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**FINAL EVALUATION
EMERGENCY PROGRAM: HEALTH
AND
JOBS FOR DISPLACED PERSONS
(PROJECT NO. 519-0281)**

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EVALUATION ABSTRACT

The project provided employment, food, health, resettlement, and relocation assistance from 1982 to 1993 to population displaced by the civil conflict in El Salvador. The project evolved during its eleven year history in response to the unpredictable course of the conflict, changing circumstances of the displaced, and periodic evaluations. Initially the project focused on emergency relief through provision of temporary employment, immunization and oral rehydration salts, curative health services, and food distribution. Beginning about 1987 the project emphasized reintegration and graduation through assistance for relocation and resettlement.

This final evaluation was conducted in June 1993 by a Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. team on the basis of documentation review; interviews with available government, Mission, and non-government organization personnel who had worked on the project; and visits to displaced persons settlements. The purpose was to assess project accomplishments and identify lessons learned for similar future programs. Major findings and conclusions are:

- The project successfully provided a safety net for many of the displaced when the GOES could not and helped to settle or relocate in rural areas many who otherwise would have migrated to over-crowded urban centers.

- The project adjusted and responded well to changing circumstances through timely use of evaluations and flexible management.

Principal lessons learned are:

- Adjustable project design and rapid response capacity are critical ingredients for a displaced persons program.

- A too proactive donor role may lead to the host government making less effort to support the program.

- Graduation from relief support should occur as early as possible in accordance with a specific plan and criteria.

- Coordination is often lacking and needs attention in emergency programs to stretch resources and avoid duplication.

- If availability of implementing institutions is limited in a civil conflict context, strengthening support for inexperienced institutions may be needed.

The evaluation team recommended no further special programs for the displaced. Safety net objectives have been met, most displaced have reintegrated, and remaining needs can and should be met within the context of national welfare and other development programs.

**PROJECT ASSISTANCE COMPLETION REPORT
EMERGENCY PROGRAM: HEALTH AND JOBS FOR
DISPLACED FAMILIES
PROJECT No. 519-0281**

I. SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT

The civil conflict and violence that engulfed El Salvador between 1979 and 1992 generated a serious problem of displaced persons. The displaced population grew until 1986, when it peaked at over one half million persons, more than 10 percent of El Salvador's population. The original agreement for Project 0281 was signed on May 12, 1982 to provide \$3,000,000 for employment, food and health assistance on an emergency basis to the displaced. Subsequent amendments brought the total grant funding to \$79,853,000 and the Project Assistance Completion Date was extended to May 31, 1993.

Project 0281 was a dynamic program. It evolved during its eleven year history in response to the unpredictable course of the conflict, changing circumstances of the displaced, and periodic interim evaluations. Project focus went from emergency relief to broader and deeper welfare assistance, to economic reintegration and graduation, and finally to phase out.

In March 1992, USAID/ES and the GOES agreed to assign to the National Reconstruction Secretariat (SRN) full responsibility for providing continued assistance to the displaced and repatriated and achieving their socio-economic reintegration into El Salvadoran society. By termination of the Project in May 1993, the number of displaced was estimated to be below the Project goal of no more than 25,000 with many continuing to return to their homes or finding other means to reintegrate. Those located in or returning to ex-conflictive zones would be able to participate in reconstruction programs in their communities along with the rest of the population.

A. Log-Frame Goal and Purpose of the Project

1. Goal

The goal of the Project was to achieve an acceptable level of social stabilization.

2. Purpose

The purpose was to provide income earning opportunities, basic health services, and adequate nutrition for the displaced population, while efforts were developed and tested to relocate those displaced persons, who were willing and able, into more productive lives.

B. Project Components

The Project included four components:

1. An employment component to provide short-term job opportunities through which the displaced could earn cash to meet basic needs.

2. A health component to provide preventive (immunization campaign and distribution of oral rehydration salts) and curative health services because Ministry of Health facilities were non-existent, abandoned, or lacking in pharmaceutical supplies in areas where the displaced were located.

3. A food distribution component to meet the basic nutritional needs of the displaced and to provide supplementary feeding to the most vulnerable among them.

4. A reintegration component to provide assistance to the displaced to enable them to support themselves as they returned to their homes, relocated in a new permanent site, or settled where they were located.

C. Present Status of the Project

All Project elements were completed, a final evaluation was carried out in June, 1993, and the evaluation concluded no further special program activities for the displaced were needed because the safety net objectives have been met.

II. FINANCIAL STATUS

The following table summarizes obligations and disbursements under the Project as reflected in the USAID/ES Controller Project Financial Status Report dated June 7, 1993.

Project 519-0281: Total USAID/ES Inputs

A. USAID/ES Dollar Grant Funds	(\$ millions)	
<u>GOES Agreement</u>	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>
Employment Generation	34.5	34.5
Health	2.6	2.6
Nutrition	.3	.3
Relocation	13.7	13.2
Program Management	3.9	3.8
International Technical Assistance	2.8	2.8
Evaluation/Contingency	2.5	2.4
National Reconstruction Activities	2.0	1.5

USAID/ES Direct Agreement

World Relief	2.8	2.7
CESAD	6.6	6.6
Project Hope	6.9	6.9
OEF	.5	.5
Local Relief Agencies	.1	.1
Baseline Survey (CCA)	.3	.3
Food Monitoring (CCA)	<u>.3</u>	<u>.3</u>
Total	79.8	78.5
B. USAID/ES Generated Host Country-Owned Local Currency	<u>14.0</u>	<u>14.0</u>
Grand Total	93.8	92.5

III. PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Project 0281 successfully met its principal objectives. It provided a safety net for many of the displaced when the GOES could not. It helped to settle or relocate in rural areas many who otherwise would have migrated to already over-crowded urban centers, especially San Salvador.

The goal was met of reducing to less than 25,000 the number of displaced without reasonable prospects of caring for themselves. At its termination, the Project had been successful in helping essentially to eliminate the displaced persons problem. While most of the resettled and relocated still live in poverty and a more permanent solution for a hard core of displaced has yet to be found, these problems should be manageable within the National Reconstruction and other on-going development or welfare programs.

1. Employment Generation

The jobs program represented almost half of total Project expenditures. A safe estimate is that between 150,000 and 200,000 of the displaced population worked occasionally in the program. Some of the principal accomplishments of the 4,968 work projects completed during the life of the jobs program, according to USAID/ES data base, were 28,390 latrines installed, 316 community potable water projects realized, and 1,665,000 square meters of cobblestone streets rehabilitated.

2. Public Health

The health program provided preventive and curative care to the displaced during ten years. During the Project's life, CONADES and PVOs vaccinated almost 100,000 displaced mothers and children against disease and tetanus infection. Mothers received nearly

100,000 ORT doses. There were 588,000 home visits and 83,000 referrals to MOH clinics for treatment. Thousands of the displaced were trained to deal with community health problems.

3. Food Assistance

This component had three phases: a dole feeding program that peaked at nearly 270,000 beneficiaries in 1984, a supplementary feeding program that expanded the program to over 300,000 between 1984 and 1987, and a food for work program. Food assistance during the period of rapid growth of the displaced population alleviated the worst effects of malnutrition. The shift to food for work, while continuing food distribution to those who still needed it, had the positive effect of reducing the number of beneficiaries to around 120,000 because the displaced that had other sources of income either from employment or remittances from relatives would not work for food and deselected themselves from the program. Food assistance was phased out in 1992.

4. Resettlement and Reintegration

PVOs and CONADES helped 13,218 families reintegrate themselves in the last eight years of the Project. Three principal PVOs, WR, IRC, and CREA, carried out the greatest part of reintegration activities by giving substantial assistance to 10,027 families in 173 communities. They collaborated in varying degrees with CONADES, who also directly helped some displaced settle. To support the reintegration program, USAID/ES created the Granos Basicos program, which supplied any farmer who wanted to resettle agricultural packages with enough seeds, fertilizers, and selected pesticides to plant corn, beans and sorghum on 1.7 acres. Over 27,000 of these starter packages were distributed to about 13,000 farmers for their first two harvests.

IV. EVALUATION AND AUDITS

Timely and effective use was made of evaluations. The 1984 evaluation confirmed the basically positive impact of the initial emergency phase but indicated that both a major expansion and improvements in the Project component programs were needed. The May 1984 Project Amendment followed soon thereafter with a major increase in funding for expanded jobs and health programs and new supplementary feeding.

The 1986 evaluation highlighted a growing trend among the displaced to return to their original homes or to resettle permanently. Again, USAID/ES took the initiative to give new emphasis to durable solutions and to ways to end the safety net aspects of the program. The 1988 evaluation basically confirmed the soundness of the Project's objectives, strategy, and approach. A final Project Amendment followed in 1990 continuing the emphasis on reintegration and beginning the planning for phase out.

From the beginning of the Project, USAID/ES contracted the Banco Salvadoreño as its fiscal agent. The Bank had full responsibility to issue funds, maintain accounting records, and provide financial reviews. The Bank played a vital role in helping to move large amounts of resources and controlling - and very likely - preventing abuses.

V. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED

The principal lessons learned were:

- Flexibility is critical. Adjustable design and rapid response capacity are crucial ingredients for an emergency displaced persons program.

- Responsibility should be placed on the host government as much as possible. If donors are too proactive in implementing emergency assistance, the host government may assign lower priority to the program and make less effort to support it.

- Targeting a specific group must be carefully managed. It will lead to problems as distinctions are made. To keep these problems to a minimum, graduation from special status should occur as early as possible and in accordance with specific criteria and a deliberate plan.

- Coordination is often lacking and needs attention in emergency programs. The natural tendency in emergencies is to give priority to getting things done. Care must be exercised not to overlook coordination, risk of duplication, and potential for stretching resources as emergency activities are developed and implemented.

- The employment program proved to be an effective model. Experience under Project 0281 strongly suggests a jobs program can be an effective means to help displaced people meet some basic needs and maintain dignity and, at the same time, to accomplish useful community projects.

- Food is necessary to assist the displaced, but needs careful management. If food distribution moves from pure dole feeding to food for work, specialized technical assistance is likely to be required for implementing institutions.

- Implementing institutions need appropriate strengthening. Attention to the strengths and weaknesses of such institutions is especially necessary when their availability may be limited in a civil conflict context and inexperienced organizations are asked to take on heavy burdens. Care should be taken to assure necessary organizational development is provided.

Beneficiary data, especially sex-differentiated, should be collected and used. In an emergency, it is easy to forget the importance of understanding what is happening to beneficiaries, especially women. Data gathering on the changing circumstances and needs of the displaced and the differential impacts on women is essential.

- Strong financial monitoring is needed. Extra measures may be necessary to assure proper financial control when large amounts of resources are involved and channeled through several organizations to large numbers of beneficiaries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	i
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY.....	3
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.....	4
A. Project Phases.....	4
1. 1982-1984: Emergency Relief.....	4
2. 1984-1987: Expanded Assistance.....	8
3. 1987-1990: Reintegration and Graduation.....	11
4. 1990-1993: Phase Out.....	15
B. Summary of Major Outputs.....	16
C. Total USAID/ES Inputs.....	17
D. Other Donor Assistance.....	21
IV. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.....	23
A. Program Accomplishments.....	23
1. Employment Generation.....	23
2. Public Health.....	26
3. Food Assistance.....	29
4. Resettlement and Reintegration.....	31
B. Program Management.....	35
1. Rolling Design.....	35
2. Implementing Institutions.....	36
3. WID Management.....	42
4. Coordination with Other Donors.....	43
V. LESSONS LEARNED.....	44
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	51

9

Table of Contents.../...

ANNEXES

- A. Scope of Work
- B. Evaluation Team
- C. Bibliography
- D. List of Interviews
- E. Site Visits
- F. WID Annex
- G. Displaced Population by Years
- H. Map of El Salvador

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AID	Agency for International Development
CCA	Contracting Corporation of America
CENA	Nutrition Education and Feeding Center
CESAD	Salvadoran Evangelical Committee for Assistance in Health and Development
CIREFCA	International Conference on Central American Refugees
CIRES	Comité de Integración y Reconstrucción para El Salvador
CLAD	Local Committee for Assistance for the Displaced
CONADES	National Commission for Assistance to the Displaced
CREA	Creative Associates International, Inc., in El Salvador (CAII is using CREA to simplify its name in El Salvador, but it is part of CAII's parent organization and not a separate agency or organization)
EEC	European Economic Community
FEDECREDITO	Federation of Credit Agencies
FUNDASAL	Salvadoran Development and Minimal Housing Foundation
GOES	Government of El Salvador
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRD	Infrastructure and Regional Development Office
ISTA	Salvadoran Institute for Agricultural Transformation
MOH	Ministry of Health
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NRP	National Reconstruction Program
OEF	Overseas Education Fund International

OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPG	Operational Program Grant
PACD	Project Assistance Completion Date
PACR	Project Assistance Completion Report
PLO	Private Voluntary Organization
SA	Semi-annual Report
SAN	National Reconstruction Secretariat
RIG	AID Regional Inspector General
CAT	Central Administrative and Technical Unit of FEDECREDITO
UNDO	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID/ES	U.S. Agency for International Development Mission to EL Salvador
WFP	World Food Program
WID	Women in Development
WR	World Relief Corporation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/ES contracted Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. to perform a final evaluation of Project 519-0281, Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Families, following its completion in May 1993. Checchi sent a two person team to El Salvador in June 1993. The team spent five weeks reviewing documentation; interviewing available government, Mission, and non-governmental organization personnel who had worked on the project; visiting displaced persons settlements; and drafting the report.

The problem of displaced persons started when civil violence broke out in El Salvador in 1979. As violence increased, the number of displaced grew rapidly to about 165,000 by December 1981, 270,000 by 1984, and peaked at over 500,000, more than 10% of El Salvador's population, by 1986. Beginning in 1987, the displaced were starting to return to their places of origin as the conflict stabilized and its intensity declined. By 1990, the number of displaced had fallen to approximately 125,000. At the end of the Project, less than 25,000 displaced remained and the number was still falling as the displaced were continuing to reintegrate themselves.

The original agreement for Project 0281 was signed on May 12, 1982 to provide employment, food, and health assistance on an emergency basis to the displaced. This agreement and subsequent amendments provided a total of \$79.8 million in grant funding through the Project's completion. The Project started as an emergency program but lasted eleven years as continuing conflict prolonged the displaced problem. It was never intended as a development project. It was implemented and monitored in the midst of conflict. It attracted special attention from the U.S. Congress, public, and press which led to the U.S. taking a proactive role under the Project and the GOES often viewing the displaced problem more as a U.S. rather than GOES responsibility.

Project 0281 was a dynamic program. It evolved during its eleven year history in response to the unpredictable course of the conflict, changing circumstances of the displaced, and periodic evaluations. From 1982 to 1984 the Project focused on emergency relief through provision of temporary employment, immunization and oral rehydration salts, curative health services, and food distribution. As the number of displaced grew, the employment, health, and food distribution programs expanded during the 1984-1987 period. In response to a 1984 evaluation, supplementary feeding for the most vulnerable was added.

As a result of a further evaluation in 1986, the shifting nature of the conflict, and changing circumstances of the displaced, the Project emphasized reintegration and graduation beginning about 1987. Assistance was provided for permanent relocation or resettlement. Food for work was substituted for dole feeding.

Emphasis was given to reducing the rolls of the displaced through an improved registry system, fixing time limits for continued eligibility, and refining criteria for graduation.

As the number of displaced began to fall, the safety net jobs, health, and food distribution programs gradually phased down and out. Principal emphasis during the final years of the Project was on assisting those who were reintegrating and the repatriates who were returning from camps in Honduras and elsewhere. In 1992, USAID/ES and the GOES agreed to assign to the Secretariat for National Reconstruction full responsibility for providing continued assistance to the displaced and repatriated. The Project terminated on May 31, 1993.

The principal findings and conclusions of the evaluation on Project accomplishments were that the major objectives were successfully achieved. The Project provided a safety net for many of the displaced when the GOES could not. It helped to settle or relocate in rural areas many who otherwise would have migrated to already over-crowded urban centers, especially San Salvador.

The goal was met of reducing to less than 25,000 the number of displaced without reasonable prospects of caring for themselves. At its termination, the Project had been successful in helping essentially to eliminate the displaced persons problem. While most of the resettled and relocated still live in poverty and a more permanent solution for a hard core of displaced has yet to be found, these problems should be manageable within the National Reconstruction and other on-going development or welfare programs.

The jobs program provided cash for some basic needs and a sense of dignity to the large numbers it reached. Useful community improvements and basic infrastructure were produced. The health programs significantly reduced the threat of disease and provided essential curative services. Food distributions prevented serious hunger and succeeded in addressing malnutrition, especially among the most vulnerable groups. Many new communities were organized, assisted with housing and other basic infrastructure, and motivated to sustain a new life for themselves. The report provides specific findings and conclusions on each of the Project's components.

The evaluation found with respect to Project management that the Project was able to adjust and respond well to the changing circumstances of the displaced over the program's eleven year history. A major reason was timely and effective use of evaluations. Flexible management also facilitated keeping up with evolving needs. Making the USAID/ES Program Unit directly responsible for managing the jobs and health programs enabled rapid action in the Project's early years. Later on, PVOs were enlisted and given substantial freedom to carry out their activities in accordance with agreed upon objectives.

Identification and management of implementing institutions presented special problems for USAID/ES. When the Project began, governmental institutions and local PVOs were weak. For reasons of security and suspicions about U.S. policy, U.S. PVOs were reluctant to become involved. USAID/ES was forced to pick some institutions that were inexperienced, and they were asked to manage resources that stretched their capacity. Poor management and misuses of funds by some of the institutions were the result. Some conclusions on successes and problems are presented in the report with respect to the specific institutions that were involved in the Project.

Apart from the World Food Program (WFP) which was mainly U.S. PL 480 food, other donor assistance represented perhaps no more than 25% of total external resources provided for displaced persons support. The lion's share was provided by AID. USAID/ES and WFP coordinated closely but other coordination among donors tended to be minimal because donors worked with their own groups and preferred to operate as independently as possible to preserve neutrality and accessibility to the displaced. Under the circumstances, closer coordination probably was not all that necessary.

Management of women in development issues was not a specific priority under the Project. Women did benefit from many of the programs. A more targeted design and data gathering to specifically track women might have led to greater benefits for them.

The principal lessons learned were:

- Flexibility is critical. Adjustable design and rapid response capacity are crucial ingredients for an emergency displaced persons program.

- Responsibility should be placed on the host government as much as possible. If donors are too proactive in implementing emergency assistance, the host government may assign lower priority to the program and make less effort to support it.

- Targeting a specific group such as the displaced must be carefully managed. It will lead to problems with the poor majority as distinctions are made. To keep these problems to a minimum, graduation from special status should occur as early as possible and in accordance with specific criteria and a deliberate plan.

- Coordination is often lacking and needs attention in emergency programs. The natural tendency in emergencies is to give priority to getting things done. Care must be exercised not to overlook coordination, risk of duplication, and potential for stretching resources as emergency activities are developed and implemented.

- The employment program proved to be an effective model. Experience under Project 0281 strongly suggests a jobs program can

be an effective means to help displaced people meet some basic needs and maintain dignity and, at the same time, to accomplish useful community projects.

- Food is necessary to assist the displaced, but needs careful management. If food distribution moves from pure dole feeding to food for work, specialized technical assistance is likely to be required for implementing institutions.

- Implementing institutions need appropriate strengthening. Attention to the strengths and weaknesses of such institutions is especially necessary when their availability may be limited in a civil conflict context and inexperienced organizations are asked to take on heavy burdens. Care should be taken to assure necessary organizational development is provided.

- Beneficiary data, especially sex-differentiated, should be collected and used. In an emergency, it is easy to forget the importance of understanding what is happening to beneficiaries, especially women. Data gathering on the changing circumstances and needs of the displaced and the differential impacts on women is essential.

- Strong financial monitoring is needed. Extra measures may be necessary to assure proper financial control when large amounts of resources are involved and channeled through several organizations to large numbers of beneficiaries.

The evaluation team was asked to recommend any needed follow-up activities for the remaining displaced not currently underway or planned under the NRP. The team recommends no further special programs for the displaced. The safety net objectives have been met, the large majority of displaced have reintegrated, and the remaining needs of those who have not can and should be addressed within the context of the NRP and other national welfare and development programs.

I. INTRODUCTION

Civil conflict and violence engulfed El Salvador between 1979 and 1992 and generated a serious problem of displaced persons. Early years of the conflict were especially difficult for El Salvador's rural population. As fighting expanded throughout the countryside, family members were assaulted, killed, or involuntarily conscripted by the guerrillas or the army. Crops were destroyed in battle or by deliberate acts of terrorism. Families were forced to feed both sides. Large farms were abandoned, making it impossible for day laborers to find work. Many rural families had no alternative but to leave their farms and residences. They became displaced.

Most displaced moved from combat zones in stages, fleeing first to the municipal centers, then to departmental capitals, and, in some cases, on to San Salvador. Some moved as many as six times after their initial displacement, looking for a place to settle. They squatted on vacant land in rural areas, settled along roadways or railroad tracks, or occupied buildings. A few fortunate ones were able to find accommodations with friends or relatives, or had the economic means to buy or rent land or blend into other communities. Others left the country. Some were attracted to the few settlement camps that could be made available by the government, churches, or private relief agencies.

While these institutions did their best to respond to the emergency, the displaced population grew so rapidly that its needs soon exhausted local resources. Recognizing the extent of the problem and the need for coordination and control, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) established the National Commission for Assistance to the Displaced of El Salvador (CONADES) in 1981 to coordinate all local and foreign assistance being furnished to displaced persons.

Project 519-0281, Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Families, was launched in May 1982 by a grant agreement between USAID/ES and the GOES to provide assistance to the displaced. The Project was not a typical AID project. It started as an emergency program but lasted eleven years as continuing conflict prolonged the displaced problem. It was never intended as a development project. It was implemented and monitored in the midst of war and unpredictable violence. It was carried out in a context in which the U.S. was not neutral but was officially supporting one side in the conflict. It attracted special attention from the U.S. Congress, public, and press which led to the U.S. taking a proactive role under the Project and the GOES often viewing the displaced problem more as a U.S. rather than GOES responsibility.

This report first sets out the purpose and methodology of the evaluation. It then attempts to summarize the special circumstances, challenges and evolution of the Project in a brief

historical overview. Findings and conclusions on program accomplishments and management are elaborated. Some key lessons learned are developed based on the findings. Recommendations are embodied in the lessons learned. One recommendation on the need for any further special assistance to the displaced is separately addressed.

II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

With the termination of Project 0281, USAID/ES contracted for a final evaluation to:

- record the costs, accomplishments, and failures of the Project;
- present "lessons learned" for use by AID and other donors faced with a similar displaced persons problem; and
- recommend any needed follow-up activities for the few remaining displaced or ex-displaced which are not currently underway or planned under El Salvador's National Reconstruction Program.

The evaluation scope of work is included as Annex A. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. sent a two person team to El Salvador in June 1993 to carry out the evaluation. The team consisted of Daniel Santo Pietro, a project management specialist with an extensive PLO background, and Henry Johnson, a retired AID senior foreign service officer, who served as Team Leader (see Annex B).

The team spent five weeks in El Salvador. They reviewed documentation and records available in USAID/ES. A bibliography of the key documents is in Annex C. GOES, NGO and USAID/ES personnel who had worked with the Project were interviewed. Because of the Project's long history and the departure from El Salvador or disappearance of a number of the institutions involved, it was not possible to locate and interview as complete a range of the key participants as would have been desirable. Annex D is a list of persons interviewed.

The team also made three field trips to visit displaced persons settlements and to talk with mayors and Federation of Credit Agencies (FEDECCREDITO) personnel. Departments and sites visited are listed in Annex E. The team talked with some beneficiaries encountered on a random basis but it was not practical given time and resource constraints to attempt to reach any representative or systematic sample.

III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A. Project Phases

Project 0281 was a dynamic program. It evolved during its eleven year history in response to the unpredictable course of the conflict, changing circumstances of the displaced, and periodic interim evaluations. Evolution of the Project and its rolling design can best be described in terms of four phases. During these phases, Project focus went from emergency relief to broader and deeper welfare assistance, to economic reintegration and graduation, and finally to phase out.

1. 1982-1984: Emergency Relief

Problem

The number of displaced families grew rapidly as violence broke out and increased during 1979/80. Displaced families were forced to flee their homes without adequate planning or resources, creating an obstacle to their incorporation into the social and economic structure of host communities. As the displaced plight became more visible, the GOES reacted by creating CONADES in late 1981. CONADES was given responsibility for evaluating the displaced person problem and coordinating assistance. The first official action of CONADES was to carry out a census of the displaced population.

Census taking was complicated by the fact that the displaced were intermingled with the general population. To solve this problem, the displaced were asked to register with local Committees for Assistance for the Displaced (CLADs), which were created under the auspices of CONADES and comprised of members of the clergy, leaders from host communities, and local government officials. Registration made it possible to know how many people needed emergency assistance, and provided a mechanism for groups and officials dispensing aid to be held accountable for commodities and services they delivered.

By December 1981, approximately 165,000 displaced persons located in 136 municipalities throughout El Salvador had been identified and registered. There were undoubtedly many more who left the combat zones but had not identified themselves as displaced persons for fear of reprisals by the military, or who were receiving assistance from private organizations without going through CONADES.

The GOES clearly did not have the resources or capacity to cope with the basic needs of this large and growing displaced population. Employment opportunities were virtually non-existent in an economy that was contracting as a result of the conflict. Surplus food supplies were not available. MOH health centers in areas where the

displaced were concentrating were non-existent, had been abandoned, or lacked pharmaceuticals and supplies.

Strategy

USAID/ES signed the original agreement for Project 0281 on May 12, 1982 for \$3,000,000. Subsequent amendments over the next two years increased funding to \$12,525,000. The agreement provided for employment, food, and health assistance on an emergency basis to the displaced.

The strategy of the employment component was to provide short-term job opportunities through which members of displaced families could earn cash to meet some of their own emergency needs. Selection criteria for work projects were to emphasize reduction of environmental health hazards, improvement of sanitation services, and provision of basic community infrastructure. In addition to providing employment and improving communities, it was anticipated that cash earned by the displaced would be spent and have an economic multiplier effect in the communities where they were located. A further purpose was to strengthen the dignity and sense of self-reliance of the displaced population.

The health component strategy was to provide preventive and curative health services because, with the retraction of MOH personnel and services from rural health posts in conflictive areas, the incidence of communicable disease began to rise dramatically. Preventive health would focus on (1) an immunization campaign for everyone in the communities where the displaced were located, and (2) distribution of oral rehydration salts (ORT) to address the serious threat of diarrhea. Curative health services would focus on ten highly concentrated sites for displaced populations through a program conducted by CONADES and supported by the Ministry of Health (MOH). The MOH was to provide technical, logistical and cold chain support to the degree possible for the immunization campaign. Food was to be distributed by CONADES to meet the basic nutritional needs of the displaced.

Implementation

Because of the emergency nature of the program and the inexperience of CONADES in managing large-scale relief operations, overall management of the Project was assigned to a Program Unit of professionals contracted directly by USAID/ES. A fuller description of the roles of the Program Unit and all the other implementation agencies mentioned in this Overview is contained below in IV. B. Program Management.

The Program Unit worked directly with implementing agencies to manage the jobs and health services programs. Food assistance was

provided through the World Food Program and was distributed primarily by CONADES. USAID/ES funded the logistical support (warehousing and distribution costs) for the food assistance program.

In implementing the jobs program, the initial task for the Program Unit was to identify a national institution with a network of local offices which could develop the work projects, acquire labor from the displaced population, and supervise implementation. After analysis of existing organizations, the credit agencies affiliated with FEDECCREDITO were chosen to manage the program at the local level. These local credit agencies are privately controlled cooperatives similar to credit unions. While they are a part of a national federation under FEDECCREDITO, which provides support and financing to its members, they all elect their own boards and operate autonomously in most respects.

Between November 1982 and January 1983, cooperative agreements were signed with seven credit agencies, one in each of the departments with the highest concentrations of displaced persons. The Banco Salvadoreño was contracted by USAID/ES to provide financial and monitoring oversight.

In anticipation of start-up, over 300 eligible projects had been identified by the Program Unit staff. These had been designed by various GOES institutions in the past but were never implemented due to lack of resources. The credit agencies were encouraged to use these project plans whenever possible and to design additional simple ones, such as sanitation and area clean up, which could be implemented immediately. More sophisticated projects, such as road repair and construction, were implemented as soon as adequate plans were completed.

To provide employment opportunities to as many displaced persons as possible, projects selected were labor intensive and employment was rotated. Compensation was fixed at half the minimum wage so as not to compete with alternative sources of employment. The target was to employ up to 10,000 displaced each month.

The immunization campaign and provision of ORT were implemented by the MOH in those geographic areas where an in-place capability existed. In addition, sixty Red Cross Volunteers were trained to reach those areas which were inaccessible to the MOH. The target for immunization was set at 400,000 children under five years of age and 50,000 pregnant women in the eight departments with significant displaced populations.

The first step in implementing the program was to improve the logistical system for receipt, storage, and handling of perishable vaccines. Cold chain equipment was installed in four locations.

Since no major vaccination campaign had been carried out in the country since the mid-1970's, a private public relations firm was hired to prepare and conduct a publicity campaign on the availability and benefits of immunization. By 1983, the organizational, reporting, logistical, and publicity system had been established and vaccinations increased rapidly.

Curative health services were provided to major concentrations of displaced persons who either did not have access to MOH facilities or were reluctant to use them. Services were provided by twelve nurses contracted in May 1983 by CONADES and assigned to specific geographic areas. The nurses were supervised by two physicians who regularly visited the sites assigned to each nurse. Each nurse was supplied with a kit of basic medicines to treat the most common health problems encountered by the displaced. In cases where the nurse could not effect treatment, the patient was referred to the nearest MOH clinic. Both the nursing staff and PVOs were trained by Program Unit medical staff in promotion and use of ORT.

1984 Evaluation

An independent evaluation of the Project was conducted in February 1984 by a team of refugee/relief experts. The evaluation found that the jobs program had achieved high levels of employment and health services had reached significant numbers of displaced persons. But the displaced population had increased well beyond levels targeted in the original Project and an expansion was needed to reach this larger population.

The evaluation found that the jobs program had clearly provided some economic benefit to many of the displaced and given those participating a measure of dignity. The fact that the program proved to be popular not only among the displaced but also with the host communities was a major reason why it should be continued and expanded.

The evaluation noted that work projects tended to be concentrated in urban communities near the larger displaced settlements. More employment opportunities needed to be provided to those displaced who were more dispersed in rural areas. Also, the evaluation noted that more job opportunities should be made available to women especially in-home work for those who were heads of households. While over two-thirds of households were headed by women, only about 20% of those employed in the jobs program were women.

The evaluators confirmed that the vaccination effort had made a significant impact on the camp population and that the system of periodic home visitations by nurses was functioning smoothly. However, they recommended a surveillance system be instituted which would provide feedback to enable the program to adjust to health

problems as they developed. The evaluators concluded that the health status of the displaced population, while improved, was still below acceptable standards. They believed education on proper personal hygiene and health practices, along with additional environmental improvements in displaced settlements, were needed.

The evaluators conducted a small sample nutrition survey and found that the nutritional status of the vulnerable displaced population (children of less than five years of age and pregnant or lactating mothers) was significantly below the general population in spite of the food assistance programs. The evaluators recommended that the "food basket" be improved (more calories and proteins in the daily ration), a system to supply additional nutritional support for the most vulnerable be developed and implemented, and a complementary program of nutritional awareness and education be established.

As noted in the following discussion of the next Project phase, this evaluation led to a major overall expansion of the jobs and health programs. Supplementary feeding for the most vulnerable was added, the "food basket" was improved, and nutrition education and health surveillance were strengthened. The evidence does not show, however, that significant efforts were made to increase job opportunities for female heads of households or to disperse work projects more widely in rural areas.

2. 1984-1987: Expanded Assistance

Problem

By 1984, the displaced person problem had changed significantly. The conflict showed no signs of abating. The rolls of registered displaced persons had swelled by more than 100,000 from 165,000 to 270,000. New settlements had sprung up in widely scattered parts of the country. The Salvadoran economy had continued to decline, further restricting job opportunities for the displaced in the labor market. Four years after the displaced person problem gained public attention, there was no evidence that any significant outflow of displaced from temporary settlement status had taken place.

Food distributions had grown correspondingly with the growth of the displaced since they were based on the number of registered displaced persons. But the jobs and health programs had been unable, under available funding, to keep pace with expanding numbers of displaced.

The country went to the polls in 1984 and the Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected President. Duarte began to take firm action to improve the human rights record of the Government and the military. In the countryside, government forces were beginning to hold their own against the insurgents. The Duarte Government

formulated in 1986 a national plan which included the goal of reintegrating the displaced into Salvadoran society but the plan said little on how this goal might be achieved.

Strategy

In May, 1984, USAID/ES amended Project 0281 to increase authorized funding from \$12,525,000 to \$72,525,000 and to extend the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) from August 1984 to August 1987. The amendment supported an expanded jobs program, supplementary feeding for the most vulnerable, more assistance to the unregistered displaced, and a pilot relocation activity.

The jobs program was to raise the number of displaced to be employed from an average of 10,000 a month to at least 13,000 a month. Geographical coverage was to be expanded to the departments of La Paz, La Libertad, and La Union.

Under the health and nutrition component, the immunization and ORT efforts were to be continued and expanded. A major expansion of curative health services was to be undertaken by building dispensaries and providing nursing aides in a number of new areas. Basic health care services were to be provided to the dispersed and unregistered through centers to be established. An environmental improvements program was to be initiated to improve hygienic and health conditions in displaced person settlements. A supplementary feeding program for the most vulnerable was to be started. A system of relocation services was to be supported, on a pilot basis, for those displaced families wishing voluntarily to resettle.

Implementation

The jobs program continued to be implemented by the USAID/ES Program Unit through the cooperative agreements with local credit agencies. Responsibilities of these agencies included organization of the program, receipt, disbursement and accounting for funds, logistical support, and monitoring. The Banco Salvadoreño continued under contract with USAID/ES to have responsibility for financial reviews and voucher examination. Requests for jobs program activities were approved first by the mayor of the local community in which the activity was to be executed and then by the USAID/ES Program Unit.

Beginning in July 1985, FEDECREDITO's central office chose to take over implementation responsibilities of the jobs program that had previously been implemented through direct agreements with the local affiliates. While overall supervision of the program improved, the local affiliates, which had become accustomed to operating directly with USAID/ES, found it difficult to adjust to the extra layering in this arrangement. As long as the central office director and the local affiliates agreed on program objectives and procedures, this

arrangement was workable. Later, when the director changed, consensus broke down and the program had to be terminated by USAID/ES in 1989.

The expanded curative health services program was implemented by Project HOPE. Under an agreement signed with USAID/ES in 1984, Project HOPE was responsible for designing, staffing, and managing the new health dispensaries built in the major displaced settlement areas. The supplementary feeding program was implemented under an agreement with the Salvadoran Evangelical Committee for Assistance in Health and Development (CESAD). The MOH continued the immunization and ORT distribution programs. CONADES' health unit continued providing primary care coverage through periodic visits to displaced persons in dispersed locations. The GOES decided that CONADES should terminate this activity, which was fulfilling an MOH responsibility, in 1986.

CONADES expanded its food assistance. USAID/ES contracted Consulting Corporation of America (CCA) to provide technical assistance in food logistics and monitoring the food distribution. CCA also conducted a baseline study of the displaced population in 1985. USAID/ES later contracted with Krause International and RONCO Consulting to continue the food management and monitoring technical assistance roles that CCA had started. USAID/ES provided approximately \$3 million for these technical assistance programs for CONADES.

New cooperative agreements were signed with World Relief (WR) and the Overseas Education Fund (OEF) to test methodologies for helping displaced families become independent of emergency assistance. The WR grant was to resettle 200 displaced persons in three new communities and assist them to become financially self-sufficient. The OEF agreement was to establish a loan fund to assist 60 displaced women to develop self-sustaining micro-enterprises.

1986 Evaluation

An outside evaluation performed in June 1986 recommended the objective and scope of the Project be adjusted to emphasize reintegration. The evaluation noted growing interest on the part of displaced families to return to their original homes. Confidence was increasing that neither the military or the insurgents would harm those displaced who chose to return. Also there was a growing conviction that the guerrillas were losing and there would not be a resurgence in their movement. The evaluation recommended the Project make every effort to support this voluntary reintegration but to offer only the minimum assistance necessary for the resettlers to make a new start.

The evaluation recommended measures to begin to limit and move away from the emergency food distributions. Food for work should be substituted for dole feeding. Technical assistance for and controls by CONADES should be strengthened to insure only those eligible actually receive food assistance. Strategies for setting time limits on receiving safety net assistance should be developed.

The evaluation recommended the jobs program be maintained at its current levels but that greater geographical distribution of jobs away from urban centers was needed. The health and nutrition safety nets should be retained but the Project HOPE dispensaries should be absorbed by the MOH as soon as feasible.

This evaluation had significant impact on program shifts beginning in 1987. The Project strategy (see below) placed new emphasis on reintegration, substituted food for work for dole feeding, and began to define limits for safety net assistance. With respect to greater geographical distribution of jobs, the number of work projects in rural areas improved dramatically from 21% in 1986 to 77% in 1987.

3. 1987-1990: Reintegration and Graduation

Problem

The problem of the displaced continued to evolve after 1984. The displaced population grew until 1986, when it peaked at over one half million persons, more than 10 percent of El Salvador's population. The dramatic increases in registration between 1983 and 1986 were probably due, however, more to diminution in fear of reprisals against those registering than to increases in movements of displaced out of the conflict areas.

The favorable political and military trends which had begun in 1984 continued. Legislative and mayoral elections were held in March 1985, the fourth election in El Salvador since 1982. Duarte's Christian Democratic Party won control of the Assembly and, through victories at the mayoral level, extended its influence into several of the departments. With this renewed mandate, President Duarte continued to work against the violence in El Salvador and sought to enforce respect for civil and human rights. The Salvadoran armed forces were gaining in the war against the insurgents and were able to prevent the insurgents' ability to concentrate forces and carry out large-scale attacks as they had in the past.

By 1987, the number of displaced persons had begun to decline for several reasons. First, the number of families newly entering the displaced persons program was declining as the intensity of the civil conflict declined. Second, continued access of the displaced to humanitarian relief in their temporary displacement sites was causing resentment among their immediate neighbors who were not

displaced persons and were not eligible for the benefits of the relief programs regardless of their economic status. These growing feelings of resentment were an encouragement to the displaced to resettle or relocate. Third, a spontaneous returnee movement had already started and many more were interested in returning if they were able to receive just a small amount of assistance in their place of origin.

For USAID/ES and the GOES, the large number of displaced posed a perplexing problem. The Government lacked the resources to sustain this population. USAID/ES had essentially accepted responsibility for the largest welfare program in the nation. And, as structured, it was a program without an end. USAID/ES wanted to cut back its involvement and transfer responsibility to the GOES. To accomplish this, the Mission was looking for ways to reduce the number of beneficiaries not genuinely in need of this assistance and to identify some durable solutions. While agreeing with these objectives, the GOES was also very sensitive to the political risks of cutting back on an established welfare program.

Strategy

Based on the 1986 evaluation, the strategy in early 1987 was to shift Project focus from humanitarian, emergency relief towards finding durable solutions for the displaced persons that would accelerate their economic reintegration. Food for work activities were to be substituted for the feeding programs. More assistance was to be directed to returnee sites (communities where displaced families were returning home) and to helping families become economically productive again. The concept of "graduation" was introduced. Displaced were to agree, prior to participation in productive projects, that they would graduate from all assistance programs for the displaced following harvest of a second crop, for example, or other predetermined means of defining a time limit.

Implementation

Under the program's employment component, FEDECCREDITO began implementing a vocational skills training program in mid-1987 that provided three to four month training for displaced persons unable to return home due to the continuing conflict. These courses were primarily in bread making and in such construction trades as carpentry, masonry, plumbing, and metal working. The participants were selected from those participating in the FEDECCREDITO jobs program. During their training they received the same wage per day they earned as participants in the employment program. This program was an attempt to assist the reintegration of urban displaced with no agricultural background.

In early 1989, FEDECCREDITO's jobs program, which had already started to phase down, was terminated because the new FEDECCREDITO director did not share USAID/ES' and the local affiliates' vision of the program. Temporary employment activities continued to be supported only on construction of infrastructure in resettlement areas under the relocation programs.

Under the health component, Project HOPE dispensaries began to phase out in 1987 because they duplicated clinics operated by the MOH. World Relief and, later, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) provided limited health assistance under their relocation programs.

In early 1987, food assistance by CONADES and CESAD was modified from dole programs to food for work activities. RONCO helped CONADES in making the transition and in developing these food for work activities. Literacy, sewing, embroidering, bread making, manufacture of hemp products, shelter improvements, vegetable gardening, and small animal husbandry were among the activities carried out. Substitution of food for work resulted in significant numbers of displaced families deselecting themselves from the food assistance programs. Once they had to participate in some type of work activity many decided it was not worth the effort or found that it conflicted with their regular employment.

USAID/ES and GOES nutritionists discovered that the supplementary food ration, which had been adopted into the employment program in 1984, had very little impact on the nutritional state of the participants and, in turn, was causing a logistical nightmare to store and distribute these small baskets of food to project participants. In May 1987, the food assistance part of the FEDECCREDITO jobs program was discontinued without complaints from the communities involved.

In mid-1987, CESAD began to reduce its supplementary food program. CESAD's feeding centers were rapidly phasing out, leaving behind only the nutritional education programs. The need for continued supplementary food assistance in most of the sites was over. USAID/ES ceased its relationship with CESAD in mid-1988 due to serious financial anomalies in its handling of AID funds. After evaluating the communities served, those ready for graduation were left on their own and those still requiring food assistance were turned over to CONADES.

Implementation of a dynamic registry of displaced persons by CONADES was a continuing problem. With technical assistance provided first by Krause and then by RONCO, CONADES established an information unit in 1986 to place emphasis on the registry's development, distribution, and feed-back/cross check from the field. A full registry was completed in 1986 and an update carried out in 1988.

This improved registry led to the trimming of substantial numbers who did not qualify for displaced person status.

In 1988, the Salvadoran Institute for Agricultural Transformation (ISTA) began working with CONADES to identify abandoned or under-utilized state-owned lands to relocate displaced persons. ISTA entered into an agreement with CONADES to resettle up to 3,500 landless families onto some 9,500 hectares of abandoned or under-utilized agrarian reform lands to which they would eventually gain titles.

Also in 1988, USAID/ES signed an Operational Program Grant (OPG) with the International Rescue Committee to assist families that had already decided to relocate. IRC prior to working with a community reached an agreement regarding services to be provided. Services included housing, latrines, wells, agricultural starter kits, family gardens, and reforestation.

Meanwhile, serious management difficulties were undermining CONADES' implementation role under the Project. CONADES was not able during 1989 to clear itself of recommendations presented by AID's Regional Inspector General (RIG). The recommendations were that CONADES should reimburse to the GOES extraordinary budget the value of certain questionable expenditures. The RIG recommended that USAID/ES should hold any further funding for CONADES until RIG's recommendations were closed. Funds were withheld for almost a year before the matter was resolved.

1988 Evaluation

An evaluation was performed in July 1988 to provide USAID/ES with guidance on future directions of the project through 1990. The evaluation found the overall strategy and objectives to be sound. No major changes in direction were recommended.

Weaknesses were found in the database on the size and characteristics of the displaced population. Absence of uniform eligibility rules for benefits were found to be impeding planning and monitoring of Project activities. A number of specific suggestions were made for minor modifications to correct these weaknesses and improve various operational aspects of the Project's components. Implementing these recommendations was difficult because they largely depended on action by CONADES which was having management problems, as noted above, and was generally unresponsive to pressure for management improvement.

4. 1990-1993: Phase Out

Problem

National elections in 1989 brought Alfredo Cristiani and the Arena Party to power while the war had essentially reached a stalemate and a peace dialogue had started. The November-December 1989 FMLN offensive was a reminder that continued major armed conflict was not necessarily over. The offensive caused a brief but severe increase in the number of displaced persons, mostly in San Salvador, but the overall scope and magnitude of displaced program needs were not increased.

By 1990, the number of displaced persons was approximately at 125,000 and continuing to fall. Program needs were to permanently resettle the remaining displaced, to reintegrate them into mainstream Salvadoran life, and to arrange support for those especially vulnerable victims requiring longer-term social and economic assistance.

Also, 1988 and 1989 saw the beginning of the return of several groups of refugees from Honduras. Many of these groups were reluctant to deal directly with the GOES. The GOES and USAID/ES recognized the importance of finding ways to reintegrate these repatriates into the socio-economic life of the country.

Strategy

The Project was amended in September 1990 to add \$7,328,000 for a new total of \$79,853,000 in grant funding and to extend the PACD to May 31, 1993. Since early 1987, the strategy had been to seek a durable solution for the displaced population focusing on reintegration, resettlement, and economic self-sufficiency. The strategy for the final three years of the Project was to continue emphasis on resettlement with the goal of reducing the number of displaced to no more than 25,000.

Efforts were to be made to resettle or relocate up to 100,000 persons and to provide continuing help to some 25,000 which were more vulnerable and in need of longer-term support. The management strategy was to prepare for full assumption by the GOES of responsibility for any continuing displaced persons needs. Continued technical assistance was to be provided to CONADES to support key positions and a repatriation office established to coordinate assistance to the repatriated population returning from Honduras.

Implementation

Implementation of resettlement and relocation was spear-headed, under agreements with USAID/ES, by IRC and Creative Associates International, Inc. (CREA). IRC worked in 73 communities with about 36,000 persons. CREA worked in 25 communities in which around 5,500 persons received a full integrated development package and another twelve communities which received partial assistance. The IRC completed work under its agreement on April 30, 1992 and CREA's program continued until the end of the Project in 1993.

CONADES provided continuing support for food for work, credit, and other self-help activities with the displaced until mid-1992. A Unit created to work with repatriates was supported by technical assistance from RONCO. USAID/ES support was subsequently terminated because of difficulties in convincing CONADES to decentralize and because of questionable uses of Project funds. By this time, the GOES had decided CONADES would not be the appropriate agency to implement the National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) agreed to as part of the Peace Accords signed December 1991 between the GOES and the FMLN. The GOES created the National Reconstruction Secretariat (SAN) to assume this responsibility.

In March 1992, USAID/ES and the GOES agreed to assign to the SAN full responsibility for providing continued assistance to the displaced and repatriated and achieving their socio-economic reintegration into El Salvadoran society. Uncommitted funding of \$2,000,000 under the Project was assigned to the SAN to carry out these purposes.

By May 1993, the number of displaced was estimated to be below 25,000 with many continuing to return to their homes or finding other means to reintegrate. Those returning to ex-conflictive zones would be able to participate in reconstruction programs in their communities along with the rest of the population. The remaining 5,830 displaced persons receiving assistance under the Project were graduated during April 1993. Project 0281 was phased out on May 31, 1993.

B. Summary of Major Outputs

Table 1 summarizes outputs achieved by the Project, which correspond to indicators tracked by USAID/ES in its Semi-Annual Reports (SARs). The table also identifies the principal implementing organizations, and the period during which they accomplished the cumulative totals for each output.

C. Total USAID/ES Inputs

Table 2 summarizes USAID/ES inputs to the displaced persons program from Project 0281 dollar grant funding and AID generated host country-owned local currencies. Data on the dollar grant funding was taken from the latest available USAID/ES Controller Project Financial Status Report dated June 7, 1993. The local currency data was supplied by the USAID/ES Office of Development Planning.

Table 1
SUMMARY OF MAJOR OUTPUTS

Component I: Employment Generation & Vital In- frastructure Programs	LOP	PLANNED	ACCOMPLISHED			
		IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONS	YEAR BEGUN	YEAR ENDED	CUM.	% OF LOP
Service Agencies	10	CAJAS DE CREDITO	1982	1989	10	100
Construction of camp environmental improvements	69	FEDECCREDITO	1982	1989	60	87
Employment projects	3,800	FEDECCREDITO	1982	1989	4,846	127
DPs employed (avg. per month)	10,000	FEDECCREDITO	1982	1989	13,000	130
Work projects for returnees	50	FEDECCREDITO	1982	1989	62	124
Vital Infrastructure projects	170	WR, IRC AND CREA	1985	1993	242	142
Component II: Nutrition Services						
Number of CENAS operating	24	CESAD	1985	1988	24	100
Food Baskets delivered monthly to DPs	25,000	CONADES	1982	1992	35,000	146
No. of health dispensaries	82	HOPE	1985	1989	82	100
<u>Immunizations</u>						
Total applications, doses	68,250	CONADES, HOPE, WR, and IRC	1983	1992	112,651	165
Children under five years old	50,375	CONADES, HOPE, WR, and IRC	1983	1992	93,515	186
Pregnant women (tetanus toxoid)	4,405	CONADES, HOPE, WR, and IRC	1983	1992	5,921	134
Distribution of MOH's ORT salts (doses)	95,500	CONADES, HOPE	1983	1989	95,094	99
<u>Curative Health</u>						
Medical referrals	74,306	CONADES, HOPE, WR IRC and CREA	1983	1993	83,099	112
Home visits	425,832	CONADES, HOPE	1983	1986	587,776	138

27

	<u>LOP</u>	<u>PLANNED</u>		<u>ACCOMPLISHED</u>		
		<u>IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONS</u>	<u>YEAR BEGUN</u>	<u>YEAR ENDED</u>	<u>CUM.</u>	<u>% OF LOP</u>
Component IV: Reintegration /Returnee						
Number of PVO Coop. or Grant Agreements	5	HOPE, CESAD, OEF, IRC, CREA and FEDECCREDITO	1985	1993	7	140
Relocated/Returned displaced families ^{1/}	16,470	WR, IRC, CREA and CONADES	1985	1993	13,218	80
Returnee/Relocation Projects ^{1/}	139	WR, IRC, CREA and CONADES	1985	1993	144	103
Solidarity groups formed to develop microbusinesses ^{2/}	80	CONADES, OEF	1990	1992	409	320
Agricultural starter packages distributed ^{1/}	31,632	WR, CESAD, IRC, and CREA	1986	1993	27,432	87
Component V: Training						
Short term vocational skills training courses completed	95	FEDECCREDITO, CONADES	1987	1989	134	141
<u>Preventive Health</u>						
No. of rural health volunteers trained	50	IRC, CREA	1988	1993	1,181	2,362
No. of community health seminars	200	HOPE, WR, IRC, and CREA	1985	1993	596	298

1/ adjusted LOPs, per September 1990 Project Paper amendment.

2/ LOP adjusted and converted to assist individual microbusinesses.

Table 2

PROJECT 519-0281: TOTAL USAID/ES INPUTS

I.	USAID/ES Dollar Grant Funds	(\$ millions)	
	<u>GOES Agreement</u>	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>
	Employment Generation	34.5	34.5
	Health	2.6	2.6
	Nutrition	.3	.3
	Relocation	13.7	13.2
	Program Management	3.9	3.8
	International Technical Assistance	2.8	2.8
	Evaluation/Contingency	2.5	2.4
	National Reconstruction Activities	2.0	1.5
	 <u>USAID/ES Direct Agreement</u>		
	World Relief	2.8	2.7
	CESAD	6.6	6.6
	Project Hope	6.9	6.9
	OEF	.5	.5
	Local Relief Agencies	.1	.1
	Baseline Survey (CCA)	.3	.3
	Food Monitoring (CCA)	<u>.3</u>	<u>.3</u>
	Total	79.8	78.5
II.	USAID/ES Generated Host Country-Owned Local Currency	<u>14.0</u>	<u>14.0</u>
	Grand Total	93.8	92.5

Other AID assistance directly or indirectly helped the displaced:

- The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provided \$126,000 to local private voluntary agencies in early 1982 to continue their programs of humanitarian assistance to the displaced. OFDA emergency procurement facilities were used to make it possible for vaccines to arrive quickly and in good condition. OFDA and the Center for Disease Control also provided short-term assistance in cold chain operations.

- The AID Food for Peace Office provided technical assistance in developing the content of the food packages for the displaced and in formulating logistics management procedures for CONADES' food distribution program.

- The USAID/ES Health Systems Revitalization Project (519-0291) provided pharmaceuticals, supplies, and technical assistance to strengthen the MOH's capacity to provide medical services especially in outlying areas. Many displaced benefitted from these services.

- The USAID/ES supported Municipalities in Action Program initiated in 1987 generated municipal infrastructure projects that provided benefits for the displaced located where projects were undertaken.

D. Other Donor Assistance

While USAID/ES provided the major share of support for the displaced, assistance also came from a number of other sources:

- The World Food Program (WFP) supported the food distribution programs of CONADES to the displaced. From 1981 to 1991, a total of 112 thousand metric tons of food commodities valued at \$43,462,996 were committed for these programs. Most of this food was donated by the U.S. under PL 480. Some came from the European Economic Community (EEC).

- International and local church groups assisted at various times and in various ways up to about 35,000 displaced persons, many of whom were unwilling to have any affiliation with government related organizations. Catholic Relief Services, the Lutheran Church, Family Foundation of America, the Knights of Malta, the Archbishop, Salvadoran Foundation for Minimum Housing (FUNDASAL), and Fe y Trabajo were the principal groups involved. Assistance included food donations, medicines and other relief supplies, provisional housing, educational assistance, and medical and sanitation care.

- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), because of its neutrality, was able to assist people in conflictive zones where other organizations could not go. ICRC served people in need equally without distinguishing between displaced and non-displaced. Its program consisted of feeding (5,000 - 10,000 recipients), agriculture assistance packages (10,000 recipients), community sanitation projects, and mobile medical clinics. ICRC assisted up to 100,000 individuals (not all displaced) with an annual budget of \$2-3 million.

- PRODERE is a UNDO program financed by the Italian Government covering five Central American countries and Belize. The program's objective is to assist the displaced impoverished population by implementing health programs, productive projects, housing and infrastructure, education, community organizations and training, legal assistance and credit. PRODERE has pledged about \$25 million for El Salvador. Repeated attempts by the evaluation team to determine actual expenditures were unsuccessful. Amounts expended have been a small fraction of the pledge.

- UNICEF provided financial support to the Salvadoran Association for Human Development for maternal child health and nutrition activities basically in six communities where displaced were located. As a policy UNICEF did not target the displaced as a separate group, but rather directed its assistance to the needy in general.

- The International Conference of Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) continues to be a mechanism organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by which the Central American countries submit project proposals to international donor agencies seeking funding to implement projects assisting displaced, repatriated and refugee families in their respective countries. Pledges for El Salvador total up to \$40 million. Figures on actual expenditures were unavailable. Programs for which these pledges have been made are on-going as part of the National Reconstruction Program.

- A number of U.S., international and local PLO groups supporting the FMLN provided limited assistance to the displaced and returnees in guerrilla held areas and to the repatriates from Honduras and elsewhere.

IV. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Program Accomplishments

Project 0281 successfully met its principal objectives. It provided a safety net for many of the displaced when the GOES could not. It helped to settle or relocate in rural areas many who otherwise would have migrated to already over-crowded urban centers, especially San Salvador.

The jobs program provided cash for some basic needs and a sense of dignity to the large numbers it reached. Useful community improvements and basic infrastructure were produced. The threat of disease was significantly reduced. Food distributions prevented serious hunger. Malnutrition, especially among the most vulnerable groups, was successfully addressed. Many new communities were organized, assisted with housing and other basic infrastructure, and motivated to sustain a new life for themselves.

The goal was met of reducing to less than 25,000 the number of displaced without reasonable prospects of caring for themselves. At its termination, the Project had been highly successful in helping essentially to eliminate the displaced persons problem. While most of the resettled and relocated still live in poverty and a more permanent solution for a hard core of displaced has yet to be found, these problems should be manageable within the National Reconstruction and other on-going development or welfare programs.

Individual success stories as well as problems and issues emerged in implementing the four components of the program. Findings and conclusions on accomplishments of these components are discussed in the following sections.

1. Employment Generation

Findings

The jobs program represented almost half of total Project expenditures. A safe estimate is that between 150,000 and 200,000 of the displaced population worked occasionally in the program. Some of the principal accomplishments of the 4,968 work projects completed during the life of the jobs program, according to USAID/ES' data base, were 28,390 latrines installed, 316 community potable water projects realized, and 1,665,000 square meters of cobblestone streets rehabilitated.

The jobs program was carried out in two stages. At first, the Program Unit administered it through ten local Cajas de Credito, each one serving a department. In the second stage, FEDECCREDITO

assumed administrative responsibility by establishing a central administrative office (CAT).

In the first stage, 720 projects were completed. The projects were divided into two categories: A. improvements in the health conditions of camps or settlements, and B. general public work improvements in the camps or communities where the displaced lived. To maximize the use of labor, Category A projects could expend only 50% for materials while category B only 30%. Each worker's pay was fixed at about one-half the minimum wage, so as not to compete with alternative sources of employment. The average project employed approximately 50 workers over eight weeks and cost about \$15,000. After the first year the program supplemented the cash wages with food rations.

The initial projects were short-term, such as clearing trash, but gradually more ambitious projects were undertaken to repair roads and build community facilities. Tight controls on the rotation of workers meant that in this first phase an estimated 50,000 persons benefitted from some part-time employment in the program. The jobs activities also involved a broad cross section of the displaced population both from camps and dispersed communities. Family members participated including youths whose schools had closed because of violence and women who engaged in equal manual labor with the men.

The success of the first phase led to a significant expansion in the 1984-87 period. In July 1985, USAID/ES entered into a project agreement with FEDECCREDITO to establish CAT. The jobs program responded to the rapid growth in the displaced population by raising the average number of displaced persons employed each month from 10,000 to 13,000 and, during peak times, up to 18,000 a month.

Since most projects drew on displaced workers in camps or concentrated in various communities, the improvements often did not benefit the displaced where they lived. For this reason, USAID/ES phased down the program in 1987, and urged a shift of job program emphasis to returnees and permanent relocation communities. A third category (C) of projects was added that responded to the health and infrastructure needs of communities where displaced families resettled or were returning to their original communities. By mid-1988 twenty-five Category C projects were underway. In mid-1987 FEDECCREDITO added a fourth category of projects that provided three to four month training courses, primarily in construction trades, to prepare displaced persons for future permanent employment. Few projects were implemented in these categories, however, because a new administration changed FEDECCREDITO's leadership. The new manager did not have a commitment to the program, so USAID/ES ended it on March 31, 1989.

Table 3 summarizes project data by category for the 1985-89 period when FEDECREDITO managed the program. A total of 4,248 projects were completed. Ninety per cent of \$23.5 million expended in this period were direct project expenses while only 10% went for administrative costs.

Table 3

**FEDECREDITO WORK PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED BY CATEGORY
July, 1985 - March, 1989**

PROJECT CATEGORIES	# PROJECTS/ # EMPLOYED	AMT.000 COLONS/ % COST
A-improve health conditions	1,710/ 76,127	31,314/ 27
B-improve community services and infrastructure	2,442/164,856	80,440/ 71
C-community projects for returnees	62/ 2,446	1,020/ 1
D-vocational training projects	34/ 1,432	1,008/ 1
TOTALS	4,248/244,861	113,782/100

In the 1985-89 period the largest concentration of projects took place in Usulután (651), Chalatenango (557), Morazan (551), and San Vicente (538). These four departments accounted for a little more than half the work projects implemented. This geographic dispersion correlated well with the movement of the displaced population.

Calculating the minimum amounts that each category of work projects had to pay in wages, at least \$14 million were put into the hands of displaced families. This timely insertion of funds benefitted 244,861 workers and had a multiplier effect as well as the funds were spent in the local markets. Considering that some people worked on more than one project at different times, a reasonable estimate is that at least half the eligible displaced population participated in the program. In some communities such as Suchitoto, the jobs program helped to revive a local economy destroyed by war.

An unanticipated result of the Project was the extent of durable community infrastructure improvements. Informants consistently confirmed the value of these improvements. It was possible to observe during the field visits that roads, buildings, and streets were being maintained and clearly had a lasting importance to the communities. The mayor in Osicala, a municipality in Morazan where numerous improvements were made in 1984-85, boasted that the sewage system and roads this program had built almost ten years ago still worked for the good of the community.

40

Conclusions

- In a period when local employment was almost nil this program made the difference between severe deprivation and meeting minimal basic needs in a way that fostered dignity among the displaced.
- The program contributed to an extensive range of durable community projects even though this was not a primary objective.
- The jobs program effectively spread work projects throughout the country in accord with where the displaced population had migrated.
- The wages paid in cash were vital to the program's success. The small amount and forced rotation avoided a dependency on this income.
- A drawback of the program was that many community improvements were not in places where the displaced settled.
- After 1987 when significant numbers of the displaced began to return home or to look for more permanent solutions, providing incentives for resettlement through the jobs program was complicated by difficulties in shifting the program's mechanisms to support of work projects in the resettlements.

2. Public Health

Findings

The health program provided preventive and curative care to the displaced during ten years. During the Project's life, CONADES and PVOs vaccinated almost 100,000 displaced mothers and children against disease and tetanus infection. Mothers received nearly 100,000 ORT doses. There were 588,000 home visits and 83,000 referrals to MOH clinics for treatment. Thousands of the displaced were trained to deal with community health problems.

In 1982 voluntary agencies were first enlisted for the vaccination campaign, but since training and licensing were necessary for all volunteers, the Program Unit decided to work through the MOH wherever it had an existing capability. Sixty Red Cross volunteers were also trained to reach areas inaccessible to the MOH. The campaign carried out in 1983 generated extensive public interest. It resulted in more than 300,000 children and women vaccinated, of which many were displaced persons. The 1984 evaluation concluded that the basic immunization needs of the displaced population at that time were met, and USAID/ES handed over the activity and

remaining vaccines to the MOH. When the displaced population continued to grow, Project HOPE and IRC vaccinated displaced children in clinics they established later in the program.

A 1984 joint USAID/ES/MOH/CONADES nutritional survey of displaced children aged six months to five years pointed out the need for special attention to health needs. Of the children sampled, half suffered from on-going, chronic malnutrition. A third of those malnourished had second degree malnutrition, and 5% third degree. In addition, the joint survey found 23% of all displaced families in the sample had lost one child during the past five years. These indicators verified the precarious status of displaced childrens' health.

To carry out curative activities, the USAID/ES Program Unit organized a team of two doctors and twelve nurses within CONADES to deliver assistance directly to major concentrations of displaced. Between May 1983 and December 1986, the team made an average of 10,000 home visits a month and 6,000 referrals annually to MOH clinics. The project reimbursed the MOH two colones for each referral treated. The team also trained mothers in treating diarrhea and distributed 40,000 ORT packages. Once the Project HOPE clinics were established in areas of high concentration of displaced, this program focused more on the dispersed population. During the 1985-88 period, a local PLO funded by the Project, CESAD, also provided limited primary health care to dispersed communities with about 35,000 displaced persons, who were mostly not registered with CONADES.

The 1985 baseline survey found that the health and nutrition status of the displaced was poor. As the displaced population nearly doubled in 1984-85, health problems clearly overwhelmed the capacity of the MOH and the CONADES health program to respond. In August 1985, USAID/ES and Project HOPE signed a Cooperative Agreement to deliver preventive and curative health care in settlements and cooperatives where displaced families relocated.

HOPE built 83 dispensaries, most with resources from the FEDECCREDITO jobs program, in camps and communities where large numbers of displaced had concentrated. HOPE staffed the dispensaries to provide immunizations, ORT, and basic curative services. HOPE also provided instruction in environmental sanitation, personal hygiene, family planning, food handling and accident prevention, and administration of medications. HOPE bolstered the primary care approach of the dispensaries by training a number of community health aides. Each clinic established a vigilance system for infectious diseases, and organized other work projects to supply sufficient potable water. At its peak in 1985-86, the HOPE system treated an average of 40,000 people a month in its clinics.

By 1987, the displaced began to seek more permanent resettlement, which decreased the need for the HOPE clinics. USAID/ES reduced the number of clinics by more than half. The HOPE clinics had developed virtually as a separate system, often superior to the MOH in rural areas. The 1988 evaluators mention cases where MOH clinics relied on nearby HOPE clinics to obtain needed medical supplies. In 1989, USAID/ES ended the Cooperative Agreement and passed responsibility for the remaining clinics to the MOH. Sixty health aides trained by HOPE were incorporated into the MOH system.

After emphasis of the Project shifted to relocation and permanent settlement, all health services funded by the Project were delivered through PVOs. World Relief, IRC and later CREA all maintained mobile health units to attend the population they were resettling. World Relief kept a doctor and nurse on its permanent staff to coordinate preventive health activities in the 73 communities where it worked.

IRC from 1988 to 1992 supported 25 clinics that handled an average of 2,800 consultations a month, which IRC provided to all in need. The clinics served as a center for training the community. IRC developed a strong cadre of health promoters, both volunteer and paid. The primary health coverage was complete. IRC also served 240,000 meals with purchased food to children in 21 community nutrition centers. IRC found this activity of only short term value and too expensive to sustain. CREA, in the 25 communities where it worked, did not provide regular health care. Instead, it concentrated on health training, and helped the community to make links with the local health care system.

One unanticipated result was that training begun by HOPE, and continued by the other PVOs, turned out more than 1,000 skilled health promoters. Unfortunately, they are dispersed and it is difficult to measure what their impact may be, but they remain a lasting resource.

By 1988, a Project HOPE contracted study showed that the displaced families' health status had improved to a level at least as good as the general rural population. This finding suggests that health care provided over the life of the Project went beyond the safety net concept, and meaningfully improved health in many rural communities.

Conclusions

- Health impacts sought were largely achieved. There were no major epidemics among the displaced, and their health status by 1988 was no worse than the general rural poor population.

- The flexible approach to providing health care to the displaced adapted well to changing circumstances.
- The Project HOPE approach probably continued for too long, especially after large numbers left the communities HOPE served in search of permanent resettlement.
- Better use of resources could have been achieved if there had been a closer coordination with the MOH, especially regarding the CONADES and Project HOPE activities.
- USAID/ES showed proper flexibility in recognizing the impossibility of establishing health services only targeting the displaced.
- PLO health assistance activities correctly emphasized community health training and health promoters, but there has been little provision for sustaining these improvements.

3. Food Assistance

Findings

This component had three phases: a dole feeding program that peaked at nearly 270,000 beneficiaries in 1984, a supplementary feeding program that expanded the program to over 300,000 between 1984 and 1987, and a food for work program that reached a reduced number of beneficiaries of around 120,000 because many former beneficiaries deselected themselves from the program. Food assistance phased out in 1992.

The first assistance offered the displaced was food aid. CONADES came into being with the mandate to provide food to as many of the displaced as possible. As the displaced were registered, they received cards that entitled them to a food ration. The 1984 evaluation concluded that the CONADES food distribution was not only necessary but the ration was, if anything, insufficient. The evaluators put priority on an adequate food basket with increased concern for vulnerable groups.

The 1985 baseline study indicates the extent of the food program's coverage. The survey sample revealed that 78% of displaced persons received food aid, a third for two years or more, and 60% received their food aid from CONADES. Other donors, particularly the churches and Red Cross supplied the remaining 18%, mainly displaced persons who sought refuge in churches or remained in conflictive areas. Nearly all displaced families questioned said they bought significant amounts of food because the rations were not enough to feed an entire family. One explanation for this disposable income

was the finding in the 1986 evaluation that many displaced received remittances from relatives who had emigrated to other countries, especially the United States.

After 1984, CONADES also made food available to workers in the FEDECCREDITO jobs program. The Cajas, unaccustomed to handling food, had many logistical problems with distribution until CONADES began distributing a pre-packaged food basket. CONADES discontinued this activity in 1987 when it became apparent it was not having much nutritional impact.

In 1984, USAID/ES signed a Cooperative Agreement with CESAD to extend nutritional impact further. CESAD had been implementing a small PL480 program, and was willing to increase its program to reach the displaced population not registered with CONADES. CESAD established 164 distribution centers, which fed an average of 35,000 displaced monthly. In addition, CESAD opened 24 CENAS to feed about 5,000 children under five as well as pregnant or lactating mothers. The CENAS prepared regular meals on site and gave nutritional instruction and special attention to cases of severe malnutrition.

In 1987, an evaluation of the CENA program concluded the supplementary feeding was no longer necessary. Few severe cases of malnutrition existed and the problems that remained were deficiencies that only long term development or welfare could correct. The CESAD program after 1987 also distributed aid under food for work guidelines, and carried out 253 productive projects in 202 communities. The CESAD program ended in December, 1988 because of CESAD's internal problems.

Food for work became the dominant approach after 1987 when CONADES started implementing a new project agreement with the WFP. CONADES distributed food to 13,000 displaced families who were resettling with assistance from PVOs. CONADES also organized and carried out its own food for work activities. Its promoters worked with the registered displaced population to organize educational and vocational training, productive projects, and camp improvements. It is difficult to get accurate data on these projects now, but most observers found them to be little more than excuses to distribute food. Informants suggested that a key reason CONADES' projects were weak was the inability of CONADES to mobilize other financial resources needed to develop community projects.

Food for work had the most positive results in reintegration activities where PVOs brought the additional resources to carry out community projects. Since farmers had to sign an agreement not to seek food after their second harvest, these projects had the advantage of a clearly defined end point. In several communities visited, beneficiaries praised the food assistance they received in this critical period.

CONADES' reports suggest in 1989-90 they benefitted 30,000 families or close to 120,000 people. Clearly the introduction of food for work substantially deselected many people who had been receiving food, which is reflected in the sharp reduction of registered displaced after 1987. Both WFP and RONCO, who gave technical assistance to CONADES in monitoring the food program, agree that CONADES never developed the staff capability to stimulate self-help activities.

Conclusions

- Food assistance during the critical period of rapid growth of the displaced population alleviated the worst effects of malnutrition.
- CONADES created a distribution network that reached most of the targeted population that was accessible and willing to accept GOES assistance.
- The CENAS and dole feeding were effective short-term measures, but had less utility when the peak period of displaced had passed.
- The shift to food for work had the desired effect of reducing substantially the rolls for food distribution mostly because the displaced that had other sources of income either from employment or remittances from relatives would not work for food.
- CONADES never made the transition from a food distributor to an organization capable of fomenting self-help among beneficiaries.
- The PVOs preferred to convince beneficiaries of the value of undertaking community projects on a volunteer basis rather than depending on food for work for community infrastructure projects.

4. Resettlement and Reintegration

Findings

PVOs and CONADES helped 13,218 families reintegrate themselves in the last eight years of the Project. Three principal PVOs, WR, IRC, and CREA, carried out the greatest part of reintegration activities by giving substantial assistance to 10,027 families in 173 communities. They collaborated in varying degrees with CONADES, who also directly helped some displaced settle. To support the reintegration program, USAID/ES created the Granos Basicos program, which supplied any farmer who wanted to resettle agricultural

packages with enough seeds, fertilizers, and selected pesticides to plant corn, beans and sorghum on 1.7 acres. Over 27,000 of these starter packages were distributed to about 13,000 farmers for their first two harvests.

In 1985, USAID/ES supported two pilot project efforts. WR signed a cooperative agreement to resettle 200 families and OEF to assist 60 displaced women establish self-sustaining enterprises. World Relief grew into a major resettlement effort while OEF never expanded beyond its original group and USAID/ES ended the OEF program in 1987.

WR successfully assisted the 200 families and then expanded into a program that resettled or helped return 7,294 families or 36,191 persons in 73 communities over five years. CESAD at first assembled the agricultural starter kits, but WR assumed this responsibility when USAID/ES ended CESAD's program. WR distributed 14,588 of the packages and became the supplier for three other programs that distributed 12,844 more.

WR worked with three types of communities:

- 1) Agrarian Reform Cooperatives -- the displaced obtained rights to land through the GOES agrarian reform where they resettled and formed their own cooperative. Ten communities fell into this category.

- 2) Plan Vincular -- ISTA identified land and CONADES the displaced families to resettle. Each family purchased their lots individually and WR provided assistance. Forty communities were benefitted.

- 3) Returnee Projects -- the displaced returned to the land they owned. In total twenty-three communities were assisted.

Of the communities assisted, thirty-nine were in Cuscatlan and Morazan, two of the most conflictive departments during this period.

In addition to the starter kits, WR assisted these communities in infrastructure development, mostly housing, agricultural and health development, and productive projects, primarily farm micro-enterprises. World Relief's approach to housing was minimalist in that they provided materials for adequate but not permanent housing. They built 5,198 houses using this approach, many of which still exist today.

The OEF experience, in contrast, reached only five communities in its first two years. OEF's intensive training approach resulted in 165 training sessions in each community. With resources provided by a FEDECCREDITO work project, each community started a productive

enterprise. Although OEF had trained these displaced women to become entrepreneurs, an evaluation calculated the cost of the OEF project at \$4,601 per woman participant, or \$920 per direct beneficiary if family members were taken into account. In terms of cost-effectiveness, the OEF approach was not viable, which was the reason USAID/ES ended the Cooperative Agreement.

Land was the crucial catalyst for the displaced to relocate. Identification of land for the displaced rested primarily with CONADES. In 1988 CONADES and ISTA began the Plan Vincular to make abandoned or underutilized state held land available to the displaced. Each family received a residential lot and an agricultural lot of 3.4 to 8.5 acres depending on land quality. The terms of sale included a grace period, low interest rates, and a repayment schedule of up to fifteen years. The program was to resettle 3,500 families. ISTA in several instances made available land that was too inaccessible for viable communities, and in general was so slow in surveying the sites and processing land titles that the total resettled under the Plan was closer to 1,200. In most instances the displaced and PVOs had to find other local solutions to acquire land.

The other initiative CONADES undertook during this period was an experiment with providing credit to the displaced through the Cajas de Credito. USAID/ES authorized the use of about 100,000 colones (approximately \$20,000) to give small loans to displaced families in four departments. In Morazan and Usulután the local Cajas verified that these funds are continuing to rotate, although not just to displaced persons.

The two PVOs that provided most of the assistance in the final phase of reintegration were IRC and CREA. IRC worked with communities that found a range of solutions to land ownership. The heart of IRC's program was housing construction. In four years it gave all necessary materials for displaced families to construct 1,526 permanent houses in sixty-nine communities, and make improvements on 369 others. IRC helped the displaced build 2,939 latrines, 550 wells, 1,426 washing sinks, and one communal building in each community. IRC also provided limited assistance for productive projects: 1,200 families received agricultural starter kits, 2,010 family gardens were started, and 21,652 tree seedlings were distributed for community reforestation. From the production resulting from the starter kits, 868 families voluntarily put funds into 22 communal banks to generate savings. In all these communities, IRC provided organizational and production training.

CREA also used permanent housing as the centerpiece of its program although its assistance also included community infrastructure, particularly access roads. CREA proved adept at diverse types of training to organize the community and at linking communities to

local authorities to meet longer term challenges. In three years, CREA reintegrated 1,147 families in 25 communities, and worked with another twelve communities with technical assistance that did not include CREA's full package of integrated development projects. Thirteen of these communities were reached only after the Peace Accords, including repatriate communities that were previously indisposed to working with USAID/ES-supported programs.

The training provided by IRC and CREA made clear to each community that, even though it was receiving substantial free assistance, meeting future needs would be its own responsibility. Empowering the displaced to solve longer term problems like gaining access to credit and diversifying production was not an objective of the Project, but in fact over 100 communities gained a new capacity and openness to tackling problems such as diversifying crops that could have a real potential for future development programs.

It is apparent that about half of the displaced persons reintegrated themselves without significant outside assistance once the war environment permitted. Many of them stayed in urban areas, or went back to their original lands. Some displaced were assisted by church and other private organizations. CRS alone distributed EEC food to between 45 and 80,000 displaced persons in 1990-92, many of whom were resettling. All factors considered, the Project played a key role in accelerating reintegration through community building and infrastructure development.

Conclusions

- The various PVOs, together with CONADES, did contribute to reintegrating a significant part of the displaced population needing assistance even though the final phase fell 20% short of its goal of assisting 16,500 families. The shortfall is reasonable considering the demand driven nature of the program.
- The shift to focus on reintegration successfully graduated most people from the social welfare programs. The most successful approach was the agricultural starter kits which established a clear end point (two harvests) for all assistance.
- The assistance given displaced families to reintegrate varied greatly during the life of the reintegration activities. Tailor-making the program to each community was responsive, but also resulted in some groups who received total assistance packages while others received much less.
- USAID/ES might have achieved more had it developed a low-cost housing strategy early with CONADES and PLO involvement that could have been adapted during its implementation instead

of the trial and error approach used. Asking beneficiaries to repay a part of the cost of building housing might have been considered to extend the benefits of this program. (The USAID/ES Project Manager does not agree with this conclusion believing the beneficiaries would not have had the means to make any repayment. Also, monitoring repayment of the loans would have been an added complicating factor in management of the Project.)

- IRC and CREA proved adept at providing organizational training, and the communities they helped build appear ripe for further development efforts.

B. Program Management

1. Rolling Design

As has been noted, Project 0281 went through significant changes during its eleven year history. The emergency lasted much longer than expected when the program started. The circumstances of the displaced kept shifting. That the Project was able to adjust and respond to these changes was a major factor in its success.

Timely and effective use of evaluations was one principal reason the Project kept up so well with evolving needs. The 1984 evaluation confirmed the basically positive impact of the initial emergency phase, but indicated that both a major expansion and improvements were needed. The May 1984 Project Amendment followed soon thereafter with a major increase in funding for expanded jobs and health programs and new supplementary feeding. The 1986 evaluation highlighted a growing trend among the displaced to return to their original homes or to resettle permanently. Again, USAID/ES took the initiative to give new emphasis to durable solutions and to ways to end the safety net aspects of the program. The 1988 evaluation basically confirmed the soundness of the Project's objectives, strategy, and approach. A final Project Amendment followed in 1990 continuing the emphasis on reintegration and beginning the planning for phase out.

Flexible management also facilitated the rolling design. The USAID/ES Program Unit made possible direct and rapid action especially in the early years of the program. Later on, PVOs were enlisted and given substantial freedom to carry out their activities in accordance with agreed upon objectives. When the special problem of the repatriates emerged in 1989, it could be efficiently addressed by using CONADES, although a new and largely autonomous repatriation office was set up, and by using PVOs already on the ground with tried and tested approaches working with displaced settlements.

Some program adjustments could have been made in a more timely and effective fashion. Project HOPE and its dispensaries continued longer than desirable. The timing of termination of the CESAD feeding centers, the FEDECCREDITO jobs program, and the programs implemented by CONADES were related to problems with the institutions. The CESAD feeding and FEDECCREDITO jobs programs were on the verge of phasing out in any event. The CONADES programs were able to be shifted to the SAN.

Some would argue that the entire program could have been terminated a year or so earlier than 1993. Difficulties with CONADES were continuing. The goal of reducing the number of displaced to about 25,000 appeared to have been met (as well as could be determined given the problems of identifying the displaced). But, as the Mission began to plan for peace and the Peace Accords were signed, Project 0281 provided a convenient bridge to the NRP principally by keeping experienced staff and PVOs in place.

The Project conceivably could have been terminated earlier, but transition to the NRP would have been less smooth. Institutional problems complicated efforts to time efficiently and smoothly the phase out of some individual programs. But overall management of the Project to respond to the changing nature of the displaced person emergency was generally very effective.

2. Implementing Institutions

Identification and management of implementing institutions presented special problems for USAID/ES. When the Project began in 1982, El Salvador was not an environment rich in PVOs. Governmental institutions were weak. For reasons of security and suspicions about U.S. policy, U.S. PVOs were reluctant to become involved. USAID/ES was forced to pick some institutions that were inexperienced and not strong. They were asked to undertake programs and manage resources that stretched their capacity. The results were cases of poor management and misuse of funds by some of the implementing institutions. Managing the implementing institutions was a constant challenge for USAID/ES. Following is a summary of findings and conclusions on the institutions involved.

Program Unit

An unusual step was to form a unit within USAID/ES and assign to it substantial implementation responsibility. The Program Unit was directly responsible for the employment generation and health programs. The unit consisted of one, briefly two, U.S. and five local personal services contractors who provided overall management, engineering and nutrition supervision, and monitoring.

The unit contracted local FEDECREDITO Cajas to implement the employment program and Banco Salvadoreño to exercise financial control. For the health program, two doctors and twelve nurses were contracted through CONADES but were managed on a day-to-day basis by the Unit. To provide better overall control of the food distribution programs, seven food monitors were contracted. As PVCs were brought in, the unit was responsible for signing agreements with them and providing direct policy guidance and management supervision.

Given CONADES' inability to handle the entire program and the lack of any other institutions USAID/ES could turn to, the Mission had little choice but to assume a major share of implementation responsibility by forming the Program Unit. The Unit functioned very well. It was efficient, flexible, and quick to respond. It was able to establish procedures and operate in the Mission in a manner that, as one observer put it, was "a project manager's dream."

The other side of the coin, however, was that overall program monitoring and coordination were not centralized in one place, but shared between CONADES and USAID/ES along lines not always clear. This led to some confusion, duplication of effort, and inefficiencies, with the food distribution program being the prime example. More important, USAID/ES involvement in direct implementation made it difficult, if not impossible, to develop an overall GOES sense of ownership for the program.

CONADES

The GOES created CONADES to coordinate policies and implement programs for the displaced population. CONADES had a governing council formed by six Ministers, and a Coordinator and Manager supervised by the Minister of Interior. CONADES built its staff as the program grew until it reached about 260 employees. It maintained a large promoter staff that organized food distribution and, in a later phase, food for work and other self-help activities.

Management problems appeared from the beginning, but particularly became critical in 1984-85 when the program expanded rapidly. USAID/ES realized CONADES needed specialized technical assistance and the Program Unit could not provide it, so an outside consulting firm was contracted. The first, Contracting Corporation of America (CCA), created systems needed to control food distribution. Krause and RONCO succeeded CCA and the latter hired a group of food monitors in reaction to sales of food in local markets. Finally, all technical assistance was consolidated in RONCO in the 1989-92 period. The technical assistance limited unauthorized use of food and updated the displaced persons registry and other specific tasks,

but had little impact on CONADES overall management or the quality of its staff.

From the beginning USAID/ES required CONADES to present annual action plans, which were used to monitor the institution's progress. After 1987 USAID/ES trained staff to undertake self-help activities and RONCO later added specialized assistance on productive projects but with little impact. One successful result of RONCO's assistance was the creation of a unit to coordinate activities with repatriate communities. But the reason for this unit's success is that it operated with direct support from USAID/ES and as autonomously as possible from CONADES' central management.

In 1989 a RIG audit recommended CONADES repay a substantial sum for unallowable expenses. Non-compliance led the Mission to withhold approval of CONADES' action plan for almost a year until the matter was resolved. Successive managers under the new GOES administration did little to improve matters. The Mission urged CONADES to decentralize, but these efforts were ignored. An audit discovered irregularities that resulted in the removal of a manager, and a cut-off of USAID/ES funds in 1992. In the end, the GOES decided to terminate CONADES, and concentrate remaining displaced activities in the SAN.

The management role of CONADES was inadequate throughout the life of the Project. In the later years, implementors complained of obstacles CONADES created to their programs and, except for food distribution, its direct program accomplishments added little to the success of the Project. CONADES undoubtedly tried to do too many things and lacked focus. The root of the problem, however, stemmed from lack of support at the highest levels of the GOES. This lack of support led to the politicized appointment of generally weak managers and hiring of staff not technically qualified. USAID/ES often found itself managing the program in ways to circumvent CONADES since it was never possible to resolve the root problem.

FEDECCREDITO

There were 42 Cajas de Credito in El Salvador when the employment program component started. The Cajas are local, privately controlled cooperatives similar to credit unions. They all elect their own boards and operate autonomously in most respects. Their national federation is FEDECCREDITO, which is a parastatal entity that provides support and financing to its members. The Program Unit organized teams in the ten participating Cajas to manage the employment program. The teams operated independently of the Caja's normal functions, but under the direction of the local Caja manager. To provide fiscal oversight of the program, USAID/ES contracted the Banco Salvadoreño.

Transfer of program coordination to FEDECCREDITO improved overall supervision of the local Cajas. The local Cajas complained of the additional bureaucracy, but as long as FEDECCREDITO had leadership committed to the program, the arrangement worked well. Unfortunately, the end of the program was precipitated by new FEDECCREDITO leadership in 1989 that raised unrealistic demands for changes in how the program was being managed.

The process to manage local work projects was particularly important to the jobs program's success. The steps were:

- 1) Local Caja promoters identified eligible projects with community leaders, CLADs in many instances.
- 2) Mayors approved all infrastructure projects.
- 3) Local Cajas carried out technical reviews, and sent proposals to FEDECCREDITO for review against program criteria.
- 4) The USAID/ES Program Unit reviewed all projects, visited those necessary, and raised any objections within ten days.
- 5) FEDECCREDITO authorized the Banco Salvadoreño to transfer funds.
- 6) Local Cajas monitored progress, and the Program Unit visited each project at least once.
- 7) Banco Salvadoreño audited most projects during implementation.

The combination of checks and balances in the system and the technical assistance given each project on-site raised the quality of the projects and assured their proper implementation.

Banco Salvadoreño

From the beginning of Project 0281 USAID/ES contracted the Banco Salvadoreño as its fiscal agent. The Bank had full responsibility to issue funds, maintain accounting records and provide financial reports. In the case of the jobs program the Bank played an active role in verifying project development, including on-site checks on progress of work projects.

In order to carry out these tasks, the Bank established a separate unit answerable directly to its President. In time USAID/ES contracted the unit to audit CONADES and PLO implementors. In FEDECCREDITO the unit actively helped establish the control systems CAT used to manage the jobs program after 1985. This intimate working relationship throughout the history of the program is in

great part responsible for the fact that FEDECCREDITO only had to make a minor repayment for unallowable costs in a program which represented about half of the Project's total expenditures.

In the other cases the Bank only was responsible to conduct periodic financial reviews, so even though the Bank's unit unearthed the irregularities discovered in CESAD and CONADES, it was too late to prevent serious abuses.

Nearly all involved in the Project's implementation praise the effectiveness of the Bank's role. In a large program oriented to emergency activities, the Bank played a vital role in moving large amounts of resources and controlling and - very likely - preventing abuses.

Project HOPE

Project HOPE is a PLO headquartered in the U.S. with experience in primary health care. USAID/ES intended HOPE to work separately, but in close cooperation with the MOH. HOPE proved adept at creating a virtually self-sufficient health system of dispensaries with its own staff of about 180 persons.

While HOPE was professionally respected by the MOH staff, HOPE did not do enough to promote coordination. HOPE tried to hang on even after it was clear that its clinics were duplicating MOH facilities. USAID/ES eventually succeeded in bringing the HOPE program to a close in 1989. USAID/ES could have been more sensitive to the potential for duplication with the MOH. More forceful and earlier pressure on HOPE to avoid duplication would have been desirable.

CESAD

CESAD had been running a small PL 480 food program when USAID/ES asked it to handle the supplementary nutritional program in 1985. Although USAID/ES funded technical staff, CESAD never developed adequate systems or the management capability to handle so large a program in a short time. Although program accomplishments were on target, the Banco Salvadoreño unit detected serious irregularities, which a financial and compliance audit verified. USAID/ES terminated the Cooperative Agreement for cause. In the case of CESAD, USAID/ES appears to have expected too much of the organization and should have sought an alternative or built in more early institutional building support to assure effective Board oversight of CESAD.

World Relief

WR is a US-based PLO that specializes in managing difficult emergency situations throughout the world. When USAID/ES was

seeking a PLO to manage its reintegration effort, WR was conducting a small relief effort in El Salvador with its own funds. Although accustomed to operating independent of government controls, WR maintained a friendly collaborative relationship with CONADES until 1989 when CONADES leadership changed. Its management style helped make its program responsive to the plight of the displaced even in difficult conflictive areas, but some observers suggested its approach was too paternalistic.

WR's responsiveness meant that many projects were carried out with insufficient participation of the community in their design. Also accounting problems surfaced later because of inadequate documentation of project activities. World Relief International became increasingly concerned with the extent and length of WR's involvement in El Salvador because, by their standards, it no longer constituted an emergency situation. WR ended its involvement in 1990 and passed responsibility for on-going projects to CREA and IRC.

WR was an agile, responsive implementor during a difficult period. Its institutional emphasis on relief and the failure to develop adequate controls for a long term complex reintegration program limited its success.

Overseas Education Fund

OEF was a U.S. PLO that specialized in assistance to women entrepreneurs. Its strength was in training, but it had little experience in emergency situations. OEF's short participation in the program points out the difficulty of adapting a long term intensive approach to a volatile large scale emergency situation. An activity designed for a small group of beneficiaries with little chance of expanding to meet the needs of the displaced more broadly was inappropriate for this Project. The local organization it spawned continues to assist the women benefitted by OEF's program.

International Rescue Committee

IRC is also a US-based PLO with extensive experience in refugee projects, but not displaced populations. IRC worked under an OPG that permitted more latitude than other PVOs. IRC worked mostly with displaced persons that had already relocated. The decision to work with a community resulted from a diagnostic survey that determined whether the population was displaced, registered or not, and willing to work. IRC negotiated a prior agreement with each community regarding the services to be provided. The IRC representative indicated this approach was made possible by USAID/ES' flexibility in adapting funding guidelines to specific needs of the communities.

IRC tended to distance itself from CONADES to preserve neutrality and credibility with all the displaced. This approach worked well in conflictive areas. IRC achieved good coordination with local authorities, particularly the MOH. It dealt flexibly with graduation, but since its OPG required annual reviews to continue funding, IRC avoided any long term commitments with communities. As a result of this program, IRC spawned a local NGO, CIRES. This step offers continuity in the communities where CIRES works, especially now that CIRES is participating in the national reconstruction program.

IRC achieved all its objectives in the OPG, and kept good administrative control. Its approach was idealistic in providing beneficiaries with extensive material assistance. This approach may not often be possible to replicate elsewhere because of its high cost per beneficiary family.

CREA

USAID/ES accepted a bid from Creative Associates, a US-based consulting firm, to carry out reintegration of the displaced in permanent communities. CREA formed a team of twenty-seven technical field staff who promoted projects in preventive health, agriculture, non-formal education, microenterprise, housing and infrastructure. Under the terms of the agreement, CREA was required to assist only the displaced registered with CONADES.

CREA at first relocated displaced persons referred by CONADES or other GOES agencies to new communities. After the Peace Accords and CONADES' demise, FMLN-affiliated repatriate communities became receptive to CREA's presence. This was evidenced in CREA's work with five such communities in Guazapa, Cabanas, Tecoluca, and Usulután in 1992-1993. CREA's approach insisted on clear legal land title as a condition to assist a community, which in some instances they facilitated. They provided extensive training that emphasized communities' responsibility for their own development. This methodology allowed it to work successfully with extremely varied groups of the displaced.

CREA is continuing to work in the reconstruction program, but within a narrower range of activities with a broader population. It has proved to be a competent professional organization, but with little institutional identity beyond that of an implementor of USAID/ES programs.

3. Management of Women in Development (WID)

The Project used the family as its basic unit of analysis for design, and only gathered the most basic information on women. Neither USAID/ES nor CONADES had a manager specifically concerned

with women's issues, and the PVOs, except for OEF, did not have or develop a special expertise regarding women. During implementation, the Program Unit showed a clear concern for women by establishing targets for their participation in the jobs program and increasing attention to their nutritional needs during the emergency phase. The PVOs did strengthen women's organizations through their community training activities, but again reintegrating families as units was the highest priority. IRC contracted a WID consultant in response to their field promoters' request. She was able to do a study and make recommendations to strengthen that aspect of IRC's program at least in its final year. In conclusion, WID management was not a priority, but the Project was able to respond in various specific instances to important concerns of women. Annex F contains more detailed analysis of women in development management under the Project.

4. Coordination with Other Donors

Apart from WFP, other donor assistance represented perhaps no more than 25% of total external resources provided for displaced persons support. The lion's share was provided by AID. Other donor assistance tended to be channeled to specific geographical areas and communities with little overlap. The exception was the special case of the repatriated communities, representing no more than about 30,000 persons, which attracted simultaneous attention and assistance of various kinds from several sources. Many donors sought to operate as independently as possible to preserve their neutrality and accessibility to the displaced.

Coordination among donors with respect to assistance to the displaced tended to be minimal, and under the circumstances, probably was not all that necessary because donors tended to work separately with their own groups. CONADES did attempt to coordinate donor meetings in which USAID/ES participated. USAID/ES did try to keep track of other donor support and did share information with the UN. For the special problem of the repatriates, some means, possibly through the UN, should have been developed to bring about better coordination because donors did overlap.

USAID/ES and WFP coordinated effectively in forming a united front to bring pressure on CONADES to decentralize and strengthen controls on its food distributions. Unfortunately, this coordinated effort failed to produce the desired results.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

Successes, problems and issues noted in the history and findings above suggest a number of lessons for future programs in support of displaced or refugee persons.

1. **Flexibility is critical** - Flexible, adjustable design is a crucial ingredient for a displaced persons program. Whatever the scenario that causes persons to be displaced on a large scale, it will be a crisis situation. Especially if civil conflict is involved, development of the crisis is likely to be unpredictable. To be able to respond rapidly to changing needs is essential for a successful program to assist the displaced.

In El Salvador, the problem of the displaced grew rapidly, lasted longer than expected, and kept changing as the nature of the conflict evolved. Efforts to assist the displaced were constrained by the disruptions of the war, political pressure, and limited availability of implementing agencies. Project 0281 was, on balance, an effective instrument in responding to these challenges.

To supplement CONADES, which did not have the capacity to implement all aspects of the program, a Program Unit was established in USAID/ES for overall management and direct implementation of some program aspects. This enabled rapid and flexible action. Later, direct agreements with PVOs were used with substantial freedom of action permitted the PVOs to experiment with different approaches and adjust to circumstances. Periodic evaluations were scheduled and utilized effectively to make significant changes in program direction.

While initiated as an emergency response to immediate needs of the displaced, the Project was quite legitimately kept alive for eleven years to address the changing but continuing problem of the displaced. It became a convenient and ready instrument to address the special problem of the repatriates. It provided a useful bridge to the peace process and NRP. The personal identification documentation effort started under Project 0281 has continued and expanded under the NRP, and both USAID/ES staff and PVOs such as CREA and IRC were on the ground and ready to go as NRP implementors.

Flexibility had its downsides as noted below. But the Project's success was due as much as any other factor, to its rapid response capacity and rolling design.

2. **Responsibility should be placed on the host government as much as possible** - There is a natural tendency in an emergency program for an external donor to be proactive. The risk arises, however, of appearing to take responsibility from the host government. This in turn can lead to the host government assigning

lower priority to the program and making less effective efforts to support it.

Implementation of the Project suffered because the problem and response came to be viewed as a U.S. rather than GOES responsibility. Why this occurred is easy to understand. The GOES simply could not respond to the needs of the displaced and tended, moreover, to view their needs as not significantly worse than the non-displaced who were also suffering effects from the war. Political heat in the U.S. was pushing the U.S. Government to act as the displaced problem became more visible. By assuming major direct responsibility for implementation, USAID/ES inevitably sent signals that the Project was more a USAID/ES than GOES concern.

The pattern continued as U.S. PVOs were brought in. Direct agreements were signed with them. To a greater or lesser degree their tendency was to ignore and even avoid the GOES and to try to perpetuate themselves. Project HOPE effectively collaborated with and complemented the MOH initially, but then later began to duplicate MOH facilities. IRC and OEF operated quite independently of CONADES.

The circumstances and nature of the displaced problem were such that USAID/ES had no choice but to take a proactive role. That proactive role made possible the flexibility and agility that contributed so much to the Project's success. But USAID/ES allowed the GOES to take too much of a back seat role. This led to a great deal of time and energy being spent on fighting the GOES rather than supporting them. It also led to the lower priority assigned by the GOES to the displaced problem generally and to the need to strengthen CONADES specifically.

Even while taking the lead initially, USAID/ES could and should have pressed the GOES earlier to take responsibility. Higher level U.S. pressure on President Duarte in the mid-80s might have produced a better-led, technically stronger, and more powerful CONADES. Greater GOES sense of responsibility for the program and a more effective CONADES would have produced greater program benefits, although the extent cannot be measured.

3. Targeting a specific group must be carefully managed -
Targeting assistance to a special group such as the displaced will inevitably cause problems as distinctions are made with the poor majority. Those problems need to be carefully and flexibly managed. To keep such problems to a minimum, graduation from special status should occur as early as possible and in accordance with specific criteria and a deliberate plan.

Project 0281 included specific measures to target assistance on the displaced. A voluntary registry system was used to define the

target group. Only those registered were to qualify for the employment and food distribution benefits. Controls were established and were effective to a degree in insuring that only the qualified benefitted.

The health benefits of the Project were handled somewhat differently. The vaccination program was targeted where the displaced were concentrated but both displaced and non-displaced were vaccinated to insure disease prevention. Project HOPE clinics were also concentrated on displaced centers, but HOPE insisted all comers to the clinics be treated. Home visits were restricted just to the displaced. Under the relocation and reintegration programs later in the Project, both IRC and CREA faced the problem that communities they were working with contained occasional individuals who were not displaced. They sought, and USAID/ES agreed, to flexibility in dealing with these special cases.

A special problem arose when it became apparent that many displaced were not registering because of fear of reprisals from either the government or the guerrillas. The response was to sign an agreement with CESAD to make food distributions and establish CENAS in known displaced concentrations where CONADES tended not to be welcome and the displaced were not registered.

Attitudes towards the displaced were initially favorable in the communities where they settled because the jobs program generated cash that stimulated the local economy and because assistance generally relieved the displaced burden on the community. But as time went on and assistance continued, resentment began to build as the non-displaced viewed the displaced as no worse off and sometimes better off than themselves. "Tagging" increasingly became an issue as did the potential for dependency.

How to get people off the dole became the next challenge. Graduation occurred in several ways, some by design, some not. The shift in 1987 to food for work had the effect of de-selecting significant numbers of displaced who either preferred not to work or found that it conflicted with their regular employment. Improvements in the displaced persons registry carried out by CONADES after 1986 with technical assistance from Kraus and RONCO led to the trimming of substantial numbers who did not qualify for displaced person status. Those participating in the agricultural starter package program agreed as a condition of participation to be eliminated from all displaced person assistance programs after two harvests.

The food assistance portion of FEDECCREDITO's program, CESAD's supplementary feeding, and HOPE's clinics were all phasing out in 1987. The FEDECCREDITO jobs program was discontinued in early 1989. Problems with these institutions rather than a deliberate

"graduation" design either accelerated or delayed phase-out. Many displaced simply dropped out of programs of their own accord as they found alternatives.

The Project developed appropriate systems and controls to insure almost all the assistance reached the target group. The Project was flexible in addressing the special problems of targeting the health and reintegration programs. When it became clear a large segment of the target group was being missed because many did not wish to register, special efforts were made to reach them. As graduation became more feasible, measures were taken to define criteria for graduation and implement them. Some of these measures, for the health and food distribution programs, might have been taken earlier and more forcefully.

4. Coordination is often lacking and needs attention in emergency programs - The natural tendency in emergency programs is to be proactive and to give priority to getting things done. Attention to coordination tends to suffer. The risk is potential for duplication and lost opportunities for more cost-effectiveness. Care must be exercised not to overlook coordination, risk of duplication, and potential for stretching resources as emergency activities are developed and implemented. This care is especially needed under the heightened pressures typical in emergency programs.

Experience with the PVOs, and to a degree with the Program Unit, illustrated this risk. An obvious example was the virtually independent health system operated by Project HOPE, CONADES, and the USAID/ES Program Unit. Health needs of the displaced during the early years clearly exceeded the MOH's capacity to respond. Supplementary efforts were needed. But lack of coordination and careful planning led not only to duplication, but also to disincentives to the MOH to assume its appropriate responsibility.

To varying degrees, the PVOs tended to operate independently from CONADES and the national government. This freedom greatly facilitated their operations and ability to meet their objectives. While they coordinated more or less effectively with local authorities, their lack of coordination at the national level certainly led to missed opportunities to stretch resources. The PVOs could have been urged to coordinate more with the national government.

Coordination with other donors also suffered. When donors worked in different geographical areas with their own groups of displaced, lack of coordination was not a serious problem. But with the special case of the repatriates, more overlap of donor efforts began to occur and stronger efforts to coordinate were needed. To the extent the host government cannot do it, a neutral party, such as the UN, needs to assume the coordination responsibility

5. The jobs program proved to be an effective model - The experience of Project 0281 suggests that a jobs program is a useful tool for assisting displaced people. It helped people meet some basic needs while maintaining dignity. At the same time, many useful community projects were accomplished.

There are several key principles to keep in mind. An emergency jobs program should be created within as simple a bureaucracy as possible, preferably in the private sector. Work projects should come from representative community organizations and have the approval of local authorities. The delivery system should have careful monitoring and various checks and balances that deter favoritism and corruption. Wages paid should not compete with prevailing job opportunities.

Ideally, work projects should concentrate in communities where the displaced are living, but selecting doable projects is even more important. A success of the jobs program was that it focused on durable community improvements using labor intensive approaches. It is preferable to do viable useful projects in surrounding communities rather than make-work activities in camps or concentrated settlements.

Making work projects open to as many family members as possible also worked well. Older children and spouses as well as fathers from the same family might work in projects at different times. Incorporating women into work crews gave many families whose fathers were killed or involved in combat a chance to participate.

6. Food is necessary to assist the displaced, but needs careful management - Food distribution clearly has a key role in a displaced persons program. However, local governments often will not trim those no longer needing food from the rolls for political and bureaucratic self-interest reasons. Donors will have to press for updated lists of needy beneficiaries. Also, an institutional strengthening effort including specialized technical assistance is likely to be required for implementing institutions if food distribution moves from dole feeding to food for work or self-help activities.

USAID/ES provided substantial technical assistance to CONADES to build its capacity to manage food aid. As long as the purpose was delivering food for dole feeding, CONADES' logistical management deficiencies could be adequately handled with the external technical assistance. Food for work, which requires more sophisticated organizational methodology at the community level, exceeded CONADES' capabilities even with competent technical assistance. Also, the attempt by CONADES to offer vocational training along with food accomplished little because CONADES failed to make any analysis of demand for the skills being provided.

7. Implementing institutions need appropriate strengthening -

Attention to the strengths and weaknesses of implementing organizations is especially important when their availability may be limited in the context of civil conflict or other emergency situations. There is also a tendency to ask a lot of implementors and to stretch their capacity. PVOs live in a delicate balance. Handling greater resources requires an organic growth that must extend throughout the organization. AID should take care to assure that PVOs take necessary organizational development steps, especially strengthening a board's oversight role, before granting them resources that exceed their capacity to control.

Throughout the life of Project 0281, USAID/ES had a difficult time finding appropriate implementors. Either because of disagreement with U.S. government policies or security concerns, many U.S. organizations declined to participate. It is difficult to say that USAID/ES could have done more to attract PVOs with the breadth of experience needed to accomplish the tasks the rapidly changing situation of the displaced required. In the end, USAID/ES had to work with a variety of organizations, some more prepared than others to implement a diverse program under difficult conditions and comply with USAID/ES accounting standards.

The most graphic example is CESAD. CESAD was not USAID/ES' first choice to undertake the supplementary feeding program. The leap from a small scale food distributor to a large multi-service organization was a clear case of too much too fast. CESAD's accounting system was examined as part of a certification process, but little was done to strengthen its board or train its staff to put into practice the internal controls needed to manage relatively large amounts of resources. External controls were sporadic and audits found irregularities too late to prevent permanent damage to the institution.

8. Beneficiary data, especially sex-differentiated, should be collected and used - In an emergency, it is easy to forget the importance of understanding what is happening to beneficiaries, especially women. In a war environment women are likely to be heads of households in an even larger than normal percentage as their spouses are involved in or casualties of the conflict. Data gathering on the changing circumstances and needs of the displaced and the differential effects on women is essential.

The Project over its history made a large effort to track the displaced population, and the changes in its circumstances. Various censuses, the CONADES registry, and the base-line study all represented important data gathering. Perhaps more could have been done to measure impacts of the employment program and track impacts on the communities where displaced resettled, but in general the

collection of data on the displaced greatly facilitated the ability of the program to change.

An obvious weakness in data collection was the sporadic attention given to the situation of women. Little attempt was made to collect sex-differentiated data. Many program activities incorporated women, but it would have been possible to address the special needs of displaced women better if USAID/ES had required a more consistent gathering of information about them.

For instance, an observation several informants made about the war is that displaced women have borne a disproportionate burden of the trauma. Husbands and sons killed in the war, an inability of women heads of household to find employment, and the need for women to keep up a home under the most difficult circumstances have all contributed to produce a generation of traumatized women who need special attention. It is possible that had more data been gathered on women, USAID/ES and the PVOs would have recognized the extent of the problem and carried out counseling and other activities aimed at alleviating these effects.

9. **Strong financial monitoring is needed** - Extra measures may be needed to assure proper financial control when large amounts of resources are involved and channeled through several organizations to large numbers of beneficiaries. Also, when local organizations are involved, concurrent financial monitoring is especially needed because it can be difficult to recover unallowable costs after the fact.

From the beginning of the Project, USAID/ES contracted the Banco Salvadoreno to be a fiscal agent. For the jobs program the Bank had full responsibility to release funds, maintain accounting records, and verify work progress. The fact that FEDECCREDITO had to make only a minor repayment for unallowable costs after over \$34 million expenditures on this program is testament to the value of this arrangement. For other implementors, the Bank was responsible only to conduct periodic financial reviews. Even though the Bank discovered the irregularities in CESAD and CONADES, it was too late to prevent these abuses. All agree the Bank played an important role in strengthening financial monitoring and control under this Project.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Lessons Learned section above incorporates the team's recommendations on relevant considerations for any such future programs. The team was also specifically asked to recommend any needed follow-up activities for the remaining displaced or ex-displaced which are not currently underway or planned under the NRP.

The team recommends no further special program activities for the displaced. The safety net objectives of Project 0281 have been met. The large majority of the displaced have reintegrated themselves into Salvadoran society or have been provided the basis through Project assistance to carry on for themselves at least as well as their non-displaced neighbors.

A few squatter concentrations of displaced remain which were not assisted with housing or other infrastructure because they occupy land for which they cannot be provided clear title and they chose not to relocate. The team visited perhaps the largest such community - El Tiangué in Gotera - where approximately 3,000 families, despite persistent efforts on CREA's part, have preferred not to leave their in-town location. The community is a slum and a more permanent solution needs to be found.

Both the immediate and longer-term needs of this and other like communities, however, can and should be addressed within the context of the NRP and other national welfare and development programs. Moreover, targeting any further special assistance to the displaced at this time would be a mistake. Their tag as displaced has been and should be kept removed so as not to revive any "special status" problems or encourage further dependency tendencies.

FINAL EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Persons
(519-0281)

BACKGROUND**A. The Problem of Displaced Families in El Salvador**

The problem of displaced families in El Salvador should be viewed against the background of violence and armed conflict that was a fact of life in the country between 1979 and 1992. The early years of the conflict (1979-82) were especially difficult for El Salvador's rural population. As the fighting expanded throughout the countryside, family members were assaulted, killed, or involuntarily conscripted by the guerrillas or the army. Crops were destroyed in the course of battle or by deliberate acts of terrorism. Families were forced to feed both sides. Large farms and haciendas were abandoned, making it impossible for day laborers (jornaleros) to find work. Many rural families had no alternative but to leave their farms and residences, thus becoming displaced (desplazados).

Most displaced families moved from the combat zones in stages, fleeing first to the municipal centers, then to departmental capitals, and, in some cases, on to San Salvador. Some moved as many as six times after their initial displacement, looking for a place to settle. They squatted on vacant land in rural areas, settled along roadways or railroad tracks, occupied buildings. A few fortunate ones were able to find accommodation with friends or relatives, or had the economic means to buy or rent land or blend into other communities; others left the country. Some families were attracted to settlement camps made available by local governments, churches, or private relief agencies.

These institutions did their best to respond to the emergency, but the displaced population grew so rapidly that its needs soon exhausted local resources. Recognizing the extent of the problem and the need for coordination and control, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) established the National Commission for Assistance to the Displaced of El Salvador (CONADES) in 1981 to coordinate all local and foreign assistance being furnished to displaced persons.

The GOES also set up a number of emergency camps to provide needy displaced families with temporary shelter and other basic services.

From an estimated 25,000 persons in 1979, the size of the known displaced population rose to about 85,000 in 1980 and to between

165,000 and 200,000 in 1981. By 1982, some 250,000 persons had been registered by CONADES as displaced, and there were undoubtedly many more who had left the combat zones but had not identified themselves as displaced persons for fear of reprisals by the military, or who were receiving assistance from private organizations without going through CONADES.

After three years of widespread terrorism and counter-terrorism, the complexion of the conflict began to change in 1983 as the military became better able to contain guerrilla activity and reduced the abuse of noncombatants. By 1985, the guerrillas had abandoned their strategy of mounting large-scale offensives on departmental population centers and had broken their forces into smaller units trained to attack targets of opportunity (including military installations) and disrupt economic activity by destroying power lines and other infrastructure. With the election of the Duarte Government in 1984, progress was made on a number of social and economic reforms which helped to reduce the influence of right-wing extremists and improve confidence in the Government's ability to control "death squad" activity and other human rights abuses. The guerrillas also began to show greater respect for the human rights of noncombatants by modifying their practices of involuntary conscription and forced payment of "war taxes."

The displaced population continued to grow through 1985, when it peaked at over one half million persons, more than 10 percent of El Salvador's population. The dramatic increases in registration that took place from 1983 to 1985 may have been due to a diminution in fear of reprisals against those registering rather than to an actual increase in movements out of the conflict areas. Since 1985, the number of displaced persons has gradually declined to less than 15,000. A Peace Agreement between the guerrillas and the GOES was signed in January 1992.

B. Historical Overview of Project No. 519-0281

Project No. 519-0281, entitled Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Families, was launched in May 1982 by a grant agreement between USAID/ES and the GOES. The Program was initially designed as an emergency response to the basic needs of displaced families for (1) occasional

employment to generate cash income; (2) preventive and curative health services; and (3) shelter and food assistance. CONADES, was given direct operational responsibility for the curative health and food assistance components of the Project. The other components were to be handled by a Program Unit which was also responsible for overall program implementation and for providing technical assistance to CONADES with food distribution and control. This Program Unit was set up within USAID/ES. The unit was staffed by U.S. and local Personal Services Contractors (PSC's) paid for with grant funds.

By 1984, the Displaced Families Program had been in operation for two years and the movement of displaced persons from the conflict areas was showing no signs of abating. As this emergency Program had not been intended to provide for the basic needs of displaced families over extended periods of time, the need for a longer term perspective and solution to the problem became apparent. The following year (1985), USAID began entering into cooperative agreements with U.S. and Salvadoran PVOs for both emergency assistance and pilot projects designed to establish models and methodologies for helping displaced families become independent of emergency assistance.

An outside evaluation performed in 1986 recommended that the objectives and scope of the Displaced Families Program be broadened so as to assist uprooted families reintegrate into the economy. These reintegration efforts started slowly, but gained momentum in 1987 when it became apparent that some families were returning home on their own initiative. With USAID encouragement, the GOES redesigned its own assistance programs for the displaced to emphasize aid to returnees.

ARTICLE I - TITLE

Project: Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Persons

Number: 519-0281

ARTICLE II - OBJECTIVE

To provide a two person team which shall evaluate the above Project in order:

- To record the costs, accomplishments and failures of this

long-term and large Project;

- To present "lessons learned" for use by A.I.D., other donors and other countries facing situations similar to that faced by El Salvador in the 1980s and early 1990s, i.e., a political upheaval which caused a prolonged armed insurgency, an economic depression and a large number of destitute displaced persons; and
- To recommend any critical follow up activities now required for the few remaining displaced and the exdisplaced persons and which are not currently underway or planned under El Salvador's National Reconstruction Program.

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

The evaluation team shall analyze the following areas and make judgements, recommendations or comments to the USAID regarding them.

- A. Institutional arrangements with Host Government and other donors.
- B. USAID administrative and operational procedures.
- C. The implementation process utilized, including:
 - 1) Activity identification
 - 2) Activity selection
 - 3) Preparation of Action Plans
 - 4) NGOs
 - 5) Host Government Agencies
- D. Project Accomplishments/Impact:
 - 1) Beneficiaries successfully resettled
 - 2) Employment
 - 3) Health and nutrition
 - 4) Physical works
 - 5) Training
 - 6) Housing
 - 7) Agriculture productive projects

8) Credit

9) Other

E. Project Spin-offs

Any objectives not particularly sought, but achieved, good or bad.

F. Women in Development Issues (WID). WID objectives should be addressed throughout the report. However, the following questions should be answered in an annex to the report.

1) Design, Appraisal and Implementation:

- How were the interests and role of women (compared to men) taken into account in each of the design, appraisal and implementation stages of the Project?
- In what ways did women (compared to men) participate in these processes?

2) Effects and Impacts Concerning Women:

- What were the effects, positive or negative, of the Project concerning women's (compared to men's) access to income, education and training, and with respect to workloads, role in household and community, and health conditions?
- How were the interests and role of women (compared to men) taken into account in the evaluation stage?
- Were significant factors concerning women (compared to men) overlooked at the appraisal stage?

3) Data Availability:

- Were gender-specific data available for each of the Project stages?
- Design
Appraisal/Approval
Implementation
Monitoring
Evaluation

4) Sustainability:

- How did women's integration in AID activities affect the sustainability of Project outcomes? Were outcomes more sustain (or less sustained) when women were taken into account in AID activities?
- Are the results achieved by the Project equally sustainable between men and women beneficiaries?

G. Project Design and Project Design Modifications

The rolling design of the Project as it attempted to respond to changing circumstances and opportunities shall be traced. Related success and failure shall be reported and commented upon.

H. Lessons Learned

The focus of this very significant section shall be on Project experiences -- 1982 to 1983 -- that may be relevant, useful and serve as guidelines for other countries, USAIDs and donors.

I. Project Followup

Recommendations for any follow-on activities not now underway or planned under the National Reconstruction Program.

J. Methods and Procedures

The evaluation team will receive an in-depth briefing by the USAID upon arrival. The briefing will be followed by a field trip to view a representative sample of activities. The purpose of this trip is to provide familiarity with the Project and its various activities.

Following the field trip, a few days will be required to review pertinent Project documentation, e.g., Project Paper, Project Authorization, Project Agreements, PILs, Project Correspondence, Project Audits/Mission Responses, etc.

The review of Project documentation should be followed by extensive visits to implementing entities. Key personnel in those entities shall be interviewed and their perspective shall be gained.

Project beneficiaries shall be visited. A sample of beneficiaries in each of the major components and activities of the Project shall be interviewed.

It is assumed that throughout the conduct of the above

activities the evaluation team will be drafting sections of their preliminary report.

The remaining time should be used in preparing the required reports, verifying information and conducting exit debriefings.

ARTICLE IV - REPORTS

The Contractor shall provide the USAID the following:

- A. Participation in entrance and exit briefings with the Project Officer, Mission Evaluation Committee and Mission management, as appropriate.
- B. Within five weekdays from the day of arrival, the team shall submit for USAID approval a working outline of the first draft report, which shall include a list of suggested places to perform field trips.
- C. Not later than seven workdays before leaving El Salvador, the Chief of Party shall give the USAID four copies of a draft report in English. This draft will be reviewed by the Mission Evaluation Committee within four days, and oral and written comments/recommendations will be provided to the team leader.
- D. The Contractor shall consider the comments and recommendations in preparation of the final draft report which is to be left with the Mission prior to departure.
- E. The USAID will provide final comments within two weeks. The Contractor shall send to the USAID ten copies of the final report in English within 30 days of receipt of the USAID's final comments. The evaluation report will include the following sections:
 - 1) Executive Summary: Including purpose of the evaluation, methodologies used, findings, conclusions and recommendations. It shall also include comments on development impact and lessons learned. It shall be complete enough so that the reader can understand the evaluation without having to read the entire document and shall be self-contained.
 - 2) Scope of Work and Methodology: A copy of the initial scope of work and a detailed outline of methodology used shall be included. Any deviation from the scope shall be explained.
 - 3) Evaluation Team: A complete list of evaluation team

members, their field of expertise and the role they played on the team.

- 4) Previous Evaluations: This section shall include a brief description of the conclusions and recommendations made in earlier evaluations (1984, 1986 and 1987). The evaluators shall discuss briefly what use was made of the previous evaluations in their review of the Project.
 - 5) Lessons Learned: This section shall describe the causal relationship factors that proved critical to Project success or failure, including necessary political, policy, economic, social and bureaucratic conditions within the host country and AID that impacted on the Project. These should also include a discussion of the techniques or approaches which proved most effective or had to be changed and why. Lessons relating to replicability shall be discussed extensively, i.e., how other countries, donors or USAID's could benefit from the lessons learned from the Project.
 - 6) Paginated Table of Contents.
 - 7) Glossary of Acronyms.
 - 8) Map of EL Salvador.
 - 9) List of Persons interviewed: Include their organizations and title.
 - 10) Table of Actual Financial and Commodity Inputs: This shall be broken down by Project components and activities and by sources of inputs (GOES, USAID, other donors).
 - 11) Table of Actual Project Outputs: This shall be broken down by Project components and activities, and shall identify target groups, institutional responsibilities, and expected or planned outputs vrs. actual outputs, including those not expected.
 - 12) WID Annex: See Article III, F.
- G. A.I.D. Evaluation Summary. Mission will provide A.E.S. forms and appropriate guidance for the submission of a draft of this formal summary.
- H. Project Completion Report. Mission will provide format and appropriate guidance for the contractor to the complete draft of this report.

ARTICLE V - RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The team will work under the guidance of the USAID's Director of the Infrastructure and Regional Development Office (IRD) or his designee. USAID liaison officials will be Messers Marc Scott, Lynn Sheldon and Raymond Lynch, all located in IRD.

ARTICLE VI - PERFORMANCE PERIOD

The target date for starting the evaluation is June 7, 1993; earlier is acceptable. Each member of the evaluation team shall spend a total of 30 calendar days in El Salvador. The team leader shall work an additional five days in the U.S. for completion of the final report. The evaluation shall be completed by the end of August 1993.

ARTICLE VII - WORK DAYS ORDERED

<u>Position</u>	<u>Work days</u>
Project Management Specialist	30
Development/Evaluation Specialist - Team Leader	<u>35</u>
T O T A L	65 days

ARTICLE VIII - USAID ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

See Attachment II

ARTICLE IX - SPECIAL PROVISIONS

- A) Duty Post: San Salvador, El Salvador
- B) Language Requirements and Other Qualifications: The Evaluation Team shall consist of two persons: 1) an individual with project management and/or evaluation experience related to long lasting disasters affecting large numbers of seriously impacted poor people, and 2) and individual with extensive project development and evaluation experience. Both shall have a Spanish language capability at the FSI R-3; S-3 level or better.
- C. Access to classified information: The contractor shall not have access to any USG classified material.

- D. Logistic Support:** USAID will provide access to Project reports and files and assist the contractor in arranging meeting with GOES officials and PVOs, and in arrangements for site visits.

The contractor will be responsible for renting office space (available in local hotels) and equipment, local transportation, transportation to and from El Salvador, hotel arrangements, secretarial services, and reproduction of reports.

The GOES will not provide logistic support.

- E. Workweek:** The team is expected to work six days for each of the five weeks in El Salvador.

WPPIBG/12(85-93)

EVALUATION TEAM

HENRY JOHNSON is a retired AID Senior Foreign Service Officer with thirty years experience mostly in Latin America. He has served as Program Officer in Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Chile, Panama, and Jamaica, and as Deputy Director of the Office of Development Planning of AID's Latin America Bureau. Both in the field missions and the Bureau he was responsible for supervising the evaluation function. As a private contractor following retirement, he was Team Leader for evaluations of the Emergency Medical Services (Project Hope) Project in Costa Rica, the PL480 Title III Program in Bolivia, and the Technical Support, Policy Analysis, and Training Project in El Salvador. He was Team Leader for this evaluation.

DANIEL SANTO PIETRO is an independent consultant with twenty-five years experience in Latin America, principally with private development organizations. He was Director of Catholic Relief Services Northeast Brazil program and later served as Deputy Director of CRS's South America Regional Office. As a consultant he coordinated a training project on monitoring and evaluation for about 60 PVOs, which involved field workshops in Asia, Africa and Latin America and editing the Evaluation Sourcebook for PVOs. He became the Latin America Director for PACT, and supervised PVO institutional strengthening USAID OPG projects in Guatemala and Costa Rica. His recent consultancies included several PVO evaluations and technical assistance to an NGO, FOES, in El Salvador.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED BY EVALUATION TEAM

- Agency for International Development, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Displaced Persons in El Salvador: An Assessment, Washington, D.C., March 1984.
- Barrau, Debbie, "Returning and Relocation of Displaced Families in El Salvador since 1987," San Salvador, March 1988
- Cañas, Mercedes, "The Story of Uprooted Women: Repatriates, Returnees and Displaced," FOREFEM, San Salvador, February 1992.
- Cavallaro, Michael, "Lessons Learned," International Rescue Committee's Operating Program Grant, El Salvador 1988-92, San Salvador, June 1992.
- Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., "Formative Evaluation of the Displaced Families Program," Washington, D.C., September 1988.
- CONADES, "Evaluación del Plan de Acción Contrapartida Abril Diciembre / 91," San Salvador, January 1992.
- CONADES - RONCO, "Diagnóstico de Comunidades Activas," San Salvador, August 1991.
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- Consulting Corporation of America, Baseline Survey of the Displaced Population, San Salvador, 1985.
- CREA Internacional de El Salvador, "Guia de Inducción Laboral," San Salvador, May 1992.
- Dunas, Abel et al., "Project HOPE Displaced Families Evaluation Report," San Salvador, 1988
- FEPADE, "Encuesta sobre Demanda de Empleo y Necesidades de Capacitacion," Marzo-Abril 1987, San Salvador, July 1987.
- Gersony, Robert et al., "The Journey Home: Durable Solutions for Displaced Families" (abridged version), San Salvador, June 1986.
- Government of El Salvador, Ministry of Planning, "Diagnostico Alimentario Nutricional de El Salvador," San Salvador, 1983.

Instituto de Derechos Humanos, En Busca de Soluciones para Los Desplazados, San Salvador, 1986.

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Nash, Jeffrey, "RONCO Final Report July 1989 - June 1992, Technical Assistance Contract No. 519-0281-C-009490-00, Washington, D.C., 1992.

Project HOPE El Salvador, "Primary Health Care to the Disabled and Resettled Population," San Salvador, April-September 1986.

UNICEF, "Análisis de la Situación de la Mujer en El Salvador," San Salvador, August 1987.

USAID/El Salvador, "Project Paper, Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Families (Project No. 519-0281)," San Salvador, May 1984.

_____, "Project Paper, Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Families (Project No. 519-0281) Amendment Number 2," San Salvador, September 1990.

_____, IRD/CDB, "Index for Background Materials on Displaced Persons Assistance".

_____, "Humanitarian Assistance Program Strategies for Displaced Persons in El Salvador," San Salvador, April 1987.

_____, PACR for Cooperative Agreement No. 519-0281-A-005442-00 with Overseas Education Fund Intl., San Salvador, 1987.

_____, PACR for Cooperative Agreement No. 519-0281-A-005388-00 with World Relief Corporation, San Salvador, February 1990.

_____, PACR for Cooperative Agreement No. 519-0281-A-004280-00 with People-to-People Foundation, Inc. (Project HOPE), San Salvador, March 1989.

_____, PACR for Project Agreement Between the Federation of Credit unions (FEDECCREDITO) and the Agency for International Development, Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Families, San Salvador, March 1989.

_____, PACR for Cooperative Grant Agreement No. 519-0281-G 005108-00 with the Salvadoran Evangelic Committee for Assistance and Development (CESAD), San Salvador, December 1988.

World Relief/El Salvador, "Memoria de Labores (1985 - 1990), Displaced Persons Project, No. 519-0281 (4 Volumes)," San Salvador, April 1990.

**DISPLACED PERSONS PROGRAM (519-0281) EVALUATION
LIST OF INTERVIEWS**

USAID: David Kitson, IRD
Ray Lynch, IRD/NRD
Marvin Dreyer, IRD/NRD
Ron Witherell, IRD/NRD
Yolanda de Herrera, IRD/NRD
Tom Hawk, IRD
Aldo Miranda, IRD
Ernesto Palomo, IRD
Ted Landau, DPP
Sam LaFoy, PRJ
Ana Cristina Mejia, PRJ
Pat Wexell, CONT
Ovidio Lara, CONT

Other Interviews:

Alfonso Muñoz, Representative, Banco Salvadoreño
Alejandro Gonzalez, Manager, Caja de Credito, USULUTAN
Asmel Aparicio, Accountant, Caja de Credito, MORAZAN
Miguel Melgar Veras, ex-Mayor, Suchitoto, CUSCATLAN
Jose Reyes Flores, Mayor, Gotera, MORAZAN
Natividad Majano, Mayor, Osicala, MORAZAN
Jorge Gonzalez Vides, ex-Planning Chief, CONADES
Sonia Alvarenga de Granados, ex-member, Unidad de
Repatriados, CONADES
Luis Mendez, ex-sub-director, RONCO
Jeffrey Nash, ex-RONCO Chief of Party
Oscar Sarroca, Director, World Food Program
Leila Lima Santos, Regional Coordinator, ONUSAL (ex-
UNHCR Representative)
Renata Dubini, UNHCR representative
Otto Eric Vidaurre, ex-Chief Administrative Officer,
World Relief
Brad Brooks, Director, CREA
Rudolfo Pacheco Paz, CREA
Michael Cavallaro, Director, IRC
Serena Cosgrove, WID Consultant, IRC
Jose Maguiña, Director, CRS

LIST OF SITE VISITS MADE BY EVALUATION TEAM

<u>Department</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Type of Activity</u>
LA PAZ	El Nilo I & II	June 16	IRC assisted agrarian reform cooperatives settled spontaneously by displaced
USULUTAN	Usulután	June 16	Interview with Manager of Caja de Crédito
	La Peña	June 16	CREA assisted new community of relocated displaced
	El Carrizal	June 16	CREA assisted new community of relocated displaced
	San Juan	June 16	CREA assisted new community of relocated displaced
SAN SALVADOR	Bolívar	June 18	WR originally assisted, then CREA; community of relocated displaced
	El Tronador	June 18	CREA assisted community of returnees
CUSCATLAN	Suchitoto	June 18	Interview with ex-mayor
	Copapayo	June 18	CREA assisted community of repatriated displaced
MORAZAN	El Tiangué	June 22	Settlement of displaced on municipal land
	Gotera	June 22	Interview with mayor and Caja de Crédito representative
	Oscali	June 22	Interview with mayor
SAN VICENTE	San Vicente	June 22	Visit to OEF assisted pig raising project

WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT ISSUES (WID)**1. Design, Appraisal and Implementation**

For the most part design efforts were aimed at the family as a whole. The team found no indication that the specific interests or roles of women were taken into account at the design or appraisal stages, except to a certain extent in the case of the OEF program since it was specifically targeting women entrepreneurs.

During the implementation phase, there were some adjustments intended to increase women's participation. Most evident are the targets established for women to work in crews assembled for the FEDECREDITO job program. This step alone greatly benefitted women, many of them heads of households, who needed the additional income. In the health and nutrition area, vaccinations reached large numbers of pregnant women for tetanus shots and CENAS fed pregnant and lactating mothers.

It is difficult to measure the exact participation of women in health activities because of the lack of data, but intense coverage through home visits and local clinics assured that women and girls were reached. Since fathers often gave lower priority to girl's health needs, they were not taken to the clinics as quickly.

The reintegration programs carried out by PVOs clearly had many activities that included women. Housing construction usually included women, water projects particularly helped lighten women's burdens, and a permanent solution to owning a home must have lifted a burden from women housemakers. There was no systematic focus on women's concerns, but part of the community building that occurred helped women's groups to organize. The limited experience of IRC with communal banks largely involved women groups. It is clear that men still dominate community organizations like cooperatives and directivas, but women are participating in greater numbers. None of the PVOs have any data to support these observations, so it is not possible to say whether the Project's specific activities have made the difference.

2. Effects and Impacts Concerning Women

The Project helped women to become income earners on an equal footing with men. The fact that men made up around 80% of the jobs program work force shows that it did not go far enough. The 1985 base line study indicates that 70% of displaced families lived off occasional employment, and that the 65% of families that had women as heads fared significantly worse in finding

employment. Again the data is sparse, but it does suggest that more needed to be done to address this significant segment of the displaced population. Another complication for women is that even though the family was displaced, the woman still had significant household chores to attend to unlike her husband who most often was unemployed and had time on his hands.

All factors considered the job program had more positive than negative benefits for women. The most beneficial effect of including women in the jobs program probably was that for the first time many of them were paid for their labor. Granted men sometimes took the income for their own use, but the precedent seems to have made a lasting impression. Many informants observed that displaced women have become more aggressive in seeking income opportunities than average rural women because of their experiences.

In general, the health activities had a positive effect on women. Improvements in health conditions resulted in benefits for men and women alike, so it is difficult to say whether one benefitted more than the other. Most of the rural health volunteers were women, who surely gained status from their new skills. Because they are most responsible for children, it is not surprising that women were more involved in health matters.

Once reintegration became the major concern, a different set of problems arose. At first ISTA would not grant land to women heads of families unless they could show they had the ability to work the land, i.e. they had older male children. Legal title to land and homes favored men. An IRC report mentions a case where a woman who helped construct the family home was told by the man she had to leave because he had found some one else. Since most rural couples are not legally married, joint ownership is not assured. Although the PVOs were aware of the problem, they could not find a general solution to the problem. Legal rights remain a major concern for women.

The evaluations conducted during the Project addressed women's concerns. The first evaluation in 1984 particularly pointed out the plight of women which resulted in the adjustments cited above. None of the evaluations conducted any special studies or recommended new programs be directed to women.

3. Data Availability

Most detailed files on this Project were warehoused, and, consequently, the evaluation team did not have available much of the information available to the designers of the various programs in this Project. In the documentation reviewed, the emphasis on the family meant that most data was not gender specific. The job program did not track an accurate account of the number of women workers, food was distributed by family and medical referral data

made no mention of sex. The base line study did offer data on the number of women overall, i.e. heads of household, and some employment data, but most often the family is treated as a unit. Other more recent studies performed by CONADES-RONCO analyze the situation of displaced communities, but with no specific data regarding women.

4. Sustainability

The emergency nature of this Project implies that sustainability was not as direct an objective as would be the case in a development project. A primary objective was to reintegrate families into their former communities or help them relocate, but not to guarantee their sustainability, particularly in economic terms. For this reason the same standards do not apply.


The integration of women on the other hand was vital to implementing this Project. Had USAID not taken women's needs into account in the employment and health programs, they would not have been nearly as effective. Since women were the mainstays that kept many displaced families together during this difficult time, emergency efforts needed their full participation.

The reintegration efforts probably should have focused even more on the specific needs of women to make their outcomes even more lasting. It is fair to say that the PVOs were aware of the problem, but no one addressed the issue head on. Displaced women were forced to emerge from the kitchen because they could no longer be dependent. Many men were killed or simply left their companions because of the war. As a result of their experience, displaced women became more independent and prepared to be involved in more significant ways in their communities. There is no evidence that the communities USAID assisted took full advantage of this social change, but at least some inroads were made through the community building training given. The stage is set for more long-term development efforts that will see women come to the forefront.

A lesson learned on this point is the importance of supporting and involving women's organizations in building communities. After 1985, many such NGOs started to form in response to the changes happening in El Salvadoran society, but informants suggest they received little attention. UNHCR has been involved in an attempt to organize these various NGOs together to give them a more direct role in reconstruction programs.


A specific example of a need that exists are the large number of displaced women that suffered mental and emotional trauma during the war often more serious than the men. These women need counseling and support. Although some organizations, including the GOES Secretaria de la Familia, recognize the problem, there is still not an effective program.

DISPLACED POPULATION IN EL SALVADOR BY YEARS



ANNEX G

MAP OF EL SALVADOR



ANNEX H

26