

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART I

PD-ABE-612  
78602

1. BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS.  
2. USE LETTER QUALITY TYPE, NOT "DOT MATRIX" TYPE.

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Reporting A.i.D. Unit: Mission or AID/W Office <u>USAID/Bolivia, DP</u> (ES# _____)		B. Was Evaluation Scheduled in Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Slipped <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ad Hoc <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation Plan Submission Date: FY ____ Q ____		C. Evaluation Timing Interim <input type="checkbox"/> Final <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ex Post <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>	
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D. Activity or Activities Evaluated (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; if not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report.)					
Project No.	Project /Program Title	First PROAG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (Mo/Yr)	Planned LOP Cost (000)	Amount Obligated to Date (000)
511-0571	Policy Reform Project		6/92		

ACTIONS

E. Action Decisions Approved By Mission or AID/W Office Director Action(s) Required	Name of Officer Responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
1. Take immediate actions to reactivate UDAPE's Board of Directors, including quarterly meetings.	UDAPE General Manager	June 92
2. Explore mechanisms for greater dissemination of UDAPE research, careful not to compromise its role as an inside advisor to the GOB.	UDAPE General Manager	June 92
3. Develop PID for follow on Project.	S. Aranibar	Nov. 91
4. Develop Project Paper for follow on Project.	S. Aranibar	June 92

(Attach extra sheet if necessary)

APPROVALS

F. Date Of Mission Or AID/W Office Review Of Evaluation: (Month) 6 (Day) (Year) 92

G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary And Action Decisions:				
Name (Typed)	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director
	Sonia Aranibar	J. Carlos Requena	Elizabeth Visnic	Wayne Tate
Signature	<i>Sonia Aranibar</i>	<i>J. Carlos Requena</i>	<i>Elizabeth Visnic</i>	<i>Wayne Tate</i>
Date	<u>4/23/92</u>			

**ABSTRACT**

**H. Evaluation Abstract (Do not exceed the space provided)**

1. The Policy Reform Project is designed to establish technical capacity in macroeconomic analysis, in order to provide the GOB with advisory services to implement sound macroeconomic and sectoral policy reforms aimed at reactivating the Bolivian economy. This technical assistance to the GOB is provided through a semi- autonomous economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE).
2. The purpose of this final evaluation was to assess project performance, to identify any operational issues to be addressed during the final year of the project, and to identify "lessons-learned" for a follow-on project. In addition, issues related to the centrally-funded "Implementing Policy Change Project" (IPC) were also explored.
3. The evaluation methodology included document review, interviews, and review of UDAPE research studies and the impact of that work. The team analyzed data employing two models-a model of organizational viability and a model borrowed from the field of strategic management.
4. The evaluation includes 51 findings, 16 conclusions, and 15 recommendations. Findings include feedback on UDAPE role, the quality of research carried out, and the organization capacity to handle its mandate. Evaluation recommendations relate to UDAPE's role or the feasibility of replicating the "UDAPE model", careful to identify the conditions/variables for UDAPE's success to date. The report also offers recommendations at the operational level concerning enhanced impact of foreign technical assistance.
5. This evaluation concludes that UDAPE is effective, reflected both in its recognition within Bolivia and internationally. UDAID should continue to support UDAPE for the foreseeable future.

**1. Purpose of the activities evaluated:**

The principle USAID tool to address its strategic objective for sound economic policy in Bolivia is the Policy Reform Project. Its task is to produce relevant studies designed to assist policy makers in arriving at sound economic policy decisions, including consideration of alternative policies and their impact on the economy.

**C O S T S**

**I. Evaluation Costs**

1. Evaluation Team		Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (U.S. \$)	Source of Funds
Name	Affiliation			
Larry Cooley	Management Specialist			
Ben Crosby	Management Specialist			
Koenen/Grant	Support Specialists			
		Total	30,980	511-0571 Project

2. Mission/Office Professional Staff  
Person-Days (Estimate) \_\_\_\_\_

3. Borrower/Grantee Professional  
Staff Person-Days (Estimate) \_\_\_\_\_

## A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART II

### SUMMARY

Summary of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Try not to exceed the three (3) pages provided)

Address the following items:

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|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Purpose of evaluation and methodology used</li> <li>• Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated</li> <li>• Findings and conclusions (relate to question):</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Principal recommendations</li> <li>• Lessons learned</li> </ul> |
|--|--|

Mission or Office: USAID/Bolivia/DP	Date This Summary Prepared: 1/10/92	Title And Date Of Full Evaluation Report: Evaluation of UDAPE and the Policy Reform Project 5/17/91
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The semi-autonomous Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE), was created under the Ministry of Planning in 1982 and 1983. The Policy Reform Project, providing funding for the operationalization of this unit, was approved in 1983 for \$1.2 million for three years, was amended in 1986 with an additional \$3.8 million, and subsequently extended until August 1991. It has since been extended until June 1992 to permit completion of the scope of work and to prepare a follow-on project.

UDAPE's mission since its conception has evolved to include the implementation of appropriate economic policies, not only the establishment of institutionalized analytical capability. Within UDAPE a concern for macro-economic issues associated with reactivation and growth has emerge, reflected in priority areas for research and analysis and conferences convened by UDAPE. There seems to be consensus both within UDAPE and among UDAPE's clients as to UDAPE's role in policy design and implementation.

### 2. Purpose of the Evaluation and methodology used:

The final evaluation of Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE) was designed to assess the impact of UDAPE on economic policy reform, stabilization, and growth and its long-term prospects for providing permanent policy analysis within the bolivian government. This evaluation will serve as the basis for the development of a follow-on project scheduled to begin in FY 1992.

The evaluation employs a methodology including data collection, interviews, review of research and impact assessment, document review, and case studies. Data gathered from these sources was analyzed in part using a simple organizational viability model and a model (SWOT) borrowed from the field of strategic management.

### 3. Finding and Conclusions:

**Performance:** In terms of the quality and quantity of studies, and their impact on Bolivia's macro-economic environment, UDAPE should be judged to have surpassed the expectations and targets contained in the project paper. UDAPE's change in role emphasizes its function as in-house policy advisors and staff support for selected policy makers, particularly the Minister of Planning. This change has increased its policy impact to date but has also limited its range of clients, its base of support, and its role as an agenda setter. The theoretical manner in which many UDAPE studies are presented limits the audience for, and impact of, these studies.

**Operational Issues:** The dormancy of UDAPE's board of Directors was thought worrisome by some interviewed and the situation should be ratified. The absence of effective mechanisms for strategic planning, setting priorities, and encouraging demand from a broader range of clients needs attention from the Board of Directors. Technical assistance to UDAPE continues to be valuable to the organization but should be altered somewhat to correct shortcomings that currently exist.

- C -

**Future:** UDAPE's operations or priorities cannot be changed without considerable disruption to the factors responsible for UDAPE's currently high performance and morale. Given some changes are necessary, UDAPE staff and external constituencies should plan such changes in a participatory and consultative manner. UDAPE should remain under the Ministry of Planning but with an invigorated and active Board of Directors. Due to the research agenda, UDAPE will be considered more "political" in the future. Therefore, steps should be taken to reduce associated vulnerabilities. The Board structure as one mechanism, and studies that present options rather than recommendations is another device.

UDAPE's continued effectiveness is more vulnerable than acknowledged. Broadening its range of clients and constituency of support within government will consolidate its position. The Board should assist with this effort. Efforts to replicate the "UDAPE model" at the sectoral level will be successful only if special factors are considered. These factors include a highly competent unit that makes efforts not to overlap functions of the line ministries, a willingness to work behind the scenes, a desire to influence policy formulation and implementation, a relationship of confidence with one or more key policy makers, and willingness by USAID not to intervene excessively in the substantive work of the unit. Conventional notions of sustainability should be reconsidered in the case of UDAPE. The costs of supporting the Unit are relatively modest and a positive role for external financial and technical assistance exists for the foreseeable future.

#### 4. Principal Recommendations and Lessons Learned:

The evaluation recommends that USAID continue to fund UDAPE policy reform efforts, with UDAPE reorienting its priorities to place substantially greater emphasis on economic policy issues associated with reactivation and growth. This may call for recruiting professionals in this area, rather than reorienting current professionals whose focus is on economic stabilization issues. A review of UDAPE salary levels should be taken, to determine if current salary levels will retain the highly qualified personnel needed (this study suggests that levels will have to be adjusted.) Additional non-financial incentives (training, conference attendance, internships with international organizations) should also be explored for attracting the caliber of professionals UDAPE requires.

The "UDAPE model" should only be replicated when and if the conditions associated with UDAPE's success are present. USAID/W should review and disseminate the UDAPE experience as instructive in regard to policy reform efforts in other countries.

UDAPE should take immediate actions to reactivate its Board of Directors, and institutionalize quarterly meetings. The President of the board should have responsibility for re-establishing with the GOB UDAPE's policy research priorities in order to avoid responding to external demands and these priorities should be ratified by CONEPLAN (as is current practice).

S U M M A R Y (Continued)

The workplan negotiated between USAID and UDAPE can and should take on greater importance as a means for clarifying UDAPE's analytical priorities. USAID should ensure: 1) a set of priorities and research issues have been defined that extend beyond immediate concerns, 2, these priorities have the support of senior policy makers in the GOB, and 3) mechanisms exist to permit UDAPE to respond to these priorities in a responsive manner. This is not to say that USAID should interfere in UDAPE's substantive priorities or policy positions, but rather facilitate this process. USAID and other donors should propose policy issues requiring UDAPE attention, as input to the Board establishing priorities for UDAPE.

USAID should continue to finance the provision of external technical assistance to UDAPE and incorporate into that provision various operational improvements as detailed in the evaluation report, in order to reflect and contribute to the maturing technical capability of the UDAPE staff.

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# EVALUATION OF UDAPE AND THE POLICY REFORM PROJECT

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May 17, 1991



**Contractor Team:**

**Management Systems International**  
(lead contractor)

**International Development Management Center**  
at University of Maryland

**Abt Associates Inc.**  
**Development Alternatives, Inc.**

United States Agency for International Development  
Bureau for Science & Technology  
Project #936-5451

**EVALUATION OF UDAPE AND THE POLICY  
REFORM PROJECT  
(Project No. 511-0571)**

**May 17, 1991**

*Submitted to:* ✓

**USAID/Bolivia**

*Submitted by:*

**Implementing Policy Change Project  
AID/S&T/RD**

*Team Members:*

**Lawrence Cooley (MSI), Team Leader  
Benjamin Crosby (MSI), Institutional Specialist  
Jorge Daly (DAI), Economist**

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- E. External Interviews--Sources, Questionnaire and Findings**
- F. Case Studies**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A semi-autonomous Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE) under the aegis of Bolivia's Ministry of Planning was established in 1983. The initial USAID project providing funding for UDAPE was approved in that year for \$1.2 million and subsequently amended to add an additional \$3.8 million and to extend the project until August of 1991. It is currently the Mission's intention to further extend the current project into 1992 to permit completion of the project's scope of work and to permit preparation of a follow-on project to begin upon completion of the current project.

Two previous interim evaluations of this project were undertaken in 1985 and 1988. Both were extremely favorable. The current evaluation has three purposes -- to serve as an "end of project" assessment of project performance; to identify any operational issues to be addressed in the final year of the current project; and, most importantly, to identify lessons learned from the current project that might have direct implications for the Mission's intended follow-on project. In addition, the evaluation incorporates a special interest in issues related to policy implementation reflecting the particular concerns of the centrally-funded Implementing Policy Change Project (IPC) through which the evaluation exercise was conducted.

The methodology employed in this evaluation includes a review of all basic project documents; an inventory and categorization of all UDAPE studies undertaken between 1988 and 1991; an itemized inventory of the utilization and impact of UDAPE studies; interviews with key informants in USAID, UDAPE and HIID on a range of operational issues; structured interviews with all members of UDAPE's professional staff and with a range of key actors inside and outside the current government; and a detailed investigation of selected case studies. Data were analyzed, in part, using two models--a model of organizational viability and a model borrowed from the field of strategic management.

The evaluation's findings, conclusions and recommendations are presented in successive chapters organized around issues of topical interest to USAID and UDAPE. The data on which these findings, conclusions and recommendations are based are presented in a series of appendices.

The evaluation includes 51 findings, 16 conclusions, and 15 recommendations. Findings concern the evolution of UDAPE's mission; UDAPE's role in policy design and implementation; the quantity, nature and quality of UDAPE's products; contingencies affecting utilization; internal and external views of UDAPE's strengths, weaknesses and comparative advantage; the composition and role of UDAPE's Board of Directors; clients and priorities; morale; use of external technical assistance; feedback mechanisms; UDAPE's future mission and scope of operations; the organization's possible vulnerability; and issues of sustainability.

The evaluation's principal recommendations address UDAPE's future mission and governance structure. It is suggested that UDAPE focus its principal attention on reactivation

and growth, that it continue to operate under the aegis of the Ministry of Planning, and that it reinvigorate its Board of Directors in order to broaden its constituency within the government.

Considerable emphasis is also placed on the importance of UDAPE utilizing a forward-looking workplan, on at least a semi-annual basis, as a means of securing commitment on a set of priorities and an array of studies to be undertaken. This same planning process should provide a participatory forum for considering the operational implications of any implicit or explicit changes in UDAPE's mission or scope of operations.

The evaluation argues that any efforts to broaden the range or number of activities undertaken by UDAPE, or to replicate the "UDAPE model", should be entered into only very cautiously and with an eye to the somewhat unique factors that have led to UDAPE's success to date. Moreover, it is suggested that UDAPE's position may be more vulnerable than has been heretofore appreciated and that it might therefore be appropriate to consider contingency plans for establishing a think tank outside of the government sometime in the future.

At a more operational level, the evaluation recommends that certain specific steps be taken to maintain or increase morale at UDAPE and that certain actions be taken to enhance the impact of foreign technical assistance.

This evaluation concludes that UDAPE has been, and continues to be, a very effective institution. The quality of UDAPE's work and technical capacity is widely recognized both in and out of the government in Bolivia and has recently begun to acquire serious international recognition. Perhaps the ultimate compliment has been paid in that there is now considerable interest in replicating the UDAPE model in several other countries. This evaluation recommends that USAID/Bolivia continue to support UDAPE for the foreseeable future.

## CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Decrees of the Government of Bolivia establishing a semi-autonomous Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE) under the aegis of the Ministry of Planning were signed on October 5, 1982 and August 22, 1983. The USAID/Bolivia Project providing funding for the operationalization of this Unit was approved in 1983 for \$1.2 million and an initial period of 3 years; was amended in 1986 to add an additional \$3.8 million and an additional 3 years to the project; and was subsequently extended on a no-cost basis until August of 1991. It is currently the Mission's intention to further extend the current project into 1992 to permit completion of the project's scope of work and to prepare a follow-on project to begin upon completion of the current project.

The nature and function of UDAPE, and of the USAID project supporting it, have been extensively and well documented in the original Project Paper, the amendment to that paper and two previous evaluations of the project (in 1985 and 1988) conducted by Dr. Kenneth Jameson, and an internal evaluation (Trajectory UDAPE) prepared by UDAPE in anticipation of the current exercise. No effort is made in this evaluation to repeat the information contained in those previous documents.

The current evaluation is intended to serve three purposes. First, but least importantly, the evaluation is intended to serve as an "end of project" evaluation augmenting and updating the information already available on UDAPE's performance with respect to the objectives outlined in the project paper. Secondly, the evaluation is intended to identify any problems or opportunities of immediate relevance to UDAPE that should be addressed in the remaining year of the current project. Finally, and most importantly, the evaluation is intended to identify lessons learned and other findings that might have direct implications for the design of the Mission's intended follow-on project. In addition, the evaluation incorporates a special interest in issues related to policy implementation reflecting the particular concerns of the Implementing Policy Change Project (IPC) through which the evaluation exercise was conducted.

The scope of work for this evaluation was prepared by the USAID Mission and is presented as Appendix A of this document. The team conducting the evaluation consisted of Lawrence Cooley and Benjamin Crosby of MSI who served as Team Leader and Institutional Specialist, respectively, and Jorge Daly of DAI who served as Economist on the team. Participation by this team was arranged through a buy-in to the IPC Project funded and managed by A.I.D.'s Bureau for Science and Technology. Wayne Tate and Sonia Aranibar of USAID/Bolivia served as key resources and adjunct members of the team as did Juan Carlos Requena, Gaby Candia and Jose Luis Lupo of UDAPE. The evaluation was conducted from May 6-17, 1991.

## CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY

This evaluation employs a methodology consisting of several distinct components. The basic data collection activities include the following:

- an inventory and categorization of all studies carried out by UDAPE between 1988 and 1991 based on documentation available in UDAPE files (Appendix B);
- an itemized inventory of the utilization and impact of UDAPE studies between August of 1988 and April of 1991 based on interviews with UDAPE staff (Appendix C);
- interviews with responsible USAID, UDAPE and HIID sources on a range of operational and policy issues;
- structured interviews with all members of UDAPE's professional staff to determine organizational strengths, weaknesses, problems and opportunities (Appendix D);
- structured interviews with a range of key actors inside and outside the Government of Bolivia to gain insight into UDAPE's effectiveness and to judge the support for UDAPE's current and potential structure and functions (Appendix E); and
- a detailed investigation of selected case studies to permit an independent assessment of study quality (by the economist on the evaluation team) and a more careful investigation of the contingencies affecting the utilization and impact of UDAPE studies (Appendix F).

Several background documents were also reviewed including the Project Paper, the 1986 amendment to the Project Paper, previous evaluations, the internal evaluation prepared by UDAPE, and various other tabular information put together by UDAPE staff.

The classificatory structure used to describe the nature of UDAPE's activities is drawn directly from that developed in earlier evaluations of the project in order to facilitate the assessment of changes over time in the quantity and nature of UDAPE's activities. This structure quantifies the number of studies completed each year in terms of type, client and subject.

The report's analysis of utilization first divides UDAPE studies since 1988 into five categories or levels of utilization, based on the knowledge of UDAPE personnel--(1) directly utilized/major impact on policy; (2) directly utilized/substantial impact on policy; (3) degree of utilization not certain/indirect impact on policy; (4) utilized indirectly at UDAPE; and (5) no apparent impact on policy. A utilization profile was then prepared for each study included in the first two of these categories indicating how the study originated, who did the study, what evidence exists as to the study's utilization and impact, the source(s) of information by which

UDAPE staff know about that utilization and impact, and possible explanations for the report's apparent utility.

Interviews with UDAPE staff were conducted based on a structured interview guide. Information was then synthesized in terms of the management and operational issues of particular interest to this evaluation exercise. In that synthesis, a special attempt was made to distinguish those observations that constituted prevalent views among staff members from those that ostensibly represented the views of a single individual. A similar process was applied to the analysis and presentation of the data obtained from external interviews.

Case studies were chosen to illustrate best-case scenarios and to generate additional insights regarding utilization, rather than to be broadly representative of UDAPE's portfolio. The three senior most members of UDAPE's staff were each asked separately to nominate the 6 studies undertaken since 1988 that they felt had had the greatest impact on government policy. From a collective list of 9 studies compiled in this way, a total of 6 were chosen based on the criterion of seeking maximum diversity in terms of subject matter. The six studies chosen in this way were used as the basis for the evaluation team's independent review of study quality and as case studies through which to gain deeper insights into the factors contributing to the utilization and impact of UDAPE's work.

Data gathered from all of the sources noted above was analyzed in part using a simple organizational viability model. This model, which is depicted below, examines an organization's viability in terms of several considerations including, most importantly, the following:

- the congruence of views among those internal to an organization as to the organization's mission and program priorities;
- the consistency, as perceived internally, between the organization's mission and its program priorities;
- the congruence of views among key actors external and internal to the organization with respect to the organization's mission and program priorities, and the consistency of those views with the objective data available on the organization's de facto priorities;
- the congruence of views among those internal to the organization as to that which is most valuable or worthwhile about the organization and how they would hope to see it evolve;
- the congruence of views among key actors external to the organization as to what is most valuable or worthwhile about the organization and how they would hope to see it evolve, and the consistency between these views and the views of those internal to the organization;

- the congruence between the things key actors internal and external to the organization value about or wish from the organization and its current mission, program priorities and management procedures;
- the financial and human resources available to the organization and their consistency with its current and possible future role;
- the "external resources" available to the organization to support its resilience and sustainability in the event of a loss in support from its principal client or patron;
- the "sensitivity" or feedback mechanisms the organization has for detecting and responding to a lack of congruence or consistency in any of the above areas.

### Organizational Viability Model

	Image	Values	Resources
Internal	Mission Program		
External	Mission Program		
Sensitivity			

A second model borrowed from the field of strategic management was also used as an aid to structuring and interpreting the data collected in this evaluation exercise. This model known as SWOT is a simple way of arraying and analyzing an organization's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in order to draw conclusions as to the most appropriate strategy for that organization to pursue in the future.

While both the organizational viability model and the SWOT model were used in this report to inform its conclusions and recommendations, neither of these models is explicitly used for presentational purposes in an effort to improve the report's readability and accessibility.

In addition to the data collection and analysis described in the previous paragraphs, roundtable discussions were held with UDAPE and USAID staff to discuss tentative findings of the evaluation exercise and to explore alternative explanations for the data obtained by the evaluation team. Several preliminary findings and conclusions were modified as a result of these discussions and several new recommendations were generated.

Findings, conclusions and recommendations from the above-mentioned sources are analyzed and presented as responses to a series of management issues of interest to USAID/Bolivia and UDAPE. In some cases, such issues are addressed on the basis of data

obtained from one of the sources noted above. In other cases, data from several sources are woven together to constitute a fuller response to the issue. To avoid any confusion as to the evidence that forms the basis for the report's conclusions and recommendations, data sources are maintained intact in the report's appendices.



## CHAPTER III: FINDINGS

This chapter summarizes the findings of the current evaluation exercise. As noted above, these findings are drawn principally from the data contained in the appendices to the report, and readers are encouraged to consult those appendices for fuller elaboration of some of the evidence summarized in this chapter. This chapter limits itself to a presentation of the data or evidence the evaluation team was able to collect with respect to a number of issues of interest. Conclusions and recommendations based on this evidence are presented in Chapters IV and V, respectively.

### A. UDAPE's Past Performance

#### i) Evolution of UDAPE's Mission

Finding #1: The amended project paper incorporates a significant change in the purpose of the A.I.D. project. The amendment establishes the implementation of appropriate economic policies, and not merely the establishment of an institutionalized analytical capability, as the criterion by which the project's effectiveness should be judged. By implication, this change represents an expansion of UDAPE's mission to include explicit attention to promoting the utilization of the analyses conducted by the Unit.

Finding #2: UDAPE is increasingly reactive and in the direct service of the Minister of Planning. The proportion of UDAPE's studies which were demand-driven ayudas memorias rather than analytic studies, methodological studies, or statistical studies increased from 27% in 1988 to 49% in 1990. The proportion of ayudas memorias conducted for the Ministry of Planning increased from 63% to 73% during this same period. These two statistical trends are further corroborated by the perceptions of most of those individuals interviewed, both inside and outside of UDAPE.

Finding #3: There has begun to emerge within UDAPE a concern with macro-economic issues associated with reactivation and growth. This interest has begun to be reflected in priority areas for research and analysis, and, the recent conferences convened by UDAPE on the subjects of reactivation and growth indicate an increasing concern with these issues. Several Government of Bolivia actors expressed a desire that UDAPE take on a greater role in the analysis of sectoral and reactivation/growth issues. In partial response to this, UDAPE is convening a major conference in June, 1991 to examine some of the constraints to growth and reactivation and to help frame an agenda for policy making in those critical areas. That activity notwithstanding, however, issues of macroeconomic stabilization still constitute the preponderance of the studies being undertaken by UDAPE, and UDAPE staff are reluctant to see UDAPE drawn into the more technical and micro-economic aspects of the issues associated with reactivation and growth.

Finding #4: There is a fairly consistent view within UDAPE regarding the nature of the organization's mission. The mission is generally described as serving as a technical adviser to

the government on short run economic policy formulation and decision-making. However, according to several key internal actors, that mission has begun to expand and evolve as the organization has gained credibility. It now includes a greater emphasis on technical advice for defining the strategic direction of economic policy..."UDAPE has to define how the country will grow."

Finding #5: Among key actors and UDAPE clients, there were only slight differences of opinion concerning UDAPE's mission. Those actors most concerned with problems of economic stabilization and short-run policy see UDAPE as a technical adviser supporting the policy formulation process of the government, particularly in the formulation and monitoring of short-run economic measures. Those actors more concerned with sectoral issues share that concept but also express a desire that UDAPE expand its mission to cover technical advice and support in the formulation of sectoral policy and analysis of the social impact of economic stabilization policies. Both types of actors indicate that UDAPE's mission ought to give a greater role to technical support for the definition of long run policy.

ii) UDAPE's Role in Policy Design and Implementation

Finding #1: Utilization of UDAPE's work continues to be commendably high. A desk review, buttressed by substantial documentary and anecdotal evidence, indicates that 44% of the studies completed by UDAPE between August of 1988 and April of 1991 were put to direct use, and a further 34% were put to indirect use, in formulating and/or implementing the government's policy reform agenda. Of those studies put to direct use, 38% were translated directly into governmental policy statements, decrees or negotiating positions and the remaining 62% had a clear role in supporting government policy actions. A more careful review of selected cases by the evaluation team indicated several impressive cases of utilization and impact.

Finding #2: UDAPE has had substantial influence on policy implementation as well as on policy formulation. The predominant view within UDAPE is that its work is directed towards policy formulation. However, UDAPE's documentary record, the case studies reviewed, and the interviews conducted inside and outside of UDAPE indicate that many of the studies served to assist policy implementation by operationalizing nominal policies, clarifying the implications of alternative courses of action, and responding to criticisms of policy actions. In addition, one of UDAPE's primary and most important roles, according to its principal clients, is the monitoring of short term economic measures, quite clearly an implementation function. Experience also suggests that, as with projects, it is important to seek mechanisms for integrating implementation considerations into the policy formulation process. UDAPE's record of performance would appear to contain cases where this linkage has been explicitly incorporated into the studies undertaken and other cases where it has not.

Finding #3: UDAPE's current organizational placement within the Ministry of Planning is perceived as affording it considerable access to certain important decision-makers with a relatively low cost with respect to autonomy and independence of judgement. Its staff are frequently involved in important ways in the formulation of macro-economic policy and are

called on to contribute in one way or another to most items on the macro-economic policy agenda. On the other hand, UDAPE personnel express some frustration that this status as in-house advisers leads to very heavy demand for the solution of immediate problems (or "fire-fighting") and often limits their ability to focus attention on longer range policy issues. There is also some regret, both within and outside UDAPE, that UDAPE's status as in-house advisers limits their ability to disseminate their findings to a broader audience inasmuch as their effectiveness as advisers is predicated, in part, on their "invisibility" outside a small circle of policy-makers and advisers.

**Finding #4:** The principal vehicles through which UDAPE has encouraged utilization of its products are its direct relationship to the Minister of Planning and its participation in the Macro Committee. Interviews with UDAPE staff and senior officials outside of UDAPE indicate that a personal relationship with the Minister, predicated on mutual confidence and respect, has been critical to UDAPE's effectiveness. UDAPE is an adviser, along with SAFCO, to the Macro Committee -- which includes representatives from the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. The Macro Committee is the agent responsible for both the design and monitoring of the GOB's short term economic program. UDAPE is also an adviser in CONEPLAN, currently chaired by the Minister of Planning. CONEPLAN serves as a central source for generating UDAPE studies and encouraging their utilization.

Although UDAPE's primary access to the government is through the Ministry of Planning, its participation in the Macro Committee and CONEPLAN has served to widen considerably its access to the most senior levels of the GOB. That UDAPE's input is widely sought and valued outside the Macro Committee is illustrated by recent major studies undertaken for the Ministries of Industry, Foreign Relations, Energy, and Agriculture.

### iii) Quantity, Nature and Quality of UDAPE Products

**Finding #1:** The quantity of studies produced by UDAPE continues to be impressive and to exceed the targets set in the project documentation. With a relatively small technical staff (at present, 11 plus division chiefs), UDAPE produced 85 studies in 1984, 125 in 1985, 148 in 1986, 103 in 1987, 91 in 1988, 47 in 1989 (an election year), 95 in 1990, and 27 in the first quarter of 1991. The project paper called for them to produce a total of 75 analyses and studies. If UDAPE were to produce another 100 studies by June of 1992 (the project's currently scheduled completion date), the Unit will have produced a total of 821 studies and will have exceeded the quantitative target set in the amended project paper by 1000%!

**Finding #2:** Since 1988, the composition of UDAPE studies shows a consistent increase in the number of ayudas memorias and a corresponding decline in the number of analytic studies reflecting the increasing requests from the government on UDAPE to address pressing policy issues. As a proportion of total studies undertaken, ayudas memorias increased at a relatively constant rate from 27% of total studies in 1988 to 59% of total studies in the first third of 1991. During this same period, analytical studies as a proportion of total studies declined from 47% to 33%. While most ayudas memorias include significant analytical content, their distinguishing

feature is the fact that they are in response to a specific question or issue raised by a specific policy-maker. In 1990, 73% of these ayudas memorias were in response to requests from the Ministry of Planning. At the same time, the number of requests from the government for analytic studies has also increased. In 1988 only 26% of the 43 analytic studies executed were done so on request of the government, whereas in 1990, that figure had risen to 66% of UDAPE's analytic studies.

**Finding #3:** The quality of UDAPE studies continues to be commendably high. UDAPE's primary clients and other external actors give it uniformly high marks across the spectrum of products produced. Studies were rated as either excellent or very good. In no case were the studies considered merely good or fair.

**Finding #4:** Although the studies produced by UDAPE have been given high marks for their quality, they are not always easily accessible to non-economist readers. Among the external interviews conducted, there were several comments to the effect that UDAPE's studies were sometimes "too technical", too "theoretical", or too "dense". One key external actor said that the size of some of the studies was off-putting and would benefit by the addition of an executive summary which clearly and concisely stated recommendations (It should be mentioned here that UDAPE officials said that in the "majority of cases, studies requested by the government do contain an executive summary.) According to another key actor, given the small and rather specialized nature of UDAPE's clientele, technical density of the studies was not necessarily a problem. Nevertheless, most external officials did agree that such problems limit the potential impact of some studies.

**Finding #5:** The issues addressed in the studies conducted by UDAPE are classified into two categories: macroeconomic studies and macrosectorial studies. Of all the studies covered in this evaluation period, 66.7% were on macroeconomic issues, 26.8% were on macrosectorial issues, and 6.5% of the studies were classified as having content in both categories. The principal issues addressed by the macroeconomic studies were fiscal policy, overall evaluation of the Bolivian economy, trade, financial program, external debt and inflation. With respect to macrosectorial issues, industry evaluation, wages and employment, agricultural policies and energy were some of the issues that were addressed.

**Finding #6:** UDAPE's de facto priorities do not differ significantly from those implicit in its mission. Most studies are directed at providing technical advice regarding the short-run economic stabilization policies of the GOB. However, as UDAPE's perceived mission evolves to include a greater role in technical advice on sectoral and longer-term growth strategy and policy, so too have priorities begun to shift. Illustrative of this shift are recent studies and advice on the GOB's alternative development strategy, the problem of interest rates as a constraint to reactivation and growth, advice to the Ministry of Industry on export policy and advice to the Foreign Ministry on free trade with Chile.

iv) Contingencies Affecting Utilization

Finding #1: Many of UDAPE's studies are intended to have an indirect rather than a direct impact on policy. Methodological and statistical studies are particularly noteworthy in this regard as are those analytical studies intended for referential purposes and those cases where several ayudas memorias are directed towards the same policy action. This matter is well discussed in the earlier evaluations of this project. While the indirect linkage of some of UDAPE's studies to the Government of Bolivia's policy efforts complicates the monitoring and evaluation of utilization, this diversity in UDAPE's portfolio is widely regarded (both internally and externally) as a strength rather than a deficiency in UDAPE's approach.

v) Internal and External Views of UDAPE's Strengths, Weaknesses and Comparative Advantage

Finding #1: UDAPE's strengths and comparative advantage, as perceived internally, emphasize staff skills in macro-economic analysis, interdisciplinary capacity, reliability, lack of political interference, stability of the core technical team, a non-bureaucratic work environment, the organization's capacity for fast response to requests, its access and its credibility. UDAPE staff feel that UDAPE is the only organization in Bolivia capable of carrying out serious analysis and monitoring of government economic policy. They also feel that emphasis on the continued development of their internal capacity for macro-economic analysis will carry that comparative advantage well into the future.

Finding #2: As perceived internally, UDAPE's principal weaknesses were considered to be the lack of a clear nexus between its two divisions (macro-sectoral and macroeconomic), salary levels, excessive workload, and the hurried nature of work in UDAPE. Other weaknesses cited were lack of clarification of roles, responsibilities, and lines of communication; turnover of staff; the small size of the organization in relation to its mission; lack of contact with other organizations at the technical level; problems of coordination with other agencies; lack of institutionalization; and uncertainty caused by the "non-permanent" nature of the UDAPE project.

Finding #3: UDAPE's strengths and comparative advantage, as perceived externally, are its technical competence in economic analysis, its fast response to requests, its credibility to a range of audiences, and its willingness to operate "behind the scenes" to promote careful analysis and effective policy dialogue. Several observers stated that UDAPE is the only reliable source for indicators and analysis on important economic policy. Other strengths cited were its lack of bureaucratization, its non-political character, independence of judgement, and pragmatism.

Finding #4: External perceptions of UDAPE's weaknesses revolved around threats posed by the environment, such as the possibility of political interference in the organization, or the cut-off of funding. Another threat cited was the possibility of a deterioration in UDAPE's professional staff because of inadequate funding.

## B. Current Operational Issues

### i) Composition and Role of the Board of Directors

Finding #1: Early on in the Team's evaluation of UDAPE it was indicated that there was a lack of clarity concerning the intended role of the Board of Directors. The Board is a relatively recent creation, having replaced the previous Advisory Group by Supreme Decree #22447 on February 28, 1990. The Board's functions are described in a UDAPE document, "Rol Institucional de UDAPE, Organizacion, y Descripcion de Funciones." The Consejo is intended to function primarily as a decision-making, governing, and oversight body with a responsibility to determine or ratify programmatic priorities; and as a means for facilitating communication between UDAPE, their respective organizations, and CONEPLAN. It is noteworthy that, by all appearances, the first of these functions is now performed to some extent by the Minister of Planning, and the other functions are performed on an informal basis by the Macro Committee.

Finding #2: The current Board of Directors performs little or no apparent function. The most immediate reason is that the Board does not meet. When those who belong were asked about the functioning of the Board, the replies ranged from "I don't remember the last meeting", to "it has not been convened". Indeed, one interviewee was chagrined to discover that he was a member. Exactly why the Board does not meet is not very clear, but there is a consensus among outside actors that it ought to meet. The fact that the Board does not meet does not appear to have dampened enthusiasm for UDAPE even among the members of the Board. One net effect of the current governance arrangement at UDAPE is considerable independence on the part of the Director with respect to the management and priorities of the organization. Another net effect, however, is the lack of any mechanism other than the Minister of Planning himself to shield UDAPE from requests made on it from any source. The rather singular dependence on the Minister of Planning also runs the risk of making UDAPE even more a creature of the Ministry of Planning than it already is.

Finding #3: There are important functions a Board of Directors could perform, assuming that it met. In particular, an effective Board could serve to broaden the constituency for UDAPE and help protect it from some of its current "firefighting" requests by agreeing on a workplan that includes attention to longer range analytical issues and studies of agreed importance, and adopting a clear statement of priorities that would allow UDAPE to refuse to take on certain kinds of requests. In addition, an effective Board could provide a forum for dealing with some of the controversies that are likely to arise as UDAPE begins to work on the more politically contested policies associated with reactivation and growth.

There is some argument that the Board, as it is currently composed, cannot perform these functions effectively. The reason stated is that some members are more "operative" or concerned with the tasks of implementation rather than policy-making, and are thus less "interested" or suited to the tasks. However, the official membership of the Board is composed of a wide range of officials, capable of looking at sectoral issues, and not simply the issues of short-term macro-economic policy measures.

ii) Clients and Priorities

Finding #1: The demand for UDAPE's products from clients other than the Ministry of Planning has declined over time. In particular, apparent utilization of UDAPE's services by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank has declined to relatively low levels. However, several external sources indicated that the Consejo Directivo could play a valuable role in generating greater demand from those agencies represented on the Board.

Finding #2: UDAPE's de facto priorities are determined by current demands for their services. Nevertheless, many of the studies done on UDAPE's own initiative are attempts (often successful) to foresee demand. Methodologies and diagnostics for dealing with new policy areas are frequently developed in advance of actual demand by clients.

Finding #3: UDAPE has so far been able to respond to almost all serious requests for its services, although frequently at a cost to their ability to undertake longer-term analytical exercises. UDAPE's delivery capability is now taxed to the limit given current staffing levels. Servicing of additional demand or greater attention to longer-term analytical exercises would be possible only with an increase in available staff and/or the need to say "no" to requests deemed to be of lower priority. UDAPE, for reasons noted above, has no obvious mechanism for screening requests and thus depends on the diplomatic skills of the director and the occasional intervention of the Minister of Planning on those infrequent occasions when they are currently obliged to say "no" to a request for their services. A functioning Board of Directors could aid substantially in mitigating this problem.

iii) Morale

Finding #1: Despite significant staff turnover, morale appears to be generally high at UDAPE. People evidence satisfaction with their work, an appreciation for their work environment, and a respect for one another. Staff work long hours with minimal direct supervision and without major complaint.

Finding #2: The most important factors contributing to high morale at UDAPE appear to be the ability to do thorough analysis and the opportunity to be personally involved with important national policy decisions from identification through adoption and implementation. In several cases, staff had extensive contact with top officials involved in negotiating policies and occasionally served as direct resources in buttressing agency positions. The need to remain relatively "invisible" to the outside world did not appear to be a matter of particular concern. Several other factors were mentioned as contributing to a positive climate within UDAPE: the prestige associated with UDAPE, freedom of action, opportunities to learn, the chance to innovate, the spirit of teamwork, and the richness of group discussions.

While no one argued seriously that there was a morale problem in UDAPE, several elements of an operational nature were considered negative. These included such things as sign-

in sheets which were argued to be unnecessary for professionals of the category in UDAPE, the lack of a sufficient number of computers, periodic overload, and a lack of heaters (the offices are rather cold). The need to limit distribution of certain important but sensitive studies has on occasion produced frustration among staff professionals who would like to see their contributions more widely disseminated.

**Finding #3:** Salary levels substantially higher than those existing in the rest of the government are essential to maintaining morale. At present, salary levels are significantly higher than the entirely inadequate salaries paid to normal civil servants. Professionals in UDAPE do not consider this to be the relevant comparison, however, and cite the approximately 30% negative differential between their salaries and those of individuals with comparable skills working outside of government. This latter differential has resulted in an inability of UDAPE to recruit certain candidates, and is a source of dissatisfaction for many of those currently working at UDAPE.

**Finding #4:** Outside of the satisfaction of working in an important and dynamic organization such as UDAPE, there are few incentives for long term commitment. UDAPE's current organizational structure is rather flat and allows for little vertical mobility. At the same time, current internal policy does not provide for professional development beyond the masters degree. Once a staff member has a masters degree, there is no opportunity for future training. Some UDAPE staff members implied that they would like to pursue opportunities for internships in the World Bank or similar organizations. of speculation. Current operating procedures at UDAPE also offer staff few opportunities to enhance their professional reputations by publishing their work in journals or elsewhere.

**Finding #5:** The changes that would have the greatest negative effect on morale at UDAPE are those implicit in the previous two findings. Any changes that entailed the need for additional "firefighting", additional work on minor policy issues, broadening of the organization's mandate, reduced inclusion in the policy process, or less competitive salaries could be expected to have a negative impact on morale. Serious or substantial politicizing of the organization would have a similar effect.

iv) Use of External Technical Assistance

**Finding #1:** UDAPE has made substantial and effective use of external technical assistance. Foreign consultants provided through HIID have participated in a significant portion of the 260 studies carried out since 1988, including some of the most significant of these studies. The recent conference for Bolivian policy-makers hosted at Harvard is also mentioned as an effective use of outside assistance.

**Finding #2:** External technical assistance is perceived as having been most effective when there was an appropriate long-term advisor at UDAPE. Only once during the project's 7 year history, for a period of two years, has there been a long-term resident advisor seen by the Bolivians as appropriate and effective. During much of the rest of the project's history, this post



has been vacant. Both the Director of UDAPE and the individual backstopping this project at HIID believe that the external technical assistance provided under the project was much more effective during the two-year period when an appropriate long-term advisor was present in Bolivia.

**Finding #3:** External technical assistance has frequently functioned as an extension of UDAPE's technical resources, delivery capability and credibility. UDAPE staff can cite many cases in which HIID staff worked side by side with UDAPE personnel in ways that not only increased the size of UDAPE's effective staff, but also transferred skills to the Bolivian staff and credibility to the particular studies involved. Other cases are cited, however, where HIID undertook actions independent of UDAPE and/or made little effort to share their data or expertise with members of the UDAPE staff.

**Finding #4:** UDAPE has achieved a remarkable technical maturity in a short period of time; nevertheless, external technical assistance can continue, and would be enhanced by certain operational changes. These changes include increasing the participation of Bolivians as co-principal investigators in studies undertaken by external consultants; giving the UDAPE Director greater responsibility for programming and overseeing the external technical assistance; and designing the scopes of work for individual studies so as to permit or require outside consultants to conduct technical consultations and staff development activities with relevant UDAPE personnel.

**Finding #5:** The "matrix system" by which UDAPE obtains the release of technicians from the relevant ministries to participate as full members of UDAPE study teams appears to have functioned very well. This approach, which includes supplementation of the salaries of the individuals participating in the studies, is said to have improved the relevance of the studies, expanded the staff resources available to UDAPE, provided an opportunity for strengthening the analytical skills of individuals in the line ministries, and improved UDAPE's acceptability in the recipient organizations.

v) Feedback Mechanisms

**Finding #1:** UDAPE has informal but entirely adequate mechanisms for monitoring the utilization of its work and taking corrective action based on that information. UDAPE staff evidenced an impressive ability to describe in some detail the specific actions taken on the basis of their work. They also showed a commendable frankness in acknowledging those cases where the hoped-for utilization had not taken place and offered thoughtful comments on why this had occurred. In those few cases where division directors were not able to answer such questions from memory, a brief consultation of project files produced the relevant information. This level of knowledge is particularly noteworthy in that well over 100 separate studies were discussed.

**Finding #2:** UDAPE has only very informal mechanisms for obtaining feedback on its mission, priorities and image. In the absence of a functioning Board or some periodic effort to poll key external audiences, UDAPE is forced to rely on occasional comments and demand for their services as their only real feedback on the perceptions of key external audiences regarding UDAPE's overall strategic direction and priorities. The organization also seems to lack any systematic means of reviewing its mission and priorities in the light of changing circumstances. This lack of more formal mechanisms appears to account for the slow response UDAPE has given to demands that it direct more of its activities toward the problem of reactivation and growth.

### **C. UDAPE's Future**

#### **i) Future Mission and Scope of Operations**

**Finding #1:** There are considerable pressures to expand the scope of UDAPE's operations and/or to replicate the UDAPE "model". Nothing succeeds like success, and there is a predictable desire in many quarters to increase UDAPE's role and/or create other UDAPE-like organizations to deal with the formulation and implementation of sectoral policies. For instance, the following roles have been mentioned by one or more external actors interviewed:

- social policy analysis;
- specialized or sub-sectoral policy analysis;
- macro-economic implications of social sector policy;
- social implications of macro-economic policy.

Of UDAPE's current activities, the only one mentioned that could be transferred to other institutions was the monitoring of short-term policies.

**Finding #2:** There is considerable resistance within UDAPE to expanding the scope of its operations. This resistance derives from UDAPE's reluctance to be drawn outside its area of technical expertise and its concern that most of the new directions suggested for it would involve taking over functions currently vested in line ministries. Secondly, an increase in functions or operations would almost certainly lead to a significant expansion of the organization and increased bureaucratization. Several staff members feel that these elements could easily lead to a deterioration of UDAPE's productive climate.

**Finding #3:** The macro-policy issues of greatest relevance to Bolivia in the coming years are likely to be at the sectoral level and to concern reactivation and growth. While there will continue to be important issues related to the maintenance of economic stability, the major issues on the minds of Bolivian policy makers relate to the need to accelerate the country's low rate of economic growth. UDAPE has begun to direct some attention towards the policy issues associated with reactivation and growth and recognizes that any such change in focus is likely to have important implications for its mission, priorities, clients and modes of operation. Few

operational or substantive changes have yet been made, however, and the implications of any such changes are only beginning to receive the attention they will require. The conference on growth and reactivation being convened in June in La Paz represents a significant step in this process.

Finding #4: There are a variety of views as to the optimal organizational placement and client group for UDAPE. The three principal alternatives with respect to organizational placement include the status quo, the instituting of genuine control by a high-level Board of Directors, and the establishment of UDAPE as a "think tank" outside of the government. Each of these options is perceived as having significant pros and cons with respect to UDAPE's effectiveness as an organization. In particular, there is probably a trade-off in the longer run between access and independence. There is precedent for each of the three models noted above operating effectively in the Bolivian context.

ii) Possible Vulnerability

Finding #1: UDAPE's success has been, and continues to be, heavily conditioned on the talent and sensitivity of the individuals who have served as Minister of Planning, Director of UDAPE, and A.I.D. Project Manager. Many of the potentially awkward issues associated with this trilateral relationship have been handled informally and verbally. A.I.D. has shown commendable restraint in refraining from interfering in UDAPE's priorities or in the substance of UDAPE's work. Two Ministers of Planning in a row have chosen to regard UDAPE as a significant asset, and have seen the value in allowing UDAPE to retain its objectivity and relative independence. The current Director of UDAPE has shown considerable talent in balancing and brokering the various pressures brought to bear on his organization. Much is dependent on the personalities and philosophies of the individuals involved, and on the relationships among these individuals. The increasingly strong link between UDAPE and the Minister of Planning makes its continued functioning in the current mode particularly dependent on the caliber and orientation of the individual serving as Minister of Planning.

Finding #2: Several respondents both inside and outside of UDAPE remarked on the political vulnerability of the organization. Situated in the Ministry of Planning, UDAPE has relatively little protection against significant changes in political leadership and political climate. While UDAPE appears to be non-partisan, and maintains a technocratic posture, it clearly has a point of view and on a number of important policy issues and places a high value on its ability to influence policy outcomes. Fortunately for UDAPE, its point of view is highly coincident with the current consensus both within and out of government concerning economic stabilization and the policy measures needed to achieve it. It is that coincidence that allows UDAPE its "apolitical" and "objective" posture.

Should a new government with rather different ideas concerning stabilization and growth appear, UDAPE's point of view could easily clash with that of the policy makers in government. In such circumstances, several key UDAPE professionals have said that they would be unable to continue.

As UDAPE alters its priorities to include more analysis of sectoral issues and the problems of reactivation and growth, it is increasingly less likely that it will encounter easy consensus. As this occurs, their current posture as "apolitical and objective" will be increasingly difficult to sustain. UDAPE will therefore have to prepare itself for conducting research on an increasingly contentious set of policies and could be threatened by the ensuing controversy.

Finding #3: A full integration of UDAPE into the Ministry of Planning or its full incorporation under civil service policy would be likely to result in a reduction of UDAPE salaries with disastrous effects on staff recruitment, retention and morale. Experience elsewhere suggests that civil service reform, if undertaken, will probably result in an increase in the salary levels of professionals in the civil service and a corresponding pressure to ensure that exceptional arrangements such as UDAPE's are minimized or eliminated. Any upward revision of civil service salaries is unlikely to match the levels currently enjoyed by UDAPE employees.

iii) Sustainability

Finding #1: UDAPE is extremely dependent in the short run on the funding decisions of A.I.D.. Most of those costs that are not met directly by A.I.D. under the Policy Reform Project are financed out of the local currency generated through the PL 480 Title III program.

Finding #2: There is no evidence that the Government of Bolivia is prepared to meet the costs of operating UDAPE or that it would be in the best interest of UDAPE, A.I.D. or the policy reform process in Bolivia for them to do so. While the GOB appears to have a very high regard for UDAPE, they have yet to indicate any interest in meeting its operating costs. Were they to do so, the link to outside technical assistance would almost certainly be lost, there would be pressures to conform salaries to civil service scales, the likelihood of UDAPE being politicized would be increased, and A.I.D. would lose an important channel for bringing its policy concerns to the attention of the GOB. It may thus be appropriate to rethink conventional notions of financial sustainability in this case.

Finding #3: Other donors have expressed a willingness to support UDAPE. If need be, UDAPE could turn to other donors, particularly the World Bank and GTZ, for financial assistance. This eventuality is viewed as a second best option by both UDAPE and A.I.D. and would probably be pursued only in the event that A.I.D. funds were somehow to become unavailable.

Finding #4: Other GOB institutions have demonstrated an interest in "acquiring" UDAPE and/or its technicians. UDAPE and its staff have developed a reputation for technical competence and dedication and appear to be very well thought of, even by those who would like to see changes in priorities and products. It is also noteworthy, moreover, that while others would be pleased to increase their access to UDAPE and would like to see the Board structure operating more effectively, nobody expressed any resentment concerning the placement of UDAPE under the Ministry of Planning.

Finding #5: There is no evidence that UDAPE would be a more effective or sustainable organization if it were to become independent of external technical assistance. The value of external technical assistance in the context of an organization such as UDAPE concerns cross-fertilization and credibility as much as augmentation of technical skills. Should it become the case that the strength of UDAPE's permanent staff is such that external involvement is no longer necessary for purely technical purposes, experience elsewhere suggests that an appropriate form of professional interchange and outside perspective on Bolivia's economic policies would continue to be of value. While the nature of the relationship between UDAPE and such outside experts should be expected to continue to mature, it may be inappropriate to think of complete "independence" as the most desirable culmination of that relationship.

## CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS

A number of conclusions are suggested by the findings presented in Chapter III. As is always the case in evaluative exercises of this sort, the conclusions presented here represent efforts by the evaluators to explain or interpret the relevant data and are only as good as the quality of judgement exercised by the evaluators. It is entirely feasible that readers may agree with the findings as presented and nevertheless take issue with some of the suggested conclusions.

### A. UDAPE's Past Performance

Conclusion #1: The evaluation team joins the chorus of others who have commended UDAPE's performance and contribution. In terms of the quality and quantity of studies, and their impact on Bolivia's macro-economic policy environment, UDAPE should be judged to have surpassed the expectations and targets contained in the documentation authorizing the project.

Conclusion #2: UDAPE's change in role emphasizes its function as in-house policy advisors and staff support for selected policy makers, particularly the Minister of Planning. This change has increased its policy impact to date but has also limited its range of clients, its base of support, and its role as an agenda setter.

Conclusion #3: There currently exists a considerable variance between UDAPE's relatively narrow vision of its mission and the broader mission others would like to ascribe to it. UDAPE should be prepared either to broaden its role somewhat or to make a convincing case for maintaining its current focus.

Conclusion #4: UDAPE has recently begun to incorporate into its priorities policy issues associated with reactivation and growth but these efforts remain a small proportion of their portfolio.

Conclusion #5: The theoretical manner in which many UDAPE studies are presented limits the audience for, and impact of, these studies.

### B. Current Operational Issues

Conclusion #1: The dormancy of UDAPE's Board of Directors was a thought worrisome by several actors interviewed and considered to be a possible limit to even greater effectiveness of UDAPE as an organization. This situation can and should be rectified.

Conclusion #2: The absence of effective mechanisms for strategic planning, setting future priorities and encouraging demand from a broader range of clients needs attention at the earliest

possible date. While the Macro Committee performs this function in a limited ad hoc manner, it is more appropriately the function of the Board of Directors.

Conclusion #3: Morale at UDAPE, while generally high, could be easily undercut by a number of factors. It is important for the UDAPE Director, the Minister of Planning, the Board of Directors and USAID to reach agreement on these factors and on the steps that need to be taken to maintain the institution's current elan.

Conclusion #4: Technical assistance to UDAPE continues to be valuable to the organization but should be altered somewhat to correct for those shortcomings that exist currently.

### C. UDAPE's Future

Conclusion #1: UDAPE's scope of operations and substantive priorities cannot be changed or enlarged without considerable disruption to the factors responsible for UDAPE's currently high performance and morale. Given that some change is almost certainly necessary, UDAPE staff and its key external constituencies should plan such changes in a participatory and consultative manner. "Joint ventures" (in which it already has limited, but successful experience) for the conduct of certain research studies and analyses should be encouraged, where feasible, as an alternative to broadening UDAPE's role.

Conclusion #2: UDAPE should probably remain under the aegis of the Ministry of Planning but with an invigorated and active Board of Directors.

Conclusion #3: UDAPE will almost certainly be perceived as more "political" in the future than it was in past given the likely changes in its substantive agenda. Various devices could be employed to reduce the potential vulnerability occasioned by this change. The Board structure discussed above is one such device. Studies that present options rather than recommendations are another such device.

Conclusion #4: Sometime in the near future, UDAPE, along with its principal constituents, should give some serious thought regarding how much it values its "point of view" versus remaining an "inside" technical adviser. Should the former have more importance, then UDAPE should think about how it can maintain that point of view into an uncertain future of political and policy change. A potential alternative for that circumstance is the development of a "think tank". Although the cost would be a loss of immediate access in the case of a government with an opposing point of view, the organization would probably be capable of maintaining credibility and impact with in the policy arena.

Conclusion #5: UDAPE's continued effectiveness is more vulnerable than has been generally acknowledged. Broadening the organization's range of clients and constituency of support within the government is likely to be the most effective means for consolidating its position. Again, an active Board would be an obvious vehicle for widening UDAPE's client base and constituency.

Conclusion #6: Efforts to replicate the "UDAPE model" at the sectoral level will be successful only if they are attentive to the special factors present in the case of UDAPE. These factors include a highly competent unit that makes efforts not to overlap the functions of the line ministries; a willingness to work behind the scenes; a desire to influence policy formulation and implementation; a relationship of confidence with one or more key policy makers; and a willingness by A.I.D. not to intervene excessively in the substantive work of the unit. In the absence of any of these conditions, consideration should be given to alternative forms such as an outside "think tank", a policy neutral research unit, or strengthened analytical units within the line ministries. The concept of a unit housed within the government and conducting policy analysis while remaining "apolitical" is, in any event, unlikely to prove feasible.

Conclusion #7: Conventional notions of sustainability should be reconsidered in the case of UDAPE. The costs of supporting the Unit are relatively modest and a positive role for external financial and technical assistance exists for the foreseeable future.



## CHAPTER V: RECOMMENDATIONS

The principal recommendations outlined in this Chapter concern UDAPE's future operations and issues of concern in the context of a possible follow-on USAID project. As with the conclusions outlined in the previous chapter, these recommendations reflect judgements on the part of the evaluation team and should be subjected to vigorous discussion among the interested parties.

**Recommendation #1:** USAID should continue to provide financial support to UDAPE including meeting the costs associated with possible expansion of the organization.

**Recommendation #2:** UDAPE should reorient its priorities to place substantially greater emphasis on economic policy issues associated with reactivation and growth. Inasmuch as the evaluation team sees an ongoing need for UDAPE to remain actively involved in issues of macroeconomic stabilization for the foreseeable future, any such expansion of scope will likely require significant expansion. As many as five new professionals might be required.

**Recommendation #3:** If possible, increased attention to issues of reactivation and growth should be accomplished by recruiting into UDAPE a cadre of individuals with predominant interest in such issues rather than by attempting to redirect the attention of those professionals within the organization who are principally interested in analysis associated with economic stabilization.

**Recommendation #4:** The adoption of roles other than macro-economic or macro-sectorial policy analysis should be undertaken only after careful consideration of implications such changes would have for UDAPE's ongoing effectiveness and morale.

**Recommendation #5:** The "UDAPE's model" should be replicated only when and if the conditions associated with UDAPE's success are present. Other circumstances call, at a minimum, for careful adaptation of that model.

**Recommendation #6:** Immediate steps should be taken to reactivate UDAPE's Board of Directors. Responsibility should reside with the Board's President for convening the Board regularly. It is recommended that quarterly meetings be established as a regular practice. The Board's President should also have principal responsibility for maintaining informal contact with Board members and with other relevant organizations to ensure that their analytical needs are being effectively identified and integrated with UDAPE's ongoing priorities.

- Recommendation #7:** If, despite renewed efforts, the Board is unable to convene regularly or to perform its functions as outlined in the relevant decrees, consideration should be given to reconstituting the membership of the Board. In the interim, the President of the Board should have responsibility for consulting with his colleagues in government, agreeing with UDAPE on a set of priorities, and helping to "protect" UDAPE from unreasonable demands that fall outside those priorities.
- Recommendation #8:** As suggested above, a principal role of the Board should be to establish priorities. Such priorities should be established annually and revisited quarterly. Long-term studies and studies focused on future policy options should receive special attention inasmuch as these will be otherwise displaced by the exigencies of day-to-day emergencies. Consideration should be given to having these priorities ratified by CONEPLAN.
- Recommendation #9:** The workplan negotiated between USAID and UDAPE can and should take on greater importance as a means for clarifying UDAPE's analytical priorities. While A.I.D. should maintain the commendable practice of not interfering in UDAPE's substantive priorities or policy positions, it is reasonable for A.I.D. to use its workplan discussions to ensure that (1) a set of priorities and research issues have been defined that extend beyond immediate concerns; (2) these priorities have the support of senior policy makers in the government; and (3) mechanisms exist to permit UDAPE to respond to these priorities in an effective manner. It might also be appropriate to use the workplan reviews as a mechanism for USAID and other members of the donor community to communicate their opinions regarding key policy issues demanding attention by UDAPE. Any such indication should, however, be considered only as one additional input to UDAPE's Board in establishing priorities for UDAPE.
- Recommendation #10:** UDAPE should explore mechanisms for greater dissemination of its work and activities which do not compromise its ~~role~~ as an inside adviser to the government.
- Recommendation #11:** A contingency plan should be prepared for establishing UDAPE as a "think tank" outside the government.
- Recommendation #12:** A review should be undertaken of salary levels in UDAPE. If, as this evaluation suggests, the organization is unable to attract or retain top flight personnel without some upward revision in its salary scale, A.I.D. should support UDAPE and the government in introducing these salary increases.

**Recommendation #13:** UDAPE should explore greater use of non-financial incentives including training beyond the MA, attendance at professional conferences, and short internships in international organizations such as the IMF, and the World Bank.

**Recommendation #14:** A.I.D. should continue to finance the provision of external technical assistance to UDAPE and should incorporate into that provision various operational improvements as detailed elsewhere in this report to reflect and contribute to the maturing technical capability of the staff.

**Recommendation #15:** A.I.D./Washington should review and disseminate the experience of UDAPE and USAID/Bolivia's Policy Reform Project as instructive with regard to A.I.D.'s policy reform efforts in other countries.

## SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE REPLICABILITY OF THE UDAPE MODEL

Given the extraordinary degree of success achieved by UDAPE during its rather short existence, there is certainly likely to be a natural and strong temptation to attempt to replicate the model in other settings. But before proceeding, it is important to carefully examine the circumstances which have contributed to that success.

As currently construed, UDAPE serves two key functions: first, it has the task of providing key, accurate and credible information and data on and analysis of critical variables and issues regarding Bolivia's economy for the formulation of economic policy. Second, it also has the task of monitoring the implementation and performance of short-run macro-economic policies. The former is carried out both through major economic studies produced on UDAPE's own initiative as well as in response to direct requests from various agencies of the Bolivian government. Its technical capacity and ability to manage quick turnaround of ministry requests has given UDAPE an image of high credibility and near indispensability. It is the institution relied upon for data and analysis on macro policy issues. Monitoring of the implementation and performance of short-run macro-economic policy is part of UDAPE's function as an advisory member of the ad hoc "Macro Committee" formed by the Minister of Planning, the Minister of Finance, and the President of the Central Bank, the key actors in the formulation and monitoring of short-run macro-economic policy. It is here that UDAPE plays what is considered (among Ministers) an invaluable role in the implementation of critical economic policy.

Among policymakers, UDAPE is viewed as playing a vital role in the provision and analysis of information, and through the credibility of that analysis has carved an extremely influential niche. Among everyone that the evaluation team talked to, UDAPE's advice was highly valued and sought after. While UDAPE does not make policy per se, its input shapes both the direction and form of policy. Indeed, members of UDAPE's professional staff feel most satisfied with their work when they can directly see the impact of their analysis in policy outputs.

Several felicitous events have contributed to the success of UDAPE: first, continuous financing from AID has allowed the recruitment and maintenance of highly qualified staff (UDAPE is a government agency, yet it is almost entirely staffed by individuals with Masters Degrees in Economics.) as well as a certain degree of autonomy and protection despite its organizational placement within the Ministry of Planning. Second, the hyperinflationary period of the early, mid-eighties, and the implementation of severe austerity measures decimated the public sector, and in particular, the economic analytic capacity of the Central Bank. Third, the entrance of a neo-liberal government with sweeping plans for reform and the consummation of agreements with the IMF and the World Bank created a thirst for reliable economic data and analysis -- at that point, UDAPE was virtually the only organization that could supply such data or analysis. As a consequence, its star rose quickly and dramatically. Finally, access to world class technical assistance through an agreement with the Harvard Institute for International Development, has helped both to improve its technical capacity as well as to cement UDAPE's credibility.

Can the model be replicated? Yes, but only partially and probably only under rather similar environmental conditions. In most developing countries there are, generally, other organizations that carry out many, if not all, of the functions of an UDAPE. Such organizations, even if not competent, would likely be the source of serious and probably debilitating rivalry. Moreover, it is generally assumed, even if erroneously, that the Central Bank (which usually carries out the kind of functions UDAPE has) is reliable and competent, and therefore there is no real need for an UDAPE-type organization. Finally, it is unlikely that in other circumstances, the creation and growth of an UDAPE-type organization would take place in an environment essentially unfettered by competition as in the case of Bolivia.

UDAPE's insertion into the policy process came about in part because of the deterioration of the Central Bank's capacity. UDAPE had virtually no competition during a very critical growth stage. By the time the Central Bank had begun to recover some of its former capacity, UDAPE was already well entrenched. At the same time, the fact that the Central Bank was not "ideologically" on board with the Paz Estenssoro government's neo-liberal program created yet another opening for UDAPE, which was clearly identified with the government. Further, and fortuitously for UDAPE, its organization already existed and was up and running and thus in a position to immediately respond to requests from the Paz Estenssoro government. Finally, it was most fortunate that UDAPE was able to have two consecutive Ministers of Planning that not only valued UDAPE but were also willing to foster and support it. Interestingly enough, the location of UDAPE within the Ministry of Planning's organizational structure unexpectedly proved to be a benefit rather than a liability. Most Planning Ministries in Latin America are notoriously weak but in Bolivia, the leadership of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada between 1984 and 1988 gave the Ministry of Planning an importance and influence unusual for the continent. That same importance and influence was conveyed to UDAPE through Minister Sanchez' belief in the organization.

While not necessarily impossible, it seems clear that it would be most difficult to replicate this series of events and coincidences in another country. While one could certainly construct another UDAPE in another setting, without the other circumstances present, it would be difficult to replicate UDAPE's success.

**APPENDIX A**  
**SCOPE OF WORK**

Background.

In 1983, USAID/Bolivia signed a \$1.2 million grant with the Bolivian government to establish technical capacity in macroeconomic analysis for providing the GOB with advisory services for implementing sound macroeconomic and sectoral policy reforms aimed at reactivating the Bolivian economy. A major purpose of the project was to develop a permanent capability within the GOB to conduct policy analysis studies and to formulate policy options necessary for promoting Bolivia's economic stability and growth. An evaluation conducted in May 1985 recommended that, despite a slow start due to political difficulties, the project be extended. The project was amended in 1986 for another three years with additional financing of \$3.8 million for a total of \$5 million. The current project terminates in August 1991, but plans call for a non-funded extension through June 1992. This scope of work is for an evaluation of UDAPE's (Economic Policy Analysis Unit) impact on economic policy reform, stabilization, and growth and its long-term prospects for providing permanent policy analysis within the Bolivian government. This evaluation will serve as the basis for the development of a follow-on project scheduled to begin in FY 1992.

ARTICLE I - TITLE

Implementing Policy Change (936-5451).

ARTICLE II - OBJECTIVE

The contractor shall supply three members of a team which will conduct the final evaluation of the Policy Reform Project (S11-0571).

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

A. Background

UDAPE began in 1983. After some initial delays in establishing an office and hiring staff, UDAPE carried out some economic analyses for several economic officials of the Siles government. Nevertheless, the Siles government, due to its internal political problems, was never in the position to use the studies effectively. With one or two exceptions, the economic policies established by the Siles government were neither complete nor coherent, and in no case were they consistently applied or followed by the complementary measures essential to economic growth. Sile's weak leadership, combined with his government's penchant for agreeing to the demands of almost all interest groups, no matter how contradictory, and a breakdown of discipline in public administration due to leftist

agitation, led to a state of near chaos and anarchy. Labor leaders intimidated the executives of state enterprises. Ministries and the Central Bank experienced prolonged work stoppages. Official government decisions and policies were ignored by those in charge of implementing them when they conflicted with their personal or political interests. Staff and payrolls were padded, and financial control over Government and state enterprise was lost. Political infighting led to nine major cabinet shuffles and the eventual departure of all of Siles' coalition party partners from his government by late 1984. By that time, the economy was in a serious tailspin, and it was clear that President Siles would have trouble completing his term. The GDP has declined for three straight years. Scheduled debt payments amounted to 57% of export earnings. The peso had devalued from 25/\$1 to 1,182,000/\$1. Subsidized interest rates, artificial exchange rates and price controls had distorted all economic activity. In December 1984, faced with a political situation he found unmanageable and threatening, President Siles called for elections in June of 1985, a year before his term was to expire.

During the last days of the election campaign, the two principal contending political parties (the MNR of Victor Paz Estenssoro and the ADN of Hugo Banzer) established contact with UDAPE, as their leaders realized that UDAPE's staff was the most reliable domestic source of information on the economy. After his inauguration, President Paz Estenssoro's MNR colleagues consulted on a regular basis with UDAPE staff, which contributed significantly to the elaboration of the Paz Government's economic program.

The situation faced by the Paz Government in August of 1985 called for drastic measures to restore public confidence and bring about economic stabilization and recovery, e.g., reduction of the fiscal deficit, implementation of an exchange rate mechanism to keep pace with inflation, elimination of price controls and subsidies, and measures to stimulate investment. On August 29, 1985, the government announced the New Economic Program (NEP) which was designed to halt Bolivia's hyperinflation, provide free-market incentives for the reactivation of domestic production, eliminate distortions in the economy, and restructure state enterprises. The measures decreed by the GOB (a) devalued the peso by 93% and implemented a flexible rate mechanism to allow the peso to be adjusted in response to market forces, (b) eliminated all price controls (except on petroleum products--which were raised to world price levels--and utility services), (c) froze public sector salaries and provide for free negotiation of private sector wages, (d) eliminated interest rate controls, (e) liberalized trade policies through the reduction of import



duties, and (f) provided for the decentralization of Bolivia's main state enterprises (COMIBOL - the state mining company, YPFB - the state petroleum company, and CBF - the state industrial conglomerate) to increase their efficiency.

In announcing the NEP, President Paz made it clear that he believed his government would have only one chance to begin implementing a program of coherent economic policies, thereby preserving Bolivia's democracy. The general public welcomed the unexpectedly far-reaching and comprehensive measures of the NEP, as most people were weary of the lack of governmental leadership and were very concerned with the country's economic decline. Despite ardent opposition from extremist union leaders, by mid-October 1985 it was clear that the Paz government had been successful in gaining the political power necessary to implement its stabilization program.

Since October 1985 until August 1989 the Paz government concentrated its efforts on its stabilization and the reactivation of the country's economy. Since then the GOB has significantly relied on the work of UDAPE. The Ministers of Planning and Coordination and Finance have repeatedly expressed to USAID their satisfaction with UDAPE's performance. The economic reforms the GOB has implemented were clearly not brought about solely by UDAPE's contributions to the Government's economic policy deliberations. UDAPE however, is the only GOB organization with the technical expertise to carry out the economic analyses required by the GOB to continue the reforms begun with the NEP.

The demand for UDAPE's services has expanded rapidly. Traditionally serving only institutions represented by its Board of Directors, UDAPE today serves other government agencies, such as the Presidency, the Fondo de Desarrollo Campesino and the Internal Revenue Service of Bolivia.

At present UDAPE works closely with the Government of Bolivia in the design of economic policies. For instance, UDAPE is currently assisting the government in thinking through the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the improvement of the country's financial and banking system and the design of a long-term investment strategy to the government.

Following the completion of a contract with Robert R. Nathan Associates (RRNA), which had been providing technical assistance to UDAPE in 1986, USAID sought bids for a new technical assistance contract. Harvard's Institute for International Development (HIID) won the new

contract, but delays in the bidding process and in the selection of the contractor's resident advisor, resulted in an eight month hiatus between the RRNA termination and the HIID start-up. While unfortunate, this delay did not hinder UDAPE's growth.

UDAFE has carried out several important policy studies for the government, including (a) assessing the impact of the cocaine industry on the Bolivian economy. (This background study was used by the President of Bolivia in negotiating a new drug eradication strategy), (b) assessing the optimal investment pattern of the Bolivian economy, (c) measuring the impact of the stabilization program on agriculture. (This study sensitized policy makers to Bolivian agriculture's vulnerability to macroeconomic policies) and (d) the UDAPE staff also evaluated the macroeconomic impact of investment in energy and hydrocarbons.

Unlike in the past, when UDAPE and foreign advisors limited themselves to carrying out specific pieces of policy research, UDAPE today routinely sponsors workshops and seminars both to strengthen the analytical skills of its staff and to educate and disseminate the results of its research findings to policy makers and the public.

#### B. Summary of Previous Evaluation Findings

UDAFE has had two external evaluations to date. Dr. Kenneth Jameson of the University of Notre Dame conducted both evaluations, the first in mid 1985 and the second in mid 1988. Both evaluations were very enthusiastic and supportive of UDAPE. The first evaluation recommended the continuation of the project in order to test UDAPE's effectiveness under more stable political conditions. The second evaluation concentrated on the purpose level, assessing to what extent technical capability had been developed for providing analytical support to the government. It examined UDAPE's performance in a number of different arenas, ranging from quick response "firefighting" data collection and analysis for specific Ministers and Subsecretaries to medium-term sectoral and long-term analytical studies. The evaluation focussed on UDAPE's role in the policy process and a series of managerial questions relating to UDAPE's operation within the Bolivian political environment and whether UDAPE's priorities responded to long-term research planning or was merely reactive. Finally, the evaluation looked at how the internal organization of UDAPE influenced the activities that their personnel concentrated on.

The mid-term evaluation concluded that UDAPE's role in the policy process was an unequivocal success. The evaluator, nevertheless, raised several questions: 1) whether UDAPE had become too ractive at the expense of longer term analysis, 2) whether UDAPE was sufficiently open with their information, limiting access to those in power and thus becoming too politically identified, 3) what will UDAPE's area of competence be once other entities develop their own in-house analytical capabilities.

The evaluation also rated the project as highly successful in developing an active and capable technical team that has functioned extremely well despite a high turnover in analytical personnel. Two other successes were cited, 1) short-term technical assistance was well managed and 2) UDAPE operated well in the Bolivian political environment. In addition, the evaluation, raised two management questions: 1) whether the Board of Directors will function well in orienting UDAPE's work and guiding the role in the public sector, and 2) whether priorities are well established at UDAPE?

The evaluation made the following recommendations:

- The Board of Directors should be made effective in establishing contacts with the sectoral ministries, providing guidance for UDAPE's studies, and supporting more "applied research".
- An executive committee made up of the division heads, the executive director, and the long-term technical advisor should share authority among them to distribute the burden of analysis, external contact, and internal management.
- A series of managerial adjustments and incentives be provided for undertaking more analytical and longer term applied research studies.
- UDAPE should implement longer term research planning.
- Use of short-term technical assistance should be amplified.

#### C. Tasks to be Performed under this Evaluation

There are four major areas where the evaluation should measure impact: 1) UDAPE's success in achieving its objectives of offering technical assistance in macro-economic policy issues to the Bolivian government; 2) effectiveness of UDAPE's organizational and administrative structure; 3) effectiveness of staff training and

development, and of long-term and short-term technical assistance; 4) role of UDAPE within the government, assessing whether emphasis on short-term firefighting or medium and long term sectoral and analytical studies represent the best use of UDAPE's skills and resources. In addition, the evaluation should include recommendations on ways to strengthen UDAPE institutionally, organizationally and operationally.

1. Achievement of UDAPE's Objectives

The evaluator shall:

- Establish a quantitative measure of the services performed by UDAPE, i.e., provide an inventory of UDAPE activities by year of operation;
- Compare output by type of activity under the present and former governments;
- Based on a sample of the total universe of UDAPE's activities, assess the quality of UDAPE's analytical methodology in their macro-economic, sectoral, and project analytical studies and the effectiveness of workshops and seminars sponsored by UDAPE;
- Evaluate the efficiency and timing with which tasks are completed, the substance of the products, and the style of presentation;
- Evaluate the quality of the studies in terms of their respective policy option recommendations and their usefulness to GOB agencies in adopting the recommended policy measures, i.e. estimate the number of government decisions based on UDAPE's analysis and recommendations of proposed economic development projects;
- Measure the degree to which policy makers have implemented policy alternatives analyzed by UDAPE and the extent to which UDAPE services have influenced Bolivian public policies, i.e. quantify the number of GOB's macro-economic policies influenced by UDAPE's analysis and policy options;
- Evaluate which activities have had the greatest policy impact, which have been of technical interest but with little demonstrable application, and which activities have proven to have no impact at all; and

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- Establish, when possible, economic production gains attributable to policy reforms adopted as a result of the project.

2. Effectiveness of UDAPE's Organizational and Administrative Structure and Operations

The evaluation shall rate the effectiveness of UDAPE's administrative structure and procedures as well as provide answers to the specific management level concerns listed below:

- Assess the effectiveness of UDAPE's Board of Directors. Has UDAPE's Board of Directors provided adequate direction in establishing priorities and procedures for achieving optimal support to GOB agencies?
- Assess the quality of the Board of Directors' initiative in developing contacts with sectoral ministries, providing guidance for UDAPE's studies, and supporting and encouraging more applied research.
- Assess how priorities have been set in UDAPE. Has this process been the best use of UDAPE's skills and resources?
- Does UDAPE's present organizational structure facilitate or hamper each of the different types of work they are supposed to do, i.e. short-term responses to Ministries, project-based options, sectoral analyses, long-term analytical studies?
- Assess the quality and commitment of UDAPE's staff. Has a high staff turnover affected continuity in planning and implementation of UDAPE's program and ability to respond to its clients?
- Evaluate the effectiveness of UDAPE's current organization in providing a clear chain of command and decision making process that optimizes UDAPE's analytical and information activities.
- Assess the morale of UDAPE's staff and establish what factors are responsible for the existing level of morale, good or bad.
- Evaluate UDAPE's planning and implementation. How are priorities set and followed through?

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- Assess the impact of UDAPE's current monitoring system. Identify criteria for a more rigorous M and E system for a possible follow-on project.
- Assess the quality and efficiency of UDAPE's accounting and financial reporting procedures. Specify how well UDAPE and HIID are able to respond to USAID's reporting requirements.
- Analyze the efficiency of intra- (between UDAPE's divisions) and inter-institutional (between UDAPE, other GOB agencies, international donors in general, and USAID) coordination of activities.

3. Impact of Staff Training and Development, and of Long and Short-Term Technical Assistance

- Evaluate the quality of the staff training and development. What have been the returns to UDAPE in terms of the quantity and quality of the work, effectiveness of team effort, and institutional strengthening?
- Have improvements in skill levels of UDAPE staff made UDAPE a more effective advisory group?
- Assess the value of the short-term technical assistance provided through UDAPE directly or to other GOB agencies according to a) the quality of the procedures by which T.A. is obtained, b) quality of the advisors, and c) extent to which the GOB adopted the advisors recommendations.
- Assess the effectiveness and quality of the long-term T.A. to the Information Unit according to the achievement of the following objectives: a) setting up the organizational structure of the Information division, b) design, installation, and operation of the databanks, c) establishment of a system for contacting and responding to databank users, d) development of specifications to respond to analytical requests, e) organization and layout of the physical and automated library reference system, and f) identification of gaps and overlaps in the national information system.
- Evaluate the effectiveness and quality of the long-term T.A. provided to the Analysis Division in the following areas: a) help given to the Division Chief on designing and planning analytical studies and in defining and preparing

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the specifications for analytical tasks, b) in coordinating with the Information Division in order to acquire the information necessary for accomplishing the analysis, c) in focussing on development and policy options, and d) advice on options consistent with a national strategy of economic stability and growth.

4. Assessment of Effectiveness of UDAPE's Role as a Provider of Key Information for Policy Dispute Resolution or as a Research Organization Concentrating on Longer Term Sectoral and Analytical Studies
- Assess the degree to which UDAPE's medium and long-term impact has been diluted by a tendency toward "firefighting" or responding to short-term policy disputeneeds of sub-secretaries.
  - Has UDAPE's short-term backstopping for other GOB entities discouraged those other agencies from developing their own analytical capabilities?
  - What might the future identity of UDAPE be once other GOB agencies develop their own analytical skills? What is the appropriate mix of short-term responses and long-term analytical policy studies?

#### ARTICLE IV - REPORTS

The Contractor shall develop a brief workplan to carry out the evaluation of the Policy Reform Project. Three days before departure, the Institutional Specialist will be required to submit a draft report to the Program Office Director and present their major findings at a Mission debriefing session. Ten copies of the final report in English must be sent to the Mission within one month of departure from the country. The report shall be presented to DP, USAID/Bolivia and UDAPE, and other relevant USAID/Bolivia offices for final review and approval.

#### ARTICLE V - TECHNICAL DIRECTIONS

Technical directions during the performance of this delivery order will be provided by Jeanne North, S&T/RD/IDM, pursuant to Section F.4. of the contract. The contractor's specialists shall work closely with the USAID/Bolivia Development Planning Office Director, the Project Manager and the Mission Evaluation Specialist. The contractor will coordinate evaluation activities with UDAPE and other GOB officials, as needed. The USAID UDAPE Project Manager and the Mission Evaluation Specialist will participate in the planning process and will be available to provide guidance on administrative, organizational, and methodological issues.

A one day team planning meeting will be scheduled prior to commencing the evaluation in order to assign tasks and develop a work plan on the most appropriate methodology for measuring the impact of UDAPE's activities and effectiveness of UDAPE's operation.

ARTICLE VI - TERM OF PERFORMANCE

- A. The effective date of this delivery order is 1991 and the estimated completion date is 1991.
- B. Subject to the ceiling price established in this delivery order and with prior written approval of the Project Officer (see Block No. 5 on the Cover Page), the contractor is authorized to extend the estimated completion date, provided that such extension does not cause the elapsed time for completion of the work, including the furnishing of all deliverables, to extend beyond 60 calendar days from the original estimated completion date or beyond the completion date of the contract. The contractor shall attach a copy of the Project Officer's approval for any extension of the term of this delivery order to the final voucher submitted for payment. The contractor is advised that Project Officers do not have the authority to extend any delivery orders beyond any pertinent Mission Project Assistance Completion Dates.
- C. It is the contractor's responsibility to ensure that the Project Manager-approved adjustments to the original estimated completion date do not result in costs incurred which exceed the ceiling price of this delivery order. Under no circumstances shall such adjustments authorize the contractor to be paid any sum in excess of the delivery order.
- D. Adjustments which will cause the elapsed time for completion of the work to exceed the original estimated completion date by more than 30 calendar days must be approved in advance by the Contracting Officer. Project Officers will be expected to provide compelling justification for a second no cost extension.

ARTICLE VII - WORK DAYS ORDERED

- A. 

Functional Labor	Work Days	Burdened Fixed	
<u>Category &amp; Specialist</u>	<u>Ordered</u>	<u>Daily Rate</u>	<u>Total</u>
- B. The individuals identified above are designated as essential/key personnel pursuant to Section H.3 of the contract.

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- C. Subject to the ceiling price established in this delivery order and the prior written approval of the Project Officer, the contractor is authorized to adjust the number of work days actually employed in the performance of the work by each position specified in this order. The contractor shall attach a copy of the Project Officer's approval to the final voucher submitted for payment.
- D. It is the contractor's responsibility to ensure that the Project Officer-approved adjustments to the work days ordered for each functional labor specialist do not result in costs incurred which exceed the ceiling price of this delivery order. Under no circumstances shall such adjustments authorize the contractor to be paid any sum in excess of the ceiling price.

ARTICLE VIII - CEILING PRICE

For Work-Days Ordered	\$
For Other Direct Costs	_____
Ceiling Price	\$

The contractor will not be paid any sum in excess of the ceiling price.

ARTICLE IX - USE OF GOVERNMENT FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL

The contractor and its employees or consultants are prohibited from using U.S. Government facilities (such as office space or equipment), or U.S. Government clerical or technical personnel in the performance of the services specified in the delivery order, unless the use of Government facilities or personnel is specifically authorized in the order, or is authorized in advance, in writing, by the Contracting Officer.

ARTICLE X - DUTY POST

The duty post for this delivery order is La Paz, Bolivia.

ARTICLE XI - LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

See Special Provisions.

ARTICLE XII - ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The contractor will not have access to classified information.

ARTICLE XIII - LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The cooperating country will provide office space and office equipment. The Contractor is responsible for all other logistic support.

ARTICLE XI - WORK WEEK

The contractor is authorized up to a six-day work week while in the field with no premium pay.

ARTICLE XII - EMERGENCY LOCATOR INFORMATION

The Contractor shall provide the information required by the AIDAR 752.7001, incorporated in the contract Part I, Section H, Article 6, to the Mission Administrative Officer on or before arrival in the host country.

ARTICLE XIII - SPECIAL PROVISIONS

A. Special Medical Requirements

The altitude of La Paz (13,400 feet above sea level) can have a deleterious effect on the health of persons with pre-existing medical problems and/or respiratory infections. Individuals with hypertension, diabetes, angina pectoris, coronary heart disease, asthma, emphysema, chronic bronchitis, or any history of heart attack, heart disease, or lung disease should have a thorough evaluation by their physician prior to travelling to La Paz. Persons with any respiratory infection, such as colds, bronchitis, or pneumonia should delay travel to La Paz until they have fully recovered.

USAID/Bolivia requires a doctor's statement declaring that incoming short-term personnel are not afflicted by any of the above pre-existing medical problems. If such problems exist, a full physical exam is required prior to departure for Bolivia.

Adjustment to the altitude usually requires only a few days. Personnel should, if at all possible, limit their physical activity for the first 36-48 hours after arrival in La Paz.

Infectious hepatitis, amoebic dysentery, bacillary dysentery, giardiasis, rabies and typhoid are endemic in Bolivia. Yellow fever and malaria are present in tropical areas of Bolivia. The usual sanitary precautions concerning food and water should be observed and all immunizations should be up to date prior to arrival in country. Yellow fever vaccine is required for all personnel travelling to tropical areas. Rabies pre-exposure prophylaxis (not the low-dose intradermal injections) is recommended for all personnel who plan to spend considerable time outdoors on foot. The Embassy Health Unit can advise personnel travelling to tropical areas concerning malaria prophylaxis on a case by case basis. The precautions and need for medications are determined by the duration of travel, the extent of exposure, and drug allergy history.

B. Qualifications of Evaluation Team Members

1. Economist

- a. Degree in Economics at the Ph.D. level.
- b. A solid educational background in macro-economic theory and methodologies.
- c. Familiarity with economic and development issues in Latin American countries.
- d. Experience as an evaluator of USAID-funded projects.
- e. Spanish language proficiency.

2. Institutional Specialist

- a. MA or Ph.D. in Public Administration or Applied Behavioral Science.
- b. Experience in organization development, management skills and management processes.
- c. Experience in the fields of training, management development and organizational analyses and planning.
- d. Familiarity with USAID procedures.
- e. Experience as an evaluator of USAID-funded projects.
- f. Spanish language proficiency.

The specialists will require three weeks each to complete the evaluation in-country. The Institutional Specialist will be the team leader and will be responsible for the report.

## APPENDIX B

UDAPE's studies are classified into four categories: Documentos de Trabajo Analítico (DTA), Ayudas Memoria (AM), Documentos de Trabajo Metodológico (DTM) and Documentos de Trabajo Estadístico (DTE).

DTA studies consist of macro-economic analysis on particular topics which usually concite the steady attention and follow-up by the Gabinete Económico (Ministerio de Planeamiento, Ministerio de Finanzas and Banco Central). Such is the case of studies that provide bi-annual evaluations of the Bolivian economy and follow-ups on the programs worked out with the International Monetary Fund. Also included are macro-economic studies whose purpose is to provide authorities with analytic instruments that will enable them to plan for the defense or introduction of new policies. Such is the case of studies on the external sector and tax policies. In general, the studies are required by the economic authorities, but UDAPE generates several of them in anticipation of problems that are likely to occur.

AM studies, in essence, are small DTAs whose purpose is to clarify and facilitate the understanding of issues, findings and recommendations to policy makers. Technically, they draw data from DTAs but they can also conceivably generate their own analytical research. As opposed to DTAs, almost all studies in this category are specifically requested by economic authorities. Both the DTM and DTE are basically in-house generated studies whose main purpose is to provide analytical support to DTAs and AMs.

As can be discerned in Tables B-1 and B-2, AM studies have surpassed now the number of DTAs, DTMs and DTEs combined. This has been explained by the fact that specific requests have become more numerous and frequent. On the other hand it should be noted that the classification criteria that separates DTAs from AMs has become increasingly blurred. This fact has become explicitly acknowledged by José Luis Lupo. At minimum, this suggests that the analytical tasks performed in these two sets of documents may well be converging to similarity and uniformity.

The increasing demand for sectoral studies is demonstrated in Table B-3. We requested that all studies and documents included in this evaluation period be divided into three categories: a) strict macro-economic studies; b) macro-sectoral studies which for the most part tie the impact of sector policies with macro-economic variables; and c) studies that fall into the two preceding categories. A total of 198 studies - corresponding to the period August 1988-May 1991 were thus classified. Of this total, 132 studies, or 66.7% were strictly macro-economic documents, 53 or 26.8% corresponded to macro-sectoral studies and the difference, 13 or 6.6% were classified in the third category as "ambas." In Table B-4, one can see that whereas both AMs and DTAs constitute the bulk of macro-economic studies, DTMs represent more than one-third (34%) of the total macro-sectoral studies.

**Table B-1**

**TRABAJOS ELABORADOS EN UDAPE 1988-1991**

TRABAJO	1988	1989	1990	1991
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO ANALITICO (DTA)	43	19	32	9
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO METODOLOGICO (DTM)	15	10	12	1
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO ESTADISTICO (DTE)	5	-	4	1
AYUDA MEMORIA	25	18	47	16
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>27</b>

Para periodos anteriores ver los informes sobre UDAPE realizados por el Dr. Kenneth Jaason.

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Table B-2

TRABAJOS ELABORADOS EN UDAPE\*1968-1991  
(ESTRUCTURA PORCENTUAL POR TIPO DE TRABAJO)

TRABAJO	1968	1969	1990	1991
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO ANALITICO (DTA)	47	40	34	33
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO METODOLOGICO (DTM)	16	21	13	4
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO ESTADISTICO (DTE)	9	0	4	4
AYUDA MEMORIA	27	38	49	59
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

\* Para periodos anteriores ver los informes sobre UDAPE realizados por el Dr. Kenneth Jaason.

Table B-3

DIVISION->	Count				Row Total
	Row Pct	MACROECO	MECROSEC	AMBAS	
	Col Pct	NOM	T.		
	Tot Pct	1.0	2.0	3.0	
A_0	-----				
88	23	5			28
	82.1	17.9			14.1
	17.4	9.4			
	11.6	2.5			
89	36	11			47
	76.6	23.4			23.7
	27.3	20.8			
	18.2	5.6			
90	54	34	8		96
	56.3	35.4	8.3		48.5
	40.9	64.2	61.5		
	27.3	17.2	4.0		
91	19	3	5		27
	70.4	11.1	18.5		13.6
	14.4	5.7	38.5		
	9.6	1.5	2.5		
Column	132	53	13		198
Total	66.7	26.8	6.6		100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 0

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Table B-4

TIPO->	Count	AM	DTA	OTE	DTM	Row Total
	Row Pct					
	Col Pct					
DIVISION	Tot Pct	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	
MACROECONOM	1.0	67	55	1	9	132
		50.8	41.7	.8	6.8	66.7
		78.8	68.8	16.7	33.3	
		33.8	27.8	.5	4.5	
MECROSECT.	2.0	11	19	5	18	53
		20.8	35.8	9.4	34.0	26.8
		12.9	23.8	83.3	66.7	
		5.6	9.6	2.5	9.1	
AMBAS	3.0	7	6			13
		53.8	46.2			6.6
		8.2	7.5			
		3.5	3.0			
	Column	85	80	6	27	198
	Total	42.9	40.4	3.0	13.6	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 0

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## APPENDIX C

### Utilization/Impact Criteria

All documents are classified into five different categories:

1. Directly utilized with a strong, direct impact in economic policy making, expressed in concrete policy action such as Decreto Supremo, Resolución Ministerial, or utilized as an official document of the Bolivian Government.
2. Directly utilized with a significant impact in economic policy making, not expressed in concrete policy action, but nevertheless utilized as key inputs in the decision making process, i.e., economic evaluations, economic policy simulations, projections on the financial program, etc.
3. Documents with a degree of utilization not ascertained but having at minimum an indirect impact in economic policy making. Included in this category are the models designed at UDAPE that allow for the economic policy simulations and/or economic evaluations, as well as the documents that are presented in international and national conferences, and documents that serve to justify the enactment of economic measures.
4. Documents that are used internally (at UDAPE), basically of a methodological, statistical or informational type.
5. Documents with no impact on economic policy making.

All the documents corresponding to the evaluation period are listed in Table C-3, which also indicates the agency that requested the study as well as the area of analysis (macro-economic vs. macro-sectoral). Table C-2 depicts the classification of all documents - according to this utilization/impact criteria, year by year. A total of 87 documents, corresponding to 44% of all the documents included in the evaluation period, were classified in the categories 1 and/or 2, which denotes the highest possible utilization/impact. Table C-2, on the other part, breaks down this classification sphere into the types of documents put out by UDAPE (AM, DTA, DTE and DTM). Of the 198 studies, 85 are AMs, 80 DTAs, 6 DTEs and 27 DTMs. Of the total of 85 AMs, a total of 52 (61%) were considered in categories 1 or 2 and 35 of the 80 DTAs (44%) were included in these same categories.

We requested that all 87 documents in categories 1 and 2 be further analyzed in order to assess the evidence of the impact and utilization. Accordingly, this sample was classified into three categories:

1. Document utilized 100% in a concrete economic action/measure. Evidence expressed in a Supreme Decree, Ministry Resolution or Administrative Decree.

2. Study prepared for the Bolivia Government (GOB) and utilized without any change as an official document.
3. Study prepared at the request of the GOB and partially utilized as part of another document, the one which is influenced or modified by the UDAPE study.

Table C-4 lists and describes all these 87 documents according to the evidence detailed above.

Table C-1

AYUDAS MEMORIAS REALIZADAS POR LA UNIDAD DE ANALISIS DE POLITICAS ECONOMICAS

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ABBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
AM-1128	88	OCT	PRESUPUESTO 1989	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. FINANZAS
AM-1129	88	NOV	APLICACION DE LA NUEVA POLITICA ECONOMICA: OBJETIVOS Y RESULTADOS	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. FINANZAS
AM-1130	88	DIC	LA NUEVA POLITICA ECONOMICA Y LA INDUSTRIA MANUFACTURERA	Macro Sect.		3 MIN. TRABAJO
AM-1131	89	ENE	SALARIOS Y EMPLEO	Macro Sect.		3 MIN. TRABAJO
AM-1132	89	ENE	AYUDA MEMORIA SOBRE POSIBILIDADES DE POLITICA ARANCELARIA	Macro Ec.		4 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1133	89	MAR	CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE UNA NUEVA ESTRATEGIA INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO PARA EL CUARTO DECEenio	Macro Ec.		3
AM-1134	89	MAR	DISCURSO DEL SEOR GOBERNADOR POR BOLIVIA ING. FERNANDO ROMERO ANTE LA XXI ASAMBLEA ANUAL DE GOBERNADORES DEL BID Y IV ASAMBLEA DE GOBERNADORES DE LA CORPORACION INTERAMERICAN DE INVERSION	Macro Ec.		3
AM-1135	89	MAR	VISION DE LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1136	89	MAR	MODELO DEL SECTOR HIDROCARBUROS	Macro Sect.		3 MIN. ENERGIA

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
AM-1137	89	MAR	BOLIVIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION	Macro Ec.		2 GABINETE ECONOMICO
AM-1138	89	JUN	LATIN AMERICAN CHALLENGES IN THE 90'S AND THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1139	89	AGT	SITUACION ECONOMICA INTERNA	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1140	89	AGT	JUSTIFICACION AUMENTO DE LOS PRECIOS DE LOS CARBURANTES	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1141	89	AGT	CONDICIONES PREVIAS PARA UN ACUERDO CON EL FMI	Macro Ec.		2 GABINETE ECONOMICO
AM-1142	89	AGT	LLOYD AEREO BOLIVIANO INCREMENTO DE TARIFAS	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. FINANZAS
AM-1143	89	AGT	ELIMINACION DEUDA BILATERAL ARGENTINA	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1144	89	SPT	PETICION DE INFORME: ASUNTO ELIMINACION DE DEUDA ARGENTINA-BOLIVIANA	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1145	89	OCT	ANALISIS SOBRE EL PROYECTO DE LEY No. 61 PRESENTADO A LA COMISION DE PLANBAMINETO, POLITICA ECONOMICA Y FINANCIERA DE LA H.CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS	Macro Ec.		5 MIN. FINANZAS
AM-1146	89	DIC	BOLIVIA'S MEDIUM - TERM ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1147	89	DIC	CREDITO AL TCM Y SU EFECTO EN EL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO DE 1989	Macro Ec.		2 GABINETE ECONOMICO

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
AM-1148	89	DIC	SEGUIMIENTO DE LAS METAS DEL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO CON EL FMI AL 30 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1989	Macro Ec.	2	GABINETE ECONOMICO
AM-1149	90	ENE	BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROJECTIONS	Macro Ec.	2	GABINETE ECONOMICO
AM-1151	90	MAR	EVALUACION DEL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO CON EL FMI	Macro Ec.	1	GABINETE ECONOMICO
AM-1153	90	MAR	AYUDA MEMORIA SOBRE REDUCCION DE ARANCELBS, REDUCCION DE LA TASA DEL CALIFICADO DE REINTEGRO ARANCELARIO (CRA) Y EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL DRAWBACK	Macro Ec.	2	MIN. PLANAMIENTO
AM-1154	90	MAR	IMPACTO MACROECONOMICO DEL PROGRAMA DE INVERSION PUBLICA DE BOLIVIA (1990)	Macro Sect.	2	MIN. PLANAMIENTO
AM-1155	90	MAR	EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DE LOS PROYECTOS ENERGETICOS DE INTEGRACION CON EL BRASIL	Macro Sect.	1	B.C.B.
AM-1156	90	ABR	COMENTARIOS A LA PROPUESTA DE LA CROWN AGENTS: "RECOMENDACIONES PARA LA REESTRUCTURACION DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE ADUANAS DE BOLIVIA"	Macro Ec.	3	MIN. PLANAMIENTO
AM-1157	90	ABR	EFFECTOS DE LA PARTICIPACION PRIVADA EN EL FINANCIAMIENTO DE LOS PROYECTOS ENERGETICOS	Macro Sect.	1	MIN. ENERGETICA
AM-1158	90	ABR	INCREMENTO PRECIO HIDROCARBUROS	Macro Ec.	2	MIN. PLANAMIENTO
AM-1159	90	ABR	AYUDA MEMORIA SOBRE INFLACION, EXPECTATIVAS Y DEMANDA DE DINERO	Macro Ec.	4	

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TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ABBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
AM-1160	90	MAY	COOPERACION ECONOMICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y NECESIDADES DE RECURSOS FINANCIEROS EXTERNOS	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANBANINETO
AM-1161	90	MAY	DESGRAVACION ARANCELARIA Y REDUCCION DEL CRA	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBANINETO
AM-1162	90	JUN	IMPACTO DE AJUSTE DE LOS PRECIOS DE HIDROCARBUROS EN 25% SOBRE LOS PRECIOS	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBANINETO
AM-1163	90	JUN	POBLACION RURAL: UNA VISION GENERAL	Macro Sect.		5
AM-1164	90	JUN	TESIS DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. RELACIONES
AM-1165	90	JUL	SEGUIMIENTO PROGRAMA FINANCIERO: CREACION DE COMISIONES ESPECIALES	Macro Ec.		2 GABINETE ECONOMICO
AM-1166	90	JUL	DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO CONCEPCIO. CRITERIOS DE SELECCION Y EVALUACION DE PROYECTOS	Macro Sect.		2 MIN. RELACIONES
AM-1167	90	JUL	PRIVATIZACION Y REFORMA DE LAS EMPRESAS PUBLICAS; ALGUNAS REFLEXIONES PARA EL CASO BOLIVIANO	Macro Ec.		5 COMISION NAL DE PRIVATIZ.
AM-1168	90	JUL	ESQUEMA PREPARADO POR EL GOBIERNO DE BOLIVIA PARA LA ELABORACION DEL DOCUMENTO "DE LA ESTABILIDAD AL CRECIMIENTO"	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBANINETO

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TRABAJO	AÑO	NBS	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
AN-1170	90	JUL	AVANCES Y PERSPECTIVAS DEL DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO	Abas	1	NIV. RELACIONES
AN-1171	90	AGT	BOLIVIA: DETERMINANTES DEL DEFICIT DEL SECTOR PUBLICO NO FINANCIERO	Macro Bc.	3	
AN-1172	90	AGT	COMENTARIOS AL DOCUMENTO ANALISIS DE LAS EXPOSICIONES Y DEL NIVEL ACTUAL DE COMPETITIVIDAD EXTERNA DE BOLIVIA (SOLICITADO POR EL MIN. DE PLANIFICACION)	Macro Bc.	2	NIV. PLANIFICACION
AN-1173	90	AGT	PROPUESTA DE BARRIA DE ARANCELAS PARA EL SECTOR AGROPECUARIO	Macro Bc.	1	NIV. PLANIFICACION
AN-1174	90	AGT	POSICION BOLIVIANA ANTE LA XVI REUNION ORDINARIA DEL CONSEJO LATINOAMERICANO DEL SEBA (CARACAS 3 AL 7 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1990)	Macro Bc.	3	NIV. PLANIFICACION
AN-1175	90	SBP	EFFECTO DEL INCREMENTO DEL PRECIO INTERNACIONAL DEL PETROLIO	Macro Bc.	3	NIV. PLANIFICACION
AN-1176	90	SBP	INCREMENTO EN EL PRECIO DE LOS HIDROCARBUROS UDAPB-SAFCO	Macro Bc.	2	NIV. PLANIFICACION
AN-1177	90	SBP	REGIMEN TRIBUTARIO SIMPLIFICADO	Macro Bc.	3	D.G.B.I.
AN-1178	90	SBP	PROPUESTA FONDO O.B.A.	Macro Bc.	3	NIV. PLANIFICACION
AN-1179	90	SBP	ENCUERE RENOVADO	Macro Bc.	2	B.C.B.

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TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ABBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
AM-1180	90	OCT	AYUDA MEMORIA: MARCO DE POLITICA ECONOMICA PARA 1991	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO
AM-1181	90	OCT	TESIS Y PROGRAMA DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO (ASPECTOS CONCEPTUALES) (BORRADOR)	Ambas		2 CONALID
AM-1182	90	OCT	ANALISIS DE LA TASA DE INFLACION OCTUBRE 1990	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO
AM-1183	90	NOV	SITUACION DE LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO
AM-1184	90	NOV	EL SISTEMA DRAW-BACK	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO
AM-1185	90	NOV	AJUSTE DE PRECIOS DE HIDROCARBUROS E INFLACION: PERSPECTIVAS 1990-1991	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO
AM-1186	90	NOV	CONSIDERACIONES ADICIONALES: PROYECTO ALCOHOL CARBURANTE	Macro Sect.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO
AM-1187	90	NOV	EL PROYECTO DE ALCOHOL CARBURANTE EN EL CONTEXTO DE LA POLITICA ECONOMICA (CONFIDENCIAL)	Macro Sect.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO
AM-1188	90	NOV	POLITICA DE FOMENTO A LAS EXPORTACIONES EN BOLIVIA	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO
AM-1189	90	NOV	PREVISIONES DE INFLACION PARA 1991	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINBTO

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TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ABBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
AM-1190	90	DIC	PIB NOMINAL PARA 1991	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1191	90	DIC	EVOLUCION DE LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA 1990	Ambas		2 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1192	90	DIC	INFLACION COMPARATIVA BOLIVIA RESTO DE LATINOAMERICA	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1193	90	DIC	CUADRO RESUMEN PARA LAS PROYECCIONES	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1194	90	DIC	REGIMEN DE LICENCIA PREVIA PARA LA IMPORTACION DE HARINA	Macro Sect.		2 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1195	90	DIC	EVOLUCION DEL D.S. 22407	Ambas		2 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1196	90	DIC	ANALISIS GLOBAL DE LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA Y PERSPECTIVAS PARA 1991	Macro Ec.		1 GABINETE ECONOMICO
AM-1197	90	DIC	ACTIVIDADES DESARROLLADAS POR UDAPE CON RELACION A LAS EXPORTACIONES	Macro Ec.		5 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1198	90	DIC	COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL PROYECTO DE DECRETO DEL MINISTERIO DE INDUSTRIA COMERCIO Y TURISMO (MICT)	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1199	90	DIC	CORREDORES DE EXPORTACION	Macro Ec.		4 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1200	91	ENE	COMENTARIOS A LOS PLANTEAMIENTOS DE LA COB (ASPECTOS ECONOMICOS)	Ambas		2 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO
AM-1201	91	ENE	EFEECTO DEL INCREMENTO DEL PRECIO INTERNACIONAL DEL PETROLEO	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO

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TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
AM-1202	91	ENE	COMENTARIOS AL DOCUMENTO "ANALISIS DEL DOCUMENTO 'BOLIVIA LA INTRODUCCION DEL DRAW-BACK Y LA PROMOCION DE EXPORTACIONES' POR JULIO BERLINSKI, DE MULLER & ASOCIADOS	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1203	91	ENE	COMENTARIOS AL PROYECTO DE DECRETO DE LA CAMARA DE EXPORTADORES (CANEB)25/01/91	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1204	91	ENE	COMENTARIOS AL DOCUMENTO: "POLITICAS ARANCELARIAS: ESTUDIO DE ALTERNATIVAS" DE LA CAMARA DE INDUSTRIA Y COMERCIO DE SANTA CRUZ	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1205	91	ENE	COMENTARIOS AL DOCUMENTO: "POSICION DEL SECTOR PRIVADO DE SANTA CRUZ EN REALCION A LA SUSTITUCION DEL CRA"	Macro Ec.		3 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1206	91	ENE	EVALUACION Y COMPORTAMIENTO DE LA ECONOMIA EN 1990 COMENTARIOS	Ambar		3 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1207	91	FEB	POTENCIAL TRIBUTARIO 1989-1990	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1208	91	FEB	RESUMEN DEL DOCUMENTO "COMO LOS SERVICIOS DE APOYO PUEDEN EXPANDIR LA EXPORTACION DE MANUFACTURAS NUEVOS METODOS DE ASISTENCIA"	Macro Ec.		3
AM-1209	91	MAR	ANTECEDENTES DEL ENCAJE LEGAL REMUNERADO DURANTE LA GESTION 1988-89	Macro Ec.		3 B.C.B.
AM-1210	91	MAR	EFFECTOS DE LA REDUCCION DE LAS EXPORTACIONES DE GAS NATURAL COMPENSADAS CON PRESTAMOS EXTRINOS (1992)	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
AM-1211	91	MAR	BOLIVIA:CAPACIDAD DE ENDEUDAMIENTO (REVISION FEBRERO DE 1991)	Macro Ec.		2 B.C.B.

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## DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO ANALITICOS REALIZADOS POR LA UNIDAD DE ANALISIS DE POLITICAS ECONOMICAS

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTA-0198	88	AGT	MEMORANDUM SOBRE POLITICA ECONOMICA - AGOSTO 1988	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0199	88	AGT	LA AYUDA ALIMENTARIA EN BOLIVIA. LINEAMIENTOS SOBRE LA POLITICA DE DONACIONES	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0200	88	AGT	EVALUACION SEMESTRAL DE LA ECONOMIA DE BOLIVIA (ENERO-JUNIO 1988)	Macro Ec.	2	
DTA-0201	88	AGT	INFORME DE COYUNTURA - JUNIO	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0202	88	AGT	INFORME DE COYUNTURA - JULIO	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0203	88	SEP	EVOLUCION SEMESTRAL DE LA ECONOMIA DE BOLIVIA ENERO-JUNIO 1988	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0204	88	SEP	DIFERENCIAS REGIONALES EN EL EMPLEO URBANO 1987	Macro Sect.	5	
DTA-0205	88	SEP	POLITICA CAMBIARIA	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0206	88	SEP	EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DEL CONVENIO CON LA REPUBLICA FEDERATIVA DEL BRASIL Y LINEAMIENTOS PARA LA NEGOCIACION	Macro Sect.	3	
DTA-0207	88	SEP	SEGUIMIENTO PROGRAM. FINANCIERO CUMPLIMIENTO DE METAS PERIODO DICIEMBRE 1987 - AGOSTO 1988 FINANCIERO	Macro Ec.	1	GABINETE ECONOMICO

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ARBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTA-0208	88	SEP	MODELO SIMPLE DE INFLACION	Macro Sect.	4	
DTA-0209	88	SEP	ANALISIS DE COYUNTURA AGOSTO 1988	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0210	88	SEP	EVALUACION DEL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO 1988 (ENERO-SEPTIEMBRE)	Macro Ec.	2	GABINETE ECONOMICO
DTA-0211	88	SEP	LA MEDICION DE LAS RESERVAS INTERNACIONALES EN EL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO COM EL F.M.I.	Macro Ec.	2	GABINETE ECONOMICO
DTA-0212	88	OCT	MEMORANDUMS MISION MINISTERIAL A WASHINGTON (CONFIDENCIAL)	Macro Ec.	1	GABINETE ECONOMICO
DTA-0213	88	OCT	INFORME DE COYUNTURA SEPTIEMBRE 1988	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0214	88	OCT	PARTICIPACION DE UDAPE EN EL GRUPO DE TRABAJO PARA LA ADHESION DEL GATT	Macro Ec.	4	
DTA-0215	88	NOV	SELECTIVIDAD INDUSTRIAL Y NEUTRALIDAD SECTORIAL	Macro Sect.	5	
DTA-0216	88	NOV	ESTUDIO DE LAS UNIDADES MICROEMPRESARIALES EN LA CIUDAD DE LA PAZ	Macro Ec.	4	
DTA-0217	88	DIC	INFORME DE COYUNTURA OCTUBRE 1988	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0218	89	MAR	MEMORANDUMS PARA EL SEMINARIO SOBRE CRECIMIENTO, AJUSTE Y FINANZAS EN AMERICA LATINA	Macro Ec.	3	

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TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTA-0219	89	MAR	EL MARCO ECONOMICO GLOBAL Y LAS FINANZAS PUBLICAS EN BOLIVIA	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0220	89	MAR	PRESENTACION DE RESULTADOS ACERCA DE LOS DETERMINANTES DEL DEFICIT DEL SECTOR PUBLICO: CASO BOLIVIANO	Macro Ec.		3 SEMINARIO INT. CEPAL
DTA-0221	89	MAR	LAS FINANZAS PUBLICAS EN EL PERIODO 1980-1987 (DOCUMENTO DE ANTECEDENTES PARA EL ESTUDIO FISCAL UDAPE-CEPAL)	Macro Ec.		3 SEMINARIO INT. CEPAL
DTA-0222	89	MAR	LA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA BOLIVIANA	Macro Ec.	4	
DTA-0223	89	MAR	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND EXTERNAL DEBT POLICY THE CASE OF BOLIVIA	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. FINANZAS
DTA-0224	89	JUN	LAS FINANZAS PUBLICAS Y EL GASTO DEL GOBIERNO EN EL PERIODO 1980-1987	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0225	89	JUL	DETERMINANTES DEL DEFICIT DEL SECTOR PUBLICO EN BOLIVIA (PERIODO 1980-1987)	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0226	89	JUL	VULNERABILIDAD EXTERNA, POLITICA FISCAL Y AJUSTE MACROECONOMICO: EL CASO BOLIVIANO	Macro Ec.	2	
DTA-0227	89	AGT	POLITICAS MACROECONOMICAS Y EL SECTOR EXPORTADOR	Macro Ec.	4	
DTA-0228	89	SEP	LINEAMIENTOS DEL PROGRAMA ECONOMICO DE GOBIERNO DE UNIDAD NACIONAL	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANEAMIENTO

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TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ABBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTA-0229	89	OCT	LA POLITICA FISCAL Y LOS DETERMINANTES DEL DEFICIT DEL SECTOR PUBLICO: CASO BOLIVIANO	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0230	89	OCT	EVALUACION ANUAL DE LA ECONOMIA DE BOLIVIA (GESTION 1988)	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
DTA-0231	89	OCT	EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DEL PROGRAMA DE INVERSION EJECUTADA POR EL FONDO SOCIAL DE EMERGENCIA (1987 JULIO 1989)	Macro Ec.		2 FONDO SOCIAL DE EMERGENCI
DTA-0232	89	NOV	DESINTERMEDIACION Y LIBERALIZACION FINANCIERA EN BOLIVIA: 1980-1988	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0233	89	DIC	EL CREDITO AGROPECUARIO EN BOLIVIA	Macro Sect.	3	
DTA-0234	89	DIC	EVOLUCION DE LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA DURANTE 1989	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMIENTO
DTA-0235	89	DIC	EL TIPO DE CAMBIO REAL DE EQUILIBRIO	Macro Ec.	4	
DTA-0236A	90	ENE	FONDO DE DESARROLLO CAMPESINO (DOCUMENTO DE PRESENTACION AL GRUPO CONSULTIVO DE PARIS 1989)	Macro Sect.		3 FONDO DE DESARROLLO CAMPE

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ABBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTA-0236	89	DIC	EFFECTOS DE LA POLITICA ARANCELARIA Y DEL TIPO DE CAMBIO	Macro Sect.	1	
DTA-0237	90	ENE	MODELO DE EQUILIBRIO GENERAL PARA EL SECTOR AGRICOLA BOLIVIANO	Macro Sect.	3	
DTA-0238	90	ENE	POLITICAS SECTORIALES RELACIONADAS A LA AGRICULTURA (1980-1987)	Macro Sect.	4	
DTA-0239	90	ENE	APUNTES SOBRE LA PRODUCCION Y COMERCIALIZACION DE PAPA	Macro Sect.	5	
DTA-0240	90	FEB	ANALISIS DEL IMPACTO DE LAS POLITICAS MACROECONOMICAS Y FACTORES EXTERNOS EN EL SECTOR AGRICOLA	Macro Sect.	3	
DTA-0241	90	FEB	LA EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DE LOS PROYECTOS ENERGETICOS DE INTEGRACION CON BRASIL	Macro Sect.	3	MIN. ENERGIA
DTA-0242	90	FEB	ESTRATEGIA NACIONAL DEL DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO 1990 - DOCUMENTO TECNICO-	Ambas	1	PRESIDENCIA
DTA-0243	90	MAR	ESTIMACION DEL POTENCIAL TRIBUTARIO	Macro Ec.	1	D.G.B.I.
DTA-0244	90	MAR	UTILIZACION DE UN MODELO MACROENERGETICO PARA LA EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DEL PROYECTO DE INTEGRACION ENERGETICA BRASIL -BOLIVIA	Macro Sect.	3	MIN. ENERGIA
DTA-0245	90	MAR	LINEAMIENTOS DE UNA POLITICA MACROECONOMICA CON ELEMENTOS DISTRIBUTIVOS	Macro Ec.	3	MIN. PLANBAMNETO

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREAS	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTA-0246	90	MAY	PROGRAMA NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO 1990-1995	Ambas	1	
DTA-0247	90	MAY	EL DESARROLLO INDUSTRIAL EN BOLIVIA	Macro Sect.	4	
DTA-0248	90	MAY	EFEECTO DE LA EMISION DE VALORES FISCALES EN EL CREDITO AL SECTOR PUBLICO	Macro Ec.	2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO	
DTA-0249	90	JUN	EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DE LOS ACUERDOS ENERGETICOS	Macro Sect.	1 MIN. ENERGIJA	
DTA-0250	90	JUN	EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DEL SECTOR FISCAL, EXTERNO Y FINANCIERO	Macro Ec.	2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO	
DTA-0251	90	JUN	TIPO DE CAMBIO REAL	Macro Sect.	4	
DTA-0252	90	JUN	MANEJO CAMBIARIO Y CRECIMIENTO DESPUES DE LA ESTABILIZACION: EL CASO DE BOLIVIA	Macro Ec.	2 B.C.B.	
DTA-0253	90	JUL	BOLIVIA: CAPACIDAD DE ENDEUDAMIENTO GLOBAL	Macro Ec.	2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO	
DTA-0254	90	JUL	EL IMPACTO DE LAS POLITICAS MACROECONOMICAS EN EL SECTOR AGROPECUARIO	Macro Sect.	3	
DTA-0255	90	AGT	SEMINARIO DE ALTO NIVEL SOBRE "POLITICAS DEL GASTO PUBLICO" POLITICAS MACROECONOMICAS Y EL GASTO DEL SECTOR PUBLICO	Macro Ec.	3	
DTA-0256	90	AGT	EVALUACION DE LOS PROGRAMAS ACORDADOS CON EL FONDO MONETARIO INTERNACIONAL	Macro Ec.	2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO	



TRABAJO	ARO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTA-0257	90	AGT	POLITICA DE FOMENTO A LAS EXPORTACIONES NO TRADICIONALES EN BOLIVIA	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
DTA-0258	90	AGT	EL DEFICIT CUASIFISCAL EN BOLIVIA 1986-1990	Macro Ec.		3 SEMINARIO INT. CEPAL
DTA-0259	90	SEP	EL PROGRAMA ECONOMICO DE AJUSTE PERUANO Y SUS REPERCUSIONES EN LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA	Macro Ec.		2 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
DTA-0260	90	OCT	SEMINARIO ESPECIALIZADO DE POLITICAS MACROECONOMICAS "LA POLITICA FISCAL EN BOLIVIA: LA EXPERIENCIA DE LOS ANOS OCHENTA"	Macro Ec.		3 SEMINARIO INT.
DTA-0261	90	OCT	ANALISIS MACROECONOMICA DE LA INVERSION PUBLICA (DOCUMENTO TECNICO)	Macro Sect.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
DTA-0262	90	NOV	LAS CUENTAS DEL SISTEMA FINANCIERO, EL ENFOQUE MONETARIO DE LA BALANZA DE PAGOS Y LA PROGRAMACION FINANCIERA	Macro Ec.		4
DTA-0263	90	NOV	LA POLITICA DE EXPORTACIONES EN BOLIVIA	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
DTA-0263-A	90	NOV	ANTECEDENTES PARA LA TRABAJO ANALITICO "LA POLITICA DE EXPORTACION EN BOLIVIA"	Macro Ec.		4 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
DTA-0264	90	NOV	LA POLITICA DE EXPORTACIONES: POLITICA MACROECONOMICA Y FACTORES INSTITUCIONALES	Macro Ec.		1 MIN. PLANBAMINETO
DTA-0265	90	NOV	ANALISIS DE SITUACION DE LA ECONOMIA (ANTECEDENTES PARA LA ELABORACION DEL MARCO DE POLITICA ECONOMICA PARA 1991, PREPARADO POR EL GRUPO TECNICO)	Ambas		3 GABINETE ECONOMICO

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TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTA-0266	90	NOV	ANALISIS GLOBAL DE LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA Y PERSPECTIVAS PARA 1991.	Ambas	2	GABINETE ECONOMICO
DTA-0268	91	ENE	ANALISIS Y RECOMENDACIONES SOBRE LA POLITICA DE PROMOCION DE EXPORTACIONES "NO-TRADICIONALES" EN BOLIVIA	Macro Ec.	4	
DTA-0269	91	ENE	ANALISIS DE LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA 1990	Ambas	2	MIN. PLANTEAMIENTO
DTA-0270	91	ENE	ZONA DE LIBRE COMERCIO	Macro Ec.	1	MIN. RELACIONES
DTA-0271	91	ENE	ZONA DE LIBRE COMERCIO ENTRE BOLIVIA Y CHILE: ESTRUCTURA DEL COMERCIO BOLIVIA-CHILE	Macro Ec.	1	MIN. RELACIONES
DTA-0272	91	ENE	ANALISIS COMPARATIVO DE POLITICAS ECONOMICAS: BOLIVIA-CHILE	Macro Ec.	1	MIN. RELACIONES
DTA-0273	91	FEB	MATRIZ DE EMPLEO Y EDUCACION	Ambas	4	
DTA-0274	91	MAR	CONTRABANDO DE IMPORTACIONES 1989	Macro Ec.	1	MIN. RELACIONES
DTA-0275	91	ABR	POTENCIALIDAD DEL COMERCIO ENTRE BOLIVIA Y CHILE	Macro Ec.	1	MIN. RELACIONES
DTA-0276	91	ABR	PLAN PARA EL DESARROLLO DE LA PRODUCCION DE TRIGO 1990-1994	Macro Sect.	1	M.A.C.A.

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## DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO ESTADISTICOS REALIZADOS POR LA UNIDAD DE ANALISIS DE POLITICAS ECONOMICAS

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	AREA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTE-2055	88	AGT	ESTADISTICA DEL SISTEMA DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL GESTION 1980-1986	Macro Ec.	4	
DTE-2056	90	ENE	CONSTRUCCION DE INDICES DE COSTOS	Macro Sect.	4	
DTE-2057	90	ENE	ANALISIS DE LA ENCUESTA DE PRECIOS DE FINCA - USAID	Macro Sect.	3	
DTE-2058	90	ENE	DECRETO SOBRE POLITICAS ECONOMICAS RELACIONADAS AL SECTOR ACROPECUARIO	Macro Sect.	4	
DTE-2059	90	JUN	INDICES DE PRECIOS DEL CONJUNTO DE LA ECONOMIA	Macro Sect.	4	
DTE-2060	91	ENE	INDICADORES ECONOMICOS	Macro Sect.	3	

## DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO METODOLOGICOS REALIZADOS POR LA UNIDAD DE ANALISIS DE POLITICAS ECONOMICAS

TRABAJO	AÑO	MESES	DOCUMENTO	ABBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTH-1071	88	SEP	ASPECTOS METODOLOGICOS DEL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO ACORDADO CON EL FMI	Macro Ec.	3	
DTH-1072	88	SEP	MODELO MONETARIO PARA COMPATIBILIZAR VARIABLES FINANCIERAS	Macro Ec.	3	
DTH-1073	88	SEP	DISCUSION METODOLOGICA PARA EL CALCULO DE TIPO DE CAMBIO REAL	Macro Ec.	3	
DTH-1074	88	NOV	MATRIX DEL SECTOR EXTERNO INDICADORES DE COMERCIO (2DA. ETAPA)	Macro Ec.	3	
DTH-1075	89	ENE	INDICE DE REMUNERACIONES MEDIAS DEL SECTOR PUBLICO	Macro Sect.	5	
DTH-1076	89	FEB	MODELO DEL SECTOR HIDROCARBUROS	Macro Sect.	3	
DTH-1077	89	MAY	DESAGREGACION TEMPORAL DE SERIES BASADA EN MODELOS ARIMA	Macro Sect.	3	
DTH-1078	89	MAY	DESAGREGACION TRIMESTRAL DEL PRODUCTO INTERNO BRUTO DE BOLIVIA	Macro Sect.	3	
DTH-1079	89	JUN	ESTADISTICAS DE LAS FINANZAS PUBLICAS GESTION: 1980-1987 UN ENFOQUE METODOLOGICO	Macro Ec.	4	
DTH-1080	89	AGT	MANUAL DE UTILIZACION DEL SISTEMA DETERMINANTES DEL DEFICIT DEL SECTOR PUBLICO	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1081	89	SEP	SISTEMA DE INFORMACION DE UDAPE	Macro Sect.	5	

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TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ARBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTH-1082	89	NOV	EL MODELO DE EQUILIBRIO GENERAL MEGBOL	Macro Ec.	3	
DTH-1083	89	NOV	MODELO DEL SECTOR ENERGIA (INTEGRADO)	Macro Sect.	3	
DTH-1084	89	NOV	MODELO ECONOMETRICO DE CORTO PLAZO (PRIMERA VERSION)	Macro Ec.	5	
DTH-1085	90	ENE	LAS MATRICES DE CONTABILIDAD SOCIAL PARA EL ANALISIS DE FINCAS CAMPESINAS EN BOLIVIA	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1086	90	ENE	MANUAL DE WORD PERFECT VERSION 5.0 VOL. I	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1087	90	ABR	SEGMENTACION DE LA INDUSTRIA MANUFACTURERA EN BOLIVIA	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1088	90	MAY	INDICADOR SINTETICO DE LA INDUSTRIA MANUFACTURERA	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1089	90	MAY	INDICADORES DEL SECTOR EXTERNO	Macro Ec.	4	
DTH-1090	90	MAY	INDICADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1091	90	MAY	INDICADORES DE LA MINERIA	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1092	90	MAY	INDICADORES FISICOS DE LA AGRICULTURA 1980-1988	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1093	90	MAY	INDICES DEL SECTOR ENERGIA	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1094	90	MAY	INDICES DEL SECTOR HIDROCARBUROS	Macro Sect.	4	
DTH-1095	90	JUN	EVALUACION DE PRECIOS INTERNACIONALES Y OTROS INDICADORES	Macro Ec.	3	

TRABAJO	ARO	MES	DOCUMENTO	ARBA	CLASIF.	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO
DTM-1096	90	JUL	MARGENES DE BENEFICIO Y ESTRUCTURA DE COSTOS DE LA INDUSTRIA MANUFACTURERA	Macro Sect.	3	
DTM-1097	91	MAR	MANUAL DE DREBLANCE PLUS VERSION 3.0	Macro Sect.	4	

Table C-2

A_0->	CLASIF	Count					Row
		Row Pct	88	89	90	91	Total
		Col Pct					
		Tot Pct					
1.0		2	2	20	9	33	
		6.1	6.1	60.6	27.3	16.7	
		7.1	4.3	20.8	33.3		
		1.0	1.0	10.1	4.5		
2.0		3	14	32	5	54	
		5.6	25.9	59.3	9.3	27.3	
		10.7	29.8	33.3	18.5		
		1.5	7.1	16.2	2.5		
3.0		17	21	20	10	68	
		25.0	30.9	29.4	14.7	34.3	
		60.7	44.7	20.8	37.0		
		8.6	10.6	10.1	5.1		
4.0		4	6	20	3	33	
		12.1	18.2	60.6	9.1	16.7	
		14.3	12.8	20.8	11.1		
		2.0	3.0	10.1	1.5		
5.0		2	4	4		10	
		20.0	40.0	40.0		5.1	
		7.1	8.5	4.2			
		1.0	2.0	2.0			
Column		28	47	96	27	198	
Total		14.1	23.7	48.5	13.6	100.0	

Number of Missing Observations = 0

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Table C-3

CLASIF->	TIPO	Count						Row
		Row Pct	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	Total
		Col Pct						
		Tot Pct						
AM	1.0	15	37	26	3	4	85	
		17.6	43.5	30.6	3.5	4.7	42.9	
		45.5	68.5	38.2	9.1	40.0		
		7.6	18.7	13.1	1.5	2.0		
DTA	2.0	18	17	29	13	3	80	
		22.5	21.3	36.3	16.3	3.8	40.4	
		54.5	31.5	42.6	39.4	30.0		
		9.1	8.6	14.6	6.6	1.5		
DTE	3.0			2	4		6	
				33.3	66.7		3.0	
				2.9	12.1			
				1.0	2.0			
DTM	4.0			11	13	3	27	
				40.7	48.1	11.1	13.6	
				16.2	39.4	30.0		
				5.6	6.6	1.5		
	Column	33	54	68	33	10	198	
	Total	16.7	27.3	34.3	16.7	5.1	100.0	

Number of Missing Observations = 0

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Table C-4

DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
AM-1151	90 MAR	GABINETE ECONOMICO APOYO	J.CUEVAS	EN ESTE DOCUMENTO SE ANALIZAN LAS DIFICULTADES EN LA EJECUCION Y ADMINISTRACION DEL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO CON EL FMI, DEBIDO PRINCIPALMENTE A FACTORES QUE TIENDEN A CONVERTIRSE EN PROBLEMAS ESTRUCTURALES, TANTO EN LOS INGRESOS COMO EN LOS GASTOS DEL SECTOR PUBLICO NO FINANCIERO. AL RESPECTO, SE RECOMIENDA LA ADOPCION DE MEDIDAS DE POLITICA ECONOMICA DE CARACTER ESTRUCTURAL.	1	1
AM-1155	90 MAR	BANCO MUNDIAL APOYO	V.H.AYALA	ESTE DOCUMENTO ES UNA EXTENSION DEL ESTUDIO "EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DE LOS PROYECTOS ENERGETICOS DE INTEGRACION CON EL BRASIL". EN ESTE ANALISIS, SE ELABORAN INDICADORES QUE TIENEN EL PROPOSITO DE PERMITIR UN ESTUDIO MAS EXHAUSTIVO DEL COMPORTAMIENTO DE LAS VARIABLES DEL SECTOR EXTERNO, PARA EL ESCENARIO SE CONSIDERA LA CONSTRUCCION DEL GASODUCTO Y LA PLANTA TERMoeLECTRICA. LOS INDICADORES PRESENTADOS, FUERON ELABORADOS A SOLICITUD DEL JEFE DE MISION DEL BANCO MUNDIAL.	1	1
AM-1157	90 ABR	MINISTERIO DE ENERGIA E HIDROCARBUROS APOYO	V.H.AYALA	ESTE DOCUMENTO ES UN ADEMPUM DEL ESTUDIO "EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DE LOS ACUERDOS ENERGETICOS DE INTEGRACION CON EL BRASIL", EN EL CUAL SE ANALIZA ESPECIFICAMENTE LA PARTICIPACION DEL CAPITAL PRIVADO EN LA INVERSION TERMoeLECTRICA, SIN QUE SE MODIFIQUE EL MONTO DE FINANCIAMIENTO EXTERNO. EN LOS RESULTADOS PRESENTADOS SE HACE ESPECIAL ENFASIS EN LA EVOLUCION DE LAS CUENTAS DEL SECTOR FISCAL Y DEL SECTOR EXTERNO.	1	1
AM-1160	90 MAY	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	J.CUEVAS J.C.REQUENA J.L.LUPO	EN ESTE DOCUMENTO SE ANALIZAN LOS PERMANENTES PROBLEMAS DE ILIQUIDEZ POR LOS QUE ATRAVIESA EL TESORO GENERAL DE LA NACION (TGN), LOS CUALES TIENEN COMO SOLUCION DE FONDO CAMBIOS ESTRUCTURALES. SIN EMBARGO, ESTOS CAMBIOS SON OBSERVABLES EN EL MEDIANO Y LARGO PLAZO, RAZON POR LA CUAL SE REITERA LA NECESIDAD DE RECURSOS ADICIONALES PARA LLEVAR ADELANTE ESTE TIPO DE MEDIDAS. SE ANALIZA, EN ESTE SENTIDO LOS PROGRAMAS DE COOPERACION ECONOMICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS; ESF (ECONOMIC SUPPORT FINANCIAL) Y DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO, QUE SON DONACIONES QUE REQUIEREN SER MONETIZADAS POR EL TGN, REALIZANDO UN DEPOSITO EN MONEDA NACIONAL EQUIVALENTE AL MONTO DE LA DONACION.	3	1

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
					EN ESTE CONTEXTO, ES IMPORTANTE RECONOCER QUE LA COOPERACION ECONOMICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS A BOLIVIA ES MUY BENEFICIOSA, PERO ES NECESARIO INCORPORAR CAMBIOS DE FORMA EN ESTA COOPERACION PRESTADA PARA QUE NO SIGNIFIQUEN EN NINGUN CASO UN ESFUERZO FISCAL ADICIONAL PARA EL TGN Y QUE EN GENERAL APUNTEN A ALIVIAR LOS PROBLEMAS DE ILIQUIDEZ QUE ESTE ENFRENTA, ASI COMO UN INCREMENTO EN LOS MONTOS.		1
AM-1164	90	JUN	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES APOYO	J.C.REQUENA J.L.LUPO R.PEREIA	ESTE DOCUMENTO FUE ELABORADO A SOLICITUD DEL CANCELLER DE LA REPUBLICA Y TIENE COMO OBJETIVO PROYECTAR LA ECONOMIA NACIONAL HACIA EL AÑO 2000 CON Y SIN DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO. LA CONCLUSION ES QUE DE NO LLEVARSE A CABO EL PROGRAMA NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO, LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA EN EL AÑO 2000 ESTARIA SOMETIDA A UNA ACTIVIDAD MONOEXPORTADORA, ILEGAL E INESTABLE, QUE ADEMAS GENERARIA GRAVES DISTORSIONES EN EL AMBITO ECONOMICO, POLITICO Y SOCIAL.	1	1
AM-1170	90	JUL	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES APOYO	R.PEREIRA	LA AYUDA MEMORIA CONTEMPLA LOS ESFUERZOS QUE HA REALIZADO EL GOBIERNO DESDE LA PROPUESTA DE "LA ESTRATEGIA NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO" HASTA LA PRESENTACION DEL PROGRAMA DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO, ASI COMO LAS ACTIVIDADES Y ACCIONES FUTURAS QUE PERMITAN PLASMAR LOS PROGRAMAS Y PROYECTOS DE INVERSION EN OBRAS CONCRETAS.	2	1
AM-1173	90	AGT	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	F.GUMIEL J.ESCOBAR	ESTE DOCUMENTO ANALIZA UNA PROPUESTA DE REBAJA DE ARANCELES PARA EL SECTOR AGROPECUARIO REALIZADA POR LA CAO (CAMARA AGROPECUARIA DEL ORIENTE). INCLUYE UN ANALISIS DEL SECTOR, ADEMAS DE LA ESTRUCTURA DE COSTOS. LUEGO SE LLEGA A LA CONCLUSION DE QUE LA REBAJA DE ARANCELES PARA LA IMPORTACION TANTO DE BIENES DE CAPITAL COMO DE MATERIAS PRIMAS DEL SECTOR AGROPECUARIO, NO AFECTA EN GRAN MEDIDA LAS CUENTAS FISCALES AUNQUE TAMPOCO SIGNIFICA UN BENEFICIO DE GRAN MAGNITUD PARA EL SECTOR AGROPECUARIO.	2	1
AM-1182	90	OCT	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	J.C.REQUENA J.L.LUPO C.DIAZ (INE)		2	1
AM-1186	90	NOV	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION	V.H.AYALA		2	1

## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO	MESES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
			APOYO				1
AM-1187	90	NOV	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION	J.C.REQUEENA V.H.AYALA		2	1
			APOYO				1
AM-1188	90	NOV	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION	F.GUMIEL		2	1
			APOYO				1
AM-1196	90	DIC	GABINETE ECONOMICO			1	1
			APOYO				1
				GRUPO TECNICO: ESTA AYUDA MEMORIA PRESENTA UN MARCO UDAPE TENTATIVO DE POLITICA ECONOMICA PARA EL AÑO 1991. SE PLANTEA LA NECESIDAD DE INCREMENTAR SAFCO EL PRECIO DE LOS HIDROCARBUROS, CON EL OBJETO DE DESTINAR LOS INGRESOS ADICIONALES A UN FONDO DE CONTRAPARTIDA LOCAL PARA LOGRAR UN MAYOR NIVEL DE DESEMBOLSOS EXTERNOS. EN EL SECTOR MONETARIO, SE RECOMIENDA OTORGAR UN MAYOR GRADO DE LIQUIDEZ AL SECTOR PRIVADO, PARA ASI GENERAR UN EFECTO "CROWDING-IN" SOBRE LA INVERSION PRIVADA, QUE COMPLEMENTA LA MAYOR INVERSION PUBLICA.			1
AM-1207	91	FEB	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION	G.HUARACHI M.F.DELGADILLO		3	1
			APOYO	J.L.PEREZ J.ESCOBAR			1
AM-1210	91	MAR	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION	F.GUMIEL		3	1
			APOYO				1
AM-1215	91	ABR	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO	F.GUMIEL		1	1
					ESTA AYUDA MEMORIA HACE UN RESUMEN DEL CONTENIDO Y LAS PRINCIPALES CONCLUSIONES DE DOCUMENTOS QUE UDAPE DESARROLLO (A PETICION DEL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO PARA ANALIZAR EL TEMA DE UNA ZONA DE LIBRE COMERCIO ENTRE BOLIVIA Y CHILE (DTA-0270 DTA-0271 - DTA-0272 - DTA-0274 - DTA-0275). ADICIONALMENTE, SE ELABORAN CONCLUSIONES GENERALES DEL TEMA, ANALIZANDO LAS VENTAJAS DEL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE UNA ZONA DE LIBRE COMERCIO ENTRE BOLIVIA Y CHILE.		1
DTA-0207	88	SEP	GABINETE ECONOMICO/ APOYO	G.AFCHA J.CUEVAS V.H.DE LA BARRA	(VER ANEXO No. 53) ESTE DOCUMENTO PRESENTA UN ANALISIS RESUMIDO DEL CUMPLIMIENTO DE LAS METAS ESTABLECIDAS EN EL PROGRAMA DE AJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL (ESAF), NEGOCIADO CON EL FMI, PARA EL AÑO 1988. ADEMAS DEL SEGUIMIENTO DE LAS METAS CUANTITATIVAS DE ESTAS Y SE SUGIEREN ALGUNAS MEDIDAS QUE	2	1

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
				COCA Y DERIVADOS. EL NUEVO ENFOQUE DE ESTE TRABAJO, IMPLICO REPLANTEAR EL CONCEPTO DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO, EN EL CUAL LA PRIORIDAD YA NO ES, COMO EN EL PASADO, SOLAMENTE LA ERRADICACION DE LOS CULTIVOS DE HOJA DE COCA, SINO LA SUSTITUCION DE LA ECONOMIA DE LA COCA Y DERIVADOS, MEDIANTE UN PROCESO DE DESARROLLO ECONOMICO ALTERNATIVO. ESTA PROPOSICION FUE PRESENTADA COMO LA TESIS BOLIVIANA POR EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA EN LA REUNION CUMBRE DE CARTAGENA-COLOMBIA EN FEBRERO DEL PRESENTE AÑO.		1
DTA-0243	90 MAR	DIRECCION GENERAL DE LA RENTA INTERNA/APOYO	G.HUARACHI COLABORARON: O.MONTAÑO	ESTE ESTUDIO TIENE COMO FINALIDAD INVESTIGAR LAS POSIBILIDADES QUE TIENE EL GOBIERNO DE AUMENTAR LAS RECAUDACIONES TRIBUTARIAS, FUNDAMENTALMENTE A TRAVES DE UNA IMPLEMENTACION MAS EFICIENTE DE LOS MECANISMOS ADMINISTRATIVOS LIGADOS A LOS IMPUESTOS INDIRECTOS. PARA ESTO, EL DOCUMENTO SE CONCENTRA EN LA ESTIMACION DEL POTENCIAL TRIBUTARIO CORRESPONDIENTE A LOS IMPUESTOS INDIRECTOS (IVA, TRANSACCIONES Y ESPECIFICO SOBRE BEBIDAS Y TABACO).	2	1
DTA-0246	90 MAY	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO/APOYO	J.C.REGUENA J.L.LUPO G.CANDIA G.HUARACHI M.DE FRANCO L.CIENFIO R.PEREIRA MIN.PLANEAMIENTO SUBDESAL	EN FEBRERO DE 1990 EL GOBIERNO DE BOLIVIA PRESENTO, EN CARTAGENA COLOMBIA, LA "ESTRATEGIA NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO". EN ESTE SENTIDO EL "PROGRAMA NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO 1990-1995" TIENEN LA FINALIDAD DE VIABILIZAR Y DARLE CONTENIDO OPERATIVO A LOS LINEAMIENTOS EXPRESADOS EN DICHA ESTRATEGIA. EL PROGRAMA PROPONE, PARA LOS PROXIMOS SEIS AÑOS, UN CRONOGRAMA DE ERRADICACION DE LA SUPERFICIE CULTIVADA DE COCA DESTINADA A LA ELABORACION DE LA SUPERFICIE CULTIVADA DE COCA DESTINADA A LA ELABORACION DE DERIVADOS. A PARTIR DE ESTAS METAS, SE IDENTIFICAN LOS COSTOS ECONOMICOS EN PRODUCTO, EMPLEO Y DIVISAS (A PRECIOS DE 1989) Y LOS REQUERIMIENTOS DE FINANCIAMIENTO PARA INVERSIONES Y ACCIONES DE CORTO PLAZO, QUE PERMITAN REPONER LAS PERDIDAS EN LAS VARIABLES AFECTADAS.	1	1
DTA-0249	90 JUN	MINISTERIO DE ENERGIA E HIDROCARBUROS/APOYO	V.HUGO AYALA	EL PROPOSITO DE ESTE DOCUMENTO ES EL DE AMPLIAR EL ANALISIS DE EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA DE LOS PROYECTOS DE INTEGRACION ENERGETICA CON EL BRASIL A RAIZ	1	1

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
				DE LAS SOLICITUDES PLANTEADAS POR LAS MISIONES DEL BANCO MUNDIAL Y EL BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO EN ABRIL DE 1990. EN LA PRIMERA PARTE SE PRESENTAN ALGUNOS ANTECEDENTES DE TIPO METODOLOGICO. EN LA SEGUNDA PARTE SE DETALLAN LOS NUEVOS ESCENARIOS SUJETOS A EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA, ASI COMO LOS RESULTADOS OBTENDIDOS. EN LA TERCERA PARTE, EL RESULTADO DE LAS CUENTAS EXTERNAS Y FISCALES ES ANALIZADO CON ESPECIAL INTERES PARA LOS ESCENARIOS: A) ASIGNACION DE LA INVERSION ENERGETICA A OTROS PROYECTOS ALTERNATIVOS; Y B) APLICACION DE LAS MEDIDAS DE POLITICA ECONOMICA DISTINTAS A LAS SUPUESTAS EN EL ESCENARIO I. EN LA CUARTA PARTE, SE DETERMINA PARA CADA UNO DE LOS ESCENARIOS, EL VALOR ACTUALIZADO DE LAS PRINCIPALES VARIABLES MACROECONOMICAS. EN LA ULTIMA PARTE, SE PRESENTAN LAS PRINCIPALES CONCLUSIONES DEL ESTUDIO.		
DTA-0257 90	AGT	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION/APOYO	J.L.LUPO F.GUMIEL J.ESCOBAR	ESTE DOCUMENTO ELABORADO PARA LAS AUTORIDADES DEL MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION, EVALUA LA POLITICA DE FOMENTO A LAS EXPORTACIONES DE PRODUCTOS NO TRADICIONALES DE BOLIVIA EN EL PERIODO 1977-1990. ADEMAS DE ESTABLECER EL MARCO TEORICO, QUE SUSTENTA EL FOMENTO A LAS EXPORTACIONES, EVALUA LOS MECANISMOS VIGENTES (EN ESPECIAL EL CERTIFICADO DE REINTEGRO ARANCELARIO), ASI COMO LA PROPUESTA DEL GOBIERNO DE REDUCCION DEL CRA Y DESGRAVACION ARANCELARIA. FINALMENTE, RECOMIENDA POLITICAS E INSTRUMENTOS DE FOMENTO AL SECTOR EXPORTADOR EN EL CORTO Y LARGO PLAZO.	2	
DTA-0261 90	OCT	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION/APOYO	G.HUARACHI V.H.AYALA G.CANDIA J.C.REQUENA	EL TRABAJO CONSTITUYE UN INTENTO DE EVALUAR LOS PRINCIPALES EFECTOS MACROECONOMICOS DE LA INVERSION PUBLICA PLANEADA PARA LOS PROXIMOS CINCO AÑOS A PARTIR DE 1990. SE REALIZAN EJERCICIOS DE DIFERENTES ESTRUCTURAS DE INVERSION PUBLICA SECTORIAL Y SE CONCLUYE QUE UNA COMPOSICION QUE FAVOREZCA A LOS SECTORES TRANSABLES RESULTA SER LA MEJOR OPCION POR SUS EFECTOS POSITIVOS EN EL CRECIMIENTO DEL PRODUCTO.	1	
DTA-0263 90	NOV	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y	F.GUMIEL J.L.LUPO	DE PLANEAMIENTO, ES UNA REVISION Y ACTUALIZACION DE UN ANTERIOR TRABAJO SOBRE LA POLITICA	1	

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO	MESES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
			COORDINACION/APOYO	J.ESCOBAR	DE EXPORTACIONES EN BOLIVIA (DTA-0257/90 POLITICA DE FOMENTO A LAS EXPORTACIONES NO TRADICIONALES EN BOLIVIA, AGOSTO DE 1990) EL DOCUMENTO ANALIZA ALGUNOS TEMAS NO TOCADOS EN EL TRABAJO PREVIO TALES COMO LA CREACION DE ZONAS FRANCAS, LA IMPLEMENTACION DEL REGI- MEN DE INTERNACION TEMPORAL PARA EXPORTACIONES (RITEX) Y ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON EL TRAMITE DE EXPORTACION Y LA ASISTENCIA TECNICA A LOS EXPORTADORES.		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DTA-0264	90	NOV	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION/APOYO	F.GUMIEL	ESTE DOCUMENTO ELABORADO PARA EL MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO, ANALIZA LAS POLITICAS MACROECONOMICAS IMPLEMENTADAS EN BOLIVIA A PARTIR DE 1985 LAS CAULES SE CONSTITUYEN EN CONDICIONES INDISPENSABLES PARA EL LOGRO DE EXITOSA. TAMBIEN ESTUDIA LOS FACTORES INSTI- TUCIONALES QUE AFECTAN AL SECTOR EXPORTADOR TALES COMO LOS ASPECTOS RELATIVOS A LOS TRAMI- TES DE EXPORTACION Y EL APOYO INSTITUCIONAL PRESTADO AL SECTOR EXPORTADOR. ADICIONALMENTE PROPONE UNA ESTRATEGIA DE PROMOCION DE EXPOR- TACIONES EN BOLIVIA.	2	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DTA-0270	91	ENE	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO		ESTE DOCUMENTO PREPARADO A SOLICITUD DEL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO, REALIZA CONSIDERACIONES DE TIPO TEORICO DE LO QUE SIGNIFICA UNA ZONA DE LIBRE COMERCIO ADEMAS DE HACER REFERENCIA A ALGUNAS EXPERIENCIAS SOBRE ZONAS DE LIBRE COMERCIO PRINCIPALMENTE EN EUROPA.	2	1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DTA-0271	91	ENE	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO		ESTE DOCUMENTO PREPARADO A SOLICITUD DEL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO, ANALIZA EL COMERCIO OFICIAL DE BOLIVIA CON LOS PAISES DE AMERICA DEL SUR Y EN PARTICULAR EL COMERCIO CON CHILE.	2	1 1 1 1 1
DTA-0272	91	ENE	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO		EL PRESENTE DOCUMENTO ELABORADO PARA EL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO, REALIZA UN ANALISIS COMPARATIVO DE LA EVOLUCION DE ALGUNAS VARIABLES MACROECONOMICAS Y DE POLITICAS QUE SE IMPLEMENTARON EN BOLIVIA Y CHILE EN EL PERIODO 1985-1990.	2	1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DTA-0274	91	MAR	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO		ESTE DOCUMENTO ELABORADO POR EL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO, REALIZA UNA ESTIMACION DEL CONTRABANDO DE IMPORTACIONES GLOBLAL DE BOLIVIA EN 1989 Y LA PARTICIPACION DE LOS PRODUCTOS CHILENOS EN EL MISMO.	1	1 1 1 1 1
DTA-0275	91	ABR	MINISTERIO DE		ESTE DOCUMENTO ELABORADO PARA EL MINISTERIO DE	1	1 1

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
AM-1140	89	AGT	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	J.CUEVAS	EN ESTA AYUDA MEMORIA SE DETALLAN LOS PRINCIPALES FACTORES QUE REFUERZAN UN INCREMENTO EN EL PRECIO DE LOS HIDROCARBUROS PARA EL ULTIMO TRIMESTRE DE 1989. ENTRE ESTOS FACTORES, SE INCLUYEN: LA CAIDA EN EL PRECIO DEL GAS EXPORTADO A LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA, EL DETERIORO DE LOS INGRESOS CORRIENTES PROVENIENTES POR LA VENTA DE BIENES Y SERVICIOS EN EL MERCADO INTERNO, Y EL COMPROMISO FIRMADO POR EL GOBIERNO BOLIVIANO CON EL FMI PARA MANTENER EL PRECIO DEL BARRIL DE PETROLEO EN UN PRECIO EQUIVALENTE A SUS 45.5.	2	2
AM-1141	89	AGT	GABINETE ECONOMICO APOYO	G.AFCHA J.CUEVAS	AYUDA MEMORIA QUE ESTABLECE LAS CONDICIONES NECESARIAS PARA LA NEGOCIACION DEL SEGUNDO AÑO DEL PROGRAMA DE AJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL CON FACILIDADES AMPLIADAS (ESAF) CON EL FONDO MONETARIO INTERNACIONAL (FMI). SE PONE ESPECIAL ENFASIS EN LA ADOPCION DE LAS PRINCIPALES ACCIONES DE POLITICA ESTABLECIDOS EN EL MEMORANDUM DE POLITICA ECONOMICA Y FINANCIERA, Y EN LA RATIFICACION DE DICHAS MEDIDAS POR LAS AUTORIDADES DEL GOBIERNO QUE ASUMIO EL PODER EN AGOSTO DE 1989.	2	2
AM-1143	89	AGT	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	G.HJARACHI G.AFCHA F.GUMIEL E.ARTISPE	RELACIONES ECONOMICAS ENTRE BOLIVIA Y ARGENTINA Y EN PARTICULAR LOS EFECTOS DE LA ELIMINACION DE DEUDAS ENTRE BOLIVIA Y ARGENTINA.	2	2
AM-1144	89	SPT	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	V.H.AYALA F.GUMIEL		2	2
AM-1146	89	DIC	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	E.LARRAZABAL	ESTA AYUDA MEMORIA SOLICITADA POR AUTORIDADES DEL MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO, ES UN DOCUMENTO DE APOYO AL GRUPO DE TRABAJO "PARIS III" QUE TIENE A SU CARGO LA RENEGOCIACION DE LA DEUDA BILATERAL. REALIZA UNA DESCRIPCION DEL PROGRAMA ECONOMICO APLICADO DESDE AGOSTO DE 1985 Y ANALIZA LOS OBJETIVOS Y LOGROS ALCANZADOS EN EL MARCO DEL PROGRAMA A MEDIANO PLAZO (1988-91) QUE EL GOBIERNO IMPLEMENTO EN 1988.	2	2
AM-1147	89	DIC	GABINETE ECONOMICO APOYO	J.CUEVAS	AYUDA MEMORIA ELABORADA PARA LAS AUTORIDADES DEL MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO, EN LA CUAL SE ANALIZA LA INCIDENCIA EN EL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO, DE LAS NECESIDADES DE CREDITO DEL TGN EN EL ULTIMO TRIMESTRE DE 1989.	2	2

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
AM-1148	89 DIC	GABINETE ECONOMICO APOYO	J.CUEVAS	ESTA AYUDA MEMORIA ELABORADA PARA LAS AUTORIDADES DEL MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO, EVALUA EL CUMPLIMIENTO DE LOS LIMITES Y SUBLIMITES ESTABLECIDOS EN EL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO CON EL FMI, HASTA EL TERCER TRIMESTRE DE 1989.	2	2
AM-1149	90 ENE	GABINETE ECONOMICO APOYO	J.CUEVAS	ESTE FUE UN TRABAJO REALIZADO PARA LA RECIENTE NEGOCIACION DE CLUB DE PARIS III, EL MISMO QUE FORMO PARTE DEL DOCUMENTO PRESENTADO EN CLUB DE PARIS. EN EL TRABAJO SE REALIZAN LAS PROYECCIONES DE LA BALANZA DE PAGOS PARA EL PERIODO 1990-91 Y SE ANALIZA LA CONSISTENCIA MACROECONOMICA DE LAS ESTIMACIONES CON EL RESTO DE LOS SECTORES Y LA POLITICA ECONOMICA EXTERNA.	3	2
AM-1153	90 MAR	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	G.HUARACHI	LA NOTA SE REFIERE A LAS VENTAJAS QUE LA REDUCCION DE ARANCELES TIENE PARA LA ECONOMIA EN RELACION A LA POLITICA COMERCIAL ACORDADA ENTRE EL GOBIERNO, FMI Y EL BANCO MUNDIAL. POR OTRA PARTE, SE HACE REFERENCIA A LOS EFECTOS FISCALES Y DE ASIGNACION DE RECURSOS DE LA REDUCCION DEL CRA, ASI COMO DE UNA POSIBLE SUSTITUCION POR UN MECANISMO DE DRAWBACK.	3	2
AM-1154	90 MAR	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	J.C.REQUENA	EL OBJETIVO DE ESTE ESTUDIO FUE EVALUAR EL IMPACTO MACROECONOMICO DEL PROGRAMA DE INVERSIONES PUBLICAS PARA 1990 (467 MILLONES DE SUS.). EN EL ESTUDIO, Y LUEGO DE ESPECIFICAR LOS SUPUESTOS DE LA EVALUACION MACROECONOMICA, SE PRESENTAN LOS EFECTOS DEL PROGRAMA DE INVERSIONES PUBLICAS SOBRE: VARIABLES REALES, EMPLEO, SECTOR EXTERNO, SECTOR PUBLICO, Y EQUILIBRIO AHORRO-INVERSION. ESTE ESTUDIO FUE REALIZADO A PEDIDO EXPRESO DEL MINISTRO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y DEL BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO.	2	2
AM-1158	90 ABR	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	J.C.REQUENA	EL DOCUMENTO SE OCUPA DE ANOTAR LOS EFECTOS DEL REAJUSTE DEL PRECIO DE LOS HIDROCARBUROS EN 25%. SE VEN LOS EFECTOS SOBRE EL NIVEL GENERAL DE PRECIOS Y SOBRE LOS PRECIOS DEL TRANSPORTE AUTOMOTOR URBANO.	2	2
AM-1161	90 MAY	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	J.L.LUPO E.LARRAZABAL G.HUARACHI E.ARISPE (MIN.PLAN)	EN EL CONTEXTO DEL PROCESO DE AJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL, LA DESGRAVACION ARANCELARIA Y LA REDUCCION GRADUAL DEL CRA SON POLITICAS COMPATIBLES PARA ALCANZAR LOS OBJETIVOS Y EFICIENCIA ECONOMICA. EL TRABAJO, SIN	2	2

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
				EMBARGO, ARGUMENTA QUE EL RETRASO EN LA IMPLANTACION DE LAS MEDIDAS ESTRUCTURALES DEL SECTOR FISCAL IMPONE FUERTES RESTRICCIONES A LA REDUCCION GRADUAL DE ARANCELES Y DEL CRA. EN EL DOCUMENTO SE RECOMIENDA QUE MIENTRAS SE EJECUTEN LAS MEDIDAS ESTRUCTURALES DEL AREA FISCAL SE REPROGRAME LA REDUCCION GRADUAL DEL ARANCEL Y DEL CRA EN FORMA TRIMESTRAL HASTA SEPTIEMBRE DE 1991, AUNQUE ALTERNATIVAMENTE SE RECOMIENDA LA REDUCCION GRADUAL DEL ARANCEL Y DEL CRA EN FORMA SEMESTRAL EN EL ENTENDIDO QUE LAS MEDIDAS FISCALES REQUIERAN DE MAYOR TIEMPO DADO SU CARACTER ESTRUCTURAL.		2
AM-1162	90 JUN	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION APOYO	J.C.REQUENA G.HUARACHI F.VALVERDE J.ESCOBAR	ESTE TRABAJO HA SIDO ELABORADO PARA MEDIR EL POSIBLE IMPACTO QUE TENDRIA UNA SUBIDA DEL PRECIO DE LOS HIDROCARBUROS. EL DOCUMENTO INCLUYE EL ANALISIS ESTATICO DE LA MATRIZ INSUMO PRODUCTO, EL ANALISIS DINAMICO DE LAS MATRICES DE CONTABILIDAD SOCIAL, EL ANALISIS BASADO EN LA METODOLOGIA DEL IPC Y LA ESTRUCTURA DE COSTOS DEL TRANSPORTE.	2	2
AM-1165	90 JUL	GABINETE ECONOMICO APOYO	J.C.REQUENA O.MONTANO J.DE LA VINA	AL EVALUARSE EL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO ACORDADO CON EL FMI, SE PUDO EVIDENCIAR QUE EXISTE UN PROBLEMA EN LA ESTRUCTURA DEL FINANCIAMIENTO DEL DEFICIT DEL SECTOR PUBLICO. SIN EMBARGO, PARECE SER QUE TAMBIEN EXISTE UN PROBLEMA EN LA ESTRUCTURA DEL GASTO DEL SECTOR PUBLICO. CON EL FIN DE EJERCER UN CONTROL MAS EFICIENTE SOBRE LA ESTRUCTURA DEL FINANCIAMIENTO Y SOBRE LA ESTRUCTURA DEL GASTO DEL SECTOR PUBLICO, SE PROPONE CREAR DOS COMISIONES ESPECIALES DE SEGUIMIENTO Y CONTROL DE LAS PRINCIPALES EMPRESAS E INSTITUCIONES DEL SECTOR PUBLICO. A TRAVES DE ESTAS DOS COMISIONES, SE PODRA TENER UN CONTROL MAS DIRECTO SOBRE EL FINANCIAMIENTO Y EL GASTO DEL SECTOR PUBLICO, CON EL FIN DE CUMPLIR CON LAS METAS ACORDADAS CON EL FMI.	3	2
AM-1166	90 JUL	MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES APOYO	R.PEREIRA	ESTA AYUDA MEMORIA, PARTIENDO DE LA PROBLEMÁTICA DE LA ECONOMIA DE LA COCA, ENFATIZA EN LOS ARGUMENTOS QUE JUSTIFICAN EL DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO, MARCO QUE SIRVE DE REFERENCIA PARA ESTABLECER LOS CRITERIOS DE SELECCION Y EVALUACION DE PROYECTOS QUE DEBERAN CONFORMAR EL PROGRAMA DE INVERSIONES PARA EL DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO.	3	2
AM-1168	90 JUL	MINISTERIO DE	E.LARRAZABAL	ESTA NOTA PRESENTA EN FORMA ESQUEMATICA LAS	3	2

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO	MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
					EL EJERCICIO QUE INCLUYE EL FINANCIAMIENTO PARA LA TERMoeLECTRICA Y EL GASODUCTO AL BRASIL, PRESENTA LA EVOLUCION DE LOS INDICADORES BASICOS DE SOLVENCIA DE LA ECONOMIA BOLIVIANA.		2
AM-1214	91	ABR	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION	J.L.LUPO G.CANDIA J.R.RAMIREZ J.ESCOBAR C.RIOS	ESTA AYUDA MEMORIA ES UNA ACTUALIZACION, HASTA ABRIL DE 1991, DEL DOCUMENTO AM 1195 "EVALUACION DEL DS 22407". PARA REALIZAR ESTA ACTUALIZACION SE AÑADIERON ALGUNAS DISPOSICIONES QUE PESE A NO ESTAR INCLUIDAS EXPLICITAMENTE EN EL DS 22407 SON CONSISTENTES CON EL PROGRAMA ECONOMICO DEL GOBIERNO. EL DOCUMENTO EN CUESTION HA SIDO REQUERIDO POR EL MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO.	2	2
DTA-0200	88	AGT		J.C.AGUILAR V.H.DE LA BARRA J.C.REQUENA	(VER ANEXO No. 46)	2	2
DTA-0210	88	SEP	GABINETE ECONOMICO/ APOYO	V.H.DE LA BARRA	EL DOCUMENTO PRESENTA UNA BREVE DESCRIPCION DEL PROGRAMA FINANCIERO 1988, LOS AJUSTES INTRODUCIDOS PARA EL RECALCULO DE LAS METAS SUJETAS A EVOLUCION Y UN ANALISIS DE LA EJECUCION A SEPTIEMBRE DE 1988. TAMBIEN SE MENCIONAN LAS DIFERENCIAS QUE EXISTIRIAN EN LOS CALCULOS RESPECTO DE LOS REALIZADOS POR EL FMI; LOS POSIBLES ESCENARIOS QUE SIRVEN DE BASE A LAS PROYECCIONES PARA FIN DE AÑO Y, FINALMENTE, SE INDICAN LOS ASPECTOS QUE DEBERIAN DISCUTIRSE EN LAS REUNIONES DE EVALUACION.	2	2
DTA-0211	88	SEP	GABINETE ECONOMICO/ APOYO	J.CUEVAS	DOCUMENTO QUE ANALIZA LOS EFECTOS DE LA DEVALUACION DEL DOLAR AMERICANO DURANTE 1988, SOBRE LAS RESERVAS INTERNACIONALES, SEGUN EL MEMORANDUM TECNICO DE ENTENDIMIENTO CON EL FMI. EN TERMINOS GENERALES, LOS EFECTOS RESULTAN SER NEGATIVOS DEBIDO A LA COMPOSICION ASIMETRICA DE LOS ACTIVOS Y OBLIGACIONES QUE COMPONEN LAS RESERVAS INTERNACIONALES NETAS DEL BANCO CENTRAL DE BOLIVIA.	3	2
DTA-0223	89	MAR	MINISTERIO DE FINANZAS APOYO	G.AFCHA J.CUEVAS	ESTE DOCUMENTO FUE ELABORADO A REQUERIMIENTO DEL MINISTERIO DE FINANZAS (SUBSECRETARIA DEL TESORO GENERAL DE LA NACION). SE DESCRIBE LA NUEVA POLITICA ECONOMICA Y LA IMPORTANCIA DE LA POLITICA DE ENDEUDAMIENTO EXTERNO EN LA ECONOMIA. SE DETALLAN LAS PRINCIPALES ACCIONES SEGUIDAS CON NUESTROS ACREEDORES CON EL PROPOSITO DE ALIVIAR EL SERVICIO DE LA DEUDA EXTERNA Y SUS IMPLICACIONES EN LA	2	2

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## DOCUMENTOS REALIZADOS POR UDAPE

TRABAJO	AÑO MES	SOLICITUD/IMPACTO	ELABORADO	OBJETIVO BUSCADO	EVIDENCIA	CLAS.
				REDUCCION GRADUAL DEL CERTIFICADO DE REINTEGRO ARANCELARIO (CRA), JUNTO A LA REDUCCION PROGRAMADA DEL ARANCEL. PARA COMPRENDER LOS EFECTOS DE LA EMISION DE VALORES FISCALES SOBRE EL CREDITO DOMESTICO DEL BANCO CENTRAL, EL TRABAJO UTILIZA LOS FLUJOS FINANCIEROS DE 1990 Y 1991 PROYECTADOS POR EL FMI, A TRAVES DE LOS CUALES SE CONCLUYE QUE A MEDIDA QUE SE UTILICEN TODOS LOS VALORES FISCALES EMITIDOS, LA PRESION SOBRE EL CREDITO DOMESTICO SERA EXACTAMENTE IGUAL A LA EMISION DE DICHS VALORES.		2
DTA-0250 90	JUN	MINISTERIO DE PLANEAMIENTO Y COORDINACION/APOYO	O.MONTANO J.R.RAMIREZ F.GUMIEL	ESTOS DOCUMENTOS TIENEN LA FINALIDAD DE HACER UN SEGUIMIENTO ANALITICO PERMANENTE A LOS OBJETIVOS, INSTRUMENTOS Y RESULTADOS DE LA POLITICA MACROECONOMICA DE CORTO PLAZO DEL GOBIERNO, ASI COMO DE IDENTIFICAR LOS PRINCIPALES PROBLEMAS Y RESTRICCIONES DEL CRECIMIENTO ECONOMICO. LA ELABORACION DE ESTOS DOCUMENTOS PERMITEN DEFINIR TRABAJOS ANALITICOS DE COYUNTURA SOBRE LOS PRINCIPALES TEMAS ECONOMICOS A FIN DE DISEÑAR PROPUESTAS DE POLITICA (O AJUSTES A ESTAS) EN EL CORTO PLAZO.	3	2
DTA-0252 90	JUN	BANCO CENTRAL DE BOLIVIA	K. DOMINGUEZ D.RODRICK	ESTE ESTUDIO FUE REALIZADO CONJUNTAMENTE ENTRE UDAPE Y LOS ASESORES DE HIID. EL BOLSIN PARECE HABER CUMPLIDO BASTANTE BIEN CON SUS OBJETIVOS, PRINCIPALMENTE AL AYUDAR A FRENAR EL PROCESO INFLACIONARIO Y A CONTROLAR EL MERCADO NEGRO DE DIVISAS. SIN EMBARGO, EL ALTO GRADO DE "DOLARIZACION" DE LA ECONOMIA Y LA PRESENCIA DE EXPECTATIVAS INFLACIONARIAS EN EL PUBLICO HACEN QUE ESTE INSTRUMENTO NO PUEDA SER UTILIZADO ACTIVAMENTE POR LAS AUTORIDADES. EN EFECTO, UNA DEVALUACION PODRIA REFLEJARSE SOBRE EL NIVEL DOMESTICO DE PRECIOS, ACELERANDO NUEVAMENTE EL PROCESO INFLACIONARIO. DESDE ESTE PUNTO DE VISTA, EL MANEJO DEL "BOLSIN" DEBE SEGUIR EN FUNCION DE LA ESTABILIDAD EN LOS PRECIOS, DADA LA FRAGIL ESTABILIDAD ECONOMICA REINANTE. ESTO IMPLICA QUE CUALQUIER INTENTO DE LOGRAR UNA DEVALUACION REAL, EN CASO DE PRESENTARSE UNA FUERTE SOBREVALUACION DE LA MONEDA, REQUERIRA DE MEDIDAS ALTERNATIVAS DE CARACTER ESTRUCTURAL.	3	2
DTA-0253 90	JUL	MINISTERIO DE	J.C.REQUENA	EL DOCUMENTO FUE ELABORADO A SOLICITUD DEL	2	2



**APPENDIX D**  
**Internal Interviews: UDAPE**

Juan Carlos Requena  
Director

Jose Luis Lupo  
Chief, Macro-economics Division

Gaby Candia  
Chief, Macro-sectorial Division

Victor Hugo Ayala  
Asesor, Macro-economic Division

Gualberto Huarachi  
Asesor, Macro-sectorial Division

Juan Ramon Ramirez  
Senior Analyst

Jairo Escobar  
Analyst

Rodney Pereira  
Senior Analyst

Jose Luis Vina  
Analyst

Maria Felix Delgadillo  
Analyst

Cecilia Rios  
Analyst

Reuben Ferrufino  
Analyst

Jose Luis Perez  
Analyst

Fredy Gumiel  
Analyst

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**INTERVIEWS WITH UDAPE PROFESSIONAL STAFF:  
FINDINGS**

**1. What are the strengths/weaknesses of UDAPE?**

Listed under strengths were the following: capacity for fast response, capacity for interdisciplinary work, a good reputation, reliability, solid technical capacity, the organization's lack of politization, the stability of the technical team, UDAPE's access and the weight of its opinion, its credibility, and non-bureaucratic environment.

Cited under weaknesses were the following: the uncertainty of UDAPE's continuity, lack of institutionalization, a lack of coordination between the macro-sectoral and the short-term macro-economic divisions, a lack of policy on internal training and development, a lack of clarification of roles, responsibilities, and lines of communication, low salary levels, lack of contact with other organizations, lack of coordination with other agencies (eg., Central Bank), and excessive workload, small size of the organization, hurried nature of the work, staff turnover, and the lack of a higher external profile.

**2. Who are UDAPE's principal clients?**

In every instance, the Ministry of Planning was mentioned first. In second place, the Ministry of Finance was mentioned most consistently, but it also warrants attention that four interview subjects did not mention the Finance ministry at all as a client.

In third place was the Central Bank -- but it was mentioned only in third place or further down, and six subjects did not mention the Central Bank as a client. The next most frequent client mentioned was the Ministry of Industry followed by the Macro-Committee. After that several other organizations were mentioned.

No one thought there were serious clients that were not being served.

**3. Are there things or activities that UDAPE ought not to be doing? Why?**

Mostly, the response to this question was negative. Those that replied positively all felt that UDAPE should reduce the "apaga fuegos" work that it does with Ministries. It was generally felt that such work distracted them from their other activities and from the workplan.

**4. Is there a piece of work that you have done that has given you a particular or special satisfaction?**

Generally, the professional staff of UDAPE was most proud of their analytical (ie., longer term research) work, even if it was produced as a result of a direct request from one of the ministries. The greatest pride was expressed in those projects which resulted in concrete

decisions or in which the analyst got to play an extensive role. Two cases were cited (a new policy on drawback arrangements and one pertaining to the macro-economic impact of a proposed gas pipeline to Brazil) where the analyst was involved from the inception of the project (when the idea was first being discussed until the appropriate enabling legislation was enacted by the government. While not conclusive, it should be noted that none of the staff said that the urgent, firefighting tasks gave them much satisfaction. Generally these projects were viewed with some degree of disdain and/or disparagement by the professional technical staff.

5. Are you content with your work? Which aspects do you like? Which ones do you not like?

Positive Aspects:

practical applications of work  
importance of UDAPE for Bolivia  
networks, contacts  
teamwork  
group discussions  
innovation  
stability of UDAPE  
research  
freedom of action  
content of work  
learning opportunities  
prestige

Negative Aspects:

petty rules  
lose time getting info.  
lack of training policy beyond MA  
lack of computers, heaters  
pressure, overload  
low salaries

**What aspects of the organization would you change?**

Development of incentive structures.  
More weight should be given to experience and less to academic titles.  
Improve training opportunities for those with MA degrees.  
Enlarge UDAPE. Bring assistants to do the data collection, preliminary analysis.  
Make structure more hierarchical -- improve opportunity for advancement.  
Improve coordination between chiefs, re-think the nature of the divisions.

6. Are there any opportunities in the external environment which UDAPE should be taking advantage of?

The following opportunities were cited by UDAPE's professional staff:

- UDAPE should give more consideration to the analysis of social and/or regional issues.
- the Board of Directors should be re-structured and improved.
- UDAPE should take advantage of opportunities for professional development of its staff (mentioned were the possibility of short term internships in the IMF or the World Bank)
- UDAPE should expand its role once all the technical staff have their MA degree.
- UDAPE should expand its financing base. Its current credibility and prestige has put it in a good bargaining position.
- UDAPE should concentrate more on conjunctural analysis.
- UDAPE needs to take better advantage of external consulting.

7. What are the principal threats you see confronting UDAPE?

The following threats were cited by UDAPE's professional staff:

- competition from other institutions.
- the absence of a base of permanent and continuous financing.
- politics. There is a continuous risk of politicization of UDAPE which would erode its credibility.
- greater integration into and subjugation by the Ministry of Planning. Subsequent bureaucratization.
- Deterioration of UDAPE's technical capacity through loss of key personnel -- salary competition.
- Inter-institutional jealousies.

## APPENDIX E

### Actors Interviewed

#### External:

Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada  
Ministro de Planeamiento y Politica Economica  
Govt. of Paz Estensorro

Enrique Garcia  
Minister of Planning  
Govt. of Paz Zamora

Jorge Quiroga  
Sub-Secretario, Inversiones  
Ministerio de Planeamiento y Politica Economica

David Blanco  
Ministro de Finanzas

Manuel Olave  
Vice Presidente  
Yacimientos Petroliferos de Bolivia

Roberto Gisbert  
Ministro de Finanzas  
Govt. of Paz Estensorro

Hernan Zevallos  
Sub-secretario de Asuntos Agropecuarios  
Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos y Agricultura

Fernando Terrazas  
Sub-secretario del Tesoro Nacional y Credito Publico  
Ministerio de Finanzas

Armando Pinel  
Asesor al Ministro  
Ministerio de Finanzas

Samuel Doria Medina  
Asesor al Presidente Jaime Paz Zamora

Raul Boada  
Presidente, Banco Central

Helga Salinas  
Sub-secretario del Presupuesto  
Ministerio de Finanzas

Marcelo Zalles  
Sub-secretario de Politica Economica  
Ministerio de Planeamiento y Politica Economica

Javier Pantoja  
Gerente General  
Banco Central

Juan Antonio Morales  
Director, Facultad de Economia  
Universidad Catolica

Roberto Casanova  
Director,

Camilo Arenas  
Chief of Party  
RR Nathan Associates, La Paz

Martha Galicia  
Consultant  
Strengthening Financial Management Project  
RR Nathan Associates, La Paz

Clark Joel  
Chief Economist  
USAID, La Paz, Bolivia

Sonia Aranibar  
Project Manager, UDAPE  
USAID, La Paz, Bolivia



Wayne Tate  
Program Officer  
USAID, La Paz, Bolivia

Carl Leonard  
Director  
USAID, La Paz, Bolivia

Garber Davidson  
Deputy Director  
USAID, La Paz, Bolivia

Oscar Antezana  
Economist  
USAID, La Paz, Bolivia

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## SYNTHESIS: INTERVIEWS WITH EXTERNAL ACTORS

### 1. What do you understand to be the mission of UDAPE?

Most responses stated that the primary mission of UDAPE was to serve as an adviser to the government on economic policy. A smaller number of respondents indicated that UDAPE has a more narrow mission, that of serving as an adviser on short-term economic policy.

### 2. Who are UDAPE's principal clients?

The first mentioned was the government, and more specifically, the Ministry of Planning. After that, the most frequent was the Ministry of Finance, followed by the Central Bank. However, the latter was mentioned much less frequently, partly because it was noted that the Central Bank has its own internal capacity for analysis.

Because of UDAPE's reputation for reliability, international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and USAID, have also become more frequent clients.

### 3. What do you see as UDAPE's priorities with respect to the allocation of their time?

Most concentration is in the area of macro-economic and short-term economic policy analysis. Some (a minority) wanted to see some change in priority to greater sectoral analysis.

### 4. What do you most value about UDAPE?

Among the characteristics cited were the following:

- professionalism, credibility
- "grupo pensante"
- technical capacity
- stability and continuity
- fire fighting capacity
- independence, non-political nature
- quality and promptness

### 5. To the extent that UDAPE has been effective, why has that been so?

Several characteristics were listed as contributing to UDAPE's effectiveness:

- professional capacity
- good access to world class external consultants
- "protection" via the relationship with and the financing from AID

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- the non-bureaucratic environment of UDAPE
- small size of organization
- continuity

6. Overall, how would you rate UDAPE with respect to quality, independence, and impact?

With respect to quality, ratings were generally between very good to excellent. Although a couple of respondents were very enthusiastic about the organization, arguing that it could fare well in an international setting, most said that it was "excellent for a Bolivian economic analysis unit."

Impact was less clear. Some respondents claimed that UDAPE was quite influential even in the policy formulation process, while others felt that it was much less direct. Others argued that at times the impact was weakened by the "dense" nature of some studies produced by UDAPE.

Independence was generally rated as high, despite UDAPE's placement within the Ministry of Planning. Some concern was expressed about AID's role and influence, especially in the area of staff selection and maintenance.

7. What is the most important thing UDAPE currently does or produces?

Monitoring of short-term macro-economic policy was generally considered the most important. This was followed by responses to direct requests (apaga fuegos) by ministries and agencies. In last place were the more theoretical studies produced by UDAPE.

8. Is there a particular piece of work that stands out in your mind?

Two pieces of work were mentioned with some frequency: one had to do with the macro-economic impact potential of the Plan for Alternative Development, and the other with the impact of the proposed natural gas pipeline between Bolivia and Brazil.

For the most part, however, respondents tended to cite projects that had specific relevance to their own agency's needs.

9. What use do you personally make of UDAPE and its work?

The principal use cited generally tended to be for short run analysis and very particular, agency-specific requests. Much less frequently mentioned were the longer-run more comprehensive or theoretic types of studies and/or analysis.

10. Are you aware of important demands being made on UDAPE that it is not meeting? Which? Why?

No one was aware of any important for UDAPE's services that were not being met.

11. Are you aware of particular problems with UDAPE's current functioning that you believe require attention?

For the most part, respondents were not sufficiently familiar with UDAPE's internal functioning to comment. Two areas were nevertheless mentioned: that the Board of Directors should be activated and that attention ought to be given to the problem of low salaries.

12. Are there other ideas or thoughts you have about ways to make UDAPE more effective?

Again there was little comment regarding how to make the organization more effective. Two areas were mentioned: activation of the Board of Directors and more attention to diffusion of UDAPE's work through publication of studies, and participation in conferences.

13. Looking to the future, do you see the need for, or value of any significant changes in UDAPE's mission, structure, or operations?

Opinion was divided on this question between those who think that things are fine and those who would like to see an expansion of UDAPE's role and/or mission. Those in the former category nevertheless said that with a greater investment in human capital a greater degree of consolidation could be achieved. In the latter group, several respondents would like to see more work on medium term issues, i.e., growth and re-activation, as well as an expansion of UDAPE's role into social issues. Interest was also expressed in UDAPE developing a greater capacity in sectoral analysis. In order to achieve this several argued for an expansion of UDAPE's staff.

14. More specifically, do you think it would be desirable for UDAPE to expand its role in any particular way?

(see 13 above)

15. Do you see UDAPE's continued effectiveness as vulnerable? If so, in what ways and what can be done to limit that vulnerability?

Vulnerability was perceived as having several sources:

- political. A change of government could have a serious or deleterious impact on the organization should it not share the same political-economic framework.
- Low salaries could cause piracy or desertion by key staff, thereby weakening the organization's technical capacity. Salaries need to be adjusted upward to market level.

- Bureaucratization. UDAPE's position outside the Ministry of planning is viewed as highly advantageous. Should there be a decision to more fully incorporate it, it could certainly harm UDAPE's responsiveness. UDAPE should be protected against full-fledged incorporation.
- Lack of permanent financing. The year to year mentality or lack of security has a negative impact on staff morale. UDAPE should try to secure financing for ten years from AID or another donor.

The Minister of Planning said that "UDAPE is not vulnerable, it is indispensable!"

## APPENDIX F

A quick analytical overview was performed on six UDAPE studies considered to be among the most highly utilized/greatest impact by UDAPE's top management. Messrs. Requena and Lupo and Ms. Candia were asked each to list the six most important studies that met that criteria. From a total of 18 observations, six studies were selected, two from each list which are immediately analyzed below.

DTA-0266/90:            Analysis Global de la Economia Boliviana y Perspectivas para 1991

This was a study requested by the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Banco Central. It was prepared by all the analysts with the cooperation of SAFCO and Banco Central. The purpose of this study was to provide scenarios on the likely impact on GDP growth, inflation rate, rate of nominal devaluation, fiscal deficit, net internal credit and net international reserves from a prescribed increase in public investment. The document recognizes a greater dynamism in public investment as the only feasible option to accelerate economic growth for 1991 but underlines the necessity to increase public investment within the framework of fiscal discipline and a monetary policy devoid of "crowding-out" effects. In this sense, a central prescription of the study was the necessity to raise the price of combustibles by 30%-40% so as to increase fiscal revenues and thus effect a non-inflationary funding of the additional investment.

The impact of this study was undeniable. On December 31, 1990, the government increased the price of combustibles by 33%. A close follow-up is being made on the effects on the major macro-economic variables.

The study relies on simulation techniques, and is a classical example of direct advice for policy making. Analytically, the document is sound and methodologically appropriate.

DTA-0263/90:            La Politica de Exportaciones en Bolivia

This study was requested by the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Industry. It was prepared by José Luis Lupo, Freddy Gumiel and Jairo Escobar.

This study consists of a detailed analysis of all the policy instruments that are utilized to foster the expansion of non-traditional exports. One of the central instruments is the Certificado de Reintegro Tributario (CRA), in essence a subsidy granted in favor of exporters to compensate for the tariffs paid on imported inputs. The study set to demonstrate that the level of the CRA (6%) constituted basically an unwarranted subsidy that offered large rents to a small number of firms. To do so, the study proceeded to analyze the structure of costs of the main products that constitute non-traditional products.

To compensate for the removal of the CRA, the study recommended the introduction of a drawback. An estimate on the net loss of fiscal revenues was made (since elimination of

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the CRA was accompanied by a reduction of tariffs), by approximately S/.14 million, but a recommendation was made to speed up customs collections. In addition to this, the study does recognize a slight decline in the profitability of the export sector that stems from the removal of the CRA, but suggests the adoption of measures oriented to provide institutional support to the export effort, such as improvements in transportation, communications and energy; easier access to credit for export activities, and a stronger marketing effort abroad. The government eliminated the CRA and adopted the drawback. I found the quality of this document sound.

DTA-0243/90:      Estimacion del Potencial Tributario

This study was requested by the Ministry of Finance. It was prepared by Gualberto Huarachi with the collaboration of Oscar Montañó and Freddy Valverde.

The purpose of this study was to analyze the possibilities of increasing tax collections within the framework of the existing tax system. In an effort to raise larger tax revenues, the government was intent on raising the IVA (Impuesto Valor Agregado) rate from 10% to 12%, a proposal that never took off the ground due to political opposition. Under those circumstances, UDAPE was asked to research the feasibility of increasing collections through more efficient administration.

The study consists of three parts: the first part discusses theoretically the concept of potential tax revenues; the second part describes the methodology for estimating the potential indirect tax revenues; and the last part offers recommendations to policy makers on ways to increase taxes efficiently.

The study reveals astounding findings. In 1988, effective collections of indirect taxes represented just 55% of potential indirect tax revenues (Impuesto Valor Agregado (IVA), plus indirect taxes on beverage and tobacco). The study shows that the elimination of "special" tax regimes, i.e., loopholes or selective tax waivers, and the incorporation of these exemptions into the IVA, would result in an increase on the potential IVA revenue by 50%. And collecting just 25% of this potential would be tantamount to raising the IVA rate from 10% to 12%. Last but not least, the study shows that tax evasions occur mainly in private industry, construction, transportation, financial services and commerce.

The study does recommend the introduction of more efficient tax administration in provinces, the elimination of tax loopholes, and improvement in tax records, under the criteria that the additional revenues should surpass the expenditures required to improve the administrative system.

According to José Luis Lupo and Gaby Candia, the topic that this study addresses is perhaps the most sensitive in Bolivia. The government has requested another study to update findings. The recommendations have yet to be implemented. Quality-wise, this study is sound.

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DTA-0264/90:      La Política de Exportaciones: Political Macro-Economicas v Factores Institucionales

This study, requested by the Ministry of Planning, was prepared by Freddy Gumiel.

Basically, this study is an extension of DTA-0263/90, analyzed above. The value added however is very significant since it fundamentally deals with an institutional analysis of all the agencies created to support the export effort (DICOMEX, INPEX, CARANA Cooperation, Proyecto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (PDA) and Proyecto Organizaciones Agrícolas Privadas (OAP). The study offers recommendations on ways to simplify the activities of these institutions so as to speed up export promotion and on adopting a more efficient system of coordination of these activities under the supervision and direction of the Ministry of Industry.

As a result of this study, the government issued a decree establishing the creation of a Consejo de Exportaciones, the one which will be activated once the by-laws are announced.

DTA-0249/90:      Evaluacion Macro-Economica de Los Acuerdos Energeticos

Requested by the Ministry of Energy, this study was prepared by Victor Hugo Ayala. This study set out to analyze the impact on the Bolivian economy as a result of an approximately \$/600 million investment project that contemplates the construction of a gas pipeline between Santa Cruz and Puerto Suarez and of a thermoelectrical plant, the ones which will facilitate the export of natural gas to Brazil. In order to achieve this objective, UDAPE designed a macro-economic model with the purpose of predicting the impact on macro variables caused by the decision to invest. The methodology relies on the analysis of four scenarios, whose assumptions are the following:

- a) Base Scenario: it depicts the likely behavior of the Bolivian economy for the period 1989-1999 without the proposed investment.
- b) Scenario I: it considers the likely behavior of the economy for the same period but incorporating the proposed investment.
- c) Scenario IA: it assumes that half of the investment funds originally assigned for proposed investment are allotted to the rest of the economy.
- d) Scenario IB: similar to Scenario I, but the economic policy does not manage aggregate demand so as to cushion the effects derived from an "investment shock."

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With respect to the Base Scenario, Scenario I shows a marginal increase in the rate of GDP growth of 0.87% and an average annual growth rate and potential GDP of above 6%. A priori, though, these estimates look very optimistic since growth performance relies heavily on strong backward linkages of this investment, a questionable assumption given the low level of development of the economy. Scenario I also predicts higher savings, larger employment levels in the short run and larger exports in the long-run (since energy is to be exported to Brazil). In addition to this, Scenario I predicts a higher inflation rate with respect to the other three scenarios since costs are likely to increase. Not surprisingly, the model also predicts that if Scenario IB prevails, GDP growth will be less than Scenario I. In general, this study is supportive of the implementation of the project, since it will remove export constraints in the long-run (there is also a sense of urgency, expressed on the fact that the agreement stipulating the sale of Bolivian gas to Argentina expires in 1992). Quality wise, this study looks sound. This document was submitted to the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank, entities likely to participate in financing should the project go. Officials in those institutions are in agreement with the methodology and findings of this study, but the implementation of the investment project looks uncertain at this moment.

DTA-0246/90: Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo 1990-1995

This study was requested directly from the Office of the Presidency of Bolivia and prepared by Juan Carlos Requena, José Luis Lupo, Gaby Candia, Gualberto Huarachi, Mario de Franco, Luis Carlos Jemio and Rodney Pereira. The purpose of this study was to provide an alternative economic development plan under the assumption that coca cultivation would be eradicated. In the first part of this study, an estimate of the costs of eradication and substitution is made. Then, the study details an investment program in agriculture, industry, mining, infrastructure and services which would substitute for the incomes generated in the coca economy. The conclusions point to the need to effect such substitution.

The study relies methodologically in the use of a general equilibrium model that simulates the impact over time on national income, domestic savings, current account balance, price level and employment from a program aimed at eradicating coca cultivation. The structure of this model and its predictive capacity is interesting and should be the basis to start a discussion on this matter. This document was taken by the President of Bolivia to Washington in June 1990 to discuss with President Bush the implementation of a strategy that would substitute development for coca. In addition to this, CONALID used this document in the discussions before the Paris Club.