.0%  |
| Milk   | 1.5%  |
| Dried Fish   | 1.0%  |
| Salt & Sugar   | 0.5%  |

In addition to regular food distribution, ICRC established and maintained stockpiles totaling about 30,000 tons of food, donated about one half by the USG and the rest from other countries, at Port Harcourt, Calabar, Enugu, Agbor/Asaba, Lagos, and Uyo. These stocks were rotated as current distribution was made and new food delivered to the port at Lagos and transported from there to the forward depots. The purpose of maintaining the 30,000 tons level stockpile was to keep up a steady flow and to be ready for the expected large demands should the war end.

Recent reports have indicated that the civilians who were accessible to established relief centers were reasonably well-fed. But there remained many people on both sides, deep in bush areas or moving because of the shift in battle lines who could not be reached. Population dislocations, breakdown of transportation and communication links, loss of health and welfare services were particularly severe in areas of military operations. Although surveys in March and April 1969 indicated a diminishing need for imported foodstuffs among stable populations in the Federal affected areas, due in part to increased supply of locally produced items, the intensified military action in the spring of 1969 produced new dislocations of people. By this time availability of emergency foodstuffs from foreign sources was not considered a problem. What was needed was a quick and efficient method of identifying critical areas and closer coordination of relief administration to facilitate a more rapid response to changes.

In Federal territory as of the end of June, ICRC reported 1,114 nationals and 205 expatriates representing 17 nationalities working in the coordinated relief program.

ICRC has established a budget for the period from March 1969 to August 1969, in which the monthly expenditure for FMG areas not including donations in kind was expected to be 8,500,000 Swiss francs (about \$1,970,000).

Forty-three national Red Cross Societies and 19 international and voluntary organizations have taken part in the ICRC relief operations, most of which have made their contributions in cash, in supplies, or in personnel to both sides.

ICRC has worked closely with the Nigerian Red Cross and believed that a transition of relief operations should be pre-planned for eventual take-over by the Nigerian Red Cross and the Nigerian Government. Initial steps had been taken to bring this about, but realistically this should take several months.

## Medical Assistance

Starting in September 1968, AID arranged with ICRC for the U. S. Public Health Service, National Communicable Disease Center (NCDC), to engage in an epidemiological nutritional survey of starvation and famine. Initially, Dr. William Foege of NCDC, Dr. W. Bulle of ICRC and Dr. T. Ademola of the



ICRC nurse with Nigerian children

Nigerian Ministry of Health, worked out the plan. Under it people at relief centers would be seen by a doctor to identify those in critical health. He would indicate those in need of immediate hospital and intensive care treatment, those in need of daily care and feeding, and those who could survive with weekly distribution of supplemental food. During December, the medical teams went to 21 village areas occupied by displaced persons. They reported a 36% factor of people with critical

health problems. NCDC epidemiologists/nutritionists continue to work with ICRC on this health/nutrition plan. The cooperative project was worked out with ICRC/NRC by USAID and was accepted by FMG authorities. The NCDC doctors designed a "Height/Weight Screening Chart for Malnutrition." The chart had the following columns "Patient requires individual medical attention", "Stamped card holder entitled to weekly food supplements", and "No card for food supplements." The chart also contained instructions



Children in FMG area

that "All patients get card for milk for mother or food for baby.", and "All obviously pregnant women get weekly food supplement." Nigerian helpers were trained to record weight and measure, vaccinate with smallpox vaccine, and issue cards.

This health/nutritional survey demonstrated that from a therapeutic and preventive viewpoint food supplements should be given to all children in the 0 to 4 age group and that 50% of these children required medical evaluation. In addition, all children under 40 inches in height required weekly food supplements.

At each food distribution point a short talk was given on use of the imported foods such as the CSM (corn, soya, milk formula), non-fat dry powdered milk, food preparation and the importance of sharing food with the children. At the nutritional treatment centers for those in need of daily care each patient was given a milk, sugar, and oil mixture, in addition to prepared meals.

The screening process used assured that virtually all of the nutritional needy would be detected. The plan was accepted and put into practice in cooperation with nutritionists from USPHS. From September 1968 to June 30, 1969 NCDC had four doctors in Nigeria at any one time working on health/nutrition programs.

At the end of June, ICRC reported it had 28 health/medical teams in operation in FMG areas.

Some 36,000 persons per week received ICRC medical assistance. From September 1968 to February 1969, ICRC spent 4,710,000 Swiss francs (about \$1 million) for the purchase of medical supplies distributed in FMG areas amounting to 323 tons. As of May 10, 1969, there was an active immunization program against measles and smallpox in progress in all areas under the FMG/USAID Smallpox/Measles Eradication Program. This was handled as part of the Ministry of Public Health immunization program and is not included as part of the emergency operation.

The medical/health care supplies, foodstuffs, and vaccination campaigns significantly reduced problems of contagious diseases and nutritional deficiency diseases in the FMG areas, with the exception of tuberculosis. Continued medical aid is particularly necessary to maintain the health of persons who are displaced. Accurate surveillance is required to detect contagious diseases and to record changes and trends in the health of the people. Any drastic reduction in foodstuffs and medical services could reverse the progress made thus far.

#### LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES

The League is assisting the Nigerian Red Cross to build up its organization and service programs. It provided this essential though less dramatic aid throughout the relief operation.



UNITED NATIONS - RELIEF OPERATIONS

UNICEF

In January 1968, UNICEF began emergency assistance to children and mothers in Nigeria--in areas under both Federal and Biafran control--by shipping foods, drugs, and medical supplies. By midsummer it had widened its relief support to provide transport (trucks and helicopters) and personnel. Among the 10 personnel were nutrition experts who served as child feeding advisors. The seven on duty in June 1969, four in FMG areas and three at Sao Tome, were receiving salaries at a rate of \$50,000 a year from UNICEF.

As of May 1969, UNICEF had shipped 10,973 tons of U. S. Government Public Law 480 high protein food commodities to Biafra via Santa Isabel, Sao Tome, and Cotonou, and 10,634 tons of USG P. L. 480 grains and dry milk to FMG areas through Lagos, for a total of 21,607 tons. Value of this food was \$6,682,794, for which credit is given in this report under USG.

From its own supplies (including donated drugs, food, and other supplies from U. S. private sources) UNICEF arranged for delivery of 350 tons to Biafra and 3,292 tons to FMG areas. These supplies were valued at \$959,675. UNICEF paid shipping costs amounting to \$318,645 for them as well as for transport costs of relief items donated by other countries and organizations.

Total value of UNICEF supplies and transport costs \$1,278,320

Credit for value of supplies donated by other countries through UNICEF has been given to the appropriate country.

In addition, UNICEF allocated funds to be used for Nigeria/Biafra emergency programs, from which it made cash contributions to ICRC, supported helicopter airlift of over 1200 tons of supplies to people in the Calabar/Uyo area who were practically inaccessible by other means of transport, provided 25 trucks for use by relief teams, paid for distribution, personnel, and for other items. Total allocation \$2,400,000  
\$3,678,320

Through its provision of smallpox and measles vaccine, UNICEF played an important role in the immunization programs in Biafra.

UNICEF has prepared a program to aid in the first phase of rehabilitation in the former Eastern Nigeria area, acting on formal requests by State Governments in Rivers and South-Eastern State. These are states where there has been prolonged and heavy fighting and they are the first to turn to UNICEF with formal requests for a rehabilitation aid. The East Central State has been the hardest hit, but only small portions of it are accessible at present. When full access is granted, this State will need one of the greatest rehabilitation operations undertaker in Africa, South of the Sahara, according to a UNICEF report.

The UNESCO Representative in Nigeria visited the South-Eastern State in October and the Rivers State in November of 1968 as part of a United Nations team. The rehabilitation plans for these states are in line with the proposals considered by UNESCO.

Proposed UNICEF rehabilitation assistance in these two states is summarized as follows

|   | <u>US Dollars</u> |                      |
|---|-------------------|----------------------|
| <u>Rivers State</u>                                   |                   |                      |
| <u>Education</u>                                      |                   |                      |
| Kits for primary schools                              | \$ 12,000         |                      |
| Science-teaching equipment, text books                | 32,000            |                      |
| Transport   | 5,000             |                      |
|   | <u>\$ 49,000</u>  |                      |
| <br><u>Health</u>                                     |                   |                      |
| Supplies and equipment for hospitals                  | \$ 40,000         |                      |
| Drugs   | 90,000            |                      |
| Transport   | 19,000            |                      |
|   | <u>\$149,000</u>  | \$198,000            |
| <br><u>South-Eastern State</u>                        |                   |                      |
| <u>Education</u>                                      |                   |                      |
| Science-teaching equip. and hand tools                | \$ 70,000         |                      |
| Transport   | 7,000             |                      |
|   | <u>\$ 77,000</u>  |                      |
| <br><u>Health</u>                                     |                   |                      |
| Supplies & equipment for hospitals<br>and maternities | \$ 50,000         |                      |
| Drugs and vaccines                                    | 150,000           |                      |
| Transport   | 33,000            |                      |
|   | <u>\$310,000</u>  |                      |
| <br>TOTAL PROPOSED UNICEF REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE   |                   | <br><u>\$508,000</u> |

It is heartening to note that both states have school and hospital restoration projects amounting to an estimated 9-1/2 million dollars for 1968/69.

UNICEF will work with the States as indicated and in addition plans to assign staff to the areas concerned to supervise distribution and use of equipment.

#### World Food Program

World Food Program approved an emergency assistance program in Nigeria for food valued at \$2,837,000 including ocean freight. The USG approved a WFP request for 1,250 metric tons of cornmeal, valued at \$161,000, including ocean freight, in support of this program.

WFP contribution of food (less \$161,000 credited under USG) . . . \$2,676,000

## CARITAS, INTERNATIONAL RELIEF OPERATIONS

In December of 1967, Caritas (CI) began an aid program to help war victims on both sides of the Nigeria/Biafra conflict.

### Biafra

On Marcy 27, 1968, CI initiated an international relief effort to airlift food and medical supplies on a regular basis from Europe to Biafra, in cooperation with the World Council of Churches. It had previously participated in special chartered flights. In June of 1968, Caritas established, in cooperation with other organizations, an airlift from the Portuguese Island of Sao Tome, about 200 miles south of Biafra in the Gulf of Guinea. Into this effort were joined Catholic, Protestant and Jewish organizations. Occasional chartered flights from Europe directly to Biafra continued.

Bringing supplies to the area actually held by the Biafran authorities was difficult, dangerous and expensive. When negotiations in Niamey and Addis Ababa brought no results for a mercy corridor, CI enlarged the airlift operation from Sao Tome. In order to safeguard the distribution of relief supplies exclusively to civilian war victims, German Caritas in July of 1968 purchased two planes to be used only for these humanitarian flights. The German Protestant relief agency, Diakonisches Hilfswerk, followed this example and purchased two additional planes.

During the month of August, Scandinavian church agencies united themselves into a group called Nordchurchaid and joined the Caritas operations at Sao Tome. At that time their activities were reported as two distinct groups. Later they combined to form the Joint Church Aid, International. (See comments under Nordchurchaid and Joint Church Aid, International.)

By May of 1969 CI, in cooperation with Biafran authorities and Protestant Relief Groups, was aiding in the feeding and care of 1.4 million persons daily in 1,280 camps and 1,528 feeding centers.

Supplies coming into the Uli airstrip from Sao Tome were divided on alternate flight nights for the Catholic and for the Protestant relief operations. Early in 1969 reports showed that the Catholic group had 20 trucks which loaded material at the airfield and delivered it to Ihioma, about 20 miles from Uli. From there smaller vehicles went out to four sub-centers with the supplies. From these four locations, the supplies were then delivered to the individual feeding centers. Practically no reserve of relief supplies was kept at the sub-centers.

### FMG Areas

Caritas, International supported the activities of the Social Welfare and Medical Department of the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, making substantial contributions to victims in the Federally controlled dioceses of Makurdi, Calabar, Ikot Expene, Lokoja, Benin, and Ogoja, since Christmas of 1967. Through the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria at Lagos, direct



contact was maintained with the Nigerian National Relief Commission and the Nigerian Red Cross. In February of 1968, CI handed over special lorries as a gift of Pope Paul to the NRC to ensure transportation of food and medicines to the needy areas.

Special arrangements were concluded with the International Committee of the Red Cross in August of 1968 under which Catholic mission personnel carried out relief work through

four mobile teams based at Abakaliki, Afikpo, Obubra, and Obudu. The initial stock of medical supplies was provided with CI funds, while ICRC provided supplies for the feeding program. OXFAM contributed the vehicles to make the teams self-sufficient.

CI carried on its relief program in FWG areas throughout 1968 and 1969 through the Social Welfare Department of the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, which is a member of the National Relief Commission. Other members included the ICRC, Christian Council of Nigeria (WCC), Catholic Relief Services, and several national organizations.

#### Summary of CI Contributions

Although many national Caritas organizations provided millions of dollars worth of supplies, CI is not credited here with the value of donations in kind. Credit for these donations has been given under private donations by specific countries in the "Other Nations" section. Also, some of the individual Caritas cash donations were listed with the total contributions reported by particular countries. The following are cash contributions by Caritas organizations and other Catholic groups which were not, insofar as is known, reported under "Other Nations".

|   |                |
|---|----------------|
| Caritas, International - Emergency Fund             | \$ 25,000      |
| Vatican   | 247,000        |
| England   | 116,360        |
| Australia   | 8,900          |
| Belgium   | 59,640         |
| France  | 15,370         |
| Austria   | 22,040         |
| Italy   | <u>256,290</u> |
| Total Caritas Cash Donations Not Credited Elsewhere | \$740,600      |

## WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES RELIEF OPERATIONS

The World Council of Churches (WCC) basic policy in Nigeria/Biafra relief was to work through the International Committee of the Red Cross to bring aid to civilian victims on both sides. In March of 1968, WCC Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee & World Service (DICARWS) arranged for the first charter flight of the Protestant Churches to carry urgently needed high-protein foods and medicines to the people in the former Eastern Region. WCC also cooperated with Caritas and ICRC in the early relief flights to Biafra from Europe prior to the establishment of the Sao Tome airlift operation.

Throughout 1968 and 1969, WCC directed its relief efforts to both sides. On January 15, 1969, WCC found it necessary to make a temporary change in policy due to the suspension at that time of ICRC flights from Fernando Po to Biafra by the Government of Equatorial Guinea, and sent \$250,000 to Nordchurchaid to assist in operating the Sao Tome airlift.

At the time of its cash donation for the Sao Tome airlift, WCC also set aside \$250,000 for the Christian Council of Nigeria for increasing the relief program in Federal controlled areas.

### Biafra

The WCC did not itself send any personnel directly into Biafra. Expatriates working in the Protestant Churches Relief Program in the area were sponsored by Mission Societies or other sending agencies. Their work in Biafra, however, was carried out under the name of WCC.

The Protestant group cooperated with Biafran authorities, ICRC and Catholic groups in operating camps and feeding centers. Protestant groups in Biafra received all the supplies airlifted from Sao Tome to Uli every other night, no matter what the original source. The agreement between Protestant and Catholic groups to alternate in receiving supplies rather than dividing up each night provided for a fair and efficient method of receiving and distributing relief goods to the feeding centers. The Protestant groups established the following arrangements for handling their supplies. A minister of one of the churches was placed in charge of administration. He supervised the off-loading from the planes and the reloading into church trucks. Convoys of six to eight trucks escorted by private cars transported the supplies. On "Protestant nights" about 30 trucks delivered the relief items from Uli to the Central Protestant store a few miles away. WCC theological students from Trinity College Seminary rode beside the truck drivers and supervised the negotiation of road blocks between the airstrip and the store. All trucks were unloaded before dawn. Later in the morning way-bills were issued for trucks to take the supplies forward to 10 provincial stores. Sorting was done at the central store. Theological students checked the unloading and reloading of each truck. Apart from a small reserve stock retained at the central store, all supplies which came in during a night went out to the provincial stores by ten o'clock the next morning. Drivers returned to the central store by late afternoon to prepare for the next operation. At the provincial stores, run by Protestant missionaries, they kept a week's reserves to supply hospitals, sickbays, feeding centers, and refugee camps in their region.

## FMG Areas

WCC shipped relief goods to the Christian Council of Nigeria which cooperated with other voluntary agencies and ICRC in forwarding and distributing. On several occasions, WCC sent medicines and medical equipment by chartered aircraft to Lagos to supply four teams working in the distressed areas under Federal control. DICARWS assisted the Christian Council of Nigeria in the staffing of six medical relief teams sponsored by National ICA agencies to work under the ICRC. These teams worked in South East and East Central States at Anua, Enugu, and Abak near Uyo as part of the total ICRC relief operations. Each team had a doctor, several nurses, a supply officer, and a maintenance man. By mid-February, 1969, two of the teams had returned to Denmark and to Norway, and changes had been made in the number and assignments of personnel in the International and American (CWS) teams. The Australian and British Teams continued with their assignments in Enugu and Abak.

## Summary of WCC Contributions

Protestant churches from many countries contributed their aid through the World Council of Churches. Value of the goods sent (over \$4 million) has been included in donations reported by specific countries and is treated in the "Other Nations" section of this report. WCC is, therefore, not credited here for these donated goods in order to avoid duplication. However, cash contributions by WCC were reported as follows

|   |                  |
|---|------------------|
| Christian Council of Nigeria                    | \$ 233,180       |
| Christian Committee for Refugees                | 52,400           |
| ICRC  | 211,715          |
| Cost of food/medicines                          | 36,540           |
| Freight for stockfish                           | 215,000          |
| Charter flights                                 | 187,416          |
| Nordchurchaid/JCA                               | 571,500          |
| Refugees and stranded persons                   | 60,128           |
| Misc. (Upsala Peace Mission, films, etc.)       | <u>7,573</u>     |
| Less USA donations credited to CWS              | <u>- 416,696</u> |
| Total WCC cash donations not credited elsewhere | \$1,158,756      |

## NORDCHURCHAID

Scandinavian organizations and churches form "Nordchurchaid" for the purpose of airlifting supplies to Biafra. Its members consisted of Folkekirkens Nodhjaelp of Denmark, Kirkens Nodhjelp of Norway, Lutherhjalpen of Sweden, and Kyrkans Ulandshjelp of Finland. Nordchurchaid began its airlift operations at Sao Tome on August 26, 1968, in cooperation with the Catholic and Protestant airlift already in operation. With donated funds from Scandinavian churches and organizations, Nordchurchaid signed a special charter contract with various air transport companies. Planes were piloted mainly by Nordic crews. By September 30, it had added five planes



JCA/USA C-97G at Sao Tome

to the four that had been provided by German Caritas and Diakonisches Hilfswerk. With a total of nine planes it was possible to deliver about 100 tons of supplies into Biafra each night. Eventually the Catholic and Protestant groups and Nordchurchaid formally joined together to form the International Church Relief Organization and then in November of 1968 the (International) Joint Church Aid. Nordchurchaid funding is credited to those who donated the money.

#### (INTERNATIONAL) JOINT CHURCH AID

To repeat, the name of Joint Church Aid (JCA) is used to describe the cooperative airlift operations from Sao Tome to Biafra. Members of JCA consisted of Catholic Relief Services (US), Church World Service (US); Das Diakonisches Hilfswerk (Germany), Caritas (Germany), Caritas, International, and Nordchurchaid. Twenty-five churches and private organizations cooperated in the JCA airlift.

In December of 1968, Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service worked out an agreement with the U. S. Government for the sale of four C-97G's, each with an optimum 18-20 tons capacity. The USG sold the planes at \$3,670 each to the newly formed Joint Church Aid/USA, whose members were CRS, CWS, and the American Jewish Committee. It was understood these planes would carry relief supplies only, to Nigerian and Biafran controlled

areas, with proper inspection to insure this, and that they could not be transferred to anyone else. JCA/USA then operated the four planes as a part of the Joint Church Aid, International.

On May 5, 1969 it was announced that an Icelandic air transport company had been formed and registered at Reykjavik which would operate exclusively for humanitarian relief under the name Aid by Air. Its Board of Directors consisted of representatives from all five Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland). Its first activity was to take over operation of the four DC-6B planes in the JCA air fleet, one of which had been damaged by a rocket on landing at Uli on June 2.

There have been changes in the kind and number of aircraft operating from Sao Tome over the several months of the JCA operations. One DC-7 and one C-97G were destroyed in crashes. At the end of May JCA had a fleet of 10 planes, including three of the original four C-97G's, two Superconstellations, and the four DC-6B's being operated by Icelandic Aid by Air. Early in June JCA's Canadian member agency Canairerelief indicated it would soon send a third Superconstellation freighter to be added to the airlift.

JCA maintained flights into Biafra on a varying schedule of landings depending on restrictions, military action, weather, condition of planes, and air crews. Many times these conditions forced the planes to return without delivering their cargoes. With the addition of the four C-97G's in December of 1968, JCA was in a position to increase considerably the number of tons delivered each night. From March to June mercy flights by both JCA from Sao Tome and by ICRC from Dahomey and Santa Isabel exceeded the so called capacity of Uli airstrip which had been placed at 300 tons. JCA alone accomplished 24 night flights with 270 tons on April 9. JCA also sponsored a special air charter flight from Europe to Biafra about once every eleven days.

The supply base airport at Sao Tome is a modern one, well run by the Portuguese authorities. It was not originally intended to handle the intensive JCA traffic. When the airlift was increased by American and Canadian planes early in 1969, additional facilities were required. With the efficient cooperation of the Governor and his officials, the parking space was enlarged and fueling capacity increased.

At the other end in Biafra, Uli airstrip is nothing more than a converted piece of highway. It is long enough, but only a little over 80 feet wide

From Sao Tome, the planes flew in relays, each attempting two shuttles per night. This allows three hours flying time, a half hour unloading at Uli, and a half hour to forty minutes loading in Sao Tome. When the planes arrived over Uli, the landing lights were turned on for a maximum of 30 seconds so the pilots could identify the field and get half way down, then the lights were turned off and the touch down and ground operations were in the dark.



By April 1, 1969, it was possible to report that delivery of food by the combined air bridges of JCA and ICRC to Biafra had eliminated deaths from starvation. This did not mean the food rations were satisfactory. In fact, there was barely enough high protein-type food to meet the needs. It could be said that the Biafran people were no longer dying of starvation. However, these airlifts had only provided food for immediate distribution and were insufficient to set up stocks inside Biafra. Unfortunately, military action in June 1969 forced stoppages of the airlifts. Other means of delivering supplies had not been resolved as of June 30, 1969.

#### Summary of JCA Air Deliveries

From March 1968 when Catholic and Protestant first regular relief flights began through June 12, 1969 there were a total of 2,706 flights that delivered 27,127 tons of supplies to Biafra. Total costs for 2,279 of these flights from mid-August to April 30, 1969 were placed at about \$7 million. No credit is given under JCA for value of supplies delivered or these operational costs. Credit for this has been given under the appropriate countries and organizations who contributed to JCA operations.

#### INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) was formed in March 1962 in a merger of three international non-governmental coordinating organizations working in the field of assistance to people in need. Its membership is around 100 organizations, including Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish agencies in various countries.

In a letter to certain governments concerning ICRC appeals for funds for Nigeria/Biafra relief, the Governing Board of ICVA recalled that many of its member voluntary agencies were active in the airlift and in massive relief programs on both sides of the conflict to which ICVA gave full support. In the letter, ICVA encouraged voluntary agencies and governments to respond generously and promptly to the appeals of ICRC for financing its relief operations.

#### ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY U. S. VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND OTHER U. S. PRIVATE AID

Voluntary agencies registered with the USC advisory committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid work in coordination with the U. S. Government in disaster relief operations. This was true of the Nigeria/Biafra relief operations. However, the size of the program involved other private U. S. relief. The registered U. S. voluntary agencies and the American National Red Cross are listed first followed by a separate list of contributions by other groups. The American Jewish Committee is included with the registered voluntary agencies because it is a member of JCA/USA and some of its member organizations are registered.

Some of this information has already appeared in this report, but it is repeated here to identify it more explicitly with the voluntary agency concerned, and to avoid the impression of an incomplete recital of its generous humanitarian contributions.

American Friends Service Committee

The American Friends Service Committee has 22 feeding station/out-patient clinics located within a 7-mile radius of Abiriba which directly aid 300,000 Biafrans. Each clinic is staffed by a Biafran nurse and midwife.

AFSC sent a 3-man observer team in 1968 to visit both sides. It provided money for the purchase of local food. AFSC also sponsors a joint medical program in Biafra with the Mennonite Central Committee. (See the MCC report in this section). Value reported for AFSC contributions . . . . . \$105,000

American Jewish Committee

The American Jewish Committee coordinates the efforts of 22 American Jewish organizations to raise money for Biafran relief. With the funds raised it supports the JCA/USA segment of the Sao Tome airlift and contributes to the relief operations for Biafra by Church World Service and Catholic Relief Services. It is a member of Joint Church Aid/USA. As of March funds raised totaled about . . . . . \$200,000

American National Red Cross

The American National Red Cross has made available ten disaster relief experts, usually on four months tours of duty, to work with ICRC in Nigeria. ANRC paid their salaries, while out-of-pocket expenses, travel and per diem were paid by USAID/Nigeria or ICRC. These men were Glen Haydon, Claud Payne, William Winters, Charles Estill, S. Gene Nunley, Wilton Gaefe, Don Northey, Alan Platt, Robert Vessey and Robert Earl. They served as area coordinators, traffic managers or directors of logistics. The last four named are presently in Nigeria. Salaries for 1/3 year for 10 persons estimated at \$50,000.

ANRC donated medical supplies from its own stock inventory and obtained drug donations from U. S. pharmaceutical firms totaling 11 tons and valued at \$226,815.

The ANRC also donated \$110,000 to ICRC for Nigeria and forwarded \$29,296 of cash contributions made to ANRC by U. S. private citizens. Included in this amount was \$3,003 sent in by students of Princeton University.

Total contributions made by and through ANRC . . . . . \$416,111

Catholic Relief Services

Catholic Relief Services has had a program in Nigeria since 1959. It was therefore able to divert supplies from its stocks on hand to people fleeing from one area of Nigeria to another as early as May of 1967. Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in July, CRS made available in Biafra 50 tons of food and 67 tons of clothing. Five Americans serving with CRS in other parts of Africa were assigned to Nigeria to assist the Nigerian Red Cross in an emergency program. In cooperation with the Catholic Medical

Mission Board of New York, CRS recruited eight registered nurses to serve on mobile medical and relief teams under the auspices of ICRC and the Nigerian Red Cross in stricken areas under Federal control.

CRS has been providing large quantities of relief supplies to both sides on a continuing basis and has been contributing both supplies and cash for expenses toward airlifts from the United States, Europe and Sao Tome. The airlift from Sao Tome direct to Biafra was organized by Caritas International in February of 1968 with the first flight being made in March of 1968. CRS was among the church relief agencies who helped organize the operation. Later the Caritas flights were joined with the Nordchurchaid airlift to form the International Joint Church Aid and CRS continued with its support of the combined airlifts from Sao Tome.

CRS is a member of Joint Church Aid/USA which owned the original four C-97G planes purchased from the U. S. Government and used in the Sao Tome airlift. (See JCA/USA in this section.)

From January, 1968, through June, 1969, CRS arranged for shipment of 10,504 tons of supplies to Biafra and 30,667 tons to Nigeria, of which 38,586 tons came from the U. S. Government food donation program under Title II of Public Law 480, for which dollar value is given in the USG



At Sao Tome

section of this report. The remainder of 2,585 tons were provided from CRS resources and private donations made through them.

Following is a breakdown of reported contributions by CRS

|  |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| 2,585 tons of high protein food, medicines and medicaments and other emergency supplies, value plus shipping costs paid by CRS. . . .  | \$3,604,842        |
| Cash provided for local purchase of food . . . . .   | 44,000             |
| Cash received from individual donors and foundations in the United States to be used for ocean and air shipment expenses, including the Archdioceses of New York, Washington, D. C., and Baltimore, the Diocese of Camden, the Council of Catholic Women, Patrick and Anna M. Cudahy Fund., W. O. O'Neill Foundation, De Rance, Inc., Frank J. Lewis Foundation, Raskob Foundation for Catholic Activities, U. S. Superior Council of the St. Vincent de Paul Society. . . . . | 610,000 *          |
| (*Does not include \$40,000 contributed to this purpose by the American Jewish Committee since this is credited under that agency.)  |                    |
| Cash donated to ICRC. . . . .  | 5,000              |
| Cash received from Northwestern Students, Evanston, Illinois . . . . .   | 6,000              |
|  | <u>\$4,269,842</u> |

Note While there were periodic reports of specific amounts turned over to JCA for airlift expenses by CRS, it is assumed these were a part of the above \$610,000 and not in addition to.

#### Church World Service

Church World Service has been providing emergency relief since late in 1967, beginning with coordinated relief shipment of drugs by the World Council of Churches and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Since that time, CWS has established a regular program in Nigeria and supplies have been sent on a continuing basis to victims on both sides. The first CWS staff persons in Biafra arrived there in March of 1969--a registered pharmacist and an automobile mechanic.

By September of 1968, CWS had recruited with the assistance of the Mennonite Central Committee an eight man medical team consisting of a doctor, his pharmacist wife, four nurses, a food distribution officer and a relief administrator. The team was endorsed by the World Council of Churches and sent to Nigeria to work under the auspices of the ICRC and Nigerian Red Cross. It operated out of the Enugu sector and became a model operation for incoming relief teams. Team members were able to turn over relief activities to Nigerians as well as to cooperate with the East Central State Government and military authorities to produce a relief program of large scale.

In Federal Nigeria, CWS works through the Christian Council of Nigeria, which is a member of the Nigerian National Relief Commission, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In Biafra, CWS channeled its material aid through the ICRC airlift from Fernando Po and the Caritas and Nordchurchaid, later Joint Church Aid, from Sao Tome. CWS is a member of Joint Church Aid/USA which owns the four C-97G planes purchased from the U S. Government and used in the JCA-international airlift at Sao Tome. See JCA/USA in this section. CWS contributed funds to JCA/USA to help in maintenance and other expenses of these planes and also gave substantial financial support toward the expenses of the JCA international airlift by channeling cash contributions through the World Council of Churches, to Nordchurchaid and to Canairerelief.

From January, 1968, through June, 1969, CWS arranged for shipment of 3,703 tons of supplies to Lagos for FMG areas and 3,636 tons to Biafra, of which 5,636 tons were USG P. L. 480 food commodities for which dollar value is given in the USG section of this report. The remainder of 1,703 tons were provided from CWS own resources and private donations made through CWS.

Following is a breakdown of reported contributions by CWS

|   |                    |                   |
|---|--------------------|-------------------|
| 1,703 tons of supplies, value and shipping costs paid by CWS  |                    | \$2,004,652       |
| Cash donations for Nigeria  |                    |                   |
| For air bridge  | \$ 125,000         |                   |
| To German churches  | 75,000             |                   |
| To World Council of Churches  | 80,000             |                   |
| To WCC for Nordchurchaid  | 125,000            |                   |
| To WCC for ICRC   | 50,000             |                   |
| To Nordchurchaid for 3 flights - Europe to Sao Tome, March 1969   | 84,000             |                   |
| JCA/USA   | 230,000            |                   |
| Canairerelief   | 100,000            |                   |
| JCA - 3 flights from Amsterdam to Sao Tome  | 37,000             |                   |
| JCA - May 10 contribution   | 150,000            |                   |
|   | <u>\$1,056,000</u> |                   |
| Subtracted from these cash donations are contributions of \$20,000 by Biafra Committee, \$38,000 by the Jewish Committee and \$25,000 by Lutheran World Relief, which is credited to these agencies | <u>- 83,000</u>    | <u>\$ 973,000</u> |
| Total reported CWS contributions . . .  |                    | \$2,977,652       |

Christian Children's Fund, Inc.

The Christian Children's Fund began emergency relief in 1969. In cooperation with the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), CCF supports a medical team of 10 persons including a physician, nurses, and other health workers in Itu, Biafra. The team assists in the care, feeding and medication of some 500 cases per day in temporary clinics and in an intensive care center

for 250 children suffering from severe malnutrition. CCF also provides immunization, medication, feeding station, supplemental clothing and other supplies where needed. Cost of this program per month has been estimated at \$10,000. Total through June 30, 1969, estimated . . . . . \$ 45,000

Christian Reformed World Relief Committee

The Committee has sent food, medicines for distribution through the Nigerian Christian Council, to needy persons on both sides . . . . . \$ 6,000

Church of the Brethren World Ministries Commission

Seven volunteer workers are assigned to an ICRC-Lutheran Church team in Biafra. It cooperates in sending medical supplies, high protein beans, metrecal, etc., through CWS. It has budgeted for relief work in Nigeria/Biafra . . . . . \$ 25,000

Community Development Foundation

A staff representative of the Community Development Foundation working with Ibo refugees in Assaba and Agor areas launched seven community self-help projects to improve living conditions, better food distribution and repair a war damaged hospital and village. Cash allocation by CDF . . . . . \$ 55,000

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)

A CARE representative spent ten days in Federal Nigeria with regard to the relief needs and on August 11, 1968, a representative was appointed on an indefinite basis. A third CARE man arrived in Lagos for one week's consultation on October 16, 1968. Personnel costs reported by CARE amounted to \$3,927.

CARE's first shipment of supplies to Federal Nigeria was made in August 1968 and the first to Biafra through ICRC via airlift from Fernando Po in December of 1968. From its own resources, CARE shipped 1,351 tons of food, medical supplies, cloth and other supplies to Biafra and 228 tons to Lagos for a total of 1,560 tons through May 31, 1969. These supplies were valued at \$610,500 plus shipping costs of \$1,293 paid by CARE. CARE also provided \$40,000 for local purchase of rice in the Enugu area and for miscellaneous other local purchases.

Total contributions reported . . . . . \$654,427

Direct Relief Foundation

During the period January 1, 1968, through February 11, 1969, the Direct Relief Foundation provided pharmaceuticals and supplies worth \$155,219 and \$129,713 to Biafra and Nigeria respectively, for a total of . . . \$284,932

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International Rescue Committee

The International Rescue Committee contributed donated drugs and medical supplies for the November charter flight to Biafra coordinated by Biafra Relief Services Foundation and B'nai Brith valued at \$179,000. It also contributed about \$50,000 worth of medicines and \$80,000 worth of food to the "Christmas Ship" and handled the logistics for the shipping of the cargo. Total contributions to date . . . . . \$ 309,000

Joint Church Aid/USA (JCA/USA)

In December of 1968, after investigating the availabilities of aircraft, CWS, CRS and the American Jewish Committee, arranged with the U. S. Government for the purchase of four C-97G "strato-freighter" aircraft at a nominal cost of \$3,670 each. These JCA/USA aircraft, with 14 ton cargo based on a maximum imprint capacity at Uli airport, were added in stages to the Sao Tome airlift beginning with the first two on January 24, 1969. The JCA/USA aircraft added measurably to the capacity of the airbridge from then through June 15, 1969, when all night airlifts to Uli were halted. One of the C-97G's made a crash landing at Uli airfield on May 7, 1969. No lives were lost but the crippled plane was later destroyed by Nigerian jet strafing.

Lutheran World Relief

Lutheran World Relief has raised \$1,000,000 through a special appeal which will be programmed over a period of about two years in projects of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. To date LWR has provided 60 tons of medical supplies valued at \$264,073 and blankets valued at \$79,910. It has allocated funds as follows \$50,000 for purchase of stockfish, \$25,000 for cost of food airlifts, \$75,000 for a medical relief team, and \$50,000 for the purchase of medicines by the Christian Council of Nigeria. Recently, it appropriated \$250,000 for relief and rehabilitation projects in Nigeria/Biafra in the remaining months of 1969. Total reported LWR contributions . . . . . \$ 793,983

Medical Assistance Program

The Medical Assistance Program has airlifted seven tons of medicines, valued at . . . . . \$ 600,385

Mennonite Central Committee

The Mennonite Central Committee has a jointly sponsored program with the American Friends Service Committee in Biafra to provide medical and emergency relief services. MCC also works in FMG areas, and has provided supplies through Church World Service valued at \$14,691 plus cash donations of \$40,000 for both sides. In June 1969 the joint MCC/AFSC paid \$25,000 for processing and shipping 100 tons of stockfish donated by Norway. Total reported contributions by MCC . . . . . \$ 79,691

Save the Children Fund, N. Y.

Cash contribution to ICRC of \$1,000 and to CARE for medical supplies of \$5,608 for a total of . . . . . \$ 6,608

Seventh-Day Adventist Welfare Service

The Service has shipped approximately \$100,000 worth of medicines donated by U. S. pharmaceutical companies through Church World Service, and an X-ray unit worth \$3,000 for a total of . . . . . \$ 103,000

Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, Inc.

As of March 15, 1969, this Committee had sent cash for agricultural supplies, medicines and costs of resettlement of 30 families in the village of Awo Omma. Their major effort is the hospital in this village.

Total reported contributions . . . . . \$ 20,000

World Relief Commission

The World Relief Commission sends funds and personnel to aid in local purchase of food, vehicles and other relief articles needed to help displaced persons and to operate feeding programs in both Nigeria and Biafra. As of March 15, 1969, more than \$30,000 had been contributed to Nigeria and more than \$50,000 to Biafra, for a total of . . . . . \$ 80,000

Total for 19 registered volags including American Red Cross \$11,031,631

Other U. S. Private Assistance

Other U. S. voluntary groups contributed to the Nigeria/Biafra relief operations. Some gave directly in supplies or cash to a particular program, some to other relief agencies and others to specially organized surface and air shipments from the United States such as the Abie Nathan airlifts and "Christmas Ship" in November and December of 1968. Following is a list of these groups on which reports were received and the value of their contributions

|  |                |            |
|--|----------------|------------|
| Albert Schweitzer Fellowship, Inc.           | \$ 30,000      |            |
| American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive      | 20,000         |            |
| Biafra Relief Services Foundation            | 50,000         |            |
| B'nai Brith Foundation                       | 250,000        |            |
| US Committee for UNICEF to UNICEF operations | <u>426,000</u> | \$ 726,000 |

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association

The following U. S pharmaceutical firms made donations of drugs, antibiotics and other medical supplies to victims of the conflict through the American National Red Cross and U. S. voluntary agencies. The values of their contributions are listed below but are not added to the others in this section since they have been included in the reports by the various agencies

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|                             |                  |
|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Abbott Universal, Lts.      | \$ 30,000        |
| Ayerst Laboratories         | 12,000           |
| Ciba Pharmaceutical Company | 3,058            |
| Cyanamid International      | 39,816           |
| Hoffman La Roche, Inc.      | 5,500            |
| Johnson & Johnson           | 3,000            |
| Lakeside Laboratory, Inc.   | 1,060            |
| Meed Johnson Laboratories   | 250,000          |
| Merck, Sharp & Dohme        | 2,408            |
| Miles Laboratories, Inc.    | 42,000           |
| Parke Davis Company         | 13,260           |
| Pfizer International        | 166,127          |
| A. H. Robbins Company       | 2,300            |
| Schering Corporation        | 5,000            |
| Upjohn International        | 12,260           |
| Wyeth Laboratories          | 104,590          |
|                             | <u>\$691,950</u> |

Total Value Contributions from U. S. Volags & Private Groups \$11,757,631

#### ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER NATIONS

There have been at least 30 countries besides the United States which have contributed food, medicines, other supplies and cash toward the Nigeria/Biafra relief operations. Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries were especially involved. In many instances they made their donations through the World Council of Churches or Caritas but it is credited here to the individual country under private contributions. Listed below are nine countries whose donations as of March 31, 1969 totaled more than a million dollars For the remaining 21, one total is given.

| Donor Nation       | Public              | Private             | Total               |
|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Canada             | \$ 2,781,600        | \$ 925,000          | \$ 3,706,600        |
| Denmark            | 1,180,000           | 700,000             | 1,880,000           |
| Fed Rep of Germany | 10,000,000          | 13,500,000          | 23,500,000          |
| Ireland            | 312,000             | 1,413,600           | 1,725,600           |
| Netherlands        | 5,300,000           | 4,400,000           | 9,700,000           |
| Norway             | 7,505,000           | 1,900,000           | 9,405,000           |
| Sweden             | 1,680,000           | 4,100,000           | 5,780,000           |
| Switzerland        | 4,585,000           | 2,735,000           | 7,320,000           |
| United Kingdom     | 5,000,000           | 2,525,000           | 7,525,000           |
|                    | <u>\$38,343,600</u> | <u>\$32,198,600</u> | <u>\$70,542,200</u> |
| 21 Other Countries | 1,187,400           | 2,392,800           | 3,580,200           |
|                    | <u>\$39,531,000</u> | <u>\$34,591,400</u> | <u>\$74,122,400</u> |

| RECAP ON WORLDWIDE CONTRIBUTIONS  |              |               |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| USG                               | \$65,996,300 | \$ 77,027,931 |
| U. S. Voluntary Agencies          | 11,031,631   |               |
| United Nations (UNICEF & WFP)     | 6,862,320    | \$ 82,884,076 |
| Caritas, International            | 740,600      |               |
| World Council of Churches         | 1,158,756    |               |
| Other Nations                     | 74,122,400   |               |
| Total Contributions - All Sources |              | \$159,912,007 |


## BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

### Africa as a Whole

In any consideration of the emergency, it is important to bear in mind the way in which African nations developed and their attitude toward territorial change.

### Decolonization, Boundaries and Institutional Frameworks

The process of decolonization--most of it in the past ten years--has resulted in 42 independent states on the continent and its off-shore islands. The boundaries were not drawn in Africa by Africans for African reasons and purposes, but by European colonial powers. Lost in the process were a host of ethnic, religious, and economic considerations which could have resulted in different and more logical units and boundaries. Within the boundaries little effort was made to facilitate internal communications among Africans which might have laid the framework for future nationbuilding and cooperation among nations. Moreover, in the earlier colonial period, under authoritarian political structures, national institutional frameworks were absent.



In the late colonial period, an effort was made to reverse these policies, and for the most part brief periods of self-government preceded independence. Yet the institutions that emerged were often fragile and out of tune with the needs and aspirations of African societies.

### Attitude Toward Territorial Change

The African governments have reacted to these inherited weaknesses by taking a strong position against territorial change by force or subversion.

This view is enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and represents a widespread conviction that any violent change, such as secession, within the political boundaries of any one of the independent countries of Africa augurs serious trouble for the rest of the continent. African leaders have felt they had to start with a premise that the thousands of ethnic groups on the continent should and could reconcile their differences within existing boundaries and build towards national identities or be faced with a process which might adversely affect every African nation and hopelessly fractionalize the continent. They insist upon the necessity for dialogue and participation in the solution of problems by those directly affected. The OAU considers the problems of Nigeria closely related to the problems of Africa as a whole and soluble only within an African framework.

### Historical Background with Regard to Nigeria

Nigeria, with about 50 million people, is the most populous of African countries. It has three major ethnic groups and some 250 smaller ethnic groups with differences in language, culture, and religion. The country is split by a Y-shaped river system, made up of the Niger and Benue Rivers. The Hausa and Fulani people live in and on both sides of the fork of the Y, the homeland of the Yorubas is in the area to the southwest of the Y, while to the southeast is the home of the Ibos, the group which predominates in the area under the control of the Biafran authorities. The way in which Nigeria developed as a nation and tribal rivalry are important to an understanding of why civil war finally broke out in that country in 1967.

### Colonial Period

Great Britain established a colony in Lagos in 1861. British influence then expanded along the coast and into the interior. In 1914 three separate territories in the country were joined to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. In 1922 the first elected African legislators were included in a council for the colony (Lagos) and southern part of the protectorate. In 1943 three Africans were appointed to the Executive Council. Following World War II, successive evolutionary constitutions legislated by the British Government moved Nigeria toward self-government on a representative, federal basis.

### Independence and Organization as a Republic

On October 1, 1960 Nigeria was granted full independence. Constitutionally, the new republic was organized as a federation of three "states" called the Northern Region, the Eastern Region, the Western Region, and later in 1963 a fourth, the Mid-Western Region, was added. Each Region had its own regional legislature, cabinet and premier. The federal government was headed by a Prime Minister, who served as chief executive and was responsible to the elected lower house of the federal parliament. The President of the Federal Republic was chief of state.

## Political and Tribal Rivalry

This federal system was based upon a compromise among political groups of long-standing rivalry and regional and tribal differences. The large, tightly-disciplined northern party dominated the federal parliament (and government) in alliance with one of the smaller southern-based parties. Shifts in political alliances, protests against electoral trickery, and charges of regional corruption led to increasing dissension in 1964 and 1965, coups and massacres in 1966, and civil war in 1967.

From the beginning, the complexity of Nigerian politics was compounded by the positions of the minority tribal elements within the regions--principally the Ibibios and Efiks (about 3.5 million) and Ijaws (about 1 million) in the East and Mid-West and the Tivs (about 1.5 million), Kanuri (about 2.5 million) and other minority elements in the North. These minority elements resisted the efforts of the regionally based parties to try to dominate their regions. Thus, during the early periods of independence the Ibibios, Efiks and Ijaws of the East tended not to support the Ibo-based party in that region but rather to side with the Western-based Action Group. A similar situation pertained to the Middle Belt populations of the North.

The Ibos traditionally had a politically decentralized and egalitarian society. They are an aggressive and industrious people with a high regard for individual ability. The European culture had a very strong influence on them as did the Christian missionary presence. Prior to Nigerian independence, Iboland had 300 high schools and over a million children in grammar school--more than any other tribal group in Nigeria. The Ibos had many lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other professional people among them and held a disproportionate share of jobs in the civil service, public utilities, and in commerce. Unfortunately, the Ibos gained the enmity of many groups in Nigeria.

Despite these centrifugal tendencies, the urge to surmount regional interests and to construct a national consensus persisted for five years. The shaky truce among the tribes collapsed in January of 1966 when a coup led by a small group of military officers--mostly Ibos--assassinated Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of Nigeria as well as the Premiers of Western and Northern Nigeria.

The Ibo rebels had their own reasons for acting as they did--dissatisfaction with the pace of modernization, widespread corruption, and exclusion of important elements of the population from participation in the decision making process. But even at this point, elements in the army, including Ibos, recognized that events had been carried too far and that the country could be torn apart unless corrective action were taken at once. They stepped in to reassert legality and to try to redress the damage that had been done to the national fabric. The army chief of staff, General Ironsi, an Ibo, became head of state, and military governors were appointed to each of the Regions. However, the new Government was not strong enough to punish the leaders of the original coup despite strong demands to that effect from the North. Nor was it strong enough to prevent vengeful

outbreaks in the North in May that resulted in mass murders of civilian Ibo citizens who lived in that region. In July of 1966 a Northern-led army mutiny brought death to Ironsi. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from a Northern minority tribe, was appointed head of state, but the military government of the Eastern Region was unwilling to accept his authority.

### Secession and Civil War

The formation of the new Federal Military Government (FMG) was followed in September by the convening of an ad hoc constitutional conference. This assembly was broken off when renewed rioting in the North led to the killing of thousands of Ibos resident there. The survivors streamed back to Eastern Nigeria. A conference of all military governors at Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967 resulted in a short-lived compromise agreement between the FMG and the East. Each side accused the other of failure to live up to the agreement and proceeded to apply economic sanctions each against the other. In late May, the Federal Government revised the constitution to establish twelve states, including three within the Eastern Region, the Eastern Region then announced its independence on May 30, 1967, as the "Republic of Biafra" under Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Ibo who was military governor of the Eastern Region.

The decision to secede had great impact on the rest of Nigeria, which felt strongly that any concession of the right of secession would irreparably splinter the entire nation. It agitated, as well, deeply held and strongly articulated concerns on the part of the rest of Africa.

The Federal Military Government announced its determination to crush the rebellion and reunite Nigeria. An almost total blockade and communications blackout for the Eastern Region was immediately established. Open civil warfare broke out July 6, 1967.

For the first 18 months, Federal troops battled until the secessionist area of Biafra, originally 29,000 square miles, was reduced to roughly 5,000 landlocked square miles. The end of the war seemed imminent, but during the autumn of 1968, Biafra began to receive reinforcements of weapons and ammunition delivered in night flights to the only remaining Biafran airstrip at Uli. Biafra had the advantage of shortened lines of communication. It had high morale. These factors sustained Biafra's will and ability to continue its resistance.

Except for brief holiday truces, all attempts at a cease-fire failed. The FMG maintained that Nigerians were fighting for survival of the country, the Biafrans maintained they were fighting for their survival as a people. The Biafrans repeated their belief that the alternative to fighting was subjection to massacre, recalling the anti-Ibo massacres in 1966, and charging the FMG with repeated air bombing raids against non-military targets--hospitals, relief centers and market areas. The Federal military forces insisted they were actually bombing strategic military and ordinance supply centers. The people of Nigeria did not consider they had persecuted the Ibos, citing the Ibo prewar dominance, the 1966 coup, and the Biafran

invasion of Nigeria's Mid-West State in August 1967. Biafra accused Nigeria of genocide. In response, the FMG invited a team of observers from Sweden, Poland, United Kingdom, and Canada, as well as the UN and the OAU, to investigate the charge. The teams reported finding no evidence of genocide in the military operations.

#### Reaction by UN, OAU, Foreign Governments to Secession and Civil War

##### United Nations

The UN Secretary General sent a personal representative to Nigeria in August of 1968, who served as an observer in FMG Territory. The Nigerian war and humanitarian relief were not placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, but the Secretary General strongly urged that a peaceful settlement be sought through the Organization of African Unity. UNICEF was active in providing food and medical supplies and air transport to both sides. FAO authorized an emergency food allocation.

##### Organization of African Unity

The general position and attitude of the Organization of African Unity is to oppose any act of secession within an African country. In September of 1967, the Heads of State of the OAU set up a Consultative Committee composed of Ethiopia, Ghana, Congo (K), Niger, the Cameroon, and Liberia with a mandate to try to resolve the conflict within the framework of one Nigeria. This decision by the OAU was accepted by the Federal Government, and the Committee met in Lagos in November. At that time General Ankrah of Ghana was delegated to try to bring the two sides together. He was unsuccessful, and for some time the OAU Committee was inactive despite a number of efforts to stimulate new initiatives. During the course of these negotiations at Kampala, Niamey, Addis Ababa, and Monrovia, the FMG made a number of proposals aimed at assuring the Ibos of their security within a united Nigeria. It proposed an international observer force to participate in overseeing the reintegration of the Ibos into Nigeria, a qualified amnesty, an Ibo police force to undertake a large part of the security responsibility in the Ibo heartland, non-discriminatory recruitment of Ibos into the Nigerian army and Federal civil service, and an Ibo Military Governor for the Ibo-populated East Central State with Ibo members on his Executive Council. These proposals were not acceptable to Biafra, which continued to insist that only through recognition of its sovereignty could the survival of its people be assured. While generally opposed to acceptance of an independent Biafra, the OAU continues to seek a solution that might be acceptable to both sides.

##### African Countries Supporting Biafra

Of the forty members of the OAU, four, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia, recognize Biafran independence.

### United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has supported the FMG in its efforts to preserve a single Nigeria. While Nigeria was a British colony and protectorate, the United Kingdom trained and equipped the Nigerian armed forces, and made sales to it of arms and ammunition. It continued to do so after granting Nigeria its independence in 1960. When the civil war broke out in 1967, the United Kingdom took the position that to refuse to continue its sale of arms to a Commonwealth member facing armed rebellion would have the effect of pro-rebel action, and continued to furnish essentially the same kind of equipment it had traditionally supplied. At the same time, the United Kingdom has sought to promote a negotiated settlement and has been one of the large contributors of relief supplies to both sides, donated through the ICRC.

### Soviet Union

The USSR has sided with the FMG in the conflict. In August of 1967, it agreed for the first time to sell the Nigerian Government military equipment, including fighter-bomber aircraft. Substantial military sales to the FMG have continued throughout the war.

### France

France has not officially recognized Biafra but on a number of occasions since July 1968 has stated its support for Biafran self-determination. The FMG has charged the French Government with supplying weapons and ammunition to Biafra. France has provided relief supplies to Biafra and care for Biafran children in Gabon.

### Other Nations, Not Including U S

While genuinely concerned over the circumstances which prevent delivery of adequate food to starving civilians in Biafra, most governments have measured their actions to avoid political involvement while supporting a negotiated settlement between the two sides. Over 30 countries, through church and relief organizations and government contributions, are providing food and medical supplies for both sides through the International Committee of the Red Cross and Joint Church Aid.

### United States

The United States follows a policy of large-scale participation in the relief efforts while avoiding military and direct political involvement in the conflict. The U. S. continues to recognize the Federal Government as the Government of Nigeria. It has supported OAU and other efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the problems which divide the parties. Four days after the outbreak of hostilities, the U. S. announced it would not sell or otherwise supply arms and ammunition to either side. The U. S. Government has been the largest donor of relief supplies for both sides and has made cash contributions for support of the expensive relief

airlift operations into Biafra. U. S. voluntary agencies have also made large contributions and have played an important role in sustaining the air bridge from Sao Tome to Biafra.

On February 22, 1969, in announcing the appointment of Ambassador Ferguson as Special Coordinator for relief to the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war, President Nixon issued a statement saying in part

*"The efforts of outside governments to expand relief are greatly complicated by the political and military issues that divide the contestants. Unfortunately, the humanitarian urge to feed the starving has become enmeshed in those issues and stands in danger of interpretation by the parties as a form of intervention. But surely it is within the conscience and ability of man to give effect to his humanitarianism without involving himself in the politics of the dispute.*

*"It is in this spirit that U. S. policy will draw a sharp distinction between carrying out our moral obligations to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and involving ourselves in the political affairs of others. The U. S. will not shrink from this humanitarian challenge but, in cooperation with those of like mind, will seek to meet it."*

The President said the Coordinator would give particular attention to ways and means by which the flow of relief could be increased to the suffering on both sides of the battle lines. He added

*"The Special Coordinator will not seek and will not accept a charge to negotiate issues other than those directly relevant to relief. Nevertheless, the U. S. earnestly hopes for an early negotiated end to the conflict and a settlement that will assure the protection and peaceful development of all the peoples involved."*

In April, May and June Ambassador Ferguson's efforts to augment the flow of relief took him to Lagos, Biafra, Addis Ababa, Geneva, London, the Hague and Copenhagen. He has been working closely with the parties to the conflict, with the OAU, the ICRC and other relief agencies, and other donor governments, seeking agreement upon proposals for mutually acceptable relief routes.

#### RELIEF WORKERS KILLED AS OF JUNE 30, 1969

There follows the dates and circumstances of the people who were killed while bringing food and medicines to or performing services for the civilian victims of the Nigeria civil war.

July 29, 1968 - Father Malachy Riddle and Jonathan Ambache, two British members of a relief team sponsored by Save the Children Fund, were killed when a landrover in which they were riding was blown up by a mine.



October 2, 1968 - Four relief workers were killed and two wounded as FMG troops were fighting their way to Okigwe. The victims were in a medical aid station and had declined to flee as combat approached the area. The dead were Dr. Drajan Hercoj of Yugoslavia, Robert Carlson of Sweden (both with ICRC) and Rev. and Mrs. Albert Savory of Britain (missionaries with the World Council of Churches).

December 7, 1968 - The first fatal air crash of relief planes occurred when a JCA DC-7, chartered by Das Diakonisches Hilfswerk, crashed approximately four nautical miles from the Uli airstrip. The accident was not due to military action. All four crew members were killed. They were: Captain John Maconie (British), co-pilot Heingz Raab (German), engineer Holsman (American), and observer-trainee Thompson (Mexican).

May 6, 1969 - An ICRC DC-6B crashed in the jungle near the town of Ihiala about six miles from Uli. All four victims, three Swedes and one German were killed. Their names were not available.

April 2, 1968 - Caritas, International announced the death of Father Wilfred Udo-Umeobi. He was killed by a bomb while distributing food in the Umuahia Market Place.

June 6, 1969 - An ICRC DC-7 was shot down by FMG forces. Killed were the four crew members Captain David Brown from the USA, co-pilot Stig Carlson from Sweden, Kiell Pettersen, flight engineer from Norway and the load master Harry Apelsson from Sweden.