



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



MOZAMBIQUE CBNRM COUNTRY PROFILE

APRIL 2011



APRIL 2011

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by DAI in collaboration with World Wildlife Fund, Inc. (WWF).

MOZAMBIQUE CBNRM COUNTRY PROFILE

APRIL 2011

Program Title: Capitalizing Knowledge, Connecting Communities Program (CK2C)

Sponsoring USAID Office: USAID/Office of Acquisition and Assistance

Contract Number: EPP-I-00-06-00021-00/01

Contractor: DAI

Date of Publication: April 2011

Text: Roland Brouwer

Maps: Joaquim Macuácuá

Support: António Inguane, Faruk Mamugy, Ivan Remane

Photos: Roland Brouwer

Collaborating Partner: COPASSA project implemented by World Wildlife Fund, Inc. (WWF); Associate Cooperative Agreement Number: EPP-A-00-00004-00; Leader with Associate Award Number: LAG-A-00-99-00048-00

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

- ABBREVIATIONS V**
- 1. INTRODUCTION: CBNRM STOCKTAKING IN THE SADC REGION 1**
- 2. HISTORY OF CBNRM IN MOZAMBIQUE 3**
 - 2.1 PRE-CBNRM STATUS 3**
 - 2.1.1 Introduction 3
 - 2.1.2 The Colonial Era Influence on Natural Resource Management 4
 - 2.1.3 The Sixteen Year Civil War..... 7
 - 2.1.4 After the War: Restoration and Devolution..... 9
 - 2.1.5 Changes in Resource Use..... 10
 - 2.2 MOVING TOWARDS CBNRM: MILESTONES..... 13**
 - 2.2.1 Legal and Policy Reforms..... 13
 - 2.2.2 Programs and Projects 14
 - 2.3 National Vision for CBNRM 17
 - 2.4 KEY CBNRM INSTITUTIONS AND PROGRAMS..... 18**
- 3. SCALE OF CBNRM PROGRAM 23**
 - 3.1 TYPES OF CBNRM ACTIVITIES 23**
 - Five Aspects of Rights to Natural Resources 25
 - 3.2 GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT 26**
 - 3.2.1 CBNRM projects..... 26
 - 3.2.2 Communities benefitting from the 20% arrangement 27
 - 3.3 NUMBER OF HECTARES UNDER CBNRM MANAGEMENT 29**
 - 3.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMS..... 31**
 - 3.4.1 Poverty alleviation and the Millennium Development Goals..... 31
 - 3.4.2 Economic growth..... 31
- 4 IMPACTS OF CBNRM PROGRAM TO DATE 33**
 - 4.1 CBNRM IMPACTS ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 33**
 - 4.1.1 Impacts of CBNRM Projects 33
 - 4.1.2 Impacts of the 20% Arrangement 33

4.2 CBNRM IMPACTS ON THE RESOURCE BASE	35
4.2.1 Changes in Rights to Benefit From Natural Resources.....	35
4.2.2 Impacts on Natural Resources	39
4.3 CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE, RURAL REPRESENTATION AND ADVOCACY	40
5 ENABLING CONDITIONS	43
6 LESSONS LEARNED.....	45
6.1 POLICY.....	45
6.2 NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING	46
6.3 GOVERNANCE.....	47
7 BEST PRACTICES.....	49
8 SCALING UP	51
9 CHALLENGES AND BARRIERS CONFRONTING NATIONAL CBNRM PROGRAMS ..	53
10 LINKS TO NATIONAL PRIORITIES/PROGRAMS	55
11 RECOMMENDATIONS.....	57
12 SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION	59
13 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	61
ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE, NATIONAL CONSULTANT(S).....	67
ANNEX 2: CBNRM PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE	73
ANNEX 3: NAMES OF INTERVIEWED PERSONS.....	77

TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES

Table 1: List of Conservation Areas in Mozambique With Year of Creation, Location, Extent and Most Important Vegetation Types.....	6
Table 2: List of Hunting Reserves and their Locations (Province and District), Extent and Year of Proclamation.....	7
Table 3: Key CBNRM Institutions.....	19
Table 4: Types of CBNRM in Mozambique by Kind of Resource Use and the Role of the community.....	24
Table 5: Roles of Government, Operators and Communities With Regard to the Five Key Rights Over Natural Resources Identified by Elinor Ostrom in Different CBNRM Settings.....	26
Table 6: Estimated Impact Indicators of 107 CBNRM Projects in Mozambique.....	27
Table 7: Number and Percentage of Districts Per Province with a Committee for 20% Forest Revenue.....	28
Table 8: US Dollar - Metical Exchange Rates 2006-2010.....	31
Table 10: Certified and Ongoing Community Land Claims (De Wit & Norfolk, 2010).....	38
Table 11: Recommendations for Future Actions by Various CBNRM Actors.....	59

FIGURES

Figure 1: Main Phases in the Period Leading up to the Widespread Adoption of CBNRM in Mozambique.....	3
Figure 2: National Parks and Reserves, Coutadas and Forest Reserves in Mozambique.....	4
Figure 3: Evolution of GDP growth in Mozambique, Sub-Saharan Africa and the World between 2005 and 2010 (EIU, 2010).....	10
Figure 4: Registered Levels of Exploitation for Firewood, Charcoal and Timber Between 1986 and 2009 (in 1000 m3 RWE per year).....	11
Figure 5: Charcoal from Combumune Waiting to be Uploaded on the Train From Chicualacua to Maputo.....	12
Figure 6: Evolution of the Number of CBNRM Initiatives per Region Between 1994 and 2005.....	16

Figure 7: The Collection of Traps Made Out of Cut Fences Exposed at Niassa Reserve's Main Camp	20
Figure 8: The Beds in the Safari Camps Are Empty Most of the Time.....	21
Figure 9: Mr. José Manuel and Mr. Ruben Chiquate, Two of the Community's Representatives on the Board of Directors.....	22
Figure 10: The Nipiodi Sawmill – a New Landmark in CBNRM in Mozambique.....	24
Figure 11: Location of Communities Benefitting From 20% of the Forestry Fees in 2009....	29
Figure 12: The Community Scouts of Pindanganga, Manica Province	30
Table 9: Benefits Per Province from the 20% Forestry Levies Between 2006-2009	33
Figure 13: School Built with CBNRM Funds From SRN	34
Figure 14: Demarcated Community Areas (2010)	37
Figure 15: Carpenter's Workshop With Carpenter Abdul Saíde (right) and Chief Amissiale Caribarise (center)	39
Figure 16: Truckload of Panga Panga Confiscated by the Community of Muzo in an Attempt to Assert Its Rights Over the Resource.....	40
Figure 17: Summary of Enabling Factors, Barriers, Best Practices, Recommendations and Lessons Learned	46

TEXT BOXES

Box 1: Community Charcoal for Maputo.....	12
Box 2: Local Communities: Present Without Commitment	20
Box 3: An Empty Bed is Still Worth a Lot of Money	21
Box 4: Joint Venture.....	22
Box 5: Community in Charge	24
Box 6: Community Scouts.....	30
Box 7: Community Members Can Be Crooks	39

ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	Agence Française de Développement, French Development Agency
AMODER	Associação Moçambicano de Desenvolvimento Rural, Mozambique Rural Development Association
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources
CBE	Community Based Enterprise
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community Based Organization
CEF	Centro de Experimentação Florestal, Forestry Research Centre
CK2C	Capitalizing Knowledge, Connecting Communities
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDF	District Development Fund (formerly OIIL)
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DNAC	Direcção Nacional das Áreas de Conservação, National Directorate for Conservation Areas
DNFFB	Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, National Directorate for Forests and Wildlife
DNTF	Direcção Nacional de Terras e Florestas, National Directorate for Land and Forests
DPTUR	Direcção Provincial do Turismo, Provincial Tourism Directorate
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDD	Fundo de Desenvolvimento Distrital, District Development Fund
FFI	Fauna & Flora International
Frelimo	Frente da Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambique Liberation Front (political party)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEREN	Gestão de Recursos Naturais, Natural Resource Management (project name)
GTA	Grupo de Trabalho Ambiental, Environmental Working Group (NGO)

GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, (German Government Technical Cooperation Agency)
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IAC	Instituto Agrária de Chimoio, Chimoio Agricultural Training Institute
IDPPE	Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Pesca de Pequena Escala, Institute for the Development of Small-Scale Fisheries
IGF	Inspeção Geral das Finanças, General Inspection of Finance
ITC	Iniciativa de Terras Comunitárias, Community Land Initiative
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, German Development Bank
LOLE	Lei dos Órgãos Locais do Estado, Law on Local State Agencies.
MAEE	Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes, French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MINAG	Ministry of Agriculture
MICOA	Ministry of Coordination of Environmental Affairs
MIPE	Ministério das Pescas, Ministry of Fisheries
MITUR	Ministry of Tourism
Mt	Metical, Mozambican currency
MWA	Mozambique Wild Adventures
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OIIL	Orçamento de Investimento de Iniciativas Locais, Local Initiatives Investment Budget (recently renamed DDF)
ORAM	Organização Rural de Ajuda Mútua, Rural Mutual Assistance Organization (NGO)
PARPA	Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PARP	Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza, Poverty Reduction Action Plan
PEPSA	Plano Estratégico de Co-Gestão das Pescarias Artesanais em Moçambique, Strategic Plan for the Co-Management of Artisanal Fisheries in Mozambique.
PNL	Parque Nacional do Limpopo, Limpopo National Park

REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Mozambican National Resistance, political party
RWE	Round Wood Equivalent
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDAE	Serviço Distrital de Actividades Económicas, District Service for Economic Activities
SRN	Sociedade para a Gestão e Desenvolvimento da Reserva do Niassa, Society for the Management and Development of the Niassa National Reserve
SNV	Netherlands Development Organization
SPFFB	Serviço Provincial de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Provincial Forest and Wildlife Service
TFCA	Trans-frontier Conservation Area
UEM	Eduardo Mondlane University
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics or Soviet Union
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
ZiMoZa	Zimbabwe-Mozambique-Zambia TFCA

1. INTRODUCTION: CBNRM STOCKTAKING IN THE SADC REGION

The present report is part of a stocktaking exercise of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) initiatives in five member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Staff of the Mozambican company Sal Consultorias e Desenvolvimento Social (SCDS) conducted the Mozambique stocktaking assessment on behalf of DAI as part of the Capitalizing Knowledge, Connecting Communities (CK2C) Program financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Through CK2C, DAI facilitates the exchange of knowledge across natural resource management Communities of Practice worldwide. CK2C supports the three fundamentals of knowledge sharing — tools and resources, discussions, and networking — through stocktaking exercises, management of the FRAME website (www.frameweb.org), training of USAID/Washington and Mission staff in the fundamentals of sound NRM, and communication and learning support to USAID’s Forestry and Biodiversity (FAB) team.

Stocktaking is a method of field assessment that identifies sites in which investments in natural resource management have had a strong, positive impact. This study describes the natural resource management practices and governance systems in place in Mozambique, identifying the enabling conditions such as changes in markets, new policies and legislation, better communication of knowledge, and new infrastructure that contributed to local successes in natural resource management. Stocktaking assessments are typically followed by a workshop to discuss and reach consensus on the study findings among key stakeholders at the local and national levels. Annex 1 includes the Scope of Work for this study.

The stocktaking itself used a combination of bibliographic research, meetings with CBNRM platforms at the national and sub-national levels, interviews with stakeholders and field visits. The interviews used a standardized questionnaire (see Annex 2) adapted to the specific position of the informant. In total more than 75 people were interviewed. Their names are listed in Annex 3. In addition, more than 60 people participated in sub-national and national meetings at the start of the data collection process and during feedback sessions in the cities of Beira (in Central Mozambique) and Nampula (in the North).

The present report follows a standard structure that begins with a brief description of the history of natural resource use in the country prior to the introduction of CBNRM. This summary is followed by the identification of the main political and legal reforms, programs and projects that have led to the expansion of the CBNRM and the vision of CBNRM that has developed. The next chapters address the scale of CBNRM, including the range of activities that have been implemented and the districts and provinces that they cover. This is followed by an assessment of CBNRM impacts on local development, the resource base, and governance. The stocktaking closes with an identification of obstacles, facilitating factors, best practices and lessons learned, from which it identifies some key elements for scaling up CBNRM.

2. HISTORY OF CBNRM IN MOZAMBIQUE

2.1 PRE-CBNRM STATUS

2.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The past always shapes the present. Each country in Southern African has its own history. While the British colonized most countries, in some there is a notable German or Dutch influence. Mozambique is the only of the five countries covered by the stocktaking exercise that was dominated and colonized by the Portuguese. The Portuguese arrived on its shores in the mid 15th century and gradually expanded their influence during the following 500 years. As a result, Mozambique's official language is Portuguese and a large part of its culture, customs, institutions and laws bear a Portuguese influence.

The unique qualities of each country have implications for CBNRM. Concepts that may work in one national context may not work in another because of cultural, institutional and legal differences. Thus, in addition to indigenous natural and cultural characteristics, the colonial heritage, the decolonization process and, in the case of Mozambique, a protracted internal war are defining factors in each country's experience with CBNRM. It is important to analyze these factors before one can understand and assess the current state and impacts of CBNRM.

FIGURE 1: MAIN PHASES IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE WIDESPREAD ADOPTION OF CBNRM IN MOZAMBIQUE.





Figure 1 summarizes the main stages in the history of Mozambique with regard to CBNRM. It starts with the colonial period and passes through the turbulent years of independence and internal war. The peace agreement in 1992 inaugurated a period of reform that resulted in the emergence of many CBNRM initiatives including, from 2005 onward, the payment of a 20% share of all forest and tourism levies to local communities.

2.1.2 THE COLONIAL ERA INFLUENCE ON NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

As in neighboring British territories, Mozambique under colonial rule had a double tenure system. Within this system – defined by Decree 33.727 of 1944 – part of the land was governed under European law and another part under customary rules. Thus, for example, at least 500 ha of the 10,000 ha Machangulu peninsula in southern Mozambique were communal pastures where the peninsula’s inhabitants would graze their cattle (Brouwer, 1998).

FIGURE 2: NATIONAL PARKS AND RESERVES, COUTADAS AND FOREST RESERVES IN MOZAMBIQUE



The customary rules left room for different levels of individualized control of resources in a space controlled by a traditional ruler. This ruler was, in turn, part of a chain of vassals in a loosely but centrally ruled chiefdom or kingdom held together by kinship and trust. However, little is known about specific livestock management practices such as stinting, seasonal closure, or rotation. This might be partially due to the decline of animal husbandry in the area following independence. Known natural vegetation

management practices dating back to the pre-colonial era include certain taboos on the felling of specific tree and shrub species. These taboos often protect fruit bearing species such as Canhu (*Sclerocarya birrea*, more widely known as Marula) and Pfilwa (*Vangueria infausta*) and thus contribute to communities' food security.

Mozambique became independent from Portugal in 1975 under the progressive liberation movement *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo)*. In the first years after Independence, the Frelimo government implemented drastic reforms. Perceiving traditional chiefs as divisive, reactionary elements of an archaic tribal-feudal structure and charging them with exploiting local communities for their own gain, it outlawed them and replaced them with village presidents and party secretaries (Pitcher, 1996). It also nationalized agricultural estates and industries, including logging and hunting operations (Fundação IGF, 2009). It created state farms and production cooperatives for food crops such as rice and cash crops such as cotton. It enacted two drastic reforms in land tenure legislation in 1976 (Law 6/76) and in 1987 (Decree 16/87). Rights regarding access to land – previously organized separately for the settler and the indigenous communities – became uniform. At the same time, freehold of land was formally abolished and all property rights vested in the state.

Colonial regulations with regard to forests and wildlife, however, remained unchanged for the next 24 years. Until the approval of Law 10/99 in 1999, decrees issued by the Portuguese colonial government in 1965 continued to govern the forest and wildlife sectors. Legislative Act 2629 of 7 August 1965 governed hunting reserves and Legislative Act 2642 of 20 September 1965 regulated forest exploitation. This latter Act provided for two types of exploitation: forest concessions and logging under licenses. However, from the 1950s onward almost all exploitation occurred under logging licenses. Apart from exonerating local communities from the need to acquire a license for small scale subsistence uses of the forest, it did not provide for any community benefit from or participation in the management of the resource (DNFFB, 1987: 15).

One may speculate why these colonial laws remained unchanged for so long. One reason might be that they guaranteed state control over the resource and, in that respect, aligned in with the official vision of the political economy in general and the governance of natural resources in particular that dominated the first decades after Independence

Another feature of Mozambique's colonial heritage is an array of national parks, special reserves, managed hunting reserves, and forest reserves. The colonial authorities proclaimed these conservancies with little concern for local residents. In some cases – such as the small reserves on Inhaca Island 40 km to the east of Maputo City – people were forcefully removed because their farming practices were seen as the main cause of the erosion that threatened the island and its coral reefs. In other cases, they continued to live together with the newly protected wildlife, but without protection for themselves or their possessions and without compensation for the loss of animals and crops. Local residents were, however, allowed to continue hunting small animals for subsistence purposes (Article 22 of Legislative Act 2629).

Figure 2 provides a map of Mozambique with the location of the national parks, reserves, managed hunting reserves (*coutadas*) and forest reserves that currently exist.

Table 1 provides summary information on the national parks and reserves in Mozambique. The list shows that all but three areas (Limpopo, Quirimbas and Chimanimani) were created under colonial rule. Two – Limpopo and Chimanimani – are part of regional initiatives to create transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs). The TFCAs will be discussed more extensively in section 2.2.2.

TABLE 1: LIST OF CONSERVATION AREAS IN MOZAMBIQUE WITH YEAR OF CREATION, LOCATION, EXTENT AND MOST IMPORTANT VEGETATION TYPES

Conservation area	Year of creation	Province	Area Km ²	Vegetation type
Reserva Especial de Maputo	1932	Maputo	780	Coastal bush-land and forests on recent dunes, mangroves, sand forest, sub-coastal forests and woodlands
Reserva Nacional do Gilé	1932	Zambézia	2.100	Late deciduous lowland miombo
Parque Nacional de Gorongosa	1960	Sofala	4.000	Evergreen moist forests, deciduous miombo woodland
Reserva Nacional de Niassa	1960	Niassa	42.200	Deciduous miombo, dry miombo
Reserva Nacional de Marromeu	1960	Sofala	1.500	Alluvial vegetations, wetland, marshes and mangroves
Reserva Nacional de Pomene	1964	Inhambane	200	Coastal bush-land and forests on recent dunes, mangroves
Reserva Biológica da Inhaca	1967	Maputo	51	Forest on recent dunes, mangroves, coral reefs
Parque Nacional do Arquipélago de Bazaruto	1971	Inhambane	1.430	Coastal bush-land and forests on recent dunes, mangroves, coral reefs
Parque Nacional de Banhine	1972	Gaza	7.000	Mopane, halomorphic vegetation
Parque Nacional de Zinave	1973	Gaza/Inhambane	4.000	Mopane
Parque Nacional de Limpopo	2001	Gaza	11.223	Mopane
Parque Nacional das Quirimbas	2002	Cabo Delgado	7.500	Deciduous miombo, dry miombo and mangroves, coral reefs
Reserva Nacional de Chimanimani	2003	Manica	1.000	Evergreen moist forests

Table 2 contains a list of the hunting reserves, or *coutadas*. Originally there were about sixteen *coutadas*, but some have been abolished or transformed into national parks. The National Parks and Reserves of Gorongosa, Limpopo and Zinave are former *coutadas*. The *coutadas* continue to be managed according to Legislative Act 2629 of 7 August 1965. The exploitation of the *coutadas* is leased to private operators.

TABLE 2: LIST OF HUNTING RESERVES AND THEIR LOCATIONS (PROVINCE AND DISTRICT), EXTENT AND YEAR OF PROCLAMATION

Number	Province	District(s)	Area (km2)	Proclamation date
04	Manica	Machaze	3.227	23/08/1969
05	Sofala	Machanga	6.868	30/05/1972
06	Sofala	Maringué	4.563	09/07/1960
07	Manica	Tambara	5.408	19/05/1969
08	Sofala	Inhamatanda	310	23/08/1969
09	Manica	Macossa	4.333	19/04/1969
10	Sofala	Marromeu; Cheringoma	2.008	04/02/1961
11	Sofala	Marromeu; Cheringoma	1.928	19/04/1969
12	Sofala	Marromeu; Cheringoma	2.963	19/04/1969
13	Manica	Macossa	5.683	27/08/1960
14	Sofala	Marromeu	1.353	19/04/1969
15	Sofala	Maringue	2.000	19/04/1969

The last type of conservation area is the forest reserve. Originally, forest reserves were created as set-aside areas to guarantee the supply of valuable timbers or protect water sources and watersheds, rather than to protect specific ecosystems, habitats or species. Created in the 1950s, they cover an estimated area of about 450,000 ha. Today, they could provide a good platform for the establishment of a forest conservation network. However, their survival is not unproblematic. Of the thirteen existing forest reserves, only two are uninhabited. Some are so heavily degraded that they have lost their original conservation value (Mueller, Siteo & Mabunda, 2005) (Siteo & Enosse, 2003).

2.1.3 THE SIXTEEN YEAR CIVIL WAR

In 1976 the white minority government of Rhodesia supported the creation and operation of an insurgency movement called the Mozambican National Resistance, or RENAMO (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*). RENAMO started a gradually intensifying internal conflict that only came to an end in 1992, wresting control from the government of a large part of the rural areas.

Even though instigated and sustained from abroad, RENAMO managed to raise significant domestic support, principally among the rural population. Villagization and collectivization programs under Frelimo had disrupted rural societies, led to a reduction of rural income and increased distrust of the Frelimo government. Traditional chiefs were angered by the way Frelimo had taken away their political and administrative powers and many moved to support RENAMO (Hall, 1990; O'Laughlin, 1992; Young, 1997).

The war had a tremendous impact on the country. It affected first and foremost the people, whose fields and houses were burned, harvests and animals stolen, and schools and health facilities destroyed. Children were kidnapped, some turned into soldiers¹. Many were killed. The result was a massive displacement of the rural population. People fled the violence and hunger in the countryside to seek safety in urban centers

¹ UNICEF estimates that around 250,000 Mozambique Child Soldiers participated in the Civil War. There were regular instances of children being abducted to be used as soldiers. All parties used child soldiers, including RENAMO's guerrilla forces and the "milicias populares", local paramilitary forces directed by Frelimo (Mapsofworld.com, 2009).

or across the border in neighboring countries. The World Bank estimated the numbers of internally displaced persons at 3.5 million and the number of refugees at 1.7 million (Zieck, 1997) (World Bank Group, not dated).

After the war, many went back to their places of origin. However, conditions were not as they had been before the war. The presence of newcomers affected the relationships and cohesion in communities. In some cases, demobilized soldiers remained in the vicinity of dismantled military bases, relying mainly on local natural resources for their livelihoods. These situations invariably led to conflict between the local returnees and the “outsiders” (Hatton, Couto & Oglethorpe, 2001). War also left a heavy psychological imprint, undermining the previous relationships of trust and authority. The war thus profoundly affected the social setting for CBNRM.

The war also affected the natural resource base, with a direct impact on conservation and wildlife. RENAMO based itself in Casa Banana, close to Gorongosa National Park in Central Mozambique, not far from the border with Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The park itself became a battleground and the deteriorating security frightened tourists away (MITUR, 2005). Wardens were withdrawn or killed and the park’s infrastructure abandoned and destroyed. The park’s wildlife became a source of bushmeat, ivory and other commodities that were sold on the black market, either on behalf of the warring parties or for the benefit of the combatants themselves. The result was the all but complete depletion of the park’s major game species. In 1992, at the end of the war, Gorongosa Park was nearly inaccessible, its facilities in ruins and its fauna gone (Hatton, Couto & Oglethorpe, 2001).

Gorongosa Park is just one case in point. The same scenario occurred in other areas. Zinave National Park in the South, for instance, was originally created as a managed hunting area (*Coutada* 16) to protect a local giraffe population. Until the 1970s, American magnates and European royalty had visited the area (Fundação IGF, 2009). The war decimated giraffes and other larger animal populations. In the end, there was nothing left to hunt (Stalmans & Peel, 2010).

Further south, the impact was less severe. Here hostilities only broke out in the mid-1980s, when RENAMO troops moved towards the capital city Maputo. In the Maputo Elephant Reserve, the elephant herd was decimated; only about a hundred animals survived the conflict.

The only conservation areas that came through the war relatively unscathed are the reserves on Bazaruto and Inhaca islands and Niassa Reserve in the North (Hatton, Couto, & Oglethorpe, 2001). The two island reserves do not have herds of large ungulates and predators but are particularly relevant for their bird and marine life. The Niassa Reserve is the only reserve in Mozambique with the ‘Big Five’ species, including surviving rhino populations (AGRECO, 2008). It is also home to important rare and endangered mammal species such as the second largest population of African wild dog (*Lycaon pictus*), the blue Niassa wildebeest (*Connochaetes taurinus johnstoni*), and Johnson’s impala (*Aepyceros melampus* subsp. *johnsoni*) (Hatton, Couto, & Oglethorpe, 2001). It is likely that much of its biodiversity remains to be discovered. A Fauna & Flora International (FFI) survey in Niassa Reserve found a new lizard species, the Mecula girdled lizard (*Cordylus macu*) (Fauna and Flora International, 2011).

While the war decimated the fauna, the deterioration of security conditions brought the exploitation of timber to a standstill (Reyes, 2003), except in relatively limited areas where a concentration of extraction led to overexploitation (Ribeiro, 1992, quoted in Wilson, 1992).

Artisanal and subsistence fishing increased as a direct impact of the war. Many people fled from the interior to the relative security of the coast and the coastal islands. There, they joined the local population

in exploiting local marine resources. Although many returned to their areas of origins at the end of the war, fishing has remained an important livelihood activity. In 2002, a census counted 118,000 fishermen and collectors. As this census probably covered only about 62% of the population, the actual number of people engaged in fishing is likely about 190,000, or 10% of the population (Jacquet & Zeller, 2007).²

Commercial fishing only began in about 1965. It was interrupted after national independence, when most of the Portuguese who owned and operated the fleet of about 100 vessels left the country. The new government nationalized the fishing infrastructure and set up joint ventures with other nations such as Norway, Japan and the USSR to exploit the rich shrimp stock of the Sofala Bank. As a result, in the early 1980s shrimp was Mozambique's second export commodity after cashew (Jacquet & Zeller, 2007).

2.1.4 AFTER THE WAR: RESTORATION AND DEVOLUTION


After sixteen years of destruction, a peace agreement terminated the war in 1992. Frelimo narrowly won multiparty elections in 1994 and also won the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2004. It solidified its position as the hegemonic party in 2009. The political stability that has characterized Mozambique since 1992 has nurtured economic growth and political reform.

Two major factors have influenced the post-conflict political agenda: the new international order and the need to finance the recovery from the war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the socialist agenda espoused by Frelimo became discredited politically and economically. Multiparty democracy, decentralization and devolution together with de-bureaucratization, privatization and economic liberalization became the dominant principles (Abrahamsson & Nilsson, 1995).

During the war, the country had increasingly become dependent on foreign financial assistance from both the East and the West in the form of grants and loans. As a result, debt became another important driver of the country's policies. Mozambique joined the Bretton Woods institutions in 1987 to gain access to international funds. Since then it has tried to apply the models promoted by IMF and World Bank (Abrahamsson & Nilsson, 1995; Hanlon, 1996). Between 1992 and 2010 Mozambique's economy grew at an average rate of over 6% per year, more than the average of Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 3) (EIU, 2006) (EIU, 2009). Gross National Product (GNP) grew from US\$2.6 billion in 1992 (Abrahamsson & Nilsson, 1995) to US\$37.0 billion in 2000 to US\$91.4 billion in 2009 (current prices) (World Bank Group, 2011). In April 1998, its rapid reform and recovery was rewarded with a debt pardon under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, making it the sixth country to benefit from this Initiative and ensuring some US\$1.4 billion (in nominal terms) in debt relief (World Bank Group, 2011).

² Gender is an important factor in fishing. Men will normally dare the waves with small wooden canoes and boats using nets, fishing rods, spears. Women will fish with nets wading through the water or collect crabs and other shellfish on the beach at low tide. They will often take their children to help them (Jacquet & Zeller, 2007).

FIGURE 3: EVOLUTION OF GDP GROWTH IN MOZAMBIQUE, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE WORLD BETWEEN 2005 AND 2010 (EIU, 2010)




The rapid pacification of Mozambican society and its strong macroeconomic performance have turned the country into a “donor darling”, receiving US\$ 65 per person per year in aid. In comparison, Tanzania and Uganda (which have almost the same GDP per capita as Mozambique) and Malawi (which is much poorer) each receive only US\$ 42 per person per year (Hanlon, 2010).

Initially, economic growth was reflected in lower poverty levels. Between 1997 and 2003, the incidence of poverty – defined as the inability to meet basic nutritional needs – declined from 69% to 54% (GOM, 2004). Since then, poverty reduction has stalled, and in some regions the poverty incidence has increased, with the recent overall average at 55% (GOM, 2010).

2.1.5 CHANGES IN RESOURCE USE

Economic growth and the reduction of poverty have important impacts on resource use. During the war, the volume of timber extracted annually from the forests had dwindled from 110,000 m³ in 1986 to 50,000 m³ in 1991 (DNFFB, 1992). It plummeted again to 14,500 m³ in 1993. But with the end of warfare the forests became accessible again and extraction increased. Currently, the legally extracted volume of logs (round-wood) is about 120,000 m³ per year, i.e., about the same as before the war (Figure 4).

FIGURE 4: REGISTERED LEVELS OF EXPLOITATION FOR FIREWOOD, CHARCOAL AND TIMBER BETWEEN 1986 AND 2009 (IN 1000 M³ RWE PER YEAR)



The graph in Figure 4 is based on data from the National Directorate for Forests and Wildlife (DNFFB, 1992), Falcão (Falcão, 2005) and the General Inspection of Finance (IGF, 2010). It shows the decrease in logging caused by the war and the rapid recuperation after the onset of peace. It also illustrates the changes in the licensed (and therefore registered) exploitation of the forests and woodlands for two other resources, firewood and charcoal, converted into Round Wood Equivalents (RWE). The first available data refer to 1991, when the government registered the extraction of the equivalents of 11,540 m³ for firewood and 8,310 m³ for charcoal. In 1997, the extracted volume of firewood was the equivalent of almost 130,000 m³ and of charcoal more than 282,000 m³. Since then, the registered extraction of firewood has decreased, and that of charcoal increased, to a value of more than 1.3 million bags or 470,000 m³ RWE. As a result, charcoal (measured in RWE) is currently the most important resource extracted from the forests.

The current level of exploitation has given rise to a fierce debate about its sustainability. The Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) has maintained that the current logging level is less than the annual allowable cut and is therefore sustainable (Anonymous, 2010). IGF, however argues that MINAG neglects the combined impacts of illegal logging, the concentration of logging on a small number of species such as Chanfuta (*Afzelia quanzensis*), Mondzo (*Combretum imberbe*), Messassa (*Brachystegia spiciformis*), and Jambire (*Milletia stuhlmannii*), and charcoal burning. IGF estimates that the real level of extraction is six times the annual allowable cut and therefore seriously jeopardizes the sustainability of forest resources in Mozambique.

Logging is mainly driven by exports. In 2008, Mozambique exported US\$38,971,000 of timber and timber products. China appears to be the largest market. In addition, timber's share in Mozambique's growing total exports to China is also increasing (Jansson & Kiala, 2009).

A considerable share of the logging – one-third, according to IGF -- is illegal and sometimes even occurs in protected areas (Anonymous, 2010). China’s demand for timber is apparently also the most important driver of illegal logging. Its role in illegal logging in Zambézia province has been extensively documented (Mackenzie C., 2007) (Mackenzie & Ribeiro, 2009).

The increase in wood fuel exploitation, notably charcoal, is driven by domestic demand and associated with the growth of the urban population. The end of war and the ensuing increase in income have changed fuel consumption patterns. While rural populations continue to rely on firewood, urban residents have increasingly shifted to charcoal (Brouwer & Falcão, 2004). The impact of this change on woody biomass extraction is tremendous. The earth kilns used locally have an efficiency of about 14%: 1 kg of wood produces only 140 grams of charcoal (Joaquim & Brouwer, 2009). The swing towards charcoal consumption therefore implies a dramatic increase in the level of forest resource exploitation. High demand is also driving up the price. In 1999, a bag of charcoal would cost about 55 Meticaís (Mt) or US\$3.50; in 2010 the price is about 500 Mt or US\$15.15. This makes charcoal an attractive source of income for rural populations, in particular in areas where crop loss due to drought is frequent. Charcoal production has therefore been one of the areas of CBNRM interventions (Box 1) (Kasperek, 2008).

Finally, one should keep in mind that the official data on charcoal extraction indicates only the top of the iceberg. Analysis of urban energy consumption patterns indicates that real extraction is likely to be five to ten times this value (IGF, 2010).

Peace brought a surge in the commercialization of forest resources. However, local benefits remained notoriously small. Loggers would hire locals to assist with spotting valuable trees and with felling them. However, the number of locals involved was small and they were paid little or not at all. Even charcoal burning was initially dominated by migrant “ninjas”, demobilized soldiers from outside the communities, and thus brought little local benefit (Brito, 1998).

After people, wildlife was probably the second most important victim of the war. Wildlife protection has improved since the end of the conflict as a result of the reassertion of state control. Wildlife populations are recovering, although they are still far below 1970 levels. A 2008 nationwide aerial survey showed that some species are re-establishing themselves, principally in the conservation areas in the North (Niassa National Reserve), Center (Gorongosa National Park and to a certain extent the Mozambican section of the ZiMoZa Transfrontier Conservation Area in Tete) and the South (Limpopo National Park and Maputo Elephant Reserve). In the Maputo Elephant Reserve, the herd

Box 1: Community charcoal for Maputo

On example of a CBNRM project is a pilot activity that ran from 1998-2008, supported by GTZ, to improve charcoal production in Combumune, Mabalane District, in the interior of Gaza Province, one of Maputo City’s important charcoal sources.

Grupo de Trabalho Ambiental (GTA), a local NGO, implemented the project as part of a regional pilot activity. The project sought to promote sustainable resource use through the implementation of a quota set under a forest management plan combined with income generating alternatives. Individual burner households were to pay a fee to the community. The receipts were to be used to buy a collective license and to invest in community goods such as schools and water wells.

A 2008 evaluation found that the community did not respect the quotas. Individual members sought to maximize their income, and exploitation intensified to unprecedented levels, surpassing the allowable volume set in the management plan (Kasperek, 2008). Due to charcoal production, average household income in Combumune is 30% above the average in the province.

Figure 5: Charcoal from Combumune waiting to be uploaded on the train from Chicualacua to Maputo.



that had been decimated and reduced to about 110 animals has since tripled its size, now counting more than 300 members. Other “Big Five” species such as rhino only occur in the Niassa Reserve and in Limpopo National Park. The number of rhinos is estimated at 20, with individuals crossing the South African border into Limpopo National Park and some residents surviving in the Niassa Reserve. Species such as giraffe, kudu and other larger herbivores have been reintroduced (AGRECO, 2008).

Today poaching for food and profit is less intensive than during the war, but it remains frequent (Anonymous, 2009) (AIM, 2010). Again, China appears to be one of the principal destinations of forbidden commodities. Samuel Ruco, a trader on the Maputo handicraft and art market explains: “*We didn’t sell anything today. It was full of Chinese, but these [sic] don’t want our art, they only want ivory.*” The extent of the illegal ivory trade was exposed in January 2010 when 161 containers of a shipment by the Mozambican logging company Miti to China were apprehended in the port of Pemba, Cabo Delgado. Among the illegal timber, 126 tusks, a rhino horn and pangolin scales were discovered (Anonymous, 2011). According to a leading staff member of Limpopo National Park, a syndicate of Chinese, Mozambican and South African hunters killed eight rhinos in 2010 (Saveca, 2011).

2.2 MOVING TOWARDS CBNRM: MILESTONES

2.2.1 LEGAL AND POLICY REFORMS

Following the 1992 peace agreement, the Government of Mozambique made a rapid swing from socialism to the market economy. The reform touched several areas that are important for the conservation of biodiversity and community control over natural resources.

- Ministerial Act 822/95 of May 11, 1995 allowed for the payment of a significant share of hunting and trophy fees to the district government and communities, contrary to standing rules (GRNB, 2002);
- The 1997 Land Law (Law 19/97) entails a major change in the relationships between the state, communities and the land:
 - While maintaining state property, the Law recognizes strong individual rights to land through *bona fide* occupation and tradition as well as community land ownership;
 - It creates a clear legal statute for protected areas, maintaining that they should be free of human inhabitants and cannot be subject to the assignment of any land tenure rights;
- The 1997 Forest and Wildlife Development Policy and Strategy (Resolution 8/97) encompasses an agenda that seeks to integrate timber-driven economic development of domestic industries, sustainable use of natural resources and community rights and forest-based community development;
- The 1999 Forest and Wildlife Law (Law 10/99) establishes:
 - A community share in stumpage fees (in the 2002 Regulation, this is set at 20% of such fees)
 - The right of forest communities to use forest resources (including wildlife) for their sustenance, exempting them from the need to request a license or pay a fee if the exploitation is for their own consumption (Article 15, #3 and Article 21, #2);
 - The right of local communities to obtain logging licenses and timber concessions, enabling them to assume the role of private operators (Art. 16, #1);

- The right of local communities to participate in the granting of licenses to logging companies and to receive a share in the public revenues from these licenses (Article 31 and Article 35, #5 of the Law; Articles 35, 36, 95-98 and 101, #1 of the Regulation).
 - The creation of local stakeholder platforms (local resource management councils) to guarantee the participation of communities in the use of and benefits from forest and wildlife resources (Article 31);
 - Forest concessions as a model for forest management.
- The 2000 Decrees on traditional authorities (Decree 15/2000 and Ministerial Act 107-A/2000) reinstate traditional rulers as leaders who can mediate between the government and their people. However, it makes the appointment of these rulers dependent on recognition both by the local community and the government administrator and emphasizes local leaders' role in guaranteeing the implementation of government policies;
 - The 2003 Law on Local State Agencies (Law 8/2003, known as LOLE after its Portuguese acronym) grants stronger powers to the (appointed) government administrators at the levels of the district and administrative post (one level below the district) and opens the way to systematic consultation of constituents in the formulation and implementation of government policies;
 - The 2005 Ministerial Act on the payment of 20% shares (Act 93/2005) sets out the procedures for the payment of the shares from forest and wildlife exploitation licenses to communities, requiring the communities to legally establish a local management committee and open a bank account;
 - The 2007 Law on Territorial Planning (Law 19/2007) strengthens the role of communities in the spatial planning process;
 - The 2009 Conservation Policy (Resolution 63/2009) calls for a reorganization of the procedures for the creation and management of conservation areas so that local interests are better protected and communities living in or depending on conservation areas can participate in decisions regarding management and their share in the profits. It also calls for a broadening of the categories of conservation areas to include categories that permit the presence and involvement of local residents in biodiversity management, instead of erroneously assuming that all conservation areas are free of people. The preparation of a new park management system is still under way.

These important decrees, laws and policies all point in one direction: a larger role for local communities in decision-making about the use of natural resources and the benefits from their exploitation.

2.2.2 PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

There are three programs or projects that can be considered as landmarks in initiating and scaling up CBNRM activities in Mozambique: the Tchuma Tchato project, the CBNRM program of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the TFCA program.

Tchuma Tchato

The legal and policy reforms cited above form the backdrop for international support for CBNRM in Mozambique. In Zimbabwe, CBNRM initiatives had evolved under the CAMPFIRE program ([Metcalf, 1994](#)). After the end of the war, the organizations supporting CBNRM in the region began to develop similar initiatives in Mozambique. In 1994, the Ford Foundation began supporting a CAMPFIRE-inspired

community-based wildlife management project implemented by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Situated in Bawa District, a remote corner of Tete province between Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Zambezi River, this project – Tchuma Tchato, or ‘Our Wealth’ – became the flagship of CBNRM in the country.

By 2002, there was some question as to whether there was a reasonable relationship between project inputs and outputs. Between 1994 and 2001, about US\$1.8 million had been invested; the communities had received about US\$50,000 and the District governments of Mágoa and Zumba had received about US\$46,000 (GRNB, 2002). Since then, income has increased, partially due to the expansion of the project, which now covers twenty-seven communities and 3.9 million ha. Between 2006 and 2009, these communities of about 135,000 people received about US\$287,000. At the same time, after a revision of the 1995 Ministerial Act in 2003, US\$279,000 was allocated to the program that manages Tchuma Tchato in order to guarantee the sustainability of technical support (Chidiamassamba, 2010).

A recent evaluation points at the fact that the impact of the revenues is still small and that, above all, local capacity to use the funds for development remains limited. It also notes that the relationship between the project implementers and the community is often weak or even bad (Chidiamassamba, 2010).

FAO Community Forestry Project and the Movement Towards CBNRM

Three years after the start of Tchuma Tchato, in 1997, the FAO initiated a CBNRM program based in the DNFFB headquarters. It operated between 1997 and 2003 and supported training and research activities at the Forestry Research Centre (CEF), the Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) (the main public university in Maputo), the Chimoio Agricultural Training Institute (IAC) (the only mid-level forestry education institution) and pilot projects in eleven areas in five provinces (Maputo, Manica, Sofala, Niassa, and Nampula).


The project has given an enormous impulse to the movement towards CBNRM. However, its impact at the community level is mixed. Core to its approach was the creation of interest groups within a community around the production of specific commodities and services, generally but not exclusively based on wild natural resources. The smallest of these groups - engaged in raising rabbits in Matamanda in Niassa - had only three members while the largest – charcoal producers in Mahel in Maputo – had approximately one hundred members. The groups were built around commodities ranging from horticulture to carpentry to honey. Many of these groups faced serious problems, often as a result of the limited economic viability of their operations, which frequently affected their sustainability after the closure of the project (Foloma & Zacarias, 2004).

At about the same time, several international organizations began similar initiatives elsewhere, including German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (in Mabalane District in Gaza Province), Helvetas (in Matutuíne in Maputo Province and in Massingir in Gaza), IUCN (also in Matutuíne), and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (in Bazaruto). In addition, the Government established a special division within the DNFFB (now the National Directorate of Land and Forests, DNTF) to support CBNRM initiatives. The same happened at the provincial level within the Provincial Forest and Wildlife Service (SPFFB).

Between 1998 and the early 2000s, the Government, FAO, IUCN and other partners organized several conferences on CBNRM at which they tried to collect and learn from experiences to date and develop a common national vision on CBNRM (Filemão & Massangue, 2002). The impact of this movement is clearly visible: as depicted in Figure 6, between 1994 and 2005 the number of projects registered by DNTF increased from 0 to 68 (Macucule & Mangue, 1998) (Matakala & Mushove, 2001) (Foloma, M.,

2005). This period can thus be characterized as a significant time for CBNRM activities. Since 2005, however, DNTF has not registered any new CBNRM projects and no national conferences have taken place. At the same time, attention has moved away from natural resource management per se towards the implementation of Ministerial Act 93/2005 to secure a 20% community share in stumpage fees and hunting levies.

FIGURE 5: EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF CBNRM INITIATIVES PER REGION BETWEEN 1994 AND 2005



Transfrontier Conservation Areas

Another major milestone in CBNRM is the creation of Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs). Mozambique is part of five major existing or planned TFCAs, including: the Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area between Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland, covering a large section of the Maputo-Pondoland center of endemism; the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park between South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, which covers a vast area linking five national parks (Kruger, Gonarezhou, Limpopo, Banhine and Zinave); the Chimanimani Transfrontier Conservation Area joining Zimbabwe and Mozambique in the management of the Chimanimani Mountains; and the ZiMoZa area joining Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique in Tete in an area that roughly coincides with that covered by the Tchuma Tchato projected cited earlier. The fifth area is the proposed Niassa-Selous TFCA in the North, which should connect Niassa National Reserve in Mozambique with Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania (World Bank, 2005).

The only TFCAs currently gazetted and managed as such are the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park and the Chimanimani TFCA. The Mozambican side of this TFCA has encountered several difficulties, including the resettlement of resident communities that have proven quite reluctant to move. The unforeseen allocation of the area to which they were intended to relocate to a biofuels project complicated matters further. In addition, communities outside the Park feel increasingly threatened by the increased presence of large animals, notably elephants, and the consistent reluctance of park management to fence it off (Milgroom & Spienburg, 2008).

The World Bank provided a soft loan and the German Development Bank (KfW), French Development Agency (AFD), GTZ and the Peace Park Foundation provided additional support for the creation of

Limpopo National Park (MITUR, 2010; MAEE, 2007; World Bank, 2005). Critics of the Peace Parks Foundation's approach to conservation in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park ([Draper, Spierenburg, & Wels, 2004](#)) point to the paradoxical situation that, while the build-up of the park is presented as a community development project, forcing 27,000 residents to resettle outside the area represents a return to the old-fashioned 'parks-as-fortresses' approach.

Limpopo National Park might be considered an exceptional situation. People reside in almost all conservation areas in Mozambique and in almost none, except Limpopo, has there been a conscious strategy to remove them. Some areas, such as Niassa Reserve and Quirimbas National Park, include entire towns. Finding ways to maintain these towns and engage their populations in conservation efforts are essential to the survival of the parks.

The critical assessment by Draper, Spierenburg & Wels of this experience in Limpopo National Park raises an important question as to whether, despite the rhetoric, TFCAs represent a milestone on the road away from CBNRM. At the same time, however, the assessment overlooks the fact that conservation in Mozambique is not limited to parks. In contrast with fortresses, conservation areas in Mozambique are not enclosed by barriers³ and wildlife can move freely in and out. Because of the recuperation of animal populations and the return of people to the countryside after the war, human-wildlife clashes have increased in number and intensity, in particular in the districts bordering Kruger and Gonarezhou National Parks (AGRECO, 2008).

The absence of fences and the presence of wild animals in and outside of conservation areas pose a specific challenge. Current compensation arrangements only provide for paying a share of revenues from hunting and ecotourism in designated conservation areas. People living outside these areas and their respective buffer zones do not receive any share in these revenues. If large animals are to survive outside the conservation areas, this must change and the benefits to local people of living with wildlife must exceed the costs of living with wildlife and the benefits of living without wildlife (AGRECO, 2008).

The situation in Chimanimani National Reserve, the other TFCA that is currently operational, is less dramatic than in Limpopo National Park. Here, there are no plans for resettlement and the park management authority is looking for ways to positively engage communities in the buffer zone in conservation (see Box 4 for an example).

2.3 NATIONAL VISION FOR CBNRM

Since 1998 the government and its partners, including the FAO, IUCN, WWF and others, have organized three national conferences about CBNRM. The third national conference, in 2004, defined CBNRM as follows:

“CBNRM is a strategy adopted by the government to implement the social objective of the 1997 Forest and Wildlife Development Policy and Strategy to improve simultaneously the living conditions of the rural community and guarantee participation and sustainable management of the natural resource” (Cuco, 2005) .

³ Private game farms are required to have a fence (Article 30 of Law 10/97). In reality however, they rarely put barriers around their perimeters.

As of 2010, however, there was apparently no longer a clear national vision of CBNRM. During a meeting at the DNTF on October 28, 2010, participants said:

“In the past, the concept was clear. CBNRM management was about the sustainable use of indigenous forest resources. Today we are talking about the management of the 20% community share in logging licenses and entry fees. But we need also to talk about the “one leader one forest” program of the Government: the creation of village woodlots. And we have to talk about the relationships the international companies currently investing in large-scale forest plantations in Niassa and Zambézia develop – or fail to develop – with the neighboring communities. Community involvement and community benefits need to be guaranteed, also in the case of these companies, for example as part of their social responsibility programs.”

Without the Government taking the lead, CBNRM proponents, appear unable to organize the fourth national conference, foreseen for 2010 but postponed several times due to problems unconnected with CBNRM itself. The apparent difficulty in arranging this important meeting is perhaps another sign of the challenges currently facing CBNRM in Mozambique.

2.4 KEY CBNRM INSTITUTIONS AND PROGRAMS

In addition to communities and Community Based Organizations (CBOs), there are three kinds of institutions engaged in CBNRM: government agencies, multilateral and bilateral agencies, and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Table 3 provides a summary of the most important institutions, their main activities and locations and the kinds of interactions they have with local communities.

Among government institutions, key agencies include: DNTF, housed within MINAG; the National Directorate for Conservation Areas (DNAC) within the Ministry of Tourism (MITUR); and the Institute for the Development of Small-Scale Fisheries (IDPPE), under the Ministry of Fisheries. The DNFFB/DNTF has traditionally played a central role in the development of CBNRM, and was the main point of entry for the FAO project in the late 1990s. Under the Forest and Wildlife Development Policy Law, DNTF is required to pay 20% of the fees it collects to forest communities. The DNTF is represented at the provincial level through the SPFFBs and at the district level through technicians within the District Service for Economic Activities (SDAE). At the central and provincial levels there are specific departments for community forestry.

DNAC was created in 2000, when the responsibility for the management of parks and hunting reserves was transferred from MINAG to the newly created MITUR. At the provincial level DNAC is represented through the Conservation Areas Department within the Provincial Tourism Directorates (DPTURs). There is no specific community liaison section within MITUR at the different levels.

TABLE 3: KEY CBNRM INSTITUTIONS

Type	Organization	Activity	Where	Community involvement
Government	DNTF, SPFFB	Payment of 20% fees, capacity building	Nationwide	Creation of NRM committees, application of revenues, training of community members
	DNAC, DPTUR	Payment of 20% fees	Nationwide	Creation of NRM committees, application of revenues
	IDPPE	Resources management capacity	Nationwide	Creation of fisheries committees and fishermen's associations
Multilateral or bilateral agency	World Bank (GEF)	Support to TFCAs	Gaza (PNL)	Resettlement, community benefits, community organization in TFCAs
	FAO	Capacity building and pilot projects	Maputo, Gaza, Manica, Nampula	Training of staff and students, support for community NRM practices; Support to CBNRM in Gaza as part of a climate change project
	GTZ (Germany)	Pilot project	Gaza	Forest management plan, management committee
	SNV (Netherlands)	Pilot project	Nampula	GEREN natural resource management project
	Various	Financial support	Gaza, Manica, Sofala	Support to ITC – Communal Land Initiative, implemented by KPMG
	Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (USA)	Financial support	Niassa, Cabo Delgado	Support to ITC – Communal Land Initiative implemented by KPMG
International NGO	Ford Foundation	Financial support	Tete and Manica	Tchuma Tchato project, communities in the Chimanimani buffer zone
	WWF	Capacity building	Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Manica	Wildlife conservation associated benefits to communities; ecotourism
	IUCN	Capacity building	Maputo, Gaza, Niassa	Community managed ecotourism efforts, Chipanje Chetu
	CARE	Natural resource management	Nampula	Community organization; integration of advocacy, forest management, and agricultural development
National NGO	ORAM	Support to communities that want to control their resources	Principally in Nampula, Zambézia, Sofala and Manica	Land titling; setting up community management structures; design of management and business plans and support for business start-ups
	Forum Terra	Support to communities that want to control their resources	Nampula, Cabo Delgado	Land titling and support to the build-up of local capacity, including the training of community forest scouts

IDPPE was established in 1987 to promote the development of artisanal fisheries through integrated projects. One of the key problems faced by artisanal fishermen is conflict over declining resources. The Strategic Plan for the Co-Management of Artisanal Fisheries in Mozambique (PEPSA) is intended to achieve a better balance between the needs of the population and the capacity of the resource base through improved fishing techniques and market linkages and enhanced coordination of fishing activities through local management committees (Eide, 2007; IDPPE, 2002). Fishing is administered through committees at four levels: central, provincial, district and community. This fisheries administration model was developed in Nampula Province (IDPPE, 2002).

The second category of institution engaged in CBNRM activities in Mozambique comprises the multilateral and bilateral development agencies. Among these, FAO has played a key role in the past and continues to do so as part of a joint United Nations Agencies' climate change project that is implementing a CBNRM initiative in Chicualacuala District in Gaza Province. As part of this effort, it has carried out baseline and resource inventories and designed a management plan. The inventory process involved approximately 18 community members (about 1.5% of the local population) and used simple tools and sampling techniques so that the community can repeat the exercise in the future.

Other agencies in this category that have played a role in the past but that have been less prominent since 2005 are the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), which provided support to a Niassa Reserve community project; Helvetas, with programs in Gaza and Maputo provinces; and the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), with the Natural Resource Management (GEREN) project in Nampula Province up until 2005. The latter project also received financial support from IUCN and focused primarily on community resources management, the development of economic activities, and integration into the participatory district planning process. A group of local partner organizations implemented the project but apparently showed little ownership in it and their engagement seemed to be strongly correlated to funding. The main executing partners were *Organização Rural de Ajuda Mútua* (ORAM) and *Associação Moçambicana de Desenvolvimento Rural* (AMODER); the latter organization also supported the credit component of GEREN (Simon & Assulai, 2005). One other agency of note in this category is the GTZ, which worked with a charcoal burning community in Mabalane District, Gaza Province, under a regional CBNRM project in five countries, including Mozambique (Kasperek, 2008) (see Box 1).

Box 2: Local communities: present without commitment

The Niassa Reserve has set up a large CBNRM project with support from NORAD. Each district has a district-wide management committee, on which village level committees are represented. These village committees, in turn, select their members so that the various neighborhoods are represented.

The Reserve's main source of income is the leasing of hunting concessions in designated areas around it. The communities receive a share in this revenue directly from the Reserve and indirectly from the Ministry of Tourism.

One of the first investments made with these revenues was to fence off farmland in the blocks around the reserve for protection from marauding wildlife.

Today, only one community is maintaining the fence. In other areas, community members have found a different use for the hundreds of kilometers of barbed wire: as traps.

This experience shows that the current revenue sharing arrangement does not produce significant changes in local attitudes towards wildlife resources.

Figure 6: The collection of traps made out of cut fences exposed at Niassa Reserve's main camp



Six countries, including the United Kingdom (UK), Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark, have partnered under the leadership of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to create the Community Land Initiative (ITC). Implemented by KPMB, ITC supports organizations working to secure community land titles in the Provinces of Cabo Delgado, Gaza, and Manica. Since 2009, ITC also operates with funds from Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in the Provinces of Nampula, Niassa and Zambézia. Between 2006 and 2011, ITC assisted 188 communities in 25 districts in the Provinces of Gaza, Manica and Sofala with the delimitation of 186.000 ha (ITC, 2011). The objective is not only to assist communities to secure resource rights vis-a-vis outsider investors but also to enable them to use the land as a starting point for activities that will engender local development.

USAID has engaged in CBNRM activities in Mozambique through support to projects implemented by WWF in Quirimbas and Limpopo National Parks and by the Carr Foundation in Gorongosa National Park (USAID, 2008). It also provides support to WWF for the Chipanje Chetu project in Niassa.

The third category of institution consists of international and national NGOs and independent organizations, including the Ford Foundation, IUCN, WWF, ORAM, Forum Terra and more recently ITC and the U.S. development organization CARE. The Ford Foundation contributed to the initiation of CBNRM activities in Mozambique with the creation of the Tchuma Tchato program in Tete Province. It has also been a key player in the creation of the Chimanimani National Park and its community tourism projects.

IUCN has played a role in setting up ecotourism initiatives in provinces such as Maputo, Tete and Niassa. In the latter province, it initiated the Chipanje Chetu project. After IUCN ended its support, WWF became active here (for more on Chipanje Chetu, see Box 7). With support from USAID, WWF has been particularly active in efforts in Niassa and Cabo Delgado to create a conservation zone connecting Lake Niassa (also known as Lake Malawi) and the Indian Ocean. WWF is supporting the management of Quirimbas and Bazaruto National Parks, where it has sought to engage with communities as a means to increase local benefits from conservation. WWF also works with CARE in promoting community involvement in fisheries resource management in Ilhas Primeiras e Segundas and the neighboring coastal area of Angoche District in Nampula Province.

Box 3: An empty bed is still worth a lot of money

Tourism is the foundation of conservation related CBNRM projects in national parks and private hunting areas. This kind of tourism is exclusive. In 2010:

- About 12 people visited the 6,500 km² Chipanje Chetu CBNRM hunting area in Sanga;
- About 8 people visited the 1,000 km² private hunting preserve of Mozambique Wild Adventures, between Marrupa and Mecula;
- About 100 people visited the 42,000 km² Niassa National Reserve and hunting concessions.

Figure 7: The beds in the safari camps are empty most of the time.



Hunting is expensive: one hunter will spend on average US\$15,000 in 10 days. “*With 200 hunters I can make the Niassa Reserve viable*” (Anabela Rodrigues, Executive Director SRN).

Hunting also uses extensive land areas, while local communities hardly notice the tourists in their areas. The 20% payment thus appears isolated from the number of tourists received and hence from the quality of the resource. By the same token, the communities remain invisible to the tourists.

CARE is a more recent actor in CBNRM. It started the Forest and Agriculture Program in Mozambique (FAPIM) in Nampula Province in 2009. The project's pilot activity in Meconta District will continue until 2011 with US\$800,000 in support from DANIDA (Brouwer, 2009).

ORAM is a nationwide farmers' organization. It has delegations in all provinces that operate with a large degree of autonomy from its headquarters in Maputo City. Since the mid- 1990s, ORAM has been actively involved in the discussions about the 1997 Land Law. It was one of the drivers behind the Law's recognition of community property rights. Since the enactment of the Land Law, ORAM has been very active in supporting communities in securing their collective land ownership rights, in particular in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambézia. Forum Terra is a platform of provincial NGOs operating in Cabo Delgado, Manica and Nampula. Its importance depends significantly on local leadership. In Nampula, Forum Terra has been engaged in various CBNRM projects, for example, through the training of forest scouts. It is also active in Cabo Delgado, where it has mobilized support from ITC for community land titling. In Manica, in contrast, the organization is present but not very prominent.

Box 4: Joint venture

Micaia is a Mozambican NGO that seeks to combine conservation with community development.

One of its projects is Ndzou Camp in the Moribane Forest Reserve. This camp is a joint venture with Mpunga, a community of about 322 households dispersed over 4 hamlets. The community association Kubatana Moribane owns 60% of the lodge's shares, thanks to a loan by the TFCA project. The total investment is US\$340,000.

Setting up the camp was initially a challenge. One of the main obstacles was winning the trust of the community. When Micaia arrived, people were wary of unfulfilled promises.

José Manuel is one of the three community members on the Board of Directors. He explains that the community, through its representatives on the Board and the financial supervision commission, has full insight into the operation of the enterprise. Community members know much is spent and earned. The community also participates with Micaia in day-to-day management decision-making. The Board meets at least once a month.

Figure 8: Mr. José Manuel and Mr. Ruben Chiquate, two of the community's representatives on the Board of Directors.



3. SCALE OF CBNRM PROGRAM

3.1 TYPES OF CBNRM ACTIVITIES

The legal and policy reform milestones presented in section 2.2.1 of this report constitute the framework for CBNRM management in Mozambique. They have established the foundation for securing community rights over natural resources and developing an organizational infrastructure for CBNRM. This framework has coevolved with the implementation of a series of projects aimed at building a sustainable relationship between communities and their resource base. Section 2.2.2 has presented the most important of these. At the same time, this framework has created arrangements for resource co-management in which the state pays communities a share of stumpage fees and other natural resource use levies paid by third party commercial operators. Since 2005, the main focus of CBNRM activity has been the implementation of the rules guiding the transfer of payments to communities.

As a result, it is now possible to discern five types of CBNRM in Mozambique. These five types vary by the nature of community participation and the form of income generation.

1. The community obtains basic resource rights (e.g., community land right certificates) and builds elementary organizational infrastructure, such as a management committee ('absentee landlord');
2. The community forms a partnership with the private sector to promote local development and sustainable resource use ('administrator');
3. The community exploits natural resources under a management plan ('extractive beneficiary');
4. The community is co-owner of a commercial enterprise exploiting the resource base ('joint venture'); and
5. A community enterprise operates under a management plan aimed at sustainable resource use, following business principles that guarantee the creation of local value added and employment benefits ('manager').

Table 4 presents the different community roles under the five types of CBNRM for both extractive uses of natural resources (e.g., hunting, logging, charcoal burning, and fishing) and non-extractive uses (such as photo-tourism and ecotourism).

TABLE 4: TYPES OF CBNRM IN MOZAMBIQUE BY KIND OF RESOURCE USE AND THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY

Type of resource use	The community's role				
	Absentee landlord	Administrator	Extractive beneficiary	Joint venture	Manager
Extractive resource use	20% share in levies and state fees	20% share + share in profits, selection of operator	Share in fees and profits, Collective license,	20% share + share in profits, co-owner of operator	20% + revenues from forest hunting safaris
Non-extractive resource use	20% share in entrance fees	20% share + share of profits, selection of the operator	20% + profits, selection of the operator, spin-off income from business	20% share + profits, co-owner of the operator	20% share + lodge owner and exploiter

Under the first kind of arrangement, despite being present, the community essentially assumes the role of an absentee landlord. After securing its ownership rights, it receives rent without playing an active role in resource management and exploitation. There is also no direct link between the rent and the behavior of the community towards the resource. The 20% payments are the most widespread manifestation of this type of project (Box 2). Private hunting operations, such as Mozambique Wild Adventures, also fit in this category. It should be added that these hunting operations affect an extensive land area and, compared to logging, are also highly profitable (See Box 3)

Under the ‘administrator’ arrangement, the community remains a landlord, but is no longer ‘absent’ and assumes a more active role. It not only shares in the state levies but also directly in the profits (and losses) of enterprises based on natural resource exploitation. Similar to the previous category, the exploitation is in the hands of a third party or “tenant”; this party will, for instance, operate a safari company, lodge or a logging operation. The community acts as manager or supervisor of the tenant’s operation. Tchuma Tchato and Chipanje Chetu are examples of this kind of projects. Compared to the absentee landlord model, there is a more direct relation between the success of the operation and the revenues to the community, although even with a successful business operation the community may not benefit if other conditions are not met (see Box 7). However, this arrangement cannot be considered a joint venture as the

Box 5: Community in charge

Nipiodi is a community in Zambézia whose 12,000 members acquired a 20,000 ha forest concession from the Government, the first community-managed concession in the country.

In the past, private operators had exploited the area without creating jobs. Any local residents they employed were paid badly or not at all.

The community received the 20% payment but viewed these benefits as insignificant. As the community committee’s president, Mr. Marco Vítor Malama, puts it, “We saw our logs disappear, while our houses didn’t have doors, and we slept on the ground instead of in a bed.”

Today, as a result of support from ORAM and Oxfam-Novib, the community operates a saw mill and has set up five carpentries that supply the local and regional market.

The entire operation employs 4 saw operators, 14 temporary workers, 15 masters, 20 assistants and 9 scouts, or a total of 62 people on a permanent basis. The job of financial manager is also a paid position and reports to a separate community enterprise structure under the community natural resource management committee.

Figure 9: The Nipiodi sawmill – a new landmark in CBNRM in Mozambique



community is not directly involved in the actual business operation.

Under the ‘extractive beneficiary’ arrangement, the community is no longer only an administrator but engages directly in the exploitation of the resource. One example in this category is the granting of collective licenses for charcoal production to community members in Mabalane in Gaza (Box 1) and in Pindanganga in Manica (Box 6). Another example is the production of *mušširo*, a traditional cosmetic extracted from tree bark by a women’s group in Mossuril, Nampula Province. In 2009, the 24 members of this group produced 100 boxes of the cosmetic per week. They sold them for 30.00 Mt to the SPFFB community liaison agent in Nampula who, in turn, organized the retailing. Compared to the next two categories, the community group is only loosely organized and is not normally formalized as a Community Based Enterprise (CBE). Its productive activities are still very much focused on extraction and directly connected to the exploitation of the natural resource.

The fourth type of CBNRM is the ‘joint venture’ arrangement. A good example of this is the project set up by Micaia in the Moribane forest reserve in Sussundenga (Manica). The project consists of a tourism lodge enterprise that is co-owned by the community and an external investor. Both parties bring in capital and skills and both parties share in decision-making and in the profits and losses (for details, see Box 4).

Under the fifth type of arrangement, communities are in full control of operations along the value chain. Here, the community acts as landlord, administrator, and extractor and is engaged in adding value to the resource and generating employment. In other words, it becomes the manager of its own CBE. Examples of this type are the community lodges set up by IUCN and Helvetas in Matutuíne (Maputo) and Massingir (Gaza). Other examples include community saw mill concessions in Mocuba (see Box 5) and Maganja da Costa (Zambézia), supported by ORAM, and in Macossa (Manica) supported by WWF. In addition, the Ndzou Camp ecotourism project (Box 4) is designed so that after five years it will transition from a joint venture to a fully community-owned and managed operation. At that time it is expected that the community will have acquired the necessary business skills and the community institutions will be sufficiently consolidated to assume full control over the operation.

FIVE ASPECTS OF RIGHTS TO NATURAL RESOURCES

Analyzing the design principles of viable CBNRM institutions, Ostrom (2008) distinguishes five aspects of rights over natural resources: the right to enter (access), the right to exploit (extract or withdraw), the right to manage and set management rules, the right to exclude third parties from access, and the right to transfer rights to third parties (alienation) (Table 5).

The one issue that remains implicit in Ostrom’s model is obligation. The right to access includes the obligation not to trespass on others’ rights. The corollary of the right to extract is the obligation to obey the norms, rules and bylaws defined by or emanating from the management plan. Finally, the right to manage implies the obligation to define rules that are just and adequate and to dedicate resources to their enforcement, as well as be transparent to community members in the application of community benefits.

Table 5 presents a schematic of the five rights identified by Ostrom (2008) and their relationships to the roles of the three key parties involved in CBNRM – the community, the government and third party operators, such as loggers and safari operators – in contexts ranging from conservation area management to artisanal fishing. The table makes clear that, in all contexts, the government maintains a predominant role. Although it is legally obliged to consult with communities, in the end the government is the party that allocates various resource-use rights.

In conservation areas, local communities essentially have no rights: according to the law, they cannot reside in national parks and reserves. Sharing entrance fee revenues with resident communities, therefore, undercuts conservation strategies by making living in a conservancy attractive.

In contrast, communities in buffer zones have a legally recognized right to live in and occupy the land, so paying them 20% of the levies on the conservation area revenues is less problematic. In some cases communities in buffer zones have secured communal land holding rights (De Wit & Norfolk, 2010).

In the case of tourism, a tripartite arrangement often emerges involving the government, communities and operators, sometimes facilitated by NGOs. The tourism operator, such as a safari or lodge owner, will normally make all operational decisions with respect to resource access and exclusion. In the case of forestry, on the other hand, the third parties are loggers. Their access to the resource requires community approval and they must manage the resource on the basis of a government-approved management plan.

TABLE 5: ROLES OF GOVERNMENT, OPERATORS AND COMMUNITIES WITH REGARD TO THE FIVE KEY RIGHTS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IDENTIFIED BY ELINOR OSTROM IN DIFFERENT CBNRM SETTINGS

Right	Biodiversity conservation		Sustainable use of natural resources			
	Conservation areas	Eco-tourism	Hunting safaris	Timber	Charcoal	Fishing (artisanal)
Access	Government	Lodge owner	Safari operator	Government Community	Government Community	Government Community
Withdrawal	Community	-	Safari operator	Logger	Charcoal burner	Fisher
Management	Government	Lodge owner	Safari operator	Government	Government, community	Government, community
Exclusion	Government	Lodge owner	Safari operator	Government Community	Government Community	Government Community
Alienation	Government	Government Community	Government Community	Government Community	Government Community	Government Community

Charcoal burners and artisanal fishermen are typically community members; they must obtain a license from the government but also need to respect specific community rules. For example, charcoal burners are not normally allowed to cut woody species bearing edible fruits. In reality, community members rarely obtain a license. Instead, wholesalers who buy charcoal from the local producers and transport it to the urban centers, and need to be able to show a document at checkpoints along the main roads, are usually the ones who obtain a license.

3.2 GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT

3.2.1 CBNRM PROJECTS

A list compiled on the basis of information from NGOs operating in the country shows that between 1997 and 2010, 107 CBNRM projects existed. The average area covered by each project is about 411,000 ha and the average number of beneficiaries is 15,000. The mean community size is 6,000 people. The average total budget of these projects is US \$1.6 million.

TABLE 6: ESTIMATED IMPACT INDICATORS OF 107 CBNRM PROJECTS IN MOZAMBIQUE

Indicator	CBNRM projects			National reference		Percentage covered by CBNRM
	Average per project	n	Estimated in all 107 projects	Indicator	Value	
Area (ha)	411.095	25	43.987.165	Total area	78,112,900	56%
Budget (US\$)	1.593.396	7	170.493.341	GDP (2009)	9,800,000,000	2%
Beneficiaries (nr)	14.943	18	1.598.889	Population	21,000,000	8%

Assuming that these values are representative of all CBNRM projects, they imply that between 1997 and 2010 almost 78 million ha of land, or 56% of the country's land area, is or has been under some form of CBNRM and that CBNRM projects have benefited about 1.6 million people, or 8% of the population. However, the information used to extrapolate these figures is far from comprehensive. Only 25 of the 107 projects indicated the size of the project area, only 18 specified the number of beneficiaries and only 7 projects were able to provide budget information, which was sometimes quite rough (Table 6).

One common feature of many of these projects is the training and recruitment of community scouts. In the absence of government rangers, patrolling the forest is delegated to the communities. The remuneration to the scouts can represent the most important economic benefit to a community from a CBNRM project (Box 6).

3.2.2 COMMUNITIES BENEFITTING FROM THE 20% ARRANGEMENT

In addition to the benefits derived from these projects, communities can also benefit from the 20% provision. Some of these communities are covered in the 107 projects cited above, as NGO assistance is often crucial for a community to meet the prerequisites to benefit from the 20% arrangement. As explained earlier, there are two sources for the 20% payment: MINAG (through DNTF) for the exploitation of timber and charcoal and MITUR (through DNAC) for the revenues from conservation areas (entrance fees) and hunting fees.

DNAC was unwilling or unable to provide a summary of the payments made by MITUR. It is therefore impossible to present information about the number of communities involved in the 20% arrangement through MITUR, how much they receive, or if payments are made on a regular basis. Interviews with DPTUR and communities in Niassa indicate that the payments since 2007 and 2008 are still outstanding.

The data provided by DNTF indicate that, since 2006, the volume of funds that MINAG has transferred to communities has increased, as has the number of communities benefiting from this arrangement. DNTF has encouraged the provincial forestry and wildlife services to engage with NGOs to accelerate the creation of committees that meet the standards set by the Ministerial Act 93/2005 to receive these funds.

TABLE 7: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DISTRICTS PER PROVINCE WITH A COMMITTEE FOR 20% FOREST REVENUE


Province	Number of districts with committees receiving 20%	Total districts in the province	Percentage of districts in the province with committees receiving 20%
C. Delgado	9	16	56.3%
Gaza	8	11	72.7%
Inhambane	7	12	58.3%
Manica	9	9	100.0%
Maputo	5	7	71.4%
Nampula	17	18	94.4%
Niassa	5	15	33.3%
Sofale	8	12	66.7%
Tete	7	12	58.3%
Zambézia	14	16	87.5%
Total	89	128	69.5%

The information provided by DNTF includes a list of all committees that receive the 20% payments, along with their respective districts. The list contains references to 597 communities that have organized themselves in accordance with this Act.

This list allows for an assessment of the relative importance of the 20% arrangement across geographic regions using the percentage of districts in each province with CBNRM committees that received funds from MINAG under Ministerial Act 93/2005 over the last three years. In 89 of 128 districts, there are CBNRM committees in charge of the local forests. The province with the highest coverage is Manica (in 100% of the districts), and the province with the lowest coverage is Niassa, with only 33% (Table 7).

Figure 11 presents the distribution of the approximately 330 of the 597 communities in the country that received money under the 20% fee mechanism in 2009 and whose coordinates could be identified. It shows that these communities are dispersed over the entire country.

FIGURE 10: LOCATION OF COMMUNITIES BENEFITTING FROM 20% OF THE FORESTRY FEES IN 2009



3.3 NUMBER OF HECTARES UNDER CBNRM MANAGEMENT

MINAG did not provide data about the area benefitting from the 20% arrangement for forest revenues, probably because it is not collecting this information. One way to estimate this figure is to look at the percentage of the payment due that was actually disbursed.

The DNTF has to guarantee the payment of 20% of the logging license fees. The data DNTF supplied for the present study show a steady increase in the amount disbursed on behalf of communities. This figure rose from 45% of the community share of the collected fees in 2006 to 65% in 2008 (IGF, 2010). The low percentages during the initial years following passage of Ministerial Act 93/2005 point to the difficulties faced by communities, supporting NGOs and DNTF in satisfying the norms established by the Act regarding the legalization of community committees and establishment of bank accounts. While the Ministerial Act provides for the transfer of funds to a bank account, the communities are typically located in rural areas where there is no bank.

The total productive forest area in Mozambique is 26.9 million ha (Martoli, 2007). This suggests that the 597 organized communities that have benefited from the 20% fee arrangement since 2006 control about 23.4 million ha of forest or, on average, each community controls about 39,200 ha of productive forests.

In many cases the communities with forest land will also have land that is not productive forest. Thus, the total area controlled by communities is likely to be larger than suggested by the previous figures. ORAM Sofala maintains a very useful database on the 55 communities it works with. The 33 communities with a stake in forest exploitation registered by ORAM Sofala have on average an area of 67,000 ha of land covered by forests, savannah and grasslands. This value is similar to the average size of community land as delimited at the national level (De Wit & Norfolk, 2010). If we take this number as a representative figure for the entire country, this would mean that 40,000,000 ha are under the forest management committees.

Current information indicates that up to and including 2009, DNTF generated about 636.4 million Mt from licenses for the exploitation of natural resources. The 20% community share of this total revenue amounts to 127.28 million Mt, although DNTF has not transferred this full amount to the communities.

This estimate should be qualified in several manners:

- The increase in the percentage paid is at least partially the result of delayed processing of payments from previous years. Thus the percentage of productive forests covered by management committees is probably smaller than the 87% here estimated;
- The payment amounts vary considerably across communities. Between 2006 and 2009 the lowest payment was 360 Mt (US\$15), paid to Goba in Maputo province in 2007. The highest amount during the same period was 1,169,620 Mt (US\$47,935), paid in 2009 to Chiure, Cabo Delgado (for exchange rates, see Table 8).
- Revenues from the 20% arrangements are not a steady source of income: communities may receive payment in one year and not in another year, depending on where loggers operate. For example, the Pindanganga community in Gondola District in Manica Province received 337,759 Mt (US\$13,000) in 2006, 138,334 Mt (US\$5,800) in 2007 and nothing in 2008.

Box 6: Community scouts

An important role of communities in CBNRM is policing the resource.

Many CBNRM projects, therefore, train and employ community scouts. There is no systematic information about the number of community scouts who have been trained, but it is likely that the hiring of scouts constitutes the largest impact of CBNRM in terms of employment.

Normally community scouts are paid with revenues from the 20% arrangement. Irregularities in these payments by MINAG and MITUR can have a noticeable effect on the work performance and motivation of these scouts.

Only in exceptional cases, such as in Nipiodi, are there additional revenues that guarantee payments to these community members.

Community scouts are critical to the policing of CBNRM areas as the government is notoriously short of rangers.

Figure 12: The community scouts of Pindanganga, Manica Province



TABLE 8: US DOLLAR - METICAL EXCHANGE RATES 2006-2010.

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 ^a
Mt/US\$	26.00	23.80	25.50	24.40	34.01
US\$/Mt	0.0385	0.0420	0,0392	0.0410	0.0294

Source: (EIU, 2010) ^a Calculated from <http://www.mataf.net/en/histo/MZN-USD>

Not all communities are well organized and even those that are may not receive funds. Bureaucratic obstacles can hinder the legal establishment of a management committee and the opening of a bank account. Financial obstacles include high transaction costs; for example, people may have to travel more than 100 km to reach a bank, incurring expenses that may surpass the 20% fee amount. The NGO Forum Terra in Cabo Delgado has a history of supporting CBNRM initiatives. During a meeting in October 2010, its representatives explained that it has now adopted a policy to only support the creation of management committees if the value of the 20% payment to be received is at least 100,000 Mt (US\$2,900). Lower amounts do not warrant support as the funds that remain after deducting the costs of creating the committee are too little to have an impact on local development.

3.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMS

3.4.1 POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The government of Mozambique has elaborated its priorities and strategies with regard to poverty alleviation in three consecutive poverty reduction action plans (PARPA I, PARPA II and PARP). It has also subscribed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). PARPA II (2006-2009) addresses the management of forests under environment and under energy, emphasizing the issue of sustainability. It also refers to the need to guarantee equitable access by communities and individuals to land, forest and wildlife resources. It makes no explicit reference to CBNRM.

The most recent assessment of poverty in Mozambique suggests that in recent years poverty levels have remained stagnant at 55% (see chapter 2.1.4). The government, however, has stated that there has been a substantial increase in access to services (GOM, 2010). Mozambique's last official report on the MDG website (www.mdgmonitor.org) dates from 2005. In general, it can be said that the government has achieved significant progress towards its goals regarding child mortality and maternal health, but that it is unlikely to reach other objectives. Taken together, Mozambique's progress with regard to poverty over the last five years appears to be quite small.

The contribution of CBNRM to poverty reduction (or to moderating the increase in poverty) is difficult to gauge due to the lack of data. At the same time, some initiatives have potential to make significant contributions (Nipiodi, Ndzou camp, etc.). It is too early to assess the extent to which this potential can be realized. However, the payment of the 20% community share of natural resource use fees does contribute to improvements in access to education and health care services, as many communities use their 20% share to (co-) finance the building or improvement of schools and rural clinics. The lack of data makes it impossible to assess the impacts of these improvements on achieving the MDGs.

3.4.2 ECONOMIC GROWTH

Current CBNRM arrangements primarily involve the transfer to communities of a part of the state revenues from natural resource exploitation. An important question is whether this transfer of funds will

promote economic growth more or less effectively than if the funds were retained at the central government level or returned to private operators. The available data do not allow for such an assessment. For example, the existence of grain mills in a village is positively correlated with household income, and localized investments in milling facilities are important for local economic development., However, without statistics about the number of mills that have been financed with the 20% funds and their operational status, it is difficult to draw conclusions about their economic impacts (Tschirley, et al., 2004).

These issues are further developed in the following chapters.

4 IMPACTS OF CBNRM PROGRAM TO DATE

4.1 CBNRM IMPACTS ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

4.1.1 IMPACTS OF CBNRM PROJECTS

There is no systematic overview of the impact of the CBNRM projects in Mozambique on local development. In some individual cases the impact appears to be significant. The communities in Combumune in Gaza province, for example, have been able to increase their incomes considerably by engaging in charcoal burning. As a result their income is now 30% higher than the average for the province (see Box 1) and charcoal is now their main source of income. This has even convinced young people who had left their communities to work as migrants in South Africa to return home and make a living as charcoal burners. In Gala, the investment in ecotourism projects by Swiss Helvetas has provided income to some members of the community and it is likely that the investment costs can be recovered. In neighboring Madjajane, in contrast, IUCN's ecotourism project has not created a significant flow of income for the community (Frederico, 2008). The picture is therefore mixed and it is difficult to assess what the real overall impacts of the CBNRM projects have been on rural development.

4.1.2 IMPACTS OF THE 20% ARRANGEMENT

The 20% arrangement is a currently the most prominent expression of CBNRM in the country. However, there are no systematic data about the number of communities that should and do benefit or the number of people involved. There is also no information about the number of beneficiaries per community. The information in the following paragraphs is therefore of necessity based on estimates and extrapolations.

TABLE 9: BENEFITS PER PROVINCE FROM THE 20% FORESTRY LEVIES BETWEEN 2006-2009

Province	Estimated total population in 2010 ^a	Communities that received payment ^b	Value paid between 2006 and 2009 ^b	Province share of total value paid	Estimated number of beneficiaries ^c	Percentage of the population ^c
	Number	Number	Metical	Percent	Number	Percent
Cabo Delg.	1,634,162	108	12,637,618	17.1%	972,000	59.5%
Gaza	1,320,970	45	2,396,003	3.2%	405,000	30.7%
Inhambane	1,304,820	34	3,673,765	5.0%	306,000	23.5%
Manica	1,672,038	44	5,815,832	7.9%	396,000	23.7%
Maputo	1,444,624	23	588,665	0.8%	207,000	14.3%
Nampula	4,191,210	165	6,224,407	8.4%	1,485,000	35.4%
Niassa	1,415,157	12	614,310	0.8%	108,000	7.6%
Sofala	1,857,611	22	11,669,744	15.8%	198,000	10.7%
Tete	2,137,700	53	6,310,002	8.5%	477,000	22.3%
Zambezia	4,327,163	125	23,916,702	32.4%	1,125,000	26.0%
Sum	21,305,455	631	73,847,048	100.0%	5,679,000	26.7%

^a On the basis of the 2007 census (INE); ^b DNTF annual report (DNTF, 2010); ^c Calculations.

The data in Table 9 show that since the publication of Ministerial Act 93/2005 establishing the procedures for the 20% payment, - almost 600 communities have benefited from a total amount of almost 74 million Mt. The provinces that received the largest shares of these revenues are Zambézia (32.4%), Cabo Delgado (17.1%) and Sofala (15.8%). The average size of the communities in the projects cited in Table 6 is 6,000 (See chapter 3.2.1). The average size of the communities in the database of ORAM Sofala is 12,600. It therefore seems safe to assume that, as a national average, a community will have about 9,000 residents. Using 9,000 as a reference value, almost 5.7 million people in 10 provinces would have benefited from the payment of the 20% forestry levies (Table 9). This is about 26.7% of the total population of these provinces estimated for 2010. The provinces with the largest percentages of beneficiaries are Cabo Delgado (59.5% of the population) and Nampula (35.4%).⁴

FIGURE 11: SCHOOL BUILT WITH CBNRM FUNDS FROM SRN



There is very little information about the impact of the 20% payments in communities. The DNTF has collected some data but they only concern 14 communities in 11 of the 89 districts benefitting from the 20% arrangements. Furthermore, these districts are situated in only two provinces: three in Inhambane and eight in Cabo Delgado.

The few data that are available, however, do provide some valuable insights into what communities do with the money they receive from forest exploitation fees. Communities appear to invest in education, agro-processing and agricultural production, and in social infrastructure.

- In eight of the eleven districts about which information exists, communities used the funds to build, rehabilitate, improve or equip schools;
- In four of the eleven districts communities invested the funds in maize mills;
- In three of the eleven districts, communities started agricultural projects, for instance by acquiring goats or cattle for animal traction, purchasing clean cassava or pineapple planting material, or starting collective farms;
- In three districts, communities used the funds to build other infrastructure such as a bridge, a borehole and a market (Source: data provided by DNTF for this study).

The lack of information is partially associated with the fact that the community management support unit in DNTF and the provincial forestry services are largely occupied with organizing the transfer of funds and have little time to build capacity or train community committee members. There is a serious lack of staff at provincial and district levels, where often only one technician is responsible for the entire forestry sector, including community forestry. This makes it almost impossible for government agencies to

⁴ Table 9 does not include Maputo City as this province is not affected by the 20% arrangements.

support the community committees after they have received the funds or to monitor the way in which the communities use the funds.

ORAM Sofala's database again provides some useful insights into the availability and application of the funds from the 20% arrangement. Of ORAM's 55 partner communities, 33 have forest exploitation activities in their territory and 23 have tourism-related activities. There is no information about the payment of revenues from tourism. According to DNTF data, 11 of those with forest exploitation in their territories (i.e., one third of those registered by ORAM) received a total of 430,550 Mt between 2006 and 2010. The ORAM data indicate that the communities intend to use the revenues for microcredit (33), maize mills (5), trucks to transport harvests to the market (4), classrooms (4), and other infrastructure (3). These data indicate that the communities assisted by ORAM intend to use a good share of the revenues to support farming. If these communities are successful in establishing microcredit schemes and other facilities to support farming, the funds liberated by the 20% mechanism may indeed have a significant impact on economic development.

4.2 CBNRM IMPACTS ON THE RESOURCE BASE

4.2.1 CHANGES IN RIGHTS TO BENEFIT FROM NATURAL RESOURCES

Since Independence, property rights over land and forest resources (particularly timber and game) have been vested in the state. The most important change since the mid-1990s is, without doubt, an increase in control over natural resources by local communities. While the government retains formal ownership of land, tree and wildlife resources as well as the authority to assign use and exploitation rights, it recognizes that local communities are entitled to have a voice in this process. People and companies who want to obtain logging rights, a land title or a safari license must consult the local communities.

Forest resources are exploited under three regimes with different legal requirements:

- **Subsistence:** For subsistence uses, no license is required; however, the products may not be traded outside the administrative post community.
- **Simple license:** For small-scale logging and commercial charcoal burning, a simple license is required. The costs of a logging license will depend on the species. A license for the most expensive species, such as Mpingo (or Pau Preto, *Dalbergia melanoxylon*), costs 1,000 Mt/m³ (US\$29.40/m³); for the species that are mostly commonly exploited such as Chanfuta (*Azelia quanzensis*), Umbila (*Pterocarpus angolensis*), and Mondzo (*Combretum imberbe*), the rate is only 250 Mt/m³ (US\$5.10/m³) (Portal do Governo de Moçambique, 2009). Thus for each m³ of Chanfuta, the community receives US\$1.02 and the price of a charcoal license is 10 Mt (about US\$0.29) per bag (IGF, 2010). Simple licenses are granted to nationals, valid for a one-year period and may not exceed 500 m³ (there is no formal maximum for charcoal, but this may change due to growing concerns about exploitation levels). Granting a license is contingent upon submission of a simple inventory, management plan, exploitation plan, a statement of the logger's exploitation capacity (number and size of trucks, etc.) and a statement of the local benefits. The provincial governor grants the simple license.
- **Concession:** For larger operations that may involve international capital, concessions are required. The provincial governor grants forest concessions for areas under 20,000 ha, while larger areas require approval by the Ministry. Granting of the concession is contingent upon submission of a full inventory,

management plan, statement of productive capacity and most importantly, of the capacity to transform the wood, i.e., through a saw mill. Forest concessions are long-term leases (50 year renewable).

For both simple logging licenses and forest concessions, community consultations are mandatory. This means that communities may block these activities in their territories. The community of Muzo in the District of Maganja da Costa in Zambézia Province has consistently blocked all requests as it wants to preserve the resource in order to start its own forest concession and saw mill.

In spite of the legal mandate for community consultation, a cursory analysis by the IGF of the processes for granting simple licenses (IGF, 2010) showed that these consultations are often a formality, never involving more than thirteen people and frequently only involving about seven people (the number of thirteen is determined by the number of available lines on the form that community members must sign as proof that they were consulted). There are no rules that guarantee that the consulted community members represent the community. There are also no means to verify the information in the required documents, making the consultation process highly susceptible to manipulation. IGF also points at weaknesses with regard to the simplified inventories, management and business plans:

“The requester merely fills in the form with false and fictitious figures without any basis in a real inventory or realistic estimates of stocks, turning the submission of the document a mere formality, without any relevance for the management of the resource... One may therefore conclude that the provincial forestry services submit to their respective provincial governors processes that do not obey the norms of the currently valid legislation”.

The lack of compliance with the legislation by the three main stakeholders (government, communities and private operators) probably constitutes the principle danger to the sustainability of the resource base and also undermines the capacity of forest resources to sustain community empowerment and growth.

FIGURE 12: DEMARCATED COMMUNITY AREAS (2010)



The Forest and Wildlife legislation provides for the use of forest resources for subsistence purposes. People living in rural communities are not normally required to obtain a license to hunt small animals or to gather firewood and charcoal for subsistence use, as long as they do not sell them on the market. As it is difficult to define “subsistence”, in practice the government will not interfere if a person burns charcoal and sells it to his neighbor. It will, however, intervene if the charcoal is sold to the outside market, which in this case is defined as outside the administrative post.

Partially because of this loophole, a large share of resource use is not licensed. IGF (2010) calculates that in 2009 about nine-tenths of all charcoal production was unlicensed. The financial threshold for entering the charcoal burning business is low: an axe or knife suffices. In important charcoal production areas such as Maputo and Gaza provinces, local community members are active in selling charcoal to urban markets but normally operate without a formal license.

The Forest and Wildlife Law also provides for commercial exploitation by local communities, who can request communal logging licenses for timber, firewood and charcoal. They can also obtain a communal forest concession. The Nipiodi community is the first one in the country to be granted a community forest concession (see Box 5: Community in charge).

Individual land ownership can be obtained in three ways: by submission of a request to the government; by *bona fide* occupation during at least 10 years; and through traditional occupation. The 1997 Land Law requires that the process of granting a land ownership title include community consultation. However, an individual's right to use land is not dependent on a formal land title.

TABLE 10: CERTIFIED AND ONGOING COMMUNITY LAND CLAIMS (DE WIT & NORFOLK, 2010)

Provinces	Number of communities			Delimited area	
	2003	02/2009		02/2009 (ha)	
	Certified	Certified	Ongoing	Certified	Ongoing
Maputo	7	11	11	98,786	55,337
Gaza	8	17	3	447,786	24,702
Inhambane	0	8	3	575,407	10,400
Sofala	5	11	3	648,288	778,699
Manica	4	7	7	226,374	553,656
Tete	0	0	27	0	3,928,912
Zambézia	28	73	18	3,637,001	568,011
Nampula	43	93	2	743,418	4,518
C. Delgado	0	0	0	0	0
Niassa	3	9	0	357,231	0
Total	98	229	74	6,734,287	5,924,235

The Land Law also recognizes community land ownership. Even if this is established on the basis of traditional community tenure practices, it requires government recognition. The government body with authority to grant such recognition varies with the size of the territory involved. For areas smaller than 1,000 ha, the provincial government may decide; for areas up to 10,000 ha, the decision resides with MINAG, and for areas larger than 10,000 ha the Council of Ministers must decide (Article 22 of Law 19/97) (De Wit & Norfolk, 2010). Table 10 provides a summary of the number of communities which obtained government recognition of their community ownership rights in 2003 and 2009 and the size of the areas involved.

According to De Wit and Norfolk (2010), over 6.7 million ha have been certified as community owned, representing about 9% of the total land area, with another 5.9 million ha awaiting recognition (Table 10). The size of community areas varies from less than 1,000 ha to over 100,000 ha. However, most areas are between 1,000 and 10,000 ha. De Wit and Norfolk (2010) estimate that about 10% of rural communities have been able to obtain recognition of their land rights. Figure 14 includes a map of demarcated community areas as of 2010.

There are three main obstacles to community land registration. First, the process is demand driven, meaning that a community has to request demarcation. Second, as there is no government budget for this purpose, communities depend on NGO support to cover the associated costs. Costs vary according to the size of the land area, ranging from \$2,000-\$8,000, but apparently this is not a significant obstacle for the NGOs involved. Finally, the government and non-governmental institutions that can carry out the community land titling process have limited capacity to do so (De Wit & Norfolk, 2010).

De Wit & Norfolk (2010) argue that the low percentage of communities that have been able to secure recognition of their land claims indicates that the obstacles they face in asserting their legal rights are still too high.

However, it is even more difficult for communities to obtain a forest concession. To date there have been at least three requests for community forestry concessions: two in Zambézia and one in Manica. Only one of these requests – Nipiodi in Zambézia – was granted, the remaining two are still in process. On the one hand, the small number of requests suggests how difficult it is for a community to meet the government standards for a forestry concession. According to Manito Lopes Coutinho of the Muzo community, the attempts by his community to acquire a community concession were until recently sabotaged by the SDAE in Maganja da Costa (Figure 16). On the other hand, this low number of requests points at the hurdles presented by the process in view of the level of communities' technical and entrepreneurial skills. In Nipiodi, there is only one person with the capacity to drive and oversee this process, so the recruitment of outside technical assistance and backstopping in business management and financial administration are fundamental. Currently, ORAM Zambézia provides such assistance using its own resources, as few donors are in a position to provide the necessary long-term commitment.

4.2.2 IMPACTS ON NATURAL RESOURCES

Chapter 2.1.4 reviewed some general trends with regard to the conservation status of the natural resource base in Mozambique. With the end of the war, populations of important wildlife species appear to be recovering. As a result, there are more incidents of people being hurt or losing goods due to animal attacks, making community involvement in and benefits from wildlife conservation more urgent.

Forest resources, on the other hand, are declining. Conversion of forests in to farmland, wildfires and forest exploitation for timber and charcoal are the main factors behind this trend.

The rate of decline is not clear. The DNTF national inventory published in 2007 had estimated deforestation on the basis of actual changes in land cover for the province of Manica only. It concluded that in this province, the forest area declined annually by 0.81% between 1990 and 2004. For the country as a whole, it estimated deforestation on the basis of a statistical correlation between the population density and the forest area, rather than on verification of actual changes in land cover. This yielded an estimated an annual deforestation rate of 0.58% (Martoli, 2007). One may question the accuracy of this estimate, particularly because when the statistical model is applied to Manica province it yields, a lower

Box 6: Community members can be crooks

The Chipanje Chetu project involves a 6,500 km² hunting concession in Sanga district. A relatively small community of about 1,200 people owns the concession and receives 20% of the hunting fees. Lipelixhi Wilderness, a subsidiary of the Portuguese Visabeira group, operates the concession.

Total community revenues between 2006 and 2010 exceeded US\$127,000 (with US\$76,700 outstanding). However, the impact of these funds is hardly visible. Community scouts complain that they are not paid. Over eight local initiatives that were to be funded by the concession revenues came to a standstill. In Maumbica, the community committee financed the building of a carpentry that is still operating, but with only 1 of the original group of 12 employees. All activities have stopped because the money has disappeared.

"The treasurer of the community committee was a crook" laments Chief Caribarise. "He took all the money and built a big house in the city. We complained with the local government but they do nothing. Perhaps they also took a cut. What can we do if even the government doesn't protect us?"

Figure 13: carpenter's workshop with carpenter Abdul Saide (right) and chief Amissiale Caribarise (center)



annual deforestation rate (0.75%) than the one determined through the interpretation of satellite imagery (0.81%)

There is no systematic evidence that community involvement in natural resources management or the payment of a share of government revenues to communities makes a significant difference in the quality of resource management. The examples of Combumune and Pindanganga (Box 1 and Box 6) suggest that the establishment of community ownership is no guarantee for sustainable use, even if these communities are equipped with resources such as a forest inventory, a management plan or community scouts. It appears that the availability of such resources by themselves is insufficient unless there is willingness on the part of the community and the government (in particular the SPFFBs) to comply with the norms contained in the management plans and to resist the lure of immediate profit over long-term benefits.

Information is also scarce with regard to the status of fish populations. Fish resources seem to decline as pressure from commercial and artisanal fishery increases. Anecdotal evidence suggests that community involvement helps to limit the use of destructive fishing techniques, such as fishing with mosquito nets and poison. According to José Cachambele, a fisherman in Metangula on Lake Niassa, the populations of certain species are recovering as a result of the creation of community structures that exclude fishermen from other areas and empower community leaders to monitor fishing techniques. However, the IDPPE delegation in Metangula has not collected data that substantiate this claim. Moreover, the impact of CBNRM initiatives may be outweighed by other factors such as an increase in industrial fishing.

4.3 CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE, RURAL REPRESENTATION AND ADVOCACY

The landmark legislation cited in chapter 2.2.1 is important in several important respects. It has brought power and responsibility to local communities regarding land and forest resources in their areas. The payment to communities of the 20% shares from forest and wildlife exploitation licenses requires the government to recognize a relationship between the resource base and the communities. In this sense, the forest and wildlife legislation has created a fundamentally different dynamic from the land tenure legislation, which requires communities to take the initiative to secure recognition of their land rights. The transfer of a share of forest and wildlife revenues in itself represents a flow of resources from the government to communities that puts them more in charge of their collective destinies.

FIGURE 14: TRUCKLOAD OF PANGA PANGA CONFISCATED BY THE COMMUNITY OF MUZO IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASSERT ITS RIGHTS OVER THE RESOURCE.



At the same time, there are some weak elements in this system. The 20% payment has transformed communities into landlords who do little more than collect the rent and use the funds for small investments. Most of these investments complement government investments in infrastructure, such as corrugated roofs on schools and teachers' houses, a bridge, or a well. Some are directed towards the creation of productive capacity, such as the acquisition of a herd of breeder goats. In many cases, the amount of funds is so small that transferring them is not cost-effective and impacts are minimal.

More importantly, under the 20% arrangement the community has no active role in managing the resource. The Government collects and distributes the 20% share and the community's behavior towards the resource has only a very indirect impact on the level of revenues it receives. This constitutes an insufficient incentive for communities to control wildfires, stop poaching or, in the case of the charcoal producing communities, forfeit immediate individual income for the common long-term good. Thus, despite their presence in the forest and in or close to conservation areas, the communities are in reality absentee landlords (Box 2).

Thus, the situation in Mozambique conforms to Liz Alden Wily's observation:

The management roles given to local people rarely extend beyond providing forest guard services, such as reporting intruders to government foresters, who alone possess the power to apprehend and fine illegal users. Local decision making is confined to determining the distribution and use of revenue received, usually through committees set up for this purpose. These committees provide a forum through which the forest managers inform local people of their future (Alden Wily, no date).

There have of course been attempts to create community management systems in which the community assumes genuine control and exploits the resource in a sustainable manner. However in many cases, as in Combumune (Box 1), the individual need for income is stronger than the collective capacity to keep individual resource exploitation in check and the management plan becomes an empty document. At the same time, interesting initiatives such as Ndzou Camp and Nipiodi (Box 4 and Box 5) suggest that sustainable CBNRM might be feasible both in terms of the resource and the institutions. It will be important to follow the progress of these initiatives to evaluate to what extent they could serve as examples for similar CBNRM initiatives elsewhere in the country.

5 ENABLING CONDITIONS

This stocktaking assessment has identified important factors in enabling the emergence of successful CBNRM activities. The key enabling conditions are:

- An array of policies, strategies and laws that strengthen community rights over resources (listed in Chapter 2.2.1);
- The presence of donors and NGOs that actively support the process of securing community resource rights and the creation of CBOs (listed in chapter 2.4);
- The obligation of third parties such as loggers to negotiate with communities when they want to exploit a resource (mentioned in 2.2.1 and analyzed in 4.2.1);
- The payment by MINAG and MITUR of 20% of the levies they receive to local communities (described in 4.1.2); and
- The willingness of communities to assume a role in the management of the natural resources in their environment (see also Figure 17).

The most important enabling condition is a general move towards decentralization and democratization. Frelimo is the hegemonic political force in the country and keeps a strong grip on events on the ground. At the same time, it does not want to alienate local communities. As a result, the Government often avoids conflicts. On the one hand, this creates a larger space for civil society and community initiatives. On the other hand, it also leads to insufficient coherence and firmness in applying policies and legislation when these are needed to secure long-term and broadly-based interests, such as resource sustainability, against short term profits and narrow interests.

Laws such as LOLE, the recognition of local (traditional) leaders, and the allocation of funds from the Local Initiatives Investment Budget (OILL, recently renamed the District Development Fund – FDD) to districts managed with the participation of the local consultative council have created a dynamic towards greater local empowerment. All of these measures help promote the involvement of local people in decision making concerning resource use for local development at the administrative post and district levels. Each is a small step that serves as a foothold from which to take greater steps and achieve a more enhanced role for citizens in the future (Alden Wily, no date).

With respect to natural resources in particular, the 1997 Land Law and the 1999 Forest and Wildlife Law have created new opportunities for community involvement in decision making about resource allocation and management. They also enhance community involvement through the payment of the 20% share of levies by implicitly recognizing local rights over the use of land and forests. In the fisheries sector, PEPSA is a key document in favoring CBNRM.

Several multi- and bilateral agencies and NGOs are providing critical support for CBNRM initiatives. This support includes helping communities to secure rights to land and other resources and providing technical assistance with regard to the sustainable management and exploitation of these resources.

The flow of funds under the 20% arrangement implies that, at the local level, money has become available in a public political space that is outside the immediate control of the government (even though

local government and party leaders continue to indirectly influence the process). To gain access to the funds, communities need to organize themselves; thus, the 20% arrangement promotes the emergence of local community natural resource governance structures. The money itself empowers communities to invest funds according to their own discretion, even though in many cases the funds are not very significant. This in turn creates a demand for accountability and transparency at the community level.

The registering of communal land is another process that helps to guarantee community rights. However, there is no systematic information about what communities do with the registered land. In many if not all cases, substantive business or land management plans that should ensure the transformation of these rights into value for the communities seem to be non-existent or are not implemented.

Together, the delimitation and certification of communal land ownership rights and the payment of the 20% share of stumpage and other fees from the exploitation of forest and wildlife resources have decisively changed the relationship between the resource, the community, and the State. The Government, while retaining its ultimate property rights, has acknowledged that communities by their nature have rights over the resource base. This is an important change in the political balance of power between the State and communities and also a first step towards the development of a new economic relationship between communities and natural resources.

At the same time, perverse markets for fuel, timber and items such as ivory and rhino horn are driving resource exploitation beyond sustainable levels. Carbon trade as promoted by Envirotrade in the Gorongosa area (Envirotrade, 2009) and mechanisms on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) may help to mitigate these pressures. REDD+ mechanisms such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the UN-REDD Programme look beyond deforestation and forest degradation to include the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (IIED, 2011). It will be important to explore the possibilities that REDD+ mechanisms might offer to channel funds to communities willing to manage their resources sustainably and respect the exploitation limits established in their management


6 LESSONS LEARNED

6.1 POLICY

Mozambique is gradually building up a body of legislation and practices that strengthen community control over and benefits from natural resources. In this way it is laying the foundation for CBNRM through a process where each step leads to the next.

At the same time, the manner in which the process is moving forward permits critical reflection on its strengths and flaws. CBNRM in Mozambique is now dominated by activities to secure community land titles and obtain the 20% community share. At the same time, there is not yet a balance between community entitlements and obligations: communities may behave as absentee landlords, present but disengaged from the management and condition of the resource. For CBNRM to successfully fulfill its role in natural resource management and community development it will be necessary to create incentives that hold the community responsible for the state of the resources to which it claims rights. These incentives should reward communities that engage in a positive manner with the resource and penalize those that permit or practice destructive resource use. They should encourage communities to assume a more prominent role by entering joint ventures that enable them to develop new skills and claim a larger portion of the value chain. This will in turn prepare them to eventually assume full control of their natural resources, as in the case of Nipiodi.

FIGURE 15: SUMMARY OF ENABLING FACTORS, BARRIERS, BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED



6.2 NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING

The 2010 IGF assessment of performance in the agricultural sector made clear that the Mozambican Government is not yet capable of effectively managing natural resources or monitoring their use. Other reports have advocated a forest policing strategy that emphasizes the role of community scouts as a complement to state scouts in controlling forest exploitation (Bila & Salmi, 2003) (Bila, 2005). Given the effective absence of the state, the involvement of communities in these activities is a necessity.

The absence of systematic monitoring of CBNRM impacts also means that it is impossible to assess the impact of CBNRM on resource management and monitoring. In general it appears that the impact on wood resources is limited, whereas that on wildlife might be better (see chapters 2.1.5 and 4.2.2). Important issues to bear in mind are that communities are not homogenous, that the costs and benefits of CBNRM are not distributed evenly, and that some community members may abuse their position (see Box 7). Moreover, the revenues from the 20% arrangement are too irregular, as there are large variations from year to year, and they are often too low.

The variability of both the size and timing of the 20% payments makes it difficult for communities to sustain management structures involving community scouts. Thus, while the government has effectively relinquished its responsibility for managing natural resource use, it has also failed to allocate sufficient resources to allow communities to fulfill this role. These constraints also seriously hamper the possibility that the community share of fees will have a significant impact on community development, for instance by allowing substantial investments in economic infrastructure. This contributes to a further reduction of communities' appreciation of the importance of sustainable resource use.

There have been attempts to produce income in a sustainable manner from logging and charcoal production by using inventories and management plans (e.g., Combumune and Pindanganga) that were designed and implemented with community involvement. However, it is clear that economic pressures and the attractiveness of short-term revenues put too much strain on communities and their relatively fragile governance systems to guarantee compliance with these plans. The lack of coherent government endorsement of these systems compounds the problem by increasing in the levels of exploitation beyond that which can be sustained by the resource.

6.3 GOVERNANCE

The policy and legal framework for natural resources management does not always fit with realities on the ground and is not always applied in a coherent manner. The Forest and Wildlife Law, in particular, is not consistent with the presence of people in conservation areas. It dates to the days of parks as fortresses, even though the conservation policy approved by the Council of Ministers in 2009 calls for a more inclusive approach regarding communities. At the same time, the design of Limpopo National Park indicates that the Government is willing, at least in theory, to force the resettlement of almost 27,000 residents to areas outside the park (see Chapter 2.2.2). It has been unable to follow through, however, partly because it has also allocated the resettlement area to a biofuel project.

This lack of coherence is also apparent with regard to the Chimanimani Reserve and its buffer zone. Today, the Ministry of Mining is considering issuing a mining license for the Binga Mountain within the Chimanimani National Park. The issuance of such a license would be in violation of the law, which explicitly forbids mining in protected areas. The Moribane Forest Reserve is part of the buffer zone. Here, the government endorses the Ndzou Camp ecotourism project, which is an attempt to connect conservation with community benefits. But at the same time and in contravention of the Reserve management regulations, the local government supports local chiefs who encourage immigration into the Reserve. In addition, the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture actively supports the growing of bananas inside the Reserve. MITUR, which is currently responsible for overseeing the ecotourism project since it is located within the Chimanimani Reserve buffer zone, appears to be unable and possibly unwilling to undertake remedial actions.

Finally, there is little room for exchange of experiences or coordination of strategies across communities because district, provincial and national platforms for CBNRM are lacking or not operational.

7 BEST PRACTICES

The experiences and lessons learned point at two important approaches that may be considered as best practices: the Ndzou Camp eco-tourism joint venture in Moribane Forest Reserve and the Nipiodi community forest concession in Zambézia. These projects distinguish themselves by the strong emphasis on securing community control, building natural resources management and business skills within the communities, and promoting the capture of greater value-added higher up the supply chain. In Moribane Forest Reserve, this occurs through the use of the natural resource as a tourist attraction and in Nipiodi by advancing from simple logging activities to sawing to carpentry.

These projects are promising in their approach, although it is still early to declare them successful. However, they clearly merit full attention and are most likely to serve as useful examples to other community-based tourism and forest exploitation endeavors.

Other experiences also contribute to the growing body of best practices; these include the conduct of community forest inventories, the formulation of forest management plans and the training of community scouts. These are all efforts to achieve sustainable resource use as well as community development. Even so, all the projects in which they were carried out have proven to be unsustainable due to local economic needs, divisions within communities, weak internal and external accountability measures, and/or the lack of coherent government support.

These less than positive experiences show the need to integrate support for CBNRM initiatives in a coherent governance framework. They also show the need to provide technical assistance focused on resource management *and* on the development of organizational and business skills. Under present conditions in rural Mozambique, such as low education rates, communities with internal divisions and a strong presence of immigrants, and a relatively weak democratic culture, the development of these skills takes time. As a result, the establishment of lasting CBNRM structures at the community level requires a long-term commitment from supporting NGOs and donors. Unfortunately, NGOs and donors often operate under short project cycles. As mentioned earlier, ORAM now supports Nipiodi out of its general funds because donors typically adhere to a three-year funding cycle and find it difficult to commit to a longer funding period.

8 SCALING UP

The scaling up of CBNRM could occur in the following three key ways:

- **Achieve full coverage for the 20% mechanism:** Communities benefitting from the 20% share of forest exploitation revenues are present throughout the entire country. It should be feasible to build on this wide base and scale up the use of this mechanism to cover all areas and communities. There are also options for scaling up to include communities in the buffer zones of conservation areas and private game reserves, and also to include other natural resources such as minerals. The most important factor in scaling up the 20% arrangement is that it be accompanied by activities that strengthen local accountability for managing both the resource base and the funds, and that stimulate them to become resource managers instead of landlords.
- **Enhance the role of communities as managers and joint venture participants:** There are very few initiatives in which communities assume the role of manager or producer. Such initiatives are likely to have the most impact in terms of sustainable resource use and economic development and therefore need to be supported carefully so that they succeed in the long run and serve as examples for future scaling up. Two initiatives under way in Muzo and Macossa fall into this category. Similar initiatives could be developed with other communities where NGOs have a strong presence and commitment to provide long-term assistance, such as Sofala and Zambézia. Ecotourism initiatives based on the joint-venture model applied in Moribane could be initiated in and around other conservation areas. It is important to promote this kind of initiative as the focus on implementing the 20% arrangement and on securing land rights has reduced attention to other aspects of CBNRM. It is necessary to promote productive activities that create employment and value-added..
- **REDD+ incentives:** One mechanism that is very poorly exploited is REDD+. REDD+ is currently the only mechanism available to channel funds to communities who refrain from exceeding annual allowable timber cuts while engaging in sustainable forest management. It is essential to make REDD+ mechanisms operational and directly beneficial to communities, and to avoid that funds from carbon credits dissipate in the bureaucracies of governmental and non-governmental organizations.

9 CHALLENGES AND BARRIERS CONFRONTING NATIONAL CBNRM PROGRAMS

The previous chapters have shown that CBNRM in Mozambique has produced important achievements and yet at the same time faces significant challenges. Many communities are organized and receive some money; some have partnered with commercial safari operators and a small number has engaged in joint ventures or even assumed full business control.

The principal barriers that continue to confront CBNRM include a combination of institutional, regulatory, bureaucratic, and internal community issues, as well as factors associated with the wider economy:

1. Institutional and regulatory barriers:

- The low value of the 20% share of stumpage fees; these values have declined even further in dollar terms due to the depreciation of the Metical(see Table 8);
- The fluctuations in the amount of the 20% payments to communities because they are tied to exploitation levels rather than to sustainable management practices, and because logging operations by simple license holders are not included in a wider resource management plan;
- The lack of transparency with regard to the allocation of funds, in particular in the case of MITUR;
- The absence of mechanisms promoting responsibility and accountability by the communities, both internally and towards the government with regard to the management of the natural resource base and of the 20% payments;
- The lack of capacity and perhaps political will on the part of the government to enforce laws with regard to licensing the exploitation of natural resources; this includes the lack of government scouts for surveillance, verification and control;
- The lack of coherence in the application of national laws, in particular with regard to issuing licenses for mining operations in protected areas and preventing the illegal occupation of land in protected areas.
- Absence of donors willing to commit themselves to long term support for building community capacity in natural resources and financial management;
- The lack of clarity with regard to the relative roles of line ministries such as MINAG, MITUR, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Coordination of Environmental Affairs, MICOA) in the allocation of hunting quotas, implementation of reforestation action plans, management of fishing and conservation areas, etc.
- Lack of platforms for CBNRM advocates to exchange information, coordinate approaches and build lobbying capacity on behalf of CBNRM.

2. Bureaucratic barriers:

- The red tape and high costs of implementing Ministerial Act 93/2005, which involves making the 20% payments through bank accounts in a country where banks are largely absent from rural areas;

3. Barriers internal to communities:

- The lack of a culture of accountability: it is still uncommon for communities to challenge leaders and force them to explain their decisions;
- The heterogeneity of communities: there may be considerable differences in wealth, as well as cleavages deriving from war, displacement and labor migration; also, political power may be concentrated in the hands of few (often belonging to a dominant lineage);

4. Barriers deriving from the wider economy:

- The high demand for timber and items such as ivory and other illegal products on the international (Asian) market and for charcoal on the domestic market;
- The general level of poverty prevailing among community members who aspire to a better life and see financial opportunities in the exploitation of (communal) natural resources, even if this affects the sustainability of the resource and the common good of the community as a whole.

10 LINKS TO NATIONAL PRIORITIES/PROGRAMS

CBNRM is part of Mozambique's national forest and wildlife and tourism policies. It has a clear significance with regard to governance, economic development, poverty alleviation and sustainable resource management, although its impacts in these areas are partially invisible and weaker than they could be. For this reason it will be important to:

- better monitor how revenues from CBNRM activities and the 20% community shares from natural resource use levies are applied;
- promote and enable the use of the 20% payments as seed money for other economic activities with significant impacts on rural income, such as agro-processing (village maize mills);
- integrate sustainable forest use into local household income generation, including exploring possibilities for benefitting from carbon trade and REDD+ mechanisms; it may be possible to use REDD+ incentives to improve the sustainability of charcoal production by capping the annual allowable cut levels (consider the community charcoal experience described in Box 1)
- Invest in the domestication of wild plant and animal species with the potential to meet nutritional needs in critical periods and to open up new export markets. The proponents of Ndzou Camp, for example, are considering non-timber forest products that could be marketed to tourists and possibly urban and foreign markets harvested on a sustainable basis.

11 RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the lessons learned, barriers and challenges presented above, it is possible to formulate recommendations for future action by the Government, donors, international agencies, NGOs, the private sector, and community organizations. These recommendations focus on promoting consistency and coherence across government institutions and programs; a commitment by donors, NGOs and communities to long-term investment in capacity building at the community level; expansion of non-destructive forms of natural resource use to raise community revenues; and a strengthening of the connection between outside visitors and local communities. Table 11 lists these recommendations by actor.

12 SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

CBNRM in Mozambique took off in the mid-1990s under specific conditions: the country still bears the traces of Portuguese colonial rule, including a single party state, the after-effects of a bitter internal war and a relatively recent transition towards multi-party democracy and a market economy. Communities and traditional structures have undergone profound transformations as a result of internal population displacements.

Since the mid-1990s, donors, NGOs and the government have all fostered CBNRM. As a result, important policy and legal reforms have created the conditions for recognition of community rights over land, forest and wildlife resources. This recognition has been translated into a focus on securing community rights by demarcating communal land and creating community natural resource management committees. A total of 229 communities have had their land demarcated and certified, covering an area of 6.7 million ha, with another 5.9 million ha in process of certification. These communities receive 20% of the forest and wildlife levies applied by the government on commercial operators. Since 2005, MINAG has transferred almost 74 million Mt to 631 communities in 89 districts in all provinces, except for Maputo City. These funds derive from fees on the exploitation of an estimated 23.4 million ha of forest area. There is no consolidated information on payments by MITUR to communities in areas with hunting safari operations.

The above figures demonstrate that there has been a large scale effort to secure community rights over natural resources. At the same time, the impacts of the 20% payments and the 107 or so CBNRM projects implemented to date on the quality of natural resource management and on local development have been limited. It appears that many communities adopt an “absentee landlord” attitude to the resource and that internal accountability structures are weak, resulting in excessive tree harvesting for charcoal, frequent wildfires, poaching and other destructive activities. The weak accountability structures have also allowed some members of community management committees abuse their positions by stealing funds for their own benefit. To a certain extent, the Government shares some responsibility in this area as it appears to turn a blind eye to these abuses.

TABLE 11: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIONS BY VARIOUS CBNRM ACTORS

Agent	Recommendation
Government	Apply the various laws affecting CBNRM in a consistent and coherent manner
	Take measures against the perverse influences of high foreign and domestic demand for specific natural resources products
	Revise the 20% arrangement by increasing the community share and making payment contingent upon the quality of resource management by the community
	Strengthen capacities at district and provincial levels to support CBNRM activities
	Operationalize and enforce the 2009 Conservation Policy regarding communities living in and around conservation areas
	Be transparent with regard to the 20% payments and collect and publish data on their application
International partners	Pilot REDD+ programs that reward communities for refraining from natural resource

Agent	Recommendation
	exploitation in excess of sustainable levels
Donors	Enter long-term commitments supporting CBNRM initiatives, focusing on the creation of natural resource, financial and organizational management capacities that lead to sustainability, accountability and profitability.
NGOs	Support the development of natural resource, financial and organizational management capacities at the community level
	Support the development of networks of CBOs and CBEs at the district, provincial and national levels to promote exchanges of experience, linkages among CBNRM initiatives in the region, and effective lobbying on behalf of CBNRM
	Scale up and replicate potentially successful activities such as joint ventures (such as Ndzou Camp), CBEs, community forestry concessions (such as Nipiodi), etc.
	Build alliances that can effectively make the case for CBNRM with the government, international partners, donors and commercial operators
Operators	Increase the number and visibility of visiting tourists so that communities can better appreciate and engage with such enterprises
	Take community consultation seriously and respect community decisions
Communities	Assume responsibility for the condition of natural resources under community-based management
	Demand internal accountability from leaders with regard to the use of natural resources and of the revenues from their exploitation
	Make use of the entitlements granted by law to have a voice in the process of issuing resource use licenses to secure substantial and sustainable benefits for communities

At the same time, there are some promising CBNRM initiatives. These include an ecotourism joint-venture designed to a transition to full community control and a community forest concession where the community manages a sawmill, sells the timber and promotes local carpentry employment.

The gains achieved with regard to securing community rights, the challenges in establishing genuine community responsibility and accountability for resource management, and the examples of initiatives that achieve sustainable resource management while maximizing value added along the commodity chain all point the way forward for CBNRM in Mozambique. This will likely require that the government assume a more consistent attitude with regard to natural resource use, that NGOs invest in building community capacity, and that communities move towards entrepreneurial models based on the creation of value added from the sustainable use of natural resources.

13 BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahamsson, H., & Nilsson, A. (1995). *Mozambique, the troubled transition from socialist reconstruction to free market capitalism*. London: Zed books.
- AGRECO. (2008). *National Census of Wildlife 2008 – Final Report*. Maputo: Ministry of Agriculture.
- AIM. (2010). *Caçadores furtivos abatem 12 elefantes na reserva do Niassa*. Article dated August 3, 2011 on @ *Verdade*: <http://www.verdade.co.mz/ambiente/13043-cacadores-furtivos-abatem-12-elefantes-na-reserva-do-niassa>
- Alden Wily, L. (no date). *Making woodland management more democratic: Cases from Eastern and Southern Africa*. London: IIED <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9029IIED.pdf>
- Anonymous. (2009). *Caça furtiva no PNG continua preocupante*. (E. Charás, Ed.) Article dated November 30, 2009 on @ *Verdade*: <http://www.verdade.co.mz/nacional/7224-caca-furtiva-no-png-continua-preocupante>
- Anonymous. (2011). Em Cabo Delgado: Madeira e marfim transportados ilegalmente. *Sugestão* (647), January 17, 2011, pp. 1-2.
- Anonymous. (2010). Ministro da Agricultura diz que não há exploração ilegal de madeira. *Canal de Moçambique*, June 2, 2010.
- Anonymous. (2010). *Seis detidos por exploracao ilegal de madeira*. Article dated August 16, 2011 on @ *Verdade*: <http://www.verdade.co.mz/nacional/13274-seis-detidos-por-exploracao-ilegal-de-madeira>
- Bila, A. (2005). *Estratégia para a Fiscalização Participativa de Florestas e Fauna Bravia em Moçambique*. Maputo: DNFFB/FAO.
- Bila, A., & Salmi, J. (2003). *Fiscalização de florestas e fauna bravia em Moçambique: Passado, presente e acções para melhoramento*. Maputo: Direcção de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Ministério da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural.
- Brito, L. (1998). *Case Study of Santaca Pilot Project 1 – Matutuíne – Mozambique*. Article dated January 29, 1998. Sustainable Rural Development Information System (SRDIS): <http://srdis.ciesin.org/cases/mozambique-001.html>
- Brouwer, R. (2009). *Forestry and Agriculture Programme in Mozambique - Realignment study*. Nampula/Maputo: CARE Mozambique.
- Brouwer, R. (1998). A Invenção da Tradição Errada: A Nova Lei de Terras em Moçambique. *V Congresso Luso-Afro-Brasileiro de Ciências Sociais, Maputo, 1 a 5 de Setembro*. Maputo.
- Brouwer, R., & Falcão, M. P. (2004). Wood fuel consumption in Maputo, Mozambique. *Biomass and Bioenergy*, 27 (3), 233-245.
- Chidiamassamba, C. (2010). *Estágio actual de funcionamento do programa Tchuma Tchato - Relatório Final*. Maputo: Kwedza Simukai Manica (KSM), Ambero e ACTF.

- Cuco, A. (2005). Prefácio. *Comunidades e manejo dos recursos naturais. Memórias da III conferência nacional sobre o manejo comunitário dos recursos naturais, Maputo, 21-23 fe Julho de 2004.* (pp. 3-4). Maputo: DNFFB and IUCN.
- De Wit, P., & Norfolk, S. (2010). *Reconhecer direitos sobre os recursos naturais em Moçambique.* Maputo: Rights and Resources Initiative.
- DNFFB. (1987). *Manual de Legislação Florestal.* Maputo: Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Ministério de Agricultura e Pescas.
- DNFFB. (1992). *Relatório estatístico anual - 1991.* Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Departamento de Economia e Estatística Florestal. Maputo: Ministério da Agricultura e Pescas.
- DNTF. (2010). *Relatório Anual 2009 (Draft).* Maputo: Direcção Nacional de Terras e Florestas, Ministério da Agricultura.
- Draper, M., Spierenburg, M., & Wels, H. (2004). *African Dreams of Cohesion: Elite pacting and Community Development in Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa. Culture and Organization*, 10 (4), 341–353.
- Eide, A. (2007). *Strategic plan for the artisanal fishing subsector of Mozambique (PEPSA).* Tromsø: MaReMa Centre, Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University of Tromsø.
- EIU. (2006). *Mozambique Country Report - February 2006.* London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- EIU. (2010). *Mozambique Country Report May 2010.* London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- EIU. (2009). *Mozambique Country Report November 2009.* London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Envirotrade. (2009). Envirotrade Carbon Livelihoods projects: <http://www.envirotrade.co.uk/html/projects.php>
- Falcão, M. P. (2005). *Policy impact on stakeholder benefits and resource use and conservation in Mozambique: the case study of MOFLOR forest concession area and Pindanganga community area. PhD Thesis.* Stellenbosch, South Africa: University of Stellenbosch.
- Fauna and Flora International. (2011). *Mozambique.* <http://www.fauna-flora.org/explore/mozambique/>
- Filemão, E., & Massangue, H. (2002). *Comunidades e Maneio dos Recursos Naturais. Memórias da 2ª Conferência Nacional sobre Maneio Comunitário dos Recursos Naturais, Maputo, Maio de 2004.* Maputo: Ministério de Agricultura e Pesacas, FAO e UICN.
- Foloma, M. (2005). *Directório de iniciativas de envolvimento comunitário na gestão de recursos naturais.* Maputo: Foloma, Marcelino (2005) Directório de iniciativas de envolvimento com Unidade de Apoio ao Maneio Comunitário, Direcção Nacional das Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Ministério da Agricultura.
- Foloma, M., & Zacarias, A. (2004). *Relatório de levantamento fa situação dos Grupos de Interesse nas áreas piloto apoiadas pelo projecto GCP/MOZ/056/NET. Documento/0074/MOZ.* Maputo: Projecto de Apoio ao Maneio Comunitário de Florestas e Fauna Bravia - 2a Fase, Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia.

- Frederico, M. (2008). *Avaliação do Impacto e da sustentabilidade do Turismo com base nas Comunidades em Matutuíbe: Estudo de caso de Tinti Gala e Tskakane Ka Madjadjane Lodges*. Tese de Mestrado. Maputo: Faculdade de Agronomia e Engenharia Florestal, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.
- Fundação IGF. (2009). *Avaliação Preliminar do Estado Actual da Caça Desportiva em Moçambique - Relatório inicial*. Maputo: DNAC e ADF.
- GOM. (2004). *Pobreza e Bem Estar em Moçambique: Segunda Avaliação Nacional*. Maputo: Direcção Nacional do Plano e Orçamento, Ministério de Plano e Finanças, Gabinete de Estudos, Ministério de Plano e Finanças, Instituto Internacional de Pesquisa em Políticas.
- GOM. (2010). *Pobreza e Bem-Estar em Moçambique: Terceira Avaliação Nacional*. Maputo: Direcção Nacional de Estudos e Análise de Políticas, Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento.
- Governo da Província de Nampula. (2008). *Doadores apoiam camponeses de cinco províncias*. Portal do Governo da Província de Nampula:
<http://www.nampula.gov.mz/Members/sandro.monteiro.nampula/doadores-apoiam-camponeses-de-cinco-provincias/>
- GRNB. (2002). *Ford in Mozambique. Lessons from the past, a perspective on the future. Restricted draft*. Maputo: Grupo de Gestão de Recursos Naturais e Biodiversidade, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.
- Hall, M. (1990). 'The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): A study in the destruction of an African country. *Africa* , 60(1): 39-67.
- Hall, M., & Young, T. (1997). *Confronting Leviathan. Mozambique since Independence*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
- Hanlon, J. (2010). Mozambique: 'the war ended 17 years ago, but we are still poor'. *Conflict, Security & Development* , 10 (1), 77-102.
- Hanlon, J. (1996). *Peace without profit*.
- Hatton, J., Couto, M., & Oglethorpe, J. (2001). *Biodiversity and war: A case study of Mozambique*. Washington D.C.: Biodiversity Support Program.
- IDPPE. (2002). *Plano estratégico de co-gestão das pescarias artesanais em Moçambique*. Maputo: Instituto de Desenvolvimento da Pesca de Pequena Escala.
- IGF. (2010). *Avaliação de desempenho no sector agrário*. Maputo: Inspecção Geral das Finanças, Ministério das Finanças.
- IIED. (2011). *Why REDD matters in Mozambique - a story in pictures*. International Institute for Environment and Development: <http://www.iied.org/natural-resources/key-issues/forestry/why-redd-matters-mozambique-story-pictures>
- INE. (n.d.). *Quadros do 3º Censo Geral da População e Habitação 2007*. Instituto Nacional de Estatística: http://www.ine.gov.mz/home_page/censo07/
- ITC. (2011). *ITC Newsletter Nr 1*. Chimoio: Iniciativa para as Terras Comunitárias.
- Jacquet, J., & Zeller, D. (2007). National conflict and fisheries: Reconstructing marine fisheries catches for Mozambique. In D. a. Zeller, *Reconstruction of marine fisheries catches for key countries and regions*

(1950-2005) (pp. 35-47). Vancouver, British Colombia, Canada: Fisheries Centre, University of British Colombia.

Jansson, J., & Kiala, C. (2009). *Patterns of Chinese investment, aid and trade in Mozambique. A briefing paper by the Centre for Chinese Studies*. University of Stellenbosch, Center for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Joaquim, A., & Brouwer, R. (2009). *Estudo do rendimento dos fornos de carvão nas comunidades de Madulo, Ndombe e Muzamane- Chissapa*. Maputo: Programa Conjunta das Agências das Nações Unidas em Valorização Ambiental e Adaptação à Mudanças Climáticas no Distrito de Chicualacuala.

Kasperek, M. (2008). *Sustainable Forest Management and Conservation Project. Evaluation of Pilot Measures in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia*. FANR/SADC – GTZ. Eschborn/Maputo: GTZ.

Mackenzie, C. (2007). *Forest governance in Zambézia: Chinese Take-Away!* Quelimane: FONGZA.

Mackenzie, C., & Ribeiro, D. (2009). *Tristezas Tropicais: Mais Histórias Tristes das Florestas da Zambézia*. Maputo: JA and ORAM.

Macucule, A., & Mangué, P. (1998). *Necessidades de investigação em manejo comunitário de florestas e fauna bravia. Relatório da consultoria para o projecto GCP/MOZ/056/NET*. Maputo: Alberto Macucule & Pedro Mague (1998) Necessidades de investigação em manejo comunitário de florestas e fa Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Ministério de Agricultura.

MAEE. (2007). *Projecto de desenvolvimento do Parque Nacional do Limpopo*. A França em Moçambique: http://www.ambafrance-mz.org/france_mozambique/spip.php?article495

Mapsofworld.com. (2009). *Mozambique Child Soldiers*. www.mapsofworld.com/mozambique/culture/child-soldiers.html

Martoli, A. (2007). *Inventário Florestal Nacional*. Maputo: Direcção Nacional de Terras e Florestas, Ministério da Agricultura.

Matakala, P., & Mushove, P. (2001). *Arranjos institucionais para o manejo comunitário dos recursos naturais (MCRN): Perfis e análise de 42 iniciáticas de MCRN em Moçambique. Project FAO CGP/MOZ/056/NET*. Maputo: Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Ministério da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural.

Metcalfe, S. (1994). *CAMPFIRE: Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management*. In D. Western & M. Wright (Eds.), *Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-based Conservation*. Washington DC: Island Press.

Milgroom, J., & Spierenburg, M. (2008). *Induced volition: Resettlement from the Limpopo National Park, Mozambique*. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 26 (4), 435-448.

MITUR. (2005). *Factos e dados*. Ministério do Turismo: <http://www.mitur.gov.mz/factos.htm>

MITUR. (2010). *Welcome to the Parque Nacional do Limpopo*. Parque Nacional do Limpopo: <http://www.limpopopn.gov.mz/>

Mueller, T., Siteo, A., & Mabunda, R. (2005). *Assessment of the Forest Reserve Network in Mozambique*. Maputo: WWF.

MWA-Safaris.com. (2009). *About us*. Mozambique Wild Adventures: <http://www.mwa-safaris.com/index-1.html>

O'Laughlin, B. (1992). A base social da guerra em Moçambique. *Estudos Moçambicanos*, 10: 107-142.

Ostrom, E. (2008). Design principles of robust property rights institutions: What have we learned? *Land Policies and Property Rights*, "Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, June 2-3. Cambridge, MA.

Pitcher, A. (1996). Mozambique: Chiefs, companies and cotton; Observations from rural Nampula. *Southern Africa Report*, 12 (1), 26.

Portal do Governo de Moçambique. (2009). *Exploração Florestal (Licenciamento)*. Portal do Governo: http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/Servicos/licenciamento/sub_fo_exp_florest/

Reyes, D. (2003). *An evaluation of commercial logging in Mozambique*. Cambridge, MA.: Collaborative for Development Action (CDA).

Saveca, F. (2011). Causando um prejuízo directo de um bilhão de meticais - Chineses, moçambicanos e sul-africanos abatem oito rinocerontes em 2010. (R. Chilengue, Ed.) *Correio de Manhã*, 13 (3501), pp. 1-2.

Simon, N., & Assulai, J. (2005). *Evaluation Report GEREN - Mozambique*. Maputo: Terra Firma.

Siteo, A., & Enosse, C. (2003). *Estratégia para Gestão Participativa de Reservas Florestais em Moçambique (final draft)*. Maputo: FAO - projecto GCP/MOZ/056/NET.

Stalmans, M., & Peel, M. (2010). Plant communities and landscapes of the Parque Nacional de Zinave, Mozambique. *Koedoe*, 52 (1), 1-11.

Tschirley, D., Walker, T., Low, J., Tanque, M., Boughton, D., Payongayong, E., et al. (2004). *Determinants of rural income, poverty, and perceived well-being in Mozambique in 2001-2002*. Maputo: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

UN REDD Programme. (2009). *UN REDD Programme*. <http://www.un-redd.org/AboutUNREDDProgramme/tabid/583/Default.aspx>

USAID. (2008). *Mozambique Biodiversity and Tropical Forests 118/119 Assessment*. Washington DC: United States Agency for International Development.

Wilson, K. (1992). *A state of the art review of internally displaced refugees and returnees from and in Mozambique. Report prepared for the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA/ASDI)*. University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House.

World Bank Group. (2011). *Mozambique*. Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative: <http://go.worldbank.org/6RGY6ATR40>

World Bank Group. (2011). *Mozambique Data and Statistics*. World Development Indicators Database: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique>

World Bank Group. (no date). *Mozambique: from war to peace and reconstruction*.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/PRSP-Review/mozamb.pdf>

World Bank. (2005). *Project Appraisal Document for a Transfrontier Conservation and Tourism Development Project*. Washington DC: World Bank.

Zieck, M. (1997). *UNHCR and voluntary repatriation of refugees: a legal analysis*. The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff - Kluwer Law International.

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE, NATIONAL CONSULTANT(S)

1. BACKGROUND

In October, 2008, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded WWF a cooperative agreement through the Leader With Associates funding mechanism for implementation of the Conservation Partnerships for Sustainability in Southern Africa (COPASSA) Project. The primary function of the COPASSA Project is to promote CBNRM as an appropriate conservation/ development strategy by strengthening networks of CBNRM⁵ service providers across Southern Africa. This award is building upon more than two decades of USAID support and over \$250 million⁶ in CBNRM and biodiversity conservation investments in Southern Africa.

CBNRM is an incentive-based conservation philosophy that links conservation of natural resources with rural development and improved rural livelihoods. The basic hypothesis within the southern Africa CBNRM program is that “for a community to manage its natural resource base sustainably it must receive direct benefits arising from its use. These benefits must exceed the perceived costs of managing the resources.”⁷ This hypothesis has three conceptual foundations: 1) economic value, giving a resource such as wildlife, a focused value that can be realized by the community or land owner; 2) devolution, emphasizing the need to devolve management decisions from the government to the community or local land users in order to create positive conditions for sustainable wildlife management; and 3) collective proprietorship, whereby a group of people are jointly given use rights over resources, which they are then able to manage according to their own rules and strategies.

The Zimbabwe Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) and the Zambia Administrative Management Design Program for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) were the initial forerunners of CBNRM in southern Africa, with both commencing in the 1980s. The Botswana National CBNRM Program was initiated in the early 1990s, while the Namibia National CBNRM Program was commenced 1993 through the USAID-funded Living In A Finite Environment (LIFE) Project. USAID also supported CBNRM investments in Malawi through the COMPASS Project, providing substantial support through two funding phases. More recently, embryonic CBNRM initiatives have been started in Mozambique and Tanzania, with both countries offering promising potential.

These CBNRM movements have had varying degrees of success in Southern Africa in helping countries address national priorities (e.g., poverty reduction, rural economic growth, climate change adaptation, biodiversity conservation, democratization, etc.) and in helping the rural poor take control of factors critical to their livelihoods. But, there are large disparities in the effectiveness and application of CBNRM

⁵ CBNRM is the acronym for community-based natural resources management

⁶ App, Mosimane, Resch, and Robinson, 2007

⁷ Steiner and Rihoy, 1995

across the SADC Region that is related to a general lack of awareness of CBNRM's track record in addressing national priorities and about the enabling conditions that led to the successes. While promising conservation and rural development results have given root to national CBNRM programs in numerous countries, CBNRM's potential remains under appreciated in some sectors in several countries and the lessons that could both accelerate its expansion and guard against threats to its approach have not been fully capitalized. While CBNRM has had national level impacts in Namibia and possibly in Botswana, it is not clear that it has been accepted by national leaders as part of a strategic approach to achieving national priorities (such as Food Security, Climate Change Adaptation, Combating Desertification, Poverty Reduction, etc.). A challenge here is to demonstrate to decision makers in a convincing way that it is in the national interest to make CBNRM an integral part of National Strategies to achieve the above priorities.

As a way to demonstrate the potential of CBNRM, CK2C will collaborate with the WWF and its COPASSA partners in conducting Stocktaking Assessments. These Assessments will generate Country CBNRM Profiles for five to seven (depending on budget availability) SADC countries that are implementing CBNRM programs at scale. This Assessment will focus on CBNRM impacts achieved in the subregion—regardless of source—and the lessons produced. With an emphasis on impacts and lessons, it will be non-judgmental and will avoid identifying a project as “successful” or “unsuccessful”. While the studies will describe the genesis and evolution of the country-specific programs, the main goals of the CK2C undertaking are to identify, analyze and assess the various initiatives and to identify opportunities and impediments to further expansion, adoption, and execution of CBNRM in each country. The following Terms of Reference lay out the proposed approach, tasks, and deliverables that would be expected of Regional CBNRM specialists who would be contracted by the CK2C Project to assist country stakeholders in this stocktaking process.

2.0 APPROACH

The objective of the planned stocktaking process will be to assist CBNRM Country Forums⁸ to undertake a participatory review and analysis of their CBNRM Programs such that: a) the history of each country's CBNRM Program is summarized (including the evolution of the working hypotheses that drove the various programs); b) the current scale of the CBNRM effort is quantified, to the extent feasible; c) the impacts of the program are captured; d) lessons learned are recognized; and e) the challenges and barriers to further advancement of CBNRM are identified and prioritized. This participatory process is intended to assist CBNRM forums in targeted countries to take stock of the progress and impacts their CBNRM programs have made since initial program inception, while concomitantly catalyzing a national level dialogue on the identification and prioritization of challenges and opportunities currently confronting the program. The resulting Profile will be a “snapshot” in time of each CBNRM Program providing a look at where the program is, from where it came, and to where it may go. In looking forward to greater collaboration across the subregion, it will contribute to the development of a standardized approach to data collection and knowledge management across Southern Africa. In some of the focus countries⁹, national or sector-specific monitoring programs have been developed that will inform the assessment of

⁸National CBNRM Forums are comprised of CBNRM service providers (government departments and NGOs), CBOs (in some countries), Private Sector (in some countries); their main aim is to coordinate CBNRM support through sharing of information, experiences, materials, tools, etc.

⁹We anticipate that there will be five focus countries: Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. The opportunity to add Mozambique and Tanzania will be considered if CK2C budget allows.

performance and impact¹⁰. The process has been designed in recognition that the roadmaps/enabling environment/vision for successful CBNRM will vary from country to country.

The compilation of the country reports will be consolidated to provide a regional analysis of CBNRM impacts, enabling conditions, strategies to produce the enabling conditions, and threats to the CBNRM approach. In particular, analysts will compare and contrast experiences across the subregion to determine if there are universal principles for establishing and strengthening CBNRM and if there are common threats. These assessments will not be judgmental but will focus on successes and best practices. These analyses should inform both national and subregional forums on mainstreaming CBNRM.

The CK2C Project will be requested to contract a consultant team of three CBNRM experts in Mozambique, to work directly with all three sub-national CBNRM Forums in the execution of this work. The vast majority of the information collection will be achieved through a combination of desk-top studies (i.e., end-of-project reports, national CBNRM reports, etc.), interviews of key stakeholders, and targeted data collection for portions of the Profile which will require digital spatial data (maps), income and/benefit data, natural resource trend data, etc.

The approach to initiating and implementing the CBNRM Country Profiles is as follows:

- The concept of the CBNRM Country Profile and its implementation approach and process are introduced to the Maputo based national CBNRM Forum by WWF through the COPASSA Project and the WWF Regional CBNRM Capacity-Building Project;
- The Maputo based national CBNRM Forum will convene a meeting of all three forums to present the concept and seek approval for undertaking the assessments;
- If positively received, the CBNRM Country Forum in each of the targeted countries will help identify authoritative CBNRM Specialist(s) that can participate in the initiative through the CK2C project;
- At the same time, WWF and DAI will identify a lead CBNRM consultant to coordinate the entire effort, provide backstopping support to country consultants and facilitate the development of a regional CBNRM status report.
- The appointed CBNRM consultants will organize meetings for each sub-national CBNRM Forum to bring together key CBNRM stakeholders to discuss both the idea of the CBNRM Profile and the approach to be followed in compiling it;
- As one of several means to continue discussions and exchanges of information following the Assessments, CK2C, WWF and the various CBNRM Forums will explore developing an on-line discussion group (or Community-of-Practice) through the FRAME website, which is managed by CK2C. We anticipate that this aspect of the initiative will continue beyond the term of this specific assignment and will be supported by CK2C.
- The CBNRM Consultant(s) would collect key reports and papers and conduct a desktop study of the national CBNRM Program with an emphasis on the most relevant.

¹⁰ In Malawi, for example, the National Council for the Environment (the country's highest environmental body) launched a CBNRM monitoring plan in 2002 and approved the first annual report in 2003.

- Following the desktop study, the CBNRM Consultants would supplement desktop study findings with consultative meetings with key CBNRM stakeholders within all sub-national forum areas. The Consultants would use a customized questionnaire (same core questions for each country) to conduct interviews with stakeholders and document findings;
- A GIS specialist (if warranted, supported by local GIS expertise) will collect digital data (for the whole country) so relevant CBNRM information and protected areas could be mapped. This process would be completed in tandem with the introduction and development of the Geospatial mapping tool to assist CBNRM forums to create “virtual” visits to key CBNRM sites in their countries;
- Following preparation of a draft Profile report, the consultant team would share the draft with all CBNRM stakeholders (not just forum members) within all sub-forum areas. Approximately one-two weeks later, the consultant team would convene meetings of all the sub-national forum members and key CBNRM stakeholders to go through the profile to reach consensus on the content of the profile. During these meetings, particular emphasis would be placed upon reaching consensus on CBNRM challenges, opportunities, and barriers and the prioritization of these. A key activity in this process would be to guide the participants through the use of the CBNRM Policy Index tool, which would assist stakeholders in the identifying enabling environment challenges, bottlenecks, etc.;
- The consultant team will translate the draft profile report (into English or Portuguese) and circulate it to a select number of CBNRM stakeholders for final verification;
- A final glossy report (inclusive of appropriate photos, charts, graphs, etc.) would be produced and submitted to all three sub-National CBNRM Forums, CK2C and COPASSA;
- Consolidate all country profiles into one bound regional document for sharing at a regional CBNRM conference to be held at a later date.

3.0 SPECIFIC TASKS FOR THE CBNRM CONSULTANTS

The consultant(s) would have the following specific tasks to perform:

3.1 CBNRM COUNTRY SPECIALIST(S) (52 DAYS, FOR ALL THREE, INCLUDING TRANSLATION)

- Review proposed Terms of Reference with all three sub-National CBNRM Forums;
- Hold initial orientation meetings with all three sub-National CBNRM Forums to gain direction and mandate to carry out the assignment and to obtain a list of key CBNRM stakeholders to be interviewed (3 days);
- Collect key CBNRM documents, reports, and digital images from various sources of information (with assistance of sub-National CBNRM Forums, DAI and WWF), inclusive of supporting donors (5 days);
- Undertake desktop study of key National CBNRM documents and commence filling in Profile information based upon available CBNRM documents (6 days);

- Review the proposed customized CBNRM Profile questionnaire (to be supplied by DAI via WWF and the Regional CBNRM Forum) to determine whether additional questions should be added to the questionnaire (1 day);
- Conduct individual CBNRM questionnaires with identified national level CBNRM stakeholders to gather additional information on CBNRM Program and the challenges and barriers the Program is facing (15 days);
- Consolidate findings of desktop studies and interviews into draft “Profile” and submit this for review by sub-National CBNRM Forum and stakeholders interviewed (6 days).
- Facilitate, through the sub-National CBNRM Forum, a workshop(s) that presents the findings of the draft report and contains a dedicated working session to identify and prioritize the National CBNRM challenges and barriers (2 days preparation, 3 days workshops);
- Prepare Workshop Proceedings and submit to sub-National CBNRM Forum (3 days);
- Incorporate workshop findings and recommendations into draft report for review by National CBNRM Forum and stakeholders (3 days);
- Translate draft profile report (into English or Portuguese) and circulate it to a select number of CBNRM stakeholders for final verification (3 days)
- Prepare final Profile report, inclusive of inputs from National CBNRM Forum and involved stakeholders and submit to National CBNRM Forum (as well as CK2C and COPASSA) (2 days).

4. DELIVERABLE PRODUCTS

4.1 CBNRM COUNTRY SPECIALIST(S)

- Minutes of initial orientation meetings between the Consultant(s) and the sub-National CBNRM Forums;
- Draft desktop study report of CBNRM documents, inclusive of bibliography of studies review;
- Summary report of interviews conducted, inclusive of list of stakeholders (title and institution) interviewed;
- Draft report of CBNRM Profile, inclusive of findings from CBNRM desktop review and interviews;
- Sub-National CBNRM Forum Workshop proceedings from review of semi-draft report and generation of prioritized challenges and barriers; and
- Final National CBNRM Country Profile in English and Portuguese.

5.0 SCHEDULE

The consultancy involved with the undertaking of the Mozambique National CBNRM Profile should be conducted over the period May – July 2010.

SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS:

Each CBNRM Specialist should be recognized as a CBNRM expert in the country for which the National CBNRM Profile is being undertaken. He/she should have a demonstrated history of preparing CBNRM documents in the country, be an excellent writer, and have the skills to facilitate the National CBNRM Forum meeting at which the draft “Profile” is reviewed and the national CBNRM challenges and barriers are identified. At least one of the consultants (most likely the team leader) should have good bilingual skills, and be able to translate the profile report into Portuguese (or English) as required.

ANNEX 2: CBNRM PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. IMPACTS ON NATURAL RESOURCES (NATURE)

- 1.1. In general, what has been the impact of CBNRM on the natural resources base?
- 1.2. Do you have or know of any data (especially numerical – we want to quantify the impacts as much as possible) that can demonstrate these impacts? If so, please specify.
- 1.3. More specifically, what has been the impact of CBNRM on the following resources (please quantify whenever possible):
- 1.4. Wildlife (terrestrial and aquatic [fish])? {n.b. consultant should obtain graphs and any other quantitative data from respondents whenever possible}
- 1.5. Forests & woodlands? {obtain maps whenever possible}
- 1.6. Rangeland? {obtain maps whenever possible}
- 1.7. Water?
- 1.8. Soil?
- 1.9. Has CBNRM had any related impact on agriculture? If so, please specify.
- 1.10. Are you aware of any negative impacts of CBNRM on the natural resources base? If so, what are they?

2. ECONOMIC AND LIVELIHOODS IMPACTS (WEALTH)

- 2.1. In general, what has been the impact of CBNRM on the livelihoods of local communities and on local, rural economies?
- 2.2. Do you have or know of any data (especially numerical – we want to quantify the impacts as much as possible) that can demonstrate these impacts? If so, please specify.
- 2.3. More specifically, what has been the impact of CBNRM on (please quantify whenever possible):
- 2.4. Revenue for CBOs? {obtain quantitative data whenever possible; present compiled data in bar graph(s)}
- 2.5. Revenue for CBO members? {add to 2.4 bar graph(s)}
- 2.6. In-kind benefits to CBOs and CBO members (e.g. materials for infrastructure, ecotourism)? {add data to 2.4 bar graph(s) or create new bar graph(s)}
- 2.7. Indirect or trickle down contributions to the local economy?

- 2.8. Creation of community enterprises (please specify scope and kind of enterprise)? {present information in table}
- 2.9. How have CBOs and CBO members used the revenue or in-kind benefits from CBNRM? {present information in table and/or pie charts}
- 2.10. What is the scope of CBNRM economic or livelihoods impacts, i.e., how many people have benefited from/been supported by CBNRM? {present compiled information in bar graph}
- 2.11. Are you aware of any negative impacts of CBNRM on local community livelihoods or on local rural economies? If so, what are they?
- 2.12. How many jobs have been created through CBNRM enterprises and/or activities? Please specify types of jobs.

3. IMPACTS ON GOVERNANCE AND RIGHTS (POWER)

- 3.1. In general, what has been the impact of CBNRM on local governance and rights to natural resources?
- 3.2. Do you have or know of any data (especially numerical – we want to quantify the impacts as much as possible) that can demonstrate these impacts? If so, please specify.
- 3.3. More specifically, what has been the impact of CBNRM on the following (please quantify whenever possible):
 - 3.3.1 Specific rights to manage natural resources (please specify the kind of rights and natural resources)? {compile data in table}
 - 3.3.2 Specific rights to use natural resources (please specify the kind of use and natural resources)? {add to 3.3.1 table}
 - 3.3.3 Specific rights to benefit from natural resources (please specify the kind of use and natural resources)?{add to 3.3.1 table}
 - 3.3.4 The ability or capacity of CBOs to organize themselves and govern natural resources?
 - 3.3.5 The ability or capacity of CBOs to develop and apply rules regarding use and management of natural resources?
 - 3.3.6 The ability or capacity of CBOs to distribute or share income/revenue?
- 3.4. What is the scope of involvement in CBNRM, i.e., how many CBOs exist? How many people are members of the CBOs (if possible, please disaggregate by gender and social class)? {compile data in table} What has been the impact on marginalized people/groups/classes?
- 3.5. Are you aware of any negative impacts of CBNRM on governance of and rights to the natural resources base? If so, what are they?
- 3.6. Have there been attitudinal changes by communities towards their natural resources as a result of the CBNRM Program? If yes, please specify these changes.

4. ENABLING CONDITIONS

- 4.1. Think back on the history of CBNRM in your country/area. What were the conditions or changes that enabled or led to the impacts of CBNRM on natural resources?
- 4.2. Please speculate on why these enabling conditions or the enabling environment occurred or were established.
- 4.3. Did the CBNRM concept or paradigm replace a former, concept, paradigm or policy? If yes, please explain. If yes, how did the CBNRM paradigm shift change natural resources, livelihoods and governance compared to the old paradigm?

5. LESSONS

- 5.1. During implementation of CBNRM in your country/area, what lessons did you learn? (What worked and what didn't work?)
- 5.2. Were there actions or ways of doing things that one learned to avoid?
- 5.3. Were there actions or ways of doing things that one learned to repeat?
- 5.4. What changes were made in implementing approaches or strategies that led to better or increased impacts?

6. BEST PRACTICES

- 6.1. In your country/area, what are the best ways or the best methods to implement CBNRM in order to achieve the best results or maximum impact?
- 6.2. For example, what are the best ways of implementing CBNRM that will lead to a healthy wildlife population and habitat?
- 6.3. For example, what are the best ways of implementing CBNRM that will lead to increased revenue for CBOs?
- 6.4. For example, what are the best ways of implementing CBNRM that will lead to improved governance of the natural resources?

7. SCALING UP

- 7.1. Is there scope or opportunities for scaling up or expanding CBNRM in your country? If so, what areas or zones should be targeted for this expansion?
- 7.2. If so, what, in your opinion is needed to scale up or expand CBNRM?
- 7.3. If so, what is the best way or method for implementing expansion efforts?

8. CHALLENGES, BARRIERS & THREATS

- 8.1. What are the present challenges with respect to achieving the maximum CBNRM impacts or best CBNRM results? Do you have any suggestions regarding how to meet or eliminate these challenges?

- 8.2. Are there barriers that exist with respect to achieving the maximum impact or best results in CBNRM? If so, what are they and do you have any suggestions regarding how to eliminate these barriers? Please rank the barriers in order of importance.
- 8.3. Do you see or know of any threats to the continuation or expansion of CBNRM in your country/area? If so, what are they? Do you have any suggestions or recommendations for addressing these threats? Please rank the threats in order of importance.
- 8.4. How can the impacts and lessons of CBNRM be used to overcome critical challenges, barriers and threats?

9. OPPORTUNITIES & NATIONAL PRIORITIES, PROGRAMS

- 9.1. In general, has CBNRM contributed to national sustainable development priorities? If yes, please specify the contributions and the national priorities.
- 9.2. If no, do you think CBNRM has the potential to contribute to these priorities? If so, how?
- 9.3. More specifically, has or can CBNRM contribute to the following priorities (please specify how):
- 9.4. Poverty alleviation or the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)?
- 9.5. Food security?
- 9.6. Climate change adaptation and mitigation?
- 9.7. Desertification?
- 9.8. Economic growth?
- 9.9. In your opinion, how can CBNRM improve or enhance contributions to the national priorities mentioned above? What are the best opportunities in the near future for improving CBNRM's contributions?

10. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS & QUESTIONS

- 10.1. In your opinion, has CBNRM contributed to community and/or environmental resiliency, i.e., has it allowed communities to respond to opportunities and to weather crises? If yes, please specify or elaborate.
- 10.2. In your opinion, will CBNRM assist in the mitigation of, or adaptation to anticipated climate change for your country? Please provide reasons for this opinion.
- 10.3. Do you have any additional observations on CBNRM that you would like to share (especially those that you think should be part of the country profile)?

ANNEX 3: NAMES OF INTERVIEWED PERSONS

Nome	Posição	Localidade	Province
Juvêncio João	Director Provincial do Turismo	Lichinga	Niassa
Manuel Simão	Chefe do Departamento das Áreas de Conservação	Lichinga	Niassa
Alberto Estevão Mucavele	Delegado Provincial do Instituto Nacional de Aquacultura	Lichinga	Niassa
Cornélio Miguel	Administrador da Reserva Nacional do Niassa	Lichinga (Mecula)	Niassa
Abdul Saíde	Carpinteiro (foto)	Maumbica	Niassa
Chaíbo Bacar	Fiscal comunitário	Maumbica	Niassa
Amissiale Caribarissee	Líder comunitário	Maumbica	Niassa
Abudala Aíde Ucadilego	Líder comunitário	Maumbica	Niassa
Amina Hussaíne	Comité da moageira	Maumbica	Niassa
Taúde Moamed	Fiscal comunitário	Nova Madeira	Niassa
Anussa Moamed	Membro do Comité de Gestão Comunitário	Nova Madeira	Niassa
Joaquim Somaída	Auxiliar da secretaria do Posto Administrativo	Marringira	Niassa
Jimo Felisberto Raposo	Director Adjunto Pedagógico da Escola Primária Completa	Marringira	Niassa
Agostinho	Gestor do acampamento Mozambique Wild Adventures	Marringira	Niassa
António Nyelge	Comité de Gestão Comunitária	Lugende	Niassa
Miguel Sabiti	Comité de Gestão Comunitária	Lugende	Niassa
Coloco Nambuto	Comité de Gestão Comunitária	Lugende	Niassa
Rosário Ulango	Líder comunitário Mucurova	Lugenda	Niassa
Marcos Mussa	Líder comunitário Lizongué	Lugenda	Niassa
João Chato Colarinho	Chefe do Serviço Distrital de Extensão Rural	Mecula	Niassa
António Adamo Inglês	Comité de Gestão Comunitária	Mecula	Niassa
Jorge Mamede	Comité de Gestão Comunitária	Mecula	Niassa
António Lande	Secretário do Bairro Junta	Mecula	Niassa
André Uadine	Chefe do Posto Administrativo de Munquia (Majone)	Munquia (Majone)	Niassa
Américo Mavila	Logístico Reserva Nacional do Niassa	Acampamento	Niassa
Nelson Jackson	Iniciativa Terras Comunitárias/KPMG Niassa	Lichinga	Niassa
Manuel Cuajana	Técnico IDPPE	Metangula	Niassa
Sr. Catucula	Técnico IDPPE	Metangula	Niassa
Dr. Barroso	Delegado Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Pesca de Pequena Escala no Niassa	Metangula	Niassa
José Cachambebe	Pescador e Secretário do CCP-Sele	Metangula	Niassa
			Zambezia
Daniel Maula	Director RADEZA	Quelimane	Zambezia
Lourenço Inácio Duvane	Delegado Provincial da ORAM na Zambézia	Quelimane	Zambezia
Gil Jaime	Oficial do Projecto de Florestas da ORAM Zambézia	Quelimane	Zambezia

Nome	Posição	Localidade	Province
Marco Vítor Malama	Presidente do Comité Comunitário para a Gestão dos Recursos Florestais e Fauna Bravia do Nipiodi	Nipiodi (Maganja da Costa)	Zambezia
Armando Sandaleia	Tesoureiro do Comité Comunitário para a Gestão dos Recursos Florestais e Fauna Bravia do Nipiodi	Nipiodi (Maganja da Costa)	Zambezia
Manito Lopes Coutinho	Secretário da Associação Comunitário de Muzo	Muzo (Maganja da Costa)	Zambezia
Ribeiro	Presidente Comité de Gestão Duhidowi	Nicoadala	Zambezia
António Chibite	Chefe dos SPFFB	Quelimane	Zambezia
			Manica
Milagre Nuvunga	Director Fundação Mocaia	Chimoio	Manica
Estefânea Michonga	Chefe do Serviço Provincial de Florestas e Fauna Bravia	Chimoio	Manica
José Monteiro	Coordenador Iniciativa Terras Comunitárias	Chimoio	Manica
José Mário Almeida	Técnica na área de manejo comunitário – SPFFB Manica	Chimoio	Manica
Jeremias Isaias	Responsável do projecto - WWF	Macossa	Manica
Andrew Newman	Fundação Micaia	Sussundenga	Manica
António Inguane	Oficial de Projecto	Sussundenga	Manica
José Manuel	Membro da comunidade	Ndzou Camp	Manica
Ruben Chiquate	Membro da comunidade	Ndzou Camp	Manica
Grilo Jaime Sweet	Membro comunidade Gudza	Gudza (Sussundenga)	Manica
Sr. Martinho	Régulo Gudza	Gudza (Sussundenga)	Manica
Sevene Macaúte	Rainha Gudza	Gudza (Sussundenga)	Manica
Sr, Augusto	SDAE Gondola	Gondola	Manica
Zacarias Bangamo	Presidente do Comité de Pindanganga	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Salimo Armando José	Secretário do Comité de Pindanganga	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Zano Fortuna	Agente comunitário	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Manuel Mário Andasene	Agente comunitário	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Rogério Fazenda	Agente comunitário	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
David Mário Andasene	Agente comunitário	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Isabell Fazenda	Membro do comité de Pindanganga	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Manuel Pita	Vice presidente do Comité de Pindanganga	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Chimone Mateus Jorge	Membro do comité de Pindanganga	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Nabuel José Manjema	Chefe dos fiscais	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Luís Joaquim Gua	Professor da Escola Primário Completa de Pindanganga	Pindanganga (Gondola)	Manica
Carlos Chadrec Chicongene	Régulo da comunidade Chicongene	Macossa	Manica
Arlindo Chadrec	Membro do comité a comunidade de Chicongene	Macossa	Manica

Nome	Posição	Localidade	Province
Hulene Chadrec	Membro do comité a comunidade de Chicongene	Macossa	Manica
Fabio Raque	Membro do comité a comunidade de Chicongene	Macossa	Manica
Raimundo Manuensa	Chefe de fiscalização comunitária da comunidade de Chicongene	Macossa	Manica
Elisabete Roque	Delegado Provincial ORAM – Delegação Sofala	Beira	Sofala
Edite Cunhate	Oficial de Projecto ORAM – Delegação Sofala	Beira	Sofala
Silvestre Santos	Unidade Maneio Comunitário, SPFFB, Sofala	Beira	Sofala
Mateo Ribaué	Chefe do departamento das Áreas de Conservação, DPTUR	Beira	Sofala
Anabela Rodrigues	Director Executivo Sociedade Gestão Reserva do Niassa	Maputo	Maputo
Madyo Couto	Técnico afecto à SRN	Maputo	Maputo