EVALUATION OF THE LAC NARCOTICS DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM (598-0000)

FINAL REPORT

Agency for International Development
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EVALUATION OF THE LAC NARCOTICS DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM (598-0000)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABEAD	Brazilian Association of Alcohol Studies (Brazil)
ADEFAR	Program for Attention to Drug Dependents, Attorney General's Office (Mexico)
A.I.D.	U.S. Agency for International Development
ADIC	Association for Integral Community Development (Guatemala)
AIDSCAP	AIDS Control and Prevention Project (Brazil)
APAAC	Association for Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Chemical Dependencies (Haiti)
ASORPRED	Association for Training, Orientation, and Prevention of Drug Addiction (Guatemala)
CDC	Center for Disease Control (U.S.)
CEBRID	Brazilian Center for Research on Drugs, University of Sao Paulo (Brazil)
CEDRO	Center for Information and Education for Drug Abuse Prevention (Peru
CEIS	Italian Center for Solidarity (Peru)
CELIN	Latin American Research Center (Bolivia)
CENDRO	Planning Center for Drug Control, Attorney General's Office (Mexico)
CEPB	Confederation of Private Businesses (Bolivia)
CESE	Drug Education Center (Bolivia)
CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, OAS
CIJs	Centers for Youth Integration (Mexico)
CIMESPAD	Intersectorial Metropolitan Commission of Health for the Prevention of Alcoholism and Drug Addiction (Peru)
COMEN	Municipal Drug Council (Brazil)
CONADIC	National Council Against Addictions (Mexico)
CONAFE	National Council on Educational Development (Mexico)
CONANI	National Coordinator of Action for Children (Guatemala)
CONAPAD	National Council for the Prevention of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse (Guatemala)
CONEN	State Drug Council (Brazil)
CONFEN	Federal Narcotics Council (Brazil)
COPRE	Prevention Council (Bolivia)
CORA	Center for the Orientation of Young Adults (Mexico)
COPUID	Commission for the Prevention of Drug Abuse (Peru)
CSAP	Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services (U.S.)
DA	Development Associates, Inc.
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency (U.S.)
DENARC	State Department for Public Security (Brazil)
DEPA	Drug Education and Public Awareness Project (Peru)
DIF	National System for Family Development (Mexico)
DINAPRE	National Directorate for Prevention of Drug Abuse and for Treatment and Social Reintegration (Bolivia)
EAP	Employee Assistance Program
EC	European Community

ENACO	Agency for Legal Coca Production (Peru)
ESAN	Graduate School of Business Administration (Peru)
FAS	Solidarity Action Fund (Colombia)
FAVA/CA	Florida Association of Voluntary Agencies for Caribbean Action (Eastern Caribbean)
FEMAP	Mexican Federation of Private Associations for Health and Community Development (Mexico)
FNJ	Fundacion Nuestros Jovenes (Ecuador)
FUNDASALVA	Narcotics Awareness and Abuse Prevention Foundation (El Salvador)
FUSSESP	Sao Paulo Social Solidarity Fund (Brazil)
GDE	General Direction of Epidemiology (Mexico)
GREA	Interdisciplinary Group for Studies on Alcoholism and Drug Dependency (Brazil)
IDB	Interamerican Development Bank
IMESC	Institute of Social Medicine and Criminology (Brazil)
INGUAT	Guatemalan Tourist Agency
INM	Bureau for International Narcotics Matters (State Department)
INSM	National Institute of Mental Health (Peru)
LAC/SAM	Bureau of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs/Office of South American and Mexican Affairs, A.I.D.
MIP	Mexican Institute of Psychiatry (Mexico)
NAE	Narcotics Education and Awareness Project, A.I.D./R & D/Development Associates
NAS	Narcotics Affairs Section (State Department)
NCDA	National Council on Drug Abuse (Jamaica)
NDACC	National Drug Abuse Control Council (Belize)
NECI	Narcotics Education and Community Initiatives (Peru)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIDA	National Institute on Drug Abuse, Department of Health and Human Services (U.S.)
NVP	New Vision Productions (Bolivia)
OAS	Organization of American States
OFECOD	Executive Office of Drug Control (Peru)
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy (U.S.)
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PASA	Participating Agency Service Agreements
PBC	Basic Cocaine Paste (Pasta Base de Cocaina)
PGR	Attorney General of the Republic (Mexico)
PRIDE	Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education (Atlanta/Belize)
PROAD	Program for Orientation and Care of Drug Dependents, Paulista School of Medicine (Brazil)
PROINCO	Project for Research and Awareness in the Prevention of Drug Abuse (Bolivia)
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
R & D	Bureau for Research and Development, A.I.D.
SEAMOS	Anti-Drug Education and Social Mobilization System (Bolivia)

SENAD	National Anti-Drug Secretariat (Paraguay)
SEP	Secretary of Public Education (Mexico)
SISVEA	Epidemiology Surveillance System for Addictions (Mexico)
SUBDESAL	Subsecretariat of Alternative Development (Bolivia)
UNC	National Communications Unit (Bolivia)
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service

COMMENTS
NARCOTICS AWARENESS AND EDUCATION (NAE) EVALUATION

Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., conducted an independent evaluation of A.I.D.'s Bureau for Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) NAE program. A.I.D.'s comments are the following:

Institution Building **[Page iii, item 7, and Page 106, item 2]** Institution building is not the purpose for NAE projects, rather it is a means to achieve project objectives. In case after case, however, A.I.D. has created institutions that are wholly dependent on continued U.S. Government support. The evaluation recommends continued A.I.D. support ("over decades", if necessary). Budget realities make this infeasible. We believe the recommendation should have been to seek less resource-intensive means of addressing NAE problems.

Baseline Data, and Monitoring and Evaluation Systems **[Page 88, paragraph A-1; and Page 106, Recommendation 3(c)]** The evaluation makes the point that most NAE projects do not have adequate baseline data or effective monitoring/evaluation provisions. The rationale provided ranges from relative newness of the activities being undertaken, to the relative low levels of A.I.D. investment (e.g. Guatemala's $100,000 program). LAC has funded NAE activities for almost 10 years. It is well past time for projects to be developed to show impact, and to have the necessary baseline and monitoring/evaluation systems in place to show results (or lack thereof). Designing and measuring for impact are just as important for small as for larger programs.

State and Local Organizations **[Page 108, Recommendation 11]**
The recommendation that A.I.D. do more with U.S. state and local organizations engaged in demand reduction is not supported in the body of the report. It is impossible to determine to what the recommendation refers. A.I.D.'s experience with U.S. state and local organizations has been mixed, at best.

Technical Support Unit: Flexible Funding Mechanism **[Pages 109-110, Recommendation 16]** Funding realities dictate that LAC limit demand reduction activities to a few, well-targeted countries. Given a limited program, and constrained budget and staff resources, the recommendation that the Bureau create a special unit and funding mechanism for demand reduction is not feasible.

X

SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Background

Between mid-January and late March 1993, a five-person team fielded by Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. conducted an evaluation of the "relevance and effectiveness of A.I.D.'s investments in narcotics awareness, prevention, and drug use reduction in the Latin American and Caribbean Region." The team began its work by reviewing documentation available in Washington and by conducting interviews with knowledgeable officials in a number of U.S. Government agencies and international and private organizations. Next, over a four week period, the team visited five countries -- Guatemala, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil. These visits permitted on-site observations of A.I.D. projects, discussions with project personnel, meetings with U.S. and host country officials, and talks with officials of non-U.S. donor organizations, notably the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), and the European Community (EC). In addition, the team spoke by telephone with senior A.I.D. officials in a number of other LAC countries.

In accordance with the scope of work provided by LAC/SAM, the Evaluation Team prepared five case studies, one for each country visited. Each study contains project-specific conclusions and recommendations. The case studies are in Section Two of this report. Section Three sets forth general conclusions and recommendations at the non-strategic level based on patterns that emerged from the case studies. Section Four contains general findings and lessons learned. Section Five provides major recommendations on issues of strategy. An inventory of activities in demand reduction by entities other than A.I.D. is presented in Annex 1.

Areas of Inquiry

The statement of work specified nine areas of inquiry, in addition to calling for production of the inventory. Team findings covering these nine areas are developed throughout the report. A summary of key points follows.

1. Nature of the Problem. Prevalence of drug abuse varies widely within the region and has been documented to a reasonable degree in epidemiological studies. The use of such illegal drugs as cocaine and marijuana tends to be well below U.S. levels in the countries where A.I.D. has demand reduction projects. However, there is a range of special factors that do not bode well for the future -- high levels of use of such "gateway" drugs as inhalants in several countries; the fact that drug traffickers often pay their collaborators in drugs, thereby increasing the user base;

high levels of poverty and rapid population growth in many countries; a growing drugs/AIDS connection, especially in Brazil; and significant increases in drug use in some countries, notably Brazil.

Levels of public awareness of the danger of drug use vary widely, but consciousness of the problem generally appears to be growing. Public awareness of the dangers of drug production and trafficking appears to have increased significantly, particularly in Peru and Bolivia.

Each Country Team tends to have a reasonably good understanding of the host country's drug awareness/prevention problem, but the problem is often defined in project documentation in vague and general terms. More attention should be paid to precise and thoughtful problem definition, and there should be a clear indication of the weight the USAID Mission places on various elements of a project -- e.g., public awareness of the need for counter-narcotics enforcement, prevention, and reduction of existing drug use.

2. **Priority Assigned to the Problem and to A.I.D. Projects that Address it.** By and large, host country governments do not assign a high priority to demand reduction and do not make significant contributions to A.I.D.-financed projects. The priority assigned to the problem by USAID Missions ranges from high (e.g., Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil) to medium (Mexico) to low (Guatemala).

3. **Definition of Project Goals, Purposes and Outputs.** For the larger projects (in Bolivia and Peru), goals, purposes and outputs are reasonably well defined. However, this is generally not the case with smaller projects that do not have an A.I.D. "Logical Framework." Although a project can produce useful results despite weaknesses in the listing of goal, purpose and outputs, a precise statement of same is clearly important for purposes of project management and evaluation.

4. **Effectiveness, Efficiency and Level of Effort within Projects.** By and large, projects in the countries visited by the team have generated impressive arrays of outputs, and the entities supported by A.I.D. are run by competent and dedicated individuals. Operational achievements are generally satisfactory.

5. **Project Monitoring and Evaluation.** Systems for monitoring project outputs appear adequate in most countries visited by the Evaluation Team. However, lack of clarity in the original definition of the problem often complicates monitoring at the goal and purpose levels. Evaluation of project impact is weak or non-existent in the case of virtually all the projects examined by the team. Even in the evaluation of output and performance there were weaknesses. There was satisfactory mission involvement in project monitoring in most cases.

6. **Adequacy of Resources.** Resources appear generally adequate for achievement of the outputs sought by project managers. There are some exceptions (e.g., the SUBDESAL Communication Unit in Bolivia; see case study). In a number of cases (notably Brazil), extra

funding could be put to good use if it were available. However, the better substantive efforts typically are those that now generate or show promise of generating outside assistance.

7. **Project Costs/Desirability of Institution Building.** Drug demand reduction appears inexpensive when measured against the price paid for other USG interventions, including A.I.D.'s investment in alternative development. Total A.I.D./LAC expenditure on demand reduction to date (some $46 million) translates into very modest unit costs in terms of population served. However, precise cost-benefit analysis is elusive in view of the general absence of project impact evaluations.

Institutional development has been used for the achievement of worthwhile results in demand reduction. Sometimes the formation of a new institution has been necessary, as was true in the case of CEDRO (the Center for Information and Education for Drug Abuse Prevention) in Peru (see case study). However, the relatively long-term, resource-intensive approach of creating or strengthening an institution should be taken only when it is demonstrably essential to address the problem that has been formally identified and less costly means of achieving similar ends have been ruled out.

8. **Sustainability**. In most cases, financial sustainability in the absence of continued USG support appears unattainable in the foreseeable future. This is particularly true because A.I.D. at this stage necessarily focuses on private, voluntary entities, which face all the difficulties inherent in private sector fund raising in Latin America and the Caribbean. Unless drug demand reduction programs begin to enjoy full support from national public sources they will continue to require outside funding. Except in the case of CEDRO in Peru, there is little evidence in the countries visited of sophisticated efforts by A.I.D.-supported entities to raise non-USG funds.

9. **Quality of A.I.D.-Funded Services and Technical Assistance**. In the countries visited, most persons with whom the team met, whether Country Team officers or host country nationals, had a high opinion of A.I.D.-funded services and believed A.I.D. had been responsive to needs. Most interlocutors also expressed satisfaction with the technical assistance provided by Development Associates, Inc. under the Narcotics Awareness and Education (NAE) contract.

Recommendations for a Modified Strategy

With a new administration beginning to consider future USG anti-drug policy, now is a good time for A.I.D. Washington to examine its past experiences, revisit lessons learned, and explore options for the future. As it does so, A.I.D., in cooperation with other USG agencies, will need to take a close look at the full range of demand reduction efforts already being carried out by the U.S. Government, international organizations, and other major donors.

In gathering information for the inventory at Annex 1, the Evaluation Team was impressed by the large number of organizations involved in demand reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean and by the size of the investments of some entities, notably the UNDCP and the European Community. It became clear to the team that coordination between the U.S. and other

donors, and among the others donors, is far from adequate. Closer coordination could lead to improved policy decisions by the U.S. and other donors, avoidance of overlap in projects, and improved targeting of problems.

As indicated below, the team proposes, inter alia, a collaboration between the USG and other major donors in developing an international demand reduction strategy. In the light of that collaboration, the donors should establish a practical coordination mechanism, and the U.S. should consider whether a more multilateral approach to its own demand reduction efforts would be desirable. One option would be a closer U.S. relationship with the UNDCP, which might include the channeling of at least some USG demand reduction funding through the UNDCP and the assignment to that organization of high quality U.S. personnel on secondment.

With the above considerations in mind, the Evaluation Team has set forth, in Section Five of this report, a series of seventeen specific courses of action that the LAC Bureau should consider in developing a modified demand reduction strategy. The proposed actions are summarized below:

1. Make a rigorous assessment to determine which countries should be the principal recipients of demand reduction assistance.

2. Concentrate resources on the few target countries that are identified in the assessment.

3. Ask each participating USAID Mission to review its definition of the specific problem that needs to be addressed in the host country.

4. Work with other USG agencies to improve coordination at the Washington level.

5. Urge host governments to contribute direct financial support to A.I.D. projects.

6. Assign a high priority to helping A.I.D.-supported entities achieve sustainability in both a financial and technical sense.

7. Consult with USAID Missions on how they might play a more proactive role in securing multilateral and other non-USG support.

8. Ensure that adequate management expertise exists within A.I.D.-supported projects.

9. Incorporate anti-drug elements into other A.I.D.-supported activities.

10. Advocate combining U.S. efforts with those of other countries in the hemisphere.

11. Explore opportunities for tapping U.S. state and local resources.

12. Bring together key experts to formulate recommendations on future efforts in demand reduction.

12. Bring together key experts to formulate recommendations on future efforts in demand reduction.

13. Give high priority to well-targeted training opportunities.

14. Communicate A.I.D.'s accomplishments in a more effective manner.

15. Consider allowing more flexibility in technical assistance contracting in the future.
16. Consider establishing a small technical support unit and a flexible funding mechanism in the LAC Bureau.

The Evaluation Team's final recommendation is a general one relating to all U.S. Government and international initiatives in drug demand reduction. The Team proposes that A.I.D.:

17. Recommend an interagency assessment of USG efforts in demand reduction, followed by a collaboration between the USG and other major donors in developing an international demand reduction strategy.

A comprehensive listing of the Evaluation Team's recommendations with page references is provided in Annex 5.

Section One

PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EVALUATION

A. Background

By the end of this year, A.I.D.'s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) will be able to look back upon a decade of efforts to help establish drug awareness, prevention and use reduction programs in a majority of the hemisphere's nations. To date, A.I.D. has committed over $46 million to demand reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a major portion devoted to two programs, Peru and Bolivia.

In view of the change of administrations and prospective modifications in A.I.D.'s organization and mandate, A.I.D. has realized for some time that it will need to consider the overall effectiveness of its past efforts and prepare a modified strategy for the future. A.I.D. asked for this study as a means of securing outside advice as it considers future options.

B. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The Scope of Work (see Annex 2) establishes the parameters for an evaluation of the "relevance and effectiveness of A.I.D.'s investments in awareness, prevention, and drug use reduction in the Latin American and Caribbean Region." The purpose of the study is to provide A.I.D.'s LAC Bureau with an assessment of its efforts in demand reduction to date and recommendations for its future work.

The Scope of Work calls for the Evaluation Team to address the following nine key issues:

1. The nature and extent of the problem being addressed in the countries visited;

2. The priority assigned by the host government and the U.S. Country Team to the problem and to A.I.D. projects that address it;

3. The extent to which project goals, purposes and outputs are correctly defined;

4. Effectiveness, efficiency, and level of effort within projects;

5. The adequacy of project monitoring and evaluation;

6. The adequacy of resources provided by A.I.D. in support of projects;

7. Acceptability of project costs and the desirability of institution building;

8. Sustainability of the entities supported by A.I.D.;

9. The quality of A.I.D.-funded services and technical assistance.

In addition, the scope of work calls for the Evaluation Team to produce an inventory of activities in demand reduction by entities other than A.I.D.

C. Methodology

The Evaluation Team followed a case-study approach. Its basic methodology was to (a) examine projects in five countries in some depth; (b) prepare case studies (including project-specific conclusions and recommendations) on each country; and (c) prepare general recommendations at the non-strategic level as well as major recommendations on issues of strategy. The Evaluation Team's work involved three phases, as follows:

1. Review of documentation available in Washington and interviews with relevant persons in the Washington area. The team met with officers of A.I.D. and other USG agencies, officials of international organizations and NGOs, and representatives of the prime contractor and sub-contractors for A.I.D.'s Narcotics Awareness and Education Project.

2. Field visits to review projects in Guatemala, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil.

3. Review of submissions from USAID Missions not visited and follow-up telephone interviews with them, as appropriate.

Persons contacted and sources consulted are listed, respectively, in Annex 3 and Annex 4 to this report. The Evaluation Team held more than 100 meetings in Washington, Guatemala City, Mexico City, La Paz, Lima, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia and made a number of site visits to observe field activities. In each country, the team held lengthy discussions with beneficiaries of A.I.D. assistance and met with USAID and other relevant Country Team officers and with host country officials -- in some cases including persons at the ministerial level. The team also interviewed officials of the UNDCP, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the European Community, the OAS, and PAHO. Finally, nine USAID Directors in countries not visited were interviewed by telephone.

Although it would have been desirable to visit field programs where additional important lessons might have been learned, time and other considerations prevailed. Responses to the requests for

inputs from countries not visited were varied in terms of level of detail and responsiveness to the evaluation issues. Several USAID Missions simply noted a lack of interest in future activity.

The team had the good fortune of finding A.I.D. and other USG officials who had prior exposure to programs in some of the countries not visited, and their views were a useful supplement to other information received. In addition, extensive interviews were conducted with foreign professionals whose experience extended beyond the borders of their own countries, notably Dr. Guido Belsasso in Mexico, Licenciada Laura Baldivieso in Bolivia, and Dr. Roberto Lerner in Peru.

D. Definition of Terms

For the reader's guidance, the team provides the following definitions of some key terms as used in this report. They do not necessarily correspond to definitions used by specialists in drug use prevention, but rather reflect the main problem areas typically addressed by A.I.D. projects in the field. For example, a specialist's definition of "prevention" might include treatment. The team's definition for purposes of this report does not, since treatment of foreign drug users is not funded by the U.S. Government.

> ***Public awareness activity***: an effort to raise nationwide awareness of the danger of drug production and trafficking; or an effort, within a prevention program, to raise awareness of the danger of drug use.
>
> ***Prevention***: an initiative designed to ensure that non-users do not initiate use of illegal drugs or abuse of certain "gateway" substances (e.g., inhalants and prescription drugs). Prevention, as used in this report, does not address the problems of alcohol and tobacco use.
>
> ***Reduction of Drug Use***: an effort to lower the number of persons experimenting with or using drugs (e.g., through training, anti-drug publicity, outreach and referral). For purposes of this report "reduction of drug use" does not include actual treatment and rehabilitation, since they are not part of any A.I.D. projects.
>
> ***Demand Reduction***: As generally used herein, this is a broad term that includes all three of the above categories of effort. As used in the inventory (Annex 1) it also includes treatment and rehabilitation, since those activities are sometimes funded by international organizations and other non-USG donors.

E. Characteristics of a Well Designed Demand Reduction Project

The Evaluation Team was aware of the need to carry out its work with a clear idea of what constitutes a well designed demand reduction project. The exact nature of such a project will of course vary from country to country, depending on the problems that need to be addressed and

on a range of local circumstances. Nevertheless, the team proceeded on the assumption that, as a general rule, a well designed project should include the following elements:

1. A clear definition of the problem being addressed;

2. Proper balance within the project based on a clear decision regarding the relative weights that should be assigned to (i) public awareness of the danger of drug production/trafficking; (ii) prevention (including public awareness of the danger of drug use); and (iii) reduction of drug use.

3. Availability of adequate resources and cost-effective use of those resources;

4. Adequate project monitoring and evaluation based on clearly established mechanisms and satisfactory baseline data.

5. Provision for necessary epidemiological research, either within the project or separate from it, with full attention paid to the need for uniform definitions, instruments, and methodology.

6. Existence of effective mechanisms within projects (e.g., endowments, technical assistance) that will enable entities supported by A.I.D. to move toward sustainability.

F. Acknowledgements

The Evaluation Team wishes to express particular appreciation to the A.I.D. Missions that facilitated this study. Appreciation is also extended to key A.I.D. and other USG officials in Washington, to officials of the U.N., EC, OAS and PAHO, and to representatives of various non-government organizations, all of whom provided useful information and insights in meetings with the team. Last but not least, a great debt is owed to officials and staffs of numerous A.I.D.-supported public and private sector organizations who gave so kindly of their time and attention to still one more group of interested visitors.

Section Two

CASE STUDIES

In response to the requirement in the Scope of Work that case studies be developed in each of the countries visited by the Evaluation Team, five such individual reviews follow, in the order of travel accomplished: Guatemala, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil. Each case study seeks to address the key questions enumerated by LAC/SAM in Section Three of the SOW. Project-specific conclusions and recommendations are included in each case study.

I. CASE STUDY - GUATEMALA

A. Findings

1. Nature and Extent of the Drug Abuse Problem

In recent years, Guatemala has become a significant transit country for cocaine. Both marijuana and opium poppies are grown domestically, and an opium processing capability exists. Although no coca is produced in Guatemala, the availability of cocaine for potential use within the country appears to be increasing, and the price of cocaine has recently dropped by almost 50 percent. There is evidence that drug traffickers tend to pay their Guatemalan collaborators in cocaine, thereby increasing the user base.

In an effort to determine the extent of illegal drug use in Guatemala, two prevalence studies have been conducted thus far -- one in 1990 by Development Associates, Inc. and one in 1992 by the National Council for the Prevention of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse (Consejo Nacional de Prevencion del Alcoholismo y la Drogadiccion -- CONAPAD). CONAPAD, which is the beneficiary of the USAID demand reduction project in Guatemala (see section A. 2), conducted the 1992 survey as part of that project.

The 1990 survey covered urban populations between the ages of 12 and 45 in Guatemala City, Quetzaltenango, and Esquintla. In addition to illegal drugs, the survey addressed alcohol, tobacco, and other legal (but abused) substances. Reported lifetime prevalence of illegal drug use was not high -- 1.4 percent for cocaine/crack (as opposed to 12 percent in the U.S), 1.7 percent for opiates, 1.8 percent for hallucinogens, and 7.3 percent for marijuana). On the more negative side, the survey indicated that initial use of such potential "gateway" drugs as inhalants and alcohol took place at relatively early ages -- between 12 and 14 years of age for inhalants, and between 15 and 19 for alcohol.

The 1992 CONAPAD survey was conducted on a nationwide basis and covered people between the ages of 10 and 60. It indicated that 2.1 percent of those interviewed had used marijuana at some point in their lives and that 1.96 percent had used "narcotics" (not defined in the study, but presumably cocaine and opium). Use of potential "gateway" drugs was high -- 25.13 percent had used tranquilizers and 73.82 percent had used alcohol.

Although illegal drug use still appears to be fairly moderate at the national level in Guatemala, the 1990 survey revealed that some 50,000 persons had used cocaine among the approximately 1.5 million Guatemalans who are relatively affluent. Both CONAPAD and Development Associates see the 1992 survey as probably reflecting an increase in the use of illegal drugs, particularly since it includes not just urban areas and younger people but regions and age groups in which drug use is not likely to be high. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) in Guatemala

estimates that between 8,000 and 12,000 street children use inhalants (gasoline, kerosene, paint thinner, glue). He noted that Guatemala City was expected to double its population in 13-15 years, and he anticipated that street gangs would become more active and that the drug problem could escalate. In view of the low price of cocaine in Guatemala, there is some potential for narco-tourism.

When all factors are considered, it seems clear that the drug abuse problem and the potential for increased drug addiction in the future justify continuation, for now, of the modest U.S. investment in demand reduction in Guatemala. However, the very low priority assigned to demand reduction by the Guatemalan Government threatens the long term sustainability of the effort, as discussed later.

2. The USAID Project

Origin and Funding

In view of the 1990 prevalence study findings, the A.I.D. Mission decided in June 1991 to begin financing demand reduction activities in Guatemala on a limited scale. As a first step, USAID/Guatemala obligated $100,000 for a 12 month buy-in to the A.I.D. Washington R&D/ED Narcotics Awareness and Education (NAE) contract with Development Associates, Inc. The resulting project in Guatemala (No. 520-0000.2) is managed exclusively by Development Associates. It is the only A.I.D.-funded demand reduction project in Guatemala.

Of the $100,000 obligated for the project, approximately $30,000 was retained by Development Associates to cover its management fee and necessary expenses. The remaining $70,000 went to support the public awareness and demand reduction activities of Guatemala's National Council for the Prevention of Alcoholism and Drug Addiction (CONAPAD). Development Associates is now proposing that there be an additional buy-in to support CONAPAD for two more years -- $100,000 for 1993 and $110,000 for 1994. The project would continue to be managed by Development Associates. (The NAE Project Director was in Guatemala during the visit of the Evaluation Team and personally prepared a new Project Implementation Order for the A.I.D. Mission's consideration.)

CONAPAD was created as a dependency of the Office of the President by Government Decree No. 950-89 on December 13, 1989. From the outset, it has been an organization with extremely limited resources. Its only permanent staff consists of its Director, Carlos Arenas, plus a secretary and a driver. Three additional persons are now on loan to CONAPAD from the Executive Branch: a psychiatrist, an education specialist, and a documentation specialist. The only support CONAPAD receives from the Guatemalan Government is (a) payment of the salaries of the three-person CONAPAD staff and of the three additional persons on loan to CONAPAD; and (b) provision of very limited office space in the building occupied by the Guatemalan Tourist Agency, INGUAT. Even this space has been made available thanks to INGUAT's Director, who is Carlos Arenas' sister. Arenas states that the funds he receives under the USAID contract are virtually the only cash resources at his disposal.

Nature of Initial Planning for the Project

At the outset of the USAID project in 1991, there was no precise definition of its goal, purpose and outputs for two reasons: (a) it was not an A.I.D. "project" in a formal sense but rather a special USAID-generated effort paid for with Project Development and Support (PD&S) funds; and (b) both USAID and Development Associates wished to proceed flexibly given the many uncertainties in Guatemala. For example, it was not clear at first whether grants should be given to several Guatemalan entities or funneled entirely through CONAPAD, and it was not clear just how much could be achieved with such limited funding in the absence of on site technical support. For these reasons, the 1991 Project Implementation Order calls for "testing different approaches to the problem in the Guatemalan context," and it sets forth a general strategy rather than precise objectives. Subsequently, the "focus of the buy-in" was described by Development Associates as "to (1) support drug prevention in Guatemala through training, technical assistance and funding of public and private sector activities; and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of various approaches to drug abuse prevention." Thus, the entire approach to the project in the early months was one of experimentation and adjustment in the light of the experiences gained.

Although public support for counter-narcotics activities was seen from the outset by the USG Country Team as one possible benefit of the project, it was never recorded as part of the project's purpose and was not part of Development Associates' statement of work. The team notes that the Project Implementation Order for the continuation of the project clearly lists "objectives" and planned outputs. The objectives focus on prevention. Within the objectives, the need for "drug awareness" is mentioned but the term is not defined. As used, it sees to refer exclusively to the danger of the use of drugs, not the danger of drug trafficking.

Since the start of the project, there have apparently never been any demarches to the Guatemalan Government requesting complementary funding. In the team's opinion, requests for such funding should have been made.

The Evaluation Team spent most of its time in Guatemala in an effort to judge the effectiveness, impact and ultimate sustainability of the very limited CONAPAD operation. The team visited field activities conducted by CONAPAD and its affiliates, talked extensively with Carlos Arenas and with persons familiar with his work, and interviewed a broad spectrum of Country Team officers (see Annex 3).

The Role of CONAPAD and Its Director

Director Carlos Arenas serves, in principle, as coordinator of all demand reduction and drug awareness activities in Guatemala, both public and private. He works with a multiplicity of national organizations, ranging from those whose main purpose is the anti-addiction effort to entities such as the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce, Lions, Rotary, and other similar civic groups that have some concern with drug use and wish to play a role in countering it.

Arenas faces a difficult coordination task for the following reasons: (a) as an embryonic organization with no financial and little political support from the Guatemalan Government, CONAPAD has little bureaucratic clout; (b) the organizations with which Arenas deals are autonomous and he therefore has no firm authority over them; (c) there are some significant rivalries among some of these organizations (Arenas says he is trying to "break through the egotism"); and, (d) Arenas himself is seen by some as having an excessively "lone wolf" style of management.

CONAPAD's Work with Guatemalan Schools

Despite these difficulties, Arenas is doing a reasonably good job of eliciting concrete, positive results from various organizations with which he deals, notably the Guatemalan schools. CONAPAD provides direct drug prevention services to local public and private educational institutions though the efforts of its own staff and those of volunteers whom CONAPAD recruits and trains. CONAPAD is developing an anti-drug curriculum for the schools, training anti-addiction trainers, and providing technical assistance to education personnel.

In an attempt to judge CONAPAD'S work with schools, the Evaluation Team made a field visit to a public school in school district 19 on the outskirts of Guatemala City. The school visited (Escuela de Turquia) was one of 17 in the district. Interviews with the district supervisor, the school principal, and several teachers from other schools of the district who assembled to meet with the team indicated that they all had a high degree of involvement in anti-drug efforts within their schools. They spoke at length and credibly of extensive involvement in the school zone's anti-addiction and public awareness activities by students, parents, and other members of the community. They said that, since 1991, CONAPAD had provided drug prevention training in the district to 50 teachers, who in turn had trained others, creating a multiplier effect. They noted that one of the principal impediments to their work was the lack of a physical facility where directors, teachers, parents, and students of school district 19 could meet to plan the implementation of drug prevention activities. All interlocutors had high praise for the anti-drug curriculum material, training, and technical advice being provided by Carlos Arenas, his staff, and his volunteers.

In general, the schools in district 19 are attended by poor to lower middle class children. Arenas informed the Evaluation Team that, in the past year, CONAPAD has begun to provide direct support services to 15 private schools serving students from the more affluent classes of society. His rationale for this assistance is that (a) out of fairness, services should not be concentrated exclusively on lower and middle class students; and (b) the most recent epidemiological study showed that the use of hard drugs was concentrated among upper class young people, who can afford them.

CONAPAD's assistance to the 15 private schools is provided in the form of anti-drug presentations in almost every classroom of every school, identification of student leaders, one-day training workshops for these leaders in various aspects of drug prevention, and follow-up training and technical assistance to school personnel in charge of the anti-drug program. The student

leaders and school personnel that have been trained spread the anti-drug message further, providing the desired multiplier effect. Once a year, a single high profile activity related to drug prevention is developed collectively by all 15 schools.

Judging from the following factors, CONAPAD's program in private schools appears to have already encountered some measure of success: (a) interest in the program on the part of the participating schools remains high; (b) there is a growing interest in drug prevention among Catholic schools, which were at first reluctant to participate in the program; and (c) there has been an increase in requests for anti-drug presentations and for drug prevention materials from private schools not yet in the program.

CONAPAD's Work with ASORPRED and CONANI

In addition to its work with schools, CONAPAD provides indirect anti-addiction assistance through advice to, and some limited funding of, two local anti-drug organizations -- Asesoramiento, Orientacion y Prevencion de Drogaddiccion (ASORPRED) and Coordinadora Nacional de Accion Por Los Ninos (CONANI). Members of the Evaluation Team visited ASORPRED and CONANI.

With ASORPRED, CONAPAD has a formal contract under which CONAPAD provides ASORPRED with training, technical assistance, and support in the development and administration of anti-drug programs. The Director of ASORPRED, Edgar Palala, expressed satisfaction with CONAPAD's work and observed that CONAPAD had been instrumental in improving institutional cooperation in a field that had its share of unhealthy competition among key players.

ASORPRED's mission is the prevention of drug addition and the promotion of a holistic health model for secondary school youth. Its programs target students, parents and teachers. ASORPRED conducts a range of demand reduction activities, the highlight of which is a one-day celebration called "Youth Without Drugs Day." When this event was last held, 1,200 persons attended from 14 different educational institutions. The celebration at a local stadium and the parade leading up to it were covered by a Guatemala City newspaper. According to ASORPRED's Director, the visibility resulting from this event has caused more people to request assistance from ASORPRED -- with consequent increased demands on CONAPAD.

In 1992, CONAPAD began to work closely with CONANI, the national organization in charge of coordinating activities related to the welfare of children. CONANI represents 26 government and non-government organizations in Guatemala. CONAPAD's objective in working with CONANI is to address the widespread use of alcohol and inhalants (gasoline, kerosene, glue, etc.) among street children. CONAPAD and CONANI have made drug prevention a key theme in training workshops conducted with street children and with adults who work with them.

CONANI, in cooperation with CONAPAD, has an impressive action plan for 1993 and beyond. The combined goal of the two organizations is to establish a "Youth Council for the Prevention of Addictions to Alcohol and Other Drugs" in each department of the country by 1996. The

preparatory work to establish these youth councils has already begun. In 1992, 73 young people were trained to work in low income communities with a view to establishing Youth Councils in them. Some of the Youth Councils are expected to be established this year.

In 1992, CONANI's presentations reportedly reached 200,000 street and non-street children, exceeding CONANI's goal of 180,000. Many of these presentations contained an anti-drug message, although the percentage that did so is not clear. In any event, CONANI, in cooperation with CONAPAD, has the potential for a massive, nationwide outreach program offering a range of useful services to young people, including drug prevention activities.

CONAPAD's Work with Communities and Churches

In cooperation with the Guatemalan Association for Integral Community Development (Asociacion para el Desarrollo Integral Comunitario -- ADIC), CONAPAD trains anti-drug speakers who deliver drug prevention messages in communities and in church related discussion groups. The Evaluation Team visited with one such drug prevention worker, a laborer from an impoverished community on the road between Guatemala City and Antigua. He painted a picture of a credible and widespread drug prevention effort in his community and parish, and gave much credit to both CONAPAD and ADIC for the training and guidance he and others in the community had received from them.

Other Activities of CONAPAD

CONAPAD organizes workshops and seminars with international participants (three were held in 1991 as initial activities of the USAID project) as well as numerous national workshops for the training of anti-addiction trainers. CONAPAD has produced a number of anti-drug videos that are used in seminars, and it has designed some anti-drug billboards using NAS funds provided via USIS (the physical placement of the billboards along highways was funded by NAS). CONAPAD publishes a monthly bulletin describing its activities in considerable detail. Finally, CONAPAD has established a "documentation center" in Carlos Arenas' office. Although rudimentary, it represents a useful start at building up the reference material necessary for CONAPAD's work.

3. Project Outputs

The Evaluation Team received a positive impression of CONAPAD's work with public and private schools, with ASORPRED and CONANI, and with community and church groups. However, a precise quantification of CONAPAD's outputs in all areas proved impossible to obtain, despite requests to both USAID/Guatemala and CONAPAD. According to Development Associates, between September 1991 and September 1992, CONAPAD trained the following persons in drug prevention: 166 teachers, 1,191 parents, 425 health professionals, and 40 individuals who work for demand reduction organizations in Guatemala. In the life of the project, according to Development Associates, over 300 persons (including some of those just mentioned) were specifically trained by CONAPAD to train others in drug abuse prevention.

These trainers, in turn, have trained 10,000 individuals, according to a Development Associates estimate. Although the Evaluation Team has no reason to doubt the basic accuracy of these figures, the CONAPAD documents listing outputs that were provided to the team are vague and confusing and do not seem to harmonize with the Development Associates figures.

Regardless of the precise number of outputs, they appear to be satisfactory -- and even impressive -- in both quantity and quality in light of the relatively small USAID investment in this project and the almost total lack of Guatemalan Government support. In terms of potential positive impact on drug abuse and potential benefit to Guatemalan society, the outputs are probably worth at least as much as the $100,000 total investment -- and more than the $70,000 net that went to CONAPAD. In short, based on its outputs, the project appears to be cost effective.

4. Project Impact

The team found it impossible to measure in a formal and precise manner the impact of a project that has been in existence for only a bit over a year and that has directly consumed only $70,000 of U.S. assistance. Nevertheless, the team received the distinct impression from its field visits and conversations and from anecdotal evidence that the project is beginning to have at least some impact in creating anti-drug attitudes and in reducing drug use, notably within the school system.

Carlos Arenas has neither the staff nor the time to attempt an impact analysis -- which, in any event, would probably be premature. However, realizing the need to conduct an impact evaluation in due course, Arenas has been in touch with the Guatemalan Association for Integral Community Development (ADIC), which has proposed an evaluation model for his consideration. The model follows an approach worked out by OAS/CICAD. A key element of the evaluation model is the unification of evaluation criteria across different prevention programs. ADIC has implemented the model in 12 projects, but only on a pilot basis. The Evaluation Team received a highly positive impression of ADIC and of its evaluation model. CONAPAD apparently intends to contract ADIC to conduct an evaluation of the impact of CONAPAD's work using funds it hopes to receive from USAID under the proposed new buy-in to the NAE contract with Development Associates. ADIC has already conducted two evaluations of some of CONAPAD's sub-projects, but the evaluations addressed process, not impact.

5. Priority Assigned to Demand Reduction and to the USAID Project by the Host Government and the U.S. Government

Although senior Guatemalan Government officials appear to attach major importance to drug enforcement, they do not see demand reduction as a high priority. It is for this reason that CONAPAD receives such limited support from the Guatemalan Government. Since the U.S. Government's priority is overwhelmingly on eradication and enforcement, the attitude of the Government of Guatemala is not surprising.

USAID/Guatemala does not see demand reduction as a mission priority but simply as a "ticket" that has to be "punched." The Mission's five strategic objectives, approved by A.I.D.

Washington, do not include demand reduction. The issue is handled under the category of "other" or "window of opportunity," with A.I.D. Washington's full concurrence. The Mission's lack of direct involvement in the demand reduction project stood in sharp contrast to the situation the team encountered in Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil. USAID/Guatemala believes it is proceeding correctly, given its many higher priorities, an environment of continually decreasing resources, and the fact that Guatemala is not a "narcotics emphasis" country (as are Bolivia and Peru).

The only non-A.I.D. Country Team officer who had any detailed knowledge of CONAPAD was the PAO. The NAS Chief (newly arrived) planned to meet with Carlos Arenas shortly. The NAS Chief argues that CONAPAD should begin to spread awareness not just of the danger of drug use but of the danger to Guatemalan society represented by drug trafficking. He said CONAPAD should arrange for the media to carry more anti-drug messages -- including anti- drug trafficker messages. The NAS Chief said he hoped to arrange for "Partners for a Drug Free America" to brief CONAPAD on how to generate a pro bono media campaign against drugs and drug traffickers in Guatemala.

6. Activities of Other U.S. Agencies in Demand Reduction

NAS funds anti-drug messages and campaigns in the drug trafficking areas of Guatemala, but provides no funding for CONAPAD. USIS believes that through its routine activities over the past two and a half years it has succeeded in making Guatemalan elites somewhat more aware of the danger of violence from the drug traffickers and more aware of the substance abuse problem in Guatemala. USIS cooperates with CONAPAD, but has apparently made no cash contributions of its own beyond the $1,000 mentioned earlier. (USIA's Washington-based activities that support demand reduction throughout the hemisphere are described in the inventory at Annex 1.)

7. Activities of Non-U.S. Entities in Demand Reduction

Neither the UNDCP, the PAHO, nor the European Community (EC) makes any direct contributions to the demand reduction effort at this time. UNICEF and the EC both finance street children programs, which indirectly address the substance abuse problem (see inventory at Annex 1 for detail). The OAS provides no budgetary support to CONAPAD, but funds international meetings in which CONAPAD participates.

The UNDCP is considering granting some assistance to CONAPAD, and the UNDP Deputy Representative in Guatemala City is in contact with Carlos Arenas in this regard. (The UNDP office in Guatemala City represents UNDCP interests there.) Arenas recently gave the UNDP Deputy Representative a copy of a draft Master Plan for Guatemala and suggested that the UNDCP fund two consultants for demand reduction workshops in Guatemala City. The UNDCP is potentially interested, but wishes to see a clear statement of rationale and detailed terms of reference before approving any expenditure of funds. The UNDP Deputy Representative implied that the UNDCP might be willing to do more than just fund consultants for a workshop. However, any extensive UNDCP assistance can be granted only if Arenas presents compelling

and detailed proposals and completes the Master Plan. These will be difficult tasks for Arenas in view of CONAPAD's institutional weaknesses and lack of staffing. In any event, on the matter of UNDCP funding the ball is entirely in CONAPAD's court.

B. Summary Responses to Questions in Statement of Work

1. The Problem

The problem being addressed by the project is one of moderate use of illicit drugs (nationwide, lifetime use of narcotics at 1.96 percent in 1990), and significant potential for increased drug abuse in the years ahead. This potential is based on the high current use of such "gateway drugs" as inhalants and tranquilizers, the fact that drug traffickers pay their collaborators in cocaine, the low price of cocaine, and rapid urban population growth. The project, in accordance with its stated purpose, is focused on prevention, including public awareness of the dangers of drug use. However, the project does little to support public awareness if this is defined as "public support for counter-narcotics activities." "Public awareness" has never been clearly defined by A.I.D. in the case of Guatemala.

2. Priority Assigned to Problem

As explained earlier in this case study, neither the host government, nor the USAID, nor the Country Team assigns high priority to the problem of drug abuse prevention, which is the one officially addressed by the project.

3. Definition of Goals, Purpose, and Outputs

The project's goal, purpose and outputs were not clearly defined at the outset, mainly because it was not a "project" in the formal sense. USAID and the contractor, Development Associates, agreed to proceed on a largely experimental basis. The targets set were very general and subject to change.

4. Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Level of Effort Within the Project

The project is effective at producing primary prevention outputs. A very small investment is resulting in extensive drug abuse prevention activity and is providing an impetus for eventually building CONAPAD into a full scale institution. Bureaucratic efficiency is somewhat faulty, particularly in the area of output documentation and financial accountability. The level of effort within the project is high, as indicated earlier in this case study.

5. Project Monitoring

The project is monitored in a general way by Development Associates, but scrutiny of outputs is hindered by vagueness in the list of outputs made available by CONAPAD. Baseline data sets were established in the sense that a prevalence study was conducted in 1990 just before the start

of the project. However, it was not conducted nationwide and covered only people between the ages of 12 and 45. Indicators being used to report performance are informal and vague. No formal evaluation of project impact has been conducted, but CONAPAD is considering the possibility of contracting ADIC to do one. The time frame for such an evaluation has not been determined.

6. Adequacy of Resources

Any discussion of resource adequacy is subjective because the project's goal, purpose and outputs were never clearly defined. Current resources supplied by A.I.D. are barely adequate for a continuation of the current level of prevention activity. They fall far short of what would be required to build CONAPAD into a fully credible demand reduction institution able to attract international financing, achieve sustainability, and meet the demands of the future. However, USG funding much beyond current levels should not be provided in the absence of increased contributions from the Guatemalan Government.

7. Project Cost/Desirability of Institution Building

The project is implemented at an acceptable cost. As indicated throughout this case study, there is very good return on the small amount of money being expended.

Institution building is essential in the case of Guatemala, as documented in section C. 7. Since CONAPAD is still a rudimentary organization, it lacks both the means to expand its efforts and the credibility necessary to attract significant non-USG funding.

8. Steps Toward Sustainability

Neither CONAPAD nor A.I.D. has taken effective steps to locate the kind of non-USG funding that could move CONAPAD toward full sustainability. There is little potential for funding from the Guatemalan private sector, but the UNDCP and the Guatemalan Government are clearly potential sources of support. Funding might also be sought from the European Community.

9. Quality of A.I.D.-Funded Services and Technical Assistance

USAID/Guatemala provided only general -- but positive -- comments on the services and technical assistance being rendered to CONAPAD by Development Associates. CONAPAD has high regard for the assistance it is receiving from Development Associates and wants the level of assistance increased. As indicated in the Conclusions and Recommendations section, it would be desirable to provide some on-site technical assistance in the practical aspects of applying for non-USG funding.

C. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Sustainability

Conclusion: CONAPAD receives virtually no budgetary support from the Guatemalan Government -- and, in fact, no significant direct support from any non-U.S. donor. In the present circumstances, CONAPAD would not be sustainable in any meaningful way without continued U.S. support. If that support were suddenly cut off, Arenas says he would try to continue his efforts with in-kind support from the Guatemalan Government and ad hoc financial support from OAS/CICAD for a few conferences and workshops. However, any real chance of long term sustainability and credibility would be seriously undermined.

Recommendations:

-- CONAPAD should be more aggressive in pressing its own Government for funding and in soliciting contributions from international organizations, NGOs, and other non-USG donors.

-- Although there is merit in continuing the buy-in with the NAE Project for up to two more years, any longer-term U.S. Government funding of CONAPAD should be conditioned on at least some direct financial support from the Guatemalan Government.

-- A.I.D. should consider providing CONAPAD with some on-site technical assistance in the practical aspects of soliciting and applying for non-USG funds.

2. Senior Management Within CONAPAD

Conclusion: CONAPAD, as an essentially one-man operation, is excessively identified with the personality of Carlos Arenas. Arenas and CONAPAD are largely synonymous.

Recommendation: If CONAPAD is to become an organization with significant national and international credibility, it must be broadened to include other qualified professionals on a permanent basis, not simply on loan as at present.

3. Documentation Issues

Conclusion: Since Arenas has virtually no permanent staff, he is unable to produce clear and detailed statements of CONAPAD's outputs. Again because of thin staffing, expenditure accountability appears uneven. The Embassy Public Affairs Officer informed the Team that USIS had once given CONAPAD $1,000 for administrative expenses related to a conference, but had never received a satisfactory accounting of expenditures, despite several requests for same.

Recommendation: In connection with any further funding of CONAPAD, USAID and Development Associates should insist that CONAPAD maintain a clear and comprehensive list of outputs and institute a system of strict accountability. CONAPAD should secure the services

of a highly qualified expert to discharge both of these functions. The new position should be made available at no cost by the Guatemalan Government.

4. Balance Within the Project

Conclusion: Because of limited funding and understaffing, the USAID project is not well balanced in terms of its activities. Although primary prevention is being carried out reasonably well, especially within the schools, public awareness efforts with the national media are very limited. Unlike analogous organizations in other countries, CONAPAD seems to have very little influence with the media and appears to have arranged for the media to carry only a small number of messages against drug use. Moreover, unlike SEAMOS in Bolivia, CONAPAD does not engage in publicity against drug trafficking, only against drug use. Finally, the project lacks several other elements that should be present in a well rounded, highly credible demand reduction effort -- e.g., research and evaluation capabilities, consultation centers (for advice and referral of those at risk or already on drugs), and a drug information hot line.

Recommendations:

-- CONAPAD should establish the clear goal of becoming a well balanced effort and should request funding for this purpose from the UNDCP and other non-USG entities.

-- CONAPAD should seek free television and radio time and free print space in periodicals for publicity against both drug use and drug trafficking.

5. Guatemalan Master Plan

Conclusion: CONAPAD's work on a "Master Plan for the Reduction of the Supply of and the Demand for Drugs in Guatemala" has proceeded slowly. Completion of this plan was a goal in 1992, and it is reflected as a goal in Development Associates' proposal for further funding of CONAPAD for 1993. A UNDP representative in Guatemala City made it clear to the team that completion of this plan is a prerequisite for any significant UNDCP assistance to CONAPAD.

Recommendation: A.I.D. and Development Associates should press hard for completion of a high quality master plan in the immediate future. If necessary, the USG should approach senior levels of the Guatemalan Government and stress the need for prompt completion of a high quality plan.

6. USAID Monitoring of Project

Conclusion: There is inadequate monitoring of the project by USAID/Guatemala. Mission officers stated candidly that they simply had no management time to devote to this small -- and, to them, low priority -- project. Conversations at all levels of the Mission revealed little knowledge of the detail of CONAPAD's work. Mission personnel noted that, in accordance with

their own wishes, accountability was out of their hands and was handled exclusively by Development Associates.

Recommendation: Despite many higher priorities, USAID/Guatemala should take steps to monitor the project more closely and provide recommendations to A.I.D. Washington and to Development Associates for improvements in the project.

7. Institution Building

Conclusion: The situation in Guatemala is clear proof of the importance of institution building in the demand reduction area. Since CONAPAD has not yet been properly "built," (embryonic staff, inadequate office space, low status in Guatemalan Government), it lacks the kind of credibility necessary to attract significant non-USG funding and to move forward toward long-term sustainability. In this sense, USAID funding of CONAPAD has been "inadequate." The PAO in Guatemala City, who appeared to have a more detailed knowledge of CONAPAD than the A.I.D. Mission, estimated that it would take $300,000 to $500,000 in funding to build the institution up to a credible level. Such an institution could then attract international and NGO funding (as CEDRO is doing in Peru), and could be sustainable.

Recommendation: A U.S. Government and Guatemalan Government goal should be to build CONAPAD into a full scale institution. However, much of the funding for this effort should come from non-U.S. sources, including the Government of Guatemala.

II. CASE STUDY - MEXICO

A. Findings

1. Nature and Extent of the Drug Abuse Problem

Mexico produces opiates and marijuana and is also considered a major transit point for illegal drug shipments to the U.S. Despite the availability of opiates and marijuana, there is no history of extensive indigenous use of these or other illicit substances. Producer incentives still seem to favor marketing products into the stream of drugs flowing to the U.S. Heroin is too expensive in Mexico to permit much local consumption; according to some estimates, a kilo in the producing area may cost as much as $1,000 compared to $150 in Asia. Still, the Government of Mexico (GOM) has been concerned for some time that the increased production of Mexican heroin for smuggling into the U.S., as well as the trafficking of cocaine and marijuana, may lead to increased domestic drug use. Major concerns include: (1) users returning from the U.S.; (2) drugs and AIDS; and (3) a reported recent doubling of the number of substance abusers, though the initial baseline levels were very low.

Even though prevalence rates for heroin and other hard drugs remain relatively modest, they have increased in the past 10 years. Mexico has its share of socioeconomic factors that could lead to increased use and abuse: a large population below 25 years of age, widespread poverty, high levels of unemployment, and, depending on the region of the country, fairly easy access to a wide array of drugs -- from heroin and cocaine in the U.S.-Mexico border area, to marijuana and inhalants in the cities, to and alcohol and over-the-counter drugs throughout the country.

Studies completed in 1980 suggest that one in eight adults in Mexico City shows behavioral problems associated with alcohol. While illegal drug dependence is more difficult to measure, a recognized problem exists in the case of marijuana, inhalants, amphetamines, and psychotropic drugs, with prevalence along the U.S./Mexico border higher than in other areas of the country. The National Survey on Addictions (1988) revealed that the number of drug addicts exceeded 700,000. Of these, over 300,000 used marijuana; 132,000 used barbiturates; 113,000 used inhalants; 129,000 consumed amphetamines; and only some 4,400 used cocaine. Of people who had used drugs six or more times, the percentages who had consumed specific drugs were as follows: marijuana 1.08 percent; cocaine 0.12 percent, and heroin 0.05 percent. Abuse rates were highest among men. In the northeastern region, the state of Chihuahua alone accounted for 40 percent of substance abuse.

A needs assessment study was conducted among a sample of 1,139 persons 11 to 67 years of age in Ciudad Juarez in 1988 by the Mexican Federation of Private Associations for Health and Community Development (FEMAP). The study revealed that drug use in the city ranged between 4.6 and 7.5 percent. The most commonly used drug (lifetime prevalence) was marijuana (80 percent of all drug users), followed by tranquilizers (7 percent), and inhalants (4.5 percent).

In 87 percent of the cases, the initial drug used was not bought, but was given to the person by others. The same percentage of cases reported that curiosity was the main reason why drugs were tried for the first time. Most users (82 percent) bought drugs with income they earned at work. On the average, a drug user invited seven other people to use drugs. Over 60 percent of the families surveyed did not know whether their children were substance abusers.

A 1989 survey of student populations in Mexico City and nearby urban areas revealed that 4.08 percent had used marijuana and 1.61 percent cocaine.

According to USIS polls, almost half (49%) of the Mexican population believes that the "problem of Mexicans using drugs" is serious and growing. In contrast, 55% a year earlier said that drugs were used mostly by people in other countries. Almost half (48%) also said that the major problem for Mexico is trafficking of drugs as opposed to consumption (32%) or production (18%).

2. USAID Projects

Mexico's designation as a "certification country" signifies its importance to the U.S. as a transit and production point. USAID/Mexico has made a small but significant contribution to the anti-drug effort. To date, it has provided over $2 million to support various demand reduction initiatives, mainly to enhance community-level activities and raise awareness in Mexico of the national drug abuse problem. A.I.D. projects support programs of private organizations along the U.S.-Mexico border and in Mexico City, surveys of community attitudes toward drug problems, school presentations, and analysis and dissemination of drug use data.

The problem of domestic substance abuse and the lack of models for community-based prevention led USAID/Mexico in 1987 to fund a pilot project in Ciudad Juarez through FEMAP. In addition, A.I.D. has provided support to the National Council for Educational Development (CONAFE), channeled through the Miguel Aleman Foundation, the Murrieta Foundation, the Center for the Orientation of Young Adults (CORA), and the Mexican Health Foundation in cooperation with the GOM's General Epidemiological Directorate (DGE). Technical support and training to the five organizations has been provided by Development Associates.

The activities and outputs of A.I.D.'s projects in Mexico are shown in summary form in Exhibit 1. More extensive descriptions of the projects follow:

FEMAP

FEMAP is primarily a family planning organization. It was founded in 1981 by Ms. Guadalupe Arizpe de la Vega, drawing on the experiences of family planning work that had been carried out in the Ciudad Juarez area since 1978. In 1987, A.I.D. made the wise decision to support the addition of a demand reduction role to FEMAP's portfolio. A.I.D. reasoned that the outreach capability and high effectiveness that FEMAP had already demonstrated in the family planning area could be put to good use in drug abuse prevention. The reasoning has proven to be correct.

EXHIBIT 1 – MEXICO NARCOTICS DEMAND REDUCTION ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

PROJECT	A.I.D. FUNDING	ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION	OUTPUTS
FEMAP	$1,710,108 FY 87-93	Data collection and dissemination, development of program models, coordination, monitoring and evaluation. Also developed a proposal for a drug prevention program in the maquiladoras.	*September 1991 - February 1992:* -- 8,540 participants in informational talks --111 artistic expression workshops with anti-drug theme --18 special events --228 posters displayed *August 1992 - March 1993:* --20,419 students and 1,601 parents participated in informational talks --66 workshops on artisitc expression --435 promoters trained
Miguel Aleman Foundation/ CONAFE	$60,000 FY 91-92	Purpose was to complete a study of junior high and high school youth to determine factors associated with drug dependence, and to develop a prevention curriculum to address these factors.	Completed study and developed curriculum.
Murrieta Foundation	$90,630 FY 89-91	Private, non-profit organization that participates in activities to raise the standard of living through income producing actities and social programs. Addresses drug prevention by communicating the dangers of drug use to young people and by sponsoring community activities, athletic events, etc.	*August 1992 - March 1993:* --1,890 people participated in special events on drug prevention. --over 2,500 directories of drug related services distributed
CORA	$99,513 FY 90-92	Educates youth with regard to reproductive health, substance abuse, and AIDS prevention with the goal of reducing incidences of unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted disease, and drug abuse.	*September 1991 - February 1992:* --9,000 youths reached via youth promoters --65 young adult leaders trained *May 1992 - March 1993:* --5,952 youths and 1,297 parents attended informational talks --32 youth leaders recognized --490 professionals above the youth leader level trained --111 youth leaders trained --3,404 pamphlets on substance abuse distributed
Mexican Health Foundation/ GDE	$63,430 FY 89-90	Analysis and dissemination of data gathered in the 1988 National Survey on Addictions to improve existing activities and plan future effective prevention programs.	"Program Against Drug Dependence 1992 - 1994" "Program Against Tobacco" "Program Against Alcoholism and the Abuse of Alcoholic Beverages 1992 - 1994"

A.I.D. has provided funding for FEMAP's demand reduction role in the amount of $1,710,108 during the period FY 87-93. FEMAP's prevention program includes data collection and dissemination, development of program models, coordination, monitoring and evaluation. FEMAP's first demand reduction activity was to conduct research studies among high risk populations which were used as the cornerstone for a mass media campaign, for development of educational materials, and to identify methods to be used in pilot interventions. Six such interventions with significant community participation were developed initially. The projects, which have been implemented among high risk community groups, include a drug hotline, a referral service, provision of information on substance abuse, and crisis intervention. The project plays a significant role in facilitating coordination of activities among all prevention and treatment centers on both sides of the border.

After the project supporting FEMAP had been underway for over two years, an assessment was conducted of inputs and outputs in order to measure effectiveness and provide a basis for future plans. Recommendations included the improvement of targeting by concentrating efforts on the highest risk population groups and revising and producing educational materials using more factual messages. In addition to the Ciudad Juarez effort, the Mission is providing support for FEMAP's programs in four other cities of the northern region: Matamoros, Monterrey, Mexicali, and Tijuana. In terms of accomplishments, between September 1991 and February 1992 there were approximately 8,540 participants in informational talks, 111 artistic expression workshops with an anti-drug theme, 18 special events and 228 posters displayed. Between August 1992 and March 1993, 20,419 students and 1,601 parents participated in informational talks, 66 workshops on artistic expression were held, and 435 promoters were trained. FEMAP also developed a proposal for a drug prevention program to be marketed to assembly line industries ("maquiladoras") in border areas. In preparation for the likely termination of USAID funds in the near future, Development Associates is providing technical assistance to FEMAP in securing non-USG funding.

Miguel Aleman Foundation/National Council on Educational Development (CONAFE)

The Miguel Aleman Foundation, established in 1984, supports improved education for Mexican youth. A.I.D. provided $60,000 from FY 91 to FY 92 for a prevention effort by the Foundation. The purpose of the project was twofold: first, to complete a study of junior high and high school youth to determine factors associated with drug dependence; and, second, to develop a prevention curriculum to address these factors.

Murrieta Foundation

The Murrieta Foundation, established in 1985, has the principal objective of assisting with the overall improvement of the economy and quality of life in Mexico. The organization participates in activities to raise the standard of living through income producing activities and social programs in association with various public and private institutions. USAID provided $90,630 from FY 89 to FY 91 for prevention work by the Murrieta Foundation. The Foundation addresses drug abuse prevention mainly by communicating the dangers of drug use to young

people, primarily students between the ages of 11 and 22, and their parents, and by sponsoring community activities, athletic events, etc. Between August 1992 and March 1993, 1,890 persons participated in special events on drug prevention, 11 promoters were trained, and over 2,500 directories of drug related services were distributed.

Center for the Orientation of Youth (CORA)

CORA, founded in 1978, is a community based organization promoting integral health, with stress on providing health services to adolescents. A.I.D. provided CORA with support for drug prevention in the amount of $99,513 in the period FY 90-92. The purpose has been to educate Mexican youth with respect to reproductive health, substance abuse and AIDS prevention with the goal of reducing the incidence of unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted disease as well as drug abuse. Approximately 9,000 young people were reached via youth promoters and 65 young adult leaders were trained between September 1991 and February 1992. Between May 1992 and March 1993, informational talks were held with 5,952 youths and 1,297 parents, 32 youth leaders were recognized, 490 professionals above the youth leader level were trained, 111 youth leaders were trained, and 3,404 pamphlets on substance abuse were distributed. This project has reportedly faced some problems in obtaining cooperation, identifying sponsors in various sites, and training professionals. As a result, some of its objectives and activities have proved difficult to accomplish, but CORA is still well regarded by Mexican authorities.

Mexican Health Foundation/General Directorate for Epidemiology

The project was funded for $63,430 in the period FY 89-90. The purpose was to analyze and disseminate data gathered in the 1988 National Survey on Addictions in order to improve existing activities and plan effective prevention programs for the future. The project reportedly experienced some delays due to changes in the General Directorate, but reports were produced for each addiction studied (i.e., tobacco, alcohol, and illicit substances).

Development Associates, Inc.

The total allocated for technical support was $290,000. The assistance was intended to provide advice and training to FEMAP and other Mexican entities in strengthening their educational programs and their sustainability efforts. Some technical assistance suffered delays due to difficulties in reaching agreement with the grantees on program priorities.

In terms of future activities, USAID/Mexico plans to continue to provide only limited support to grass-roots prevention organizations. A plan calling for three training workshops covering institutional sustainability, drug abuse prevention skills, and materials development has been drawn up for 1993. USAID may explore a potential new avenue of activity to deal with substance abuse in the workplace, building upon positive results demonstrated in the border area by FEMAP.

3. Project Outputs

According to a 1990 project assessment, FEMAP's expanded activities in the Mexican border cities in public awareness, especially with at risk populations, its educational materials, and its participation in employee assistance programs were all found to be useful and of excellent quality. FEMAP's subsequent work appears to have maintained this standard. CONAFE has produced an innovative risk inventory for adolescents and a research-based prevention curriculum with didactic materials that has been distributed in secondary schools. The Murrieta Foundation has delivered drug prevention messages in schools and communities by utilizing youth as social promoters. CORA continues to educate Mexican youth on drug and other types of prevention using mainly talks given by young adult leaders. The three volumes produced by the Mexican Health Foundation/General Directorate for Epidemiology on tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drugs provide useful data and analysis. (The volume on illicit drugs reveals that age at first use of most drugs, including cocaine and marijuana, is between 12 and 17. It also shows that, in the Mexican student population, use of cocaine and marijuana doubled between 1976 and 1986; however, the baselines were low -- marijuana use went from 1.6 percent to 3.2 percent and cocaine use rose from .5 percent to 1 percent).

Despite difficulties experienced in the listed projects from time to time, the outputs of project entities were in accord with established plans. Where problems emerged, appropriate action by the USAID and project personnel allowed the delivery of planned outputs. The quality of the technical assistance delivered by Development Associates in Mexico also continues to get high marks, though, as noted earlier, some assistance was delayed due to disagreements with grantees.

Seen as a whole, the USAID investment in Mexico has addressed important areas of the prevention continuum: public awareness; research and epidemiology; school and community-based drug prevention; drug hot lines; and work with out-of-school youth, parents, teachers, and persons in the workplace. Treatment is being provided with funding from the GOM, private organizations, and international donors. Most of USAID/Mexico's narcotics awareness and education initiatives are being carried out with non-governmental organizations, although there is some level of support and coordination with organizations representing the GOM. Most USAID-sponsored demand reduction investment is concentrated on areas near the U.S. border and in Mexico City, where both the problems and U.S. interests are the greatest.

4. Project Impact

With the exception of FEMAP, no USAID-sponsored demand reduction project in Mexico has benefitted from any formal impact evaluation. In the case of FEMAP the 1990 assessment looked at inputs, outputs, effectiveness and future plans, but not at project impact. An impact evaluation of FEMAP may be initiated this year.

Without such an evaluation, and in light of the limited nature of narcotics awareness projects sponsored by USAID/Mexico, it is difficult to judge what has been accomplished with the approximately $2 million dollars invested by A.I.D. to date in demand reduction in Mexico.

From the outset, A.I.D.'s activities were sharply circumscribed by the nature of U.S.-Mexican relations, with assistance limited to basically private organizations that were often working at the margin of principal drug concerns, except in the border areas. Only in the endeavors with FEMAP is any appreciable program impact ever likely to be demonstrated. Direct funding to other programs was very small, in any case.

5. Project Management

A locally-hired project manager has been assigned on a part-time basis to monitor the various demand reduction activities. It was evident to the team that she was knowledgeable about program content and about the Mexican personnel carrying out the activities. At levels above her, only limited attention is paid to this area of mission activity. USAID/Mexico considers narcotics demand reduction, along with AIDS, a "target of opportunity" and plans to maintain only a modest level of activity through 1994, involving expenditures on the order of $200,000 annually.

6. Priority Assigned to Demand Reduction by the GOM

The GOM's concern with drug awareness and prevention dates back to 1914 when laws were passed prohibiting the importation of opium and cocaine. The Constitution of 1917 charged health authorities with the responsibility of undertaking campaigns to control the use of substances that "poison the individual and degenerate the human race." In the 1930s a medical and social model for the control of drug problems was promoted in the country, possibly the earliest such effort in the hemisphere. Since the 1960s great strides have been made by the GOM in support of the technical advances that allow identification of drug problems in the country and the development of specific strategies to address them.

The Government of Mexico continues to make substance abuse prevention and treatment a relatively high priority. Although still of limited scope, efforts to date have focused on treatment through national organizations such as the Centros de Integracion Juvenil (CIJ) -- which receives half its support from the GOM -- as well as through clinics and public hospitals. The Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduria General de la Republica -- PGR), has developed a prevention curriculum that has received some dissemination throughout the country. The National System for Integrated Family Development (Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia -- DIF) has been involved in drug prevention for years, utilizing the "political infrastructure" provided by first ladies at the national, state, and local levels. Various Mexican PVOs of national stature have been involved in drug prevention.

The GOM also has supported demand reduction efforts in the country through the creation of a well developed system of data collection. Both the General Directorate of Epidemiology (GDE) and the Mexican Institute of Psychiatry (MIP) conduct periodic drug-related epidemiological studies and research in schools and in the community at large. These two leading information centers coordinate their activities with both the demand and supply reduction organizations of the GOM. Research activities worthy of special mention are the 1976 and 1988 Surveys of

Addictions, the National System of Epidemiological Surveillance, and the National Surveys of Drug Use among School Populations of 1976, 1986, and 1991. Research activity is also generated for the government by semi-public national organizations such as the CIJ.

Demand reduction in Mexico is coordinated through a National Drug Prevention Council (Consejo Nacional Contra las Adicciones -- CONADIC), which is without executive power but is charged with providing advice and technical assistance on the implementation of national drug prevention policies. The GDE and the MIP also coordinate with the PGR's Planning Center for Drug Control (CENDRO), which is in charge of executing supply reduction policies for the GOM. CENDRO's data collection unit keeps the GDE and the MIP informed on evolving trends related to drug trafficking and consumption in the country.

Despite this extensive infrastructure, the priority accorded to demand reduction efforts in Mexico has fluctuated in the past 25 years. In the 1970s, the GOM launched a marijuana eradication program through the PGR. A high level of awareness existed at the time among a small group of concerned people and manifested itself in monthly meetings among top level PGR officials as well as representatives from the Ministries of Education, Health and Interior. Demand reduction efforts were directed at municipal levels throughout the country by the Attorney General's special demand reduction program (Programa de Atencion a la Farmacodependencia -- ADEFAR). The PGR also was in charge of supply reduction measures. Because of its enforcement activities, it was not considered by many to be the ideal organization to spearhead drug prevention efforts in the country. Growing awareness of drug use in that period also prompted the establishment of the CIJ and the MIP.

The emphasis on supply reduction continued, but demand reduction efforts declined during the intervening years until 1986, when the Minister of Health created CONADIC. Before long, however, this organization had shrunk from an initial staff of approximately 40 to two people. When President Carlos Salinas de Gortari assumed office, a more balanced emphasis on both supply and demand reduction was resumed in support of his announced objectives in the narcotics area, which were to protect and enhance the health of the Mexican people, the security of the State, and international solidarity. CONADIC was again enlarged to a staff of about 40 people. A conflict soon emerged between CONADIC and the PGR related to whether the PGR or the Minister of Health would lead drug prevention initiatives for the country. Supply reduction regained any predominance it may have lost early in the Salinas administration. Demand reduction efforts continue, nevertheless, with ADEFAR now directly under the aegis of CONADIC. At the time of the team's visit, a new CONADIC director had just been installed, and the impact of bureaucratic changes in process was unclear.

Mexico has a high degree of technical sophistication in identifying its own drug problem, at least at the federal level. It is not clear if the same degree of sophistication extends to the state and municipal levels. It is also not clear how Mexico's insistence on solving drug problems without significant external assistance is going to affect its capacity in demand reduction. Given the dimension and growth potential of the drug problem in Mexico, there may continue to be

underfunding of public awareness, data collection, prevention, and evaluation and research initiatives.

7. Priority Assigned to Demand Reduction by the USG

Because Mexico is both a major producer of narcotics and offers a principal route for trafficking of drugs into the United States, the USG concern centers on supply reduction. Nevertheless, in October 1986, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico outlined a drug awareness strategy and solicited funding from A.I.D., INM and USIS. Since that time, these and other U.S. organizations have played a limited role in helping the GOM reinforce expertise and technical sophistication in identifying and solving its own drug problems. Some of the input provided has come from U.S. research institutions such as the Center for Disease Control (CDC), the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), and other well-regarded USG agencies and private organizations, as well as from the state of Texas.

How drug problems are handled in Washington obviously affects the importance given to the issue by foreign governments. This has been especially true in Mexico. The lack of clarity as to who in the USG is responsible for setting international demand reduction policy was noted by Mexican interlocutors. The Evaluation Team was left with the impression that knowledgeable Mexicans did not consider A.I.D. a player of much consequence in drug matters.

8. Activities of Other U.S. Agencies in Demand Reduction

NAS efforts in demand reduction were extensive in the past, but currently are limited to providing $250,000 for the next prevalence survey in Mexico (now being conducted). Efforts by USIS are essentially limited to sending Mexicans to the U.S. under the international visitor program, bringing U.S. experts to Mexico under the U.S. speaker program, and supporting Worldnet presentations. The USIS representative with whom the team spoke noted that some of the U.S. drug prevention approaches that U.S. speakers had described in the past simply could not be applied in Mexico because of the very different conditions there. USIS is very aware of the need to avoid this problem in its future efforts. For its FY 1993 work on the narcotics theme, USIS has received authorization for five international visitors, three U.S. speakers, one teleconference, and one Worldnet presentation. (USIA's Washington-based activities that support demand reduction throughout the hemisphere are described in the inventory at Annex 1.)

9. Activities of Non-U.S. Government Entities in Demand Reduction

The United Nations currently has no projects in Mexico specifically directed at demand reduction. However, from 1989 through 1992, the UNDP financed a rural development project in the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero and Michoacan whose explicit purpose was to encourage farmers to reduce their cultivation of poppy and marijuana. A U.N. Evaluation Team judged the project to be a success, but it seems unlikely that Mexico will request any additional alternative development projects, apparently because they tend to call unwanted political attention to Mexico's status as a drug producer.

Against this background, the current thinking at the UNDCP in Vienna is that the UNDCP should initiate some projects in Mexico specifically in the prevention/demand reduction area. However, before reaching any decisions the UNDCP will wish to see the 1993 version of Mexico's Master Plan for its anti-drug effort. When the Evaluation Team visited Mexico, work on the plan was moving slowly, largely as a result of the reorganization of the Mexican drug control bureaucracy, described earlier.

Since 1983, UNICEF has been carrying out an extensive, nationwide program of assistance to street children. It is currently active in 38 cities in 30 states and has, according to UNICEF, improved the lives of over 58,000 children. Although the UNICEF program is one of general assistance to street children, it does address the substance abuse problem indirectly.

Covenant House in New York also has a street children program in Mexico. Like the UNICEF one, it is of a general nature but is indirectly useful in terms of substance abuse prevention.

PAHO has no demand reduction, public awareness or treatment programs in Mexico. However, PAHO believes that its general health program in Mexico -- which focuses on more sanitary cities and AIDS reduction -- contributes to an atmosphere less conducive to drug use. PAHO has provided some bibliographical information to CONADIC and cooperated with OAS/CICAD by providing information and by paying for some visits to Mexico by foreign consultants on the drug prevention issue. In addition, PAHO has provided some limited technical support for the prevalence study currently being carried out with NAS funding.

The European Community (EC) has contributed 360,000 ECU to a three-year project (1991-94) for the construction of facilities for drug dependent children at the Children's Psychiatric Hospital in Mexico City.

Almost a year ago, Ford Motor Company gave the Mexican Junior League $1 million for a drug prevention program in Ford Motor Company branches throughout Mexico. At first the project went poorly, since it was run by U.S. experts whose experiences were not applicable to the Mexican scene. Now Mexican drug prevention professionals are being used and the project has improved.

None of the Evaluation Team's interlocutors in Mexico could identify any bilateral assistance (other than U.S.) to demand reduction efforts in Mexico.

B. Summary Responses to Questions in Statement of Work

1. The Problem

The problem addressed by the USAID projects is illegal drug use which, although relatively low, has the potential to escalate, particularly in areas bordering the United States. Factors presaging a possible escalation are: a large young population, widespread poverty, high unemployment, and fairly easy access to illegal drugs in the border areas and in the cities.

2. Priority Assigned to the Projects

USAID/Mexico considers demand reduction to be a "target of opportunity" rather than a high priority. The projects are managed on a part time basis by a locally hired project manager. They receive relatively little attention from senior Mission personnel and from Country Team officers -- not surprising in view of the many higher priorities with which these officers must deal. The Mexican Government assigns a relatively high priority to drug awareness and prevention, as documented in section A. 6. However, the A.I.D. projects are not high priorities for senior levels of the Government of Mexico, given the size and sophistication of Mexico's own demand reduction efforts.

3. Definition of Goals, Purposes, and Outputs

The purposes of all the projects are clearly stated, and outputs are clearly set forth in each case. The purposes and outputs appear to have focused the projects effectively on the achievement of objectives. However, a project goal appears to have been defined only in the case of the project that supports FEMAP.

4. Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Level of Effort Within the Projects

By and large, the projects appear to have demonstrated good levels of effectiveness, efficiency and effort. However, it is difficult to quantify these levels or judge them precisely given the absence of formal evaluations of any entity other than FEMAP. As stated in section A. 4, it may never be possible to identify appreciable program impact, except perhaps in the case of FEMAP.

5. Project Monitoring

The projects are monitored in a highly competent manner by the part time project manager. However, as indicated earlier, senior levels of the Embassy pay only limited attention to the projects.

6. Adequacy of Resources

Resources provided have been adequate for the limited purposes envisioned.

7. Project Cost/Desirability of Institution Building

As pointed out in section A. 4, it is difficult to judge how much has been accomplished with the $2 million that A.I.D. has thus far invested in demand reduction in Mexico. Conclusions are elusive because of the absence of impact evaluations and even of formal process evaluations (except in the case of FEMAP.) The projects have accomplishments to their credit, but their overall cost effectiveness cannot be determined.

In view of Mexico's long background in demand reduction activities and the sophistication of existing federal government institutions, A.I.D. projects in Mexico do not support government entities. However, A.I.D. projects have contributed in a useful way to the strengthening of the community based, private institutions they have supported.

8. Steps Toward Sustainability

By and large, the entities supported by the A.I.D. projects appear not to have taken the kind of vigorous and sophisticated steps toward sustainability that are clearly required. Only now are they beginning to make applications for assistance to non-USG entities.

9. Quality of A.I.D.-Funded Services and Technical Assistance

The Evaluation Team's interlocutors in Mexico had a high opinion of the quality of technical assistance provided thus far by Development Associates. Key officials in the project elements had warm praise for the support given them by the A.I.D. project manager.

C. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Sustainability

Conclusion: The issue of sustainability remains critical for the A.I.D.-supported projects in Mexico. All non-government organizations supported by projects will face problems. For some (e.g., the Murrieta Foundation), USAID provides virtually 100% of the available funds for anti-drug efforts. For the more experienced organizations (CORA and FEMAP), national and international support for sustainability has tended to be cyclical; currently it is at a low level. The planned termination of USAID assistance will face both CORA and FEMAP with considerable hardship unless they obtain other grants. Both are involved in efforts that may lead to more stable sources of funds, e.g., selling services and materials, providing technical assistance to other organizations, and developing special products to sell to private companies. It is not yet possible to foresee the results of the technical assistance in fund raising that Development Associates is providing to project elements.

Recommendations:

-- Beyond the current work of Development Associates, USAID/Mexico, the Country Team, and A.I.D. Washington should consider ways of helping project-supported entities to secure multilateral or other non-USG funding. Possibilities include a joint Mexican-USG approach to the UNDCP, and an A.I.D. Washington effort to generate assistance from NGOs in U.S. states that border Mexico.

-- A.I.D. itself should consider some additional assistance to FEMAP and CORA, if necessary, to ease the transition to sustainability.

2. Mexico as a Resource Country

Conclusion: The richness of Mexican experience in demand reduction and the solid expertise demonstrated in programs such as those of the CIJs in operational areas, the Psychiatric Institute in research, and even CONADIC in documentation could be usefully shared with other countries. Mexico is not unlike the U.S. in terms of the technical assistance it could provide in demand reduction to other nations of the hemisphere -- either bilaterally, multilaterally, or through private channels.

Recommendation: USAID/Mexico should be tasked to provide A.I.D. Washington with (a) detailed and specific recommendations as to how Mexico's expertise and experience could be applied elsewhere in the hemisphere; and (b) recommendations on how the U.S. and Mexico can work together in this regard. In preparing the recommendations, USAID/Mexico should consult with knowledgeable Mexican experts, including Guido Belsasso and others who met with the Evaluation Team.

3. Future U.S. Assistance

Conclusion: For the reasons stated in conclusion 2, above, A.I.D. Washington should look upon Mexico primarily as a resource country rather than as a client. However, in some special cases, limited and carefully targeted support will be appropriate.

Recommendations:

-- Significant U.S. assistance should normally be considered only if it (a) serves to reinforce the ability of Mexican institutions to help other countries with demand reduction, particularly in Central America; (b) supports innovative approaches to the special problems of young people and drugs; (c) provides critically needed support for isolated efforts of the Murrieta Foundation type; or (d) is essential on a strictly interim basis for sustainability reasons, as may be the case with FEMAP and CORA.

-- The U.S. should continue to provide limited training to private groups as a means of improving their effectiveness, assisting them toward sustainability, and maintaining professional contacts with them.

-- Even in the absence of U.S. financial support or formal training, USAID/Mexico (and other elements of the Country Team) should maintain close contact with relevant Mexican entities and provide them with informal advice and support.

4. The FEMAP Case as a Model

Conclusion: As indicated in section A. 2, A.I.D. made a wise decision when it reasoned that the outreach capability and high effectiveness that FEMAP had already demonstrated in the family planning area could be put to good use in drug abuse prevention.

***Recommendation*:** To the extent feasible, A.I.D. should append demand reduction activities to existing institutions with proven effectiveness rather than create new institutions.

III. CASE STUDY - BOLIVIA

A. Findings

1. Nature and Extent of the Drug Abuse Problem

Bolivia is the second largest producer (after Peru) of coca leaf that eventually enters the United States in the form of cocaine. The illegal coca industry has created serious distortions in the Bolivian economy, led to migrations of workers to the coca growing areas, resulted in violent challenges to established authority, and created problems in Bolivia's international relations. Nevertheless, Bolivian elites and the public at large have tended to see the drug issue as a U.S. problem, not a Bolivian one. The fact that coca leaf has traditionally been viewed in Bolivia as acceptable complicates U.S. and Bolivian Government efforts to achieve eradication of coca in some areas and control its cultivation (for licit uses) in others. Therefore, the first challenge faced by the U.S. in the public awareness area is to ensure that Bolivians understand the seriousness of the drug production and trafficking problem. A second challenge is to increase awareness of the problem of drug abuse within Bolivia and help Bolivians conduct an effective drug prevention effort. Several studies over the past decade suggest that a significant abuse problem exists.

The first serious drug use prevalence study in Bolivia was conducted in 1983 by the Bolivian Government with United Nations funding. Some 19,000 secondary, university and technical school students between the ages of 14 and 22 were interviewed. Of these, 21.7 percent reported substance abuse (not counting alcohol and tobacco). The main drugs used and the percentage of students reporting lifetime use of them were: marijuana 4.9 percent, cocaine 2.3 percent, inhalants 2.3 percent, LSD 0.6 percent, and other substances (amphetamines, barbiturates, tranquilizers, coca paste cigarettes, etc.) 11.6 percent.

In a 1990 study conducted by the Red Cross, 1,536 persons between the ages of 10 and 25 in La Paz were interviewed. Slightly more than 10 percent reported substance abuse at some point in their lives. Reported lifetime use of key illegal drugs was: marijuana 3.98 percent of respondents, cocaine 0.91 percent, and opium 0.13 percent.

In 1990, the USAID-supported Bolivian Government entity PROINCO (described in section A. 2), using proceeds from PL-480 funds, interviewed 7,218 secondary and university students in the capital cities of the nine Bolivian departments. The following are percentages of students who reported lifetime use of specific drugs: marijuana 2.67 percent, cocaine 2.08 percent, inhalants 2.98 percent. In 1991, PROINCO conducted a study of 1,225 working students between the ages of 6 and 13 in the cities of Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and El Alto. It revealed a high use of inhalants -- 4.73 percent -- with cocaine at 1.47 percent and marijuana at only 0.08 percent.

Finally, in 1992 PROINCO, with USAID financial support, sponsored a prevalence study in which 6,000 persons between the ages of 12 and 50 were interviewed in 12 cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants each. The results showed that 10.5 percent had abused drugs other than alcohol and tobacco at some point in their lives.

Taken together, the above studies reveal an illegal drug abuse problem which, although relatively low, has demonstrated considerable staying power and has the potential to increase. Factors presaging a possible escalation of the problem are: the abundant supply of cocaine paste in the country, the fact that those who collaborate with the illegal coca growers are often paid in illegal drugs, the high level of poverty and frustration in Bolivian society, and the high use of such "gateway drugs" as alcohol and inhalants.

In the opinion of the Evaluation Team, the need to increase the Bolivian public's still limited support for drug enforcement and the need to manage the drug abuse problem clearly justify a USAID public awareness and demand reduction program in Bolivia.

2. The USAID Project

There is currently one USAID public awareness/demand reduction project in Bolivia, No. 511-0613, which was authorized on April 5, 1991 and is scheduled to continue until October 31, 1996. It is the successor to project No. 511-0592, which was originally authorized on August 8, 1986 and lasted until September 31, 1991.

Under the original project, $2.15 million dollars were provided for the support of one organization, the then embryonic Anti-Drug Education and Social Mobilization System (Sistema de Educacion Antidrogas y de Movilizacion Social -- SEAMOS), a private entity. SEAMOS was established in 1986 because of a perception on the part of both the U.S. Embassy Country Team and the Bolivian Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs (Confederacion de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia) that there was a need for a nationwide awareness and education campaign against illicit narcotics use and trafficking. With project funds, SEAMOS (whose current role is described in detail later in this section), began a media campaign against illegal drugs. Development Associates, Inc. received the contract for technical support of the project.

The original project was fraught with considerable confusion. Key elements of the Country Team objected to what they saw as Development Associates' wish to impose the Peru model (CEDRO) on Bolivia. (This was not necessarily Development Associates' plan and, in any event, the CEDRO model is a good one, as explained in the Peru Case Study.) Some in the Country Team questioned the size of Development Associates' overhead. There were personality clashes, and for a time the Development Associates presence in Bolivia was reduced to consultants on temporary duty. The demand reduction project was being run (on paper) by the USAID Agriculture Office, which paid only limited attention to it. As the need to extend and possibly expand the project loomed, there was sharp disagreement within the Country Team over whether any funds should be granted to Bolivian Government entities involved in the demand reduction

effort. Coordination on the project among Country Team elements was limited, and no single entity was effectively in charge.

In an attempt to end the confusion, prepare for the successor project, and improve interagency and U.S.-GOB coordination, the U.S. Ambassador in March 1991 asked USAID/Bolivia to centralize and manage the U.S. demand reduction effort in Bolivia. This was a logical decision given USAID's experience in managing projects and the fact that the funding for the project originated with A.I.D. The Chief of the Health and Human Resources Division of the USAID Mission was designated as project manager.

The project manager's first task was to win A.I.D./Washington and Country Team approval of the new, successor project -- which is the principal subject of this case study. The project goal is very broad -- i.e., "to help transform the Bolivian economy through increased employment, income, investment and productivity in non-coca activities." The project purpose is "to increase public support for effective implementation of the Government of Bolivia's anti-drug programs through enhanced public awareness of the health, social, political and economic dangers of drug production, consumption, and trafficking in Bolivia." Under the project, support is given to four Bolivian entities, two in the public sector and two in the private sector. They are:

Public Sector

a. The National Directorate for Prevention of Drug Abuse and for Treatment and Social Reintegration (Direccion Nacional de Prevencion Integral del Uso Indebido de Drogas, Tratamiento y Reinsercion Social -- DINAPRE).

b. The Subsecretariat for Alternative Development (Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Alternativo -- SUBDESAL)

Private Sector

a. SEAMOS (the entity that benefitted from the earlier project)

b. The Drug Education Center (Centro Educativo Sobre Estupefacientes -- CESE).

USAID/Bolivia's next challenge was to achieve agreement on the precise functions of each of the above organizations and on the amount of funds to be granted to each. For assistance with this effort, USAID contracted Training Resources Group (TRG) to conduct a pre-implementation workshop in La Paz. In attendance were representatives of all of the above entities, Development Associates personnel, and Country Team officers, including the USAID project manager and the USAID Director.

Based on a reading of the report of this workshop and observations in La Paz over a four-day period, the Evaluation Team believes that the workshop was of critical importance in launching the current project in a proper manner. Bolivian participants in the workshop were competitive,

each hoping to receive the lion's share of the USAID funding. Despite a difficult atmosphere, USAID was able during the workshop to achieve consensus decisions on functions and responsibilities for each Bolivian entity, for Development Associates, and for USAID itself. The decisions are set forth in the workshop report in a clear and definitive manner. This clarity was critical to the future success of the project and to a rational decision on the division of funding.

In the light of the decisions on functions, USAID decided on the following funding for the Bolivian entities (through 10/31/96):

SEAMOS - $5 million plus the equivalent of $940,000 in local currency from the Balance of Payments Program.

CESE - $1.4 million plus the equivalent of $940,000 in local currency from the Balance of Payments Program.

DINAPRE - the equivalent of $750,000 in local currency, part to be used by DINAPRE's affiliate, the Project for Research and Awareness in the Prevention of Drug Abuse (Proyecto de Investigacion/Concientizacion en Prevencion del Uso Indebido de Drogas -- PROINCO).

SUBDESAL - the equivalent of $750,000 in local currency.

3. Role and Performance of Bolivian Entities Funded by the Project

The following are descriptions of each Bolivian entity that benefits from the USAID project, along with comments and team judgments. A summary evaluation of the outputs of the Bolivian organizations (and therefore of the project) is contained in section A.4, and the project's possible impact is discussed in section A.5.

DINAPRE

In principle, DINAPRE is the central coordinator of all activities in Bolivia related to drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. It is headed by Carlos Dipp, a former brother-in-law of President Paz Zamora. Dipp is an active, highly intelligent official who understands realistically that his organization is actually more a facilitator than a coordinator. Until 1986, the Bolivian Police had, under law, been primarily responsible for all anti-drug activities in Bolivia -- both enforcement and prevention. This was changed by the September 1986 decree that established what is now known as DINAPRE, although it can be argued that the law giving the police priority still overrides the 1986 decree. (DINAPRE was originally called CONAPRE, the "C" standing for Council -- vice Directorate, as at present). Dipp was placed in charge of the organization in 1986 at the suggestion of the First Lady and managed to survive the subsequent change of government.

In addition to serving as a coordinating/facilitating entity, DINAPRE conducts concrete activities in the areas of research, prevention, and treatment/rehabilitation.

Research is carried out through DINAPRE's affiliate, PROINCO. As indicated earlier, PROINCO has conducted three studies on drug use in Bolivia -- all of which the Evaluation Team considers to be of high professional quality. PROINCO has produced other excellent studies as well, notably an innovative, non-quantitative analysis of the problems (including substance abuse) faced by Bolivian street children, based on interviews with the children themselves. All of the team's interlocutors in Bolivia had high praise for PROINCO'S professionalism and output, and many noted that it had grown greatly in stature and effectiveness in the recent past with help from the current USAID project. In order to protect PROINCO from the turbulence of Bolivian politics, Dipp has proposed that it be converted into a private organization called the Latin American Research Center (Centro Latinoamericano de Investigacion -- CELIN). This proposal is now being considered by the Bolivian Government. The Evaluation Team strongly supports the proposal. Not only would privatization serve to protect PROINCO; it would create the potential for PROINCO (CELIN) to become a transnational organization that could attract more multilateral support and provide research for use throughout the Andean region, possibly in cooperation with Peru's CEDRO.

DINAPRE conducts an extensive prevention effort nationwide, working through its regional branches (Prevention Councils - Consejos Departamentales de Prevencion Integral del Uso Indebido de Drogras --COPRES), one of which is located in each of Bolivia's nine departments. Each month, a typical COPRE holds several major anti-drug activities, e.g., training sessions for individuals (including teachers and social workers) who spread the anti-drug message among high risk populations, discussions with groups of parents of potential or actual drug users, discussions with students on the dangers of drug abuse, workshops and seminars for anti-drug abuse professionals, "alternative" free time activities for young people, etc. Judging from DINAPRE's monthly Information Bulletin and conversations with DINAPRE personnel, there appear to be about 30 major activities nationwide each month. These are in additior to DINAPRE's day-to-day work with high risk populations through its nine COPRES.

In the area of prevention, the COPRES also disseminate anti-drug messages regionally via radio and television, with a specific focus on COPRE actions and recommendations. (The principal media campaign in Bolivia against drug abuse is conducted by SEAMOS, discussed later.)

DINAPRE operates three centers for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts. In this area, DINAPRE has received support from the European Community (see section A.9).

One of DINAPRE's responsibilities is the elaboration of a an updated Master Plan for Bolivia's demand reduction efforts -- required by the UNDCP in connection with its assistance to Bolivia. The new Master Plan was recently completed and submitted to UNDCP Vienna.

The Evaluation Team formed a positive judgment of DINAPRE's prevention effort, which appears to be well established on a nationwide basis. The team was also favorably impressed by

Dipp's collegial and creative management style, his success in obtaining EC funds, and hi encouragement of creativity in PROINCO.

SUBDESAL

USAID funds were granted to SUBDESAL under the present project specifically for the creatio and operation of a National Communication Unit (Unidad Nacional de Comunicacion --UNC) The purpose of the UNC is to give appropriate positive publicity and support to the Bolivia Government's program of alternative development, supported by A.I.D.

The UNC is a small (four person), struggling entity, suffering from scarcity of resources PROINCO's share of the $750,000 in local currency approved under the present project i disbursed in a sporadic and piecemeal fashion to the UNC by the Bolivian Finance Ministry. A a result, the UNC has on occasion been unable to pay its staff on time, and it has not been abl to acquire a much needed vehicle for the official use of its personnel.

Despite these difficulties, the UNC is managing to publish a monthly bulletin (SUBDESAL Informa), containing articles and color photographs describing the nature and the advantages of alternative development. In addition, the UNC carries out pro-alternative development publicity via radio broadcasts (including some material in indigenous languages), brochures, posters, and workshop discussions. UNC's efforts also include practical advice to producers of alternative products (e.g., brochures on preventing disease in livestock, on tropical fruit production, etc.).

The Evaluation Team was impressed with the UNC's work under difficult conditions, but believes that the effort must receive additional funding from some quarter soon if it is to have a significant impact.

SEAMOS

SEAMOS' primary function is to conduct a nationwide media campaign against the use of illegal drugs. SEAMOS is headed by Lupe Andrade, an intelligent, energetic woman, well connected in influential Bolivian circles. She comes from a prominent family (her father served twice as Ambassador to the U.S.), and she has personal contacts from the President on down. In addition to heading SEAMOS, she directed Ultima Hora, a major La Paz daily newspaper, until early March of this year. She announced to the Evaluation Team during its visit that she was giving up the Ultima Hora position in order to devote her full attention to SEAMOS.

SEAMOS has an eight-person Board of Directors composed of prominent citizens representing a broad spectrum of society -- e.g, the government, the academic community, and the Catholic Church. According to Andrade, the members of the Board take an active role in SEAMOS' affairs, meeting with her frequently and attending her round table discussions (described later). The Chairman of the Board, engineer and prominent businessman Juan Azcui, attended the briefing that SEAMOS gave the team.

SEAMOS, with a full time staff of 14, carries out the following principal activities:

a. Production of anti-drug video and audio material for broadcast over radio and television, as well as articles for newspapers and periodicals.

Director Andrade and her staff informed the Evaluation Team that SEAMOS routinely places anti-drug spots on 20 television channels, 5 in La Paz and 15 in the rest of the country. There is an average of 15 spots per day on each channel. In other words, SEAMOS arranges for some 300 anti-drug messages to be telecast each day. SEAMOS' anti-drug effort via radio is apparently somewhat less extensive (Andrade's staff said that SEAMOS' anti-drug advertisements were carried on about 15 radio stations, but gave no figures as to the number of advertisements broadcast). The staff pointed out that some program material is telecast or broadcast in indigenous languages. Andrade showed the team examples of SEAMOS-sponsored articles in several newspapers, and indicated that such articles appeared frequently in major dailies.

SEAMOS' television spots, unlike those produced by analogous organizations in other countries the Evaluation Team visited, do not limit themselves to an anti-drug abuse theme but directly attack drug trafficking and related activities. Typical spot titles: "Dollars and Narcotrafficking," "Coca and Narcotrafficking," "Money Laundering," and "Deforestation." Other spots are designed to explain and support alternative development (complementing the work of SUBDESAL's National Communication Unit).
Andrade has worked out an arrangement with Bolivian television stations, radio stations, and newspapers/periodicals under which SEAMOS pays an average of 10 percent of the normal cost of airing program material and printing articles. Although this arrangement represents a significant achievement for SEAMOS, the Evaluation Team notes that in Peru CEDRO pays nothing to the media for running its material.

b. Research and Evaluation Related to Material to be Telecast/Broadcast

SEAMOS conducts research on public attitudes toward drugs in order to be able to prepare material that targets the public as effectively as possible. In 1992, it conducted research on public attitudes in La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Trinidad. SEAMOS also carries out pre-tests of its audiovisual material, using specially chosen audiences.

SEAMOS conducts an annual survey designed to measure the impact of its prevention initiatives. However, the survey (based on questionnaires) is designed to measure SEAMOS' impact on attitudes toward drugs and drug trafficking rather than its success in reducing drug abuse. In any event, the survey process is too new and experimental to allow firm conclusions to be drawn regarding impact of any kind.

c. Scholarships for University Students

SEAMOS grants scholarships to graduate students who propose theses on subjects of relevance to the drug abuse problem and whose proposals are accepted by SEAMOS. The average grant

is $1,000 (plus $500 to cover thesis publication costs). In 1992, 16 scholarships were awarded. Typical titles: "Trade Preferences for Coca Producing Countries," "Narcotrafficking and the National Press," "The Industrialization of Exotic Fruits," and "The Effects of Agricultural Policy on the Process of Alternative Development."

d. Support for Alternative Free Time Activities

SEAMOS sponsors a range of free time activities -- e.g., sports, theatrical productions, crafts -- designed to serve as substitutes for involvement with illicit drugs. Through seminars and workshops, teachers are trained in drug prevention. SEAMOS also grants sports scholarships to underprivileged youth, and finances specific projects, e.g., the nighttime illumination of 14 sports playing fields in the city of Trinidad.

e. Round Table Discussions

Director Andrade periodically holds round table discussions at SEAMOS Headquarters on key subjects related to the drug problem. Experts from various sectors of society are assembled, including senior government officials (the Minister of Planning and the Chief of Police of Bolivia have attended). The discussions sometimes last as long as five hours. The results are transcribed, disseminated to interested parties, and filed in SEAMOS' Documentation Center (see below). In 1992 five round tables were held on the following topics: "The Effect of Enforcement on the National Security Organizations and on the Institutional Structure of the Bolivian State," "Legal Problems Related to the Application of Law 1008" (regulating coca growing), "The Coca Economy of Bolivia," "The Impact of Alternative Development Programs," and "The Parliament and the Coca-Cocaine Problem."

f. Documentation Center

SEAMOS operates what is apparently the most extensive documentation center in Bolivia on drug use prevention issues. The computerized center contains texts and summaries of relevant books, other key documents such as university theses and transcripts of round table meetings, results of opinion polls on the drug issue, lists of persons and institutions active in the anti-drug effort, anti-drug videos used by SEAMOS and other institutions, and clippings from eight Bolivian newspapers. The center is open to the public several hours a day.

CESE

The primary mission of CESE is to carry out educational programs against drug abuse, primarily in Bolivian schools. CESE is headed by Laura Baldivieso, an experienced and dedicated woman with a strong academic background, an international reputation in drug education matters, and a knowledge of Quechua. Until late 1991, CESE had no legal status. Since 1987 its work had been carried out by Baldivieso with funds provided by NAS via USIS. When the current USAID project was being considered in late 1991, USAID suggested that it would be logical for CESE to be merged with SEAMOS. However, following strong resistance to the idea, CESE was

created as an independent legal entity in late 1991 with the help of a lawyer under USAID contract. The Evaluation Team believes this was an appropriate step, given the different roles of SEAMOS and CESE and the desirability of some healthy competition in the anti-drug area.

Because of CESE's newness as a formal entity and its limited track record, it was given a far smaller allocation of funds than SEAMOS (see section A. 2). CESE has acquitted itself exceptionally well with its limited funding.

CESE has produced and published excellent curriculum material for drug prevention use in both public and private schools. With titles such as "I Want to Be Someone" and "I Want to Live," CESE's didactic material is well designed to convince young people of the dangers of substance abuse. CESE Director Baldivieso has shared her didactic books and brochures with anti-drug organizations in other countries, and the material has been translated into Portuguese (for use in Brazil), into French (for use in Gabon), and into English (for use in the U.S.). Unfortunately, Director Baldivieso did not protect her copyright, and a valuable potential source of funds for CESE's work may have been lost.

CESE has set a goal of training all of Bolivia's 80,000 teachers in the use of its curriculum material, and it has already trained 15,000 through seminars and workshops, according to Baldivieso. CESE calculates that even if only 50 percent of the 15,000 teachers carry out drug prevention activities in classrooms with an average of 30 students each, some 225,000 students will have received anti-drug instruction. CESE's achievements in training teachers are impressive, particularly in view of its limited funding. With a full time staff of only about 25 professionals, CESE relies heavily on volunteers to carry out its mission.

CESE conducts numerous seminars and workshops not only for educators but also for community leaders, for families of drug abusers, and for doctors, psychologists, social workers and others active in the prevention field. Under its "Direct Action with Youth" program, CESE conducts anti-drug seminars with students and other young people (average of about ten seminars a year). CESE operates a drug hot line and provides help and advice to drug users. Although CESE carries out no treatment, it maintains close contact with treatment centers and is able to refer drug abusers to them.

In the past year, CESE has extended its efforts nationwide in a convincing manner and has opened offices in both Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.

CESE has close contacts with the media and has arranged for several newspapers and periodicals to print information regarding CESE's activities without charge. The telephone number of its hot line is published routinely in the daily Presencia. CESE's work with the media appears not to overlap the efforts of SEAMOS to any significant degree.

Every two months, CESE publishes an approximately 25-page magazine entitled Apuntes ("Notes"). Because of a color title page, high quality paper, and excellent organization, it is an

attractive periodical. Apuntes carries convincing articles on the dangers of drugs and on the activities of CESE. Circulation is now 20,000 and is scheduled to be increased to 30,000.

CESE has its own limited documentation center on prevention issues.

4. Project Outputs

The Evaluation Team left Bolivia favorably impressed with the achievements of all four of the Bolivian organizations that benefit from the USAID project. SEAMOS is conducting an extensive and vigorous campaign against both drug abuse and drug trafficking. Its scholarships program, round table discussions, research, and social mobilization activities are impressive in both quantity and quality. CESE has produced didactic material of great utility, and has trained 15,000 teachers as well as numerous other professionals, creating the potential for a major multiplier effect throughout Bolivia. DINAPRE serves as a creative facilitator of the national anti-drug effort, and its affiliate, PROINCO, appears to be one of the better emerging drug research entities in Latin America. SUBDESAL's National Communication Unit's output -- monthly bulletin, radio broadcasts, advice to alternative development farmers -- is significant and laudable, particularly in view of the severe funding constraints and disbursement problems from which it suffers.

A summary of these organizations' activities and key outputs under the USAID project is provided in Exhibit 2.

Not only are the outputs of all entities numerous and reasonable; the dedication of the leaders of each of the entities visited is palpable. There is some competition, even rivalry, but on the whole it appeared to be of the healthy and productive variety. There is some overlap of effort, but it is minimal and, in the team's judgment, does not require corrective action.

The project is well balanced in its activities and outputs, devoting attention to a media campaign against both drug use and drug trafficking, a program of anti-drug education in the schools, a campaign to increase awareness of the value of alternative development, a sophisticated program of epidemiological research, a drug hot line, and (with non-U.S. funding) treatment and rehabilitation. There is also a good balance of public and private effort within the project.

5. Project Impact

The team considers it impossible to measure the impact on demand of a project that has been underway in an effective manner for only a bit over a year. Probably the earliest that a full scale, formal impact evaluation could be conducted would be 1995. Periodic informal evaluations should be conducted throughout the life of the project. Taken together, the formal and informal evaluations could help A.I.D. reach a decision on the extent of any funding beyond 1996.

EXHIBIT 2 -- SUMMARY OF USAID/BOLIVIA PROJECT ACTIVITIES IN DEMAND REDUCTION

ORGANIZATION	ROLE	SECTOR	A.I.D. FUNDING	ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS
DINAPRE	Coordinates activities related to drug abuse prevention, public awareness, treatment, and rehabilitation	Public	$750,000 Local Currency Through 1996	--Conducts extensive nationwide prevention effort working through nine regional branches. --Carries out circa 30 prevention activities per month. --Operates three drug treatment/rehabilitation centers. --Elaborates Bolivian Master Plan for Demand Reduction.
PROINCO	Subunit of DINAPRE. Conducts prevalence studies and carries out research on drug use.	Public	Shares DINAPRE funds Through 1996	--Conducted Prevalence Studies: Capital cities of the nine departments (1990); Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, El Alto (1991); 12 cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants each (1992). --"Vulnerable Children," non-quantitative analysis of problems (including substance abuse) faced by Bolivian street children.
SUBDESAL, National Communication Unit	Gives positive publicity and support to alternative development	Public	$750,000 Local Currency Through 1996	--Publishes monthly bulletin, SUBDESAL Informa. --Carries out pro-alternative development radio publicity, including in indigenous languages. --Distributes brochures and posters, holds workshops. --Offers practical advice to alternative product producers.
SEAMOS	Conducts nationwide media campaign against use of illegal drugs.	Private	$5 Million plus $940,000 Local Currency Through 1996	--Produces anti-drug videos and audio material for radio and television broadcasts. --Drafts anti-drug articles for newspapers and periodicals. --Places anti-drug spots on 20 television channels (15 spots per channel, 300 spots per day). --Conducts research and evaluation related to material to be telecast/broadcast. --Provides scholarships for university students for theses on drug abuse related issues. (16 scholarships granted in 1992). --Supports alternative free time activities. --Conducts round table discussions on drug related issues. --Maintains documentation center.
CESE	Carries out programs against drug abuse, primarily in Bolivian schools.	Private	$1.4 million plus $940,000 Local Currency	--Produces curriculum material for drug prevention use in public and private schools. --Trains teachers in the use of its curriculum material. (15,000 teachers trained; goal is to train all 80,000.) --Conducts seminars and workshops for educators, doctors, families of drug abusers, community leaders, psychologists, and other private activists. --Conducts anti-drug seminars with students and other young people. --Operates a drug hotline and provides advice to drug abusers. --Places information in newspapers and periodicals regarding CESE's activities. --Publishes a monthly magazine entitled Apuntes ("Notes") on the dangers of drugs and on the activities of CESE. --Maintains a documentation center.

In the meantime, the team can only express the intuitive judgment that the efforts of SEAMOS and CESE along with DINAPRE's social mobilization activities and its creative leadership are having and will continue to have a positive impact -- not only on drug use but in the broader area of Bolivian attitudes toward the drug problem. A wide range of the team's interlocutors in Bolivia, both Bolivians and Americans, noted that over the past year Bolivian elites and the Bolivian public have begun for the first time to see drug abuse as a Bolivian -- and not just a U.S. -- problem. Also, a recent USIS poll showed that the percentage of Bolivians who had heard or read recently about the use of, and trafficking in, illegal drugs rose from 41 percent in January 1990 to 61 percent in October 1992. The team believes that the project has probably played some part in bringing about these desirable results. The work of SUBDESAL's Communication Unit, although limited, is probably having some positive impact in terms of increasing acceptance of alternative development and directly benefiting producers of alternative products.

6. Project Management

As indicated in section A. 2, USAID's management of the start up of the current project was outstanding. It was essentially a textbook operation, and included the following key elements that other Country Teams in similar circumstances would do well to emulate: centralization of the effort in a single U.S. Government entity, designation of an excellent project manager, clear decisions (arrived at through negotiation) on the functions of each of the entities that benefit from the project, and an agreement with the host government, signed at the ambassadorial and ministerial levels, recording the functions of each entity, the responsibilities of the two governments, and the project funding arrangements.

Following the start up phase, the Country Team, and particularly USAID, have continued to manage the project in an excellent manner. The project manager has succeeded in establishing effective coordination of the project despite some rather strong and competing personalities in the Bolivian organizations and the relatively large number of players (four Bolivian organizations, Development Associates, NAS, USIS, and other Embassy elements). A Project Coordinating Unit, including representatives from all key project players, both Bolivian and American, meets once a month to discuss the progress of the project as a whole and to examine ways in which coordination and overall effectiveness can be improved. The UNDCP representative in La Paz is invited to attend meetings of the Coordinating Unit. The meetings, which are held at Development Associates' La Paz office, are chaired by DINAPRE Director General Carlos Dipp. Evaluation Team members attended a session and were impressed by the businesslike atmosphere and the spirit of collegiality that prevailed. The team has also read the minutes of the Project Coordinating Unit meetings for the past year. They reflect intensive discussions on a wide range of project issues and problems. On the whole, they reveal a group of dedicated individuals working hard -- and successfully -- for the enhanced effectiveness of all project activities in Bolivia.

In order to discuss and decide on U.S. policy aspects of the drug prevention effort in Bolivia, the Country Team has created the "U.S. Mission Drug Prevention Policy Committee," chaired by the

DCM and attended by representatives of USAID, USIS, NAS, and other interested Embassy elements. The Evaluation Team attended a meeting of this committee, and found its members well informed and well prepared to reach decisions that are in the overall U.S. interest.

Finally, an informal U.S.-Bolivian committee meets regularly to review SEAMOS' audiovisual material for appropriateness and likely effectiveness before it is aired on television and/or radio. Some of the material is produced for SEAMOS under subcontract by New Vision Productions (Nueva Vision Producciones-- NVP), an entity headed by a member of the same family that controls Television Channel 9 in La Paz.

7. Priority Assigned to the Project by USAID/Bolivia and the Bolivian Government

As is clear from the previous section, USAID and the Country Team as a whole assign a high priority to the project. It is listed prominently in USAID's action plan, and the project manager (who has other duties) devotes his close personal attention and a large percentage of his time to the project.

The Bolivian Government officials in DINAPRE, PROINCO, and SUBDESAL are fully dedicated to their work and consider it a high national priority. Two cabinet officers with whom the team spoke (the Minister of Health and the Minister of Campesino Affairs, appeared knowledgeable about the demand reduction project and fully supportive of it. However, it is less clear that other key ministers and the highest levels of the Bolivian Government attach major priority to the project. Although they view public awareness of the danger of drug trafficking as desirable, they probably do not see illegal drug consumption as a serious problem in Bolivia, and their principal drug related concerns are the political clout of the coca growers, enforcement, and the practical aspects of alternative development. Most of the Bolivian Government funding of DINAPRE, PROINCO, and SUBDESAL's National Communication Unit consists of the payment of some salaries and the provision of in-kind support. There is no Bolivian Government budgetary support for SEAMOS and CESE.

8. Activities of Other U.S. Agencies in Demand Reduction

NAS has no budget for demand reduction, but it periodically uses limited funds from other programs to support discrete demand reduction efforts. For example, in March of this year it provided $5,000 for a seminar for Bolivian journalists conducted by CESE. USIS carries out routine anti-drug publicity through pamphlets, hand outs, publication of a "Parents' Guide" regarding drug use, and publication of anti-drug articles in the USIS publication entitled Notas Seminales ("Weekly Notes"). In addition, the Voice of America has a 15-minute weekly program against drug abuse, which USIS arranges to be telecast by most of Bolivia's television stations. There are also periodic WORLDNET presentations on the drug issue. USIS states that its target audiences are the Bolivian elites and the media. USIA's Washington-based activities that support demand reduction throughout the hemisphere are described in greater detail in the inventory at Annex 1. Neither NAS nor USIS is providing budgetary support for any of the Bolivian organizations involved in the USAID project.

9. Activities of Non-U.S. Entities in Demand Reduction

The UNDCP is very active in Bolivia, with 13 ongoing projects and 21 more in the pipeline. Four of the current projects directly support demand reduction and collectively total over $3.25 million. Of the projects in the pipeline, at least four are designed to support demand reduction.

The UNDCP representative in La Paz told the Evaluation Team that the United States is currently contributing nothing to demand reduction in Latin America via the UNDCP. He said that Italy was contributing 40 percent of the UNDCP's budget, and that nations such as the Netherlands, Spain, and even Finland were making significant demand reduction efforts in Latin American via the UNDCP. He thought this situation particularly ironic in view of the primacy of the United States in the U.N. system and the importance the United States attaches to Latin America and to the drug prevention issue. He recommended that the United States increase its contribution to the UNDCP, begin to conduct at least some demand reduction work through the UNDCP, and assign some highly qualified U.S. citizens to the UNDCP on secondment, e.g., in Bolivia.

The UNDCP representative said that the European Community currently works through the U.N. office in La Paz but plans to open its own office in the not too distant future. The EC funding thus far has been largely in the area of alternative development -- a project in the Yungas between 1987 and 1991 (circa $5.5 million, partly funded by Italy) and a current project in Cochabamba ($1.75 million), funded entirely by the EC. The UNDCP representative was not aware of any EC demand reduction projects in Bolivia, and the most recent EC bulletin on drug related programs shows none. However, DINAPRE informed the Evaluation Team that it has recently asked for and received a $90,000 grant from the EC to build two floors in one of DINAPRE's drug treatment centers (with the money, DINAPRE was able to build four floors plus an auditorium and a bakery.)

PAHO makes no direct budgetary contributions to demand reduction projects. However, in accordance with a recent U.N. resolution, PAHO/Bolivia has begun to function as the executing agency for the UNDCP's demand reduction programs in Bolivia. PAHO/Bolivia has thus far taken charge of the UNDCP's demand reduction effort in Cochabamba.

The PAHO representative noted the importance of contracting competent and dedicated local NGOs and individuals to carry out the UNDCP projects. She said that some organizations, notably in the Cochabamba area, were incompetent profit seekers. (Carlos Dipp of DINAPRE had noted earlier that there are over 500 institutions in Bolivia that are somehow involved in the anti-drug effort.)

B. Summary Responses to Questions in Statement of Work

1. The Problem

The problem being addressed by the project has two elements (a) inadequate awareness by the Bolivian public that the drug issue is a Bolivian problem, not just an American one; and (b) relatively moderate, fairly stable, but persistent use of illicit drugs in Bolivia. The highest reported lifetime use of cocaine in available studies is 2.08 percent. The 1992 PROINCO survey of persons in urban areas revealed that 10.5 percent of those interviewed had abused drugs other than alcohol and tobacco at some point in their lives. There is no clear evidence that illegal drug use is increasing, but there is the potential for an escalation of the problem, as explained in section A. 1.

2. Priority Assigned to the Project

USAID/Bolivia and the Country Team assign the project a high priority. However, top officials of the Bolivian Government, other than the Minister of Health and the Minister of Campesino Affairs, do not attach major priority to the project. Although they see some merit in increasing public awareness of the dangers of drug trafficking, they probably dc not see drug consumption as a serious problem in Bolivia.

3. Definition of Goals, Purpose, and Outputs

As indicated earlier, the goal and purpose are clearly stated. It is clear from reading them that the project is meant to address both public awareness and drug abuse prevention. Although "public awareness" is not clearly defined in project documents, all persons involved in the project in Bolivia understand it to have two elements -- awareness of the dangers of drugs and awareness of the dangers of drug trafficking.

4. Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Level of Effort Within the Project

All elements of the project appear to be efficiently run and the level of effort in all of them appears high. The potential multiplier effect of the work of CESE and SEAMOS is enormous, and the work of the Bolivian Government elements of the project is of high quality, as earlier explained. The entire project is proceeding satisfactorily. Outputs are impressive in quality and quantity.

5. Project Monitoring

The project is well managed and monitored by USAID/Bolivia, in close coordination with other Country Team elements and with Development Associates. The baseline data being used for prevalence are those that emerged from the 1992 prevalence study by PROINCO. Baseline data sets for public awareness were established in the sense that USIS conducted a poll of attitudes toward the overall drug problem in 1990. Clear purpose indicators have been established -- i.e.,

percentage increase in number of people who believe drug production and trafficking constitute a problem for Bolivia, percentage decrease in drug use in Bolivia, and percentage increase in popular understanding of Law 1008, which regulates coca growing. Since the project has been in existence for only about 18 months, no evaluation of project impact is yet possible. However, process evaluation is conducted on a continuing basis through periodic workshops involving project participants and through the monthly meetings of the Project Coordinating Unit.

6. Adequacy of Resources

Resources provided SEAMOS are adequate, but those given CESE fall short of requirements. Funding of DINAPRE should ideally be increased, and funding of SUBDESAL's Communication Unit is clearly inadequate.

7. Project Cost/Desirability of Institution Building

The project is being implemented at acceptable cost, considering the importance to the United States of building support in Bolivia for counter-narcotics activities and for national drug abuse prevention.

Bolivia is an example of a country where effective institutions -- both public and private -- have been built with U.S. assistance. Without institutions and coordinating mechanisms of the type described earlier in this study, the successes achieved in Bolivia in public awareness and prevention would not have been possible. SUBDESAL's Communication Unit is an example of an institution that has not yet been properly "built" and which is clearly underfunded. As a result, its effectiveness is limited despite the excellent efforts of its personnel.

8. Steps Toward Sustainability

Emphasis thus far has been on getting the project activities underway with U.S. funding and technical support. Steps toward long-term sustainability have been limited. Already, however, the leaders of project entities are very aware of the need to seek non-USG funding, and some efforts in this regard have been made -- e.g., DINAPRE's approach to the European Community, mentioned earlier, and CESE's application to the UNDCP, described in section C 1.

9. Quality of A.I.D.-Funded Services and Technical Assistance

The management and services provided by USAID/Bolivia have been of exceptionally high quality, as earlier described. Technical assistance rendered by Development Associates has been valuable, according to USAID/Bolivia, and the Development Associates staff plays a major role in ensuring the effectiveness of the work of the Project Coordinating Unit, which meets monthly at Development Associates' office in La Paz.

C. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Sustainability

Conclusion: All four Bolivian organizations supported by the project face problems of sustainability. DINAPRE is sufficiently well established as a government entity that it could probably survive without the limited local currency funding that USAID is now providing. The SUBDESAL Communication Unit is facing serious funding problems even with its limited local currency funding, and if this funding were cut off it would have to seek financial support from elsewhere (e.g., the Bolivian Government, the UNDCP) in order to survive. SEAMOS and CESE are largely dependent on USAID funds for their work. If the funding were terminated, both would need alternative sources of financing in order to continue in an effective manner.

Recommendations:

-- All four Bolivian organizations should follow the example of CEDRO and aggressively solicit funds from the Bolivian private sector and from international organizations, NGOs, and foreign governments other than the U.S. (Note: CESE recently applied to the UNDCP for assistance. Partly as a result of this application, the UNDCP is considering a $3.76 million dollar project in drug abuse prevention in Bolivia. No firm decisions have yet been made in Vienna; the value of the project may be lowered, and CESE's possible role in the project is not clear. Nevertheless, CESE showed useful initiative in approaching the UNDCP.)

-- The U.S. Government should urge the Bolivian business sector to make at least some cash contributions to SEAMOS and to the other project entities. (Note: The Evaluation Team stressed the need for such contributions to the Head of SEAMOS' Directorate, Juan Azcui. The same day, Azcui passed on the idea to a meeting of the Bolivian Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs, of which Azcui is a member, and advised that the matter will be considered further by the Confederation.)

-- The Country Team and A.I.D. Washington should explore the possibility of helping to establish endowment funds for at least some of the Bolivian organizations in the project. An endowment fund, even if modest, can provide a measure of stability and predictability to an organization that otherwise might face a very uncertain future. Additional contributions to the endowment fund could be solicited from multiple sources once the fund came into existence (as CEDRO is doing for its endowment fund in Peru). If maintained in U.S. dollars and properly invested, such a fund could provide significant support indefinitely.

-- The U.S. Government should urge that the Bolivian Government provide increased support for the entities involved in the USAID project. Direct budgetary contributions from the Government of Bolivia, even if modest, would be appropriate.

-- The Bolivian Government should take steps to disburse already approved local currency funding in a timely manner. As indicated earlier, there have been significant delays in such

disbursement, especially to SUDESAL's National Communication Unit, and the problem has dragged on for many months. If the problem is not resolved soon, USAID/Bolivia should consider recommending to Washington that a formal demarche be made to the Government of Bolivia on this matter.

2. Senior Management Issues Within the Project Elements

Conclusion: SEAMOS and CESE are each heavily identified with the personalities of their leaders, Lupe Andrade and Laura Baldivieso. The energy and dedication of both women are laudable, but they appear not to have encouraged the emergence of strong alter egos with credibility similar to their own. This situation stands in contrast to that of CEDRO in Peru, where several strong personalities function largely as equals, each having high credibility both with Peruvians and with members of the international community. It may be partly for this reason that CEDRO has been so successful both in its core activities and in its fund raising efforts with international organizations and foreign governments.

Recommendation: Both Andrade and Baldivieso should consider cultivating selected staff members to become largely their equals and their potential successors. Both need to devote more attention to representing their organizations to the outside world. Such action would strengthen SEAMOS' and CESE's fund raising efforts both in Bolivia and abroad.

3. Inadequacy of Funding of SUBDESAL's Communication Unit

Conclusion: Not only is the funding of SUBDESAL's Communication Unit inadequate, but its work -- building support for alternative development -- is of major importance to both the U.S. and Bolivian governments.

Recommendation: A.I.D. should consider way of increasing USG funding of SUBDESAL's Communication Unit despite the current environment of budgetary stringencies.

IV. CASE STUDY - PERU

A. Findings

1. Nature and Extent of the Drug Abuse Problem

Peru is the largest producer of coca leaf which reaches the United States in the form of cocaine. Although coca has long been a traditional crop in the country, its importance as a cash crop has increased in recent years due both to the weakness of the Peruvian economy and the potential for profit in the illegal market. Currently it is estimated that 800,000 persons in Peru benefit from the illegal coca industry. This industry, with its production of cocaine paste (pasta basica de cocaina "bruta" -- PBC-B), cocaine base (pasta basica de cocaina "lavada" -- PBC-L, and cocaine hydrochloride -- HCL) has had a negative impact in the country in terms of security, ecology, internal migration, the economy, and democratic development. Cocaine hydrochloride is the product that reaches the U.S. market. PBC-B and PBC-L are consumed locally. Over 70 percent of the PBC consumed is PBC-B, which is cheaper, more toxic, and more addictive than PBC-L.

Despite the preventive actions undertaken, Peru has experienced an increase in illicit consumption of cocaine paste and cocaine base, notably in areas of high production and trafficking. Prevalence studies from 1988 to 1991 show an increase of 26 percent for such use in populations between 12 and 50 years of age. According to Peruvian health experts, about 70,000 individuals consume cocaine paste and cocaine base in the country.

However, nationwide there appears to have been little change between 1985 and 1992 in marijuana and cocaine use. A 1985 epidemiological study conducted by Development Associates revealed lifetime prevalence of key substances to be as follows: 8.3 percent for marijuana, 2.6 percent for cocaine, and 20.7 percent for coca leaf. Data from a 1992 study by CEDRO showed lifetime prevalence to be as follows: 7.8 percent for marihuana, 2 percent for cocaine, 3.6 percent for inhalants, and 26 percent for coca leaf (mostly among traditional users in the sierra region). It is not clear whether the small decreases in marijuana and cocaine use between 1985 and 1992 are statistically significant. The latest study shows that among street children, close to 100 percent of the males are daily substance abusers (mostly glue), with 20 percent addicted to coca paste. Drug abuse by female street children is occasional, but affects 40 percent of this population.

Regarding the negative impact of the coca industry on the ecology, about 15 percent of currently cultivated lands in the Amazon region and approximately 129,000 hectares in the country are used for coca cultivation. It is estimated that about 700,000 hectares have been deforested since large scale cocaine production began in order to accommodate coca cultivation, illegal airstrips, and cultivation of food supplies for coca producers. The contamination of rivers due to precursor chemicals continues to grow and estimates are that as much as 400 million liters of poisonous waste (e.g., kerosene, sulfuric acid, hydrochloride acid, ammonia, permanganate and toluene) are

dumped annually into Peru's rivers, destroying plants and animals, adversely affecting the food chain, and increasing risks to human populations.

The profitability of coca cultivation and production makes it extremely difficult to deal with Peru's drug problem. Estimates from the 1980s showed that day laborers earned up to 30 U.S. dollars a day picking illegal coca leaves. Although daily income at this time from harvesting is down in the $10 range, work on non-coca producing enterprises yields only about $4 a day. The clandestine coca economy has caused a steady decline in the value of Peru's currency. It has delayed economic recovery by discouraging legal exports, blocking efforts to modernize agriculture, encouraging capital flight, and diverting an important part of national income to the purchase of luxury goods. Money laundering, corruption and violence accompany the drug trade. The desire for profit, lack of agricultural credit and inadequate distribution networks have caused not only an increase in the number of coca growers, but also considerable migration to the coca growing region.

Producers in some regions of the country have organized themselves against forced eradication and alternative development. Because most coca growers have not been authorized by ENACO (the government agency in charge of legal coca production), they are at the margin of the law and caught among three opposing forces: the police/military, the terrorists, and the drug traffickers. In addition, the judicial system of the country is collapsing under the volume of cases related to illegal drug sales on the streets by minors. In some jails, these minors constitute over 80 percent of the prison population.

Coca leaf chewing in Peru dates back to as early as 3,000 B.C. and, along with the use of coca tea, is generally accepted as part of the Peruvian culture. This general acceptance has hindered recognition that the use of coca derivatives or other illegal substances is a problem in Peru. Peruvians of all social classes, their opinion leaders, and some government officials still tend to view drug abuse as a demand problem in the U.S. and other consumer countries. However, CEDRO's most recent opinion surveys indicate increases in awareness that domestic demand in Peru has the greatest negative impact on Peru itself. Respondents holding this view rose from 31 percent in 1988 to 39 percent in 1992.

2. The USAID Project

a. General Background

Legal attention to drug use in Peru goes back to 1916 (when Peru's first prevention legislation, Law Number 2282, was enacted). However, it was only in the mid-1980's that the U.S., concerned over lack of public awareness in Peru of the extent of Peruvian drug problems, decided to become involved in drug awareness and prevention in Peru. Until that time, little connection had been made between Peru's role as a coca producer/user and resultant economic and social development problems.

USAID/Peru contracted with Development Associates in September 1984 to conduct a study on public perceptions regarding narcotics issues and alternatives for action. The firm, in conjunction with the Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru and the Escuela de Administracion de Negocios para Graduados (ESAN), conducted a national perception survey among 1,600 representatives of major populations in all regions of the country.

As a result of the findings, Development Associates recommended to USAID/Peru the creation of a new private voluntary organization that would assume the task of establishing and operating a drug information and education center that would have the support of all sectors of Peruvian society. In September, 1985, Development Associates was awarded a contract to provide technical assistance in the implementation of a drug education and public awareness program for Peru, concentrating on three major tasks:

(1) Assisting Peruvians in establishing a Drug Education and Information Center (Centro de Informacion y Educacion para la Prevencion del Abuso de Drogas - CEDRO);

(2) Conducting a national study of drug use in Peru; and

(3) Providing technical assistance to the ministries of Health and Education on drug abuse prevention.

b. Phase I: Drug Education and Public Awareness Project (DEPA)

The first Drug Education and Public Awareness Project (No. 527-0288) for Peru began in September 1985, and was successfully concluded in September 1992. Total funding was approximately $6 million. The project's purpose was to increase public awareness of problems in Peru related to the production, trafficking, and abuse of illicit drugs and the multiple consequences of these activities. The primary implementation focus of the DEPA project was the creation and operation of CEDRO under the guidance of Development Associates. The secondary focus was the strengthening of public sector programs that complemented the work of the Center. To this end, the project granted $368,874 out of total funding to the Ministry of Education and $80,950 to the Ministry of Health for use by Peru's National Institute of Mental Health (INSM).

In the seven years it has been in operation, CEDRO has developed into a highly respected, independent institution with an excellent reputation in international drug prevention circles. CEDRO probably represents the most outstanding example of USAID anti-drug efforts in Latin America to date. The organization has spearheaded efforts to publicize the dangers that drugs pose for Peruvian society, gathered data on the extent of domestic drug abuse, and mobilized private sector contributions for rehabilitation activities. With only 14 professional employees, CEDRO carries out its work through a vast network of volunteers, part time consultants and social promoters, along with a network of local organizations throughout the country. CEDRO is guided by a Board of Directors composed of influential citizens representing a broad spectrum

of political views, religious ideologies, professional backgrounds, and social classes. The Board meets bi-weekly to discuss major issues, modify its strategies and deal with financial and administrative matters. Although its program is nationwide, branch offices have not been needed as CEDRO uses existing organizations within its institutional network to gain outreach capacity.

CEDRO remains concerned about its sustainability once USAID funding terminates. While still far from financially independent, the center has made progress in increasing donations from non-AID sources including the European Community and other international organizations (see inventory, Annex 1). It should be noted, however, that local donations have been mostly "in-kind" for such things as radio and TV air time. CEDRO continues to cultivate aggressively its contacts with Embassies, the European Community, the UNDCP, and the Kellogg Foundation. It is expected that current technical assistance on fund raising and greater assignment of core administrative costs to programs enjoying international support will help CEDRO along the road to self-sufficiency.

Of particular note in this regard is that CEDRO has established an endowment fund in which it is trying to attain a level of $750,000. It is contemplated that such an amount could guarantee operations at half current levels after A.I.D. support terminates. Unfortunately, early accumulations in Peruvian currency were largely destroyed by inflation because of the absence of a defense against erosion of value.

Under the initial A.I.D.-supported project (Phase I), CEDRO accomplished the following principal actions (see Exhibit 3 for a more detailed list of activities and outputs):

Information Collection and Applied Research

- Developed an information and video center that is open to the public on all subjects related to drug production, trafficking and consumption, prevention, rehabilitation, etc.
- Conducted nationwide epidemiological studies and nationwide public opinion and attitude studies; sponsored approximately 30 other research studies.
- Published a bi-annual magazine and a bi-monthly institutional bulletin and organized international and national seminars on drug problems and alternative solutions.

Communications

- Developed mass prevention campaigns for TV, radio and press usage (airing and publications at no cost to CEDRO). Developed, printed and produced audiovisual preventive material that is disseminated by other institutions (also at no cost to CEDRO).
- Promoted the establishment of drug-related and coordinating institutions in the Andean Region.

EXHIBIT 3 – CEDRO ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS IN DEMAND REDUCTION

ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION	RESULTS
I. INVOLVEMENT		
Institutional Network	Private, public, and base community organizations involved in drug prevention. Training, TA, and prevention assistance from CEDRO	1,985 institutions involved, including Ministries of Health and Education, the Police, and the National Office for Drug Control
Opinion Leaders	Building awareness among political, religious, intellectual, civil, and military leaders to the drug problem.	Working with 1,900 national opinion leaders.
Political Groups and Professional Colleges	Coordination and sensitization activities.	Periodic meetings with leaders of political parties and professional colleges.
Latin-American Network	Network of private and public organizations in prevention research, training, conferences, and publications.	208 insitutions involved
CEDRO's Actions in Production/Trafficking Zones (Upper Huallaga)	Since 1992, Cedro has been working in the principal drug production and trafficking areas, mostly in training "promotors" for the fight against drugs, prevention programs for children and adolescents, and programs for fathers. CEDRO will begin to develop programs for income generation, health promotion, and community development. Will also begin small programs in crop substitutions. Coordination with Special Projects for Upper Huallaga.	Over 1,157 beneficiaries in 9 regional cities from December 1992 - January 1993
II. STUDIES		
Public Opinion Studies	National level study on drug issues, in 13 major cities.	3 studies carried out.
Opinion Leaders	Study with 1,498 prominent opinion leaders in Peru.	1 study carried out.
Epidemiologial study	National level study on drug consumption.	3 studies carried out.
Youth Opinion Study	National study on values and attitudes of youths on various issues.	1 study carried out.
Epidemiological Study on Cocaine Base Paste	Epidemiological study on use of cocaine base paste among youths under 15 years old in Tingo Maria and Tarapoto.	One study carried out.
Pre/Post Testing of Publicity Campaigns	Preliminary research with groups and evaluation of the impact of four mass TV publicity campaigns carried out by CEDRO	Four evaluations completed.
Research sponsored by Cedro	TA and financial support for local drug-related research (biomedical, historical, economic, psychological, sociological, education).	28 projects supported.
Third Party Research	Drug related research by specialists (i.e., legislation, biomedical).	4 studies carried out.
III. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AND DIRECT ACTION		
1. Training	Training of personnel of private, public, and religious institutions and base communities as promotors of drug prevention.	4,095 training courses 473,822 people trained
-International Activities	Attend international conferences; member of international institutions; CEDRO staff trained abroad; participate in intl. projects.	Member of 220 intl. institutions and organizations; represented at 46 intl. conferences and seminars; 25 persons trained abroad.
2. Technical Assistance	TA, training, and materials for numerous national institutions. Identify needs and objectives; implement methodologies and evaluation	TA to 1,084 national level institutions, including ministries, regional authorities, 41 municipalities, 800 NGOs, and 212 communities, in 210 meetings.

EXHIBIT 3 – CEDRO'S ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS IN DEMAND REDUCTION (CONTINUED)

ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION	RESULTS
3. Development of Specific Programs	Social rehabilitation of prisoners: legal advice, crafts training, drug counseling, acceleration of justice process.	Permanent programs in Lima (1 male, 1 female); 1,500 inmates benefitting; program with children of inmates.
-Street Children	Give food, lodging, psychological and rehabilitation support, medical attention, work training, family reinsertion for boys and girls.	5 houses and 8 training facilities to cover 60% of the street children population of Lima, using "revolving door" system.
-Recreation and Prevention	Program during school vacations for children and adolescents in marginal urban areas and high risk zones in Lima.	10,000 children and adolescents involved per year; 25 community libraries established; 22 communities visited by traveling museum.
-Religious Community	Develop prevention programs/activities through churches and parishes.	1,500 national religious networks working in drug prevention.
-Drugs in Workplace	Information, training, awareness activities for managers and employees.	370 companies, more than 10,000 employees involved.
-Child Care Centers	Prevention training at public and private child care institutions.	Working in 6 institutions.
-Income Generation	Experimental labor training for youths at risk to create microenterprises as alternatives to selling drugs, to generate income (in jungle region).	15 microenterprises implemented; alternative short term work programs for 200 youths.
-Ecological Defense	Diverse activities to protect and promote ecology and environment.	Over 30 initiatives being developed.
-Drug Counseling	Primary counseling for drug dependents and families in order to initiate treatment in hospitals/clinics, and to enlist families in recovery.	4,862 requests for help, directed to specialized services.
-Work with Women	Involvement of women's groups in drug prevention activities.	Over 200 women's groups involved.
-Education Centers	Training/advising in public and private education centers on programs designed by CEDRO-"Natural Leaders," "School and Parents," etc.	Working with over 1,000 centers and their respective associations for parents and families.
-School for Fathers	Drug prevention training for fathers during 12 sessions.	Over 8 groups of 30-40 fathers in neighborhood associations.
-Ministry of Education	Agreement w/MOE-implement National Drug Prevention Curriculum.	Being implemented.
-Local Universities and Military Institutes	Prevention training courses for pre-professional students. in various disciplines (workshops and informational discussions).	12 universities involved; preparation of action plans for the Armed Forces and Police.
-National Congress	Permanent lobbying of Congress, presentation of legislative proposals and policies on production, trafficking, and consumption of drugs	Advisory status to the Congressional Committee on this topic.
-Judicial/Fiscal Branches	Permanent coordination on actions/programs on information/training.	Annual courses on permanent information.
-Executive Branch	Permanent coordination with Ministries of External Relations, Education, Health, Interior, Justice, and contact with Presidency.	Advisory level for commissions of the ministries. Technical advisory to MOE. Cooperative agreements.
-Regional and Municipal Authorities	Cooperative Agreements; support for training and TA for direct actions. Develop training courses.	Permanent programs with 42 municipalities in TA, training, drug prevention, work alternatives, child abuse, and social services
4. Document Center and Data Base	Library and audiovisual services available to scholars, universities, professionals, researchers, and the general public.	33,034 information requests; 22,555 people have used the library services; 616,939 CEDRO publications distributed.
5. Publications and Materials	Editing and publishing of research, books, magazines, bulletins, manuals, and local prevention materials	Over 250 documents edited and published.
6. Communications and Mass Media	Radio-weekly programs for 189 radio stations; TV-regular production of prevention material for all networks; Press-2 to 3 press items per week.	25 Radio spots & 441 direct interventions; 10 TV spots & 375 presentations on TV; 3,537 press items, 1,625 articles per month.
7. Mass Campaigns Special Groups	Production of 3-month drug prevention campaign via major TV networks. Campaigns on activities for marginal urban communities.	4 mass campaigns produced. Work with 84 at risk communities.
10. Self Financing	Generation and increase in permanent institutional funds.	CEDRO permanent funds at US$150,000 due to Peru's economic problems.

Training and Technical Assistance

- Developed training and technical assistance activities for CEDRO staff as well as for workers of over 1,900 public and private institutions.

- Developed a center for the orientation, counseling, and referral of drug addicts and their families to treatment centers.

- Developed a program to integrate street children into their communities. Five "open houses" are operated under this program.

- Promoted and supported small businesses that are run by young people at risk in low income urban communities.

- Developed a nationwide drug prevention program for schools, churches and low-income communities.

- Trained over 150,000 drug abuse prevention promoters.

In addition to CEDRO's impressive work outputs listed above, A.I.D.-supported public sector activities under the first project accomplished the following:

In the Ministry of Health, as part of the DEPA Project, the Peruvian National Institute for Mental Health (INSM) worked with CEDRO in strengthening its capability to institutionalize a system for conducting studies and data collection, to install an ongoing surveillance system, and to standardize drug abuse terminology and techniques used by physicians and hospitals. INSM received a grant of $80,950 to support the Government of Peru (GOP) in its efforts to improve drug abuse prevention activities through the conduct of three pilot studies. Because of multiple problems within the health sector, the Institute complied only in part.

In the Ministry of Education, the DEPA Project, using CEDRO's professional staff and technical assistance resources, was able to assist the Ministry to design and carry out a comprehensive drug abuse prevention program. The objective was to strengthen the institutional capability of the MOE's drug prevention unit to develop drug abuse prevention curricula, disseminate materials, carry out a training program for trainers, and improve its research capability. Assistance was provided through grants of $181,868 and $121,600 ($40,000 of the second grant was for technical assistance by CEDRO). With these resources the MOE also conducted two major activities: a national high school survey to identify drug use and risk factors, and the development and pilot application of a drug prevention high school curriculum. The high school prevention curriculum was established in 114 schools, involving almost 9,000 teachers and serving over 290,000 students. In 1979 the MOE created the Commission for the Prevention of Drug Abuse (COPUID). COPUID developed a national drug abuse prevention plan in 1982 and is working on the prevention section of the new national drug prevention plan being developed by the

Executive Office of Drug Control (OFECOD). However, as explained in section A. 9, work on that plan has been seriously impeded as a result of bureaucratic difficulties.

c. Phase II: Narcotics Education and Community Initiatives (NECI)

The follow-on Narcotics Education and Community Initiatives project (No. 527-0347) was authorized in September 1992, and is scheduled to continue until 1997. New funding authorized for the life of the project (1993-1997) is $8.8 million, including $300,000 in funds granted by the U.S. Congress for the Displaced Children Program. As a result, Peru has become the major recipient of A.I.D. support in drug demand reduction in the region, in the amount of approximately 15 million dollars.

The NECI's underlying strategy presumes that a better understanding of the drug problem leads individuals and community groups to promote efforts that build upon existing public awareness and that result in broader, nation-wide actions. One component of the approach is to establish a number of self-sustaining long-term activities (e.g., community work programs) and other income generating activities aimed at preventing youngsters from seeking income from illegal activities, particularly drug trafficking. The program goal, which coincides with one of the Mission's strategic objectives, is to replace coca-based employment and foreign exchange earnings with legal alternatives. The program has identified a specific intermediate sub-goal which is to establish a sustainable and aggressive Peruvian government and private sector action plan to counteract drug production, trafficking and abuse.

The NECI project focuses on: (1) dissemination of information in order to increase and maintain heightened awareness regarding the negative effects of drug production, trafficking and consumption; (2) expansion of the recently-developed drug prevention curriculum in high schools with special emphasis in cities of the Upper Huallaga Valley; and (3) development of locally-designed prevention programs in high risk communities, including those adjacent to coca-growing areas, and consolidation of the street children program. By way of results, the project intends to produce a strong public response that generates anti-drug newspaper editorials, publications, radio announcements, television presentations and conferences, as well as an increase in the number of community level-generated and implemented programs, with involvement of both the public and private sectors. CEDRO's success will be judged by program outputs (ability to produce quality services and influence opinion leaders) and fund raising outputs to achieve self-sustainability.

3. Project Outputs

The Evaluation Team left Peru impressed with what can be considered a textbook case of a well run prevention program. Mission management of the project has been supportive, but not intrusive. Commendable by all accounts was the performance of Development Associates in the initial phases of the project.

The DEPA project clearly achieved its major output -- the successful establishment of CEDRO as a credible institution. Other major achievements include the development and implementation of a school-based prevention curriculum through the Ministry of Education and completion of the MOE's prevalence research studies. Because of frequent personnel changes and other problems, as earlier noted, one of the outputs that was only partially accomplished was conduct of epidemiological studies by the Ministry of Health. The second output that has only partially been fulfilled is the achievement of sustainability by CEDRO. The Center has made progress in raising funds from non-USG sources, as will be discussed later, but not surprisingly it is still far from achieving independent financial status. In August, 1990, an evaluation report of DEPA (conducted for USAID/Peru by the Development Economics Group) concluded that the "methodology by which the project was planned could and should be used for similar projects" in other countries in Latin America and worldwide.

CEDRO is making great strides in the development of project evaluation research and is currently working on a "holistic research model" which promises to enhance its capability for conducting project evaluation and epidemiological research. CEDRO has the technical sophistication, the computer equipment, and other resources necessary to conduct adequate research, as well as evaluation studies.

4. Project Impact

An impact evaluation of the DEPA project, while planned, was never conducted. Assigned funds were utilized for operations to compensate for financial losses suffered by CEDRO due to inflation and devaluation of funds held in Peruvian currency. However, CEDRO's opinion polls in Lima (1987, 1988, 1992) showing changes in public perception of the drug problem in Peru may be generally indicative of project impact.

Based on these opinion polls, other research studies and anecdotal references gathered by the team, the impact of drug awareness education efforts in Peru (CEDRO's being the most important in the country) would seem to be substantial. Peruvians more and more consider drugs to be a national problem and opinion leaders now appear to begin to understand the complexity of the problem and the threat to the stability of national institutions. In 1986 less than one percent of the public considered drugs to be Peru's main problem; reportedly, this has increased to 25 percent today. A 1985 study by Checchi and Company of A.I.D's "Narcotics Control Development Assistance Program" noted that in Peru "national elites give a low priority to the drug problem within the context of overall development priorities." That this is no longer the case with regard to Peruvian elites is confirmed by the above-mentioned studies, even if the 25 percent figure for the general public is overstated. Both in Lima and the provinces, the Peruvian public now seems to have a better understanding that prevention is a task that must be undertaken, and that it is a necessary part of the activities of every community. CEDRO is perceived as a source of reliable knowledge to this end among Peruvians at all levels and has become a catalyst for stimulating public opinion on drug related topics among Peru's diverse cultural and ethnic groups.

5. Future Evaluations

An in-depth evaluation of the NECI project is scheduled for the end of 1993 to review the project's achievement of intended outputs and recommend revisions to indicators. Other evaluations are scheduled to be carried out at the end of 1995 and 1997. It is hoped that in upcoming evaluations, the USAID will go beyond measuring quantitative outputs and begin to look at the long-term impact that its narcotics awareness education activities are having on knowledge, attitudes and behaviors, risk factors, and drug use at both the national and local levels in Peru.

6. Management of the Project

The USAID assigns a high priority to the NECI project in Peru, as evidenced by the level of funds invested in the project, the identification of both the DEPA and NECI projects with one of the main USAID objectives in Peru, and the assignment of a most capable project manager who devotes much personal attention and time to the project. Because of the DEPA/NECI concentration on only one organization, CEDRO, coordination of project activities has required less Country Team time and effort than in Bolivia. USIS and NAS maintain some level of involvement in narcotics awareness activities, the latter with the MOE, as described in Section A. 9, but CEDRO remains the principal actor.

7. Priority Assigned to the Project by USAID/Peru and the Peruvian Government

The government has not given high priority to promoting drug awareness education, though two ministries have participated in the project as a result of USAID's initiative and NAS support. The range of pressing issues facing the Peruvian Government -- the economy, the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru, political instability, and narco-terrorism -- all militate against making drug prevention a higher priority. As far as the Evaluation Team could judge, government officials in the Ministry of Education's prevention unit and at the Ministry of Health are committed to their work and consider it a priority. What is not evident is whether officials at higher levels attach any appreciable priority to demand reduction work. The most active unit of the government remains the Ministry of Education (MOE), responsible for the implementation of drug abuse prevention programs with teachers, young people, and their families.

8. Activities of Other U.S. Agencies in Demand Reduction

NAS has its own demand reduction project in Peru, devoted mainly to support for the Ministry of Education's Commission for the Prevention of Drug Abuse (Comision de Prevencion del Uso Indebido de Drogas -- COPUID). NAS financing helps defray the cost of COPUID'S anti-drug education program in the schools and its anti-drug television spots. The project also supports international conferences and meetings on drug use prevention. The total amount allocated to the project for FY 90 through FY 93 was $380,000, of which about half -- $167,000 -- remains in the pipeline. (See the inventory for a breakdown of the funding by year and for the amounts of money still unspent from each year).

USIS assists the prevention effort largely through the U.S. Speaker Program and the International Visitors' Program. In 1992, one American expert was brought to Peru to speak on prevention, and one Peruvian, from CEDRO, was sent to the United States to be briefed on U.S. efforts to control drug abuse. USIS also contributes periodically to the cost of CEDRO-sponsored international seminars on prevention held in Peru. The USIS chief estimates that USIS expenditure in all of these areas totals about $20,000 per year. In addition, USIS has provided CEDRO with a CD ROM Reader for use in its documentation center. (USIA's Washington-based activities that support demand reduction throughout the hemisphere are described in the inventory at Annex 1.)

9. Activities of Non-U.S. Entities in Demand Reduction

There is only one UNDCP demand reduction project in Peru, first approved in 1987. It has a budget of $315,000 (provided by Italy), and its purpose is the "preparation and implementation of treatment and rehabilitation activities for drug addicts in Peru." In the first phase of the project, Peruvian drug treatment personnel were trained in prevention and social reintegration at the Italian Solidarity Center (Centro Italiano di Solidarieta -- CEIS) in Rome. In the second phase, now underway, financial support is being provided to two drug treatment NGOs in Peru.

The UNDCP representatives with whom the team spoke said they hoped the UNDCP would be able to do more in prevention in the future. They saw drug use in Peru as a growing problem that required increased attention. However, they noted that completion of a Master Plan for Peru's anti-drug effort was a precondition for further UNDCP assistance. As earlier noted, OFECOD is in charge of producing the overall plan, and the Ministry of Education is drafting the prevention portion. However, work on the Plan is bogged down, apparently because of disorganization and jealousies within the bureaucracy. The UNDCP representatives said the situation was sufficiently serious that President Fujimori should consider naming a special commission to finalize the plan. They noted that a $2.6 million UNDCP grant to the Ministry of Education for prevention is being considered, but that final decisions on it cannot be taken until a Master Plan is drafted and approved.

Between 1976 and the end of 1992, the European Community (EC) provided over 250 million ECU in assistance to Peru, mostly in the areas of alternative development and food aid. Demand reduction assistance thus far is valued at 275,000 ECU (two prevention projects in 1987 and 1988, respectively, and one prevention/rehabilitation project in 1989). Currently, rehabilitation assistance in the amount of over 300,000 ECU is being considered. In addition, the EC gave CEDRO 230,000 ECU for support of CEDRO's street children program in 1990-92, and is considering additional support for CEDRO. These EC efforts in demand reduction are set forth in greater detail in the inventory.

The EC representative with whom the team spoke had high praise for CEDRO and indicated that additional EC assistance to CEDRO might well be forthcoming. However, he stressed that the EC was moving toward a policy of co-financing its projects with European NGOs, and he implied

that CEDRO and other potential beneficiaries of EC projects would have to help the EC locate co-financing partners in the future.

PAHO's contributions to demand reduction are very limited. PAHO is providing CEDRO with $12,000 for consulting centers for use by drug addicts and/or their families. In addition, PAHO is advising the Ministry of Health on how to insert an anti-drug message into its mental health program, and PAHO is advising the Ministry of Education on its school health program (which includes an anti-drug element). However, PAHO is making no cash contributions in these areas. PAHO provides information on general health issues for radio broadcasts in Peru, and it also prints and distributes reading material on general health issues. According to the PAHO representative with whom the team spoke, up to 30 percent of this recorded and printed health information deals with the problem of alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs.

CEDRO has engaged in a massive and very successful fund raising campaign that is far superior to any similar effort the Evaluation Team observed on its trip. To date, CEDRO has received, or is receiving, contributions from 25 different sources, including international organizations, NGOs, and the governments of Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The grants range in size from very modest amounts (the lowest is $1,200) to donations of over $300,000 each. In addition, CEDRO calculates that it has received $3 million in free air time on Peruvian radio and television. CEDRO's success in fund raising can be attributed to its high national and international credibility and to the initiative and sophistication of its excellent staff. CEDRO informed the team that every grant it has received from an institution resulted from an initial approach by CEDRO to the donor, not vice versa. Moreover, there is every indication that CEDRO submits its applications for assistance in a businesslike and practical manner, thereby facilitating action by the potential donors. All grants that CEDRO has received, in addition to those for which it is currently applying, are set forth in detail in the inventory.

B. Summary Responses to Questions in Statement of Work

1. The Problem

The problem addressed by the original project, or Phase I -- which ran from September 1985 to September 1992 -- had two elements: (a) an inadequate public understanding in Peru of the overall drug problem and insufficient support for efforts to address it; and (b) a moderate but growing level of illegal drug use in Peru. The new project, or Phase II, authorized in September 1992 and scheduled to continue until 1997, addresses the same two problems -- although at this point the first one has decreased somewhat in severity, as already explained.

2. Priority Assigned to the Project

USAID/Peru and the Country Team assign a high priority to the project. However, top officials of the Peruvian Government do not. Their attention is concentrated on more pressing matters, notably terrorism, political instability, and the economy.

3. Definition of Goals, Purpose, and Outputs

For the original project the goal, purpose, and outputs were clearly defined. The goal was "to strengthen Peruvian commitment to drug enforcement and coca eradication programs by changing the public's perception of drugs and drug related issues." The purpose was "to increase public awareness of problems in Peru related to the production, trafficking, and abuse of illicit drugs and the social, political, economic, and health consequences of these activities." The outputs, or "results," were described as "(1) an established, operational private drug information and education center carrying out a national drug awareness and information program which has the capacity to generate a large proportion of its income from non-A.I.D. sources; (2) improved public sector educational programs in drug abuse and drug problems in the Ministry of Education, including the design and implementation of a national program for training teachers and other youth workers in drug abuse awareness and prevention; (3) the institutionalization of an improved drug surveillance and data collection system in the Ministry of Health, including the standardization of drug abuse terminology and reporting techniques; (4) the design, implementation, and analysis of a drug incidence and prevalence study; and (5) recommendations provided by a comprehensive analysis of the project for further A.I.D. programming of a similar nature in other drug producing and consuming countries."

The above definitions clearly focused the project on achieving the desired ends and therefore contributed to the success of the first project. The targets set were realistic.

For the current project, which was approved only late last year, the goal is to "consolidate and broaden the work developed by CEDRO during the last five years aiming at raising public consciousness of the drug problem in Peru and its social, political, economic, and health consequences, and promoting specific actions in the public and private sectors for the reduction of drug production, trafficking and use." The project purpose is to "increase the level of awareness and positive endeavors of the Peruvian people and their institutions in relation to the drug problems through a private information and education system . . . " (the full statement of purpose, available in the Project Identification Document, goes on to list detailed activities that CEDRO will carry out). The outputs of the current project are defined as "a prestigious self-sufficient private institution demonstrating that it can effectively provide the nation with accurate information on the adverse effects of drugs; the dissemination of timely and accurate information to the nation; drug prevention curricula expanded nationwide; and, drug prevention and awareness network strengthened."

The goal and purpose of the present project are realistic and clear. The formal statement of outputs appear a bit too broad, at least as compared with the expected "results" of the 1985-1992 project. However, the project documentation goes into considerable detail regarding what actions CEDRO is expected to take under the new project.

4. Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Level of Effort Within the Project

The original project was effective at producing an impressive array of outputs, as documented elsewhere in this case study. It was run efficiently; the project's successes were achieved by a staff of only 14, working through a vast network of volunteers and local organizations throughout Peru. By all accounts, and based on direct observation by the Evaluation Team, the level of effort of CEDRO's staff is high. An example is the work CEDRO has done in the fund raising area -- an effort superior to that of any other A.I.D.-supported demand reduction entity. Barring unforeseen developments, similar levels of effectiveness, efficiency, and effort can be expected in the new project, or Phase II.

5. Project Monitoring

The project is monitored very effectively by a capable project manager. The degree of Mission and Country Team scrutiny of the project appears to be about right -- continuous and well informed but not intrusive. For the original project, the results of a 1986 nationwide prevalence study were used as baseline sets. These data corre onded reasonably well in time to the start of the project. Although no formal baseline sets were established at the outset in the public awareness area, opinion polls conducted in Peru near the beginning of the project served as rough baseline data. The project description for the current project sets forth 1991 prevalence data and attaches recent opinion survey results, both of which are apparently intended to serve as baseline data sets. An impact evaluation of Phase I was planned but never carried out. Evaluations of Phase II are planned for 1993, 1995, and 1997.

6. Adequacy of Resources

Resources provided by A.I.D. in Phase I (some $6 million) were adequate and led to excellent results, as already indicated. The $8.8 million amount authorized for the life of Phase II (until 1997) appears adequate, particularly given CEDRO's skill at raising funds from non-USG sources.

7. Project Cost/Desirability of Institution Building

Phase I was implemented at acceptable cost, particularly in view of successes achieved. Phase II is only just beginning.

Peru is the best example in Latin America of the desirability of building a demand reduction institution with USG support where no appropriate organization already exists. As documented throughout this case study, CEDRO has been exceptionally effective and productive. Since the institution is now largely "built," it has international credibility, which is serving it well in its fund raising efforts.

8. Steps Toward Sustainability

CEDRO has been markedly successful in securing funds from non-USG sources. Its sophisticated and extensive contacts with the UNDCP, the European Community, European governments, and major NGOs have paid impressive dividends, as can be seen from the inventory (Annex 1). Sustainability without A.I.D. funding is still elusive, but it probably could be achieved in due course with additional international fund raising and a build-up of CEDRO's endowment fund with some of the moneys thus obtained.

9. Quality of A.I.D. Funded Services and Technical Assistance

Development Associates' assistance in the establishment of CEDRO was an impressive achievement. By all accounts, the technical assistance rendered by Development Associates was of commendable quality. USAID/Peru's management of the project is appropriately broad, encouraging initiative on the part of CEDRO's excellent staff, yet the project manager follows CEDRO's efforts very closely and provides guidance as required.

C. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Project Content

Conclusion: CEDRO has been successful in developing the necessary mechanisms to increase public awareness of the dangers of drug use and drug trafficking in Peru. As discussed in section A. 4, CEDRO's positive impact on public opinion over the years seems to have been substantial. Probably due in some measure to CEDRO's efforts, there is now widespread acceptance of the need for drug prevention and a more sophisticated understanding of the threat drug trafficking poses to the Peruvian economy and ecology.

Recommendations:

-- Given progress in its public awareness campaign to date, CEDRO should consider branching out more into other important areas. These should include consolidation of its efforts in research and increased attention to operational aspects vital to greater community mobilization.

-- Without weakening its role in publicizing the threat of drugs to Peru's future development, CEDRO should seek new and innovative ways to present the drug problem to a better informed public.

-- Leading government organizations (e.g., the Ministries of Education and Health and OFECOD) as well as local universities should be encouraged to increase their participation in epidemiological and other types of research and in project evaluation efforts.

2. Sustainability

Conclusion: Although CEDRO's fund raising efforts have been more extensive and successful that those of any other A.I.D.-supported entity visited by the Evaluation Team, CEDRO is still far from achieving full, long-term sustainability.

Recommendation: CEDRO should strengthen and expand its fund raising efforts still further. Without greater assistance from other donors, CEDRO, after A.I.D. inputs cease, may need to reduce its core staff by as much as half, even more if its endowment fund is not at target levels by then. With this reduction in size, the organization would need to scale down or terminate some vital activities in research and community support, threatening its continued effectiveness.

3. Measurement of Project Impact

Conclusion: USAID/Peru has not identified with sufficient clarity the impact it expects or hopes to derive from the current project. In project documents, the principal stress is placed on outputs rather than impact. Impact targets are clearly stated only for "the percentage of the population which recognizes drug-related activities as a major national problem that needs to be corrected immediately." A target percentage is indicated for each year through 1997.

Recommendation: Impact indicators and targets should be clearly stated at the start of any project. In the case of the current project, additional impact targets should be established in the public awareness, drug education, and epidemiological areas.

4. Possible Broadening of Project Effort Beyond CEDRO

Conclusion: The Mission has concentrated most of its available resources in drug prevention on CEDRO to the exclusion of other NGOs.

Recommendation: Should further financing become available, the Mission should consider earmarking some funds to support the efforts of local NGOs that complement activities undertaken by CEDRO.

V. CASE STUDY - BRAZIL

A. Findings

1. Nature and Extent of the Drug Abuse Problem

Reportedly, drug use in Brazil has experienced the most rapid rate of increase in all of Latin America in the last five years. The use of illicit drugs has grown by approximately 20% per year according to research carried out by the Paulista School of Medicine of the University of Sao Paulo. Brazil also has a major problem with trafficking, money laundering, and precursor chemicals. Drugs enter Brazil from neighboring countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, primarily via the Amazon basin rivers. According to anecdotal information, it is relatively easy to get drugs into Brazil, but the Brazilian authorities have made it difficult to get them out. While some drugs coming through Brazil are re-exported to Europe and North America, a considerable quantity reportedly remains within the country and is sold to an "expanding Brazilian market".

According to the 1989 epidemiological study carried out by CEBRID (Centro Brasileiro de Investgacoes Sobre Drogas), 23.5% of the sample population had used psychotropic substances (lifetime prevalence). On the other hand, only 3.5% reported frequent use. The psychotropic substances consumed most, in terms of both lifetime and frequent use, were (1) solvents, (2) tranquilizers, and (3) amphetamines and/or marijuana. This pattern of preferences was found throughout Brazil, revealing homogeneity to be taken into account in education programs. As in other Latin American countries, economic status affects the kind of drugs individuals use. Members of the upper class use cocaine, while street children use inhalants. Interestingly, according to a recent study by CEBRID, there is wide use of inhalants among medical students. CEBRID is completing plans for a new study to be carried out this year in which use of "crack" will be measured for the first time.

2. USAID Projects

Nature and Funding

The USAID started working on drug awareness programs in Brazil in November 1990 when it funded a major seminar on narcotics awareness in Sao Paulo. The seminar was organized by USAID's grantee for the purpose, Partners of the Americas, in cooperation with PREVIDA (a drug abuse prevention parastatal entity of the government of Brazil). Since that time, a number of training activities have been provided for professionals and community leaders in specific regions of Brazil (notably Sao Paulo and Ceara States), as well as in the United States.

In view of the significance of the drug problem in Brazil and the large size of the country, Brazil has extensive needs for training in state of the art strategies in narcotics awareness education.

Many national leaders remain unaware of the extent of the problem and do not see it as particularly important. Moreover, many professionals in the field continue to use a medical model that concentrates on treatment and rehabilitation rather than on preventing the drug problem before it takes root. Keeping that in mind, the main objectives for A.I.D.'s drug program development in Brazil have fallen into two categories: (a) increasing awareness of narcotics abuse as a domestic problem; and (b) developing leadership that is committed to demand reduction within Brazil and that will seek innovative solutions and expand attention to the issue.

It should be noted that, except for training activities, A.I.D. assistance to Brazil has been proscribed under Sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). These sections refer to countries that do not provide safeguards for nuclear technology. Assistance is also limited by Section 620q of the FAA and Section 518 of the Appropriations Act, which refer to countries that default on loan payments to the USG.

Measured against the extent and nature of drug prevention activities needed in the country, USAID/Brazil's financing has been minimal (only $700,000 over the three-year period, FY 91-93, including $500,000 in buy-ins to the A.I.D. Washington R&D/ED Narcotics Awareness and Education contract with Development Associates). Assistance in drug awareness was also provided within the five-year contract with SUNY for participant training assistance, and through a grant to Partners of the Americas. Early last year, the USAID considered phasing out the drug program in order to focus on its activities in AIDS and the environment. However, recognizing the positive response and increased level of Brazilian commitment that a small investment of USG funds had begun to have, USAID/Brazil reconsidered its earlier inclination to phase out its low-cost prevention effort. The Country Team expressed support for this decision during the Evaluation Team's visit.

The USAID has sought to serve as a catalyst in stimulating incipient interest in demand reduction activities in Brazil. To date, initiatives sponsored by the Brazilian federal government have, for the most part, been fragmented and superficial in nature. Since the USAID does not expect either much financing or program activity to come from the federal level, efforts wisely have been focused on state-level operations. In both Sao Paulo and Ceara, these are conducted with a view not only to achieving state-wide results but also to expanding ideas and programs to other states.

Activities in target areas involve working with public, private and community-based entities that have the potential to develop effective prevention and demand reduction programs. Programs first develop pilot interventions in key sites and later scale up activities according to lessons learned. The process utilized in this effort includes: (1) modest USAID financing with high counterpart contributions from other sources; (2) focus on future financial, technical and structural sustainability; and (3) networking of private, non-governmental, and governmental institutions.

Essential to the USAID's drug prevention strategy in Brazil has been coordination with other USG agencies, attention to bringing together multi-disciplinary groups, and emphasis on

developing sustainable efforts that rely heavily on local resources as well as multi-donor cooperation.

The bulk of USAID project activity is concentrated in Sao Paulo and Ceara, as can be seen from Exhibit 4, which provides an overview of the various drug awareness and education initiatives currently sponsored by USAID in Brazil. The USAID has played a pivotal role in fostering the involvement of key leaders in drug awareness education and prevention in Sao Paulo and Ceara. In order to advance drug prevention activities, interdisciplinary groups from these two states were sent to the U.S. for a three-week observation course. After these groups returned they prepared action plans outlining priority activities to be carried out. USAID/Brazil financed consultants to assist these groups in consolidating their ideas and designing project proposals. Donor roundtables were held where ideas were presented; most of the proposals discussed were funded. USAID contributes an average of about 20% of the total cost of carrying out proposals it supports. The remaining funding is provided by the private sector, state agencies, local foundations, and universities.

3. Project Outputs

While waiting for a reasonable level of national concern with drug demand reduction to develop in Brazil, a small USAID investment has helped to generate much attention to drug prevention in two key states. Judging from presentations made by recipients of USAID funds, review of written descriptions of projects, and conversations with personnel engaged in the work, it appears that output requirements are well on their way to being satisfied by all participating organizations. The USAID is fully involved in monitoring the operational status of projects, and timely support has come from Development Associates and its sub-contractors.

4. Project Impact

Measuring the impact of drug awareness and education activities in Brazil is a major challenge in view of the size of the populations being reached and the modest dimensions of the USAID projects. Adding to the challenge are other factors that include:

a. The length of time work has been implemented. In the case of Brazil the individual USAID projects have not been formally evaluated yet because most of them have been in operation only a few months.

b. An emphasis, thus far, on the measurement of quantitative outputs. More faithful indicators of success would be behavioral outcomes of awareness and prevention efforts, indicators of effective prevention models and approaches, or changes registered in the indicators that help monitor the drug problem in a particular community or region of the country. As currently constituted, drug awareness education projects in Brazil are required to have an evaluation, but how the impact of those projects will be measured is yet to be defined.

EXHIBIT 4 – SUMMARY OF DRUG PREVENTION ACTIVITIES IN CEARA AND SAO PAULO

ORGANIZATION	DATES	USAID FUNDING	LOCAL FUNDING	ORG. TYPE (*)	ACTIVITIES
CEARA					
Desafio Jovem do Ceara	10/1/92 3/31/94	$12,750	$11,150	SG	Train 240 interested professionals in drug prevention, who will work with 12,500 adolescents and children in drug prevention. 10 workshops @ 20 hours and 24 participants each.
Fundacao Cearense de Combate as Droga	10/1/92 9/30/93	$12,800	$57,000	SG	Provide resources to design and implement training program for 54 educators from 18 schools in drug prevention, and to develop 3 video tapes for schools and long-distance program, "Tele-Enfoque."
Centro de Estudos da Familia	10/1/92 9/30/93	$10,000	$6,200	NGO	Strengthen the capability of consortium of six institutions to initiate and expand drug abuse prevention activities in Ceara State.
Secretaria de Saude	10/1/92 9/30/93	$9,000	$3,400	SG	Provide resouces to design and implement a training project for 50 adolescent leaders from 10 "favelas," in drug prevention. Each leader will train 30 adolescents, for a total of 1,500 adolescents trained in 12 months.
Universidade Federal do Ceara	10/1/92 9/30/93	$16,320	$13,500	UNIV	Provide resources to design and implement a training project for core group of 20 consultants in a one year post-graduate course in drug prevention.
Fundacao Cearense de Combate as Droga	9/92 9/93	$7,300	$12,500	SG	Train youth leaders in drug prevention through five seminars with 20 participants each. Each participant will then train 20 adolescents in prevention. ("Pro-Jovem" Project)
SAO PAULO					
GREA	7/1/92 6/31/93	$18,975	$8,000	UNIV	Design and implement a training project for 60 leading researchers from Sao Paulo State in research skills development to improve quality and quantity of drug prevention research.

* ORGANIZATION TYPE:

SG – State Government sponsored programs
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
UNIV – University sponsored programs
MEDIA – Programs based on the use of the Media
PWP – Prevention in the Workplace

EXHIBIT 4 – SUMMARY OF DRUG PREVENTION ACTIVITIES IN CEARA AND SAO PAULO (CONT'D)

ORGANIZATION	DATES	USAID FUNDING	LOCAL FUNDING	TYPE	ACTIVITIES
Pastoral do Menor	8/1/92 6/30/93	$10,600	$2,000	NGO	Training of trainers project for 50 people, including street children, in drug prevention to work at grassroots level in poor sectors of Sao Paulo, to train 5,000 people over a 1 year period.
COMUNICARTE - Social and Cultural Marketing	7/1/92 6/30/93	$16,000	$318,000	MEDIA	Train 100 communication specialists from four different media, with emphasis on television (i.e., soap operas), to produce and diffuse drug related messages to reach approximately 30 million Brazilians per program. Will also train FUSSESP personnel in communication theories and practices.
PROAD-Programa Orientacao e Asistencia ao Dependiente	9/1/92 8/30/93	$17,500	$14,000	NGO	Training project for 200 key private and public sector leaders, organization directors, and business leaders on drug-related problems in Brazil. Encourages them to develop and implement community and/or institutional drug prevention programs.
Fundo Social de Solidariedade do Estado de Sao Paulo FUSSESP	2/93 2/94	$23,000	$30,000	SG	Training in social marketing and communication in drug prevention for 25 officers from 8 secretariats and municipalities, who will subsequently train 400 other officers from different secretariats and municipalities.
Fundacao para o Desenvolvimento da Educacao	2/1/93 1/30/94	$20,000	$44,950	NGO	To design and produce a series of audiovisual educational materials to be used by 300 drug prevention trainers.
Autolatina				PWP	This is a program to prevent the use of alcohol in the workplace. Provides treatment and rehabilitation for alcoholics and their families. Provides training and assistance in prevention to employees and employers. Receives no USAID funds.
ACTIVITES UNDER NEGOTIATION					
HOJE - Consultoria A Empresas	2/93 2/94	$15,440	$10,412	PWP	To train approximately 75 people from the Industrial Relations Departments of 30 corporations, in drug prevention issues, so they can establish programmatic prevention activities.
Funcacion Civita	3/93 3/94	$20,000	$40,000	SG	To train and disseminate drug prevention information to 50,000 teachers, through Nova Escola, a specialized educational magazine.

In the absence of such clearly delineated indicators, nevertheless, one can draw on observations and conclude that the USAID efforts in Brazil already have been partially successful based upon the following:

- USAID's work with the Paulista and Cearense Groups, which depends heavily on complementary local support and on the multiplier effect, has provided a useful model for future efforts. Given the size of the country and the limited and fragmented nature of prevention efforts at the federal level, no reasonable alternatives exist to this approach.

- The projects funded by USAID have generated varying levels of support from local sources, but in all cases local input is significant, well above ratios achieved in other countries visited.

- Comments from professionals involved support the view that the technical assistance provided by Development Associates, Partners of the Americas, and others have markedly enhanced prospects for the future development of prevention efforts in Brazil.

- Most of the projects observed are wisely aimed at achieving a multiplier effect in communities, at both the leadership and grass roots levels.

- The multidisciplinary professional group observed in Sao Paulo has developed a common understanding of basic prevention terminology, concepts, and strategies. This is no small accomplishment in a group that includes professionals from unrelated areas of expertise such as police work, education, social work, labor activism, etc.

- According to the Fundo de Solidariedade of Sao Paulo, the annual cost of providing drug prevention educational services per child is running about U.S. $0.80, low by any standard.

6. Priority Assigned to Demand Reduction by the Host Government

Thus far drug prevention efforts at the federal level in Brazil represent a mix of good intentions with half-hearted, short-term attempts to activate an incipient, still fragmented demand reduction bureaucracy. With rare exceptions, prevention strategies emanating from Brasilia are not transformed into concrete actions. The federal government has available the basic ingredients to produce a demand reduction program in the country, although it has not articulated what can be identified as a national drug policy. Enforcement of the Law Against Drugs (Lei Anti-Toxico 6368/76) has been at best minimal, even though the law has been in existence for several years. There is a Federal Narcotics Council (Conselho Federal de Entorpecentes--CONFEN) under the Ministry of Justice which, in theory, exercises a normative function over the state and municipal Drug Councils (CONEN and COMEN, respectively). However, CONFEN has limited resources and its leadership has been unable to muster the necessary political and economic support to move drug prevention forward in Brazil.

According to a document produced by the Ministry of Education in 1992, both the State and Municipal Drug Councils have been subjected to personalized and transitory political interests -- accompanied at times by technical incompetence that preclude the systematization of activities to promote prevention, treatment, and research. Other barriers involve the lack of continuity resulting from frequent political changes and the consequent replacement of responsible individuals in the Ministries of Justice, Health, Education and Social Welfare, key agencies in the development of drug prevention efforts.

In 1988, CONFEN presented guidelines which included the creation of Regional Centers for Drug Prevention (Centros Regionais de Referencia em Prevencao e Tratamento ao Uso Abusivo de Drogas Licitas e Ilicitas) in six key cities of the country (Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Sao Paulo). The guidelines also included the selection of two "outstanding" centers (Centros de Excelencia) to conduct research and treatment activities. The Centers have had a precarious history due to a lack of financial resources and political changes. The absence of a national drug policy and proper implementing programs has created an institutional vacuum that paralyzes many of the preventive efforts initiated by states and municipalities. According to some long-term observers, CONFEN has tended to support isolated projects of a philanthropic and moralistic nature without requiring needs assessments, planning, or evaluation.

Because of the many changes in the Ministry of Justice and CONFEN since 1988, another federal project gained some importance. This effort (Projeto PREVIDA), created originally by the Secretary of Physical Education and Sports in the Ministry of Education with the purpose of working with teachers and students, religious groups, and municipal drug councils, remains active in several states. Critics have charged that the information disseminated by Projeto PREVIDA about the pernicious effects of drugs is not sufficient to change attitudes, that the assumptions are more appropriate for other countries than for the social reality of Brazil, and that the project does not conform to state-of-the-art criteria in the international community.

To address some of the deficiencies of Projeto PREVIDA, the Brazilian Association of Alcohol Studies (Associacao Brasileira de Estudos de Alcool--ABEAD) in 1990 developed another prevention project for primary and secondary schools in response to a request from the Ministry of Education. This new project, "Program to Value Life" ("Programa Valorizacao da Vida"), takes a holistic approach that goes beyond specific discussions about drugs. Other collaborators in the development of this program were the Reference Centers, the leading epidemiological research institution in the country, CEBRID, and some international organizations. Although the program seems to have the backing of leading prevention professionals, it does not have the basic support of CONFEN and the Ministry of Education and Culture. In spite of its limitations, this program already has inspired interesting prevention initiatives at the local and state levels. Specifically, it has spurred the creation of drug prevention programs by the Secretary of Education of Rio Grande do Sul and the state of Bahia.

An "Ecola é Vida" project was initiated in November of 1991 as the official program for the State of Sao Paulo. It has the support of the Fundo Social de Solidariedade, CEBRID, the

Paulista Group, the UNDCP, and USAID/Brazil. The participatory nature of the activities, as well as their integrated strategies, could benefit awareness and education efforts in Brazil beyond the borders of Sao Paulo.

In addition to the state initiatives noted above, a hopeful note is afforded by the currently-planned restructuring of CONFEN to the level of a Secretariat (Secretaria dos Entorpecientes) and the expectation that its enhanced status can muster the political support of the Ministries of Education and Justice. The draft of a "National Plan for the Prevention of Drug Abuse" exists and the Brazilian government has declared 1993 the year to wage war against drugs. The UNDCP representative in Brazil, who is in close contact with the Ministry of Justice, sees a corner being turned and is anxious to provide technical support to a restructured CONFEN. Nevertheless, prospects for early success remain uncertain. Team discussions with the responsible Senior Secretary in the Ministry of Justice and the newly-named head of CONFEN revealed that it will be the second half of 1993 before initial changes in CONFEN can be expected.

The new director of CONFEN plans to try to unify existing federal level efforts, coordinate with Drug Councils at the state and municipal levels, and create the necessary mechanisms within CONFEN to conduct research. CONFEN will retain its normative function and the Secretariat for Drug Prevention of the Ministry will provide some of the technical expertise so badly needed. The size of CONFEN is being reduced by half (it initially had 22 members), while maintaining representation from all relevant Ministries. All future members will live in Brasilia and will therefore be more likely to attend monthly meetings. CONFEN is making an assessment of available amounts of financial resources derived from seizures from drug traffickers, and hopes to correct past mistakes regarding the assignment of these resources.

Only time will tell whether the federal government of Brazil is sufficiently serious about drug awareness education in the country to move ahead as it now proposes. Looking at the record, a certain degree of skepticism appears warranted as to whether the same CONFEN that once espoused the notion that "the less publicity about drugs the less the problem will grow" will be the organization to catapult drug awareness education forward in Brazil.

7. Priority Assigned to Demand Reduction by the USG

USAID/Brazil considers demand reduction one of its top four priorities. In addition to adequate involvement of the A.I.D. Representative, the USAID is investing one-third of the time of a host country national employee in the coordination and supervision of the drug prevention activities it helps to sponsor. A good degree of contact is maintained with the UNDCP representative, Partners of the Americas, SUNY and Development Associates to ensure maximum coordination. The USAID's relations with, and support from, other elements of the Country Team appear to be satisfactory. USAID/Brazil clearly has shown proper commitment to making its limited drug prevention program a success. Country Team support was reaffirmed at the time of the Evaluation Team's visit.

8. Activities of Other U.S. Agencies in Demand Reduction

In 1991, NAS allocated $330,000 for prevention activities in Brazil. In accordance with a decision by the new NAS Chief, the funds are being spent on carefully chosen small projects, each with an expenditure ceiling of about $5,000. Currently NAS is funding eleven demand reduction projects valued at from about $3,000 to $5,000 each. Most of the projects support training sessions and seminars throughout Brazil for teachers, students, and parents. One contributes to prevention training for police and military personnel in Rio de Janeiro, and two support the distribution of scientific information on the drug problem. Another provides administrative support for CONFEN. The projects are detailed in the inventory (Annex 1). Of the $330,000 allocated in 1991, approximately $280,000 is unspent and constitutes a reserve for future use.

Of the approximately 30 U.S. experts that USIS brings to Brazil each year under the "U.S. Speaker Program," about four make presentations on drug prevention. USIS spends about $5,000 on each speaker for a total cost of some $20,000 a year for presentations on drug abuse by U.S. experts. USIS also sends an occasional Brazilian drug prevention activist to the United States for training and orientation under the International Visitors' Program. At the time of the Evaluation Team's visit, USIS was considering three new possibilities in the demand reduction area: (1) talks by U.S. specialists at a two-day drug prevention seminar in Minas Gerais; (2) a presentation in Brazil by U.S. experts on how to raise funds for prevention activities; and (3) a presentation in Brazil by U.S. experts on how the United States is addressing the problem of drugs in the work place.

USIS has 12 videos on drug prevention that it regularly lends to school, clubs, and other interested institutions. Under USIS' book translation program, about one U.S. book a year on the drug problem has been translated into Portuguese over the past 4 years. In the case of each book, USIS funds the translation and then purchases about 800 copies for free distribution to appropriate recipients in Brazil. The publishing house is free to sell as many additional copies as it can, at a profit. Finally, USIS funds the publication of a number of anti-drug pamphlets in Portuguese for use by drug prevention activists in Brazil.

USIA's Washington-based activities that support demand reduction throughout the hemisphere are described in greater detail in the inventory at Annex 1.

9. Activities of Non-U.S. Entities in Demand Reduction

In 1987, the UNFDAC (now the UNDCP) signed an agreement with Brazil providing for $12 million in anti-drug assistance, of which half was to be spent for enforcement and half for prevention and rehabilitation. Four projects in the prevention area were eventually launched: (a) support for the research activities of CEBRID; (b) a drug treatment project based on the Canadian "Brief Intervention Method;" (c) a prevention project for Brazilian Army recruits; and (d) a drug hot line. Each was a three year project; the first three ran from 1988 to 1991 and the third from 1989 to 1992. Currently there is only one demand reduction project -- support for anti-drug

efforts by the Sao Paulo Medical School. It is funded in the amount of $571,780. Although it was planned as only a one year project scheduled to end in January of this year, it is being continued at least through the end of 1993. The UNDCP also intends to contribute to the "institutional strengthening" of CONFEN by helping it to design a technical secretariat.

The UNDCP plans to send a delegation to Brazil later this year to evaluate the UNDCP's efforts there and make recommendations for the future. In the light of the delegation's findings, new demand reduction projects could be decided on by October and launched in early 1994. The UNDCP Representative in Brasilia points out that considerable funding from the original 1987 allocation of $6 million for demand reduction remains unspent. In the UNDCP, unspent money is not lost but remains in reserve. The UNDCP Representative said the remaining funds, and any new funds allocated, would be spent only following "careful planning."

In this connection, he noted that it would be important to finish the Master Plan for anti-drug efforts in Brazil, a project that has languished too long. In order to push the project forward, the UNDCP and the OAS/CICAD co-financed a seminar in Brazil in January to design the prevention/demand reduction section of the Master Plan. Representatives of CONFEN and interested Brazilian parliamentarians attended, in addition to UNDCP and OAS officials. If all goes well, a completed Master Plan should emerge in the near future.

In addition, each Brazilian state will have to produce an action plan indicating how it will implement the Master Plan. Each action plan will have to be approved by CONFEN, and CONFEN will determine the priority of each proposed project. The UNDCP Representative noted that CONFEN's priorities might not be the UNDCP's. Significant disagreement on priorities could delay any new UNDCP projects.

The UNDCP Representative noted that his organization is beginning to move away from 100 percent financing of projects. It is moving toward a "firm policy" of requiring that up to 75 percent of the funding for new projects come from some other entity or entities.

UNESCO recently signed an agreement with the Ministry of Education providing for assistance with a national program of drug abuse prevention. The agreement foresees UNESCO contributions in four areas: technical assistance, training of teachers, research, and provision of didactic material. The UNESCO representative in Brasilia indicated that details of the assistance, including funding amounts, were yet to be determined. No funds have yet been allocated to the program.

The European Community (EC) funded a prevention program for street children in Salvador (Bahia) from 1989 to 1991 (cost 470,000 ECU) and is funding a 1991-93 rehabilitation program for young drug users in Campinas (cost 100,000 ECU). Four additional projects approved in November, 1992 are now getting underway. They are: a project to train drug prevention trainers (one year; 150,000 ECU); a project to double the capacity of a rehabilitation center in Campo Grande (one year; 100,000 ECU); a national survey of psychotropic drug consumption by

students and street children in Brazil (three years, 70,000 ECU); and a project to prevent drug abuse among children and teenage girls in the Recife area (two years, 70,000 ECU).

The EC Representative noted that, thus far, EC projects have been funded 100 percent by the EC. She stressed, however, that EC policy is to move toward co-financing in the future, with 50 percent of the funding coming from NGOs, mainly European.

The EC Representative informed the Evaluation Team that, aside from the United States, only the French Government was providing bilateral assistance to Brazil in the prevention area. A French Embassy officer informed the team that the assistance was granted through four projects supporting drug treatment, AIDS treatment, a documentation center on prevention, and a drug and AIDS prevention program for street children and prostitutes. The projects, which have a total value of about $100,000, are set forth in greater detail in the inventory.

B. Summary Responses to Questions in Statement of Work

1. The Problem

In the past five years, Brazil has experienced the most rapid rate of increase in drug use in all of Latin America. A 1989 study indicated that 23.5 percent of the sample population had used psychotropic substances. There is a clear connection between drug use and AIDS, a disease that is spreading rapidly in urban areas.

2. Priority Assigned to the Projects

Demand reduction is one of the top four priorities of USAID/Brazil. The Brazilian Federal Government, although increasingly aware of the drug abuse problem, has thus far not assigned a high priority to demand reduction, and it is not active in operational areas. The various weaknesses of the Federal Government are documented in section A. 6. By contrast, at the state level drug prevention has been assigned a significant priority, at least in Sao Paulo and Ceara, where the governors' wives have become closely involved with the anti-drug effort.

3. Definition of Goals, Purpose, and Outputs

In the case of the two NAE buy-ins, Development Associates has clearly articulated a "focus of the buy in" in each case. For the project that ran from June 1990 to June 1991, it was "to help Brazilian organizations develop training materials and train trainers to design and carry out a pilot program to prevent drug abuse." In the case of the current project, it is "to provide training to develop and strengthen key institutions' capacity to increase awareness of the social consequences and costs of narcotics abuse -- awareness which will help mobilize Brazilians against narcotics use and trafficking." The focus also includes developing "leadership needed to seek solutions and expand national commitment to end drug abuse."

The various agreements between Development Associates and Brazilian implementing agencies set forth project goals, purposes, and outputs, but they tend not be clearly identified as such, except in the case of project purposes. Outputs tend to be listed as "responsibilities" of the implementing agency. In at least one case they are made part of the project "purpose" and in one case they are set forth under "project summary."

4. Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Level of Effort Within the Projects

Despite the newness of the projects, they have been effective in generating much attention to drug prevention in two states, Sao Paulo (which has one of the world's largest cities with a population of 16 million) and Ceara. The projects have generated significant levels of support from local sources, far exceeding those seen by the Evaluation Team in the other countries visited. The projects correctly place stress on the multiplier effect, a particularly useful approach given the size of the country and the significance of the drug abuse problem. Brazilians involved in the projects, from the wife of the Governor of Sao Paulo on down, gave evidence of a high level of effort and dedication in their demand reduction work.

5. Project Monitoring

The projects are effectively and thoroughly monitored by the A.I.D. Representative and by an excellent local national employee. Good baseline data sets exist in the epidemiological area. A prevalence study was carried out by CEBRID in 1989 at exactly the time the A.I.D. projects in Brazil began. There are also relevant public opinion polls that serve as general baseline data. Given the newness of the projects, no evaluations of impact have yet been conducted. However, following a second prevalence study to be conducted by CEBRID this year, the USAID office in Brasilia plans to make an initial attempt to evaluate impact. Clear output indicators have been established; the USAID office is carefully monitoring output and is very satisfied with the results achieved to date.

6. Adequacy of Resources

Resources are adequate for the limited goals that have been set. Additional A.I.D. funding, if available, could be put to good use. The need for demand reduction efforts in Brazil is great, as the UNDCP and the European Community have fully realized (see inventory, Annex 1).

7. Project Cost/Desirability of Institution Building

The projects are being implemented at acceptable costs, particularly in view of the increased drug awareness they have already produced and the local support they have generated.

Some institution building is desirable, as is the improvement of existing institutions, notably the Federal Narcotics Council (CONFEN). However, in view of the budgetary and legislative constraints on U.S. assistance to Brazil and the fact the UNDCP plans to help improve CONFEN, institution building as such is not an A.I.D. objective in Brazil at this time.

8. Steps Toward Sustainability

In view of the size of Brazil and the limitations, just mentioned, on A.I.D.assistance, project elements are fully aware of the need to seek non-USG funding. As already indicated, they have been successful in generating local support. Some are in contact with the UNDCP, which is considering significant increases in its assistance for demand reduction in Brazil (see inventory, Annex 1).

9. Quality of A.I.D.-Funded Services and Technical Assistance

Persons interviewed by the Evaluation Team indicated that the technical assistance provided by Development Associates and Partners of the Americas was of high quality and had made a marked difference in prospects for the development of prevention efforts in Brazil. The USAID Mission provides excellent support and advice to project elements, as described in section A. 7.

C. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusion: USAID/Brazil has launched a series of projects without clear decisions on the impact it anticipates that the projects will achieve.

Recommendation: USAID/Brazil should clearly identify the impact it expects to achieve with the projects it funds in order to monitor them properly. Without the delineation of specific impact measures up front, and an emphasis on qualitative as well as quantitative results, continued project funding may become harder to justify.

Conclusion: Project entities in Brazil often face administrative difficulties when they receive support for their activities in one dollar-denominated lump sum. Both the rapid rate of inflation and the small number of administrative staff members available in most of these projects, as well as Brazilian regulations, cause complications.

Recommendation: Development Associates should issue individual checks in U.S. dollars to each recipient.

Conclusion: Some Brazilians think that the U.S. is seeking to export policies together with its programs. At times the programs are seen as so rigid that they do not respond to local needs. As one drug prevention expert in Brazil put it: "this policy of transporting programs here in such a cold and mechanical way does not work."

Recommendation: Experts coming from the U.S., and those in the U.S. who receive delegations from Brazil, should be reminded that no prevention program developed for a particular setting can be transferred to other countries without taking into account the reality of its new context. This is more critical, perhaps, in dealing with Brazil than most other hemisphere nations, given both Brazil's size and its penchant for seeking solutions unique to its culture.

Conclusion: Given the enormity of the demand reduction task in Brazil and the limitations on A.I.D.'s resources, pursuit of non-USG resources is of critical importance.

Recommendations:

-- USAID/Brazil should encourage Brazilian state and local organizations to increase involvement of the private sector in drug prevention activities. This effort could be facilitated by drawing greater attention to large enterprises (e.g., Autolatina) that have ongoing substance abuse and treatment programs.

-- USAID/Brazil and other USG and international organizations should continue to seek creative ways of providing direct assistance to state and local organizations.

-- A.I.D. should consider providing technical assistance to cooperating groups in methods of raising funds from non-USG sources.

Conclusion: There is an inadequate exchange of experienced technical resources between other countries in the Latin American region and Brazil.

Recommendation: USAID/Brazil and other USG agencies should consider doing more to facilitate the development of technical exchanges between demand reduction entities in Brazil and drug prevention organizations in other countries, especially Mexico and Peru.

Conclusion: All too many professionals are necessarily involved in the field of drug prevention only as an avocation. To compensate for low salaries, many of them already have more than one job and are limited as to the amount of time they can invest in training and other drug prevention activities.

Recommendation: USAID/Brazil and other USG agencies should continuously look for ways of compensating for the economic limitations imposed upon narcotics awareness education programs and key professionals in the country. At a minimum, the achievements of the professionals should be recognized by sponsoring their involvement in international fora.

Conclusion: A.I.D.-supported drug awareness education initiatives in Brazil have for the most part ignored the needs of out of school populations, which normally leave school by age 14, if not earlier.

Recommendation: A.I.D. should consider addressing the needs of these populations by integrating drug prevention with alternative activities of both a vocational and recreational nature.

Conclusion: For demand reduction to take root in Brazil, institutions and leadership are far more important than laws and regulations. Narcotic awareness and education efforts in Brazil are still very new. There are drug laws on the books that have only been partially enforced. States such as Sao Paulo, Ceara, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul are only now beginning to develop

a sufficiently large cadre of private and public sector professionals. The state governments of both Sao Paulo and Ceara currently seem to have the political will to continue to support drug prevention efforts, but there is no certainty that this situation will continue following the eventual replacement of the present governors (and their wives) in future elections.

Recommendation: A.I.D. should consider encouraging the creation of a demand reduction NGO, using the Paulista Group as a nucleus. Continuity and progress in what will clearly be a long-range demand reduction effort would probably be best served by a legally independent private organization.

Section Three

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE QUESTIONS IN THE STATEMENT OF WORK

This section sets forth general conclusions and recommendations based on patterns that emerged from the case studies.

1. Definition of the Problem

Conclusion: In project documentation, the problem being addressed by A.I.D.-financed projects is often defined in vague and general terms. In many cases, there is no clear indication of the weight that the project should place on each of the following: (a) building public awareness of the need for counternarcotics efforts; (b) prevention (including public awareness of the danger of drugs); and (c) reduction in drug use. As a result, the typical project addresses these factors in a largely ad hoc manner with considerable discretion given to the implementing agency.

Recommendation: During project design, more attention should be given to formulating a clear and thoughtful definition of the problem, based on the best data available. The problem should be defined in terms of either an A.I.D. Strategic Objective to combat narcotics or as a subset of another Strategic Objective that identifies drug use as a health, education, democracy, public safety or other development issue. Only in rare cases should the problem be defined as a "target of opportunity." In every case, the problem definition should indicate clearly which action areas of those listed in the conclusion above are being addressed, the data on which the decision to address them was based, and the weight that should be assigned to each action area.

2. Definition of Goals, Purposes and Outputs

Conclusion: For the largest projects (in Bolivia and Peru), goals, purposes, and outputs are reasonably well defined, although some weaknesses do exist. For example, in the "Logical Framework" for Peru outputs tend to be too vague, as indicated in the Peru case study. In the case of smaller projects that do not have an A.I.D. "Logical Framework," it is rare to find a clear and carefully considered statement of goals, purposes, and outputs. In many cases, one or more of these elements is not addressed at all. Sometimes the purposes are stated but not the goals. There is considerable confusion as to terminology -- especially as regards the exact meaning of "goals," "purposes," and "objectives". Outputs are often not listed as such but as desired "results" or as "responsibilities of an implementing agency". Although a project can produce useful results

despite weaknesses in the listing of goal, purpose, and outputs, a precise statement of same is clearly important for purposes of project management and evaluation.

Recommendation: In projects with "Logical Frameworks" greater attention should be paid to rigorous and useful definitions of goals, purposes, and outputs. In the case of every project, regardless of nature or size, the goal, purpose, and expected outputs should be thoughtfully formulated and clearly set forth in one place in the project documentation.

3. Project Monitoring

Conclusion: Systems for monitoring project output appear adequate in most countries visited by the Evaluation Team. However, lack of clarity in the original definition of the problem often complicates monitoring at the goal and purpose levels. In most cases, monitoring is focused on input-output analysis, with insufficient attention paid to the achievement of beneficial results. In one case (Guatemala), project monitoring has been left almost entirely to the contractor. Such an arrangement inappropriately relieves A.I.D. of the responsibility of ensuring that the project is making satisfactory progress. The team cannot judge the effectiveness of monitoring systems in the countries it did not visit.

Recommendations:

-- Monitoring should carefully track purpose achievement as well as production of outputs, consistently using the Logical Framework or analogous project documentation as a point of reference. This discipline should be followed by all contractors performing work for A.I.D. as well as by A.I.D. itself.

-- A.I.D. should take steps to ensure that project monitoring is carried out effectively by both the USAID Mission and, as appropriate, the relevant contractor or contractors in every country that benefits from an A.I.D. project. In no case should the USAID Mission abdicate its monitoring role. In the case of small projects, A.I.D. and Country Team monitoring may not need to be extensive. However, the USAID Mission should follow every project closely enough to be able to determine whether the established outputs and impact are being achieved.

4. Establishment of Baseline Data

Conclusion: In most cases, baseline data of one form or another exist. However, the data sometimes do not correspond in time to the date of the start of project, and in some cases project documentation does not make it clear which sets of data are being formally used for a baseline. As a result, impact measurement is seriously compromised.

Recommendation: Every effort should be made to establish baseline data that are meaningful for project evaluation. In every case, the project documentation should make clear which data are serving officially as baseline sets.

5. Need for Uniformity in Prevalence Studies

Conclusion: Prevalence studies on which A.I.D. demand reduction projects rely often do not reveal a clear picture of changes in drug use nationwide over time. Successive surveys often deal with different population samples (as regards age group, geographic location, etc.). In addition, there is a lack of uniformity in the definitions of the drugs addressed in successive studies. For example, a 1990 survey in Guatemala separately lists prevalence for several specific hard drugs (e.g., cocaine/crack, marijuana), while a 1992 survey lists prevalence for "narcotics" only with no explanation of the term and with no breakdown by individual drugs. All of these factors make it difficult to compare studies and establish national trends. This confusion adds to the already difficult task of evaluating project impact.

Recommendation: A.I.D. should make a concerted effort to ensure (a) uniformity in prevalence study definitions, instruments, and methodology; and (b) reasonable comparability of successive prevalence studies.

6. Standardized Data Sheet for Projects

Conclusion: Currently, it is often necessary for a manager or evaluator to sift through pages of documentation on a given project to find statements of project goal, purpose, and outputs; impact indicators and expected impact; and baseline data sets being used for the project. (In many cases, some of these elements are missing, as already indicated.)

Recommendation: A.I.D. should require that each project have a one-page or two-page standardized data sheet, succinctly identifying the project, giving project cost and time frame, and clearly setting forth goal, purpose, outputs, impact indicators, expected impact, and baseline data sets in both the prevalence and public awareness areas. The data sheet should accompany any project paper, Logical Framework, implementation plan, and technical analysis, all of which are defined in A.I.D. Handbook 3. All of these, where they exist, plus the data sheet should be attached to any project agreements with implementing agencies so that all parties clearly understand what their respective responsibilities are and what specific results are expected.

7. Project Evaluation

Conclusion: A.I.D. appears never to have developed a reliable methodology for determining the impact of demand reduction activities. Such determination is fraught with difficulty for the following principal reasons: (a) positive results (e.g., increased public support for counter-narcotics activities) are usually attributable to a range of factors, not just A.I.D. interventions; (b) in the case of a small A.I.D. project in a large country (e.g., Brazil and Mexico), the project can hope to be responsible for only a modest percentage of any improvement that may take place, and the methodology for determining that percentage is not clear; (c) sometimes positive impact takes place only years after the fact (e.g., young school children may not start using drugs as young adults because they were exposed to effective A.I.D.-financed drug prevention curricula

at ages 10-15); and (d) baseline data used are not always the most appropriate ones, and follow up surveys are sometimes not well keyed to baseline data, as indicated earlier in this section.

Recommendation: A.I.D. should conduct a study to (a) identify means of impact determination in both large and small demand reduction projects; and (b) devise simple, reliable, low cost methodologies for the determination of impact in both kinds of projects. In developing such methodologies, A.I.D. should consult with a wide range of entities (e.g., NIDA, CSAP, State/INM, USIA, OAS/CICAD, UNDCP) in order to take advantage of their considerable expertise and insights.

Conclusion: For the reasons indicated above, impact evaluation is weak or non-existent in the case of virtually all the projects examined by the Evaluation Team. The team often heard the assertion by USAID Mission and project personnel that it is "too soon" to conduct meaningful impact evaluations of A.I.D.-supported projects. However, in the team's judgment this is true only in the case of a relatively new project or a new phase of an ongoing project. In project documentation, impact indicators are often absent. Where they do exist they are sometimes so broadly formulated as to be of little practical utility. As noted throughout this report, determining the impact of demand reduction activities is difficult at best. Without precise and meaningful impact indicators, it becomes virtually impossible, leaving project measurement to estimates, anecdotal information, and intuition.

Recommendations:

-- Impact evaluation should be an essential part of every project and should be carried out on the basis of clearly established baseline data. Projects deemed to be worthwhile on the basis of informal evaluations and judgments need not be abandoned or scaled back simply because absolute proof of their effectiveness is not yet available. However, the managers of such projects should turn their attention now to determining baseline data and arranging for systematic monitoring, rather than waiting for the end of the project to do so. Since A.I.D. has supported demand reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean for almost a decade and invested over $46 million in the effort, impact evaluation is generally overdue. In the absence of credible evaluations of impact, long-term USG funding will be increasingly difficult to justify.

-- Surveys of drug use and public attitudes during a project and at its end should be closely keyed to baseline data. Where possible and appropriate, prevalence and attitude surveys should be conducted as part of the project. If necessary, USIS polls could be relied on to some extent for determining public attitudes, but A.I.D. and USIS should work together to ensure that the polls are properly timed and well keyed to baseline public opinion data.

-- In the case of every project, clear and precise impact indicators should be established at the outset. Impact should be measured against the problem identified and according to successes achieved in the areas of (a) public awareness of the need for counter-narcotics action; (b) prevention; and (c) actual reduction of drug use.

Conclusion: Even in output and process evaluation there are weaknesses. Output indicators are sometimes absent, and in many cases there is no detailed, current list of all outputs that have resulted from a given project. Only in the case of CEDRO was the Evaluation Team able to obtain a reasonably clear and comprehensive list of outputs.

Recommendation: Output indicators should be established for all projects, and careful attention should be paid to output and process evaluation. Every entity benefiting from A.I.D. support should be required to maintain a current list of all outputs developed with A.I.D. assistance since the beginning of the project, broken down by calendar year. The exact nature of each output should be clearly described, and the outputs should be clearly quantified (e.g., 300 five-minute television spots per day).

8. Guidance on Fund Raising

Conclusion: Except in the case of CEDRO in Peru, there is little evidence in the countries visited of sophisticated efforts by A.I.D.-supported entities to raise non-USG funds. In some cases, there appears to be considerable ignorance as to how to proceed. Some entities do not seem to realize fully that success depends to a large degree on (a) assertively cultivating high level contacts with key donors; and (b) drawing up detailed, compelling, and well drafted applications for assistance.

Recommendation: A.I.D. Washington, and especially USAID Missions, should provide specific guidance to project entities on methods of raising non-USG funds. On-site technical assistance may be indicated in some cases. In addition, A.I.D. should consider producing, either in house or under contact, a well though out, written guide to fund raising techniques in the area of demand reduction for use by A.I.D. project entities.

9. Institution Building

Conclusion: As indicated throughout this report, institution building is often essential to the achievement of worthwhile results in demand reduction. However, the creation of institutions with A.I.D. funds has at least two potential disadvantages (a) it is a long-term and often expensive effort; and (b) the U.S. sometimes ends up facing a difficult dilemma -- either continue unilateral funding indefinitely or witness a possible shut down of the institution.

Recommendation: Normally, a new institution should be created only where no appropriate entity already exists and where a new institution is demonstrably essential to address the problem identified by the project. If institution building is chosen, project papers should set forth a full explanation for the decision, along with a clear statement of the alternatives that were considered.

10. Inventory of NGOs

Conclusion: As is clear from the inventory (Annex 1), an enormous number of NGOs (over 500 in Bolivia alone) are somehow involved in demand reduction in Latin America and the

Caribbean. As can be seen from the Peru section of the inventory, several European NGOs have provided significant funding to CEDRO. The Evaluation Team had neither the time nor the mandate to prepare an extensive inventory of NGO activity in the demand reduction area. However, in view of the sizeable funding that is originating from NGOs and the desirability of some coordination with them, an inventory of at least the more important NGO activities in demand reduction is clearly indicated.

Recommendation: A.I.D. should collaborate with other USG agencies and international donors in the production of an inventory of the demand reduction activities of European, North American, host country, and other NGOs that make significant contributions to demand reduction efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Section Four

GENERAL FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

As the preceding case studies show, a range of approaches has emerged to the problem of demand reduction in the countries visited by the Evaluation Team. Diversity is further pronounced when activities in other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are taken into account (Exhibit 5 shows both ongoing and completed A.I.D. demand reduction projects in those countries).

A. Countries Visited by the Evaluation Team

In Guatemala, one individual, with limited A.I.D. funding, has successfully put in motion an incipient drug demand reduction effort without significant support from the Government of Guatemala. The achievements and the weaknesses of the Guatemala project are described in Section Two. Key lessons learned are that: (a) a demand reduction entity should not be excessively identified with the personality of one individual, as CONAPAD is; (b) strict accountability of expenditures is essential; (c) management and monitoring of a project should not be left entirely in the hands of a contractor; and (d) the absence of significant financial support from a host government hampers not only the actual work of the demand reduction entity but its overall credibility and hence its ability to attract international funding.

The future of the Guatemala project is uncertain in the absence of GOG financial contributions, any clear evidence that the USG Country Team assigns significant priority to CONAPAD's activities, or ability to show impact. As in the case of other Central American countries, the best course of action may be to look to international efforts to buttress CONAPAD's work. Nevertheless, that institution's demand reduction activities may merit continued A.I.D. funding at a modest level pending support from the GOG, the UNDCP, OAS/CICAD or a possible trilateral effort on the part of Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. However, the USAID Mission should first determine if the project is addressing the correct problem(s).

Mexico, as the case study indicates, should be looked upon in the future as a drug demand reduction resource for the hemisphere, particularly for the area north of Panama. Among the resources available in Mexico are a premier investigative institution, the Psychiatric Institute, plus the Centros de Integracion Juvenil and CORA, which are known for their sustained, high quality work in demand reduction. The Mission's choice of FEMAP as a vehicle for work in the northern areas of Mexico, based upon its past success in family planning, illustrates the desirability of appending drug demand reduction activities to existing institutions with proven

EXHIBIT 5A – ON-GOING A.I.D. NARCOTICS DEMAND REDUCTION PROJECTS IN LA/C COUNTRIES NOT VISITED BY EVALUATION TEAM

COUNTRY	PROJECT	A.I.D. FUNDING	CURRENT PACD	DESCRIPTION
Belize	Drug Awareness Education Project No. 505-0033	$1,932,000	6/30/93	Fourth Phase of an on-going project to reduce the prevalence of drug use and abuse among Belizeans by increasing public awareness of the dangers of drug use and trafficking. Emphasis placed on narcotics demand reduction research, information dissemination, awareness, and knowledge about the dangers of drug use; organizational development; and changes in values and attitudes about alcohol and other drugs.
Ecuador	Drug Information and Public Awareness Project No. 518-0064	$2,730,000	4/01/94	Four main components: a) institutional strengthening of the implementing agency, Fundacion Nuestros Jovenes; 2) research on drug consumption and the risks of consumption; c) prevention information dissemination; and d) legal education.
El Salvador	Drug Awareness and Abuse Prevention Project No. 519-0377	$1,500,000	9/30/93	Grant funding to the Anti-Drug Foundation (FUNDASALVA), a local PVO that focuses on community outreach, drug education, drugs in the workplace, and rehabilitation.
Haiti	Awareness and Prevention of Drug Abuse Project No. 521-0221	$1,150,000	12/31/94	Program supports the Association for the Prevention of Alcoholism and other Chemical Substances (APAAC) in activities to address Haiti's growing drug problem, including the systematic study of drug abuse prevalence in Haitian society, an evaluation of drug abuse prevention interventions, and dissemination of information on drug abuse.
Jamaica	Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Project No. 532-0161	$500,000	9/30/94	Funding for a number of activities designed to improve the capability of the Jamaican public and private sectors to design and implement drug abuse prevention programs for high risk target groups.
Panama	Drug Awareness and Education Project Nos. 525-0292 and 525-0320	$450,000	9/30/93	Project focuses on institutional strengthening of Cruz Blanca, a local PVO, and training of staff and additional volunteers. Also working on drug education, referral services for drug rehabilitation treatment, community outreach, and youth programs.
Paraguay	Drug Abuse Prevention Project No. 598-0616.06	$400,000	9/30/93	Combines private and public cooperation in drug awareness and demand reduction. Project serves as an "executive secretariat" for the growing network of NGOs who work closely with the Ministry of Health, the official organization responsible for drug prevention and awareness.
Eastern Caribbean	Drug Prevention and Education Pilot Project No. 538-0190	$450,000	7/31/94	Attempts to stem drug abuse among young people by strengthening the ability of local organizations in the Eastern Caribbean to carry out prevention and education activities, and to focus greater attention on the issue of drug and alcohol abuse through community-based public education campaigns. The seven Eastern Caribbean nations involved include Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia.

EXHIBIT 5B – COMPLETED A.I.D. NARCOTICS DEMAND REDUCTION PROJECTS IN LA/C COUNTRIES NOT VISITED BY EVALUATION TEAM

COUNTRY	PROJECT	A.I.D. FUNDING	STARTING DATE	PACD
Chile	Drug Abuse (Part of a larger project for primary health care) Project No. 513-0351	$253,000	11/90	11/92
Colombia	Narcotics Public Awareness Project No. 598-0649	$470,000	8/87	3/31/91
	Narcotics Demand Reduction Project No. 598-0650	$1,270,000	9/85	9/30/90
	Narcotics Awareness/Demand Reduction (Project not yet designed)	$4,000,000		
	Total	$5,740,000		
Costa Rica	Drug Awareness Project No. 515-0253	$500,000	3/24/90	3/30/92
Dominican Republic	Drug Prevention Survey Project No. 517-0000.91	$79,200	1991	1992

track records wherever possible. The universe of organizations of the Murrieta type (small, with emphasis on alternative free time activities) is so huge and the impact of their work necessarily so restricted that further grants to such entities would appear to merit a relatively low priority, at least in Mexico. Clearly, support to CORA or FEMAP, with their well established, broader reach, is preferable.

However, in the future the focus should be on training and, possibly, on helping to support new, innovative approaches to demand reduction. Training grants to key individuals in private organizations such as the Murrieta Foundation might continue to be made available. Depending on the success of current FEMAP efforts to obtain non-USG funding, USAID/Mexico might wish to continue limited inputs to support FEMAP's work in the border areas for another year or two. Should it be possible to devise a specific program under which the CIJs and/or the Psychiatric Institute could serve as training or observation bases for technical staff from other countries in the region, the initiative might merit either direct A.I.D. inputs or USG funding channeled through OAS/CICAD or the UNDCP.

Programs in Bolivia and Peru are of a far greater dimension and complexity than those in Mexico and Guatemala. In both of the former countries, the marriage of strong support from A.I.D. and other USG agencies with substantial local private sector involvement goes far to explain the successes to date. A key lesson learned in Bolivia is that, for success to be achieved, strong leadership is essential on the part of the U.S. Country Team, host government officials, and officials of the private entities supported by A.I.D. Another lesson is that full time technical assistance, of the type provided by Development Associates in Bolivia, is sometimes necessary, particularly in large, complex projects.

Plans to privatize PROINCO, the research arm of DINAPRE, are an example of creativity on the part of host government officials. PROINCO's conversion to CELIN, a mostly private sector "Latin American Center," should allow the organization to survive domestic political change and should enhance its chances of securing external support to supplement A.I.D.'s local currency allotment. Bolivia's SEAMOS and CESE both need to be more aggressive in their pursuit of outside help, emulating CEDRO's growing success in this regard in Peru.

The CEDRO experience suggests that institutional success depends not only on excellent leadership, but also on a clear project focus and on a strong commitment of time and interest on the part of A.I.D. Moreover, CEDRO illustrates the value of an institutional arrangement in which no single individual receives credit for the accomplishments of the organization. CEDRO's emphasis on the team approach encourages full and creative participation by all key staff members, leading to broader and more effective representation to potential donors and ensuring easy continuity in the event of the resignation of the principal leadership.

Technical assistance provided by Development Associates in connection with the establishment of CEDRO was critical to the successful launching of the institution. Moreover, the guidance provided by Development Associates in the early years of the project undoubtedly contributed to the high quality and sophistication of CEDRO's current work. The CEDRO example attests

to the wisdom of providing heavy doses of technical and administrative support early in a project. Had the value of such a course been fully appreciated, problems noted later in this report with regard to Colombia and Ecuador might have been less pronounced.

CEDRO is a non-partisan institution that has assembled an eclectic group of supporters who represent all social classes and a wide range of professions, political tendencies, and religious affiliations. Thanks in part to this diversity, CEDRO's leadership has been able to recruit and manage extensive volunteer resources. With its small staff, flexible structure, and strong support base in the community, CEDRO is a model of how an organization can best survive in difficult and changing environments.

As indicated earlier, CEDRO has achieved far more success than any other entity visited in raising funds from non-USG sources. Although CEDRO is still far short of attaining financial sustainability, the contributions it has received are impressive (see inventory, Annex 1). A lesson learned here is that if an organization is to succeed in fund raising it must have a reasonably high degree of credibility and sophistication. It must cultivate contacts with a wide range of major donors, and it must be adept at preparing compelling and well crafted applications for assistance. CEDRO is effective in all of these areas. With an eye to the long term, CEDRO is using part of the funds raised from non-USG sources to build up its endowment fund. In addition, CEDRO is keeping its staff to a reasonable level and projecting survival at half its current size after U.S. assistance runs out. Because of all of these actions, CEDRO is the best example encountered by the Evaluation Team of a conscientious attempt to achieve sustainability.

Country programs in Bolivia and Peru demonstrate that institutional development, and even the creation of a new institution, are sometimes necessary. When a proper institutional basis exists in combination with spirited leadership, as in Bolivia and Peru, programs can and do move forward.

Brazil presents a unique situation not susceptible to the institutional approach that has served A.I.D. well in the cases of Bolivia and Peru. The A.I.D. representation in Brazil has chosen well in pursuing a state-level response to a problem far beyond A.I.D.'s ability to address effectively at the national level. By selecting two states with active social programs and political "muscle" provided by their respective First Ladies, A.I.D. is achieving benefits far out of proportion to the limited financial input involved. Whether this experience will have a positive impact upon thinking at the national level remains to be seen. There appears to be at least some hope that the Federal Narcotics Council (CONFEN), which is attached to the Ministry of Justice, will become more effective as a result of new leadership and the planned creation of a technical secretariat for CONFEN, with assistance from the UNDCP.

In the case of Brazil, the size of A.I.D.'s investment has proved less important than the emphasis placed on exchanges of technical knowledge. A.I.D.'s experience in Brazil proves that it is possible to do something about the drug problem without large U.S. inputs. High motivation, of the kind found at the state level in Brazil, facilitates creative means of collaboration and the provision of significant in-kind contributions.

Brazil also clearly illustrates another factor. Projects need strong political support to carry out objectives. It has taken years for some professionals in drug prevention to understand this reality. Many believe that it is enough simply to do a good job. The leadership of the First Ladies of both Sao Paulo and Ceara attest to the positive relationship between political "muscle" and program success.

B. Countries Not Visited by the Evaluation Team

A.I.D.'s experience in Belize is an interesting example of how a prominent, well-recognized U.S. drug use prevention organization, PRIDE/Atlanta, can be utilized to create and develop a local private organization, PRIDE/Belize. The A.I.D. project, authorized in 1985, called for PRIDE/Atlanta to establish PRIDE/Belize and to use it to reduce the incidence of drug use among Belizeans, particularly young people, by building public awareness of the dangers of drug use. In 1989, USAID/Belize redesigned the project and established a revised purpose, i.e., to increase the public's awareness of the dangers of narcotics production and trafficking and to decrease demand for illicit drugs in high risk groups. By 1990 PRIDE/Belize had become an independent PVO, and in March 1991 it became the direct recipient of project resources. In implementing its program, PRIDE/Belize works closely with the host government's prevention organization, the National Drug Abuse Control Council (NDACC), established in 1990. The two organizations carry out similar functions, except that the NDACC's portfolio includes legal reform and treatment and rehabilitation.

According to a 1993 evaluation by Porter/Novelli, PRIDE/Belize is well managed, is known for excellent accountability, and has an effective and committed staff. It has successfully produced most of its planned outputs. Its strengths are in training, technical assistance and information dissemination. It is less effective in media relations, communications campaigns, research, and evaluation. A prevalence study recently conducted by PRIDE/Belize has several weaknesses, e.g., a focus on individuals who are in the formal education system and a bias in favor of urban areas in a country where over half the population is rural.

The Porter/Novelli evaluation expressed concern that when A.I.D support ends, PRIDE/Belize and the NDACC may start competing for the same resources. The evaluation suggests two options: (1) merge the two organizations; or (2) maintain both, but as complementary entities with well defined roles. The evaluation also recommends technical assistance for PRIDE/Belize in social marketing and integrated communications, research and evaluation, and cost recovery and sustainability.

Some lessons learned in Belize are: (a) roles should be clearly defined when two or more organizations (in this case PRIDE/Belize and the NDACC) are closely involved in the same kind of work; and (b) as has been pointed out in several other cases, technical assistance is often essential, particularly in the case of a newly established PVO.

The current A.I.D. project supporting PRIDE/Belize is scheduled to end in June of this year. However, the Mission plans to design a new three-year $750,000 demand reduction project, with

both PRIDE/Belize and the NDACC as implementing agencies. A.I.D.'s expenditure to date on the original project has been $1,932,000.

In Chile A.I.D. has never funded a demand reduction project as such. However, the A.I.D.-financed Program for the Immediate Improvement of Primary Health Care was partially used by the Government of Chile on its own initiative for a demand reduction effort. The GOC channeled some $253,000 of program funding to community mental health clinics of the Chilean Ministry of Health (MOH) to help the clinics upgrade their prevention capabilities. As a result, the MOH's "Quiero Mi Vida Sin Drogas" program was established. The program is designed to help children to develop the kind of positive self image that is so critical to success in prevention efforts. The pilot phase of this program consisted of training courses for "multiplier counselors," who are now working in public schools and community organizations. The MOH plans to expand the "Quiero Mi Vida Sin Drogas" program dramatically in the 1993-1994 academic year. The long term goal is to provide all Chileans between 10 and 19 years of age with access to prevention education. The USAID office in Chile believes that excellent benefit has been derived from the limited A.I.D. funding that has been used for prevention under the health rubric.

The lesson learned in Chile is that A.I.D. funding for a broad program -- e.g. in health, education, or democracy -- can sometimes usefully be drawn on for a demand reduction purpose. The effort in Chile is also an example of a limited amount of U.S.-origin funding resulting in a host government's devoting substantially increased national resources to the demand reduction effort.

In Colombia A.I.D.'s institutional investment in the Fundacion Accion Solidaria (FAS) did not produce the national organizational focus for demand reduction contemplated when it was first funded in 1987. This five-year investment produced benefits in terms of work with community-based organizations, but a number of activities never reached maturity and there were problems of accountability. As recently as 1989, a Development Associates evaluation gave FAS a mixed review, but concluded that a viable organization might yet emerge. Unfortunately, this did not occur. Because of continuing problems, notably in the areas of management and accountability, A.I.D. has suspended all funding for the project.

A.I.D.'s other investment in demand reduction in Colombia was with the National Association of the Partners of the Americas. The USAID Mission provided funding for programs of the three Colombia partnerships: Florida/Bogota, Massachusetts/Antioquia and South Carolina/Cali, with each covering a broader area than the cities mentioned. USAID/Colombia believes that the Partners' program ended with only limited achievement. The Partners channeled A.I.D. funds to more than 60 small "grass roots" organizations in Colombia for a wide variety of demand reduction activities. However, according to the USAID, Partners never developed a system for assessing the effectiveness of the individual programs, and they therefore had no way to weed out the less productive approaches. Today only limited activity by Partners continues in the absence of current A.I.D. financing.

The A.I.D. representative in Bogota is awaiting results of an epidemiological study being conducted by the Escuela Colombiana de Medicina with NAS/USIS support. Following two

recent A.I.D. attempts to design a follow-on activity, there is expectation that a project more responsive to the Colombian environment may emerge based on the study's determination of domestic drug use trends. There is a general perception that Colombians still tend to see the drug problem as one for the government, not for individuals. However, some positive changes in attitude are surfacing, and A.I.D. should consider fashioning a new project designed to respond to the new trend in public thinking.

In Costa Rica between 1990 and 1992 A.I.D. provided a $500,000 operational program grant to the Association of Professionals for the Development of the Costa Rican Family (ADIFAC), a local PVO. The purpose of the project was to establish a community awareness program regarding drug abuse. ADIFAC trained approximately 800 community leaders to act as multipliers, developed didactic material for use in prevention work, conducted a public awareness campaign related to prevention training, and provided support to local community groups. Over 300 "Drugs, No" committees were formed. Overall, project targets were exceeded.

However, disagreements between the Executive Director of ADIFAC and certain members of the Board of Directors resulted in funding restrictions being imposed by the Board. This action impacted negatively on project implementation. In addition, there were problems caused by lack of familiarity with U.S. Government management and accountability requirements. As in other cases (e.g., Colombia and Ecuador), it appears that this project could have benefited from technical assistance, particularly in the area of management.

A.I.D. demand reduction activity in the Dominican Republic has consisted of using an NAE project buy-in to conduct a survey on drug prevalence and attitudes. The survey, completed in September, 1992 by Development Associates, shows illicit drug use levels to be considerably below those generally found in urban areas of the region. Nevertheless, Development Associates has recommended a primary prevention campaign. Results of the survey have been used by the Mission to stimulate increased interest in primary prevention on the part of local officials. Although no specific drug demand reduction project is contemplated, the Mission has made demand reduction activities eligible for funding under an A.I.D. umbrella support project for local PVOs. The Mission advises that as many as four local groups may be eligible for support via this vehicle -- an interesting arrangement for possible emulation by other Missions that seek mechanisms for providing only limited support for demand reduction activities in their countries.

In the case of Ecuador, ongoing support to the Fundacion Nuestros Jovenes (FNJ) has had an unhappy administrative history. Problems attributed to the management style of FNJ's charismatic, well-connected leader have required the attention of the Mission. Current funding will support operations for approximately one more year, and the Mission has confirmed that it has no plans to provide additional support to the FNJ or any other Ecuadorean drug activity in the foreseeable future. Had original goals and funding been more modest and had greater management support been available at the outset, results to date might have been better. Still, the eventual outcome may prove more positive than A.I.D./Colombia's experience with FAS. Recent reform of FNJ's Board of Directors and some strategic planning in anticipation of the end of A.I.D. support may enable FNJ to continue on a more modest, better targeted basis. Efforts

to attract external support are increasing, with some success to date. The future of FNJ after mid-1994 may provide a useful test of just what degree of sustainability can be expected in major institutional programs when A.I.D. support is phased out after a long period (in this case seven years). To its credit, FNJ is reported to have exceeded quantitative targets associated with its prevention activities. It was instrumental in achieving enactment of a new narcotics law and in helping to ensure the law's implementation. FNJ has been deficient, however, in accomplishing national epidemiological and opinion survey work in a timely manner.

As noted earlier, USAID/Ecuador has stressed its reluctance to engage in any drug-related activities once FNJ support ends. Management time considerations as well as reduced overall funding availability are cited as reasons for not proposing even limited support for training and research. However, the Mission indicated some interest in tapping regional sources of funding or expertise for any useful short-term efforts. The Mission also mentioned the possibility of an NAE Project buy-in to perform a final evaluation of the FNJ activity.

The most significant lesson learned in Ecuador may be that confronting institutional deficiencies in a timely manner is as important as ensuring adequate technical content. A pattern of administrative difficulties was identified early in USAID/Ecuador's relationship with the director of FNJ, and delineated in considerable detail in an evaluation of that entity by Development Associates in August, 1991 -- after FNJ's grant had been increased substantially early in 1990. Evidently considerable pressure for management improvement was brought to bear on FNJ by audits and other means, but responses were less than satisfactory. It is worth pondering, in the light of USAID/Bolivia's well-regarded employment of a resident specialist in administration, whether it might not have been prudent to enlist similar full-time support early in the Ecuador project. The same question applies to USAID/Colombia's relationship with FAS. It is recognized, nevertheless, that the problems in both countries may have been rooted in circumstances that could not easily have been changed simply by the injection of administrative and technical assistance. Initiating new programs with new entities is by nature a chancy business.

In El Salvador A.I.D.'s "Drug Awareness and Abuse Prevention" project, initiated in late 1990, has provided effective support to FUNDASALVA and is reported to have exceeded specific quantitative targets well ahead of schedule. Expansion of activities beyond the San Salvador area has begun now that security conditions have improved. FUNDASALVA, which is currently involved in drug counseling for ex-combatants, has emphasized drug prevention education encompassing community groups, classroom and workplace programs, mass media efforts, and institutional strengthening. The Mission indicates that it expects measurement of impact to be possible only after the project has been in operation for five years. Of particular interest is the fact that FUNDASALVA, which gained legal status only a year before A.I.D. initiated support, was largely a result of the efforts of one family of highly-motivated individuals who were able to mobilize support from more than 30 business enterprises. What is clearly seen here is that it does not take many inspired individuals to produce effective action if the proper level of dynamism exists. As in other instances where much has been accomplished through A.I.D.

support to a nucleus of dedicated private sector leaders, financial sustainability following the termination of A.I.D. funding is a matter of concern.

In Haiti the USAID project seeks to build and expand on the activities of the Association for Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Chemical Dependencies (APAAC), a Haitian PVO established in 1986. The purpose of the project, which began in 1988, is to develop and disseminate information on drug abuse and prevention through use of the media and personal contacts, assess public awareness of drug abuse in Haiti, and strengthen APAAC as a sustainable national drug awareness and prevention resource through training and technical assistance.

APAAC activities continued almost without interruption despite the serious events of the recent past. As soon as renewal of priority humanitarian activities was authorized subsequent to the events of mid-1991, A.I.D. resumed assistance to APAAC. Currently authorized financing runs through 1994, but the Mission plans to extend assistance through 1996. A well-rounded program of activities is reportedly achieving anticipated results, owing in good part to the highly motivated leadership in APAAC. The organization reportedly has both a realistic idea of what can be accomplished and reasonable expectations of what support A.I.D. can provide. More training for APAAC's 16 staff members may merit special attention to help further benefit and conserve the Association's most valuable resource. A key lesson learned here is that a highly motivated leadership within an A.I.D.-supported entity can be a critical factor in achieving results despite serious obstacles.

Jamaica presents another example of shortcomings in terms of program management. First there was a failure to match project design to the capabilities and objectives of the National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA). This problem was evidently compounded by the inability at an early stage of the project to come to a meeting of minds as to what the project was expected to accomplish. Telephone contact with the USAID Mission suggests that the National Council's program has from the start been a community effort, far more broadly based than the drug program the Mission had in mind when the relationship started in 1989. Major targets in the A.I.D. project have not been met and there have been problems of accountability. More than half way through the five year life of the project, USAID/Jamaica faces the need to reprogram remaining project funds, and is now seeking to provide support directly to various private organizations working on drug prevention. The Mission is also aware of the inadequacy of current prevalence data, and plans to commission a new epidemiological study.

A new A.I.D. project for Jamaica is foreseen for 1994, but funding will go to entities other than the National Council. In any event, the National Council continues to enjoy considerable support from U.N. sources, and the Mission expects Council programs will continue to offer drug prevention content even without further A.I.D. support. The lessons learned in this case are clear. Programs need to be mutually understood by both parties from the outset, and the nature of principal institutional interests needs to be identified early. Project design must adequately reflect the institutional and absorptive capabilities of the implementing agencies. Again, as the Colombian and Ecuadorean cases also indicate, new organizations often need extensive technical assistance to meet A.I.D. management requirements.

Panama presents a good pattern of success in a moderately-financed activity. As in the case of FEMAP in Mexico, A.I.D. identified as the recipient of its assistance an effective and respected PVO, Cruz Blanca. That organization had been created in 1978 to address the problems of juvenile delinquency. Cruz Blanca began its drug abuse prevention activities in 1981 with direct technical assistance from the Glenbeigh Hospital in Miami. By 1987, Cruz Blanca had become the leading drug abuse prevention organization in Panama. It was at that point that A.I.D. support was initiated. Cruz Blanca has received two modest A.I.D. grants, and has had considerable success in local fund raising and enlistment of quality volunteer help. Given other USAID Mission priorities, further assistance is not presently planned. The Mission believes that, after five years of support, Cruz Blanca is capable of sustaining its efforts without A.I.D. assistance.

This may illustrate a case where too much or too long a period of A.I.D. assistance conceivably could weaken sustainability of a well-established local effort. Although USAID/Panama has expressed concern about Cruz Blanca's being "stretched thin," the Mission is satisfied that the organization is now well established and that it can attract sufficient local support, at least in the Panama City area.

Paraguay represents an example of considerable progress within a unique public/private framework involving the Ministry of Health, the National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD), Project Marandu of the Paraguay-Kansas Partners, and $400,000 in support from an A.I.D. project begun in 1990. Technical support is provided by Development Associates. The purpose of the A.I.D. project is to (1) assist in organizing and making operational a Paraguayan drug awareness and information center; (2) support the development of a national prevention plan; (3) design, conduct, and disseminate the results of an epidemiological study on the nature and extent of drug abuse; (4) increase the elites' awareness of the drug problem; (5) assist the Ministry of Education and Worship in the design and implementation of a school based program; (6) design and implement community outreach through selected NGOs; and (7) conduct communications campaigns to create broad public support for anti-drug efforts.

The project is progressing well. However, the Mission did note some dissatisfaction with the technical assistance contractor, Development Associates. The Mission expressed the view that Development Associates was very costly and tended to provide assistance at its own convenience rather than at times most appropriate for the project.

The current project ends in September of this year, but the Mission indicates it will seek additional funding into FY 1994. Thereafter, it expects the Marandu Project will be able to continue with local support and with multilateral funding currently being sought from the UNDCP. Only a very limited need for further technical support is foreseen.

A two-year pilot project in the Eastern Caribbean is the newest A.I.D.-supported initiative in drug abuse prevention in the LAC region. Implemented by Partners of the Americas and the Florida Association of Voluntary Agencies for Caribbean Action (FAVA/CA), the project serves seven Eastern Caribbean countries: Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.

Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia. The Eastern Caribbean effort, by using Partners and FAVA/CA, will provide a further, welcome test of the potential for drawing upon low cost, non-profit resources to help launch projects of significant scope. The activities programmed range from a needs assessment to training and institutional strengthening.

C. A.I.D.'s Role and Experiences in Demand Reduction

1. Rationales for A.I.D. Interventions

One might ask why A.I.D. should be involved at all in drug demand reduction. What has motivated A.I.D. to add demand reduction activities to the already rather heavy menu of issues it is addressing in the region?

Availability of cocaine in the U.S. may well be the main factor that led to A.I.D's involvement in demand reduction in the mid-1980's. This involvement was impelled by Congressional interest and by a general assumption that Latin American and Caribbean leaders might be more inclined to deal with the supply issue if the USG could convince them that they, too, had a domestic demand problem. In fact, official U.S. policy, according to the ONDCP, has based USG support for demand reduction abroad on the assumption that it would impact supply to the U.S. A.I.D.-supported projects have generally responded to this reasoning, whatever their other stated purposes.

There has been a similarly tenuous assumption that inhibiting domestic drug demand in the region -- or at least increasing public awareness of the dangers of drug use -- would impact negatively on economic benefits to producers and traffickers. Unfortunately, the prevailing inter-American view, as reflected in OAS/CICAD's report due to be presented to this year's U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs Conference, is as follows: "Empirical evidence indicates that trafficking continues unabated...and that...measures to reduce demand and prevent drug abuse have been offset by the development of new markets..."

Several development-related justifications for demand reduction investments have surfaced -- social, political and economic in nature. All are valid to one extent or another, but it is doubtful that any one rationale alone, or any combination, would justify high priority A.I.D. funding in most countries of the region. Even in Bolivia and Peru, where local professionals were instrumental in engaging USG attention to drug prevention, it is doubtful that A.I.D. would have supported major programs in the absence of strong U.S. congressional interest and access to specific funding through the Andean Initiative. Public health is a valid rationale for demand reduction efforts, but numerous other health problems in the region, including alcohol and tobacco use, threaten far greater numbers of people than the use of illegal drugs.

The threat to the physical environment from coca, marijuana or poppy plantings would also represent an interesting, though probably insufficient, rationale for A.I.D. involvement in drug demand reduction. Clearly, the environmental problem is better addressed by eradication and broad based economic development, i.e., alternative development.

From a regional standpoint, the threat of the illegal drug trade to democratic development may be a convincing rationale for A.I.D.'s involvement in demand reduction. The corrupting influence of the drug trade on often fragile democratic institutions needs no elaboration. Again, however, it is not easy to establish a strong, causal relationship between A.I.D.'s demand reduction efforts and any reduction in the success of the drug producers and traffickers.

An even stronger case might be possible on strictly economic development grounds, particularly in the case of the Andean countries. It is painfully evident that the drug business has produced serious distortions in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia that will long negatively impact on these countries' economies. But here again, it is difficult to establish that A.I.D.'s drug demand reduction efforts are having a negative impact on the drug industry.

In summary, whatever the detailed justifications of A.I.D. programs in drug demand reduction, the principal A.I.D. motivation in the region comes down to a perceived need to (a) be involved in the narcotics area because of its impact on the U.S. domestic scene; and (b) counter obstacles to development in the countries where programs have been mounted. The A.I.D. "mandate" for intervention in demand reduction has never been clear and is not likely to become any more precise.

If any single factor might best contribute to helping A.I.D. identify its future role in drug demand reduction in the hemisphere, it may be the capacity to articulate more clearly why A.I.D. considers work in this regard to be consistent with and appropriate to its overall developmental purpose. A broad spectrum of objectives exists to justify current efforts: improved public health, social welfare, encouragement of democracy, national security, defense of the physical environment, worker productivity, and better administration of justice, among others. Certainly in the Andean region, economic distortions caused by drug production, trafficking, and use are a central threat to A.I.D.'s success in addressing traditional development concerns.

What also becomes clear in this study is that any attempt to generalize approaches to the problem would fly in the face of enormous differences in local circumstances.

2. Types of Interventions

Public Awareness Campaigns

Activities of A.I.D., USIA, and State/INM in the countries visited have targeted the general public and/or populations at risk by various means. Both the dangers of drug production/trafficking and the dangers of drug use are stressed, each to different degrees in different countries. The general assumption is that it can only do good to get the anti-drug message across as often as possible in as many ways as modern communications permit.

Useful as the broad programs to inform the general public have been and may be in the future, a valid question arises as to whether A.I.D. is the proper agency for delivering the anti-drug message. On the surface, public awareness would seem to fall more under the purview of other

USG agencies. However, USIA's role is properly restricted to presenting a U.S. version of matters -- one not necessarily encompassing all that a national anti-drug effort might find useful. A.I.D.'s development role is sufficiently broad to cover all aspects of drug demand reduction, including public awareness, and A.I.D. is experienced at the kind of institutional support that public awareness work requires. The kinds of awareness efforts supplied by a SEAMOS in Bolivia or a CEDRO in Peru certainly exceed what USIS could accomplish.

The issue, therefore, is not who in the U.S. Government should handle public awareness. There is ample room in most countries for complementary efforts by USIS, NAS and A.I.D., assuming their work is properly coordinated. The critical question is which public is it most important to reach.

Observations in the countries visited support making public and private leadership a key target, at least in the initial stages of an A.I.D. project. This suggests that high priority should be given to (a) in-country seminars specifically oriented to opinion leaders and decision makers; and (b) grants for trips to the United States by members of these same elites. A.I.D.'s work with the "Paulista Group" and the "Ceara Group" in Brazil attests to the multiplier effect that can be derived from public awareness efforts with elites.

Broad media campaigns of the SEAMOS and CEDRO type are also important and should continue to receive A.I.D. support. Such activities would also be excellent candidates for increased local support, especially as host country elites become more attuned to the need for media campaigns. Already, CEDRO in Peru receives free air time and print space, and in Bolivia SEAMOS pays 10 percent of commercial rates for TV spots. Additional local support should be encouraged throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Drug Awareness Education

Building public awareness through curriculum modification corresponds more closely to A.I.D.'s traditional role than supporting media campaigns. Observations in the countries visited suggest that there is widespread interest in inserting an anti-drug message into the school day experience. In Guatemala, the team observed considerable enthusiasm among teachers and supervisors for this approach, and in Bolivia CESE has generated great interest in drug awareness through the training of 15,000 teachers and the production of highly effective didactic material. In Mexico, the sustained record the CIJ and CORA demonstrate the value of well-balanced, broad anti-drug messages within the school environment but beyond the formal school curriculum.

What the above suggests is that even greater attention should be given to influencing Ministries of Education and public and private schools to introduce adequate anti-drug programs.

Greater efforts should also be made to reach street children and others who are not enrolled in schools. The excellent work of CEDRO in Peru should be emulated to a greater degree by some of the other A.I.D. demand reduction projects. Increased efforts by international donors on behalf

of non-traditional children and adolescents would also be appropriate, particularly since work with street children encompasses far more than drug abuse prevention.

Research, Investigation and Documentation

There was evidence in all countries visited by the team of considerable technical competence to conduct epidemiological and attitudinal surveys and other research critical to understanding drug issues. Mexico stands out with regard to professional capacity in research and documentation. Peru, Bolivia and Brazil fall short of matching Mexico's capacity mostly because of financial limitations and lack of experience rather than as a result of any great lack of technical expertise. Even in Guatemala significant technical competence exists.

A.I.D. supports research in private sector demand reduction entities, but there is little A.I.D. funding for research in universities. In the countries visited, A.I.D.'s support for PROINCO in Bolivia is the Agency's only direct attempt to assist a public agency in this area. (Moreover, as indicted earlier, there are plans to convert PROINCO into a private sector organization.) Non-USG support, both bilateral and multilateral, is now available in the region and may be sufficient to reinforce the research capacities of public entities. Nevertheless, there may be cases in which A.I.D. could usefully provide support for research by public organizations, drawing on the capacity and interest available elsewhere in the U.S. Government (e.g. in NIDA).

In the area of research, the key lesson is that the current lack of uniformity in prevalence studies makes accurate intra-country and inter-country comparisons of prevalence virtually impossible and severely compromises the ability of A.I.D. to determine project impact. Unless accurate baseline are established, unless they correspond in time to the start of the project, and unless the project manager arranges for effective mechanisms for data collection and maintenance during the project's life, impact determination will remain elusive.

Institution Building

In the case of CEDRO, critics have argued that nurturing a new institution for almost a decade is an excessively costly means of addressing the demand reduction problem. Similar comments may eventually be heard with regard to SEAMOS, and perhaps CESE, before their currently planned financing in Bolivia runs out in 1996.

Clearly, time can be gained and money saved by grafting an anti-drug effort onto a successful existing organization, as was done in the case of FEMAP in Mexico. A.I.D.'s approach with FEMAP should be replicated elsewhere, to the extent feasible, although opportunities for a FEMAP style solution are not abundant. The team received no indication that in Peru there was any FEMAP type alternative to the long and costly task of helping to create and support CEDRO.

In Guatemala, CONAPAD antedated A.I.D. interest and also was virtually the only option available. In Bolivia, DINAPRE, and to some extent CESE, were functioning prior to A.I.D. support. In Brazil, the extensive variety of organizations being afforded limited amounts of

support were all in existence before A.I.D. assistance was made available. Yet even when an institution already exists, support for substantial institutional development will often be required.

Typically, A.I.D. programs with private sector organizations have tended to fare better than those of a government-to-government nature. A case-by-case approach appears to have guided A.I.D. Missions in the selection of entities to support. Sometimes the decision to take is obvious, e.g., where initiative exists in the private sector as was the case with the Bolivian business community's sponsorship of SEAMOS, or where legal or policy impediments make working with official agencies difficult, as in the case of Mexico. However, where options are open, Missions have wisely spread the risks inherent in drug-related activity by supporting a mix of public and private action, e.g. in Paraguay and Brazil.

Alternative Activities

Experience in Mexico attests to the desirability of offering young people a menu of alternatives to idleness, frustration and temptation as incentives for drug avoidance. In dealing with certain high risk groups (e.g., adolescent populations), delivering an anti-drug message in isolation from other efforts sometimes accomplishes little and may even do some harm. For example, the Murrieta Foundation discovered that anti-drug messages alone sometimes focused the attention of youth on drugs with negative consequences -- they became interested in them. Only when alternatives to drug use were made available was success achieved.

However, the provision of alternative free time activities -- whether recreational or vocational -- is expensive. Desirable as such activities may be, it would appear to be beyond A.I.D.'s capacity to fund very many of them. Local and multilateral organizations would appear to be more promising sources of funding.

3. Key Problem Areas

The Difficulty of Measuring Impact

For the reasons set forth throughout this report, impact evaluation is extremely difficult, particularly when problem definition is vague, clear baseline data are not available, and there is no uniformity in data from study to study. The key lesson learned here is that, despite the many difficulties, impact evaluation must be taken seriously and rendered as effective as possible if long-term (and probably worthwhile) expenditures in demand reduction are to be justified in an environment of increasing budgetary stringencies.

However, the cost of impact measurement is worthy of note. Conducting properly designed surveys can be high in cost in relation to the amount of money that is being spent to carry out basic prevention activities. USAID/Panama, in particular, has noted this problem. A judicious balance between the need to know impact and the cost of knowing should be struck on a case-by-case basis to avoid overly-elaborate or overly-frequent attempts to be precise.

Sustainability

Failure to build sustainability mechanisms (e.g., endowments) into projects, unrealistic expectations as regards fund raising, and weak management can all lead to the foundering and even the extinction of projects once A.I.D. support is no longer available. The problem of sustainability is by no means limited to drug prevention projects, though their newness, complexity and inability to generate income through the sale of services or products leave them more vulnerable than development projects in more traditional areas. In demand reduction projects of any size, obtaining sufficient non-USG funding to ensure sustainability must be treated as a long-term objective.

In certain countries not visited by the team, inadequate management has posed a greater threat to sustainability than lack of present or prospective funding. A vicious circle can develop quickly when managerial deficiencies are present: A.I.D. becomes unable to provide the kind of continuing support that would have been made available if progress had been smooth, thereby effectively eliminating the possibility that non-USG support will be forthcoming. Experience in Colombia with Fundacion Accion Solidaria is a prime example. Conversely, where management is solid, e.g. in the case of CEDRO in Peru, financial sustainability appears attainable following the eventual termination of A.I.D. assistance.

The record of technical sustainability to date in A.I.D-supported programs has been good. Attention to training and observation opportunities, including sponsorship of useful travel abroad, has paid important dividends in keeping key individuals involved, especially when their work is of a volunteer nature.

As the team's report was being written, the R&D Bureau's NAE contractor, Development Associates, issued "A Strategy for Promoting Sustainability in Narcotics Awareness and Education Projects." This document describes in detail actions that the authors believe are required to pursue sustainability in drug demand reduction. Little that is recommended differs from what has proved desirable in other A.I.D.-supported development projects over the years. However, one factor of critical importance stands out -- the need to build sustainability into projects during the earliest planning stage. It may still not be too late to compensate for past deficiencies in this regard.

Section Five

RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES OF STRATEGY

Now is a propitious time for A.I.D. Washington to consider anew the extent to which it should be involved in narcotics awareness, education, and prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean.

A new administration promises to set policy guidelines, both domestic and international, which will condition all future USG anti-drug activity in the region. These guidelines, and overall budgetary considerations, will define funding parameters for any future initiatives. Prospective changes in A.I.D.'s organization and mandate may further shape interest in, and capability to continue, LAC Bureau support for drug demand reduction in the region. In the light of such uncertainties, fixing a strategy now would seem to be premature. Yet now is an excellent time to consider the past decade of experience, to revisit the lessons learned, and to explore options for the future, unfettered by decisions already set in concrete.

Despite the LAC Bureau's major contributions to demand reduction, it is likely to remain a junior partner in the overall U.S. counter-drug effort. Still, the uneven record to date of other USG activities in counter-narcotics suggests that greater attention to the demand side of the demand/supply equation is in the offing domestically. This change could spill over to the international scene, opening up for A.I.D. the opportunity to build upon its experiences.

If the LAC Bureau is to respond to this opportunity, it will need to define more clearly than it has in the past why it should be involved in demand reduction and in what way it can be usefully engaged. A.I.D.'s strategy, while regional in substance, must be country specific in practice. The differences between the Andean countries and Central America, for example, are significant both in terms of needs and the degree of current USG drug concerns.

With the above considerations in mind, the Evaluation Team recommends that the LAC Bureau consider the following courses of action in developing a modified strategy:

1. **Make a rigorous assessment to determine which countries should be the principal recipients of demand reduction assistance.** The countries selected should be of particular importance to U.S. drug and developmental interests and offer reasonable promise of supporting effective demand reduction programs. In all cases, it will be

important to have strong interest and support from the host country's private or public sector, and ideally from both.

2. **Concentrate resources on the few target countries that are identified in the assessment.** In some of these countries, A.I.D. should be prepared to support projects for long periods of time. For example, in the case of Peru and Bolivia, A.I.D. needs to think in terms of decades, not years.

3. **Ask each participating USAID Mission to review its definition of the specific problem that needs to be addressed in the host country.** The Missions should normally define the problem to be addressed in terms of either an A.I.D. Strategic Objective to combat narcotics or identify it as a subset of another Strategic Objective -- e.g., one that identifies drug use as a health, education, democracy, public safety, or other development issue. In rare cases, the problem can be addressed as a "target of opportunity." In all cases, the Missions should be asked to:

   (a) determine the weight to be assigned to each of the following: (i) public awareness of the danger of drug production/trafficking; (ii) prevention (including public awareness of the danger of drugs to the individual, the family, and society); and (iii) reduction of drug use;

   (b) consult with other members of the Country Team in determining the logical division of labor among USG agencies in the host country, based on mutual agreement as to each agency's comparative advantage in the field; and

   (c) re-target A.I.D. resources as necessary to address the specific problem(s) identified.

   The rationale and structure for all projects must be based on a clear definition of the problem, regardless of whether it has been described in terms of a Strategic Objective or a "target of opportunity." It will be important to have clear indications of host country support for any new or ongoing programs.

4. **Work with other USG agencies to improve coordination at the Washington level.** Numerous Washington agencies are involved in demand reduction efforts in the hemisphere (see inventory, Annex 1). From the beginning of the Evaluation Team's work, it was clear that coordination among these agencies was uneven and that some elements of the Government were not sufficiently aware of the activities of other elements. As the new administration settles in, it will be important for A.I.D. to work with others, in the first instance State/INM and USIA, in devising a more effective coordinating arrangement. Currently, USIA chairs a monthly interagency meeting on demand reduction attended by some 50 people. Apparently, however, its primary role is information sharing rather than coordination. A smaller group, meeting more frequently

with a clear coordination and problem solving mandate, would be a useful supplement to the existing USIA-chaired meeting.

5. **Urge host governments to contribute direct financial support to A.I.D. projects.** As indicated throughout this report, the lack of significant national government financial support is a problem in all countries visited by the Evaluation Team. Increased financial support would have value not only in itself but as a signal that the host government takes demand reduction seriously. This, in turn, would boost morale among professionals working in demand reduction and could encourage contributions from multilateral and other non-USG donors. A.I.D. should consider proposing that ambassadorial level demarches be made to host governments stressing the importance the U.S. attaches to the A.I.D.-supported projects and to increased host government contributions to them.

6. **Assign a high priority to helping A.I.D.-supported entities achieve sustainability in both a financial and technical sense.** By choice or simple process of elimination, the preponderant share of A.I.D. support in the region has gone to private sector organizations. These organizations appear to be well-endowed with inspired leadership and with technically-competent (but small) cadres. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, fund raising from the private sector is difficult. The following possibilities should be considered:

   (a) assist project entities in accessing multilateral, NGO, and other funding, whether through technical assistance in fund raising, demarches to potential donors, or other means;

   (b) urge host governments, local businesses, NGOs, and other potential sources of funds to match or partially match funds received from A.I.D. and multilateral organizations;

   (c) encourage the establishment of endowment funds for project entities and assist these entities in developing ways to attract contributions and matching fund support; and

   (d) consider providing project entities with local currency generated from U.S. sources, especially where it can be maintained in dollar accounts and thereby protected from the effects of excessive inflation.

7. **Consult with USAID Missions on how they might play a more proactive role in securing multilateral and other non-USG support.** The United Nations may be the most promising source of support, judging from the interest in demand reduction evidenced by UNDCP representatives in countries visited by the Evaluation Team. However, Missions should be encouraged to seek out additional possible sources, including local business communities.

8. **Ensure that adequate management expertise exists within A.I.D.-supported projects.** One way of ensuring proper management expertise is by using an existing successful organization to carry out A.I.D.-supported projects. Such organizations need not have drugs as their primary focus; in Mexico, for example, a drug function was added to FEMAP, a family planning organization, with satisfactory results. Regardless of the nature of the organization with which A.I.D. is involved, technical assistance may need to be provided to improve managerial expertise. In some cases, it may be necessary to contract for full-time management assistance (such as that provided by Development Associates in Bolivia).

9. **Incorporate anti-drug elements into other A.I.D.-supported activities.** This approach would be particularly appropriate in countries that are not identified in the assessment as principal recipients of U.S. assistance but where USAID Missions are engaged in health, education, democracy or other activities to which an anti-drug component could be added.

10. **Advocate combining U.S. efforts with those of other countries of the hemisphere.** The cooperation among the U.S., Canada and Mexico in the training of Central American personnel offers a useful model for this approach. Cooperation is indicated not only in training but also in research, investigation and documentation. For example, it might be productive to link capabilities of USG programs, such as those of NIDA, with Mexico's Psychiatric Institute and with comparable resources available in Sao Paulo, Lima and La Paz.

11. **Explore opportunities for tapping U.S. state and local resources.** Aside from the work of Partners of the Americas in several countries, PRIDE/Atlanta in Belize, and the State of Texas with CSAP support in Mexico, the Evaluation Team encountered little evidence of involvement of U.S. state and local organizations in drug prevention. A.I.D. should consider seeking out additional opportunities to promote technical exchanges with selected U.S. state and local programs that have operational expertise, while recognizing that U.S. approaches will need to be adapted for Latin American and Caribbean cultures.

12. **Bring together key experts to formulate recommendations on future efforts in demand reduction.** A.I.D. should organize a seminar and invite to it a very limited number of Latin American and Caribbean professionals with long years of experience beyond their own borders. Examples of such individuals are Dr. Guido Belsasso (Mexico), Dr. Roberto Lerner (Peru), and Licenciada Laura Baldivieso (Bolivia). The seminar should also include carefully selected representatives of the UNDCP, the EC, OAS/CICAD, and the U.S. Government. Participants should be asked to propose concrete ideas and options in written form for consideration by A.I.D., other USG agencies, and the international donor community. A one-week session in an informal setting is recommended.

13. **Give high priority to well-targeted training opportunities.** A.I.D. and other USG agencies have been particularly successful in providing excellent training and observation opportunities for present and future leaders and technicians. In the case of narcotics demand reduction, this has helped to create a cadre of concerned professionals with an interest in urging their own governments to commit resources to the demand reduction effort. Even in the face of growing budgetary constraints, providing key individuals in drug prevention activities with further opportunities of this nature merits consideration. The Sao Paulo and Ceara groups in Brazil are good examples of a well-conceived training effort leading to complementary local funding and to very useful multiplier effects.

14. **Communicate A.I.D.'s accomplishments in a more effective manner.** Many contacts made by the Evaluation Team prior to field visits elicited a largely negative view of A.I.D.'s work in drug demand reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean. There were also negative reactions to the efforts of the R&D Bureau's principal contractor, Development Associates. However, in the field, with minor exceptions, reactions to both A.I.D. and Development Associates were predominately favorable within the family of USG agencies and highly positive among public and private host country personnel. Field successes appear to be doubted or unknown in the Washington bureaucracy, and this should be corrected through a targeted information campaign carried out by the appropriate entities within A.I.D.

15. **Consider allowing more flexibility in technical assistance contracting in the future.** The Evaluation Team did not encounter reasons to differ substantially with most findings of the "Interim Evaluation of the NAE Project," recently completed by Creative Associates International, which gave a generally positive rating to the performance of the Development Associates contract. However, the team does question the assumption that a second five-year contract by the Bureau of Research and Development would correspond to the likely needs of the LAC Bureau. Since almost all buy-ins have served programs in the LAC region, there appears to be little rationale for supporting a worldwide contract -- except possibly for a continuation of research activity. Moreover, since much has already been accomplished in launching projects and institutions, notably in Bolivia and Peru, a central contract, even for the LAC region, may no longer be required. The needs of individual Missions or projects could be met as well, perhaps better, through direct contracts with appropriate USG agencies (e.g., NIDA, CSAP), U.S. contractors, local contractors, and other competent sources of technical support.

16. **Consider establishing a small technical support unit and a flexible funding mechanism in the LAC Bureau.** The purpose would be to support narcotics demand reduction activities and initiatives that do not lend themselves to Mission funding and to provide short-term services to Missions in management and technical areas. A nucleus of two or three field-oriented technical staff with a relatively modest capability in regional funds could suffice. Among other activities, the unit could assist Missions with the

identification and definition of problems to be addressed by demand reduction projects and with the development of monitoring and impact measurement systems for these projects.

The Team's final recommendation is a general one relating to all-U.S. Government and international initiatives in drug demand reduction. The Team proposes that A.I.D.:

17. **Recommend an interagency assessment of USG and other donor efforts in demand reduction, followed by collaboration between the USG and other major donors in developing an international demand reduction strategy.** This effort should be conducted in three phases, as follows:

Phase I: The USG assessment would be an interagency effort, with A.I.D. as a major participant. The purpose would be to examine all U.S. demand reduction activities and tentatively decide on any changes in interagency division of labor, based on comparative advantage, or in the projects themselves, based on an analysis of their effectiveness and their importance to U.S. objectives.

Phase II: The USG, multilateral organizations, and other major donors would come together to develop an international strategy. A special committee should be designated for the purpose. In an appropriate international forum (e.g., the Dublin Group), the U.S. could propose the formation of such a committee. It should include, at a minimum, representatives of the UNDCP, the EC, OAS/CICAD, the U.S. Government, and other major donors. The purpose of the consultations should be to examine the effectiveness of projects and the extent of any overlap, and establish a basis for any changes in programs and policy. Such a collaborative effort is of critical importance in view of the major investments the UNDCP, the EC and others are making in demand reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean (see inventory, Annex 1).

In the light of the results of the international consultations, the special committee should recommend a practical system for coordination among the U.S., the UNDCP, the EC, and other major donors. One possible model is the "Mini Dublin Group," which exists in some countries. Another model can be found in Bolivia, where the UNDCP representative participates in meetings of the U.S.-sponsored "Project Coordinating Unit."

Phase III: In the light of both the USG assessment and the international consultations, the U.S. should:

(a) decide on any changes in its own demand reduction efforts.

(b) decide whether a more multilateral approach to demand reduction is desirable. Increased emphasis on multilateral efforts may be indicated in some cases, e.g., Central America (where some multilateralization is already underway), and in

countries where existing capabilities or sensitivities make U.S. direct involvement less necessary or desirable.

(c) consider establishing a closer USG relationship with the UNDCP in the demand reduction area. The closer relationship could include channeling a portion of future USG funding through the UNDCP and assigning high quality USG personnel to the UNDCP on secondment in key countries.

Annex 1

INVENTORY OF ACTIVITIES IN DEMAND REDUCTION BY ENTITIES OTHER THAN THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (A.I.D.)

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1. Comments on Nature of Inventory

This inventory has been prepared with a view to giving readers an appreciation of the wide range of demand reduction activities being carried out by entities other than A.I.D. in the 22 Western Hemisphere countries where A.I.D. finances or recently financed demand reduction projects. For purposes of this inventory, demand reduction is defined as including prevention, public awareness, drug use reduction, and treatment/rehabilitation. Countless efforts in these areas are being carried out by a broad spectrum of U.S. Government agencies, international organizations, and foreign governments and by thousands of non-government organizations (NGOs). In Bolivia alone, some 500 NGOs are somehow involved in demand reduction activities. For these reasons, the present inventory does not pretend to be complete. A definitive inventory of all relevant on-going activities in the 22 countries in question would require exhaustive research and would take far more time to prepare than the Evaluation Team had at its disposal. Even if such a compilation were produced, it would be essentially a snapshot in time and would require frequent updating to remain meaningful. Such an effort would necessitate a significant commitment of resources.

The Evaluation Team supports the idea of creating and maintaining an inventory of all demand reduction activities worldwide. The task could be carried out either by a U.S. Government agency, a contractor, or an appropriate international organization, perhaps the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP). State/INM is already attempting to establish and maintain an inventory of all demand reduction seminars, workshops, and training activities worldwide.

2. Uses of This and Future Inventories

From the first week of the Evaluation Team's work, it became clear that, even within the U.S. Government, coordination on demand reduction issues is faulty and that some elements of the Government are not sufficiently aware of the activities of other elements. The problem is even more pronounced in the international arena. A multiplicity of players -- several U.N. organizations, the European Community, the Organization of American States, individual donor governments, and countless NGOs -- engage in demand reduction activity, often with minimal coordination. The Evaluation Team believes that any effort to improve coordination and eliminate duplication must start with at least a general understanding of the broad spectrum of demand reduction efforts now underway. The team hopes that the present inventory will contribute to such an understanding on an interim basis, pending the eventual creation, and continued maintenance, of a comprehensive inventory.

3. Organization of Inventory

This inventory begins (sections 4 through 9) with general descriptions of the demand reduction roles of U.S. Government agencies (other than A.I.D.), international organizations, individual governments, and NGOs. Section 10 contains a detailed listing of non-A.I.D. efforts in each of the five countries the Evaluation Team visited. Section 11 is devoted to a listing of some of the key non-A.I.D. demand reduction efforts in the 17 countries not visited by the Team.

4. The Demand Reduction Roles of U.S. Government Agencies Other than A.I.D.

The principal U.S. Government elements besides A.I.D. that are active in the demand reduction effort are the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (State/INM), the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) through its Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) and its National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA).

The ONDCP, which was recently reduced in size and reorganized, provides general policy guidance on the drug issue, including demand reduction, but does not fund individual projects.

State/INM centrally funds a wide range of workshops, seminars and intensive training sessions on demand reduction throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Total expenditure in these areas in FY 1992 was approximately $400,000. INM has a visitor program under which selected persons active in demand reduction are brought to the U.S. for orientation and training. In FY 1992, INM spent some $100,000 in support of Latin American and Caribbean visitors. In addition, the NAS sections in U.S. embassies carry out specific demand reduction projects in individual countries. Examples are listed later in this inventory. INM estimates that the total cost of these projects in Latin America and the Caribbean was $391,000 in FY 1992. INM also contributes funds for demand reduction to the Inter-American Drug Control Commission of the OAS (OAS/CICAD). In FY 1992, INM gave over $300,000 for general support of CICAD. In the past, INM has provided demand reduction funding to the UNDCP. INM anticipates that its expenditure on demand reduction will increase significantly in both FY 1993 and FY 1994.

USIA contributes funding for international workshops and seminars on demand reduction. Worthy of special note are USIA's periodic drug workshops for journalists, held in Washington. Since early 1987, over 250 journalists from Latin America and the Caribbean have attended these workshops. USIA funds trips abroad by U.S. speakers on demand reduction and trips to the U.S. by foreign drug prevention activists for briefings and orientations. It distributes drug prevention pamphlets and videos for use by governments and NGOs, disseminates drug related information from the USIA Wireless File, and renders some limited technical support to drug prevention organizations abroad. The Voice of America prepares a 15-minute weekly program in Spanish against drug abuse and drug trafficking, which is carried on at least 500 radio stations in Latin America. Finally, USIA conducts surveys (over 15 in the past year) of Latin American and

Caribbean opinion on drug use and drug trafficking. Given the variety and decentralized nature of USIA's work, it is difficult to quantify the value of its total contribution to demand reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, USIA estimates that the FY 1992 contribution from its Washington program budget was approximately $7 million. It estimates that, in addition, its posts in the Hemisphere south of the U.S. spent the modest total of about $150,000 from their own program budgets in FY 1992 for efforts directly related to demand reduction.

Although the DEA's principal role is law enforcement, it conducts an innovative demand reduction effort in the United States. DEA has not officially extended this effort abroad. However, the bilingual staff coordinator from DEA's Demand Reduction Section has given presentations on his agency's demand reduction program to audiences in several Latin American countries, largely with USIA funding. Under a Memorandum of Understanding recently signed with INM, he will make additional presentations abroad, including in Latin America. In late 1992, with USIA and INM funding, three DEA demand reduction experts and one consultant addressed a conference of Argentine drug prevention activists in Buenos Aires. The DEA International Training Center at Quantico, VA has inserted a four-hour demand reduction element into its 40-hour training course on enforcement. The course is given both at Quantico and abroad (by traveling teams).

CSAP and NIDA, both elements of HHS, are understandably devoted primarily to demand reduction activities within the United States. CSAP currently has no authorization to conduct international activities, but it is requesting same from senior levels of HHS. In the meantime, CSAP is rendering some support to demand reduction abroad in an indirect manner. It hosts and briefs some 200 foreign visitors each year, the vast majority from Latin America and the Caribbean. CSAP is cooperating with PAHO the State of Texas, and the U.S. Mexican Border Association in a study of drug use on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. CSAP has directly contributed $40,000 to this program. CSAP also works closely with NIDA and USIA is proposing foreign experts for NIDA's Hubert H. Humphrey fellowship program in post-doctoral research in drug related issues. Numerous foreign governments would like CSAP to assist with the training of drug prevention activists in their countries, but CSAP is holding off on any action in this area pending a clear decision on its request for authorization to conduct activities abroad.

NIDA, within an annual budget of $400 million, conducts or funds about 90 percent of the world's research on illegal drugs and their abuse. It works closely with relevant research institutions and individuals worldwide. Its objectives are the promotion of collaborative research and the international sharing of information in the fields of science and technology. NIDA promotes international collaboration through its International Visiting Scientists and Technical Exchange Program (INVEST). Through INVEST, NIDA sponsors the Humphrey fellowships already mentioned, awards INVEST fellowships for post-doctoral drug abuse research, arranges international conferences and symposia, and provides technical advise to foreign experts. INVEST has also developed a network of drug abuse researchers around the world. A major international symposium on research in drug abuse prevention is held about once a year in cooperation with the Department of State. Thirteen countries were represented at the 1991 symposium and 22 at the 1992 meeting.

5. The Demand Reduction Roles of International Organizations

The United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP)

The UNDCP, based in Vienna, carries out a larger number of practical, in country projects in Latin America and the Caribbean than any other international organization. Although most of its some 130 projects in those regions are in alternative development and other areas of economic development, over 40 current projects in the Western Hemisphere south of the United States support demand reduction. Projects in the countries that are the subject of this evaluation are detailed, country by country, later in this inventory.

The Evaluation Team was favorably impressed with the UNDCP's practical and businesslike approach to its tasks. It is the only international organization in the demand reduction area that has a worldwide membership and is therefore able effectively to solicit financial support worldwide. For this reason, and because of the practical nature of the UNDCP's work, it is perhaps the most logical primary forum for U.S. action should the U.S. Government decide on a more multilateral approach to its own demand reduction efforts.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

In some countries (e.g., Guatemala and Mexico) where no UNDCP official is assigned, the UNDP represents UNDCP interests and handles its affairs. However, the UNDP as such does not conduct demand reduction programs, to the best of the Evaluation Team's knowledge. It does occasionally finance an alternative development project, e.g. in Mexico from 1989 to 1992 (see Mexico Case Study).

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Although UNICEF does not fund any projects that are exclusively of a demand reduction nature, it operates street children programs that have a significant anti-drug element. One of these programs is described in the Mexico Case Study.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Although UNESCO is not normally a player in the demand reduction area, it recently signed an agreement with the Brazilian Ministry of Education providing for UNESCO assistance with a drug abuse prevention program in Brazil (see Brazil Case Study). This was the only UNESCO demand reduction effort identified by the Evaluation Team.

The European Community (EC)

The European Community carries out a surprisingly large number of specific demand reduction activities in Latin America. The EC's work is particularly significant in Brazil and Peru, as

indicated in the case studies for those two countries and as can be seen from the detailed listings later in this inventory.

The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)

In most cases, PAHO does not carry out demand reduction efforts in isolation from other health related tasks. Typically, it conducts a general health improvement program, with at least some drug prevention elements. See the Peru Case Study for a description of one of these programs. In Bolivia, PAHO is becoming the executing agency for the UNDCP's demand reduction projects, and has already taken over the management of one of them (see Bolivia Case Study).

The Organization of American States - Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD)

CICAD has a formal Demand Reduction Program, which has two priority elements: education in drug abuse prevention and community mobilization. CICAD does not fund specific, national efforts in demand reduction. Rather, it serves as a facilitator and coordinator, promoting regional and inter-country cooperation and arranging for the exchange of information on drug abuse issues. CICAD's outputs include international training courses for prevention activists, workshops and seminars on various aspects of demand reduction, and the development of curriculum and teaching materials for prevention activities. In addition, CICAD has established the Inter-American Data Bank on drug issues, created the Inter-American Uniform Statistical System to harmonize criteria, definitions, and procedures in prevalence research and related matters, and established the Inter-American Drug Documentation Center. This Center can be accessed electronically by 18 regional, subregional, and national institutions via CICAD's Inter-American Drug Information System (IADIS).

In addition to contributions from its members, CICAD has managed to attract funding for demand reduction from outside the hemisphere, as follows: (a) $241,524 from the European Community for the Inter-American Drug Information System (additional EC funding up to a ceiling of $710,000 has been pledged); and (b) $200,000 from the Government of Japan for implementation of the Inter-American Uniform Statistical System.

6. The Roles of Host Governments in Countries with A.I.D. Demand Reduction Projects

With the exception of Mexico, which conducts a sophisticated, nationwide prevention effort, the federal governments of the countries visited by the Evaluation Team make only limited contributions to the demand reduction effort. Brazil does well at the state level in Sao Paulo and Ceara, but Brazil's national drug commission is not active in any operational areas and lacks much needed technical support. In Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala, the governments make virtually no cash contributions to the demand reduction effort, but do provide support in kind -- payment of some salaries, provision of office space, etc. In Peru, jealousies and bureaucratic disorganization impede useful work. Only in Bolivia (of the countries visited) does work on the national Master Plan for anti-drug activities appear to have proceeded well. Absence of Master

Plans in Peru and Brazil are holding up large potential contributions from the UNDCP. These problems are addressed in some detail in the relevant case studies.

7. Roles of Private Sectors (Others than NGOs) in Countries with A.I.D. Demand Reduction Projects

With the exception of Mexico and Brazil, the private sector has not made significant cash contributions to demand reduction efforts in the countries visited by the team. In Peru, the media have given CEDRO some $3 million worth of free radio and television air time and free space in newspapers and periodicals. SEAMOS in Bolivia pays only 10 percent of the value of such air time and print space. In the countries visited, the team stressed the desirability of cash contributions of purely national origin.

8. Roles of Foreign Donors Other than the United States

Most foreign donors (e.g., European countries and Japan) prefer to make donations on drug issues through international organizations for two reasons: (a) most do not have sufficient personnel in country to administer purely national projects; and (b) giving through international entities allows the donors to keep a low profile, desirable for reasons of sensitivity and security. The Evaluation Team identified very few purely bilateral donations, and most of them were modest. They are detailed in the country by country sections of this inventory. (However, national contributions via the UNDCP are sometimes very large, as can be seen from the list of UNDCP projects later in this inventory.)

9. Roles of Non-government Organizations (NGOs)

As indicated earlier, an enormous number of NGOs are somehow involved in demand reduction in the 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries that are covered in this inventory. Most, however, exist for reasons unrelated to the drug problem and devote only a small portion of their time and effort to demand reduction. Examples are the Lions, Rotary, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, etc. Others have a broad humanitarian/anti-poverty purpose, with drug prevention being only a small part of their efforts. Few of the purely local NGOs make major cash contributions to demand reduction, limiting their efforts to volunteer time and in kind support. According to the PAHO Representative in La Paz, a few NGOs, at least in Bolivia, are incompetent money seekers and pursue essentially a self interest. By and large, the purely local NGOs play useful roles in drug prevention, providing fora for discussions on prevention, volunteers for prevention work, and publicity for the anti-drug effort.

European and American NGOs are in a position to provide not only time and effort but also cash funding. Although the team had no opportunity to inventory these numerous NGOs, it is clear that many provide useful contributions. Partners of the Americas is one of the more prominent of the U.S. NGOs. Numerous charity organizations make at least indirect contributions to the anti-drug effort. The section of this inventory dealing with Peru gives an example of cash contributions to demand reduction by various European NGOs.

10. Activities by Entities Other than A.I.D. in Countries Visited by the Evaluation Team

BOLIVIA

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

NAS has no budget for demand reduction, but it periodically uses funds from other programs to support limited demand reduction efforts. For example, in March 1993, NAS provided $5,000 for a seminar for Bolivian journalists conducted by CESE.

USIS carries out a range of routine public affairs activities in the anti-drug area, as described in the Bolivia Case Study. In November 1991, USIA sponsored a regional demand reduction conference in La Paz and provided $40,000 in funding for it. To assist USIS/La Paz in its work on the drug theme in FY 1993, USIA has authorized one international visitor, one U.S. speaker, one teleconference, and two Worldnet presentations.

International Organizations

UNDCP

The UNDCP makes substantial contributions to demand reduction in Bolivia, as follows:

Project AD/BOL/90/417 - Prevention of drug abuse among young people at risk (mainly street children, working children, and institutionalized children). Executing agency: Junta Nacional de Solidaridad y Desarrollo Social. Dates: October 1990 - October 1993. Donor: Italy. Budget: $461,748.

AD/BOL/92/658 and AD/BOL/92/659 - Assistance to the Government of Bolivia in the revision of Bolivia's National Drug Abuse Master Plan; collection and analysis of data related to drug abuse; analysis of programs, services, and organizations active in the prevention field; identification of priorities and areas for action; organization of a conference to consider the Master Plan. Executing agency: DINAPRE. 1992. Donor: United Kingdom. Budget: $89,270.

AD/BOL/92/663 - Survey of the problems of vulnerable children; assistance to street children through provision of services to cover their needs (dining rooms, showers, health care, etc.); activities to encourage personal development of street children. Executing agency: ENDA-Bolivia. Donor: Netherlands. Budget: $2,312,522.

AD/BOL/92/664 - For design of a program of prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation in Cochabamba (training of project personnel, establishment of treatment and consultation centers, organization of an education and awareness campaign). Executing Agency: PAHO. Dates: 1993 - 1994. Donor: Spain. Budget: $400,000.

The following UNDCP projects are in the pipeline (a pipeline project is one that is being seriously planned but whose ultimate realization is not necessarily guaranteed; no project numbers have yet been assigned to the following pipeline projects):

-- Training in drug abuse prevention. Dates: 1993-1995. Budget: $1,819,000.

-- Drug Abuse Prevention, Santa Cruz. Dates: 1993-1995. Budget: $2,000,000.

-- Program to prevent use of illicit drugs. Dates: 1993. Budget: $192,012.

-- Improvement of education and public awareness to prevent drug abuse. Dates: 1993-1996. Executing agency: not yet decided; CESE and/or a government agency are being considered. Budget: $3,756,767.

The European Community

The only project identified was a recent $90,000 grant to DINAPRE for construction of a section of one of DINAPRE's drug treatment centers.

PAHO

PAHO funds no demand reduction projects, but serves as executing agency for the UNDCP's project in Cochabamba (AD/BOL/92/664), described above.

BRAZIL

U.S. Government Agencies

NAS

In 1991, NAS allocated $330,000 for prevention activities in Brazil. In accordance with a decision by the new NAS Chief, the funds are being spent on carefully chosen small projects, each with an expenditure ceiling of about $5,000. The following eleven projects were funded in 1992:

1. Training of teachers and health professionals for a program of prevention in the schools of Natal, Rio Grande do Norte. Funds allocated: $2,795.

2. Training of 29 Brazilian military police officers in prevention by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department. Brazilian officers then trained students in schools in the Rio de Janeiro area. Funds allocated: $4,422.

3. Publication of the minutes of a symposium related to drug use conducted by the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Funds allocated: $3,604.

4. Support for distribution of CEBRID's scientific bulletin. Funds allocated: $3,799.

5. Seminar and training courses in drug prevention for educators, parents, and young people in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul. Funds allocated: $3,356.

6. Training of directors of kindergarten and first grade schools in Florianopolis in a systematic program of drug prevention. Funds allocated: $2,775.

7. Seminar in Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul on drug prevention in the family, school, and work place for professionals in education, health, and related areas. Funds allocated: $3,131.

8. Seminar in drug prevention in Sao Paulo; support for acquisition and distribution of didactic material. Funds allocated: $3,013.

9. Training course in demand reduction in Florianopolis for Municipal Council members and other area leaders. Funds allocated: $3,647.

10. Anti-drug posters and brochures for use by teachers and students who serve as volunteers in the drug prevention effort in Porto Velho, Rondonia. Funds allocated: $4,362.

11. Administrative support for CONFEN. Funds allocated: $5,538.

USIS

USIS brings about four U.S. experts a year to Brazil to make presentations on drug prevention at a total cost of approximately $20,000. USIS also sends an occasional Brazilian drug prevention activist to the United States for training and orientation under the International Visitor Program. USIS has 12 videos on drug prevention that it loans out to schools, clubs, and other interested institutions. In addition, it funds the publication of anti-drug pamphlets for use by drug prevention activists, and it pays for the translation into Portuguese of about one U.S. book a year on the drug problem.

International Organizations

UNDCP

In 1987, the UNFDAC (now the UNDCP) signed an agreement with Brazil providing for $12 million in anti-drug assistance, of which half was to be spent for enforcement and half for prevention and rehabilitation. The following four projects in the demand reduction area have been carried out:

-- Support for research carried out by CEBRID in Sao Paulo. Dates: 1988-91.

-- A drug treatment project based on the Canadian "Brief Intervention Method." The project included treatment of drug addicts using this method, monitoring of ex-patients, training of therapists, and publication of a book on the Brazilian experience with the "Brief Intervention Method." Dates: 1988-91.

-- "Project Hope," a drug prevention project for Brazilian Army recruits. Dates: 1988-91.

-- A telephone hot line, providing information on licit and illicit psychoactive substances. The project supported operation of the telephone service, training of the hot line's technical team, preparation of information material, and project evaluation. Dates: 1989-92.

The following UNDCP demand reduction project is currently underway:

AD/BRA/91/557 - Support for establishment of a data base at the Department of Psychobiology of the Sao Paulo Medical School; establishment of five regional information centers; collection of data; training of health and education professionals. Dates: 1992 to present (likely to be continued at least through 1993). Budget: $571,780.

The following UNDCP projects are in the pipeline:

-- Support for a permanent national program on information, research, and evaluation in the area of demand reduction. Dates: 1994-1998. Budget: $500.000.

-- Support for an effort to increase awareness of the need for drug prevention in Brazilian society. Dates: 1994-1998. Budget: $1,000,000.

-- Drug abuse prevention in rural and urban communities. Dates: 1994-1998. Budget: $5,000,000.

-- National primary prevention program for the formal education system. Dates: 1994-1998. Budget: $2,500,000.

-- National primary prevention program for the basic health system. Dates: 1994-1998. Budget: $4,000,000.

-- Integrated program for street children. Dates: 1994-1998. Budget: $5,000,000.

-- National program against AIDS and for the prevention of drug abuse. Dates: 1994-1996. Budget: $2,500,000.

(Note: See Brazil Case Study for a discussion of the UNDCP's funding philosophy and of the UNDCP's support for completion of Brazil's Master Plan.)

UNESCO

UNESCO recently signed an agreement with the Ministry of Education providing for UNESCO assistance with a national program of drug abuse prevention. The agreement foresees UNESCO contributions in four areas: technical assistance, training of teachers, research, and provision of didactic material. Details, including funding amounts, have not yet been determined.

The European Community

BZ-89-03 - Prevention program for homeless children and young people in the poor areas of Salvador (Bahia). Project includes construction of homeless shelters and education in drug prevention. Dates: 1989-91. Funds spent: 470,000 ECU.

BZ-91-12 - Rehabilitation of young drug addicts in Campinas. Project includes construction of facilities. Dates: 1991 to present. Funds spent: 100,000 ECU.

BZ-91-27 - Project to double the capacity of a drug treatment center in Campo Grande. Project includes funds for construction of additional facilities and for the training of personnel. Dates: August 1992 to at least August 1993. Funds authorized: 100,000 ECU.

BZ-91-26 - Training of trainers in drug prevention. Dates: late 1992 to late 1993. Funds authorized: 130,000 ECU.

BZ-91-28 - Project to conduct national survey on psychotropic drug consumption by students and street children in Brazil. Dates: late 1992 to late 1995. Funds authorized: 70,000 ECU.

BZ-91-38 - Prevention of drug abuse among children and teenage girls in outlying communities of the city of Recife. Dates: late 1992 to late 1994. Funds authorized: 70,000 ECU.

French Government

The French Government is funding the following four small projects that are related, at least indirectly, to drug prevention (total value: circa $100,000):

-- AIDS assistance to PROAD, Sao Paulo, for a treatment center at the Paulista School of Medicine.

-- Support for a Sao Paulo documentation center on drug abuse prevention.

-- Assistance to the Center for Research and Therapy in Drug Abuse, Salvador (Bahia). Funds support research on AIDS and drug abuse among street children and prostitutes.

-- Assistance to the University of Brasilia for a family drug consultation center.

In addition, the French Government provides about $200,000 a year for an anti-AIDS project in Salvador (Bahia). The funds support seminars in Brazil and the training of Brazilian doctors in France. Some 209 doctors have been trained thus far.

GUATEMALA

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

NAS provides funding for the Office of Public Information, a small organization of concerned citizens in Huehuetenango Department, an opium growing region. NAS financing helps support anti-drug programs in every school in Huehuetenango Department, family counseling, the provision of anti-drug printed material, and the broadcast of local radio spots against drugs. The radio spots denounce illegal drug production and urge listeners to report drug producers and traffickers to the authorities. The NAS budget for the entire effort in Huehuetenango Department in 1992 was $15,000. NAS is asking for $40,000 for the effort in 1993. It is also requesting $55,000 for support of the new narcotics law and new specialized narcotics courts. Part of this money would be used to fund a USIS campaign to make the public aware of the new narcotics law and to warn potential drug producers about the risk of imprisonment and the loss of their lands. Finally, NAS is requesting $25,000 to support an effort to generate a regional pro bono media campaign, based in Guatemala, against drugs and drug trafficking. NAS provides no funding for CONAPAD.

USIS cooperates with CONAPAD in arranging anti-drug conferences and seminars, and once gave CONAPAD $1,000 for administrative expenses for a such a conference. Aside from this one effort, USIS has provided no funding to CONAPAD. USIS recently worked with CONAPAD on a project in which CONAPAD designed anti-drug billboards using NAS funds.

International Organizations

Neither the UNDCP, PAHO, nor the EC makes any direct contributions to the demand reduction effort at this time. However, the EC provided 400,000 ECU for a three year street children project that just ended and that addressed indirectly the problem of substance abuse by some of the children. The EC is now considering whether to grant funds for a continuation of the project. The UNDCP is considering granting some assistance to CONAPAD, but wishes to see a clear and compelling request for a grant and completion of Guatemala's Master Plan before reaching any decisions. (See Guatemala Case Study.) OAS support is limited to funding international meetings in which CONAPAD participates.

MEXICO

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

NAS efforts are currently limited to providing $250,000 for the next prevalence study in Mexico (now being conducted). USIS plans to bring three U.S. speakers to Mexico in FY 1992 to make presentations on U.S. drug prevention activities. In addition, it expects to send as many as five Mexicans to the U.S. for discussions on demand reduction in the same period.

International Organizations

UNDCP

The UNDCP has no demand reduction projects in Mexico. See Mexico Case Study for a discussion of the potential for such projects.

UNICEF

UNICEF has no projects exclusively in demand reduction, but its long term program of assistance to street children contains a substance abuse element. See Mexico Case Study.

The European Community

The EC is funding construction of facilities for drug dependent children at the Children's Psychiatric Hospital in Mexico City. The project supports demand reduction indirectly. Dates: 1991-94. EC contribution: 360,000 ECU.

PAHO

PAHO funds no demand reduction projects. However, PAHO provides information related to drug prevention to CONADIC and OAS/CICAD and occasionally funds trips to Mexico by foreign consultants on the drug prevention issue.

Ford Motor Company

Ford has supported a drug prevention program in Ford Motor Company branches throughout Mexico. Contribution: $1 million. Year: 1991.

Jarero Internacional

This NGO carries out drug treatment and rehabilitation. It is funded privately by the Jarero family, with limited outside contributions.

PERU

U.S. Government Agencies Other than A.I.D.

NAS has its own drug awareness/demand reduction project in Peru, devoted mainly to support for the Ministry of Education's Commission for the Prevention of Drug Abuse (Comision de Prevencion del Uso Indebido de Drogas -- COPUID). NAS funds support the training of teachers in the use of new anti-drug curricula, programs of alternative use of free time by young people, production of anti-drug pamphlets and other printed items, and production of anti-drug television spots. A secondary objective of the project is to support international drug awareness conferences and meetings, complementing the work of USAID, USIS, and others.

Funding allocations for the entire project in the recent past were as follows:

FY 90 - $125,000 (of which all but $105 has been used)

FY 91 - $170,000 (of which only 1,713 has been used)

FY 92 - $85,000 (of which none has been used)

FY 93 - (no allocation; pipeline funds -- which total $253,392 -- will be used.)

USIS spends about $20,000 per year funding U.S. speakers and international visitors who deal with the prevention issue. USIS has provided CEDRO with a CD ROM Reader for use in its documentation center.

International Organizations

UNDCP

Currently, the UNDCP has only one project in Peru, as follows:

AD/PER/87/457 - to reduce drug addiction in Peru. In the first phase of the project, Peruvian personnel were trained in drug prevention and social reintegration at the Centro Italiano di Solidarieta (CEIS) in Rome. In the second phase, now underway, financial support is being provided to two drug treatment NGOs in Peru, the "Escuela de Vida" and "Los Entusiastas." Executing agency: CEIS. Dates: 1987-93. Donor: Italy. Budget: $315,500.

(Note: The UNDCP would like to launch additional projects in Peru, but it is experiencing serious difficulties with the Peruvian Government bureaucracy; see Peru Case Study for details.)

The following additional UNDCP projects are in the pipeline (i.e., being considered):

- Support for an integral program of education against drug abuse. Dates: 1993-1995. Budget: $2,655,600.

- Community prevention, ecological defense, and youth employment. Dates: 1993-1994. Budget: $365,000.

- Pilot project for the social reintegration of former drug addicts. Dates: 1993. Budget: $398,400.

- Pilot project for prevention of substance abuse among youth in Lima. Dates: 1993. Budget: $45,000.

The European Community

The EC has funded three demand reduction projects in Peru thus far, as follows:

- Drug prevention effort in the streets of Lima. 1987. Local partner: OFECOD. EC contribution: 115,000 ECU.

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-- Drug prevention effort in the streets of Lima. 1988. Local partner: OFECOD. EC contribution: 46,892 ECU.

-- Program of prevention, rehabilitation, and social reintegration for street children, Plaza San Martin area of Lima. Local partner: CEDRO. EC contribution: 113,112 ECU.

The following project is under consideration:

Pilot center for the rehabilitation of drug addicts. Local partner: TAKIWASI Center. EC contribution: 301,330 ECU.

PAHO

PAHO has contributed $12,000 to CEDRO for consultation centers for use by drug addicts and/or their families.

See Peru Case Study for discussion of PAHO's general health efforts, which contain an anti-drug element.

Contributions Received by CEDRO

CEDRO has engaged in a massive and very successful fund raising campaign. It has received, or is receiving, contributions from 25 different sources, as follows:

1. International Development Research Center (IDRC), a Canadian NGO:

$14,000 (1990) - to pay for an inventory of NGOs in Peru involved in prevention and demand reduction.

$22,000 (1991) - to pay for a study on how to establish a "school for parents," where fathers and mothers can learn how to teach their children to avoid drugs (the school was later established, based on the methodology set forth in the report).

2. German Government through the Agency for Technical Cooperation (Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit -- GTZ):

$70,000 (1993) - for anti-drug messages on radio and television.

3. The European Community:

130,000 ECU (1990-92) - for support of CEDRO's street children program.

4. The International Committee for Andean Aid (INCA), a British NGO:

$24,046 (1993) - to train disadvantaged youth to be plumbers and electricians.

5. Canadian Government through the Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives:

$7,000 (1990) - to help build a house for street children in Miraflores.

$22,000 (1992) - to equip houses for street children.

6. The Oxford Famine Agency (OXFAM), an NGO, Belgian branch:

$4,000 (1991) - to help build a house for street children (in Miraflores).

7. The Dutch Children's Postage Stamp Foundation (Stichting Kinderpostzegels Nederland -- SKN), a Dutch NGO:

$73,000 (1993-94) - for use in efforts against child abuse.

8. Joint Contribution by the U.K. Government (through the Overseas Development Agency -- ODA) and World Vision (each contributed 50 percent):

$330,000 (1992-94) - operating costs for CEDRO's street children program.

9. Kellogg Foundation (a U.S. NGO):

$320,000 (1993-95) - for drug prevention and community development in six marginal communities, three in Lima and three in the provinces.

10. PAHO:

$12,000 ($3,000 every three months -- 1992-93) for counseling centers (lugares de escucha) for use by drug addicts and/or their families.

11. The Europe-Third World Association (Association Europe Tiers Monde -- AETM), an NGO composed of employees of the European Community:

$10,000 (1990) - for machinery and equipment for workshops for street children.

$9,700 (1992) - for machinery and equipment for workshops for street children.

12. MISEREOR, the name for a fund collection effort conducted by the Catholic Central Organization for Development Assistance (Katholiche Zentrale Stelle fuer Entwicklingshilfe), a German NGO:

$11,000 (1992) - for workshops for high risk youth.

13. One Percent for Development (Un Pourcent pour le Developpement), an NGO composed of employees of the International Labor Organization -- ILO:

$6,300 (1992) - for workshops for street children.

14. CARITAS - the Netherlands (a Dutch NGO):

$90,000 (1992) - for operating costs for CEDRO'S street children program.

$46,000 (1993) - for operating costs for CEDRO's street children program.

15. TROCAIRE, an Irish Catholic NGO:

$5,000 (1989) - for community anti-drug efforts.

16. Partnership Action (Aktion Partnerschaft), a German NGO:

$1,200 (1992) - for support of CEDRO's street children program.

17. Rotary International Foundation:

$35,000 (1993) - machinery (in kind) for workshops (including a bakery) for street children.

18. OAS/CICAD:

$5,000 (1992) - for seminars and discussion workshops.

19. Pan American Development Foundation:

$3,000 (1992) office equipment (in kind) for CEDRO's general use.

20. Association of Female Rotarians:

$3,000 (1992) in kind donation for a ceramics workshop for street children.

21. German Embassy, Lima:

$8,000 (1990) - for workshops for high risk youth.

$3,000 (1991-92) - to buy building material for a house for street children (in La Parada, near Lima).

22. Dutch Embassy, Lima:

$4,000 (1990) - for workshops for street children.

$4,000 (1992) - for workshops for high risk youth.

23. U.K. Embassy, Lima:

$5,000 (1992) - to support a workshop for street children in Callao.

24. Contributions in Kind by the Media (free air time on radio and television, free space in newspapers and periodicals):

$3,000,000 (approx.) (1988 through 1992)

25. Individual Contributions:

$10,000 (1993) - cash gift from French industrialist Alain Prost du Clercq - for general support of CEDRO's street children program.

$50,000 (1990-92) - cash gifts to CEDRO's endowment fund -- most came from Peruvians; a small percentage was given by foreigners.

$100,000 (1990-92) - gifts in kind, virtually all from Peruvians.

CEDRO has made the following applications for assistance that are now being considered:

1. To Interamerican Development Bank (IDB):

$500,000 loan - $50,000 would go to CEDRO's endowment fund; the remainder would be used to establish small enterprises in Lima to provide employment for young people.

2. To the UNDCP (submitted directly by CEDRO, although requests to the UNDCP are normally made by government entities):

$300,000 - to establish a pilot project in the Peruvian jungle to provide the local people with education in ecology and drug prevention and to pay for a limited amount of reforestation of land stripped of forest by the activities of narcotraffickers. (Approximately 20 percent of the funds will be spent on prevention.)

3. To the European Community:

536,260 ECU - for CEDRO's use in helping other Peruvian NGOs in the anti-drug effort. A condition of approval is that an NGO provide 15 percent of the above total; the EC would provide the remaining 85 percent. CEDRO is negotiating with the Spanish NGO, EDIX, with a view to obtaining the 15 percent from EDIX.

4. To French Embassy, Lima

$20,000 - for a pilot project to provide assistance to indigenous children of the jungle region whose parents have been killed by drug dealers or terrorists.

$1,300 - for anti-drug street theatre (using puppets, e.g.).

The following possible donation to CEDRO is being discussed informally with the European Community:

The EC has indicated a potential willingness to provide CEDRO with a grant of 200,000 ECU if an NGO can be found that would donate an additional 200,000 ECU. (This 50 percent/50 percent model is being increasing favored by the EC.) The resulting 400,000 ECU would be used for CEDRO's general operating costs. CEDRO will attempt to negotiate a larger percentage contribution by the EC in order to increase the likelihood of finding an NGO willing to make the necessary donation.

(Note: CEDRO states that all donations thus far received from institutions were the result of initial approaches to the donors by CEDRO.)

11. Activities by Entities Other Than A.I.D. in Countries Not Visited by the Team (but where A.I.D. finances or has financed projects specifically directed at demand reduction)

BELIZE

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

There is no NAS in Belize and no INM demand reduction budget specifically for Belize. INM has a regional account that can be drawn on for use in Belize and elsewhere, and INM's centrally funded workshops, training sessions, and visitors program can be used for Belize. There are no USIS personnel in Belize, but USIA carries out certain limited activities through the Political and Economic sections of the Embassy. For example, the USIA Wireless File, including articles on the drug issue, is distributed on a regular basis and is used to a considerable degree by the local media. In FY 1993, USIA arranged for one international visitor from Belize to visit the U.S. for discussions and briefings on drug abuse prevention.

International Organizations

The UNDCP is carrying out the following project:

-- Implementation of a nationwide anti-drug education program. Main activity: revise primary school curriculum to include anti-drug element; train teachers in the skills deemed necessary for the implementation of a drug education curriculum. Dates: July 1991 to July 93. Executing agency: Government of Belize through PRIDE Belize. Budget: $200,525.

The EC is providing 206,813 ECU for a national demand reduction effort with the emphasis on anti-drug education (project no. D-B1/91/24). The Government of Belize, as the EC's partner in the project, is contributing 148,309 ECU.

COLOMBIA

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

NAS has a substantial Public Awareness and Demand Reduction Project in Colombia. The project budget was $200,000 in FY 1992, and an expenditure of about $300,000 is planned for 1993. Project activities include collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data on substance abuse in Colombia, publishing and distributing anti-drug literature, and sponsoring Colombian participants in international conferences on demand reduction. In 1992, INM conducted three demand reduction workshops in Bogota (April, May, and July). USIA has approved the funding of four International Visitors and two U.S. speakers on the drug issue for FY 1993.

UNDCP

The UNDCP carries out an impressive array of demand reduction projects, as follows:

AD/COL/92/569 - to develop additional facilities and alternative methods for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts. Dates: 1992 - 1993. Executing agency: National Drugs Office (DNE). Donor: Italy. Budget: $231,645.

AD/COL/90/620 - to reduce risk factors associated with drug abuse through an educational strategy designed to strengthen the family unit and protect young people. Main activities: workshops and training courses, recreational activities for young people in institutional care. Dates: 1990 - 1993. Executing agencies: DNE, Colombian Institute for Family Welfare. Donors: Italy and Denmark. Budget: $1,298,000.

AD/COL/90/621 - to develop programs and activities in drug abuse prevention for all levels of the educational system, involving members of relevant institutions (e.g., the media, schools, advertising agencies). Dates: 1990 -1993. Executing agency: DNE. Donors: Italy and Denmark. Budget: $2,097,500.

AD/COL/90/622 - to create among the general public a receptive attitude toward positive alternatives to drug production, trafficking, and illicit consumption; to persuade leaders of mass media of their responsibility to transmit positive attitudes. Main activities: devise and disseminate messages (television, cinema commercials, newspaper articles) on the theme of drug abuse prevention. Dates: 1990 - 1993. Executing agency: DNE. Donors: Italy and Denmark. Budget: $1,052,761.

AD/COL/92/623 - anti-drug dependency program. Dates: 1992-1995. Donor: Italy. Budget: $1,205,200.

AD/COL/89/624 - to investigate the connection between AIDS and drug abuse and develop a program of AIDS prevention. Dates: November 1990 to November 1991. Executing agency: DNE. Donor: Sweden. Budget: $42,525.

AD/COL/89/631 - to reduce drug abuse in Bogota. Main activities: establish drug abuse information centers, create some 20 youth clubs or centers for alternative free time activities, provide facilities for treatment, train health care professionals in treatment. Dates: July 1990 to July 1993. Executing agencies: Office of the Mayor of Bogota, DNE. Donor: Netherlands. Budget: $850,000.

AD/COL/89/632 - to reduce the incidence of drug dependency in the Atlantico Department through a program of information, education, recreational opportunities, and treatment. Dates: February 1991 to February 1994. Executing agencies: DNE, Council of the Atlantico Department. Donors: Italy and Denmark. Budget: $292,500.

AD/COL/90/633 - to reduce the incidence of drug dependency in Bucaramanga through a program of information, education, recreational opportunities, and treatment. Dates: February 1991 to February 1994. Executing agencies: DNE, Town Hall of Bucaramanga, Regional Drugs Office. Donor: Netherlands. Budget: $445,640.

AD/COL/90/635 - to develop permanent, structured programs in drug abuse prevention in the Department of Caldas. Main activities: design and develop prevention programs for inmates of penal institutions and for workers in the coffee industry. Conduct a mass media campaign against drug abuse and alcohol and tobacco consumption. Dates: February 1991 to February 1994. Executing agencies: DNE, Regional Drugs Office, Caldas. Donors: Italy and Denmark. Budget: $378,000.

AD/COL/89/636 - to reduce demand for illicit drugs in Medellin. Main activities: establish data bank on prevention, treatment and rehabilitation; train health care workers and teachers; produce and distribute anti-drug printed material; improve services (e.g., in clinics and hospitals) for drug abusers and their families. Dates: February 1991 to February 1994. Executing agencies: DNE, Medellin Town Hall. Donor: Netherlands. Budget: $500,000.

AD/COL/91/665 - to assess the social situation of young people at risk in Colombia, develop a strategy for their protection, and set up an integrated program of drug abuse prevention. Main activities: establish youth centers, improve work opportunities for young people, establish municipal recreational programs, and conduct a media campaign against drug abuse. Dates: 1990 - 1993. Executing agency: DNE. Donor: Italy. Budget: $4,000,000.

AD/COL/92/709 - to strengthen NGO participation in activities to reduce drug abuse in Colombia. Main activities: identification of NGOs with potential for working in the demand reduction field. Identification of areas for joint action between NGOs, on the one hand, and the UNDCP and Colombian government agencies, on the other. Establishment of criteria for the selection of NGOs. Dates: February 1992 to February 1993. Executing agencies: UNDCP and PAHO. Donor: Sweden. Budget: $227,694.

The following UNDCP projects are in the pipeline:

-- AD/COL/93/625 - drug abuse prevention in institutions for juvenile offenders. Dates: 1993-1996. Donor: Italy. Budget: $247,000.

-- Drug Abuse Prevention Plan for the Department of Huila. Dates: 1993-1995. Budget: $280,000.

-- Drug Abuse Prevention Plan, Santiago de Cali. Dates: 1993-1995. Budget: $478,481.

European Community

D-CL/89/27 - program of drug prevention and treatment for high risk children and young people. EC contribution: 246,100 ECU. Contribution of EC's partner, NOVIB (an NGO): 206,100 ECU.

D-CL/90/17 - follow up and evaluation of treatment of drug addicts. EC contribution: 52,000 ECU. Contribution of EC's partner, SURGIR (an NGO): 52,000 ECU.

D-CL/90/21 - program for the prevention of drug addiction in the Department of Valle de Cauca. EC contribution: 142,300 ECU. Contribution of EC's partner, the Zentrale Stelle fuer Entwicklungshilfe (a German NGO): 190,000 ECU.

D-CL/91/13 - support for the Action Center Against Drug Abuse, Barranquilla. EC contribution: 337,965 ECU. Contribution of EC's partner, COMIDE (an NGO): 405,558 ECU.

Canadian Government

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) recently provided 19,590 Canadian dollars to the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) of Medellin for education in the dangers of substance abuse.

COSTA RICA

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

There is no NAS in the U.S. Embassy in San Jose and no INM demand reduction program budget specifically for Costa Rica. INM conducted a demand reduction workshop in San Jose in June, 1992. INM is considering funding a conference in Costa Rica in 1993 on the dangers of crack cocaine at a projected cost of $25,000. USIA authorized one international visitor and one Worldnet presentation in FY 1992.

International Organizations

The UNDCP conducts the following project, its only effort in Costa Rica:

AD/COS/89/595 - prevention of drug abuse among young people. Main activities: preventive education campaign via the mass media, research into conditions that predispose young people toward or away from drug use, training seminars, drug hot line, program to encourage the business community to support the project. Dates: 1989 - 1993. Executing agency: Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of the Offender (ILANUD). Budget: $410,000.

There appear to be no EC projects in Costa Rica.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

There is a NAS in Santo Domingo, and INM funds a limited number of selected demand reduction activities from its central budget for Latin America. INM conducted a demand reduction workshop in Santo Domingo in March, 1992. USIA authorized one international visitor and two Worldnet presentations for FY 1993.

International Organizations

The UNDCP has no projects in the Dominican Republic.

The EC is carrying out the following project:

D-RD/88/18 - to support prevention education in the family. EC contribution: 180,000 ECU. Contribution by the EC's partner, Casa Abierta, an NGO: 220,000 ECU.

ECUADOR

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

NAS has no demand reduction program budget for Ecuador. However, INM conducted demand reduction workshops in Quito and Guayaquil in October, 1991. USIA arranged for two Wordnet presentations and one teleconference on drug enforcement/demand reduction in FY 1992.

International Organizations

The UNDCP recently carried out the following project:

AD/ECU/87/514 - to reduce drug dependency by providing means for drug dependent persons to become productive members of the community. Main activities: training courses, workshops, production of educational material and training aids. Dates: 1988 to 1992. Executing Agency: Centro Italiano di Solidarieta (CEIS). Donor: Italy. Budget: $305,127.

The following UNDCP projects are in the pipeline:

-- To assess drug use in Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca, and Loja. Dates: 1993. Budget: $40,000.

-- Drug prevention in marginal urban areas. Dates: 1993-1994. Budget: $397,162.

-- Support for a center for the training of street educators. Dates: 1993-1996. Budget: $340,000.

-- Support for national program of treatment and rehabilitation. Dates: 1993-1996. Budget: $806,963.

-- Drug prevention in the City of Quito. Dates: 1994-1995. Budget: not stated.

The EC is carrying out the following project:

D--EC/89/24 - support for drug treatment at the "Centro Nuestros Jovenes." EC contribution: 200,000 ECU. Contribution by the EC's partner, Centre la Chapelle aux Champs (an NGO): 338,000 ECU.

EL SALVADOR

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

There is no NAS in San Salvador and no INM program budget specifically for El Salvador. INM conducted a demand reduction workshop in San Salvador in June, 1992. USIA authorized two international visitors, three U.S. visitors, and four Worldnet presentations in FY 1992.

International Organizations

No UNDCP or EC projects were identified.

HAITI

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

There is no NAS in the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince and INM has no demand reduction program budget specifically for Haiti. USIA authorized three international visitors, one U.S. visitor, one teleconference, and one Worldnet presentation in FY 1992.

UNDCP

Pipeline project - support for a permanent system of anti-drug education. Executing agency: PAHO. Donor: Sweden. Budget: $285,500.

JAMAICA

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

In FY 1992, INM funded two demand reduction workshops, a seminar on drugs in the workplace, and a treatment and rehabilitation workshop. INM sponsored two Jamaicans on International Visitor grants. INM and USAID jointly funded a drug free teen center in Kingston's inner city. INM sponsored a survey entitled "Crack Use and Women in Jamaica," which was completed in January 1992. In FY 1992, USIS sent two Jamaican journalists to VOA drug abuse workshops and sponsored one additional Jamaican on an International Visitor grant. For FY 1993, USIA has authorized two international visitors, two U.S. speakers, and two Worldnet presentations.

International Organizations

UNDCP

AD/JAM/91/695 - to strengthen existing community based organizations that deal with prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. Dates: 1991 to 1994. Executing agency: National Council on Drug Abuse, Office of the Prime Minister. Budget: $1,000,000.

AD/JAM/92/735 - to establish a comprehensive training program for communities in all areas of drug abuse control. Main activities: assist Community Development Action Committees (CODACS) to legally register as NGOs, train 690 persons in developing and implementing community based programs, implement a program of public information/education and of sports and cultural activities, strengthen five existing treatment and rehabilitation facilities. Executing agency: Jamaican Government. Budget: $1,500,000.

AD/JAM/92/765 - to support 15 community drug awareness committees. Main activities: establish microenterprises, establish 15 community employment agencies in the 15 communities, create 1,000 new jobs, sponsor youth programs in the 15 communities, rehabilitate unemployable youth through skills training. Executing agency: National Council on Drug Abuse. Budget: $250,000.

European Community

D-JA/87/16 - support for a detoxification and rehabilitation center. EC contribution: 554,527 ECU. Contribution by the EC's partner, Richmond Fellowship: 1,366,650 ECU.

D-JA/88/05 - for drug prevention education in the schools. EC contribution: 285,000 ECU. Contribution by the EC's partner, the Jamaican Government: 285,000.

PANAMA

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

NAS has an active project entitled "Public Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Promotion of International Cooperation." NAS support is channeled primarily to the National Drug Prevention and Awareness Committee. In FY 1992, NAS provided funds for a narcotics public awareness campaign, a national anti-drug poster contest, visits of Panamanians to the U.S., regional meetings of workers from the National Drug Prevention Awareness Committee, and community level drug prevention workshops. In addition, INM conducted demand reduction workshops in Panama in late 1991 and in June 1992. USIA has authorized two international visitors, two U.S. visitors, and one Worldnet presentation for FY 1993.

International Organizations

The UNDCP is helping Panama to develop a Master Plan. No EC projects were identified.

PARAGUAY

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D

INM provides funding to private organizations in Paraguay engaged in drug prevention and public awareness activities. In FY 1992, approximately $30,000 were made available to four key NGOs. In addition, INM conducted a demand reduction workshop in Paraguay in April 1992. USIA authorized one international visitor, one U.S. visitor, two teleconferences, and one Worldnet presentation in FY 1992.

International Organizations

No UNDCP or EC projects were identified.

EASTERN CARIBBEAN (REGIONAL)

The UNDCP is carrying out the following regional project:

AD/CAR/92/668 - preparation of a cadre of education personnel from 10 Eastern Caribbean countries for the development of a preventive drug education curriculum. Main activities: train teachers, parents, and students in drug prevention; develop teaching material for use as part of school curricula. Executing agencies: UNESCO and the Caribbean Network of Educational Innovation for Development (CARNEID). Dates: 1992-1993. Budget: $123,170.

GRENADA

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

Limited non-A.I.D activity is sponsored in Grenada and elsewhere in the Eastern Caribbean by Amembassy Bridgetown. Embassy Bridgetown officers have met with demand reduction officials in Grenada (as well as Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) with a view to promoting closer coordination among the various agencies of the local governments. With INM assistance, Embassy Bridgetown sponsored a demand reduction media seminar in Barbados in 1992 for journalists from the entire Eastern Caribbean.

International Organizations

UNDCP

AD/GRN/89/607 - to increase public awareness of the danger of drug abuse through a mass media campaign. Dates: 1990-1992. Budget: $115,895.

European Community

D-GR/89/30 - rehabilitation center for drug addicts. EC contribution: 256,417 ECU. Contribution by the EC's partner, an NGO: 572,055 ECU.

ST. LUCIA

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

Please see comments under Grenada, above.

UNDCP

AD/STL/90/687 - to reduce the high level of drug abuse and drug related problems island-wide. Main activities: train key personnel in drug prevention; establish a drug abuse prevention center for the distribution of anti-drug information; design and implement prevention training programs island-wide. Executing agencies: UNDCP and PAHO. Dates: 1991-1993. Budget: $51,600.

ST. VINCENT

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

Please see comments under Grenada, above. USIA funded a trip to St. Vincent by a U.S. speaker on effective drug treatment strategies in October 1991.

UNDCP

AD/STV/92/673 - to reduce domestic demand for illicit drugs and provide a national program of treatment and rehabilitation. Main activities: train teachers in drug prevention education; establish a treatment and rehabilitation system. Dates: 1992-1994. Budget: $114,000.

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, DOMINICA, MONTSERRAT, ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

U.S. Government Agencies Other Than A.I.D.

These countries are handled on a regional basis. Please see comments under Grenada, above.

International Organizations

The UNDCP's Eastern Caribbean project, described earlier, benefits these countries.

Note: All currency amounts in this inventory are listed in U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. Some are given in ECU, and in one case an amount is listed in Canadian dollars. Exchange rates as of May 5, 1993 were: one ECU equals 1.24 U.S. dollars; one Canadian dollar equals 78 U.S. cents).

Annex 2

EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

BACKGROUND

A. An important component of A.I.D.'s Counter-Narcotics Program has been its investment in narcotic demand reduction -- awareness, prevention, and drug use reduction -- projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. Awareness projects are concerned with creating public support for counter-narcotics programs and strengthening political will to carry out counter-narcotics measures. Prevention projects reflect efforts to stop the potential use of narcotics. Treatment and rehabilitation projects have the objective of reducing and/or eliminating actual drug use.

B. Initially the focus in projects funded by the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was to increase awareness of opinion leaders in those countries where an illicit narcotics threat existed. It was recognized that successful counter-narcotics programs must build on a broad constituency that recognizes the consequences of illicit narcotics and is motivated to stop its production, processing, trafficking and consumption. Targeting groups at risk of consuming or who are actually consuming illicit narcotics eventually emerged as a key activity.

C. The over-arching goal of these projects is to support the United States Government's (USG) policy of reducing illicit narcotics production, trafficking, and use. Critical dimensions of this policy are project purposes concerned with (1) developing in host countries an understanding of the nature and extent of the drug use and trafficking problem and its relationship to the country's development concerns; (2) persuading governments, opinion leaders and the general public of the negative consequences and importance of eliminating drug use, production and trafficking; and (3) reducing the use of drugs in foreign countries. Activities funded in pursuit of these objectives include:

-- Building host country institutions which provide training, technical assistance, and/or financial support for public awareness, education and prevention activities;

-- Supporting research including prevalence surveys to assess the extent and nature of drug use;

-- Performing periodic epidemiological, attitudinal, and related studies which assess the effectiveness and impact efforts to shape public opinion regarding counter-narcotics activities, and which identify and target groups at-risk of using or that are using illicit narcotics;

-- Sharing information about the trends and magnitude of the drug demand in the U.S. as well as information about successful prevention and treatment interventions.

-- Initiating drug use education and prevention programs;

-- Enlisting support of the media in alerting the general public to the negative consequences of illicit narcotic production, trafficking and use;

-- Providing technical assistance to countries interested in developing treatment programs for addicts;

-- Establishing support groups which encourage members to stop or never start using illicit drugs; and

-- Supporting research to identify interventions for target groups.

D. In some countries, the effort has been comprehensive. In other countries in the region, the effort has consisted of a single study or a workshop. There is a wide range of service resources, i.e. U.S. Government, private contractors, private non-government organizations, host country organizations, with a rich mixture of skills and experience being used to address the problem. For the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative Countries, which include Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, gaining public support for counter-narcotics activities is the primary objective. For other countries, the priority is defined in terms of public health and social welfare concerns, e.g. drug related crime and violence. The degree of effectiveness these activities have had -- in terms of contributing to the previously stated objectives -- is not well understood and needs to be measured.

E. The total resources available for these activities have been relatively small. Most of the resources currently being provided are from the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative (NSD-18). While host country contributions have been modest, many governments are becoming increasingly involved in these efforts. Other donors also are active in the area. However, no comprehensive inventory exists of the activities currently underway. Given the relatively small resource base, it is imperative that the funds being provided are applied to the highest priorities, that the resources being provided are sufficient for the tasks, and that the activities are effective in meeting program objectives.

ARTICLE I - TITLE

Evaluation of the LAC Narcotics Demand Reduction Program (598-0000)

ARTICLE II - OBJECTIVE

The objective of this delivery order is to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of A.I.D.'s investments in narcotics demand reduction -- awareness, prevention, and drug use reduction -- in the Latin American and Caribbean region.

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

In conducting the evaluation, the Contractor shall use the following guidelines:

A. The evaluation team will review A.I.D.'s investment in narcotics awareness, prevention, and drug use reduction projects in five LAC countries as agreed to by the evaluation project manager. At this juncture, it is tentatively agreed that case studies will be developed in Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and Guatemala. (Material on projects in other countries in the region has been requested from the LAC field missions or USAIDs to be reviewed by the evaluation team.) The country review to be conducted by the evaluation team will involve addressing the following key questions:

-- Define as precisely as possible the nature and extent of the problem(s) being addressed by the project(s) in each country. For example, what is the size of the actual drug use population? Is there potentially a serious user problem which requires particular interventions? Where the problem is one of awareness (i.e. public support for counter-narcotics activities), how well has the problem been defined? How well has the problem of prevention been defined?

-- Examine whether the problems/constraints addressed by a project or set of projects, as initially designed, are of high priority to the country, the USAID, and/or the United States Government interagency country team. Indicate or identify ways in which the priority of activities addressing these problems/constraints are or can be determined.

-- Determine how well the project's goal, purpose, and outputs were defined. Did the definition of these factors clearly focus the effort on achieving the objective? Were realistic targets set at the beginning?

-- Examine the level of effort, effectiveness, and efficiency of project(s) so as to determine whether the projects are proceeding satisfactorily toward achieving their stated objectives at the goal, purpose, and output levels.

-- In terms of assessing performance, are project monitoring systems in place? Have baseline data sets been established? Were the indicators being used to report performance at the goal, purpose, and output levels appropriate? Have formal evaluations been undertaken? Were the targets achieved?

-- How do the resources (funds and technical resources) A.I.D. provides match with the requirement? Are there

sufficient resources to achieve the project purpose? Is there a need for LAC funds beyond the resources provided to the Bureau for Research and Development-(R&D) Narcotics Awareness and Education Project?

-- Determine whether projects are implemented at acceptable costs when compared with alternative approaches in accomplishing the same objective. Examine whether the traditional emphasis on institution building in host countries is a cost-effective method to achieve awareness, prevention, or drug use reduction objectives.

-- Examine the steps taken toward the full sustainability of projects and identify key elements (e.g., commercial private sector support, fee for services, in-kind or financial contributions by foundations/community groups) which have enhanced or could enhance the financial viability and independence of awareness, prevention and drug abuse reduction projects. Canvass private sector funded activities in the area to ascertain key sustainability elements in their design.

-- How do the USAIDs and host country governments judge the quality of services and technical expertise being provided? What improvements can be made in the technical services being provided and in the training being offered? (Note: A separate evaluation of technical assistance funded by R&D for their Narcotics Awareness and Education Project is currently underway. A draft of the NAE evaluation will be provided to this evaluation team, and the team will be briefed by the R&D NAE project evaluator to their first field trip. This effort must not duplicate R&D's evaluation.)

-- Compile an inventory of the means used to realize the objectives of investments in narcotic awareness, prevention, and drug use reduction projects. These inventories will include the projects funded by other USG agencies, other foreign donors, the host governments themselves, and the private sector.

B. Upon completion and review of the five case studies and of the field submissions from the countries not visited by the evaluation team, two sections -- findings and conclusions -- will be developed that pull together the studies and the field submissions. "Lessons Learned" will be emphasized in these sections. Finally, a recommendations section will identify future priorities that LAC should address; contain a strategic framework for country based projects concerned with narcotics awareness, prevention, and drug use reduction as components of the larger LAC Counter-Narcotics/Public Health Strategy in the region; and serve as the basis for developing future guidelines for design and implementation of projects in this field.

ARTICLE IV - REPORTS

A. The Contractor shall provide ten (10) copies of a draft report and five (5) copies of a final report to A.I.D. which must include:

1. Summary and Key Recommendations

2. Purpose of the Evaluation

3. Methodology

4. Presentation of the five country case studies organized in the sections labelled findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

5. Two Sections -- Findings and Conclusions -- that pull together the six country case studies and the field submissions. Finally, a recommendations section will identify future priorities that LAC should address; contain a strategic framework for country based projects concerned with narcotics awareness, prevention, and drug use reduction as components of a larger counter-narcotics and/or public health strategy of LAC in the region; and serve as the basis for developing future guidelines for design and implementation of projects in this field.

B. Annexes

-- Persons Contacted

-- Sources Consulted (Key Documents)

-- A List of All Recommendations with Page References

C. The draft report will be reviewed by A.I.D./Washington and comments will be provided to the team by the project manager within five (5) days of receipt.

D. The Contractor shall provide five (5) hard copies of the final report as well as a copy stored on a 3.5" computer diskette in Word Perfect 5.1 to the Director, LAC/SAM at the end of the tenth week after the effective date of this delivery order.

ARTICLE V - RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Contractor shall work under the technical guidance of the Director of the Office of South American and Mexican Affairs in the Bureau for Latin America and Caribbean (LAC/SAM) or their Designee. The Contractor personnel shall be expected to abide by Regional Security Office regulations for their personal safety.

Annex 3

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Annex 3

PERSONS CONTACTED

WASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S. Agency for International Development
Ambassador James Michel, Acting Administrator
Aaron Williams, Acting Assistant Administrator, LAC Bureau
George Hill, Director, Policy Analysis and Resources
Norma Jean Parker, Director, LAC/SAM
Ann W. McDonald, LAC Narcotics Coordinator
Bernadette M. G. Bundy, Deputy LAC Narcotics Coordinator
Anthony J. Meyer, Project Officer, Research and Development Bureau
Karen E. Moore, AAAS Fellow, Research and Development Bureau
Carrie Thompson, Project Development Officer, LAC Bureau
Larry Heilman, Director, Management Systems International

Telephone Interviews with A.I.D. Mission Directors and Representatives
David Cohen, Mission Director, Haiti
Charles Costello, Mission Director, Ecuador
Edward Kadunc, A.I.D. Representative, Colombia
Kevin Kelly, Mission Director, Panama
Richard Nelson, A.I.D. Representative, Paraguay
Robert Queener, Mission Director, Jamaica
Raymond Rifenburg, Mission Director, Dominican Republic
John Sanbrailo, Mission Director, El Salvador
Ronald Venezia, Mission Director, Costa Rica

Narcotics Awareness and Education Project
Peter Davis, President, Development Associates
John Garcia, NAE Project Director, Development Associates
Don Mathis, Macro International
Robert Porter, Porter-Novelli
Juan Braun, Academy for Education Development

Department of State
Melvin Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters
Robert Gelbard, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Inter-American Affairs
Donald Strasser, Chief, Andean/South American Division, International Narcotics Matters
Thom Browne, Demand Reduction Specialist, International Narcotics Matters

Office of National Drug Control Policy
Arthur Houghton, Demand Reduction Specialist
J.C. Comolli

United States Information Agency
Lee Johnson, Former Director, Drug Unit
Barbara Smela, Senior Research Analyst/Deputy for Latin America, Office of Research Marshall Louis, Deputy Director, Drug Unit

Drug Enforcement Agency
Victor Aponte, Special Agent, Staff Coordinator

Center for Substance Abuse Prevention
Carl Hampton, Associate Director for Special Projects

National Institute on Drug Abuse
Richard Lindblatt, Director, International Office
Nick Kozel, Chief, Epidemiology and Surveillance Studies Branch, Division of Epidemiology and Prevention Research
Zili Amsel, Associate Director for Planning, Division of Clinical Research
Frank Tims, Department Chief, Treatment Research Branch, Division of Clinical Research
Richard Needles,Chief, Community Research Branch, Division of Clinical Research
Moira O'Brien, Public Health Advisor
Mario de la Rosa, Project Officer, Epidemiological Research Branch, Division of Epidemiology and Prevention Research

Partners of the Americas
William Reese, President
Alvin Cohen, Director, Brazil Education Programs
Lewis Harwood, Director, Youth Programs

OAS/CICAD
Irvin Tragen, Executive Secretary
Ana Chisman, Demand Reduction Specialist

PAHO
Dr. Enrique Madrigal Segura, Regional Advisor on Alcohol and Drug Abuse

Other Interviews
Geraldo Flowers, Director of Youth/Media Programs, PRIDE-Belize
Omario Contreras, NDACC, Belize
Dr. Ena Campbell, Research Director, Drug Abuse Secretariat, Jamaica
Cherry-Ann Millard, Information Specialist, National Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Programme, Trinidad and Tobago

BOLIVIA

United States Government
Ambassador Charles Bowers
Dan Johnson, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission
Carl Leonard, Mission Director, A.I.D.
Garber Davidson, Deputy Director, A.I.D.
Paul Hartenberger, Director, Health and Human Relations Section, A.I.D.
Sigrid Anderson, Deputy Director, Health and Human Relations Section, A.I.D.
James McHugh, Program Director, NAS
Timothy F. Smith, Information Officer, USIS
John Williams, Public Affairs Officer, USIS

Government of Bolivia
Carlos Dabdoub, Minister of Health
Oswaldo Antezana, Minister of Campesino Affairs
Francisco Zanneir, Subsecretary of Alternative Development

Development Associates
Russell Stout, Resident Representative
Maria Elena Rodriguez, Information Specialist and Drug Education

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Laura Baldivieso, Director
Oscar Peña

Anti-Drug Education and Social Mobilization System (SEAMOS)
Juan Azcui, Chairman, Board of Directors
Lupe Andrade, Director
Norah de Flores, Administrative Director
Paula Carvajal, Information Dissemination
Miguel Cortez, Production

SUBDESAL
Jaime Rodriguez Alcocer, Director
Luis Terraza, Coordinator of National Communications Unit
Oswaldo Perez Coronel, Administrative and Financial Director

DINAPRE
Carlos Dipp, Executive Director
Franklin Alcaraz del Castillo, Director of PROINCO

International Organizations
Sandro Calvani, Resident Representative, UNDCP
Mirta Roses Periago, Resident Representative, PAHO

BRAZIL

United States Government
Richard Melton, Ambassador
Mark Lore, Deputy Chief of Mission
Philip Bates Taylor, III, U.S. Consul General, Sao Paulo
Thomas White, Economic Officer, Sao Paulo
Earle Scarlett, Political Officer, Sao Paulo
John Pielemeier, A.I.D. Representative
Norma V. Reyes, Director, Narcotics Awareness Unit
Carl Howard, Public Affairs Officer
Lane Cubstead, First Secretary, USIS
Miguel Fontes, AIDS and Drugs Project Officer
Ricardo Falcao, Senior Officer/Training Officer

Government of Brazil
Isaac Barriento Riveiro, Director, CONFEN
Pedro Demo, Secretary for Citizen Rights and Justice, Ministry of Justice
Bardur Schubert, Narcotics Section Coordinator, Ministry of Education
Georgina C. Rausch, Director of Special Projects, Ministry of Education and Sports
Richard Bucher, Consultant, Ministry of Education

Ceará Group
Socorro Maia, Coordinator of Ceara Drug Foundation

Paulista Group
Nair Passos Fleury, First Lady, State of Sao Paulo, and President, Solidarity Fund
Arthur Guerra, Paulista Group Coordinator, and Health Coordinator of GREA
Francisca Rodriquez, Chief of First Lady's Cabinet
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Antonia Maria B. Cipolla, Secretariat of Health, Sao Paulo
Alberto Corazza, State Department for Public Security (DENARC), Sao Paulo
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Patricia Hochgraf, Research Director, GREA
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Paulo Junquiera, IMESC, Secretariat of Justice and Civil Defense, Sao Paulo
Ana Maria Kardachevisk, Secretariat for Sports and Tourism, Sao Paulo
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Ana Maria Mesquita, Epidemiological Research, GREA/Prevention Programs Coordinator
Salime Rezek, Secretariat for Labor Relations, Sao Paulo
Manuel Santos, Pastoral do Menor
Marcio Ruiz Schiavo, Sao Paulo Media Program Coordinator, Comunicarte

Dartiu Xavier da Silveira Filho, Coordinator, PROAD
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Maria do Socorro, Secretariat of Children, Family, and Social Welfare, Sao Paulo
Percival de Souza, CONEN
Ornelia de Tolosa, Secretariat for Social Security, Sao Paulo

International Organizations
Jacques Berteaud, Cooperation Attaché, French Embassy
Richard E. Bucher, UNESCO Representative
Martine Delogne, Program Coordinator, European Community
Dr. Maria Eugenia Lemos Fernandez, Resident Advisor, AIDS Control and Prevention Program, AIDSCAP
Bo Mathisen, Deputy UNDCP Representative
Giovanni Quaglia, UNDCP Representative

GUATEMALA

United States Government
John Keane, Chargé
Terrence Brown, Mission Director, A.I.D.
Steve Wingert, Deputy Director, A.I.D.
Gary Cook, Director of Health and Education Office, A.I.D.
Bambi Arellano, Director, Office of Democratic Development and Training, A.I.D.
Patricia O'Conner, Education Project Officer, A.I.D.
Jorge Chang, Health Project Officer, A.I.D.
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Ministry of Health
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Andrea Tamangini, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
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Jorge Lamport, Former Minister of Finance

MEXICO

United States Government
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Arthur Danart, A.I.D. Representative
Liese Sherwood-Fabre, Program Coordinator, A.I.D.
Robert Retka, Director, NAS
Bill Carroll, Projects Manager/Field Advisor, NAS
Mark Leubker, Assistant Cultural Affairs Attache, USIS
Miriam Hamdan, Program Assistant USIS
Alfredo Villareal, U.S. Customs Service
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National Council Against Additions (CONADIC)
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Ministry of Health
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Patricia Cravioto, Operative Coordinator of Epidemiology Vigilance System for Addiction

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Centers for Youth Integration (CIJ)
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International Organizations
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PERU

United States Government
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Annex 4

LIST OF SOURCES CONSULTED

ANNEX 4

SOURCES CONSULTED

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Annex 5

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS WITH PAGE REFERENCES

Annex 5

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS WITH PAGE REFERENCES

A. Country-Specific Recommendations

1. Guatemala (See Text pp. 16-18)

Recommendations:

- CONAPAD should be more aggressive in pressing its Guatemalan Government for funding and in soliciting contributions from international organizations, NGOs, and other non-USG donors.

- Although there is merit in continuing the buy-in with the NAE Project for up to two more years, any longer-term U.S. Government funding of CONAPAD should be conditioned on at least some direct financial support from the Guatemalan Government.

- A.I.D. should consider providing CONAPAD with on-site technical assistance in the practical aspects of soliciting and applying for non-USG funds.

- If CONAPAD is to become an organization with significant national and international credibility, it must be broadened to include other qualified professionals on a permanent basis, not simply on loan as at present.

- In connection with any further funding of CONAPAD, USAID and Development Associates should insist that CONAPAD maintain a clear and comprehensive list of outputs and institute a system of strict accountability. CONAPAD should secure the services of a highly qualified expert to discharge both of these functions.

- CONAPAD should establish the clear goal of becoming a well balanced effort and should request funding for this purpose from the UNDCP and other non-USG entities.

- CONAPAD should seek free television and radio time and free print space in periodicals for publicity against both drug use and drug trafficking.

- A.I.D. and Development Associates should press hard for completion of a high quality master plan in the immediate future. If necessary, the USG should approach senior levels of the Guatemalan Government and stress the need for prompt completion of a high quality plan.

- Despite many higher priorities, USAID/Guatemala should take steps to monitor the project more closely and provide recommendations to A.I.D. Washington and to Development Associates for improvements in the project.

- A U.S. Government and Guatemalan Government goal should be to build CONAPAD into a full scale institution. However, much of the funding for this effort should come from non-U.S. sources, including the Government of Guatemala.

2. **Mexico** (See Text pp. 30-32)

Recommendations:

- Beyond the current work of Development Associates, USAID/Mexico, the Country Team, and A.I.D. Washington should consider ways of helping project-supported entities to secure multilateral or other non-USG funding. Possibilities include a joint Mexican-USG approach to the UNDCP, and an A.I.D. Washington effort to generate assistance from NGOs in U.S. states that border Mexico.

- A.I.D. itself should consider some additional assistance to FEMAP and CORA, if necessary, to ease the transition to sustainability.

- USAID/Mexico should be tasked to provide A.I.D. Washington with (a) detailed and specific recommendations as to how Mexico's expertise and experience could be applied elsewhere in the hemisphere; and (b) recommendations on how the U.S. and Mexico can work together in this regard.

- Significant U.S. assistance should normally be considered only if it (a) serves to reinforce the ability of Mexican institutions to help other countries with demand reduction, particularly in Central America; (b) supports innovative approaches to the special problems of young people and drugs; (c) provides critically needed support for isolated efforts of the Murrieta Foundation type; or (d) is essential on a strictly <u>interim</u> basis for sustainability reasons, as may be the case with FEMAP and CORA.

- The U.S. should continue to provide limited training to private groups as a means of improving their effectiveness, assisting them toward sustainability, and maintaining professional contacts with them.

- Even in the absence of U.S. financial support or formal training, USAID/Mexico (and other elements of the Country Team) should maintain close contact with relevant Mexican entities and provide them with informal advice and support.

- To the extent feasible, A.I.D. should append demand reduction activities to existing institutions with proven effectiveness rather than create new institutions.

3. **Bolivia** (See Text pp. 49-50)

Recommendations:

- All four Bolivian organizations should aggressively solicit funds from the Bolivian private sector and from international organizations, NGOs, and foreign governments other than the U.S.

- The U.S. Government should urge the Bolivian business sector to make at least some cash contributions to SEAMOS and to the other project entities.

- The Country Team and A.I.D. Washington should explore the possibility of helping to establish endowment funds for at least some of the Bolivian organizations in the project. An endowment fund, even if modest, can provide a measure of stability and predictability to an organization that otherwise might face a very uncertain future.

- The U.S. Government should urge that the Bolivian Government provide increased support for the entities involved in the USAID project. Direct budgetary contributions from the Government of Bolivia, even if modest, would be appropriate.

- The Bolivian Government should take steps to disburse already approved local currency funding in a timely manner.

- The leaders of both SEAMOS and CESE should consider cultivating selected staff members to become largely their equals and their potential successors. Both need to devote more attention to representing their organizations to the outside world. Such action would strengthen SEAMOS' and CESE's fund raising efforts both in Bolivia and abroad.

- A.I.D. should consider way of increasing USG funding of SUBDESAL's Communication Unit despite the current environment of budgetary stringencies.

4. **Peru** (See Text pp. 65-66)

Recommendations:

- Given progress in its public awareness campaign to date, CEDRO should consider branching out more into other important areas. These should include consolidation of its efforts in research and increased attention to operational aspects vital to greater community mobilization.

- Without weakening its role in publicizing the threat of drugs to Peru's future development, CEDRO should seek new and innovative ways to present the drug problem to a better informed public.

- Leading government organizations (e.g., the Ministries of Education and Health and OFECOD) as well as local universities should be encouraged to increase their participation in epidemiological and other types of research and in project evaluation efforts.

- CEDRO should strengthen and expand its fund raising efforts still further.

- Impact indicators and targets should be clearly stated at the start of any project. In the case of the current project, additional impact targets should be established in the public awareness, drug education, and epidemiological areas.

- Should further financing become available, the Mission should consider earmarking some funds to support the efforts of local NGOs that complement activities undertaken by CEDRO.

5. **Brazil** (See Text pp. 79-81)

Recommendations:

- USAID/Brazil should clearly identify the impact it expects to achieve with the projects it funds in order to monitor them properly.

- Development Associates should issue individual checks in U.S. dollars to each recipient.

- Experts coming from the U.S., and those in the U.S. who receive delegations from Brazil, should be reminded that no prevention program developed for a particular setting can be transferred to other countries without taking into account the reality of its new context.

- USAID/Brazil should encourage Brazilian state and local organizations to increase involvement of the private sector in drug prevention activities. This effort could be facilitated by drawing greater attention to large enterprises (e.g., Autolatina) that have ongoing substance abuse and treatment programs.

- USAID/Brazil and other USG and international organizations should continue to seek creative ways of providing direct assistance to state and local organizations.

- A.I.D. should consider providing technical assistance to cooperating groups in methods of raising funds from non-USG sources.

- USAID/Brazil and other USG agencies should consider doing more to facilitate the development of technical exchanges between demand reduction entities in Brazil and drug prevention organizations in other countries, especially Mexico and Peru.

- USAID/Brazil and other USG agencies should continuously look for ways of compensating for the economic limitations imposed upon narcotics awareness education programs and key professionals in the country. At a minimum, the achievements of the professionals should be recognized by sponsoring their involvement in international fora.

- A.I.D. should consider addressing the needs of out-of-school populations by integrating drug prevention with alternative activities of both a vocational and recreational nature.

- A.I.D. should consider encouraging the creation of a demand reduction NGO, using the Paulista Group as a nucleus. Continuity and progress in what will clearly be a long-range demand reduction effort would probably be best served by a legally independent private organization.

B. Recommendations Based on Questions in the Statement of Work (See Text pp. 82-87)

***Recommendations*:**

- During project design, more attention should be given to formulating a clear and thoughtful definition of the problem, based on the best data available. The problem should be defined in terms of either an A.I.D. Strategic Objective to combat narcotics or as a subset of another Strategic Objective that identifies drug use as a health, education, democracy, public safety or other development issue. Only in rare cases should the problem be defined as a "target of opportunity."

- In projects with "Logical Frameworks" greater attention should be paid to rigorous and useful definitions of goals, purposes, and outputs. In the case of every project, regardless of nature or size, the goal, purpose, and expected outputs should be thoughtfully formulated and clearly set forth in one place in the project documentation.

- Monitoring should carefully track purpose achievement as well as production of outputs, consistently using the Logical Framework or analogous project documentation as a point of reference. This discipline should be followed by all contractors performing work for A.I.D. as well as by A.I.D. itself.

- A.I.D. should take steps to ensure that project monitoring is carried out effectively by both the USAID Mission and, as appropriate, the relevant contractor or contractors in every country that benefits from an A.I.D. project. In no case should the USAID Mission abdicate its monitoring role.

- Every effort should be made to establish baseline data that are meaningful for project evaluation. In every case, the project documentation should make clear which data are serving officially as baseline sets.

- A.I.D. should make a concerted effort to ensure (a) uniformity in prevalence study definitions, instruments, and methodology; and (b) reasonable comparability of successive prevalence studies.

- A.I.D. should require that each project have a one-page or two-page standardized data sheet, succinctly identifying the project, giving project cost and time frame, and clearly setting forth goal, purpose, outputs, impact indicators, expected impact, and baseline data sets in both the prevalence and public awareness areas. The data sheet should accompany any project paper, Logical Framework, implementation plan, and technical analysis, all of which are defined in A.I.D. Handbook 3. All of these, where they exist, plus the data sheet should be attached to any project agreements with implementing agencies so that all parties clearly understand what their respective responsibilities are and what specific results are expected.

- A.I.D. should conduct a study to (a) identify means of impact determination in both large and small demand reduction projects; and (b) devise simple, reliable, low cost methodologies for the determination of impact in both kinds of projects. In developing such methodologies, A.I.D. should consult with a wide range of entities (e.g., NIDA, CSAP, State/INM, USIA, OAS/CICAD, UNDCP) in order to take advantage of their considerable expertise and insights.

- Impact evaluation should be an essential part of every project and should be carried out on the basis of clearly established baseline data. Projects deemed to be worthwhile on the basis of informal evaluations and judgments need not be abandoned or scaled back simply because absolute proof of their effectiveness is not yet available. However, the managers of such projects should turn their attention now to determining baseline data and arranging for systematic monitoring, rather than waiting for the end of the project to do so.

- Surveys of drug use and public attitudes during a project and at its end should be closely keyed to baseline data. Where possible and appropriate, prevalence and attitude surveys should be conducted as part of the project. If necessary, USIS polls could be relied on to some extent for determining public attitudes, but A.I.D. and USIS should work together to ensure that the polls are properly timed and well keyed to baseline public opinion data.

- In the case of every project, clear and precise impact indicators should be established at the outset. Impact should be measured against the problem identified and according to successes achieved in the areas of (a) public awareness of the need for counter-narcotics action; (b) prevention; and (c) actual reduction of drug use.

- Output indicators should be established for all projects, and careful attention should be paid to output and process evaluation. Every entity benefiting from A.I.D. support should be required to maintain a current list of all outputs developed with A.I.D. assistance since the beginning of the project, broken down by calendar year.

- A.I.D. Washington, and especially USAID Missions, should provide specific guidance to project entities on methods of raising non-USG funds. On-site technical assistance may be indicated in some cases. In addition, A.I.D. should consider producing, either in house or under contact, a well though out, written guide to fund raising techniques in the area of demand reduction for use by A.I.D. project entities.

- Normally, a new institution should be created only where no appropriate entity already exists and where a new institution is demonstrably essential to address the problem identified by the project. If institution building is chosen, project papers should set forth a full explanation for the decision, along with a clear statement of the alternatives that were considered.

- A.I.D. should collaborate with other USG agencies and international donors in the production of an inventory of the demand reduction activities of European, North American, host country, and other NGOs that make significant contributions to demand reduction efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.

C. **Recommendations on Issues of Strategy** (See Text pp. 105-111)

- Make a rigorous assessment to determine which countries should be the principal recipients of demand reduction assistance.

- Concentrate resources on the few target countries that are identified in the assessment.

- Ask each participating USAID Mission to review its definition of the specific problem that needs to be addressed in the host country.

- Work with other USG agencies to improve coordination at the Washington level.

- Urge host governments to contribute direct financial support to A.I.D. projects.

- Assign a high priority to helping A.I.D.-supported entities achieve sustainability in both a financial and technical sense.

- Consult with USAID Missions on how they might play a more proactive role in securing multilateral and other non-USG support.

- Ensure that adequate management expertise exists within A.I.D.-supported projects.

- Incorporate anti-drug elements into other A.I.D.-supported activities.

- Consider combining U.S. efforts with those of other countries of the hemisphere.

- Explore opportunities for tapping U.S. state and local resources.

- Bring together key experts to formulate recommendations on future efforts in demand reduction.

- Give high priority to well-targeted training opportunities.

- Communicate A.I.D.'s accomplishments in a more effective manner.

- Consider allowing more flexibility in technical assistance contracting in the future.

- Consider establishing a small technical support unit and a flexible funding mechanism in the LAC Bureau.

- Recommend an interagency assessment of USG efforts in demand reduction, followed by collaboration between the USG and other major donors in developing an international demand reduction strategy.