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START-UP EVALUATION

AREA FOOD AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

660-0102

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ACRONYMS

USAID: United States Agency for International Development  
NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations - Includes collectivities in the project area, as well as mission and private trading/manufacturing organizations  
TAT: Technical Assistance Team  
SOW: Scope of Work  
PROCAR: Area Food and Market Development Project (French acronym)  
PO: Project Officer  
COP: Chief of Party  
BSU: Bandundu Support Unit  
ARD: Agricultural Rural Development  
Project Officers Offices - USAID/Kinshasa  
PRM: Program Office - Evaluations - USAID/Kinshasa  
RRA: Rapid Rural Appraisal  
GOZ: Gouvernement of Zaire  
CPF: Counterpart Funds: generated by USAID PL 480 and CIP programs  
RID: Research and Information Unit  
PIU: Project Implementation Unit - Project site management and staff, excluding COP  
EPIF/CAL: Outreach Extension Program to Women Farmers at Centre Agricole Lusekele, NGO  
OPG: Operations Program Grant  
DPP: Developpement Progrès Populaire  
DRD: Department of Rural Development: GOZ  
ITAK: Institut Technique Agricole de Kikwit - an agricultural training school  
ITPK: Institut Technique Professionnelle de Kikwit (Mechanics) - engineering training school  
CEPAS: Centre d'etudes pour l'Action Social  
ICRW: International Centre for Research on Women  
COOPEC: Credit Union Structures at the Regional and National Level  
PLZ: Plantation Lever au Zaire  
CEPLANUT: Centre de Planification de la Nutrition  
PRAGMA: The contractor for the technical assistance team, Project 102

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### I. PURPOSE OF ACTIVITY BEING EVALUATED:

The purpose of the project is to increase agricultural production, marketing, and processing, in Central Bandundu, consistent with the project goal of raising the standard of living of the rural population of the region.

The mechanism to be used is the strengthening, both technically and materially, of indigenous NGOs to expand and improve agriculture-related services already or potentially provided in the project area. The role of the PVO/NGO community in providing necessary services to rural populations is generally recognized, even by the GOZ, as crucial to the success of a broad range of development activities.

### II. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION:

1. To assess actual versus planned progress toward the achievement of project objectives;
2. To determine whether appropriate systems of management are in place for effective project implementation;
3. To review stated and unstated assumptions made during project design and to determine their continued validity;
4. To determine whether information gathered to date indicates that scopes of work need to be adjusted, or emphases changed, in order to improve project implementation;
5. To identify, based on the review findings, specific actions by the mission and/or the project, to improve project implementation.

### III. METHODOLOGY USED:

The evaluator spent three days in Washington discussing the project with available AID/Washington and AID/Kinshasa staff (Linda Brown and Donald Brown) to provide general orientation in addition to that contained in the Project Paper and Project Implementation Reports.

In Kinshasa, with the cooperation of the Program Office, a file study of documentation was made, and a project review carried out with John Bierke and the Project Officer Cheryl McCarthy. A similar review was carried out with the Project Officer of 098, (C. Pappas) and the quarterly inter-project coordination meeting attended.

In Kikwit, aside from the coordination meeting, involving projects 102, 098, 091, Peace Corps, and Office des Routes representatives, the evaluator participated as well, in an internal project meeting, a summary feedback report on an internal project evaluation, and the project handover to another Project Officer. Some participants were questioned in private on subjects raised in these discussions.

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There were interviews by the evaluator with the Project Coordinator, the Chief of Party (COP) and other members of the TAT as well as the Head of the Bandundu Support Unit (BSU). Also interviewed were an area entrepreneur and a local Head of a catholic mission. Other Zairian Staff were interviewed by Stephen Vance, USAID/PRM/. Ongoing results were reviewed on a continuing basis with the Program Office representative.

A debriefing meeting was held with the Coordinator and the COP to share preliminary findings before departure from Kikwit.

The evaluator returned to Kinshasa to gather additional material unavailable in Kikwit, and for follow-up interviews with the former Project Officer, the ARD supervisor, as well as the ARD agricultural economist assigned to the dossier. A debriefing meeting was held with the coordinator, the COP, the former Project Officer, and the new Project Officer, to review a draft report. Preliminary and final reports were prepared.

#### IV. FINDINGS:

1. The project Design, using AID resources as a catalyst for generating additional productive activity through existing NGOs can be an efficient mechanism for achieving AID goals in the project area.
2. The project has suffered from contract procurement and staffing delays, some of which appear to have been avoidable. This has affected the project objective realization calendar, but achievement of the April, 1989 IMO identification and intervention target is realizable. The population impact objective timetable based on economic analysis is less likely to be achieved. However, a catch-up is certainly possible.
3. While only the proposed completion of RRAs and NGO evaluations can validate this key hypothesis, it appears there exist sufficient potential NGOs likely to meet project criteria to permit the achievement of the project purpose and goal.
4. Project management faces the challenge of accelerated development to achieve objectives within the analytical and time framework foreseen for the project. Realignment of tasks and more concentration of improved management resources at the site are required, as well as an established overall plan of attack on project objectives.
5. Project activity planning and organization of NGO identification and mobilization has suffered delay and requires comprehensive attack to verify project impact potential. Definition of the baseline is not clear and needs specification.
6. Off-site management behaviors which discouraged desirable project goal ownership by on-site project management and dictated decisions to delay staffing and procurement. Urgent staffing and procurement problems remain to be resolved. The recent housing policy announced could make some staffing difficult if not impossible.

7. Scopes of work and management behaviors at the project site have in some cases proved to be inappropriate. Greater clarity of role allocation/authorities in necessary.
8. PIU staffing is inadequate and incomplete with the exception of the General Administration Division which has shown high performance. Team composition remains to be accomplished in other divisions before a concerted attack on project objectives can be launched.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the new PO resolve immediately existing staffing and procurement problems. The PO should seek authority to facilitate contract hiring and Pragma procurement where required to advance the project. The procurement tracking system used by the PO of 091 be institutionalized for 102 as previously instructed by the ARD. Maximum time horizon of 60 days is recommended.
2. Changes in scopes of work be developed for the Coordinator and the COP with particular attention given to assuring directly goal-oriented responsibility. A conflict resolution mechanism for site management should be established with the PO. The Coordinator should be freed from GOZ liaison so that bi-monthly Kinshasa visits will suffice, with bi-monthly PO site visits programmed.
3. There is an apparent necessity for the hire of an expatriate marketing specialist. Short-term assistance should be engaged if necessary to supplement resources until arrival. A maximum 60 day time horizon is recommended.
4. Formal management training be provided for the Project Coordinator at the earliest practical opportunity. A course is available this fall at the University of Pittsburgh.
5. Frozen salaries should be instituted for Zairians of the project affected by the new housing policy until the policy (amended to take into account actual rent) is compiled with. This should be immediate. Other housing policy options should be explored.
6. Defining eligible NGOs with the scope to impact significant numbers of project area producers should be sufficiently flexible to include private traders, corporations and collectivities. An NGO evaluation and intervention prioritization mechanism should be tested and put in place for implementation by the project after completion of the RRAs.
7. Defining appropriate commodity inputs should include products mentioned in the project paper without their being considered exclusive, or irreplaceable by other products.

8. The functions of marketing and processing be united in one division of PROCAR under a marketing specialist chief, staffed with a financial analyst and an appropriate technology specialist. A separate training division should be established within Procar. Amended scopes of work are required for the production chief, the administration specialist, the marketing specialist and research and information chief. Staff establishment of RID be subject to review to deal with the apparent need for two additional positions.
9. Pragma be contracted to carry out procurement for the project as soon as the required procedures permit, if other alternatives to resolve procurement needs are unavailable under Recommendation 1.
10. The Pragma contract be amended to permit short-term technical assistance contracting for marketing and institution building expertise if other methods of supplying required services are not easily and quickly available. Decision to be made consequent on the implementation of Recommendation 1.
11. Concrete baseline measures be established which respond to the project goal and purpose.

START-UP EVALUATION  
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I. Introduction

The purpose of this project is to increase agricultural production, marketing, and processing in 16 collectivities in the Kwilu and Mai-Ndombe subregions of Bandundu, so as to achieve the project goal of raising the standard of living of the rural population of central Bandundu. The Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is made up of a Technical Assistance Team (TAT); excluding the Chief of Party (COP) i.e., 4 expatriate specialists (the Administration Specialist, the Extension Specialist, the Agronomist, and the Research and Information Specialist), and about 18 Zairian specialists in functional divisions, general administration, production, marketing, processing, and research and information. The PIU, which began to be put in place in 1987, identifies and establishes priorities for interventions with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), assists the design and selects the proposals from these organizations which are most likely to contribute significantly to achieving the project purpose, and may assist selected NGOs to prepare proposals for financing by other USAID projects. It establishes the baseline situation, supervises the allocation of project resources, monitors the implementation and evaluates the results of these interventions.

Project funding, authorized was in early 1985, to a total of U.S.\$15,000,000 (as well as counterpart fund equivalent to U.S.\$10,000,000, and estimated NGO contributions of U.S.\$1,000,000) is to be disbursed by 31 January 1995.

II. Actual versus planned progress

2.1. NGO interventions

The data extrapolated from budgets etc. showing planned project progress are presented in Annex II.

Data has been assembled from various project documents to provide some frame of reference against which to compare measures of current achievement. All sources are not consistent. As of a proposed April 1989 evaluation, i.e. 4 years after approval, expectations were that 8 NGOs will have already been evaluated and that interventions would have been approved for the initial six interventions. The table in Annex II shows an objective of an established intervention of only one NGO at the end of year 3, i.e., 1988. The COP annual plan submitted in November 1987 spoke of 8 NGO identifications, and 4 established interventions by November 1988.

As of July 1988, there are three agreements signed, (2 with CAL, one with Technoserve) and three implemented interventions, a coffee dehuller placed with CAL, instruction in OPG grant preparation for CAL as well as PROCAR staff, and demonstration plots with CAL (covered by an agreement) and DPP.



An extension training program with Lusekele EPIF/CAL (aimed at women cultivators), covered by the above agreement, is to begin in January 1989. A planned demonstration program initiated by the project could ultimately reach about 2,400 producers at CAL (48 extensionists) and about 1,000 individuals at DPP (36 agents) and an unidentified number at Mbanza-Lute (17 agents). Except for the latter, these interventions were developed, on an ad hoc basis, through identification in the PP rather than within an overall development plan including baseline data. Complete RRAs have been carried out (Feb. 1986) and proved useful in the areas of these NGOs, but provided insufficient data on other potential NGOs. Another 11 RRAs remain to be completed, and two others need additional work. Based on current plans they may be completed on schedule.

The project claims to have identified 8 NGOs as intervention objects (1. CAL.; 2. DPP; 3. Mbanza-Lute; 4. Djuma; 5. C.R.B./Bobore; 6. Mission Catholique, Bokoro; 7. ITPK (Kikwit) 8. COOCEC/Bandundu (Djuma/CDR has reportedly declined participation). It also claims 5 interventions as follows:

- \*1. Coffee Huller, CAL
- \*2. EPIF/CAL (Pilot Research Project)
- \*3. TECHNOSERVE/D.P.P.
- \*4. OPG/098/CAL/PROCAR
- \*5. Demonstration (plots) CAL/DPP/Mbanza-Lute

Three \* interventions are actually in force as indicated earlier. The installation of the coffee huller at Lusekele, occurring at the Project Officer's initiative, lacked any prior needs assessment, follow-up or evaluation. While other NGOs have been visited, of 14 requests received by the project, 3 have resulted in visits by the project relative to coordinator priorities.

Two RRAs carried out recently have verified that the project does not have the know-how to carry these out as planned. Consultants have been engaged to assist in carrying out the eleven remaining RRAs, and to "supplement" the work done in the other two collectivities and to identify potentially eligible NGOs.

Further, the quarterly project coordination meeting has established concrete mechanisms to encourage improved consultation and interaction between USAID projects and participants in the region.

## 2.2 Staffing

It was projected that expatriate TA staffing would be completed for the beginning of year 2. Staffing began at the beginning of year 3 and has only become complete for the 4th year. Three specialists were available by the beginning of the second quarter of year 3. Effectively, the TA team is only beginning to function as such. There has been a loss of 1.25 to 1.5 years of project activity. The Zairian coordinator was appointed in early 1986 and began to build up local staff in 1987. It is considered that the PIU in place

performed a useful role in establishing a project framework in providing follow-up for PO initiatives, assuring a presence in the project area, and providing logistical support and institutional memory for short-term technical assistance.

Insofar as the Zairian portion of the PIU, hiring was put off until the TAT team arrived and has only very recently been revived. Candidates offered by GOZ were either rejected, or recruitment delayed. There are still no marketing or processing staff. There is only one agronomist and one extensionist, while four of each were planned. For Research, and Information, while the chief is present two specialists are missing, an Agricultural Economist and a Non-formal Education Specialist. This division now seeks an additional socio-economist and a data manager (see Annex XIII), and seeks to transfer the Education specialist. A responsible for Documentation/Librarian has already been added to the ranks of the RID staff. In contrast, General Administration is at full strength. It has added four positions not foreseen owing to GOZ and workload requirements. Since five positions have been added, 12 programmed posts have yet to be filled, and an additional two others considered. Table 2-2 in Annex II summarizes.

The POs no-hiring policy, as the completion of the RRAs approaches, has now rebounded on the project. An agro-economist and a training specialist have been identified for Research and Information (RID) but the required final recruitment has not been initiated by the PO. Recent remuneration policy changes may prevent identified individuals from being available. The Production Division seeks one each of soils, plant protection, and animal husbandry specialists, and 3 Rural Development specialists for extension as planned. In view of the dearth of management personnel it is suggested that one Chief for both marketing and processing together be sought, with two second level posts to cover each speciality. If the Chief marketing specialist is not immediately available by month end, consideration must be given to conferring the specialist hiring responsibility on Pragma as an addition to the TAT.

Confusion reigns as to where the initiative to resolve this resides. PROCAR leadership insists the action to resolve this situation is required at USAID/Kinshasa level, while the PO waits for an initiative from the project staff. The PO seeks from the Coordinator a declaration that he is not able to staff satisfactorily through GOZ but until very recently has not permitted any actual hiring. Thus he is reluctant to provide this. Leadership is required to deal with this situation. If necessary, the initiative should be taken by the COP consistent with his role representing the contractor if satisfactory personnel are not available in the next 60 days. To ensure achievement of project goals, a project implementation letter to GOZ should be conveyed to permit contract hire of necessary personnel.

Of \$15 million authorized, \$4.5 million earmarked, and \$3.9 million committed, only \$0.9 million had been disbursed at June 27, 1988. Committed funds are made up of \$3.5 million for TA and \$0.4 million for commodities. More data is available (Table 2.4) in Annex II.

### III. Project Management

The various components of project management touch a number of levels, AID/Washington, AID/Kinshasa the Contractor, and Project site management.

#### 3.1. AID-WASHINGTON

The project is experiencing great difficulty in achieving the timely ordering and acquisition of the goods and service required. (See Annex X). Some officers feel a delay of 1.5 years is within standard for large items, such as vehicles purchased from the U.S. No project can function effectively within such a timeframe, at least, for initial start-up equipment. Nor would this lag permit reacting to varied client requirements. The PO cites the following problems: 1) project overload for the officer, 2) no budget for seven months after signing, 3) delayed arrival of TA, 4) two year delay in equipping office, 5) delayed start of first major intervention (DPP is still waiting) 6) delayed start of major second intervention for 3 years (EPIF/CAL), 7) two years delay in audit and training services permitting transfer of total accounting responsibility to the project.

This situation has led to granting PRAGMA authorization to permit dollar purchases by them of up to \$5,000 per item. This will facilitate flexibility but may not be sufficient to avoid impeding the project for items such as vehicles and computers. Continued failure to meet project needs suggests that AID give consideration of such other approaches as commodity leasing, or counterpart fund purchase. If purchase responsibility transfer to Pragma, with associated waivers, is not possible.

#### 3.2. USAID/KINSHASA

The initiatives made by the Project Officer have led to concrete results. The PO has been responsible for much of the current advancement of the project. The PO hired the Administration Specialist on a short-term contract (July 1987) filling an immediate project need.

However, the view from the project operations level is that too much initiative has rested with the project office, and there is a misallocation of PO resources, i.e., too much supervision and project operation level decision-making, with insufficient support for follow-up of project requirements. The project officer admits that much less than 60% of time has been committed (the PP calls for 75% of a direct hire PO requirement) until just recently. This (in the office's own view) has had a visible cost in terms of morale, organization, staffing, and

delivery of equipment. Site management reports insistence on the priority PO initiatives, and arbitrary refusal to proceed with site-based initiatives, particularly in the face of opposition. The situation has prevented the project ownership by site management necessary to ensure initiative for successful implementation, and has made collaboration difficult. The PO was pursuing activities directly, which could have been delegated, and did not delegate necessary follow-up, leading to needless delay and non-resolution of project problems (See Annex X details). Project area management has been forced to take their difficulties to the PO's superiors.

### 3.3. PRAGMA MANAGEMENT

This firm has been somewhat tardy in supplying some of the TA staff. Two division chiefs arrived 5 and 8 months after the COP, although it is clear that the project was not ready to receive them.

One might critique the performance of the COP, in that he might have been more forceful. The COP, however, did take his problems to USAID/Kinshasa. He needs have more assertive input on vital issues, like longer-run-work planning and specialist freedom to perform work. On-site authorities are not clear and need definition.

### 3.4. PROJECT SITE MANAGEMENT

The staggered nature of TAT arrival delayed activity on PO instructions. The Coordinator was limited to facilitating establishment, and follow-ups on PO initiatives. With the arrival of the COP, annual and 18 month work plans were submitted (Dec. 87). No formal acceptance has been received, and the originals have reportedly been unilaterally modified by USAID/Kinshasa. While three individual (TAT) work plans have been prepared, none has been prepared by division. The status of these programs is not clear. Some training has occurred within the PIU. A team-building exercise (Jan. 88) was implemented to encourage a common focus or objectives. See Annex V for scopes of work and Annex IV for CVs. An internal evaluation is presented in Annex XI.

There is some conflict inherent in the organization design. The Coordinator sees himself as the Director in his responsibility for Zairian staff and to the GOZ. The COP has direct goal achievement responsibility, and TAT performance responsibility to Pragma. Thus though the Coordinator is the nominal head, his function is one of facilitating PIU and TAT activities to achieve project goals. The COP must provide the sense of urgency that illuminates the work of the specialists. He will have to negotiate with the Coordinator to ensure the necessary freedom of action and collaboration of all PIU resources. The Coordinator will bring to the equation the Zaire political reality required to meet his commitment to the GOZ. Differences in priorities will have to be resolved between the two parties. Where no agreement can be found the matter will have to be resolved at the PO level.

#### 3.4.1 The GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

This division, the only one fully staffed, according to PRAGMA's scope of work, is responsible for the following: day-to-day direction of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU); implementation of the project; final selection of participating NGOs; financial management of project resources; timely ordering and procurement of project inputs; record keeping; and, financial and implementation reporting.

Its composition differs slightly from the descriptions found in the Project Paper and PRAGMA's SOW. It consists of the Project Coordinator (Cit. Nkoy), the Chief of Party (Mr. Olson), the Administrative Assistant (Cit. Bagba), the Administrative Specialist (Mr. Vaughan), the Chief Accountant (Cit. Mayanga), the Bookkeeper (Cit. Mikwiniy), the Stock/Inventory Accountant, the Cashier, and the support staff - secretaries and drivers.

Management/control systems, including those outlined in the administrative and financial accounting handbook prepared by Coopers & Lybrand for this project, have been instituted. These include vehicle control, stock/inventory control, fuel usage control, financial management/accounting, and field trip reporting. The C&L handbook was designed to serve as a practical guide to assist in the daily management of project commodities and financial resources. It was initially foreseen that C&L would first conduct an audit of the project's finances (from 1986 to present) and then assist project staff, which included the TA team, in putting the system in place. However, owing to delays in audit implementation, PROCAR was forced by its growing activity to implement systems outlined in the handbook, and others required without a formal audit. Of the systems now in place, field trip reporting was initiated by the Project Coordinator prior to the arrival of the TA team; two others - vehicle control and fuel use control - not identified in the handbook were initiated by PRAGMA; the remaining two - financial accounting and stock/inventory control systems - were implemented as outlined in the handbook. Preliminary findings of the audit, which began in late June, 1988, indicate that PROCAR has done a fine job in implementing the required control systems.

The division, with high quality staff, which generally understands its roles and responsibilities, is expected to fully accomplish its required task as well as absorb increased workload as the project fills vacant positions and expands its implementation activities.

The only potential problem area concerns the Zairian members of this division. The new "prime policy" (effective July 1, 1988) has affected the morale of those individuals (the three most senior staff) who now benefit from project-provided housing. If the individuals concerned remain in present housing, their primes, which make up most of their salary, would be reduced by fifty percent. This policy appears designed to force the current occupants out of their homes in an area where their

living standards are at the same level as their expatriate colleagues. A more equitable solution would be to freeze remuneration until the difference with newly adjusted salaries and primes would cover the actual cost, or forego an amount from the proposed salary increase to cover all or a portion of actual rent. These individuals were hired on the current basis, and a freeze would be preferable and more equitable.

3.4.1.1 The Coordinator, a Graduate Ingénieur Agronome was involved in an E.E.C. tea project (Directeur?) for nine years in the Kivu Region, and was for five years Inspecteur Sous-Régional in the same region. He is reported to be a better than average manager. Under close supervision and direct instruction by the PO, there was limited project authority. The Coordinator consequently devoted relatively small priority to those parts of his job outside the administrative realm. As his scope of work does not speak directly to the project purpose and goal, it would be useful to amend it to do so.

The Coordinator is an intuitive rather than an analytical manager. Decisions once made become difficult to change, consequent on the authoritarian model. These considerations may not work well for North Americans. Approaches like team planning and tasking, and management by objective, do not appear to be part of his management equipment.

The 1988 plan of work was made up almost totally of work to be done by external consultants, and did not incorporate the work programs prepared by the TAT members. Although presented, they were not reviewed, evaluated, and approved to permit team managers a free field of action. There is a tendency to action by action approval i.e. close control of individual activities rather than a focus on desired outputs. He has not used the COP, or his ideas on management as fully as he might have, or will find necessary. An opportunity to be exposed to North American management methodology facilitate his work with the TA team.

The incumbent currently spends 25% of his time in Kinshasa. If he could be relieved of the necessity for GOZ contact allocated him by the PO, and the Kinshasa project office was strengthened, his application to the project could be improved. It is suggested that work be organized to limit Kinshasa trips to brief bi-monthly visits, and that the PO or a representative visit Kikwit bi-monthly.

The Coordinator must prioritize with the COP, project interventions, discriminating between one or another institution, or region, collectivities, or village. He does, and will, face strong pressure from the milieu in making these choices. There has been a tendency on his part to control very closely every opportunity to encounter potential clients owing to concern about raising expectations. He will need firm criteria developed with the TA team to liberate the specialists and permit him to protect himself within his milieu, through analytically justified choices. An approach has been suggested to alleviate this problem.

3.4.1.2 Chief of Party. The incumbent is highly sensitive to the needs of a successful interaction process. Although the requirements of this project call for a broader scope than evidenced by previous experience, his background will be very useful. He must assist the Coordinator to develop an effective coordinated goal-oriented team. The COP performs his task in a very subtle way, so subtle that his subjects may not get message. He needs to be more direct. In the face of opposition, he may not in the past have been sufficiently assertive on issues vital to the success of the project. While the decision-making process is vital, ensuring the best decision is made to advance the project is even more vital.

The scope of work for the COP, which emphasizes administrative functions does not touch on his direct responsibility as the chief Pragma agent for assuring that the project focuses on actions aimed at achieving the project goals and purposes (although it was included in his 1988 work plan).

The COP will, as part of the management input role associate with his bottom line responsibilities as chief of party, and contractual responsibility for the achievement of project goals for which Pragma Corporation has been engaged will wish to define clearly his involvement in project decision-making and prioritization with the coordinator.

3.4.1.3 The Administrative Assistant to the Coordinator - Feedback indicated that the incumbent of this post (insisted on by GOZ) is performing well and reliably. He has been at his post for about three months. He is acting Coordinator in Cit. Nkoy's absence, and is responsible of monthly and quarterly reporting GOZ/DRD.

3.4.1.4 The Administrative Specialist - serves as acting COP in Mr. Olson's absence. He was originally hired by the PO on a short-term contract, does not meet the education specifications for the post, but has made up for this lack with on-the-job experience, and high project team performance. The preliminary department rating by Coopers and Lybrand have been very positive. The Coordinator relies heavily on his expertise. He has prepared a work plan and followed up on it closely. Continued pre-occupation with logistics, which was not included in his scope of work, could impede participation in NGO evaluation and training. Allowing the Bandundu Support Unit to handle more maintenance/logistics as it should assist in resolving this problem. (See items 3, 8, 9 in Annex XI). A procurement system is in place. The section needs assistance with computerizing inventory and end-use tracking.

3.4.1.5 The Chief Accountant - His performance has been excellent according to those who supervise his work. His role was important in assuring the Coopers and Lybrand commendation. His staff of two bookkeepers, an inventory/stock control accountant, and a cashier perform well under his supervision.

### 3.4.2 PRODUCTION AND EXTENSION DIVISION

It is obvious that the organization of this division is rudimentary. Except for the demonstration plots, developed by the agronomist, initiatives have come through the PO. An agronomic evaluation of Lusekele proposals was carried out. The agronomist has focused on plans for the identification and dissemination of improved varieties, and useful plant material and developing linkages with the RAV (091) project.

3.4.2.1 The Chief Production Division's - practical experience transcends her educational background (which does not match specifications) in qualifying her for her post. With one week on the job, it is not possible to assess performance, but the individual manifests positive management behaviour and strength of character. She will wish to engage a highly qualified extension specialist.

The specific scope reference (No.4 - "As division chief, report to the Project Coordinator on daily implementation") implies a close control which is inappropriate. The scope of work should be amended to delete the word "daily."

3.4.2.2 The Head Production Subsection - Although the incumbent appears well qualified to fulfill the scope of work for this post, he has had a difficult adaptation to Zaire. Highly motivated and committed to the achievement of his professional goals, he has run afoul of project procedures. He has shown a limited capacity for inward/outward communication in French (which has improved). There have been personal/family problems that have interfered with the execution of his mandate. Charged with carrying out RRAs, he was superseded by the PO. The task may have been beyond his scope. It was not in his scope of work, but he was chosen for previous RRA experience. He has not gained the esteem of his Coordinator, who somehow has left the impression with him, and others, that he had been reduced to a peer level with the junior (Zairian) Agronomist. It is not clear that he has yet gained a clear understanding of the catalytic (rather than direct) nature of his role within the project and the need to look at the larger scale. He has prepared a work plan.

The incumbent supervises the work of a junior Zairian agronomist. The latter is considered to be capable of more than satisfactory work, which will be shown once the project gets rolling.

The only Zairian extensionist, who has had some seven years of somewhat similar experience working on the North Shaba Project (PNS), has up to now worked under the direct supervision of the Project Coordinator (who was himself acting chief of the division). Although the latter gives him good ratings for his performance, which was to a large degree outside the realm of extension work, the general perception is that he is an unsatisfactory employee, uninterested in extension work, and preferring



office work to field work where the risks of dirtying one's hands are great. This individual was initially hired on a temporary contract. The PO, who was opposed to hiring him and requested that the Coordinator allow his contract to expire. Before this occurred, the extensionist became a full DRD employee, so that he could not be removed.

#### 3.4.3 RESEARCH, INFORMATION AND TRAINING

The incumbent appears well qualified for his post. There is no mention of training in his scope of work, and it has been suggested this function be transferred elsewhere. (See Annex XIII). His analysis of the research information activity indicated insufficient resources for the workload is persuasive. He feels a data manager and a socio-economist are urgently needed. While additional staff may indeed be required, filling the current establishment is of the highest priority. Currently two established posts are not named and one post has been added. Primary work has been concentrated on collecting and evaluating completed studies and exploring what data can be extracted. Initial work has begun with the available computer (rented). Baseline development work has begun. The incumbent has been available only since March 1, 1988.

The librarian for the division maintains document files for the project, does translation from English to French of studies, make copies of required studies, etc. He is performing satisfactorily in this position. He was transferred from Personnel where his work was not considered satisfactory.

#### 3.4.4 MARKETING AND PROCESSING

No staff are present. A judgement has already been offered as to staffing.

#### 3.4.5 TRAINING

Establishment of training as a separate division as originally programmed. This is a key project activity touching both internal and external training. A candidate is available for this post. Division head status is required if an individual of satisfactory capacity is to be recruited.

#### IV. PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS/HYPOTHESES

- A. There are sufficient numbers of interested self-sustaining NGO's capable of benefiting from the project and impacting the project purpose and goal on a sustainable basis, during and after the completion of its mandate.

It is evident that some NGOs (some identified in the project documents) will not be interested or able to meet project selection criteria. The school ITAK is moribund, CODAIK has lost its funding, the Djuma mission has declined to collaborate. There will certainly be some potential NGOs that will not wish to expand their role, or cannot absorb assistance, or handle recurrent cost, or accept being non-exclusive in offering benefits. The RRAs, combined with an NGO evaluation, will settle this question.

USAID accountability requirements in end use CPF budgets, dollar-procured goods and services may be more demanding than that which is acceptable to some NGOs. PROCAR will have to assist some NGOs to organize to meet minimum requirements in ways which are acceptable to them.

The independent income-generating criterion may be a problem. However, many NGOs have a long historic record of funding success which AID should take into account. If not, pre-intervention action may be required in some instances (i.e. CAL).

There are reports of the absence of NGOs in the Mateko and Mikwi collectivities. While active collectivities (local government units) might be of interest, their developmental programs have been rejected by the previous PO. The PP specifically mentions working with collectivities. If such collectivities' programs still are a problem, they might be structured to be undertaken by community development associations, receiving "Government" funding but also involving the non-governmental sector in management. Thus the project may be able to participate in these programs.

As for non-exclusivity, this may be negotiable, but the project should have the option at least making a beginning before tackling the issue.

Indicated below is a listing of NGOs identified as having significant scale of operations. This does not mean they meet all criteria, but it does identify a pool from which "10 to 15" NGOs can be drawn who can collaborate with the project. The RRAs to be completed will provide a list from which these institutions can be confirmed and added to DPP and LUSEKELE which are actively involved with the project. (See Annex XIV).

Then there are a number of private sector groups who work with a multitude of farmers and farmer groups. These farmer groups, numbering from 5 to 60 individuals, band together to make marketing arrangements with buyers. These buyers are often interested in developing extension arrangements where-by farmers

organize their culture, production and marketing in accordance with market requirements. It is proposed that the project work with such buyers to train such extension teams perhaps paid partially by the project during the training process, and increasingly operating at the merchants costs i.e. 75/25%; 50/50%; 25/75%; 0/100%.

There are also the large enterprises like British American Tobacco (33) and PLZ (34) who are potential partners, and work in the project area.

Finally there are groups of villages which enter into associations of from three up to thirty, who may in their own turn be assisted to create the mechanisms to permit them to work with the project. There may also be some collectivities with which the project could work, in the absence of more dynamic NGOs.

The bottom line is that there appear at this time to be at least three dozen potential intervenants permitting the project to identify and implement significant interventions directed at achieving the objectives of the project. Verification will be carried out by the current RRA program.

- B. There are improved technologies available to be extended to the NGOs.

The area is mainly a cassava (with some corn) growing area. All the improved technology implied in the availability of an improved variety (RAV has improved cassava and corn varieties) remains to be disseminated. Extension work based on the faithful performance of known practices, now incompletely carried out, would yield significant production benefits. Improved organization of the marketing process (bicycles/pushcarts/market calendars and harvesting dates), identification of labor saving methods in processing (i.e. cassava treatment) could have a significant impact on the project goal. Improvements in training approaches, the development of tools methodology, and tools, could improve results markedly. This assumption continues to be valid.

- C. There is equitable distribution within households of resources generated by project activities.

This is an unstated assumption which does not have the acceptance of the former PO. Hence proposals for extension services to women (ICRW), nutritional monitoring, off-farm employment for men, and COOCEC/COOPEC credit policies regarding women. A valid preoccupation of priority interest, given the overwhelming agricultural role of women, and gender household interaction in Zaire.

- D. Price liberalization and macroeconomic policies are maintained.

Price direction is not followed in the markets. There is reported to be some command activity on basic agricultural commodities at the farm level. It is recommended that the RRAs attempt to verify that lingering attempts to place administrative controls of price have been abandoned.

The continued adjustment of the zaire relative to other currencies should encourage greater domestic production but will make imported inputs more difficult to obtain except through the project. Imported inputs may not be sustainable. Project emphasis must be on locally available inputs.

- E. The Project can find a way to work with the private sector.

There is interest on the part of the private sector, but the project will have to work out the modalities. We would recommend a smaller scale intervention to test out possible approaches - A local trader, C. Burn in Kikwit, has knowledge of the AID system. This may provide an opportunity to design and test out a model which could be applied to larger traders such as FERNANDES, PLZ, etc.. The project will require private sector interventions if it is to attain the scale to reach project objectives. There may not be a sufficient number of missions with the scale of activity to achieve project purposes. The PLZ situation is one where the company wishes to disengage. The project may be of assistance in ensuring a productive transition rather than allowing the situation to deteriorate.

- F. The specific NGOs stated in the PP are the priority candidates for the project.

With the passage of time, and project delays, some candidates like ITAK, CODAIK, as mentioned earlier, and CEPAS (which has dropped its appropriate technology activity), no longer appear feasible. Some missions (Swedish) are not active in the area. In any event the project should consider prioritizing (after testing), by potential impact, to achieve efficiencies. Project document candidates could be scanned like others to establish priorities.

- G. USAID can provide project resources in a timely manner in accordance with the project plan to facilitate project implementation.

This assumption has not been validated. The PO by her own admission never committed as much as 60% of her time to the project except recently before her planned departure. Delayed contracting and procurement as well as management problems have impeded project results. (See Annex X for details). However, things could improve.

- H. Project coordination will improve overall aid impact results.

There are obvious synergisms in projects coordinating their activities. Real progress is being made in this regard, which will yield benefits in achieving project results.

- I. Project area producers are sufficiently interested in project inputs delivered through NGOs, that there is a satisfactory return.

While this is not true to date, the interest of potential NGOs both religious and private sector, indicates there is a market for opportunities to improve economic well-being. The demonstration plot of the project alone, if realized, could approach the numbers required to achieve and impact (low yield) equal to a 5% return in the fourth year of the project. Double this number would have to be reached to achieve a 15% return on project investments. This would approximate the target yield horizon in the PP.

- J. Supporting other USAID projects will parallel the life of 102.

Projects 026 and 028 have effectively disappeared. Although 098 remains and PPF (080) will be renewed in another form, the Kyaka sub-station of 091 is having severe financial difficulty. The Peace Corps association has been developed. CEPLANUT (079) has not been extended; the PVO Economic Support Project (097), though beyond the PACD, may find some offspring in the new umbrella project (125); and, SANRU I (086) has been followed on by SANRU II (107). It is evident that not all the support projects will be available. This will require greater flexibility in the use of project resources.

- K. Project Impact can be measured.

There is no clear definition of the baseline. Measures of proxies which respond directly to project goal and purpose need definition.

## V. EVALUATION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1. FINDING

The project has not yet reached the stage where it is impacting the project goals and purpose. The advancement of the project has been negatively affected by shortfalls in management at the USAID/Kinshasa and AID/Washington levels. There are potential management problems at the project site.

RECOMMENDATION

Review immediately with newly assigned project officer, the division of project work between PO and balance of project team.

1. Bottom-up formulation of project priorities for agreed upon calendar (plan) of immediate and longer-term project activities to meet challenge of achieving project objectives.
2. Analysis of outstanding problems confronting the project and their resolution by immediate action according to established order or priorities.
  - Missing personnel - immediate recruiting from GOZ, if available within 60 days otherwise recruit by direct means.
  - Missing equipment/commodities - ordering of appropriate goods within \$5,000 limit; review of outstanding procurement requests and PO follow-up. Institution of 091 methodology of procurement tracking; exploration of potential for procurement transfer to Pragma, with waivers for commodities - or local leasing; review of permitted commodities for supply by project.
  - Short-term Technical Assistance - inclusion of institution building and marketing specialist assistance in Pragma terms of reference.
  - Formalization of conflict - resolution mechanism for site management as proposed.
  - Programming formal management training for the Coordinator - earliest possible moment, with exposure to Pragma. Course available this Autumn.
  - Review and approval as indicated of proposed scope of work changes, including separate training division, as shown hereafter.
  - Early adjustment of Pragma short-term consultancy mandate and review of permitted NGOs.
  - Clarification of definition of project eligible NGOs.
3. Ranking of priority tasks to be performed by project officer and development of a calendar of activity to correct deficiencies.
4. Ranking of priority tasks to be performed by Coordinator, COP and TA team members, and calendar of activity.
5. PO responsibility for GOZ contact, and bi-monthly visit to project site.

5.2. FINDING

Existing organization and scopes of work of project team need to be reviewed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Chief of Party

1. Inclusion of bottom line responsibility for achievement of project objectives.
2. Role in management evaluation of NGOs, and in formulation of training program.

B. Coordinator

1. Consultation with Chief of Party in the development of management procedures with TAT team.
2. Responsibility for project goal/calendar establishment relative to project objectives in collaboration with division chiefs.

C. Administration Specialist

1. Sharing of NGO evaluation responsibilities with other TAT members.
2. Recognition of logistics role within the project.

D. Chief Training Division

1. Establishment of an independent training division with discrete scope of work.

E. Research and Information Specialist

1. Shift training responsibility to a new training division.
2. Share NGO evaluation responsibilities.

F. Marketing and Processing

Unite these functions under one division chief; the project would establish a processing section head position.

5.3. FINDING

Improved management practices needed by the Coordinator.

RECOMMENDATION

A 3-month French language course on management is available this Fall at the University of Pittsburgh. The Coordinator would benefit from formal instruction in the theory and practice of management and would facilitate the communication regarding management issues with the COP. This mission should include a review of the Pragma facility/personnel.

5.4. FINDING

There is inadequate project staffing.

RECOMMENDATION

1. Communicate to GOZ the immediate necessity for qualified staff indicating intention to move to contract hire for missing project personnel if unavailable within 60 days. Authorize project team to proceed with hiring before RRA results compiled. Pragma be authorized to carry out expatriate hiring as part of TAT, if no acceptable marketing specialist candidate is immediately available in Zaire.

5.5. FINDING

The project faces serious procurement problems relative to past requests and future flexibility required.

RECOMMENDATION

PO to review with Management the substantive nature of outstanding requests soonest and make recommendations to USAID as appropriate. Institute 091 PO procurement tracking system as instructed by Director ARD. USAID should consider within 60 days Pragma contract changes which would provide increased scope for Pragma procurement of necessary commodities by the contractor, if PO assistance and project purchase authority up to \$5,000.00 cannot resolve urgent procurement problems, and provide required flexibility.



5.6. FINDING

Project management is not clear as to range of actions permitted within the project.

RECOMMENDATION

PROCAR to immediately present their view of project scope to clarify range of unacceptable action. PO should consider the importance of project flexibility and the desirability of site management's ownership of project initiatives.

5.7. FINDING

PROCAR has not defined adequately an NGO identification/recruitment strategy. This key activity if accompanied with a mobilization of project resources to identify priority NGOs, and conclude and implement intervention agreements with them, could permit the programmed achievement of project goal and purpose. This does not mean that a project should not continue with existing interventions and evaluations of already identified NGOs. The latter may be used as a testing ground to perfect the evaluative mechanism for the general attack on the overall NGOs evaluation task.

RECOMMENDATION

PROCAR should develop a comprehensive evaluative, planning, and implementation procedure for NGOs based on RRA results. The following elements might be included.

1. Review of evaluative questionnaire which has been developed (Annex VII) by the project to ensure it provides sufficient data to respond to all selection criteria.
2. Make a general assessment of all identified NGOs likely to meet project criteria. Define baseline measures.
3. Implement an evaluation procedure of most likely candidates.
4. Establish priorities for negotiating agreement using such criteria : as size of potential population impact; or balanced geographic dispersion choices, etc.
5. Implement programs in accordance with established priorities and project capacity.

5.7.1. FINDING

PROCAR should carry out an overall assessments of potential NGOs in the project area.

RECOMMENDATION

The following is offered as a suggestion

NGO Identification Plan

1. Scan potential NGOs identified by the RRAs and project paper.
2. NGO visits: describe mandate, general NGO overview, interest canvas as indicated, request completion of finalized questionnaire as indicated within specific period i.e., 30 days.
3. Project team should carry out a preliminary evaluation of potential NGOs and preliminary targeting/prioritization with available data.
4. Establish liaison with targeted NGOs to encourage questionnaire completion.
5. Discussion with targeted NGOs of potential common interests and invitation re proposals.
6. Formulation of intervention possibilities for discussion with NGOs.

5.7.2. FINDING

PROCAR should prioritize its preferred interventions.

RECOMMENDATION

1. Identify potentials of NGOs meeting project criteria.
2. Discuss with NGOs prioritization of intervention/ involvement or support. Gather baseline measures.
3. Negotiation of NGO agreement in accordance with project capacity and NGO priorities.
4. Formulation of joint work program and calendar of activity.
5. Detailed development of project divisions calendar of activity in support of intervention.

5.8. FINDING

Short-term technical assistance has been and will continue to be a key factor in advancing the project.

Short-term contractor assistance has been crucial to existing progress made by the project, given the late arrival of the TAT, the absence of a full Zairian team, and the constraints placed on the project. Short-term assistance was as follows:

1. The initial RRA study
2. The Gadway-Credit Union study
3. The proposed Technoserve contract - buy-in
4. The proposed ICRW contract for EPIF/CAL
5. The Green consultancy - OPG grant preparation
6. The Tollens marketing study
7. The New contract for RRAs - buy-in

#### RECOMMENDATION

In the absence of a specialist to head up marketing, short-term contracting should be considered to carry out the general NGO evaluation as described earlier, and may be needed to implement the program until a long term hire is made. Additional evaluation resources would be required to supplement project resources to reduce NGO evaluation completion time, i.e., 60 days. This element, which might be characterized as institution building, is not provided for in the Pragma contract, and should be. Such an evaluation team would include marketing/processing, financial/management and training/agronomic resources. A team leader would be required to set the stage before actual evaluation activities occur.

#### 5.9. FINDING

Implementation of housing policy as currently enunciated may be highly counter-productive to the project goal.

Current senior Zairian staff have been hired and been working based on the current housing policy. Rigid application of the current policy would result in significant reduction (25%) current salary levels. It appears USAID is trying to force Zairians out of housing equivalent to the expatriates.

#### RECOMMENDATION

Current salary/primes arrangement should be frozen until actual rental costs are absorbed by the difference between future remuneration and current actual remuneration. Individuals should have the option of avoiding the proposed charges by choosing their own housing after being given some notice. The issue bears serious review.

ANNEXES

- I. EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE
- II. STATISTICAL TABLES
- III. DOCUMENTS AND PERSONS CONTACTED
- IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM CV'S
- V. MANAGEMENT TEAM SCOPES OF WORK
- VI. SUBMITTED WORK PLANS
- VII. NGO APPLICATION FORM
- VIII. RRA EVALUATION - C. MCCARTHY
- IX. CORRESPONDENCE : MCCARTHY - NKOY, JULY ", 1987
- X. USAID OVERSIGHT DETAIL
- XI. PROCAR INTERNAL EVALUATION
- XII. PROCAR PLAN OF ACTION 1988
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ANNEX I

EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

I. Activity:

Start-up Evaluation of the Area Food and Market Development Project (660-0102).

II. Project Description - Background:

The purpose of this project is to increase agricultural production, processing, and marketing in 16 collectivities in the Kwilu and Mai-Ndombe subregions of Bandundu.

The Technical Assistance Team (TAT), through the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), is responsible for establishing priorities for project funded interventions within each collectivity; identifying appropriate Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); selecting proposals from chosen NGOs for the interventions most likely to contribute to achieving the project's purpose; assisting, when appropriate, selected NGOs to prepare proposals for submission for financing; supervising the allocation of available project resources (in kind, local currency or foreign currency); and monitoring the implementation and results of these interventions.

The PIU is subdivided into functional divisions. These are: General Administration, Production, Marketing, Processing, and Training, Research and Information. The TAT has members in three of these divisions - General Administration, Production, and Training, Research and Information. The TAT consists of a Chief of Party (COP), an Administration Specialist, an Extension Specialist, an Agronomist, and a Research and Information Specialist.

This project was authorized in early 1985, has a Life of Project funding of \$15,000,000. Members of the Technical Assistance Team started to arrive in Zaire at the beginning of November, 1987. The Project Assistance Completion Date is 31 January 1995.

III. Purpose of Review:

This is a project start-up evaluation. Its purpose is five-fold. First, it is to assess actual versus planned progress towards attainment of project objectives. Second, it is to determine whether appropriate systems of management are in place for effective project implementation. Third, it is to review stated and unstated assumptions made during project design and determine their validity. Fourth, it is to determine whether information gathered to date indicates that the TAT's Scopes of Work need to be adjusted or emphases changed in order to improve project implementation. Fifth, based on the findings of this review, it is to identify specific actions for the Mission and the Project to take towards improving project implementation.

IV. Specific Issues to be Addressed:

The evaluator will be responsible for reporting on and analyzing the following topics.

A. Project Management

Review and assess progress to date, in the context of (1) the objectives and implementation plan of the Project Paper and, (2) those activities identified in the TAT's Scope of Work and benchmarks established by the Team during its first months in country.

- Was the first NGO intervention finalized? How was this activity selected? Why was this activity selected? Were other options considered?
- Were annual workplans submitted for each of the existing Divisions? Are they appropriate? Realistic? How will they contribute to the achievement of project objectives?
- Was the 18-month implementation plan submitted and approved by USAID? Will it satisfactorily contribute to the progressive achievement of project objectives?
- Were the Rural Rapid Appraisals (RRA) begun in a timely fashion? For those completed, did they provide information that was not previously known? Based on their findings, is it possible to determine the foci of project attention in those collectivities appraised? Are the remaining RRAs planned to provide such information?
- Was the second NGO selected? What criteria were used in making that selection? Was an RRA completed for the collectivity? Did the RRA provide any information not previously known about the collectivity in which the NGO is located? Have other NGOs been identified? Of those identified, how many possess the characteristics sought by the project? Discuss problems and propose solutions.
- Was the second intervention designed? How does it differ from the first? How will it contribute to project objectives? How will it complement the first?
- Has the first NGO intervention been evaluated? What were the results? What lessons can be learned from it? How will it influence future interventions?

Describe the extent to which the assistance provided by S/T contractors, centrally funded buy-ins, etc., has been used by the project, whether such counsel has been useful, organized. Assess against original objectives and final value in contributing to project objectives.

Describe the role of the counterpart staff, from the Project Coordinator on down. Assess their performance for the period preceeding and following the arrival of the TAT. What would have been the probable effect if the PIU had not been established until the arrival of the TAT?

Review overall management and effectiveness of the General Administration Division. Examine adequacy and effectiveness of current staffing to accomplish tasks assigned to this unit. Identify problem areas and propose solutions.

Identify any constraints which might impede project implementation or preclude attainment of project objectives, distinguishing between those which are critical to successful achievement and those which are not.

#### B. Production Division

Examine adequacy and effectiveness of current staffing to accomplish tasks assigned to this unit. Review progress to date. Identify problem areas and propose solutions.

In particular, when and to the extent appropriate, review the Division's progress on the following fronts:

- evaluating the existing extension activities of the two NGOs that have been identified for possible attention by this division;
- making recommendations to the COP and Project Coordinator as to whether the groups identified are capable of furthering the objectives of the project;
- helping design production interventions;
- evaluating technological packages proposed for dissemination;
- monitoring production initiatives undertaken through project auspices;
- recommending appropriate training interventions for extension agents, animators or agronomists;
- providing on-the-job training where appropriate;



- evaluating the potential of the two regional vocational agricultural training centers' ability to provide training and human resources supporting project objectives; and,
- developing or creating linkages between NGOs with production oriented activities and those resources which exist in the region or to which access may be obtained.

#### C. Marketing Division

Examine the adequacy and effectiveness of current staffing to accomplish tasks assigned to this unit. Review progress to date. Identify problem areas and propose solutions.

In particular, when and to the extent appropriate, review the Division's progress on the following fronts:

- establishing and maintaining ties with other USAID projects (026, 028, and especially 098); and,
- making recommendations to the PIU based on the studies financed with project funds.

#### D. Processing Division

Examine adequacy and effectiveness of current staffing to accomplish the tasks assigned to this unit. Review progress to date. Identify problem areas and propose solutions.

In particular, when and to the extent appropriate, review the Division's progress on the following fronts:

- evaluating project interventions proposed by the NGOs and recommending to the PIU the appropriateness and the potential spread effect of such interventions; and,
- fostering the development of linkages between the NGOs and such organizations as CEPAS, which are currently active in appropriate technology for processing.

#### E. Training, Research and Information Division

Examine adequacy and effectiveness of current staffing to accomplish the tasks assigned to this unit. Review progress to date. Identify problem areas and propose solutions.

- In particular, review the Division's progress on the following fronts:
- designing NGO-specific training programs related to the intervention chosen by the PIU;
  - developing linkages between the NGOs and regional and national training resources;
  - overseeing and following-up on studies, coordinating on-going and new studies, making recommendations based on the analysis of the studies, designing studies to avoid overlap or unnecessary duplication of work effort;
  - collaborating and coordinating with other study groups ;
  - designing on-going data collection and processing by the other PIU divisions and particularly project 098;
  - designing PIU's management system (accounting system, inventory, tracking, NGO input requests, end-use tracking, receiving reports, annual work plans, project resource accounting, etc.); and,
  - collating all reports and data produced for or by the project.

#### F. USAID Oversight

Assess the level and adequacy of USAID oversight, including: project implementation monitoring, procurement actions, program oversight, and budget planning. Identify problem areas, both actual and potential, and propose solutions.

#### G. Future Activities

Identify issues that were considered to be outside the scope of this review, and that should be examined during the April 1989 evaluation. Provide illustrative suggestions in the form of terms of reference for that evaluation.

#### V. Methods and Procedures:

One external contractor-participant, under the general guidance of the Chief/ARD, will assist USAID/Kinshasa staff and TAT/project staff in its start-up evaluation of this project.

Prior to arrival in Kinshasa, the Contractor will spend three days in Washington, D.C. familiarizing himself with the project's history, reviewing project documents, Project Implementation Reports, and discussing, as necessary, surrounding issues with cognizant AID/Washington staff.

This evaluation is expected to require four six-day work-weeks. The proposed itinerary follows.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
June 18	Arrive Kinshasa
June 20 - 25	Orientation, review project files, meetings with USAID staff
June 28 - July 4	Travel to Kikwit, Idiofa, and Lusekele
July 5 - 11	Drafting of report
July 12	Submission of draft Report
July 13	Meeting to discuss findings
July 13 - 15	Revisions of draft report, submission of final report.

#### VI. Team Composition:

This evaluation will be conducted by the ARD division at USAID/Kinshasa. Members of that office, the Program Office, the TAT including PIU division counterparts, as well as one outside Contractor will participate in the evaluation.

The qualifications of the Contractor should include several years of experience in the area of African economic development; specific experience working in Zaire would be helpful. The individual should have knowledge of and experience in evaluating USAID agricultural development projects. It is essential that the Contractor have first-hand experience with agricultural project management/implementation. The Contractor should have excellent communications skills, with a special emphasis on the ability to write clear and concise English. French language proficiency of at least the FSI S-3, R-3 level is required.

#### VII. Reporting Requirements:

The Contractor will be responsible for preparing a report summarizing the issues, progress, and problems discussed during the evaluation, as outlined in Sections III and IV of this Scope of Work. He will also be responsible for documenting the findings and actions assigned to various staff members as a result of the evaluation.

Annex I

The Contractor will submit ten copies of the draft report to USAID's Evaluation Officer four days before the end of his contract. This report will include the following: (1) Executive Summary of no more than two pages (including the purpose of the activity being evaluated, purpose of the evaluation and the methodology used, findings and conclusions, and the recommendations and action assignments made during the review meeting); (2) Body of the Report of no more than 15 pages (including a discussion of the purpose of the evaluation, the study questions, and the significance of the resulting recommendations); and, (3) Appendices (including a copy of the Scope of Work, a list of the documents consulted, and individuals and agencies contacted).

Following the submission of the draft report, a meeting will be held with Mission and project staff to discuss findings and conclusions. The Contractor will then incorporate in the final version of the report the subsequent consideration of recommendations discussed during the course of this review meeting. The Contractor will be responsible for submitting the final report to the USAID Evaluation Officer prior to departure from Kinshasa.

ANNEX II

STATISTICAL TABLES

STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE 2.1 PLANNED PROJECT GOALS\*

Year: 1985-86 - 1994-95	Year									
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
NGO participation units	-	-	1	2	3	4	5	7	9	11
<u>Staffing</u>										
TAT staffing units		5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Zairians staffing units	-	full	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
Vehicles-presence %	-	50%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Housing construction/.....	100%									
<u>Production</u>										
<u>Training</u>										
50 NGO trainees			5	10	15	20	25	35	45	50
100 village ext. trainees			10	20	30	40	50	70	90	100
180 demons plots			18	36	54	72	90	126	162	180
ITAK construction	50%	100%								
Ag. Production equipment	-	-	33%	50%	67%	75%	83%	91%	100%	
<u>Processing/marketing</u>										
<u>identified</u>										
2 prototype mills										
<u>Distribution of commodities</u>										
500 small mills no.	-	-	50	100	150	200	250	350	450	500
160 bicycles/.....no.	-	-	16	32	48	64	80	112	144	160
32 vehicles no.	-	6	12	14	16	21	23	27	29	32
32 motorcycles no.		2	4	18	10	16	20	24	28	32
<u>Training</u>										
10 short courses	-	-	1	2	3	4	5	7	9	10
100 trainees			10	20	30	40	50	70	90	100
5 trainees (complex)	-	-	5							
<u>Short-term Technical Assistance</u>										
Land tenure	x	x								
Credit	x	x								
Market	x									
Soils	x	x								
Baseline	x					x			x	
FSR	x									
Nutrition	x									
Other		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

\* some data is extrapolated based on number of NGOs programmed for integration in the project

Table 2.2

Planned Versus Actual Staffing

<u>Division</u>	<u>Planned</u>		<u>Actual</u>		<u>Unfilled</u>	
	<u>TAT</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>TAT</u>	<u>Other</u>		
Gen. Admin.	2	4	2	8	-	
Production	2	8	2	2	6	
R.I.D.	1	2 (+2)	1	1	2	(+2)
Marketing	-	3	-	0	3	
Processing	-	1	-	0	1	
Summary	<u>5</u>	<u>18</u> <u>(+2)</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>(+2)</u>
Proposed		<u>(+2)</u>				

Table 2.3

## REPORTED PROJECT OUTPUTS - ACTUAL VERSUS PLANNED

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Achieved</u>
<u>Production components</u>	50	6
NGO personnel trained		
Village ext. agents trained	100	30
NGO variety		
Multiplication prog.	10	0
Village Demd plots	180	9
Communication linkages		CAL/DPP
<u>Processing components</u>		
Prototype mills identified	2	Two being evaluated?
Small mills distributed	500	1
Bicycles/pushcharts	160	0
Short courses for ITPK	10	0
NGO agents trained (vehicle FRT)	5	0
NGO Agents Trained (equipment)	100	0
Communication channels		
NGO - CEPAS; ITPK		
<u>Marketing component</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Achieved</u>
Ident critical MKTG bottlenecks (098)	5 RRAs	3 RRAs
Priority transport need identified		KAPIA/CAL
Credit RECC'D implemented		0
<u>Research/Info component</u>		Initial work
Data collect and impact baseline	Baseline data established	
Studies developed analyzed/ communicated		9
RECC'D'N implemented		6



Table 2.4  
Project Disbursement

Project financial status, June 27/88 (3rd Qrt.)

As of June 27/88 (3rd Qrt.)

Component	Authorized	Earmarked	Est. needs	Disbursed	Committments
	-000-				
Technical Assist.	11,200.0	4,065.5	4,566.5	632.9	3,532.4
Training	1,100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Commodities	2,700.0	472.7	660.2	316.9	356.9
Other					
Total	15,000.0	4,538.2	5,266.7	949.8	3,889.3

ANNEX III

DOCUMENTS AND PERSONS CONSULTED

Persons Consulted

USAID

1. Linda Brown - Project Officer, USAID/Washington
2. Donald Brown - Chief, ARD, Kinshasa
3. Stephen Vance - Evaluation Officer, Kinshasa
4. Cheryl McCarthy - Project Officer, Project 102, Kinshasa
5. Chris Pappas - Project Officer, Project 098, Kinshasa
6. Doug Daniell - Ag. Econ., ARD, Kinshasa
7. John Bierke - Chief Program Officer, Kinshasa
8. Rudy Griego - Deputy, ARD, Kinshasa

Developement Associates, Inc.

1. John Sullivan
2. Thomas Morris
3. Peter Davis
4. L.V. Sanchez

Kikwit

1. Abbé Gouya - Catholic Brother, Kikwit
2. Cameron Burns - Area Entrepreneur (For Area Project Cooperant)
3. Nkoy Bumbu - Coordinator (Directeur) - Project 660-0102
4. David Olson - Chief of Party - TAT - Project 660-0102
5. Walter West - Chief, Research Advisor, Gen. Administration Division TAT
6. Wendy Ascher - Chief, Production Division TAT
7. Craig Smith - Head, Production sub-section, Production Division
8. Tobin Vaughan - Head, Financial and Accounting sub-section, General Administration Division
9. Cit. Gbagba - Head, Administration and Personnel Division sub-section
10. Cit. Myenge - Head, Accountant, plus Accounting sub-section General Administration Division
11. Cit. Kingidila - Agronomist, Production sub-section, Production Division
12. Dana Ward - Chief B.S.U.
13. Johan Fagerskiold - Assistant Head, Project 660-098

Reports

- a. Second Quarter (Ident of CAL and DPP - RRA Feb. 1986)
- b. Third Quarter Aug.-Sept. 1986
- c. July 22-26, 1986
- d. August 3-23, 1986

Economic Data on Region

1. October 16-18, 1986, Economic Data on Region
2. May 23-25, 1987, CAL Problems (Kaziama et Kingidila - Vulgarisateurs)
3. April 28 - May 5, 1987, Evaluation project
4. May 9-15, 1987
5. July 9-11, 1987
6. July 18-22, 1987
7. September 1987
8. October 1987
9. November 1987
10. November 18-22, 1987
11. November 30 - December 12, 1987
12. January 4-11, 1988
13. February 1988
14. February 17-20, 1988
15. March 17-20, 1988
16. April 4-10, 1988
17. May 2-10, 1988
18. May 12-14, 1988
19. Rapport de Suivi de Projet  
Undated/unsigned - prior to 1986 transmitted to DDR (Secrétaire d'Etat)  
by Directeur November 10, 1986
20. Rapport de Projet - 1987  
Unsigned/undated
21. Final report Rapid Reconnaissance Survey of 102 Project Area  
Collectivities of Kilunda-Kimbata/Kapia  
Vaughan and Susan Almy (Consultant SECID)
22. Project Correspondence Files

Documents Consulted

1. Project Submission for authorization approval including parts I-VI and 10 annexes
2. IQC Contract with Development Associates Inc.
3. Project Implementation Reports, Zaire. Period ending March 31, 1988
4. Project Implementation Order
5. Summary - stated project purposes
6. Pragma first quarterly report : Nov 87 - Jan 88  
Pragma second quarterly report : Jan 88 - Apr 88
7. Summary of active and proposed projets - Zaire, USAID 1986-1989
8. PROCAR quarterly coordination meeting summary report
9. Award/Contract no. : AFR-0102-C-100-Pragma
10. Compte-rendu de la réunion de concertation entre le projet PROCAR et les autres projets DDR March 29, 1988
11. Team building, C.T. Puku, Division R.F.I. DDR March 1988
12. Project Officer final report on 660-0102 (partial)
13. Project implementation reports; fourth quarter 1986; first half 1987; second half 1987; first half 1988;
14. Mission trip reports of Nkoy Baumbu, Coordinator/Directeur of project

ANNEX IV

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM CV'S

THE PRAGMA CORPORATION  
116 East Broad Street  
Falls Church, Virginia 22046  
(703) 237-9303 FAX (703) 237-9326  
TELEX 203507 PRAGMA FSCH UR

CURRICULUM VITAE  
DAVID LAVERNE OLSON

EDUCATION

B.S.                    Communications, University of Wisconsin  
                         Madison, Wisconsin, 1980

                         Speech and Pre-Law, University of Wisconsin  
                         Madison, Wisconsin

LANGUAGE            French - excellent

EXPERIENCE

Jan 1986              Graduate School, US Dept. of Agriculture

                         Design consultant for international training programs in  
                         Agriculture.

Nov-Dec 1985        USAID/Kinshasa, Zaire

                         Management and Organization Development consultancy aimed at  
                         improving the effectiveness of human resource development in the  
                         Agricultural Sector.

Sept 1985            Management Consultant  
                         The World Bank

                         Management consultant with the Government of Tunisia, Ministry  
                         of Agriculture-Planning Division to plan for implementation of a  
                         modified Training and Visit system of Agricultural Extension.

Aug-Nov              International Training Division/Office of International  
                         Cooperation and Development  
                         USADA, Washington, D.C.

                         Consultant and Lead Trainer "Agricultural Policy Seminar"  
                         overseas version in French language for 20 senior level  
                         agricultural officials of Department of Agriculture in Zaire.

Pre-implementation Workshop Facilitation for long-range Organization Development and Training in Agricultural Sector with a local training institution in Zaire.

Jun-Jul 1985 Lead Facilitator  
The World Bank EAPIT/EASPA, Washington, D.C.

Process consultancy to facilitate change in Agricultural Ministry of Agriculture.

Mar-May 1985 Lead Trainer  
International Training Division/Office of International Cooperation and Development  
USDA, Washington, D.C.

Jan-Feb 1985 Consultant  
Institute of Public Administration, Washington, D.C.

Developed management needs assessment training materials for use in developing countries.

Aug 1983 Lead Trainer  
Dec 1984 International Training Division/OICD  
USDA, Washington, D.C.

Lead trainer for the "Initiating and Managing Integrated Rural Development" Course TC-140-25 (overseas version) in French to 25 Zairian Rural Development Manager, in Kikwit, Zaire.

Co-trainer for "Initiating and Managing Integrated Rural Development" Course TC-140-25 in Washington, D.C.; designed and taught course to 25 participants from 13 countries.

Conducted needs assessment/analysis/evaluation research for USDA-Zaire courses.

Organization Development Consultancy, Zaire, with USDA USAID for Development of Management Training Institute "CENACOF" Manpower Planning and Curriculum Development Assessment.

Lead Trainer for "Small Farmer Credit" Course for USDA/Togo. National Level Seminar for 3 days/workshop for 3 weeks with Regional Level Staff.

Co-trainer-Cross-Cultural Re-entry workshop for 23 TRD-Tranzania participants.

Lead trainer - "Initiating and Managing Integrated Rural Development" Course TC-140-25 for USDA in Washington, D.C.



Jun-Aug 1983 Lead Trainer,  
Arlington, Virginia

In cooperation with USDA and the Ministry of Education and Culture, Jakarta, Indonesia, taught "Training of Consultants and Trainers" for the Education Sector of Indonesia.

Jan-Jun Lead Trainer,  
International Training Division/OICD  
Washington, D.C.

Coordinator and Lead Trainer for projects in Zaire, Tanzania, and Indonesia.

May 1982 Management  
Banque Centrale, Le Gouvernement de la République Populaire Révolutionnaire de Guinée in cooperation with the World Bank, Conakry, Guinea.

Organization development consultancy activities aimed at strengthening the financial management of economic development in Guinea.

Designed management development training systems for a proposed project in the Central Bank, and associated ministries.

Jun 1980 International Training Division/OICD  
Mar 1981 USDA, Washington, D.C.

Lead trainer for USDA Course TC-140-35 "Management of Agricultural Organizations" conducted in Washington, D.C. for 26 foreign agriculturists from 10 countries.

Taught trainers to give courses in Jamaica and Francophone Africa, developed management programs for senior-level agriculture personnel and training institutions, conducted overseas courses in management in French under the auspices of the Foreign Agricultural Service.

Nov 1979 Lead Trainer  
Mar 1980 Associate Control research Analysis (A.C.R.A.)  
in cooperation with ACTION, Washington, D.C.

Lead Trainer for Centers for Assessment, Screening and Training for personnel in Honduras, Costa Rica, Chile, and the Eastern Caribbean.

1977-1979 Lecturer  
Institute of Development Management  
Gaborone, Botswana

Instructor in management and rural development.

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Sep-Dec 1976 Lecturer/Training Consultant  
University of Botswana and Swaziland, Gaborone, Botswana

Research, teaching, management, training and developmental administration in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland in the urban, rural and private sectors.

1972-1975 Training Director  
Peace Corps, Botswana

Director and organized the training, formulation of volunteer roles, administration, counseling and training of counterpart.

1971 Chief Technical Advisor  
Rural Development for Northern Togo

Budget preparation, curriculum development, technical assistance, and training

1965-1968 Peace Corps  
Guinea, Niger, Togo

Training/consultancy assignments in agriculture

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

American Society for Training and Development  
International Association for Training and Development

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Annex IV

WENDY HOPE ASCHER

CONTACT ADDRESS:  
c/o Walter L. WEST  
USAID-ARD Project 102  
Kinshasa "C"  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520-2220

FORMAL  
EDUCATION

M.S. Cornell University, 1985  
Major: Development Sociology  
Minor: International Agriculture  
Thesis topic: Labor migration in West Africa,  
with emphasis on Burkina Faso

B.A. State University of New York at Binghamton, 1977  
Major: Anthropology  
Minor Concentration: Environmental Studies

PROFESSIONAL

- Research design, implementation, and evaluation
- Project administration, management, and logistics
- Data management and analysis

LANGUAGES

English, French, Fulani (Peul)

EXPERIENCE

Sociologist: Associates in Rural Development,  
Burlington, Vermont. (October-May 1987)  
Member of an interdisciplinary team which conducted a field  
study of irrigation sites in Chad. Primary participation in all  
phases of this endeavor: research design, data collection and  
analysis. Contributed to a document describing the specific  
farming systems and a final report with recommendations for  
possible USAID-Chad interventions.

Consultant: CARE- International, Niger.

CARE-International, Niger. (July 1986-June 1987)

Managed a nutritional recuperation project with a staff of  
fourteen people. Prepared financial and monthly activity  
reports. Combined the logistics of food distribution with  
informal education. Authored a mid-term evaluation.

Consultant: Niger. (April 1986). Participated in the research  
design phase of an irrigation study conducted by the Water  
Management Synthesis II Project.

Consultant: HFT Management Consultants, Ithaca, New York. (1984-1985). Organized the presentation of materials on program effort by Cooperative Extension staff in New York State. Prepared statistical analysis of data and graphical presentations of the results.

Predissertation Research: Kedougou, Senegal, West Africa. (summer 1983) Prepared two preliminary research agendas: market activities of women, and a comparison of fulani adaptations to veying political and ecological settings.

Teaching Assistant: Department of Rural Sociology, Cornell University. (1981-1984). Assisted in organizing and teaching courses in development sociology. Lectured, prepared examinations, advised students and evaluated their work.

Peace Corps Volunteer: Dori, Burkina Faso, West Africa. (1977-1980). Coordinated women's projects administered by Save the Children. Involved in design, budgeting, and evaluation of projects. Trained and supervised local personnel. Prepared and conducted a baseline survey.

Archaeological Fieldworker: State University of New York at Binghamton. (1975-1976). Excavation and analysis of historic and prehistoric sites. Responsible for excavation surveying, mapping, coding, data entry, data analysis, and reporting.

#### REFERENCES

Dr. Charles G. Geisler  
Cornell University  
Department of Rural Sociology  
134 Warren Hall  
Ithaca, New York 14853  
607-256-4514

Dr. Catherine C. Obern-Robinson  
Director, International Public Affairs  
Cornell University  
626 Thurston Avenue  
Ithaca, New York 14850  
607-255-3585

Professor S. Dunham Rowley  
257 Commom Street  
Watertown, Massachusetts 02171  
671-926-9890

Dr. Alfred Waldstein  
Associates in Rural Development  
110 Main Street, Fourth Floor  
P.O. Box 1397  
Burlington, Vermont 05402  
802-058-3890

Fred Weber, Consultant  
5797 Bogart  
Boise, Idaho 83702  
208-344-1150

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CURRICULUM VITAE  
WALTER LAWRENCE WEST

EDUCATION

- M.S. Major: Development Sociology, Cornell University, 1985  
Minor: Agricultural Economics.  
Thesis topic: A conceptual framework for socioeconomic impact assessment of river basin development projects in West Africa.
- B.A. Major: Anthropology, New York University, 1975  
Minor: Africa History

PROFESSIONAL SKILLS

Socioeconomic research; evaluation and monitoring research. Project design and management. Data management and analysis; familiar with database, statistical and word processing programs on mainframe and micro-computers.

LANGUAGES

French - fluent  
German, Hausa, Mandinka

EXPERIENCE

1986-present

Socioeconomic impact Analyst, Evaluation Assistance Project, Ministère du Plan, Niamey, Niger

Provides technical assistance on socioeconomic research and impact analysis of development projects to the Ministry of Plan. Developed project evaluation methods and guidelines; trained Ministry personnel in computer use and research methods; provided training in the use of Lotus 1-2-3; set up a computerized socioeconomic data bank using dBase III software for project monitoring; and designed and directed a need assessment and project identification study of the region of Dosso. Responsible for the management of the Evaluation Assistance project since January 1987.

- March 1983      Senior Researcher, Gambia River Basin Development Socioeconomic Impact Analysis Project, Kedougou, Senegal West Africa.
- Designed and implemented the Kekreti Dam socioeconomic study. Responsible for the design and pretesting of questionnaires, selection of study sites, training of researchers, management of the field study, data analysis, training new computer users and preparation of the final report.
- 1975-1979      Peace Corps Volunteer, Senegal, West Africa
- Assigned as a rural development volunteer to work with village cooperatives in the Casamance Region; organized village level projects in poultry, gardening, fruit production, water supply, and women's cooperatives. Helped organize a regional non-governmental farmers' association and assisted this group in its first projects.
- Sept. 1980  
Jan. 1983      Research Assistant, Department of Rural Sociology and International Agriculture Program, Cornell University.
- & Feb. 1984-  
May 1985
- Managed and analyzed data for several research projects including a study of the adaptations of local governments to fiscal stress in New York State; the International Population Program Egyptian Fertility Study; regional analyses of Senegal, Tunisia, and the Eastern Visayas region of the Philippines.
- Researched possible microcomputer applications in rural development; prepared training modules in the use of microcomputers for international development professionals.
- Sept. 1981  
May 1982      Teaching Assistant, Department of Rural Sociology, Cornell University. Assisted in preparation and teaching of courses on computer methods in social science research and on agricultural development.

#### OVERVIEW

##### Social Science/Economics

Mr. West's development expertise covers the fields of sociology and economics. He is experienced in research methods and theory, demographic methods, regional analysis, social impact assessment, farming systems research, social movements and theories of developments. He has also worked extensively in the areas of microeconomic theory and its applications in development, planning analysis methods, marketing analysis, and the economics of agriculture in developing countries.

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## Information Systems

Mr. West has a strong background in mainframe and micro-computer use. He has an advanced knowledge of Lotus 1-2-3, including use of macros and databases as well as programming experience in DBase III. In his present position with the Ministry of Plan in Niger, he set up a socio-economic data bank using DBase III. He has several years of experience working with SPSS for database management and analysis. Mr. West is also well versed in other statistical and database program such as Statpac, Abstat and Minitab. His experience extends to work processing software packages and MS-and PC-DOS. His computer training expertise in West Africa extends from the Gambia to Niger.

### PAPERS AND REPORTS

"Kekreti Dam Socioeconomic Study: Final Report". CRED, Ann Arbor, Michigan; April 1983.

"Analyse de la Répartition Spatiale et Catégorique de la Programmation des Investissements en Projets 1986 - 1989". DEPP, Ministère du Plan, Niamey, Niger: October 1986.

"Bilan et Diagnostic du Département de Dosso" (principal author, with H. Mayaou and Y. Adou). Ministère du Plan, Niamey, Niger; May 1987.



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CURRICULUM VITAE  
GRAIG R. SMITH

EDUCATION

1984-87 Ph.D. University of Illinois, Crop Physiology  
1979-81 N.Sc. University of Florida, Agronomy  
1974-77 B.S.A. University of Florida, Agronomy  
1973-74 A.A., St. Petersburg, Jr. College, Pre-Forestry

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES

1984-87 Research Assistant, ACID RAIN PROJECT - UNIV. ILLINOIS

In charge of measuring physiological stress from acid rain on corn and soybeans. Monitored effect of acid rain on plant photosynthesis, water potential, pollen germination, chlorophyll content, nitrogen fixation and yield components.

Assisted in supervising labor, purchasing supplies, operating rain exclusion shelters, analyzing data, and reporting results.

1982-83 AGRONOMIST, WOMEN IN AGRIC. DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - MALAWI

In charge of technical aspects for a project focusing on women's roles in agricultural development in Malawi. Conducted soybean adaptive research trials testing methods of inoculation. Interviewed farmers for intra-household surveys. Interviewed extension officers in 5 districts. Co-author of numerous reports. Supervised 3 teams of surveyors in farming systems survey of 10 villages. Purchased supplies, managed office and field staff. Represented project at Ministry of Agriculture meetings. Served as Acting Chief of Party in July 1982.

1982 RESEARCH ASSISTANT, NORTH FLORIDA FARMING SYSTEMS PROJECT - UNIV. FLORIDA.

Assisted the FSR project conduct Adaptive Research trials with smallholder farms north of Gainesville, Florida. Supervised workers collecting data on the rate of wheat maturity as affected by cattle grazing. Organized workers to harvest forage trials.

1972-81

RESEARCH ASSISTANT, CROPS, INTRODUCTIONS - UNIV. FLORIDA

Assisted the Agronomist in charge of introducing exotic field crops into north Florida. Helped conduct field trials with over 30 species for year-round cropping systems on farms and experiment stations. Research corn and legume intercropping. Supervised soil preparation, pesticide and chemical application, and machine harvest. Supervised laborers in seed planting, irrigation, weeding, and hand harvest.

1977-78

SITE COORDINATOR, PEACE CORPS - NEPAL

Managed adaptive research trials of one site of the Asian Cropping Systems Network. Tested fertilizers and varieties of rice, wheat, corn, millet, lentils, peanut, and mungbean. Worked without an interpreter. Managed irrigated and rainfed trials.

Supervised employees in recruiting farmers, measuring terraces, planting and harvesting trials, Managed site budget, acquired supplies, and interacted with district officials. Attended adaptive research training courses at IRRI, Philippines and CIMMYT, Mexico.

1972-76

MANUAL LABORER AGRICULTURE

Worked in peanut breeding against aflatoxin; commercial orchard; nursery propagation of trees; urban landscaping; garden shop operation; organic vegetable and hay farming.

LANGUAGES

	Speaking	Reading	Writing
French:	2	2	1
Spanish:	3	3	2
Chichewa (Malawi)	3	2	2
Nepali (Nepal)	3	1	1

COMPUTER SKILLS

Word processing, data base, spreadsheet and statistical packages.

OVERLAND TRAVEL

U.S.A., Canada, Nepal, Philippines, Hong-Kong, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Paraguay and Bolivia.

## PUBLICATIONS

Effect of acid rain on corn pollen and soybean nitrogen utilization, 1986. Abstract, American Society of Agronomy, Annual Meetings, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Physiological responses of corn and soybean to acid rain in Central Illinois, 1985. Abstract, American Society of Agronomy, Annual Meetings, Chicago, Illinois.

Women farmers in Malawi : Their contributions to agriculture and participation in development projects, 1983. USAID/PPC/WID.

Soybean program in the Lilongwe Rural Development Project, 1983. USAID/PPC/WID.

Intercropping and double cropping of corn with green manure legumes in North Florida, 1982. Soil and Crop Sci. Soc. Fla. Proc. 41:148-152.

## PROFESSIONAL GOALS

Manage agricultural development projects. Train extension staff in farming systems research. Conduct on-farm research and applied crop physiology.

Charles Tobin Vaughan

EDUCATION

1978 B.A. Zoology, University of New Hampshire  
1978 Peace Corps fish culture training program (9 weeks)  
University of Oklahoma  
1978 Fluent French, Kikongo, Lingala, some knowledge of  
Tshiluba, Swahili.

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

Feb. 1986 - present

Employer SAN GIRO FARM  
Position Production Manager

Responsibilities Managed the second largest layer operation in Zaire. Activities include raising large flocks (10,000-15,000) of day old chicks to point of lay and maintaining a lay flock with a production of 14,000 eggs per day. This involved the supervision of 40 workers, including payroll management, controlling feed and egg stocks, monitoring growth rates and egg production, and keeping an inventory of all production-related materials. Management techniques include establishing feeding and stocking rates, controlling feed quality, and following a vaccination and disinfection program.

Sept. 1985 - Jan. 1986

Employer PEACE CORPS/ZAIRE  
Position GSO/AFSI/Program

Responsibilities Logistical preparations for the implementation of the new Peace Corps AFSI program. Involved local procurement of vehicles, generators, appliances and building materials, supervising AFSI related construction and installation activities, negotiating with local contractors, and arranging the transport of materials from Kinshasa to the interior.

July 1985 - Sept. 1985

Employer GTZ  
Position Guide

Responsibilities Logistical man for a four member team doing a two months biological and cultural study on the lake Mai Ndombe fisheries. Procured all provisions, advised in trip planning, and acted as cultural consultant/interpreter.

Dec. 1984 - July 1985

Employer LASCO-ZAIRE  
Position Office Manager

Responsibilities Airport protocol, procurement, and personnel/payroll for a logistics company in Kinshasa. This company provided logistical support for several American scientific projects in the interior of Zaire.

Mar. 1982 - Nov. 1984

Employer SAGES  
Position Farm Manager

Responsibilities Manager of a 20,000 hectares private agricultural project in Kasai Oriental. Activities included cattle ranching (700 heads), mechanically cultivated field crops (30 ha) and fish pond construction. Responsibilities included supervision/payroll management for 80 workers, construction of personnel housing, supervision of repair and maintenance of farm machinery, creating and maintaining an inventory system, procurement, accounting, and establishing relations with government institutions.

Feb. 1981 - Mar. 1982

Employer PEACE CORPS/ZAIRE  
Position Volunteer Leader

Responsibilities Maintaining technical and logistical support for all fish volunteers in the Kasai Oriental Region, training a regional coordinator, managing a 2.5 ha fish station which entailed supervision/payroll for 33 workers, accounting, procurement and establishing a rapport with government officials.

Feb. 1979 - Dec. 1980

Employer PEACE CORPS/ZAIRE  
Position Fish Extention

Responsibilities Extension agent for construction and management of earthen ponds for 20-30 farmers within a 60 km radius. Also acted as an advisor to a local farmers' cooperative.

ANNEX V

MANAGEMENT TEAM SCOPES OF WORK

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ARTICLE III - CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITIES AND PERSONNEL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

A. CHIEF OF PARTY (36 person-months)

Qualifications : Masters Degree in Public Administration, Rural Development, Economic Anthropology, Rural Sociology or Agricultural Economics; ten years experience in agricultural development in developing countries; useful).

Responsibilities :

The Chief of party shall :

- 1) Manage the technical assistance team, including financial management, field personnel management, logistic coordination, procurement;
- 2) Report to U.S.A.I.D. Project Officer;
- 3) Advise Project Coordinator on PIU management;
- 4) Develop with the Project Coordinator, all local currency budget;
- 5) Approve, with the Project Coordinator, all local currency expenses and cosign all CPF checks;
- 6) Report to U.S.A.I.D. Project Officer, with the Project Coordinator, on PIU recommendations for NGO selection and interventions;
- 7) Initiate, with the Project Coordinator, track and monitor procurement;
- 8) Develop yearly, with the U.S.A.I.D. Project Officer and the Project Coordinator, an 18-month implementation plan;
- 9) With the Project Coordinator, negotiate the contractual documents with selected NGOs;
- 10) Submit all required reports to the Project Officer;
- 11) Depending on qualification and available time, provide technical advice or assistance to other PIU divisions.

B. AGRONOMIST

(36 person-months)

Qualifications : MS Agronomy (legumes or corn) or Soils; three years research experience on experimental farm or equivalent; five years experience with tropical crops and soils; two to three years experience with African slash and burn agriculture; tested FSI S-3, R-3 in French (Kikongo or Lingala useful).

Responsibilities :

The Agronomist shall :

- 1) Evaluate agronomic and related components of NGO agricultural activities;
- 2) Direct the agronomic staff of the Production Division in project implementation;
- 3) Report to the Division Chief (the Extension Specialist);
- 4) Evaluate proposed interventions, when appropriate, for agronomic suitability, validity and complementarity to existing cropping systems;
- 5) Make recommendations about interventions and/or propose interventions by PIU;
- 6) Provide COP with information requested for reporting purposes;
- 7) Assist NGOs to establish linkages with multiplication centers, research stations, vocational agricultural centers, other agricultural projects and GOZ services;
- 8) Provide assistance, when appropriate, to the PIU Processing Division;
- 9) Assist the Training Specialist, as appropriate, in designing agricultural training programs for PIU staff and for selected NGO staff; in evaluating quality and suitability of curricula in vocational agricultural training centers, and in determining NGO training needs; and,
- 10) Assist the Research and Information Division in reviewing and analyzing available data on agronomic and farming systems; in identifying insufficiencies, inadequacies, inaccuracies and/or inconsistencies in agronomic/agricultural information; in designing studies to supplement existing data; in monitoring of interventions; and in evaluating project interventions.

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C. EXTENSION SPECIALIST

(36 Person-months)

Qualifications : MS Extension and Adult Educations, Rural Sociology with Extension training, for MS Agricultural Economics with a BS in Agronomy; soils, or Extension Education; two years administrative experience; five years experience in developing countries, preferably in Africa; academic training in design and evaluation or demonstrable practical experience; tested FSI S-3, R-3 in French (Kikongo or Lingala useful).

Responsibilities :

The Extension Specialist shall :

- 1) Act as Chief of the Production Division;
- 2) Evaluate, as appropriate, outreach and extension activities of NGOs;
- 3) Design, implement and monitor extension-related interventions, when appropriate, for selected NGOs;
- 4) As Division Chief, report to the Project Coordinator on daily implementation;
- 5) Direct the rural development staff of the Production Division;
- 6) Provide COP with information requested for reporting purposes;
- 7) Assist NGOs to establish linkages with rural development projects, extension projects, CODAIK, services, and research stations;
- 8) Assist the Training Specialist, as appropriate, in designing training programs for PIU staff and for selected NGO staff; in evaluating quality and suitability of curricula in vocational agricultural training centers, and in determining NGO training needs; and
- 9) Assist the Research and Information Division in reviewing and analyzing available data on farming systems; sociology of organizations in the project area; in designing studies to supplement existing data; in monitoring of interventions; and in evaluating project interventions.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE SPECIALIST (36 person-months)

Qualifications : MBA Small Business Administration, Business Administration, Management; experience in financial management, logistics and personnel management; experience in management evaluation of profit and non-profit organizations; five years experience in developing countries, two years of which must have been in Africa; tested FSI S-3, R-3 in French ability to learn Kikongo (history of language learning, other African or Asian language competency).

Responsibilities :

The Administrative Specialist shall :

- 1) Act as Deputy Chief of Party;
- 2) Evaluate NGOs management systems, financial control systems, debt-asset ratios, personnel systems, inventory systems, procurement systems, cash flow, and other management-related concern;
- 3) Made recommendations as to whether an identified NGO has the management capability to undertake and sustain a proposed intervention;
- 4) Supervise the PIU accountant/bookkeepers, logistics assistant, office and clerical staff;
- 5) Establish an inventory and end-use tracking system for the PIU;
- 6) Assist the COP in establishing and updating a procurement plan;
- 7) Advise the COP and Project Coordinator on their respective management issues;
- 8) Assist the Training Division in designing management training programs for the selected NGOs and the PIU staff;
- 9) Monitor the management aspects of the intervention implementation;
- 10) Provide the COP with requested information for reporting requirements; and
- 11) Assist the Research and Information Specialist to develop computerized data management systems for the PIU and project.

E. RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SPECIALIST (36 person-months)

Qualifications : Masters Degree in Agricultural Economics, Rural Sociology or other social science discipline which pertains to the socio-economic development of rural communities; formal training in both quantitative and qualitative research methodology, such as a minor in research methodology for their graduate degree(s); three-five years experience with data collection, and analysis in developing countries, preferably Africa, which required the application and adaptation of formal research methodology to meeting the information requirements of development projects; three year experience in the use of microcomputers and related software for data management and analysis preferably in a field setting; tested FSI S-2, R-2 in French.

Responsibilities :

The Research and Information Specialist shall :

- 1) With the COP the and Administrative Specialist, develop computer program for the management of the PIU and project including vehicle use, inventory control and replacement, financial management, procurement, implementation plans, monitoring of interventions during implementation and over life of project, reporting systems, tracking annual work plans and other monitoring as determined necessary by the COP, the cognizant A.I.D. Project Officer or Project Coordinator;
- 2) Design a performance monitoring system for all NGOs selected to participate in the project. The Information Specialist will determine the format, content and frequency (monthly, if possible) of reporting in light of the limited management capabilities of participating NGOs. The system should focus on operational data including the number of farmers contacted, the amount of improved seed or planting materials delivered to the farmers, charges for these inputs (if any), the number of extension workers employed by the NGO, operating expenses, and other similar types of data concerning the delivery assistance to farmers deemed necessary by the project management team. The Information Specialist will provide training to NGOs concerning the reporting system as part of the management training the NGO's will receive. Using available software, the Information Specialist will design a data management system based on a microcomputer to be purchased by the project to enter and process NGO reports. Monthly (or bi-monthly) and semi-annual summary reports of NGO operation will be produced.
- 3) The Information Specialist will be responsible for or participate with outside researchers in the design and implementation of periodic (e.g., every six months) follow-up survey of farmers receiving assistance from the NGOs. Farmers will be selected from the NGOs lists of clients. The purpose of the survey will be to obtain information on assistance to increase farm production and the equity of benefits resulting from that assistance. The Information Specialist will be responsible for or

participate with outside researchers to develop a microcomputer-based, project data bank to store and analyze the survey data. Summaries of survey results will be produced expeditiously to assist project management. As subsequent surveys are completed, comparison of survey results will provide a basis for tracking the performance of the project's (660-102) extension component.

- 4) The Information Specialist will be responsible for producing periodic assessments of NGO performance based on analysis of data from the NGO reporting system and the follow-up surveys of small farmers.
- 5) The Information Specialist will be responsible for keeping the project's (660-102) staff informed about other data collection activities in the region, such as those supported by other A.I.D.-funded projects in the region, which could have utility for the management and evaluation of the project (660-102).
- 6) The Information Specialist will provide assistance to other professionals on the project management team with the use of microcomputers in their work, such as financial accounting. In this capacity, the Information Specialist should provide guidance to the project about hardware and software acquisitions.
- 7) The Information Specialist will participate in the design and implementation of surveys conducted for project evaluation purposes. This will include the annual community-level survey to be supported jointly by projects 102 and 0098. This survey will be designed to collect data necessary for assessing :
  - a) the socioeconomic effects of the projects on the Bandundu region, and
  - b) the equity of benefits within the community.
- 8) The Information Specialist will participate in the design and implementation of the marketing surveys which will collect data on the volume and types of commodities traded, prices, intra and inter-regional activity. Both established and transient (small merchants travelling between Bandundu and Kinshasa by river) merchants will be included in this survey.
- 9) The Information Specialist will participate in the drafting of scopes of work for the studies project 660-0102 will contract for using Zairian research groups combined with short-term U.S. technical advisors.

#### ARTICLE IV - HOME OFFICE SUPPORT

The contractor home office support staff will consist of a Project Director, and Assistant Project Director (i.e. clerical assistance) and Financial Manager for the number of person-months specified in Section F.

The contractor home office support staff will :

- 1) Act as chief correspondent on all matters related to this contract;
- 2) Provide, or arrange to be provided, all logistic support required to send and maintain the contract team for the life of the contract. This includes briefing the contractor team, ticketing, arranging for shipment of UAB and HHE, prompt payment of salaries, per diem, education and other allowances, maintaining communication with the Chief of Party and providing sufficient office supplies to the contractor team to enable them to satisfy contract report requirements;
- 3) Ensure that reporting deadlines are met, including invoicing;
- 4) The Project Director and Financial Manager may make one field trip each per year with the written approval of the cognizant A.I.D. project officer.

#### Coordinator Scope of Work

Le Coordinateur du Projet : En collaboration avec l'Administrateur Général, ce haut cadre du Projet aura à assumer les responsabilités importantes de :

- a) Gérer les ressources financières et le patrimoine matériel du Projet;
- b) Administrer le personnel Zairois oeuvrant au sein du Projet;
- c) Coordonner et superviser les activités scientifiques de toutes les branches intégrées du Projet;
- d) Veiller à l'exécution et au bon fonctionnement des activités du Projet;
- e) Participer à l'évaluation des activités du Projet et en faire rapport aux autorités de tutelle;
- f) Stimuler et harmoniser les contacts avec les autres organismes d'obédience agricoles tant nationaux qu'étrangers dont l'apport pourrait contribuer avantageusement à l'essor du Projet.

ANNEX VI

SUBMITTED WORK PLANS, 1988

DAVID OLSON    C.O.P

WORKPLAN 11/87 - 11/88

Objectives :

- 1) To have developed with PIU coordinator annual CPF Budget and have submitted by 7/12/87 to P.O. (Project Officer 102); that this budget will enable completion of critical project workplan activities for CY 1988.
- 2) To have developed with P.O. and PIU coordinator an 18 months implementation plan; by 12/87.
- 3) To review all pertinent studies and assist in as well as ensure written establishment of benchmarks for future impact evaluations; by 4/1/88.
- 4) To develop with PIU coordinator an annual plan of activities based on 18 months workplan by 1/31/88.
- 5) To systematically advise PIU coordinator on management of PIU.
- 6) To report as required to Project Officer; including submission of reports.
- 7) To approve with PIU coordinator all local currency CPF expenses and co-sign all checks after audit completed.
- 8) To manage technical assistance team's payments, reimbursements, leave and vacation, logistics, and procurement.
- 9) To initiate, track and monitor procurement with the PIU coordinator.
- 10) To develop with PIU coordinator recommendations for NGO selection and interventions (8) by 11/88 and report to P.O.
- 11) To negotiate contractual documents (with PIU coordinator) with selected ONG (4) by 11/88.
- 12) To supervise in terms of contract obligations and responsibilities the PRAGMA Technical Assistance Team.
- 13) To develop of 24 months plan indicating objectives and activities for the period 10/88-10/90.
- 14) To advise/assist PIU divisions as time is available.

C.T. VAUGHAN

WORKPLAN 1988

JANUARY 1988 (21 1/2 DAYS)

- 1) Complete monthly financial reports by 31/1/88 (2 days)
- 2) Procurement and arrangement of transport of project commodities in Kinshasa (see attached list) (6 1/2 days)
- 3) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 31/1 (1 day)
- 4) Team building workshop (5 days)
- 5) Coordination or reorganization of PROCA office 31/1 (2 days)
- 6) Prepare personal annual workplan by 31/1 (1 1/2 days)
- 7) Devise and install an inventory plan for fuel and drums purchased in Kinshasa and needed for RRAs and generators by 31/1 (1/2 day)
- 8) Supervision of preparation of West residence to be terminated by 15/2 (2 days)

FEBRUARY 1988 (22 DAYS)

- 1) Complete monthly CPF financial reports by 28/2 (2 days)
- 2) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 28/2 (1 day)
- 3) Supervision of preparation of West residence to be finished by 15/2 (2 days)
- 4) Supervision of preparation of Brandstetter residence to be finished by 15/3 (2 days)
- 5) Travel to Kinshasa to arrange protocol for PRAGMA financial consultant and return with him to Kikwit (3 days)
- 6) Individual work with PRAGMA consultant in Kikwit (5 days)
- 7) Evaluation of Lusekele management and financial control system accompanied by PRAGMA financial consultant by 28/2 (4 days)

TOTAL DAYS : 19 DAYS

MARCH 1988 (25 DAYS)

- 1) Complete monthly CPF financial reports by 31/3 (2 days)
- 2) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 31/3 (1 day)
- 3) Complete quarterly CPF financial reports by 31/3 (5 days)
- 4) Travel to Kinshasa and arrangement of transport of first load of generators by 31/3 (5 days)
- 5) Coordinate with Smith logistics of first RRAs by 15/3 (3 days)
- 6) Begin C&L training by 15/3 (9 days)

TOTAL DAYS : 25 DAYS

APRIL 1988 (23 1/2 DAYS)

- 1) Complete monthly CPF financial reports by 30/4 (2 days)
- 2) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 30/4 (1 day)
- 3) Complete C&L training and install their system by 30/4 (11 days)
- 4) Coordinate with Smith logistics of second RRAs by 30/4 (3 days)
- 5) Procurement CPF-Kinshasa by 30/4 (5 days)

TOTAL DAYS : 22 DAYS

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MAY 1988 (23 DAYS)

- 1) Complete monthly CPF financial reports by 31/5 (2 days)
- 2) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 31/5 (1 day)
- 3) Travel to Kinshasa and arrange transport for the second load of generators by 25/5 (5 days)
- 4) Evaluation of DPP management and financial control system accompanied by accountant by 31/5 ( 6 1/2 days)
- 5) Follow-up of Feb. Lusekele evaluation by 31/5 (3 days)
- 6) WOrk with Information Specialist on developing a computerized monitoring system for PIU management (5 days)

TOTAL DAYS : 22 1/2 DAYS

JUNE 1988 (22 DAYS)

- 1) Complete monthly CPF financial reports by 30/6 (2 days)
- 2) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 30/6 (1 day)
- 3) Prepare quarterly CPF financial reports by 30/6 (5 days)
- 4) Coordinate with Smith logistics for the third set of RRAs by 15/6 (3 days)
- 5) Control inventory-finance at PROCAR to insure that C&L procedures are being followed (2 days)
- 6) Complete computerized PIU monitoring system with Information Specialist by 15/6 (5 days)
- 7) Briefing with COP in preparation for his vacation (3 days)

TOTAL DAYS : 21 DAYS

JULY 1988 (22 1/2 DAYS)

- 1) Complete monthly CPF financial reports by 31/7 (2 days)
- 2) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher COP by 31/7 (2 days)
- 3) Acting COP

TOTAL DAYS : 22 1/2 DAYS

AUGUST 1988 (25 DAYS)

- 1) Brief COP on July activities ( 3 days)
- 2) Complete monthly CPF financial reports by 31/8 (1 day)
- 3) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 31/8 (1 day)
- 4) Coordinate with Smith logistics for RRAs by 31/8 (3 days)
- 5) Follow-up of DPP May evaluation by 31/8 (5 days)
- 6) Evaluation of third NGO management and control system (5 days)
- 7) Procurement Kinshasa (5 days)

TOTAL DAYS : 24 DAYS

SEPTEMBER 1988 (24 DAYS)

- 1) Complete monthly CPF financial reports by 30/9 (2 days)
- 2) Prepare quarterly CPF financial reports by 30/9 (5 days)
- 3) Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 30/9 (1 day)
- 4) Follow-up Lusekele evaluation (2 days)
- 5) Control PROCAR inventory-finance system (2 days)
- 6) Evaluation of fourth NGO management and financial control system (5 days)
- 7) Brief COP and replacement before departure on vacation (3 days)

OCT 1988: VACATION

NOV. 1988 (23 DAYS)

1. Briefing following return from vacation (3 days).
2. Complete monthly CPF financial report by 30/11/88 (2 days).
3. Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 30/11 (1 day).
4. Prepare yearly CPF budget for 1989 by 30/11 (5 1/2 days).
5. Follow-up DPP evaluation (3 days).
6. Follow-up third IMO evaluation (4 days).
7. Control PROCAR inventory-accounting system (2 days).

TOTAL: 21 1/2 DAYS

DEC. 1988 (24 1/2 DAYS)

1. Complete monthly financial report by 31/12 (2 days).
2. Present budget and discuss work plan in Kinshasa (7 days).
3. Complete quarterly CPF financial report by 31/12 (5 days).
4. Complete yearly report by 31/12 (5 days).
5. Prepare PRAGMA monthly voucher with COP by 31/12 (1 day).

TOTAL: 20 DAYS

MAY 1988 : 23 WORKDAYS

1. Further interventions with CAL ..... (4 days)
  2. Continue with RAV collaboration: trial planning ..... (6 days)
  3. Planning for future RRAs ..... (1 day)
  4. Management at Masamba seed center ..... (3 days)
  5. Deborah Smith leaves for maternity trip to USA;  
medical trip to Kinshasa ..... (5 days)
- TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 19 DAYS

JUNE 1988 : 22 WORKDAYS

1. Initial visit with DPP of Idiofa ..... (4 days)
  2. Further intervention with CAL ..... (4 days)
  3. Selection of sites and DIGs for RAV collaboration ..... (8 days)
  4. Management at Masamba seed center ..... (2 days)
  5. RRA planning ..... (2 days)
- TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 20 DAYS

JULY 1988 : 22.5 WORKDAYS

1. Participation in 7th & 8th RRA ..... (10 days)
  2. Travel to Kinshasa for annual leave ..... (4 days)
  3. Annual leave July 20th to 31st ..... (1 day)
- TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 20 DAYS

AUGUST 1988 : 25 WORKDAYS

1. Conference of annual leave August 1st to 18th ..... (14 days)
  2. Return to Kikwit ..... (1 day)
  3. Preparations for demo/trials in RAV collaboration ..... (4 days)
- TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 19 DAYS

SEPTEMBER 1988 : 24 WORKDAYS

1. Planting of demo/trials for RAV collaboration ..... (10 days)
  2. RRA analysis ..... (3 days)
  3. Further interventions with CAL and DPP ..... (5 days)
  4. Management at Masamba seed center ..... (2 days)
- TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 20 DAYS

OCTOBER 1988 : 21 WORKDAYS

1. Finish planting of RAV demo/trials ..... (5 days)
  2. Evaluation for previous 16 FSR/RRA ..... (4 days)
  3. Management at Masamba seed center ..... (2 days)
  4. Medical and services trip to Kinshasa ..... (3 days)
  5. Cooperation with Division Transformation and  
Division Commercialisation ..... (2 days)
- TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 16 DAYS

NOVEMBER 1988 : 23 WORKDAYS

1. Mid-season evaluation of RAV demo/trials ..... (5 days)
  2. Continued intervention with CAL or DPP ..... (4 days)
  3. Management at Masamba center ..... (2 days)
  4. Begin intervention with 3rd DIG ..... (4 days)
  5. Cooperation with other PROCAR divisions ..... (4 days)
- TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 19 WORKDAYS

DECEMBER 1988 : 24.5 WORKDAYS

1. Continued intervention with CAL or DPP ..... (4 days)
  2. Management at Masamba seed center ..... (2 days)
  3. Medical and air travel trip to Kinshasa ..... (4 days)
  4. Continue intervention with 3rd DIG ..... (4 days)
  5. Cooperation with other PROCAR divisions ..... (4 days)
- TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN :

APRIL 29, 1988

From : CRAIG SMITH, AGRONOMIST, PROCAR

To : DAVID OLSON, CHIEF OF PARTY, PROCAR

ABOUT : 1988 Work Plan for CRAIG SMITH, PRODUCTION DIVISION

The following is the second draft of my proposed work plan for 1988. The first version was submitted Jan. 28, 1988, and the second version has changes which have occurred.

JANUARY 1988 : 21.5 WORKDAYS MAXIMUM

1. Planning, implementation and reporting on 2 trips for Etude Pilote d' Integration de la Femme at the Centre Agricole de Lusekele (EPIF/CAL) ..... (8) days
2. Organize equipment for Rapid Rural Appraisals (RRA) ..... (2 days)
3. Meetings with Production Unit Personnel on RRA and Workplan ..... (2 days)
4. Team building exercise ..... (5 days)
5. Collection of leguminous seeds for Season B (1988 and Season A (1988-89) ..... (1 day)
6. Inspection and initial organization of experimental farm at Masamba Concession of Kikwit ..... (1 day)

TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN: 19 DAYS

FEBRUARY 1988 : 22 WORKDAYS

1. RAV/Peace Corps conference at Kiyaka ..... (6 days)
2. Programming for 4th & 5th RRA ..... (4 days)
3. Evaluation of 4th FSR/RRA ..... (2 days)
4. Legume trees at Masamba seed center ..... (2 days)
5. Medical trip to Kinshasa ..... (3 days)
6. Begin installation of rain gauges ..... (2 days)

TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 19 DAYS

MARCH 1988 : 25 WORKDAYS

1. Programming for 4th & 5th RRA ..... (5 days)
2. Training of RRA participants ..... (2 days)
3. Implementation for 4th FSR/RRA ..... (7 days)
4. Evaluation for 4th FSR/RRA ..... (3 days)
5. Management at Masamba seed center ..... (3 days)

TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 20 DAYS

APRIL 1988 : 23.5 WORKDAYS

1. Continued installation of rain gauges ..... (1 day)
2. Programming for future RRAs ..... (2 days)
3. Management at Masamba seed center ..... (3 days)
4. Medical, flight and services trip to Kinshasa ..... (5 days)
5. Collaboration with RAV for multiplication trials ..... (5 days)
6. Assist in word processing for Chief of Party ..... (1 day)
7. Communicate with CAL staff over interventions ..... (1 day)

TOTAL DAYS IN WORKPLAN : 18 DAYS

ANNEX VII

NGO APPLICATION FORM

DEPARTEMENT DU DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL  
PROJET DE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA PRODUCTION  
ET COMMERCIALISATION AGRICOLES REGIONALES  
PROJET USAID No. 660-0102  
B.P. 262  
KIKWIT  
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FORMULAIRE DE DEMANDE D'ASSISTANCE AGRICOLE  
AUPRES DE PROCAR/BANDUNDU  
=====

NOM ET ADRESSE DU DEMANDEUR: \_\_\_\_\_

2. NOM ET ADRESSE DE L'ORGANISATION: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

3. NOM, TITRE ET ADRESSE DU RESPONSABLE DE L'ORGANISATION: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

4. DATE DE L'EXISTENCE DE L'ORGANISATION: \_\_\_\_\_

5. LIEU DES OPERATIONS \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

6. QUEL EST LE BUT ET L'OBJECTIF DE VOTRE ORGANISATION \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

7. QUEL GENRE D'ACTIVITES AGRICOLES QUE VOTRE ORGANISATION ENTREPREND  
(Cultures vivrières, cultures pérennes, élevage, pisciculture,  
foresterie, autres à préciser): \_\_\_\_\_

8. QUEL EST LE DOMAINE D'INTERVENTION DE VOTRE ORGANISATION:

- a) Production
- b) Transformation
- c) Technologie appropriée
- d) Commercialisation
- e) Vulgarisation Agricole
- f) Formation
- g) Autres (à préciser)

9. DECRIVEZ LE NIVEAU DE DEVELOPPEMENT ATTEINT PAR LES ACTIVITES SELECTIONNEES CI-DESSUS AU SEIN DE VOTRE ORGANISATION

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10. QUELLE SORTE D'ASSISTANCE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE SOLLICITE VOTRE ORGANISATION? \_\_\_\_\_

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11 POURQUOI SOLLICITE-T-ELLE UNE TELLE ASSISTANCE? \_\_\_\_\_

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12. COMMENT ALLEZ-VOUS MESURER L'EFFET D'UNE TELLE ASSISTANCE AU SEIN DE VOTRE ORGANISATION? \_\_\_\_\_

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13. DECRIVEZ VOTRE ORGANISATION ET LE PRINCIPAL ROLE A JOUER PAR LA CATEGORIE DE PERSONNEL CHARGEE DE LA MISE EN PRATIQUE DE L'ASSISTANCE SOLLICITEE \_\_\_\_\_

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14. QUEL EST LE NIVEAU DE FORMATION DU PERSONNEL OEUVRANT AU SEIN DE VOTRE ORGANISATION QUI SERA APPELE A L'APPLICATION DE L'ASSISTANCE SOLLICITEE \_\_\_\_\_

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15. INDIQUEZ L'ORGANIGRAMME DE VOTRE ORGANISATION



16. QUEL EST LE PROGRAMME D'ACTION ET LE CALENDRIER DES ACTIVITES FUTURES DE VOTRE ORGANISATION? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
17. QUELLES SONT VOS RESSOURCES ACTUELLES EN :
- a) Personnel \_\_\_\_\_
  - b) Matériel \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - c) Capital \_\_\_\_\_
  - d) Autres \_\_\_\_\_
18. QUELLES SONT LES RESSOURCES COMPLEMENTAIRES QUE VOTRE ORGANISATION SOLLICITE ET EN QUELLE QUANTITE? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
19. VOTRE ORGANISATION SOLLICITE-T-ELLE L'ASSISTANCE AUPRES D'AUTRES DONATEURS? SI OUI EN QUOI CONSISTE-T-ELLE? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
20. DISPOSEZ-VOUS DES DOCUMENTS SUIVANTS DANS VOTRE ORGANISATION? SI OUI, VEUILLEZ ATTACHER UNE COPIE, SI NON EXPLIQUEZ POURQUOI.
- a) Statut de l'organisation \_\_\_\_\_
  - b) Règlement d'ordre intérieur \_\_\_\_\_
  - c) Convention Collective \_\_\_\_\_
  - d) Programme annuel d'activités \_\_\_\_\_
  - e) Rapport annuel d'activités (Rapport administratif, technique et financier) \_\_\_\_\_
  - f) Rapport d'Evaluation et d'Audit \_\_\_\_\_
  - g) Bilan trimestriel et annuel \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

21. QUEL EST LE SYSTEME ET LES LIVRES COMPTABLES QUE VOTRE ORGANISATION UTILISE? \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
22. QUELLES MESURES PRECONISE VOTRE ORGANISATION EN VUE DE SAUVEGARDER ET D'UTILISER A DE BONNES FINS LES RESSOURCES QU'ELLE SOLLICITE AUPRES DU PROCAR? \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
23. QUELLES SONT LES GARANTIES MATERIELLES OU FINANCIERES QUE VOTRE ORGANISATION DISPOSE EN VUE DE DEDOMMAGEMENT EN CAS D'ECHEC DE SES PROJETS? \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
24. VOTRE ORGANISATION SERA-T-ELLE EN MESURE DE S'AUTO-FINANCER APRES LA FIN DE L'ASSISTANCE SOLLICITEE AUPRES DU PROCAR? SI OUI, EXPLIQUEZ COMMENT ET APRES COMBIEN D'ANNEES \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
25. VOTRE ORGANISATION A-T-ELLE UN REPRESENTANT LEGAL? SI OUI, QUEL EST SON NOM ET SON ADRESSE \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
26. VOTRE ORGANISATION DISPOSE-T-ELLE DE REFERENCES POUVANT ATTESTER SES ACTIVITES? SI OUI, CITEZ LES. \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
27. VOTRE ORGANISATION EST-ELLE AFFILIEE OU ENREGISTREE AUPRES DE L'UNTZA, L'ANEZA, L'INSS ET LA DIRECTION DE CONTRIBUTION DU DEPARTEMENT DE FINANCE? \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Fait à ....., le .../.../19..

POUR LEGISLATION :

NOM ET FONCTION

NOM ET FONCTION

SIGNATURE

SIGNATURE

ANNEX VIII

RRA\_EVALUATION\_C.MCCARTHY

Date : 5 avril 1988

DE : Cheryl A. McCarthy, Administrateur du projet 660-0102

Sujet: Enquêtes de Reconnaissance Rapide dans les collectivités de Mikwi et de Manzansay - Leçons apprises et suggestions pour les prochaines enquêtes.

A : Directeur Nkoy  
: Chef d'Equipe David Olson

L'équipe de 8 enquêteurs s'était réunie le 28 mars pour discuter sur la structure, la logistique et les autres problèmes qui n'étaient pas liés au contenu de l'enquête. Nos commentaires, constatations et recommandations, plus particulièrement les miens propres, sont présentés ci-dessous.

#### A. Logistiques

Les enquêteurs doivent recevoir leur per diem un ou deux jours avant le jour du départ pour qu'ils puissent acheter la nourriture nécessaire avant le chargement des véhicules. Désormais, le projet devra établir une politique séparée des primes pour les participants PROCAR et les participants non-PROCAR.

L'inventaire des articles individuels devra être fait au début ou à la fin de la dernière session préparative. Les véhicules devront être chargés la nuit précédant le départ. De ce fait, l'équipe peut partir à une bonne heure le matin. La feuille de route ou ordre de mission de chaque membre devra lui être remis au moment du départ. Aussi pour le départ, tous les membres devront se réunir à un endroit, par exemple devant le bureau du PROCAR (même les employés du PROCAR). Ceci évitera la désorganisation qui a caractérisé le début des deux enquêtes qui viennent de se terminer.

Le projet devra confier au responsable désigné pour chaque véhicule de l'équipe, une boîte des produits pharmaceutiques tels que les médicaments anti-malarial (curative), les produits pour le traitement des blessures, fièvre, pansements, etc.

Par chance, il n'a pas plu pendant ces enquêtes, mais pour l'avenir, l'équipe recommande des imperméables et bottes imperméables pour chaque membre. Après l'arrivée des chapeaux PROCAR, le projet peut aussi donner un chapeau à chaque membre.

Les lampes torches n'étaient pas assez adaptées aux conditions. Le problème connu avec les lampes torches pouvait être dû à la marque des piles, mais aussi elles n'ont pas été adaptées au besoin d'une lumière adéquate pour lire et écrire. Les lampes tempêtes aussi avaient leur limite en vue de résoudre ce problème. Deux alternatives proposées par l'équipe sont un système de 12 V (batteries chargées par moteur ou panneau solaire) ou un petit groupe électrogène avec des lampes fluorescentes.

Les enquêtes exigent aussi la présence d'un cuisinier pour préparer les repas, bouillir de l'eau potable, faire la lessive et le nettoyage simple des maisons de passage ou guesthouses. Le problème de manque d'eau potable s'est posé quelques fois surtout parce que tous les bidons de 15 litres étaient désignés pour l'eau de bain. 40 litres de l'eau potable n'a pas suffi pour 11 à 13 personnes pendant les jours les plus chauds et les jours où les champs étaient vraiment loin du village. Malheureusement "le cadeau Jean" n'a pas pris l'initiative de bouillir l'eau sans attendre les ordres ou d'informer la responsable quand les bidons se trouvaient vides. Il est arrivé quelques fois que les équipes sont rentrées à la maison et se trouvaient sans l'eau nécessaire pour se baigner ou pour boire.

Avec la mise en exécution des ces recommandations, on a besoin d'un troisième véhicule pour transporter les biens et le cuisinier. Le chauffeur de ce véhicule peut être responsabilisé pour aller puiser de l'eau potable et celle destinée aux travaux de ménage et aux bains des participants.

Avec le cuisinier, le PROCAR devra fournir (comme il a fait au dernier moment) un aliment de base comme du riz. Un sac a suffi pour deux semaines dans les collectivités où on peut trouver un peu de manioc et du maïs moulu. Personne ne peut être condamné à manger du fou-fou sans maïs. Le projet devra aussi fournir du sel, de l'huile de cuisine et du savon pour la vaisselle. Bien que ceci ne constitue pas exactement un besoin de base, on recommande que les sticks pour les moustiquaires fassent partie de l'inventaire des véhicules. On ne peut pas compter sur la présence immédiate des aires boisées aux environs des maisons de passage ou des clous dans les chambres.

On s'est débrouillé mais il y avait un problème de manque des chaises et des tables pour écrire et servir les repas. En général les maisons de passage et guesthouses n'ont pas des mobiliers pour une équipe de 11 à 16 personnes. Pour le problème des moustiques et autres insectes attirés par la lumière des lampes, on propose que le projet fournisse des spirales de "DOOM" (ou quelque produit pareil) et "screened gazebo" pour le travail pendant la nuit.

L'équipe recommande aussi que si le groupe électrogène est disponible, le projet peut fournir un ou deux ordinateurs portables ou transportables pour faciliter la rédaction des rapports du village et des rapports de la collectivité.

#### B. Méthodes, Procédures, contenu

Au moins une semaine avant la formation ou sessions préparatives de l'équipe, toute la documentation, les cartes, le choix des sites doivent être complétés et rassemblés. Une équipe du PROCAR doit se déplacer jusqu'aux sites choisis pour s'assurer de leur accessibilité et prendre contact avec les chefs. La responsable de l'équipe en tant que membre de l'équipe, a sacrifié du temps important pour faire le protocole. Ceci ne signifie pas que le responsable ne doit pas faire le protocole, mais avec un pré-avis il pourra le faire pendant une ou deux fois seulement. Les documents importants doivent être traduits en français avant le démarrage de l'enquête. Dans la mesure du possible, les tableaux modèles (comme le calendrier agricole) doivent être développés avant ou pendant les sessions préparatives de telle façon qu'ils puissent servir de guide additionnel dans les discussions des grandes lignes.

Entre la formation et l'heure du départ on a besoin de quelques jours pour lire et discuter les documents existants sur les collectivités choisies. Sur le terrain nous avons découvert que selon une étude chez les Bambala, on ne peut pas appliquer de l'engrais chimique sur les cultures. A cause du manque de renseignements et informations avant l'enquête, l'équipe n'a pas cherché à vérifier si les Bambala sont toujours défendus par les ancêtres pour appliquer de l'engrais chimique sur le sol de ces derniers. Dans l'aire d'influence de la BAT qui insiste sur l'application de l'engrais sur le tabac, on n'a pas cherché à savoir si l'interdiction des ancêtres bloque la convention des Bambala avec la BAT ou si les Bambala ont développé une stratégie acceptable.

Pendant ces mêmes jours l'équipe des enquêteurs, sous la direction du spécialiste en recherche et information devra développer les grandes lignes de l'enquête en français et en Kikongo. Mais les grandes lignes sans un développement profond résulteront en un manque de consistance des détails concernant les enquêtes. C'est une des raisons pour laquelle les entretiens à Mikwi n'ont pas fourni assez des données et renseignements sur les systèmes de production comme ce fut le cas à Manzansay.

Il est aussi recommandé que le PROCAR maintienne le même groupe des enquêteurs si c'est possible. La formation pour les prochaines enquêtes devra être concentrée sur les techniques des entretiens, particulièrement sur les entretiens des groupes (petits et grands). Il faut aussi une meilleure sensibilisation parmi les hommes de l'équipe pour ne pas laisser les paysans parler à la place des paysannes.

Dans plusieurs cas, ce que les femmes ont expliqué était contradictoire ou assez différent de ce que les hommes ont exprimé. Les différences s'expliquaient en général par le fait que les hommes parlent du point de vue théorique ou de leur propre participation et de leur culture, mais pas du point de vue des pratiques actuelles appliquées par les femmes. Il y avait aussi une tendance de la part des membres masculins de divertir les réponses des femmes par leurs commentaires autour de l'entretien. Plusieurs fois quand l'entretien s'est passé de cette façon, les femmes cessent de répondre.

Il y avait aussi une tendance par l'équipe d'accepter la première réponse comme étant la réponse complète, sans chercher à clarifier si la question était bien comprise et/ou vérifier si la réponse était complète (exemple: un champ de sésame ne signifie pas un champ de monoculture). L'équipe s'est améliorée pendant les études mais elle a toujours besoin d'une meilleure formation et pratique sur ces questions.

Il faut spécifier si le projet s'intéresse plus aux cultures vivrières ou plutôt aux cultures pérennes. Le choix des enquêtés et partant le degré auquel ils représentent ce que le projet cherche à connaître dépend de cette clarification. Au cours de 5 entretiens tenus respectivement avec un fermier, un commerçant, un chef et ses notables, un couple et une femme, on arrive avec difficulté (si on y parvient) à établir le calendrier agricole ainsi que les vraies pratiques récentes appliquées dans les champs vivriers, puisque on a en effet parlé avec 4 hommes et une seule femme.

Le projet devra nommer un responsable pour chaque enquête et aussi désigner un responsable pour chaque équipe de 4 membres (véhicule). Cette deuxième personne sera également chargée de la rotation des quatre membres dans les sous-groupes de deux. (Il y avait une résistance à cette idée, mais la qualité des entretiens s'est améliorée avec l'imposition de ce régime). On ne doit pas inclure dans l'équipe des membres qui ne sont pas assez aptes (ou ouverts) à travailler en groupe. Les entretiens conduits par une personne étaient plus superficielles et partant moins crédibles. Les problèmes cités ci-haut sur le choix des enquêtes et la tendance de ne pas prêter attention aux femmes se manifestent fortement avec les entretiens solitaires. Aussi il y a une contrainte de la mémoire d'un individu qui peut également entrer en ligne de compte.

On devra limiter le maximum de nombres des villages par collectivités à 8 ou 9. On peut estimer 4 à 6 entretiens par village. Comme c'était expliqué ci-dessus, les meilleurs entretiens étaient conduits par les sous-groupes des deux personnes. Les entretiens ont duré près de 2 heures de temps sauf l'entretien avec le chef (-/+ une heure) et les entretiens avec les commerçants (demi-heure). L'enregistrement a pris une demi-heure pour chaque entretien. Nous avons essayé deux systèmes d'enregistrement: soit tous les deux membres enregistrent soit un seul membre s'occupe de cette tâche. Au moment de confirmer les détails ou quand il a fallu obtenir plus d'informations, dans les cas où les deux membres ont chacun enregistré ses propres notes, nous avons trouvé plus de renseignements et de détails.

Pour chaque village donc, on devra estimer 1 - 2 heures/entretien, une demi-heure d'enregistrement/entretien pour arriver à un total de 3 - 7 heures dans un village. Le temps de voyage a varié entre 5 et 6 heures aller et retour. Après la rentrée à la maison, il faut encore 4 à 6 heures pour terminer avec l'enregistrement des entretiens, discuter sur les activités du village parmi les membres de l'équipe et écrire le premier brouillon.

Chaque jour nécessite donc 11 à 18 heures de travail, sans tenir compte du temps pour le petit déjeuner et le dernier repas du jour. Pour le rapport de la collectivité il y a lieu d'estimer un jour complet ou même un jour et demi. Il convient aussi de programmer la lessive chaque jours. Entre les collectivités on devra programmer un jour de repos de préférence un jour autre que le jour de voyage.

Après le retour à Kikwit, l'équipe a besoin d'un jour pour la revue des rapports avec le spécialiste en recherche et informaton et pour rédiger les rapports.

L'enregistrement des entretiens devra être en français pour faciliter la participation des membres qui ne parlent pas le Kikongo. Les rapports aussi doivent être en français. Pour la facilitatbn des entretiens, les membres qui ne parlent pas le Kikongo doivent avoir des interprètes. C'est une charge lourde de demander qu'un autre participant s'occupe et de l'interprétation et des entretiens en même temps.

Franchement, on ne peut pas envoyer seulement un mundele comme chef, responsable, participant, observateur et protocolaire. Il faut aussi qu'au

moins un des mondele soit de PRAGMA. Il faudra aussi essayer de responsabiliser le cuisinier pour les petits détails de logement, de l'eau, de l'approvisionnement, de lessive et de la nourriture.

### C. Evaluation de l'équipe

Kaziama            Protocolaire, mais il sacrifie l'enquête pour pouvoir envisager une possibilité de retour dans l'avenir;  
Ne travaille pas assez bien en groupe, ni pour les entretiens ni pour la synthèse;  
Etrangle les moins expérimentés;  
A tendance de ne pas écouter les femmes;  
A tendance de choisir les hommes pour les entretiens, peut-être parce qu'il n'a pas observé que les femmes ne parlent pas devant leurs maris et devant les chefs.

Kingidila          Bon agronome;  
Apprend vite;  
Conduit des bons entretiens avec les femmes;  
A tendance d'accepter ou de rejeter les opinions des autres sur base de sa connaissance, mais il s'est vite amélioré dans ce domaine

Kapita             Bonne enquêtrice,  
Polyvalente, dans un groupe de deux ou trois, elle peut suivre les voies non suivies par les autres;  
Est organisée, et a une excellente mémoire;  
Travaille bien en groupe;

Kawanda            Idem que Kapita.

Kabemba            Il ne parle pas Kikongo assez bien, ensuite je n'ai pas travaillé directement avec lui;  
Il prend des bonnes notes;  
Manifeste une forte curiosité, et suit les renseignements au début;  
Travaille bien en groupe;  
Bon agronome.

Mawa Nfumu        Un peu plus superficiel dans les entretiens, mais il est plus alerte aux besoins économiques et sociologiques;  
Réfléchit bien et propose des hypothèses;  
Conduit des bons entretiens avec les femmes, mais sans direction, il a une tendance à converser uniquement avec les hommes;  
parle Kikongo de l'état.

Smith              Bon agronome;  
Habitué à travailler dans les équipes moins polyvalentes et spécialisées;  
Manque de patience pour le protocole;  
Ne travaille pas assez bien en groupe;  
Ne connaît pas les exigences des logistiques au Zaïre.



Kabwenge

Bon protocolaire

Travaille bien en groupe

Bon enquêteur

Synthétise bien

Bon observateur

A une perspective commerciale et d'infrastructure

Bon écrivain.

ANNEX IX

CORRESPONDENCE MCGARTHY - NKQY - 2 JULY 62

Le 2 juillet 1987

87-0102-017

Citoyen Nkoy Baumbu  
Coordinateur PROCAR  
B.P. 262  
Kikwit

Objet: Accusé de réception

Citoyen Coordinateur,

J'accuse réception des rapports des missions effectuées au centre Agricole de Lusekele et au projet d'autopromotion rurale d'Ipamu que vous m'avez transmis et je vous en remercie.

Ci-après, veuillez trouver quelques observations utiles s'y rapportant.

1. Centre Agricole de Lusekele.

- Dans le domaine de la Technologie Appropriée, le Projet 102 collaborera étroitement avec l'ITPK/CEPAS qui opère déjà dans la Région et dont les capacités institutionnelles ont été mises en évidence dans le document du projet.

- Le projet PROCAR n'entend pas fournir des biens en nature (semences, moyen de déplacement, moulins, matériaux de construction, équipements de bureaux et mobiliers etc...) aux O.I.G participantes, mais se propose de les aider par voie de l'information ou au moyen d'un financement, à se procurer certains biens matériels indispensables au bon déroulement de leurs programmes agricoles.

- L'étude sur la mobilisation de l'épargne et de crédit étant en cours, il s'avère prématuré d'envisager l'octroi d'un crédit comme solution aux problèmes de la commercialisation des produits agricoles dans le rayon d'activité du C.A.L.

- D'une manière générale, l'USAID est présentement en train d'examiner les voies et moyens de concilier les options futures du C.A.L. avec les objectifs du projet 102 conformément à la politique et à la stratégie de l'USAID en matière de développement.

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## 2. PARI/Ipamu

Outre les observations concernant la fourniture par le projet PROCAR des biens matériels aux O.I.G. et dont question ci-dessus, je trouve utile de vous rappeler également que suivant l'esprit du document du projet au sujet du programme d'activités du PROCAR, bien que des missions de reconnaissance et de sensibilisation auprès des O.I.G. potentielles soient permises, l'assistance du projet durant les deux premières années, s'adressera préférentiellement à deux O.I.G. pilotes seulement (C.A.L. et D.P.P./Idiofa). L'intégration progressive des autres O.I.G. intéressées, notamment le projet PARI/Ipamu, interviendra à l'issue de cette phase expérimentale et suivra les leçons et les recommandations issues de la première intervention du Projet.

Dans l'espoir que ces quelques éclaircissements vous seront d'un grand intérêt, je vous prie de croire, Citoyen Coordinateur, en l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Cheryl McCarthy  
Administrateur du projet 102  
USAID/Kinshasa

ANNEX\_X

USAID\_OVERSIGHT\_DETAIL

## BACKGROUND DETAIL

From the perspective of an outsider looking in on the daily functioning of the project, one could say that the level of USAID oversight has been enthusiastic and, except for a few instances, appropriate. The adequacy of that oversight, has been less than appropriate. Unilateral decisions, affecting the project and the TA team, have been made by the PO without prior warning or consultation. This oversight has been characterized by seeming negligence in follow-up, and misallocation of PO resources often resulting in unreasonable delays in project implementation. The following are examples of this.

### Housing

Approximately one year prior to the arrival of the TA team housing had been identified and rental agreements negotiated between USAID and the landowners. Rightly or wrongly the PO relied on the judgement of the Bandundu Support Unit's (BSU) director to determine whether housing was in livable condition. Once the team began arriving in country the PO was quickly made aware that the quarters would require substantial renovations to meet the standards established by the Embassy housing board. It was at this point that the PO decided to make a trip to Kikwit to assess the quality and state of the housing. This was accomplished in December 1987, more than a month after the COP was on board. Renovations were begun and nearly completed by the time of this evaluation.

### Project Documents

The TA team is required, according to the terms of its contract, to "review all pertinent studies completed to date and establish benchmarks for future impact evaluations," during the team's first six months in country. As of the date of this writing, nine months into the contract, all pertinent documents have still not been made available to the team; nor have they all been translated into French for the non-English speaking members of the PIU. Some translation are still not available at end July, 1988. This has made the job of establishing benchmarks all the more difficult.

### Commodities

First, office furniture was ordered by the P.O. in 1986, more than two years ago, and has still not arrived. The reasons for this delay are unknown; as is why an interim solution was not permitted (i.e. local purchase of needed items). Second, among the furnishings ordered for the team's housing were washers, driers, and water heaters. Rather than consulting with the ultimate users as to the need or desire to have such amenities, the P.O. sold the lot to another project based in Kinshasa. The team should have been consulted. Third, in December 1987, PROCAR sought pro-forma invoices for the local purchase of four vehicles needed for the conduct of field research. The invoices were presented to the P.O. by the team, highlighting the pressing need for them. It was not until late June, 1988, that the PID/C and source/origin waiver were completed. Fourth, in November, 1987, the COP

requested that personal computers be procured for the project office in Kikwit. It is now eight months later and there is still no sight of them. To fill the gap the team has borrowed one from project 098 and rented another one locally - to date its rental fee equals the purchase price of one complete PC.

#### RRAs

The second priority information gathering exercise (RRAs 4 and 5) was scheduled for March, 1988 and was to include some outside assistance from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Inadequate preparation was made for these RRAs, dates were changed to suit the PO's schedule, and ten days prior to the arrival of the USDA expert, the TA team was informed that the expert would not be available to assist them. This loss, along with other perhaps avoidable oversights which occurred during the execution of the RRAs, resulted in an only partially successful exercise. The PO overruled the technical team, the responsible withdrew, and the PO took over. The PO devoted six weeks to this exercise. Having the PO available to devote sufficient time to administration, has, in contrast, always been a problem. The data collected proved to be incomplete. Additional work will need to be done to complete information base for the two collectivities studied. A decision could have been made to postpone the RRAs, at a time when PROCAR staff would be fully in place.

#### Staff Training

The project Coordinator requested that he be permitted to accompany the Assistant PO (USAID) to attend a project management training course given in the U.S. The COP supported his request. The PO refused, arguing that the timing was not right. An opportunity lost. This course would have provided an opportunity for the project Coordinator to receive additional management training while also giving both the Assistant PO and the Coordinator an opportunity to discuss and apply the theoretical concepts they both know.

#### NGO Staffing

In early June 1988, the PO informed the COP of some training opportunities that Israel was offering in the fields of rural development and agricultural extension. On July 7, 1988 during the project's internal review, the P.O. announced that 30 candidates would be selected from Bandundu to attend the Israeli course in November 1988. There was no prior warning, no consultation with either the COP or the Coordinator. The probable quality of the courses is not in question, nor is the ability of PROCAR to identify a sufficient number of qualified candidates who might benefit from such training. The process and the coordination are in question.

### Contracting for Services

Excessive delays in obtaining the specialized services of Technoserve (TNS) to assist Développement Progrès Populaire (DPP) and the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) for a pilot study that would ultimately assist the Centre Agricole de Lusekele (CAL) has been unfortunate and to some unavoidable. Each of these actions was initiated about one year ago. The former was delayed to a large extent because the PO was not active in monitoring the document's internal clearance and passage through USAID's labyrinth. The delays were perhaps unavoidable: the length of this particular delay was unnecessarily excessive. Irrespective of which office held the document or had reservations - stated or unstated - about some aspect of the presentation or substance, it was ultimately the responsibility of the PO to see that the document was approved in a timely fashion. The latter was an entirely different case. Due to the contracting mechanism selected the delays and setbacks were beyond the control of the PO. However, what should be noted here is that it is not clear whether alternatives were considered. A direct USAID contract or an IQC, had they been considered, might have provided the required solution and allowed the work to begin on schedule.

### Short-Term Technical Assistance

The Tollens Study is a marketing study of Bandundu which is potentially useful for project No 102. However, the study focuses on the servicing of the Kinshasa market from the whole of the province. There AID-Kinshasa funds for this sort of general research. Why did it have to be funded out of limited project S/T TA project funds? On the other hand, with the TAT delayed and the PIU staffing restrained, why could not information from the RRAs (Feb. 1986) in three collectivities, and the project paper identifications have been used as a basis for NGO evaluations using S/T TA, in accordance with PP criteria, to advance the project purpose (as was done by 097 for DPP). The PIU would now have a bank of NGO evaluations which would permit the more rapid exploitation of potential intervention agreements.

### Potential NGOs and Types of Assistance

Although project documents speak to the private sector and even collectivities as well as educational institutions, the PO has flatly ruled out the latter and focused attention solely on missions. In spite of specific provision for project distribution of commodities, the PO has ruled out such interventions (see Annex IX).

### PIU Staffing

The PO has restrained the PIU from staffing. While this may have had some justification in 1987 (while some preliminary evaluation work might have been accomplished with S/T TA, at least with the arrival of the TA team) recruitment would have advanced the team development process, if undertaken in early 1988. It is reported that offers of staff were refused as late as the arrival of the evaluation team. While one refusal was on merit, (a chemist was offered as a training specialist) the PO unilaterally felt it was too early to hire. When finally brought on, if the people offered are still available), the time required for orientation and integration will intrude on what could have been more productive time.



## PQ Availability

Although the PO has been responsible for solely 102 at least since late 1986, availability to carry out required tasks and follow up has continuously been a problem. Devoting "much less than 60% of time...until very recently" for a project calling for 75% of officer time has reduced hoped for results. Sit project management has waited days in Kinshasa to attend previously scheduled meetings. The assistant PO has reported to superiors that normal delegation of routine follow up has not occurred. The PO has insisted on doing personally all data entry even when it prevented availability to meet project management. Although the PO was to participate fully in the internal evaluation of the project, her availability in the end was limited to a hurried attendance at a two-hour summary meeting. The management of priorities and time allocation by the PO has affected project advancement.

### Specifics of Oversight Problems Cited by PO

- no budget until 7 months after ProAg was signed
- delayed arrival of TA short and long-term
- the continued delay of the first major intervention DPP/Technoserve
- the continued delay in the second major intervention (now 3 years)  
ICRW/CAL.
- a two year delay in equipping the office
- a two year delay in audit and training  
(The project accounting system was developed in spite of instructions by the PO to the contrary, and earned high praise on review.)
- delays in USAID decision-making, i.e. project housing policy,  
(delayed/demoralized the project team and led to inordinate emphasis on logistics during the TA team's first six months)

ANNEX XI

PROCAB INTERNAL EVALUATION

## INTERNAL EVALUATION

Réunion du 29/06/88

### (1) Participants

- 1) Mr Olson
- 2) Directeur du Projet
- 3) Assistant Administratif
- 4) Mr West
- 5) Mr Vaughan

### (2) Ordre du jour

#### Evaluation interne

- 1) Progrès (Planification).
- 2) Système d'exécution du projet.
- 3) Validité des hypothèses du projet.
- 4) Evaluer l'A.T. et changer ou non pour améliorer l'exécution du projet.
- 5) Recommandations pour améliorer l'exécution du projet.

#### II Périodes

- 1) Avant l'arrivée de l'A.T. au projet
- 2) Avec l'A.T. sur place au projet.
- 3) Réorientation
- 4) Exécution

#### III Objectifs de l'évaluation interne

- 1) Préparation pour l'évaluation externe en vue d'améliorer l'orientation du projet et la performance du projet.
- 2) Développer un plan d'action dans ses grandes lignes de 1988 à 1990.
- 3) Développer les recommandations.

Au cours de la première journée de la réunion de l'évaluation interne, c'est Mr. David qui a présidé la réunion.

1. Progrès/Planification

> Objectifs en 1988	> Resultats	> Ecart	> Raisons de ces écarts
1. >6 interventions avant >avril 89	> 5	> 1	>Procédure adm >USAID >ICRW >TECHNOSERVE >qui bloque tout
2. >8 ONG identifiés >à Avril 1988	> 8	> 0	> -
3. >Ligne de base	> possible	> 0	>Reformulation >de la méthodologie
4. >Plan du travail	> 5 1/4 > en 6 mois	> -	> -
5. >Rapides Reconnaissances >(13)	> Non fait	> -	>Reformulation >des R.R.S
6. >Formation UEP	> Oui (faites)	> -	> -
7. >Achats	> Oui/non partiel- > lement faits	> -	>Poursuite des >achats
8. >Système administratif	> Oui	> -	> -
9. >Etudes	> Oui/non > partiellement > faites	> -	> à refaire

## Objectifs mis en détail

- 1) 5 interventions du projet en faveur des ONG.
  - Achat de la décortiqueuse placée à Lusekele avant l'arrivée de l'AT/PRAGMA
  - EPIF/CAL
  - TECHNOERVE/D.P.P
  - O.P.G./098/Lusekele
  - Champ de démonstration
  
- 2) Les 8 ONG identifiés sont:
  - D.P.P.
  - C.A.L./Lusekele
  - Mbanza-Lute
  - Djuma
  - CBB/Bosobe
  - Mission Catholique Bokoro
  - ITPK à Kikwit
  - COOCEC/Bandundu
  
- 3) Ligne de base
  - Etude du petit paysan
  - Etude par satellite
  - Etude de Tollens
  - Etude du système foncier dans l'aire du projet
  - Rapide Reconnaissances
  - BEAU
  - Rapport de l'Administration publique sur la population

\* La ligne de base doit être conçue de manière à évaluer la contribution du projet, qui est l'amélioration du niveau de vie de la population de l'aire du projet.

\* Avant l'intervention du projet, on doit faire une étude d'évaluation pour connaître la situation du départ; après l'intervention du projet, on évalue les résultats de celle-ci sur la population cible. L'existence d'une autre ligne de base est possible mais il faut reformuler la méthodologie.

4) Plan du Travail pour l'Exécution du Projet.

	Objectifs	Résultats	Ecart	Motifs
1.	>Plan RR'S (13)	> non faites	> -	> Reformulation > avec USAID
2.	>Achat de 4 véhicules	> non fait	> -	> faute à imputer > USAID > commodités
3.	>Choix des sites >pour RR'S	> non fait	> -	> on attend > consultante > USAID
4.	>Revue de la >documentation	> non fait	> -	> Reformulation
5.	>Définition de la >méthodologie des RR'S	> non faite	> -	> Reformulation > avec la > consultante > USAID
6.	>Composition des >équipes pour RR's	> faite	> -	> -
7.	>Système Adm/Fin.	> déjà audité	> -	> -
8.	>EPIF/CAL	> non fait	>non démarré	> faute à imputer > à ICRW > la consultante > se présente
9.	>COOPEC	> Rapport déjà > fait	> -	> -
10.	>DPP/Technoserve	> non fait	> -	> Lenteur dans > l'approbation > du contrat > USAID/Washington

	Objectifs	Résultats	Ecarts	Motifs
11.	>Off Farm System >employment	>non fait	-	> non priorit... > pour PROCAR > manque de > technicien à le > faire
12.	>Formation du personnel >du projet par le Team >Building de l'UEP	>déjà fait	-	-
13.	>Plan des achats	>grande partie >faite	> Documentation, > planning > certains achats > sont à faire	> manque des > données > CMO, procédure > USAID
14.	>Construction des >bureaux et des maisons >pour PROCAR	>non faite	-	> Fonds bloqués > par l'AID
15.	>Exécution des achats >pour le PROCAR		> - 4 véhicules pour RR's > - 1 camion > - citerne pour l'eau > - ordinateur pour PROCAR > - mobilier du bureau > - citerne d'eau > - château d'eau > - caburant > - matériel pour RR	> CMO/USAID > Reformulation

## 5) Choix de sites: problèmes à prendre en considération

- protocole d'entente avec les autorités locales à qui il faut expliquer les raisons de l'enquête.
- Où aller: géographie et topographie
- Où loger, où rester pour faire l'enquête.
- Où faire ces enquêtes en fonction de la méthodologie définie.

Il faut informer les autorités locales et les ONG pour s'assurer la collaboration de la population cible. Il faut aussi préparer la logistique, connaître l'état des routes et des bacs dans la contrée à visiter. Il faut que le calendrier soit établi avant le démarrage des RR. Il faut que l'on connaisse le nombre des villages à visiter en tenant compte du temps, de la distance à parcourir et de la quantité du carburant disponible. Il faut aussi tenir compte du site écologique des villages à visiter: village de forêt ou village de la savanne.

## 6) Revue de la documentation

Il faut récolter des informations auprès des chefs des collectivités et des commissaires de zone qui connaissent bien la population administrée et le milieu.

En ce qui concerne le plan des achats pour le PROCAR, les besoins en carburant et les réserves pour 2 mois sont estimés à 22m<sup>3</sup>. Il faut que l'on achète une citerne.

Certains équipements pour les RR's ont été acheté par Mr Smith, mais le problème est que tous ces biens ne sont pas dans le magasin du PROCAR, car il y a des articles qui sont chez Smith.

## II Système d'Exécution du Projet

Dans l'exécution du projet, il y a des problèmes qui se posent, voici une liste non exhaustive de ces problèmes.

1. 4 interventions en faveur des ONG ont été suggérés par l'USAID qui n'est pas sur le terrain et qui ne connaît pas bien la population. En cas d'échec la faute incombera au projet 102 et non à l'USAID.

Une seule intervention en faveur des ONG a été initiée par le projet 102. C'est le champ de démonstration. Mais l'exécution est bloquée par l'USAID avec sa lenteur administrative.

2. Identification des ONG

Il y a une mauvaise définition des ONG appelés à travailler le PROCAR. En effet jusqu'à présent seules les confessions religieuses sont prises comme ONG, les commerçants, les collectivités sont exclus alors que le Project Paper les inclut.

3. La conception de la ligne de base est mal définie.
4. Il n'y a rien à dire sur le plan du travail.



5. La conception et l'exécution des 2 premières étaient différentes de celles faites en mars 88. Pour Mr West les premières Rapides Reconnaissances étaient meilleures que les secondes parce qu'elles ont fournies davantage d'informations utiles au PROCAR.
6. Il faut clarifier la politique des achats. Il faut les programmer et désigner clairement celui qui doit les effectuer. Cfr CMD/prise de décision du Project Officer.
7. Il faut tenir compte des termes de référence (SOW) et de l'intervention de l'AID dans l'exécution du projet.
8. L'intervention de l'USAID doit être moindre dans l'exécution du Projet. L'USAID doit avoir un rôle passif dans l'exécution du projet et non un rôle trop actif comme cela se passe actuellement.

### III Validité des hypothèses du cadre logique du projet 102

Il y a au total 24 hypothèses dans le cadre logique du Projet 102.

1. Le projet 102 peut atteindre la population de l'aire du projet de manière équitable par les ONG.
2. Les ressources distribuées par le PROCAR aux ONG seront transférées au niveau des villages à la fin du mandat du PROCAR.
3. Le gouvernement Zaïrois maintiendra la politique macro-économique actuelle.
4. Les ONG assumeront la responsabilité des composantes du projet.
5. La responsabilité de l'AID sera moindre durant la vie du projet 102.
6. Les agriculteurs de l'aire du projet tireront un profit de leur travail agricole.
7. Les ONG et le gouvernement Zaïrois investiront des capitaux dans l'aire du projet 102.
8. Les ONG ont la capacité et servent de lien entre le projet 102 et la population cible.
9. Les ONG disposent des ressources financières pour continuer les activités du PROCAR après la fin de son mandat.
10. Les programmes nationaux de recherche vivrière identifient et rendent possible les variétés sélectionnées avant la 4<sup>e</sup> année.
11. 024, 028 et 098 seront mis en oeuvre en même temps que 102.
12. Les postes de l'UEP seront pourvus par des Zaïrois et des expatriés.
13. Les communications seront maintenues entre les ONG et les organismes centraux du Développement.
14. Les OIG sont disposés à mettre en place les programmes suggérés par le projet.
15. Les OIG doivent collaborer avec le personnel du projet 102 et avec les organismes centraux du Développement.
16. Les cultivateurs villageois sont disposés à adopter les nouvelles méthodes d'exploitation agricole: cultiver de nouveaux produits et apprendre de nouvelles techniques de transformation.
17. Les ONG doivent tenir des comptes précis.
18. Le projet 102 doit tenir des comptes précis.
19. Des variétés sélectionnées doivent être obtenues des centres de Recherche nationaux.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

20. Les DIG peuvent obtenir des ressources utiles auprès des institutions centrales de développement, p.e. la banque.
21. ITAC peut être restauré de manière à former les ONG à prix raisonnable.
22. Il faut que les biens du projet 102 soient commandés et expédiés à temps.
23. Il faut analyser les besoins de l'aire du Projet 102 en matière de crédit et des institutions financières (crédit) démontrant que le secteur crédit est important et faisable.
24. Il faut que l'Assistance Technique à court terme soit qualifiée, choisie et engagée à temps opportun.

Inventaires des hypothèses non valables pour les participants

- L'hypothèse 21 n'est pas valable. En effet, ITAC est une école qui n'existe pas. De plus même si elle existait, elle dépendrait de l'EPS et ne pourrait pas être financée par le PROCAR qui dépend du Département du Développement Rural.

- En rapport avec l'hypothèse 12, il faut que les effectifs du PROCAR.

- Effectif du PROCAR au 1er juillet 1988

Expatriés : 5 agents  
+ Consultants

Zaïrois:

- Division RIF
  - 1 agent en place
  - 2 agents à pourvoir
- Division Production
  - 2 agents en place
  - 6 agents à pourvoir
- Division Transformation
  - 1 agents prévu
  - 0 agents en place
- Division Commercialisation
  - 2 agents prévus
  - 0 agents en place
- Administration générale
  - 3 agents en place
  - effectif complet

Il manque 11 agents Zaïrois, cadres de collaboration. Les agents de soutien sont engagés en fonction des besoins du PROCAR.

- Pour la division RIF, dans l'immédiat, il faut engager un formateur et un agro-économiste.

- Pour la division production, il faut trouver:

- un pédologue
- un phytotechnicien
- un zootechnicien

- Pour la division commercialisation, il faut engager 1 chef de division.

- Pour la division Transformation, il faut engager un chef de division.

A propos de l'hypothèse 13, il est dommage que rien n'est prévu dans le PROCAR pour maintenir ces communications. L'AID n'a pas prévu la structure-relai entre les ONG et les organismes centraux de Développement.

La supposition 14 doit être complétée. Il faut qu'il existe des liens préétablis entre les 100 vulgarisateurs formés et la population cible. Il est regrettable que les collectivités et les autres organes du gouvernement Zaïrois ne soient pas pris comme ONG. Les ONG retenus jusqu'ici ont déjà leur propre but à poursuivre: évangéliser. Il n'est pas sûr que ces ONG confessionnels réussiront dans le développement intégral. Les responsables du PROCAR souhaitent que les collectivités, les opérateurs économiques soient aussi identifiés comme ONG.

Dans la 16<sup>e</sup> supposition, il faut souligner le fait que le PROCAR doit susciter un intérêt de la part de la population paysanne et, surtout obtenir sa participation, avant d'espérer qu'elle soit disposée à adopter les nouvelles méthodes culturelles et de nouvelles techniques.

Dans l'hypothèse 20, il convient de souligner que les variétés sélectionnées des centres de recherche ne sont pas nécessairement les meilleurs partout au Zaïre car on connaît des cas d'échec. Ainsi il faut que l'on diffuse davantage les nouvelles techniques culturelles que les nouvelles variétés.

Sur hypothèse 21, il faut dire que les achats locaux ne posent aucun problème, mais les achats à l'étranger sont compliqués et traînent trop.

Les achats prévus pour l'exécution du projet et pour les interventions en faveur des ONG sont:

1. 500 petits moulins  
2 grands moulins (pilotes)
2. 300 bicyclettes: pousse-pousse.  
32 véhicules pour une somme de 443.000\$
3. Matériel technique agricole
4. Equipement technique et didactique
5. Equipement de bureau
6. 32 motos

Sur quoi l'AID s'est fondé pour fixer ces chiffres? Est-ce que ce sont des chiffres minima ou maxima en fonction de l'enveloppe?

Vu la lenteur dans l'achat et l'expédition de ces équipements, l'équipe de PRAGMA suggère que la firme PRAGMA prenne la place de CMO afin que les biens commandés arrivent à temps au PROCAR.

Pour les ONG, c'est le PROCAR qui doit identifier les besoins en équipement.

Enfin en rapport avec la 24<sup>e</sup> hypothèse, on souhaite que les consultants pour le PROCAR viennent de PRAGMA car on a constaté que les autres consultants prennent trop de temps pour venir au PROCAR, ce qui cause du retard dans l'exécution du projet dans le délai prévu.

On constate que le SOW de l'A.T. doit changer pour améliorer l'exécution du projet. Mr. West souhaite une discussion sur la répartition actuelle du personnel qualifié dans les 4 divisions.

#### Propositions

On souhaite que les tâches du Conseiller Financier en logistique soient diminuées en faveur des travaux avec les ONG en matière de gestion. Et pour ce faire il faut engager des unités supplémentaires, ou alors que le B.S.U. soit absorbé dans le PROCAR avec un aménagement des services et du personnel.

Cependant, certains souhaitent au contraire que l'on mette en valeur la division logistique et service technique tel que mentionné dans le Guide Administratif du PROCAR Cfr. p. 17. Pour Mr. West, il faut que le document du projet soit amendé car vu les travaux à faire, il éprouve le besoin d'engager 1 gestionnaire des données sur ordinateurs, 1 agroéconomiste et 1 secrétaire.

ANNEX XII

PROCAR PLAN D'ACTION 1988

## VII PROGRAMME D'ACTIONS POUR L'ANNEE 1988.

Le programme d'actions du PROCAR, pour l'année prochaine comporte l'ensemble des activités tant techniques qu'administratives de l'Unité d'Exécution du projet (UEP), composée du Staff Zaïrois et de l'équipe d'Assistance Technique (A.T.) d'une part et des consultants contractés par l'USAID, pour le compte du PROCAR, d'autre part.

Nous nous bornerons à présenter ci-dessous la nature des activités techniques prévues pour l'année 1988.

### 7.1. Les Reconnaissances Rapides (R.R.)

#### But et Méthodologie

Ces études de R.R. constituent la grande activité de l'Unité d'Exécution du Projet (UEP) en 1988, en effet, l'UEP va entreprendre une évaluation rurale rapide dans treize collectivités de l'aire du Projet. Trois ont déjà été étudiées en 1986.

#### A) Ces études auront comme but:

- a) de fournir des informations sur les structures et systèmes ruraux et agricoles;
- b) de servir comme base dans la détermination des foyers de développement à l'intention du Projet.

Les systèmes ruraux et agricoles seront examinés en termes de production, de commercialisation et l'aspect sociologique des sols dans la région du projet ainsi que toutes les contraintes y afférentes.

Les équipes des enquêteurs examineront les systèmes sociaux et institutionnels pour identifier les sources locales d'informations et de services, y compris les O.I.G. potentielles, les commerçants et autres associations des fermiers.

Les informations de ces R.R. seront utilisées par l'UEP pour identifier les foyers de développement prioritaires pour chaque collectivité.

A l'aide des recommandations des RR, l'UEP procédera à la sélection des O.I.G. appropriées dans les collectivités prioritaires conformément aux critères de choix des O.I.G. ✓

Les O.I.G., une fois sélectionnées, seront ensuite évaluées avant la négociation des interventions proprement dites.

#### B) Méthodologie

Pour l'exécution de ces enquêtes de R.R., le projet va recourir à la méthode de recherche des systèmes agricoles "Farming Systems Research" (FSR). ✓  
Les équipes seront composées par des experts multidisciplinaires issus de divers origines à savoir: le PROCAR - l'USAID - le Département du Développement Rural - les Projets et Organismes locaux de collaboration.

Nous avons estimé le nombre des participants à huit membres répartis dans deux équipes de quatre personnes. Les disciplines impliquées pourraient être: Agronomes - sociologues - Agro-Economistes - Anthropologues.

La première R.R. de l'année 1988 débute en mars, suivi chaque fois d'un mois d'intervalle. Il y a aura au total cinq enquêtes R.R. en mars, mai, juillet, septembre et novembre 1988 d'une durée de deux semaines par R.R.

Avant l'exécution d'une R.R., le Projet entreprendra un voyage pour choisir les sites dans les collectivités à enquêter. La revue de la documentation des collectivités concernées, la composition des équipes ainsi que la définition de la méthodologie interviennent deux à trois jours avant le voyage sur le terrain.

#### 7.2. Exécution de la Formation en Gestion Administrative et Financière au D.P.P./COMBILIM

La formation qui sera dispensée au D.P.P./COMBILIM par TECHNO SERVE fait suite aux négociations amorcées entre le D.P.P., le TECHNO SERVE et le Projet USAID 097/ORT, avant la fin du financement de ce dernier.

Puisqu'il s'agit d'un contrat direct avec l'USAID, la supervision du contrat reviendra à l'Administrateur du PROCAR, au niveau de l'AID.

- Le but de l'étude est d'apporter une assistance dans l'organisation du système comptable et de gestion financière du D.P.P./COMBILIM.

Le déroulement de l'étude comporte quatre étapes à savoir:

1. analyse des besoins du D.P.P./Combilim dans le domaine de la comptabilité et de la gestion financière;
2. élaboration et organisation des systèmes;
3. mise à exécution du système et formation;
4. révision et contrôle des systèmes.

Ladite étude est l'une des interventions à long terme du Projet au D.P.P.

#### 7.3. Exécution de l'Etude Pilote sur l'Intégration des Femmes dans la Vulgarisation au Centre Agricole de Lusekele EPIE/CAL.

Durant son exécution, le PROCAR compte réserver une grande attention à la place qu'occupe la femme dans le processus du développement en général et dans la production agricole en particulier.

Le CAL semble avoir mis en place un bon système de vulgarisation s'appuyant sur la formation des candidats vulgarisateurs de son rayon d'action. Lors de l'évaluation des activités de ce Centre, nous avons pu constater que les femmes n'étaient pas intégrées dans ce type de vulgarisation.

Le but de l'étude est d'intégrer les femmes dans la vulgarisation agricole au sein du CAL.

- a) identifier les organisations féminines existantes dans la zone d'action du CAL;
- b) étudier une organisation typiques pouvant servir de support à la vulgarisation
- c) expérimenter les résultats dans une zone où il n'y a pas d'organisations féminines.

C'est une étude à court terme.

#### 7.4. Exécution de l'Etude sur la Mobilisation de l'Epargne dans les COOPECS de la Région du Projet E.M.E/COOPEC

L'étude initiale de Monsieur J. Gadway avait bel et bien montré que les Coopératives d'Epargne et de Crédit (COOPECS) offrent un potentiel énorme dont le projet peut se servir pour sa composante crédit.

La seconde phase de l'étude aura comme but de développer une stratégie d'intervention conjointement avec les COOPECS, l'UCCEC et la Coopération Canadienne.

La méthodologie de l'étude est celle qui permettra au consultant de se concentrer sur les questions suivantes :

- a) La demande, en ce qui concerne les possibilités de dépôt par les personnes à faibles revenus dans l'aire du projet;
- b) Le rôle que jouent les institutions parallèles de crédit et d'épargner, pour l'ensemble des services financiers à la disposition des personnes à faibles revenus dans l'aire du Projet;
- c) Les relations qui existent entre les COOPECS et d'autres institutions financières classiques;
- d) Les relations entre les COOPECS et les systèmes d'épargne et de crédit non-formels;
- e) Les rôles joués par les COOPECS à tous les niveaux; national, régional et local.

Les données et informations une fois analysées, seront fournies au Projet et à l'USAID sous forme des recommandations.

#### 7.5. Exécution de l'Etude sur les Emplois Non-agricoles dans le Rayon d'action du Projet (Off-Farm Employment)

Le but de "Off-Farm Employment Study" est d'identifier, dans l'aire du Projet, les emplois non agricoles qui y existent de façon à développer une stratégie pour leur promotion.

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En effet, on connaît souvent un problème de chômage masculin dans la campagne d'une part. D'autre part, lorsqu'une activité traditionnellement féminine devient profitable du point de vue économique, les hommes ont tendance à s'en approprier en poussant ainsi les femmes dans des activités de plus en plus marginales.

Il est connu aussi que les salaires sont pour les ménages la source principale, si pas unique de revenu. Lorsque le salaire devient insuffisant et la production pour la consommation familiale devient pire, le coût est souvent supporté par le bien-être de la famille. Cela se remarque par l'augmentation du taux de la malnutrition, très peu d'accès à l'éducation, etc...

L'étude sur les emplois non-agricoles fournira au projet quelques idées sur les activités potentielle telles que l'artisanat, la transformation des produits etc...

Cette étude sera exécutée par un consultant à court terme.

#### 7.6. Construction d'un Centre d'Adaptation et de Conservation des Semences

##### A) Exposé des motifs

Au départ, il était question que le projet puisse construire un camp (± 12 habitations) pour les cadres, avant le démarrage des activités liées à son exécution.

Cette question des constructions demeure jusqu'à ce jour, controversée au niveau de l'AID malgré l'acquisition par le projet d'une concession de 3 hectares à Kikwit depuis l'année 1986.

Dans l'entretemps, une solution "provisoire" avait été adoptée par l'USAID, celle de louer des maisons à Kikwit. Ces maisons dont les taux de loyer varient souvent selon l'inflation et les caprices de bailleurs semblent peser lourdement dans les dépenses du Projet, à la longue par rapport aux constructions telles qu'initialement prévues.

Comme le PROCAR va collaborer avec le projet RAV dans sa composante Production, la multiplication des semences améliorées issues des trois programmes nationaux du RAV; PRONAM, PNM et PNL pourra se réaliser sur ce terrain, dans le cadre des adaptations. D'où la nécessité de construire un centre d'adaptation et conservation des semences qui pourront être multipliées dans des champs de multiplication que vont gérer les D.I.G.

Cette activité servira donc comme une mise en valeur du terrain en question, en attendant la décision de la hiérarchie sur la construction des maisons ou bureau.

ANNEX XIII

ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH, INFORMATION AND TRAINING DIVISION

PROCAR

le 13 Juillet, 1988.

De: Walter West, DRI/F

W West

A: le Directeur Nkoy

Sujet: Renforcement et restructuration de la Division de  
Recherches, Information et Formation

Suite aux discussions de notre évaluation interne, voici mes  
propositions pour la restructuration de la DRI/F avec points de  
justification.

I. Structure Actuelle

Le Document du Projet (Project Paper) ne désigne que deux  
positions au sein de la Division de Recherches et Information:

1. Assistant technique expatrié spécialiste en recherches et  
gestion de données; par décision du PROCAR l'AT détient le  
grade de Chef de Division
2. Agré-économiste Zaïrois (qualification B.Sc. ou équiv.).

A ces deux positions s'ajoute une position créée de facto par  
le PROCAR mais qui n'a pas de statut officielle dans les  
documents du Projet: la position de documentaliste et  
gestionnaire d'informations. La création de cette position se  
justifie en fonction de l'envergure du travail impliquée dans la  
charge de "maintenir à jour les informations et la documentation  
adéquate concernant tous les aspects du Projet" (Guide  
Administratif et Financier, p. 34) qui fait partie des  
attributions de la Division. Parmi les travaux qui dérivent de  
cette charge sont: création et gestion d'une bibliothèque;  
traduction d'un grand nombre de documents (du Projet et autres)  
d'anglais en français pour l'usage des cadres Zaïrois du Projet,  
synthèse des rapports d'activités mensuelles des différentes  
Divisions et des OIGs concernées par le Projet et préparation de  
rapports de synthèse pour le PROCAR et pour le Gouvernement du  
Zaïre.

Une quatrième position - celle du formateur du Projet (cadre  
Zaïrois spécialiste en enseignement non-formel) - est pour le  
moment rattachée à la DRI (d'où la désignation DRI/F ci-  
dessus). Or, le Project Paper et le Guide Administratif et  
Financier sont explicites en désignant un Bureau de Formation à  
part, sans dépendance hiérarchique particulière de la DRI. Selon  
le Guide Administratif et Financier ce Bureau se trouve au même  
niveau hiérarchique que les Divisions du Projet (voir  
organigramme p. 10) et fait part égal de l'Unité d'Exécution du  
Projet.

En plus de ces quatre positions-cadre, le Project Paper (p.  
72) prévoit l'engagement d'énumérateurs à besoin pour les  
recherches à effectuer, ainsi que "90 mois/personnes d'assistance  
technique à court terme" (consultants). Le contrat Pragma/USAID  
admet l'engagement remboursable d'un secrétaire pour assister le  
Chef de Division.

## II. Tâches de la Division

Citant le Project Paper, n. 32 (ma traduction), le rôle de la DRI est défini ainsi:

"La DRI détient la principale responsabilité pour la supervision des recherches et pour l'interprétation des résultats. Cette division coordonnera toute recherche avec les autres divisions concernées et préparera les recommandations concernant l'application des résultats. En plus . . . la division peut effectuer des recherches elle-même ou en coordination avec les activités d'autres projets . . . La DRI jouera un rôle principal dans la collecte de données pour les évaluations de l'impact du Projet, pour l'analyse des tendances de la région, et pour recherches sur la commercialisation. La DRI dirigera aussi l'analyse de données du Projet qui sera exécuté avec l'assistance de Projet 098 à Kinshasa."

Notons, pour comparaison, les fonctions de la DRI tel qu'ils sont interprétés par le Guide Administratif et Financier (p. 34):

"[La DRI] est . . . le service de statistique et d'analyse de données au bénéfice de l'ensemble des activités du Projet, tant techniques que financières . . . Elle sera chargée de:

- (i) l'étude et l'amélioration des techniques d'enquête et de l'analyse de leurs résultats
- (ii) effectuer la recherche sur le "farming system"
- (iii) maintenir à jour les informations et la documentation adéquate concernant tous les aspects des diverses activités du Projet"

Dans tout ceci il est évident que la DRI est conçue pour servir d'organisateur et de source d'informations pour le Projet, mais quelles sont ses tâches exactement? Il est possible de distinguer les suivantes:

1. collecte de données par la DRI elle-même:
  - a. les données concernées dans les suivis et évaluations des actions du Projet; notamment, la DRI doit définir et mettre en exécution un système qui permet le suivi et l'évaluation de chaque intervention du Projet (PP, p. 46)
  - b. recherches sur la commercialisation; spécifiées dans le Project Paper mais jamais précisées
  - c. "farming system research": "Pendant la première année du Projet 8 mois de FSR seront entrepris dans la zone" afin d'assurer "la validité technique et sociale des interventions du Projet" (PP, p. 49)

d. l'analyse des tendances dans la région; la DRI (en collaboration avec Projet 098 à travers un Service d'Information pour Suivi et Evaluation qui est en effet fictif) est responsable pour la réalisation d'une étude qui établira une ligne de base contre laquelle des éventuelles études de mi- et fin-de-Projet peuvent être comparées (ces derniers seront aussi la responsabilité de la DRI).

2. supervision et coordination de recherches:

a. coordination de toutes recherches du Projet

b. supervision et direction des recherches de consultants; implicite: identification de besoins en recherches, définition de SOW, définition de cadre de recherches, responsabilité pour organisation logistique du séjour de consultants, responsabilité pour évaluation et synthétisation de documents de rapport

c. coordination d'études avec autres projets; implicite, connaissance et proche suivi des activités en recherches des autres projets dans la région, réunions d'organisation (probablement à Kinshasa) et autres activités de communication, organisation et définition de la partie attribuée à PROCAR ou ses consultants, etc.

d. définition et établissement des systèmes internes de suivi de la gestion du Projet (inventaires, comptabilité, etc.) (PP p. 45); implicite fonction de formation

e. évaluation et amélioration les techniques de recherches utilisées par le Projet; implicite fonction de formation

3. stockage et distribution d'informations

a. création, gestion et mise à jour périodique de plusieurs banques de données (systèmes internes du Projet, base/line/suivi de la zone du Projet et de chaque intervention, statistiques, données de recherches particulières)

b. analyse de données et informations: analyses statistiques, interprétations d'études et de rapports de consultants, intégration d'informations d'hors du Projet dans les annales du Projet, synthèses de rapports internes et des DRS, etc.

c. rapports de synthèse et de recommandations basés sur informations reçues; notes y compris la synthèse des rapports de consultants existant pour le Projet

d. création et gestion de la bibliothèque

4. formation/encadrement

a. formation d'enquêteurs pour études

- b. formation de cadres concernés du Projet dans les éléments de l'informatique et des systèmes de gestion interne à établir

5. Divers

- a. participation à l'identification et le recrutement de consultants
- b. participation active de la Division et des cadres dans l'élaboration et les prises de décision concernant la poursuite du Projet
- c. création d'une capacité permanente de réponse aux exigences de l'USAID (et du GdZ?) en matière d'information (interne et régional), collaboration, et coordination de recherches
- d. représentation du Projet dans divers réunions (implicite).

III. Evaluation du Programme de la DRI et Besoins en Personnel

En revoyant les tâches de la DRI, ci-dessus, il m'est évident qu'un certain nombre (limité) de tâches est précisé dans le Project Paper alors qu'une grande partie des responsabilités de la Division restent mal définies, cachées ou au mieux implicites. Si l'ensemble des tâches est prise en considération le personnel désigné pour la Division est loin d'être suffisant pour réaliser les travaux exigés.

Je rappelle que le personnel prévu pour la Division est de deux personnes, dont un technicien expatrié et un cadre Zaïrois. En effet, les qualifications exigées du cadre Zaïrois dans le Guide A/F sont si minimales (B.Sc., agro-économiste) que cette personne ne peut être vu que dans le rôle d'assistant au technicien expatrié; bien que les rôles relatifs des deux ne sont nulle part spécifiés.

Sans autres attributions la DRI serait responsable pour la réalisation de plusieurs études pendant la première année du Projet. Celles-ci comprennent:

1. Etude de base pour comparaison avec éventuelles études mi- et fin-de-Projet. Cette activité à elle seule est assez complexe de conception, comprenant la formulation et coordination d'une enquête de production, consommation et revenus sur l'ensemble du territoire du Projet avec des reconnaissances rapides de villages prévus pour interventions (comment identifiés?), des enquêtes de commercialisation et de nutrition organisées en dehors du Projet (mais dont la provenance n'est pas claire), et plusieurs autres enquêtes spécifiques (transformation, recherches techniques) que le Projet entreprendra en même temps. Note: j'estime que le seul baseline pourrait occuper notre division à plein temps pour au moins 10 mois.

2. 8 mois de "farming systems research" sur les premiers 12 mois du Projet. Le déroulement de ces recherches sera dans le cadre d'interventions spécifiques (notons que le mécanisme pour l'identification de celles-ci n'est nulle part spécifié) et ont pour objectif, parmi autres, de familiariser les agents de PROCAR et des IMOs avec les principes d'un programme de recherches intégré et interactif (PP, p. 49).
3. Etude de besoins en crédit des commerçants et investisseurs de la région (PP p. 26; collaboration à temps partiel de l'AT de la DRI avec le spécialiste en crédit de la Division de Commercialisation)
4. Analyses des capacités et besoins de OIGs spécifiques; études de faisabilité et de baseline pour toute intervention proposée auprès d'une intervention (PP, p. 18)
5. Autres projets de recherches à besoin ou à la demande des autres Divisions du Projet auquel l'AT de la DRI est associé à temps partiel (en effet, tous les autres divisions de l'UEP).

Outre les études programmées dans le PP la DRI doit, suivant la structure du Projet, gérer sur le terrain toutes études et équipes de consultants programmées pour le Projet par l'USAID, que ça soit en consultation avec la DRI ou non.

Les prévisions du Project Paper semblent réduire les activités de la DRI à la seule activité de recherches. Cette réduction est irréaliste, même si la principale activité de la division était celle-ci: la recherche dans le cadre d'un projet complexe suppose un travail de coordination et de définition ainsi que la gestion de nombreuses activités simultanées, l'analyse et interprétation de résultats, et la diffusion de résultats. On peut se demander si la DRI telle qu'elle est constituée dans le PP pourrait même assurer la seule activité de recherches telle qu'elle est définie - rien que la préparation et exécution du baseline demanderait l'attention à plein temps de deux personnes pour 10 mois, sans prendre en compte les autres études que la DRI doit assurer.

Le PP prévoit l'appel à un grand nombre de consultants extérieurs pour combler les faiblesses de la DRI en personnel. Ce n'est pas une solution, pour trois raisons. De moindre importance est que la procédure d'appel aux consultants est longue et pénible, et les résultats souvent peu satisfaisants - en effet, on passe des fois autant de temps et on dépense autant d'effort dans la définition des tâches de consultants, les négociations et la gestion sur le terrain que si on avait fait le travail soi-même, sans les mêmes résultats. Plus grave, il ne serait simplement pas possible de faire appel à des consultants à temps pour réaliser tous les travaux de recherches dénommés ci-dessus, ni même des plus importants. Mais le gros du problème de la stratégie de consultants est que cette stratégie exigerait la pré-définition d'une stratégie de globale recherches basée sur une philosophie et une approche bien définies pour l'ensemble du Projet. Or, le PP ne fournit pas ces conditions au préalable. Ce même document suppose que la DRI va réaliser ce travail de

définition pour l'ensemble du Projet, mais il n'est pas évident quand ce travail sera fait, ni par qui, ni dans quel contexte. Remarquons que ce travail essentiel ne se fera pas simplement à l'intérieur du Projet, mais aussi en coordination avec l'USAID et d'autres projets concernés, ainsi que, à long terme, avec les DIGs et les populations de la zone d'intervention.

La coordination des activités de recherche du PROCAR avec celles d'autres projets USAID dans la région est mentionnée à plusieurs reprises dans les documents de base du Projet. Or, plusieurs des suppositions du Project Paper sont fausses: la présence sur le terrain de ODDO K et de ISALOMU; la possibilité de travail avec l'INSA; la réalisation par le Projet 098 d'un programme extensif de recherches dans les domaines de commercialisation et d'établissement de ligne de base pour la région. En fait, il est supposé que le Projet 098 assurerait deux fonctions qui n'ont jamais été réalisées et que maintenant la DRI doit prendre en charge:

1. la synthèse des informations résultant des études préliminaires des Projets 098/100: rapports de consultants, étude du Petit Cultivateur, études du système foncier, des relations rurales-urbaines, des entreprises dans le Bardundu (Smith, Coopers and Lybrand), etc.
2. la fonction d'analyse statistique des données des enquêtes du PROCAR et de projet 098; en effet, le Project Paper prévoyait que le PROCAR et le projet 098 partageraient une cellule d'analyse de données informatisée à Kinshasa, sous direction de 098.

La fonction, attribuée à la DRI, d'organiser les systèmes informatisés de suivi du PROCAR (inventaires, comptabilité, suivi de travaux logistiques, etc.) reçoit une mention en passant dans le Project Paper. Aucun emploi de temps n'y est associé. Or, ces systèmes, qui doivent être mis en place au plus tôt possible, demanderont énormément de temps des seuls cadres du Projet bien placés pour les implémenter: ceux de la DRI. Une estimation grossière du temps nécessaire pour la formulation et adaptation des logiciels pour ces travaux serait d'un homme-mois, sans compter le temps exigé pour la formation sur ordinateur du personnel concerné (ou l'organisation de stages de formation menés par consultants extérieurs).

Il existe un grand nombre d'informations concernant la zone du Projet et les conditions qui auront un effet sur d'éventuelles interventions. Ces informations se trouvent dans les documents préliminaires du Projet (ainsi que projet 098), mais aussi dans la littérature, dispersée, concernant la région. Une des fonctions de la DRI serait de trouver, étudier, digérer et synthétiser ces informations pour l'utilisation des agents du Projet et d'autres. Cette fonction est à peine reconnue dans le Project Paper; aucune personne n'y est consacré, ni une minute du temps du personnel désigné.

La fonction de diffusion d'informations en format utile pour le reste du Projet (et même pour ceux en dehors) est souvent noté par le PP. Ni qui assurera ce travail, qui demandera beaucoup



de temps de rédaction et de distribution, ni quand ce sera fait ne sont prévus dans ce document.

Le temps nécessairement consacré par le Chef de Division aux travaux de formulation des principes et paramètres du PROCAR, surtout au début du Projet, n'est nullement prévu dans l'emploi de temps des membres de la DRI dans le PP.

De même: le temps consacré aux questions de gestion et de logistique; le temps à consacrer à la formation et la construction de l'équipe de la Division; le temps perdu en formulant des stratégies de recherches parce que les interlocuteurs nécessaires (notamment le personnel essentiel du Projet à 75%) ne sont pas encore sur place; le temps usé en maîtrisant une stratégie de recherches trouvée sur place (imposée de l'extérieur) et la reformulant pour conformer de façon plus proche aux besoins et à la philosophie émergente du Projet. Je note, en plus, que même le personnel minimal prévu pour la DRI ne se trouve actuellement pas sur place; tout le temps à consacrer aux travaux prévus ou implicites dans le PP sont donc à redoubler.

#### IV. Propositions de Rectification

Les leçons à tirer du précédent sont ceux-ci:

1. Les attentes du Project Paper de la Division de Recherches et Information sont irréalistes. Ceci se voit sur trois plans:
  - a. la complexité des tâches de la Division était grossièrement sous-estimée. Notamment, le rôle que la division (à travers sa place dans l'Unité d'Exécution du Projet) dans la définition d'une philosophie et d'une stratégie d'action pour le Projet a été minimisé, avec le temps qui y serait nécessaire; la dépendance de la division sur une telle philosophie a également été mal jugée. En plus, les tâches de coordination (interne, entre projets, entre Projet et USAID) ont été sous-estimées, ainsi que les travaux de synthèse et de diffusion d'informations.
  - b. plusieurs des suppositions à la base de la programmation du PP ne sont plus valables. La plus évidente est que le projet 098 ne peut pas assurer le rôle d'analyse qui lui était impliqué. Hors ceci, plusieurs des projets de recherches dans la zone qui devaient contribuer aux informations et recherches de PROCAR n'existent plus (notamment CODAIK, CEPLANUT); un nombre des études préliminaires n'ont jamais été réalisées; d'autres études ont été imposées de l'extérieur sans programme ou coordination préalable; le personnel décisionnaire du PROCAR (impliqué dans les travaux de la DRI de même que la DRI est impliqué dans leurs travaux) n'est pas jusqu'à présent au complet.
  - c. enfin, un grand nombre des activités de la DRI sont

cachées dans le PP. En somme, ceux-ci occupent le temps du personnel de la DRI. Si il n'est pas possible de réaliser X sans faire Y au préalable, Y devient une activité nécessaire à la réalisation de X. Il est clair pour les activités de la DRI: la définition d'une philosophie directrice du Projet et d'une stratégie de recherches sont réalisables à ces recherches préliminaires, et surtout, la coordination de ces recherches avec les approches autres divisions; l'établissement d'une base de données du Projet ou d'une intervention globale ou une stratégie d'intervention, etc. La réalisation du Projet exige plusieurs activités préliminaires à ces approches et interventions. La structure actuelle du Projet, y compris la distribution du personnel ne peut pas être réalisée.

2. Les conditions sous lesquelles la DRI opère ne vont pas se simplifier. C'est-à-dire: si le mandat du Projet ni les conditions de milieu dans lequel il doit travailler ne deviennent moins complexes; le Projet ignore tout autre d'obligations pour réaliser ses objectifs. Les exigences de l'USAID (définies dans le Project Paper) ne deviendront pas moindres: en effet, le Projet sera évalué éventuellement autant sur les objectifs implicites que celles explicites. De même, les nécessités en informations objectives vis-à-vis les populations cibles du Projet seront toujours grandes, et celles-ci essentielles en ce qui concerne ce que veut savoir le Projet ou l'USAID.
3. Les besoins en information du Projet ne vont que croître. Ils rassembleront éventuellement les exigences de l'UEP du PRDCAP, de l'USAID, des OIGs, de l'USAID, des populations et du biais propre à la DRI.
4. Le personnel prévu pour la DRI actuellement ne peut pas répondre à ces besoins. Un minimum de personnel pour satisfaire les besoins en information du Projet sera:
  - a. Un Chef de Division (sans doute l'AT) qui s'occupera de:
    - la coordination de la progression du Projet au sein de l'UEP
    - la définition d'une stratégie de recherches pour le Projet qui dirigera les activités actuelles et le programme à long terme
    - l'élaboration des principes théoriques et méthodologiques gouvernant les recherches entreprises par la division; élaboration et direction de projets d'analyse de données
    - responsabilité primaire pour la définition et réalisation des principaux projets de recherches prévus dans le PP (baseline, FSR)

- la coordination et les consultations internes au PROCAR nécessaires pour réaliser des objectifs
- la coordination avec les projets et autres agences externes au PROCAR
- le choix et recrutement de consultants, définition, planification et supervision des activités de ceux-ci
- la direction de la DRI, y compris justification de toutes décisions prises par la division; décisions finales de priorités, méthodes et stratégies de gestion particulières de recherches; relations externes et protocol; bref, toutes responsabilités de base de la division
- réalisation des systèmes informatisés de suivi interne du Projet; organisation de formation nécessaire.

- b. Un agro-économiste (niveau M.Sc. ou équivalent, expérience considérable en recherches sur terrain, capacité d'analyser données et informations sur ordinateur et de produire rapports) avec responsabilité spécifiques d'élaboration et de réalisation de projets de recherche répondant aux besoins du Projet. L'agro-économiste contribuera une perspective économique à tous projets de recherches entrepris par le Projet seul ou en collaboration, notamment le baseline et les FSR. L'activité principale de l'agro-économiste sera de réaliser les enquêtes de faisabilité et de baseline/suivi d'interventions, jusqu'à l'analyse des résultats et la publication des interprétations de ceux-ci.
- c. Un sociologue (ou socio-économiste, anthropologue) dont les attributs seront parallèles à celles de l'agro-économiste ci-dessus. Le sociologue apportera son appui professionnel aux recherches entrepris par l'agro-économiste, et vice-versa. Vu le nombre de projets de recherche à prévoir dans le cadre du Projet, le sociologue et l'agro-économiste se départageront ce travail. Ces deux positions sont égales dans l'hierarchie et dépendent directement du Chef de Division.
- d. Gestionnaire de données (expérience en recherches, connaissance pratique d'informatique) qui supervisera la saisie et gestion de données sur ordinateur et qui assurera l'exécution d'analyses statistiques demandées par les chercheurs.
5. Documentaliste qui sera chargé de la gestion de la bibliothèque, de collecte, synthèses et traductions de documents importants pour le Projet, et de distribution des documents d'information produits par la division.

6. Autres:

- énumérateurs ou chercheurs pour projets de recherche spécifiques, recruté à court terme selon besoins
- secrétaires pour entrée de données à l'ordinateur: minimum deux à temps partiel
- secrétaire/dactylographe pour la division.

Note: le formateur sera déplacé de la DRI pour permettre d'établir un Bureau de Formation indépendant et à pied égal, selon la définition du PP et du Guide A/F.

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ANNEX XIV

LISTING OF POTENTIAL NGO CLIENTS

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Potential NGO Clients**Missions**

1. Mbanza Lute - Catholic mission - Bagata
2. Bengi Catholic mission - Bulungu
3. Djuma Catholic mission - Bulungu - Declined participation to date
4. Bokoro - Catholic mission - Kutu
5. Idamu - Catholic mission - Idiofa
6. Kimputu - Catholic mission - Idiofa
7. Makaw - Catholic mission - Kutu
8. Mateka - Catholic mission - Idiofa
9. Mokala - Catholic mission - Idiofa
10. Mutoy - Catholic mission - Bulungu
11. Pindi - Catholic mission - Bulungu
12. SIA - Catholic mission - Bagata
13. Bosobe - Protestant mission - Bulungu
14. Nkara Ewa - Protestant mission - Bulungu
15. Semendua - Protestant mission - Kutu

There are other institution such as:

16. ITPK - Jesuit-workshop, training, and manufacture-Kikwit
17. ITAK - Jesuit-animator training-Kikwit
18. COOPEC - General - local credit union ASS'N - project area
19. Peace Corps volunteer support program: - Project area (8)
20. Kimbanguist women's group
21. The BAHAI mission

Some Private Sector Operators are:

- |               |                            |
|---------------|----------------------------|
| 22. Fernandes | 28. Mabobo                 |
| 23. Boliaka   | 29. Hans Buchold           |
| 24. Valels    | 30. Vidois                 |
| 25. SOLBENA   | 31. Association Nguy/Bogas |
| 26. Jopal     | 32. Kevany, Osi-Pa (Kutu)  |
| 27. Kanus     |                            |

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