EVALUATION OF THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

MAIN REPORT

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Canada – Canadian International Development Agency
Netherlands – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Norway – Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Evaluation of the World Food Programme

FINAL REPORT

CHR. MICHELSEN INSTITUTE
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PREFACE

EVALUATION OF THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

The Canadian International Development Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway have collaborated in undertaking a comprehensive evaluation of the World Food Programme, under the management of the Directors of Evaluation of these agencies.

We wish to express our appreciation to the team of consultants from the North-South Institute of Canada and the Chr. Michelsen Institute of Norway. The evaluation is the result of their effort and commitment to the goals which were set for the evaluation. The evaluation remains the work of these independent consultants, and as can be expected in such a complex review, the three donors do not necessarily share all of the views, conclusions and recommendations contained in the reports.

We believe that the reports can serve as a valuable input into the formulation of our respective agency's future policies and in determining our aid commitments. It is also believed that the reports will prove to be useful for the WFP Secretariat, the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA), recipient countries, as well as the collaborating partners of WFP.

Finally, we are very grateful for the constructive cooperation and patience, with which WFP has participated and contributed to the evaluation.

January 1994

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Evaluation of the World Food Programme

It is with pleasure that I transmit herewith the Final Report of the evaluation of the World Food Programme which the three donor governments initiated in 1990-91.

Our report is presented in eight chapters, preceded by an Executive Summary with a selection of findings and recommendations spread throughout the main body of the report.

In Annex A we give an account of the evaluation process itself, and identify the sixteen international consultants who have been engaged in this venture; the national consultants supporting the country studies are identified in the respective country reports.

In Annex B we provide an overview of the set of nine countries selected for special study and summarize our evaluation findings for each country in respect of eight major issues areas; we similarly summarize the findings from our evaluation of five WFP relief operations.

The country studies are presented separately, each under separate cover. They have been extensively drawn on in this report and should be seen as integral parts of the overall evaluation.

Throughout this exercise, the staff at all levels of the WFP in Rome and in the field have been open and responsive in providing the material needed for our evaluation, and have generously and constructively shared with us their insights and views, without at any point seeking to unduly influence or bias our evaluation and judgement. Similarly, the three donors cooperated with the evaluation group in setting the terms of reference for our work, and interacted at arms' length and most helpfully with us as the work progressed.

The evaluation was conducted in two phases, under the auspices of the North South Institute in Ottawa, Canada for the first phase, and the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway for the second phase. The untiring assistance of the support staff of the two institutes is gratefully acknowledged.

The report as here presented draws on the accumulated experience of all members of the evaluation team, of whom nine international consultants constituted a core group, and reflects a distillation of their combined and collective thoughts and insights. The analysis, evaluation and recommendations command a wide measure of agreement within the group, and have been presented as understood and accepted by the general coordinator. No other member of the group bears responsibility for every phrase and recommendation in the main report.

On behalf of the consultants and myself I want to express our appreciation to the three donors for the opportunity they have given us to engage in this study of the workings, contributions and potential of the World Food Programme as a vehicle for relief and development assistance from the international community to people in need.

Just Faaland

Bergen, December 29, 1993

Just Faaland
General Coordinator

List of Acronyms

ACABQ	United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
BCM	Beneficiary Contact Monitoring
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CFA	Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes, of WFP
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CO	WFP Country Office
COPR	Country Office Progress Report
CSN	Country Strategy Note, of UN
CSO	Country Strategy Outline, of WFP
DAC	Development Assistance Committee, of OECD
DHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DOO	Director of Operations
EC	European Communities
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ED	Executive Director of WFP
EDP	Extended Delivery Points
EEC	European Economic Communities
EMOP	Emergency Operation of WFP
FAC	Food Aid Convention
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFW	Food for work
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GS	General services staff
HQ	WFP Headquarters
HRD	Human resources development
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEFR	International Emergency Food Reserve
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGC	Intergovernmental Committee
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFAIS	WFP International Food Aid Information System
IRA	Immediate Response Account of WFP
ITAD	Information Technology and Agricultural Development
ITSH	Internal transport, storage and handling
JCGP	Joint Consultative Group on Policy, of UN
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
LDC	Least Developed Country
LIFD	Low income food deficit country
MCH	Mother child health

MOH	Ministry of Health
MT	Metric ton
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OEC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEDA	Internal Audit of WFP
PAS	Public Administration Service
PC	Projects Committee of WFP
PDPO	Protracted Displaced Persons Operation of WFP
PHC	Primary Health Care
PI	Project Idea of WFP
PIR	Project Implementation Report by recipient government to WFP
PO	Project Outline of WFP
PPF	Project Preparation Facility of WFP
PRO	Protracted Refugee Operation of WFP
PS	Project Summary of WFP
PSA	The World Food Programme Support and Administrative Budget
QPR	Quarterly Progress Report by recipient government to WFP
RB	Regional Bureau of WFP
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional de Mocambique
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SCP	Sub-Committee on Projects of CFA
SPAR	Staff Performance Assessment Report
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SRPA	Special Relief Programme for Angola
UMR	Usual Marketing Requirements
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	União Nacional para a Indepência Total de Angola
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine in the Near East
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
VGF	Vulnerable Group Feeding
USD	United States Dollars
WFP	World Food Programme
WSM	Watershed Management
WTOE	World Food Programme Transport Operation in Ethiopia

Executive Summary

With Selected Findings and Recommendations

The reader should be warned that this Executive Summary lists only a selection of findings and recommendations spread throughout the main body of the report. It is important to note that many findings and recommendations reflect a sometimes difficult balance of judgement; they should be understood and assessed in their context, which cannot be adequately reflected in the summary statement. We have, therefore, given page references to where the findings and recommendations reported in this summary appear in the main text.

Also a further note of warning may be in order. Our evaluation has focused on the WFP and its functioning within the wider system; we have not conducted parallel studies of other channels of international assistance for objectives equivalent to those of WFP. While we do have something to say on the Programme's relative strength and weaknesses, a full assessment of its comparative advantages would require similar evaluations also of the alternative channels of assistance.

1.0 Food Aid in a Global Context

Summary of the Chapter

In the developed world, the relentless advance of technology since 1950 and the widespread practice of basing income support to farmers on production, have together driven farm output to levels exceeding domestic requirements and trading opportunities. In the developing countries production has also increased - in some cases most impressively - but in the Least Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa this has not been enough to prevent a decline in per capita output in the last decade. According to FAO projections, the grain import requirements of the developing world will continue to grow in the remainder of the present decade, facing some countries with serious difficulties in finding the necessary foreign exchange. The problem is expected to be most acute in Sub-Saharan Africa, where food aid may well have to cover an increasing share of imports.

According to current estimates there are between 700 and 800 million chronically undernourished people in the world. Massive food aid would not provide a lasting solution to this problem, which is essentially one of poverty, but it is worth noting that a trebling of food aid from its present level of 15 million tonnes could (if the distribution problems were soluble) enable this number of people to reach minimum dietary standards.

In recent years food aid has accounted for less than 10 percent of official development assistance, and the ratio has been falling. The multilateral part of food aid has recently been above 20 percent with WFP accounting for 80 to 90 percent of it.

The extent to which food aid is *additional* to other forms of aid (i.e. the level of food aid does not affect the quantum of non-food assistance) remains a controversial question. In the cases of surplus-producing countries such as the United States, the EEC and Canada at least part of the food aid accorded appears to be additional to other aid resources, but we doubt if this is the case for many other major donors.

Cereals have predominated in food aid accounting for about 90 percent of the total. The United States has provided well over half of this, and EEC countries and Canada are strongly represented. The current Food Aid Convention assures a minimum level of cereal food aid amounting to some 7.5 million tons.

Food may be provided as programme aid for balance of payments and budgetary support, as project aid and as relief shipments. Programme aid has been restricted to bilateral donors. The shares of these types of aid in the total have fluctuated, but programme aid in cereals has traditionally accounted for over 50 percent of the volume of all food aid. Food aid is usually delivered in kind by donor countries but there has been increasing use of "triangular" transactions whereby food is purchased in one developing country for delivery in another, and also of local purchases in the recipient countries. Just over a quarter (by value) of the commodities handled by WFP in 1992 were purchased.

In 1992 cereal food aid corresponded to 0.7 percent of the world production of grains and 6.8 percent of world imports of cereals. Although these figures are small they have provoked a largely inconclusive debate on the effects of food aid on domestic agricultural production. The most critical argument against food aid is that it may make policies for increased domestic food production less pressing.

There are several processes underway in the developed world which could affect the outlook for food aid. There is a trend to de-link income support to farmers from production, so that surpluses may tend to diminish. The Uruguay Round of negotiations in GATT has led to agreements for a gradual reduction in export subsidies and trade tensions which, by themselves, would tend to lead to higher international food prices. In turn, this would stimulate production in some developing countries but would create difficulties for the poorer nations in financing food imports. Donors would be likely to review the levels of their food aid, and to compare food more closely with other forms of aid.

The macroeconomic effects of food aid do not differ in principle from other forms of aid. Relief, like other forms of aid, provides balance of payments and budgetary support, but the main justification and effect is to restore the nutrition levels of people affected by disaster.

Project aid is intended to provide resources for specified development activities, usually through the direct distribution of food to project beneficiaries.

Food aid is a form of tied aid with associated inefficiencies, but its value to recipient countries in the forms of programme aid and relief are obvious. The use of food aid as a resource for development projects raises more complicated issues. The recipient country would probably prefer cash if there were a free choice, but there will generally not be this option. The greatest drawback to the use of food as a development resource is that it is expensive to transport and manage, and it is perishable. On the other hand it lends itself to targeting on the needy in some situations (although we have been disappointed with WFP's performance in this area), and unlike cash in local currency it cannot lose its value from inflation.

As a general guideline it may be said that the use of food as a *tool,* as opposed to food aid as a *resource,* should be considered only when there is particular merit in using food as an input. Some illustrations of this emerged from the country studies that were carried out. What is also clear is that the use of food as a resource adds a further dimension of difficulty to almost every aspect of project design and implementation.

Donor countries which do not have surpluses, and for whom food aid is *not* additional to other aid, should consider providing their contributions in cash to WFP or other agencies using food as a tool in development activities. It would then be for the agencies to determine how much and what kind of food to buy, and where to buy it.

Findings and Recommendations in Chapter 1

Given that vulnerable nations may face increasing difficulties in mobilizing foreign exchange for their food imports, and considering the extent of under-nutrition in many developing countries as well as the extent of food insecurity at household level, the case for food aid remains strong. (p. 3)

If world prices of some of the most important commodities in the food aid basket were to increase due to policy changes in EEC and other developed countries, it would most probably raise the opportunity cost of such aid to the donors. Donors would be likely to review the efficiency of food aid in support of development projects compared to financial aid, not only as regards that part which goes through WFP, but food aid in general. (p. 14)

There are strong arguments for providing the maximum possible amount of emergency aid in cash. This permits food to be purchased either in the stricken country or nearby, and avoids the long lead-time required for the mobilization and transport of food from donor countries. However, the public in donor nations will often wish to express their solidarity by sending some food from their own countries. (p. 14)

These reflections suggest that the future of food aid as part of the overall aid package will to an increasing extent depend on the particular suitability of food aid compared to other forms of aid. In particular, the use of food aid for development projects is likely to be increasingly closely scrutinised. (p. 14)

In addition to the possible cost inefficiency of food aid in food for work development projects, these projects sometimes suffer from shortages of non-food items, including both material and human support, for which there may be an inadequate budget. At the same time it must be recognised that this kind of project has two aims: to do development work, and to provide poor people with better nutrition. The feeding element of food aid assisted projects is an important objective in itself. That objective might or might not (according to country circumstances) be attainable with financial aid alone. (p. 17)

In our opinion food aid has two advantages: to some extent it is additional to other development aid; and in a number of cases it can be used as a tool, provided that it is the right kind of food, arrives at the right moment, and reaches the intended beneficiaries. (p. 18)

When food is used as a tool in development projects, it is not food provided as aid which is the most important resource, but the people who design and implement such projects. Bilateral agencies and programme officers who deal with food aided projects, and equally the many NGOs which are active in this field, and, of course, also the World Food Programme, have acquired valuable experience in project activities which include feeding of poor and vulnerable people as a major objective. This experience could possibly be put to even better use if they were to handle projects for which also financial aid was available. (p. 18)

We recommend that donor countries without surpluses, where food aid is taken from the development budget and does not constitute an additional resource, should consider providing their contributions in cash, whether through WFP or through another agency, concentrating on ways and means of improving short term food security of the intended beneficiaries while at the same time achieving long-term development effects. (p. 18)

2.0 Mandate, Governance and Working Relationships

Summary of the Chapter

In 1961 matching resolutions were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the FAO Conference, establishing the World Food Programme on an experimental basis as a joint undertaking of the two organizations. In 1965 the Programme was placed on a continuing basis "for as long as multilateral food aid is found feasible and desirable". In 1974, the World Food Conference recommended that the WFP Intergovernmental Committee be reconstituted as the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA), with a dual

mandate: to oversee the operations of the Programme, and to help in the evolution and coordination of food aid policies in general. The International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) was also created at the behest of the World Food Conference; since 1978 it has functioned as a continuing reserve replenished annually and at the disposal of the Programme. The Programme continues to report to both the United Nations and FAO, each of which elects half the members of the CFA.

The operational mandate of WFP, and the detailed procedures and arrangements which govern it, are enshrined in its General Regulations, which are approved by the Economic and Social Council and the FAO Council. They have been revised several times; the current version came into effect in 1992. The Programme's mandate has not changed greatly over the years. It now consists of implementing projects using food aid for economic and social development, meeting emergency food needs including the provision of logistic support, and promoting world food security.

As the housekeeping body of WFP, the CFA approves projects (approval up to an amount currently set at USD 3 million is delegated to the Executive Director), approves the administrative budget, and reviews all activities of the Programme. Projects are examined by a Sub-Committee on Projects (SCP); we have put forward some suggestions as to how the work of the SCP could be strengthened as part of an overall approach to upgrading the quality of WFP's development work. We do not feel the CFA has produced striking results in its role as a forum for discussing international food aid policies, and we have suggested a way in which it could be reinforced if such policies move close to the top of the international agenda.

Both emergency operations and development projects are implemented by the recipient government (not by WFP), and we have reviewed both the legal basis and the practical procedures governing implementation. The Programme is enjoined by its General Regulations to cooperate with other United Nations agencies, and we have briefly examined the forms which this cooperation takes. The Programme does not have a technical staff of its own, but draws on technical support from the appropriate agency, particularly FAO. It works closely with non-governmental organizations, particularly at country level; NGO support is particularly important in emergency operations.

Findings and Recommendations in Chapter 2

As the global food supply and trading situation unfolds, as the food aid policies of the major food aid donors change, and as perceptions for appropriate development modes evolve, the mandate of WFP and its operational mode will call for further consideration. But it is our view that any major mandate review would be premature at this stage, that should follow rather than precede membership - wide discussion and resolution of issues of purpose, focus and role of the Programme. (p. 23)

We believe that the risk of weak projects could be reduced by changes in the way in which the CFA approaches the Programme's development role. It appears that the CFA - and management - have been unduly reluctant to get into sector-based discussions of food as a tool for development. The CFA and management have not gone nearly far enough, in our view, to focus WFP's work at country level. We support the idea of moving towards a programme as distinct from a project approach. We advocate a more active role by the CFA in monitoring the quality of WFP programmes at country level, for instance through an External Review at regular intervals of perhaps five years. (pp. 24-25)

A shift from projects to programmes, in conjunction with a more sector and country approach, could enable the SCP (with expanded terms of reference, as needed) to have greater impact than is possible at present. It would also permit the greater delegation of authority for project approval to the Executive Director, which we feel is needed. (p. 25)

Agreement needs to be reached on a clearer policy regarding country eligibility for WFP development food aid. The issue should be tackled through the adoption of objective criteria rather than by *ad hoc* decisions on particular countries. We believe the overall thrust should be to reduce the number of countries in which the Programme operates. (p. 26)

It is open to question whether it would be more sensible to continue the present arrangement for the FAO Finance Committee to review the WFP budget or to set up an internal Finance Committee of the CFA. Change would require an amendment of the General Regulations, which in turn would need approval by ECOSOC and the FAO Council, and we see no point in starting down this road unless it is reasonably clear that change is important and that it can be made without generating major political frictions. (p. 26)

As a body for handling international food aid policies, we find the CFA has achieved little in recent years. If a situation emerges in which such policies become of major international importance, we suggest that the debate on policy questions be much more clearly separated from WFP housekeeping matters, and that countries be encouraged to send special representatives chosen according to the precise nature of the issues to be discussed. (pp. 26-27).

WFP and a recipient country should reach a clear understanding on how the Programme's development aid can play a strategic role in support of government policies and priorities. This will require a policy dialogue, with which the Programme should seek to associate other food aid donors and funding agencies. The outputs should include a Country Strategy Outline, greatly improved over those so far produced and clearly linked to the Country Strategy Notes or other document setting forth the overall approach of the United Nations system in the country concerned. (p. 29)

Arrangements should be made for Governments to be more closely and systematically associated with the development of Project Ideas. In the later stages of the Project Cycle,

Headquarters should refrain from making unilateral changes without consulting either the Country Office or the government. (p. 30)

One way of minimizing the risk of failure in project implementation is to build close relationships with the implementing agencies to ensure that WFP projects receive the necessary attention, and to include arrangements for training in the project if shortage of trained staff is likely to be a bottleneck. In the worst case the Programme should be ready to select a new working partner within the government machinery. Sometimes the best solution may be to make an alliance with stronger development partners as WFP has done, for example, when it has furnished resources to World Bank or IFAD projects. (p. 30)

WFP is required by its General Regulations to cooperate with other UN agencies. This cooperation may be extended and assume a more integrated form in the future, going far beyond present arrangements, if UN resolutions to those ends are fully implemented. (p. 31)

3.0 WFP Resources

Summary of the Chapter

WFP resources in commodities and cash are made available through a series of "windows"; donors may, at their discretion, request that pledges to WFP be considered as contributions under the Food Aid Convention. *Regular resources* are used mainly for development projects and the administrative budget. A biennial pledging target is established by the CFA and approved by the United Nations General Assembly and the FAO Conference. Total pledges have been falling slightly since the 1987-88 biennium, but the cash proportion (needed for transport and administrative costs) has been rising; however, it still falls short of the target of one-third of resources. A separate window within the regular resources was established in 1989 for *Protracted Refugee or Displaced Person Operations (PROs)*. Commodity pledges under this window are accompanied by the cash needed for their transport.

The *International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR)* currently funds all WFP emergency operations. Pledges to the IEFR can be made in advance (for instance at the biennial Pledging Conference), or may represent *ad hoc* responses to appeals for particular emergencies. Advance pledges may be untied or restricted to a specified purpose. The IEFR is difficult to manage because of the relatively small proportion of untied advance pledges. Despite its makeshift air, the IEFR succeeded in coping with a massive increase in requirements for the southern Africa drought in 1992. The *Immediate Response Account (IRA)* is a cash window to get emergency operations off to a quick start by purchasing foodstuffs in the neighbourhood of the stricken area. Its target is USD 30 million; for 1993, contributions by mid-year amounted to only USD 17 million.

Special emergency operations is a name for contributions to cover airlifts or other major logistic expenditures for relief. *Non-food items (NFI)* are provided on a limited scale for projects and PROs. *Bilateral services* are provided by WFP to donors - working in effect as their agent - in the fields of food purchase, transport and monitoring.

As a result of the very high cash costs of relief operations just over half of all WFP expenditures in 1992, which totalled some USD 1.7 billion, were in cash rather than commodities. About a third of the cash expenditures were for the purchase of commodities. Slightly more than a quarter (by value) of all commodities handled by WFP in 1992 were purchased. A major item of cash expenditure consists of charges for the internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) of commodities, which may be paid by the Programme (rather than the government) in Least Developed Countries or those in similar conditions.

We have reviewed WFP practice in commodity purchases, commodity swaps and the monetization of commodities. We feel that all of these devices increase the flexibility of operations. The Programme's food basket, augmented through swaps and purchases, appears to be reasonably satisfactory.

Commodity pledges are retained by donors until they are called forward for a specific project or operation. An individual donor thus has veto power over the use of its pledge. We have not found any evidence that this has compromised the multilateral nature of the Programme, since donors have come forward with contributions even for "unpopular" countries.

Projects involve the commitment of commodities over a period of up to five years. Resources, on the other hand, are pledged not more than two years into the future. We have looked into the problems which this entails.

Another problem area is the funding of the administrative costs of relief operations. The volume of relief now surpasses development, and there is no way in which the traditional administrative budget can be expanded to meet the new situation. A 4 percent levy has been introduced on emergency operations and PROs but has not proved compatible with the domestic legislation of some donors, including the largest.

Findings and Recommendations in Chapter 3

The biennium for pledging is out of phase with the biennium for the administrative budget (which follows the cycle adopted throughout the United Nations system). There has been some preliminary discussion of bringing the two biennia in line later in the present decade. We feel that, when achieved, this would make the Programme somewhat easier to manage, although at the cost of some disruption in the transitional period. A one-time pledging period of either one or three years would be required (the adjustment can hardly be made in the budget cycle, which is standard across the system). We suggest that the Executive Director and the CFA examine the costs and benefits of an adjustment to bring the pledging

and budget cycles in line with each other, and proceed with such a step if there is a balance of advantage for the Programme. (p. 36)

In order to make the IEFR easier to manage, and to reduce response time to emergency requests, we recommend that donors increase the level of untied advance pledges. (p. 40)

It is disturbing that WFP does not appear to have a formal system for recording (and reporting on) shortfalls in resources mobilized as compared with quantities provisionally committed for emergency operations under Letters of Understanding. We recommend that such a system be put in place. (p. 40)

Our evaluation of relief activities in Chapter 5 points to the great importance of the IRA in getting emergency operations off to a quick start by purchasing (as well as borrowing) commodities. We urge donors to give a higher priority to cash contributions to the Immediate Response Account, with a view to reaching the USD 30 million target. (p. 40)

Contributions for special emergency operations in 1992 amounted to USD 103 million. Clearer reporting on activities under this window would be of general interest and we suggest that it be instituted. (p. 41)

We suggest that the system for handling NFI be made less rigid and partially decentralized. Country Offices might be encouraged to approach potential donors locally. These could then channel the items either through WFP at country level, or directly to the national agency implementing the project. Fundraising via Rome would take place only if there was no expectation of achieving results locally. (pp. 41-42)

We urge WFP to give increased priority to cost control of ITSH charges, considering the large proportion of WFP resources which they will probably continue to absorb. (p. 44)

We are not convinced that it is useful to have an arbitrary limit of 15 percent on monetization, and it is our judgement that, on balance, the technique of monetization has probably been under-utilized by WFP in recent years. We advocate a more flexible approach to monetization, under which WFP (including Country Offices) would have some liberty to monetize resources in particular circumstances and for pre-defined purposes. (p. 50)

We suggest that WFP review its information system for purchases, swaps and monetization, certainly in respect of its own resources and perhaps also for food aid in general. The first stage would be to develop improved conceptual and operational tools for monitoring in this area. Ambiguities should be sorted out, the risk of double-counting eliminated, and a clear set of definitions and guidelines adopted. (p. 50)

In order to reconcile short-term pledging with longer-term project commitments, we urge the Programme to develop a more sophisticated model for projecting the total resource

requirements of approved projects in future biennia. Adjusted projections should be made biennially, or perhaps even annually, taking account of progress under each project. Projected requirements should be disaggregated by type of commodity. (p. 54)

We are convinced that a satisfactory formula to generate funding for the administration of relief operations must be found urgently. A solution is of great importance for the Programme. The issue of administrative costs for the development programme could then be tackled separately in its own right. (p. 57)

While not advocating that changes in the resource systems of WFP be considered at this time, we have advanced the following suggestions in case a review of funding arrangements should be undertaken in future: (pp. 57-58)

- First, the funding structure is rather complicated, and quite difficult for the uninitiated to understand. Simplification, in the form of a smaller number of resource windows, would seem desirable.

- Second, there appears to be a case for a less absolute division between resources for emergencies and resources for development. Greater flexibility at country level in using food aid for either purpose could in some cases lead to more effective approaches. Among the countries we have studied Ethiopia could be the main beneficiary from such a shift.

- Third, the IRA should be fully funded as a priority for special donor contributions for as long as the Programme has a serious cash problem and cannot afford to use unrestricted cash pledges to kick-start emergency operations. It could be dispensed with as a separate window if there was ample cash within the regular resources.

- Fourth, the IEFR in its present form bears only a limited resemblance to what was envisaged at the World Food Conference. Indeed it is now little more than a label attached to contributions for WFP emergency operations. As such, it may inhibit the flexible use of resources for either relief or development as advocated above. However, the IEFR would be a really useful facility if there were a major increase in advance pledges and at the same time donors found a way to carry over unutilized resources from one financial period to another until they were required. In this way it would be possible to build up, in periods of low activity, a genuine reserve that could be drawn upon in years when relief needs were high. However difficult this may seem in the present period of financial stringency, it is worth bearing in mind as an ideal objective.

4.0 WFP Organisation and Management

Summary of the Chapter

It was only in 1992, when revised General Regulations came into effect, that WFP secured full management control over its personnel and finances from FAO. Since then there have been major changes in the organisational structure, partly in response to the increase in recent years in the volume of relief operations.

The Regional Bureaux are now responsible for all phases of an emergency operation or PRO/PDPO, including assessment. The Disaster Relief Service has become the Emergency Division with responsibility for managing the emergency activities carried out by the Regional Bureaux and forming an emergency support service.

The Emergency Division is balanced by the Development Division. There are other associated changes. The justification of the new structure is that of bringing relief and development closer together but the central fact is that the Programme has coped with the build up of relief operations by mobilising its development staff to carry out emergency operations. There are a number of ambiguities in the new arrangements including the degree of control that the Director of Emergencies is able to exercise over the Regional Bureau Managers. It is possible that the organisational structure will require further modifications.

The staff at headquarters would be able to work more effectively and efficiently if they were housed in accommodation more suited to their needs. This is urgently needed. There is also a need to improve office automation, telecommunications and management information systems.

Country management. In January 1993, WFP maintained 87 staffed Country Offices, often in areas of the world where basic infrastructure, facilities and communications are poor. The complexities of WFP country operations and relations between HQ and COs place considerable strain on HQ and CO management. One of the difficulties that has emerged is that local WFP staff are, in effect, UNDP employees. The bureaucratic delays of working with such a system can also be frustrating, as many routine clearances and decisions are taken between Rome and New York.

Of particular importance are the qualities needed in Directors of Operations in Country Offices. We note that the professional experience of such officers can range considerably from a P-3 to a D-1. It may be difficult to find sufficient officers of the required experience and aptitudes, particularly as a programming approach would require them to play a greater role in policy analysis and discussions. In addition, the Executive Director is now proposing further decentralisation of some management processes, making Directors of Operations more responsible and accountable.

Many of the Country Offices of WFP consider themselves as understaffed and their staff overworked. In some countries the situation may be eased by substitution of national for international staff. We also suggest that the number of Country Offices should be reduced in order to arrive at a more cost effective structure, with better staff resources. A halfway house in countries with few WFP activities might be to locate in the UNDP office a single WFP officer, preferably a national, who could carry out food management and monitoring. Other functions would then have to be covered by visiting missions from HQs and the nearby Country Office. This in turn would involve concentrating on fewer projects in order to simplify management. The choice of locations for fully fledged Country Offices would have to be examined with care. We note that the World Bank has only a little more than 50 resident missions in developing countries.

The relationship between the Country Office and the UNDP Resident Representative as representative of WFP is not typical of country representation of other UN agencies, and this is a cause for serious concern within WFP. We have some sympathy for this concern, but our country studies revealed no major operational difficulties resulting from the relationship. In the circumstances, particularly in view of the ongoing efforts to ensure better coordination between the development work of UN agencies, and the shortage of sufficiently experienced officers in WFP, we find it unnecessary to consider formally upgrading Directors of Operations to become independent WFP representatives. Problems generated by the present arrangement should be removed through direct negotiation between the parties.

The length of overseas postings also needs to be considered from the point of view of efficiency. Short postings are not generally economical, given the learning time to become fully efficient in a new station. Better support to staff posted in difficult countries should make a lengthening of posting acceptable.

Whether WFP as a whole is overstretched is open to question. There is little evidence of this in the handling of relief, once an operation is started. Response times, for instance, do not appear to have slowed down. The real question relates not to relief but to development. Can the Regional Bureaux handle development on top of relief without sacrifice of quality? Our evaluation clearly suggests that WFP is not carrying out certain functions effectively, notably in project design. In the area of staffing there appears to be great pressure on units handling such functions as resource management, food purchasing, shipping and logistics.

Financial management. The ED has recognised that the Programme now suffers from unacceptable and inadequate financial control; this will require an increase in financial staff to cure. WFP is subject to usual financial auditing procedures. We note that in his 1988-89 statement the Internal Auditor made over 100 substantial recommendations. We have not considered these in our report.

Food management. The commodities available from year to year are still strongly correlated with surpluses in WFP's major donor countries. In spite of this, WFP has obtained a reputation for relatively efficient resourcing of commodities.

The outstanding reputation of WFP in moving food was confirmed by an "Evaluation Study of Food Aid Transport Costs and Options" carried out for the European Community. It was felt that overall WFP was the most effective agency. This view was confirmed by the Nordic Study of 1990 which "recommended that the World Food Programme be formally designated as the UN agency with primary responsibility for matters relating to logistics and transport for both food and non-food items, including assistance to countries in developing their own transport arrangements".

Internal decision making structures. A weakness of the current structure appears to be the Project Committee. We are critical of its functioning and apparent lack of control over the quality of projects. The arrangements for processing projects through the various stages of preparation was also very unsatisfactory to many Country Offices who were not properly consulted on substantive changes in project design made in HQ prior to approval by Executive Director or CFA.

WFP has taken steps to improve communications with regular and structured staff meetings at all levels. The current approach of executive management is to state broad objectives at the senior level of management and to leave this interpretation to lower levels.

We have noted the recommendation of the McKinsey Report that greater decentralisation was needed in the operations of WFP but as yet it is not clear in what particular areas decentralisation will be attempted. We have noted that Country Offices seem to be reluctant to take full advantage of the degree of decentralisation of decision-taking already open to them.

Personnel management. It is recognised that personnel management has not been well developed and that there is considerable scope for improvement which is now being put in hand. Particular problems are caused by the need to have staff who are flexible in their ability to move between development and relief. The most visible weakness in the staff complement is the few specialists who are available for support in design and implementation of development projects.

The concept of Unified Service adopted in 1986 for greater interchange of staff between headquarters and the field has never been fully implemented. In consequence the divide between the two still persists to some degree. Staffing has benefited from the employment of Junior Professional Officers at relatively little cost to the organisation and likewise from the use of United Nations Volunteers.

Dependence on host governments for project implementation has demonstrated the need for training of counterparts and a minimum of half the budget for training is reserved for this.

Findings and Recommendations in Chapter 4

If the Director of Emergency Operations is to direct, there should be no ambiguity regarding the degree of his authority over the Regional Managers. We recommend that a formal mechanism, or formal procedures, should be established for the Director of Emergency Operations and the Regional Managers to reach decisions on current issues. (pp. 60-61)

Following the shift of responsibility from the former Disaster Relief Service to the Regional Bureaux, staff members who were recruited for development are now handling all phases of emergency operations. We recommend that the Programme should evaluate the performance of all concerned, from the Regional Managers downwards. Those who do not appear to possess the necessary aptitude for relief work should either be reassigned, or be allowed to concentrate exclusively on development. Training courses in emergency management should be devised for members of both Headquarters and field staff who possess the aptitude but not the experience. (p. 61)

We recommend that the Programme should go ahead with the formation of a Rapid Response Team. Besides a core of permanent staff, the Unit could utilize a roster of individuals who could be made available immediately when required. These could include people in the various developing regions who have the necessary experience. (p. 61)

The question of special conditions of service for staff exposed to physical danger is of interest to all humanitarian organizations of the United Nations system, and is under widespread discussion. WFP has a major concern for this, and if necessary should be ready to table a proposal. We also suggest that the Programme should consider recruitment of a small number of international staff specially for service in areas of conflict. (p. 61)

Surprisingly, the Programme has never developed fast-track administrative procedures for use in an emergency. We suggest that special procedures should be worked out to cover personnel appointments and movements, budget and finance, and procurement (notably of vehicles and communications equipment). Within general guidelines, operational managers should have delegated authority to take quick decisions, subject to reporting afterwards. (p. 61)

The Programme should review its filing system for relief operations. Not only is this required for adherence to normal standards of administration, it is also part of building up an institutional memory of relief operations. (p. 61)

In this era of UN reforms and donor constraints, it is unlikely that WFP will be able significantly to redress staffing issues with additional people. We recommend that it seems

more realistic for WFP now to consider closing some Country Offices, consolidating its diverse portfolio, relying more on national staff in Country Offices, more fully joining forces with other UN agencies, international finance institutions and other donors, etc., so as to better match WFP activities and responsibilities with existing staff. (p. 65)

The problems referred to in our case studies in project planning and management are so pressing that limits need to be set on the number of projects undertaken at any time, and also on their scope and complexity. (p. 66)

To our knowledge, WFP has not critically assessed its potential to manage activities more fully from Rome, or whether experience points to narrowing the range of activities and projects assisted. The choice between these options would have considerable political ramifications, but a choice needs to be made, both for general guidance and on a country by country basis. (p. 66)

Where there is no WFP Country Office, we suggest the watching brief on emerging needs of food aid relief be clearly given to the UNDP Resident Representative, as the WFP Representative, and his staff in the UNDP. (p. 66)

The Executive Director has expressed support for decentralized decision-making to the extent possible. The performance of the organization under a different style of management cannot easily be assessed at this time. Since these are principles of management highly encouraged by previous WFP management reviews, it is important that the CFA monitor the progress being made in these areas. (p. 72)

We generally support , as does the Executive Director, placing more responsibilities on those individuals closest to the work. But we are in doubt about how much further decentralisation is justified, and in which areas. The Executive Director has recognised this problem and has requested all division heads to determine the degree to which decision-making can be more decentralised. The results of this analysis are not yet available, but its completion and follow-up actions should be closely monitored by the CFA. (p. 74)

Country Office authority, notably over operating funds, training funds, and local staff issues needs to be clarified. Whether, on balance, existing delegations of authority to Country Office should be increased or not is unclear. The perceptions of several Directors of Operations in the case studies would indicate a need for more delegation and more flexibility depending upon the management capacity of the field office. However, Headquarters reports that some delegations are grossly underutilized, and that there is already some flexibility to increase delegations on a case-by-case basis, for instance, in purchasing. The unwillingness of Directors of Operations to exercise their management authority has been attributed both to complex procedures which are not fully understood and to a reticence on the part of Director of Operations to take responsibility. (p. 74)

WFP's general regulations indicate that here the FAO and other UN agencies will normally supply the required technical expertise. WFP pays to support liaison officers in these agencies as well as the consultant services actually provided. There are mixed reviews among WFP managers on both the services provided by these liaison officers and the timing and quality of technical assistance. Based on discussions at Headquarters and in the case studies, the spectrum of opinion runs from total disappointment to complete satisfaction. However, in the spirit of integration and cooperation being discussed in the UN system, we recommend that the consultancy relationships with UN agencies should as far as possible be maintained, although new formulas and understandings should be considered. (p. 78)

We have found that the project approval process within WFP is not satisfactory. The Project Committee has not been able to prevent projects that are weak in problem analysis, set unrealistic objectives, and do not cover important issues. Headquarters staff appear to "massage" elements of project proposals, such as the effects on women, to gain approval in the CFA. Country Office staff and national officials complain that the Project Summaries approved in the CFA have sometimes been substantively changed from those which were submitted, without proper consultations between HQ and CO. It is understandable that the Project Committee, whose members have heavy workloads and travel schedules, is unable to examine projects better, but this clearly demonstrates that more in-house technical staff is required. (p. 83)

The issue of staff growth, which is to be discussed in detail in the November 1993 CFA is a serious one. Additional posts have already been identified for improving the financial management and logistics operations of WFP, aspects fundamental to the Programme and to donor confidence in WFP. In our opinion also other specialist staff is needed. We will stress once more that the concentration of available staff in fewer Country Offices is the most cost effective solution in a situation of staff constraint. (pp. 83-84)

5.0 WFP as a Relief Organisation

Summary of Chapter

It was shown in Chapter 3 that in 1991 the volume of WFP relief shipments surpassed that for development, and in 1992 it was about two thirds higher. Commitments for emergency operations in 1992 came to almost USD 900 million and for PROs to more than USD 400 million. WFP is currently handling more than half of all international food for relief. In recent years the bulk of relief operations have been for drought or crop failure in sub-Saharan Africa, refugees and displaced persons in sub-Saharan Africa, and refugees and displaced persons in WFP's North Africa, Near East and Europe Region. One of the most remarkable developments in the recent past has been the increasing involvement of WFP and other relief agencies in areas of conflict, notably in Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique,

Liberia, Afghanistan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and some of the Newly Independent States of the former USSR.

The first important stage of a relief operation is the assessment of needs. Very different approaches are needed in cases of crop failure and in situations involving refugees or displaced persons. In the former, a macro-level assessment of the food situation and outlook and an estimate of food aid needs are normally prepared jointly by FAO and WFP in consultation with the government. The two organizations are cooperating well, and their work appears to be appreciated by both donors and recipients. However, the recent drought emergency in Malawi has thrown into prominence the need for much better information at micro-level, including the geographical location of the emergency by district, the economic classes affected, the relevance of traditional coping systems and the local trading sector, emerging or expected nutritional problems especially of vulnerable groups, and any differential impact of the emergency by gender.

In the case of refugees or displaced persons, the key issue is the number of people to be fed. Under a recent Global Agreement with UNHCR, WFP has taken over the responsibility for providing basic foods in all refugee situations involving more than 1,000 people. We have found serious and long-standing problems in assessing the caseload in Ethiopia and Pakistan. Refugee leaders have an interest in exaggerating the numbers, and sometimes the government is unable or unwilling to face up to them.

We have a number of suggestions for the improved planning of emergency operations, and like the phrase "operational design", which conveys the idea that planning should go beyond logistics and set the operation in a policy framework. PROs are expected to have a developmental dimension. The development role of WFP may vary according to circumstances, but we feel that there could be better guidelines, covering also environmental aspects.

The monitoring of relief operations is taken seriously by WFP, which makes extensive use of UN Volunteers for this purpose. We feel that further strengthening of the monitoring function could permit the fine-tuning of operations, including their phasing-out at the earliest feasible stage.

The Programme has a well-formulated policy on evaluating relief operations, but unfortunately it has not been implemented in recent years. Country Offices have not been preparing the prescribed evaluative reports, nor were any formal evaluations undertaken between 1985 and 1993.

Since its inception, WFP has been wrestling with the long delivery-cycle for food coming from distant donor countries to meet emergency needs. Borrowing from in-country stocks, purchasing food in the country or nearby, and diverting shipments already on the high seas are the basic techniques that are now used to get operations off to a quick start. We do not

believe that the problem has been fully resolved, but none of our country studies reported major difficulties. Both borrowing and the diversion of shipments can create secondary problems, and we attach particular importance to WFP's ability to kick-start operations with purchases. To that end the full funding of the IRA would be important.

The Programme's fine reputation in the field of transport and logistic appears to be fully justified. We were particularly impressed by the way in which it handled the logistics of the southern Africa drought operation. As reported in Chapter 4, deliveries to Malawi achieved twice the level that had previously been estimated by the government as the maximum possible ceiling.

In-country arrangements for the distribution of WFP relief supplies are normally handled by a government agency, either directly or through NGOs. Our country missions to Ethiopia, Malawi and Pakistan identified a few problems, but our overall view is that the arrangements are functioning reasonably well with help from WFP itself, from UNHCR in the case of refugees, and from NGOs.

There has been considerable recent interest in the idea of monetizing food aid for relief purposes. The biggest danger is that aid may reach those who can afford to buy food, and elude those who are destitute.

WFP concerns itself seriously with the nutritional aspects of the food basket for relief operations. While some problems are reported, they are not major and at the policy level no corrections appear to be required. The nutritional impact of operations for refugees and displaced persons is generally monitored by NGOs, but little has been done to organize the collection of data on other types of operation.

The interfacing of relief and development is a fashionable theme. Our country studies suggest that success is difficult to achieve in the absence of the requisite capacity on the part of the national administration concerned. We have distinguished between attempting to reach developmental goals through relief operations, and gearing development projects to disaster preparedness. WFP documents have reported some successful examples in both categories. We have briefly examined aspects of vulnerability mapping, early warning systems, post-emergency rehabilitation, and the use of food security stocks for disaster preparedness. In the case of refugee problems, generally it is only repatriation that can open up the possibility of development. Our country mission to Guatemala found serious weaknesses in the way WFP had handled assistance to refugees repatriated from Mexico.

To obtain a sidelight on WFP's performance in the field of relief, we have spoken with people from the main UN agencies concerned and from a cross-section of international NGOS. The image of WFP that emerges from these discussions is generally very positive. People in all types of organisation find WFP to be straightforward, cooperative and easy to work with. The most frequent criticism of the Programme's overall performance was that it

was slow to get started when an emergency arose. Once it had got its act together it generally did a very good job. It is participating well in the new arrangements for coordination focused on the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

The Programme is responsible under its General Regulations for coordinating emergency food aid from different sources. At the international level it does this by collecting and circulating information. At country level, it has played a particularly useful role in difficult and complex situations, where it has served as the consignee or coordinator of food aid from most or even all donors. Examples have included Malawi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Mozambique, Liberia and the former Yugoslavia.

As far as can be judged, the Programme has acquitted itself creditably in operations undertaken in zones of conflict.

Findings and Recommendations in Chapter 5

Micro-assessment is already foreseen in WFP's manual on "Food Aid in Emergencies". We advocate its further practical development as an important way forward for improving the effectiveness of WFP emergency operations. It should not be considered as a luxury add-on, but as an integral part of the WFP approach. It can be simple or elaborate, and the exact nature and extent of micro-assessment in a particular emergency will have to be decided very early on. WFP should develop a methodology for micro-assessment, incorporating a range of possible approaches, that should be available to its own staff at Headquarters and in countries, as well as to governments and other organizations. (p. 93)

WFP should seek recognition from UNHCR that deciding on numbers of refugees to be fed is fully a joint responsibility. The Programme should also press UNHCR to develop more sophisticated techniques for the assessment of numbers, that could be applied without precipitating a confrontation with the refugees. (p. 94)

We feel that the Programme should be prepared, in future, to make relief planning expertise available at short notice in answer to a government request. This could be one of the functions of the proposed Rapid Response Team. (p. 95)

The development of micro-assessment should be accompanied by improved planning with a view to the better targeting of relief; adapting operations to local coping systems, and maintaining the resilience of communities; taking account of the role of the commercial sector or local trading system; and seeking, wherever possible, to get at the root causes of the emergency and to reinforce long-term development objectives. (p. 95)

The Programme does not have a standard set of forms or software for such activities as food movement, beneficiary registration, or in-country reporting. We feel that standard forms and

software should be developed and placed at the disposal of Country Offices as soon as feasible. They can be adapted as necessary to local circumstances. (p. 95)

We believe that should WFP develop arrangements for bolstering a Country Office quickly in case of a major emergency; the proposal for a Rapid Response Team put forward in the WFP Programme Support and Administrative Budget, 1994-95 appears to be a suitable mechanism. (p. 95)

WFP should systematically plan at the earliest possible stage for the phasing out of an emergency operation. (p. 95)

We believe that WFP should include environmental concerns as an explicit area to be addressed in the planning of a PRO. (p. 96)

We suggest that WFP, in association with UNHCR (for refugees), FAO (for agriculture) and ILO (for training and employment), consider organizing a "horizontal" review of the development content of PROs and PDPOs, and develop more sophisticated guidelines for the passage from an EMOP to a PRO. (p. 96)

We propose that wherever feasible WFP organize extended monitoring including economic, social or nutritional indicators. Indeed, monitoring could become a form of continuous assessment. The overriding purpose of such an approach would be to make the best use of available resources. If the Programme decides to go for improved monitoring systems, it may wish to consider a workshop on methodologies, with participation from other United Nations organisations and NGOs. (p. 97)

We feel that Country Offices should be asked to prepare the "evaluative reports" foreseen by present policy, but in fact rarely drawn up, on completion of an emergency operation. (pp. 97-98)

We suggest that the resumption of the formal evaluation of relief operations by WFP be accompanied by stock-taking on the methodologies for carrying out such evaluations. If it emerges - as appears likely - that there are no satisfactory and generally acceptable methodologies now available, WFP should take the lead in filling the gap. To that end, it could organize a workshop (possibly combined with monitoring) that would bring together all interested parties. (pp. 98-99)

There have in the past been many appeals to donors to speed up their internal procedures for making pledged commodities available to WFP in emergency cases, and this has to some extent been done. However, many donors still have domestic constraints of a legislative or procedural nature which hinder a quick response. We recommend that the Programme informally take the matter up again with individual donors, and press for further action. (pp. 99-100)

We suggest that action be taken by the central coordinating mechanisms of the United Nations system, together with the Programme's own governing bodies, to formalize a system-wide logistic mandate for WFP in emergency situations as originally recommended by the Nordic Study. (p. 101)

We suggest that WFP should cautiously continue to experiment with monetization in emergency situations, making after every case a full evaluation of the pros and cons. And any impression that monetization of relief is the "wave of the future" should be discouraged - at least for the moment. (p. 103)

Since nutritional impact is the most evident justification for relief, it needs more attention from WFP. We recommend that as far as possible nutritional data should be systematically generated in the monitoring phase and analyzed during evaluation. (p. 105)

The CFA, in November 1992, endorsed the Secretariat's proposal for a more extensive and systematic application of WFP assistance to support disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation and rehabilitation measures in Africa as outlined in the paper. We recommend support for this work, which is still in its early stages. Of particular importance (as noted by WFP in its report to the CFA) could be cooperation with IFAD, the World Bank and UNDP. (p. 107)

We recommend support for the Programme's participation in work on vulnerability mapping, subject to the question of cost-effectiveness being kept clearly in view. An investment in vulnerability mapping will only be justified if it yields new and usable information not available from any other source. If and when the methodology has proved its value, the Programme should also promote capacity building in the countries concerned, so that they can make effective use of the new technique. (p. 107)

We suggest that WFP take up with FAO the possibility of creating a joint mechanism on agricultural rehabilitation which could permit the systematic mobilisation of FAO's technical knowledge for the purchasing of inputs, and WFP's skills in transport and logistics. (p. 108)

In the light of the Guatemala experience we recommend that WFP take careful steps to ensure that there is adequate planning, and coordination between WFP Country Offices, when a repatriation operation is about to be launched. (p. 109)

We feel that during its relief operations WFP should continue to watch out for opportunities of capacity building, especially in disaster-prone least developed countries. (p. 110)

The reports of our country studies, the documents of WFP and other bodies, and discussions with senior staff of other United Nations organisations and NGOs have not identified any basic faults in WFP's relief work. However, the lack of any serious evaluation of recent

relief exercises, and the absence of agreed criteria for judging cost-effectiveness in complex emergency operations, require caution in expressing any definitive judgment. (p. 117)

Donors have three main options: they can provide emergency assistance bilaterally; they can work through NGOs; or they can use the World Food Programme. There is no other polyvalent international organisation in a position to provide the services offered by WFP. Provided the Programme continues to search for ever higher quality in its relief operations, donors can continue to give it their confidence. (p. 118)

6.0 WFP as a Development Agency

Summary of the Chapter

The Development Project Portfolio: WFP's development portfolio is examined in order to see whether there are any discernible patterns of project effectiveness which might suggest that some types of development activity are meeting with greater success than others. The question of the distribution of activities on a country basis is also discussed.

It is evident that there has been considerable stability in the broad composition of the project portfolio over time. Human resource development projects account for about 40 percent of WFP's current development activities and directly productive activities for about 50 percent with the rest being classified as economic and social infrastructure projects. Analysis of a more detailed classification of WFP's portfolio raises the question as to whether WFP ought to concentrate on a much more limited range of activities in the interests of greater efficiency. Each type of activity requires its own specialist expertise to design, implement and evaluate and makes its own special demands on government capacity in recipient countries. Such concentration is necessary to enable WFP to perform at acceptable levels of efficiency and effectiveness.

An examination of agricultural projects gives a very mixed picture of project effectiveness. This is evident both in WFP's own evaluations of projects and in the nine country studies conducted for this evaluation. Key problems noted in the evaluations carried out by WFP have included lengthy payback periods for investment by farmers, lack of integration of project activities into local production and marketing systems and very limited success in achieving agricultural development objectives in the wider context of rural development projects.

A number of evaluations of forestry projects has also shown that performance has varied greatly. Projects carried out in China appear to have been very successful but in a number of other countries considerable difficulties have been encountered. In the absence of cost-benefit studies it is not possible to assess the rates of return that can be expected to emerge from such projects although potentially returns could be high with efficient implementation.

Altogether our review of food-for-work projects show that there have been considerable problems in the design of projects which were sometimes based on unrealistic assumptions about the implementation capacities of governments and were provided with insufficient technical assistance. There was a general lack of impact evaluation and a number of examples of FFW projects benefiting the less disadvantaged. More attention needs to be paid to targeting and to community participation in projects.

Supplementary feeding projects cover school feeding and vulnerable group development. These projects are intended to improve nutrition, attendance and performance of school pupils and in the case of projects concerned with primary health care, to improve nutrition and encourage attendance at clinics. It is again evident from WFP's evaluations that there is wide variation in performance of such projects. This is also true for the country studies carried out by the team. It appears that vulnerable group feeding are capable of giving satisfactory results but often experience difficulties in implementation. Improvement in relating vulnerable group feeding projects to the overall national response to malnutrition and malnutrition related disease is required.

A number of difficulties have also been experienced with school feeding projects. It is very difficult to establish how far they attain their objectives. Reduction of malnutrition may be frustrated because rations are shared with the family and there appears to be little evidence of an improvement in nutrition though it may be that the concentration of pupils in school may be improved. In some cases the provision of food serves only to relieve school budgets of expenditure on it; in many instances it appears unlikely that governments would fund school feeding projects if WFP support were withdrawn.

A great many problems have been encountered with supplementary feeding projects. These include difficulties in targeting and the emergence of dependence. There was a general lack of impact evaluation of the effectiveness of the projects and it was noted that there was often an unclear link between such projects and their objectives and a need to recast projects in the light of what they can realistically achieve.

As a general conclusion to the discussion of food for work and supplementary feeding projects it may be said that there is no demonstrated general case for WFP to favour either food for work or supplementary feeding projects. Success is highly dependent on local conditions and on the strengths of the key counterpart agencies as well as on WFP's capacity to ensure adequate project design, implementation and evaluation. There is a need to integrate food aid with financial and technical assistance, for instance, from UNDP, the World Bank or IFAD.

Country Considerations: WFP attempts to give priority to countries designated as low-income food deficit countries. In 1991 there were 74 countries classified in this category.

We find it surprising that the line between LIFD countries and those better off is drawn, in 1991, at as high a level as USD 1235. It is highly desirable for WFP and the CFA to reconsider the criteria for classifying a country as LIFD with particular attention to the per capita income to be used. It is only recently that WFP appears to have considered the relative allocation of resources to countries. As a result some middle income countries have large programmes.

Straitened resources have led WFP to draw up guidelines for country allocations. This is to be welcomed as an attempt on the part of the Secretariat and WFP to target resources to the most needy. An examination of the regional distribution of resources shows some interesting shifts in the pattern of allocation. It is noticeable that between 1963 and 1992 Latin America and the Caribbean increased its share from 11 percent to 20 percent although only one Least Developed Country, Haiti, is located in the region.

Country Programme Versus Project Approach: It is not clear at the present time if the key question in WFP's allocations is aiming to direct its food aid to the most food insecure countries or to the largest collections of impoverished and food insecure people. For 30 years WFP has used a project approach to allocate its resources and until recently there have been no guidelines for limiting the size of any given country allocation.

The call of the UN that non-emergency food aid channelled through the UN system should be programmed coherently is a factor that WFP is having to take into account. It is possible that this will lead to the approval by the CFA of multi-year programmes of assistance to recipient countries. Although WFP has a wide understanding of the implications of the adoption of a programme approach to planning it has a major impediment in adopting it in the face of the unreliable nature of the resources provided to it, such as having to programme on a biennial basis, and uncertainties about the types and quantities of commodities. If WFP were to be able to cooperate fully in a programming approach, it would also be necessary to improve its capacity to develop a country programme strategy in the light of weaknesses exposed by the country studies.

Findings and Recommendations in Chapter 6

There has been considerable stability in the composition of WFP's project portfolio over time with human resource development accounting for 40 percent of activity and directly productive activities for about 50 percent. (p. 121)

WFP should consider whether it ought to be attempting to assist in the design, implementation, management and evaluation of some of the smaller categories of development activities given the need to concentrate its activities and reduce the diversity and complexity of its operations. (p. 122)

WFP's experience with the evaluation of projects in the agricultural sector has shown that they have produced mixed results and that a number of them have been disappointing. (p. 123)

There is a similar spread of performance in the case of forestry projects. (p. 126)

A review of the various types of food-for-work projects show that there have been considerable problems in the design of projects which were sometimes based on unrealistic assumptions about the implementation capacities of governments and were provided with insufficient technical assistance. There was a general lack of impact evaluation and a number of examples of FFW projects benefiting the less disadvantaged. More attention needs to be paid to targeting and to community participation in projects. (p. 128)

A great many problems have been encountered with supplementary feeding projects, including difficulties in targeting and the emergence of dependence. There was a general lack of impact evaluation of the effectiveness of the projects. (p. 134)

There is no demonstrated case for WFP to favour either food for work or supplementary feeding in its future support of development projects. Neither is there a demonstrable reason for eliminating or favouring projects in agriculture, forestry, vulnerable group feeding or school feeding. Success is highly dependent on local conditions and on the strengths of the key counterpart agencies as well as on WFP's capacity to ensure adequate project design, implementation and evaluation. (p. 136)

We recommend that WFP and CFA reconsider the criteria for classifying a country as a Low Income Food Deficit Country with particular attention to the per capita level of income to be used. (p. 137)

There is a marked need to integrate food aid with financial and technical assistance, for instance, from UNDP, the World Bank and IFAD. (p. 139)

There has been a surprising shift in allocations of WFP's resources by region leading to an increase in the share of Latin America and the Caribbean between 1963 and 1992 from 11 to 20 percent, although there is only one LIFD country in the region. (p. 139)

If a programming approach to the use of food aid is to be fully implemented by the UN system, WFP will have to further orient itself as a UN team member in the countries in which it works. (p. 143)

7.0 WFP as a Development Agency: Processes and Performance

Summary of the Chapter

It is necessary to ensure that WFP's activities are integrated into the national development strategies of the countries with which it works. The preparation of a Country Strategy Outline is one device to assist with this. It is intended to foster a dialogue with the concerned Regional Bureau in WFP Headquarters to ensure consistency of assumptions regarding the framework for future project activities. The scope of this examination is intended to be wide and cover all aspects of WFP's activities. The country studies found weaknesses in the capacity of Country Offices to prepare CSOs and in some cases consultants have been drawn in to assist.

The CSO has to be seen against the decision of the UN to ask for the preparation of Country Strategy Notes as part of a strategy for the integration of operations by UN agencies. At the present time, it is uncertain how this will link to WFP's planning activities.

WFP has laid down a series of six steps that are to be followed in project preparation. A review of these procedures as revealed by an examination of files supplemented by the country studies have thrown up a number of ways in which project preparation could be improved. The project summaries, which define the basis of the projects are often analytically and operationally weak and at times important issues raised by technical experts may be ignored or only superficially reflected. There is a need to exercise more quality control over projected development projects assisted, as needed, by specialist staff with a view to avoiding the many design deficiencies noted in the field. Specific weaknesses include lack of beneficiary participation in project planning, inadequate targeting, and inadequate measures to assure sustainability. Many technical deficiencies in project design were noted ranging from over-ambitious project objectives to designs which ignore traditional or existing institutional arrangements in government.

Once a project is approved, implementation is entrusted to the recipient government ministries with some assistance from WFP. WFP is responsible for delivery of food to the recipient country and for monitoring food deliveries and distribution. It is also expected to strengthen the capacity of implementing agencies. Another area where WFP is involved is in the provision of non-food items in conjunction with others.

One of the major functions of WFP lies in the monitoring of projects. It appears from our investigations that WFP's capacity to monitor the development projects it supports is stretched beyond reasonable limits. There is very little evaluation data on the effectiveness of WFP supported projects and almost no information on their impacts. More effort is needed to understand the basic effectiveness of WFP supported projects in bringing benefits to the poorest and most food insecure people.

One of the key design weaknesses noted in our country studies concerned unrealistic assumption about the administrative and programming capacity of counterpart agencies and inadequate measures to secure technical assistance when required.

It appears that almost all the Country Offices visited were able successfully to manage food movements and support the logistics involved.

The country studies generally found that commodities made available in WFP were acceptable and valuable and at times rations had a higher value than local wages so that better off farmers and labourers might be attracted thus impairing the self-targeting nature of food aid to the poorest.

One issue is that projects that require non-food inputs were sometimes approved without any assurance that such inputs could be provided, with serious consequences for project implementation. It appeared that WFP was able to deal with commodity exchanges in a generally effective and acceptable way.

From the country studies it was possible to form some impression of the performance of WFP's projects. The overall picture of effectiveness that emerged was one of mixed results with weaknesses in design and implementation often overshadowing basic benefits to project participants. In most cases projects fell short of their potential often because of problems associated with poor design. Rarely, if ever in the country studies was the basic development rationale found to be simply wrong; the thrust of the evaluation was rather to point to opportunities for increased effectiveness through changes in design and implementation. Commitment of the recipient government to project activities was another fact that explained the relative success of certain WFP assisted projects.

There was evidence in the country studies of food for work and human resource development projects having medium and long term positive effects but the fact that there was little quantitative or even qualitative information on the impact of WFP projects available made systematic analysis difficult.

The country studies threw considerable doubt on the sustainability of project activities which was often weak or absent.

WFP has recognised the importance of enhancing the participation of women in its activities following guidelines introduced in 1989. CFA and SCP guidance has been decisive and remains influential in ensuring continued attention to gender issues in WFP project design and implementation but the country studies revealed attitudinal and practical difficulties in translating the guidelines into effective and concrete measures in a number of countries. Nevertheless, many of WFP's projects have benefited a very large number of women. The need remains, however, to pursue the gender issue systematically so that opportunities to benefit women will not be lost.

Our country studies confirmed the importance of WFP's activities in regard to the environment.

Findings and Recommendations in Chapter 7

For most if not all Country Offices we find it unrealistic to expect them to develop such strategic documents as the Country Strategy Outline on their own: we welcome that external consultants have been engaged to develop Country Strategy Outlines in some countries. (p. 148)

WFP is seen as a rather passive in the debate on how to use food to support development and on the criteria to be met if food is to be used efficiently and effectively for development. (p. 148)

To effect much needed improvement in development project design, more effort is warranted in basic problem analysis, particularly studies of target population and potential involvement of other agencies, including mechanisms of coordination; and the assumptions on which project feasibility are based need to be more clearly spelt out, including the capacity of implementing institutions. We attach particular importance to what we see as a failure to provide an analysis of the suitability of food aid in the project activity. (pp. 151-152)

We find that the real responsibility for project design is blurred. To what extent, for instance, should Headquarters be making substantive changes at the Project Summary stage when full consultation with the Country Office and the Government in fact is not practicable? As now practised, CFA approved projects do not in all cases have the full and explicit approval of all the parties involved. We believe the cost in time spent on securing full agreement will often be worth paying. (p. 152)

The country studies raise serious questions about the design quality of many of the projects currently being supported by WFP. There are key problems in targeting food aid to the poorest and most food insecure, ensuring participation by target group members in project design, development and implementation, addressing gender issues in project design, and ensuring adequate measures for sustainability of assets, activities and institutions created or supported by WFP assistance. In addition, there is a general need to improve the technical quality of projects. The country case studies draw into question WFP's current *capacity*, not its willingness and good intention, to ensure a reasonable level of design quality for the projects it supports with food aid. (pp. 154-155)

We recommend strongly that the Programme consider whether it should attempt fewer, perhaps larger projects, with less complex objectives and lower expectations, more focused sector approaches and perhaps fewer country programmes. (p. 155)

In most of the country studies, we found that monitoring by WFP was limited to food movements, to numbers of beneficiaries participating, and to output indicators, with little involvement in analysis to affect changes in direction or implementation of projects. (p. 156)

We recommend that the CFA should assure itself that non-food items are available and committed before projects are approved and initiated. (p. 156)

Monitoring operates at both formal and informal levels; both are important and both need improvement. We recommend that beyond the clarification of reporting relationships recently provided to Directors of Operations, WFP should strengthen the relationship between HQ and the field through more consultative visits, seminars, and training. (p. 158)

We recommend that, after a few years of practice, the Programme review the current reporting procedures with a view to simplification. We have the impression that these implementation reports are of little relevance and use when it comes to the planning of a project expansion, with the result that the significance of difficulties experienced in the past is under-rated. (p. 158)

The quality of monitoring and reporting is sometimes negatively affected by a lack of agreed and relevant indicators for achievements, particularly at the "immediate" objectives level. Also, we observed a lack of systematic monitoring of fulfilment of project pre-conditions, even those upon which WFP involvement was to be based. We consider Beneficiary Contact Monitoring (BCM) to be one of the more important elements of improved project planning and implementation; it does, however, require specialized skills for obtaining and analyzing information and requires the involvement of nationals of the country concerned. (p. 159)

In general, we have been favourably impressed by the quality of management reviews and by interim and thematic evaluations, except in the lack of impact information. We question the effectiveness of combining management reviews and evaluations with appraisal missions, all being accomplished within a tight time schedule. (p. 160)

One of the overall weaknesses emerging from our country studies is the neglect of assessment of effectiveness and impact at country level. A number of important evaluation problems were identified: there is a lack of baseline data and of qualitative information on beneficiaries; targeting is seldom considered in depth in project design or evaluation; very little is known about how WFP food is used by households; and it is also the case that economic analyzes of projects are seldom done. WFP's capacity either directly or indirectly to monitor the development projects it supports seems to be stretched beyond reasonable limits in a number of countries visited. (p. 160)

One of the key design weaknesses, noted with some frequency in our country studies, concerned unrealistic assumptions about the administrative and programming capacity of counterpart agencies and poor or inadequate measures to provide technical assistance where it is required. (p. 162)

The overall picture of effectiveness emerging from our country studies is one of mixed results. In many cases, we felt that project effectiveness and basic benefits to project participants would be greater if improvements were made in project design and if adequate technical assistance were provided to implementing agencies. (p. 167)

We recommend that the Programme move towards a country programming approach which seeks to identify the most effective uses of food aid in support of development projects, and that it adhere to programming objectives when approving projects. This will require more technical support in the preparation of Country Strategy Outlines, better analysis of economic and social conditions during project design and implementation, and more severe scrutiny in the project approval process. (p. 177)

We recommend that the Programme more realistically assess the capacity of implementing agencies; that it be more active and consistent in providing institutional support to national governments; that it provide relevant training and systems for effective project management; and that country programmes and projects be related to the absorptive capacity of the recipient countries. (pp. 177-178)

We recommend that the Programme apply more effort to improve the targeting of projects to ensure that the benefits will more fully reach the most food-deficit regions, the poorest and the most food insecure members of the community, and so that women participate more fully. In addition, we recommend greater attention to effective community-level participation in identification of project activities, to ensure community sense of ownership and responsibility for maintenance of the assets created in development projects. We also note the need for concrete measures to ensure that women participate in influencing project orientation and in management and implementation, and that they get an equitable share in project benefits. (p. 178)

A number of the country case study reports indicate that WFP will need to upgrade the technical capacity in development project design if it is to achieve more acceptable levels of project quality. We indicate several ways in which this can be accomplished: a stronger complement of technical specialist staff at HQ; more flexible and innovative arrangements for using outside consultants, including those from other UN agencies; and an expanded use of national consultants by Country Offices. (p. 178)

Many of the most successful WFP projects are those where other development organisations have taken the lead and where the Programme supplies food as an input. We recommend far greater efforts than now to integrate WFP food aid into projects formulated and implemented by other agencies of the UN and by the international financial institutions and also other donors, with stronger technical expertise. (p. 178)

We recommend that the Programme be much more active in ensuring that assistance to projects, which tends to create budgetary dependence for key ministries, is accompanied with clear and

concrete plans for phasing out and for budgetary and institutional sustainability. Otherwise, an unacceptable level of dependence is created and the inevitable end of WFP support will cause undue hardship for both project staff and beneficiaries. We emphasise, however, that there are situations where it is fully justifiable to keep a project going for many years, even decades. Phasing out is not necessary in the case of project activities that have proved reasonably effective and have improved and benefited new cohorts of people over time in poor countries that remain dependent on foreign grant aid. (p. 178)

8.0 The Future of the World Food Programme

This is a short chapter, needing no summary, in which we set forth our views on the possible future evolution of the World Food Programme. These are not be considered as formal recommendations. Rather they are shared judgements, reached at the end of this long evaluation exercise, which may be of general interest, and perhaps of value to those who will have to take decisions on the shape of the World Food Programme in the later nineties.

We first present our views on the future of the Programme as a relief agency, second as a development agency, and then as a hybrid organisation combining both. In a final paragraph we reflect on the possible future role of WFP in regard to food aid policies.

1.0 Food Aid in A Global Context

1.1 Overall Food Balance

There is a great divide in the World food situation. In the developed world food is plentiful and produced in surplus; in the developing world food is scarce and malnutrition all too prevalent. This is in spite of large increases in the world output of food.

Globally, food production per capita has increased faster than population during the last four decades. Grain production has fluctuated from year to year, but rose from MT 630 million in 1950 to MT 1,780 million in 1990. Availability per capita progressed from 247 kg. in 1950 to a peak of 346 kg. in 1984, and a recent estimate for 1992 shows it at 318 kg. Similarly, output of meat climbed from 18 kg. per capita in 1950 to 32 kg. towards the end of the 1980s, and fish from about 10 kg. in the beginning of the 1950s to 18-19 kg. around 1990.[1] For the moment, available information suggests that the world can produce enough food for its needs, the question is whether output can continue to grow rapidly, even though yields still are low in many developing countries, and whether poverty can be alleviated thereby.

During the last decade, production of cereals in all developing countries combined has increased *pari passu* with population, even a little faster. But for the group of the Least Developed Countries and for that of Sub-Saharan Africa there was a small, if marginal, falling back, see Table 1.

There are very few large exporters of cereals amongst the developing countries: in 1991/92 only Argentina, China (which imported twice as much as it exported), Turkey and Thailand exported more than MT 5 million each.[2]

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[1] Source: Lester R. Brown, Hal Kayne & Ed Ayres: *Vital signs 1993. The trends that are shaping our future.* Worldwatch Books. W.W.Norton & Co., New York, London 1993.

[2] Source: *Food outlook, global information and early warning system on food and agriculture*, No.7, 1993, FAO, Rome, July 1993

Table 1
Developing Countries: Cereal Production, Imports and Food Aid
1982/83 and 1991/92
MT million

	Developing Countries		Least Developed Countries		Sub-Saharan Africa	
	1982/83	1991/92	1982/83	1991/92	1982/83	1991/92
Production total	699.0	879.0	61.0	72.5	42.9	56.2
Imports	104.0	127.0	7.6	10.3	9.3	10.6
Exports	33.0	45.0	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.2
Net imports	71.0	83.0	6.3	9.3	8.3	9.4
Food aid *total*	9.2	11.5	3.7	5.1	2.5	4.0
% of imports	8.9	9.0	48.7	49.5	26.9	37.7
Production per head: kg	204.0	214.0	149.0	139.0	111.0	110.0
Total supplies per person kg	225.0	234.0	164.0	157.0	132.0	128.0

Source: *1993 Food Aid Review*. Table 16. World Food Programme, Rome, 1993

There appears to be little prospect of a world shortage of cereals in the short run. According to FAO, stocks of cereals will fall to 18 percent of world consumption in 1994 against 19-20 percent during the last three years. But so far, the possibility of some depletion of global stocks does not appear to have had any effect on prices of wheat, maize and rice, which in June 1993 were significantly lower than during the preceding four years.

With a continued rapid increase in world population, and significant growth in national product and consumer incomes in many developing countries, including the largest ones, global food consumption and demand for cereals are bound to grow significantly during the coming years. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations has led to potentially important changes in agricultural policies in future years, as a consequence of which the growth of output in some food exporting developed countries may slow down or output may even fall. In terms of world trade balance, this may be offset by a reduction of up to two-thirds, as projected by FAO,[3] in wheat imports by the former USSR and Eastern Europe. The FAO projections also show that the net grain import requirements of the developing countries will increase by more than one-third in the 1990s. On balance, it is unlikely that these requirements will be met without an upward pressure on prices which will make it more difficult for many developing countries to finance grain imports needed to at least maintain per capita consumption at present levels. Given

[3] Medium-term outlook for the world grains economy, Committee on Commodity Problems, Intergovernmental Group on Grains, CCP: GR 93/6, March 1993, FAO, Rome.

that vulnerable nations face increasing difficulties in mobilising foreign exchange for their food imports and considering the extent of under-nutrition in many developing countries as well as the extent of food insecurity, particularly at household levels, the case for food aid remains strong.

In spite of the food aid which is provided, and large and increasing commercial imports by food deficit countries, all available estimates show that there is a vast number of undernourished people in the world. One estimate of chronic undernutrition in developing regions puts the figure at 786 million in 1988-90, down from 941 million in 1969-71, thanks to a remarkable improvement in Asia, while the number of undernourished people was estimated to have risen by two-thirds in Africa in the course of those two decades.[4] Another estimate for 1988 of the number of only *rural* people who are below the poverty line, is even higher: 939 million people.[5] It is highly likely that most of these people are undernourished. If the international community, including of course the governments of the developing countries concerned, were really serious about taking effective action to "eliminating hunger", the task at hand would be heavy but not at all impossible in its demand on food resources. Thus, by way of illustration, a trebling of present levels of about MT 15 million of food aid would suffice to provide a nutrition supplement directly to 1 billion people, corresponding to one-quarter of their full daily need of foodgrain, estimated at 450 grams. "Only" about 10 percent of this amount of food aid might be needed - as in 1992 - for emergencies and for refugee and displaced persons operations. Clearly, it is the political will and objectives of potential food aid donors which determine the size of the food aid programme and its ability to reduce the hunger in the world.

Unfortunately, at least for the short run, a realistic projection of the volume of food aid must be made on the basis of pragmatic assumptions about trends in production and in *effective demand*, not nutritional needs, and the corresponding estimate of food imports of food deficit countries. The most comprehensive recent review of food aid needs was carried out under the auspices of the US National Research Council in 1988. This showed that a doubling of the present levels of about MT 10 million of cereals to developing countries would be necessary to meet projected *market* needs throughout the decade of the nineties; and that a quadrupling over present levels would be needed to meet *nutritional* needs by the year 2000.[6] The more conservative FAO *World Agriculture Towards 2000*[7] estimates suggest that between MT 17 and 20 million of cereals would be necessary to *maintain the existing ratio of food aid to food imports*. Both these studies project substantial trend increases in food imports which will be difficult to finance in many low income countries without associated increases in ODA generally

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[4] FAO and WHO, *Nutrition and development - a global assessment*, Rome, 1992. Quoted in *Review of global food aid policies and programmes.* WFP document CFA: 35/P/Add.1, Rome April 1993.

[5] Jazairy, Idriss et al.: *The State of World Rural Poverty*. IFAD, Rome 1992.

[6] Source: National Research Council 1988. *Food Aid Projections for the Decade of the 1990s,* National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1989 (or 1988?)

[7] Alexandros, N. (ed). *World Agriculture Towards 2000. A FAO Study*. Belhaven Press, London 1988.

or in food aid. Another estimate, by the Unites States Department of Agriculture, based on maintaining per capita grain consumption at the 1987-91 average for 60 low-income countries with food security problems, concludes that it "would take an estimated 16 million tons of food aid. However, to meet the United Nations minimum nutritional standard would require 27 million tons".[8]

Food aid needs are potentially most acute in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 1991 World Bank and World Food Programme report on food aid to the region concludes that food imports in that region will at least double during the 1990s, a conclusion which is supported by other studies.[9] The US Department of Agriculture estimated that MT 10 million would be needed in Sub-Saharan Africa even by 1992, to maintain the 1987-91 average cereal consumption level, over 60 percent more than its estimate for the previous year, and almost the double of the food aid actually received in 1992.

The ability of food deficit countries to pay for commercial food imports is clearly a major determinant of food aid needs. As shown by table 1, the share of food aid in cereals imports in Sub-Saharan African countries rose from 27 to 38 percent in the course of a decade. The outlook is bleak in most of Africa for increased foreign exchange availability, so aid will have to cover an increasing share of imports. For the Least Developed Countries, also shown in Table 1, the dependence on food aid for nearly one-half of imports in the early 1990s was not much different from a decade earlier; this largely reflected the predominant position in this group of Bangladesh. At least as long as effective demand determines the need for food aid, most of the growing requirement for it in the coming years will come from Sub-Saharan Africa.

It has been argued that concessional imports of food to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union may need to be greatly increased, but this seems to be rather unlikely. Calorie intake per capita in the formerly centrally planned economies in that part of the world was very high before the recent upheavals. "FAO notes that the nature of food insecurity in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has changed fundamentally over the past year. Problems are currently mainly related to low incomes and inadequate purchasing power following price deregulation and sharp increases in retail prices of staple foods. In general, the widespread shortages that characterized the situation a year ago no longer exists."[10] The problem now is that high prices restrict access of poor households to the food they need; the size of the vulnerable population is expected to increase. In the coming few years, targeted food aid as relief or project aid may therefore be appropriate also to these countries, but a large-scale

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[8] United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, *Global Food Assessment: Situation and Outlook Report*, Washington D.C., November 1992.

[9] References: World Bank and WFP: *Food aid in Africa: an agenda for the 1990s*. Washington and Rome, 1991; World Bank: *Sub-Saharan Africa. From Crisis to Sustained Growth*. Washington, 1989; Alexandros, op.cit. (1988); von Braun, J and Paolillo, L. Food in Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends and Policy challenges for the 1990s. *Food Policy*, 15 (6).

[10] Source: quotation from WFP document, op.cit., April 1993, based on FAO, *Assessment of the Current World Food Security Situation and Recent Policy Development*, CFS: 93/2, January 1993.

extraordinary programme of food aid to CIS countries will hardly be called for. Yet, general aid needs in the former centrally planned economies in Europe and ex-USSR may for political reasons be given priority by the major donors, and thus constrain aid resources available for developing countries. In its turn, this may also reduce food aid to developing countries, not because food surpluses as such will be diverted to other areas, but because overall aid resources to pay for food aid may be cut back.

1.2 Overall Aid and Food Aid

In financial terms food aid in recent years typically has accounted for less than ten percent of total official development assistance (ODA) provided by the largest groups of aid donors, see Table 2. Food aid as percent of total ODA fell from over 12 percent in 1977 to about half this share fourteen years later. Some of this fall may be more apparent than real. In 1990 cereal prices were 22 percent *lower* than in 1980, while the implied deflator used by OECD to estimate ODA at constant prices and exchange rates, showed an *increase* of 55 percent. But even if the real value of food aid may not have fallen, in relation to the purchasing power of total development aid, foreign aid provided in kind as food has declined markedly in aid budgets.

Table 2
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Food Aid
by Members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD

Net disbursements	1977	1980	1982	1985	1988	1989	1990	1991
At current prices (USD billion)								
Total ODA (OECD)	15.7	27.3	27.1	28.8	47.0	45.7	54.5	58.5
Total food aid	1.9	2.6	2.4	3.1	3.8	3.2	3.2	3.6
of which: multilateral	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.8
bilateral	1.5	2.0	1.9	2.6	3.0	2.5	2.4	2.7
Food aid as percent of total ODA	12.2	9.6	8.7	10.7	8.1	7.1	5.8	6.1
Multilateral as percent of total food aid	19.3	24.7	21.7	15.4*	22.5	22.9	25.6	23.0

Source: FAO *Food Aid in Figures*, 1986; WFP *1993 Food Aid Review*.
* Multilateral grants include bilateral grants by the EC Commission, except for 1985. The percentages for 1984 and 1986 respectively are 21.2 and 21.6.

As revealed by a more detailed table to compile Table 2, the multilateral part of food aid in most years has been well above 20 percent. Multilateral food aid is mainly provided by the WFP (80 to 90 percent), and other UN agencies (UNRWA, UNHCR and UNICEF).

The fact that the share of food aid in total ODA has declined brings us to the controversial question of the extent to which food aid is *additional* to the total of other aid flows from the donors. In the 1950s when the US started to use its food surpluses as food aid, it came to be regarded as a supplement to other aid. Throughout the history of food aid, donor countries have tried to dispose of surplus commodities in this way. Given the continuing legal requirements of PL 480, US food aid comes at least partly in addition to other foreign aid from USA. For Canada the situation is different: its food aid allocation is an integral part of official ODA. Nevertheless, Canada's food aid is not fungible in the sense that it could readily and fully be substituted by a commensurate increase in financial aid. By contrast, for many other donor countries their food aid contributions have a high degree of fungibility in this sense and cannot be regarded as additional to other aid flows.

In a recent study[11] the point is made that "(even) when the cereal supply situation has been relatively tight, the opportunity cost of food aid (for the donors) has been much below the cost of acquiring the aided commodities on the world market. ... A rigorous analysis would be needed of all relevant factors, including budgetary procedures followed in donor countries, particularly if food aid remains stagnant while real costs are low." This is an important observation because any gain to the donor country from using food aid or to its government budget, would not necessarily be credited to the foreign aid budget which would carry the full nominal costs of food aid.

Cereals constitute in most years more than nine-tenths of the volume of food aid, see Table 3, which shows the significant growth of cereal food aid shipments over time, with sharp increases in response to crises. The dominant position of the USA is striking. In 1976/77 it provided more than two thirds of all cereal food aid; in 8 out of the last 18 years its share exceeded 60 percent, and in 1991/92 it still provided close to 55 percent. In most cases when food aid has increased steeply from one year to another, USA's share has increased, which underlines that country's leading role in the area. The sudden rise in the community action part of EEC cereals food aid in two of the last three years is noticeable, and the shares of Australia and Japan appear to be falling over time. MT 3.4 million tons of cereals were delivered by WFP in 1992 (plus cereals handled on behalf of bilateral donors).[12]

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[11] Ram Saran and Panos Konandreas: An Additional Resource? A Global Perspective on Food Aid Flows in Relation to Development Assistance, in Edward Clay and Olav Stokke: *Food Aid Reconsidered. Assessing the Impact on Third World Countries,* Frank Cass, London and EADI, Geneva, 1991.

[12] Source as for table 3.

Table 3
Total Cereal Food Aid by Major Donors 1973/74 to 1991/92
Thousand tons - grain equivalent

Year	Australia	Canada	EEC comm.	EEC bil.	Japan	USA	Others	Total
1973/74	222	664	603	605	350	3,186	188	5,819
1974/75	330	612	555	858	182	4,722	1,141	8,399
1978/79	329	735	612	547	352	6,238	687	9,500
1983/84	460	817	1,024	892	445	5,655	555	9,848
1984/85	466	943	1,253	1,245	234	7,536	767	12,442
1985/86	346	1,204	903	697	432	6,675	646	10,904
1986/87	377	1,321	1,130	1,015	454	7,467	789	12,552
1987/88	330	1,143	1,444	1,266	652	7,983	792	13,609
1988/89	316	1,146	1,223	1,014	421	6,541	665	11,326
1989/90	293	884	2,453	758	424	5,702	399	10,913
1990/91	346	1,142	1,599	987	508	7,433	535	12,543
1990/91	340	1,002	2,941	950	405	7,600	665	13,904

Source: FAO, *Food Aid in Figures*, 1986 and WFP, *1993 Food Aid Review*

The supply of food aid in cereals is guaranteed by the present Food Aid Convention of 1986, extended to the end of June 1995, which assures a minimum level of food aid defined as MT 7.5 million in wheat equivalent, irrespective of fluctuations in production and prices. The World Food Conference in 1974 recommended MT 10 million as a minimum flow of cereal aid. With aggregate shipments of MT 10 million or more since the mid 1980s, the present commitment seems to be both inadequate and outdated, and a more realistic figure should be agreed upon.

During the last 5 years, deliveries of non-cereals as food aid have fluctuated sharply, from MT 1.7 million in 1988 to MT 1 million in 1989; in 1992 they reached MT 1.6 million; of which more than MT 0.4 million were delivered by WFP. While they account for only about 10 percent of the tonnage of food aid, they probably represent as much as 30 percent of its value.

Food aid is classified into three main categories depending on the way in which it is used: programme aid that acts as balance of payments and government budget support to the recipient government which can sell or otherwise use the food subject to agreement with the donor agency; project aid that acts as support to well defined activities designed in common by recipient and donor; and relief aid targeted to victims of disasters or to refugees and displaced persons. Programme aid is only provided by bilateral agencies, as an integrated part of their overall aid to each recipient, and normally on the assumption that the local currency counterpart funds will be used to finance development expenditure in local currency. Attempts by food aid

donors to control the use of counterpart funds generated by programme food aid, seem to encounter frequent problems. Food aid donors aim at better targeting through project food aid, which is provided by a multitude of multilateral and bilateral agencies, and also NGOs, either as channels of official aid or from their own resources. The same is the case for relief aid, with WFP playing a crucial role as channel of such aid, providing services for bilateral donors.

During the period 1988-1992 the share of programme aid in the volume of cereal food aid fluctuated between 50 (in 1992) and 61 percent; that of development aid over 18 (in 1992) and almost 27 percent; and the share of relief aid between 19 and 32 percent (in 1992).[13] Also the distribution of non-cereal food aid oscillated widely during that period, but the share of programme aid is considerably lower than in the case of cereals. Even though the share of project aid in all food aid deliveries has fallen during the last 4 years, the actual volume of cereals delivered as project aid has not declined. The same is true for the volume of programme aid. With the exception of Japan,[14] the volume of total development aid from the main food aid donors between 1985/86 and 1990/91 increased only very slowly, in some cases it even fell. Given that the share of food aid in total aid has fallen, it is not surprising that non-relief food aid has stagnated during the last several years. Nevertheless, we find that so far there is no convincing evidence that other food aid has declined as a result of the sharp increase in food aid for relief.

There have been substantial changes in the direction of food aid to different parts of the world. In the 1960s South Asia, in particular India, East Asia and the larger Latin American economies were the most important food aid recipients. During the 1970s and 1980s food aid was progressively reallocated towards least developed countries with low rates of growth of domestic food output relative to population. The trends during the last decade are illustrated in table 4, which shows that the share of the low-income food deficit countries has fallen significantly during the last three years, mainly, but not only, as a reflection of food aid being provided to Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet Union.

Food aid commodities are usually delivered in kind by the donor countries or purchased in them, but to an increasing extent they are procured through triangular transactions and local purchases. By triangular transactions is meant purchases of food commodities in one developing country for delivery in another, while local purchases are done in the recipient country. In addition,

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[13] Note that the costs to the donors differ considerably between programme, project and relief aid. In programme food aid international transport etc. adds at most 15 percent to the cost of the food itself; in project food aid and relief operations, WFP data suggest, non-food costs average about 50 and 100 percent, In recent years the average shares of programme, project and relief in terms of physical flows have been of the order of, respectively, 55, 20 and 25 percent, while in terms of costs to the donors the corresponding shares have been, respectively, well over 40 and 20 percent for programme and project food aid and about 35 percent for relief. In 1992 the shares of costs of programme and project food aid may have fallen below 40 and 20 percent, whereas the cost of relief aid probably approached 45 percent. It should be noted that these are but rough estimates of orders of magnitude; we have not undertaken any actual costing for the different types of food aid flows.

[14] OECD, *1992 report development cooperation*, table 1, page A8, OECD, Paris, 1992.

food aid commodities are frequently exchanged against local commodities to be used in project activities, such exchange is often referred to as swap. The reasons for these operations are several, but mainly that they can be more cost efficient, that it is possible thereby to provide commodities more appropriate to food habits and customs, and that they can encourage food production in developing countries and stimulate intra- and inter-country trade.[15] The volume of triangular transactions and local purchases rose rapidly in the middle of the 1980s, from MT 443,000 of cereals in 1983/84 to MT 1,171,000 in 1987/88, and MT 1,039,000 in 1992, of which MT 461,000 purchased by WFP. In addition, MT 187,000 tons of non-cereals were purchased in this way in 1992, of which more than half by WFP.[16] These transactions represented 7.5 percent of cereal food aid (against 4.5 percent in 1983/84), and more than a quarter of non-cereal food aid.

Table 4
Cereal Food Aid Shipments by Regions and Country Groups
MT million - grain equivalent

Geographical area	1982/ 1983	1984/ 1985	1986/ 1987	1988/ 1989	1989/ 1990	1990/ 1991	1991/ 1992
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.5	5.0	3.3	2.9	2.8	3.3	4.3
Asia and Pacific	2.7	3.2	4.9	3.7	2.5	2.6	3.1
Latin America and Carribean	1.3	1.4	2.4	2.0	1.7	1.9	1.9
North Africa and Middle East	2.4	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.4	3.3	2.5
Eastern Europe and former USSR	0.1	0.1	..	-	1.5	1.3	2.1
Unspecified	0.2	0.1	-	-	-	-	-
WORLD TOTAL	9.2	12.5	12.5	11.3	10.9	12.5	13.9
of which Low-income food deficit countries	8.2	11.5	11.6	9.7	7.9	9.9	10.8
of which Sun-Saharan Africa	2.5	4.8	3.3	2.9	2.6	3.3	4.3
Least Developed Countries	3.7	5.9	5.0	4.4	3.7	4.6	5.4

Source: *1993 Food Aid Review*, op. cit.

[15] This subject is dealt with in Edward Clay and Charlotte Benson: Triangular Transactions, Local Purchases and Exchange Arrangements in Food Aid: A Provisional Review with Special Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa, in *Food Aid Reconsidered*, op. cit.

[16] Ibid, page 152, and *1993 Food Aid Review, op.cit.*, pp. 131-132.

1.3 Food Aid, Production and Trade

In 1992 cereal food aid corresponded to 0.7 percent of the world production of grains, 6.8 percent of world imports of cereals and 8.4 percent of the cereal stocks in developed countries. The corresponding figures for developing countries show that food aid added 1.1 percent to their output of cereals and represented 9 percent of their imports of cereals.[17]

Even though cereal food aid, therefore, is very small in relation to total output of grain in the developing countries as a whole, its impact on domestic agricultural production has been a subject of recurrent controversy. There is now wide agreement that the long debate on this impact has been inconclusive, and the potential impact, particularly in the form of cereals, cannot be assessed in isolation.[18] Where quantitative analysis has been attempted, the overall impact on the agricultural sector was found to vary considerably amongst countries, as it was heavily determined by the specifics of national food policy: the segmentation of markets; separation of consumer and producer price; and overall investment policy. In the case of most project food aid, the scale of transfers has not been sufficiently large to have had any significant direct negative sectoral impacts. Moreover, since it is aimed at enabling poor people to eat more, increased consumption will tend to counterbalance any such negative impacts. The risk of negative production impacts may be more important for emergency food aid provided retroactively and concentrated on restricted areas, than for long term projects. By itself, of course, any import of cheap food from abroad will tend to depress domestic prices and therefore act as a disincentive on domestic production. But this can be countered by stronger policies to stimulate domestic food production than would have obtained without food aid. The most critical argument against food aid is that it may make policies for increased domestic food production appear less pressing.[19]

The effects of food aid on commercial trade in grain are potentially significant for a number of countries. Although as shown in table 1, cereal food aid in 1991/92 corresponded to only 9 percent of the developing countries' cereal imports, the least developed countries covered almost half their cereals imports by food aid, and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa more than one-third of theirs. In these countries therefore, food aid interferes seriously with potential, ordinary

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17 *1993 Food Aid Review*, op. cit. and *Food outlook*, op. cit.

18 Singer, Hans W. and others, *Food aid. the challenge and opportunities*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, Clay, Edward and Stokke Olav, Assessing the Performance and Economic Impact of Food Aid: The State of the Art, in *Food Aid Reconsidered*, op. cit, and Clay, Edward J. and Singer, Hans W. Food aid and development issues and evidence, *WFP Occasional Paper* No. 3, World Food Programme, Rome, 1985.

19 A recent evaluation of Danish food aid examined its effects on agriculture in recipient countries and on poverty, food security and nutrition, in terms of market and distributional effects. The study concluded that only under rare circumstances does food aid depress agricultural prices and thereby production. Food aid is usually a substitute for commercial imports, and often results in rising demand for food among consumers through a transfer of purchasing power. (Per Pinstrup-Andersen, *Food aid to Promote Economic Growth and Combat Poverty, Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in Developing Countries, and Suggestions for How to Increase the Effectiveness of Danish Aid to the World Food Programme*, September 1991.)

commercial trade with grain. There is an international agreement that seeks to prevent food aid from interfering with the *normal* level of imports of food of any developing country: the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal from 1980. According to these, food aid should represent additional imports over and above commercial imports as defined by the Usual Marketing Requirements (UMR). In practice, however, cereal food aid often substitutes for commercial imports. There are special dispensations which allow the UMR to be reduced if countries face exceptional economic difficulties.[20]

If food aid commodities arrive in addition to normal commercial imports instead of substituting for them, they can serve to expand the market for imported foodstuffs and change consumer preferences away from food, the domestic output of which could be increased. Such an increased dependence on imports, and disincentive for domestic production is claimed to have occurred in some countries, but the reason for increased dependence may have as a root government policies, e.g. through food subsidies on imported food, rather than the food available through aid.[21]

Food aid in support of dairy development has been particularly controversial. In the analyses of such aid it has rarely been considered whether these commodities are providing additional milk products or acting as import or balance of payments support. Instead additionality has been assumed and the analyses have focused on the effects of domestic milk pricing on both producers and consumers, and the longer term implications from dairy development for income distribution and nutrition.[22] The Indian project Operation Flood, historically the largest dairy project, which was funded by WFP in its first phase, and by EEC in phases 2 and 3, has been subject of an extensive evaluation.[23]

From a macroeconomic perspective food aid in kind does not differ from other forms of aid. Food aid may save foreign currency (improve the balance of payments) if the recipient country would have imported food anyway. Alternatively, if the same volume of food would not have been imported without food aid, it provides an additional supply with macro-economic impact highly dependent on the policy orientation and the priorities of the recipient government. In any case, food aid is an additional resource for the recipient country, and even if it is tied to specific commodities, it will save foreign exchange and provide government with resources, and in fact, therefore, must be regarded as highly fungible.

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[20] Committee on Commodity Problems, Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal, Thirty-second report to CCP, CCP 91/17, FAO, Rome,1989.

[21] See Simon Maxwell: The Disincentive Effect of Food Aid: A Pragmatic Approach, in *Food Aid Reconsidered*, op.cit.

[22] World Food Programme, *Food Aid and dairy development*, WFP/CFA: 25/P/8, Rome, 1988.

[23] Doornbos, M. and others, *Dairy aid and development: India's Operation Flood*,Sage, New Delhi and London, 1990; Mergos, G. and Slade R., Dairy Development and milk cooperatives, *World Bank Discussion Papers* No 15., World Bank, Washington DC, 1987.

Programme food aid is intended to give balance of payments and government budget support even though donors may attach conditions to the use of generated counterpart funds, and thereby to some extent reduce its fungibility. Relief aid also functions in reality as balance of payments and/or budget support as it compensates governments for expenditure needed to avoid catastrophical results of emergencies, refugee inflows etc. Late arrivals of relief aid are still useful as compensation. Formally, project aid in which food is allocated for support of specific activities, appears to be of a different nature. If the aided activities would have been carried out anyhow, the aid flow must be regarded as a general, fungible resource transfer. If the activity in question would not have been undertaken without aid, the food aid supported project would constitute a burden on the government budget to the extent that additional local expenditure would be needed; however, the government would have been enabled to undertake (or expand) activities at little or no opportunity cost in terms of forgoing other, possibly higher priority, projects. Also project food aid will tend to lower commercial imports, unless it is so well targeted that all food delivered will lead to increased food consumption. The fungibility of project food aid can in practice be assessed only with great difficulty on a case by case and country by country basis.

Project food aid is normally intended to provide additional resources to development as well as, in most cases, to raise the level of food entitlements of the direct beneficiaries in the short run. The efficiency of these resource transfers in terms of long-term development impact and of direct income transfer to beneficiaries has been the subject of continuous evaluations over 30 years. The opinion of long time students of these issues is that, at its best, project food aid is good in parts, often severely constrained by lack of complementary finance, poor design and supervision.[24] Our nine country studies tend to confirm this judgment; there is often doubt about the long-term macro-economic impact of project food aid. It must be stressed, however, that in projects oriented towards poor people and poor areas anywhere and anyhow, it is very difficult indeed to reach high levels of efficiency. To our knowledge no systematic and conclusive comparison has been made between the impact of poverty oriented projects financed by non-food aid or by food aid in sectors, regions and countries where food aid is used extensively.

1.4 Policy Environment for Trade, Aid and Development

When this was written, the negotiations in GATT to terminate the so-called Uruguay Round were moving slowly; the question of farm subsidies remaining a road block. The resolution reached in December on this particular issue may greatly affect the future of food aid. As subsidies to farmers in the industrial countries are reduced, as is foreseen in the agreement, this is expected to lead to reduced production in high cost countries, and subsequently reduced

[24] Stevens, C. *Food aid in the developing world: four African case studies*, Croom Helm, London, 1979; Clay, Edward J. Rural public works and food-for-work: a survey, *World Development*, 14 (10-11), 1986; von Braun, J. and others, Labour-intensive Public Works for Food Security. Experience in Africa. *Working Papers on Food Subsidies 6*, IFPRI, Washington DC, 1991.

exports of highly subsidised food from those countries, and therefore to an increase in world market prices of basic food commodities, including cereals.

What effect this will have on developing countries is subject of considerable uncertainty and controversy. As we have seen, the majority of the developing countries are importers of grains. Once the agreed policy are put in place, the direct effect would therefore be to make their import bill higher. However, higher world market prices would lead to increased producer prices for basic foodstuffs in the developing countries, and therefore stimulate farmers to produce more and thus reduce imports. But none of this would work itself out immediately and automatically. Farm gate producer prices are in many countries effectively delinked from world market prices, and such policy interventions are not easily or readily dispensed with. Moreover, in many developing countries, perhaps notably in Sub-Saharan Africa, farm output does not necessarily quickly respond to price incentives, because farmers face a series of constraints such as lack of knowledge due to shortage of agricultural extension services, lack of credit to buy inputs, lack of marketing opportunities due to poor or non-existent roads, and consequently poorly functioning markets.

Many attempts have been made to estimate the effects of a successful completion of the Uruguay Round on developing countries. They give conflicting results. Most of them illustrate the results of two different scenarios: one in which only the OECD countries liberalise the trade in farm products; and one in which also the developing countries do the same. In either case most models show that world market prices of wheat, coarse grains, meat and dairy products will increase up to 25 percent in some areas, and even more for dairy products. This would provide stronger incentives to increased output in developing countries.[25]

These studies have been used as basis for some further assessment of the impact of the GATT Uruguay Round on developing countries.[26] Once more the estimates derived show very modest effects of trade liberalisation, even under the most radical alternatives. Estimates of effects on developing country exports suggest a 0.2 percent increase in export earnings, and the increase in the cost of imports is on the same modest scale. The model used by the US Department of Agriculture, which is included amongst those reviewed in the OECD Development Centre publication, predicts the welfare implications of liberalisation of trade in farm products and concludes that developing countries will suffer a net welfare loss of USD 4.5 billion (or USD 2 per capita) because a net loss of USD 20 billion to consumers will more than offset the gains accruing to farmers.[27] In any case, the outcome from the GATT negotiations has not been to

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[25] Goldin, Ian and Knudsen, Odin, *Agricultural trade liberalization. Implications for developing countries*. OECD and the World Bank, Paris 1990. For a comprehensive review of the results of various models see also *Food for Development in a Market Oriented World*, prepared for The World Food Programme by John Mellor Associates, Inc. September 1992.

[26] Page, Sheila, Davenport, Michael and Hewitt, Adrian, *The GATT Uruguay Round: Effects on Developing Countries*. Overseas Development Institute, London, reprint 1992.

[27] Ronningen, Verson O. and Dixit, Praveen M, Assessing the implications of freer agricultural trade. *Food Policy*, February 1990.

abolish subsidies in industrialised countries completely, and such reductions as are agreed will be implemented over a period of several years. A reform of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Communities is under way. This may already in the short run reduce output of some products, including wheat. As pointed out already, FAO expects cereal stocks to fall in 1994, and even a modest fall in production in some areas of the world may easily lead to an upward pressure on the usually volatile grain prices of a different order of magnitude than those shown by models built on long run price elasticities.

If world prices of some of the most important commodities in the food aid basket were to increase, it would most probably raise the opportunity cost of such aid to the donors. Donors would be likely to review the efficiency of food aid in support of development projects compared to financial aid, not only as regards that part which goes through WFP, but food aid in general. Also the relative efficiency of programme food aid would be questioned.

There are strong arguments for providing the maximum possible amount of emergency aid in cash. This permits food to be purchased either in the stricken country or nearby, and avoids the long lead-time required for the mobilisation and transport of food from donor countries. However, the public in donor nations will often wish to express their solidarity by sending some food from their own countries.

These reflections suggest that the future of food aid as part of the overall aid package to an increasing extent will depend on the particular suitability of food aid compared to other forms for aid. But the volume of food aid will also be determined by the future volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA from DAC countries accounts for at least nine-tenths of such assistance. It has remained practically constant as percentage of the OECD countries' GNP (around one-third of one percent) during the last 15 years, and as the growth of the OECD countries has slowed down or stagnated, so has the increase in ODA in real terms. During the five year period 1985/86 to 1990/91 the annual growth of net ODA disbursements in real terms was only 1.7 percent, or below the population growth in the recipient countries.[28] As virtually all major OECD donors strive to contain the increase in government expenditure, it is quite likely that ODA from OECD countries will not increase at all during the next few years. In particular, the use of food aid for development projects is likely to be increasingly closely scrutinised.

1.5 Resource Availability for Food Aid

We have already pointed out that the actual volume of cereal food aid in recent years has been a good deal higher than the minimum of MT 7.5 million guaranteed by the Food Aid Convention of 1986, and has also exceeded the target of MT 10 million recommended by the World Food Conference in 1974. For non-cereals there are no corresponding donor guarantees. However, food aid is only part of a larger overall aid package, and the volume of food aid is best

[28] All facts in this paragraph are based on *1992 report development cocperation*, op. cit.

determined by efficiency considerations within the framework of the overall commitments to provide aid by the donor countries. Obviously, it would be far better for the developing countries if the DAC donors raised their ODA to the agreed target level of 0.7 percent of GNP (i.e. more than twice the present level) than if they increased the cereal food aid target to MT 10 million or higher! One reason for increasing this specific target, is that it is in fact respected. Also, a specific cereals food aid guarantee assures at least a minimum level of availability of aid for relief, as well as for other activities for which cereals can be utilised effectively. This brings us back to the issue of food aid effectiveness compared to that of financial aid.

Hitherto there has not been any apparent difficulty in supplying grains as food aid, as long as donor countries had the resources to make pledges. Yet, the volume of food aid varies from one year to another, and the most plausible immediate cause of this is price changes, because some donor food aid budgets are fixed in financial and not quantitative terms. Econometric analysis confirms that the price elasticity of supply of cereal food aid is around -0.5, i.e. that a ten percent increase in the world price of wheat would lead to a 5 percent fall in the volume provided as food aid.[29]

Food aid includes also many important non-cereals, notably vegetable oils and fats, dairy products and pulses (including soyabeans and products) which together accounted for at least 85 percent of the volume of non-cereal food aid in recent years.[30] The supply of non-cereals as food aid appears to be much more volatile than the supply of grain, judging by the experience of WFP in recent years when, for example, pledges to supply dairy products have been so low that WFP has been unable to meet its commitments to several countries. This fact suggests that surplus disposal still is an important element behind donors' decisions to supply the different food aid commodities. The supply of specific non-cereals as food aid appears to be so irregular that they might be better excluded as part of the regular resource base of food aid agencies, including the WFP, which for its development projects need assured supplies over several years. Of course, available, appropriate non-cereals will always be welcome for short term emergency operations.

1.6 The Suitability of Food as Development Aid

There is a considerable body of literature and experience available on the advantages and disadvantages of using food as a development project input. After years of reflection and analysis of the value of food aid in support of development, the jury is still out.

Historically food aid started as a means to make good use of available food surpluses. In the case of USA it almost certainly meant a significant addition to what the country otherwise would have provided as aid to developing countries. However, by contrast, for some other countries

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[29] Taylor,D. and Byerlee, D., Food and food security: a cautionary note, *Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics,* 39, 1991

[30] *1993 Food Aid Review,* op cit, page 20.

food aid was and remains only a way in which to get rid of part of some food surpluses by using some of the budget allocation for assistance to developing countries to buy domestic surplus food for delivery to recipients of development aid. To this extent, food aid was and is a form of aid tied to purchases in the donor countries and as such not better, but sometimes possibly worse, than other forms of tied aid. It would be worse if the commodities offered are expensive in relation to their nutritional value, and sometimes not even acceptable by the ultimate consumers of the food.

Food aid is undoubtedly of value to the recipient countries as relief aid, if the "food basket" supplied is suitable, and as programme aid, if the country would have imported the aided food commodities in any case. However, general economic arguments suggest that in both cases it is likely that the recipient country would often have done better if the donors had offered to it the equivalent of their costs of providing the food, in cash to be used for food purchases. Food aid can, of course, be the most cost efficient solution when the donor is the cheapest supplier, or when in the case of emergencies, the recipient country is unable in a timely and efficient manner to procure and distribute the needed commodities itself.

The usefulness of food aid as assistance to development projects is a far more intricate issue. Food is a complex input to development and, as such, requires specialist expertise and organisation to acquire, transport, insure, store and distribute. It can hardly be disputed that financial aid in all instances would be preferable to food aid, because it could always be used to purchase food for use in a project when and if desirable or used conveniently in other ways if these were judged to be of greater benefit. This is so also for projects in which direct feeding is a crucial part, such as provision of meals in schools, hospitals etc., and nutrition oriented projects. Clearly, food provided through food aid can be used in such projects, but it is not obvious that food instead of cash offers the best value for money. Often it may cost donors more to assure and transport the food to the point of arrival than would have been paid if the recipient country had undertaken the import itself. When food reaches the distribution points inside the country, the total cost may very well be much higher than the price of food which can be bought locally. The latter problem is to some extent avoided by selling, monetising, the imported food on arrival in the recipient country, and using the proceeds to buy food locally.

In development projects food is very frequently a cumbersome resource. Food for work is a rational solution when food is the only resource available. It is popular amongst recipients when food is scarce and expensive and the money value of the daily food ration is higher than the ruling market wage. Also, in some cases, women prefer their spouses to be paid in food so that they bring home food to the family. It is widely held that food as aid can be more directly targeted towards the most vulnerable individuals and households. These preferences for food do not in themselves justify that a foreign donor brings food into the country. Suitable solutions could be found on the basis of financial aid from abroad as well. Part of the wages could be paid in locally purchased food, if appropriate. Steps could be taken to increase supply of food into areas where food prices are high because of inefficient marketing and poor infrastructure, and cash wages adjusted to living costs. In such cases large efforts already go into supplying target groups of beneficiaries with food. Further efforts to provide everybody with food at accessible prices would appear to be cost effective and therefore justified.

In addition to the possible cost inefficiency of food aid in food for work development projects, these projects normally suffer from shortage of "non-food items", for material and human support which imply cash expenditure for which there is frequently an inadequate budget. At the same time it must be recognised that this kind of project has two aims: to do development work, and to provide poor people with better nutrition. The feeding element of food aid assisted projects is an all - important objective in itself. That objective might or might not (according to country circumstances) be attainable with financial aid alone.

The pros and cons of food aid can be understood better if we distinguish clearly between food as a *resource* and food as a *tool* emanating from food aid. To the extent that food is *additional*, it is a welcome supplement to the scarce flow of development aid to Third World countries, and the question is only how to use this additional resource in the most efficient manner. If food aid is regarded only as an additional resource, its most ready use is for programme aid (or for relief operations caused by crop failure), provided that the recipient countries would have had to import the commodities in any case. It then represents a flexible and fungible form of resource transfer to the recipient which will strengthen both its balance of payments and its central government budget. The serious argument against programme aid is that it will not necessarily lead to an improved development performance if the recipient government does not use foreign aid efficiently. *Donors* may therefore prefer to target some of their *additional* aid resources better by using such food aid for development projects or relief operations. Also in this case food aid will represent an additional resource to recipient countries even though they may have derived more benefit from an equivalent amount of financial aid.

The situation is entirely different when donor development aid budgets are fixed in amount but may include varying amounts of food aid depending on the availability of domestic surpluses. In this case food aid is to be regarded as tied aid with all the accompanying disadvantages of such arrangements. Another way in which some donors provide food aid is through financial transfers to an intermediary, for example WFP or NGOs, on the condition that it should be used for purchase of food. This condition is an unnecessary constraint on the intermediary agency which might have used the money more efficiently to reach the objectives of aided activities than through the purchase, transport and distribution of food.

The use of food as a *tool* in development projects and also in relief operations should be decided on the basis of the particular *merit of food* as an input in the project or operation. In our case studies we have found examples of projects and operations in which direct delivery of food to the ultimate beneficiaries is either strictly necessary or highly desirable. Food had to be brought to areas in Ethiopia where food marketing was dysfunctional and cash grants to starving people would have been of no avail. Wet feeding of school and preschool children and their mothers is claimed to serve the targeted beneficiaries better than cash contributions could have done. In periods of high inflation food instead of, or as supplement to, cash wages has not only benefitted the workers but has made them perform better and thus contribute to the development of their countries, as examples from Ghana and Vietnam show. Food provided as *additional* aid from countries, can be particularly beneficial in such cases. But food can also be bought with money provided to agencies which are entrusted to use food as a tool whenever appropriate. Even as relief aid, direct deliveries of food may be unnecessary or directly harmful. When a catastrophe

hits parts of a country with well functioning food markets, hundreds of thousands of people may loose crops, livestock and other assets, and they will need money to buy food from markets which normally will be able to supply food at normal prices shortly after the catastrophe. Similarly, such an emergency will lead to an economic loss for the country which it hits, and the principal purpose of relief aid from the international community is to compensate the country for part of the losses it has sustained. This can also been done in cash.

Food aid has therefore two advantages: to some extent it is additional to other development aid; and in a number of cases it can be used as a tool, provided that it is the right kind of food, arrives at the right moment, and reaches the intended beneficiaries. But food as a tool can also be provided through financial aid and often at lower cost and better adapted to its final uses.

When food is used as a *tool in development projects*, it is not food provided as aid which is the most important resource, but the people who design and implement such projects. Bilateral agencies and programme officers who deal with food aided projects, and equally the many NGOs which are active in this field, and, of course, also the World Food Programme, have acquired valuable experience in project activities which include feeding of poor and vulnerable people as a major objective. This experience could possibly be put to even better use if they were to handle projects for which also financial aid was available. We recommend that donor countries without surpluses, where food aid is taken from the development budget and does not constitute an additional resource, should consider providing their contributions in cash, whether through WFP or through another agency, concentrating on ways and means to improve the short-term food security of the intended beneficiaries and at the same time achieving long term development effects.

1.7 Conclusions

World food output has increased greatly in the last forty years, also in many, but far from all, developing countries, and hundreds of millions of people remain seriously under-nourished. Given the extent of under-nutrition in many developing countries and the extent of food insecurity at household levels, the case for food aid remains strong. The need for food aid continues to be large. Historically, such aid emerged as an outlet for surplus commodities and was additional to other forms of assistance and not an alternative to them. This is still the case for some donor countries but not for all.

Ninety percent of food aid consists of cereals and it is used to provide programme aid (about half the total), project aid and relief supplies. Although in recent years there has been a sharp increase in food aid for relief, it does not appear that the availability of other forms of food aid has declined. But the share of total food aid in ODA has fallen and the use of food aid for development projects will increasingly be closely scrutinised.

Cereal food aid is small in relation to world production and trade and to the food needs of developing countries as a whole, but it is of greater significance for individual countries. There do not appear to be strong arguments to suggest that the flow of aid has had marked adverse

effects on the domestic agriculture of developing countries but the effects of food aid on commercial trade in grains are potentially significant. The macroeconomic effects of food aid are not different in principle from those of other forms of aid.

Studies of the likely effect of success in the GATT Uruguay Round have produced varying conclusions, but some increase in food prices may be expected with possibly adverse welfare effects on developing countries as a whole. An increase in food prices would have the effect of increasing the opportunity cost of food aid and possibly reducing its flow.

The conclusion of studies of the effects of project food aid on long-term development is that, at its best, it covers only part of its more ambitious objectives; this is also confirmed in our country studies. At its worst, it can be a very expensive delivery system with inherent institutional and community problems.

The pros and cons of food aid can be understood better if we distinguish clearly between food as a *resource* and food as a *tool*. The advantages and disadvantages of using food as a development *tool* are highly debatable. The provision of food is of undoubted value in relief operations though even here there may be instances when the provision of money would be more beneficial than the provision of food. Thus, for example, effective marketing of food can sometimes speedily be re-established after a catastrophe. In the form of programme aid, food provides support to the balance of payments and increases the resources available to government in a similar way to the provision of monetary aid, but it may also act as a disincentive to agricultural production and disturb food markets. The usefulness of food aid as an input to development projects depends on specialist expertise and organisation to acquire, transport, insure, store and distribute it. It can, however, be advantageous in conditions of marked inflation, limited geographical availability of food and as a means of payment less likely than money to be diverted to less basic needs than improving nutrition. The use of food as a *tool* in development projects should be decided on the basis of the particular *merit of food* as an input in the project or operation. In short, as an additional resource for development food can be utilised effectively, but in many instances, the provision of financial resources is preferable because greater flexibility in the use of resources within development projects is conferred.

Food aid may have a particular appeal to the public opinion because it is looked upon as a means to improve the living conditions of hungry people. This objective can be reached by any form of aid which ultimately increases the food entitlements of food insecure people and households.

2.0 Mandate, Governance and Working Relationships

2.1 The Mandate

In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Conference approved the formation of a World Food Programme as a joint subsidiary body, on a three-year experimental basis, to use surplus food for both development and emergency purposes. The rationale was that "the effective utilization of available surplus foodstuffs ... provide(d) an important transitional means of relieving the hunger and malnutrition of food-deficient peoples, particularly in the less developed countries, and for assisting these countries in their economic development."[31] In 1965, the Programme was put on a regular footing and its life extended "for as long as multilateral food aid is found feasible and desirable" under the governance of its Intergovernmental Committee (IGC). In 1974 the World Food Conference called for the reconstitution of the IGC into a Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA), "so as to enable it to help evolve and coordinate short-term and longer-term food aid policies recommended by the Conference, in addition to discharging its existing functions". Subsequently enacted by the General Assembly and the FAO Conference, this added a food aid policy development and coordination role to the operational functions of the Programme.

In 1976, again following a recommendation of the World Food Conference, an International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) was established "as an emergency reserve to strengthen the capacity of the Programme to deal with crisis situations in developing countries". It was to be sourced through donors earmarking resources above and beyond the regular programme pledge. In 1978, provision was made for operating the IEFR as a continuing reserve replenished annually on the recommendation of the CFA and placed at the disposal of WFP.

On the basis of experience and changing global political and economic conditions the mandate of the WFP was clarified and amplified, and its operational modes streamlined in major reviews in 1978 and, more recently, in 1991. The upshot was the current (1992) set of General Regulations, which set out comprehensively the principles and rules relating to the sourcing of the Programme, its fields of activity, management structure and finance, and its operational procedures.

Under the current General Regulation 4, the Programme is to assist, on request, in

"a) implementing projects, using food as an aid to economic and social development, particularly when related to feeding and improving the nutritional condition of the most vulnerable and neediest groups, increasing agricultural production and productivity, fostering labour-intensive projects and promoting rural employment and welfare, and

[31] UNGA Resolution 1714 (xvi), 19 December 1961; FAO Conference Resolution 1/61.

human resources development; and such other projects ... as may be approved (by the CFA). Special emphasis should be given to projects in the neediest countries;

"b) meeting emergency food needs; and the logistic support thereof; and

"c) promoting world food security in accordance with the recommendations made to it by the United Nations and the FAO".

An important feature of these provisions is the sharpening of the focus of WFP *development activity*, as to both fields of concentration and modalities. The emphasis is on the neediest countries and, within them, on projects aimed at improving the condition of the most vulnerable and neediest groups. In order to ensure appropriate targeting, the Regulations indicate a preference for types of activities which, through the enhancement of agricultural production and human resources development, and emphasis on labour-intensity and rural employment, are calculated to reach just those groups in those countries.

In relation to *emergency relief*, provision is made for securing food and the means for managing it and getting it to the areas of need (regs. 4(b) and 5). Notable by its absence is any explicit reference to one of the major current preoccupations of the WFP, namely, protracted refugee operations (PROs), which are neither emergency operations, in the usual sense of the term, nor development projects. Though this omission has become increasingly anomalous, it is the case that the CFA has had little difficulty in accommodating PROs, largely because of the recourse to special pledges for support for such operations. On the question of emergency relief generally, an issue of increasing significance is the relationship between economic and social development in the "neediest countries" and vulnerability of the "neediest groups" to certain kinds of food emergency. Serious doubt has been cast upon the usefulness of too rigid a distinction between emergency and development operations. There is thus increasing concern to address the "emergency/development interface" in the design and implementation of both emergency and development projects. This is taken up again later in this report.

The role of the Programme, specifically the CFA, now includes the evolution and coordination of food aid policies. However, there does not seem to be much spelling out of what could be considered guiding principles of this aspect of WFP's work. Though there is evidence of considerable activity in this connection, there does not appear to be much to show for it.

At a different level, important policy considerations are implicit in some of the operational guidelines. Thus, the injunction on the CFA to ensure that its programmes do not disrupt commercial markets, domestic and international (regs. 15, 26-28), reflects not only the origin of the WFP in the disposal of surplus food but also the very real current concern with the effect of food aid on markets. Again, a concern to promote developing country agricultural production and trade is reflected in the encouragement of triangular trade and local purchase of commodities. Similarly important policies underlie the requirement that development projects fit into recipient country development plans, and that project implementation be primarily a matter for the recipient governments (regs. 20(b) & 24). At the same time, the obligation of WFP to both donors and intended beneficiaries is sought to be safeguarded by the requirement

that WFP reserve the right to "observe all phases of project operation ...; provide for audits ...; and ... suspend or withdraw assistance in case of serious non-compliance". Other policies catered for in the operational provisions include the notion of WFP as a lean operational body drawing heavily on the technical and administrative support of agencies in the UN family (reg. 19); and the control imposed on the use of the proceeds of monetised supplies (reg. 24(c)).

The Programme thus responds to a dual mandate: first, in relation to the discussion, formulation and coordination of appropriate national and international policies regarding food aid; and secondly, an operational mandate to carry out emergency operations, and to design and implement development projects. While it is neither easy nor always useful to insist on the distinction between the two categories of mandate, the distinction has some value, to the extent that the capacities required of a policy-making body are not necessarily those required of a technical/operational body, an issue addressed later.

In addition to serving as a channel for the use of food in development and emergency activities, the food logistics expertise of the Programme may be made available to the international food aid community on a bilateral basis. Provision of such bilateral services is to be on the basis of reimbursement according to criteria and procedures approved by the CFA, and agreed with donors and agencies using such services.

The Programme is enjoined to consult and cooperate with other United Nations agencies and with FAO in particular and to associate its programmes with technical and other assistance secured from them. The ramifications of this requirement are far-reaching and have recently been reinforced and perhaps overtaken by the recent requirement of the United Nations General Assembly that the UN system adopt a programming approach in the management of its affairs.

The Programme is authorised to supervise and assist in the execution of projects but the primary responsibility for this has to be placed on recipient governments. It is not confined to working with individual governments for under regulation 4 it is permitted to implement regional development projects although it does not appear to have taken advantage of this.

In summary, it may be noted that the mandate of the WFP has evolved over the years, principally by extension to accommodate changing conditions, rather than by contraction or radical changes of direction. While it is possible to point to redundant hold-overs from earlier times as well as minor gaps in present coverage, the firm impression gained in both the desk studies and the field missions, and confirmed by comments of senior WFP management, is that the broad formulation of the General Regulations allows the Programme the flexibility needed to discharge its mandate. As the global food supply and trading situation unfolds, as the food aid policies of the major food aid donors change, and as perceptions for appropriate development modes evolve, the mandate of the WFP and its operational mode will call for further consideration. But it is our view that any major mandate review would be premature at this time; that should follow rather than precede membership-wide discussion and resolution of issues of purpose, focus and role of the Programme.

2.2 Role and Functioning of CFA

The CFA is responsible, under the General Regulations, for providing "intergovernmental supervision and direction of the Programme". The performance of WFP as an institution cannot be judged without looking at the role and functioning of the Committee. This is the main subject of the present section which is based on a review of CFA documentation, on the findings of the country studies and on informal discussions with WFP staff and government officials.

As mentioned above, the CFA was created through the reconstitution of the former Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme (IGC), as recommended by the World Food Conference in 1974, so that the new body could exercise, alongside the supervision of WFP, a broader responsibility in the evolution and coordination of food aid policies in general. The way in which the Committee carries out this policy function is also briefly examined.

The members of the CFA are elected half by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and half by the FAO Council. The membership has recently been raised from 30 states to 42 (of which 27 should be developing and 15 should be developed countries).

During the first half of 1993 there were extended negotiations in the United Nations on a draft resolution that, if adopted, would certainly have a major effect on the CFA. Based on the ideas of the Nordic project for reform of the United Nations it calls for the governing bodies of the UNDP, UNICEF and - subject to negotiations between the United Nations and FAO - also WFP to become Executive Boards subject to the authority of ECOSOC. Negotiations on the draft text are suspended at the time of writing. In view of the many uncertainties, we have not tried to grapple with all the implications of such a development.

As the housekeeping body of WFP, the main responsibilities of the CFA are defined in the General Regulations. They include the approval of projects (for which a specified authority - currently USD 3 million - may be delegated to the Executive Director), the approval of the administrative budget, and the review of all activities carried out by the Programme.

Since December 1988 projects are examined in a Sub-Committee on Projects (SCP), which normally meets just ahead of the CFA itself. Previously this was done in a Committee-of-the-Whole, which met during the session. The SCP is designed as a more technical body. Supplementary information on projects that are being considered can be supplied by a technician from the country concerned, who attends at WFP expense. The report of the SCP is normally approved by the CFA without reopening the discussion of individual projects. For practical purposes, the Committee has delegated its approval responsibility to the SCP.

Since the country studies of the Joint Evaluation have found a number of weaknesses in development projects, we have looked into the question of whether the approval process has any fundamental flaws. We believe that the risk of weak projects could be reduced in future not so much by changes in the approval process itself, but rather by changes in the way in which the CFA approaches the Programme's development role.

It appears that the CFA - and management - have been unduly reluctant to get into sector-based discussions of food as a tool for development. There have been two sectoral evaluations of WFP projects (for dairy development and school feeding) but no attempt to give WFP's development work a clear focus on sectors or types of activity where food aid has a clear advantage. We welcome the current evaluation of types of project in which WFP performs well. Nor have the CFA and management gone nearly far enough, in our view, in attempting to focus WFP's work at country level. There has been a general fixation on the project cycle, with little serious attempt to develop a strategy for ensuring that the projects within the cycle are those that will produce maximum impact with WFP's limited resources in the countries concerned. We welcome the intention of submitting Country Strategy Outlines to the SCP.

More broadly, we support the idea of moving towards a programme as distinct from a project approach. Speculating on what this might mean in practice, WFP suggests that "the CFA may be invited, for example, to approve multiyear programmes of assistance to recipient countries rather than individual projects; decision-making on the allocation and use of WFP resources may shift between the CFA and the Secretariat, between headquarters and the country offices, or otherwise at the country level. The relationship between the CFA and the governing bodies of other agencies may also be affected" (United Nations document E/1993/Misc. 2, Chapter II.F). The subject is pursued elsewhere in our report.

A shift from projects to programmes, in conjunction with a more sector-and-country approach, could enable the SCP (with suitably expanded terms of reference) to have a greater impact than is possible at present. It would also permit the greater delegation of authority to the Executive Director for project approval, which we feel is needed.

At the same time, we would advocate a more active role by the CFA in monitoring the quality of WFP programmes at country level. There are various ways in which this could be done. One of the simplest would be a regular External Review (say every five years) along the lines of the present evaluation but conducted under the auspices of the CFA. This is a technique employed in other international organizations, notably the member institutions of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. Such a Review might cover the activities of the Programme in selected countries or sectors. The primary aim would not be to uncover weaknesses, but to make an objective assessment of performance on the ground. Favourable judgments would help to maintain the confidence in WFP of all parties, and particularly of donors.

We note that no project proposal before the SCP has been rejected in the roughly five years of its existence. Turning down projects is not necessarily an indication of merit in a governing body. Nevertheless, insofar as the SCP's record results from solidarity among developing countries in reacting to criticisms of project proposals there may well be a danger of donor disenchantment leading to a loss of support. It is only fair to add that developing countries, for their part, are frustrated by donor solidarity on such questions as a new target level for total food aid, the budget level, or a possible increase in the WFP pledging target.

Such political tensions are inherent in any multilateral governing body, and we do not believe they are any more intense in the CFA than elsewhere.

A politically delicate issue is country eligibility for WFP development food aid. In some of our country studies questions have been raised regarding the justification for continuing WFP food aid to the countries concerned, and it would be preferable for these to be answered through the adoption of objective criteria rather than through *ad hoc* decisions on particular countries. We believe the overall thrust should be to reduce the number of countries in which the Programme operates. We revert to this as an option for the future of WFP in Chapter 8.

So far as relief is concerned, the WFP management has felt obliged to handle the current emergencies in former Yugoslavia and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union exclusively through the use of extra-budgetary resources outside existing pledges to the IEFR, in order to avoid any charge of misusing resources intended for developing countries. Here again, we believe that the ambiguity inherent in the present position should be cleared up.

The findings of our evaluation suggest the need for somewhat more restrictive criteria for development aid that would permit a narrower focus on fewer countries, and somewhat more liberal criteria for relief that would formally allow the Programme to undertake relief in a wider range of situations.

The net losers in such a shift would be the middle-income countries. Their situation would need to be examined in a much broader development context, within which a decline in future food aid could be taken into account when targets are fixed for other forms of aid. This could not be done by the CFA itself, but would be possible through a CFA initiative to ECOSOC. The process would become easier if the resolution under negotiation in the United Nations and mentioned above were to be adopted in something like the form being discussed at mid-1993.

The process leading up to budget approval by the CFA is elaborate, but no more so than in other United Nations organizations and programmes. There are two rounds of discussion, each involving three separate bodies - the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the FAO Finance Committee and the CFA itself. The first round is based on a strategic financial plan, the second on the proposed budget.

The ACABQ looks at all budgets of UN bodies in the so-called common system, and its role must clearly continue. The importance of the FAO Finance Committee was more obvious in earlier years when the Programme was administered under the FAO Financial Regulations. Now WFP has its own Financial Regulations, and it is open to question whether it is more sensible to continue the present arrangement or to establish an internal Finance Committee of the CFA. This might be discussed informally by WFP management with CFA members and with FAO. If there is a general feeling that a change should be seriously considered, the question could be taken up formally by the CFA in line with an earlier decision to review the role of the FAO Finance Committee after the new arrangements have been in place for two years. Change would require an amendment of the General Regulations, which in turn would need approval by ECOSOC and the FAO Council. However, we see no point in starting down this road unless

it is reasonably clear that change is important and that it can be made without generating major political frictions.

Relations with the Secretariat are an important factor in the functioning of any multilateral governing body. A lack of confidence in the Secretariat on the part of one or more major groups of countries can induce confusion or even paralysis. On the other hand excessive confidence in the Secretariat can lead to complacency and result in the governing body failing to exercise proper control. If there have been difficulties in recent years they have been more of the second type. We have been particularly disturbed by the massive over-commitment of development resources in the second half of the eighties, for which both CFA and management must share responsibility. We have little information on the current state of relations, which sees a mainly new management team in place, but our impression is that both sides are working together constructively.

Regarding the CFA's role as a general policy body for food aid, we find that policy issues have been regularly tackled but little has been achieved. In May-June 1993, for instance, the Committee examined a group of inter-related issues that included the appropriate level of food aid for the nineties, the implications of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in GATT, and the principles governing programme food aid. The issues were important, but no significant results were reached. It is symptomatic that the section of the CFA's report on food aid policy issues (12 paragraphs in a document containing 142) is dwarfed by the reporting on WFP affairs.

Of course, issues relating to international food aid policies are not of equal importance every year, and only from time to time will they require major attention from policy-makers. Nevertheless the CFA does not impress as a body for handling policy issues if and when they become high on the international agenda. Perhaps one reason is that delegations are composed essentially of officials with responsibility for WFP matters. This tends to induce a parochial approach to broader policy matters. If at any time there is need for high-level discussions and negotiations on international food aid policies, then special measures will need to be taken to beef up the CFA. We suggest that the debate on policy questions (including the reporting) be much more clearly separated from WFP housekeeping matters, and that countries be encouraged to send special representatives chosen according to the precise nature of the issues to be discussed.

2.3 Working Relationships

The obligations laid upon WFP by its General Regulations and the way in which it conducts its activities set the scene for its working relationships with other bodies: the countries with which it works, the UN agencies with which it cooperates and NGOs which frequently act as implementing agents for the projects it supports.

2.3.1 Relations with Recipient Governments

To initiate relations, the WFP and a recipient country government sign a Basic Agreement which constitutes the legal framework within which subsequent joint-activities are conducted. In general terms, this Agreement deals with the process by which WFP assistance is to be sought; the respective obligations of WFP and the government in relation to such matters as the delivery, handling and storage of commodities; the implementation and monitoring of projects and operations; the privileges and immunities to be accorded WFP agents; and the settlement of disputes. The terms of the Basic Agreement are reproduced and amplified in a Plan of Operations in the case of development projects, or Letter of Understanding in the case of emergency operations, signed between WFP and a recipient country government in the process of undertaking particular projects or operations.[32]

The Plan of Operations which, as its title implies, is the operational document, first sets out the background, objectives and terms of the project, then makes detailed provisions spelling out the obligations set out in general terms in the Basic Agreement. The broad structure of relations established by the two documents is that, for the purpose of executing the project, the WFP undertakes to supply a list of commodities by type and quantity over a given period, and to meet a stated portion of the internal transport, storage and handling costs; in the case of least developed countries up to all such costs. It is made explicit that WFP's obligation is contingent on the availability of the stated types and quantities of the commodities. In addition to the supply of basic food commodities, WFP undertakes to "attempt to supply or arrange for the supply" of non-food resources, and to provide a resident officer to assist and advise the implementing government agency or agencies on project implementation and food management.

Upon the landing of WFP commodities at the port of entry or, in the case of land-locked countries, at agreed entry points, title and responsibility pass to the recipient government, provided that WFP is entitled to require restitution for the cost of any commodities not used for the indicated purpose. With the transfer of title to government goes full responsibility for handling, storage, and ultimately distribution in the manner and for the purposes agreed, together with the obligation to report at stated intervals and account to WFP for the use of its resources. Any commodities remaining unused at the end of the project are to be disposed of by agreement between WFP and the government.

To meet its obligations, the recipient government undertakes to designate an agency to liaise with WFP, in addition to an agency or agencies to be responsible for project coordination and implementation. The principal obligation of government, however, is to take "primary responsibility for execution of development projects and emergency operations ... (and) provide all personnel, premises, supplies, equipment, services, and transportation and defray all expenditures necessary for implementation of any development project or emergency operation." Thus, upon delivery of the commodities to government or its designated agent, WFP's *direct*

[32] As the relevant provisions of Plans of Operations and Letters of Understanding are in substance the same, references to the former are intended to include the latter, unless otherwise stated.

responsibility for the commodities and their handling, and for project implementation ceases. Thereafter, except to the extent that it has agreed to cover ITSH charges, its *formal* responsibility remains at the level of advice and assistance, and, in cooperation with the government, appraisal and evaluation.

Either party may suspend the performance of its obligations by written notification to the other, or terminate the project altogether by giving six months' written notice, in the event of failure by that other party to fulfil any of its obligations under the Plan of Operations. Though available to both parties, this provision gives to WFP a potentially powerful sanction for ensuring that recipient governments adhere to the terms of the agreement. Yet, the enforcement of such a sanction is conditioned less by legal rights than by the practical considerations of state sovereignty and UN/Member State relations.

This sketch of the formal relations between the WFP and recipient governments raises a number of important issues, some of which became evident in the course of our country studies.

Policy issues: The development of good working relationships with recipient governments requires a clear understanding on how the Programme's development aid can play a strategic role in support of government policies and priorities. This will require a policy dialogue with which the Programme should seek to associate other food aid donors and funding agencies. The outputs should include a Country Strategy Outline, greatly improved over those so far produced and clearly linked to the Country Strategy Notes or other document setting forth the overall approach of the United Nations system in the country concerned.

Project design: The projects undertaken by WFP are intended to be fully compatible with the policies of the national government. In practice little formal machinery seems to exist for ensuring this. The initiative for ensuring compatibility often hinges on informal relationships built up between WFP country office staff and government departments with which they have developed close relationships over the years. One consequence of this is that it cannot be ensured that WFP projects are indeed the best that could be devised to meet the objectives of the country in question.

Project design starts with the Project Idea, which may be prepared either by the Government or the Country Office. In practice it appears that the contribution of the government at this stage is only rarely substantial. Arrangements should be made for Governments to be more closely and systematically associated with the development of Project Ideas. The sequence followed in developing the idea into a fully fledged project, following the project cycle laid down by the CFA, is undertaken by WFP staff and is intended to be carried out in consultation with the host government. It is evident from the country studies that, as the project preparation passes through this process, it may be changed significantly in Rome without adequate consultation either with the Country Office or the government. Apart from leading to strained relationships between the Country Office and the host Government, lack of consultation can result in project designs ill-adapted to the particular conditions of the country and presenting unnecessary difficulties in implementation.

Implementation arrangements: A consequence of assigning responsibility for implementation of projects to host governments is that project execution depends to a marked degree on the administrative and executive capacity of the government concerned. Instances arise when the government ministry or department with which WFP is committed to work is inappropriate or overwhelmed with other and prior responsibilities. WFP's recourse against failure to implement projects satisfactorily is limited. Representation to government departments about implementation failures cannot be relied upon to result in improved performance. Discussions can be long drawn out and ineffectual. For the most part remedies may not lie in WFP's hands, but in some cases where projects have been held up because of inadequacies in government financial provision or lack of complementary inputs it may be possible for WFP to come to the rescue by seeking additional assistance from elsewhere.

One way of minimising the risk of failure in project implementation is to build close relationships with the implementing agencies to ensure that WFP projects receive the necessary attention, and to include arrangements for training in the project if shortage of trained staff is likely to be a bottleneck. In the worst case, the Programme should be ready to select a new working partner within the government machinery. Sometimes the best solution may be to make an alliance with stronger partners, as WFP has done, for example, when it has furnished resources to World Bank or IFAD projects.

Conditional WFP obligations: The Plan of Operations for projects agreed between WFP and the government concerned specifies the foods that WFP undertakes to supply, subject always to the availability of food globally and in relation to individual commodities. Conditionality is necessary for WFP cannot be sure that it will dispose of the quantities needed for the life of the project under current procedures for pledging, nor can it be certain about its capacity to deliver particular foods which may be even more uncertain than the total value of resources it will dispose of. Thus the specification of the types and quantities of commodities to be made available by WFP for particular projects has to be regarded as indicative. This is made very clear in the Plan of Operations. Further complications occur when the foods supplied, even to specification, prove to be unsuitable because of type, condition or recipient tastes. The country studies provide instances where food supplies were not well matched to the dietary pattern of beneficiaries, illustrating the difficulty of micro-programming of food supplies.

In practice difficulties in the supply of food can be mitigated in various ways. Food may be swapped in the country concerned, wheat for rice for example, or exchanged in third countries, as is described later. If it cannot be made available in these ways it may also be purchased as a measure of last resort, using WFP's cash resources. If, faced with *force majeure*, WFP is unable to supply food because of global shortage, other arrangements have to be made: borrowing, slowing down implementation and in the longer term avoiding new commitments. Clearly inability to provide food in the required quantities and at the agreed time places some strain on WFP's relationships with recipient countries.

As a general rule ownership of commodities supplied to countries passes to the government on delivery of the food. Thereafter, WFP's capacity to intervene in food management is limited. Food aid may on occasion be diverted to purposes not foreseen in the original agreement. It

may also happen that arrangements for delivery of food to projects will be interrupted or fail for administrative or financial reasons.

As a safeguard against such events and to provide the information needed to deal with them, the provisions made in the Plan of Operations for accounting and monitoring of food movements are of the first importance. If information is available, WFP is in the position of being able to make representations to the responsible government departments and suggest remedial action. In the event that the commodities are not used as agreed, WFP may require that they should be returned or cash paid in compensation. Projects can also be suspended in such cases but it is understood that this is done only rarely.

Financial relations: One consequence of the transfer of the ownership of food to the government of the country concerned on delivery is that the government is responsible for carrying out any monetization that has been agreed upon. It is a not uncommon experience that the money raised by this may be slow to be credited to the projects that it is intended to finance. It also may be the case that the government may be slow to provide the financial resources that it is required to make available for the execution of projects. There is very little that WFP can do about this short of finding alternative sources of finance from donors.

2.3.2 Relations with the UN system

WFP is required by its General Regulations to cooperate with other UN agencies. Existing cooperation between WFP and other United Nations Agencies is significant: in a survey of 266 on-going projects at the beginning of 1992, it appeared that 108 projects involved other agencies to some extent. This cooperation may be extended and assume a more integrated form in the future, going far beyond present arrangements, if UN resolutions to those ends are fully implemented.

WFP's relationship with FAO is of particular significance. FAO plays a role in the governance of WFP as discussed above. It provides a range of administrative support services, notably in the fields of documentation, personnel and finance. It is consulted in relation to the formulation of development projects and is expected to assess the compatibility of projects with a country's priorities in the agriculture sector. It also plays a major role in the assessment of emergency needs. Probably its most important role in relation to WFP's development projects is as a provider of technical support. FAO provides more than half the technical support for project appraisals and evaluations; in 1991, 108 of the 177 UN experts contracted by WFP came from FAO. The general relationship with FAO has been acutely strained in the past, but most problems - particularly in the administrative field - were resolved, and new arrangements were established, through revisions in the WFP General Regulations which came into effect on 1 January 1992.

WFP collaborates with the World Bank in a number of initiatives fully described in the joint study *Food Aid in Africa*. The relationship between WFP and the World Bank has not always proved satisfactory, and both parties appear to recognise that there is inadequate integration of food aid and financial aid in development.

WFP has formal arrangements for obtaining technical support for development projects from FAO, the United Nations, ILO, WHO and UNESCO. In later chapters of this report we suggest that the time has come to reconsider the ways in which technical expertise is mobilised for projects. The Programme has a close relationship with UNDP, the Resident Representative acting as the Representative of WFP in each recipient country. WFP field staff form part of his office.

Cooperation with UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and IFAD is formalised through the Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP) which promotes joint policy development and operational planning. The chairmanship of the group rotates annually. Priority is given to assisting low income food deficit countries. Its focus has been on critically affected groups such as women and children, the rural poor and the under-nourished. Of the five agencies WFP has contributed most resources to joint activities. The Group operates through a pyramid structure. "High level" meetings determine policy; the General Meetings translate policy into guidelines; Sub-groups make these guidelines more operational, aiming at harmonisation and synchronisation.

For assistance to refugees, WFP entered into a Global Agreement with UNHCR which took effect from January 1992. This entailed a progressive expansion of WFP's responsibilities in mobilising and delivering food for refugee operations during the 1992-93 period. UNHCR was to be responsible for the distribution of all food commodities to refugees and for monitoring their nutritional status. Guidelines have been jointly developed for food needs assessment and for calculating food rations for refugees, though some improvements are still needed.

2.3.3 Relationships with NGOs

WFP has links with approximately 270 NGOs, of which more than 100 are international. Cooperation with NGOs can arise in two ways. The host government and WFP can mutually agree to employ NGOs as executing agents for WFP supported projects; and under guidelines prepared for delegation of authority to initiate small-scale development activities and emergency responses to NGOs by WFP in 1989, Directors of Operations and Area Directors can allocate up to 5 percent of the resources WFP allocates to any project for support to local NGO projects that have objectives and beneficiary groups similar to WFP assisted projects, with an upper limit of USD 200,000. In practice it does not appear that much use has been made of this opportunity, largely because implementation can be cumbersome, requiring a change in the Plan of Operations and the cooperation of various government ministries, UNDP and the NGOs themselves.

The participation of NGOs in emergency operations is particularly important. In most cases, a clear division of labour emerges with WFP concentrating on moving the food to the country where it is needed and NGOs normally being responsible for internal transport and storage of the food and its distribution. Typical instances arise in the operations of Save the Children in the Sudan and CARE and ICRC in the case of Somalia.

The use of NGOs in development projects can also be of considerable value. In implementation, the choice here is often between using government departments or - with government

concurrence - NGOs. In some cases government departments have a clear advantage and NGOs are not considered as implementing agencies. This can be the case when WFP is providing food to pay workers engaged on a project which the government is implementing itself. In other cases, government departments may be quite unsuited to execute the type of projects that WFP is supporting or may not dispose of the staff needed to do so. Many of WFP's projects are designed to reach very large numbers of people and can be widely scattered geographically. Some of the NGOs operating in developing countries have the personnel and capacity to reach large and dispersed populations but frequently there may be advantage in employing more than one NGO in large projects.

The country studies reveal varying degrees of cooperation with NGOs in the field. In Morocco and Bolivia, government was reluctant to consider the involvement of NGOs preferring to keep matters in its own hands and in Guatemala NGOs were not used. In Pakistan, while NGOs were concerned with refugee operations they were not involved in development activities, although NGOs in that country have acted independently and effectively in areas of concern to WFP. In Ghana it was felt that there was too little involvement of NGOs in the development and implementation of projects, but in Ethiopia cooperation with NGOs in technical matters was effective. In Vietnam, where grass roots relationships are well established, NGOs had been involved in the preparation of one development project and had been drawn into health and nutrition projects. Very effective cooperation was noted in the case of Malawi and in Bangladesh, where lack of government support for further involvement of NGOs was restricting the extension of training opportunities.

While the general policy of WFP is clearly in favour of working with NGOs whenever this is beneficial and compatible with government attitudes, the development of relations with NGOs appears to be left mainly to the country offices. Headquarters have a staff member with part-time responsibility for NGO matters whose main function appears to be that of preparing an information base of NGOs used by WFP. It appears that about 60 percent of the NGOs with which WFP country offices work are local NGOs. The survey of their activities shows a wide range of functions with collaboration in such matters as emergency support, project management and logistics. WFP does not seem to have accorded any special status to NGOs as some other UN organisations have done. The World Bank, for example, has established a consultative committee with NGOs. In the case of WFP there may be no need for such formal relationships as arrangements in the field for cooperation with NGOs seem to work quite well when governments are favourable to them.

2.4 Conclusions

We noted that the mandate of the WFP has evolved over the years by extension to accommodate changing conditions, rather than by contraction or radical changes of direction. The broad formulation of the General Regulations provides the Programme the flexibility needed to effectively discharge its mandate. As conditions and perceptions change and evolve, the mandate of the WFP and its operational mode will call for further consideration. But it is our view that any major mandate review would be premature at this time; that should follow rather than

precede membership -wide discussion and resolution of issues of purpose, focus and role of the Programme.

Changes which might be required, would in particular relate to the relationship between relief and development, which may necessitate a more focused and well defined role of the PROs. As regards administrative matters the continued role of FAO Finance Committee in the adoption of the WFP budget might be reviewed.

The role and functioning of CFA will most certainly change over the next few years. As the regards its housekeeping function, we have argued in favour of an emphasis on country programming instead of the present task of the Committee of approving individual projects. This will not only influence the way in which the CFA handles this part of its function, but should also permit a significant broadening of the authority of the Executive Director to approve projects.

Regarding the CFA's role as a general policy body for food aid, we note that policy issues have been regularly tackled but little has been achieved. Issues relating to international food aid policies are not of equal importance every year, and only from time to time will policy-makers be required to give these matters major and sustained attention. Nevertheless, from the record, the CFA does not impress as a body for handling policy issues. We suggest that the debate on policy questions (including the reporting) be much more clearly separated from WFP housekeeping matters, and that countries be encouraged to send special representatives chosen according to the precise nature of the issues to be discussed.

The relations of the Programme with Recipient Governments cover such widely different matters as policy issues, project design, implementation arrangements, conditional WFP obligations and financial relations. In various parts of this evaluation we recommend improvements in these relationships; these can be effected within the framework of the existing mandate, regulations and agreements.

In the case of WFP relationship with the United Nations and its agencies, other multilateral and bilateral donor agencies and the NGOs, there is a need for examining existing arrangements with a view to facilitate and strengthen the interaction in matters of food policy and in the design and implementation of both relief operations and development projects.

3.0 WFP Resources

3.1 Types of Resource

The General Regulations of the Programme specify that contributions may take the forms of "appropriate commodities, acceptable services (including transport and other services) and cash". The Programme currently uses only two categories for reporting: commodities and cash. Transport and other services are covered by the cash component.

Advance pledges in commodities carry varying degrees of restriction as to the type of food that can be made available to the Programme. Most large donors make at least some broad specification, such as "cereals" or "dairy products". Countries with a narrow range of products available will often specify the exact commodity they are [illegible] hard wheat.

Pledges of commodities may be made in either volume or value terms. They are most often made in terms of value in the national currency of the contributor. In this case, the General Regulations specify that commodities are valued by WFP at the time of shipment at current world market prices, or at donor's invoice price, or at the Food Aid Convention price; donor's invoice is the formula generally used.

Commodities pledged to WFP are held by the donor, but usually in the form of a budget line rather than in a physical stock. When they are called forward by the Programme, the donor has to procure them from the market and carry them to the point of export. There they are taken in charge by WFP, which arranges the external shipping.

Most commodities made available to the Programme for emergency operations are not pledged in advance, but are provided in answer to specific appeals.

Cash may also be pledged subject to a variety of conditions. For a start, it is generally limited to one of the resource windows analyzed in the next section. Within a given resource window, its use may be further restricted.

WFP's problems with cash are dealt with in the next section under "Regular resources", and in a later section on the funding of the administrative budget.

3.2 Resource Windows

The Programme currently has a series of "windows" through which resources can be pledged, or income earned. The nature of the windows is examined in this section.

a) *Regular resources:* Regular pledges (in early years the Programme's only resource) are now used mainly for development projects and the Programme Support and Administrative (PSA) Budget. The target for regular pledges is established every two years by the CFA and approved by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and General Assembly, and the FAO Council and Conference. The current target for 1993-94 is USD 1.5 billion, the same as for 1991-92. The biennium for pledging is out of phase with the biennium for the administrative budget (which follows the cycle adopted throughout the United Nations system). There has been some preliminary discussion of bringing the two biennia in line later in the present decade. We feel that, when achieved, this would make the Programme somewhat easier to manage, although at the cost of some disruption in the transitional period. A one-time pledging period of either one or three years would be required (the adjustment can hardly be made in the budget cycle, which is standard across the system). We suggest that the Executive Director and the CFA examine the costs and benefits of an adjustment to bring the pledging and budget cycles in line with each other, and proceed with such a step if there is a balance of advantage for the Programme.

An overview of regular resources in the last four biennia is given in Table 1. By and large, total resources have remained stable with a variation of only about 7 percent between the highest level (1987-88) and the lowest (1991-92). An increase in the target for 1991-92 was accompanied by a drop in contributions - certainly a warning sign. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the table is the steady increase in the cash percentage. The proportion has gone up in every biennium, and the process appears to be continuing into the current period. However, the Programme has still not achieved the target set in the General Regulations of at least one-third of the contributions being in cash (including services).

Table 1
WFP Regular Programme Resources 1985-86 to 1991-92
(million USD)

Biennium	Target	Commodities	Cash	Total	Percent of target	Percent in cash
1985-86	1,350	915.7	255.7	1,171.4	87	21.8
1987-88	1,400	943.4	293.3	1,236.7	88	23.7
1989-90	1,400	905.8	298.2	1,204.0	86	24.8
1991-92	1,500	802.7	349.7	1,152.4	77	30.3

Source: Adapted from document CFA:35/P/7, Annex V.

The exact wording of the General Regulations is "aiming at cash and services components amounting in the aggregate to at least one-third of the total contributions".

It is not stated that the ratio of one-third is to apply to individual pledges. There is nevertheless considerable pressure on donors that put up significant amounts of commodities to subscribe also a corresponding amount of cash. The actual proportion of cash pledged varies between donors, as portrayed in Table 2, which gives details for the ten largest donors in the 1991-92 biennium and summarizes the position of the rest.

The ten largest contributors for the 1991-92 biennium pledged 89 percent of the Programme's regular resources. Overall, as shown in Table 2, they averaged 30 percent in cash with individual contributions ranging from 25 percent to 35 percent. The second group of ten countries contributed a slightly higher proportion of cash, 32 percent. The remaining 43 contributors, including 40 developing countries, averaged 50 percent in cash, but pledged less than 1 percent of total regular resources.

Table 2
Proportion of Cash in Regular Pledges for Biennium 1991-92
(position at 31 December 1992)

Country	Total pledge (million USD)	Share of cash
Canada	258.7	26
USA	223.4	33
EEC	126.3	25
Denmark	68.5	34
Australia	66.0	35
Germany	63.3	32
Finland	59.7	28
Sweden	53.8	32
Norway	51.7	35
Netherlands	50.6	32
Sub-total	1,022.0	30
Ten countries making next largest pledges	121.2	32
All other pledges (43 countries)	9.1	50
Total	1,152.4	30

Source: Document CFA:35/P/4 Add.1, Table A.2.1.

The exact cash situation of the Programme is difficult to understand from the published reports. Cash contributed in lieu of commodities is normally listed under commodities rather than under cash (and is so shown above). This may seem confusing but in fact is logical, since such contributions cannot be used for any of the purposes for which cash

is sought (notably payment of transportation, ITSH and administrative costs). However, the contributions which are shown in the cash column may still be subject to a variety of restrictions as to their use. For instance, most of the cash contributed by the United States is retained to pay for freight costs on US commodities. The initial pledge of the United States for the 1993-94 biennium included only USD 2 million for WFP administrative costs in 1993. Some pledges by developing countries are in local currency, and are restricted to part payment of the costs of the WFP Country Office.

It is therefore a welcome development that the CFA, at its 35th session (May-June 1993), has asked for the Programme's accounts and records to show clearly cash that is contributed in an untied manner. The Secretariat has undertaken to provide the Committee with a breakdown, donor by donor, of contributions in kind, cash and services, untied cash being indicated through footnotes (CFA:35/17, para. 92).

b) *PRO/PDPOs*: Within the regular resources, a separate window has been open since 1989 for the funding of Protracted Refugee Operations (PROs) and Protracted Displaced Person Operations (PDPOs). Previously, these had been handled as emergency operations and financed mainly under the IEFR. Under the current arrangement, refugees or displaced persons will be helped initially under an emergency operation; when this runs for more than a year it will be transformed into a PRO or PDPO. Separate pledges are sought for PRO/PDPOs, but there is no specific target.

Since the PRO facility was established in 1989, resources have risen rapidly, as shown in Table 3. This increase comes partly from increased feeding requirements for refugees and displaced persons, and partly from the progressive takeover by WFP of responsibilities previously exercised by UNHCR. The subject is pursued in Chapter 5 on relief operations.

Table 3
Resources for PRO/PDPOs 1989-92
(million USD)

1989	73
1990	232
1991	293
1992	422

Note: Figures for 1989-91 include resources channelled through the Afghanistan regular relief subset.

Since the PRO/PDPO window is a subset of the Programme's regular resources, donors can on occasion give WFP latitude to assign resources to one window or the other. At the Pledging Conference of November 1992 the United States pledged USD 350 million

in food aid resources from PL 480, Title II, for the biennium 1993-94, leaving it to the Programme to allocate this amount between the development portfolio and PRO/PDPOs. WFP has allocated roughly two thirds to the regular programme and one-third to PRO/PDPOs.

Commodity contributions for PRO/PDPOs are accompanied by the cash needed for their transport.

c) *IEFR*: The International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) was established in 1976, following a resolution of the World Food Conference. The target remains at the original figure of 500,000 MT of food. The IEFR currently funds all WFP emergency operations (EMOPs). Table 4 shows the volume and value of contributions actually made to the IEFR each year since 1985. The drop in contributions to the IEFR in 1990 corresponds to a shift of resources into the PRO/PDPO facility. In the late eighties around 60 percent of the IEFR resources were being used for refugees and displaced persons.

Table 4
Contributions to the IEFR 1985-1992

Year	Metric tons (thousands)	Value (million dollars)
1985	768	223
1986	569	140
1987	691	184
1988	511	155
1989	389	127
1990	244	107
1991	627	319
1992	1,379	572

Source: Document CFA:35/P/7, Annex VI

Contributions to the IEFR can be pledged in advance, or offered in response to appeals from WFP for food to meet specific emergency requirements. Most of the main donors offer both a basic pledge, and *ad hoc* contributions for particular emergencies. However, the United States (by far the largest single donor) is restricted by domestic legislation from making advance pledges to the IEFR, and can only respond on a case-by-case basis. Commodities must be accompanied by the cash for their transport.

Advance pledges can be restricted in various ways by the donor. Restrictions may be rather narrow, requiring negotiations by WFP before commodities are released for a

particular emergency, or they may be broad enough to permit a measure of prior agreement. According to an informal estimate from WFP, about half of the IEFR contributions for 1993 announced up to mid-year were "reasonably untied".

When untied pledges have been used up the Programme must, in effect, negotiate with donors on contributions for new emergencies. In the case of a "popular" emergency, much written up by the media, donors will tend to respond quickly and generously. Their response may, on the other hand, be slow and reluctant for emergencies that occur in unpopular countries, or that lack any news value. In order to make the IEFR easier to manage, and to reduce response time to emergency requests, we suggest that donors increase the level of untied advance pledges.

In present circumstances it is common for the Programme to find itself obliged to start an emergency operation, and in particular to make a commitment to the requesting government, before it is certain of being able to mobilize the necessary resources. The Letter of Understanding signed by both WFP and the government protects the legal position of the Programme by stating that the obligations of WFP are "subject to the availability of resources in general and of individual commodities in particular". It is disturbing that WFP does not appear to have a formal system for recording (and reporting on) shortfalls in resources mobilized as compared with quantities committed under Letters of Understanding. We feel that such a system should be put in place.

Looking at the way the IEFR functions, the system has a makeshift air. Nevertheless it is sufficiently flexible to cope with a massive increase in requirements, such as occurred in 1992 following the southern Africa drought.

d) *IRA* The Immediate Response Account (IRA) is a cash window for the exclusive purpose of enabling emergency operations to get off to a quick start by purchasing food, usually in the country or region concerned. Its target is USD 30 million. It is considered as an integral part of the IEFR.

The IRA was established at the beginning of 1992, and WFP gave a one-time contribution of USD 7.5 million to get it launched. For that year contributions amounted to about USD 24 million. In 1993 the Programme has not repeated its contribution due to pressure on its cash resources, and at mid-year the total available under the IRA came to only about USD 17 million. Our evaluation of relief activities in Chapter 5 points to the great importance of the IRA in getting emergency operations off to a quick start by purchasing (as well as borrowing) commodities. We urge donors to give a higher priority to cash contributions to the Immediate Response Account, with a view to reaching the USD 30 million target.

For the four windows listed above, pledges can be made at the biennial Pledging Conference. The Conference is normally held in November of the year preceding the start of the biennium. In practice, rather few donors are in a position to announce a specific pledge at that stage of their domestic budget cycle. Of the ten largest donors to

WFP in 1991-92, only three were able to indicate a firm figure at the Pledging Conference for 1993-94.

There are three other specialized windows through which WFP receives or handles resources. These appear to be not fully integrated into the reporting system of WFP - for instance, they are only partially covered in the regular Statistical Appendix to the Annual Reports of the Executive Director.

e) *"Special emergency operations"* is the rather unclear name adopted by WFP for contributions to fund airlifts and other major logistic expenditures in conjunction with large-scale complex emergencies. Examples are the current or recent operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, the four-country operation for Liberian refugees and displaced persons, the Sudan, and former Yugoslavia. The administrative costs of special emergency operations are covered out of contributions made under this window, and not out of the regular budget. Contributions for special emergency operations in 1992 amounted to USD 103 million. Clearer reporting on activities under this window would be of general interest and we suggest that it be instituted.

f) *Non-food items (NFI)* are provided on a limited scale by the Programme in conjunction with projects and PRO/PDPOs in least developed and low-income food-deficit countries. Examples include kitchen equipment, tents, and farming tools. Contributions for this purpose can be made to WFP in either cash or kind. They have been running at a yearly rate of some USD 15 million. The Programme itself regularly provides USD 1 million per annum.

NFI needs are identified in the country and forwarded to Headquarters. After being vetted by the Regional Bureau and the Development Division, they are circulated to potential donors by the Resources Division. When funds have been mobilized the purchasing is done by the Procurement Unit.

NFI are marginal to WFP, representing less than one percent of all expenditures in 1992. They can, however, be very important for certain projects.

Some issues regarding NFI have been raised in three of our country studies. In Malawi problems were encountered in the provision of inputs for agricultural development, partly because approval had to be received from Rome before changes could be made in the package. The highly centralized procedures of WFP, with long lead-times and uncertain results, were also highlighted in the Guatemala study. In Morocco the evaluation team found that spades, wheelbarrows etc. had been provided in kind by Norway and were of excellent quality; however, such items could have been procured more quickly and cheaply through local purchases.

We suggest that the system for handling NFI be made less rigid and partially decentralized. Country Offices might be encouraged to approach potential donors

locally. These could then channel the items either through WFP at country level, or directly to the national agency implementing the project. Fundraising via Rome would take place only if there was no expectation of achieving results locally.

g) *"Bilateral services"* are provided by WFP to individual donors who wish to take advantage of the Programme's expertise in handling food aid. The services available consist of food purchase, transport and monitoring or any combination of these, and an integrated programming service. Fees are charged according to the nature of the service, which is intended to be self-financing. For instance, the fee for transporting bilateral commodities is 3 percent of the transport expenditure, with a minimum of USD 5,000 and a maximum of USD 75,000. For purchase, transport and monitoring it is 5 percent of the C&F value, with a minimum of USD 10,000 and a maximum of USD 175,000. Income generated under this window in 1992 came to USD 6.7 million. It is not clear at present whether the fees do fully cover WFP's administrative costs for providing the services. This will be clarified by a study now underway of the actual costs of all types of programme.

The Programme is, in effect, working as an agent for the donor. WFP's vocabulary is neither clear nor consistent in conveying the nature of these resources, which are handled by WFP but are not "WFP resources" in a sense that would be conveyed by standard accounting. Sometimes they are referred to as "bilateral resources", sometimes as "bilateral services" or "services to bilateral donors".

Nor is the Programme's reporting on bilateral services particularly clear. In 1992, WFP states that it was requested to buy, ship or monitor one million tons of food worth USD 300 million, 90 percent of it for relief purposes. However, the amount shown as transported is only just over 400,000 tons. The balance was presumably the subject of monitoring.

The budget table on sources and utilization of funds in 1994-95 (document CFA:36/5) includes a column headed "Bilateral operations". This appears to include cash inflow and outflow for purchasing, transport and related expenditures, but does not show estimated fee income as a separate item. In fact, such income is the only real WFP resource under this window, since it is the only element over which the Programme can freely dispose.

There does not seem to be a firm trend in shipments under this window. The volumes transported over the last three years were 470,000 MT in 1990, 247,000 MT in 1991 and 413,000 MT in 1992.

3.3 The Food Aid Convention

Food aid can be a weak crutch in times of crisis. It is normally budgeted by donors in monetary terms, so that when prices rise a fixed amount of money provides less aid. At a time of global food shortage, when food aid is most needed, its volume falls. This had a dramatic effect in the

world food crisis of the mid-seventies, not least on the World Food Programme. To counteract this feature is the main purpose of the Food Aid Convention (FAC). Participants in the Convention undertake to provide a minimum volume of cereal aid yearly, independently of prices. The Convention is supervised by a Food Aid Committee and administered by the International Wheat Council, which is also responsible for the International Wheat Trade Agreement. The current level of the FAC is just over 7.5 million tons in wheat or wheat equivalent. Actual shipments reported by participants have been running at much higher levels.

It has long been accepted that contributions to WFP can be reported as fulfilling FAC obligations. Also cash contributions to the IRA can now be included. The extent to which individual donors choose to report WFP shipments as meeting FAC commitments varies widely, as does the way they handle the reporting. For instance Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland channel 100 percent of their FAC commitments through WFP, either as part of the regular resources of the Programme or through the IEFR or PRO windows. The EEC currently channels about 30 percent of its FAC obligations through the Programme (11 percent through the regular resources), Germany 31 percent (8 percent through the regular resources), United Kingdom 50 percent (all through the regular resources). Ireland and Norway channel 100 percent of their FAC contributions through the Programme, but outside the existing windows; their pledges are shown in WFP documents as a separate line item "Food Aid Convention". Canada, Japan and the United States do not use WFP as a channel for FAC contributions (although, in the case of Canada, all cereal shipments through WFP count against FAC contribution).

It can be concluded that in present circumstances the relationship between WFP and the FAC largely depends on the book-keeping of the donors. However, the relationship could become important if a rise in food prices (and/or mounting pressure on aid budgets) threatened a major fall in the volume of food aid. Then the FAC would be, to some extent at least, a safety-net under the Programme. The Convention in its current form has been extended to the end of June 1995.

3.4 ITSH Costs

WFP has long subsidized the internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) costs incurred by least developed countries for the movement of its food aid. In the case of development projects, the payment of ITSH costs is funded partly by selling a commodity (usually wheat) and partly by using regular cash resources. For relief operations (which account for by far the larger part of ITSH expenditures), costs are estimated on a per ton basis, and donors to the IEFR or PRO windows are requested to provide the necessary cash along with the funding for external transport. In 1992 the Programme made commitments totalling USD 320 million for ITSH costs, of which about USD 30 million were for new development projects approved in the course of the year and USD 290 million for relief operations.

Reimbursement of costs is made through the WFP Country Office to the party handling the work, normally a government agency or an NGO.

There is a substantial time-lag between commitments and expenditures on ITSH costs. For instance, the WFP financial accounts show only a small part of the 1992 commitments as having been settled in that year. The figure for expenditures on ITSH costs in 1992 was just under USD 120 million (of which some USD 14 million from commodity sale proceeds); however, in the first six months of 1993 the corresponding figures were USD 135 million (of which USD 3 million from proceeds of sale).

We urge WFP to give increased priority to cost control of ITSH charges, considering the large proportion of WFP resources which they will probably continue to absorb.

Whether they are obtained by monetization or contributed directly by donors, ITSH expenditures are generally estimated in advance. The estimate may, in the nature of things, be too high or too low. In our country study of Bolivia we came across a case where the estimate had been too high. Surplus counterpart funds obtained from the monetization of WFP commodities remained in a joint WFP/Government of Bolivia account, and it was not clear how they were going to be handled. In this case the funds were in local currency and could only be used in the country. In other cases where donors contribute ITSH monies in advance any surplus will be in convertible currency.

The obvious approach would be to use surpluses resulting from too-high estimates to cover deficits from too-low estimates. However, it does not appear that the Programme and the donors have in all cases the necessary flexibility to do this. The problem is one that deserves specific attention from WFP, covering both convertible and non-convertible currencies.

3.5 An Overview of WFP Expenditures

With resources flowing in through various windows, the pattern of WFP activities is best illustrated by its expenditures. Table 5 gives an overview of expenditures in 1992, distinguishing between cash and commodities.

The most interesting fact that emerges from this table is the high proportion of expenditures in cash - more than half the total. In 1992 - contrary to the general belief - WFP was as much cash-driven as commodity-driven. However, only a small proportion of cash expenditure (about 17 percent) was directly related to development projects. Relief operations were by far the biggest consumers of cash.

Table 5
WFP Expenditures in 1992
(million USD)

Item	Cash	Commodity	Total	Percent cash
Development projects	151	337	488	31
PRO/PDPOs	188	237	425	44
IEFR/IRA	201	228	429	47
PSA	94	-	94	100
Other exp.	4	-	4	100
Subtotal	638	802	1,440	44
Extra-budg. operations	230	18	248	93
Total	868	820	1,688	51

Note: Derived from documents CFA:35/P/7, Table 1, and CFA:35/P/4, Table 9. Extra-budgetary operations are defined as services to bilateral donors, sub-trust funds and "other expenditures" including Gulf Crisis Operations, Special Emergency Operations in Africa, Task Force on Afghanistan, Junior Professional Officers Scheme and WFP service charges.

3.6 Commodity Purchases

Approximately a third of the cash expenditures shown in Table 5 were for the purchase of commodities. Some details of commodity purchases in 1992 are shown in Table 6.

Noteworthy here is the high proportion - 71 percent - of purchases made from developing countries. This is in line with a policy established by the CFA.

Over half of the purchases were made for relief operations (IEFR plus PRO/PDPOs). More than one quarter were for bilateral donors. Presumably the main motive of donors in availing themselves of WFP purchasing services is to use the Programme's expertise and experience in buying commodities from developing nations for use as food aid.

Table 6
WFP Commodity Purchases in 1992
(million USD)

Source of funds	Total Purchases	Purchases in Developed Countries	Purchases in Developing Countries	Percent in Developing Countries
WFP regular cash pledges	8.0	1.0	7.0	87
Cash pledged in lieu of commodities	44.1	13.6	30.5	69
FAC funds	6.3	3.6	2.7	43
IEFR	92.5	33.9	58.6	63
FRO/PDPOs	51.8	16.6	35.2	68
Bilateral funds	78.7	12.9	65.8	84
Total	281.4	81.6	199.8	71

Source: Adapted from internal WFP working paper.

Of all the commodities handled by WFP in 1992, just over a quarter in value terms were purchased. This illustrates very clearly how WFP has moved away from the concept of "surplus utilization" which inspired its creation.

Purchases made in the recipient country are defined as "local purchases". A cash purchase in one developing country for shipment to another recipient country is known as a "triangular transaction".

A study of triangular transactions and local purchases in food aid was commissioned by WFP and conducted in 1987 by the Relief and Development Institute of London. The provisional overall conclusion was that "cash purchase operations by WFP, both triangular transactions and local purchases, have been broadly cost-effective uses of the limited financial resources available within food aid programmes".[33] We have not come across any evidence that would cast doubt on this conclusion.

3.7 Commodity Swaps

A commodity exchange or swap arises when WFP (or another food aid donor) ships food to a developing country and exchanges it for the equivalent amount in another commodity. This may be for distribution within the country itself (a local swap), or for shipment to a third country.

[33] "A Study of Triangular Transactions and Local Purchases in Food Aid", Relief and Development Institute, London, published by WFP as Occasional Paper No. 11, 1987.

Thus Australian wheat might be shipped to Zimbabwe and exchanged for white maize, which is then supplied to Mozambique. The usual purpose is to provide a commodity which is not available directly within the WFP food basket.

The great majority of swaps are made within the recipient country. However, local swaps are not recorded in WFP's International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS).

As in the case of triangular transactions and local purchases, WFP commissioned a review of swap experience by the Relief and Development Institute of London. This was published in 1990.[34] The study concentrated mainly on local swaps of three types: direct barter of different commodities; sale of commodities tied to local purchase of other commodities; and exchange of grain for the same commodity in processed form. It found that between 1985 and mid-1988 the Programme had exchanged some 950,000 tons of cereals (in wheat equivalent). Almost all (97 percent) of the cereals offered for exchange were wheat or wheat flour. Rice was the main commodity acquired (66 percent), followed by coarse grains (19 percent), wheat flour (11 percent) and wheat (4 percent).

The study noted that "The generally most positive aspect of exchange operations has been their broadening of the types of commodities provided as food aid, enabling more appropriate local cereals as well as small quantities of other commodities to be supplied to food aid recipients in lieu of commodities that are more plentiful within the food aid basket." It suggested a number of practical measures to achieve the WFP aim of "No Gain, No Loss". This is intended to ensure that the transfer is cost-effective from the point of view of both the donor and the recipient. Experience on the timeliness of delivery of commodities acquired locally through exchange is reported as mixed.

In our country studies we did not come across any particular issues relating to commodity swaps. The study of Vietnam noted that WFP wheat was being exchanged for local rice on an agreed basis. The rice would be distributed under WFP projects, while the wheat after milling would be consumed by urban populations.

The Programme is to be complimented for its efforts, through an independent study, to examine the merits and problems of swap transactions (as also of triangular transactions and local purchases). At the same time it is paradoxical that WFP does not record as swaps the types of exchange on which the study focused. The question of information is pursued further in a later in section.

3.8 Monetization

The basic principle of monetization is very simple: instead of being distributed directly to beneficiaries, food aid is sold and the proceeds are used to finance developmental or relief

[34] "A Study of Commodity Exchanges in WFP and other Food Aid Operations" Relief and Development Institute, London, 1990, published as WFP Occasional Paper No. 12.

activities. The extent to which food aid should be monetized has been a controversial one for decades, and currently the issue is again in the forefront of attention.

WFP has monetized a small part of its food aid since early days. Between 1963 and 1986, 15 percent of its food commitments were authorized for sale. Between 1987 and 1992 the proportion was slightly lower at 13.2 percent. During the 1987-92 period 128 projects had a monetization component, which could vary from 100 percent sales to a very small percentage.

For some years WFP has classified its projects with a monetized component in three categories. *Category A* consists of projects in which the sale of WFP commodities is an inherent part of the operation. Food reserves and price stabilization schemes, for instance, function by releasing commodities for sale when a trigger mechanism sends the signal. Again, under its projects for dairy development the Programme normally supplies dried skim milk and butter oil; reconstituted milk is then sold, and the proceeds are used to build up the local dairy industry. *Category B* (closed-circuit monetization) involves the sale of WFP food to specific beneficiaries outside commercial channels. A typical instance is an afforestation project in which part of the labourers' wages is deducted in exchange for food aid. The main impact is an income transfer. Under *Category C* part of the commodities are sold in order to generate funding for project costs. These may be ITSH costs, non-food inputs (such as tools) or services (e.g. credit, child care or health).

The most widely practised form of monetization is the provision of programme food aid as budgetary or balance of payments support. More than half of all food aid takes this form. However, it is the exclusive domain of bilateral assistance. Neither the CFA nor the management of the WFP is anxious to take the Programme into this area, and with development resources under pressure there does not seem to be a case for reopening the question.

The CFA (and its predecessor the IGC) have considered monetization issues on numerous occasions. In 1987 the CFA set a ceiling of 15 percent for total sales. The Committee plans to take up monetization again at a forthcoming session. To prepare for this, several steps are being taken.

WFP clearly wants to draw on all sources of thinking on monetization before taking the question back to the CFA.[35] Presumably it also hopes, if possible, to bring about a consensus in thinking on monetization issues among all the main actors (actual decisions regarding WFP operations will, of course, be the responsibility of the CFA). This is certainly a constructive

[35] In May 1993 the Programme (with financial support from the United States and the European Community) organized a one-day workshop in Rome to review current thinking and practical experience in monetization. The participants included representatives of bilateral and multilateral food aid donors, NGOs and independent researchers. They recommended that a further meeting be organized with a somewhat wider participation, preceded by one or more meetings at country level.

and welcome approach. A number of governmental and non-governmental agencies appear to be reviewing their own position, in parallel to the reflection underway in WFP.

Separately, the WFP Evaluation Service is assessing the impact of monetization under projects approved between 1987 and 1992. The Programme is also implementing a recommendation from the External Auditors for reporting systems to increase the accountability of monetized funds.

The results of all this will be incorporated in a paper to serve as the basis for the CFA's debate on monetization.

Certain points in the current discussion seem important in the context of our evaluation. The main issue is: when should food aid be monetized? There are then two practical questions: how should the food sale be organized? and how should the counterpart funds be handled? The second and third issues are not pursued below.

On the main issue, the present debate examines the alternatives of using food aid in cash or in kind. The discussion does not, however, appear to be grappling fully with the further alternative of monetized food aid versus direct cash aid. In what circumstances is it more effective to ship food from a donor country and sell it locally, instead of simply providing cash from the outset? To what extent do current practices reflect budgetary rigidities in the donor country (e.g. the difficulty of mobilizing cash in conjunction with food aid), rather than economic considerations? It would be useful to have some light thrown on such issues, either within the ongoing review sponsored by WFP or separately.

Furthermore, it may be useful to distinguish between sales of food *to* beneficiaries, and sales (or barter) *by* beneficiaries. We have turned up ample evidence in our country reviews that refugees and displaced persons often sell or barter a small part of their rations. This is certainly not foreseen in the project objectives, but it is nevertheless a form of monetization. Would it or would it not be more cost-effective to give the refugees cash (or a voucher usable at a camp store) instead of transporting a commodity such as oil or sugar or even grains which they then sell or exchange? Insofar as there is a conflict between nutritional objectives (giving the beneficiaries an adequate and balanced diet) and economic considerations (giving them cash instead of rations which they sell or barter for less than their market value), what policy position ought to be taken?

In assessing the pros and cons of monetization under a particular project, it will often be important to look at the potential impact on women. Depending on traditions and local circumstances, women may have more control over food than they do over cash.

Most of the experience acquired with monetization has been under development projects. Monetization of relief appears to have been limited to parts of the operation in Somalia and of that for Liberian refugees and displaced persons. It would be helpful if the CFA review could push for further experimentation, accompanied by careful evaluation. The subject is further discussed in the chapter on relief.

Case studies assembled for a recent WFP workshop[36] suggest that certain traditionally accepted ideas need to be regarded with caution. Cash aid is not necessarily more difficult to target than food distributed in kind: much depends on project design. Workers do not always prefer cash: two case studies (from Ethiopia and Madagascar) quote instances where they voted in favour of food. (The key, of course, is the local value of the food wage compared with the cash alternative). Cash is not necessarily more vulnerable to mismanagement than food.

The philosophical arguments for and against monetization appear to be nicely balanced, and throw little light. In favour of monetization, the most telling point is perhaps the greater flexibility offered by cash in most situations. Against it, weight should be given to the fact that popular support for food aid is based mainly on the idea of giving food to hungry people; this is precisely what doesn't happen when food aid is monetized.

The most reasonable conclusion at the present time is that any ideological bias for or against monetization should be avoided. It is simply one technique among others for the handling of food aid, and should be adopted in the right place at the right time. We are not convinced that it is useful to have an arbitrary limit of 15 percent on monetization, and it is our judgement that, on balance, the technique of monetization has probably been under-utilized by WFP in recent years. We advocate a more flexible approach to monetization, under which WFP (including Country Offices) would have some liberty to monetize resources in particular circumstances and for pre-defined purposes.

3.9 Information on Purchases, Swaps and Monetization

The brief survey above of purchases (including triangular transactions), swaps and monetization has pointed up some ambiguities, and a lack of full and clear information. The problems are basically with commodity swaps, with no information being systematically collected on local swaps. It has also been pointed out that commodity swaps may be considered as a form of monetization by some experts, but not by others (including WFP). We suggest that WFP review its system for monitoring purchases, swaps and monetization, certainly in respect of its own resources and perhaps also for food aid in general. The first stage would be to develop improved conceptual and operational tools for monitoring in this area. Ambiguities should be sorted out, the risk of double-counting eliminated, and a clear set of definitions and guidelines adopted.

We believe that more complete and meaningful information would be of long-term value for policy development, and of short-term interest to followers of food aid in general and of WFP in particular. The costs would need to be examined carefully before action was taken, but we do not believe it would be disproportionately expensive to collect this information and include it in the present reporting systems.

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[36] See note 3 above.

3.10 Balance between Relief and Development

Table 7 shows, in terms of volumes shipped, the changing balance between relief and development in the WFP portfolio.

It will be seen that EMOPs (plus PROs from 1989) remained fairly constant in a range between roughly 400,000 and 700,000 tons through 1989. In 1990 the volume of relief started to climb, and in 1991 for the first time it surpassed the level of shipments to projects. In 1992 it was two thirds higher than project shipments.

Comparing 1989 with 1992, the major increase in the level of EMOPs results from the southern Africa drought. The increase in PROs is largely the result of the agreement with UNHCR, under which WFP has taken over responsibility for providing basic foods in all refugee emergencies involving more than 1,000 people. These aspects are pursued further in the chapter on relief, which also looks at the question of whether relief is likely to continue at such a high level.

Table 7
Food Shipments by WFP 1982-1992
(MT thousands)

Year	Development projects	EMOPs	PRO/PDPOs	Sub-total relief
1982	1,110	566	-	-
1983	1,059	428	-	-
1984	1,329	612	-	-
1985	1,091	735	-	-
1986	1,374	589	-	-
1987	1,520	567	-	-
1988	1,875	622	-	-
1989	1,045	553	30	583
1990	1,058	260	522	782
1991	1,354	583	913	1,496
1992	1,328	1,188	1,088	2,224

Source: Figures provided by WFP Shipping Branch, Transport & Logistics Division

From the point of view of resources, it is significant that 70 percent of all WFP contributions for relief (IEFR, PRO/PDPOs and Special Emergency Operations) in 1991-92 came from only

two donors: the United States (44 percent) and the EEC (26 percent). A change of policy by either donor on using WFP as a channel for relief aid could have a considerable impact on the Programme. In 1992 the EEC established a new entity, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), to handle relief including food aid. It is not yet clear to what extent ECHO will continue to channel emergency assistance through WFP. The three donors sponsoring this evaluation contributed together only 7 percent of the Programme's resources for relief in the last biennium, whereas they contributed nearly one-third of the Programme's regular resources.

3.11 Degree of Multilaterality

Commodity pledges to WFP are in practice often made available for particular operations. To this extent, the donor has, in effect, a veto right on the destination of its WFP contribution. It is therefore sometimes queried whether WFP is a truly multilateral programme, or a "multi-bi" exercise.

We were impressed by the findings in our review of WFP operations in Vietnam. At a time when aid to that country was far from popular with most Western donors, WFP performed a pioneering role and was the first UN organisation to establish a major programme there. This single example is enough to demonstrate that WFP, provided it has the backing of some donors, has the capacity for acting in an independent manner, and can be at least as multilateral as any other programme of the United Nations system.

Paradoxically, WFP's strength comes from the apparent weakness described above. The very fact that donors exercise control over the use of their individual contributions makes them less reluctant to go along with a project in (for instance) a country with which they do not have diplomatic relations, than would be the case if their contributions disappeared into a single pool over which they have no control once an allocation has been approved. In other words, an individual donor has the certainty that its resources will not be used for a project which would be at conflict with its domestic legislation.

3.12 The Food Basket

The WFP food basket comes from two sources: commodities pledged, and foodstuffs purchased. The pledged commodities for the 1991-92 biennium (regular resources) consisted of the following quantities in metric tons:

Cereals	2,227,605
Blended foods	35,604
Dairy products	66,637
Meat and fish products	44,171
Fats and oils	132,521
Other items	129,011

Wheat and wheat flour accounted for 78 percent of the cereals, maize and maize meal for 8 percent and rice for 7 percent. Among "other items" the most important were pulses (96,927 tons) and sugar (23,587 tons).

The commodities pledged to the Programme represent a reasonable balance between different types of foodstuff. Furthermore, donors are generally liberal in agreeing on the exact commodity to be utilized by the Programme. Flexibility is greatly increased by purchases and commodity swaps. As a result, WFP can generally put together an acceptable combination of foods for a particular project or relief operation, and we have not found any evidence of serious deficiencies in the food basket. Shortages of particular commodities have, however, sometimes led to their exclusion in the course of project execution.

Flexibility is inhibited to some extent by a restriction in US domestic legislation. Since 1986, three quarters of all commodities supplied under Public Law 480, Title II (which covers contributions to WFP) must be in the form of bagged, fortified or processed products.

3.13 Reconciling Biennial Pledges with Long-Term Commitments

A five-year development project may start operating a year or more after it has been approved by the Executive Director or the CFA. At the time of approval, therefore, WFP resources are being committed to that project (in commodity, not monetary terms) over a period up to six years ahead. On the other hand, actual resource levels are never known more than two years ahead (even the Pledging Conference will not give definite information about all contributions for the coming biennium). The problem of reconciling biennial pledges with long-term project commitments makes a food aid programme difficult to manage. Project approvals in biennium A will have little effect on resource flows in that biennium because of the time needed to get projects underway, but must be geared to the level of resources expected in biennia B, C and D.

Predicting resources available and resources required in future biennia is more of an art than a science, because so many variables come into the calculation. For instance, the actual volume of commodities at the Programme's disposal can be affected not only by the level of pledges in monetary terms but also by changes in world food prices and exchange rates. Moreover, variations in the rate of project implementation can modify the amount of food that has to be called forward in a particular biennium.

WFP management and the CFA took an over-optimistic view in the mid-eighties that the flow of food aid resources through the Programme would continue to grow. By 1989-90 it was clear that the Programme had over-committed itself. A series of measures have now been taken to bring current and future requirements in line with a more realistic view of likely resource levels. Ongoing projects have been reviewed and commitments scaled back according to a set of criteria, of which the most important is project performance. New project commitments have been greatly reduced, and in 1993 are projected to fall to less than half the level of 1988. The immediate pressure has to some extent been relieved by a special contribution from the US

Department of Agriculture of 260,000 tons of yellow maize and 14,000 tons of butteroil for the 1993-94 biennium.

The picture of annual new commitments and actual deliveries is set forth in Table 8. The peak level of new commitment was reached in 1984 (2.1 million MT) and has since then declined to half that level in 1992; projections show a further marked decline for the current year, but then an increase in the coming two years. Actual deliveries of WFP peaked in 1988 (1.9 million MT), but the level has since been around the average level of the seven years before the peak.

Uncertainties about future resource levels are likely to continue and even intensify in coming years for many multilateral development programmes, including WFP. We therefore urge the Programme to develop a more sophisticated model for projecting the total resource requirements of approved projects in future biennia. Adjusted projections should be made biennially, or perhaps even annually, taking account of progress under each project. Projected requirements should be disaggregated by type of commodity.

Table 8
WFP Project Commitments and Deliveries 1980-95
(thousand MT)

Year	Commitments	Deliveries
1980	958	847
1981	1,109	790
1982	1,350	1,246
1983	1,407	1,124
1984	2,109	1,410
1985	1,795	1,132
1986	1,753	1,419
1987	1,522	1,549
1988	1,842	1,900
1989	1,582	1,079
1990	1,419	1,106
1991	1,440	1,404
1992	1,085	1,397
Projected 1993	850	1,408
1994	1,250	1,250
1995	1,400	1,250

Source: Document CFA:35/P/7, Annex IV.

In this way WFP would have a clear idea of the total resources, and the quantities of different foods, needed in coming biennia to meet existing commitments. It is indeed very surprising that the CFA and the WFP management have got by for so long without this information.

3.14 Regular Programme Cash Requirements and the Administrative Budget

With such a large volume of business in cash it may appear paradoxical that the Programme has a serious cash problem, and has been pressing donors for some years to improve the balance between cash and commodities. In fact, the issues are sufficiently serious to lead the CFA to set up an informal working group on the long-term financing of WFP operations. Following consultations with the Executive Director in September 1992, a report (CFA:34/P/6) was considered by the Committee in November.

The basic problem relates to cash contributed as part of the WFP regular resources for payment of transport costs on food for development projects, and for the funding of the PSA budget. The Programme's cash resources are under pressure from both the transportation and the PSA factors.

The cash cost of projects is rising, mainly because of increasing payments for ITSH charges in least developed countries. In projects proposed for approval in 1993, the proportion of cash costs is stated to be close to 30 percent of total commitments (CFA:35/P/7, para. 24). If this trend were maintained for a number of years, even a one-third cash component would be insufficient for the management of the Programme.

At the same time, the Programme must cope with a rapid increase in relief operations, which has brought extra administrative burdens without automatically generating (until 1992) any additional funding for administrative costs.

Until 1991 the PSA budget was funded by regular cash resources plus interest income, contributions by recipient governments towards the running costs of Country Offices, and fees for bilateral services. From January 1992 the Programme introduced, as an interim measure, a fee system for handling relief contributions. As approved by the CFA, a levy of 4 percent is made on the total value of commodity and transport costs on all IEFR and PRO/ PDPO contributions. In addition, WFP may charge 10 percent on additional staff and other administrative costs incurred for complex emergency operations. These charges are referred to by WFP under a variety of names, including "support costs" and "indirect programme support".

This new arrangement has two major weaknesses. In the first place, it is not clear to what extent the 4 percent levy covers actual costs. In order to get at the facts, the Programme is conducting a detailed study of the costs of all programmes. While the results are not yet available, the Programme clearly believes that 4 percent is an under-estimate. In the PSA Budget for 1994-95 the levy is shown at 5 percent subject to CFA agreement. The second weakness is that three donors have not so far been able to accept these charges, for internal

legislative reasons. The three include the largest single donor for relief programmes, the United States, and also ECHO which handles some food aid for the European Community.

In 1992 the Programme collected only about USD 12 million, or under a third of the levy that would have been theoretically due on contributions for the IEFR and PROs in the region of one billion dollars. It is currently exploring, with those donors that cannot accept the levy system, alternative ways of obtaining income for administrative expenses on relief programmes.

The nature of the Programme's dilemma is shown in Table 9, which compares the cost of the budget over the last four years with regular cash pledges (ignoring interest income and other sources of funds), and which relates the budget level also to total expenditures.

Table 9
PSA Costs Compared to Regular Cash Pledges and Total Expenditures
1988-92

Year	PSA (million USD)	PSA as percent of regular cash pledges	PSA as percent of all expenditures
1988	64.0	44	5.8
1989	70.0	47	7.0
1990	75.2	50.4	7.3
1991	81.8	46.8	5.7
1992	93.9	53.7	5.6

Source: Derived from documents CFA:35/11, Annex, and CFA:35/P/7, Annex V. Regular cash pledges for individual years are taken as being half of the cash pledges for the biennium.

It will be seen that the budget level currently corresponds to about half of all regular cash pledges to the Programme. Since the main charge on regular cash contributions is the transport of food for development projects (which as mentioned above is rising as a proportion of project costs), it is evident that the Programme must urgently find stable sources of additional income to cover its budget and/or reduce administrative costs.

The table shows that the budget for PSA has been increasing rapidly in absolute terms (up by 47 percent in four years). Most of the growth is certainly due to cost increases. According to WFP, there has been a real programme increase of only 14 percent over the last ten years (CFA:35/17, para. 113). In relation to total expenditures of all types PSA costs have fluctuated in the range between 5.6 and 7.3 percent.

Regarding the search for additional income, the Programme is clearly right to relate this to relief operations, since these are the source of the increased workload. However, the Programme is ambiguous about the precise objective to be sought. Document CFA:34/P/6, considered by the

Committee in May-June 1993, states (para. 31) "It is necessary that ... the administrative costs related to emergency and refugee operations become entirely self-financing". The budget for 1994-95 contains a much more sensible assumption that the structure for supporting emergency and refugee operations would be covered under PSA costs, while expenditure for relief operations at country level would be funded from specific appeals (CFA:36/5, para. 13).

We are convinced that a satisfactory formula to generate funding for the administration of relief operations must be found urgently. A solution is of great importance for the Programme. The issue of administrative costs for the development programme could then be tackled separately in its own right.

.15 Future Directions

The future of WFP as a development programme is likely to be influenced by several factors pertaining to resources. Among these are the strength and nature of political support for food aid in each of the main donors, and the extent to which food for development can be considered additional to other forms of aid. Donors that do not have surpluses are likely to assess the implications of switching to all-cash contributions to the Programme (a process which has already started); another option, of course, is to switch support to other forms of aid. Another factor is the trend towards or away from multilateral channels. Again, individual donors will be considering how far sustained increases in the level of relief food aid are likely over the medium and longer term to reduce food resources for development projects.

It has not been possible within the boundaries of the present evaluation to ascertain the position of individual donors on such issues. Some of the questions that arise out of our evaluation must therefore be left, for the moment, without answers.

Looking at the present picture, the funding of WFP reflects a partnership between the Programme and its main supporters. To a considerable extent, the structure of resource windows has evolved to match the arrangements whereby food aid is mobilized at national level. Fundamental changes in this structure would not be helpful if they made it more difficult for donors to provide support. We therefore do not recommend that such changes be considered.

This having been said, certain points are put forward in case a review of funding arrangements should be undertaken in future:

First, the funding structure is rather complicated, and quite difficult for the uninitiated to understand. Simplification, in the form of a smaller number of resource windows, would seem desirable.

Second, there appears to be a case for a less absolute division between resources for emergencies and resources for development. Greater flexibility at country level in using food aid for either purpose could in some cases lead to more effective approaches. Among the countries we have studied Ethiopia could be the main beneficiary from such a shift.

Third, the IRA should be fully funded as a priority for special donor contributions for as long as the Programme has a serious cash problem and cannot afford to use unrestricted cash pledges to kick-start emergency operations. It could be dispensed with as a separate window if there was ample cash within the regular resources.

Fourth, the IEFR in its present form bears only a limited resemblance to what was envisaged at the World Food Conference. Indeed it is now little more than a label attached to contributions for WFP emergency operations. As such, it may inhibit the flexible use of resources for either relief or development as advocated above. However, the IEFR would be a really useful facility if there were a major increase in advance pledges and at the same time donors found a way to carry over unutilized resources from one financial period to another until they were required. In this way it would be possible to build up, in periods of low activity, a genuine reserve that could be drawn upon in years when relief needs were high. However difficult this may seem in the present period of financial stringency, it is worth bearing in mind as an ideal objective.

4.0 WFP Organisation and Management

4.1 Organisational Structures

WFP has evolved from a joint programme of the UN and FAO into a nearly autonomous agency within the UN system. Until 1992 when the revised General Regulations came into effect, WFP did not have full management and administrative authority over its personnel or finances; many functions, such as staff hiring, administration and audit, were provided by or largely depended on FAO. In recent years, more of these functions have been assumed by WFP, with nearly complete administrative control only occurring in 1992.[37] Many of WFP's current standards and procedures have been put in place only recently and rather hurriedly; a number of actions have been initiated to address outstanding concerns.

Over the years, WFP has commissioned a number of external management and governance reviews, including the 1986 McKinsey and Company report.[38] Many of its recommendations were adopted, resulting in organisational changes and some delegation of authority to the field. Subsequent management consultancies by the Public Administration Service (PAS) concentrated on headquarters general service staff (February 1990), manpower planning (November 1990), and evaluation functions of WFP headquarters (January 1991).[39]

In 1992, in view of the rapid expansion of relief operations and the expected reduction in resources available for the regular programme, an in-house analysis of organisational structure and functional relationships was conducted, resulting in some major structural changes in the organisation.[40] In general, the reorganisation which took effect 1 January 1993 is intended to group all core operational functions - development, emergency, and transport and logistics - within the Operations Department. It gives substantially more authority in the management of all operations to the Regional Bureaux, which have now become the focal point of communication from the field in nearly all matters. The number of Bureaux was increased from 5 to 6. There have been some additional staff allocations to Regional Bureaux, though perhaps not directly commensurate with the increased responsibilities.

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[37] It must be noted that WFP still does not administer its general services staff in the field, this being done by UNDP, and that the FAO Finance Committee still approves WFP's budget.

[38] WFP/CFA. "A Blueprint for Organizational Change: Improving Operational Effectiveness and Managerial Efficiency". WFP/CFA:22/5, 18 September 1986.

[39] Public Administration Service. "Study of Headquarters General Service Staff for the WFP". PAS, February 1990. "Budget Manpower Planning Review and Management Analysis Consultancy for the WFP". PAS, November 1990. "Reworking the WFP Organizational Blueprint: Proposed Revisions to EPP, EPE, and ODC Functional Statements". PAS, January 1991.

[40] See appended revised organisational chart.

The mounting volume of operations has placed increasing pressure on WFP's systems for managing relief. The Regional Bureaux are now responsible for all phases of an emergency or PRO, including assessment. The Disaster Relief Service has become the Emergency Division, with two separate roles. The Director of the Division is given line responsibility for managing the emergency activities carried out by the Regional Bureaux. Secondly, the staff of the Division outside the Director's office form an Emergency Support Service, with technical support functions for the Bureaux and some limited line responsibilities.

The Emergency Division is balanced by the Development Division, with matching responsibilities. The heads of the two units are known respectively as the Director of Emergency Operations and the Director of Development. While the formal justification of the new structure is to bring relief and development closer together in the Regional Bureaux, the central fact is that the Programme has had to cope with the build-up of its relief operations by mobilizing its development staff to carry out emergency activities. There was probably no reasonable alternative. A major increase in the staffing of the Disaster Relief Service would not have been acceptable to donors in present circumstances.

The new arrangements are considered, for the first half of 1993, to be in a transitional phase. The transition has not been helped by a long vacancy in the post of Assistant Executive Director, Director of the Operations Department (the post was filled in late summer 1993 only). Presumably the new arrangements will be reviewed by management, and adjusted if necessary, when they have been in full effect for a reasonable period of time. They do not yet appear fully satisfactory.

The new structure looks at first sight like a simple form of matrix management, in which the Managers of the Regional Bureaux are responsible either to the Director of Development or to the Director of Emergency Operations according to the type of activity they are carrying out. However, it is not clear to what extent the Director of Emergency Operations is a line manager or a policy advisor. This ambiguity is reflected in the rather uncertain degree of control that he is able to exercise over the Managers of the Regional Bureaux. Nor is the division of responsibilities between the Director of Emergency Operations and the Assistant Executive Director as head of the Operations Department fully clear.

Similarly, the functions of the Emergency Support Service require clarification. The Service is available "on call" for technical backstopping to the Regional Bureaux, but the Service is not routinely involved. The Regional Bureaux do not appear to be fully aware of the form and extent of support they in fact need from the Service. Sometimes the staff of the Service are simply helping the Bureaux with overload situations. The expertise within the Service should certainly be fully utilized.

If the Director of Emergency Operations is to direct, there should be no ambiguity regarding the degree of his authority over the Regional Managers. There has been a complaint from another organization that different Regional Bureaux were handling the same issue in different ways. There should be no opportunity for such divergences to occur. A formal mechanism, or formal procedures, should be established for the Director of Emergency Operations and the Regional

Managers to reach decisions on current issues. This should not only serve to expedite business, but should have a symbolic value in crystallizing the Director's authority.

Following the shift of responsibility from the former Disaster Relief Service to the Regional Bureaux, staff members who were recruited for development are now handling all phases of emergency operations. The Programme should evaluate the performance of all concerned, from the Regional Managers downwards. Those who do not appear to possess the necessary aptitude for relief work should either be reassigned, or be allowed to concentrate exclusively on development. Training courses in emergency management should be devised for members of both Headquarters and field staff who possess the aptitude but not the experience.

The Programme should go ahead with the formation of a Rapid Response Team, as suggested in the WFP Programme Support and Administrative Budget for 1994-95 (document CFA:36/5). This would enable a Country Office to be bolstered fast when a sizable emergency arises. The normal time of assignment should probably not exceed two or three months, enough to see through the assessment and design phases, and to help instal the necessary forms and procedures. Besides a core of permanent staff, the Unit could utilize a roster of individuals who could be made available immediately when required. These could include people in the various developing regions who have the necessary experience.

Surprisingly, the Programme has never developed fast-track administrative procedures for use in an emergency. Special procedures should be worked out to cover personnel appointments and movements, budget and finance, and procurement (notably of vehicles and communications equipment). Within general guidelines, operational managers should have delegated authority to take quick decisions, subject to reporting afterwards. For actions falling outside the guidelines there should be a rapid decision-making procedure, perhaps involving the Deputy Executive Director.

As pointed out in the case study of Malawi, the Programme has been lacking a standard set of forms (or standard software) for the various functions of an emergency operation in the field. Each Country Office has had to design forms starting from scratch.

The question of special conditions of service for staff exposed to physical danger is of interest to all humanitarian organizations of the United Nations system, and is under widespread discussion. WFP has a major concern for this, and if necessary should be ready to table a proposal. The Programme should also consider the suggestion for the recruitment of a small number of international staff specifically for service in areas of conflict.

The Programme should review its filing system for relief operations. With the transfer of responsibilities to the Regional Bureaux, it is necessary to ensure that the Bureaux files include the principal documents and correspondence. Not only is this required for adherence to normal standards of administration, it is also part of building up an institutional memory of relief operations.

The reorganization has also resulted in the transfer of Transport and Logistics to the Operations Department. The former Project Design Service was moved to the Operations Department and amalgamated with the former Project Programming Branch into the Project Design and Programming Service, responsible to the Director of Development.

The Evaluation Service now has a more independent placement within the organization; like Internal Audit, it is directly responsible to the Executive Director. External Relations and parts of what was the Policy and Evaluation Division have been combined into the Division of Policy and Public Affairs. Likewise, the NGO Unit which was temporarily placed with the Resources Division has been relocated into the Policy and Public Affairs Division to give it a higher profile. The Resources Division is the main contact with donor governments and retains primary authority for marshalling resources. It also now has the sole purchasing function within WFP; some purchasing has been moved from Administration.

Personnel and Administration Services retains basically the same structure. Finances and Computer Services will be augmented by the Policy and Data Analysis Branch, previously within the Evaluation and Policy Division.

An important "structural" issue for WFP has been its long-standing headquarters constraint: cramped office space, separate buildings, limited conference rooms, an extremely cramped reference centre, small and dysfunctional elevators, and inadequate office automation and information storage. In March 1991, the Government of Italy, the United Nations, and FAO signed a Headquarters Agreement which would require that the Italian Government provide WFP with appropriate office accommodation in Rome. After more than two years, the agreement is still pending ratification by the Italian Parliament. In the meantime, WFP has been investigating options. In any event, there will likely be considerable expense involved in moving to new quarters or renovating the old quarters. The Executive Director has requested a contingency amount for this in the 1994-95 budget.

In addition to a low standard of physical facilities, WFP needs to improve its office automation, telecommunications, and management information systems. There are, for example, several computer-based information systems which cannot interface with one another. (Of particular note are problems now recognized in the financial administrative systems in place.) It is important to bear in mind that some of the performance issues raised in this evaluation are directly influenced by the facilities and services available to WFP staff. The Executive Director's push to correct these underlying problems, evidenced in the 1994-95 Programme Support and Administrative Budget, should be supported.

.2 Country Offices

WFP Country Offices have particularly challenging management obstacles to overcome. WFP by its very nature operates in some of the most difficult locales in the world, where basic infrastructure, facilities, and communications are less developed. In January 1993, WFP

maintained staffed Country Offices in 87 countries; 11 additional countries were being covered by offices elsewhere.[41]

The Country Offices differ greatly in size, staffing and programme responsibilities. Almost half have had a "turnover" of less than USD 6 million per year in the early 1990s and typically handled two or three development projects and relief operations each; for one in seven of all Country Offices the turnover was between USD 6 and 10 million and the typical case load twice as high. Clearly, the number and variety of activities, not only the total volume, determine the need for competent staff. This explains why the rank in the UN hierarchy of the Director of Operations is not a close reflection of the volume of food delivered; high ranking directors are sometimes placed in low volume Country Offices and junior directors in much larger ones.

More than half the Country Offices had only one or two international staff in place, only 15 had five or more. In general, the number of international staff mirrors the relative volume of operations, but also the availability in the country of skilled and experienced nationals who may be recruited and retained, and the capacity of national counterpart institutions to plan, design, implement and monitor projects. Our study of Morocco is a good example of this. It is one of the larger recipients of WFP assistance ("turnover" above USD 20 million) with five active development projects; it has only two international staff members, and we have suggested that one may be sufficient. This illustrates the opportunity for WFP to become more active in recruiting competent national staff.

The size of Country Offices can dramatically expand and contract in response to EMOPs and PROs. The Malawi Country Office is a case in point, having grown from an international staff of 2 with local support in 1987 to a complement in 1993 of 45, including 14 international staff and 4 volunteers. In some countries the WFP Country Office also supports sub-offices and manages special logistics operations, sometimes more or less permanent in nature. An extreme case is Ethiopia where WFP supports 2 sub-offices and a truly major logistics operation, involving more than 1,100 people in total. Such complexities of WFP Country Offices place considerable strain on Headquarters and Country Office management and administration systems - much more than for organisations where staff complements and activities are more predictable.

It is all the more important that WFP should be in the forefront of analyzing its own structural and operational constraints, including the consequences of its dependence on UNDP for some personnel and administrative functions. Local WFP staff are, in fact, UNDP employees; in some Country Office this has caused some difficulties in clarity of lines of authority. WFP has found that its financial management systems for the Country Offices are too complex and in some respects also inadequate; some elements of these systems are independent of UNDP and, once identified, can be corrected by WFP itself.

Under this complex scenario, the Directors of Operations are required to manage the WFP country programme and staff and to master the bureaucratic requirements of both WFP and

[41] See appended list.

UNDP; they are required to be skilled enough and quick enough to operate in the face of highly unpredictable situations, including the onset of emergencies. Moreover, as WFP begins to address the role of food aid in development in a more strategic manner, Directors of Operations and their staff will have to be a conduit, even substantive participant, in policy analysis and discussions of priority uses for food aid as a development resource.

In the recent reorganisation, WFP has drawn more clearly the lines of responsibilities between Country Office and Headquarters. Directors of Operations now report directly to Headquarters through Regional Bureau managers for all programme, personnel, and resource issues, copying to other units as appropriate. The primary exceptions are requests for emergency assistance; these are now sent directly to the Executive Director, copied to other relevant parties. Within the Country Office, all staff are responsible to the Director of Operations. In order to permit further decentralising of management processes, management training of Directors of Operations are to commence in late 1993.

In spite of the fact that WFP in many countries supplies more resources to the country than any other UN agency, the Directors of Operations have a relatively inferior status within the UN system. One step towards addressing this issue is a request in the 1994-95 Programme Support and Administrative Budget to upgrade posts of Directors of Operations to have a minimum qualification of P4, more in keeping with their important responsibilities. WFP also plans to rotate more senior and experienced managers to the more difficult Country Offices, including rotation between field and Headquarters.

The official WFP Representative is always the UNDP Resident Representative, whose knowledge of the Programme and of food aid reportedly varies considerably. The views of WFP may therefore not be fully and actively advocated in broader discussions of aid matters. In some countries, there is at times duplication of effort between UNDP and WFP, resulting in individual frustration, inefficiencies in project development and execution, and a blurred image of UN agencies to national governments. When they occur, counter-productive relationships between WFP and UNDP staff can also spill over into administrative and support relationships.

As the size of Country Offices depends on the volume of activities they handle, staff complements vary considerably, and so does the workload on the resident staff. In our visits to the case study countries, we called on five of the fourteen largest recipients of WFP aid, and in the remaining four case study countries the country offices handled more aid than half of all country offices. Thus while our sample of development projects, emergency operations and Protracted Refugee Operations was adequately representative of WFP activities, the sample of Country Offices was not; we did not visit any of the really small ones. With this caveat in mind, the country case studies resulted in mixed reviews of workloads and skills: some Country Offices were deemed reasonably well staffed for the workloads handled (e.g. Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Morocco); others (such as Pakistan and Malawi) were considered to be not equipped with the number and quality of professional staff needed. In nearly all cases, the lack of specialist expertise in policy and economics, social sciences, nutrition, and technical fields was considered a weakness which contributed to inferior project design and implementation.

The separate and disparate personnel systems for international and national staff are sources of tension. National officers, some of whom have worked for more than 10 years for the Programme, are sometimes used only as food aid monitors and logistics agents, without drawing fully on their wider development experience. The Executive Director has proposed a gradual substitution of some junior-level international posts by more experienced national staff. In the long run, this could considerably improve WFP's development effectiveness, particularly if the nationals engaged have technical and economic development expertise. This should be kept in mind in recruitment of national officers; in some of the case studies we have found that hitherto these have only lower level, not specialised, university education.

Country Office staff are greatly strained under circumstances where emergency operations build up rapidly. The lack of standardized approaches (administrative and computerized) to deal with relief operations results in considerable lost time "reinventing the wheel". Our visits to the case study countries revealed that the Country Offices cope well with these challenges, but there are also serious shortcomings in the full mobilisation of the relief effort. The country study of Malawi included a careful analysis of the build-up of the Country Office in response to the drought emergency. Although the emergency was formally declared in March 1992, it was not until July that a full-time coordinator for the operation was in place. In the meantime the Director of Operations spent most of his own time on the emergency, and reassigned his staff to work on it. By December 1992, nine months after the onset of the emergency, the Malawi Country Office had 14 international staff, 23 nationals and 8 Volunteers in two locations. The overall cost was still low in relation to the value of the resources being sent into the country. Among the casualties was development programming, which suffered from relative neglect during this period. It clearly was not feasible for a small Country Office to effectively support development activities, alongside commitments thrust upon the staff to quickly mobilise and support major refugee feeding and emergency programmes.

We urge consideration of a more rapid response system to better handle the problems of starting an operation, specifically the establishment of the proposed Rapid Response Team. Also, in countries where relief operations are being mounted and supported, the capacity of Country Offices to handle micro-assessment and monitoring needs to be strengthened. A suggestion as to how this might be funded is put forward in Chapter 5.

The Programme's activities have more than doubled in value since 1986, while core staff resources and facilities have remained at roughly the same level, suggesting that many Country Offices are under-supplied and staff are overworked. To verify whether this is so, WFP is in a process of examining workloads, facilities, and staff for its larger and more complex operations, such as those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, Sudan, Mozambique, and Angola. The nine country case studies point to many concerns about COs not having adequate capacity, particularly in analytical areas, to plan and manage its activities. However, in this era of UN reforms and donor constraints, it is unlikely that WFP will be able significantly to redress staffing issues with additional people. It seems more realistic for WFP now to consider closing some Country Offices, consolidating its diverse portfolio, relying more on national staff in Country Offices, more fully joining forces with other UN agencies, international finance

institutions and other donors, etc., so as to better match WFP activities and responsibilities with existing staff.

The relationship between the Country Office and the UNDP Resident Representative as representative of WFP is not typical of country representation of other UN agencies, and this is a cause for serious concern within WFP. We have some sympathy for this concern, but our country studies revealed no major operational difficulties resulting from the relationship. In the circumstances, particularly in view of the ongoing efforts to ensure better coordination between the development work of UN agencies, and the shortage of sufficiently experienced officers in WFP, we find it unnecessary to consider formally upgrading Directors of Operations to become independent WFP representatives. Problems generated by the present arrangement should be removed through direct negotiation between the parties.

A reduction in the number of Country Offices does not necessarily mean the full phasing out of activities in those countries where offices are closed. It would mean a shifting of actual, not only formal, responsibility to the WFP's representatives, the UNDP Resident Representatives. In many countries, a WFP officer attached to the UNDP office should be sufficient to handle ongoing food management and monitoring, whereas planning of new, extended or "expanded" activities would require participation by Headquarters or - where such is established - the WFP area office.

In other countries where the WFP is and remains active with a full complement of resident WFP staff, the problems referred to in our case studies in project planning and management are so pressing that limits need to be set on the number of projects undertaken at any time, and also on their scope and complexity. In the absence of a large Country Office staff, remote management of country operations from Rome could only be satisfactory if country programmes were concentrated on one or two projects that would be relatively simple to supervise. To our knowledge, WFP has not critically assessed its potential to manage activities more fully from Rome, or whether experience points to narrowing the range of activities and projects assisted. The choice between these options would have considerable political ramifications, but a choice needs to be made, both for general guidance and on a country by country basis. In the absence of better donor coordination and allocation of primary responsibility, particularly within the UN family, there are limits to the number of countries in which WFP could make do with only "indirect" representation through the UNDP Resident Representative.

Arguments have been advanced in favour of a WFP field presence in countries prone to emergencies, not only those currently receiving WFP relief assistance; the main argument being that this would facilitate start-up of relief operations. We are not aware of any analysis which supports this position, given the high costs of maintaining resident staff. Where there is no WFP Country Office, we suggest the watching brief on emerging needs of food aid relief be clearly given to the UNDP Resident Representative, as the WFP Representative, and his staff in the UNDP.

Rules and practices with respect to length and terms of overseas postings are major influences on WFP efficiency and effectiveness in the field. Overseas postings now last for four, three or

two years, depending upon the difficulty of the duty station. Given the time needed to become fully acquainted with the local scene, the impact from two-year rotations is sometimes limited. Particularly for involvement in policy formulation, in integration of food aid into national development strategies, in food aid coordination etc., a longer tenure is desirable. We are not aware of any in-depth WFP or UN-wide benefit-cost assessment of short-term assignments, but programme effectiveness foregone is certainly one cost element in the equation.

To facilitate longer-term postings in difficult duty stations, improved support services to staff and their families would be helpful, particularly in locating housing, spouse employment, and education opportunities. There might also be a bonus or other incentive applied to fill these posts, many of which are difficult to staff. These are personnel issues which need to be addressed by the UN system as a whole, perhaps with some encouragement from WFP. We have been told that junior field office staff with family prefer assignments outside Headquarters because of the high living costs in Rome. Nevertheless, some additional incentives may be needed to keep qualified staff in overseas posts. This problem would become less difficult to tackle if the number of fully staffed Country Offices was reduced.

4.3 Is WFP Over-Stretched?

In the light of all that has been said above, is the Programme coping adequately with its expanded workload, or has it taken on more than it can handle?

With regard to relief, problems have of course been created by the great increase in the volume of operations but we have come across no suggestions that the Programme's response time in handling requests or arranging shipments has slowed down. However, its financial systems need upgrading, and the Strategic Financial Plan 1994-95 speaks of "unacceptable and inadequate financial control" (CFA:35/11, para 10). There also appears to be great pressure on units handling such functions as resources management, food purchasing, shipping and logistics. We have a question as to how far the Regional Bureaux can handle development on top of relief, without sacrifice of quality. On the relief side, in short, there are problems, which are unlikely to be solved until the Programme has evolved a satisfactory system for financing the administration of its relief operations (this issue is further examined in Chapter 3.14).

There are problems of a different nature on the development side. Our evaluation clearly suggests that WFP is not carrying out certain functions effectively, notably in project design. Key skills are under-represented in both Headquarters and Country Offices. We see no possibility of obtaining funding for additional posts. We do, however, believe that project quality could be improved by concentrating on activities in fewer countries and sectors, leading to savings (especially through a reduction in the number of Country Offices) which could be deployed to bring about the necessary strengthening.

.4 Financial Management

WFP controls more grant resources than any other UN agency. It is expected to be the "honest broker" between donors of food aid, cash, and non-food items and recipient countries. It is not clear whether the WFP has fully come up to speed in financial management since gaining more autonomy over its resources, or whether the recent increases in the size of the Programme have outpaced administrative and financial systems. What is clear is the recognition on the part of the Executive Director that the Programme now suffers from "unacceptable and inadequate financial control". She has recommended a significant increase in financial management staff, particularly for field offices, to implement a reformed financial system. To management's credit, these problems were self-diagnosed and proposals for rectifying them have been given due priority.

While we are not in command of all details, we feel the need to underline the fundamental importance of managing these resources properly. It is not only an issue of controls, but also of project effectiveness, since some of the problems of the current system result in delays in local contracting, the movement of food, or the purchase of services. These, of course, are vital in relief operations. As WFP considers decentralizing authority and making Directors of Operations more responsible and more accountable, the financial management systems in place must be "user friendly" and fully transparent.

It is surprising that the problems in financial management were not diagnosed earlier, since WFP is subject to both external and internal audits, and inspection by the Joint Inspection Unit. In principle, the audit functions applied to WFP are important to assure donors that resources allocated to WFP are used according to strict financial standards. In addition, the internal audit has a role to play in improving the efficiency of development project and emergency management.

The Financial Regulations of the Programme require that the CFA appoint the Auditor-General of a state which is a member of the UN or of FAO as External Auditor of the Programme. The External Auditor, who reports to the CFA, is completely independent and solely responsible for the conduct of the audit, according to generally accepted auditing standards. In addition to performing the audit of the Programme accounts, the Financial Regulations foresee that the External Auditor may make observations with respect to the efficiency of the financial controls and, in general, the administration and management of the Programme. In line with the foregoing, the External Auditor gives an "Opinion" as to whether the financial statements present fairly the financial position and are prepared in accordance with the Financial Regulations. Since the inception of the Programme, the Comptroller and Auditor General of Great Britain has been the External Auditor of WFP.

The External Auditor examines both Headquarters and Field operations, and chooses special topics each biennial reporting period for analysis, such as the management of development projects, overland transport, and the management of the sale of commodities.

The internal audit office (OEDA) is responsive to an Audit Committee, composed of WFP directors and one member partner from an international accounting firm. OEDA is most concerned with systems and controls, in terms of compliance and efficiency audit. There is a

need for strengthened audit control on emergencies, authorized through Letters of Understanding. Internal audits focus first on programmes in LDC countries.

In his report on the 1988-89 Financial Statements of WFP, the External Auditor carried out a review of OEDA operations. During the period under review OEDA made more than 100 substantial recommendations, falling into the following categories: internal controls (39 percent), financial matters (25 percent), value for money (18 percent), and procedures and regulations (18 percent). We did not investigate which of these recommendations have been rectified by management.

We have been informed of differing opinions about how audit and evaluation functions are to interface. While not wanting to compromise the "carte blanche" of the audit function to analyze what it deems necessary, more coordination between Internal Audit and the Evaluation Service could be beneficial and complementary. This coordination should be easier to achieve now that audit and evaluation both respond directly to the Executive Director.

The Joint Inspection Unit is external to WFP and reports directly to the United Nations General Assembly. It has a special and autonomous status, and can take up any issue affecting UN organizations. It is currently looking at NGO relations within the UN system and comparative advantages.

1.5 Food Management

Food management is one of the key operations of WFP, which is common to development projects and relief operations. Though provision of food for emergency operations has to be undertaken more urgently, the process remains basically the same. We deal with some of the special problems linked to emergency operation in Chapter 5 and to development projects in Chapter 7.

The commodities made available as food aid from one year to the next are strongly correlated to the surpluses in WFP's major donor countries. Even where cash is given in lieu of commodities, procurement may be tied to the donor country involved. The resulting uncertainties and strings make the job of finding commodities in a timely way very complex. These issues were discussed in Chapter 3.

WFP is straightforward in its agreements with recipient governments; in all cases the food aid pledged is "subject to the availability of resources in general and of individual commodities in particular". Even the items indicated in project documents "constitute a notional food basket..., it being acknowledged that the precise mix and actual quantities of commodities ... may vary over time depending upon the availability of commodities to WFP and domestically within the recipient government." This flexibility allows WFP to attempt a balance between multilateral food aid supply and project demand.

WFP has gained a reputation for its relatively efficient resourcing of commodities. A literature review of food aid in Sub-Saharan Africa found few problems associated with late or inappropriate resources. Some problems have been experienced in recent years with the "borrowing" of food aid from development projects to accommodate emergencies, where replenishment of these stocks was slow or lacking. Some of the country case studies reported that development projects sometimes had to absorb unsolicited and unsuitable shipments of food that were "donated" by a single donor and which the WFP Country Office felt it did not have the authority to reject. Thus in Malawi, as reported in our country study, the WFP there had to absorb a shipment of oil which was not needed and which greatly disturbed domestic production and markets.

.6 Transport and Logistics

In WFP terminology "transport" covers the international movement of commodities up to the port or border crossing point at which they are normally handed over to the country concerned. Onward transportation and related costs are the responsibility of the government. In the case of least developed countries and "countries in similar conditions" the Programme is currently authorized to reimburse 100 percent of internal transport and handling (ITSH) costs of relief shipments and a lower proportion of these costs for development projects. Furthermore, the Programme has the possibility of agreeing with the government that title to WFP commodities will pass, not at the port or crossing point, but at a number of specified inland locations known as extended delivery points (EDPs). In this case it is the responsibility of WFP itself to arrange the internal transport. WFP uses the term "logistics" to cover onward movement to extended delivery points or to any other internal destination that may be decided in a particular case.

Transport and logistics undoubtedly represent the strongest point of WFP. Virtually all organizations consulted about the performance of the Programme spoke with respect for its skills and achievements in this area. The case study of Malawi reports an excellent example of the Programme's skill in the handling of the transport and logistic problems of the recent Southern Africa drought operation. Deliveries were planned on a regional basis, using all available port and railway facilities throughout the affected area. A regional Logistics Advisory Centre in Harare was established jointly by WFP and the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and the Programme stationed a staff member in Johannesburg to help in coordinating shipments passing through South Africa. As a result of these and other measures, stimulated by WFP but involving all transportation authorities in the region, deliveries to Malawi achieved twice the level that had previously been estimated by the Government as the maximum possible ceiling.

The outstanding reputation of WFP in this field has been confirmed by an "Evaluation Study of Food Aid Transport Costs and Options" carried out for the European Community in 1992 by a United Kingdom firm of economic and transport consultants (TecnEcon). The consultants examined the performance of all the organizations shipping significant quantities of food aid, and concluded that WFP consistently achieved the most competitive freight rates. Overall, they felt that WFP was the most effective agency, with a team of professional staff engaged solely on

transport matters, and a comprehensive database system of transport cost information. An indirect acknowledgement of WFP's skills in this area is the fact that bilateral programmes are asking the Programme to transport increasing quantities of food aid on a bilateral services basis. Approximately one million tons of bilateral food aid were handled by WFP in 1992.

It is thus not surprising that the Nordic Study of 1990 "recommended that the World Food Programme be formally designated as the UN agency with primary responsibility for matters relating to logistics and transport for both food and non-food items, including assistance to countries in developing their own transport arrangements". (Recommendation X)

After all these compliments, what are the negative points to note? The most significant is perhaps the danger of WFP being hypnotized by its own success in transport and logistics. This is a very important element in food assistance but it is, after all, only one. The Programme's ability to exert both intellectual and practical leadership, to propose strategic options, and to launch policy initiatives (particularly in the very costly field of relief), will ultimately determine its standing in the international community at least as much as its skills in transport and logistics.

A comment of a different nature is prompted by the wide variety of major tasks the Programme has taken on under the headings of logistics or special emergency operations. The establishment of the largest trucking enterprise in Ethiopia to make up for the lack of private-sector facilities seems to have gone well, and the World Food Programme Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE) is scheduled to be handed over to the government at the end of 1993. One hopes there will be a similarly happy ending for a USD 10 million project funded by the World Bank for the rehabilitation of port facilities in Somalia. However, the Programme is vulnerable, and if things go wrong there could be severe damage to its very high credibility. WFP needs to exercise caution in not getting too deeply involved in activities that are incidental to its basic mission, and that could probably be carried out by other organizations. If it is desired to continue down this road, thought might be given to hiving off such activities to a semi-independent body run on commercial lines with WFP as the main shareholder. This body could also handle bilateral services that involve resources not made available to the Programme.

Cost control of ITSH expenditures is going to become increasingly important, and these large items are likely to come under close scrutiny. It is difficult to comment on airlifting, which accounts for a substantial part of ITSH costs of some large operations (for instance Somalia, Sudan, Angola and Rwanda); in 1992 alone, the Programme lifted 68,000 tons of food at a cost of nearly USD 500 per ton. The question is not whether airlifting could have been done more cheaply, but whether this highly expensive form of transport was justified for every ton. This is an issue of overall operational management, rather than of logistics as such. The Programme has to exercise its judgement on when the use of air transport is justified, but there are no economic criteria to guide it. We are confident that the Programme does not need to be defensive about having incurred the high transport costs. However, the WFP should not only exercise every possible economy, it should also be able and ready to demonstrate, when called upon, that it has practised rigorous cost control.

4.7 Internal Decision-Making Structures

Since this evaluation is focused on programme efficiency and effectiveness, it is important to understand those internal decision-making structures and processes which most influence development projects and relief operations. There are also other formal decision-making committees within WFP, such as the Establishments and External Relations Committees, which are not discussed here. Some changes in committees and relations have taken place since the appointment of the new Executive Director.

Following the recent change in management, WFP now has more structured staff meetings at all levels. An Executive Staff meeting is held weekly, is chaired by the Executive Director and attended by all D-2s (Division Heads) and above, the Chief of Internal Audit, and the Chief of the Evaluation Service. A Senior Staff meeting is held monthly, is chaired by the Executive Director, and attended by D-1s (Service level) and above. Each division, service and branch is expected to organize regular staff meetings as well. Managers indicated to us that decision-taking previously had been highly centralized, somewhat ad hoc, and not consultative. A more formal and inclusive management approach should be an improvement; the effectiveness of these various meetings will, of course, have a lot to do with the attitudes and skills of management.

The current approach of executive management is to state broad objectives at the senior level and further define objectives at each subsequent level of management, thereby encouraging creativity and commitment. The Executive Director has expressed support for decentralized decision-making to the extent possible. Efficiency and accountability are now watchwords of the organization. All of these elements are somewhat new to WFP, and the performance of the organization under a different style of management cannot easily be assessed at this time. Since these are principles of management highly encouraged by previous WFP management reviews, it is important that the CFA monitor the progress being made in these areas.

It is also important to recognize that a management approach which decentralizes decision-taking must be supported by good information systems: office communications, analytical capacity, and support staff. WFP has acknowledged problems in its various information systems: some being too complex, obsolete, or unable to interface. These systems, like the financial system described earlier, must be improved concurrently with decisions to delegate more management authority.

It is especially important to look at the Projects Committee of WFP since all development and refugee project proposals and expansions must pass through this committee before being either approved by the Executive Director and/or sent to the SCP and CFA for approval. The performance to date of the Projects Committee indicates lack of quality control over projects. Recently, changes have occurred which might influence the functioning of the Projects Committee, such as the reorganization of the Operations Department, the need to be more discriminating in project approval to match available resources, and proposed revisions to the project cycle which might shift more substantive analysis to earlier stages of the process.

The Projects Committee brings together WFP expertise from the Bureaux, the Project Design and Programming Service, the Evaluation Service, the Transport and Logistics Division, and the Resources Division to discuss in detail every project or expansion being considered. The Project Idea is first circulated to members for written comments, but is not reviewed formally unless requested by the Regional Bureau or a committee member. The Project Outline is formally discussed in respect of objectives, beneficiaries, mission composition, and issues. When the Project Summary is prepared, the Projects Committee again examines it along with Notes for the Record from the previous meeting on the Project Outline and comments received from other UN technical agencies. The final version of the Project Summary takes into account the Projects Committee's concerns and those of other agencies.

In our country studies we found that this process was highly unsatisfactory as seen from the point of view of several Country Offices: changes have been made in Project Summaries without sufficient time for field consultation or to incorporate expert comments from technical assistance; sometimes projects sent before the CFA have been substantively changed from the Project Outline agreed by the recipient government, and these changes require delicate negotiations with government to retract decisions taken earlier; Headquarters often prepares sections which were absent or weak in the original submission, such as on gender or sustainability, which are then included to gain project approval, but are seen as irrelevant as guidance for project implementation in meaningful ways. The pressure of time for preparing these summaries for the upcoming CFA is frequently the reason given for the centralized and swift nature of these decisions.

There are many structural reasons, however, why the Projects Committee may not be performing to capacity: the workloads and travel schedules of its members, the limited in-house specialist staff available to comment, the variable responses and quality of the technical reviewers from other UN agencies, and the time pressures of trying to prepare for the CFA.

This is not to say that the Projects Committee does not make substantive improvements in project designs. From a sampling of formal remarks from Projects Committee members and from project files, very specific and often critical analyses are given. In our desk studies of project files it was found that Project Summaries were generally much improved from Project Outlines, indicating the important role played by Headquarters in project preparation and also the lack of planning capacity in the Country Offices. However, we noted that projects which have passed through the Projects Committee, including those in 1992-93, frequently were inconsistent in problem analysis, in setting realistic objectives, and in their coverage of important issues. The Projects Committee does not seem to exercise its full authority to require project design improvements before the Project Summaries are received by the SCP. While the Projects Committee may turn back more projects than in the past, quality control over those projects that pass through the Projects Committee remains an issue.

One of the effective committee structures before the reorganisation was the Disaster Relief Committee. This committee no longer formally exists, and, reportedly, decisions are taken through frequent, often informal, staff meetings. This may be appropriate now that Regional Bureaux are the focal points for both relief and development activities. Exactly how decisions

on emergencies will be handled, remains a bit unclear to us. Presumably, the current ambiguities about authority and priorities will be ironed out with the coming of the new Assistant Executive Director as head of the Operations Department.

4.8 Decentralisation

WFP decision-making, both at a policy and operations level, has been highly centralised over the years. The McKinsey Report attempted to "shift the centre of gravity" of WFP more to the field, and this has been done to some limited degree through increased delegations of authority to field offices.[42] We generally support, as does the Executive Director, placing more responsibilities on those individuals closest to the work. But we are in doubt about how much further decentralisation is justified, and in which areas. The Executive Director has recognised this problem[43] and has requested all division heads to determine the degree to which decision-making can be more decentralised. The results of this analysis are not yet available, but its completion and follow-up actions should be closely monitored by the CFA.

Some of the largest issues needing clarification relate to Country Office authority. Given the variable staffing of these offices, it stands to reason that variable scope and extent of delegated authority should also be considered. These might include more authority over operating funds, training funds, and local staff issues. Career development of international and local staff is also a major concern. With UNDP overheads for services increasing, WFP/HQ should investigate options for financial and administrative functions which it might handle more efficiently through electronic communications.

Resourcing the programme - made more complex by donor uncertainties and food basket issues - will remain largely a centralized function, as will most budgeting and staffing issues. WFP is proposing to further decentralize some of its administrative and financial functions, providing budgets for staff, overtime, travel, and consultants. Some other functions, such as the purchase of office equipment, documentation support, and even training may be decentralized in the future.

Whether, on balance, existing delegations of authority should be increased or not is unclear. The perceptions of several Directors of Operations in the case studies would indicate a need for more delegations and more flexibility depending upon the management capacity of the field office. However, Headquarters reports that some delegations are grossly underutilized, and that there is already some flexibility to increase delegations on a case-by-case basis, for instance, in purchasing. The unwillingness of Directors of Operations to exercise their management authority has been attributed both to complex procedures which are not fully understood and to a reticence on the part of Director of Operations to take responsibility.

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[42] WFP. "Delegations of Authority". Memorandum from AED/OD, WFP, 3 March, 1993.

[43] "Remarks of the ED of the WFP to the CFA", CFA: 34/3. 4 November 1992.

These conflicting views indicate that there is still a "cultural" barrier among many field and headquarters officers, and a communication problem at policy and operational levels.

There are several constraints to further decentralisation to the field. Perhaps the most limiting is the very uneven management experience in the country offices. Also, full accountability requires central control over procedures and budgets; opportunities for further decentralisation should be explored in the current review of the entire financial management review. Furthermore, in general, there must be central control of negotiation with donors of volume, composition and timing of food aid commodities and resources, and of transport and logistics; in fact, the 1994-95 Budget points to many advantages to further centralizing functions and achieving more economies of scale. The Programme, however, is encouraging more local purchases of commodities, which would require clearer procedures and the training of CO staff to implement. Some of our case studies also suggest that non-food items might be readily obtained locally if this were more decentralized.

.9 WFP Personnel

Only in recent years, and most conclusively in 1992 with its revised General Regulations, has WFP in fact assumed full managerial authority over its finances and personnel. Like other UN agencies, however, WFP is subject to UN Common System regulations regarding personnel. WFP's own personnel management procedures over the years have been weak. It appears that these issues are now being addressed. The CFA should keep itself informed of progress in this area in order to effectively discharge its oversight responsibilities.

Two of WFP's personnel quandaries are matching the changing requirements of development and emergency workloads, and accommodating a rapidly expanding growth in total resources going through the Programme. It is evident that quite a few staff members are called upon to handle tasks with which they are not previously familiar. Development and emergency roles are not fully interchangeable and some specialization of personnel is required. Food management is central to both types of activities, but relief work requires more management skills, while analytical ability and understanding of substance behind the activities is needed for effective guidance of development projects. WFP is still hiring and retaining "generalists", that is, individuals who are expected to work in many different routine capacities from development project planning to food management to the management of emergency operations. More core specialist support is especially needed if WFP is going to advance in its development understanding and programming.

In recent years, WFP has tackled its personnel issues in a variety of ways: some strategic planning reviews, a headquarters general service classification review, WFP country office reviews, and specific WFP country office assessment missions. The 1990 manpower report submitted by Public Administration Service strongly recommended that WFP analyze staff functions, workloads, and medium-term changes in programming.

The issue of staff growth is a serious one which is to be discussed in detail in the November 1993 CFA. Additional posts have already been identified for improving financial management and logistics operations, aspects fundamental to the Programme and to donor confidence in WFP. There are also proposals to substitute junior level international staff with more experienced national officers, and to offer more fixed term contracts, often from extrabudgetary sources, to local and international workers for both emergency operations and development activities. Increasingly, some WFP functions previously handled "in-house" (with little success) are being handled through specialist consultancies, for instance, in the analysis and development of Country Strategy Outlines. WFP is also considering training in-house and consultant specialist teams who can aid Country Missions in setting up emergency operations. These are all innovative approaches to addressing WFP's evolving staff needs. In addition, difficult decisions may need to be made about terminating staff who are no longer needed or who do not fit the corporate profile.

In 1992, two working groups were set up to assess the system from a general services and professional staff perspective. For professional staff, many deficiencies were enumerated in personnel procedures, including the criteria for appointments, promotions, and transfers, lack of transparency and ad hoc decision-taking, and disparities between promotions for Unified Service versus Specialized posts. In addition, a questionnaire sent to professional staff on career development indicated a perception that human resource development planning does not occur or is deficient. It was felt that the Staff Performance Assessment Report (SPAR) does not clearly link staff appraisal with specific staff objectives. Staff also recommended that more and better staff training was needed.[44]

Up to this point, considerable consultation has taken place to better understand personnel issues, but very few changes have been implemented to date. One explanation offered is that the personnel division is understaffed. It is too early to assess whether the recent reorganisation of WFP will significantly improve operations. It is apparent that a lot of thought and discussion have gone into the changes made so far: for example, functional statements and staffing needs were updated for each division, and parts of a personnel manual, supplemental to that of FAO, has been prepared in draft. Personnel appraisal for professionals has been adapted to become more transparent, but there is still no personnel appraisal in place for general services staff.

WFP and its Country Offices are made up of many different categories of staff, funded through different mechanisms and funds. In 1993, the professional staff funded from regular and extrabudgetary resources, including both Unified Service and Specialists, totals 505, of which 320 or 63 percent are in Country Offices. In addition, there are 83 National Officers in Country Offices; 10 Junior Professional Officers at HQ and 32 in field offices, all financed by donors; and 94 UN Volunteers in field offices. These categories largely make up the pool of professionals who perform WFP's work. They are supported by 259 General Services staff in Rome, 8 international GS staff in COs, and 1,091 local GS staff in COs. In total, WFP HQ

[44] Report of the Working Group on Personnel Matters - Professional Staff. WFP. July 1992.

staff comprise 454 people in all staff categories, compared with 1,628 in Country Offices. These figures do not include the many consultants WFP hires in different capacities.

From recommendations made in the CFA, the *Unified Service* came into effect in 1986, with the intention of better professional staff interchange within and between headquarters and the field and between related areas of work. The major objectives were to enhance the Programme's efficiency and effectiveness, strengthen WFP's field orientation, and improve career development possibilities for WFP professional staff. It was to improve morale in the organization, and make the Headquarters-Field schism less obvious. The Unified Service has made some inroads into bringing the HQ and CO "cultures" closer together. However, the rotation of HQ and CO staff remains limited, one result being that individuals making policy and analyzing issues at HQ are often perceived as being too distant from the realities of the field. Likewise, CO staff are sometimes presumed to be primarily good at logistics and not in tune with WFP's evolving principles and procedures. To some extent our country case observations confirm that these two "cultures" still hold unconstructive perceptions of the other.

The recent reorganization has, in fact, resulted in some moves between HQ and the field. A more decentralized management approach, coupled with improved systems, clear lines of authority, and greater accountability, could contribute to a fuller achievement of the intentions of the Unified Service.

In addition to Unified Service Posts, which for functional purposes are considered "generalist" in scope, a limited number of Specialist Posts exist. Specialists are primarily located at HQ, in fields such as logistics, computer services, and administration. The number of technical specialists in the Project Design and Programming Service is far too low to cope effectively with what we consider an important function in an organisation with the range of activities of the WFP. Its forerunner, the Project Design Service, was already very short on staff with sufficient technical coverage and depth; their number has actually been reduced in the recent reorganisation. We do not see how the WFP can fulfil even its basic development programming functions with the present complement of technical staff.

The lack of an adequate technical core, which can analyze and assimilate technical information coming from various missions, is one fundamental reason why WFP has not incorporated "lessons learned" into its development and emergency programming. It could be argued that some core support is needed in economics, agro-economics, rural sociology, community development, forestry, agronomy, civil engineering, education, nutrition, and health. A sharpening of the focus of WFP's programmes would logically reduce the range of sectoral expertise required.

General Services staff provide most of the support functions. Those located in Rome are administered by the Personnel Division. Apparently because of local union disagreement, the GS staff does not undergo any personnel appraisal procedure.

GS staff in Country Offices are hired and administered by UNDP. While this may be convenient, it is not optimal from the point of view of clearly establishing authority over staff.

In our country studies we found some evidence of problems in personnel evaluation and career advancement, but, in general, the personnel appraisal procedure were consultative between supervisors and staff, objectives-oriented and providing opportunities for discussion of workplans and performance. It is not, however, fully linked to advancement or career opportunities; thus, for instance, GS staff have defined grade ceilings beyond which not even an extraordinary achiever can advance; on the other hand, there are also near automatic step increases within a given grade, regardless of performance.

Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) are provided by donors to WFP as international interns. This arrangement is considered mutually beneficial to donors and WFP, though several problems have been highlighted in discussions. JPOs do not always receive sufficient induction, training, or supervision for their level of experience, and there are some concerns about using them effectively. Total annual costs to donors for each JPOs range from USD 60-USD 80,000, including a 12 percent administrative overhead to WFP. The WFP would prefer to have more experienced JPOs since the system does supplement staff at little cost to WFP; it is a possible source of recruitment, and it creates future "ambassadors" of WFP. We join WFP itself in urging more donors to follow the example of the Netherlands and Italy in financing JPOs from developing countries.

Though WFP appraises individual JPO performance, no evaluation of the JPO mechanism as a whole is available. However, the results of an ongoing evaluation are due to be presented in 1993. It is important for the effective use of this resource that any misconception and unrealistic expectation on the part of donors and JPOs themselves about the JPO programme be corrected.

United Nations Volunteers (UNV) are another source of recruitment. They are generally more experienced than JPOs, require less supervision, and are often given large responsibilities in emergencies, monitoring, etc. In 1993, there were 59 financed through regular resources, most of them from developing countries, and 35 financed by other funds. They tend to be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa.

WFP statistics indicate that only 7 percent of the UNVs are female. (We do not have comparable figures for other UN agencies.) WFP reports that it would recruit more women if qualified candidates were made available. This is particularly important since the UNV mechanism is noted for bringing more professionals from developing countries into the UN system. We suggest that WFP determine the structural reasons within the UN why more women candidates are not proposed for selection.

WFP makes a distinction between consultants recruited for policy and operations, for emergencies, and for project design and evaluation. For policy and operations, decisions have so far been taken in the Consultants Committee, which, we understand, is now being abolished. The Consultants Committee was originally put in place to make consultant selection more objective and to curb abuses in hiring. The recruitment of consultants for emergencies is currently approved by the Director of Personnel, usually within a few days. This does not seem to pose any problems. It is the system of recruitment and management of consultants for project design and evaluation which seems most problematic. WFP's general regulations indicate that

here the FAO and other UN agencies will normally supply the required technical expertise. WFP pays to support liaison officers in these agencies as well as the consultant services actually provided. There are mixed reviews among WFP managers on both the services provided by these liaison officers and the timing and quality of technical assistance. Based on discussions at Headquarters and in the case studies, the spectrum of opinion runs from total disappointment to complete satisfaction. However, in the spirit of integration and cooperation being discussed in the UN system, the consultancy relationships with UN agencies should as far as possible be maintained, although new formulas and understandings should be considered.

There are also differing opinions within WFP of whether consultants outside the UN system could or should be used more frequently instead of UN technical assistants. More specialist, higher quality consultants might be available from outside the system in those sub-sectors where results from UN contacts have not been satisfactory. The Nordic UN Project found that, in general, the UN technical agencies were analytically weaker than counterparts and consultants in the international financial institutions, and that salaries and consultant's fees were far higher in these institutions.[45] This may put WFP at a disadvantage when competing for some of the better external consultants.

As part of a comprehensive review of WFP's personnel policies and practices, an assessment of the technical assistance relationship and mechanisms used, such as liaison officers and the Consultants Committee, would be useful. This would include a serious analysis whether WFP is getting value for money from the UN agency relationship, and whether engaging high quality external consultants is a realistic option. There might also be some consideration given to posting UN technical experts within WFP, or other more innovative approaches.

An important personnel function in consultant selection, however, would be an evaluation mechanism to assure that low performers were not re-engaged by WFP at a later date. WFP should put into place a formal consultant evaluation system, thereby giving more structure to decisions to re-engage both external consultants and UN technical assistance. Should consultant decisions become more decentralized, this information could be made available on a confidential basis and regularly referred to by hiring officers.

We have noted, from Headquarters interviews and from Country Office observation, that there appears to be much variation in the qualifications and skills of international staff, not least at the level of Director of Operations. In principle, since 1988, WFP has more rigorously applied education, experience, and language requirements when selecting candidates. Appointment to the Unified Service is now based on academic qualifications: a graduate academic background (minimum Master's degree or equivalent) in a development-related discipline, preferably economics, agriculture, public or business administration, or inter-disciplinary studies with an international orientation, or equivalent professional experience. In addition, the selection

[45] The Nordic UN Project. *The United Nations in Development: Reform Issues in the Economic and Social Fields - A Nordic Perspective*. 1991.

committee is to take fully into account the Programme's policy to increase the representation of women and to achieve a more balanced mix of nationalities.[46]

According to the UN Charter, "efficiency, competence, and integrity" are to take precedence in hiring over geographic representation. The Nordic UN Project found the hiring of lesser qualified individuals because of political considerations to be a major obstacle to effectiveness in the UN system in general. We did not review the criteria used or processes of the WFP Appointments and Promotions Committee, which matches individuals with defined jobs and recommends candidates for retention on qualified recruitment rosters, but the ad hoc working group on personnel expressed concern about inconsistencies and lack of transparency in the process.

In principle, promotions in WFP are to be based on three criteria: merit, mobility (for Unified Staff), and seniority. The key elements of merit or performance are job knowledge and competence, personal effectiveness, interpersonal effectiveness, and performance as a supervisor. Other merit criteria are integrity, ability to communicate clearly, both orally and in writing, ability to perform at higher levels of responsibility, and managerial and supervisory capabilities for promotion to the P4, P5, and D1 levels.[47] All things being equal and as long as all criteria are met, priority for promotions is to be given to female staff members and to officers who have completed two assignments in very difficult duty stations.

We did not investigate in detail how performance appraisal of professional staff is done: how much self-assessment there is or dialogue with supervisors, who comprise the review panels, or how appeals are made. It is also not clear how, in practice, non-performing staff are dealt with in WFP, by termination or non-renewal of contract, or whether they are retained in the Programme indefinitely. However, the Executive Director has reported that the most recent personnel appraisal was more consultative and transparent than was previously the case. It also resulted in considerably more women being promoted in professional categories than had been the case in the past.

At the Country Office level, personnel appraisal of general service and other local staff is administered through a standard UNDP procedure, with representation of the Director of Operations on the committee. While the process, which links performance with objectives, is useful, advancement for this group of staff, as at headquarters, is not necessarily linked with the appraisal process. There are also delays in Country Offices for local staff receiving promotions, since all administrative procedures must pass through both UNDP and WFP headquarters.

WFP is now taking more seriously its stated commitment to recruit and advance qualified women candidates, especially in senior management positions where representation was practically nil until very recently. In the latest annual promotion process, 44 percent of those promoted were

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[46] WFP. "Criteria for Appointment (Unified Service)". Undated.

[47] WFP. "Provisional Guidelines and Procedures Regarding Promotion and Reassignment of Staff on Unified Service Posts". Memorandum from the ED. 6 April 1988.

women. Of all staff newly hired by WFP since April 1992, 33 percent were women. Of the top level D-1 and D-2 appointments made in the past year, 6 out of 16 were women. Women now occupy the senior positions of Executive Director, Director of the Office of Executive Director (D-1), Director of Personnel (D-2), Director of Resources (D-2), Director of the WFP's New York Office (D-1), and two Regional Managers (D-1).[48]

While this is encouraging, it is important to recall that the representation of women in general in WFP in 1992 was grossly inadequate and it will take years of vigilance and effort to redress these issues. For example, in 1992, of the 244 WFP field staff indicated, only 44 were women.[49] Women comprise only 17 percent of the Unified Service and 21 percent of the Specialist Staff. Women were more strongly represented as JPOs (38 percent), but barely represented as UN Volunteers (7 percent).[50] The distribution of women among the different levels of staff shows a much higher proportion in lower staff categories. When General Service (support) staff are included in the average, the overall WFP complement of women is 56 percent.

The UN system as a whole has adopted a target of 35 percent representation of women among professional staff by 1995, with 20 percent being in the management category. While WFP has recently made some advances in this area, there is a long way to go.

Training is an essential part of the evolution of WFP towards being a more effective development and emergency response organization. Since many of these functions are carried out by the same individuals, creating and upgrading the "optimal" employee will require considerable training support. A survey by the working group on personnel issues found a keen desire for more training of both WFP personnel and counterparts.

Training courses are now evolving to address needs identified with the on-going reorganization. In the next biennium, training in emergency management will be offered, at both Headquarters and in the field, in conjunction with UNHCR if donor financing comes through. Senior management training will be conducted for all Directors of Operations in 1993-94. The Monitoring and Evaluation Workshops, which have been extensively offered over the past two years, will be wound down. The more routine training events in office automation, food management, language skills, and financial management will continue. Experimental courses have recently been offered in the new staff appraisal system, in team building and in communications.

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48 "Statement by the ED of the WFP", CFA: 35/3. 2 June 1993. Since then, a woman has also been appointed as Secretary CFA (D-1).

49 WFP. "WFP International Staff Outside HQ (All Categories)". March 1992.

50 WFP/CFA. "Annual Report of the Executive Director: 1991. Appendices: Table A.26", WFP/CFA: 33/P/4 Add. 1, 16 March 1992.

WFP's dependence on host government personnel for development project implementation justifies the need for a major portion of the training budget, at least one-half, to go towards counterpart training, with over 7,400 counterpart staff in 47 countries being trained in 1991. Nearly half of the training events were conducted in LDC countries, the majority of these in Sub-Saharan Africa. The training was usually linked to the project cycle. Training is being increasingly decentralized, and is open to government professionals, project and programme management staff, NGOs, and other UN and development agencies with shared objectives.[51]

In general, we are impressed by the training effort in WFP and the efforts to up-date and tailor the training programme to changing needs. Our country case studies indicated that Country Offices could use some discretionary funds for training which could be developed and offered locally. The centralized training process does not permit the very cost-effective and punctual training that might be particularly helpful to CO staff and counterpart agencies.

4.10 Issues to be Kept Under Scrutiny

Over-Arching Institutional Changes

WFP has some serious institutional problems to overcome, relating most urgently to aligning staff and facilities with a growing programme in a climate of economic austerity. In addition, it has to adapt its way of functioning to the increased autonomy which it has obtained in recent years. As we have come to see it, management has, in general, focused on critical and fundamental issues, including reorganization for higher quality development and relief activities, overhauling personnel systems and procedures, and critically assessing the financial, administrative, and logistics systems in place. While the full result of these efforts are yet to show themselves, it is evident that management is taking these issues seriously. The CFA should, as part of its oversight function, carefully monitor and encourage these improvements, as necessary.

Responsibilities for Development and Relief

The reorganisation has increased the responsibilities of the Regional Bureaux for relief operations, but the respective roles of the Directors of the Development and Emergency Divisions in relation to that of the Assistant Executive Director as head of the Operations Department are not clear. In particular the functions of the Emergency Support Service require clarification.

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[51] WFP. "Operational Activities Training Programmes", memorandum from H.J. Gotzmann to Mr. Andrew J. Joseph, UNDP. 10 March 1992.

Resolving WFP's Headquarters Problem

WFP's current facilities are not adequate, expectations to move into an adjoining office tower have been complicated by a need to invest considerably in renovations, and another location in Rome has not been found. In addition to a low standard of physical facilities, WFP needs to improve its office automation, telecommunications, and management information systems. While the office problem in due time may be resolved through the generosity of the Italian government, a more explicit recognition of the unacceptable working conditions by the donors supporting the Programme would seem to be long overdue. The status quo undoubtedly seriously affects WFP's performance in many areas, and aggressive measures should be taken to resolve this problem.

Considerations for Country Office Improvements

The Country Office is in the frontline of all WFP activities. The value of the Programme's activities has more than doubled since 1986, mainly due to relief operations. Though the Country Offices have coped remarkably well with rapid increases in workload, this has been at the cost of reduced ability to participate effectively in initial design and subsequent modification of development projects.

There are several ways of improving Country Office efficiency and effectiveness: through staff training; through reductions in the numbers of international staff in favour of national officers and experienced professionals on fixed-term contracts; through office closures and consolidation; through reductions, simplification, or phasing out of country programmes, making remote management more feasible; through closer in-country relationships with UNDP and others where WFP does not have a field office; and through longer, better-supported field postings of international staff. We stress the need for fewer and better-staffed own Country Offices, and for a concentration of project activities in fewer sectors in which WFP has demonstrated its ability to assist in the design and implementation of relatively successful projects. The Programme could still operate projects in countries without such Country Offices by relying on the UNDP Resident Representative, supported as needed by, preferably, nationally recruited WFP project officers.

Food Management, Transport and Logistics

We have found no evidence to suggest that the WFP Headquarters and Country Offices do not handle food management as efficiently as circumstances permit. To find the right resources at the right time depends on available donor pledges and WFP has clearly acquired rich and valuable experience in contact with donors. Its ability to handle international transport is highly regarded, and also its efforts in logistics to get food to its final destinations in recipient countries seem to satisfy both governments and other donor agencies, which draw on WFP for assistance.

Improvements Needed in Development Projects and PROs

We have found that the project approval process within WFP is not satisfactory. The Project Committee has not been able to prevent projects that are weak in problem analysis, set unrealistic objectives, and do not cover important issues. Headquarters staff appear to "massage" elements of project proposals, such as the effects on women, to gain approval in the CFA. Country Office staff and national officials complain that the Project Summaries approved in the CFA have sometimes been substantively changed from those which were submitted, without proper consultations between HQ and CO.

It is understandable that the Project Committee, whose members have heavy workloads and travel schedules, is unable to examine projects better, but this clearly demonstrates that more in-house technical staff is required.

Personnel Issues

There is considerable case study evidence that some staff are over-stretched, and that development and emergency roles are not easily interchangeable. The core WFP staff are "generalists" who work in different capacities, from development project planning to the management of emergency operations, with food management as a key operation which in general appears to be handled well. Again, more core specialist support is needed, notably in planning and supervision of development activities, and in the mobilisation and supervision of the external technical assistance on which WFP as a development agency relies.

The issue of staff growth, which is to be discussed in detail in the November 1993 CFA is a serious one. Additional posts have already been identified for improving the financial management and logistics operations of WFP, aspects fundamental to the Programme and to donor confidence in WFP. In our opinion also other specialist staff is needed. We will stress once more that the concentration of available staff in fewer Country Offices is the most cost effective solution in a situation of staff constraint.

Attaining Adequate Technical Assistance

WFP pays for technical assistance from FAO and other UN agencies for project design missions and evaluations. There are mixed reviews among WFP officials and national counterparts of the timing and quality of technical assistance, running the gamut from complete satisfaction to total disappointment. WFP needs to analyze its technical assistance relationships and mechanisms particularly in respect of the services provided by FAO and other UN agencies, and establish whether and when engaging high quality external consultants is a better course. Consideration may also be given to more innovative uses of UN technical experts, e.g. by posting some of them within WFP. In any case, WFP should put into place a formal consultant evaluation system, thereby giving more structure to decisions to engage and re-engage both external consultants and UN technical assistance.

The Status of Women in WFP

WFP has demonstrated its seriousness of intent to recruit and advance qualified women, especially in senior management positions where representation was practically nil until very recently. While this is encouraging, it is important to recall that the representation of women in professional positions in general in WFP in 1992 was grossly inadequate and it will take years of vigilance and effort to redress this imbalance.

Annex 4.1: WFP Organisational Chart



Annex 4.2: List of WFP Responsibilities by Regional Bureau from 1 January 1993

Horn and East Africa (ODH)	Latin America and Middle East (ODM)	Mediterranean and Middle East (ODM)	Asia and Pacific (ODP)	Southern Africa (ODM)	West and Central Africa (ODW)
Regional Manager	**Regional Manager**	**Regional Manager**	**Regional Manager a.i.**	**Regional Manager**	**Regional Manager**
BURUNDI *	ANTIGUA & BARBUDA	AFGHANISTAN *	BANGLADESH *	ANGOLA *	BENIN *
COMOROS *	BARBADOS *	ALGERIA *	BHUTAN *	BOTSWANA *	BURKINA FASO *
DJIBOUTI *	BOLIVIA *	EGYPT *	CAMBODIA *	LESOTHO *	CAMEROON *
FRITREA *	BRAZIL*	GAZA/WEST BANK	CHINA *	MALAWI *	CAPE VERDE *
ETHIOPIA *	CHILE *	IRAN *	INDIA *	MOZAMBIQUE *	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC*
KENYA *	COLOMBIA *	IRAQ *	INDONESIA *	NAMIBIA *	CHAD *
MADAGASCAR *	COSTA RICA *	JORDAN *	LAOS	SWAZILAND *	CHONGO *
MAURITIUS *	CUBA *	LEBANON *	NEPAL *	TANZANIA *	COTE D'IVOIRE
RWANDA *	DOMINICA	MOROCCO *	PHILIPPINES *	ZAMBIA *	EQUATORIAL GUINEA *
SEYCHELLES	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC *	PAKISTAN *	SRI LANKA *	ZIMBABWE *	GAMBIA *
SOMALIA *	ECUADOR *	SYRIA *	THAILAND *		GHANA *
SUDAN *	EL SALVADOR *	TUNISIA *	VIETNAM *		GUINEA *
UGANDA *	GRENADA *	TURKEY *			GUINEAU BISSAU *
	GUATEMALA *	REPUBLIC OF YEMEN *			LIBERIA *
	GUYANA *	EASTERN EUROPE (NIS/CIS)			MALI *
	HAITI *				MAURITANIA *
	HONDURAS *				NIGER *
	JAMAICA *				SAO TOME PRINCIPE *
	MEXICO *				SENEGAL *
	NICARAGUA *				SIERRA LEONE *
	PANAMA *				TOGO *
	PARAGUAY *				ZAIRE *
	PERU *				
	ST. KITS/NEVIS				
	ST. LUCIA				
	ST. VINCENT/GRENADINES				

* Countries marked with an astisk indicate where WFP maintains a presence through a staffed office.

ODS
5 February 1993

Annex 4.3: Country Offices Classified by Volume of Disbursements 1990-92 Number, Activities and Top Management

Turnover in mill. USD per year	Number of COs			Grade of country office DOO in UN staff structure				COs without international staff
	total	with development activities	with frequent emergencies	P 3	P 4	P 5	D	
0 - 3	14	13	1	3	7	1	0	3
3 - 6	26	24	10	3	17	5	0	1
6 - 10	12	12	8	2	7	3	0	0
10 - 20	20	16	7	1	9	7	3	0
20 - 50	7	5	3	1	1	3	2	0
Above 50	7	6	5	0	2	2	3	0
Total	86	76	34	10	43	21	8	4

Sources: *WFP Progress Report 1992*, table A4, page A 12 ff.; *WFP International Staff outside HQ (all categories)*, December 1992.
Notes: The table does not cover the Country Office in Eritrea, as no activities were listed there in the progress report. The "turnover" is defined as annual average disbursements during 1990-92 according to the progress report. (Data in *1993 Food Aid Review* are somewhat different.) Development activities refer to COs with ongoing projects. Frequent emergencies refer to countries for which EMOPs have been approved in at least 6 years during 1980-1993. PROs are not included. Four of the 87 staffed Country Offices have no international staff (except the UNDP Resident Representative as WFP Res. Rep), and are supervised from a neighbouring country or in one case from HQ.

5.0 WFP as a Relief Organisation

This chapter is based mainly on the country studies carried out as part of this evaluation. Particular use has been made of the studies of Ethiopia, Pakistan and Malawi, where major relief operations had just been concluded or were still underway at the time of our visits. Annex B contains a tabular summary, in highly condensed form, of the main findings on relief operations.

There is very little material available from other sources evaluating WFP's performance in relief. While extensive discussions at WFP Headquarters with the staff of the Programme have enabled many points to be clarified, it has not proved feasible on the basis of information available in Rome, either orally or in files, to reach any judgment on relief operations that were not reviewed on the ground in our own evaluation.

In addition, information and opinions have been sought, either by visits or on the telephone, from senior staff of other United Nations agencies, donors and NGOs.

Additional information on resource flows for relief will be found in Chapter 3. Decision-making procedures and management questions are covered in Chapter 4.

5.1 The Background

5.1.1 Objectives and Definitions

There is no formal definition of the objectives of WFP's relief work, perhaps because they are considered obvious. For the purposes of this evaluation the primary objective is taken as being "To save lives and restore levels of nutrition following an emergency". A secondary objective is summarized as follows in WFP's excellent manual on "Food Aid in Emergencies": "To the maximum extent possible, [emergency food aid] is provided and used in ways which promote self-reliance, attack the root causes of the emergency, support national food security, and reinforce long-term development efforts."

WFP's definition of an emergency was adopted by the IGC (Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme, predecessor of the CFA) in 1970, and slightly amplified by the Committee in 1975:

> "... emergencies are defined as urgent situations in which there is clear evidence that an event has occurred which causes human suffering or loss of livestock and which the government concerned has not the means to remedy; and it is a demonstrably abnormal event which produces dislocation in the life of a community on an exceptional scale. This definition covers (a) sudden calamities

such as earthquakes, floods, locust infestations and similar unforeseen disasters (b) man-made emergencies like an influx of refugees (c) food scarcity conditions owing to drought, crop failures, pest diseases."

Neither the IGC nor the CFA has ever fixed a formal time limit for the duration of emergency operations (EMOPs), but they are not normally expected to run beyond one year, and much shorter periods are set whenever possible. The major exceptions are operations for refugees and displaced persons, who may need relief for many years. Since 1989, longer-term operations for these groups have been known respectively as Protracted Refugee Operations (PROs) and Protracted Displaced Person Operations (PDPOs); they are subject to different procedures and different funding. The term "relief" thus covers both EMOPs and PRO/PDPOs. (In the following we use just PRO to refer, where applicable, also to PDPO.)

5.1.2 Procedures

Under the General Regulations of the Programme, allocations of emergency aid are approved by the Executive Director up to the level of his authority for approving projects (currently $3 million) after "close consultation" with FAO. Allocations for a higher figure involve "due consultation" with FAO and are approved by the Executive Director and the Director-General of FAO jointly.

The government of an affected country and WFP sign a Letter of Understanding which sets forth their respective obligations. This constitutes the formal legal agreement covering the handling and use of commodities. The government must submit reports as provided in the Letter of Understanding. The main requirement is for a final report within three months of the end of distribution, together with final accounts certified by the Government auditor.

In contrast, PROs are subject to the regular approval procedures for projects. The Executive Director may currently approve allocations up to the $3 million level, while higher amounts must go to the CFA for approval. Once a PRO is approved the operational and reporting procedures as set out in the Letter of Understanding are very similar to those for EMOPs.

5.1.3 Growth and Pattern of Relief Activities

Table 1 shows the growth and pattern of relief activities in terms of numbers of operations and financial commitments for food and transport costs between 1988 and 1992.

Perhaps the most striking feature is the enormous increase in the cost of EMOPs in 1992 due to the southern Africa drought (commitments to PROs actually went down slightly in that year). Also remarkable is the escalation in transport costs (including ITSH charges), which in 1991 and 1992 represented nearly half of the total cost of both EMOPs and PROs. The explanation lies in the very high logistic costs of complex operations such as those in Somalia and Sudan, and in the fact that refugees tend to flee to remote areas to which transport is expensive.

WFP classifies relief operations in three categories: refugees and displaced persons; drought and crop failure; and natural disasters. The second and third categories are intended to distinguish slow moving from sudden emergencies.

The breakdown of EMOPs between 1990 and 1992 by category and region is given in Table 2. Notable is the low proportion of commitments for emergencies resulting from sudden natural disaster during this period. Except for major occurrences these are usually taken care of by national government alone or with NGOs.

Table 1
WFP Relief Commitments 1988-92

Year	Number of Operations Approved	Food Cost (mill.$)	Transport Cost (mill.$)	Total Cost (mill.$)	Transport Percent of Total	Average Cost per Operation (mill.$)
EMOPs						
1988	65	177.2	76.5	253.7	30	3.9
1989	46	68.7	23.1	91.8	25	2.0
1990	32	79.3	52.0	131.3	40	4.1
1991	44	223.4	167.4	390.8	43	8.9
1992	63	454.7	442.1	896.8	49	14.2
PROs						
1989	22	201.8	64.6	266.4	24	12.1
1990	19	255.4	80.2	5.6	24	17.7
1991	14	301.7	197.5	499.2	40	35.7
1992	14	253.7	178.4	432.1	41	30.1

Note: In 1992 the southern Africa drought emergency, covering nine countries, was approved as a single umbrella operation but is counted here as nine operations. Transport costs include ITSH costs.
Source: Reports of Executive Director to CFA on Emergency Operations and PROs

The dominant categories in Table 2 are drought/crop failure in sub-Saharan Africa, refugees and displaced persons in sub-Saharan Africa, and refugees and displaced persons in North Africa, the Near East and Europe.

Table 2
EMOPS 1990-92 by Type of Emergency and Region
(percent of annual commitments by value)

Year	Type of emergency	All regions	Sub-Saharan Africa	Asia and Pacific	Latin America & Caribbean	N. Africa, Near East & Europe
1990	Refugees/ displaced	74	64	-	2	8
	Drought/ crop failure	23	21	-	-	2
	Natural disaster	3	1	1	-	1
1991	Refugees/ displaced	62	35	1	-	26
	Drought/ crop failure	36	36	-	-	-
	Natural disaster	2	-	2	-	-
1992	Refugees/ displaced	42	19	3	1	19
	Drought/ crop failure	57	56.5	-	0.5	-
	Natural disaster	1	-	0.5	0.5	-

Source: Reports of Executive Director to CFA on emergency operations.

The classification used by WFP does not bring out one of the most significant developments in the Programme's work, namely the provision of relief in zones of conflict. This is discussed below.

5.2 Assessment, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

5.2.1 Assessment of Needs

In cases of *crop failure* a national-level assessment of the food situation and outlook, and an estimate of food aid needs, is normally undertaken jointly by FAO and WFP in consultation with the Government. This may be termed macro-assessment. The broad division of functions is for FAO to examine crop prospects and estimate the extent to which they can be met by commercial imports, while WFP looks at vulnerability and, taking into account any logistic or other constraints, estimates the scope and level of food aid required. The joint mission will then come up with an estimate of the national shortfall and a recommendation on emergency food aid.

Both organisations have published guidelines on assessment, WFP in its handbook on "Food Aid in Emergencies" and FAO in its "Methodology for the Assessment of the Food Supply Situation and Requirements for Exceptional Assistance arising from Crop Failure or Unusual Crop Surplus" (Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture, 1987). The joint assessments are considered helpful to donors in determining their response. Cooperation

between WFP and FAO appears to be going well. The current arrangements for national-level assessment seem to be working satisfactorily.

The country study for Malawi, however, strongly suggests the need for more detailed information regarding the situation of the specific population groups affected by the emergency; such information might be developed through what may be termed micro-assessment. The lack of such information in the earlier stages of the Malawi drought emergency was brought to our attention by people at all levels from Minister downwards. While the scope will vary from case to case, the data generated by micro-assessment could include any or even all of the following types of information: geographical location of the emergency by district; economic classes affected, e.g. nomads, landless workers or small farmers; nature and relevance of traditional coping systems, including secondary crops; functioning of the commercial or local trading sector, and buying power (if any) of affected groups; emerging or expected nutritional problems, particularly of vulnerable groups; and any differential impact of the emergency by gender.

The lack of micro-assessment in Malawi opened the way to disputes over the geographic location of the emergency, with pressure (for political reasons) for the operation to be extended to all districts of the country. Again, the country study reports anecdotal suggestions that, at least in some areas, the ration was over-generous since no account was taken of secondary crops such as cassava, rice, and vegetables produced in waterlogged areas. Neither the Government of Malawi nor the WFP Country Office was ready with a methodology for collecting the required information.

Micro-assessment is already foreseen in WFP's manual on "Food Aid in Emergencies". We advocate its further practical development as an important way forward for improving the effectiveness of WFP emergency operations. It should not be considered as a luxury add-on, but as an integral part of the WFP approach. It can be simple or elaborate, and the exact nature and extent of micro-assessment in a particular emergency will have to be decided very early on. WFP should develop a methodology for micro-assessment, incorporating a range of possible approaches, that should be available to its own staff at Headquarters and in countries, as well as to governments and other organisations.

Very often there will have to be a trade-off between collecting full information and making quick decisions. Micro-assessment should not slow things down. On occasion, an initial allocation of emergency food aid can be made in order to get the operation started while further data is collected and a more accurate assessment of needs is built up.

Micro-assessment should be conducted under the full responsibility of WFP but making use of all sources of information in the country, including central and local government, other organisations such as UNICEF, and international or national NGOs.

Micro-assessment (linked with improved monitoring, which is dealt with below) can be expensive if done elaborately. On the other hand, it can certainly save many times its cost in relief resources. In any gradually unfolding emergency such as crop failure the key decision for

WFP is whether, and in what form, micro-assessment is feasible and justified. The cost should be part of the budget of the operation (not part of the regular budget of WFP).

Quite a different set of problems is involved in assessing the food aid needs of *refugees and displaced persons*. The key issue is the number of people to be fed. The country studies of Ethiopia and Pakistan report long-standing and still partly unresolved problems in this area.

In Ethiopia, we found that supplies to Somali refugees had been over-generous, perhaps with a view to food being carried over the border into a part of Somalia that could not be reached directly. Whatever the reason, the number of rations distributed had certainly been excessive, with the result that the local price for a bag of grain had dropped from 80 birr to 10 birr, a fraction of the figure in other parts of the country. There was anecdotal evidence that traders had accumulated hundreds of ration cards. In Pakistan, a series of measures had been taken to cope with over-counting of Afghan refugees. These had included re-enumeration, reduction of rations, and a suspension of the registration of new arrivals. Numbers were going down as repatriation took place but the situation was still not under control, particularly in Balochistan. Various options were being examined at the time of the field visit. On the other hand, no problems of this nature were reported with the operation for refugees from Mozambique in Malawi.

Refugee feeding operations are the joint responsibility of WFP and UNHCR. Under the Global Agreement between the two bodies, WFP has undertaken to provide the basic food for all refugee situations involving more than 1,000 persons. Assessments of needs are carried out jointly. However, the determination of numbers of refugees is within the domain of UNHCR, together with the host government. Disputes over numbers generally arise because the government is unable or unwilling to face up to refugee leaders who have an interest in exaggerating the size of the caseload.

Experience under the Global Agreement is currently being assessed by WFP and UNHCR. We feel that WFP should seek recognition from UNHCR that deciding on numbers to be fed is fully a joint responsibility. The Programme should also press UNHCR to develop more sophisticated techniques for the assessment of numbers, that could be applied without precipitating a confrontation with the refugees. One of these might be the use of remote sensing technology (aerial and/or satellite photography). If no agreement can be reached between UNHCR, WFP and the host government on an accurate census, and there are serious reasons for believing that refugee numbers are being exaggerated, the Programme should press for delivery of a smaller number of rations than the official caseload. This, in effect, was one of the measures taken in Pakistan.

5.2.2 Planning of EMOPs and PROs

Successful planning of *an EMOP* depends in the first place on the recipient government; WFP provides assistance insofar as the government has difficulty in coping. The country study for Malawi has reported on the difficulties experienced by the government in planning relief for the 1992 drought, which in scope far surpassed anything in recent national experience. WFP was

not in a position to provide planning help quickly. The emergency had been underway for over two months before a senior person, funded by a donor, could be made available to help the Government of Malawi with planning and organizing the relief operation. We feel that the Programme should be prepared, in future, to make relief planning expertise available at short notice in answer to a government request. This could be one of the functions of the Rapid Response Team discussed further below.

The development of micro-assessment as described above should be accompanied by improved planning with a view to the better targeting of relief; adapting operations to local coping systems, and maintaining the resilience of communities; taking account of the role of the commercial sector or local trading system; and seeking, wherever possible, to get at the root causes of the emergency and to reinforce long-term development objectives. The phrase "operational design" may be useful in conveying the idea that planning should go beyond logistics and set the operation in a policy framework.

The Malawi country study brings out certain weaknesses in WFP's internal planning for emergencies. The Programme does not have a standard set of forms or software which can be adapted to local circumstances for such activities as food movement, beneficiary registration, or in-country reporting. Each time the wheel has to be reinvented. We feel that standard forms and software should be developed and placed at the disposal of Country Offices as soon as feasible. They can be adapted as necessary to local circumstances.

The buildup of staff in the Malawi Country Office to cope with the demands of the drought relief operation took place gradually. In the meantime tremendous demands were placed on the existing staff, and particularly the Director of Operations. Development programming had to be abandoned for a time. We believe that should WFP develop arrangements for bolstering a Country Office quickly in case of a major emergency; the proposal for a Rapid Response Team put forward in the WFP Programme Support and Administrative Budget, 1994-95 appears to be a suitable mechanism.

The proposal envisages that all members of the Rapid Response Team would be WFP staff members. This is understandable, since emergency managers want to be sure that the Team members really are available when they are needed. Nevertheless, the Programme might also experiment with a roster of outside people who could be mobilized at short notice. This might involve formal agreements with their current employers for their immediate release when they are needed for an nergency. There may well be many organisations or firms - not to mention individuals - who would be ready to enter into such an arrangement for primarily idealistic reasons.

The need to plan a phase-out of the Afghan refugee operation is mentioned in the Pakistan country study. The review of the Malawi drought relief operation comments that insufficient attention was paid in the planning phase to a smooth phasing out at the end of the operation. In several interviews for this study the comment was also made that WFP sometimes had difficulty in phasing out an operation. WFP should systematically plan at the earliest possible stage for the phasing out of an emergency operation.

By definition, *a PRO* is preceded by an emergency operation so planning does not start from scratch. Planning is also helped by the greater predictability and timeliness of resources, with donors able to make special pledges in advance. PROs are supposed to have a developmental or quasi-developmental content, which may vary according to circumstances. In general, the Programme aims at promoting four types of developmental activity: more systematic attention to health and nutrition, especially for mothers and children; education; training in technical skills; employment and income generation.

We believe that WFP should include environmental concerns as an explicit area to be addressed in the planning of a PRO. Afghan refugees in Pakistan had a devastating impact on the environment through the cutting of trees for fuelwood and the overgrazing of pastures by their livestock. The country study of Malawi reports similar effects from Mozambican refugees through the uncontrolled cutting of fuelwood, while the passage of heavy vehicles carrying food had damaged the road network, and there was concern over the effect of 1,700 boreholes for water that had been made without sufficient study of the hydrology.

The country study of Pakistan found that the Afghan refugees were able to benefit from a very open policy on the part of the authorities. The refugees were encouraged to take up work in the area surrounding their villages, and on their behalf projects for income generation, vocational training and employment were organized by UNHCR, the World Bank, other UN agencies and bilateral donors. WFP itself did not need to play more than a minor role in the development side of activities.

We suggest that WFP, in association with UNHCR (for refugees), FAO (for agriculture) and ILO (for training and employment), consider organizing a "horizontal" review of the development content of PROs and PDPOs, and develop more sophisticated guidelines for the passage from an EMOP to a PRO.

5.2.3 Monitoring

Formally, title to WFP foodstuffs passes to the recipient government at a port, border crossing point or extended delivery point as specified in the Letter of Understanding. However, the General Regulations give the Programme certain duties at later stages of an operation. For both projects and emergency operations the Executive Director is responsible for "supervision and assistance in execution". In the specific case of EMOPs, the recipient governments must "enable authorized personnel of the Programme to observe operations from time to time, to ascertain their effects, and to carry out evaluations of the results".

Observing operations, or monitoring, is taken seriously by WFP. As a cost-saving measure it is usually entrusted to United Nations Volunteers.

The logistic monitoring by the Programme appeared to be satisfactory in the relief operations examined in the country studies. Besides monitoring the use of its own resources, in Pakistan the Programme is monitoring bilateral wheat donations for Afghan refugees under its bilateral

services facility. In the Malawi drought operation WFP monitored the national pool of relief food, which included bilateral contributions.

In the operation for Somali refugees in Ethiopia, we found that monitoring had recently been strengthened and included the monitoring of local food prices and the livestock-wheat exchange ratio. This type of extended monitoring indicates a useful line of development for monitoring systems.

We propose that wherever feasible WFP organize extended monitoring including economic, social or nutritional indicators. Indeed, monitoring could become a form of continuous assessment. The overriding purpose of such an approach would be to make the best use of available resources. The phasing-out of relief could be handled in an orderly manner at the earliest possible moment. Changes in the nutritional situation and prospects of different groups of beneficiaries could be identified and the distribution of relief adjusted accordingly. Rehabilitation needs could be assessed. In general, the relief operation could be fine-tuned to changing circumstances. Monitoring of this type should be explicitly linked to decision-making on the conduct of the operation.

Decisions on when to go in for extended monitoring would need to be taken, like those for micro-assessment, on a case-by-case basis. Costs would need to be carefully contained, and should be part of the budget of the operation itself. Evaluation (discussed below) should examine the cost-effectiveness of extended monitoring.

NGOs can play a particularly useful role in monitoring, and should be involved where possible on a contract basis.

If the Programme decides to go for improved monitoring systems, it may wish to consider a workshop on methodologies. Possible participants could include people from other United Nations organisations and NGOs.

A particular problem that has arisen in some countries is the inability of the Programme to monitor food aid delivered in conflict zones, for instance in territory held by a rebel faction. This may be precisely where the needs of the population are greatest, and it would be inhuman to withhold assistance simply on the grounds that it cannot be monitored. If WFP is unable itself to obtain access to such territory, it should try to contract an NGO to carry out the monitoring function on its behalf.

5.2.4 Evaluation

Official WFP policy on post-emergency evaluation was established in the early eighties and appears eminently sensible. Alongside the Government's final report and audited accounts, the Country Office is supposed to prepare "a complementary, evaluative report providing the Country Office's own retrospective summary, focusing on WFP's role, the effectiveness of the WFP-assisted operation, and the lessons to be drawn for the future (for the country and for WFP

itself)." (WFP Handbook on Food Aid in Emergencies, page B5-59). In addition, formal evaluations are to be undertaken of a small number of emergency operations each year.

None of the relief operations examined in our country studies had been the subject of a recent evaluation, although preparations were underway in Malawi to evaluate the drought emergency. Indeed, between 1986 and 1992 WFP carried out no formal evaluation of any emergency operation, although there was an attempt to draw the lessons of the Africa food crisis of the mid-eighties, and the Disaster Relief Service organized studies of refugee feeding in Malawi and Swaziland. Belatedly, evaluation is being resumed in 1993, with a start on the southern Africa drought emergency and the four-country operation for Liberian refugees and displaced persons. It is important that this work be pressed forward rapidly.

At the same time we feel that Country Offices should be asked to prepare the "evaluative reports" foreseen by present policy, but in fact rarely drawn up. These may appear a nuisance to hard-pressed staff, but they can be of unique value in recording the things that happened under a relief operation and that are not to be found in the official papers. They could be of particular value for the identification of recurring problems, and of solutions that could be applied elsewhere. They need not be long, should not try to be comprehensive, and should highlight the important issues. They should be prepared as soon as possible after the emergency, while it is still fresh in people's minds, and should not await completion of the government's final report. In the absence of such reports, we were unable in our country study of Pakistan to obtain an adequate picture of what had happened under three emergency operations (one for drought and two for floods).

In evaluating relief operations, there can be difficulties in handling cost-effectiveness. The emotional impact of starvation and death causes normal economic criteria to be set aside, and the international community has not yet got an alternative set of criteria to take their place. If an airlift costs $1,000 per ton of food transported, what degree of risk to human life is necessary to justify it? Should different standards be applied in zones of conflict and in areas of tranquillity? There are no obvious answers to such questions.

There may also, in many circumstances, be difficulties in impact evaluation. Figures of food aid delivered are no substitute for an assessment of its impact. The immediate objective of relief being to restore levels of nutrition, it is on nutritional impact that attention needs to be concentrated. This can be relatively easy in a protracted operation for a stable camp population of refugees or displaced persons. Anthropometric measurements can be taken, and the nutritional status of the beneficiaries can be compared either with the local population or with their own earlier condition. The difficulties arise with short-term operations - which may often be conducted in circumstances of haste and confusion, not exactly conducive to data collection. For assessing nutritional status suitable indicators might be under-five mortality rates and household food intake. This, however, is a question which needs to be determined by the experts. The findings in our country studies on nutritional impact are analyzed below.

We suggest that the resumption of formal evaluation of relief operations by WFP be accompanied by stock-taking on the methodologies for carrying out such evaluations. If it

emerges - as appears likely - that there are no satisfactory and generally acceptable methodologies now available, WFP should take the lead in filling the gap. To that end, it could organize a workshop (possibly combined with monitoring as suggested above) that would bring together all interested parties.

The entire process of post-emergency evaluation should be regarded as a prime instrument for improving the quality of WFP's relief activities. Procedures should be established for using the results of evaluation to strengthen the Programme's work in the earlier phases of an emergency.

5.3 Delivery of Food, Internal Transport, Distribution

5.3.1 Calling Forward the Commodities

When an emergency operation has been approved, the classic procedure is for WFP to obtain agreement from a donor to supply the necessary commodities (short-cuts are discussed below). This may be received very quickly when an advance pledge is being used, or in the case of a "popular" emergency that is in the forefront of public attention. It can take a very much longer time, up to several weeks, if the donor office concerned has to seek approval from other governmental offices and mobilize budgetary resources. The rapidity with which individual donors react tends to vary widely.

Once the donor has given its approval, it generally has to procure the commodities from the market and forward them to the port of loading. Minimum donor procurement lead time is estimated by WFP at eight weeks, and it may be substantially longer in some circumstances. The food then has to be transported to the recipient country, unloaded, and forwarded to the points of need. The average lead time from donor agreement to supply food up to its arrival in the country is estimated by WFP at four to six months. In the case of a landlocked country, or one with serious transport problems, the period may of course be significantly longer.

Ever since its foundation, WFP has been wrestling with the problem of lead time for the delivery of emergency aid. Several attempts have been made to organize the pre-positioning of food stocks. A comprehensive proposal was put forward by the Government of the Netherlands in 1970, for the creation of an Emergency Food Supply Scheme. The Scheme included provision for donors to hold stocks ready for immediate use in an emergency, but it never became a reality. In 1984 a new scheme for Multilateral Emergency Food Aid Storage (MEFAS) was worked out between WFP and the Netherlands. Stocks were pre-positioned in Rotterdam and Singapore, but the arrangement has not been able to make more than a modest contribution towards securing fast delivery of relief goods. The main problems have been management of the pre-positioned stocks, storability of foodstuffs, and cost-effectiveness.

There have in the past been many appeals to donors to speed up their internal procedures for making pledged commodities available to WFP in emergency cases, and this has to some extent been done. However, many donors still have domestic constraints of a legislative or procedural

nature which hinder a quick response. We recommend that the Programme informally take the matter up again with individual donors, and press for further action.

5.3.2 Short-Cutting the Delivery Cycle

There are three basic approaches to making a quick start to an emergency operation, and WFP applies all of them.

The first is to borrow food within the stricken country, distribute it to the victims of the emergency, and then repay the loan when the WFP shipments arrive. Borrowings can be made from WFP project stocks, from government stocks, from the private sector or from stocks held by other organisations. They take place in the majority of emergencies. In Ethiopia, for instance, we found that borrowing had been extensively practised in that country. There had, as a result, been some disruption in food-for-work projects, but the judgement was that this was justified in the circumstances.

The second method is to divert a shipment en route to another country. In the case of the Malawi drought operation, the first WFP shipment of maize arrived in the same month that the EMOP was approved, thanks to diversion of a shipment originally landed elsewhere in southern Africa. Donors tend to be rather liberal in agreeing to transactions of this nature, but WFP has to exercise careful judgment in not creating a new round of problems in the country that should have received the original shipment.

The third approach is to purchase food in the country or close to it. For this purpose the Immediate Response Account (IRA) was created in 1992, as described in Chapter 3 on WFP resources. In 1992 - with resources of some $24 million - the Account was used for a quick start to emergency operations in 23 countries. In 1993 the IRA received less than $17 million, and by mid-year only $2 million remained uncommitted.

How far have these three lines of attack overcome the inherent delays in the delivery cycle? None of the country studies reported major problems, although occasional delays were mentioned in Ethiopia. A much larger sample of operations would need to be examined in-country before a final judgment could be made. There are anecdotal reports that relief food aid often arrives late, but this is not borne out in our country studies. With its Immediate Response Account under-funded the Programme remains vulnerable, and there is a good case for donor generosity in securing the cash target of $30 million.

5.3.3 Transport and Logistics

The procedures and problems of food aid procurement and the shipment of food to the countries in need have been dealt with in an earlier chapter. Here we focus on issues of logistics, in particular the movement of relief food within countries.

Out of the five major relief operations reviewed in the field in this evaluation, only in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan did the government handle and pay for internal transport. Wheat

shipments were merged into commercial supplies in Karachi, and an equivalent amount withdrawn at provincial storage points. Other commodities were shipped directly. The logistics apparatus is reported as having worked well for most of the operation, except for some distribution bottlenecks in 1991/92 caused by strikes and other delays.

In Ethiopia, the lack of suitable domestic transport facilities caused WFP in the mid-eighties to establish the World Food Programme Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE). With a fleet of 250 trucks and 1,100 employees, this rapidly became the largest trucking enterprise in the country. Our country study confirms its central importance for the two relief operations that were examined. For transport into areas of high insecurity military escorts were required. Even so, there have been numerous casualties among WTOE staff. The only complaint that reached us about the management of WTOE was that truck repairs and maintenance had been slow, expenditures having to be authorized from Rome; however, according to WFP Addis Ababa, this problem has been resolved. WTOE is to be turned over to the government at the end of 1993.

The Programme's search for ways of overcoming logistic blocks in Ethiopia led it to station port captains in ports to speed up operations. Where insecurity prevented any road transport, airlifting was resorted to.

Under the Malawi PRO for refugees from Mozambique, maize was milled at WFP expense and delivered as flour. UNHCR handles internal transport to EDP's. The systems built up for refugees were further developed by WFP for the very large drought relief operation. The Programme helped the Government of Malawi to create an Ad Hoc Transport and Logistics Unit. Extensive use was made of private suppliers of services.

Our findings as reported in the country studies strongly confirm the Programme's reputation in the field of relief logistics. Perhaps the most distinctive mark of WFP's work is its versatility and ingenuity in finding solutions to problems, and its effectiveness in getting things done fast. This has been shown strikingly also in countries not visited in this evaluation, and notably in Somalia. In order to keep logistic channels working in that country, the Programme has undertaken a variety of tasks, including execution of a $10 million World Bank-funded project for the rehabilitation of the port of Mogadishu.

In the case of the southern Africa drought, WFP was designated by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) as the logistics coordinator for the relief effort, which involved a number of other agencies. Less formal mandates to provide overall logistics support have been given in Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique and Sudan. These developments are broadly in line with the recommendation of the Nordic Study of 1990 quoted in Chapter 4 which, however, foresaw a more formal role for WFP as the primary logistics agency of the United Nations system. The recent record of WFP suggests that there are grounds for proceeding further in the direction that the Nordic Study advocated. We suggest that action be taken by the central coordinating mechanisms of the United Nations system, together with the Programme's own governing bodies, to formalize a system-wide logistic mandate for WFP in emergency situations as originally recommended by the Nordic Study.

The main points of such a mandate might include the provision of transport services, on a cost-recovery basis, to other UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs, including both food and non-food items provided for relief purposes. WFP should seek to establish a system for having suitable personnel and equipment readily on call at short notice. The Programme should be made responsible for ensuring, when necessary, that the logistics infrastructure of the stricken area is functioning well enough for the relief operation to be conducted efficiently. The cost-effectiveness of logistic activities should be strongly emphasized. WFP might be given general responsibility for coordinating the logistic aspects of emergency operations, within the framework of the broader coordination mandate of the United Nations.

Irrespective of whether it is given such a mandate, the Programme should continue to exercise great care over its involvement in the restoration or maintenance of the logistic infrastructure. The danger is that it may get out of its depth in technical fields in which it has no in-house expertise. A fiasco in a major exercise of this type could undermine the Programme's overall credibility.

5.3.4 Distribution

The distribution of WFP relief supplies is normally handled by a government agency, either directly or using NGOs.

Our country studies have highlighted a few points with regard to distribution. In Pakistan, the combined efforts of WFP and UNHCR were unable to bring about a change in the distribution system in Balochistan, where rations were handed over to group leaders; this arrangement is considered more susceptible to misuse than distribution to family heads which is practised in other provinces. The country study for Ethiopia suggests that existing social structures could have been used for distribution to Somali refugees in order to minimize the need for camps. In fact, to remedy this, in some cases the so-called Cross Mandate approach was applied, permitting distribution to both refugee and non-refugee members of local communities.

Under the PRO for refugees from Mozambique in Malawi, UNHCR transported WFP food to the extended delivery points where title passed to the government, and further distribution was undertaken by the Malawi Red Cross Society. The major operation for drought relief in Malawi saw a more complex arrangement, with drought relief from different sources going into a single pool, coordinated by WFP; distribution was by the local authorities, with NGOs participating in 17 out of 24 districts.

Overall, distribution arrangements appear to be functioning reasonably well with help from WFP, from UNHCR in the case of refugees, and from NGOs. The problems identified in our field visits were all being tackled by WFP with greater or lesser success, but were not sufficiently serious to undermine the credibility of the relief operations.

5.3.5 Monetization

The monetization of emergency food aid can be adopted in some circumstances as a form of distribution. The general principles of monetization are discussed above in Chapter 3. For relief purposes WFP has undertaken little monetization beyond the occasional sale of commodities to cover ITSH costs. Only recently, in Somalia and Liberia, has monetization been undertaken as an integral part of a relief operation.

In 1989, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen published "Hunger and Public Action". Their book was cautious, but suggested that in some circumstances African market mechanisms could be used more effectively than the direct distribution of food aid in case of famine. If there were supplies of food available not too far away, and a reasonably alert trading system which could respond quickly by moving food into the stricken districts, then famine victims could be given cash. The total food supply could if necessary be increased by an injection of food aid (which would not need to be transported at public expense to the famine area). What the authors proposed was not exactly monetization in the WFP sense, but their thesis has been much discussed and to some extent is responsible for a rather widespread interest in the possibilities of a monetized approach to relief.

The experience of WFP and CARE in monetizing food aid in the special conditions of Somalia and Liberia has shown some of the potential advantages and difficulties of the process. The main benefit was to take advantage of local food distribution networks in a situation of general lawlessness. The main danger was that commodities might not reach the intended destination, and the beneficiaries would be the traders rather than the hungry.

The biggest danger in the monetized approach is the very simple one that too much aid may reach those who can afford to buy food, and too little those who are destitute. Despite the dangers, monetisation as an approach to relief continues to fascinate, and it remains worth exploring further.

We suggest that WFP should cautiously continue to experiment with monetization in emergency situations, making after every case a full evaluation of the pros and cons. And any impression that monetization of relief is the "wave of the future" should be discouraged - at least for the moment.

.4 Suitability of Food Basket, Nutritional Impact

5.4.1 Suitability of the Food Basket

A great deal of work has been done over the years in developing guidelines for the food basket and ration scales for emergency operations. They are set out in detail in the WFP handbook on "Food Aid in Emergencies" (Book A, Chapter A6). The average requirements used as the basis for planning relief were recommended by the International Conference on Nutrition in Times of Disaster held in Geneva in 1988. The basic energy requirements are taken as 1,900

kcals/person/day, 10 percent of the energy should be in the form of fats or oils, and a minimum of 8 percent of the energy in the form of protein. All essential micronutrients should be included in the diet.

WFP's responsibility is normally to supply basic foods. In some circumstances, such as for refugee feeding, it can also supply complementary foods, notably fortified cereal blends and sugar, if these are necessary for a balanced diet. The Programme does not normally supply fresh produce and other complementary foods such as spices and condiments, coffee and tea.

A precise food basket and ration scale is drawn up according to the circumstances of the stricken populations and the foodstuffs available to WFP. This takes into account the extent to which the beneficiaries are able to avail themselves of household reserves and other sources of food.

Refugees may require special treatment since they have been uprooted from their homes and are unlikely to have other food sources. WFP and UNHCR have reached agreement on calculating food rations for refugees, and guidelines have been issued to the Country Offices of both organisations.

Supplementary feeding is organized, often through NGOs, when necessary to combat malnutrition among identified groups who are at risk or already malnourished.

The country study of Pakistan carefully examines the food basket and ration scales of the Afghan refugee operation. Numerous adjustments have been made over the years. The most important problem recently has been with the use of vitamin-A fortified dried skim milk in supplementary feeding programmes. Among the concerns expressed were inadequate targeting, and unsupervised infant feeding. The country study argues that a nutritionist should have been engaged, possibly co-funded by WFP and UNHCR, to oversee feeding operations in the camps.

The country study of Ethiopia reports no evidence that the food basket under relief operations was not satisfactory, although there was a complaint that some locally purchased pulses required too much cooking-time in conditions of fuel shortage. There were also reports that some of the more costly items were being sold.

In Malawi, a serious problem reported in the country study arose from the provision of edible oil to Mozambican refugees. Requirements appear to have been greatly over-estimated and much of the oil was sold. The quantities involved were large in relation to the local market, and the three companies producing edible oil reported drops in sales ranging up to 70 percent. For this and other reasons, the oil ration was first halved and then eliminated. This in turn led to criticism that the refugees' rations were deficient in fat. Perhaps the problem could have been avoided by a micro-assessment of the refugees' eating (and cooking) habits at an early stage of the emergency.

Under the drought operation in Malawi yellow maize was distributed instead of the preferred white maize. As it turned out, the resulting flour was healthier and there was less wastage in

milling. As a side-benefit. it was easy to distinguish relief (yellow) from commercial (white) maize.

As an overall conclusion, it can be said that WFP concerns itself seriously with the nutritional aspects of the food basket and of the ration scales under relief operations. Mistakes can be made, and problems can arise in specific cases, but at the policy level no corrections appear to be required.

5.4.2 Nutritional Impact

In Pakistan, nutrition surveys of the Afghan refugees were undertaken in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1990, 1991 and 1992. The country study reports that the nutritional status of the refugees was generally considered better than that of the surrounding populations.

No specific conclusions were put forward in the country study of Ethiopia regarding the nutritional impact of the EMOPs for drought relief. Nor was clear information available on the refugees from Somalia. Preliminary reports suggested a worsening of malnutrition among children, both refugees and locals. If confirmed, this would indicate that food was not reaching its intended beneficiaries.

In Malawi, there were periodic nutritional surveys of Mozambican refugees by NGOs. The overall condition of the refugees appeared to be at least on a par with that of the surrounding populations. Data on the nutritional impact of the drought operation was patchy. Overall, mass starvation was certainly avoided. However, it was not clear how far malnutrition identified by surveys was chronic and how far it resulted from drought conditions.

Since nutritional impact is the most evident justification for relief, it needs more attention from WFP. We recommend that as far as possible nutritional data should be systematically generated in the monitoring phase and analyzed during evaluation.

5.5 Interfacing with Development

5.5.1 Natural Disasters

The country study reports for Bangladesh and Ethiopia give two contrasting pictures of the interlinkages between relief and development.

In Bangladesh, two WFP country-wide projects dealing respectively with vulnerable group feeding and food-for-work have an emergency window. Activities can be stepped up in any area where relief is required, the usual cause being monsoon flooding. In the food aid literature these are referred to as "concertina" projects because they can be expanded and contracted at will. Generally, relief is provided without an EMOP, but on occasion WFP has made an emergency allocation to supplement the project resources. Such an arrangement will not suffice to meet the

requirements of a major disaster, but it is adequate for most circumstances. Recurrent relief needs are here being met through development projects.

In Ethiopia relief requirements are endemic to an extent not known by any other developing country. According to estimates brought back from our field study, the proportion of the population affected by drought in the period 1981-1991 ranged from a minimum of 6.5 percent (in 1987) to a maximum of 19 percent (in 1985). No other country of comparable size has a greater need for development. For years, attempts have been made to bring about systematic linkages between relief and development, yet so far no successful formula has been found.

The country study of Ethiopia reports that in 1989 a WFP mission proposed some ways of integrating emergency and development aid ("Food for Development: New Roles for Food Aid in Ethiopia", by Maxwell and Belshaw). The key ideas were for multi-sectoral employment plans with a shelf of projects to be taken up as required, and the creation of a multi-donor food security counterpart fund based on monetization. It does not appear that these proposals have proved feasible on a significant scale. An Ethiopian mission to India, organized by WFP, to study techniques for developing a shelf of projects has given no results.

The comparison of Bangladesh and Ethiopia suggests that linking relief and development is a complex matter that depends on many factors, and most particularly on the capacity of the administration at central and local levels. If the government is not strong enough to bring about linkages, WFP cannot be expected to fill the gap.

It may be useful to distinguish two types of linkage serving different purposes. One is to achieve the secondary objective quoted above, namely to provide relief in ways which "promote self-reliance, attack the root causes of the emergency, support national food security, and reinforce long-term development efforts". This might be termed the relief-development link. The second is to gear development activities towards disaster preparedness or mitigation - and this might be called the development-relief link.

Using relief for development goals: Our country studies have not found any successful example of the first type of linkage - achieving development goals through a relief operation. The country study of Malawi suggests that better design of the drought relief operation could have permitted a greater contribution to future preparedness, and even reconstruction and rehabilitation. Recent WFP documents cite a few cases of such linkage. For instance in Mozambique WFP emergency food rations have been used as payment under food-for-work schemes for the rehabilitation of roads, railways, hospitals and other vital infrastructure. Part of the drought relief provided to Madagascar in 1992 was used to support small-scale food-for-work activities, using locally purchased maize and rice.

A CFA document asserts that "A part of the considerable emergency food aid being provided to Africa might be used for disaster mitigation and rehabilitation objectives, if combined with cash and other assistance." (CFA:34/P/7-B, para. 48). This is certainly a most desirable goal. The biggest obstacle, obviously, is the haste with which emergency operations have to be prepared. The best way round it is likely to be the development of micro-assessment, better

planning and extended monitoring systems as suggested elsewhere in this chapter. It will be neither necessary nor feasible for all relief operations to have a development interface: the task for WFP is to recognize the circumstances in which such a linkage is possible, and help to ensure that it is put in place. Where the administration is strong enough, and disasters recur, one technique worth examining might be the preparation of a shelf of quick-action projects that are technically sound and can be launched at short notice.

Gearing development projects to disaster preparedness: Somewhat less difficult to tackle is the second type of interface, with relief problems being approached through development projects. Africa is the central challenge, and the Programme has produced a good report for the CFA on "Disaster Mitigation and Rehabilitation in Africa" (document CFA:34/P/7-B of August 1992). The suggested approaches include projects to foster development and at the same time reduce the risk of disaster - or at least facilitate relief operations. These would be in such sectors as water management, environmental protection, improvement of the transportation infrastructure, food security, market restructuring together with pricing policy and food reserves, and strengthening disaster responsiveness. The CFA, in November 1992, endorsed the Secretariat's proposal for a more extensive and systematic application of WFP assistance to support disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation and rehabilitation measures in Africa as outlined in the paper.

We recommend support for this work, which is still in its early stages. Of particular importance (as noted by WFP in its report to the CFA) could be cooperation with IFAD, the World Bank and UNDP.

Vulnerability mapping: Of much interest is a current exercise on vulnerability mapping. FAO through its Global Information and Early Warning System is taking the lead in association with the Save the Children Fund (UK) and with financial backing from the European Economic Community. The objective is to develop risk maps of geographical areas and population groups as a basis for intensive monitoring and disaster preparedness. The methodology involves a Geographical Information System and other software packages. WFP is associated with the project.

We recommend support for the Programme's participation in work on vulnerability mapping, subject to the question of cost-effectiveness being kept clearly in view. An investment in vulnerability mapping will only be justified if it yields new and usable information not available from any other source. If and when the methodology has proved its value, the Programme should also promote capacity building in the countries concerned, so that they can make effective use of the new technique.

Early warning systems: Much progress has been made in the development of global, sub-regional and national early warning systems since the world food crisis of the mid-seventies. WFP, for its part, cooperates well with FAO in contributing information for the Global Information and Early Warning System. The problem now is the response to early warnings.

The systems in southern Africa, which come together in a sub-regional system sponsored by SADC, seem to have generally functioned well in the 1991/92 drought. However, the Malawi country study suggests that the system in that country functioned correctly in a technical sense, but failed to bring home to policy-makers the danger of a major crisis. The WFP office in Malawi appears to have reacted early, requesting an assessment mission from Rome before the government had officially acknowledged the emergency, and starting to plan for a drought operation.

Overall, the Programme appears to be playing its role well in contributing information to the global system and responding to early warnings from particular countries.

Rehabilitation: It is current practice to speak of the continuum between relief, rehabilitation and development. This is a half-truth. If preparedness has been well organized, relief in its classical form may not be needed. And for refugees in camps there may be no rehabilitation or development, because the solution they await is repatriation and reintegration in their original homes. Nevertheless in many cases, particularly in drought and other types of crop failure, there can be a genuine continuum, and it needs to be carefully managed.

The most common form of rehabilitation is in agriculture. Planning for rehabilitation should take place at the earliest possible stage, with future needs being identified if possible during the assessment phase. These preliminary indications should be followed up locally or internationally. FAO is normally a partner of WFP in the assessment mission, and is in a position to take a lead for rehabilitation. We suggest that WFP take up with FAO the possibility of creating a joint mechanism on agricultural rehabilitation which could permit the systematic mobilisation of FAO's technical knowledge for the purchasing of inputs, and WFP's skills in transport and logistics.

Food security stocks: When the concept of world food security was launched in the early seventies, one of the key ideas was the establishment of national stocks which could be drawn upon in cases of emergency. In later years, the proposal for national stocks came under increasingly critical scrutiny. They were found expensive to establish, difficult to manage, and generally not cost-effective.

The country study of Ethiopia reports on efforts in that country to establish an Emergency Food Security Reserve. In Malawi, the start of the drought operation was greatly facilitated by the existence of a large strategic grain reserve. WFP documents describe the establishment in the Sudan of an Emergency Response Food Facility to meet urgent unexpected needs and to implement food-for-work programmes. However, by the end of 1992 only 65 percent of the 75,000 ton target had been achieved, and all the stock had been used to cover emergency requirements.

While security stocks should not be ruled out as a possible tool for disaster preparedness, especially in drought-prone countries, they should be approached with great caution. The cost-effectiveness of the exercise should be demonstrable, and stock management should be of the

highest standard. WFP should be ready to prove clearly that these conditions are met. If it can do so, donors should be ready to offer support.

5.5.2 Refugees and Displaced Persons

Around half of WFP's commitments for EMOPs are for refugees and displaced persons, as shown in Table 2 above. In areas of conflict the linkage will generally be problematical, since development thrives best in a stable political environment. Efforts by WFP to combine relief and development in Somalia are reported to have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, this is no reason to give up. The challenge is to recognize circumstances in which attempts to link relief and development stand a reasonable chance of success.

In the somewhat more stable environment of most PROs, a development dimension is an integral part of the operation. This is only a palliative pending a final solution of the refugee problem through repatriation, integration in the country of asylum, or resettlement to a third country. It can nevertheless be important in sustaining the morale of the refugees or displaced persons and improving their welfare. Generally initiatives are taken by UNHCR and other organisations, with WFP support. WFP should be ready to take a lead role in mobilizing others if UNHCR (or another UN agency) is not involved, as may be the case in displaced person operations.

A particular set of problems arises when refugees are repatriated. Here the task is to provide relief during a settling-in period, while promoting longer-term development. In our country studies we came across three examples of this process: Afghan refugees leaving Pakistan, Mozambican refugees about to leave Malawi, and Guatemalan refugees returning from Mexico.

The Guatemalan case does not appear to have been well handled by WFP. The repatriants were to be provided three months' rations funded out of the Mexican PRO, but it took some time for the Guatemala Country Office to realize that they had responsibility for monitoring and controlling the initial food distribution even though it was part of the Mexican programme. There were disagreements between the Country Office and Headquarters over what should happen after the initial distribution was completed, and finally it was decided that support from the Mexican PRO would be extended for six months and followed by a quick-action project. The project had not yet been approved at the time of our visit. In the light of the Guatemala experience we feel that WFP should take careful steps to ensure that there is adequate planning, and coordination between WFP Country Offices, when a repatriation operation is about to be launched.

On a more positive note, during the oral contacts for the preparation of this study UNHCR spoke in very high terms about WFP's performance during the recent repatriation of Cambodian refugees. With several peace accords possibly coming into effect in late 1993 and 1994, repatriation may become an important form of the interface between relief and development. A specialized aspect is assistance to demobilized soldiers, an activity in which WFP has already acquired experience.

5.5.3 Capacity Building

Relief operations for both natural disasters and refugees or displaced persons can provide opportunities for capacity building in the recipient country. The country study of Malawi highlights WFP's efforts in this regard. In the drought operation, particularly, the Programme made laudable efforts in training counterpart institutions. Unfortunately the ad hoc Transport and Logistics Unit was entirely staffed by expatriates, despite WFP's request for national counterparts.

We feel that during its relief operations WFP should continue to watch out for opportunities of capacity building, especially in disaster-prone least developed countries.

5.6 Working with Other Actors

5.6.1 WFP as Seen by Others

The view of WFP held by other organisations in the relief sector can provide valuable clues about its performance. As well as interviews during field visits, opinions were sought for our evaluation - mostly by telephone, in some cases by meetings - from senior people in five United Nations bodies and eleven non-governmental organisations.

The image of WFP that emerges from these discussions is generally very positive. People in all types of organisation find WFP to be straightforward, cooperative and easy to work with. The most frequent criticism of the Programme's overall performance was that it was slow to get started when an emergency arose. Once it had got its act together it generally did a very good job. There were many tributes to the Director and senior staff of the Programme's Emergency Division.

As seen by people contacted in *UN bodies*, WFP was an attractive partner: it kept a relatively low profile and stuck to its mandate. In the field its performance in logistics was particularly impressive. However, it sometimes appeared to be under-staffed at country level, and its policy of keeping overhead costs extremely low was in some circumstances a false economy: it should invest more in monitoring and controls, at least in situations of conflict.

However, following the recent buildup in emergencies WFP did not seem to be clear about the relative priorities it attached to relief and development. As a result of the reorganisation at the beginning of 1993 there were staff in Regional Bureaux handling emergencies who were obviously development-oriented and were not performing well in their new tasks.

The reactions of *NGOs* covered a wide spectrum. In general they spoke positively about the Programme, and considered it supportive of the NGO community. Many said that, even if they had criticisms, they had a better relationship with WFP than with any other UN body.

Several organisations commented that relations at the country level were uneven, and greatly influenced by the personality and competence of the WFP Director of Operations. Most of the field staff were highly rated. However, sometimes heterogeneous teams were put together in a rush and took time to settle down. A view strongly expressed from one NGO was that at country level WFP should be less oriented towards "doing things itself", and more towards relief strategy and helping the agencies on the spot to divide up the work in a cost-effective manner.

More broadly, the Programme should move from an *ad hoc* use of NGOs to a more systematic set of arrangements planned in advance. NGOs were generally paid lower salaries than UN bodies, and if they could do a job well they could probably do it more cheaply than WFP. Any systematic arrangements should take into account the differences among NGOs, some of which have large staffs and worldwide operations, while others are small and run on a shoestring.

There were criticisms of the absence of WFP (and other UN agencies) from some of the hottest areas of conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross was sometimes better able to operate in these conditions, partly because it was perceived as neutral in conflicts where the United Nations had a contested military presence, and partly because its staff were recruited in the expectation that they would have to serve in danger areas. WFP should have some international staff members specifically appointed for service in zones of conflict.

The view was expressed that WFP should do more local purchasing in difficult situations where there was nevertheless grain to be found. The examples quoted were Ethiopia, Somalia and Mozambique. Local purchases had been made, but the scale could be stepped up. In some cases a local purchase could raise serious problems of a political and security nature, and it was difficult to obtain an equitable price, but such difficulties could be overcome with skill and persistence.

Several people felt that WFP (like other UN bodies) should give more credit to non-governmental and governmental agencies that provide cooperation and resources. For them, public support is more vital than it is for the Programme, and WFP can afford to be generous in acknowledging their role.

A suggestion was made that the management of WFP should have an informal mechanism for consultation with NGO leaders. Informality was important; it would tend to ensure that this was not "just another meeting", and would promote attendance at the most senior level. The aim would be to discuss policy issues of mutual concern, not specific country situations or operational matters. Advantage could be taken of meetings of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in Geneva. Another possibility would be to organize a meeting (which could be quite short, perhaps even over lunch) with the participants in a session of the Geneva-based Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response. The Committee comprises seven of the largest NGOs active in the field (Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Relief Services, the World Council of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation, the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, OXFAM, and the Save the Children Fund). The previous Executive Director of WFP once accepted an invitation to appear before the Steering Committee. This was certainly a good

step for strengthening relations, but what is needed for the future is a regular procedure for informal interaction.

5.6.2 Coordinating Food Aid with Other Types of Emergency Assistance

At the *international level*, coordination of different types of humanitarian assistance for victims of natural disasters and other emergencies is the responsibility of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), established under a General Assembly resolution of December 1991. Multi-sectoral emergencies are now the subject of a consolidated appeal issued by DHA and covering all relevant organisations of the United Nations system. A policy-level Inter-Agency Standing Committee has been established in Geneva, and this in turn has set up a subsidiary Inter-Agency Working Group. The Department is strongly emphasizing the continuum between relief, rehabilitation and development and the need to avoid prejudicing long-term development efforts.

The creation of the DHA, with its close link to the Secretary-General who in turn is working closely with the Security Council, has tended to promote not only "horizontal" coordination among different sectors and agencies engaged in relief, but also "vertical" coordination between humanitarian operations, political initiatives and peace-keeping. This has made it easier for the United Nations to apply a coherent policy in complex situations, including military protection for relief work. Where the United Nations has taken position against one of the parties to a conflict it can now be more difficult for UN agencies to be accepted as impartial, and thus to have access to affected populations irrespective of which side they are on. However, most UN agencies have always had problems in accessing both sides in a civil war, because they could only act on the basis of a request from or at least the concurrence of the officially recognized government.

WFP has outposted one officer to DHA in New York and another in Geneva. The Programme is considered by DHA to be cooperating well in the new arrangements. Historically, there have almost always been tensions between coordinating and operational bodies involved in relief work. The coordinators have tended to become operational in order to secure quick and coherent decisions in complex situations. The operators, while recognizing the need for coordination, have tended to be wary of it as a source of delay (and sometimes as a threat to their operational autonomy). Under the new arrangements established by the General Assembly, care will be needed on both sides to maintain mutual confidence and a good equilibrium.

The General Assembly resolution of December 1991 also set out to clarify the arrangements for coordination at *country level*. However, it cannot be said that this objective has yet been achieved in all cases. The resolution specifies that coordination should normally be carried out by the Resident Coordinator, who would chair an emergency operations group of field representatives. In fact, a special Humanitarian Coordinator has been appointed by DHA in some cases, while in several countries with complex political and humanitarian problems a Special Representative of the Secretary-General has been designated to oversee all activities. In Angola and Mozambique there are currently three levels of authority for coordination: a

Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a sizable office for the coordination of humanitarian assistance established by DHA and headed by a Director, and the Resident Coordinator. Even if all the individuals concerned work together in perfect harmony, the impression remains that the various parts of the United Nations with coordinating responsibilities have still not got their act together.

5.6.3 Coordinating Food Aid from Different Donors

The General Regulations give WFP a responsibility to "seek to ensure coordination of emergency food assistance".

At the *international level* coordination can only be ensured by the flow of information. At the start of an emergency, the FAO/WFP or UNHCR/WFP assessment of needs is immediately made available to the donor community as a whole. As operations get underway, the Programme has informal contacts with the offices handling emergency food aid in the various donor countries. More formally, the Emergency Division issues a weekly telex report to interested parties on developments in particular emergencies. WFP has taken account of suggestions as to how its services could be improved, and seems to be performing to donor satisfaction.

The Programme's International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) is another useful aid to coordination. Its database covers food aid flows from all sources (not only emergency), as well as information on logistics. The System publishes a quarterly Food Aid Monitor. For operational purposes there is a facility called FAMINET which makes available weekly updates by electronic mail through the International Computing Centre, Geneva. A separate PC-based information system entitled FASREP is dedicated to the pipeline for refugee operations, and is used by both UNHCR and WFP. Information is circulated at country level through *ad hoc* arrangements.

In summary, WFP is working hard on the information front. At some stage in the future, it will be advisable to review all information systems (including the internal management information system WIS) with a view to their simplification and perhaps combination. When computer and communications technologies are developed one or two notches further, it should be possible to have a single integrated system with data being input and retrieved at country level as well as at Headquarters, and with online facilities for both donors and recipients. However, the investment is likely to be substantial, and the time is not yet ripe.

It is mainly at the *country level* that WFP seeks to fulfil the coordination mandate given in its General Regulations. The Programme's activities vary in different country situations, and may include coordinating the mobilization, delivery and distribution of relief from different donors. In the Malawi drought operation, as seen in the country study, WFP's performance was impressive in the coordination of the national pool of food aid from various donors. In Ethiopia already in 1984, the WFP was entrusted by Government with the responsibility for coordination of all food aid. We saw no other example of a major coordinating role by the Programme, but

some are described in WFP's documents and have already been briefly mentioned in the section above on logistics.

In the Sudan, for instance, the international relief community has agreed on a year-to-year basis to consign to WFP all food aid sent to Port Sudan. The Programme's responsibilities included berthing the ships, discharging the cargo, and arranging for its transportation from the port to primary delivery points throughout the country. In Eritrea WFP has been acting as the coordinator for food aid deliveries, and the Programme reports that in 1992 there was a smooth scheduling of shipments from all donors. In Mozambique, in September 1992 a special United Nations logistics operation (UNILOG/Mozambique) was established as an integral part of the WFP Country Office to support all United Nations agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs.

The Programme has assumed the lead role in the United Nations system for coordinating the mobilization and transport of most food consignments from various donors to Liberian refugees in Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone as well as to Liberians displaced within their own country. In the former Yugoslavia, WFP has assumed responsibility for the coordination, mobilization, purchase and delivery of food assistance. Relief supplies are handed over to UNHCR or their implementing NGO partners at extended delivery points in the various republics.

While we have only secondary information on operations in countries other than those covered by our country studies, it would appear that WFP is handling its coordination responsibilities energetically and imaginatively.

5.6.4 Working with UN Organisations and NGOs

The relations of WFP with other UN organisations and NGOs are examined in an earlier chapter, and this section offers only a few supplementary remarks.

In the particular field of relief, FAO has had an intimate concern for WFP's activities since the creation of the Programme. Relations between WFP and FAO have been delicate at many periods during the thirty-year history of the Programme, but they currently seem to be in a "corridor of tranquillity". At working level the two bodies cooperate well in the assessment phase of emergencies. The consultations leading up to the approval of an emergency allocation are also carried forward expeditiously.

The Global Agreement between UNHCR and WFP has already been described. The effect of the agreement has not been uniformly to the advantage of WFP. The Programme has got a clearer mandate for resource mobilization in refugee situations, but has also been landed with shared responsibility for delicate problems arising out of difficulties in determining the numbers of refugees to be fed as described earlier in this chapter. Furthermore, there is a substantial increase in the Programme's workload; it is by no means clear that the cost of administering these extra resources is covered by additional income (the problem of recovering the costs of administering relief is explained in Chapter 3).

From the viewpoint of donors and recipients the Global Agreement is almost certainly a good thing. It enables them to benefit from the strengths of both UNHCR and WFP. The two organisations should therefore work out problems as they arise, in the sole interest of achieving the most efficient and effective operations possible.

In relief operations skilled NGOs can have a flexibility and a capacity for quick decisions that may elude an organisation of the UN family. Furthermore, NGOs often have a presence at the grassroots level that cannot be matched by an official international body. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that to be an NGO is not necessarily to be beautiful. The only touchstone is performance. WFP should only entrust important tasks such as micro-assessment or monitoring to NGOs that are able to deliver the goods.

Overall, the Programme has done well in developing the NGO connection, but needs to build further. More systematic arrangements are needed for the development of micro-assessment and monitoring, as well as evaluation.

7 Relief in Areas of Conflict

One of the most remarkable developments in WFP's relief work (like that of other agencies) has been an increasing involvement during recent years in zones of conflict. In none of our field visits were we able directly to observe this in process, although there had been conflict in Ethiopia not long before. The present section gives a brief descriptive rather than evaluative panorama of this work.

The first phase of Operation Lifeline Sudan can be taken as the start of this development. Between March and October 1989 a massive relief effort coordinated by the United Nations brought 100,000 tons of food to the hungry in parts of the war-torn country held by both the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). About 40,000 tons was channelled through WFP, which worked closely with other UN agencies and NGOs in coordinating deliveries by air, rail, road and waterway. Despite agreement with the warring parties that convoys could pass unhindered through "corridors of tranquillity", they were occasionally attacked and altogether 11 WFP truck drivers or their assistants were killed. In other attacks a WFP monitor was wounded, and a light plane was shot down killing all passengers including a WFP consultant and two staff members of an NGO.

The Programme established major logistic bases in Kenya and Uganda and smaller ones inside the Sudan. It was involved in road repairs and improvement of airstrips in strategic areas. It airlifted a pontoon ferry for a vital river crossing in Uganda, and 22 prefabricated storage units of 500 tons capacity each.

An independent review of Operation Lifeline Phase I has compared the performance of WFP with that of UNICEF. "WFP, which enjoyed better working relationships with NGOs as Lifeline began, was less aggressive, less flexible in coping with the exigencies of the civil war, and more dependent for decision-making on its Rome Headquarters. WFP took longer to gear

up for action ...". The criticism of WFP as a slow starter has been mentioned several times in earlier sections of this chapter. The review emphasized the difficulties (also highlighted above) in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a complex emergency operation: "In short, it is difficult to judge whether Lifeline, an expensive program at either $200 or $300 million, used resources as wisely as possible".[52]

In subsequent years insecurity has continued to be a major obstacle to relief in the Sudan. The current situation has been complicated by a split in the SPLA accompanied by factional in-fighting and the extensive mining of roads.

In Somalia insecurity has dominated relief operations since December 1990. United Nations staff were evacuated in January 1991. A contingent from UN agencies including WFP returned to Mogadishu in August 1991, but left the city again the next month. WFP arranged for a programme of emergency assistance through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and CARE. WFP stocks totalling about 9,000 tons were looted in Mogadishu port in January 1992 and Berbera in February. A WFP vessel carrying wheat was shelled in March. The Security Council approved an inter-agency 90-day plan of action including a geographical distribution of responsibilities between United Nations agencies, the ICRC and the NGOs active in Somalia. WFP focused on Mogadishu, the north-east and the north-west regions.

By late September 1992 the situation had sharply deteriorated due to both drought and mounting insecurity. A new United Nations 100-day Action Plan was formulated. WFP received adequate pledges including cash for airlifting, overland logistics, assessment and monitoring. It reports on excellent cooperation from NGOs, including CARE which became its main implementing partner (a CARE-managed monetization programme is mentioned above). However, in November a WFP vessel was again shelled on entering the port of Mogadishu which had to be closed, as also the port of Kismayo. Food convoys from Mogadishu came to a halt due to widespread attacks. Against this background the military intervention first by United States and then by United Nations troops was designed to restore order and allow relief operations to proceed securely. The subsequent course of events does not need to be described here.

A Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA) was drawn up in August 1990 under the auspices of the United Nations. It foresaw that relief would be provided to the victims of drought and the long-lasting civil war in areas controlled by both the Government of Angola and UNITA. The SRPA was suspended by the Government in December 1990, but resumed the following March. In May 1991 a Peace Agreement was signed in Lisbon, and elections were held in September. However the results were rejected by UNITA, and full-scale civil war was resumed by the end of the year. In May 1993 the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs issued a consolidated appeal for contributions totalling about $226 million, of which food aid represented $131 million.

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[52] Larry Minear and collaborators "Humanitarianism under Siege - A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan", The Red Sea Press, Inc., Trenton, NJ, USA, 1991

During the first part of 1993 WFP carried out relief operations under conditions of great difficulty. Airlifts were effected both to Government-held and UNITA-held areas, with aircraft sometimes landing under fire. After a WFP aircraft was shot down, the airlift was suspended. Security conditions in the ports were poor, with looting reported to be widespread. Staff of WFP, other United Nations agencies and NGOs were working in conditions of great personal danger in many parts of the country as the civil war intensified.

In the last three years WFP has provided relief in conflict zones of several other countries: in Mozambique to areas held by government forces and by RENAMO; in Liberia to displaced persons in areas controlled by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia; in Northern Iraq, where trucks have been bombed and in November 1992 unknown gunmen killed an international staff member of WFP's NGO partner CARE (Australia); in Afghanistan, where security is still a major problem and United Nations staff have been evacuated several times from Kabul and other towns; in Cambodia, now fortunately on course towards a more peaceful future; in the former Yugoslavia; and it is becoming involved in some of the Newly Independent States of the former USSR (where civil strife has disrupted food supplies in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan).

The experience of WFP in handling relief under fire has been shared by UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC (which has a long history in this field), a number of NGOs, and to a lesser extent other UN organisations. As far as can be judged from the documents and from discussions with other actors, the Programme has acquitted itself creditably. However, a considered judgment on its performance must await an evaluation of an adequate number of specific operations.

The heroes of these actions are the locally recruited staff, who have taken most of the risks and received most of the casualties.

The challenge for international staff conducting such exercises is to strike the right balance between courage and caution. They have been people taken on by WFP for quite different tasks, mainly in development. It is very difficult to tell from reports how far they have taken correct operational decisions in the face of conflict. At the individual level they have certainly conducted themselves with bravery. The Programme might wish to pursue the NGO suggestion, reported above, that it recruit a small number of staff specifically for work in danger zones.

.8 Overall Conclusion

The reports of our country studies, the documents of WFP and other bodies, and discussions with senior staff of other United Nations organisations and NGOs have not identified any basic faults in WFP's relief work. However, the lack of any serious evaluation of recent relief exercises, and the absence of agreed criteria for judging cost-effectiveness in complex emergency operations, require caution in expressing any definitive judgment.

A series of incremental improvements have been suggested above in assessment, planning and monitoring. Evaluation of relief operations has been virtually abandoned for six years and is

fortunately being revived. The available evidence suggests that WFP's reputation in the field of transport and logistics is well deserved. The problem of short-cutting the delivery cycle, and ensuring that food is available in time to meet emergency needs, has been partly resolved; further progress seems to depend on speeding up deliveries from donors and in more generous cash funding for local purchases. The food basket provided by the Programme is generally satisfactory. WFP has good ideas on interfacing relief with development, and can point to some successes, but it cannot make up for deficiencies in administrative capacity at national and local levels. The Programme works well with other organisations, of the United Nations system and NGOs. It seems to be putting up a creditable performance in providing relief in areas of conflict.

The great increase in the Programme's relief activities in the last four years is not the result of any decision by WFP. Rather, international relief needs have grown, and donors have chosen to use WFP as a vehicle for channelling a substantial part of their assistance.

Donors have three main options: they can provide emergency assistance bilaterally; they can work through NGOs; or they can use the World Food Programme. There is no other polyvalent international organisation in a position to provide the services offered by WFP. Provided the Programme continues to search for ever higher quality in its relief operations, donors can continue to give it their confidence.

6.0 WFP as a Development Agency: Profile and Activities

In this chapter we first review WFP's experience in support of development mainly through a project focus. We draw on WFP's evaluation material and on our own country studies to explore whether there are any discernible patterns of project effectiveness which might suggest that some types of development activity in certain sectors are meeting more success than others. Clearly, if there is reason to believe that some types of food aid (food for work versus supplementary feeding, for example) or some sectors of development (say, education or primary health care versus agricultural production) are more suited to food aid or to the capacities of WFP than others, then WFP might be able to improve its overall effectiveness by concentrating on those sectors.

In a later section we describe and discuss the questions of how WFP's development activities are distributed on a country by country basis, how allocations are made to countries, and whether some further degree of country concentration is called for. All these are clearly important for an assessment of efficiency and effectiveness of WFP operations.

6.1 The Development Project Portfolio

In WFP development projects food is normally either distributed free to members of specific target groups or it is provided as compensation for work, either by itself or in combination with a cash wage. Some projects combine free food with wages or with inputs provided on credit to participants, but the broad distinction between food for free distribution and food for work is an important one.

Food for free distribution is generally used by WFP in support of projects aimed at the development of human resources in such areas as school feeding and the feeding of especially vulnerable target groups such as pregnant and lactating women, children under five, children in malnutrition rehabilitation units, etc. Though these types of projects are seen by some as more "welfare" oriented than projects in support of production, it seems more reasonable to view them as contributions to human development, to the preservation and development of human potential in the societies involved.

Food-for-work is more likely to be used in support of projects in sectors directly related to production, with food used to compensate workers for creating or preserving important development assets which are either their own property or part of the development infrastructure of the community, the region or the nation.

WFP's current system of project classification is primarily based on *the sector* of development involved rather than on *the way* its food assistance is used. There is, however, a strong link

between broad categories of project classification and the two main ways of providing food aid. The WFP classifies projects into three broad categories: Human Resource Development Projects, Economic and Social Infrastructure Projects, and Directly Productive Projects. It is reasonably accurate to state that projects grouped under human resource development will rely mainly on free distribution of food, while those oriented towards infrastructure and production will involve (with some important exceptions such as the establishment of food reserves) food-for-work. Within the three broad categories the Programme distinguishes between altogether 20 sub-categories. Table 1 below presents an overview of WFP's development projects completed up to the end of 1992.

It is important for any interpretation of the classification of WFP development projects to take into account the possible inconsistencies and mis-classification which can occur in such a system. A single project may include expenditures from a number of classes yet be coded under a single entry. This is particularly likely with community development projects which may include activities in a number of sectors. It is also difficult to account for inputs by other donors which may dramatically alter the shape of the overall project of which the WFP component is a very small part. That being said, some clear patterns are illustrated in Table 1 which are worth emphasizing.

Table 1
WFP Development Project Portfolio to End 1992 and in 1993

Project Class	USD Millions 1963-92	% of Total to End 1992	% of Active Projects 1993	% for the Nine Country Sample
Human resource development (sub-total)	**2,865**	**36.2**	**39.7**	**46.4**
Feeding expectant/nursing mothers and pre-school children	1,005	12.7	15.2	23.5
Feeding in primary schools	1,316	16.6	20.0	18.1
Five other HRD project classes	545	6.9	4.6	4.9
Economic and social infrastructure projects (sub-total)	**789**	**10.0**	**12.7**	**8.3**
Transportation and communications infrastructure	261	3.3	2.1	2.3
Community development/self help projects	364	4.6	8.9	6.0
Two other ESI project classes	164	2.0	1.7	0
Directly productive projects (sub-total)	**4,267**	**53.9**	**47.6**	**45.3**
Land development and improvement	1,496	18.9	18.6	18.1
Land settlement and agrarian reform	560	7.0	6.1	0
Promotion and diversification of crop production	339	4.3	4.3	0
Animal production (including dairy)	619	7.8	3.2	0.7
Forestry projects (including watershed management)	846	10.7	14.3	25.5
Four other DP project classes	408	5.2	1.1	0.9
Grand total	**7,922**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Sources and notes: *WFP Progress Report 1992*, World Food Programme, Rome, 12 May 1993. The value figures in the first column are based on table A2, page A7, from which the costs of ongoing projects have been deducted. These were calculated from the data for individual projects and countries (pages C-1 to C-142). The two last columns are based on these calculations for ongoing projects. Note that in seven cases, in order to avoid double counting, we have excluded one of the two phases (expansions) of a project that is listed as ongoing, as two phases are not normally executed simultaneously (Uganda, Chad, Mali, Botswana, India, Guatemala and Pakistan). The nine countries are those included for study in this evaluation: Ethiopia, Malawi, Ghana, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Bolivia, Guatemala, Morocco and Pakistan.

First there is clearly a considerable amount of stability in the overall project portfolio over time. Human resource development projects completed before 1992 accounted for 36.2 percent of the portfolio while they make up 39.7 percent of the dollar value of currently active projects (which totals USD 3.0 billion). Directly productive projects have declined from 53.9 percent of the dollar value of projects completed before the end of 1992 to 47.6 percent of currently active projects. The project classes which appear to be growing in importance are feeding projects in primary schools and forestry projects.

It is also clear from Table 1 that the altogether nine project subcategories listed in the table (out of the twenty in WFP's tabulations) dominate the portfolio of both completed and ongoing development projects; there is in fact an increase in concentration in 1993 compared to past years on the nine sub-categories listed. There is no indication that this trend is the result of any overall policy direction by CFA.

It can well be argued that these nine project classifications are so large as to conceal an important array of sub-activities and sub-classifications and therefore that their utility as a management tool is somewhat limited. On the other hand, it is important to note that the elimination of over half of the project classes, which WFP now tracks in its data gathering and reporting, results in a reduction of only 6.2 percent in the overall dollar volume of the current development portfolio. It is worth questioning whether WFP ought to be attempting to assist in the design, implementation, management and evaluation of some of the smaller categories of development activities given the need to concentrate its development capacities as we argue below.

It is worth noting that, as the table shows, there is a good general fit between the distribution of WFP's efforts in development everywhere and the pattern of the development projects we reviewed in our nine country studies. Clearly, the main categories of development projects supported by WFP are quite well represented in our nine country studies. This pattern of coverage is even more complete when one notes that the Ghana country case study examined a completed project to re-settle government employees made redundant under structural adjustment, and a major sub-component of the Vulnerable Group Feeding Project reviewed in the Malawi country case study was directly focused on crop diversification. While it may seem that Vulnerable Group Feeding projects are slightly over represented in the sample, the fact that some of these projects included agricultural sub-projects may offset this.

One important aspect of the fairly wide range of the WFP development portfolio lies in the management issues implied by the diversity and complexity of the Programme's development assistance. Each type of activity requires its own specialist expertise to design, implement, evaluate, and then to make improvements in subsequent projects. Each raises its own special demands on government capacity, relationships with other technical and financial organisations, monitoring systems, and also for different types of non-food items.

The complexity of WFP's work in numerous and varied sectors is further complicated by additional development concerns which have been self-imposed by management or required by donors or CFA, such as WFP's focus on low-income and Least Developed Countries; a need to consider disaster mitigation and the development-relief interface; concerns for women and the environment; and operations in support of complex policy initiatives, such as structural adjustment. All this adds up to a practically impossible work load and raises doubts about WFP's overall capacity to perform at an acceptable level of efficiency and effectiveness.

In what follows we review in turn WFP's experience and performance in each of the two major types of WFP development assistance: food for work and supplementary feeding and, within each, we examine key sectors of activity. The specific sectors of activity reviewed under food

for work (agriculture and forestry) and supplementary feeding (vulnerable group feeding, school feeding) were chosen mainly because of the availability of existing WFP evaluations[53] and the relevance of the experience gained with projects in these sectors during the country case studies.

6.2 Food for Work Development Projects

Food-for-work (FFW) is the most prevalent approach to distributing WFP food aid, especially in some of the poorest countries of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. FFW is the primary approach used in food and agricultural production, rural infrastructure, resettlement, and urban poverty alleviation projects. FFW projects are generally claimed to be targeted towards poor households. They often have two main objectives: to contribute to increasing economic growth through the creation of capital goods, and to combat poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition.

6.2.1 Agricultural Projects

Projects in the agricultural sector shade progressively from those concerned exclusively with land development and soil conservation to wider based activities which may be centred on agricultural production while incorporating a variety of other features, including communal development in one form or another. It is often difficult to classify projects into agricultural sub-sectors as a result. In addition, agricultural projects often pursue compound or multiple objectives. WFP has carried out a number of sectoral and project specific evaluations in the area of agricultural projects and these evaluations present a very mixed picture of project effectiveness.

A Sectoral Evaluation Summary Report on WFP Assistance to the Development and Protection of Rain Fed Agriculture in China (Loess Plateau) presented to the CFA in May 1993 was very positive in its findings. The objectives of the two projects reviewed in the report are progressively to eliminate erosion in the project areas and to increase the area under protection through terracing and permanent vegetation so as to increase output of agricultural products, including fruit and to develop animal husbandry. Projects with such a wide range of objectives are inherently hard to bring to a successful conclusion.

Nevertheless, in this case they appear to have worked very well. As the report states "All socio-economic indicators show improvement in agricultural production and in living conditions, as well as a general economic uplift. The assets created by the projects are economically sustainable provided the established maintenance system is continued and the existing road network is extended to all villages, thus allowing for easy access and export of agricultural products. Project No. 2744 has served as a demonstration area and the more recent No. 3225 has taken into account the lessons learned from the other (e.g., the inclusion of road construction and safe water schemes)....Implementation of projects is according to schedule. Food

[53] At our request, WFP in Rome provided us with a set of three score or more evaluation reports from recent years, covering a wide range of WFP assisted projects within these sectors in different circumstances, with different modalities and organisation, and with varying degrees of success.

management is highly satisfactory." Unusual for WFP, internal rates of return were calculated during the evaluation for these projects with one (No. 2744) estimated at 17 percent per annum and the other (No. 3225) at 22 percent. These rates of return were arrived at without taking into account substantial environmental benefits.

Project No. 2817, also located in China, has as its objective to improve the living conditions of nomadic herders through increased fodder production and settlement. WFP's own evaluation also rates this project as a success. "The implementation of the project demonstrated that it had been well conceived and that the principal targets set out in the plan of operations could be attained... The success of the project is largely the result of the mobilisation and dedication of the administrative Staff.."[54] The net return on the project was calculated in various ways and the lowest result was 7.5 percent, regarded as good for a socio-economic project.

Project Vietnam 2779, Development of water resources in the Province of Binh Tri Thien and Nghe Tinh, was also very positively reviewed by a WFP evaluation carried out in 1988 (which was confirmed in our own country study). Construction of irrigation and drainage schemes was found to be of high technical quality and the amount of work completed at the project's half-way mark generally coincided with the planned programme of work and the number of rations distributed. Food aid had provided a supplementary resource as an incentive for labour-intensive activities and as an important source of income for participating workers and their families. The construction was found to be of generally high quality and it was expected that double cropping and better yields would lead to important increases in crop production.

The evaluation in 1993 of Project China No. 3357 struck a more negative note. This is a project concerned with the development of agricultural incomes in Lhasa river valley, Tibet Autonomous Region. The difficulties encountered could in the view of the evaluation mission, "compromise the likelihood of ultimate success in terms of immediate impact on agricultural output and incomes in the project area, as well as the long-term sustainability of the project and its replicability in the three main neighbouring river valleys".

Similarly, WFP's experience with Project Egypt No. 2270 provides an illustration of the problems which can arise in assessing the overall performance of projects with multiple objectives. Its purpose is to support the settlement of the Bedouin population in the Mursah Matrouh Governorate by improving overall living conditions and providing them with a regular and gradually increasing income in line with government priorities. The project has been implemented reasonably successfully over a period of 12 years and appears to be reaching its objectives and supporting government policy. The attempt made in the 1990 evaluation report to gain an impression of the benefits accruing to farmers in the area shows that they might be expected to recoup their outlay only after eight years, and this estimate allocates no cost to their labour. A payback period of eight years seems to represent too long a time horizon for returns in a developing country and considered in isolation might appear to throw doubts on the effectiveness of the project.

[54] CFA 34/SCP:9, Document 9/3 Add.C1, p. 2.

A WFP evaluation in 1989 of Project Senegal No. 2630 highlighted the problem of lack of integration of a particular development project into the overall production and marketing system in the region. This project is concerned with irrigation development in the Senegal River Valley. It appears that the project was ill-conceived in the first place and was unsuitable for the use of food aid because of the relatively small amount of manual work involved. The evaluation also notes, however, that the plan of operations does not take a global view of the agrarian system operating in the valley. For instance, the measures proposed in support of livestock are not in keeping with local traditions, environmental conditions or the valley's socio-economic situation.

Project Sao Tome and Principle No. 2757 is another example of a project in the agricultural sector apparently failing to achieve its objectives. It is intended to support the production of cocoa by reducing absenteeism, restructuring the cocoa enterprises and improving social infrastructure by increasing food crops for the workers. These aspirations were hit by a slump in cocoa prices and the project has been rated unsuccessful with a danger of aid dependence developing.

Projects concerned with rural development almost always include a significant agricultural production component and are worth noting in any review of experience in this sector. The evaluation reports prepared by WFP in the last five years in this area are not encouraging. The evaluation of project Central African Republic No. 2652 concluded that certain operations had been a success and that, on the whole, management was successful, but the other 15 or so reports that have been consulted could not indicate much more than limited results, and three of them provided reasons for project termination.

WFP's own experience with the evaluation of projects in the agricultural sector is quite mixed with examples of highly successful projects in China and Vietnam and more disappointing project experiences reported elsewhere. Since agricultural development projects often pursue a wide range of objectives it is difficult to develop a single indicator of success. Key problems noted in the evaluations carried out by WFP have included lengthy payback periods for investments by farmers, lack of integration of project activities into local production and marketing systems, and very limited success in achieving agricultural development objectives in the wider context of rural development projects.

The experience gained by our own reviews of agricultural projects in the country studies can be seen as broadly supporting the pattern of WFP's own evaluations. The report on Guatemala refers to project 2587 as working well with implementation on schedule and increasingly significant achievements. Our review of WFP supported projects in Vietnam emphasised the success of agricultural development projects there, while in Bolivia and Malawi mixed to negative results were found for the WFP agricultural development projects there. The report on Malawi, for example, noted problems in the financial sustainability of a project sub-component aimed at crop diversification by means of an agricultural inputs package and the provision of small-scale credit, and concluded that WFP had not applied sufficient technical analysis to the design of this project.

6.2.2 Forestry Projects

In the last five years a number of evaluations of forestry projects have been carried out by WFP. As with agriculture and other sectors of development, project performance has been reported as varying greatly.

Amongst the forestry projects most apparently successful are those carried out in China. WFP reported on its assistance to forestry activities in China in 1991.[55] Support to forestry activities in that country started in 1982 and has accounted for about one-fifth of the assistance approved for the country through over a score of projects. The report concluded that "the projects were well justified and in general very successful technically; physical targets were met, sometimes ahead of schedule; food commodities were used wisely and the economic and social benefits will be of considerable importance to the direct beneficiaries and to the areas concerned". The report went on to identify "a few shortcoming in institutional coordination".
A key strength of some forestry projects noted in WFP evaluations is the opportunity they present for very high levels of community participation as these projects may involve hundreds or thousands of farmers. A small-scale example of this is project El Salvador 3097 which seeks to promote the adoption of soil conservation and agro-forestry techniques by 9,000 farmers living at subsistence level in the hill areas of the eastern region of the country. Its greatest contribution over the long term might be that it has shown small farmers in hill regions that there are viable options for them to increase their output and at the same time secure the conservation and improvement of natural resources.

The same positive picture does not emerge in WFP evaluations of projects in other countries. In the case of Senegal, for instance, the interim evaluation carried out in 1991 concluded "Since the project has not been modified during implementation, it is no longer in line with the national rural forestry strategy. Furthermore, the project has not been adapted to reflect variations in climatic conditions. In view of its inadequate design and in the light of the changed policy context, the mission recommends that the current project be terminated..."

Project Morocco 2691 was reviewed by WFP in 1991 and many aspects of the project gave rise to concern. Planning had to be amended, there was a lack of specific data on the work and work norms, and difficulties had been experienced in moving food to remote areas. The vast majority of the reafforestation, watershed management and dune fixation work had been increasingly subcontracted by the Forestry and Inland Waters Department so that the workers employed were paid directly by the operating firm. The wage paid by the Forestry and Inland Waters Department appeared to be above the minimum wage and distribution of food rations as an incentive and wage supplement was, therefore, no longer justified. The project has been terminated before completion.

Our own country studies focus on a number of forestry projects and, not surprisingly, report varying apparent levels of project success. Forestry projects in Vietnam appeared to be working

[55] CFA:31/SCP:6, Document 6/3-D Add.C4

very well during the period of our visit there. Early difficulties had been overcome by drawing on various forms of technical assistance. The country study of Pakistan, while criticising delays in the execution of forestry projects concerned with environmental protection, suggests that they were attaining their objectives.

In our Ethiopia study the judgement is less clear cut. There had been serious failures in implementation but, as stated in an earlier evaluation report,[56] the result had been "an impressive output of physical conservation structures and tree planting in degraded catchments". However, much of this was destroyed from lack of maintenance. This brings out the important point that sustainability can be ensured only if it is in the interests of persons or bodies to continue operations. In this connection usufruct rights are of the first importance. Indeed, the ultimate success of all such projects often depends on the rights of participants to effective use of the assets they create and are expected to maintain. Similarly, mere afforestation is not enough to ensure viability; it needs to be combined with many aspects of social forestry, including provision for pasture, and for participation of communities.

As was the case with agriculture projects, project success seems to be more directly co-related with the country situation and the strength of the implementing agencies (successful projects reported in China and Vietnam) than with the inherent nature of the sector projects. Forestry projects (afforestation, re-forestation and social forestry) hold out the potential for important long term environmental and production impacts and have the added advantage of compatibility with very high levels of community participation. Their longer term viability seems to be directly related to property rights and integration of projects into many aspects of social forestry.

The above cases constitute no more than examples of the performance of forestry projects in a number of countries. In the absence of cost-benefit studies of the results of forestry projects, it is not possible to assess the rates of return likely to be achieved but they could clearly be quite high when the projects are well implemented. It may be far more important to assess the strength of implementing institutions and thus the prospects for effective implementation in advance of carrying out such projects, than to calculate expected rates of return.

6.2.3 General Overview of Food for Work Projects

As examples of projects using food for work as a development tool, experience in agriculture and forestry seem to indicate that these projects rely for their success or failure on other factors than the use of food as an input. Most of the WFP evaluations reviewed, as well as the assessments of our country studies, attribute success or failure of these projects to factors such as the strength of project designs, the degree to which the assets created serve the interests of participants and those charged with maintenance, or the technical and administrative capacity of the counterpart agency. The general results of our country studies, as they relate to WFP food for work projects and their effectiveness, may be summarised as follows:

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[56] CFA 32/SCP: 7, Document 7/3 Add. C2.

Identification, planning and management: There were important problems in the design of FFW projects in that they were sometimes based on unrealistic assumptions in respect of available inputs, and in the financial and technical capacity of implementing agencies of government; the designs often failed to provide for adequate technical assistance to implementing agencies or to incorporate necessary measures for extension services.

Targeting: There were real difficulties in the targeting of many WFP supported development projects, both in terms of those benefiting from immediate employment and from long-term improvements in infrastructure; there were disappointing results also in targeting of FFW projects. The targeting of long-term benefits of infrastructure created through FFW has not met much success; they have often been captured by better off residents of the localities involved.

Disincentives: We did not come across cases of significant and lasting local disincentive effects to production as a result of FFW projects.

Dependence: In Ghana, Morocco and Vietnam, major problems have arisen from the creation of budgetary dependence in key counterpart ministries and agencies of Government as a result of FFW (and Vulnerable Group Feeding). It seems that the creation of institutional and budgetary dependence is much more of a real concern than creation of dependence among FFW project participants, perhaps because systems for rotating employment (and areas in which FFW projects were implemented) had largely controlled the problem.

Commodity basket: Our country studies contain little evidence that the basket of commodities used in FFW projects is inappropriate or unacceptable to participants. In some projects the mix of cash and food commodities may be higher in value than local wages, or when food rations are given as a supplement to the local cash wages. This tends to further frustrate efforts to target FFW participation to the poorest and most food insecure.

Impact evaluation: We found a general lack of impact evaluation of FFW projects and especially of effectiveness of targeting. WFP clearly has serious problems in ensuring that food aid is used to benefit the poorest and most food insecure. We found numerous examples where the benefits of FFW projects redound to the less disadvantaged (better off landowners in Pakistan and Morocco and employed public servants in Ghana). WFP's monitoring and evaluation system does not seem to capture just who the recipients are and what is their status in relation to defined targets. Moreover, we found almost no data in the nine countries studied on how food is used within the households receiving WFP provided rations or cash. Assumptions are made as to the way that this food will benefit women and children with little or no evidence to back them up.

Our overall assessment of the Programme's FFW projects, based on available WFP evaluations and our country studies, is that there is a crying need for more attention to targeting and to community participation in projects. We emphasise the problem inherent in planning and administering FFW projects which are often large and almost always complex. The overall success or failure of the projects does not seem to depend so much on the administration of the food resources provided, as on the planning, organisation and implementation of the project work that is being supported by the provision of food.

6.3 Supplementary Feeding Projects

Supplementary feeding projects are specifically designed to improve nutrition and assist the development of human resources. There are two large categories of WFP projects in this field: school feeding and vulnerable group development. As stated in the review on food aid in Sub-Saharan Africa,[57] school feeding projects are intended to have three major objectives: improving nutritional status, increasing attendance, and improving student's performance. Vulnerable group development projects are generally part of a larger primary health care programme, and food is used to encourage attendance at clinics. Food rations are often taken home from the clinic, calculated to last until the next visit. Though not strictly supplemental in nature, food aid is also used in institutional settings, such as hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, and training centres, to substitute for food that would otherwise have to be purchased; in these cases food is providing budgetary support to the institutes involved. Some vulnerable group development projects also aim at promoting income generating activities through training and credit, and assistance in marketing.

6.3.1 Vulnerable Group Feeding

There does not appear to have been any sectoral review by WFP of this class of projects. However, some of our country studies provide insights into the effectiveness of such operations and these can be supplemented by individual project evaluations conducted by WFP. An extensive discussion of non-school supplementary feeding is available in a WFP occasional paper[58] prepared by Clay and Singer.

A number of variants of vulnerable group feeding have been carried out by WFP, including food for pregnant and nursing mothers, and food to hospitals, orphanages and other institutions. Their objectives generally extend beyond attempting to deal with malnutrition and may include *inter alia* the provision of instruction in health matters, functional literacy and training of various types designed to promote income-earning opportunities.

As might be expected, experience with vulnerable group feeding projects as reported in WFP evaluations has been mixed. Project Tunisia 3408 appears to have been a singular failure. In the 1991 evaluation report,[59] it is described as being "..part of Government's social assistance programme which does not, in general, address the causes of poverty."[60] Results at mid-term

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[57] "Food Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of the Literature"; WFP Occasional Papers No. 13. February 1989.

[58] *Food Aid and Development Experience: A Survey of the literature since 1977 on the Role and Impact of Food in Developing Countries*, E.J. Clay and H.W.Singer, WFP 1985. This study covers much more than food aid provided by WFP.

[59] CFA:31/SCP:6.

[60] P. 1.

for this project were reported as not satisfactory. The 1989 review of Project Yemen Arab Republic 2694 was critical of the execution of the project for having failed to link feeding to complementary programmes for nutrition education, health services, improved water supply and the creation of adequate infrastructure, without which progress in improving nutritional status could not be expected.

Similarly, the interim evaluation, 1992, of the Syrian Arab Republic project 2511 (Exp. 2), for the feeding of women trainees, vulnerable groups and primary school children, was critical of the programme, regarding it as amounting to general budgetary support for the Government's social development policy. The gradual phasing out of the project was recommended and then accepted by the Government.

On the other hand, project Zambia 2710, for infant feeding and prevention of malnutrition, evaluated in 1992, has been more successful. Somewhat inadequate records appeared to suggest that "..moderately-malnourished children receiving take-home rations of the High Energy Protein Supplement (HEPS) gained weight when the recommended ration scale and duration of assistance were strictly adhered to."

Other WFP evaluations give the same varied picture: an incentive to the involvement of women in development in Peru; impediments to expansion of the supplementary feeding programme in Haiti; and attempts to implement supplementary feeding in El Salvador in the face of financial difficulties and a situation of insecurity.

The two most important vulnerable group feeding projects reviewed as part of our country studies were a large vulnerable group development project in Bangladesh and vulnerable group feeding in Malawi. The study of the VGD programme in Bangladesh revealed a cost effective VGD programme delivering wheat to the value of one taka at a total cost of 1½ taka.[61] On the other hand, Malawi project 525/4780 illustrates the difficulties that can be experienced in evaluating projects in the absence of an effective monitoring and evaluation system. It seems that the effect of WFP's assistance was mainly to provide a budgetary supplement for the hospitals which, however, failed to pay into the fund intended to support the operations of the Project Management Unit responsible for logistics, coordination, evaluation and monitoring. In addition, the Malawi country study emphasized that there was a large gap between the objectives of this project (to address the problem of malnutrition in Malawi) and the volume of resources being provided.

In short, vulnerable group feeding programmes are capable of giving satisfactory results in favourable circumstances but often experience difficulties in implementation. The most important general problem with vulnerable group feeding seems to be limited conceptual work done to relate the direct intervention (provision of on-site or take home food rations) to the overall and specific objectives of the projects. WFP and its counterparts need to be better able to situate vulnerable group feeding projects within the overall national response to malnutrition

[61] *Bangladesh Implementing Structural Reform*, World Bank, p. 115.

and malnutrition related disease and to link food use directly to other responses in order to develop "nutrition" projects rather than simple "feeding" projects.

6.3.2 School Feeding Projects

WFP assistance to education was reviewed in June 1990 when an overview paper was submitted to the CFA.[62] The paper is remarkable for revealing how little is known about the benefits that food aid can bring to education. Conventional beliefs are that food provided for school children would have any or all of the following effects:

- Reduce malnourishment and improve nutrition;
- Improve the physical and mental capacity of children to learn;
- Increase attendance at under-utilised schools;
- Ultimately support development by increasing the supply of educated and healthy people;
- Provide a supplement to school budgets enabling the schools to function more effectively.

As the occasional paper notes, it is difficult to establish with any certainty how far school feeding promotes the effects described above. The object of reducing malnourishment is often frustrated because rations, if issued, are shared with the family or, if given in the form of meals in school, may lead to the child receiving less food at home. It is disappointing to read "...that very few, if any, evaluations of WFP-assisted school feeding projects have demonstrated an improvement in the nutritional status of school children".[63] There does, however, appear to be some certainty that if a mid-morning snack is made available to children who may have travelled long distances on foot to school without having eaten, concentration and performance at school will be improved.

Very little also seems to be known about the capacity of school feeding to improve attendance. In some cases where schools are full, it simply cannot have this effect. Also, the assumption that the availability of food may increase the numbers of girls attending, seems to be more a matter of belief than established fact.

The ultimate effects on the availability of well educated people that might be expected to come from increased attendance and improved performance are hard to quantify, although a great deal of research has been done to demonstrate the benefits of education to individuals and establish rates of return that can result from it.

The effects of such projects on school budgets may also be in doubt. In some cases, for example boarding schools, where the cost of food may he a high proportion of total costs, the effects may be potentially significant but a great deal depends on how the budgets of the schools

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[62] WFP/CFA:29/SCP:4

[63] *Op. cit*, p. 8.

are drawn up and whether the provision of food is indeed a supplement and not offset by reductions in other budgetary provisions. What is fairly clear is that in most cases the withdrawal of food rations by WFP would be unlikely to result in the Government of the country concerned using its own resources to continuing feeding programmes, at least not at the same level.

Evaluation reports prepared by WFP and submitted to the CFA, during the last five years report mixed results regarding the effectiveness of school feeding projects. In El Salvador school feeding seems to have been going well with the community support and similar projects were well regarded in Botswana and Cote d'Ivoire.

The case of Mexico was also found to be a positive use of school feeding with some very special features. In addition to improving the learning capacity of pupils and increasing enrolment of girls, the support given by WFP to National Indigenous Institute boarding schools had been used successfully to generate savings in the Institute's budget which were then used for the economic and social development of indigenous communities. The growing commitment of the Government offered the prospect of being able to phase out the project within a measurable period of time.

On a similar note, with the attainment of nearly universal primary education in Sao Tome, WFP was looking to use food aid to improve the education system, including the construction, and maintenance of school buildings. In other countries performance was acceptable with some qualifications in certain matters. The project for Brazil might reasonably be questioned on the grounds of whether a school feeding project could be justified in the context of a per capita income of over USD 2,000; although the intention was to concentrate WFP support on poor and remote regions where there was no coverage.

The review in 1992 of the Bolivia 2735 project for integrated assistance to pre-school children in depressed areas was also favourable. "The mission noted that the rate of return from investment in the education of pre-school children was probably very high and recommended that the Government calculate and monitor these figures on a regular basis. Such calculations are likely to emphasize to the Government and to donors such as WFP and the World Bank the relative advantage of investment in school children compared with, for example, investments in irrigation, roads, dams, tourist projects, rural electrification, etc."[64]

On a more negative note, the school feeding projects in Burundi and Mauritius were recommended for phasing out following WFP evaluations. In the case of Burundi the main reason for the recommendation appears to be that the Government had been unable to apply the policy put forward several years ago by the World Bank for phasing out boarding schools in favour of day schools. For Mauritius, the evaluation report concluded "that..projects..in the social sectors, have not, over nearly 20 years of implementation, been adapted to the profound social changes in Mauritian society and, therefore, no longer address the more needy in an

[64] CFA:35/SCP:10/3-D Add.A1, p. 3.

effective manner."[65] The underlying explanation of this conclusion appears to have been that the project was no longer regarded as a particular development undertaking, financed by an outside international donor for a specific purpose and time, but as an acquired right.

The findings in our country studies do not differ greatly from the general impressions put forward above. The case of school feeding in Morocco illustrates the difficulties that can occur when planning the number of beneficiaries goes astray and projects expand rapidly. It also shows that, even in relatively well-off countries, and with projects supported by governments, aid dependence can become a factor so that a cut back in programmes finds governments unable to replace donor assistance. An impact study of this project is under way. The secondary school feeding project reviewed in the Ghana country study suffered from problems in integrating a new system of purchases with existing commercial arrangements. The project is reported as leading the Ministry of Education and the Ghana Education Service to a situation of dependence. It also illustrates the difficulty in creating sustainable systems for generating the necessary revenue to support school feeding when WFP support is withdrawn.

The country study of Guatemala notes the difficulties faced by officials implementing school feeding projects when they have the responsibilities of supervising projects with little in the way of supporting resources to enable them to do so.

In summary, a thematic review paper, the individual WFP project evaluations reviewed and our own country studies all note the potential benefits and positive impacts of school feeding projects. However, some benefits such as improved attendance and increased academic performance have seldom, if ever, been adequately evaluated. They also note the difficulty of targeting school feeding to the more poor and food-insecure families, and the very real problems which may arise in terms of aid dependence for ministries of education, as well as for the parents of students who receive an effective subsidy on the cost of education.

6.3.3 General Overview of Supplementary Feeding Projects

The general result of our country studies, as they relate to WFP supplementary feeding projects and their effectiveness, may be summarised as follows:

Identification, planning and management: The country studies confirm that there are problems in project planning and management for supplementary feeding projects, reflecting low community participation and involvement of target group members in project design. Problems encountered included:

- Over-ambitious project objectives in relation to volumes of food and numbers of participants;
- Designs which ignore existing institutional arrangements;

[65] *Interim Evaluation Summary Report on Project Mauritius 511* (Expansion 3), Assistance for Pre-primary and Primary School Feeding, and Project Mauritius 649 (Expansion 2) Feeding of vulnerable groups, *WFP/CFA:29/SCP:4, p. 5.*

- Creation of vertical structures for administering programmes outside the line ministries with attendant problems for budgetary and bureaucratic sustainability;
- Problems in planning food movements and the handling of logistics issues by counterparts;
- Unrealistic assumptions of the financial and technical capacity of implementing agencies of government; and,
- Failure to provide for adequate technical assistance for implementing agencies or to incorporate necessary measures for extension services in project designs.

While these problems can also occur in relation to FFW projects, they seemed to be particularly debilitating in Vulnerable Group Feeding or School Feeding projects.

Targeting: There are real difficulties in targeting supplementary feeding projects and in assessing whether or not the rations provided have any appreciable impact on the health status of participants; as the household use of take-home rations is not well understood. The key problems in targeting seem to be that school feeding projects often benefit more well off families, sometimes in the form of a subsidy to school fees, and that the rations provided in VGF projects are either diverted in the family, or if provided on site, are so small and so infrequent as to have limited nutritional impact.

Dependence: As with FFW, the key form of dependence arising from use of food aid for feeding projects concerns the ministries and agencies of Government. This dependence can be particularly severe since the withdrawal of WFP food aid can cause disruptions in service to patients and full or partial closures of key elements of the primary and secondary school systems.

Cost-effectiveness: No special problem of cost-effectiveness was apparent in WFP feeding projects, but the cost of food movement, logistics and control represent a very real financial burden for ministries of the government, a burden which further weakens programme sustainability.

Impact evaluation: We found there was a general lack of evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of WFP feeding projects, particularly Vulnerable Group Development Projects. One problem was poor data collection at the clinic level, another concerned the wide gap between the projects' stated objectives and the quantity and value of food resources being provided.

In addition to the above, our country studies raise two important issues regarding WFP's Vulnerable Group Development and School Feeding projects. The first issue concerns the often unclear link between the project and its overall objectives. In the case of VGF, many projects are approved at the CFA as measures to address the national problem of high rates of malnutrition, even though the project is not in any way directed at the root causes of malnutrition and food insecurity. For most participating health services, Vulnerable Group Feeding (in MCH clinics, in Nutrition Rehabilitation Units and in Paediatric Wards) is either a means of improving attendance and access to PHC services or a specific element in the case-treatment of malnutrition related disease.

Poor nutrition is not solely a result of inadequate feeding; lack of education in nutrition, weak health services and inadequate water supply and sanitation are some of the other factors that affect nutritional status. It follows that if feeding programmes are to be effective they have to be carefully planned, well-administered and subjected to competent monitoring and evaluation. Since some projects may cater for as much as half a million beneficiaries, proper supervision is hard to accomplish. VGF projects need to be re-cast in light of what they can realistically achieve; which is almost never to provide an important response to national problems of food-insecurity and malnutrition.

The second issue concerns the fact that, by their very existence, large Supplementary Feeding Programmes directly affect national education and health policy, sometimes in ways that are quite destructive and often without any explicit review by WFP to see if these changes are desirable. School Feeding Projects often provide a direct subsidy to secondary education costs which would otherwise be born by parents in the form of school fees. While such subsidies may be desirable, it is clear that, for instance, in Ghana they run counter to the stated national education policy of reducing or eliminating subsidies to Secondary Boarding Schools. In the case of VGF programmes, they often have a direct impact on the organization and delivery of PHC services and almost always involve a significant commitment of funds and management resources. It is unclear, for example, whether the health service in Malawi, in the absence of WFP support, would direct *its own* resources to Vulnerable Group Feeding in an amount equivalent to what now is deployed. A number of senior officials in the MOH indicated that other expenditure areas in PHC would have a higher priority.

It seems clear that WFP needs to be much more sensitive to the fact that large scale feeding programmes can directly affect national education and health policy and to recognize the role that WFP may inadvertently play.

A review of WFP project evaluations and the findings of the country studies supports the view that supplementary feeding projects could have an important potential role to play in human resource development and in encouraging the effective use of national systems of primary health care and education. However, the nutritional impacts of these projects are most often not known and they are seldom adequately linked to other elements of effective nutritional programming. Indeed the key question for this whole area of projects seems to be the need for more careful conceptual work on the link between the food inputs used, the activities which support them, and their specific objectives.

On a cautionary note, these projects are large and complex, suffer difficult problems in targeting and seem prone to the creation of very high levels of institutional and budgetary dependence.

5.4 Concluding Comments on WFP Project Portfolio

The evaluative material described above demonstrates quite strongly that both food for work and supplementary feeding have an important role to play if WFP is to support development through the use of project food aid. Further, they establish a basic rationale for programming in

agriculture, forestry, vulnerable group development and school feeding, although they also indicate that important problems have occurred in realizing the potential benefits of these categories of projects and in designing and implementing them effectively.

There are important common problems in the design and implementation of all the classes and categories of projects reviewed above relating mainly to the complexity of using food to support large projects and the need to match this difficult resource to what may be limited technical and administrative capacity in the counterpart agencies involved. Special problems noted for food for work projects include the need for effective measures to ensure adequate targeting of benefits to participants, the need to link projects in agriculture and forestry to local ownership and production practices and to systems for marketing, and problems inherent in planning and administering large and complex projects.

In the case of supplementary feeding it seems to be most difficult to establish whether or not the supposed benefits (improvements in nutritional status, improved attendance at schools and clinics, and improved health and education for participants) are actually achieved. There is also real concern over the extent to which food can be assumed to be as self-targeting as food aid proponents have contended. Most important of all, there is a recurring theme that supplementary feeding represents a very narrow response to problems of malnutrition; the basic causal link between the project inputs and activities and the hoped for outcomes is often missing. Supplementary feeding projects often seem also to act in isolation from other elements of a reasonable strategy for nutrition, such as nutrition education, income generation, etc.

There is no demonstrated case for WFP to favour either food for work or supplementary feeding in its future support of development projects. Neither is there a demonstrable reason for eliminating or favouring projects in agriculture, forestry, vulnerable group feeding or school feeding. The rationale for each of these project types and the prospects for success seem to be highly dependant on local conditions, on the apparent strength of the key counterpart agencies, and on WFP's capacity (alone and in combination with its partners) to ensure adequate project design, implementation and evaluation. The selection of which type of food aid to utilize and which sectors to work in must clearly be based on country specific criteria rather than an overall global decision. It must also depend on strong, sector-specific, capacities within WFP and its partners.

6.5 Country Considerations

Just as WFP directs food aid to the support of development in specific sectors to be used mainly as food for work or supplementary feeding, it must also contend with the problem of which countries should receive development food aid and how WFP development food aid should be concentrated or dispersed on a geographic basis. This section deals with the overall policy context within which WFP (as directed by the CFA) allocates development food aid to countries and with the criteria used to guide this allocation.

6.5.1 Policies on Country Allocations

WFP attempts to give priority in its various programmes to countries designated as low-income food deficit (LIFD) countries, whose per capita GNP in 1991 was less than USD 1,235 and which rely on food imports to meet domestic requirements. The Least Developed Countries (LDC) are intended to progressively receive more WFP assistance. In 1991, there were 74 countries classified as LIFD and 47 countries classified as LDC. In its operations, this means that WFP has to apportion relatively scarce development project resources among many potential recipients. For any multilateral organization this is a painful exercise with political overtones and implications. For WFP it is intensified because the CFA, representing recipient and donor country governments, approves each project.

We find it surprising that the income frontier between low income food-deficit and better off countries is set as high as USD 1,235 in 1991. The explanation given is that this is per capita incomes "below the level used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA assistance (USD 1,235 in 1991)".[66] However, two of the countries we have studied, Guatemala and Morocco which are classified as LIFD countries have not received IDA credits in recent years; the same is the case for other LIFD countries with large WFP development assistance, such as Jordan, Syria and El Salvador. We recommend that WFP and CFA reconsider the criteria for classifying a country as LIFD, with particular attention to the per capita income level to be used.

As part of its effort to concentrate more programming in LDC countries, WFP provides a subsidy to LDCs to meet the internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) costs of its development activities. Additional assistance is also given to help meet some of the recipient governments' costs of implementing WFP-assisted development projects, such as monitoring and evaluation activities or administrative support for the establishment and operation of central food management units. Any programming decisions to allocate increasingly more WFP resources to LDCs will require concomitant cash resources to implement.

WFP's project funding approach to resource allocations did not, until very recently, take into consideration relative allocations of resources to countries, per se. This has resulted in large programmes in some countries generally considered as middle income, such as Morocco, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Guatemala and El Salvador.[67] In recent years, resources available to the development programme began to stagnate, in part due to reduced ODA among major donors. This unexpected levelling-off of food aid resulted in an over-commitment of WFP development resources which has had to be urgently addressed in the past two years. Coupled with CFA policies which encourage an increasing proportion of WFP resources to be channelled to the

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[66] *1993 Food Aid Review*, op. cit page 130. We have not been able to reconcile this statement with what we understand is the *actual* IDA eligibility level of USD 765, not USD 1,235.

[67] However, all of these, except Tunisia, are classified as LIFD countries.

poorer countries, this resulted in efforts on the part of WFP to establish a more formal country allocation procedure.[68]

The Secretariat has raised this issue in several CFAs since November 1991 and a decision was taken in November 1992 to endorse draft guidelines, subject to certain amendments, which can be summarized as follows:[69]

- Allocations to countries will be based on an assessment of relative need;
- Though there is no strict cut-off point for eligibility, in relatively better off countries, assistance will be provided only when there are serious local or regional food problems at the household level or evident malnutrition;
- The determination of relative need should be used as an indicator of the order of magnitude of assistance to be provided. Other factors will be considered also, such as, requirements of ongoing activities, operational constraints, absorptive capacity, and effectiveness of the project food aid in the country concerned;
- Determination of need will be based on several indicators: per capita GNP, per capita daily calorie supply, mortality rate under five years of age, and food import requirements relative to foreign exchange availability;
- Special consideration may be given to non-LIFD countries having large concentrations of poor people;
- Proposals from non-LIFD countries will be scrutinized to assure targeting, poverty alleviation, and phasing out;
- No single country, however populous, should normally receive more than 10 percent of WFP's overall development assistance;
- Changes arising from these guidelines will be introduced progressively; a target is set to achieve within five years the provision of at least 90 percent to LIFDs; highest priority should be given to LDCs at 50 percent. A progress report will be submitted to the spring 1997 CFA;
- The unit of assistance will be a three-year moving average of the value of the shipments; and
- Actual allocations should only be made on the basis of specific projects that are technically, economically, and socially sound.

The approval of these guidelines is indicative of real attempts on the part of the Secretariat and the CFA to address resource issues, particularly in the targeting of development resources to the most needy. Making these guidelines operational, however, will require further changes in the way the organization functions and in the resources committed. As mentioned earlier, any further targeting toward the poorest countries will also require increased cash support for ITSH, internal administration, and non-food items. Assessing the absorptive capacity of very poor countries and redressing these problems will require specialist expertise and concomitant

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[68] WFP internal memo "Approach to be followed in the allocation of commodities to development project in 1992". June 1991.

[69] "Criteria for country allocation"; CFA:34/P/7-A.

development efforts by other organizations. The need to strengthen the institutions and facilities involved implies an even greater need to integrate food aid with financial and technical assistance, for instance, from UNDP, the World Bank and IFAD.

6.5.2 The Regional Pattern

One way to examine the result of WFP policies on resource allocation and its efforts to influence the portfolio of projects so that food aid is used where it is most needed is to examine the regional pattern of development project allocations. Table 2 presents an overview of this pattern in WFP's development portfolio by using as an indicator the dollar value of projects in the three classifications of human resource development, economic and social infrastructure and directly productive projects.

As the table indicates, there has been strong overall stability in the division of WFP commitments by class of projects over time. The current overall project portfolio is remarkably similar to the commitments made to projects completed between 1963 and 1992. On the other hand, there has been considerable shift among broad project classifications within certain regions. Not surprisingly, development programming by WFP in the East and Horn of Africa has tended to shift out of directly productive projects and toward projects classes as human resource development (mainly vulnerable group feeding). Such a shift would be in keeping with the need to preserve basic human capabilities at a time of great crisis in the region. Southern Africa also experienced a strong increase in project allocations toward human resource development and a decrease in directly productive projects, while in the Asia and Pacific Region there has been a real drop in the relative share of human resource development projects and a shift into directly productive projects.

Table 2
Percentage Distribution of WFP Commitments for Development: 1963-92 and Current

Project Class	East and Horn of Africa		Southern Africa		West and Central Africa		Asia and Pacific		Latin American and Caribbean		Mediterrean and Middle East		Total for All WFP	
	63-92	93	63-92	93	63-92	93	63-92	93	63-92	93	63-92	93	63-92	93
Human resource development	39.7	49.9	49.3	69.5	36.3	37.0	26.3	20.2	52.7	45.6	36.1	44.3	36.2	39.7
Economic/ social infra-structure	3.3	1.2	10.5	11.0	17.4	24.2	5.9	1.5	18.6	32.8	10.6	4.5	10.0	12.7
Directly productive projects	56.7	48.9	40.2	19.5	46.3	38.9	67.8	78.3	29.2	21.7	53.4	51.2	53.9	47.6
Total for region	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
% of all WFP com-mitments for devel-lopment	10.5	12.5	7.2	7.8	11.8	16.0	32.4	25.9	11.4	19.8	26.7	17.1	100	100

Source: As for Table 1.

Perhaps most surprising has been the shift in the total allocation of WFP development resources by region. While the three regions in Africa have increased their share of overall commitments to development projects from 29.5 percent in the period 1963-92 to 37.2 percent of current commitments, Latin America and the Caribbean also increased its share from 11.4 to 19.8 percent. In light of efforts to concentrate food aid use in Least Developed Countries (of which only one - Haiti - is located in the region) this seems remarkable.

A review of more detailed data indicates that Least Developed Countries (LDCs) account for well under 40 percent of WFP commitments for development. Compared to the pattern of WFP's total portfolio, LDCs are more often the location for human resource development projects and less often the site for directly productive projects. This reflects the higher concentration in LDCs of both vulnerable group and primary school feeding projects, and is not surprising or unreasonable, given the need to invest in human resources in these countries. It is rather unexpected to find, however, that development projects for land development and forestry in LDCs account for a much lower proportion of current commitments than in the project portfolio as a whole; there are certainly sectors in which LDCs face important challenges.

.6 Country Programme Versus Project Approach

A key question for WFP in attempting to allocate resources is how to combine the need to identify and support strong and effective development projects which are reaching the poorer and more vulnerable elements of societies within an overall framework of country allocations. At the present it seems that the guidelines and policies in place regarding country allocations are used sparingly and are more or less wholly subordinate to considerations regarding the selection and approval of projects. It is not clear, for example, if the key question is directing WFP food aid to the most food insecure countries or to the largest concentrations of hungry, impoverished and food insecure people. If the latter were to be the guiding principle used, much higher WFP allocations would be provided for Bangladesh and India. If the former, then many fewer countries would be the site of WFP-supported development projects. The challenge for WFP is to develop a system which combines the need to identify and support strong development projects with a means of providing development food aid to the countries which most require it and where it can have a comparative advantage as a development tool.

For thirty years, WFP has used a project approach to allocate its resources for development resources. Allocations to projects may have implicitly also been made according to some sense of regional proportionality, but the premise of universality of access and global coverage has made allocations based on a strategy of support to individual countries unacceptable. Until recently, there have been no guidelines for limiting the size of any given country allocation, and these guidelines are only beginning to be exercised. Some country allocations, such as Morocco's, have been reduced through the project mechanism, by suppressing new projects or by winding up ongoing projects.

WFP has been considering a programme approach to development food aid activities at least since 1979, when the CFA established "Guidelines and Criteria for Food Aid." These guidelines state that "for maximum effectiveness, project food aid should be coordinated, to the fullest extent possible with financial aid and other forms of development assistance". More recently, as discussed in Chapter 2, an emphasis has been placed on UN agency collaboration as a coordinated response to national development planning and priorities.[70] The need both to improve upon its development activities and to integrate them with national plans has resulted in some promising, if belated, attempts to work more effectively with other UN agencies, NGOs, bilateral donors, and host governments.

The UN Resolution 44/211 of 22 December 1989 provides much of the steam for this initiative. It recommended in paragraph 17(e) that "non-emergency food aid channelled through the organizations of the United Nations system should be programmed coherently so as to ensure its full integration with the development programmes of the government." The UN agencies have been asked to recommend ways to bring about this greater integration.

The Resolution calls for a shift from project to programme approaches, and emphasizes the need to further decentralize capacity and authority in the UN system to the country level in order to increase responsiveness to the needs of developing countries, enhance coherent and efficient programming and resource utilization, achieve the objectives of programmes and projects, and strengthen and utilize national capacity. It seems to be an omission, however, that neither the World Bank nor the IMF, also UN agencies, are part of the UN Resolution 44/211.

Resolution 47/199 has defined a more operational approach to implementing these programme recommendations, which involves the development of Country Strategy Notes (CSN), the harmonization of agency programming cycles, a programme approach, and capacity-building of recipient governments. The resolution requires that each UN member agency provide an annual progress report on measures taken. It states that "national plans and priorities constitute the only viable frame of reference for the national programming of operational activities for development of the UN system" and the "processes and procedures of the UN system should be streamlined and rationalized, especially in the interrelated areas of programming, execution, decentralization, monitoring and evaluation, thus making the UN system more relevant and responsive to the national plans, priorities, and objectives of developing countries, and more efficient in its delivery systems."

Though discussed for several years, these new requirements are relatively recent in place. In its first progress report[71] WFP states that the adoption of a programme approach for WFP development assistance could have major implications for the ways in which both the CFA and the Secretariat conduct their business. Depending upon how it is defined and implemented, the

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[70] United Nations. "Comprehensive triennial policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system." UN General Regulation 44/211. 22 December 1989.

[71] "Measures taken by funds, programmes, and specialized agencies of the UN system in implementation of General Assembly resolution 47/199"; Operational Activities for Development. E/1993/Misc.2. 8 June 1993.

CFA may be invited, for example, to approve multi-year programmes of assistance to recipient countries rather than individual projects; decision-making on the allocation and use of WFP resources may shift between the CFA and the Secretariat, between headquarters and the Country Offices, or otherwise at the country level. The relationship between the CFA and the governing bodies of other agencies may also be affected.

From interviews with WFP staff and recipient government officials, it appears that there is a wide range of understanding and appreciation of a programming approach. One of the major impediments is the unreliable nature of the resources provided: the types and quantities of commodities; it is difficult to consider in long-range planning a resource that is only available on a biennial basis. A second impediment will likely be the WFP culture itself; accustomed to a project focus and a sentiment that there is food to be moved, the Programme and its government counterparts will need to be more analytical, more discriminating, and more flexible about its uses of food as a development input.

To accomplish the above measures, WFP would have further to orient itself towards participating as one member of the UN team in any given country. To contribute at this level, WFP will need to improve its internal monitoring and evaluation, concentrating more on effects-level evaluation than is currently done. In addition, many of these initiatives require strong analytical skills in-house for the preparation of documents to complement the policy framework and technical assistance framework papers prepared by the World Bank and UNDP; WFP country staff will have to be better informed, persuasive, and more interactive; and duties will have to be managed to allow the time required to add this considerable volume of policy and coordination work to the already charged workloads of WFP staff. As expressed in our country studies, we see a clear need for improved capacity at Country Offices level for policy dialogue and programme development, with greater autonomy for them in developing a programme approach, and greater technical and programme cooperation between the WFP and other UN agencies, including the Bretton Woods agencies.

A number of our country studies related the question of the quality of the design of WFP *projects* to the apparent weakness of a WFP *programme* in the country in question. The studies for Malawi and Morocco emphasise that the lack of an effective country programme strategy has limited the ability of the CO to cooperate with governments in a policy dialogue and in effective project design. In addition, the reports on Bangladesh, Bolivia, Guatemala and Pakistan echo the fact that WFP has been unwilling or unable to engage in effective policy dialogue concerning the use of food aid as an input to development.

The reports on Morocco, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Vietnam all make the case for increased delegation of authority to the Country Office for both programming and administrative matters such as finance, staffing and administration. The Bolivia, Bangladesh, Morocco and Vietnam reports emphasize the need for more CO involvement in the later stages of project development so that arrangements can be negotiated locally with the host government based on a clear knowledge of national development conditions. The Pakistan and Morocco reports came out in favour of more autonomy to negotiate monetization arrangements and more decentralization of authority for control of funds, administration and local staffing.

One of the most striking patterns we observed in the nine country studies was the apparent lack of a country programme approach or of a strong and clear statement of WFP priorities at country level. This lack of a cohesive statement of WFP's development objectives regarding the use of food aid at country level is one cause of the passive role WFP seems to take with regard to how food aid is used in the projects it supports (e.g. considerations of targeting, gender, sustainability, comparative advantage, etc.). It seems reasonable to infer that one reason why, at the field level, we see a need for more authority to the Country Office is that it may represent one element in the development of a more country-focused approach to programming for WFP.

6.7 Conclusions

In WFP development projects food is normally either distributed free to members of specific target groups or is provided as compensation for work. WFP classifies projects under three broad categories: Human Resource Development Projects, Economic and Social Infrastructure Projects and Directly Productive Projects. There has been a considerable amount of stability in the composition of the overall project portfolio over time, with directly productive activities accounting for about half of the total. It is questionable whether WFP ought to continue with some of the smaller categories of projects, given the need to concentrate its development activities in the interests of efficiency. The wide remit of WFP, including its focus on low income countries, commitments to disaster mitigation and concerns for women and the environment and operations in support of complex policy initiatives, all of which increase the work load, is a further reason for concentration of activities.

An examination of WFP's evaluation reports of agricultural projects and the results of the country studies shows that experience with this class of projects is quite mixed with some outstanding projects and others producing disappointing results for a variety of reasons. In the case of forestry projects a similar picture emerges. The degree of success seems to be heavily dependent on the situation in particular countries and the strength of the implementing agencies rather than on the inherent nature of the sector projects.

Altogether, our review of food-for-work projects throws up important problems in design and failures in financial and technical capacity of implementing agencies. Other difficulties such as inadequate targeting and emergence of dependence also came to light. There was a general lack of impact evaluation.

In the case of vulnerable group feeding projects, it is evident that while they are capable of giving satisfactory results, difficulties are often experienced in implementation. A particular problem was limited conceptual work to link the operations of the projects to the specific objectives they were expected to attain. The school feeding programmes offer considerable potential benefits but lack of adequate evaluation makes it difficult to see how far they are attaining their objectives. They suffer from difficulties experienced in targeting the poorest and most food insecure families. Very little is known about the effects of such projects on health and nutrition; they can give rise to dependence and their impact is hard to establish. In some cases they may serve more as a budgetary subvention than a means to improve food intake.

From the available evidence it is difficult to establish a case for favouring either food-for-work projects or those concerned with supplementary feeding. In all cases success or failure is heavily dependent on the strengths or weaknesses of the implementing agencies and WFP's capacity to ensure adequate project design implementation and evaluation.

It is necessary to consider not only what type of project should be supported but also how assistance should be apportioned between countries. This is a painful exercise which has received inadequate attention, although the secretariat has attempted to guide it by the preparation of guidelines aiming to respond more closely to needs. It is intended to give priority to low income countries but it is surprising that the cut off between low income and better off countries is set so high and that the Least Developed Countries account for less than 40 percent of WFP's commitments. It is also surprising that there has been a shift in allocations to Latin America and the Caribbean from 11 percent to 20 percent in the period 1963 to 1992, although there is only one Least Developed Country in the region.

WFP's approach to allocating resources could be considerably modified if United Nations recommendations for a more coherent programme were to be fully implemented.

7.0 WFP as a Development Agency: Processes and Performance

Assessing WFP's efficiency and effectiveness is at the heart of this evaluation. In the preceding chapter we have presented an overview of WFP's major development activities: its approaches, sectors of involvement, country considerations, and project focus. Here we describe the processes which WFP undergoes to plan, design, manage, monitor and evaluate its development project activities, and assess WFP's performance, based on previous evaluations and case study observations.

7.1 Planning and Designing Development Projects

7.1.1 Country Strategy Outlines (CSO) and Country Strategy Notes (CSN)

For a number of years, the CFA and others have tried to make WFP's development activities more sensitive to local issues, sustainable, and effective. To do this requires greater integration of WFP projects into national development strategies, greater appreciation of the real constraints and desires of the beneficiaries, and improved host country and WFP management. One measure taken to this end is the requirement that all WFP projects and expansions be considered within the framework of a Country Strategy Outline (CSO).

A similar attempt was made in the mid-1980s, in the form of Country Food Planning Reviews, but this was found to be too time-consuming and expensive, and of variable quality. In 1988, WFP changed to the more informal CSO approach, which is to be developed by the Country Offices themselves. The primary purpose of the CSO is stated[72] to be "to foster a dialogue with the concerned Regional Bureau in WFP headquarters to ensure consistency of assumptions regarding the framework for future project activities". In principle, all project ideas - including those that relate to the expansion, continuation, or reorientation of long-standing projects - are to be systematically scrutinized within a CSO framework. It is not clear to what extent the CSOs will be reviewed in the CFA or how they will be used in the SCP.

The intended scope of the CSO is wide, the level of ambition is high. The document is required to analyze and justify food aid in general, and project food aid in particular; review the government's attitude towards project food aid; assess past experience in the implementation of WFP projects and lessons that can be drawn from it in programming future WFP activities; examine the potential for collaboration and harmonization with bilateral aid programmes and other UN activities; describe the current WFP programme in the country including use of cash

[72] WFP. "Integration of Multilateral Non-Emergency Food Aid with Government Development Programmes", WFP/CFA 26 March 1992.

resources generated through monetization; list opportunities, if any, for local purchases of food, triangular transactions and commodity exchanges; and identify new areas of concentration, indicating the approximate level of inputs that might be appropriate over time, subject of course to the availability of resources and other demands. The CSOs are expected to be used as vehicles to gain consensus and understanding with recipient governments about the best uses of WFP food aid; they also are intended to constitute WFP's contribution to the UN family-wide strategy of assistance to the country. To date, governments and other development agencies have not been much involved in formulating CSOs. At this time, CSOs are largely for internal WFP use, though they are to be shared with JCGP partners in country programming.

WFP has drawn up a set of guidelines (not altogether clear and operational) and a multi-year schedule for the preparation of CSOs, and most Country Offices have now prepared them. WFP management admits that the analytical quality and usefulness of the CSOs produced thus far are variable, reflecting the uneven capacity of field personnel, and the difficulties that both field and headquarters senior staff have had in allocating the necessary time. For most if not all COs it is unrealistic to expect them to develop such strategic documents on their own; we welcome that external consultants are currently engaged to develop CSOs in some countries, such as Bolivia, Yemen, and Tanzania.

The country case studies noted weaknesses in the capacity of WFP Country Offices to discuss food aid policy and strategic uses of WFP assistance with government, and to develop CSOs as a basis for a programme approach to using food aid at country level. Our country reports for Bangladesh, Bolivia, Guatemala, Malawi, Morocco and Pakistan noted some reluctance (or inability) of the CO to become involved in clear cut discussion on the appropriate use of food aid for development with its government counterparts. WFP is seen as a rather passive actor in the debate on how to use food to support development and the criteria to be met if food is to be used efficiently and effectively for development.

For the CSO process to become effective, a number of requirements will need to be better met, including direct involvement of governments in the various stages, particularly in the identification of priority sectors and in problem analysis; more systematic involvement of senior field staff of other UN agencies, particulary UNDP, as well as some bilateral donors and cooperating NGOs; interaction with the IMF and World Bank on macro-economic and structural and sectoral adjustment policies; coordinated scheduling with similar efforts of other major UN partners and IFIs; rigorous analysis of food security at national, regional and household levels, again including stronger in-country links with the World Bank and FAO; and assessment with the host government of performance to date, analysing institutional strengths and weaknesses in sectors and areas for possible food assistance.

UN resolution 47/199 (1992) calls for a Country Strategy Note (CSN) to be formulated by interested recipient governments in cooperation with the United Nations system to outline the contributions which the various UN agencies could make to support national plans, strategies, and priorities, aiming at a more effective integration of assistance provided by the UN system. UN agency involvement in this process will be under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator.

Guidelines for the CSN[73] are still to be fully developed and will be refined in 1994. The WFP Executive Director has advised all Directors of Operations that they should play a full and active role in drawing up CSNs. It is not yet evident how this process will influence UN agency programming, how the quality of the country strategies will be assessed or assured, or whether the availability of UN resources will be influenced by the existence or not of a well worked out CSN.

The relationship between the CSOs and the CSNs is still uncertain. They both require the WFP to be in a position to define and declare its own comparative strengths in the application of food aid for development in the particular setting of each country in which it operates. At Headquarters, a Project Review Committee, under the leadership of the Chief of the Evaluation Service, has been instituted, which will review all operational projects and analyze successes and failures to determine under what conditions, through which approaches and in which sectors WFP is normally most successful, and why. WFP also intends to develop its corporate memory so as to facilitate such analyses. A survey questionnaire is currently being pre-tested, to elicit qualitative judgements based on first-hand experience of WFP activities in different sectors. The questionnaire will be sent to all WFP country officers and those recently retired, a number of Headquarters officers, national project authorities, donors, other UN agency personnel, and NGOs altogether around 1,000 respondents. Results of this study are scheduled to be reported to CFA in June 1994. This might be a starting point for developing the capacity in-house to re-orient WFP's development portfolio toward more promising activities.

7.1.2 The Current Project Cycle: A Six-Step Approach

In 1986, the new Project Cycle was introduced and the Projects Committee instituted to improve project design and management. The following year, the management of development projects was reviewed by the External Auditor, who indicated some improvements and remaining problems of this new Project Cycle.[74] The Operations Department, in conjunction with the former Project Design Service and the Training Unit, has developed training materials and conducted regional workshops, including training since 1987 in application of the Project Cycle requirements and since 1991 in ITAD monitoring, reporting and evaluation.[75] In general, the thrust has been for more realistic objectives, ITAD-inspired monitoring, reporting and evaluation, more attention by field offices to the tracking of progress towards "immediate" objectives and to beneficiary contact monitoring (BCM).

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[73] "Measures taken by funds, programmes, and specialized agencies of the UN system in implementation of General Assembly resolution 47/199". E/1993/Misc 2. 8 June 1993.

[74] FAO. "Report of the External Auditor on the Accounts of the WFP for the Financial Period Ended 31 December 1987". FAO, C 89/7. September 1988.

[75] The system of monitoring referred to follows a report by consultants engaged by WFP to design suitable systems. See WFP/ITAD, *Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation: Proposals for change*, Final Report, May 1991.

WFP activities are required, in principle, to be identified and designed in close collaboration with governments, beneficiaries, NGOs and local bodies. The process is supposed to be decentralised, with Country Offices being supported, as needed, by Headquarters and technical agencies. The Executive Director has the authority to include in development project budgets up to USD 150,000 or 10 percent of the cost of food, whichever is less, to finance project preparation and enhanced project monitoring and evaluation. This fund, called the *Project Preparation Facility* (PPF), offers considerable flexibility for improving the entire project cycle. It could be used to introduce the programme approach in existing and new project designs through the employment of persons familiar with government programmes; to monitor and strengthen technical activities; and to conduct evaluations of effects.

In brief, the Project Cycle, which is under re-examination and in some cases now includes a *pre-appraisal step*, has a six step approach.

Identification: The Project Idea (PI) describes the basic concept and goals of the project. It is prepared by the WFP Country Office with the more or less active participation of government. It is reviewed by the Regional Bureau (RB) and the Project Design and Programming Service. It is then circulated for discussion in the Projects Committee (PC) and forwarded to UN technical agencies for information. At the specific request of the Regional Bureau or a PC member, the Project Idea may exceptionally be discussed at a PC meeting.

Formulation: The Project Outline (PO) is prepared by the Country Office with participation of government, and of technical experts, if needed. It is supposed to include a detailed project strategy, description of outputs, targets, support needed, analysis of key issues and risks, and an explanation of the monitoring system to be used. A covering letter from the government concurring with the PO serves as the official request for WFP assistance. The Project Outline may undergo revisions by the Regional Bureau before being presented to and approved by the Projects Committee.

Review: An appraisal mission is then fielded with experts from UN technical agencies or outside consultants to review technical and socio-economic aspects of the project. These missions are usually organized by the Operations Department. New projects are appraised; project expansions frequently undergo a combined "management review and appraisal" or "evaluation and appraisal"; in the latter case the mission is organised by the Evaluation Service.

Approval: A Project Summary (PS) is prepared by the Regional Bureau for submission to the Projects Committee and, according to the Project Design Manual, "again maintaining full consultation with the Country Office". It is required to contain detailed information on the economic, technical and social feasibility of the project, the beneficiaries (both immediate and long-term), the role of food aid, project outputs, workplans and costs, the role of women, the impact on the environment, possible negative effects on local food production, special design features, monitoring, reporting and evaluation, and UN agency comments. If the Project Summary is cleared by the PC, it is normally approved by the Executive Director, and sent to the Sub-Committee on Projects (SCP) of the CFA, six weeks before each semi-annual meeting. Projects under USD 3.0 million can now be approved by the Executive Director.

The SCP makes recommendations to the CFA, which approves all projects above the Executive Director's delegated authority. After each CFA, the Project Design and Programming Branch prepares a summary of issues raised and conveys them to Country Offices. Project issues arising from the CFA are monitored by the Regional Bureaux.

Action: Project implementation begins when the Country Office drafts and negotiates a Plan of Operations which specifies mutual responsibilities in detail; it is subsequently signed by the government and the WFP Representative; the government sends a Letter of Readiness when all of its obligations have been assured, such as payment of internal transport costs and recruitment or posting of project personnel; the Resources and Transport Divisions of WFP arrange for shipping, insurance and subsequent deliveries; activities begin under the direct responsibility of the government with WFP assistance, including commodity management and necessary steps toward achieving the project's development objectives. Monitoring includes government quarterly reports on commodity movements and accounts, biannual reports on achievements, and annual audited accounts and financial records, if requested; WFP Country Offices issue periodic reports, including the biannual Country Office Progress Reports (COPR), and prepares Progress Reports for the CFA, and annual and financial statements. As the capacity of the Evaluation Service is limited, evaluations are frequently replaced by Management Review Missions organised by the Operations Department.

Improvement: Project evaluation consists of an interim evaluation and a terminal evaluation, both conducted by the Evaluation Service in collaboration with government and the WFP Country Office. Interim evaluations examine project implementation, identify problems, recommend improvements, and reassess objectives and project designs. In principle, terminal evaluations look at all aspects of a completed project, assessing its relevance, effectiveness, effects and impact, though in practice this seldom occurs.

7.1.3 The Quality of Project Design

In our assessment of just how well the Project Cycle is functioning as a process of identifying, developing and approving projects, we reviewed a number of project files at WFP headquarters and examined design elements of projects in the nine countries visited.

Our review of project files at Headquarters revealed that, in spite of efforts to standardise the Project Cycle and to offer guidance through the Project Design Manual and the ITAD report on each step of the process, the coverage and quality of Country Office proposals and reports varied considerably. We concluded that more effort was warranted in basic problem analysis, particularly studies of the target population, the socio-economic environment, and the potential involvement of other agencies, including mechanisms of coordination; the definition of "immediate objectives" needs to be more specific to facilitate monitoring, and the objectives themselves should be more realistic, within the scope and control of the project; the assumptions on which project feasibility are based also need to be more clearly spelt out, including the capacity of implementing institutions, and the consequences of non-fulfilment of assumptions; and more emphasis should be put on the participation of beneficiaries, indicating the institutional mechanisms required and beneficiaries' acceptance of food assistance and project outputs. We

attach particular importance to what we see as a failure of planning documents to include an adequate analysis of the suitability of food aid in the project activity, including, where applicable, proposals and mechanisms for monetisation, and institutions to be funded.

We also found that some important development principles or themes emphasised in WFP guidelines and in statements of the CFA are often not effectively reflected in WFP-assisted projects. Issues such as gender, the environment, dependence on aid and disincentives are often only superficially analyzed in project documents, and Headquarters sometimes writes or "massages" the sections for inclusion in Project Summaries. We acknowledge that some of these themes do not belong in every project documents and urge a more realistic presentation where such is the case. We found that often the important issue of phasing out was, at best, treated in an ambiguous and non-committal way; also here we urge a more frank treatment.

As seen from our file reviews, Project Summaries (PS) are often analytically and operationally surprisingly weak or incomplete, the interventions of the Projects Committee, the SCP and the CFA notwithstanding. Moreover, important issues raised by technical experts were sometimes ignored or only superficially reflected. We reiterate that the Projects Committee needs to exercise more quality control over project development, assisted, as needed, by specialist staff.

In sum, the file review raised questions about the working of the rather complex project cycle process, involving Country Offices, Regional Bureaux, Project Committee, the Project Design and Programming Branch, with important inputs at various stages from beneficiaries, NGOs, government, UN agencies and others, and ultimate project approval by either the Executive Director or the CFA. In the end, the real responsibility for project design is blurred. To what extent, for instance, should Headquarters be making substantive changes at the Project Summary stage when full consultation with the Country Office and the Government in fact is not practicable? As now practised, CFA approved projects do not in all cases have the full and explicit approval of all the parties involved. We believe the cost in time spent on securing full agreement will often be worth paying. To do so would also focus more attention on the need and possibilities for revisions in the process.

Many of the development projects visited in the field suffered from design deficiencies; only the country studies of Bangladesh, Morocco and Vietnam reported that WFP development projects there were generally reasonably well-designed and implemented. In the case of Ghana and Guatemala, certain specific elements of the development projects were viewed as well designed and implemented, but others suffered serious problems of sustainability. The reports on Ethiopia, Malawi, Bolivia, and Pakistan noted serious project design deficiencies that hamper project implementation and jeopardise the achievement of objectives and intended impacts.

Also a number of design strengths were noted. In Vietnam, the projects were developed in close collaboration with Government at national, regional and community levels, included effective measures for dealing with gender, and sought and received effective beneficiary participation in the design of activities affecting them. However, project designs did not include measures for impact evaluation. In Bangladesh, the shift by WFP and the Government to supporting better focused development priorities through food aid has led to improvements in project planning,

specifications, and the quality of outputs; and the link between food for work and relief action represents a positive element. On the other hand, projects have weaknesses in targeting and in incorporating revenue raising devices to promote sustainability of assets created. In Morocco, close collaboration between WFP and Government line ministries in project design resulted in projects that were, on the whole, technically well prepared and executed although they lacked measures for precise targeting (especially to women) and for institutional sustainability.

7.1.4 Weaknesses in Project Design

Lack of Participation in Project Planning: There is a general deficiency in the area of community participation and target group influence on formulation of project activities which impact on the lives of people in their home communities. Only the Vietnam country case study reported that beneficiary participation was sought and achieved in planning of project activities. The reports on Ethiopia, Malawi, Morocco, Bolivia, and Pakistan specifically noted the lack of beneficiary participation and consultation as an important weakness in the implementation and potential impact of WFP supported projects. As summarized in the Bolivia Report, there is a distinct lack of community participation as a strategy in project design and implementation; beneficiaries are seen not as actors in the development process but as recipients of food benefits and are subordinated to the views and decisions of public officials; in some countries beneficiary participation seems to be declining rather than increasing. It should be noted, however, that in Ethiopia the implementing Government agency is now reported to be fully behind efforts to give beneficiaries a key role in determining the type and location of project activities.

Targeting: Only one country study (Vietnam) did not report deficiencies in the way in which WFP projects targeted the use of food aid to the poorest, the most food insecure and to women. The studies of Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Malawi, Morocco, Bolivia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan all noted such weaknesses. Again except for Vietnam, project design included weak or non-existent measures to target women as participants in food for work, as actors in decision making structures for project administration, or sometimes even as simple beneficiaries of food distribution. Land reclamation and re-forestation projects were often, sometimes unavoidably, seen as indirectly benefiting better off landowners; projects sometimes had an urban bias when the worst food deficiencies were in rural areas; and participation by state employees as beneficiaries sometimes overshadowed the need to direct food to poorest villagers and farmers.

We see effective targeting of WFP food in support of development as the crucial element, indeed the very *raison d'être* of the WFP as a development agency. The claim is often made that food aid has the special quality of being particularly effective in targeting the poorest and the most food insecure and, as often stated by WFP itself, women. Yet, the country studies suggest that the mechanisms of such targeting of food aid are not always seriously considered in the design of WFP supported projects.

Inadequate Measures for Sustainability: Sustainability has many different meanings: the simplest case concerns physical assets created, under private or collective ownership. We have come across assets created, privately owned or used, which are inappropriate, irrelevant, or technically inadequate and therefore not maintained or even destroyed (Ethiopia). Assets owned

collectively require collective maintenance, and arrangements to ensure this are frequently missing. The country case studies for Ghana, Malawi, Morocco, Bangladesh and Pakistan all noted lack of attention to "sustainability" in ongoing projects.

A more complex case is the change in attitudes, for example, to soil conservation; to sending children to school; to visiting health clinics, or to production methods sparked off by innovative projects. We have come across promising examples of change in attitude, notably to soil conservation (Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan), but policies and resources to enable beneficiaries to continue to act in a new way are often lacking.

Sustainability of activities started and institutions strengthened through WFP support is most elusive. The country studies of Ghana, Malawi, Morocco, Bangladesh and Pakistan point out that specific ministries have become dependent on the budgetary support provided by WFP food aid; we take WFP to task for not having been more activist in ensuring that plans for phasing out its support have been prepared. As a result, unnecessary dislocation of project activities has occurred and avoidable losses to beneficiaries incurred on termination of WFP assistance.

There are also special cases of lack of sustainability. In Ghana and Malawi there was a predictable erosion of the value of project revolving funds due to inflation or losses. In other projects, the use of new production methods by farmers, initially supported by inputs and credit, was discontinued when food aid support was withdrawn, because no institutional and financial support mechanism had been built.

Technical Deficiencies in Project Design: All country studies, other than the Vietnam study, reported a wide range of technical deficiencies in the design of development projects supported by WFP, including problems in establishing the technical content of input packages in agricultural production and agro-forestry projects; over-ambitious project objectives in relation to volumes of food available and numbers of participants; designs which ignore traditional or existing institutional arrangements in government; creation of vertical structures for program administration outside the line ministries with attendant problems for budgetary and bureaucratic sustainability; problems in planning food movements and the handling of logistics issues by counterparts; different programme specifications among UN agencies sponsoring very similar projects in different regions; unrealistic assumptions of the financial and technical capacity of implementing agencies of government; and failure to provide for adequate technical assistance for implementing agencies or to incorporate necessary measures for extension services in project design.

7.1.5 Overall evaluation of project design

The country studies raise serious questions about the design quality of many of the projects currently being supported by WFP. There are key problems in targeting food aid to the poorest and most food insecure, ensuring participation by target group members in project design, development and implementation, addressing gender issues in project design, and ensuring adequate measures for sustainability of assets, activities and institutions created or supported by WFP assistance. In addition, there is a general need to improve the technical quality of projects.

This being said, it should also be realised that such failures are not uncommon in projects assisted by other aid agencies, bilateral, multilateral or NGOs.

Based on experience from our country studies, we again emphasise the relative weakness of technical collaboration between WFP and other United Nations agencies, an emphasis made all the more poignant by the fact that the more successful WFP supported projects are often those in which another development agency has taken a strong lead in design and execution with WFP food assistance as project input.

The Bolivia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Malawi, Morocco and Pakistan country studies all noted the need for greater technical interchange with UN agencies or indicated that the level of technical support to the project was inadequate. By contrast, the Ghana and Morocco studies found that close collaboration with IFAD, the World Bank and bilateral donors had given technical strength to WFP assisted projects, and the Vietnam study stressed the importance of strong technical collaboration with UNICEF, UNDP, and FAO. Clearly, such collaboration is possible and allows access to technical expertise far beyond what is available when WFP operates more on its own, both for project design and implementation.

In combination, the results of the file review and the country case studies draw into question WFP's current *capacity*, not its willingness and good intention, to ensure a reasonable level of design quality for the projects it supports with food aid. Both our sources emphasize problems with beneficiary participation, draw attention to unrealistic project objectives and weak measures for targeting benefits, and regret the absence of concrete plans for phasing out of projects, and the pro-forma way in which thematic issues such as gender, poverty alleviation and sustainability are addressed.

WFP has now started a re-examination of the Project Cycle, in light of organisational and resource changes at Headquarters, and based on problems observed. In some cases pre-appraisal missions have been in the field to define project issues more clearly and to make better use of design expertise at an earlier stage of project formulation. However, even if WFP streamlines its processes and improved its efficiency, it is unlikely to have adequate resources for the design of its present very diverse range of projects. We strongly recommend that the Programme consider whether it should attempt fewer, perhaps larger projects, with less complex objectives and lower expectations, more focused sector approaches and perhaps fewer country programmes. Some of these options are already under consideration.[76] In 1990 and 1991, 48 and 43 development projects were approved respectively, at an average project value of USD 10 million.[77] This is down from the 65-70 project approvals in the mid-eighties. We have not been in a position to make any judgement, however, whether the recent projects have been significantly better designed.

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[76] The Role of WFP in the Nineties. CFA 31/P/5-A.

[77] Computed from development project approvals listed in WFP/CFA 33/P/4 *Annual Report of the Executive Director 1991*, Annex 3 pp 62-73. 1991.

7.2 Implementation

Once a project is approved and agreements are signed, implementation is entrusted to the recipient government line ministries with assistance from WFP, or in some cases to NGOs. WFP is responsible for delivering food to the recipient country and for monitoring food deliveries, storage, transport, and distribution, as well as project outputs, within the country. Depending upon the collaborating partners and the structures in place, this will require more or less actual hands-on management by WFP.

In addition, WFP project officers are supposed to advise, as appropriate, on mid-course changes in implementation to better achieve project objectives. This goes beyond food management monitoring; it also requires overall project management and development experience. Here the case material on performance is quite varied. In most of the country studies, we found that monitoring by WFP was limited to food movements, to numbers of beneficiaries participating, and to output indicators, with little involvement in analysis to affect changes in direction or implementation of projects. In other countries, such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Ghana, however, the CO did contribute to project implementation and assisted government agencies in re-directing operations. We also observed cases (Morocco and Guatemala) where the implementing agency had made significant changes in project activities even without prior agreement by the CO or WFP HQ.

WFP is expected to strengthen the capacity of implementing institutions through direct working relationships and counterpart training, primarily in food management. Greater emphasis is placed on capacity building under UN resolution 47/199. Problems in this area, as well as deficiency of project design were pointed out in several country reports (Ethiopia, Malawi, Bolivia and Pakistan).

The greatest implementation problem for which WFP is directly responsible is tardy resourcing and delivery of WFP commodities in some cases. This has become more problematic in recent years with a general food aid resource constraint, coupled with the need in some situations to divert country-level development food aid to emergency operations. Other problems have resulted from the unfortunate timing of call forwards which do not correspond to project cycles, for example, school years.

Some issues related to the provision of non-food items (NFI) is discussed in Chapter 3. This is an important matter because the timing and reliability of supply of NFIs complicate the smooth running of WFP projects and there are a number of examples of projects being held up for lack of them. The CFA should assure itself that NFIs are available and committed before projects are approved and initiated.

7.3 Monitoring and Reporting

About 10 years ago, in order to address donor concerns about the effectiveness of development projects, WFP tried to institute a comprehensive system of monitoring and evaluation, similar to that used by donor agencies. This system was to provide a continuum from *ex ante* to *ex post* which would have allowed for more in-depth analysis and attribution of effects. These evaluation efforts were suspended after only a few years, perhaps because they were deemed overly ambitious for the human and financial resources available to the Programme.

In 1990, the Executive Director engaged a consulting firm to review and propose revisions to the monitoring, reporting, and evaluation system for development projects. The objective was to provide a better information base on project performance for management purposes and subsequent evaluation.[78] In reviewing the consultant report, some CFA members challenged the emphasis on inputs and outputs (process) monitoring. Project effectiveness was to be assessed - and needs for improvements identified -through beneficiary contact monitoring (BCM) and some selected effects-level evaluation. The ITAD Report has been adopted and WFP staff have now been trained.

The principal aim of the system is to reinforce basic monitoring and reporting by streamlining procedures and ensuring that data collected are used for project management by clearly comparing intended and achieved results. The system emphasizes the generation and reporting of minimal data; it calls for more standardization and enforces universal project monitoring at an inputs and outputs level; to some degree it encourages regular reporting on beneficiary responses to project activities.

BCM is to be used to obtain information on perceptions and responses to project activities, before, during, and after project implementation. While the technique is primarily qualitative, the data are to be obtained and analyzed systematically. WFP will use BCM in two ways: as part of regular, routine field visits, using structured checklists by WFP officers trained to collect and analyze the information; and as part of rapid rural appraisal, either during project preparation or during implementation.

The Country Office Project Report (COPR), which is the primary reporting document, is a two-page summary, the design of which was derived from the ITAD report. A rating system is used to gauge project effectiveness along several key dimensions, including project management, government contributions, monitoring, the provision of WFP inputs, and beneficiary perceptions. The COPR is an action-oriented report, indicating agreed and completed actions, and responsible parties. It does not, however, necessarily provide for the depth of monitoring required for determining progress towards achieving immediate objectives.

The COPR is complemented by a series of other reports, including the Quarterly Progress Report (QPR), Project Implementation Report (PIR), Project Annual Report by the implementing

[78] WFP/ITAD. "Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation: Proposals for Change", Final Report, May 1991.

agencies, and Project Progress Report, and field trip reports by WFP staff. One important aspect of monitoring is the inclusion of ongoing information on potential disincentives, displacement, and dependence, which is to be included in the PIR. The objective is to identify possible risks as early as possible and take corrective action. In cases of severe risk of counterproductive effects it may be necessary to halt temporarily the external supply of food to the project or altogether interrupt the project. Such drastic actions are not to be taken without consultation with the government and Headquarters.

Monitoring operates at both formal and informal levels; both are important and both need improvement. Beyond the clarification of reporting relationships recently provided to Directors of Operations,[79] WFP needs to strengthen the relationship between HQ and the field through more consultative visits, seminars, and training.

Country office project officers monitor their projects at two different levels: at a food management level and at a substantive level. In principle, each year they establish a workplan of visits, usually spending 25 percent of their time on routine monitoring. They take unannounced trips, and attempt to cover most of each project annually. They visit food depots and work sites, and interview project staff and beneficiaries. In general, they are competent in food management and show serious interest in it.

They are not, however, technical or socio-economic experts and yet are expected to substantively monitor the appropriateness and effectiveness of project activities. The extent to which project officers can adequately fulfil this role depends upon their qualifications, time constraints and competing demands, and the competence of collaborating partners, either governments or NGOs. Certainly, many useful observations have been made by project officers, often referred to in project evaluations, yet there is a general sense of frustration that these projects, some highly technical, get only occasional technical scrutiny from evaluation teams, from WFP specialists or local consultants. Funds are not usually available in operating or project budgets for technical consultants on an ongoing basis.

The reporting now required is an improvement over past practices in that much information can be conveyed in a fairly concise format, particularly to Regional Bureaux where corrective actions are initiated. The COPR has its weaknesses, ratings are highly subjective and more substantive issues are not easily accommodated on the form, but by and large they are useful for communication of issues and progress. The COPR is a less than effective reporting instrument in large WFP projects, owing to too much information being consolidated on the forms provided. The frequency of the QPR has been questioned, primarily by counterparts who often must report on activities carried out in a large number of places. It may be worthwhile, after a few years of practice to review the current reporting procedures with a view to simplification. We have the impression that these implementation reports are of little relevance and use when it comes to the planning of a project expansion, with the result that the significance of difficulties experienced in the past is under-rated.

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[79] A.N. Ngongi, outgoing telegram, dated 4 January 1993.

The capacity of recipient governments to monitor activities is often limited, as a consequence of which the Country Office takes on more work and responsibility than formally planned. Government counterparts complain that the reporting requirements are too frequent and too arduous, with excessive data collection. In some larger programmes, such as in Bangladesh, monitoring has become a mammoth activity, resulting in volumes of data which are difficult to decipher and therefore of questionable utility.

The quality of monitoring and reporting is sometimes negatively affected by a lack of agreed and relevant indicators for achievements, particularly at the "immediate" objectives level. Also, we observed a lack of systematic monitoring of fulfilment of project pre-conditions, even those upon which WFP involvement was to be based.

We consider Beneficiary Contact Monitoring (BCM) to be one of the more important elements of improved project planning and implementation; it does, however, require specialized skills for obtaining and analyzing information and requires the involvement of nationals of the country concerned. WFP has few specialists in monitoring and evaluation methodologies, and must build up its capacity and draw more on outside, usually local, expertise in social sciences for BCM training and support.

Some of our country studies examined the joint WFP and host government arrangements for local monitoring of development projects and for the gathering of data to be used in the assessment of project effectiveness and impacts. The picture we formed is mixed at best. The reports on Bangladesh and Vietnam pointed out that development projects were well supported by monitoring and field visits by the Country Office and that the monitoring efforts of WFP were well appreciated by the Governments involved and by other parties. In Ghana, the staff were seen to be able to provide a reasonable level of monitoring for the small number of large and stable infrastructure food for work projects which have historically made up the bulk of WFP involvement there. The report, however, doubted whether WFP staff would have the capacity to effectively monitor a programme of the same size, if it were composed of such smaller and more targeted projects which would be appropriate to conditions now emerging in Ghana. The country studies of Ethiopia, Bolivia, Guatemala and Pakistan reported that WFP has not been able to ensure adequate direct monitoring of the projects it supports, nor has it been effective in providing support to the establishment of adequate systems for this function.

7.4 Evaluation

The monitoring and evaluation system at WFP has never functioned fully and effectively. The Evaluation Service is responsible for interim, terminal and thematic evaluations, as well as impact evaluation on selected projects or themes, but concentrates almost exclusively on interim and terminal evaluations. Recently, there has been a reorganisation of the Evaluation Service, a renewed interest in effects-level evaluation, and some effort to evaluate projects, sectors, and approaches more in-depth than has so far been the case. However, capacity is limited by both staff and financial resource constraints. As planned, thorough evaluation will be limited to selected projects, such as those which are innovative and potentially replicable, in countries

where there is a real capacity for data collection and evaluation, or projects about which there is controversy over the effects and impacts of food aid. WFP has embarked upon an ambitious training program, nearly completed, in the ITAD monitoring and reporting system, which is the underpinning of project evaluation.

In general, we have been favourably impressed by the quality of management reviews and interim and thematic evaluations, except for the lack of effects-level information. Of course, there were omissions in some of the evaluations we have seen, and we strongly question the effectiveness of combining management reviews and evaluations with appraisal missions, both being accomplished within a few weeks time. There are numerous instances of explicit evaluation recommendations and issues which were not incorporated into subsequent project designs or expansions, and also of recommendations which were more optimistic than was supported by evidence from the evaluation. One reason for this may be the compressed time frame of evaluation-cum-appraisal missions, which denies project planners time to digest and incorporate lessons from the evaluation. These combined missions also split the focus of the experts involved so that both evaluation and planning may be compromised.

One of the overall weaknesses emerging from our country studies is the neglect of assessment of effectiveness and impact at country level. None of the countries visited had a Country Office with the capacity to evaluate the effects or impact of projects and support from Headquarters was inadequate for this purpose. A number of important evaluation problems were identified: there is a lack of baseline data and of qualitative information on beneficiaries; targeting is seldom considered in depth in project design or evaluation; very little is known about how WFP food is used by households; and it is also the case that economic analyses of projects are seldom done. In general there were weak systems to relate the results of project evaluations to improvements in such operations and, in particular, such weak systems for the collection of data on patient experience in VGF programmes that feeding arrangements and rations could not be assessed for effectiveness and case treatment thereby be improved.

The country studies noted the value of new monitoring and evaluation tools such as BCM, and applauded efforts under way in some countries to improve project evaluation systems, such as the effort in Malawi to build an effective M&E system into the agricultural component of a large development project. Generally, however, the COs had little capacity and commitment to support counterpart agencies in effective monitoring and evaluation.

WFP's capacity either directly or indirectly to monitor the development projects it supports seems to be stretched beyond reasonable limits in a number of countries visited. The periodic evaluation of projects by centrally-directed evaluation and appraisal missions has resulted in operational improvements to projects and some of the most recent tools developed for project evaluation are proving useful at the CO level. Nonetheless, there is very little evaluation data on the effectiveness of WFP supported projects and almost no information on their impacts. Further, there are key gaps in the country level information which would be needed to sort out and balance the basic arguments relating to the real value of food aid (social, nutritional, economic) in support of development.

Almost all the country studies noted that WFP has serious problems in ensuring that food aid is used to benefit the poorest and most food insecure. Numerous examples were given, particularly of food for work projects, of benefits accruing to the less disadvantaged (better off landowners in Pakistan and Morocco and employed public servants in Ghana) without any reliable information to show whether this was inevitable, or due to serious weaknesses in targeting, as in some cases it undoubtedly was.

Assertions are made that the food will benefit women and children, but with little or no evidence to back them up. Not surprisingly, given that most project designs do not include practical measures for ensuring effective participation by women, monitoring and evaluation systems do not normally gather and analyze data on a gender-disaggregated basis or include mechanisms for assessing gender impacts.

While evaluation is an expensive and management-intensive activity and WFP can clearly not afford full impact evaluations of all projects, it seems clear that more effort must be made to understand the basic effectiveness of WFP supported development projects in providing benefits to the poorest and most food-insecure people in the countries receiving assistance, and in evaluating the impacts of projects as they relate to the critical themes of gender, environment and sustainability. The Morocco report strongly recommended that impact evaluations be conducted for both the dairy development and Rif projects. For both these projects baseline and ongoing data exist to some extent, projects are still ongoing with government support, and assets are quantifiable.

At a corporate level, most evaluation material at WFP focuses on inputs and outputs, with too little being done on the effectiveness of projects, even towards achieving immediate objectives, or across projects within sub-sectors. Where some analysis has occurred, e.g. dairy development and education,[80] important information for both policy and operations has been obtained. The survey on sectors and approaches now underway is an important first step towards thematic evaluation.

Some innovative techniques are being used by the WFP Evaluation Service. Remote sensing was used for the first time in 1991, and is useful in monitoring and assessing large-scale activities related to land use, such as afforestation, settlement of new lands, the introduction of new crops, and the construction of terraces.[81] WFP does not have a computerised corporate memory for ready retrieval of evaluation information nor for incorporating lessons learnt into project designs. The technology for the storage and retrieval of this kind of information is available in most other development agencies. WFP may be able to develop and install such a system soon with Canadian assistance.

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[80] WFP/CFA:25/P/8. "Food Aid and Dairy Development", 21 April 1988. WFP/CFA:29/SCP:4. "WFP Food Aid to Education - Past Experiences and Future Directions", 24 April 1990.

[81] WFP. *1991 Food Aid Review*. 1991.

7.5 Efficiency

Efficiency criteria are fairly straightforward to define and examine for most WFP projects, having to do primarily with the supply of inputs and the achievement of outputs. The elements of efficiency examined in this evaluation include the institutional capacity of WFP and recipient government agencies; the "mechanics" of food aid - determining the appropriate food basket, finding the resources, transport and logistics, off-loading and port/frontier storage, quality control, internal transport, shipping and handling, and distribution to the targeted population; the provision of non-food items, technical and financial assistance; and the best modalities, including local purchases, swaps, and monetization. Some of these responsibilities are WFP's, some are the recipient government's, and some are shared. We did not try to analyze micro-management issues such as transport costs and alternatives, which are more detailed aspects of an efficiency discussion.

7.5.1 Institutional Capacity

The infrastructure and management required by both WFP and implementing agencies, usually government organizations but sometimes NGOs, to handle food efficiently as an input and to achieve project outputs is supposed to be examined before projects are initiated. One of the key design weaknesses, noted with some frequency in our country studies, concerned unrealistic assumptions about the administrative and programming capacity of counterpart agencies and poor or inadequate measures to provide technical assistance where it is required.

WFP can help to upgrade the capacity of government organizations, particularly in LDCs, by supporting administrative and monitoring staff functions, through the provision of facilities, equipment and vehicles, and through counterpart training. These types of support, however, require cash resources, which are a constraint of the current Programme. In some cases, WFP has set up parallel Project Management Units as an alternative to strengthening government institutions; this can lead to conflicting and unsustainable administrative systems.

Regarding its own capacity, WFP is currently examining through field visits some of the larger and more complex Country Offices to better assess staff complements and workloads. Our country studies point to serious deficiencies in the match between staff and functions. Of the nine country case studies, only the Bangladesh Report indicated that the WFP Country Office was large enough and well enough staffed with technical capacity to allow the local dimension of project design considerations to be brought to bear. In all other countries visited, serious deficiencies in the capacity of the Country Office, particularly as they pertain to development projects, were indicated. Thus, in Ghana, Morocco, Bolivia, and Vietnam, there was a demonstrable need for improved training of WFP staff and counterparts in monitoring and evaluation and in the thematic areas of gender, nutrition, child health, sustainable development and popular participation. In Malawi, Morocco, Bolivia, and Pakistan, the Country Office was seen to be not well enough equipped to meet all the demands of project development, design, and monitoring that were incumbent on its operations. In Ethiopia and Malawi the heavy burden of emergency and refugee operations had seriously undermined the capacity of the Country Office to support development operations, and to prepare for activities in the future.

As seen in our country evaluations, a stronger system of project development guidelines and for technical support provided from Headquarters in Rome could and should be developed, but it would not be a full and valid substitute for stronger in-country capabilities. In fact, a clear theme emerging from the country studies is that the Country Offices have not been able to mobilise the technical support needed from other agencies and actors locally. In Malawi, Morocco and Bolivia, the provision of expertise in the form of multi-agency project appraisal missions did not result in adequately detailed project proposals and designs. In Ethiopia, Guatemala, Malawi, Morocco and Bolivia, the Country Office was apparently not able to draw on the expertise needed from sister UN agencies such as FAO, WHO, UNICEF, etc. to ensure adequate technical review of project designs. In Vietnam, however, the WFP was successful in doing so, as it was in Ghana where the WFP projects built on a prior design by other technical agencies, such as IFAD. In several country studies (Ethiopia, Morocco, Bolivia) the capacity of WFP to design and oversee development projects was seen as weakened by having to rely on UNDP for local staffing actions.

Interestingly, a number of the studies also indicated that the WFP Country Office might be more effective if given more autonomy from Rome over a number of programme and administrative areas within the capacity of its staff. The studies of Morocco, Bangladesh, and Vietnam in particular emphasized the need for more autonomy for the Country Office in programme development, staffing and administration. The country studies were almost unanimous in noting the lack of capacity for gender analysis in Country Offices; only in Vietnam was gender seen as receiving adequate attention in project development and design.

The only two country reports which did take special note of well designed and implemented projects were Ghana and Vietnam. In the case of Ghana, the projects in question were first designed by IFAD and the World Bank, working closely with the appropriate ministries of government and in support of a very widely accepted national framework for development. In Vietnam, WFP's programme represented the main source of development financing available to both the Government and the UN system, and here WFP was able fully to draw on the required technical expertise to support project design and implementation. In both countries, it seems, there were special circumstances which led to the strengthening of the normal system of WFP project development, design and implementation.

Almost all our country studies are positive in their assessment of the capacity of the Country Office to manage food movements and to support the logistics involved. These are specialist skills in their own right which have built up over the years in the organisation. All Country Offices were not, however, competent to assess monetisation issues or to manage this modality.

Although our country studies did not directly analyze the social and economic dimensions of individual projects, a number of weaknesses in project design leads us to question how seriously the Country Offices take this responsibility. These shortcomings explain, at least in part, why development projects supported by WFP were seen in the country studies as suffering from serious deficiencies in targeting and the almost universal absence of gender analysis in their design, monitoring and evaluation.

7.5.2 The Food Basket

The food basket: Before WFP commits itself to supplying a particular food basket, its staff are supposed to assess the appropriateness of food as a development resource; whether food aid causes disincentives or dependence; whether internal food logistics are too costly compared to project benefits; whether the food on offer would be clearly unattractive to beneficiaries, etc. The Project Design Manual stresses that under no circumstances should a project officer feel under pressure to find an outlet for food aid.

The Manual does not clearly define how WFP should determine the appropriate quantity and mix of commodities in a project, but presumably this is done in close consultation with the recipient agency. It does not necessarily have to be a preferred or staple food, but should fit within a traditional dietary pattern. In order to determine the appropriate food basket, this part of project design requires information on consumption habits of the target population; commodity costs to WFP; costs of delivery of the commodity to beneficiaries, local market prices for food etc. To develop a judgement on the cost effectiveness of food assistance, information is also needed on what food items will be replaced by food aid and on prices of alternative foods obtaining in the local market. Where the objective of a project is income transfer, the numbers and types of commodities in the food basket is less relevant than the total market value. In an evaluation of Danish food aid[82] it is pointed out that in most cases high transfer efficiency (the alpha value) of commodities is more important than nutritional content, because normally the target group makes substitutions in food items available from other sources. It should be recognised that when food rations are the only source of revenue, beneficiaries will necessarily barter some of the food against essential non-food items.

The country studies generally found that commodities made available in WFP projects are valued although problems do occur occasionally because the value of food rations or the mix of food and cash wages provided is sometimes higher than local wages; this may attract somewhat better off farmers and labourers, thus impairing the "self-targeting" of food aid to the poorest.

Our country studies focused on this issue by attempting to identify who were most often the direct and indirect beneficiaries of WFP supported development projects; who were in fact receiving food, cash or services and who would benefit from the assets created. However, information on these matters was generally poor and inconclusive, and projects often had very weak mechanisms for targeting.

The way in which food is obtained and delivered to the country is described in some detail in chapter 4. It is the host government, however, which is responsible for the arrangements for the actual delivery of the food aid to the designated target population. The organizations involved are required to submit quarterly reports to WFP on this and all other food movement issues. WFP project officers are to verify this information in their monitoring visits. Some

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[82] Pinstrup-Andersen, Per. "Food Aid to Promote Economic Growth and Combat Poverty, Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in Developing Countries, and Suggestions for How to Increase the Effectiveness of Danish Aid to the WFP". September 1991.

complex and isolated WFP projects employ monitors to help verify in the field that food is used properly.

The recipient government is responsible to receive, discharge and properly store commodities when they arrive in the country. A WFP supervisor inspects the cargo to assure no damage in transit; any insurance matters are handled directly by WFP. The recipient government is penalized if it does not discharge the cargo in a timely way and must reimburse WFP for demurrage charges; the recipient government is rewarded for speedy discharge, as it gets to receive the dispatch bonus. Our country study of Morocco, for example, noted that one counterpart ministry consistently incurred demurrage while others were timely. WFP was apparently unable to assist the ministry in resolving its problems with port clearances.

Quality control of the commodities and handling is a joint responsibility of WFP and the recipient government. After port inspection, WFP project officers and monitors make periodic visits to storage depots, transporters, and distribution points; they review records of food movements; and they interview project employees, beneficiaries, and local officials. The government organizations implementing the projects also appoint inspectors who monitor in-country food management. WFP can offer some counterpart training in the required techniques; but this facility does not seem to be as fully and widely used as needed. There were some case study examples of poor quality food being supplied to projects, either infested with insects or expired (Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Guatemala). Overall, however, the quality of food did not seem to be a large issue.

The transport options employed in different countries vary: from national or parastatal transporters to the private sector. In some cases, such as Malawi, WFP has helped develop and support the private transportation sector in order to facilitate large movements of food in support of development and refugee operations.

The costs of ITSH vary considerably from one country to the next, depending upon infrastructure, the size of the country, the isolation of delivery points, and government tariffs and regulations. WFP is expected to analyze these issues when designing projects. Some of the country case studies did note some reluctance on WFP's part to take a more cost-efficient approach by monetizing donated commodities and making more local purchases.

In general, internal food management is not a major problem in the projects we have reviewed for this evaluation. The capacity for food management is one of the key strengths of WFP's Country Offices as described in the country case studies. We also note, however, that a number of counterpart agencies using WFP food aid for development projects experienced considerable difficulty in planning food movements, and handling logistics issues. The VGF project in Malawi is an example of large development projects in which the counterpart has experienced a number of problems in food handling.

7.5.3 Non-food items (NFI)

Recipient governments are to identify and mobilise needed NFIs during project preparation and implementation, using WFP services to locate them only after other attempts have failed. Government is required to report twice yearly on non-food items: type and quantity received, from what donor, when, where, and their use. In many respects, NFIs affect efficiency.

The arrangements for mobilising NFIs are not always successful or timely. There is a centralized office at WFP Head Quarter which tries to locate NFIs from donor countries for specific projects. Some Country Offices have suggested that they might be more successful at marshalling donor resources locally or that they could in some cases procure the needed items if funds were made available, perhaps by monetizing part of the commodity contribution. The extent to which Country Offices can take such initiatives is a confusing point, interpreted differently depending upon who describes the situation. This confusion is mainly caused by the fact that donor support is needed. Attempts by a Country Office to find donor support locally may interfere with Head Quarter's efforts to utilise promised NFI donor support for items and places given the highest priority.

The most serious issue, however, is that projects which require NFIs for achieving their objectives are sometimes approved and initiated without any assurance that these NFIs will in fact be available. Numerous evaluation reports point to a lack of NFIs as a key aspect of project failure. One problem with NFIs noted in the country studies is a lack of flexibility to procure more NFIs should the project require them, either because of donor shortfalls or to accommodate an acceleration of activities.

7.5.4 Commodity swaps and monetisation

As part of project design and on a periodic basis during implementation, WFP is to analyze how most efficiently to utilize aid commodities, and to assess the cost-effectiveness of local purchases, commodity exchanges, and triangular transactions. WFP operates under a "no loss, no gain" principle in these arrangements. In the case of local purchase or exchange, the government is to ensure that the local commodities are of an acceptable quality. The nature of commodity swaps is described in Chapter 3.

Examining the potential for such transactions and managing the process can be quite complex and skills in market analysis are needed. In some of the country studies the combination of WFP experience in local markets and support from Rome in securing regional pricing and quality data was reported as very effective in ensuring efficient local purchasing. In Malawi, for example, WFP staff noted that the role of Rome in negotiations over the milling of wheat for refugees and in checking regional commodity prices compared to local purchases had the effect of greatly strengthening the Country Offices hand in arriving at fair prices with local suppliers.

When it comes to monetisation, the sales price must not be below the commercial cif price at the time of delivery. WFP and the government are jointly responsible for the conditions of sale.

Depending upon the capacity of the government and the complexity of operations, the government alone or in conjunction with WFP is responsible for the financial management of the funds that are generated.

Seen from the field, and as reported in our country studies, there are clear opportunities for project cost-effectiveness in more frequent use of monetisation by WFP. However, this appears to run counter to an apparent reluctance of both the Headquarters and some Country Offices to monetise food aid; some Country Offices believe monetisation to be very complex and do not want the added management responsibilities.

While the overall efficiency of WFP development operations, particularly with arrangements for food aid shipment, local purchasing and distribution, can be considered acceptable, there are serious problems with the capacity of the Country Office to deal with issues of project design and monitoring, and weaknesses in the financial, administrative and programming capacity of counterpart agencies. These problems are not realistically assessed by WFP prior to project commitment nor addressed by adequate measures of technical assistance and capacity building.

6 Effectiveness

Project effectiveness has primarily to do with the degree to which WFP and host governments accurately identify a problem which can be addressed by food aid, appropriately incorporate and target beneficiaries, and manage implementation in light of evolving information and circumstances. Our approach also recognizes the important fact that these are "WFP-assisted" projects, and that responsibilities for success is shared by WFP and recipient governments.

The overall picture of effectiveness emerging from our country studies is one of mixed results. In many cases, we felt that project effectiveness and basic benefits to project participants would be greater if improvements were made in project design and if adequate technical assistance were provided to implementing agencies. We review briefly the pattern of project effectiveness as reported for each of the nine country studies.

Ethiopia: Through lack of data on project effectiveness made overall assessment difficult, some salient points are noted. Direct distribution to beneficiaries was an appropriate mode of operation, given dysfunctional internal food markets. FFW had been properly concentrated in food deficit areas. However, rather than FFW activities being expanded when famine threatened, food aid for FFW had to be diverted to emergency operations. While asset creation (in the form of bunds etc.) had been impressive during the 80s, only about one quarter of the assets created are now intact, due to neglect, and in some cases deliberate destruction.

Ghana: Large-scale, public sector infrastructure FFW projects have been effective in supporting the early phases of the process of structural adjustment in the 1980s, but these projects no longer represent the best use of food aid; they now show their potential weaknesses in terms of targeting, budgetary dependence and sustainability. However, elements of these projects, which

are community-based, remain effective - or have the potential to so become - and could be preserved and expanded.

Malawi: The VGF project appeared to have an important positive effect in case treatment of malnutrition, but poor systems for collecting basic data on its effectiveness made it impossible to reach a firm conclusion. It suffered from problems of institutional and budgetary sustainability and was clearly inadequate to meet the unrealistic goals set for it. The agricultural development project, however, was enthusiastically received by participants and brought about higher yields; yet it suffered from poor institutional sustainability as well as basic technical design problems.

Morocco: WFP projects were well planned and integrated into national strategies, adequately managed, and had a satisfactory record with respect to outputs and rates of implementation. There are questions, however, about targeting and involvement of beneficiaries, and whether monetary resources would have been preferable, given the high costs of managing food distribution. While some rural development activities had technical shortcomings, the dairy development project was considered effective.

Bolivia: The effectiveness of WFP supported development projects is stronger with regard to short term objectives than in addressing underlying causes of poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition. There was a clear case of failure to provide technical assistance to the counterpart. Combined with deficiencies in WFP's supply performance, this caused significant delays in some projects. However, WFP has been instrumental in providing a push for government and donors to maintain a programming interest in support of pre-school children.

Guatemala: The Women's Employment project was seen as effective in stimulating productive activities among vulnerable groups and to have produced impressive outputs in the training of women. Similarly the Soil Conservation project was effective, in main part due to strong technical inputs from an individual UNV in the CO. The largest WFP project in Guatemala (to which two-thirds of WFP resources are directed) suffered from poor targeting and had limited nutritional impacts. The Basic Community Infrastructure project had only limited effectiveness due to disruptions in supply, poor training, a weak counterpart, and political problems in district targeting and was expected to be terminated.

Bangladesh: The FFW projects were seen as contributing to development and poverty relief objectives to varying degrees. Effectiveness is expected to increase, following quick action to ensure improvements in implementation by the government agencies involved. However, problems in the design, construction and maintenance of some structures limited their effectiveness; also, workers on food for work projects are not always the poorest of the poor, and male employment dominated.

Pakistan: The Watershed Management and Rural Development projects are located in highly inaccessible areas, where assistance in the form of food supplies have no apparent comparative advantage. Yet, the WFP has been a pioneer donor in the area of WSM and has succeeded in demonstrating the potentials in this sector. Even if somewhat slowly implemented, WSM

projects assisted by WFP food aid have been by and large effective. All WFP projects in Pakistan, particularly the PHC projects, have suffered from disruptions in food supply and problems of food distribution. The country study reports that the achievement of Women in Development objectives in WFP supported projects was "practically nil", but also that there is scope for stronger participation by women in WFP projects generally in Pakistan.

Vietnam: Alone among the country studies, the Vietnam report finds that WFP projects have been effective almost without exception. The projects were judged to be efficiently planned and implemented, to have used appropriate levels of technology, supported with effective training and technical assistance. In some instances, effectiveness would have been even stronger and more visible if agricultural extension had been included as a project activity. The effectiveness of the VGF project would have been enhanced if the PHC had been better integrated into the national health care system.

The pattern portrayed by the country studies is one where most projects fall short of their potential as good development projects; not surprisingly, the problems noted in project effectiveness often seemed to grow out of deficiencies in project design. Some projects were judged to be benefiting also relatively better off individuals, not only the poorest and most food insecure. This is sometimes unavoidable, in any case it is not surprising when problem analysis and beneficiary involvement in project formulation are often so weak. Many projects lacked adequate technical assistance during implementation, and physical assets were not adequately maintained; this reflects unrealistic assessment of the capacity of counterpart institutions to implement and sustain project activities and weak support to these institutions built into the projects. Often there seems to have been little understanding of local markets and food availability, and the effects of project food aid on them, but the evaluations give little evidence of serious direct or lasting disincentive effects on local production and markets. Rarely, if ever, in the country studies was the basic development rationale of a project found to be simply wrong; but there were many missed opportunities for greater project effectiveness through changes in design and implementation.

The commitment of the recipient country government to project activities is another fact that explains the relative success of certain WFP assisted projects; Vietnam, but also Bangladesh and Morocco, are examples of this. Without such commitment accompanied by sufficient capacity to transform good intentions into actions, otherwise technically well designed projects are liable to fail. Project success was often attributed to special circumstances which helped provide needed technical and financial support: in Ghana, WFP was working with other donors and the World Bank within a common policy framework; in Vietnam, WFP was able to draw on the technical support of a wide range of UN agencies; in Morocco, some WFP projects were part of a larger IFAD or World Bank initiative.

7.7 Impact

Longer-term effects on technical, socio-cultural, institutional and environmental conditions determine impact. WFP has not conducted impact evaluations of its projects or sector work, nor

has it put firmly into place a monitoring system which would permit such analyses. Our approach to the assessment of impact draws on our nine country studies to bring out some judgements about what has been achieved and what might be expected in the longer-term.

Ethiopia: The key role for WFP has been the feeding of hungry people, and WFP food has undoubtedly benefited large numbers of people in need of assistance. At the present time only a limited number of workers are engaged on FFW on a continuing basis which would ensure their food security. Moreover, it has not been possible to expand FFW activities at the right time so as to give food entitlements to millions who need them just when crops fail. However, given the social and political upheaval over the past decades during which so much has collapsed, it would not be reasonable to characterise WFP supported projects as failures because they have not produced long-term impacts on productivity, environment, poverty and equity.

Ghana: The large-scale infrastructure projects to which WFP contributed components had a clear positive impact on the balance of payments situation and on macroeconomic stabilisation in the early phases of structural adjustment. The school feeding project played a role in creating the basis for social acceptance of the SAP and in allowing secondary boarding schools to continue to operate. Elements of the forestry and feeder roads projects achieved high levels of community participation and acceptance. However, the projects have created a high degree of dependence on budgetary support among some of the departments of the Government involved. Prospects for smooth phasing out of large-scale projects are by no mans assured. Moreover, the beneficiaries of WFP supported projects have not always been the very poor or the most food disadvantaged. The key impact felt in the early days of the Structural Adjustment Programme has largely vanished in WFP supported projects in Ghana today.

Malawi: With rather poor monitoring and evaluation very little is known about the impact of WFP supported development projects. The VGF project may well have a beneficial impact for participants but almost nothing is known about the use of rations provided for home consumption. Also, the project is simply not large enough to produce the impact on national rates of malnutrition and related disease expected in its stated objectives. The agriculture development project holds out some promise of positive short term impact on crop yields but is rather small and, in any event, it represents a high risk strategy for the participating farmers.

Morocco: Concrete achievements of projects have been impressive in terms of tree plantations established, roads and dams built, improvements in milk production and encouragement of enrolment in primary and vocational training schools. No information is available on the maintenance or neglect of physical assets created; yet, our judgement is that the human resources developed through education and training will give long term benefits and also that the institutions supported by WFP will be viable in the longer term. The school feeding program has created aid dependence within the Ministry of Education, resulting in the closures of some canteens when WFP support was reduced.

Bolivia: WFP supported development projects have been in the nature of palliatives and they have not addressed basic causes of poverty and food insecurity. They have helped to meet immediate development objectives in sanitation, fuel wood conservation, crop diversification and

other areas and some of these impacts may be sustained in the longer term through demonstration effects and application of experience gained, provided additional steps are taken to ensure sustainability.

Bangladesh: Food aid (including WFP food aid) has been a major factor in preventing mass starvation. The Vulnerable Group Development Project has had a clearly valuable relief impact for women but its development impact has been restricted by limited access to training and credit. While the FFW and VGD projects do reach the poor, they may not primarily benefit the most impoverished.

Pakistan: The Watershed Management Projects have had an important demonstration effect on farmers and have helped to change their attitudes and those of forest department officials, both of which represent important long term gains. These projects also had the effect of providing balance of payments and public budget support. Donor interest in these activities will result in more impact in the future.

Vietnam: A number of important positive impacts result from WFP supported projects: food aid is acting as an important substitute for financial aid; forest projects contribute to farmers incomes in both the short and longer term; demonstration effects are evidenced by WFP assisted forest projects being replicated by the Government on a smaller scale; there are visible positive impacts in respect of environment, forest resources, management capacity of forest department staff, and participation of women. Problems arise in the maintenance of assets for lack of local generation of financial resources.

Guatemala: WFP supported projects in Guatemala have been conducive to improvement in the organisation and training of women's groups and in their participation in agricultural production. Unfortunately, very poor implementation of the larger VGF programme (frequent disruption in supply, poor targeting) has severely limited its impact. At times, the impact of food aid supplies on local markets for agricultural products has been negative, due to poor timing of shipments.

In summary, we found evidence of WFP project activities, in both FFW and HRD sectors, having medium and long term positive impacts. Indeed, some country reports are strongly positive regarding either the basic humanitarian impact of WFP food aid (Ethiopia, Bangladesh) or its development impact (Morocco and Vietnam). In other country reports (Ghana, Morocco and Malawi) problems of dependence in key ministries and national programmes are brought out as negative impacts. The country studies have shown that there is considerable room for improvement in targeting project benefits to the poor.

There is a general lack of information relevant to an assessment of the direct impact of WFP supported development projects on food security and on the nutritional situation of individuals and households. In particular, there are very few data on the ways in which project food aid impact on women, and on what access women have to the food distributed, the income generated or the assets created.

7.8 Sustainability

In our country studies the sustainability of project activities and of impacts is expected to be weak or improbable. The Bangladesh and Morocco reports are in this respect exceptions: they find that national government commitment to certain projects is high enough for some level of activity to be sustained also in the absence of continued WFP support. All the other country studies note serious difficulties in the institutional and financial sustainability of projects, in the financial viability of assets created, and in the technical and economic sustainability of benefits generated by the development projects.

In Ghana, Malawi, Morocco (in the case of school feeding), and Vietnam, major sustainability problems are noted in respect of the creation of budgetary dependence in key counterpart departments and agencies of the Government, indicating that the services provided may well be discontinued in the absence of WFP support; in some cases, even present level of commitment to an on-going project may not be sustained. In the case of Ghana, Malawi and Pakistan, there are specific technical problems jeopardising even short term sustainability of projects: interest rates in credit programmes, lack of local revenue generation for asset maintenance, and lack of community participation to help ensure maintenance.

As for institutional sustainability, we do not wish to argue that all WFP projects should continue unchanged once the period of WFP support is over. It is not acceptable, however, that so many WFP development projects, which represent large resource commitments both for WFP and for host government agencies, simply do not have any built-in plan for dealing with an inevitable phasing down of external assistance. As now is the case, the end of a WFP supported project most often represents a budgetary disaster for the government agency involved and the abrupt withdrawal of services and benefits for participants.

7.9 Gender Issues

As with all donor agencies, WFP has recognized the importance of enhancing the participation of women in its activities. Guidelines[83] to better integrate women were developed in 1989, aiming to include women more fully in productive, income-generating activities and not just as beneficiaries of feeding projects. Prior to this, most WFP assistance had treated women merely as vulnerable groups with unmet nutritional needs, especially while pregnant or nursing. An example of the new approach taking hold is the Vulnerable Group Feeding program in Bangladesh which was converted to a Vulnerable Group Development programme with emphasis on income-generation, training and credit provision in addition to the provision of a monthly food ration.

[83] "WFP Sectoral Guidelines on Women and Development: Gender Variables in Food-Assisted Projects", WFP/CFA:27/P/INF/4. April 1989.

These policy guidelines are general in nature and are intended to guide country offices in the design of projects to ensure women equal access to resources, to identify the effects on women's incomes and to assess the social and cultural factors relevant to women's participation in WFP projects. The WFP has also developed operational guidelines for specific project types to ensure that they are gender-sensitive. In spite of this, serious problems remain. We have reviewed a number of Project Summaries, which are required to describe and quantify, if possible, the participation of and effects on women. In nearly all cases, the analysis of gender and women's participation, which sometimes is treated in a single paragraph, was weak and superficial; in fact the relevant section is often added to the PS in Rome so that projects can pass through the SCP. In these cases, of course, there is no commitment by the host government or the CO to such statements. This is an area where CFA and SCP guidance has been decisive, and remains influential, in ensuring continued attention to gender issues in project design and implementation, and in WFP training programmes.

An assessment of WFP experience with gender-focused activities in three Latin American countries pointed to a number of difficulties in enhancing the socio-economic position of women through targeted projects.[84] The review noted that WFP projects focused on women are not necessarily gender-sensitive nor beneficial to women and therefore that more analysis is required in project planning to meet these goals; that more socio-economic expertise on WFP missions is required; that social empowerment and economic viability are not guaranteed even when women's groups are mobilised; and that economic enterprises which are intended to assist women as entrepreneurs require attention to credit and capital needs.

The country studies, except for Vietnam and Bangladesh, revealed that no special attention was given in project design to ensure participation by women, or to monitoring and evaluating projects in order to understand and assess the impact on women. In most cases this was seen to be a significant weakness for proper targeting.

The country studies revealed attitudinal and practical difficulties in translating the guidelines into effective and concrete measures for ensuring women's participation in project planning and implementation (e.g. in Malawi), and noted the absence of WFP advocacy for measures to improve women's participation in FFW projects (e.g. in Pakistan). The general view put forward in the country study reports is that WFP has not succeeded in putting in place in its COs the capacity to undertake gender analysis and the institutional resources necessary to effectively implement a strategy for participation of women.

This is especially damaging for the WFP, which strongly claims that food aid is a particularly effective resource in support of women at household level, often more so than is cash. While the claim may have some validity, WFP has neither invested in research and evaluation to verify its claim, nor made determined efforts to design and implement projects in such a way as to bring about the impact claimed.

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[84] "Comparative Review of WFP-Assisted Projects in Latin America Focused on Women (Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru)", WFP/CFA:28/SCP:3. October 1989.

This is not to deny that many of the projects reviewed in our evaluation have women as direct beneficiaries and have benefited a very large number of women. Our concern is that the gender concept has not been pursued systematically, and that therefore opportunities for involvement of many more women may have been missed. Gender is an area where the CFA and the SCP have played an important role in the past, in promoting more attention to the issue in project design and implementation and in WFP training programmes. They need to insist, however, that their recommendations are substantively followed through by more intensive monitoring and more rigorous project approval processes.

7.10 The Environment

It has been estimated that the WFP spends the equivalent of USD 1 million every day on projects for afforestation and soil conservation, and on activities to promote sustainable agricultural production.[85] Resources of the order of USD 5 billion have been so disbursed so far and outstanding WFP resource commitments amount to another USD 1 billion.[86] This makes WFP one of the largest donors for environmental protection and improvement.

In the recent United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) the possibility was raised of WFP stepping up its activities as they bear on the environment. This would mean - inter alia - greater efforts by WFP to direct its resources so as to help develop national strategies for drought preparedness in both the short and long term, aimed at reducing the vulnerability of production systems to drought; to strengthen the flow of early-warning information to decision makers and land users to enable nations to implement strategies for drought intervention; and to develop and integrate into national and regional development planning both drought-relief schemes and means of coping with environmental refugees.[87]

In 1991, WFP undertook a review of its environmental activities and concluded, among other things, that people's rights to the benefits accruing from projects need to be more clearly stated, that clear tenure and usufructuary rights should be established before starting projects, and that rapid rural appraisal at the pre-appraisal stage can help ensure beneficiary inputs in project design. In a review of WFP experience[88] the Secretariat stresses that, since environmental sustainability requires economic and social sustainability at the same time, this will influence who will benefit and who will participate in projects; that appropriate government policies are crucial to success and in particular to determining who benefits from land improvements; and therefore that projects must be designed and implemented with regard to the wishes of the

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85 WFP. *Journal*, No. 20, April-June 1992.

86 *Eighteenth Annual Report of the CFA to the ECOSOC, the FAO Council, and the World Food Council*, CFA:35/13. 30 April 1993.

87 WFP. *Disaster Mitigation and Rehabilitation in Africa*, CFA:34/P/7-B, 1992.

88 *Achieving Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Work of the WFP*, WFP/Rome mimeo, March 1992.

beneficiaries. We have not seen any documentation showing how such guidelines will be put into effect in WFP projects.

Our country studies, with the exception of Vietnam study, found that community participation and beneficiary involvement in the development and planning of WFP supported development projects have been very limited, as has the use for such purposes of NGOs and other organs of civil society. In our review of project files at headquarters we came across cases of WFP activities being potentially damaging to the environment in Bangladesh and Ethiopia, perhaps in consequence of insufficient technical assistance in project design and implementation. WFP projects most liable to produce negative environmental effects are those which move large quantities of earth for road building or water control. In our study of WFP operations in Malawi we noted that there were fears that the use of intensive monocropping of hybrid maize and agrochemicals promoted in an agricultural development project might have the potential for soil depletion and other harmful environmental effects and may not be appropriate given the risk profile of small farmers and the prevailing soil conditions. The specialist expertise required to design structures and to assess environmental impact are apparently not sufficiently available within WFP. Obtaining the technical support needed - preferably from local sources - and requiring more in-depth environmental analysis in project documentation should be a primary concern.

7.11 Conclusions

Country strategies: WFP appears to plan and design projects at a country level with an incomplete understanding of the most efficient uses of food aid to support national development priorities. The preparation of CSOs was introduced to provide guidance for project selection and design at country level. Many CSOs have been completed by Country Offices, but they are variable in quality and usefulness. WFP appears to have been reactive rather than consciously selective in determining projects to assist. The report suggests many improvements that could be made in the CSO process, including the provision of more technical assistance to develop them with national governments and COs, more involvement of UN agencies, donors, NGOs, and financial institutions, scheduling the process to coincide with other agencies, more rigorously analyzing country food security at national, regional, and household levels, and with the host government, assessing country performance to date, and analyzing institutional strengths and weaknesses to identify areas for support. In future CSOs will also have to be developed within the framework of the Country Strategy Notes to be formulated by the United Nations System and the interested governments.

Efficiency: We have found the WFP to be a generally efficient organization in activities related to the "mechanics" of food aid: determining the appropriate food basket, finding the resources, transport and logistics, off-loading and port/frontier storage, quality control, internal transport, shipping and handling, and distribution to the targeted population. WFP has mixed performance in the provision of non-food items, and technical and financial assistance. Likewise, WFP seems constrained in the use of the best modalities in projects, which in our view would include more flexible use of monetization.

We find that WFP often fails to realistically assess and take into account the institutional capacity of counterparts in charge of implementation, and to analyze sufficiently the social and economic conditions under which food management and project activities are undertaken.

Effectiveness: Project effectiveness has primarily to do with the degree to which WFP and host governments accurately identify objectives which can be met by using food aid, appropriately incorporate and target beneficiaries, and manage implementation in light of evolving information and circumstances. The pattern portrayed by the country studies is one where too many projects fall short of their potential; not surprisingly, the problems noted in project effectiveness often seemed to grow out of deficiencies in project design.

Some projects were found to be unduly benefiting relatively better off individuals more than necessary (or unavoidable), rather than the poorest and most food insecure. One reason for this is weak problem analysis and limited beneficiary involvement in project formulation and planning in the face of inherent difficulties in achieving a satisfactory distribution of benefits. We generally found that the basic development rationale of projects reviewed was convincing in terms of their potential to benefit the poor and to produce positive impacts, in some cases provided some changes in design and implementation were made. Many projects lacked adequate technical assistance during implementation, with negative effects on the quality of assets created and services offered. Adequate maintenance of physical assets was rarely assured; this follows from weaknesses in realistically assessing the capacity of counterpart institutions to implement and sustain project activities; and also from inadequate involvement of beneficiaries in the choice of assets to create.

There appears to have been little effort placed on clearly understanding the operation of local markets and the value and extent of food availability, or the effects of project food aid on them, but even so we did not come across any clear case of lasting disincentive effects caused by development projects.

Under favourable circumstances there is no reason why most of the kind of projects supported by WFP cannot make effective contributions to development. But in almost every case, the authors of our country case studies felt that significant gains could easily have been made with better technical and financial support. Project successes, where they were found, could best be explained by reference to special circumstances under which technical and financial support had been forthcoming, such as the integration of WFP activities into larger development efforts to which the recipient governments were committed, and which benefited from support from other donors, financial institutions, or UN agencies.

The World Food Programme as a development agency has set itself the ambitious and difficult task of identifying and supporting development projects of demonstrable benefit to the poorest of the poor, and the most vulnerable, including women and children; and this should all be done with the active involvement of beneficiaries. In our evaluation we are critical of the way in which targeting is done in many WFP projects; we call for more beneficiary participation in decisions on project activities influencing them; and we want WFP to be more flexible in responding to changes in local markets and food availability. But such changes alone will not

enhance the effectiveness or efficiency of project activities without better technical preparation of projects, stronger implementation capacity in recipient governments, and more careful and selective choice of projects confined to fields where the provision of food aid has proved itself to be capable of success.

Impact and sustainability: We found that some FFW and HRD project activities have had clearly positive impacts; indeed some of our country reports are strongly positive in their assessment of some projects' humanitarian or development impacts. As with programme effectiveness, a number of the country case studies indicate that successful WFP supported development projects do not benefit only the poorest elements of the population or even the most food insecure.

We found little in the way of information and analysis of the impact of WFP supported development projects on food security and nutritional situation of individuals and households. In particular, little is known about the impact on women of the food distributed.

The country study reports are often negative in their assessment of sustainability of project activities. Except for some projects in Bangladesh, Guatemala and Morocco, serious difficulties are found in the institutional and financial sustainability of project activities, in the financial viability of assets created, and in the technical and economic sustainability of benefits generated.

As for institutional sustainability, the objective is not that all the projects should necessarily continue unchanged, once WFP assistance is withdrawn, but it is not acceptable that so many WFP development projects, which have required large resource commitments also by the counterpart government or agency, simply are without any plan of action for phasing down or with changes as needed - for continuation at some level without outside support. As now designed and operated, in most if not all cases the end of WFP support to a project represents a budgetary disaster for the government agency involved and an abrupt withdrawal of services and benefits, often of great value, for participants.

Recommendations for improvement: It seems clear that there are a number of critical system-wide improvements which must be made in WFP's development operations if the agency is to achieve a more acceptable level of efficiency and effectiveness. Drawing on our country case studies a number of specific recommendations may be recalled.

We recommend that the Programme move towards a country programming approach which seeks to identify the most effective uses of food aid in support of development projects, and that it adhere to programming objectives when approving projects. This will require more technical support in the preparation of Country Strategy Outlines, better analysis of economic and social conditions during project design and implementation, and more severe scrutiny in the project approval process.

We recommend that the Programme more realistically assess the capacity of implementing agencies; that it be more active and consistent in providing institutional support to national governments; that it provide relevant training and systems for effective project management; and

that country programmes and projects be related to the absorptive capacity of the recipient countries.

We recommend that the Programme apply more effort to improve the targeting of projects to ensure that the benefits will more fully reach the most food-deficit regions, the poorest and the most food insecure members of the community, and so that women participate more fully. The use of food aid as an input for development activities will be difficult to justify in the absence of improved targeting and fuller realisation of its potential qualitative advantages over cash. We urge greater attention also to effective community-level participation in identification of project activities, to ensure community sense of ownership and responsibility for maintenance of the assets created in development projects. We also note the need for concrete measures to ensure that women participate in influencing project orientation and in management and implementation, and that they get an equitable share in project benefits.

A number of the country case study reports indicate that WFP will need to upgrade the technical capacity in development project design if it is to achieve more acceptable levels of project quality. We indicate several ways in which this can be accomplished: a stronger complement of technical specialist staff at HQ; more flexible and innovative arrangements for using outside consultants, including those from other UN agencies; and an expanded use of national consultants by Country Offices.

Many of the most successful WFP projects are those where other development organisations have taken the lead and where the Programme supplies food as an input. We recommend far greater efforts than now to integrate WFP food aid into projects formulated and implemented by other agencies of the UN and by the international financial institutions and also other donors, with stronger technical expertise. This would assure that the necessary financial and non-food resources would be available and that food would be used more effectively as a development resource. The role of the Programme would be to identify the most effective use of food and, second, to efficiently handle the logistics; this is what WFP currently does best.

We recommend that the Programme be much more active in ensuring that assistance to projects, which tends to create budgetary dependence for key ministries, is accompanied with clear and concrete plans for phasing out and for budgetary and institutional sustainability. Otherwise, an unacceptable level of dependence is created and the inevitable end of WFP support will cause undue hardship for both project staff and beneficiaries. We emphasise, however, that there are situations where it is fully justifiable to keep a project going for many years, even decades. Phasing out is not necessary in the case of project activities that have proved reasonably effective and have improved and benefited new cohorts of people over time in poor countries that remain dependent on foreign grant aid.

8.0 The Future of the World Food Programme

Our findings and recommendations on specific issues are given in the earlier chapters of this report and brought together in the Executive Summary and Recommendations. In this chapter we set forth our views on the possible future evolution of the World Food Programme. These are not to be considered as formal recommendations. Rather they are shared judgments, reached at the end of this long evaluation exercise, which we believe may be of general interest, and perhaps of value to those who will have to take decisions on the shape of the World Food Programme in the later nineties.

8.1 WFP as a Relief Agency

We have been well impressed by WFP's performance in relief. The recommendations we have put forward aim at incremental improvements rather than radical changes.

Several factors have contributed towards giving a special prominence to the Programme's role. International emergency needs have escalated sharply in recent years, largely as a result of the increasing number of armed conflicts underway in different parts of the world. Relief has become a top global priority, with a political as well as a humanitarian dimension. Food (together with the related transport and logistic costs) is generally the most expensive single item in an emergency. At its present level of operations, the Programme is handling over half of all international food for relief. Consequently, the Programme's relief role is widely perceived as being more important than its role as a development agency.

This is a reversal of the situation that prevailed during the Programme's first twenty-five years, when its true vocation was seen as development. Relief operations generally ran at a much lower level than development projects, and absorbed a smaller part of the energies of the staff and the governing body.

We have asked ourselves whether the present situation is a temporary one, with the traditional balance between relief and development likely to be restored at some stage in the not too distant future. Of course it is impossible to make a confident prediction, but we have noted that the Programme itself is estimating that relief operations will continue at roughly the 1992 level through 1994 and 1995. For planning purposes, it seems prudent to assume that relief will continue to be the central concern for some time to come.

It is important to recognize that the level of relief operations is not determined by policy decisions on the part of the Programme. What has happened is that the total level of relief needs has gone up, and at the same time the donor community has found WFP an effective channel for its aid. The arrangements for funding WFP relief operations are open-ended, in the sense that contributions can be sought and made for whatever amount may be required, without any

upper limit. If donors want to use WFP as the main vehicle for emergency food aid, there is no obvious reason why they should not do so. The structure of the Programme's resources is, however, somewhat unbalanced, with 70 percent of all relief contributions in 1992 coming from just two donors: the United States and the EEC. The level of operations could fall away or further expand rapidly if either of these donors was to alter its preference for the channelling of its relief contributions.

We have looked into the desirability of forcing a cutback in relief operations, with a view to maintaining WFP as an organisation devoted primarily to development. Such a course of action would run counter to common sense, since in our view the Programme handles relief better than it handles development. Furthermore, there is no other United Nations or non-governmental organisation in a position to take over WFP's relief functions, particularly in the field of transport and logistics. Consequently, we have not pursued this as an option for the future of the Programme.

The coordination of relief is both difficult and important, because of the many organisations involved both inside and outside the United Nations system, and because of the fast-moving nature of the work. Within the UN system there has almost always been tension among and between operating and coordinating organisations. We have found WFP to be conducting itself well; the existing tensions appear creative rather than destructive. In particular we have appreciated the Programme's cooperation with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. WFP appears to be doing a good job as a specialized coordinator of emergency food aid from different sources. We have suggested further movement on the recommendation advanced by the Nordic Study of 1990 that WFP be designated as the UN agency with primary responsibility for matters of logistics and transport for both food and non-food items.

In summary, we believe that it is in the interest of all countries, both donors and recipients, to maintain and strengthen WFP as the principal international organisation for handling food relief.

8.2 WFP as a Development Agency

The analysis in earlier chapters has pointed to some successes, but has also identified a disturbing number of weaknesses, in WFP development projects. In essence, the Programme performs well in the physical movement of food but is much less successful in coping with the strictly developmental aspects of its projects. Both Headquarters and Country Offices are strong on food management but weak on development planning. There is little evidence that Country Strategy Outlines are seriously addressing the question of how food aid could be used most efficiently to support national priorities. At project level we have found many weaknesses in design: the targeting of food aid on the poorest areas and the poorest people is often unsatisfactory; the technical content of projects often leaves much to be desired; the phasing out of a project is often not planned at all.

We have given considerable thought to the question of whether it makes sense for WFP to remain in the business of implementing food aid projects for development. Donors that contribute surplus food to the Programme for development projects could, in theory, utilize NGOs for such activities, or handle them bilaterally with the recipient government (possibly as programme aid). Donors that contribute cash rather than food would have no difficulty in finding alternative uses for their funds. While various views were put forward within the evaluation team, we would like to highlight the argument of equity. Even some of the richest nations have domestic food programmes for the benefit of people living below the poverty line. A development programme targeted at the poorest people in the poorest countries, organized by the United Nations system, based on bringing food to the hungry, and aiming at long-term impact as well as short-term benefits, should surely be maintained by the donors as long as it can be run effectively and efficiently. We should be thinking about improving effectiveness and efficiency, not about winding up the programme.

A particular option that we have discussed would be to provide other funding agencies such as UNDP, the World Bank, IFAD or the regional development banks with a "food window" permitting them to manage a certain amount of food aid directly and incorporate it in their own projects. On balance, we do not feel that such an approach would be likely to offer a practical alternative to a WFP development programme. Food management is a specialized task, and there are strong arguments for having all types of food aid handled together by a single staff. We do, however, feel it would be useful for the financial institutions to be invited to make use of WFP-managed food aid in any of their respective projects where it could play a role.

Looking at WFP's performance over the last few years, it should be borne in mind that food is a less flexible - and in some ways more difficult - resource to handle than financial or technical aid. Furthermore WFP is increasingly concentrating its efforts on the least developed and other low-income countries, where implementation capacity is weakest. Consequently the Programme has been facing a challenge of extraordinary difficulty. Nevertheless, we feel that - even in the face of these constraints - WFP could have done a better job.

We believe that the Programme has made two strategic errors. It has gone in too much for stand-alone WFP projects, whereas we are convinced that the Programme's aid can be used more successfully as an input into broader projects handled by other agencies, particularly the funding organisations. And it has offered too broad a range of project types, instead of concentrating on those for which food aid is particularly well suited. We also feel that there is a case for focusing efforts on a smaller number of countries.

More positively, the Programme has built up over the years a very considerable capacity for handling poverty- and hunger-related projects, and a wide experience of what works and what doesn't work in particular countries. This provides a good basis on which to build a stronger programme in the period ahead.

In thinking about possible courses of corrective action, we have borne in mind that recommendations for strengthening the staff in terms of numbers would not be realistic. Proposals for further increases in the budget could hardly be acceptable to donors in the present

economic climate. We believe, however, that the quality of the development programme could be upgraded without a budget increase by such approaches as: making joint projects with funding agencies a standard approach; narrowing the focus of the programme in geographical or sectoral terms or both; renegotiating the arrangements for technical support from other UN agencies; and reducing the number of Country Offices so as to strengthen those that remain.

We therefore put forward for consideration the following three options regarding the future course of WFP's development work. These are highly condensed and schematic. A great deal more work would be needed to translate any one of them into a set of specific proposals.

a) Reduce the number of countries in which the Programme operates, perhaps to about 50, concentrating on those with the lowest incomes, and especially on those which are disaster-prone. Programmes in other countries would be run down gradually, and there would have to be a substantial period of transition. At an early stage it should be possible to close down some thirty to forty Country Offices, maintaining only a modest presence through the UNDP Resident Representative's office. Resources could be redeployed to strengthen the Country Offices that are retained, particularly in the field of development planning. The Programme would operate to the maximum extent possible through joint projects with funding agencies.

b) Keep the present spread of countries, but limit activities to a much narrower band of project types in which food aid functions well. Possible candidates might include natural resources management (soils, water, forestry) and human resources development (school feeding). But it should be borne in mind that no type of project is guaranteed to work in all countries: allocation of funds should take account of what works well in the particular country concerned. As in option a), the Programme should work as far as possible through joint projects with funding agencies. Insofar as joint projects do not prove a satisfactory vehicle for mobilizing technical support, the present arrangements with FAO and other technical agencies should be renegotiated so as to enable the Programme to acquire resident expertise in one or two high-priority sectors, and the possibility of hiring local experts in recipient countries.

c) Phase out development projects except for relief-related development activities (disaster preparedness, rehabilitation, PROs, settlement of repatriated refugees).

It would be possible to combine elements from the three options in different ways. For instance the geographic focusing which is the basis of a) could be combined with sectoral focusing as in b), or the more drastic focusing suggested in c). Indeed, we are inclined to think that discussion of the best way to combine these various suggestions would be the most constructive approach to the future of WFP's development work.

Whatever the option that may be adopted, WFP development assistance should be slotted into the total effort of the United Nations system in a logical and effective manner. The dispositions already adopted by the General Assembly, for instance on a programme approach and the preparation of Country Strategy Notes, should help to bring this about.

We have not, in earlier chapters of this report, attempted to guess the future level of resources that might be available to WFP for development. We have found no evidence that the surge in relief operations has so far led to any reduction in funding for development projects, but we wonder if this can be maintained over a period of several years. In any event, the food aid channelled through WFP for development is only a part of the total flow. The interest of donors in supporting the Programme will depend mainly on their perception of whether it is doing a satisfactory job. We have advanced numerous criticisms in this report, but we believe corrective action is feasible. Whatever the steps that may be taken, we urge donors to be consistent. If they agree to a refocussing of the development programme, whether it is along the lines we have suggested or following another approach, it will be vital that they maintain their support and that they help WFP to achieve the necessary quality improvement.

8.3 Combining Relief and Development

If, as we believe likely, relief continues for some years at least to be the main focus of WFP's work, then this major shift of emphasis will have to be absorbed into the Programme's thinking and the way in which it works, at both Secretariat and CFA levels. In order to permit a smooth and rapid transition to a new balance between relief and development, it would be advisable to reach early decisions on any change in the Programme's developmental role.

Looking first at the relief side, the Programme will have to see itself as a fast-moving body, taking quick decisions and often acting in a non-bureaucratic manner. This is already the case in some parts of WFP, but not in others. In particular, decision-making on the administrative aspects of relief operations will have to become speedier and more efficient. Top management will have to look at the balance of the time and attention it devotes to relief issues as compared with the regular programme (including fund-raising for the biennial pledging target). It will need to ensure that a clear decision-making structure is in place for handling the strategy and tactics of particular emergencies (as distinct from operational decisions on logistical or other aspects). The structural changes put in place at the beginning of 1993 should be assessed after an adequate shaking-down period, and modified if necessary. Policy staff (already heavily laden with issues on the development side) will have to be much more concerned about the problems of a policy framework for relief operations. The availability of a Rapid Response Team (or a similar mechanism under any other name) will be important for reinforcing Country Offices in an emergency, and ensuring that WFP overcomes its reputation as a slow starter. Staff recruitment and training will need to emphasize the skills required for relief operations; the Programme may consider recruiting people ready and suited for service in danger zones. The CFA will certainly wish to look at the balance of attention it devotes to relief and development.

On the development side, the exact nature of the changes required would of course depend on the decisions about a refocussing of WFP's development role (whether or not they be along the lines of the options suggested above). Over the short term it will, in any event, be important to ensure that the Regional Bureaux are able to handle their development responsibilities effectively despite the load of relief operations. Over the medium and longer term, any of the options advanced above is likely to require new modes of cooperation with other agencies, both

the funding and the technical organisations. The need for a more strategic use of food aid at country level, possibly combined with the advent of a programme approach, will place greater responsibility upon Country Offices, and call for skills in development planning which most of them do not at present have. New project proposals will have to be rigorously screened from the earliest stage.

Taking relief and development together, we see the value of retaining WFP as a hybrid organisation. If relief is accepted as the main focus there is still a strong case for continuing - as a minimum development profile - an active programme oriented towards disaster preparedness, mitigation and rehabilitation.

8.4 WFP's Policy Role

The role of WFP with regard to food aid policies in general is vested in the CFA rather than in the Secretariat. The results achieved by the CFA have not impressed us. The lack of performance may, however, be partly due to the fact that food aid policies have not, in the recent past, been high on the international agenda. This could change in the course of the next few years if the industrialized countries succeed in establishing agricultural policies that lead to lower levels of production, a decline in surpluses and a rise in international prices. Broader questions of the food security of the poorest countries will certainly be followed by the FAO Committee on World Food Security, but there could be important specific issues relating to levels of food aid. These could include the future shape and level of the Food Aid Convention. We believe that the CFA should actively exercise its policy role as these events unfold.

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Annex A

The Evaluation Process

A.1 An Account of the Process

In 1990-91, the Government of Canada, The Netherlands and Norway developed terms of reference for a comprehensive evaluation of the World Food Programme (WFP), see section A.2. The purpose was "to study the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the WFP and to examine the relevance of key operational objectives considering emerging trends of the 1990s". The evaluation was designed in two phases.

The first phase, completed in late 1992, was coordinated by the North-South Institute of Canada. It was a desk study which included three visits to WFP headquarters in October, 1991, March and July, 1992. WFP and donor documentation on policies and operations was reviewed, as were WFP project files, and WFP headquarters management and staff were interviewed. The consultants recruited for work in the first phase included:

R. Culpeper (Canada)	- Coordinator
D. McLean (Canada/USA)	- Core group member
R. Young (Canada)	- Core group member
E. Clay (UK) S. Maxwell (UK) N. Nicholds (UK) H. Singer	- Consultants on global food aid context
O.D. Koht Norbye (Norway) A.M. Jerve (Norway) A. Miranda (Portugal/France)	- Consultants for review of WFP project files

Documentary material collated, analysis developed and insights gained in the first phase was fed into the evaluation exercise in the second phase.

The terms of reference for the second phase, see section A.3, were elaborated in January, 1993, and the Chr. Michelsen Institute of Bergen, Norway was designated to coordinate the effort. The international consultants involved and their respective primary roles are listed below; names of members of the core team are shown in italics:

J. Faaland (Norway)	- General coordinator
E. Clay (UK)	- Consultant-at-large
W. Cornelissen (The Netherlands)	- Country team member (Malawi)
T. Freeman (Canada)	- Country team member (Ghana, Malawi)
N.G. d'Arcy Houghton (UK)	- Country team member (Guatemala)
H. Jaworski (Peru)	- Country team leader (Bolivia, Guatemala)
W. Keddeman (The Netherlands)	- Country team member (Ethiopia)
D. McLean (Canada/USA)	- Country team member (Morocco)

O.D.K. Norbye (Norway)	- Joint coordinator and country team leader (Ethiopia, Morocco)
J.R. Parkinson (UK)	- Country team leader (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam)
S. Pausewang (Germany)	- Country team member (Ethiopia)
A. Sawyerr (Ghana)	- Country team leader (Ghana, Malawi)
H. Stokke (Norway)	- Country team member (Pakistan)
M. Syeduzzaman (Bangladesh)	- Joint coordinator and country team member (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam)
D. Walton (Ireland)	- Consultant for special study of relief
T. Weersma-Haworth (The Netherlands)	- Country team member (Bolivia, Guatemala)

The evaluation was organised around a sample of nine country case studies, selected with reference to several criteria, such as food aid volume, duration and types of activities, geographic distribution, size of the Country Office, food security and government capacity. This case study approach relied on host government and aid agencies' analyses, evaluations and reports, as well as on other available documentation, and on formal and informal interviews in the countries concerned and in WFP and sister UN agencies, and with NGOs and other sources. The terms of reference *cum* workplan for the country studies are reproduced in section A.4.

Prior to field visits, all of which took place in the first half of 1993, desk studies were conducted in Rome of WFP projects and activities in each of the selected nine countries. WFP documentation on recent and ongoing development projects, emergency operations (EMOPS), and protracted refugee and displaced person operations (PRD/PDPO) was reviewed, and issues were identified for subsequent field verification and analysis. Also, a brief one-person advance visit was made to five of the countries studied to establish a work plan, initiate contacts and identify local consultants.

For each of four of the nine countries - *Ethiopia, Guatemala, Malawi* and *Pakistan* - a small team of two or three of the international consultants conducted the field work, in each case over a period of about three weeks. For each of the other five countries - *Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ghana, Morocco* and *Vietnam* - only two international consultants carried out the field work, in each case over a period of up to two weeks. In most cases, a local consultant assisted the respective country teams with documentation and analysis, contacts and logistics during their period of work in the host country.

The scheduling of the country studies was such that three countries - Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Vietnam - were visited in the first quarter of 1993. This allowed treatment of the three first-round countries as pilot studies, the experience of which was drawn upon in the planning of work in the six other countries, in which field studies were conducted in the second quarter of 1993.

In all cases the teams worked with the full cooperation of the WFP Country Offices, interviewed WFP management and staff, government policy makers, ministry officials, food aid managers

and staff in the various projects concerned, and gained perceptions of WFP, its working relationships, and the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations from other UN agencies, donors, non-governmental organisations, and some beneficiaries.

Because WFP has become a major channel for international food relief, a special study of these operations was undertaken in the second quarter of 1993 as an integral part of the evaluation. The nine country study reports - and review of other material collected during field visits - were the most important sources of information for evaluation of WFP performance in relief. Extensive discussions were held at WFP headquarters with management and staff of the Programme. Information and opinions were sought from senior staff of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), FAO, UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR, and from NGOs or NGO coordinating bodies. Contacts were made also with officials of the two donors, US and EEC, that together contribute more than two-thirds of WFP resources for relief.

In a meeting in Oslo in September, 1992, in which the three donors, WFP officials and some international consultants participated, progress in the evaluation during the first phase was reviewed and plans laid for its follow-through.

In the closing months of 1992, preparations were made for the second phase, including the mobilisation of the group of international consultants, elaboration of terms of reference and of assignments, initial work in Rome on WFP project file review for the country studies, as well as sorting out administrative, organisational and financial matters.

In mid January, 1993, the three donors and officials of the WFP met in Rome with the international consultants to discuss and agree the terms of reference and work plan to completion of the evaluation. In a similar meeting mid April, 1993, again in Rome, progress was reviewed, including the early drafts from the three pilot country studies and the (near) completion of WFP project file reviews; plans for the remaining six country studies and for the special study of relief operations were discussed and adjusted, as needed.

In late June, 1993, when all the field work for the country studies had been completed, as had the review and analysis for the special study of relief, and initial drafting had commenced, the core group of international consultants met in Bergen to go over the material and tentative findings, to agree on format and thrust of the reports to be prepared, to establish an agreed, if tentative, outline of the ultimate overall evaluation report, and to establish a plan of work and time table for work during the summer. The three donors and the WFP did not participate in this meeting, but were informed of its results.

In early September, 1993, the three donors, senior officials of WFP and the core group of consultants had a three day meeting in Bergen to review the material then available: the nine draft country studies, a draft of the special study of relief, and the outline of the overall report; and to discuss and agree an up-dated work plan and time table to completion of the evaluation. The core group on this occasion worked together in Bergen for two weeks, both on the draft country studies and the special report on relief to take account of comments and suggestions made in writing and in discussion, and on drafting and re-drafting of sections intended for the

overall evaluation report. It was decided that the analysis and findings of the special study of relief would be presented, as appropriate, as a chapter on relief in the final report, and that the nine country studies -while remaining integral parts of the overall evaluation - would each be presented under separate cover.

In early November, 1993, when a full set of draft final country studies and a first complete draft of the overall report had been circulated to the core group for comment, four of the international consultants met for a week in Bergen to complete and finish the overall report.

A complete Draft Final Report, was sent to the three donors on 8 November, 1993. Following a review by the general coordinator of comments received from the three donors, from WFP and from colleagues in the group of international consultants, the Final Report was completed by the end of December, 1993.

A.2 Terms of Reference, Phase One, July 1991

Background

Within the United Nations system the World Food Programme (WFP) is the second largest program, with operations in 90 countries managed through 83 country offices. The WFP handles nearly one quarter of world food aid, and supports both developmental and emergency projects, with its primary focus on the former, although in recent time it has had to devote a growing share of its resources towards emergency relief. Since 1963, it has funded more than 1,400 development projects, the majority of which have been multi-phased, and thus of medium to long term duration. The WFP plays a vital role in coordinating the logistics of bilateral food aid for various donors, and has administered several hundred emergency relief projects. In 1989 the WFP established a sub-set to its regular programming, namely Protracted Refugee and Displaced Persons Operations assistance.

Types and Fields of Activity of the WFP

The WFP shall, in accordance with the Guidelines and Criteria for Food Aid as shown in annex A (Source Report of the Seventh Session of the UN/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes) and other relevant CFA decisions, provide assistance for:

a) implementing projects, using food as an aid to economic and social development, particularly when related to vulnerable group feeding, increasing agricultural production and other projects, including regional activities;

b) meeting emergency food needs and the logistic support thereof; and

c) promoting world food security.

The WFP may, upon request, arrange for the purchase and transport of food and related non-food items and for the monitoring of their distribution, on behalf of bilateral donors or UN agencies. (Source Revised General Regulation 4 (a) (b) and (c) and 6.)

WFP's Governing Body

WFP's governing body, the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA) provides, inter alia, a forum for intergovernmental consultations on national and international food aid policies and programmes and formulates proposals for more effective coordination of multilateral, bilateral and NGO food aid programmes, including emergency food aid. (Source Revised General Regulation 9 (a) (ii) and (v).)

The types and range of development projects and activities supported by the WFP have considerable diversity, but can nonetheless be broadly categorized as focusing on: agricultural development; rural development; and human resource development. Projects to assist

agricultural and rural development accounted for two-thirds of WFP's development portfolio in 1989, i.e. 193 projects with a value of USD 2.23 billion.

As has been the case with other multilateral channels, some basic questions pertaining to the effectiveness of the WFP have been posed by the donor community. In 1990, the Canadian International Development Agency conducted an Evaluation Assessment of Multilateral Food Aid, for which the WFP is the singular channel. The Assessment resulted in a recommendation to proceed with a comprehensive review of numerous issues. At the same time, Norway was proceeding with a pre-survey of its Food Programme. As well The Netherlands was conducting an evaluation of its Aid Programme.

The joint evaluation by Canada, Norway and the Netherlands will focus the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the WFP. Furthermore, the evaluation will serve to examine the relevance of key operational objectives against a backdrop of the broader emerging trends of the 90s. The Terms of Reference which follow have been jointly developed by the three donors as a basis for proceeding with a joint evaluation.

Evaluation Issues to be Covered

The following issues have been identified for purposes of this evaluation:

Issue I: The Global Food Aid Situation

In order to examine the WFP, it is important to place it within the global food aid context. The evaluation will thus briefly describe the current status of total food aid programming, including a breakdown of contributing countries, recipient countries and regions. The evaluation will describe the range of objectives for food aid, and will attempt to assess the extent to which food aid investments serve to meet these objectives. It will also examine - largely on the basis of existing research - the impact of international food aid on the domestic product and prices of food products in recipient countries. Where possible or relevant the global food aid situation will be compared with WFP operation.

Specific sub-issues include:

1.1 What have been the most significant changes in global food aid policies and approaches over the past decade?

- What has been the trend in allocations between program and project type food aid?
- What are the implications of the emerging trends and changes to food aid in the 90s?
- What are the projections as to the most critical needs in food aid in the 90s?

1.2 What is the total financial commitment to food aid for project/program development versus emergency/humanitarian purposes?

1.3 What are the global experiences and position on the role of recipient countries in programme food aid and projects versus emergency/humanitarian activities, including their absorptive capacities, responsibilities and contributions to food aid activities (taking into account the policy, human and financial resource contexts)?

1.4 What is the global experience and position on the role of beneficiaries in programme food aid and projects versus emergency/humanitarian activities?

1.5 How effective has food aid been in improving food security, in complementing structural adjustment programmes, and in improving balance of payments?

1.6 How does food aid affect domestic food production, prices and consumption patterns - including the absorptive capacities of markets - in recipient countries?

1.7 What is generally perceived as the main relative strengths and weaknesses of delivering food aid via WFP vis-à-vis multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental channels?

Issue II: The WFP's Food Aid and Development, Mandate and Objectives

The WFP has been evolving over the years to respond to emerging food aid needs and policy changes. It is important to examine WFP's current food aid and development mandate purpose and objectives, including its programming strategies for achieving them.

Specific sub-issues include:

2.1 What is the WFP's current mandate, objectives, priorities and constraints, and how have these evolved over the past decade?

- To what extent is the WFP Mandate - including the full scope of its operational objectives and priorities - still valid and relevant?

2.2 How much is WFP involved in programme food aid, in donor coordination and support services for bilateral donors, and in policy analysis and development?

- What has been WFP's mandate and role?
- Does it have a comparative advantage in any of these activities?
- To what extent has the WFP a role to cover food aid related activities including servicing the CFA in the performance of its wider mandate of providing an intergovernmental forum for discussion on national and international food aid policies and programs and providing bilateral services?

2.3 What are the types of programs and projects which WFP currently assists?

- How appropriate are these relative to its corporate priorities and objectives?
- How are donor allocations matched to these priorities and objectives?

2.4 How does WFP respond to substantive changes within recipient countries, e.g. in times of crisis or of major policy redirection?

Issue III: The Institutional Structure and Viability of the WFP

The WFP is governed by the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA), which exercises responsibility for the intergovernmental supervision and direction of the Programme, including food aid policy, administration, operations, funds and finances and carries out such other responsibilities as are conferred upon it in the present General Regulations. The CFA, jointly established by the United Nations and FAO, is composed of member states from developing countries and economically developed countries. The CFA will report annually to both the ECOSOC and the Council of FAO. (Source: Revised General Regulations 7 (a) and 8.)

Given the broader context, it will be useful to examine key institutional, administrative, and personnel factors which influence the effectiveness of the WFP.

Specific sub-issues include:

3.1 What is the internal organizational profile, and operational systems and procedures of the WFP?

3.2 What is the current and projected status of the WFP - UN System relationships?

- to include an examination of WFP - UN System inter-relationships relative to:
  - the mandate of the WFP's governing body;
  - the accountability of its Executive Director to the governing body;
  - management of its general fund;
  - audits and certification of accounts;
  - senior staffing decisions at HQ and in the field;
  - its headquarters agreement; and
  - the management of emergency operations.

3.3 How effectively does WFP conduct its relationships with and respond to recipient country governments, UN agencies, NGOs, implementors, and donors?

- To what extent is there pro-active coordination and cooperation with other interested parties in the planning, implementation and evaluation of projects?
- Does the provision of ancillary of services for donors - in conducting their bilateral initiatives - strengthen or weaken the WFP's capacity to meet its own primary objectives?
- What are WFP's relationships within other UN agencies in terms of technical support, for which liaison officers are appointed in UN, FAO, ILO, UNESCO and WHO, in collaborative action and co-financing (World Bank, IFAD, UNICEF) and in emergencies (UNHCR, UNDRO, FAO)?

- What is WFP-UNDP relationships in WFP Country Offices (where the UNDP Resident Representative is also the Representative of WFP and where local officers employed by WFP are administered by UNDP)?

3.4 What is the overall WFP human resource profile and tenure of service, at both the headquarters and field office levels, including: administrative and professional categories; sectoral expertise; women; comparative representation from developed and developing countries.

- How does the HRD profile correspond with the organizational requirements for development projects, emergency operations and refugee operations?

3.5 Is there a staff development plan, including training, and career structures both at headquarters and in the field?

3.6 What are the main strengths and weaknesses of the WFP as an organization?

Issue IV: WFP Resources

4.1 What is the level and nature of WFP resources, e.g. financial, technical, human, and including its foodbasket?

- What influence does the WFP have on determining the level and nature of its resource base?

4.2 To what extent is the current ratio of contributions in cash and in kind optimal from an efficiency point of view?

4.3 How does the WFP manage and assign priorities for allocating resources between the categories of activities (Development projects, Emergency activities, Refugees operations)?

- How does meeting the resource needs of emergencies (whether commodities, cash, logistics/infrastructure or staff) impinge on the management of the overall supply of resources for WFP development projects?

4.4 Have alternative sources of funding other than government been explored?

Issue V: The Effectiveness and Efficiency of WFP Programmes and Projects

The evaluation will seek to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the WFP, i.e. the extent to which its programming and projects are selected, administered, extended, phased out and are responsive to the changing development objectives and context of its own organization including coordination, consultation mechanisms, as well as of recipient countries. This assessment will be done largely through an examination of process and intermediate impact indicators.

- Process indicators include the organization and management of programme activities, such as how decisions are made, roles and responsibilities of involved parties, and how policies are made operational in programme activities.
- Intermediate impact indicators include those measurable at the purpose and output levels of the traditional logical framework, which are to some degree available through project evaluation and through field investigation.

Specific sub-issues include:

5.1 How effective and efficient is the WFP in planning, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating of development project and programmes?

- What criteria and practices are employed by WFP in selecting recipient countries, identifying projects, target populations and counterpart (executing) organizations?
- What is the role of the WFP's project committee and sub-committee in projects (SCP)?

5.2 How effective is WFP in planning, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating PROs (Protracted Refugees and Emergencies Projects).

- What is the appreciation of WFP's performance in PROs in terms of efficiency, adequacy and food deliveries, logistics, adequacy of commodity choice, coordination, continuity?

5.3 How effective is WFP in planning, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating emergency assistance, including International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR)?

- What is the appreciation of WFP's performance in relief operations in terms of: timeliness, efficiency, purchasing, logistics, adequacy of commodity choice, coordination?
- What are the criteria and practice being employed for starting emergency operations?

5.4 To what extent is Food Aid an efficient mean to achieve various objectives under different project categories, such as employment and income generation, nutritional support, agricultural/rural and Human Resource Development?

Issue VI: The Modalities of Implementation

6.1 Given the move towards food self-sufficiency in basic food staples in many of the traditional food aid (food importing) countries - how effective has the WFP's shift toward 'monetization', 'local purchases', 'triangular transactions' and 'swap operations' been in response to this?

6.2 How effective are the WFP's criteria and practices pertaining to "food for work", contextual to countries now self-sufficient in food staples?

- What are the comparative strengths and weaknesses of using food versus cash for work?

6.3 How appropriate and sound are relief response practices and procedures?

6.4 What has been the WFP experience with respect to monetization?

Issue VII: The WFP and The Major Development Issues

7.1 How have WFP objectives and programming evolved in ways that address growing concerns about poverty alleviation, structural adjustment, increased participation of women, environmentally sound and sustainable development, food security and energy availability?

7.2 What has been the WFP strategies and experience in terms of poverty alleviation?

- Are there documented cases of long-term impact in this area?
- Who have benefitted in the short term and in the long term?

7.3 What role has WFP played in structural adjustment?

- Are there documented cases of impact in this area?
- What are the "lessons learned" from evaluations of food aid in structural adjustment?

7.4 How has WFP addressed gender-related issues?

- What support does WFP/HQ offer the field (recipient country) in this area?
- How are the WID policies and sector guidelines developed by WFP/HQ being used in the field?
- Is there evidence that project design and implementation have improved?
- What field training is ongoing and planned to sensitize staff to gender issues?

7.5 How environmentally sound are WFP projects?

- What effort is currently being made by WFP to ensure environmental soundness of proposed projects, to monitor projects, and to assess long term environmental effects of completed projects?
- Is there evidence that these procedures are being followed in the field?

7.6 How sustainable and replicable are WFP projects?

- Is there evidence that project outputs are being used and maintained by the targeted population?
- What effort is currently being made by WFP to:
  - ensure local participation in project identification, design, management, and evaluation;
  - guarantee government commitment (post-project) to managing and or maintaining the infrastructure created in the project; and
  - provide adequate training of both government officials and local populations in the management and maintenance of these facilities?
- Is there evidence that these procedures are being followed in the field?

7.7 What has been WFP's record in addressing food security as an objective?

- What effort is being made to ensure that:
  - socio-cultural, nutritional and economic factors are sufficiently analyzed, and that such issues are adequately reflected in project documentation;
  - project evaluation includes issues related to long-term effects and impacts on food security; and
  - WFP incorporates "lessons learned" into subsequent projects?

7.8 What has been the short and long-term consequences of WFP initiatives relative to the issue of energy availability (e.g. the question of fuel availability and sustainability in the distribution and preparation of particular foodstuffs)?

Recommendations and Options

On the basis of the findings and conclusions reached on the aforenoted issues, the team shall provide specific Recommendations and Options that may be of primary interest and relevance to the WFP, project/programme recipients and beneficiaries, and donor agencies.

General Methodology

The basic approach to implementing the evaluation will be to jointly execute the evaluation in two sequential phases. For the first phase an independent Canadian based policy research institute will be jointly contracted. The scope and implementation will be decided jointly depending on the results of the first phase. The approach given above for the second phase must, therefore, be seen as preliminary.

Phase I will be conducted essentially as a desk study in which the full range of available planning documents, evaluations, reviews, and reports by and or on the WFP and international food aid, will be subjected to a comprehensive and in depth investigation, analyses and syntheses. This will include making initial contact with members of the DAC Expert Group on Evaluation (to access key documents), and conducting telephone interviews with selected donor agencies.

It is anticipated that the consolidated findings will serve to provide useful insights and clarification on the issues, including:

- a detailed discussion of their content, including relationships to other issues;
- the relevance and/or necessity for further examination (for example to confirm any initial findings that remain tenuous);
- and the recommended approaches for such further study in Phase II.

Phase II will constitute a full effectiveness, efficiency and impact evaluation, which will employ site visits to WFP Headquarters, field offices, as well as to executing agencies and projects in recipient countries. More extensive interviews with selected donor and other UN agencies will also be conducted.

To ensure that the highest level of relevant experience is brought to bear in executing the evaluation, when negotiating the agreement with the designated institute, the three donor countries will be recommending names of select (world recognized) food aid professionals for potential inclusion in the study team.

Insofar as is practicable, it is intended that the WFP evaluation unit will be invited to cooperate with and provide constructive feedback to the evaluation team.

Data collection methods and instruments to be used in the second phase will include:

a) Structured Interviews: to collect information on the evaluation issues from both WFP-HQ and field staff, and from recipient country officials and participants.

b) Informal Interviews: with appropriate donor government ministries in Ottawa, Oslo, and the Hague; food aid project participants, as well as local NGOs and other involved parties.

c) Focus (Expert) Group Discussions: potentially one in N. America, Europe, and the Developing World respectively.

d) Questionnaire Administration: by mail and by direct interviews, for the latter possibly tapping the assistance of various donor decentralized missions.

e) Site Visits: the evaluation team will visit a representative cross sampling of sites in a minimum of six (6) countries equally distributed between Asia, Africa and Latin America, where the WFP has had a long-term (greater than 10 year) involvement.

Gathered data will be subjected to primarily qualitative measurement and analyses, while employing generally accepted approaches in both policy and systems analyses.

The findings of various major studies now completed and/or nearing completion such as the joint WFP-World Bank review on Food Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa and the FAO's Prospects for Food Aid and its Role in the Nineties, will need to be taken into account as the evaluation proceeds.

In summary, it is anticipated that both phases of the evaluation will together constitute a definitive and timely assessment of WFP's mandate and operational effectiveness, thus providing useful recommendations to both the WFP and participating donors on future policies, programming, allocation and management decisions on food aid for the 90s. It is projected that Phase I of the Evaluation will be completed early in the 1992 calendar year.

A.3 Terms of Reference, Phase Two, January 1993

Background

1. In 1991 an agreement was reached between the three donor countries Canada, Norway and the Netherlands, to undertake a joint evaluation of WFP. The Terms of Reference (TOR) prepared (dated July 31, 1991) outlined the need for (a) a broad perspective "on the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of WFP", and (b) a two stage approach, where Phase I would essentially be a desk study that would "serve to provide useful insights and clarification on issues" identified in the TOR, and recommend "approaches for such further study in Phase 2".

2. The 1991 TOR identified seven broad issues for the evaluation, all of which have been analyzed to various extent in Phase I:

- The global food aid situation;
- The mandate and objectives of WFP;
- The institutional structure and viability of the WFP;
- WFP resources;
- The effectiveness and efficiency of WFP programmes and projects;
- The modalities of implementation;
- The WFP and the major development issues.

3. The 1991 TOR stipulated that "Phase II will constitute a full effectiveness, efficiency and impact evaluation".[1] A discussion on what this means in more precise terms and operational framework took place in a meeting in Oslo (September 14-18,1992) upon the completion of the Phase I report. In this meeting the three donors agreed that separate TOR have to be formulated for Phase II, reflecting the findings, experiences and recommendations of Phase I.

4. The Terms to Reference for Phase II have been formulated on the basis of the output from work in Phase I and the results of the discussions in Oslo.

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[1] **Efficiency** is "an economic term which means that the aid uses the least costly resources necessary to achieve its objectives. In other words, the aid can gain the most result for its economic contribution." **Effectiveness** is "a measure of the extent to which an aid programme attains its objectives", while **impact** is "a term indicating whether the project had an effect on its surroundings in terms of technical, socio-cultural, institutional and environmental factors." Source of definitions: paragraphs 5.1. 5.2 and 5.3, pages 72-73, *Methods and Procedures in Aid Evaluation*, OECD, Paris 1986.

Objectives

5. Phase II will assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of WFP efforts, with a primary focus on operations in the field. However, the analysis will be made with special reference to WFP's mandate, objectives and resources. The central issues will be:

a) Relevance of WFP programming in the host country context;
b) Effectiveness and efficiency of project management and implementation;
c) Impact and sustainability of WFP activities.

6. What has been termed "global" issues (i.e. issues 1 and 2) and issues pertaining to the WFP at large (i.e. issues 3 and 4) has been covered in the Report from Phase I, and will only be further elaborated in Phase II where this is necessary for the analysis of patterns and processes pertaining to (a), (b) and (c) above, or to the extent that field studies will supplement the analysis in Phase I (such as in the case of the role of the Country Office in the WFP organisation).

Scope of Work

7. The three main areas identified in para 5 remain rather broad labels covering a wide range of issues. It is clearly recognised that a need for flexibility must be catered for in the TOR.

- The TOR list a range of issues that are recognised as potentially important, and which constitute the overall thematic framework for the initial project desk studies (see para 12).
- The TOR identify one key issue that will be subject to a special study in the initial phase of the evaluation (see para 13).
- There is provision in the workplan for establishing special priorities and foci for the field studies, on the basis of the initial desk studies (cf. workshop in para 19).
- There is provision in the workplan for defining the main issues for the final reporting, on the basis of the field studies (cf. workshop in para 19).

8. The evaluation in Phase II will build mainly on field work in nine of the countries in which WFP operates significant activities, and will focus on the ability of WFP, at headquarters and through its field offices, to exploit the opportunities which exist in developing countries, and to identify shortcomings, resource constraints and problems to enable them to be overcome, thereby making WFP more effective and efficient. WFP activities will be assessed in respect of WFP role and relevance, programming of activities, efficiency and effectiveness in planning and implementation, as well as in terms of short and long term impact and sustainability.

a) *Role and relevance[2] of WFP programming in the host country context*

Role and relevance of programme and activities:

- Relation between WFP programme and the host country's own strategy and development plan or programme, in particular within agriculture and food production.
- The function of foreign aid of relevance to the food situation and the justification for food aid.
- Coordination of food aid: the roles of the host country, UN agencies and programmes, bilateral donors and NGOs, and WFP.
- Adaptivity and flexibility of WFP under changing social, political and economic conditions (including inter alia structural adjustment programmes, emerging self-sufficiency in basic foods, and emergency situations and PROs).
- Relation between other donors' projects and programmes, including NGO activities, and those of the WFP.
- The relevance of inputs: commodity mix and composition food versus non-food items and cash.
- The contribution of WFP activities to development and to emergencies and PROs: significant or marginal.
- Emergencies: WFP's role in early warning, and aid mobilisation and coordination.

b) *Role and capacity in programme formulation, planning and evaluation*

- The capacity of the Country Office and the WFP HQ to undertake national problem analysis (e.g. the Country Strategy Outline), and food aid problem analysis.
- The role of the host country in initiation of project ideas, as part of its own strategy or in response to what WFP can offer.
- The emergency-development interface: transition from relief operations to development activities, and emergency preparedness as part of developmental work.
- The capacity of the Country Office to undertake problem analysis related to project planning, including the utilisation of the Project Preparation Fund that permits the use of local expertise.
- The handling of planning of activities involving joint or co-financing, cooperation with other financial or technical agencies, bilateral services, non-food items and coordination, with reference to the experience of the Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP).
- The extent to which the planning of WFP assisted projects reflects WFP guidelines on/is sensitive to:

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[2] OECD defines **relevance** as "to what extent are the objectives and mandate of the programme still relevant? Are the activities and outputs of the several projects and operations consistent with its mandate and plausibly linked to the attainment of the objectives and the intended impacts and effects?" Source: item 5.4, page 73, *op. cit.*

- gender issues
- environmental issues
- poverty alleviation
- participation of beneficiaries
- capacity for implementation of planned activities
- sustainability of planned outputs

- The formulation of output targets and objectives: feasibility in relation to inputs available and risks/assumptions.
- The choice of modalities for individual projects (e.g. different forms of monetisation, use of counterpart funds, food swaps, direct distribution, triangular transactions or local purchases, food or cash for work).
- The function of project monitoring and evaluation systems and feedback to management and planning.
- The quality and scope of WFP's own impact assessment of both development projects and relief operations.

(c) *Project management and implementation*

- WFP's own performance as regards timely supplies of appropriate goods and services, non-food items and technical assistance to development projects and emergency operations and PROs, both from own resources and complementary input (co-financing).
- The way in which host government ministries, departments and agencies fill their central roles in planning, management, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of projects, emergency operations and PROs, that WFP supports.
- The roles of cooperating financial and technical aid agencies and NGOs cooperating with WFP.
- Implementation problems resulting from foreseen and unforeseen constraints, indicating inadequate planning, and steps taken to overcome them.
- Implementation issues related to various modalities (direct distribution, food for work, monetisation, including host country management of counter part fund financed activities, triangular transactions, local purchases, commodity swaps and exchange arrangements.)
- The handling of long standing projects that are subject to questioning by CFA.
- The cost effectiveness of food baskets and input mixes in projects, emergency operations and PROs.
- The overall efficiency of WFP activities as perceived by beneficiaries, host countries and other donors, including NGOs.

(d) *Effectiveness, impact and sustainability*[3] *of WFP activities*

- The effectiveness of WFP activities. To what extent have the objectives of programmes/projects been reached?
- The macro-impact of the food aid provided by WFP (and of other food aid managed by WFP) on the national food supply, the host country's balance of payments and government budget.
- The short term impact on household food security of development projects and emergency activities and PROs.
- Asset creation and other immediate effects of development activities (e.g. productive effects and service levels of infrastructure, school attendance, visits to health and family planning institutions, positive effects on women, children and the environment).
- Possible negative effects: creation of aid dependency, environmental harm, gender discrimination, disincentive effects on local agricultural production, disruption of local self-reliance mechanism, interference with other productive activities etc.
- The long term impact on poverty alleviation through projects:
- Sustainability of WFP assisted activities:
  - maintenance or continued operation after termination of activities
  - use of outputs by beneficiaries
  - follow-up of WFP activities by national and local institutions
- Ecological aspects of the long term impact.

Approach

9. Phase II will be composed of five main components:

- Project desk studies for countries selected
- Special study of emergency operations and PROs
- Full country studies
- Rapid field assessments
- Final reporting

10. Phase II will be organised around a sample of countries, selected with reference to a multitude of criteria (including food aid volume, duration, activity types; geographical distribution and size of field office; recipients' food balance, income level and government capacity; inclusion in Phase I, NGO liaison and donor cooperation). The total number of countries is nine: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Malawi, Morocco,

[3] For the purpose of this analysis a development programme is considered to be **sustainable** when it is able to deliver an appropriate level of benefits for an extended period of time after major financial, managerial, and technical assistance from an external donor is terminated. (Source of definition: *Selected Issues in Aid Evaluation - 1. Sustainability in Development Programmes: A Compendium of Evaluation Experience*. OECD, Paris 1989.)

Pakistan and Vietnam. This is to be regarded as a final list, but a contingency is made for special problems that may appear during the preparation of the workplan, which may make it advisable to replace one or more countries.

11. The relationship between countries and components is as follows:

Name of Country	Type of Country Studies to be Conducted		
	New Project Desk Study	Full Country Study	Rapid Field Assessment
Ethiopia		x	
Malawi	x	x	
Pakistan	x	x	
Guatemala	x	x	
Bangladesh			x
Bolivia			x
Ghana	x		x
Morocco	x		x
Vietnam			x

Project desk studies for Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia and Vietnam were carried out during Phase I. While these may need some supplementation and up-dating, the main work of project desk studies will be on the remaining five countries in the list of nine countries.

As part of the preparation for the four full country studies, the need for a preparatory field trip is envisaged. (This is not listed as a separate component).

12. The purpose of the *project desk studies* is to review WFP project cycle information and evaluations for individual projects, along the lines adopted by the CMI Phase I study. The study will cover all on-going development projects, with a history of two years or more, and also emergency operations and protracted operations for refugees and displaced people during the last two years (and some times earlier). It will also include development projects terminated during the last two years. The objectives are twofold; partly to provide background information to the field studies, and partly to identify project cases which can amply illustrate problems related to the issues identified for Phase II (para 8), as well as identifying successes.

The studies should identify relevant indicators of performance and impact, if possible, on the basis of the information and analysis presented in management reviews and evaluations. Attempts should be made to establish a common analytical framework for the total sample of project cases (around 40). The studies should furthermore establish the needs for verification in the field.

13. *One special study* will be carried out on food aid used for disaster relief operations, including PROs. The study will review attempts to evaluate relief operations of WFP as well as that of some other relief organisations, to identify issues and to assess efficiency and

effectiveness of operations. In the case of WFP, the study shall cover Emergency Operations. This study will also include a brief review of recent (within the last 2 or 3 years) relief operations within all the 9 countries selected.

14. The *country studies* will comprise a general assessment of WFP assisted projects, emergency operations and PROs and provide a comprehensive analysis of key contextual factors for WFP operations. These may vary among the four countries selected, but will typically include in-country relationships to government agencies, other UN agencies, other donors and NGOs, developmental trends and policies in sectors/areas of importance to WFP, and needs and problems of identified beneficiaries. The country studies will facilitate the study of all functions of WFP that are relevant at the country level as listed in para 8. The relations between the various functions identified under para. 8 a), b), c) and d) will be of particular concern.

15. *Rapid field assessments* will be carried out in five countries. The purpose is to allow for a) verification of findings emanating from the desk studies, b) limited field investigations on particular issues identified by the desk studies, and c) to make general observations on the views from the field on the WFP organisation and the attitudes of recipients.

16. The *final reporting* from the evaluation shall incorporate findings and recommendations from both Phase I and II. The structure of the final report shall be determined upon the finalisation of the field studies. It shall be a synthesis report focusing on findings, assessments and recommendations, basically under the following headings:

- Global context: trends and implications;
- Profile of WFP activities: trends and implications;
- Performance of WFP activities: general assessment;
- Factors effecting profile and performance: diagnosis;
- Recommendations for action: by WFP, by the three donors and, where appropriate, by others.

Reporting to the commissioning agencies and WFP shall also take place in the form of workshops and seminars. The evaluation will result in a number of interim reports and including the reports on the nine countries and the special study.

Organisation

17. The Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Bergen, Norway has been appointed as the coordinating institution for Phase II. CMI will be responsible for preparation of a Workplan on the basis of these TOR, and for entering into contracts with all consultants to be involved in the evaluation. The selection of consultants will be made by the CMI in consultation with the three commissioning agencies.

CMI will be administratively responsible for the coordination of Phase II and professionally responsible for methodological approach and final report of the evaluation.

18. In order to ease communication between the main partners involved, the commissioning agencies may send observers to the two workshops which would be convened during the implementation period (see para 19), viz. after completion of desk studies and after completion of field studies. This arrangement could take the form of meetings of the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation, to which representatives of the CMI and the WFP would be invited for discussion of the progress of the implementation.

19. Details on mode of operation will be worked out as part of the Workplan. The following are general guidelines to be applied with flexibility:

- The five components will be carried out in the following order: Project desk studies followed by full country studies and rapid field assessments. The special study will be initiated as early as possible and will be enriched by insights gained through country field work.
- If possible, one of the full country studies and one or two of the rapid assessments will be carried out as pilot studies immediately after the completion of the relevant project desk studies and a briefing of consultants at WFP HQ.
- Prior to the main phase of country field work, a workshop will be conducted (in Bergen or Rome) involving all participants in the field studies. A major purpose of the workshop is to prepare special guidelines and designs for the remaining field studies.
- After completion of field studies, including reporting, another workshop will be conducted involving coordinators of field studies and the special study. The purpose is to identify the content of the final report.
- The special study will be undertaken by one or maybe two individual consultants.
- The nine project desk studies will be carried out by a team of two consultants.
- The country studies will each involve teams of three or four consultants, including a team leader, one or two country or subject matter specialists from outside the country, and one consultant from the host country. Prior to the field mission the team leader will visit the country to interact with the local consultant who will undertake preparatory work in his home country, and to arrange appointments etc. for the main mission. The duration of the main work on the country study (field visits and report writing) will be up to seven weeks.
- The five rapid field assessments will be divided among the four country study teams, probably on the basis of geographical proximity and working language requirements. However, only the team leader and one of the team members will participate in each rapid field assessment. Also for these rapid field assessments local expertise will be mobilised. Duration of each study is about three weeks, including fieldwork and report writing.
- Final reporting will include time for workshop, drafting and circulation for comments of final draft report, as well as finalising country studies and the special study.

Time Frame

20. The exact timetable for the evaluation will greatly depend on the availability of key consultants. The following time frame is tentative:

• October 92-January 93	Preparatory work; project studies and up-dates; preparation of tentative TOR for field studies and special study.
• Mid January 93:	Briefing of consultants at WFP HQ, for pilot field studies and other field studies.
• February-March 93:	Pilot country study and rapid assessments.
• April 93:	Workshop and meeting with commissioning agencies.
• April-June 93:	Fieldwork in connection with full country studies (approx. three weeks for each study) and rapid field assessments (approx. two weeks).
• May-June 93:	Preparation of country reports (country studies three to four weeks; rapid field assessments one week).
• August 93:	Workshop and meeting with commissioning agencies.
• August-September 93:	Preparation of draft final report (with a tentative time frame of eight weeks).
• October 93:	Presentation of draft final report.
• November 93:	Preparation of final report.

A.4 Terms of Reference, Country Studies, January 1993

General Note

As will be seen, these TOR are extensive and detailed. They cover all country missions, both those for "full" study and those for "rapid assessment". Taken literally, the TOR define an impossible task. They should be taken, therefore, more as a check list of areas and issues for review and analysis, from which explicit decisions of choice are taken (and justified) by the team. In this selection process a major challenge to the country teams separately and together is to secure that the country material provided through the field studies - *inter alia* -lends itself

- to comparisons and contrasts in experience of WFP activities;
- to build up an overall and balanced assessment of the WFP as an institution and channel for food aid;
- to provide a basis for the identification and assessment of WFP's role and comparative advantage in world food aid.

I. Objectives

1. The country studies will comprise a general assessment of WFP assisted development projects and relief operations (emergency operations and PROs) and will provide an analysis of key contextual factors for WFP operations. These may vary among the countries selected, but will typically include needs and problems of identified beneficiaries, in-country relationships to government agencies, other donors and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), development trends and policies in sectors/areas of importance to WFP, policy context, other development aid and food aid, bilateral services, and the coordination role. The country studies will facilitate the study of all functions of WFP that are relevant at the country level as spelled out below. The relations between the various functions will be of particular concern.

2. The focus of the country studies will be the same as for the joint evaluation as a whole, viz. to review the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of WFP.[4]

[4] Efficiency is "an economic term which means that the aid uses the least costly resources necessary to achieve its objectives. In other words, the aid can gain the most result for its economic contribution." **Effectiveness** is "a measure of the extent to which an aid programme attains its objectives", while **impact** is "a term indicating whether the project has had an effect on its surroundings in terms of technical, socio-cultural, institutional and environmental factors." Source of definitions: paragraphs 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, pages 72-73, *Methods and Procedures in Aid Evaluation*, OECD, Paris 1986.

II. Scope of work

3. Relevance of WFP programming in the host country context. OECD defines relevance as "to what extent are the objectives and mandate of the programme still relevant? Are the activities and outputs of the several projects and operations consistent with its mandate and plausibly linked to the attainment of the objectives and the intended impacts and effects?"[5]

4. As a background for the relevance and role of WFP activities in the host country, the country study team will familiarize themselves with the economic, social and political situation and trends in the host country.

5. The food situation of the country will be reviewed, including an analysis of the national food supply situation; household food security including identification of the extent of undernourishment; and the recurring fluctuations in output of food and corresponding changes in "food entitlements" of vulnerable groups.

6. Relevant government policies in particular within agriculture and food production will be analyzed, including the "development strategy"; government planning, its content and procedures; structural adjustment measures, if any; budget allocations (development and recurrent), in particular to activities related to WFP assisted projects and operations; policies for recurring emergencies; and the relationship between government policies and WFP activities.

7. Foreign aid to the country of relevance to the food situation will be reviewed: its type, volume, modalities, distribution on sectors, sources, how it is determined, and the way in which it is coordinated, by the government itself and/or by donor cooperation. WFP's and other UN organisations' role in the overall food aid effort and its coordination.

8. The particular role of and justification for food aid will be analyzed, with emphasis on the role of WFP, both as source of aid, service agent, and in formulation of aid policy and coordination of aid efforts.

9. Special emphasis will be put on the roles of WFP Country Office and HQ respectively in emergency operations (and PROs), from early warning through mobilisation and coordination of aid to implementation of emergency operations.

10. The roles of WFP Country Office and HQ in different WFP activities: as sole aid donor to activities implemented by national bodies; as one of several foreign donors; and as contributor to activities in which another donor is executing agency. Other forms of cooperation with other donor agencies, including NGOs (national and international), **inter alia** to mobilise non-food items and to provide bilateral services, will also be reviewed.

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[5] Relevance, or programme rationale, as defined in item 5.4, page 73, *op.cit.*

11. The study will include an analysis of the way in which WFP has operated within the country context, with emphasis on its ability to adapt in a flexible manner to changing social, political and economic conditions including introduction of structural adjustment measures; changes in the national food supply situation, e.g. towards self-sufficiency in food items traditionally supplied as food aid; and its response to emergency situations. Compare the duties and responsibilities, and level of delegated authority of WFP Country Offices, especially Directors of Operations, with those of other comparable UN agencies.

12. An overall evaluation of WFP's role as food aid donor will be aimed at in order to assess if its contribution is significant nationally or in particular regions or areas, as a donor of development aid, through its emergency activities and PROs, and as provider of bilateral services.

13. Role and capacity in programme formulation, planning and evaluation. The relative success of an aid donor's activities in the host country will presumably largely depend on its ability to formulate programmes that are adapted to the specific country context. The following aspects will be reviewed.

14. The capacity of WFP Country Office and WFP HQ staff to undertake national problem analysis (e.g. the Country Strategy Outline) and in particular food aid problem analysis.

15. The role of the host country in initiation of project ideas, as part of its own strategy or in response to what WFP can offer.

16. The participation of WFP through its Country Office or Regional Bureaux in preparing overall or aid strategies with impact on WFP's own programme.

17. The emergency-development interface: transition from relief operations to development activities, and disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation as part of development assistance.

18. The capacity of the Country Office to undertake problem analysis related to project planning, including the utilisation of the Project Preparation Fund that permits the use of local expertise.

19. The way in which joint or co-financing of projects and emergency operations and PROs, involving cooperation with other financial and technical agencies, is planned.

20. The extent to which the planning of WFP-assisted projects reflects WFP guidelines on/is sensitive to:

- gender issues;
- environmental issues;
- poverty alleviation;
- participation of beneficiaries;
- capacity for implementation of planned activities by the agencies concerned;

- sustainability of planned outputs.

21. The formulation of output targets and objectives: feasibility in relation to inputs available risks.

22. The choice of modalities for individual projects (i.e. different forms of monetisation, direct distribution, triangular transactions, local purchases or commodity exchanges, food or cash for work).

23. The WFP's roles in bilateral services, non-food items and coordination, including logistics and food aid data.

24. The function of project monitoring and evaluation and feedback to management and planning.

25. The quality and scope of WFP's own impact assessment:

- development projects;
- relief operations (emergency operations and PROs).

26. Efficiency of management and implementation. WFP resources are inputs in support of projects and operations that are implemented by recipient governments, ministries, departments and agencies. WFP, nevertheless, has an important role to play and monitors and evaluates the activities supported. Moreover, WFP is responsible for the supply of goods, services and money in support of the activities. The country studies will review not only the way in which WFP itself fulfils it commitments, but also the interaction with executing agencies and other aid agencies, also NGOs, in the host country, including following issues:

27. WFP's own performance as regards timely supplies of appropriate goods and services, non-food items and technical assistance to development projects and emergency operations and PROs, including bilateral services.

28. The way in which host government ministries, departments and agencies fill their central roles in planning, management, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of projects, emergency operations and PROs that WFP supports.

29. The roles of financial and technical aid agencies and NGOs cooperating with WFP.

30. Implementation problems resulting from foreseen and unforeseen constraints, indicating inadequate planning, and steps taken to overcome these.

31. Implementation issues related to various food aid modalities used (direct distribution, food for work, monetisation including host country management of counterpart fund financed activities, triangular transactions, local purchases and exchange arrangements).

32. The handling of long standing projects that are subject to questioning by CFA.

33. The cost effectiveness of WFP food baskets and input mixes in projects, emergency operations and PROs (transportation cost, perishability, food acceptance etc.).

34. The overall efficiency of WFP activities as perceived by beneficiaries, host countries and other aid agencies, including NGOs.

35. Effectiveness, impact and sustainability[6] of WFP activities. Measurement of the impact of WFP-assisted development projects or emergency operations and PROs is a difficult operation. The country studies will seek to complement information available from other sources and, to the extent possible, review the outputs and outcomes of the aided activities.

36. The effectiveness of WFP activities. To what extent have the objectives of programmes/projects been reached?

37. The macro-impact of the food aid provided by WFP and of other food aid managed or assisted by WFP through bilateral services, logistic support and food aid coordination on the national food supply, the host country's balance of payments and government budget.

38. The short term impact on household food security of WFP-assisted development projects, emergency activities and PROs.

39. Asset creation and other immediate effects of development activities (e.g. productive effects and service levels of infrastructure, school attendance, visits to health and family planning institutions, positive effects on women, children and the environment etc.).

40. Possible negative effects: disincentives to food production, creation of aid dependency, environmental harm, gender discrimination, interference with other productive activities etc.

41. The long term impact on poverty alleviation through projects.

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[6] For the purpose of this analysis a development programme is considered to be sustainable when it is able to deliver an appropriate level of benefits for an extended period of time after major financial, managerial, and technical assistance from an external donor is terminated. (Source of definition: *Selected Issues in Aid Evaluation - 1. Sustainability in Development Programmes: A Compendium of Evaluation Experience*, OECD, Paris, 1989.)

42. Sustainability of WFP assisted activities:

- maintenance of continued operation after termination of activities;
- use of outputs by beneficiaries;
- follow-up of WFP activities by national and local institutions.

III. Approach

43. The country studies will be carried out by small teams of international and local consultants.

44. The group of international consultants will meet in Rome in January 1993 for discussion of the work programme and terms of reference for country studies, for interaction with the three donors, and for briefing by officials of the World Food Programme.

45. These provisional terms of reference for the country studies will be tested in one country (Ethiopia) as a pilot operation for a full-scale country study, and if possible, also in two countries (Bangladesh and Vietnam) as a pilot operation for rapid assessment; all to be undertaken in the period February - March. The draft reports of the pilot country studies will be discussed in a workshop in April, in which also the terms of reference for the three other full country studies and three other rapid assessments will be finalised.

46. Each full country study mission will be preceded by a visit to the country by the team leader who will settle practical arrangements with the WFP Country Office, take preliminary contacts with government officials, other donor agencies and NGOs, and brief the local team member(s) who will also undertake some preparatory enquiries before the arrival of the main mission. Such contact and planning visits may have to be dispensed with for rapid assessments.

47. The full country study mission for Ethiopia will assemble in January in Roma before travelling to the host country, in order to be briefed by the relevant WFP officials and assisted by other international consultants in the project. The mission members will have at their disposal the relevant desk studies of projects, emergency operations and PROs which will have been prepared prior to that meeting.

48. The full country study mission will as a rule stay three weeks in the country. The rapid assessment missions will stay in their respective countries for up to two weeks. The teams will visit projects and undertake a series of interviews with, and assemble documentation from, the main institutions and persons whose actions influence WFP activities and, of course, the WFP Country Office. Such contacts will also be taken with important institutions regionally or locally and, as practicable, with the beneficiaries themselves.

49. As regards the issues under paragraphs 3 to 42 above, available recent documentation should be consulted (e.g. host government documents, including possibly official submissions to meetings with donors, budget documentation etc.; documents prepared by UNDP, WFP (CSO if available), the World Bank, IMF, the regional development bank, and other donor agencies,

major national and international NGOs; and other relevant, recent literature). Supplementary and more up-to-date information will be sought in interviews with organisations referred to above, including where applicable, representatives of such institutions in field offices outside the capital, but also academic institutions and other sources of relevant information. Government institutions to be consulted would include the office of the head of government; the ministry of finance, the planning organisation where it exists, and ministries and other government institutions with which WFP has working relationships. Also as regards other issues to be covered, the institutions referred to above will have information and views to contribute, but in addition a variety of people and institutions which are directly involved in implementation of activities or benefit from them will have to be consulted.

50. The mission will review WFP activities *in situ*. However, the country study teams will not be expected to undertake any real evaluation of development projects, emergency operations and PROs during their visits; independent evaluations of individual activities would have had to be done by teams comprising relevant subject matter specialists. The number of field visits to ongoing activities, and to former project areas, will be balanced with other important tasks. Individual team members may undertake additional field visits. At the end of the mission, a debriefing session will be held in the WFP country office.

51. The full country study mission will then spend up to two weeks together to produce the zero drafts of the country study, which then will be finalised by the team leader, possibly with additional inputs from team members. For rapid assessments, only one week has been allocated for joint report writing.

Annex B:

Overview of Country Studies

B.1 Introduction to the Nine Country Studies

This set of nine country studies was prepared as part of a larger evaluation of the World Food Programme, commissioned jointly by the Governments of Canada, The Netherlands and Norway. The countries covered are four in Africa: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi and Morocco; three in Asia: Bangladesh, Pakistan and Vietnam; and two in Latin America: Bolivia and Guatemala.

The purpose of the country case studies was to give field level insights of the real life and operational environment in which WFP activities are conducted and in which WFP responses to challenges and choices can be evaluated. The nine country studies of WFP activities have been extensively consulted in the description, analysis and evaluation in the Main Report on the overall evaluation.

The list of nine countries for case studies was established in consultation with WFP and the sponsoring agencies to represent a wide range of criteria, including among others, food aid volume, duration and types of activities, geographic distribution, size of field office, food security, government capacity, as well as particular issues such as WFP involvement in structural adjustment programmes, and the scope for interface between emergency and development.

The reports of our country studies are presented separately. In this annex, however, we present two statistical tables and two sets of summary presentations of findings from our country studies.

Summary Table B.2 gives statistical data (in two parts) which describe conditions of life and provide a set of food security indicators for each of the nine countries, one by one, and as compared with wider groups of developing countries.

Summary Table B.3 gives data which position the nine countries in the overall picture of WFP as a development agency, showing how WFP's twenty categories of development projects are represented in the Programme's portfolio globally and for our group of nine countries.

Summary Table B.4 lists findings in each of the nine country studies in eight issue areas: capacity, collaboration, design and implementation, monitoring and evaluation, effectiveness, impact, relationship to HQ, and new directions. The table is so constructed as to allow full cross-country comparison of evaluation findings in each issue area.

Summary Set B.5 lists findings from country studies in Ethiopia, Malawi and Pakistan for a total of five relief operations. Findings are characterized as positive or negative for each of six aspects of each operation, and an overall-comment is offered.

Table B.2: Human Development and Food Security Profiles for the Nine Countries

Table B.2.1
Human Development Indicators

Country	GNP Per Capita USD 1990	Real GDP Per Capita PPP USD	Human Development Index	Life Expectancy at Birth Years	Access Health Services % of Population	Daily Calorie Supply Percent of Needs	Adult Literacy Rate Percent	School Enrolment Rate
Bangladesh	210	872	0.189	51.8	74	88	35	42
Bolivia	630	1,572	0.398	54.5	n.a.	74	78	68
Ethiopia	120	369	0.172	45.5	55	73	n.a.	28
Ghana	390	1,016	0.311	55.0	76	93	60	58
Guatemala	910	2,576	0.489	63.4	60	103	55	52
Malawi	200	640	0.168	48.1	80	88	n.a.	52
Morocco	970	2,348	0.433	62.0	62	125	50	50
Pakistan	400	1,862	0.311	57.7	85	99	35	29
Vietnam	n.a.	n.a.	0.472	62.7	97	103	88	69
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	810	2,170	n.a.	62.8	72	107	65	73
Least-dev. countries	240	740	n.a.	51.0	62	90	45	42
Sub-Saharan Africa	490	1,200	n.a.	51.8	60	93	47	46

Source: *Human Development Report 1993*, human development indicators, tables 1 and 2, Oxford University Press for UNDP, 1993. Note that school enrolment rates are for primary and secondary level combined.

Table B.2.2
Food Security Indicators

Country	Food Production Per Capita Index 1979/81=100	Food Import Dependence Ratio		Cereal Imports 1,000 MT		Food Aid in Cereals 1,000 MT	
		1969/1971	1981/1990	1980	1991	1979/80	1990/91
Bangladesh	96	8.3	12.3	2,194	1,631	1,480	1,356
Bolivia	109	20.0	11.6	263	219	150	229
Ethiopia	84	1.1	9.4	397	802	111	894
Ghana	97	12.4	11.3	247	344	110	72
Guatemala	91	11.0	18.5	204	410	10	170
Malawi	83	4.4	5.6	36	120	5	181
Morocco	128	18.1	21.1	1,821	1,957	119	201
Pakistan	101	3.5	14.1	613	972	146	343
Vietnam	127	19.3	1.8	n.a.	(204)	n.a.	(60)
All developing countries	115	6.7	10.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Least developed countries (or low income countries)	93	n.a.	11.3	35,359	36,510	6,913	7,373
Sub-Saharan Africa	95	6.5	10.2	8,434	10,626	1,602	3,221

Sources: First three data columns: *Human Development Report 1993*, op.cit. table 13; last four columns: *World Development Report 1993*, World Development Indicators, table 4, Oxford University Press for World Bank, 1993. Data for Vietnam not available in World Development Report: figures in brackets for cereal imports are from Human Development Report (and for 1990), and for food aid from *1993 Food Aid Review*, op. cit.

Note: Figures in the next to last row are for least developed countries in the first three columns and for low income countries in the last four columns.

Table B.3
WFP Development Projects to End 1992: Total and for Nine Countries

Project Class	USD Millions	% of Total to End 92	% of Active 1993	% in Nine Country Sample
Human Resource Development (Sub-Total for Class)	**2,865**	**36.2**	**39.7**	**46.4**
Feeding Expectant/Nursing Mothers and Pre-School Children	1,005	12.7	15.2	29.5
Feeding of Patients, Convalescents and Socially Disadv.	158	2.0	1.8	2.1
Feeding in Primary Schools	1,316	16.6	20.0	18.1
Feeding in Secondary Schools	153	1.9	2.1	2.0
Feeding in Vocational Schools, Camps, Job Training	155	2.0	0.6	0.8
Feeding in Universities, Professional, Technical Institutions	68	0.9	0.1	-
Literacy and Adult Education Courses	11	0.1	-	-
Economic and Social Infrastructure Projects (Sub-Total)	**789**	**10.0**	**12.7**	**8.3**
Public Health Programmes: Including Disease Eradication	11	0.1	1.0	-
Housing and Creation of Public Amenities: Including Slum Clearance, Sanitation, Water Supplies	153	1.9	.7	-
Transportation and Communications Infrastructure	261	3.4	2.1	2.3
Community Development/Self Help Projects	364	4.6	8.9	6.0
Directly Productive Projects	**4,267**	**53.9**	**47.6**	**45.3**
Land Development and Improvement	1,496	19.0	18.6	18.1
Land Settlement and Agrarian Reform	560	7.1	6.1	-
Assistance to Refugees	155	2.0	0.3	-
Promotion and Diversification of Crop Production	339	4.3	4.3	-
Animal Production	619	7.8	3.2	0.7
Forestry Projects (Including Watershed Management)	846	10.7	14.3	25.5
Fishery Development	133	1.7	0.2	-
Industrial Development and Mining (Including Prospecting)	49	0.6	-	-
Establishment of Food Reserves (Price Stability)	71	0.9	0.6	0.9
Grand Total	**7,922**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Sources and notes: *WFP Progress Report 1992*, World Food Programme, Rome, 12 May 1993. The value figures in the first column are based on table A2, page A7, from which the costs of ongoing projects have been deducted. These were calculated from the data for individual projects and countries (pages C-1 to C-142). The two last columns are based on these calculations for ongoing projects. Note that in seven cases, in order to avoid double counting, we have excluded one of the two phases (expansions) of a project that is listed as ongoing, as two phases are not normally executed simultaneously (Uganda, Chad, Mali, Botswana, India, Guatemala and Pakistan). The nine countries are those included for study in this evaluation: Ethiopia, Malawi, Ghana, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Bolivia, Guatemala, Morocco and Pakistan.

WFP As A Development Agency: Summary Findings of the Country Studies: Part 1: Africa

Issues Area	Findings: Ethiopia	Findings: Ghana	Findings: Malawi	Findings: Morocco
Part 1: WFP Capacity -Develop CSOs -Design Projects -Implement Projects -Mon/Evaluation -Capacity Building -Staffing - Finance - Administration	-Rel. large and well staffed organization -Limits to what can be expected of CO due to fact development expertise can be concentrated in a single official -heavy concentration of program on emergency -prolonged absence of deputy raises questions as to efficiency of staffing practices in WFP HQ -Crucial role of World Transport Operation for Ethiopia	-Professional staff complement just able to meet ongoing project requirements -Staffing actions difficult and slow in light of unavoidable staff illnesses, turnover, etc. -Changing nature of project design requirements puts more stress on capacities of CO -need to improve project development, design, and monitoring and evaluation capacities of the CO through both staffing and training.	-Strength of WFP CO in food management and logistics -Lack of technical capacity in key sectors resulted in shortcomings in design quality re. economic sustainability, gender, nutrition education, monitoring and evaluation -Limited capacity to call on technical experts from UN agencies and no means of ensuring adequate support -System of appraisal missions not sufficient to augment WFP CO expertise in development -EMOPs further stressed development capacity	-CO well equipped to handle project responsibilities but lacks capacity for analysis and policy dialogue -No system in place for a programme approach to project design and management -Requirement for increased staff/counterpart training -Technical assistance provided on by FAO, ILO etc. has adequate but has not met need for regular technical support in project monitoring and management -CO requires more autonomy in budgeting, planning, staff assignment, national staffing, etc.
Part 2: Collaboration -Sister UN Agencies -Host Governments -Civil Society	-Excellent relations with UNDP somewhat dependent on personalities -Active cooperation with UNHCR -Heavy burden on WFP posed by "Global Agreement" with UNHCR not fully recognized in Rome (more staff likely required) -Need for technical assistance from other UN agencies such as FAO has not been successfully met -WFP CO seeking and receiving technical cooperation on projects from bilaterals and NGOs -Problems in project implementation related to heavy load on government administrative systems and political/administrative instability	-Close collaboration with World Bank, IFAD and bilateral donors supporting SAP has improved technical strength of WFP supported projects -Projects well implemented through line departments of government, no creation of new "vertical" structures for project delivery -Care taken to involve appropriate health and nutrition specialists from Government in food for work project delivery -Problems occurring in ability of Government Ministries to develop action plans for withdrawal of long term, large scale FFW. Not yet convinced of WFP determination -Too little involvement of NGOs in the development and implementation of WFP dev. projects	-Basic collaboration with UNDP good and excellent cooperation with UNHCR on PROs and EMOPs -Less successful tech cooperation on development(FAO, UNICEF) -Effective cooperation with National Government in PROs and EMOPs including effective capacity building -Less effective in capacity building and support for dev. projects such as the PMU of the VGF program -Very effective collaboration with NGOs in dev. projects -Effective collaboration with donors in securing food commitments and ensuring flow of food to commercial sector to maintain viability of VGF development project	-Integration of WFP food aid into well-supported and managed projects of World Bank, African Development Bank, IFAD, etc. has been very successful -Tech assistance from UN agencies adequate but not sufficient to overcome need for technical support in project monitoring and evaluation -Delegation of authority allowing for NGO projects not well utilized due to government's insistence on directly programming resources from WFP -More active participation by WFP CO in policy dialogue on food security and food aid is required -Not clear how GOM will set priorities if WFP commitments were to be reduced
Part 3: Program and Project Design and Implementation	- Effective targeting (for which none of the projects has been designed) has not been achieved -Limited beneficiary participation in planning because of the previous Government's emphasis on central planning -Large number of schemes made proper technical planning impossible, led to the use of standard solutions not specific to local climate and soil conditions and reduced the value of assets created -Need for relief distribution during famines severely disrupted food for work operations -Rates of pay above the very low market wage rate have caused difficulties in targeting FFW - Reduced activities have resulted in a large cadre of full time permanent FFW workers -Dairy project over-ambitious in objectives and inconsistent with government policy in the sector - WFP has sought opportunities to modify some government policies	-WFP CO must be strengthened to access design expertise of other agencies under newer, smaller project focus. -Design of the School feeding project ignored crucial traditional arrangements for financing -Technical quality of design of feeder roads and forestry food for work strengthened by involvement of other lead donors -Value of revolving fund for school feeding project eroded by inflation -Problems in targeting of Ports and Harbours and School Feeding projects:participant base widened to include more schools and supervisory personnel. Targeting to be improved -In early stages of SAP use of food aid as wage good for key public sector workers was appropriate, changes in conditions not yet reflected in greater targeting -WID aspects of FFW design ensured by other partners (IFAD)	-Lack of a clear country strategy limits CO ability to cooperate with govt on fit between food aid and national development needs -Shortage of technical capacity limits effectiveness of development projects -Need to harmonize design of projects among UN agencies -No effective target group participation in project planning -Lack of specifics in gender guidelines led to projects targeted to women with few operational means of ensuring participation -Practical measures for economic, social, environmental sustainability are lacking -Weak project systems of evaluation and monitoring -Objectives of VGF unrealistic in light of investment	-Lack of capacity and an up-to-date CSO limits the quality and content of WFP input to policy dialogue - Targeting effective in the school feeding project but not in the food for work projects - School feeding program effective but suffers greatly from lack of sustainability,Ministry of Education is highly dependant on WFP resources -Women beneficiaries not sufficiently targeted to benefit from food for work and gender issues not addressed -Capacity of implementing agencies demonstrated by good execution of projects -Good and close collaboration between WFP and line ministries on project design -On the whole project well designed and executed

WFP As A Development Agency: Summary Findings of the Country Studies: Part 1: Africa (cont'd)

Issues Area	Findings: Ethiopia	Findings: Ghana	Findings: Malawi	Findings: Morocco
Part 4: Monitoring and Evaluation -Quality of Monitoring -Use of Monitoring -Quality of Evaluation -Use of Evaluation Results	-CO has not always been able to effectively monitor large development projects -Detailed analysis and evaluation of mechanisms for targeting is necessary before targeting can be made integral to design of FFW -Pilot projects have been established to improve targeting	- Monitoring has been reasonably effective for large, stable infrastructure FFW projects - Need to shift focus from monitoring to evaluation as smaller, more targeted development projects come on stream. -Premium on assessing project effectiveness will demand improvements in CO and govt. capacity to gather, analyze and report on effectiveness data.	-Development project designs, especially VGF, have lacked effective data collection and evaluation systems -Recent improvements planned in evaluation system for agriculture component of VGF -Adequate systems for monitoring food management and delivery but not for measuring effectiveness and impact of development programmes	-Most projects have been evaluated but only one attempt made to assess project effectiveness and impacts -Lack of baseline data makes impact assessment difficult but more effort needs to be made by GOM and WFP -Evaluations of ongoing projects have been used as the basis for recommendations which have been acted on
Part 5: Project Effectiveness	-Direct distribution appropriate given dysfunctional internal markets -limited availability of food and disruptions due to emergency led to emergency of "voluntary" FFW and need for "back payments" -FFW has been concentrated in food deficit areas but it has not been possible to match food availability with needs at regional level and had little if any impact on famine prevention -while asset creation during the 80s was impressive in area of arresting soil degradation, it is estimated that only one quarter of assets created are still there	-Large scale infrastructure food for work projects were very effective during the early days of SAP -Changing conditions, (improvements in real value of currency, food production, food distribution, reductions in inflation) have reduced rationale for large infrastructure projects and raised importance of targeting -Targeted, community based aspects of feeder roads and forestry projects effective in directing resources to community development	-Lack of adequate effectiveness data means impossible to assess effectiveness of VGF program -Individual clinic records and views of MOH staff support the view that WFP food is important to case treatment of malnutrition related disease but not assessed on national basis -Participants in ag development component very enthusiastic and appreciative of program -Recent crop under ag development program shows increased yields for project participants but not yet shown to be economically viable -Projects could be made more effective if design improved	-Projects well planned and implemented and plenty of evidence of project outputs -Projects subject to evaluations have received good ratings as to outputs and implementation and planning has been satisfactory and realistic. -Not known whether the sum of positive results has been sufficient to justify resources invested -Not known whether beneficiaries are in fact from poores groups
Part 6: Project/Program Impacts Apparent Positive Impacts Apparent Negative Impacts Issues of Sustainability	-WFP record with regard to targeting distribution to households is mixed: a limited number of workers are benefiting from FFW on a more or less permanent basis -limited sustainability of assets created due to political upheaval and negative policies of old government re-agriculture and land tenure -Not reasonable or fair to judge development projects in Ethiopia by attaching importance to the general failure of WFP supported development projects to produce sustained impacts on productivity, environment, poverty, equity -Has not been possible to expand FFW activities at the right time so as to give food entitlements [illegible] who need them at time of crop failure.	-Large scale infrastructure projects had clear impacts on macroeconomic performance of Ghana and stabilization of BOP -School Feeding project played a role in creating social acceptance of SAP and in allowing secondary Boarding Schools to operate -Targeted elements of Forestry and Feeder Roads projects achieved high levels of community acceptance -Key ministries and parastatals have become very dependant on FFW as supplement to input costs or wage bill. Seen as crucial ongoing budgetary support in some Ministries and Services -Slow emergence of strategies for winding down FFW from WFP or effected Ministries exacerbates dependency and sustainability problems	-Impact of VGF on health of participants not known due to weaknesses in monitoring -Short term impact of ag development project seems positive but higher risks and economic problems may reverse this in future -Ag development project may have resulted in at least short term dependency on free maize distribution among participants -Institutional impact of VGF program (creation of a PMU in the MOH) may not be sustainable -Some dependency creation re budgetary viability of the MOH programs in nutritional rehabilitation and MCH -No evaluation of gender specific impacts of dev. projects -Environmental measures required in design to limit any negative effects of use of fertilizers in ag dev. project	-Very little recorded evidence of the long-term impact of projects -No evidence that the assets created through food for work have been neglected or destroyed -Physical assets created and human resources developed through education and training will give long term benefits and WFP activities have led to sustainable improvements for many people -Institutions supported by WFP appear to be viable in the longer term -School Feeding program has created problems of aid dependency within the Ministry of Education and WFP must share responsibility for lack of sustainability -Concrete achievements of projects have been impressive tree plantations, roads and dams, milk production, enrolment in primary schools, etc.
Part 7: Relations With HQ and CFA -Rome/Field Authorities -Quality of Programme Support			-Development projects (VGF) have sometimes had to accommodate unsolicited donor shipments of inappropriate commodities (oil) -Project design missions for development projects result in a basic design which must be modified by experienced technical staff	-Need for more decentralization of control of funds, administration and local staffing

WFP As A Development Agency: Summary Findings of the Country Studies: Part 1: Africa (cont'd)

Issues Area	Findings: Ethiopia	Findings: Ghana	Findings: Malawi	Findings: Morocco
Part 8: New Directions	-2 basic options available are to expand the large FFW project (2488) into an employment based safety net capable of rapid expansion during times of acute food shortage or to concentrate it on "rehabilitation of forest, grazing and agricultural land", -Project needs to be re-oriented so that assets created are well built and are decided upon with the full participation of beneficiaries in order to improve maintenance. -Whatever options are chosen, project should be concentrated in food deficit areas.	-Re-develop and strengthen the CSO to place an emphasis on targeted projects in food deficit regions where food has a comparative advantage -Effectively disengage from long-run budgetary support of parastatals and line ministries -Place greater emphasis and attention on the design of development projects through improved links to national and international expert agencies -Build the capacity of the CO to reflect the shift to smaller, more management intensive projects -Increase attention and capacity for evaluation -Analyses requirement for higher admin costs in light of shift to smaller, targeted, design and management intensive projects.	-Case for continued WFP support to Malawi is strong -Clear need for development of a Country Strategy document which sets out WFP's understanding of priority uses of food aid for development in Malawi -Need for more attention and resources to the design and implementation of development projects -Need for improving CO capacity to access technical expertise from sister UN agencies -Need for closer collaboration among UN agencies (WFP/FAO/UNICEF) on project design. -Priority should be given to development of an effective system for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the VGF and ag development projects	-Continued support to the school feeding project should be combined with an agreed plan for phasing out as a highest priority -WFP projects in the future should be more carefully targeted to the poorest regions and populations based on past experience

WFP As A Development Agency: Summary Findings of the Country Studies: Part 2: Americas

Issues Area	Findings: Bolivia	Findings: Guatemala
Part 1: WFP Capacity -Develop CSOs -Design Projects -Implement Projects -Monitoring/Evaluation -Capacity Building -Staffing - Finance - Administration	-CO staff are both hard working and dedicated but the expertise required for running development projects is short or non-existent -Not enough technical assistance is available to staff to deal effectively with development projects -Upgrading of staff and greater reliance on expertise from Rome, international consultants and Bolivian specialists are all required -Little or no organized training has been provided to staff in the areas of direct importance to project effectiveness: nutrition, children's health care, environment and sustainable development, gender analysis, food aid management, cooperation with NGOs, etc.	-CO has a capable team for field work -Strong technical team is quite reliant on two senior UNVs and this represents a risk to overall CO capacity -No training provided relating to substantive development themes or project specific issues -Training has been provided for staff of counterpart agencies but has been very limited for CO staff -Current CSO out of date given national socio-political changes -Little participation in overall debate on food aid and food security policy in Guatemala -CO feels effective monitoring limited by lack of vehicles -Lack of capacity to provide technical assistance to counterparts -Lack of financial expertise to take part in Social Investment Fund
Part 2: Collaboration -Sister UN Agencies -Host Governments -NGOs and Civil Society	-School feeding project demonstrated benefit of close cooperation with IFAD -WFP maintains too low a profile in food aid coordination and policy dialogue with govt on food security and food aid -Collaboration with some UN agencies is close (IFAD, UNFPA, WHO/PAHO) but less successful with agencies such as FAO -Highly centralized decision structure of WFP limits inter-agency cooperation at local level -Clear lack of community participation in WFP supported projects reflects difficulty of WFP entering direct relations with NGOs, unlike UNICEF, FAO, UNESCO, WHO/PAHO it can only relate to NGOs through the GOB and this severely curtails relations	-Difficulties in harmonization of UN agency programmes caused by difference in project cycle -Little evidence of inter-agency UN coordination -WFP with extremely low profile in inter-agency dialogue on nutrition, food security, etc. -Violence and political upheaval made development activities most difficult -Problems in WFP cooperation with government centred on weak administrative systems in key agency (CRN) and differences over "political" use of food aid -WFP seen as not adequately addressing political issues in programming with CRN -Inter-agency differences within GOG made collaboration more difficult -No working relationship with local NGOs -Participation in project development limited by government policy and organization of women's groups down played in favour of support to activities
Part 3: Program and Project Design and Implementation -Quality of Project Des. -Quality of Project Impl.	-Importance of gender analysis and women's participation in development not in evidence in WFP supported projects or in attitudes of project counterparts -Development themes of environment, self-reliance, community participation and poverty alleviation given only formal consideration in project design and not in evidence in actual project implementation -Project designs show lack of firmness and consistency by WFP in pursuit of objectives and targeting of resource use; despite fact that rural malnutrition and poverty are primary targets, pre-school feeding project has a strong urban element -Lack of community participation as a strategy in project design and implementation: beneficiaries not actors but recipients subordinated to public sector officials, their participation seems to be decreasing. -Little attention in designs to sustainabiltiy issues and for the phasing out of development food aid projects -Monetization arrangements well designed and monetization a successful modality in Bolivia but administration/monitoring of arrangements should be centralized in the CO and strengthened	-Very serious and common shortfalls in food deliveries and disruptions in supply caused by both WFP and CRN act to undermine project implementation in a number of projects -Shortfalls in delivery have effected WFP's standing with counterparts -Supplementary feeding project lacks clarity of focus and suffers from poor targeting -SF project and Women's Enterprise project lack adequate technical focus and assistance and can lead to demoralization of participants -Cohesion and commitment of women's organizations in WE project is impressive and sustainable -Very poor targeting in community infrastructure project as a result of political influence on districts participating in distribution -Wide dispersion of activities in the community infrastructure project led to technical assistance requirements neither WFP nor counterpart could fulfil and thus to consideration of early termination -Women's enterprise project apparently well implemented but groups handicapped in promoting micro enterprise by weak technical assistance -Soil conservation projects appear to realise some potential for positive impact and sustainability
Part 4: Monitoring and Evaluation -Quality of Monitoring -Use of Monitoring -Quality of Evaluation -Use of Evaluation Results	-Some development projects show effects of insufficient monitoring and lack of WFP familiarity with project progress -Negative effects of dairy plants now being privatised appear not to have been foreseen -While new M&E tools and budgetary funding have been useful in some development projects, on the whole monitoring and evaluation have not been used to contribute to improved operations -Closer monitoring of monetization and food for work are necessary -Monitoring and evaluation of development projects should be used to develop a profile of participants, improve targeting and prepare for project phase out.	-Monitoring and supervision severely handicapped by inefficiency and lack of mobility of counterparts -Resultant heavy demands for monitoring by WFP cause problems due to lack of specialist in M/E -Methodology required for monitoring and evaluation of school feeding project by counterpart staff -Field supervision by government staff weakened by shortages of vehicles, money for fuel and travel

WFP As A Development Agency: Summary Findings of the Country Studies: Part 2: Americas (cont'd)

Issues Area	Findings: Bolivia	Findings: Guatemala
Part 5: Project Effectiveness	-Effectiveness of WFP in Bolivia stronger re. short term objectives -Flexibility in allocation has contributed to efficiency of resource use in school feeding and in other development activities -WFP has supported UNICEF and WHO/PAHO in highlighting urgency of action for children between 7 and 23 months; WFP projects provided a push for donors and government to maintain an interest in pre-school child -Effectiveness of implementation of development projects depends largely on the effectiveness of the GOB counterpart involved. -Most successful projects have been integrated into activities supported by IFAD, WHO/PAHO and now the World Bank -One development project (dairy) was less successful than it could have been because WFP was not able to provide needed technical assistance to counterpart -Problems with the national counterpart responsible for food distribution and problems in WFP's supply performance have caused significant delays on some development projects	-Inadequate targeting in largest project (2/3 of resources) results in reduced effectiveness -Home ration method for above project limits nutritional benefits for participants -Not clear that VGF project focuses on most vulnerable groups Women's Associative Enterprises (WE) project has produced impressive outputs in training women -Deficiencies in identifying activities and in providing adequate technical assistance combine to reduce effectiveness of WE project, especially in promotion of micro-enterprise - WE project does stimulate productive activities among vulnerable group -Soil conservation project judged effective partly due to strong technical assistance from WFP's UNV. Clear signs of sustainability and replicability and promising impacts on production. WFP's smallest project in Guatemala -Basic Community Infrastructure (BCI) project very limited in effectiveness due to disruptions in supply, poo training, weak counterpart and political problems in targeting by district.
Part 6: Project Impacts -Apparent Positive Impacts -Apparent Negative Impacts -Issues of Sustainability	-Most important impacts have been palliative and short term -Less apparent impact on the basic causes of poverty and food insecurity -In some projects food aid provided by WFP has been used to reach and expand on development objectives in sanitation, food production, fuel wood conservation, crop diversification, etc. -Short term impacts like those listed above may be converted into longer term impacts by demonstration effects and by the effect of the fund of experience created but measures must be take to improve sustainability of project impacts	-Very poor implementation of the large VGF programme acts to limit impacts (frequent disruption in supply, poor targeting, use of take-home rations) -Women's enterprise project did have positive impact on organization of women's groups and training but thi is now limited. Limited impact on women's participation in micro-enterprise sector due to poor TA -Soil conservation and agro-forestry project though small has produced important impacts on production, soil improvement, women's participation in farming -Any beneficial impact of BCI project very limited due to inefficiency of counterpart and poor delivery performance -Some negative impact on price due to untimely arrivals
Part 7: Relations With HQ and CFA -Rome/Field Authorities -Quality of Programme Support	-There is a need for greater autonomy of the CO in negotiating project parameters with Govt. and Rome HQ must be more sensitive to the need to secure govt. understanding and support before it modifies project designs -Need for greater support from Rome re. training, staffing of national officers and assigning and utilizing international officers effectively	- Rome's heavy involvement in project preparation limits reflection of host government and CO input - Too little flexibility in project design to adapt to changing conditions in the country - Apparent need for greater involvement and guidance from Rome r.e. the WFP's advocacy position with government.
Part 8: New Directions	-Case for continued WFP involvement in Bolivia no longer rests on overall level of development or need to support structural adjustment but on the existence of high levels of malnutrition and food insecurity -Future rationale of WFP program in Bolivia must be based on improved targeting of food aid (or of the cash resulting from monetization) to the most vulnerable and malnourished groups -Monetization as a modality can be both preserved and strengthened -Project design needs to incorporate development themes of gender, community participation and environmental sustainability as more that just pro-forma concerns -Project designs must encompass effective measures for sustaining benefits and realistic plans for phasing out of the project.	-Continued relevance of programme dependant on addressing causes of malnutrition and food insecurity more directly -Need exists for improved targeting of beneficiaries -Project activities aimed at women need to be better integrated into existing productive tasks and roles in the family -Women's Enterprise project requires improved technical assistance in marketing and distribution -Popular participation requires more support to development and strengthening of popular organizations, especially for women -Problems in food management by counterpart and with shipments by WFP must be addressed if projects are to be effective - WFP must develop better guidelines on relations with government agencies in the difficult political situatio of Guatemala and must support the CO in difficult situations requiring advocacy; guidance from Headquarter is required

WFP As a Development Agency: Summary Findings of Country Studies: Part 3: Asia

Issues Area	Findings: Bangladesh	Findings: Pakistan	Findings: Vietnam
Part 1: WFP Capacity -Develop CSOs -Design Projects -Implement Projects -Monitoring/Evaluation -Capacity Building -Staffing - Finance - Administration	-Diversification of FFW and improved performance reflect strong project selection and support by a CO with strong technical capacity (engineering) among staff -WFP CO is large and well staffed, establishment and offices are adequate but with no frills and regional presence is maintained in four divisions -CSO not yet prepared and essential for establishing WFP's reading of priority objectives for food aid in Bangladesh	-CO is not equipped with required number and quality of professional staff to handle operations (especially concerning technical qualifications in rural dev., forestry and watershed management) -Supervision and monitoring of widely dispersed, isolated projects places heavy burden on CO staff -Pressure of EMOPs and PROs has adversely effected development projects: CO needs to be strengthened for better planning of projects	-There is some need to strengthen the capacity of the CO, especially in monitoring -CO has drawn on other UN agencies in the preparation of projects and this has been fairly effective -Lack of capacity in impact evaluation -There is scope for delegation of authority to CO from headquarters: Field specific issues should not be settled by missions from HQ -WFP has little in-house technical expertise but draws on other UN agencies as needed
Part 2: Collaboration -Sister UN Agencies -Host Governments -NGOs and Civil Society	-WFP collaborated effectively with donors and GOB on the SIFAD study (Strengthening the Institutions for Food Assisted Development) although recommendations slow to be implemented by GOB -WFP's coordinating role viewed as effective by all actors -UNDP control of local staffing not conducive to efficient operation of CO, operations in this area could be left to CO -No apparent gain to be made at this time by substantial increase in UN integration in Bangladesh -In VGD program WFP has collaborated effectively with the NGO BRAC and could expand training operations through collaboration with other NGOs (with support of GOB)	-Serious problems in financial support and cooperation from Provincial and Federal Govts. based on unrealistic assumptions of financial and admin capacity -Cooperation with bilaterals could be improved with more CO authority to negotiate co-financing -WFP seems reluctant to take full role in policy dialogue -Scope exists for greater NGO participation and greater community participation in development projects, CO seems reluctant to press this issue with GOP -WFP could take much greater advantage of opportunities for collaboration with UNICEF and WHO, and with bilaterals and improved relationships with the GOP and with large NGOs	-Good technical cooperation with some UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP -Broader and more intensified coordination envisaged in JCGP not yet taken hold -Technical collaboration between WFP, UNICEF, UNDP and FAO has been effective and has contributed to improved project design and implementation -Institutional weaknesses in the PHC system have prevented WFP and the GOV from realizing the objectives of the VGF project -WFP projects have, for the most part, included effective measures for technical assistance to counterpart agencies of the GOV
Part 3: Project Design and Implementation -Quality of Project Des. -Quality of Project Impl.	-Positive feature of FFW design has been link to relief action so that FFW could be used to repair damaged rural structures -FFW and VGD projects through large resource flows may produce budgetary dependency within the GOB -Shift to development priorities for the FFW has led to improved planning, design and quality of outputs -Local initiative projects under FFW (as opposed to current emphasis on line ministry projects) were often ill-designed environmentally and without necessary supporting structures -FFW schemes had weaknesses in targeting and development benefits tended to go to relatively well-to-do landowners -Focus of much FFW in Bangladesh on maintenance and rehabilitation of existing assets may be appropriate as a higher yielding investment than new capital expense -Projects lack revenue raising devices to promote future sustainability of assets	-Projects suffered overambitious targets, overestimates of govt admin and finance capacity, and slow incorporation of lessons learned from earlier phases -Lack of beneficiary consultation and participation in project planning and absence of measures for addressing gender issues or only mechanical attention to WID reflect lack of effort to mobilize technical assistance in participation -Projects showed a wide range of technical deficiencies in planning, many of which have been addressed in the proposed latest phases of watershed management projects -Problems in the planning of food management and of the food basket: commodities sometimes not suitable and arrangements for transport and distribution sometimes poorly planned (i.e. no vehicles included in some WSM projects) -Projects were expanded or extended using unrealistic assumptions of GOP financial input despite the need for bilateral donors to rescue previous phases -Designs failed to provide for necessary technical assistance to implementing agencies or for improved extension services	- Project preparation done jointly with govt and involves intensive consultation with lower levels of govt and with communities -The State Planning Committee (SPC) has attached great importance to WFP projects -Planning is in full compliance with WFP guidelines -Project planning does not suffer from a gender bias, nor does implementation -All project documents identify the benefits that will accrue to women in the project area -Beneficiary participation is sought and achieved in project planning and implementation mainly through commune level discussion and follow-up -Follow up or extension projects tend to be better planned and implemented than their predecessors due to improved appraisal -Implementation problems did occur with earlier projects as a result of lack of adequate pre-appraisal -None of the development project designs provided for impact assessment -Up to now at least, the cash value of food rations has been high enough (given inflation) to act as a strong incentive for participation, indeed it was higher than local market wages
Part 4: Monitoring and Evaluation -Quality of Monitoring -Use of Monitoring Data -Quality of Evaluation -Use of Evaluation Results	-Projects strongly supported by monitoring and field visits by the CO -WFP has well designed procedures for monitoring the VGD exercise including site visits to centres in all thanas	-Monitoring system for development projects has been weak and ineffective -Monitoring and evaluation system should highlight qualitative aspects	-No organized study of project impacts has been undertaken to date and the CO does not have the capacity to undertake an impact study -No impact assessment provided for in current project designs (latest PLANOPs -4304 and 4617 do provide for impact evaluation) -WFP staff carry out monitoring effectively and this is appreciated by the GOV and other donors -As project planning and design has improved, followed by more thorough monitoring of implementation, improvements are made in new projects and in project extensions

WFP As a Development Agency: Summary Findings of Country Studies: Part 3: Asia (cont'd)

Issues Area	Findings: Bangladesh	Findings: Pakistan	Findings: Vietnam
Part 5: Project Effectiveness	-FFW projects cover poverty relief and development through infrastructure objectives to varying degrees: problems in design, construction and maintenance of structures have limited development impact and produced some negative environmental effects -Employees of FFW projects not always poorest of poor and employment tends to be male dominated; attempts to increase female participation would be resisted by agencies involved -WFP has acted effectively to ensure improvements in implementation by GOB agencies involved	-For Watershed Management (WSM) and Rural Development (RD) food has not special advantage as a development input but WFP was a pioneer in WSM and its benefits are becoming increasingly clear -Against overall objectives, WSM projects have been by and large effective, though inefficiently implemented -WID achievement in WFP projects has been practically nil, scope exists for improved participation by women -If "social forestry" is to become a feature of WSM projects NGOs must become involved in implementation -All projects seem to have suffered from an effectiveness point of view due to disruptions of supply and problems in distribution of food, especially the PHC project	-Projects are by and large efficiently planned and implemented (i.e. realistic, technically sound and in accordance with guidelines) -Training and technical assistance to counterpart personnel has contributed to project effectiveness -WFP projects in health care have suffered from weak institutional arrangements for delivery of primary health care. VGF may not realize its potential for human resource development due to poor integration of PHC into the national health care system -The technology provided through WFP project has been appropriate and use of the assets created has been readily assimilated by participants -WFP's credible implementation record suggest effectiveness and the potential for positive impacts -In some instances, project impact would have been stronger and more visibl if agricultural extension had also been included
Part 6: Project Impacts -Apparent Positive Impacts -Apparent Negative impacts -Issues of Sustainability	-Food aid (including WFP food aid) has been a major factor in preventing mass starvation -VGD program has a valuable relief impact for women participants but development impact has been restricted by limited access to training and credit elements by participants -While projects such as FFW and VGD do reach the poor they may not benefit the most impoverished -Official GOB commitment to the FFW project is very high and it could be expected to be sustained even after WFP's involvement ends -The impact of the VGD program could be greatly increased if it were expanded to meet current needs and priorities and if the training and credit elements were available to all participants instead of 20 to 40%.	-WSM projects have had an important demonstration effect on farmers and the change in their attitudes and the attitudes of forest department officials are net important long-term gains -WFP food assistance has also had the effect of providing balance of payments and public budget support -The sustainability of physical assets and infrastructure is an important question regarding the achievement of desired environmental impacts: WFP should continue to move toward permitting use of food in support of maintenance of physical assets as this may be a better investment than creation of new assets -Sustainability of RD projects has suffered from lack of strong community participation and efficient local government systems.	-WFP food aid has played an important role as a substitute for financial aid when Vietnam was not receiving aid from other sources "food aid in fact has been a substitute for financial aid" -Forestry projects respond well to social and economic needs and contribute to farmers' incomes in the short, medium and long term -Positive impact is the fact that the GOV is replicating WFP type projects in water and forestry sectors (on a smaller scale) -Afforestation projects are having a positive impact on the environment, on sustaining forest resources, on the capacity of the forestry staff, on participation of women and on the demonstration of natural resource management practices. -Problems may occur in maintenance as there are no arrangements for local level resource generation for maintenance -Sustainability of PHC based project will require major efforts by both govt and UNICEF and involvement of NGOs
Part 7: Relations With HQ and CFA -Rome/Field Authorities -Quality of Programme Support	-Need fo much more CO involvement in the latter stages of project. Rome should not make major changes in project documents without first consulting the country office.	-CO may require more authority to monetize food in situations where counterpart funds are delayed and/or to negotiate co-financing with other donors -Defects in project planning have not always been rectified as early as they should have been and this may reflect inadequate scrutiny of project approval in Rome	-There is scope for delegation of authority to CO from headquarters: Field specific issues should not be settled by missions from HQ
Part 8: New Directions	-A priority for WFP is preparation of a CSO setting out the priority to be attached to development themes such as gender, poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability, etc. -There is a need to set out WFP's understanding of priority needs for national development and the use of food aid in Bangladesh -A fully developed CSO could serve as a vehicle to re-dress the balance of influence between Rome HQ and the CO which is now too much in favour of HQ.	-Only with better planning and more efficient implementation will Rural Development projects fit in WFP's future portfolio -Problems in administering the supplementary feeding programmes supported by WFP are far from resolved -If problems in planning and implementation are to be rectified in the future, the CO requires strengthening in its personnel, including appointment of staff with technical competence in the areas of WFP operations. -WFP must better accommodate the complexities of government administration in Pakistan in the planning of projects	-Even now, when multilateral financial agencies are about to enter the scene WFP development assistance will remain important in the period of transitio before alternative flows of development resources come into play

B.5 Evaluation Findings for Five Relief Operations

B.5.1 Ethiopia: EMOPs for Drought Relief

Country Study Findings on Relief Operations

Country: ETHIOPIA
Operation: EMOPs for Drought Relief

\+ indicates positive point
\- indicates negative point
() indicates factual point

Assessment, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

\+ Annual joint FAO/WFP assessments used by donors for deciding level of pledges.
\+ System of early warning and nutrition monitoring by Relief & Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) supported by UNICEF
\- No systematic evaluation undertaken.

Delivery of Food, Internal Transport, Distribution

\+ Crucial role of WFP Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE).
() Distribution by Relief & Rehabilitation Commission (RRC).
\+ Port captains stationed in ports to speed up operations.
\+ Extensive use of borrowings and purchases to ensure timely availability of food.

Suitability of Food Basket, Special Feeding, Targeting, Nutritional Impact

\+ Food basket generally considered satisfactory.

Interface with Rehabilitation or Development, Disaster Preparedness, Capacity Building

() Considerable efforts made to link relief to disaster preparedness, food for work and other developmental initiatives, but no successful formula yet found. Long-standing problems in full participation of local communities, partly due to peasant suspicion of government projects (still not removed).

Coordination at Country Level, Cooperation with Other Organizations and Private Sector

() Appointed by Government in 1984 as coordinator of all food aid
() Participates in regular meetings of UN Emergency Prevention & Preparedness Group chaired by UNDP, inter-agency meetings with RCC, and meetings of Relief Logistics Committee.

+ Organizes weekly "shipping meetings" with donors and NGOs to review food movements.
- Efforts to coordinate donor shipments only partially successful, port congestion still frequent.
+ Assists NGOs with port operations.

WFP Administration, Staff Performance

+ Hardworking Country Office doing good job.

Overall Comments

+ WFP has certainly contributed towards food security of those families it was able to reach. No clear answers available on how far this went towards meeting the total problem.
+ WFP has done more than its formal duties to get food to people threatened by starvation.

B.5.2 Ethiopia: EMOP and PRO for Assistance to Refugees from Somalia

Country Study Findings on Relief Operations

Country: ETHIOPIA
Operation: EMOP and PRO for Assistance to Refugees from Somalia

+ indicates positive point
- indicates negative point
() indicates factual point

Assessment, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

- Major problems in arriving at accurate number of refugees have led to over-supply of food, and collapse of local food prices at time of field visit.
+ Monitoring recently strengthened, including local food prices and livestock-wheat exchange ratio.
- No systematic evaluation undertaken.

Delivery of Food, Internal Transport, Distribution

() Until recently security problems have required extensive use of airlifting or military escorts for road convoys.
+ Crucial role of WFP Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE).
- Some complaints about past slowness in WTOE truck maintenance, expenses having to be authorized from Rome; problem stated by WFP Addis to have been resolved.
() Distribution by UNHCR in cooperation with Administration of Refugee Affairs (ARA).
- Failure to mobilize existing social structures for distribution (but see point on "Cross Mandate" below).

Suitability of Food Basket, Special Feeding, Targeting, Nutritional Impact

+ Food basket generally considered satisfactory.
- Complaint that locally purchased pulses required excessive cooking-time for people in fuelwood-short areas.
() Controversial "Cross Mandate" approach, intended to avoid creation of refugee camps, permits distribution of food to both refugee and non-refugee members of local communities.
- Preliminary reports suggest worsening malnutrition among children, both refugees and locals; if confirmed would indicate that food not reaching intended beneficiaries.

Interface with Rehabilitation or Development, Disaster Preparedness, Capacity Building

() No developmental activities feasible.

Coordination at Country Level, Cooperation with Other Organizations and Private Sector

+ Close cooperation with UNHCR.

WFP Administration, Staff Performance

- Doubts whether staffing level of Country Office adequate for full implementation of Global Agreement with UNHCR.

Overall Comments

- Unsatisfactory conditions in area in which assistance provided to Somali refugees.
+ WFP has done more than its formal duties to get food to people threatened by starvation.

B.5.3 Malawi: EMOP for Drought Relief

Country Study Findings on Relief Operations

Country: MALAWI
Operation EMOP for Drought Relief

+ indicates positive point
- indicates negative point
() indicates factual point

Assessment, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

+ Joint FAO/WFP macro-assessment in ten countries of southern Africa including Malawi.

- Government had no system for micro-assessment, WFP unable to propose and support methodology. Resulting shortage of information led to uncertainty regarding needs of populations in different areas (this was corrected later in the operation).
+ WFP fortunate to obtain locally (with donor funding) services of experienced person to help government in planning.
- Insufficient attention in planning phase to smooth phasing out at end of operation.
- No evaluation immediately upon conclusion (but evaluation of food management dimension completed by WFP in August 1993 in cooperation with government, bilaterals and NGOs).

Delivery of Food, Internal Transport, Distribution

() Systems for food handling built on procedures developed for Mozambique refugee operation.
+ Remarkable success of WFP-supported Regional Logistics Advisory Unit (Harare). Transportation systems permitted importation at rate almost three times that estimated by government as maximum possible.

Suitability of Food Basket, Special Feeding, Targeting, Nutritional Impact

- Needed more comprehensive efforts to monitor nutritional status of target groups.

- Due to lack of micro-assessment data, ration may have been over-generous.
- No research on use of rations at household level.
() Yellow maize distributed instead of preferred white maize; however, resulting flour healthier and wastage lower. As side-benefit, easy to distinguish relief (yellow) from commercial (white) maize.
+ Mass starvation avoided. Consumption of seed as food avoided.

Interface with Rehabilitation or Development, Disaster Preparedness, Capacity Building

+ Laudable efforts in training of counterpart institutions.
() Ad hoc Transport & Logistics Unit created, but entirely staffed by expatriates despite WFP request for national counterparts.
+ Further support to private sector suppliers of services used for operation for Mozambique refugees.
- Better operational design could have permitted greater contribution to future preparedness, and even reconstruction and rehabilitation.
+ Implementation through local government offices has strengthened functions of District Commissioners and led to improvement of the staffing and equipment of their offices.

Coordination at Country Level, Cooperation with Other Organizations and Private sector

+ Good cooperation with FAO in assessment.
+ Important role of UNICEF especially in early phase of emergency.
+ Drought relief from all sources into a single national pool coordinated by WFP.
+ Support from bilaterals for commodity loans and funding of administrative costs.

+ Some bilaterals entrusted WFP with handling all or part of their food aid to Malawi for drought relief.
+ Commodities lent to commercial sector at crucial moment, also to UNICEF and NGOs.
+ NGOs participated in planning and distribution of relief in 17 out of 24 districts.
- Some complaints from NGOs about occasional failure of WFP to inform them on supplies for collection.
+ Close cooperation with private-sector suppliers of services. Overall effect was to strengthen infrastructure of trucking and food processing facilities.

WFP Administration, Staff Performance

- WFP Headquarters unable to provide experienced staff to support Director of Operations during early stages of drought.
+ Intensive efforts by WFP staff in Malawi contributed to very high flow of relief (30,000 tons per month in key months).
- Development programming had to be neglected during emergency.
- Complaints from private-sector firms that payment procedures were too slow (corrective action reported as taken).
- Lack of off-the-shelf information systems for field office use in emergencies. Should cover food movements, reporting and (where appropriate) beneficiary registration.

Overall Evaluation

+ Too early to determine overall success, but clearly mass starvation was avoided.

B.5.4 Malawi: PRO for Refugees from Mozabique

Country Study Findings on Relief Operations

Country: MALAWI
Operation: PRO for Refugees from Mozambique

+ indicates positive point
- indicates negative point
() indicates factual point

Assessment, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

+ Joint assessment of needs with UNHCR. No problems reported.
+ Monitoring of food movements up to EDPs, then spot checks by field monitors.
- No evaluation

Delivery of Food, Internal Transport, Distribution

() Maize milled at WFP expense, delivered as flour.
() UNHCR handles internal transport to EDPs, where title transferred to government and further distribution by Malawi Red Cross Society.
+ Good systems developed with private-sector suppliers of milling, transport and other services.

Suitability of Food Basket, Special Feeding, Targeting, Nutritional Impact

- Problems with provision of edible oil.
+ Periodic nutritional surveys by NGOs.
- No analysis of possible differential impact on women and children.
- No research on use of take-home rations at household level.

Interface with Rehabilitation or Development, Disaster Preparedness, Capacity Building

+ Settlements receive education and health services from government with support from NGOs.
- Need for environmental rehabilitation activities in and around camps.
+ Capacity-building support to private-sector suppliers of services.

Coordination at Country Level, Cooperation with Other Organizations and Private sector

() Joint Operations Committee set up by government at start of emergency to establish refugee policy and coordinate relief. Includes government officials, UN system, donors and NGOs.
+ Good cooperation between WFP and UNHCR in all aspects of the operation.
+ Cooperation with NGOs in settlements.
+ Private sector plays vital role in food handling.
- Negative effect on edible oil producers from sales by refugees.

WFP Administration, Staff Performance

+ WFP Country Office staff developed and implemented strong and efficient system for managing large-scale imports, processing, procurement and inland transport of food for refugees. Computerized databases developed for tracking all these functions.

Overall Comments

+ WFP ability to keep food pipeline stocked, and camps supplied, generally considered as exceptional.

B.5.5 Pakistan: PRO for Afghan Refugees

Country Study Findings on Relief Operations

Country: PAKISTAN
Operation: PRO for Afghan Refugees

\+ indicates positive point
\- indicates negative point
() indicates factual point

Assessment, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

- Recurring problem for many years over assessment of correct refugee numbers.
+ WFP and UNHCR work well together in tackling the numbers problem.
+ Food monitored up to and including distribution to beneficiaries (including wheat supplies monitored on behalf of bilateral donors).
+ Stock verification exercise entrusted to independent firm of auditors as part of monitoring effort.
- Need to plan phase-out.

Delivery of Food, Internal Transport, Distribution

() Title passes at port. ITSH charges paid by government. Distribution by provincial and camp administrators. Wheat shipments merged into commercial supplies in Karachi, and equivalent amount withdrawn at provincial storage points.
+ Logistics apparatus has worked well for most of the operation, except for some distribution bottlenecks in 1991/92 caused by strikes and other delays.
- Shortfalls in donor contributions of wheat obliged government to make up the gap in various years.
- Edible oil (and earlier also tea and sugar) supplies have been erratic.
- WFP and UNHCR unable to bring about a stop to distribution in Balochistan to group leaders; this arrangement more susceptible to misuse than distribution to family heads as in other provinces.

Suitability of Food Basket, Special Feeding, Targeting, Nutritional Impact

+ Nutrition surveys undertaken in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1990, 1991 & 1992.
+ Nutritional status of refugees generally better than surrounding population.
- Problems with dried skim milk.

Interface with Rehabilitation or Development, Disaster Preparedness, Capacity Building

() Need for large-scale environmental rehabilitation in areas of refugee concentration.
() Refugees able to access: free services for health, education & vocational training; employment when available; food production from own farming and livestock; trading opportunities. Successful projects by government, UNHCR, World Bank, other UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs.
+ Sensible handling by UNHCR and WFP of arrangements for repatriating refugees.

Coordination at Country Level, Cooperation with Other Organizations and Private Sector

+ Coordination arrangements working very well, with key actors at federal level being the States and Frontier Regions Division, the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, UNHCR and WFP.
+ WFP and UNHCR maintain regular contacts with NGOs, many of whom implement vocational training projects inside the refugee villages.

WFP Administration, Staff Performance

() WFP sub-offices at Peshawar and Quetta devote 85% of staff time to work on PRO.
+ Monitoring for refugee operation considered better than for development projects.
+ Commissioner for Afghan refugees, Peshawar, acknowledged performance of WFP staff as better than own staff.
+ Good job in addressing numbers problem, even if it remains unsolved.

Overall Comments

+ WFP has done a good job overall, notably in planning, monitoring and coordination. Main brunt of work falls on government.