



KENYA SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT STUDY: SROI EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION, PEACE, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE YOUTH

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KENYA SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT STUDY:

SROI EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION, PEACE, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE YOUTH

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ACRONYMS

CPEYK	Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in Kenya
DRG-LER II	Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance – Learning, Evaluation, and Research Activity
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
IIGH	Institute on Inequalities in Global Health
KII	Key Informant Interview
KRC	Kenya Red Cross
NORC	National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago
SROI	Social Return on Investment
SVI	Social Value International
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	University of Southern California

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Institute on Inequalities in Global Health (IIGH) at the University of Southern California (USC), in collaboration with Search for Common Ground, was supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through NORC at the University of Chicago to develop a proof of concept to assess the social value, including quantifying the impact, of youth-led and youth-supporting peace and security efforts in Kenya using the social return on investment (SROI) model. SROI is a framework for measuring and accounting for the value of an intervention, organization or policy. It measures changes that are relevant to the people that contribute to and experience them by capturing the value of social, economic, and environmental outcomes, and uses monetary values to represent these outcomes.

As part of the proof of concept, a call was initiated for youth-led and youth-supporting peace and security efforts in Kenya interested in participating in the study to be evaluated according to the SROI methodology. Response to the call resulted in a list of approximately 300 interventions which were reviewed and shortlisted for participation by the research team based on certain criteria (i.e., whether the program was youth-led or youth-supporting, the number of beneficiaries and key stakeholder groups affected, how long the program lasted, key program activities, program location(s), availability of data, etc.) and availability of resources to conduct the study. One of the four interventions selected was Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in Kenya (CPEYK) and is the focus of this report. CPEYK was implemented in Kenya during 2016-2021 by Kenya Red Cross.

USC partnered with SVT Group (a US consulting firm specializing in SROI impact assessment), AMREF Health Africa (the largest health development NGO in Africa) and Rural Senses (a social enterprise research organization) to conduct the overall research including the SROI evaluation of the program. The SROI evaluation was guided by the following five main questions:

- 1) Who are the key stakeholders of the intervention?
- 2) What outcomes do key stakeholders experience?
- 3) What is the relative value of the outcomes to key stakeholders?
- 4) What is the social return on investment (SROI) of the program?
- 5) How can the results of the SROI analysis be used to improve future programming?

EVALUATION DESIGN

The SROI evaluation design included a desk review of 137 documents as well as data collection using mixed methods. This included focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and quantitative online surveys. Data was collected between June 2022 – October 2022.

At the outset of the evaluation, members of the research team conducted discussions with the staff of the intervention to define the scope of the analysis, including the identification of main activities, key stakeholders and how best to engage them. In addition, a theory of change workshop was conducted with program staff to identify from their perspectives what were the key outcomes of the intervention and their underlying assumptions. A map of the “well-defined outcomes,” meaning specific changes in wellbeing experienced by stakeholder groups “that provide the best opportunity to increase or decrease

value,”¹ was developed through engagement with all key stakeholders to understand from each of their perspectives the outcomes they experienced, including intended and unintended, and any positive and negative outcomes.

Qualitative data collection was collected from a purposive sample of key stakeholders identified, including youth, trainers of youth, families of youth participants, private sector businesses, and program staff. It included 5 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) (2 with youth, 2 with families of youth, and 1 with program staff), and 9 key informant interviews (KIIs). Eight (8) KIIs were with the trainers of the youth participants and 1 with a representative of the private sector. After data collection, transcripts were translated from Kiswahili to English as needed then analyzed and coded in Excel.

Quantitative data collection included online surveys programmed in Kobo Collect to collect data from stakeholder groups that had large numbers of participants, in this case youth participants, in order to obtain a more representative sample. Fifty-eight (58) respondents completed the surveys. Quantitative data was cleaned, then analyzed using Excel software.

The outcomes identified by key stakeholders were monetized using two different approaches to valuation: cost-based valuation (using literature) and stakeholders-stated preference valuation (during FGDs, KIIs, and online surveys). The monetized values of outcomes were used to calculate SROI ratios.

Preliminary results and findings were presented to key stakeholders during validation sessions, followed by revisions to the analysis as relevant.

Understanding the relative value of outcomes to stakeholders during periods of heightened tension or conflict can provide further important information for peacebuilding efforts. As the national elections in Kenya took place in August 2022, this presented a unique opportunity to understand how the outcomes created by peacebuilding interventions may be valued differently by stakeholders in this context. As such, an additional round of quantitative data collection was conducted after the elections through online surveys administered in October 2022. Surveys were programmed in Google surveys. Seventeen (17) respondents completed the surveys including youth, trainers of youth participants and program staff. Data was analyzed using Excel. An additional SROI ratio in the context of the elections was calculated based on this data.

Final results were shared with key stakeholders in December 2022, including a discussion of how results can be used and recommendations for future programming to grow social value creation.

MAIN FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A summary of main findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the evaluation are presented in the boxes below.

¹ Standards on Applying Principle 2: Understand What Changes, Part I. Social Value International (2021)

Box I: Evaluation Findings

EQ1: WHO ARE THE STAKEHOLDERS OF THE INTERVENTION?
Key stakeholders of this intervention are: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Youth participants• Families of youth participants• Trainers of youth participating in the program• Private sector businesses• Program staff
EQ2: WHAT OUTCOMES DO KEY STAKEHOLDERS EXPERIENCE?
Youth experienced: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Becoming an upstanding member of society• Increased rehabilitation and reformation• Increased networking and opportunities• Increased business skills• Increased income Families of youth experienced: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increased self-sufficiency of the family• Increased feeling of community safety• Increased social cohesion Trainers of youth experienced: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increased sense of fulfillment from participation Private sector businesses experienced: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increased community safety allowing for better business operations Program staff experienced: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increased capacity for peacebuilding• Increased sense of fulfillment from participation
EQ3: WHAT IS THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE OUTCOMES TO KEY STAKEHOLDERS?
Based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation; <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Youth most valued their becoming an upstanding member of society,• Private sector businesses most valued the increased community safety allowing for better business operations, and,• Program staff most valued their increased capacity for peacebuilding. (Note: the value of outcomes for families of youth participating in the program and for trainers are not included due to limitations as noted in the report.)
EQ4: WHAT IS THE SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT (SROI) OF THE PROGRAM?
Findings suggest a strong positive impact of the program. Results of the cost-based approach to valuation using literature, which is traditionally how economic analyses are done found an SROI of \$1: \$1.75 meaning that for every \$1 invested in the program, it generated \$1.75 in social value (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$0.35 to \$2.62). Results of the stakeholders-stated preference valuation, which allowed for a fuller picture of the outcomes including that which is most valuable to stakeholders experiencing the program found an SROI of \$1: \$6.48-\$10.60, meaning for every \$1 invested in the program, it generated between \$6.48 and \$10.60 in social value (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$1.35 to \$15.76). Results of the stakeholders-stated preference valuation in the context of the national elections suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$7.52 to \$12.53 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$1.35 to \$15.91).
EQ5: HOW CAN THE RESULTS OF THE SROI ANALYSIS BE USED TO IMPROVE FUTURE PROGRAMMING?

Results of the SROI according to cost-based valuations found in the literature can be used to understand value of the intervention to the State and areas it may want to further invest in. Results of the SROI according to stakeholders-stated preference valuation can be used in multiple ways, including but not limited to understanding what outcomes mattered most to key stakeholders, what negative outcomes may have been experienced, and how to increase value for different stakeholder groups. Results of the SROI analysis also demonstrate the added value of this approach over current approaches to evaluation used in this sector, including but not limited to its encouragement of decision-making based on value, not outputs. Outputs do not reflect the whole picture but have often been the basis for many decisions in aid and development programming.

Box 2: Evaluation Recommendations

Three specific recommendations were identified for this program to increase value in the future. They are:

- 1) Programming should be designed in consultation with key stakeholders. For example, some youth expressed that they experienced jealousy and retaliation from family and community members as a result of participating in this project. Addressing this potential harm during the design phase of future programming can minimize the risk of this happening again and enable increased value for various key stakeholders.
- 2) Adapt programming to address all sub-groups of key stakeholders.. For example, some youth participants were able to receive funding to start their income generating activities and some did not. This created a differential experience for these youth, and while it was not possible to collect all outcomes for these sub-groups due to research constraints, it became clear that the social value created for these different sub-groups was also different. Creating plans to address potential differential experiences at the program design phase can increase social value creation in the future.
- 3) Focus on extending the duration of desired outcomes. While many outcomes created positive value for stakeholders, these outcomes sometimes only lasted a year or less than a year. As such, programming should be adapted to focus on extending the duration of desired outcomes.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

PURPOSE

The Institute on Inequalities in Global Health (IIGH) at the University of Southern California (USC), in collaboration with Search for Common Ground, was supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through NORC at the University of Chicago to develop a proof of concept to assess the social value, including quantifying the impact, of youth-led and youth-supporting peace and security efforts in Kenya using the social return on investment (SROI) model. SROI is a framework for measuring and accounting for the value of an intervention, organization or policy. It measures changes in ways that are relevant to the people that experience or contribute to it by capturing the value of social, economic, and environmental outcomes, and uses monetary values to represent these outcomes.

As part of the proof of concept, evaluations of various youth-led and youth-supporting peace and security interventions were carried out using the SROI model. One of the evaluations, an SROI evaluation of the program Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in Kenya (CPEYK), is the focus of this report.

USC worked with SVT Group (a US consulting firm specializing in SROI impact assessment) and two local research partners, AMREF Health Africa (the largest health development NGO in Africa) and Rural Senses (a social enterprise research organization) who led data collection (focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and quantitative surveys) for this evaluation. The evaluation data collection was carried out between June 2022 and October 2022, with validation meetings with key stakeholders in July and September 2022, respectively. The research team included Dr. Shubha Kumar (research team lead and SROI expert), Sara Olsen (SROI expert), Aaron Mallett (research analyst), Samuel Muhula (local co-investigator), Yau Ben-Or (local research support), and Ngesa Maturu (lead local data collector). The research team was closely advised by Saji Prelis (youth, peace and security expert), Adrienne Lemon (Search for Common Ground Senior Director for Strategy and Learning), and an Expert Advisory Group (representatives from various organizations engaged in youth, peace and security (see Annex J for full list) to provide guidance and context about the peacebuilding field, including common practices, key actors at the international, regional, national, and local levels, and relevant key reports and publications.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The research team was tasked with answering the following questions for the SROI evaluation:

- 1) Who are the key stakeholders of the intervention?
- 2) What outcomes do key stakeholders experience?
- 3) What is the relative value of the outcomes to key stakeholders?
- 4) What is the social return on investment (SROI) of the program?
- 5) How can the results of the SROI analysis be used to improve future programming?

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in Kenya (CPEYK) was implemented by Kenya Red Cross from October 2016 to March 2021 in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Tana River, Lamu, Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale Counties. It was funded by the European Union's (EU) Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The overarching goal of this intervention was to increase the effectiveness and inclusiveness of community peace and security efforts involving vulnerable and marginalized youth in the regions in which the intervention operated CPEYK targeted 4,500 youth aged 18-35 to participate in its activities.

The activities of this program were divided into 2 key thematic areas:

AREA 1: ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT FOR THE YOUTH IN TARGETED AREAS

Activities in this stream were centered around economic empowerment of the participating youth by supporting them with the tools, training, and support necessary to create income generating activities. This included activities such as support with business registration, training on group dynamics, entrepreneurship and business training, financial literacy training and support with creation of business plans.

AREA 2: LINKING PROGRAM TO PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Activities in this area were centered around alternative methods of addressing underlying conflict factors. Activities in this area included training on conflict management and accountability to communities for security actors in the regions in which the program operated, the creation of the Youth Peace Van which allowed for forums between youth and security actors as well as sporting events. Youth peace committees were also created in each of the counties where the program operated centered on spearheading community peace initiatives.

The objectives of the program were:

1. Enhancing understanding of sources of conflict and exclusion, leading to informed policy and interventions, which identify means of addressing development needs and grievances.
2. To provide youth with skills that can be used to improve employment and livelihood prospects.
3. To strengthen capacity to manage and prevent conflict and improve trust between the State and communities.

METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

The research team applied the internationally-recognized approach to SROI analysis (articulated by Social Value International) to conduct the evaluation of this program. This included a stakeholder-centric mixed-methods approach including a document review and qualitative and quantitative data collection to generate credible evidence to answer the evaluation questions. The design included focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), and quantitative online surveys with key stakeholders. Local research staff worked closely with USC to validate instruments and translate them from English to Kiswahili for data collection. Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the SROI analysis process. An extended methodology section can be found in **Annex B – Extended Methodology**.

Figure I: SROI Analysis Process



DESK REVIEW

The research team conducted a literature review of peacebuilding outcomes and how they have been monetized in previous peer-reviewed literature and reports. In addition, the research team reviewed all documents pertaining to CPEYK provided by Kenya Red Cross including interim and final evaluation reports. In total, 132 documents (2 provided by the program staff and 130 from a literature search) were reviewed to either provide context, or provide further evidence to support findings for the evaluation questions.

ESTABLISHING THE SCOPE OF ANALYSIS

At the outset of the evaluation, members of the research team conducted discussions with the staff of the intervention to define the scope of the analysis. This stage included identifying the key activities that were part of the intervention, the time period over which they occurred, and their locations, and which of those would be included in the analysis. In addition, this stage included identifying the key

stakeholders of the intervention and the best methods for engagement with key stakeholders for data collection.

THEORY OF CHANGE WORKSHOP

Members of the research team conducted a theory of change workshop with program staff to identify from their perspectives what were the key outcomes of the intervention and their underlying assumptions. A map of well-defined outcomes was developed through engagement with all key stakeholders to understand from each of their perspectives the outcomes they experienced, including intended and unintended, and any positive and negative outcomes. (Given the focus was on identifying key outcomes, and not so strictly the cause and effect over time to the extent that formal theories of change typically do, this resulted in a map of well-defined outcomes instead of a traditional theory of change diagram.)

QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Moderators conducted a total of 5 FGDs with key stakeholders of the intervention. Two (2) FGDs were conducted with youth, 2 with families of youth, and 1 with program staff. The purpose of the FGDs was to understand from stakeholders' perspectives what were the key outcomes they experienced as a result of the intervention, how they would describe the changes they experienced (indicators), how long outcomes lasted (duration), their relative importance or value, what would have happened anyway without the intervention (deadweight), how much of the outcomes they experienced they would attribute to the intervention (attribution), if the outcomes dropped off over time (drop-off), and any recommendations they have for the future. The extent to which outcomes experienced by program stakeholders may have resulted from those outcomes simply shifting away from other stakeholders who would otherwise have experienced those same outcomes if not for the program activities (displacement) was considered to be zero. Four of the focus groups were conducted in-person while the 5th (with program staff) was conducted online via Zoom.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

The local research team also conducted semi-structured KIIs with additional key stakeholders of the intervention who were unable to be engaged via focus groups including trainers and representatives of the private sector. In total, 9 KIIs were conducted. The purpose of the KIIs was similar to the purpose of the FGDs and the same instrument was used. Interviews conducted via Google Meet or telephone.

Data for FGDs and KIIs was entered into Kobo Collect. After data collection, transcripts were translated from Kiswahili to English where necessary and analyzed using content analysis and coded in Excel.

QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

Based on the qualitative data collection and analysis of outcomes, online surveys were developed to understand the quantity of people from key stakeholder groups that had large numbers of participants (in this case, youth participants) that experienced the outcomes identified during the qualitative data

collection phase, along with how long outcomes lasted (duration), their relative importance or value, what would have happened anyway without the intervention (deadweight), how much of the outcomes they experienced they would attribute to the intervention (attribution), if the outcomes dropped off over time (drop-off), etc. Online surveys were translated into Kiswahili and programmed in Kobo Collect. Fifty-eight (58) respondents completed the surveys. Quantitative data was cleaned and analyzed using Excel software.

OUTCOMES VALUATION

The outcomes identified by key stakeholders were monetized using two different approaches to valuation: cost-based valuation (using financial proxies for similar outcomes found in the literature) and stakeholders stated preference valuation (derived directly from stakeholders via FGDs, KIs, and online surveys). The purpose of valuation is to reveal the value of outcomes and show how important they are compared to the value of other outcomes. SROI uses monetary values to represent outcomes as money is a widely accepted way of conveying value. The monetized values of outcomes were used to calculate the SROI ratios.

(1): For the cost-based valuation using literature, the research team identified similar outcomes that had been valued using financial proxies in relevant published reports and literature. This approach is traditionally how economic analyses are done. Some outcomes had previously been monetized in the literature according to value to the State (i.e., how much money the government would save, or gain in tax revenue, if a specific outcome occurred). Other outcomes had been previously monetized in other SROI reports according to stated preference valuation. Where information on financial proxies was not available, the research team used the market price method to assign values (i.e., how much would it cost to purchase an experience that leads to similar outcomes). Financial values from the literature were adjusted for time horizon or purchasing power parity as appropriate (i.e., if an outcome was valued in the United Kingdom using the market price method, the research team considered what would the price be in KES factoring in purchasing power parity).

(2): For the stakeholders-stated preference valuation, a list of common items in the market that stakeholders might find valuable was created by the local field research team and validated with key stakeholders in validation sessions after the first round of data collection. Each item on the list had an approximate market price (which was hidden) and items were shown in order by price. Respondents were asked to select which items from the list the outcome would fall between, if they had to say how relatively important to them the outcome in question was compared with these items. After responses were collected, the value of the outcome was equated to the average value of the market-priced items the outcome fell between. This correlation occurred by averaging the responses from the stakeholders and using the upper and lower values to estimate the valuation. For example, if the average valuation was 4.3, the valuations of items corresponding to '4' and '5' would be used to establish the low valuation and high valuation. Table 1 shows the item list as presented to stakeholders and Table 2 shows the items and their corresponding valuations.

Table 1: List of Items presented to stakeholders to establish their valuations

Item Number	Item Description
1	Airtime for One Week
2	Used Mobile Phone

Item Number	Item Description
3	32" TV
4	Laptop
5	Plot of Land (40 x 80 square feet)
6	Business investment in a flock of chickens
7	Used car
8	New tuk-tuk
9	Buying a land a building a home for myself
10	Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
11	Apartment in Mombasa
12	100 acres of land in the Central Region of Kenya where the land is fertile
12	Apartment in Syokimau*
13	Two Apartments in Mombasa
14	A Beachfront Property

* Some stakeholders stated that they felt an Apartment in Syokimau (a highly sought-after residential area of Nairobi) was not relevant to them but that an area of land in central Kenya was. Where this secondary option was relevant, it was given.

Table 2: List of Items and their corresponding valuations

	Items for Stakeholder Stated Preference	Value in Kenyan Shillings (KSh)	Value in United States Dollars (USD)
1	Airtime for one week	700	\$5.83
2	Used Mobile Phone	10,000	\$83.34
3	TV 32"	20,000	\$166.67
4	Laptop	30,000	\$250
5	Plot of Land (40x80)	100,000	\$833.34
6	Business Investment in Flock of Chickens	200,000	\$1,666.67
7	Used Car	300,000	\$2,500
8	New Tuk Tuk	500,000	\$4,166.67
9	Buying land and building a home for myself	1,000,000	\$8,333.34
10	Starting a tent chair hiring business	2,000,000	\$16,666.67
11	Apartment in Mombasa	5,000,000	\$41,666.67
12	Apartment in Syokimau	7,000,000	\$58,333.34
13	100 acres of land where the land is fertile	7,500,000	\$62,500
14	Two apartments in Mombasa	10,000,000	\$83,333.34
15	Beachfront Property	15,000,000	\$120,000

* A rough conversion of 1 USD = 120 KSh was used throughout the project as informed by local research partners.

CALCULATION OF THE SROI RATIO

Calculation of the SROI ratio involved taking into account the monetized value of each outcome, the quantity of stakeholders experiencing the outcome, subtracting for deadweight, attribution, drop-off, and discounting projected values to present value to arrive at the impact for each outcome. The sum of all values was calculated, from which the total investment was subtracted, and then the total value was divided by the total investment to arrive at the SROI ratio.

After calculating the SROI ratio, sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess the extent to which the results would change if some of the assumptions made in the previous stages (i.e., monetized value of outcomes, deadweight, attribution) were changed. The aim of such analyses were to test which assumptions have the greatest effect on the model.

VALIDATION SESSIONS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Preliminary SROI results and findings were presented to key stakeholders during validation sessions in July and September 2022, followed by revisions to the analysis as relevant. A total of 42 stakeholders participated in the validation sessions.

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS: SROI IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTIONS

Understanding the relative value of outcomes to stakeholders during periods of heightened tension or conflict can provide further important information for peacebuilding efforts. As the national elections in Kenya took place in August 2022, this presented a unique opportunity to understand how the outcomes created by peacebuilding interventions may be valued differently by stakeholders in this context. As such, an additional round of quantitative data collection was conducted after the elections through online surveys programmed in Google surveys, translated into Kiswahili, and administered in October 2022. Twenty-seven (27) respondents completed the surveys including youth, and program staff. Data was cleaned and analyzed using Excel. An additional SROI ratio in the context of the elections was calculated based on this data.

REPORTING AND USING RESULTS

Final results were presented to program staff and additional key stakeholders in December 2022. This included discussion of how the results can be used, including key strengths of the interventions as well as key recommendations to inform the strategic design of future programming to grow more social value.

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

The following assumptions were made when conducting this analysis:

1. **Scope.** While the intervention was implemented in multiple counties, this analysis focused on the programming in Mombasa only (given limits on human and financial resources to conduct the study). All program activities conducted in Mombasa were included in the analysis. Given this limited scope, the SROI ratio calculated here will be different compared to if the intervention was analyzed in its entirety, and is likely underestimated in this analysis.
2. **Investment.** The estimated budget that was spent for the programming in Mombasa (out of all counties where the intervention was implemented) was \$740,000 according to data provided by KRC staff.

The following limitations should be considered when interpreting results from this report:

1. **Results: Attribution and Deadweight.** While findings suggest that the intervention contributed to and helped achieve outcomes that stakeholders experienced, causality cannot be pinpointed on this intervention alone. A variety of other factors and/or assistance from other interventions may have also contributed to results, and this evaluation does not use a randomized control trial methodology to tease out attribution and deadweight. It does however ask stakeholders to estimate how much of the outcomes they experienced were attributable to the intervention under analysis (i.e., attribution), as well as how much of the outcomes they experienced would have happened anyway based on other factors/trends (i.e., deadweight) and both of these estimates from stakeholders are taken into account in the SROI calculation.
2. **Recall Bias.** As several questions raised during the data collection processes addressed issues that took place in the past, recall bias may have affected the responses provided due to discrepancies in the accuracy or completeness of recollections of past events.
3. **Halo Bias.** There is a known tendency among respondents to under-report socially undesirable answers and alter their responses to approximate what they perceive as the social norm, called halo bias. This can manifest in responses from key stakeholders, especially youth, who may have a tendency to respond favorably to questions as key beneficiaries of the intervention. The research team made efforts to explicitly ask about any negative outcomes stakeholders may have experienced, and to gather information from a wide range of stakeholders and number of respondents to adjust for this bias and triangulate responses among each group.
4. **Sampling for FGDs.** The research team sought to select 8-12 respondents for each FGD. Participants were sampled from lists of individuals involved in relevant activities provided by the implementing organization. This does not sample for the entirety of the population of participants but focuses on participants that were included in the lists leading to possible selection bias.
5. **Survey Sampling.** The method of sampling for the online surveys focused on reaching as many stakeholders as possible to achieve statistically representative samples of the stakeholder groups. However, the research team acknowledges a potential limitation of relying too heavily on those who responded as the desired sample size was not met in some cases. This was particularly problematic in the additional round of online surveys administered post the national

elections in Kenya. Response rates are noted in the report. The research team was also aware of participant fatigue due to multiple data collection efforts.

6. **Timing of the Analysis.** Generally, peacebuilding interventions seek to create long-term community change through their actions. The intervention analyzed ended within the 12 months preceding the analysis. While this timeframe may lend to more accurate recall of the impacts of the program by its participants than if the study were done later, longer-term outcomes that may have been created by the program were not yet possible to observe and analyze.
7. **Cost-Based Valuation Using Literature.** This analysis is one of the first known studies to apply SROI methodology to peacebuilding interventions. Consequently, the approach of using financial proxies to translate well-defined outcomes into monetary terms is not as well-developed in peacebuilding literature as it has been in other areas where SROI and/or similar approaches are more commonly used (e.g. Health Program Analysis). The literature review conducted as part of this study only surfaced 5 studies where monetization of outcomes was done in the peacebuilding field. The majority of these used stakeholder preference valuation to determine their valuation. Valuations established through stakeholder preferences should be leveraged with caution as it is likely that preferences are not the same across populations. Additionally, the scales or instruments used to establish stated preference valuations in other studies were not clear so it could not be established whether the scales used in this study were similar to ensure comparability of results. As such, results using this approach should be interpreted with caution. However, the research team employed an alternate approach to valuation in this study via stated preferences with stakeholders in this study, which provided a more accurate basis for results in this context. It is likely that as SROI methodologies are used more in the analysis of peacebuilding interventions, a consensus will emerge regarding the proper techniques to monetize relevant outcomes, and thus develop SROI ratios that more accurately reflect the social value created by peacebuilding interventions.

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

FINDINGS

EQ1: WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS OF THE INTERVENTION?

Program staff identified key stakeholders of the intervention, including all groups who participated in programming, those who were involved with the coordination and delivery of the program, and any other parties who were significantly affected by the program. In addition, to ensure that any other stakeholders or sub-groups of stakeholders were not missing, participants were asked during qualitative data collection to identify other groups who they felt may be affected by the programming. The groups who were deemed to be materially affected based on (1) staff report, (2) self-reported outcomes from the qualitative data collection, and/or (3) identification by parties included in the qualitative data collection were in the analysis. Table 3 summarizes each stakeholder group, their relationship to the program and the rationale for inclusion or exclusion from the analysis.

Table 3: Key stakeholders of the program and inclusion or exclusion from SROI analysis

STAKEHOLDER GROUP	DESCRIPTION	RATIONALE FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION
Youth Participants	Program beneficiaries	Included as intended of programming
Families of Youth Participants	Indirect beneficiaries	Included as indirect beneficiaries of programming and experience outcomes
Private Sector Businesses	Program contributors	Included as affected and affected by programming
Trainers of Youth Participants	Program contributors	Included as affecting and affected by programming
Religious Leaders	Indirect beneficiaries	Excluded given insufficient resources
Civil Society Actors and State Actors	Indirect beneficiaries	Excluded given insufficient resources
Program Staff	Provider of programming	Included as affecting and affected by programming
EU Trust Fund for Africa	Provider of funding	Excluded as priorities understood through program staff

Table 4: Key stakeholders reached

Stakeholder Group	Population Size (Mombasa)	Number of Participants in Focus Groups or Interviews	Number of Respondents to Survey	Number of Respondents to Post-Election Survey
Youth	1000	24	58*	11*
Families of Youth	Unable to determine	24	Not surveyed	Not surveyed
Trainers	8	8	Not surveyed	2*
Private Sector Businesses	10	1*	Not surveyed	Not surveyed
Staff	10	8	Not surveyed	4*

*Indicates where a representative sample size was not reached.

EQ2: WHAT OUTCOMES DO KEY STAKEHOLDERS EXPERIENCE?

Key stakeholders included in the analysis identified several outcomes that they experienced as summarized in Figure 2 on the next page.

Figure 2: Map of Well-Defined Outcomes of the Program



EQ3: WHAT IS THE RELATIVE VALUES OF THE OUTCOMES TO KEY STAKEHOLDERS?

The relative value of outcomes experienced by each stakeholder according to the cost-based valuation (using literature) (also known as “benefit-transfer method”) is presented in Table 5. This approach of using literature is how many traditional economic analyses are done. As described in the limitations, it is worth noting that most of these outcomes have not been previously monetized in the literature. Only one outcome could be monetized according to previous literature as related to value to the State, whereas most other outcomes were monetized based on market price method, and a handful based on stakeholder stated preferences from other studies and adapted for time horizon or purchasing power parity to this context.

Table 5: Condensed Impact Map (Cost-Based Valuation Using Literature)

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Extrapolated Quantity Outcome description	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
			Valuation approach (monetary)	Monetary valuation					
Youth	Becoming an upstanding member of society	741	20 % of value of a mentor's time (Converted from AUD to USD & Kenyan PPP)	432	13%	0%	28%	-61%	200,393
	Increased rehabilitation and reformation	655	Avoided costs to the State associated with reduced costs of re-offending and reduced substance abuse	3310	22%	0%	27%	-54%	1,234,813
	Increased income	569	Increase in income resulting from program	61	12%	0%	29%	-49%	21,516
	Increased networking and opportunities	776	Cost of Toastmasters for One Year	110	17%	0%	26%	-55%	52,419
	Increased business skills and capacity	714	Cost of one vocational education course in Kenya	350	14%	0%	27%	-58%	156,950
	Community jealousy/retaliation	133	Prorated Average Cash Value of tools and materials provided by Kenya Red Cross	-1563	10%	0%	25%	-13%	-139,746
Families of Youth Participating in Program	Increased Social Cohesion	-	-	-	0%	15%	0%	-33%	-
	Improved self-sufficiency	-	-	-	25%	15%	0%	-33%	-
	Increased feeling of community safety	-	-	-	0%	15%	0%	-33%	-
Private Sector Businesses	Improved community safety allowing for better business operations	10	Per Capita economic gains due to reduction in prevalence of gangs in local area	297	0%	0%	0%	0%	2971
Trainers	Increased sense of fulfillment from participating in program	10	-	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
Staff	Increased sense of fulfillment from participating in program	10	-	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Extrapolated Quantity Outcome description	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome Valuation approach (monetary)	Monetary valuation	Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	10	Average cost of Professional Peacebuilding Course	1,664	0%	0%	0%	0%	16,642

The relative value of outcomes experienced by each stakeholder according to stakeholders-stated preference is presented in Figures 3-5.

Figure 3: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (n=58)




Figure 4: Relative Value of Outcomes for Private Sector Businesses (n=1)





Figure 5: Relative Value of Outcomes for Staff (n=8)




Outcomes for families of youth were not monetized to maintain consistency with SROI methodology. For families of youth, the total population size was not available from Kenya Red Cross meaning that a sample size could not be estimated. Additionally, any valuation calculated from an approximate sample size may overestimate the true value created violating the SROI methodological principle of not overclaiming results.

For trainers of youth and project staff, the outcome of increased sense of fulfillment experienced was also not monetized as an outcome that could occur during the normal course of employment and therefore reflected in their pay (staff income is not an outcome according to Social Value International methodology).

Based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation, findings suggest that the intervention created the most value for youth (91-92%), then private sector businesses (4%), followed by other key stakeholders, which is consistent with the primary targets of the intervention (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Distribution of Value Created for each Stakeholder Group (Stakeholders-Stated Preference Valuation)



The additional findings of the evaluation, based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation of the value of outcomes in the context of the election, are presented below.

Figure 7: Value of Outcomes for Youth Post-Election (n=11)





Figure 8: Value of Outcomes for Staff Post-Election (n=4)



Note that while trainers and staff were surveyed to understand how the importance of the outcome they experienced (increased sense of fulfillment due to participation) changed during the post-election period, consistent with SROI methodology a value was not assigned to this outcome as monetizing it would not be consistent with Social Value International Methodology (see explanation above).

EQ4: WHAT IS THE SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT (SROI) OF THE PROGRAM?

The findings of the evaluation, according to cost-based valuation (using the literature), suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$1.75 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$0.35 to \$2.62).

Total Monetized Impact	\$1,294,917
Total Present Value	\$554,917
Total Investment	\$740,000
Social Return on Investment (SROI)	\$1.75

The findings of the evaluation, based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation, suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$6.48 - \$10.60 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$1.35 to \$15.76).

Total Monetized Impact	\$4,831,372- \$7,937,634
Total Present Value	\$4,793,352 - \$7,845,489
Total Investment	\$740,000
Social Return on Investment (SROI)	\$6.48 - \$10.60

The additional findings of the evaluation, based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation of the value of outcomes in the context of the election, suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$7.52-\$12.53 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$1.35 to \$15.91). It's important to note that this result should only be interpreted as suggestive given that full data was not collected for this calculation (i.e., deadweight, attribution, and drop-off were assumed to be the same as in the earlier results) and the sample was far from representative.

Total Monetized Impact	\$5,565,734 - \$9,275,840
Total Present Value	\$4,825,734 - \$8,535,840
Total Investment	\$740,000
Social Return on Investment (SROI)	\$7.52 - \$12.53

Additional detailed results and information are available in Appendix G.

EQ5: HOW CAN THE RESULTS OF THE SROI ANALYSIS BE USED TO IMPROVE FUTURE PROGRAMMING?

Results of the SROI analysis can be used to improve future programming in multiple ways.

Results from the cost-based approach to valuation (using literature), which are often based on large sample sizes and statistics, and consider the value to one key stakeholder (i.e., cost savings to the State), can generally provide insight on how the State is affected by the intervention, including areas it may want to invest in further. However, given the dearth of literature in this context, and the narrowness of the perspective on value applied, the utility of this set of results may be limited.

Results from the stakeholders-stated preference valuation suggest which outcomes were most important to key stakeholders who experienced the program and can be used in multiple ways. First, these insights can be used to identify the activities or approaches that are most associated with these

outcomes (for example, becoming an upstanding member of society) as ones that should be continued or expanded. Second, any negative outcomes that stakeholders described present an opportunity to dig deeper to understand what led to those outcomes and how they might be prevented or reduced in the future. Third, findings can elucidate any sub-groups of stakeholders who may be experiencing outcomes differently and opportunities to better meet their needs (for example, youth who were not provided loans for income-generating activities). Fourth, if there were outcomes that stakeholders did not report as having experienced, but were intended by program managers and/or donors, it opens the dialogue for why that was the case, and if there was a potential mismatch between what mattered to decision-makers versus users of the intervention, or the approaches used, that can be considered in future design. Finally, the fact that stakeholders are asked to provide their experience of value embodies an approach to understanding and to accountability that recognizes the important role the various stakeholders play in creating positive change. This itself may enhance the rapport between funders, program implementers and communities, and improve the ability of program operators to deliver meaningful benefits to communities experiencing conflict.

Results from the stakeholders-stated preference valuation in the context of the national elections can be further useful in understanding the value of this peacebuilding intervention to stakeholders during periods of heightened tension. Given that many peacebuilding programs in Kenya have been developed in response to experiences of violent elections or conflict, these findings (while only suggestive) imply this intervention is even more valuable in such contexts, and contributed to what proved to be a relatively peaceful election in 2022, which is of utmost importance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Three specific recommendations were identified for this program to increase value in the future. They are:

1. Programming should be designed in consultation with key stakeholders. For example, some youth expressed that they experienced jealousy and retaliation from family and community members as a result of participating in this project. Addressing this potential harm during the design phase of future programming can minimize the risk of this happening again and enable increased value for various key stakeholders.
2. Adapt programming to address all sub-groups of key stakeholders. For example, some youth participants were able to receive funding to start their income generating activities and some did not. This created a differential experience for these youth, and while it was not possible to collect all outcomes for these sub-groups due to research constraints, it became clear that the social value created for these different sub-groups was also different. Creating plans to address potential differential experiences at the program design phase can increase social value creation in the future.
3. Focus on extending the duration of desired outcomes. While many outcomes created positive value for stakeholders, these outcomes sometimes only lasted a year or less than a year. As such, programming should be adapted to focus on extending the duration of desired outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings, based on both valuation approaches and across data collected both pre- and post-election, suggest that CPEYK has had a positive impact on the communities in which it operates. While the youth participants benefitted the most from the intervention, there was clear benefit to all stakeholder groups including trainers of youth, the families of the youth participants, private sector businesses and staff working on the program. Results of the stakeholders-stated preference valuation suggest that for every \$1 invested in CPEYK, between \$6.48 and \$10.60 of social value is created, with the estimated social value of the intervention increasing even further in the context of an election.

Despite the limitations noted in this report, using the SROI approach for this evaluation provided added value over traditional evaluation approaches used in this sector in the following ways:

- 1) SROI analysis prioritized the voice of all key stakeholders and what mattered most to them. It did this by asking stakeholders what outcomes they experienced and the relative importance of them. Through this process, SROI allowed for the measurement of ‘softer’ intangible outcomes as opposed to solely focusing on ‘hard’ tangible or economic outcomes. These ‘softer’ outcomes are often excluded from traditional program evaluation and economic analyses due to the difficulty of quantifying them. However, this analysis found that these intangible outcomes (i.e., becoming an upstanding member of society) were the most important to stakeholders (even more than their increased incomes).
- 2) SROI analysis provided insights to avoid or mitigate harmful effects. SROI engaged key stakeholders in defining what changed for them and explicitly required them to consider both any positive and negative consequences they might have experienced. These insights can be used to mitigate these harms from occurring in the future.
- 3) SROI examined sustainability by considering how long outcomes lasted and how they dropped off over time and factored those into the calculations of value.
- 4) SROI elucidated value for money. While most programming in this space has inherently been understood as valuable by program staff and donors, SROI made that value explicit by assigning a dollar value to outcomes.
- 5) SROI analysis encourages decision-making based on value, not outputs. Outputs do not reflect the whole picture but have often been the basis for many decisions in aid and development programming.

Ultimately, as the goals of programming and evaluation are to improve the well-being of communities, understanding, measuring and valuing what matters most to all key stakeholders of peacebuilding interventions is key to proving and improving value.

ANNEX A: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

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ANNEX B: DETAILED METHODOLOGY

Social return on investment (SROI) analysis is a methodology that seeks to measure and account for the value (economic, social and/or environmental) created through (or diminished by) a program, policy, or intervention. Table B.1 outlines the six-step process of analysis and Table B.2 outlines the eight principles that govern how SROI (and Social Value Analysis) should be applied.

Table B. 1: The SROI Analysis Process (Adapted from SVI, 2022)

<p>Step 1: Establishing scope and identifying key stakeholders. It is important to clearly delineate the scope of what is to be included in the SROI analysis – including what activities will be analyzed, who will be involved in the process and how they will be included.</p>
<p>Stage 2: Mapping outcomes. As stakeholders are engaged with, the relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes becomes clearer. As a result, these can be mapped into a <i>Theory of Change and Impact Map</i>.</p>
<p>Stage 3: Evidencing outcomes and giving them a value. In this stage, data is collected to understand if outcomes have occurred and to assign them a monetized value.</p>
<p>Stage 4: Establishing Impact. Now that evidence of outcomes has been collected and they have been monetized, change because of other factors, or that would have occurred anyway, must be controlled for to establish the true impact of the intervention.</p>
<p>Stage 5: Calculating the SROI. At this stage, the value of all outcomes is calculated by summing total benefits and subtracting any negatives. This total value is then compared to the investment into the intervention (both financial investment and non-monetary investments) to generate an SROI ratio (the ratio of outputs to investment). This ratio is then tested for sensitivity.</p>
<p>Stage 6: Reporting, using, and embedding. This last step of the SROI process shares findings of analysis with stakeholders, verifying the report, and sharing recommendations to improve the impact of the program.</p>

Table B. 2: Social Value Principles (Adapted from SVI, 2022)

<p>Principle 1: Involve stakeholders. This suggests that stakeholders are best placed to describe how an intervention has affected them and means that they are consulted throughout the analysis process.</p>
<p>Principle 2: Understand what changes. This requires that the Theory of Change or Impact Map (both describing how the change occurs) be articulated and evidence-based - involving stakeholders, positive and negative outcomes, and intended and unintended outcomes.</p>
<p>Principle 3: Value what matters. This suggests that it is important to understand the relative importance or value of different outcomes – especially to the stakeholders that experience them.</p>
<p>Principle 4: Only include what is material. This means that only what has been determined to be of importance to stakeholders is included (i.e. what may affect future decisions).</p>
<p>Principle 5: Do not overclaim. This means that an intervention should only claim the value it has created. This requires considering impact that may be created by other interventions, the amount of future change to happen as a result of the program, and counterfactual impact.</p>
<p>Principle 6: Be transparent. This means that at each step of the analysis, the process and decisions made should be documented to ensure it is a fair and honest representation of the actual impact of the scope of analysis.</p>

ANNEX C: FOCUS GROUP GUIDE (ENGLISH VERSION)

Guide for Focus Groups/Interviews with Key Stakeholders (i.e., Youth, Families/Communities, Program Staff, State Institutions, Private Sector, etc.)

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this focus group [or interview] today. My name is Ngesa/Mariam/Other of Rural Senses. Our purpose is to evaluate the effects of the [program name]. As part of this effort, we are doing focus groups and interviews with key stakeholders of the program like yourselves, to understand from their perspectives what the program's effects were.

This study will be used to improve the program and similar programs so that they can be as beneficial as possible for young people and your community. Your responses will be anonymous- we will not associate anyone's name with anything you say. We are an independent party and we want to capture the reality and your honest feedback, whether good or bad. We expect this session to last approximately 90 minutes.

Our objectives are to:

- I. Understand your perspectives in terms of any positive or negative changes, both intended and unintended, experienced by participants or other key stakeholders as a result of the program
- II. Explore what the importance of that change has been to the participants and other key stakeholders

We plan to share results with participants and other interested parties during and upon completion of the evaluation – we will reach out to you by the end of September regarding the results.

If you agree to participate, we will continue, if you don't want to participate you are free to leave.

Introduction round (present yourself and an animal/fruit name)

First let's just start by talking about your involvement with the program.

1. How would you describe your experience in the program in your own words?

Now let's think about what the program's effects were.

2. What were you hoping the program would do for you?
3. What positive changes did you experience as a result of the program? (Probe: did it affect your knowledge/attitudes/behavior, interactions with others, quality of life, safety, less violence, empowerment, business, policies, etc.) (note: list the top 2-5 outcomes that come up)
4. What negative changes did you experience as a result of the program, if any? (note: 1-2 if any)
5. Were there any results or changes that surprised you? If so, what were they?
6. For each change you experienced:
 - 6.1. Change title:

- 6.2. Positive/Negative change?
- 6.3. How could you tell that had changed?
- 6.4. How much did it change (a little, significantly, a lot)?
7. Of all these changes, which ones (1-3) were most important to you and why?
8. For each of the most important changes:
 - 8.1. How long did the changes last? (a few days, weeks, months, years, ongoing- if years specify how many years)?
 - 8.2. Did the effects change over time (increased a lot over time, increased a bit over time, no change, decreased a lot over time, decreased a bit over time)?
 - 8.3. If the program didn't exist, is there anything else that would have led to any of the same changes?
 - 8.4. What or who else contributed to any of these changes, and how?
 - 8.5. How much of the changes would you say was caused by the program? (0% - none, 25% - some, 50% - half, 75% - a lot, 100% - all)?
9. Who else did the program affect in a significant way?
10. for each affected stakeholder from previous question:
 - 10.1. Stakeholder title
 - 10.2. How were they affected?
11. Do you have any suggestions or ideas how the program could be improved in the future?

In the last part of this focus group, we want to discuss the value of other items with regards to the change. We are now going to present you with a list of items. Let's go over them to estimate their approximate market price. [Put up images, cards, or list of those items from lowest to highest value].

12. For each of the most important change:
 - 12.1. Where would you place the value of that change in relation to these items? Facilitator notes down the 2 items below and above the change.
13. Is there anything else you'd like to share with us?

Thank you so much for your time!

List of items:

Item	~value (KS)	~value (US\$)
Airtime for 1 week	700	7
Used mobile phone	10,000	100
Laptop	30,000	300
TV “32	20,000	200
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)	100,000	1,000
Used car	300,000	3,000
Apartment in Mombasa	5,000,000	50,000
Apartment in Syokimau	7,000,000	70,000
Beachfront Property	12,000,000	120,000

ANNEX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENTS FOR EACH STAKEHOLDER (ENGLISH VERSIONS)

SURVEY INSTRUMENT – YOUTH

Thank you for taking the time to do this survey. It should take no more than 30 minutes. Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and only used to help improve future programs like the Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in the Coast Region of Kenya.

Some youth were asked about what had changed for them as a result of the Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in the Coast Region of Kenya. We will tell you what the youth we talked to said - we want to know if you have experienced the same changes or not.

This first set of questions is aimed to understand who the program has reached.

1. Did you participate in the Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in the Coast Region of Kenya program?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. I don't know
2. In what year did you participate?
 - a. 2016
 - b. 2017
 - c. 2018
 - d. 2019
 - e. 2020
 - f. 2021
 - g. 2022
3. In what county do you live?
 - a. Mombasa
 - b. Kilifi
 - c. Lamu
4. What is your age?
 - a. 18-24
 - b. 24-29
 - c. 30-35
 - d. other
5. What is your gender?
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
 - c. Other

Next, we'll ask questions about how this program has impacted you.

Outcome #1 – Upstanding Member of the Society

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced becoming more of an upstanding member of society as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
 - a. I experienced becoming more of an upstanding member of society as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
 - b. I haven't yet experienced becoming more of an upstanding member of society as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
 - c. I do not think I will experience becoming more of an upstanding member of society as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that you became more of an upstanding member of society? (Select all that apply)
 - a. I became more able to help other members of the community
 - b. I helped to support others who have dropped out of school to return to school
 - c. I became more able to provide for my children/my family
 - d. I became more responsible
 - e. I spent less time being idle as I participated in income generating activities instead
 - f. I felt an increased sense of respect from the community due to my work on this program
3. By how much did your becoming more of an upstanding member of society increase as a result of this program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Significantly
 - c. A lot
4. For how long after you finished being involved in this program did the change of becoming more of an upstanding member of society last?
 - a. A few days
 - b. Weeks
 - c. Months
 - d. 1 year
 - e. 2 years
 - f. 3 years or more
 - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did becoming more of an upstanding member of society change over time for you?
 - a. The amount of change in me being an upstanding citizen continued to grow over time by a lot
 - b. The amount of change in me being an upstanding citizen continued to grow over time by a little
 - c. The amount of change in me being an upstanding citizen stayed the same over time
 - d. The amount of change in me being an upstanding citizen declined over time a bit
 - e. The amount of change in me being an upstanding citizen declined over time a lot
6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to becoming more of an upstanding member of society?
 - a. No
 - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
 - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
 - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced

7. How much of your becoming more of an upstanding member of society would you say was caused by the program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Half
 - c. A lot
 - d. All

Outcome #2 – Rehabilitation and Reformation

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced more rehabilitation and reformation as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
 - a. I experienced more rehabilitation and reformation as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
 - b. I haven't yet experienced more rehabilitation and reformation as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
 - c. I do not think I will experience more rehabilitation and reformation as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your rehabilitation and reformation had increased? (Select all that apply)
 - a. I reduced the use of violence when responding to provocation
 - b. I decreased my use of drugs or was freed from addiction
 - c. My interpersonal relationships improved
 - d. My personal situation improved
 - e. I re-established ties with some family members
 - f. Increased confidence to enter police stations
3. By how much did your rehabilitation and reformation increase as a result of this program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Significantly
 - c. A lot
4. For how long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased rehabilitation and reformation?
 - a. A few days
 - b. Weeks
 - c. Months
 - d. 1 year
 - e. 2 years
 - f. 3 years or more
 - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did the increase in your rehabilitation and reformation change over time for you?
 - a. The increase in rehabilitation and reformation that I experienced continued to increase a lot over time
 - b. The increase in rehabilitation and reformation that I experienced continued to increase a bit over time
 - c. The increase in rehabilitation and reformation that I experienced continued to stay the same over time

- d. The increase in rehabilitation and reformation that I experienced declined a bit over time
 - e. The increase in rehabilitation and reformation that I experienced declined a lot over time
6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased rehabilitation and reformation?
- a. No
 - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
 - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
 - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much increased rehabilitation and reformation would you say was caused by the program?
- a. A little
 - b. Half
 - c. A lot
 - d. All

Outcome #3 – increased Income

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced increased incomes as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
- a. I experienced increased income as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
 - b. I haven't yet experienced increased income as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
 - c. I do not think I will experience increased income after participating in this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your income had increased? (Select all that apply)
- a. My ability to earn an income from legitimate sources was greater
 - b. I was less reliant on theft and violence to earn an income
 - c. I was able to reduce or avoid the use of sex for food or other basic needs
 - d. I became more financially independent
 - e. My ability to save money increased
3. By how much did your income increase as a result of this program?
- a. A little
 - b. Significantly
 - c. A lot
4. For how long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience an increased income?
- a. A few days
 - b. Weeks
 - c. Months
 - d. 1 year
 - e. 2 years
 - f. 3 years or more
 - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did the increase in income change over time for you?
- a. The amount my income changed continued to increase a lot over time

- b. The amount my income changed continued to increase a bit over time
 - c. The amount my income changed remained the same over time
 - d. The amount my income changed declined a bit over time
 - e. The amount my income changed declined a lot over time
6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased income?
- a. No
 - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
 - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
 - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much of your increased income would you say was caused by the program?
- a. A little
 - b. Half
 - c. A lot
 - d. All

Outcome #4 – Networking and Opportunities

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced more networking and opportunities as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
- a. I experienced more networking and opportunities as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
 - b. I haven't yet experienced more networking and opportunities as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
 - c. I do not think I will experience more networking and opportunities as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your networking and opportunities had increased? (Select all that apply)?
- a. My relationship with local chiefs, elders and security actors became better
 - b. I had more job opportunities
 - c. I had more opportunities to share knowledge with others
 - d. I had more opportunity to use skills to earn an income
 - e. I had more opportunities to share knowledge about peace
 - f. I had more opportunity to attend local council sessions
3. By how much did your networking and opportunities increase as a result of this program?
- a. A little
 - b. Significantly
 - c. A lot
4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased networking and opportunities?
- a. A few days
 - b. Weeks
 - c. Months
 - d. 1 year

- e. 2 years
 - f. 3 years or more
 - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did the increase in your networking and opportunities change over time for you?
 - a. The increase in my networking and opportunities continued to grow a lot over time
 - b. The increase in my networking and opportunities continued to grow a bit over time
 - c. The increase in my networking and opportunities stayed constant
 - d. The increase in my networking and opportunities declined a bit over time
 - e. The increase in my networking and opportunities declined a lot over time
 6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased networking and opportunities for you?
 - a. No
 - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
 - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
 - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
 7. How much of the increased networking and opportunities you experienced would you say was caused by the program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Half
 - c. A lot
 - d. All

Outcome #5 – Increased Capacity

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced increased capacity (e.g. an increased sense of personal skills and capacity) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
 - a. I experienced increased capacity as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
 - b. I haven't yet experienced increased capacity as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
 - c. I do not think I will experience increased capacity as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your capacity had changed? (Select all that apply)
 - a. Increased personal skills (i.e. cooking, ability to manage my own finances)
 - b. Increased employable skills (i.e. metal working, decorating, being a security actor guarding materials)
 - c. Increased ability to provide for oneself
 - d. Increased business management skills
 - e. Increased ability to share business knowledge with others
 - f. Increased understanding of group dynamics and how to motivate others
3. By how much did your capacity increase as a result of this program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Significantly
 - c. A lot
4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased capacity?

- a. A few days
 - b. Weeks
 - c. Months
 - d. 1 year
 - e. 2 years
 - f. 3 years or more
 - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did the increase in your capacity change over time for you?
- a. The amount of change in my capacity continued to increase a lot over time
 - b. The amount of change in my capacity continued to increase a bit over time
 - c. The amount of change in my capacity stayed constant over time
 - d. The amount of change in my capacity declined a bit over time
 - e. The amount of change in my capacity declined a lot over time
6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased capacity?
- a. No
 - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
 - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
 - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much increased capacity would you say was caused by the program?
- a. A little
 - b. Half
 - c. A lot
 - d. All

Outcome #6 – Unequal access

1. Some youth who were not previously involved in gangs or criminal activities may have felt that they could only access the program's resources if they became involved in a gang.
- a. I was not involved in gangs or criminal activities but I felt as if I could only access the program's resources if I became involved in a gang, so I thought about joining a gang, but did not.
 - b. I was not involved in gangs or criminal activities before, but because I could only access the program's resources if I became involved in a gang, I joined one.
 - c. I haven't yet experienced an increased sense that I needed to join a gang to gain access to this program's resources. (Go to next outcome)
 - d. I do not think I will experience an increased sense that I needed to join a gang to gain access to this program's resources. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that the feeling of pressure to join a gang or become involved in criminal activity increased? (Select all that apply)
- a. I felt that it was unfair that resources were being invested in people who were involved in gang or criminal activity
 - b. It seemed like only those who were troublemakers were being given access to resources
 - c. I felt like I would have to become a troublemaker to be given access to resources
 - d. I joined a gang in order to access the program's opportunities and resources, but still did not succeed in accessing the program's resources

- e. I joined a gang in order to access the program's opportunities and resources, and then succeeded in accessing the program's resources
3. By how much did the feeling of pressure to join a gang or become involved in criminal activity increase as a result of this program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Significantly
 - c. A lot
 4. For how long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience a feeling of increased pressure to join a gang or become involved in criminal activity?
 - a. A few days
 - b. Weeks
 - c. Months
 - d. 1 year
 - e. 2 years
 - f. 3 years or more
 - g. This change ended once the program ended.
 5. How did the increased feeling of pressure to join a gang or become involved in criminal activity change over time for you?
 - a. The increase in feeling like I could only access the program's resources if I were a troublemaker/in a gang continued to grow a lot over time
 - b. The increase in feeling like I could only access the program's resources if I were a troublemaker/in a gang continued to grow a bit over time
 - c. The increase in feeling like I could only access the program's resources if I were a troublemaker/in a gang stayed the same over time
 - d. The increase in feeling like I could only access the program's resources if I were a troublemaker/in a gang declined a bit over time
 - e. The increase in feeling like I could only access the program's resources if I were a troublemaker/in a gang declined a lot over time
 6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to a feeling of increased pressure to join a gang/become involved in criminal activity?
 - a. No
 - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
 - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
 - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
 7. How much of the feeling of increased pressure to join a gang/become involved in criminal activity would you say was caused by the program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Half
 - c. A lot
 - d. All

Outcome #7 – Sense of Mistrust of Programming

- I. Some youth that participated in this program experienced an increased sense of mistrust about whether the program might share their information in a way that posed a danger to them (for

example that they may be targeted by security actors). Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?

- a. I experienced an increased sense of mistrust of the programming as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
 - b. I haven't yet experienced an increased sense of mistrust of the programming, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
 - c. I do not think I will experience an increased sense of mistrust of the programming. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that this sense of mistrust increased? (Select all that apply):
 - a. Hesitancy to participate in this program due to concerns that I may experience retaliation from security actors
 - b. A feeling of concern that due to my past activities I was already at risk from the police, and the program might share my whereabouts with police who would target me
 - c. A feeling of concern that due to my past activities I was already at risk from gang members, and the program might share my whereabouts with gangs who would target me
 3. By how much did your sense of mistrust or insecurity increase?
 - a. A little
 - b. Significantly
 - c. A lot
 4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience this increased sense of mistrust or insecurity?
 - a. A few days
 - b. Weeks
 - c. Months
 - d. 1 year
 - e. 2 years
 - f. 3 years or more
 - g. This change ended once the program ended.
 5. How did this feeling of mistrust or insecurity change over time for you?
 - a. My feeling of mistrust increased a lot over time
 - b. My feeling of mistrust increased a bit over time
 - c. My feeling of mistrust stayed the same over time
 - d. My feeling of mistrust reduced a bit over time
 - e. My feeling of mistrust reduced a lot over time
 6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to a feeling of mistrust or insecurity?
 - a. No
 - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
 - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
 - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
 7. How much of your feeling of mistrust or insecurity would you say was caused by the program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Half
 - c. A lot
 - d. All

Outcome #8 – Community Jealousy/Retaliation

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced jealousy and/or retaliation from the community. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
 - a. I experienced jealousy and/or retaliation from the community as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
 - b. I haven't yet experienced jealousy and/or retaliation from the community, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
 - c. I do not think I will experience jealousy and/or retaliation from the community. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that the community's jealousy and/or retaliation had changed? (Select all that apply)
 - a. Materials I acquired due to the program were stolen
 - b. Community members have expressed criticism or jealousy as to why I was selected to participate in this program
 - c. I have been attacked and/or injured by a member of the community as a result of my participation
3. By how much did your experience of increased jealousy and/or retaliation change as a result of this program?
 - a. A little
 - b. Significantly
 - c. A lot
4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience this change in increased jealousy and/or retaliation?
 - a. A few days
 - b. Weeks
 - c. Months
 - d. 1 year
 - e. 2 years
 - f. 3 years or more
 - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did this experience of jealousy or retaliation from the (some of the) community change over time for you?
 - a. The amount of jealousy or retaliation I experienced from the community increased a lot over time
 - b. The amount of jealousy or retaliation I experienced from the community increased a bit over time
 - c. The amount of jealousy or retaliation I experienced from the community stayed the same over time
 - d. The amount of jealousy or retaliation I experienced from the community declined a bit over time
 - e. The amount of jealousy or retaliation I experienced from the community declined a lot over time
6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased jealousy/retaliation?
 - a. No

- b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
 - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
 - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much increased jealousy/retaliation would you say was caused by the program
- a. A little
 - b. Half
 - c. A lot
 - d. All

Important! Your Preferences

In each of the next few questions, we ask you to rate how important each outcome is to you, on a scale of 1 to 5.

1 = This change was unimportant to me.

5 = This change was extremely important to me.

How important are these outcomes to you?

1. Becoming more of an upstanding member of society
 - a. I did not experience this change
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4
 - f. 5
2. Increased rehabilitation and reformation
 - a. I did not experience this change
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4
 - f. 5
3. increased income
 - a. I did not experience this change
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4
 - f. 5
4. Increased networking and opportunities
 - a. I did not experience this change
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4

- f. 5
- 5. Increased capacity:
 - a. I did not experience this change
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4
 - f. 5
- 6. Sense of necessity of joining a gang in order to access the program's resources:
 - a. I did not experience this change
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4
 - f. 5
- 7. Mistrust of the program:
 - a. I did not experience this change
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4
 - f. 5
- 8. Community jealousy/retaliation:
 - a. I did not experience this change
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4
 - f. 5

Important! Valuation

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

In this last part of the survey we want to understand how you would estimate the importance of the changes you experienced compared with things you might consider valuable. Please review the following chart: Where would you place the importance of that outcome in relation to two of these items? For example, if you think the change is more important than a used mobile phone, but less than a TV - choose 2.

I. Becoming more of an upstanding member of society

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

2. Increased rehabilitation and reformation

- a. 1
- b. 2

- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

3. Increased income

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

4. Increased networking and opportunities

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

5. Increased capacity

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9

- j. 10
 - k. 11
 - l. 12
6. Sense of necessity of joining a gang to access program resources
- a. 1
 - b. 2
 - c. 3
 - d. 4
 - e. 5
 - f. 6
 - g. 7
 - h. 8
 - i. 9
 - j. 10
 - k. 11
 - l. 12
7. Mistrust of programming
- a. 1
 - b. 2
 - c. 3
 - d. 4
 - e. 5
 - f. 6
 - g. 7
 - h. 8
 - i. 9
 - j. 10
 - k. 11
 - l. 12
8. Community jealousy/retaliation
- a. 1
 - b. 2
 - c. 3
 - d. 4
 - e. 5
 - f. 6
 - g. 7
 - h. 8
 - i. 9
 - j. 10
 - k. 11
 - l. 12

SURVEY INSTRUMENT – YOUTH (POST-ELECTION)

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5-10 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in the Coast Region of Kenya**. We also asked how you might estimate the importance of these changes compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale below).

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week	1
Used mobile phone	2
TV 32"	3
Laptop	4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)	5
Business investment in flock of chickens	6
Used car	7
New tuk-tuk	8
Buying land and building a home for myself	9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm	10
Apartment in Mombasa	11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile	12
Two apartments in Mombasa	

1. Previously, **youth** valued the importance of **becoming an upstanding member of society**, on average, as between **7-8**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

2. Previously, **youth** valued the importance of **increased rehabilitation and reformation**, on average, as between **7-8**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same

- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
 - Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)
3. Previously, **youth** valued the importance of **increased income**, on average, as between **6-7**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?
- Response options:
- Its importance remained the same
 - Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
 - Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)
4. Previously, **youth** valued the importance of **increased networking and opportunities**, on average, as between **7-8**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?
- Response options:
- Its importance remained the same
 - Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
 - Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)
5. Previously, **youth** valued the importance of **increased business skills**, on average, as between **6-7**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?
- Response options:
- Its importance remained the same
 - Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
 - Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

SURVEY INSTRUMENT – FAMILIES OF YOUTH (POST-ELECTION)

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5-10 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in the Coast Region of Kenya**. We also asked how you might estimate the importance of these changes compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale below).

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

6. Previously, **families** valued the importance of **increased social cohesion**, on average, as between **11-12**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

7. Previously, **families** valued the importance of **improved self-sufficiency**, on average, as between **11-12**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

8. Previously, **families** valued the importance of **increased feeling of safety in the community**, on average, as between **11-12**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

SURVEY INSTRUMENT – TRAINERS OF YOUTH (POST-ELECTION)

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5-10 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in the Coast Region of Kenya**.

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

9. How might you estimate the importance of **increased sense of fulfillment** compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale)?
- 1
 - 2
 - 3
 - 4
 - 5
 - 6
 - 7
 - 8

- i. 9
 - j. 10
 - k. 11
 - l. 12
2. In context of the recent elections, did the importance of **increased sense of fulfillment** remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?
- Response options:
- Its importance remained the same
 - Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
 - Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

SURVEY INSTRUMENT – PROGRAM STAFF (POST-ELECTION)

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5-10 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in the Coast Region of Kenya**.

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

10. How might you estimate the importance of **increased sense of fulfillment** compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale)?

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

3. In context of the recent elections, did the importance of **increased sense of fulfillment** remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

ANNEX E: IMPACT MAPS (CONDENSED) STAKEHOLDERS-STATED PREFERENCE VALUATION

See Tables E1 and E2 for the condensed impact maps according to stakeholders-stated preference valuations.

Table E. 1: Condensed Impact Map – Stakeholders-Stated Preference Valuation (Low End Values)

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Quantity (scale)	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Outcome description			Monetary valuation					
Youth Participating in Program	Becoming an upstanding member of society	741	Survey Data	2490.00	13%	0%	28%	-61%	1,156,356.00
	Increased rehabilitation and reformation	655	Survey Data	2490.00	22%	0%	27%	-54%	928,907.38
	Increased income	569	Survey Data	1660.00	12%	0%	29%	-49%	590,112.83
	Increased networking and opportunities	776	Survey Data	2490.00	17%	0%	26%	-55%	1,186,570.86
	Increased business skills	714	Survey Data	1660.00	14%	0%	27%	-58%	744,391.43
	Community jealousy/retaliation	133	Survey Data	-1660.00	10%	0%	25%	-13%	-148,466.25
Families of Youth Participating in Program	Increased social cohesion	200	Focus Group Data	-	0%	15%	0%	-33%	-
	Improved self-sufficiency	200	Focus Group Data	-	25%	15%	0%	-33%	-
	Increased feeling of community safety	200	Focus Group Data	-	0%	15%	0%	-33%	-
Private Sector Businesses	Improved community safety allowing for better business operations	10	Interview Data	41500.00	50%	0%	0%	-25%	207,500.00

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Quantity (scale)	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Outcome description			Monetary valuation					
Trainers	Increased sense of fulfillment due to participation	3	Interview Data	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
Staff	Increased sense of fulfillment due to participation	10	Focus Group Data	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	10	Focus Group Data	16,600.00	0%	0%	0%	0%	166,000.00

Table E. 2: Condensed Impact Map – Stakeholders-Stated Preference Valuation (High End Values)

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Quantity (scale)	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Outcome description			Monetary valuation					
Youth Participating in Program	Becoming an upstanding member of society	741	Survey Data	4150.00	13%	0%	28%	-61%	1,927,260.00
	Increased rehabilitation and reformation	655	Survey Data	4150.00	22%	0%	27%	-54%	1,548,178.97
	Increased income	569	Survey Data	2490.00	12%	0%	29%	-49%	885,169.24
	Increased networking and opportunities	776	Survey Data	4150.00	17%	0%	26%	-55%	1,977,618.10
	Increased business skills	714	Survey Data	2490.00	14%	0%	27%	-58%	1,116,587.14
	Community jealousy/retaliation	133	Survey Data	-2490.00	10%	0%	25%	-13%	-222,699.38
Families of Youth Participating in Program	Increased social cohesion	200	Focus Group Data	-	0%	15%	0%	-33%	-
	Improved self-sufficiency of the family	200	Focus Group Data	-	25%	15%	0%	-33%	-

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Quantity (scale)	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Outcome description			Monetary valuation					
	Increased feeling of community safety	200	Focus Group Data	-	0%	15%	0%	-33%	-
Private Sector Businesses	Improved community safety allowing for better business operations	10	Interview Data	58100.00	50%	0%	0%	-25%	290,500.00
Trainers	Increased sense of fulfillment due to participation	3	Survey Data	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
Staff	Increased sense of fulfillment due to participation	10	Survey Data	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	10	Survey Data	41,500.00	0%	0%	0%	0%	415,000.00

ANNEX F: IMPACT MAP (CONDENSED) COST-BASED VALUATION

See Table FI for the condensed impact map according to cost-based valuation.

Table F. I: Condensed Impact Map – Cost-Based Valuation

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Quantity (scale)	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
			Outcome description	Valuation approach (monetary)					
Youth	Becoming an upstanding member of society	741	20 % of value of a mentor's time (Converted from AUD to USD & Kenyan PPP)	431.51	13%	0%	28%	-61%	200,393.24
	Increased rehabilitation and reformation	655	Avoided costs to the state associated with reduced costs of re-offending and reduced substance abuse	3310.00	22%	0%	27%	-54%	1,234,812.62
	Increased Income	569	Increase in income resulting from program	60.53	12%	0%	29%	-49%	21,516.01
	Increased networking and opportunities	776	Cost of Toastmasters for One Year	110.00	17%	0%	26%	-55%	52,418.79
	Increased business skills and capacity	714	Cost of one vocational education course in Kenya	350.00	14%	0%	27%	-58%	156,950.00
	Community jealousy/retaliation	133	Prorated Average Cash Value of tools and materials provided by Kenya Red Cross	-1562.50	10%	0%	25%	-13%	-139,746.09
	Increased Social Cohesion	-	-	-	0%	15%	0%	-33%	-
	Improved self-sufficiency	-	-	-	25%	15%	0%	-33%	-

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Quantity (scale)	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
			Outcome description	Valuation approach (monetary)					
Families of Youth Participating in Program	Increased feeling of community safety	-	-	-	0%	15%	0%	-33%	-
Private Sector Businesses	Improved community safety allowing for better business operations	10	Per Capita economic gains due to reduction in prevalence of gangs in local area	297.09	0%	0%	0%	0%	2970.9
Trainers	Increased sense of fulfillment from participating in program	10	-	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
Staff	Increased sense of fulfillment from participating in program	10	-	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	10	Average cost of Professional Peacebuilding Course	1,664.24	0%	0%	0%	0%	16,642.38

ANNEX G: DETAILED RESULTS

WELL DEFINED OUTCOMES

One of the important aspects of social return on investment analysis is the generation of well-defined outcomes which help to summarize the change experienced by a certain stakeholder group. These outcomes are then leveraged to develop a theory of change for the intervention. A well-defined outcome results from the participation of the stakeholder and describes what changed for them due to their participation (either positive or negative). This section will present the well-defined outcomes for each stakeholder group and the indicators they used to help describe these outcomes.

Table G. 1: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Youth

OUTCOME	INDICATORS
INCREASED REHABILITATION AND REFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Youth reduced the use of violence when responding to provocation Youth decreased their drug use or were freed from addiction Youth experienced improvement in their interpersonal relationships Youth experienced improvements in their interpersonal relationships Youth re-established ties with some family members Youth experienced increased confidence to enter police stations
INCREASED NETWORKING AND OPPORTUNITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Youth experienced improvements in their relationships with local chiefs, elders and security/state actors Youth experienced increased job opportunities Youth experienced increased opportunities to share knowledge with others Youth experienced increased opportunity to use skills to earn an income Youth experienced more opportunities to share knowledge about peace Youth experienced more opportunity to attend local council sessions
INCREASED BUSINESS SKILLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased personal skills (i.e., ability to manage own finances) Increased employable skills (i.e., metal working, decorating, security roles) Increased ability to provide for oneself Increased business management skills Increased ability to share business knowledge with others Increased understanding of group dynamics and how to motivate others
INCREASED INCOME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased ability to earn an income from legitimate sources Less reliance on theft and violence to earn an income Reduced or avoided use of sex for food or other basic needs Increased financial independence Increased ability to save money
BECOMING AN UPSTANDING MEMBER OF SOCIETY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased ability to help other members of the community Helped support others to dropped out of school to return to school Increased ability to provide for children/family Increased responsibility Decreased time spent idle due to participation in income generating activities Increased sense of respect from the community due to work on this program

OUTCOME	INDICATORS
INCREASED COMMUNITY JEALOUSY/RETALIATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Materials that were acquired due to the program were stolen • Community members have expressed criticism or jealousy as to why I was selected to participate in this program • I have been attacked and/or injured by a member of the community as a result of my participation • I have been arrested as a result of my participation in this program

Some youth that participated in this program also expressed that they experienced additional negative outcomes relating to their participation in this program. These outcomes were:

- Mistrust of programming
- Sense of necessity of joining a gang to access the programs resources

Ultimately, upon further analysis these outcomes were not included in the final impact map as they did not persist past the end of the program.

Table G. 2: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Families of Youth Participants

OUTCOME	INDICATOR
IMPROVED SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE FAMILY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreased hunger • Increased food security
INCREASED FEELING OF COMMUNITY SAFETY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased sense of safety when walking at night • Ability to walk in areas of the community where it was previously too unsafe
INCREASED SOCIAL COHESION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth now greet other community members respectfully • Increased sense of balance within the community • Improved relationship with rehabilitated youth

Table G. 3: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Private Sector Businesses

OUTCOME	INDICATORS
INCREASED COMMUNITY SAFETY ALLOWING FOR BETTER BUSINESS OPERATIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreased business disruption resulting from violence

Table G. 4: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Trainers

OUTCOME	INDICATORS
INCREASED SENSE OF FULFILMENT DUE TO PARTICIPATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased personal fulfilment/happiness resulting from participation in program

Table G. 5: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for KRC Staff


OUTCOME	INDICATORS
INCREASED SENSE OF FULFILMENT DUE TO PARTICIPATION	Increased personal fulfilment/happiness resulting from participation in program
INCREASED CAPACITY FOR PEACEBUILDING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased program management skills • Increased confidence to engage with the community • Increased inter-personal relationship skills

RESULTS – STAKEHOLDERS-STATED PREFERENCE VALUATION

Overall results suggest that for every \$1 invested in peacebuilding through the CPEYK Program, between \$7 and \$13 in Social Value was created when using what program stakeholders said of the value their outcomes (this ranges from \$1.35 to \$15.76 when conducting a Sensitivity Analysis).

The total value created per stakeholder group varies depending upon the valuation used (low vs. high). For youth, the percentage varies between 91% (high valuation) and 88% (low valuation). For private sector businesses, the value created is 4% across both valuations. Finally, staff follow with a range of 8% (low valuation) to 5% (high valuation). Figure G6 presents the relative social value generated at both valuations. Note that while trainers and families experienced outcomes, those outcomes were not monetized and thus not reflected in these figures.

Figure G. 1: Distribution of Value Created by Stakeholder Group



For each main stakeholder group identified – youth, families of youth participants, private sector businesses, trainers and staff – a set of outcomes that were experienced because of the programming was identified. These identified outcomes were then used during surveys to understand the relative importance of each outcome to the stakeholders.

For youth, the relative importance of the outcomes that were experienced follows in Table G6.

Table G. 6: Relative Importance of Outcomes for Youth

OUTCOME	RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO YOUTH
Becoming an upstanding member of society	1
Increased networking and opportunities	1
Increased income	1
Increased business skills	3
Increased rehabilitation and reformation	5
Community Jealousy/Retaliation	6

One key insight delivered by this analysis was around the duration of outcomes. Participants were asked to quantify how long after the program ended did they continue to experience the outcome in question on the following scale: a few days, a few weeks, a few months, 1 year, 2 year, 3 years or more than 3 years. It was found that not all groups experienced outcomes that lasted for a full year after the program ended. To establish the duration of each outcome, a weighted average of the answers was calculated using the conversion outlined in Table G7. Note that this was applied to both valuation techniques.

Table G. 7: Conversion Chart used to Establish Outcome Duration

SURVEY RESPONSE	FRACTIONAL YEAR	DECIMAL USED TO CALCULATE DURATION
A few days	3/365	0.00821918
A few weeks	3/52	0.05769231
A few months	5/12	0.4166667
1 Year	1/1	1
2 Years	2/1	2
3 Years	3/1	3

Outcomes and their durations are presented in Table G8.

Table G. 8: Outcomes and their Durations

STAKEHOLDER AND OUTCOME	OUTCOME DURATION (YEARS)
YOUTH PARTICIPANTS	
Becoming an upstanding member of society	1.26
Increased rehabilitation and reformation	0.76
Increased income	1.06
Increased networking and opportunities	0.79
Increased business skills	1.14
Community jealousy/retaliation	0.69
PRIVATE SECTOR BUSINESSES	
Improved community safety allowing for better business operations	1*
TRAINERS	
Increased job satisfaction	1*

STAKEHOLDER AND OUTCOME	OUTCOME DURATION (YEARS)
STAFF	
Increased job satisfaction	1*
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	1*

* For outcomes that were collected in focus groups and interviews, specific questions to establish duration were not always asked. As a result, it is assumed that these outcomes lasted for 1 year (minimum amount of time used in Social Value International Methodology).

To ensure that results align with the Social Value International principle of not overclaiming results, results were adjusted to account for these durations. As the Social Value International Impact Map Template uses years as the unit of analysis, the value created in the first year was multiplied by the fractional year (where there was one) in order to get a more accurate representation of the value created.

Using stakeholders-stated preference valuation, all outcomes were able to be monetized. The three outcomes that generated the most value for youth across both low and high valuations were: (1) Increased Networking and Opportunities, (2) Becoming an upstanding member of society and (3) Increased rehabilitation and reformation. Youth also experienced other outcomes (as shown in Figure G2) that created positive social value. Importantly, youth expressed that they experienced an outcome that generated negative social value for them – community jealousy and retaliation. Figure G2 presents all outcomes and their valuations across both low valuations and high valuations. Figures G3 and G4 present these valuations relative to one another.

Figure G. 2: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth




Figure G. 3: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (Low End Values)





Figure G. 4: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (High End Values)




For families of youth participants, three key outcomes were experienced. These were: (1) increased social cohesion and (2) improved self-sufficiency and (3) increased feelings of community safety. These outcomes were not monetized as a true population size was not available and using an assumed sample size could overstate the SROI of the program.

Trainers experienced one key outcome – increased sense of fulfilment due to participation. This outcome was not monetized as per SROI principles (as trainers were remunerated by KRC for their participation this was not monetized).

Private sector businesses experienced one key outcome – increased community safety allowing for better business operations. Stakeholders described that through the change in community environment


created through CPEYK they experienced less business disruptions. The valuation for this outcome is presented in Figure G5.

Figure G. 5: Value of Outcomes for Private Sector Businesses



Staff members working on the CPEYK program also experienced two key outcomes – (1) Increased sense of fulfilment due to participation in the program and (2) increased capacity for peacebuilding. Like the outcomes for trainers, the first outcome could be monetized due to SROI principles. However, the second outcome could be monetized and valuations for this outcome are presented in Figure G6.

Figure G. 6: Value of Outcomes for Staff



SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

To understand how changes to any of the assumptions may affect the overall social value found, a range of sensitivity analyses were conducted.

The first scenario tested changes to the attribution assumptions. It was assumed in the analysis that the values for attribution were what stakeholders told us about what amount of the change experienced is caused by CPEYK. Attribution was calculated by asking stakeholders how much of the change that they experienced was caused by the program. Stakeholders responded as follows: none, a little, half or a lot. These were correlated with percentages as follows: none (0%), a little (25%), half (50%) or a lot (75%). A weighted average was then taken to determine an attribution percentage.

While CPEYK did contribute to the changes that participants experienced, the reality is that multiple interventions operate in the same communities in which CEPYK operates, potentially contributing to

CPEYK’s effects in a way that is difficult to tease apart. Therefore, adjusting the assumed attribution values will account for the effect of this potential overlapping. Attribution values were increased from their baseline (surveyed) result by 10% and 25%. The resulting social value can be found in Table G9 (low valuation) and Table G10 (high valuation).

Table G. 9: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to attribution (+10% and +25% from Baseline Low Values)

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY, ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,831,372	\$4,404,632	\$3,391,021
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,793,352	\$4,330,393	\$3,332,553
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$6.48	\$1: \$5.85	\$1: \$4.50

Table G. 10: Sensitivity Analysis of based on changes to attribution (+10% and +25% from Baseline High Values)

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY, ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$7,937,614	\$6,872,128	\$5,273,900
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$7,845,489	\$6,730,319	\$5,162,713
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$10.60	\$1:\$9.10	\$1: \$6.98

Across all levels of attribution, the program has a strong positive SROI.

A further sensitivity analysis was conducted to understand how changes to deadweight can also affect the total SROI. The original deadweight assumption was calculated again using a weighted average of stakeholder responses. However, this time stakeholders were asked how much of the change would have occurred in the absence of the program using the same scale. The answers were correlated to the same percentages to allow the calculation of a weighted average.

Similarly to attribution, by increasing deadweight values it is testing assumptions on how much change would have occurred in the absence of CPEYK. Change may occur in the absence of one specific program, such as CPEYK due to other factors such as the population growing tired of economic disruption after COVID-19 – understanding how the social value created by CPEYK is affected by this is key to understanding overall social value. Tables G11 and G12 outline how changes to deadweight (+10% from Baseline and +25% from baseline) affect the social value created at both low and high stakeholders-stated preference valuations.

Table G. 11: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to deadweight (+10% and +25% from Baseline Low End)

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY, DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,831,372	\$4,465,288	\$3,542,661
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,793,352	\$4,394,670	\$3,493,246
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$6.48	\$1:\$5.94	\$1: \$4.72

Table G. 12: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to deadweight (+10% and +25% from Baseline High End)

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY, DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$7,937,614	\$6,974,059	\$5,528,728
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$7,845,489	\$6,837,819	\$5,431,463
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$10.60	\$1:\$9.24	\$1:\$7.34

Across all levels of deadweight, the program has a strong positive SROI.

A final sensitivity analysis was conducted to test the assumed valuations. Analyses were conducted at 20% of the base case financial proxy, 50% of this proxy and 150% of this proxy in order to test if social value is still created at these levels. Table G13 presents the results of this scenario when testing the low survey proxies and Table G14 presents this for the high survey proxies.

Table G. 13: Sensitivity Analysis of monetized outcomes at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (low end)

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY)	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,831,372	\$1,016,074	\$2,540,186	\$7,620,558
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,793,352	\$999,124	\$2,497,810	\$7,793,430
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$6.48	\$1:\$1.35	\$1:\$3.38	\$1:\$10.13

Table G. 14: Sensitivity Analysis of monetized outcomes at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (high end)

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY)	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$7,937,614	\$1,587,523	\$3,948,807	\$11,906,421
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$7,845,489	\$1,555,078	\$3,887,695	\$11,663,085
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$10.60	\$1:\$2.10	\$1:\$5.25	\$1:\$15.76

Across all valuations and scenarios, the program still has a strong positive SROI.

Based on the totality of these sensitivity analysis, when using stakeholders-stated preference valuations – CPEYK has a Social Return on Investment Ratio between \$1: \$2 and \$1:\$16.


RESULTS – COST-BASED VALUATION

When estimating the value for outcomes using financial proxies for outcomes based on market rates and other financial proxies identified through the literature search, it was found that for every \$1 invested in the program - \$1.75 in Social Value is created (with a range of \$0.30 to \$2.62 after Sensitivity Analysis).

When using this strategy, the value created for each stakeholder group is similar to that of the survey valuation approach. The most value is created for youth (87%), followed by staff (8%) and private sector businesses (5%). This is largely consistent with the primary targets of the intervention.

The relative importance of outcomes to each stakeholder group did not change from the stakeholders-stated preference valuations and therefore will not be presented in this section.

Figure G. 7: Distribution of Value Created for Each Stakeholder (Cost-Based Valuation)



In this valuation approach, all outcomes were able to be monetized. The three outcomes that generated the most value for youth were: (1) Becoming an upstanding member of society, (2) Increased rehabilitation and reformation and (3) Increased business skills. Youth also experienced other outcomes (as shown in Figure G8) that created positive social value. Importantly, youth reported an outcome that created negative value – Increased community jealousy and retaliation. Figure G8 presents all outcomes and their values and Figure G9 presents these valuations relative to one another.

Figure G. 8: Value of Outcomes for Youth (Cost-Based Valuation)





Figure G. 9: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (Cost-Based Valuation)



Similarly to the approach for stakeholders-stated preference valuation – outcomes for both families of youth participants and trainers could not be monetized. As explained earlier, monetizing these outcomes would not be consistent with SROI principles.


Private sector businesses experienced one key outcome – increased security allowing for better business operations. This valuation is presented in Figure G10.

Figure G. 10: Value of Outcomes for Private Sector Businesses (Cost-Based Valuation)



Finally, the approach for valuing the outcomes experienced by staff is consistent with the stakeholders-stated preference valuation. Recall, only one of the two outcomes – increased capacity for peacebuilding can be monetized in order to stay consistent with SROI principles. The valuation is presented in figure G11.

Figure G. 11: Value of Outcomes for Staff (Cost-Based Valuation)



SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

To understand how changes to any of the assumptions made affect the overall social value created, a range of sensitivity analyses were conducted.

The same analyses were conducted on the literature valuations as were done on the stakeholders-stated preference valuations. To summarize, the following were tested:

- 1) Changes to attribution (+10% and +25% to base case)
- 2) Changes to deadweight (+10% and +25% to base case)
- 3) Changes to valuation (20%, 50% and 150% of base case)

The base case for attribution and deadweight were the levels established through stakeholders, and for financial proxies it was the valuation established through the literature.

Results for each of the sensitivity analyses are presented in Tables G15-17.

Table G. 15: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Attribution (Cost-Based) (+10% and +25% from Baseline)

	BASE CASE (ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,294,917	\$1,324,289	\$1,016,882
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$554,917	\$1,107,520	\$882,519
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1:\$1.75	\$1:\$1.50	\$1:\$1.15

Across all levels of attribution, the program has a positive SROI.

Table G. 16: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Deadweight (Cost-Based) (+10% and +25% from Baseline)

	BASE CASE (DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,294,917	\$1,123,254	\$882,446
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$554,917	\$383,254	\$142,446
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1:\$1.75	\$1:\$1.52	\$1: \$1.19

Across all levels of deadweight, the program has a positive SROI.

Table G. 17: Sensitivity Analysis of Monetized Outcomes at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (Cost-based)

	BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,294,917	\$258,984	\$872,143	\$1,942,407
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$554,917	-\$481,016	\$132,142	\$1,202,407
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1:\$1.75	\$1:\$0.35	\$1:\$1.18	\$1:\$2.62

At both 50% and 150% of scenarios, the program has a positive SROI. However, at 20% the analysis shows a negative ratio. This is not likely due to the program diminishing social value for participants but rather a combination of factors including a high budget figure used for calculations.

Based on the totality of these sensitivity analyses, when using cost-based valuation – CPEYK has a Social Return on Investment Ratio between \$1: \$0.35 and \$1: \$3.


RESULTS – STAKEHOLDER STATED PREFERENCE (POST-ELECTION)

As previously mentioned, the timeframe of this analysis afforded the unique ability to understand how the 2022 Kenyan national elections influenced the value of outcomes, through repeating the Social Return on Analysis process. Results from the analysis show that for every \$1 invested in CPEYK between \$7 and \$13 in value was created. To understand the value that was created in context of the election, outcomes were valued based on stakeholders-stated preferences. This ratio changed to \$1: \$1.35 and \$1: \$16 when conducting a sensitivity analysis.

Due to limitations within the data collected (number of responses), the relative social value created for each stakeholder group is not clear. However, presented below are the valuations and sensitivity analyses for the results that were able to be collected and monetized. The stakeholder groups that results can be presented for are: youth and staff.

In this monetization approach, all outcomes for youth were able to be monetized. When compared to the pre-election period, there is a shift in the outcomes that have created the most value for youth. In the post-election period these are: (1) Increased networking and opportunities, (2) Becoming an upstanding member of society and (3) Increased business skills. All valuations in this period are shown in Figure G12.


Figure G. 12: Value of Outcomes for Youth Pre- and Post- Election (Stakeholder Stated Preference Valuation)



These results demonstrate that in the post-election period, there is a significant growth in value creation.


There is a marked shift in the relative value of outcomes during the post-election period. The relative value of outcomes at both low and high valuations is presented in Figure G13.

Figure G. 13: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth Post-Election (Stakeholders-Stated Preference Valuations)



Analysis also included how the election affected the outcomes that staff members working on the CPEYK program experienced. Based on this, it is evident that staff also had increased social value created for them during the election period. Figure G14 compares this value to pre-election valuations.

Figure G. 14: Value of Outcomes Pre- and Post-Election for Staff (Stakeholders-Stated Preference Valuation)



SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Consistent with both pre-election scenarios, sensitivity analysis was conducted to ensure the robustness of the data presented. The sensitivity analyses were conducted on both low and high valuations obtained from the post-election surveys and tested the following scenarios follows:

- 1) Testing levels of attribution (+10% and +25% from Base Case)
- 2) Testing levels of deadweight (+10% and +25% from Base Case)
- 3) Testing levels of valuation (20%, 50% and 150% of Base Case).

The results are presented in the following tables:

- 1) Attribution – Tables G18 and G19
- 2) Deadweight – Tables G20 and G21
- 3) Valuation – Tables G22 and G23

Table G. 18: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Attribution (Post-election) (+10% and +25% from Baseline Low End Values)

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY, ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$5,565,734	\$4,330,393	\$3,332,553
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,825,734	\$3,590,393	\$2,592,553
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$7.52	\$1: \$5.85	\$1: \$4.50

Table G. 19: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Attribution (post-election) (+10% and +25% from Baseline High End Values)

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY, ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$9,275,840	\$7,997,840	\$6,104,177
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$8,535,840	\$7,237,840	\$5,364,177
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1:\$12.53	\$1:\$10.78	\$1: \$8.25

Based on this sensitivity analysis, at all levels of attribution the program has a strong positive SROI in the post-election period.

Table G. 20: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Deadweight (post-election) (+10% and +25% from Baseline Low End Values)

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY, DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$5,565,734	\$4,394,670	\$3,493,246
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,825,734	\$3,654,670	\$2,753,246
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$7.52	\$1: \$5.94	\$1: \$4.72

Table G. 21: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Deadweight (post-election) (+10% and +25% from Baseline High End Values)

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY, DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$9,275,840	\$8,150,315	\$6,535,364
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$8,535,840	\$7,410,315	\$5,795,364
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1:\$12.53	\$1:\$11.01	\$1:\$8.83

Again, the results of this sensitivity analysis demonstrate that the program generated a strong positive Social Return on Investment in the Post-Election period.

Table G. 22: Sensitivity Analysis based on Monetized Values at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (post-election) (Low End Values)

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY)	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$5,565,734	\$999,124	\$2,497,810	\$7,493,430
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$4,825,734	\$259,124	\$1,757,810	\$6,753,430
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$7.52	\$1:\$1.35	\$1:\$3.38	\$1:\$10.96

Table G. 23: Sensitivity Analysis based on Monetized Values at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (post-election) (high end values)

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY)	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$9,275,840	\$1,569,925	\$3,924,812	\$11,774,435
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$8,535,840	\$829,925	\$3,184,812	\$11,034,435
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000	\$740,000
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1:\$12.53	\$1:\$2.12	\$1:\$5.30	\$1:\$15.91

Based on the results of this sensitivity analysis, there is positive social value generated across all levels of valuation.

Based on the totality of these sensitivity analysis, when using stakeholder valuations in the post-election context– CPEYK has a Social Return on Investment Ratio between \$1: \$1.35 and \$1: \$16.

ANNEX H: IMPACT RISK ASSESSMENT

For each outcome that it seeks to deliver or understand, the program faces impact risks. According to the Impact Management Program consensus, “[i]mpact risk is the likelihood that impact will be different than expected, and that the difference will be material from the perspective of people or the planet who experience impact.” One of the primary such risks is evidence risk, which is closely related with the credibility of the assessment in the eyes of its audience. The evidence risk for each outcome and financial proxy used in this analysis is rated. Three aspects of accuracy are considered in the evidence risk rubric: volume of evidence, rigor of evidence, and applicability of evidence. Additionally, the consequences of inaccuracy are rated.

RUBRIC FOR IMPACT RISK: EVIDENCE

A (Likelihood of Accuracy) + B (Consequences) = Evidence Risk

The rating is on a 1 - 10 scale, 10 being highest risk, as follows:

- 1 = Extremely unlikely to be inaccurate, based on: statistically significant sample size/very large sample size relative to size of affected population, well-documented and robust methods of measurement and/or analysis, recency from 0-3 years old, and highly similar population and context to that in our study.
- 2 = Very unlikely to be inaccurate, based on: nearly statistically significant sample size/sizeable sample size relative to size of affected population, well-documented and reasonable methods of measurement and/or analysis, recency from 4-6 years old or better, and similar population and context to that in our study.
- 3 = Moderately likely to be inaccurate, based on: somewhat less than statistically significant sample size relative to size of affected population, mostly well-documented and reasonable methods of measurement and/or analysis given the nature of the intervention and study, recency being from 7-9 years old or better, and population and context somewhat similar to that in our study or better.
- 4 = Highly likely to be inaccurate, based on: sample size not close to representative of size of affected population, patchy discussion of methods of measurement and/or analysis and/or some quality issues with methodology, study being 10-12 years old or better, and/or population and context being significantly different than that in our study.
- 5 = Extremely likely to be inaccurate based on: sample size insufficient relative to size of affected population, unclear methods of measurement and/or analysis, study >12 years old or better, and population and context significantly different than that in our study.

EVIDENCE RISK RATING: CONSEQUENCES

- 5 = Catastrophic, in that human life is at risk if the assessment of impact is inaccurate.
- 4 = Major in that severe damage to peoples' well-being could occur if the assessment is inaccurate.
- 3 = Moderate in that significant damage to peoples' well-being could occur.
- 2 = Minor in that some disruption to quality of life is possible.
- 1 = Insignificant in that only minor problems would ensue if the assessment of risk is inaccurate.

Table H. 1: Impact Risk Assessment

STAKEHOLDER AND OUTCOME	IMPACT RISK LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT RISK CONSEQUENCES	OVERALL IMPACT RISK RATING
Youth Participants			
Changed relationship with police	3	2	5
Increased capacity	3	1	4
Increased empowerment	3	1	4
Increased inclusion in in peace- and decision-making processes	3	1	4
Increased networking and opportunities	3	2	5
Increased rehabilitation and reformation	3	2	5
Community Influencers			
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	4	1	5
Increased networking and opportunities	4	2	6
Engaged Listeners			
Increased collaboration with other youth to solve problems	4	2	5
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	4	1	4
Security Actors			
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	4	1	4
Staff			
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	3	1	4
Average	3.4	1.4	4.58

The overall assessment of the risk that the evidence is inaccurate, and of the severity of the consequences of that inaccuracy to stakeholders experiencing the impact of this program, is 4.58 out of 10.

ANNEX I: COST-BASED VALUATION SOURCES AND ASSUMPTIONS

Table I. I: Cost-Based Valuation Financial Proxy Sources and Related Assumptions

WELL-DEFINED OUTCOME	FINANCIAL PROXY	SOURCES	RELATED ASSUMPTIONS
Being an Upstanding Member of Society	20 % of value of a mentor's time (Converted from AUD to USD & Kenyan PPP)	https://www.niaa.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/indigenous/Youth-Prevention-and-Diversion-Circular-Head-Aboriginal-Corporation/pdf/CHAC_YPD_Forcast_SROI_PDF.pdf	SROI of Prevention and Diversion efforts for Indigenous Youth in Australia. Valued the time of mentorship over 5 years, as program participants only participated in this study over 1 year, can only take 20% of the value. Financial Proxy in AUD, Converted to USD using 0.66 AUD: USD (as of 1/10/2022) then to Kenyan PPP as 43.8 LCU/INT)
Increased Rehabilitation and reformation	Avoided costs to the state associated with reduced costs of re-offending and reduced substance abuse (EUR converted to USD, Converted to Kenyan PPP)	https://socialvalueuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Final-Report-3-March-2017.pdf	SROI analysis of Youth Programs in Ireland monetized this outcome as the sum of the value of reduced costs to the criminal justice and health systems of re-offending Youth and reduced substance Abuse Used EUR to USD to conversion of 1:1 as of (1/10/2022) then used conversion of 43.8 LCU/INT to for Kenyan PPP
Increased Income	Increases in income resulting from the program	Program provided data	N/A
Increased Networking Opportunities	Cost of Joining Toastmasters for One Year	https://www.toastmasters.org/membership/my-first-meeting	Local Kenyan Toastmasters did not publish localized prices as of (1/10/2022), market rate established with prices published by Toastmasters international
Increased Business Skills and Capacity	Cost of One Vocational Education Course in Kenya	https://www.3ieimpact.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ie37-kenya-vocational-education.pdf	2019 SROI analysis of Vocational Education Vouchers in Kenya established this as the market rate for vocational education in Kenya as this was the value of the vouchers given to participants.
Increased Community Jealousy and Retaliation	Prorated Average Cash Value of tools and materials provided by Kenya Red Cross	Program Provided data	Program provided the total cash values of tools and materials provided to participants by Kenya Red Cross. Prorated by 25% as 4 year intervention and analysis only covered 1 year.
Increased Social Cohesion	.	-	Not monetized as a population size could not be determined
Improved self-sufficiency of the family	-	-	Not monetized as a population size could not be determined
Increased feeling of community safety	-	-	Not monetized as a population size could not be determined

WELL-DEFINED OUTCOME	FINANCIAL PROXY	SOURCES	RELATED ASSUMPTIONS
Improved community safety allowing for better business operations	Per capita economic gains associated with reductions in gang violence in the local area (El Salvador PPP in USD, Converted to Kenyan PPP)	https://www.nber.org/digest/202012/gang-culture-and-economic-development-evidence-el-salvador	USD used as basis for Proxy, converted to USD PPP using 0.46 LCU/INT then to Kenyan PPP using 43.8 LCU/INT.
Increased sense of fulfillment due to participation in the program (Trainers)	-	-	Not monetized due to SROI principles
Increased sense of fulfillment due to participation in the program (Staff)	-	-	Not monetized to SROI principles
Increased capacity for peacebuilding (Staff)	Market rate for professional peacebuilding education	https://www.undp.org/jposc/course-s-governance-peacebuilding?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&src=CENTRAL&src2=GSR&gclid=CjwKCAjwg5uZBhATEiwAhhRLHqmu7BFMrr8j-cjfyPQDwhjPUKkp8ZzrVxIhAApXQMhjW	Assumed that knowledge gained through participation of Security Actors is more than what would be gained through introductory course. Average cost of all courses listed by UNDP as professional peacebuilding education (converting to USD from CHF, EUR and GBP all at 1:1 on 1/10/2022).

KENYAN PPP CONVERSION: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP?locations=KE>

Logical Basis for PPP Conversion: <https://littlebighelp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/SROI-2020-LittleBigHelp-Boys-Home.pdf>

ANNEX J: LIST OF EXPERT ADVISORY GROUP MEMBERS

Table J. 1: List of Expert Advisory Group Members

MEMBER'S NAME	ORGANIZATION REPRESENTED
Dr. Rhuks Ako	African Union Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security
Terri-Ann Gilbert	Commonwealth Secretariat
Christine Odera	Commonwealth Youth Peace Ambassadors Network
Viridiana Wasike-Mutere	National Youth Council of Kenya
Mattias Lundberg	World Bank
Eliska Jelinkova	United Network of Young Peacebuilders
Jessica O'Connor	US Agency for International Development
Steve Commins	Scholar-practitioner
Joao Felipe Scarpelini	UN Population Fund
Cristina Petcu	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mridul Upadhyay	Youth Observer
Adrienne Lemon	Search for Common Ground
Matteo Busto	UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs