



**Report to Congress on  
Progress Made in the Strategy to Advance Economic Prosperity,  
Combat Corruption, Strengthen Democratic Governance, and  
Improve Civilian Security in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras  
Section 352(f) of the United States-Northern Triangle  
Enhanced Engagement Act (Div. FF, P.L. 116-260)**

Consistent with section 352(f) of the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (Div. FF, P.L. 116-260 (the “USNTEEA” ), the Department of State (Department) prepared this report providing the first annual update on progress made in meeting the benchmarks established within the Strategy. The Department submitted the Strategy required in section 352(a) of the USNTEEA on July 29, 2021. The Strategy included the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America (RCS), Public Diplomacy Strategy, and Illustrative Benchmarks. The Department and USAID have developed an interagency Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Plan that lays the groundwork for generating a body of evidence needed for tracking changes in the region associated with RCS implementation, including to the extent feasible, expected changes in migration itself, and for understanding how or why those changes take place.

**Notable Fiscal Year 2021 Achievements**

Despite the country commitment challenges described below and detailed in appendix 2, and the implementation challenges faced by U.S. foreign assistance programs due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions in the region, U.S. departments and agencies made notable achievements and adaptations in FY 2021, including:

- U.S. government programs under Pillar I provided support to more than 6,000 firms, generating \$415 million in sales, agricultural producers gained access to nearly \$90 million in financing and private investment, and energy services improved for more than 43 million Central Americans. Programs implemented by USAID and USDA helped the private sector create nearly 85,000 jobs across northern Central America. USAID educational programs reached

approximately 2.4 million primary school learners and 60,000 secondary school learners in northern Central America countries, and USDA reached nearly 215,000 enrolled students with food or other school-based assistance.

- For Pillar II interventions, the switch to virtual training platforms during the pandemic helped sustain training for judicial sector personnel (including judges and attorneys) and meet increased demand for anticorruption training.
- Pillar III had limited results data because U.S. government agencies implemented few dedicated, stand-alone programs in this area. Nevertheless, programs implemented by State, USAID, and the Department of Labor exceeded training targets for human rights and labor activities and continued providing support to more than 500 civil society organizations engaged in advocacy. USAID rapidly expanded its legal, digital, and physical protection support for at-risk journalists, human rights defenders, anticorruption campaigners, and judicial officials.
- For Pillar IV, U.S. government programs reached more than 200,000 youth with training and other support. U.S.-supported narcotics and asset seizures in Central America remain at historic highs. In FY 2021, the U.S. government supported more than \$5.1 billion in illegal drug seizures, nearly \$15 million in illegal asset seizures, trained more than 5,000 police, and assisted with more than 16,000 criminal convictions across Central America.
- For Pillar V, U.S. government programs reached more than 20,000 individuals with gender-based violence-related services, mostly in Honduras, but faced implementation challenges due to COVID-19 restrictions. State and USAID plan to expand and launch new programs under this pillar in FY 2022.
- Operationalization: Departments and agencies made advances to focus programs more effectively, including by using migration data (see appendix 5), innovating plans to increase localization of assistance efforts, pivoting on our corruption response and bolstering work with civil society, and developing an initial interagency RCS MEL plan to assess our efforts over the life of the Strategy.

This first interagency results report and attachments highlight context data and FY 2021 results, primarily as outputs, to inform policymakers as they monitor and assess progress toward achieving the strategic objectives of the RCS. The country commitment metrics highlight and confirm the current reality in Central America:

intentions to migrate remain high; the COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating impact on the region's economies and health systems; and democratic governance and adherence to the rule of law have regressed over the last four years.

### **Intentions to Migrate Remain High**

Recent data from Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2021 AmericasBarometer surveys revealed the percentage of citizens intending to leave Guatemala and Honduras registered the largest increase in the history of the AmericasBarometer since it began tracking this data in 2004. El Salvador registered a more modest increase. Increased intentions may portend elevated migration levels (though less than a quarter had taken concrete steps to migrate) and those intending to emigrate predominantly showed interest in the United States as their destination. LAPOP also reported the lack of economic opportunities, food insecurity, and crime and violence as the main motivations for those intending to emigrate from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

### **Economies Contract as COVID-19 Pandemic Continues to Take a Toll**

Current data show that in 2020, northern Central America economies precipitously declined due to the pandemic and tropical storms Eta and Iota, reflecting declines in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth rates and increased unemployment (see appendix 2). Suspension or closure of schools due to the pandemic exacerbated gaps in educational access, quality, and learning outcomes. The pandemic highlighted weaknesses in health systems and the vulnerability of health systems to corruption. Food insecurity in northern Central America rose in 2020, and the region remains more food insecure compared to averages for both Central America and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) overall. The U.S. government has worked to counter these trends by promoting private sector investment through the Call to Action and programs that support small businesses and entrepreneurs.

### **Corruption Rampant as Democratic Backsliding Accelerates**

On nearly all well-known metrics of public corruption, all three northern Central America countries continue to score lower than regional averages for Central America and LAC. In Guatemala and Honduras, surveys reflect declining trust in the judicial systems. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP decreased in Honduras and slightly increased in El Salvador in 2020, resulting in rates at or near the LAC-wide average; Guatemala's tax revenue as a percentage of GDP remains far below the LAC regional average. The U.S. government has provided support to anticorruption activists, justice sector actors, and independent media to promote

transparency. The Department placed more than 70 individuals on the Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors List.

### **Human Rights, Labor Rights, and Free Press Remain Under Pressure**

Freedom House downgraded El Salvador's status from "free" to "partly free" in 2020, putting them in line with Guatemala and Honduras. El Salvador's civil society and media effectiveness score dropped substantially from 2017 to 2020, coinciding with gradual declines in press freedom in El Salvador and Honduras, with Guatemala showing small improvements. We continued our support to human rights and other civil society organizations and provided training to independent journalists.

### **Crime and Violence Remain High, Trust in Police Remains Low**

Northern Central America countries continue to have higher criminality scores than LAC averages, with Guatemala and Honduras higher than the Central America average. Trust in police decreased in Guatemala and Honduras in 2020. The U.S. government worked across the region to improve the professionalization of police and other security forces, helping communities become safer and counter organized crime.

### **Gender-Based Violence, a "Shadow Pandemic"**

The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated gender-based violence (GBV) – limiting survivors' abilities to report incidents, keeping women and their perpetrators together in lock down, and straining the social fabric as families lost income and jobs. U.S. government programs seek to strengthen host nation capacity to prevent GBV and prosecute GBV crimes, including by increasing access to data on GBV in each country.

State and USAID will continue to work with interagency partners to further elaborate the RCS MEL Plan, to include learning questions, additional metrics, and plans for evaluations, assessments, and studies. We continuously seek to put in place metrics that will further enable us to assess the outcomes and impact of our collective efforts in the region. Future annual reports to Congress will incorporate new programs and data as RCS implementation matures.

## **Explanation of Attachments**

- **Appendix 1** contains the Strategy report required by section 352(a) of the USNTEEA that was provided on July 29, 2021, including the Biden-Harris Administration's Root Causes Strategy (RCS), Public Diplomacy Strategy, and Illustrative Benchmarks.
- **Appendix 2** provides country commitment (or context) indicator data comparing country-specific values to regional and other benchmarks over time. Country commitment data will serve as benchmarks for comparing and analyzing future commitment and results data and will provide a guide to tracking our progress in key areas outlined in section 352(d) of the USNTEEA.
- **Appendix 3** provides data and analysis of U.S. government program performance indicator results achieved in all of FY 2021, much of which predates the approval of the RCS.
- **Appendix 4** includes the White House Fact Sheet providing updates on the Administration's progress since the launch of the RCS. This fact sheet provides a mix of results for U.S. government programs, diplomatic engagement efforts, and progress on the Call to Action investment commitments. The fact sheet includes a link to the White House Report on the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America.
- **Appendix 5** provides maps developed by USAID using CBP migrant encounter data to show geographic origins of migrants.

## Attachments

Appendix 1 – Strategy Report to Congress

Appendix 2 – Country Commitment Metrics Analysis

Appendix 3 – Performance Metrics Analysis

Appendix 4 – Fact Sheet: Update on the Root Causes Strategy in Central America

Appendix 5 – Migration Data



**Report to Congress on  
A Strategy to Advance Economic Prosperity, Combat Corruption, Strengthen  
Democratic Governance, and Improve Civilian Security in El Salvador,  
Guatemala, and Honduras and to Curb Irregular Migration from the Region  
Section 352(a) of the United States – Northern Triangle Enhanced  
Engagement Act (Div. FF, P.L. 116-260)**

As Congress identified in the United States – Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act, fundamental improvements in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are needed to advance economic prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen democratic governance, and improve civilian security. Absent systemic reform to address these root causes of irregular migration, efforts to curb irregular migration will see only temporary progress without changing the calculus for many Central Americans, who have lost hope for better futures for themselves and their families in their home communities.

The attached strategy includes the Biden-Harris Administration’s Root Causes Strategy, which was developed under Executive Order 14010 on “Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address the Causes of Migration, to Manage Migration Throughout North and Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum Seekers at the United States Border,” is rooted in the key issues identified by Congress and organized into five pillars:

- Pillar I: Addressing economic insecurity and inequality
- Pillar II: Combating corruption, strengthening democratic governance, and advancing the rule of law
- Pillar III: Promoting respect for human rights, labor rights, and a free press
- Pillar IV: Countering and preventing violence, extortion, and other crimes perpetrated by criminal gangs, trafficking networks, and other organized criminal organizations
- Pillar V: Combating sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence

It also includes a public diplomacy strategy for how we will inform citizens in the region about U.S. assistance with the aim of building hope in their countries of

origin, as well as cautioning them on the dangers of irregular migration. Finally, we have provided an explanation of the monitoring, evaluation, and learning plan we are developing to track progress and recalibrate our efforts, as needed, to reach the short-, medium-, and long-term outcomes we see as key to long-term success. The Root Causes Strategy was developed after thorough consultations with the U.S. Congress; U.S. and regional civil society groups, including faith-based organizations; diaspora groups; the private sector; regional governments; and international partners. We will continue those consultations as we implement the strategy to ensure our efforts are targeted to effect the most significant change.

### Attachments

Tab 1 -- Root Causes Strategy

Tab 2 -- Public Diplomacy Strategy and Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan Framework

## **Root Causes Strategy**

### **Introduction**

It is in the national security interest of the United States to promote a democratic, prosperous, and secure Central America, a region closely connected to the United States by culture, geography, and trade. COVID-19, extreme weather, and severe economic decline are compounding longstanding challenges in the region, forcing far too many Central Americans to conclude the future they desire for themselves and their children cannot be found at home. They have lost hope and are fleeing in record numbers.

Persistent instability and insecurity in Central America have gone on for too long. Poverty and economic inequality, pervasive crime and corruption, and political leaders' drift toward authoritarian rule have stunted economic growth and diverted critical resources from healthcare and education, robbing citizens of hope and spurring migration. The worsening impacts of climate change, manifesting as prolonged periods of drought and devastating storms, have exacerbated these conditions and undermine U.S. and international interests. All of these factors contribute to irregular migration, and none of them can ultimately be addressed without honest and inclusive democratic governance that is responsive to the needs of citizens in the region.

The Root Causes Strategy, directed by the President in Executive Order 14010, focuses on a coordinated, place-based approach to improve the underlying causes that push Central Americans to migrate, and that “take s into account, as appropriate, the views of bilateral, multilateral, and private sector partners, as well as civil society.” This Strategy lays out a framework to use the policy, resources, and diplomacy of the United States, and to leverage the expertise and resources of a broad group of public and private stakeholders, to build hope for citizens in the region that the life they desire can be found at home.

The U.S. government consulted with a wide range of stakeholders to inform this Strategy, including governments in the region, Members of Congress and their staff, international organizations, civil society organizations, labor unions, and the private sector. Consultations will continue throughout implementation.

### **Strategic Environment**

Weak investment in infrastructure and education and poor rule of law leaves Central America at a competitive disadvantage for external investments, economic growth, and talent retention. Weather shocks due to climate change contribute to growing poverty, homelessness, and food insecurity. Corruption and other government actions to undermine transparency and democratic governance limit confidence of the public in their governments and discourage domestic and foreign investment. Threats such as gang



violence, criminal activity, and illicit drug flows challenge the security environment in Central America.

Nevertheless, opportunities for change exist. A growing number of stakeholders, including from civil society and the private sector, are interested in pushing governments toward reforms that foster greater transparency and address climate change. Likeminded government actors, as well as multilateral banks, private companies, foundations, civil society organizations, and international organizations, are interested in partnering on efforts to address the root causes of migration. Sustainable technology can help increase access to government services and economic opportunities. We will take advantage of these opportunities to address the reasons individuals choose to leave their home.

### **Desired End State**

*A democratic, prosperous, and safe Central America, where people advance economically, live, work, and learn in safety and dignity, contribute to and benefit from the democratic process, have confidence in public institutions, and enjoy opportunities to create futures for themselves and their families at home.*

### **Strategic Framework**

The Strategy focuses on the most commonly cited factors limiting progress in Central America, particularly those related to economic opportunity, governance and transparency, and crime and insecurity. It is often a combination of multiple factors, resulting in a lack of hope that their country will improve, that marginalizes large populations within the region and pushes some people to migrate. As such, we must work across all pillars to create economic opportunities, empower women and youth, support responsive and transparent governments, and build communities where people feel safe. As individuals observe and experience improvements in these areas, we anticipate more people in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras will have a reason to believe they can build successful lives at home rather than abroad.

Effecting systemic change and achieving the desired end state of a democratic, prosperous, and safe region will require the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to govern in a transparent, professional and inclusive manner that favors the public interest over narrow private interests. U.S. foreign assistance cannot substitute for political will in these countries. Used strategically, however, U.S. development, diplomatic and related tools can generate political leverage, empower champions of change, combat impunity and state capture, and catalyze improvements in governance, private investment, and human capital.

Execution of the Strategy will draw on the breadth of the U.S. government and a diverse group of public and private stakeholders. It will draw on technological advances and

leverage existing technology to offer dynamic, creative, efficient, and transparent solutions. Throughout, it will focus on ensuring opportunities are available to all citizens regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. The Strategy is organized under five pillars:

- **Pillar I:** Addressing economic insecurity and inequality;
- **Pillar II:** Combating corruption, strengthening democratic governance, and advancing the rule of law
- **Pillar III:** Promoting respect for human rights, labor rights, and a free press
- **Pillar IV:** Countering and preventing violence, extortion, and other crimes perpetrated by criminal gangs, trafficking networks, and other organized criminal organizations
- **Pillar V:** Combating sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence

Each Pillar is supported by various lines of effort, many of which advance progress in multiple pillars. While implementation of the lines of effort will be similar in each country, the specifics will differ. To build political will among leaders in Central America, the United States will utilize diplomacy, public diplomacy, sanctions and visa revocations, and targeted foreign assistance programs.

The United States will combine our efforts with those of other governments, including in Central America and beyond, the private sector, civil society, international organizations, and multilateral banks and institutions, to leverage investments and speak with a similar voice as we advocate for partner government actions to affect sustainable change. This holistic approach utilizes all U.S. government tools and a broad array of partnerships to leverage expertise, creative ideas, and the power of multiple voices to generate necessary change to provide citizens in the region with hope. Even with a strong, sustained commitment, the type of systemic change envisioned in the Strategy will take time to achieve, and progress will not be linear. Implementing the Strategy demands a disciplined approach that relies on innovation and evidence, but also clear accomplishments along the way to maintain momentum.

Across all pillars of our work, we will:

- *Consult and Coordinate:* To further develop our path forward, the administration will continue to consult with Congress, civil society, international organizations, the private sector, like-minded partners, and governments. We will listen, learn the lessons of past efforts, create an approach which draws on input from across sectors, and develop a broad base of support that advances efforts across the Framework.
- *Communicate:* We will create a robust communications plan, leveraging independent and social media, to convey our efforts to improve conditions in the

region, build support for our approach, and instill hope in the region. We will also seek to discourage irregular migration and dispel misinformation.

- *Assess:* We will move forward deliberately with clear goals, measurable objectives, and strong safeguards to guide our efforts. Throughout implementation, we will build in assessment points to ensure our efforts are producing the results we seek, strengthening where needed, adjusting course where warranted, and discontinuing as required.

### **Pillar I: Addressing Economic Insecurity and Inequality**

Despite reductions in poverty rates and increases in GDP per capita prior to the double impacts of the pandemic and hurricanes Eta and Iota, the economies of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras remain largely informal and highly unequal. Key to growth will be structural reforms to address impediments to investment, economic diversification, increased judicial transparency, improved governance and transparency, expanded access to financial capital for businesses, streamlining of government procedures to start businesses and pay taxes, investment in workers, and formalization of the economy. Inclusive growth, that reaches women and marginalized populations, and includes decent work, will be critical to creating hope among citizens in the region. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed weakness in national health care systems, led to severe economic downturns, and devastated tourism. The consequences of climate change are only projected to get worse, further disrupting growing cycles, upending farmer livelihoods, and exacerbating food insecurity and malnutrition. Securing commitments from regional governments while working with the private sector, international donors, foundations, international financial institutions (IFIs), and multilateral development banks (MDBs) will be critical to fostering the reforms necessary for businesses to thrive, mobilizing investment, and promoting economic development in the region. Across these efforts, we will focus on empowering women, youth, and marginalized communities.

#### **Strategic Objectives:**

1. *Foster a Business Enabling Environment for Inclusive Economic Growth:* Governments build an enabling environment for business by implementing reforms to address structural impediments to growth, streamlining and digitalizing business registration and operations processes, offering legal certainty, reducing opportunities for corruption, enforcing labor and environmental rules, combating insecurity and extortion, and leveling the playing field for international businesses. Governments promote and facilitate economic growth in a manner that is available to all sectors of society, including women, minorities, and other marginalized populations.
2. *Increase and Diversify Trade:* Customs and border systems are more efficient and less subject to malfeasance, there is increased alignment and reduced redundancy of regulations across the region, and infrastructure projects better facilitate trade.

Enhance and diversify trade to include new export sectors, including those that reinforce U.S. supply chain needs.

3. *Enhance Workforce Development, Health, Education, and Protection:* Governments are able to effectively manage the COVID-19 response and prepare for the potential of future pandemics, and all citizens, including women and girls, have improved access to quality education, health care and clean water access, and social safety nets.
4. *Build Resilience to Address Climate Change and Food Insecurity:* Governments target investments so they are better able to mitigate the impact of severe weather events, including flooding and drought. Agriculture, including fisheries and aquaculture, is developed toward higher levels of climate resilience, leading to affordable and available food that can be utilized for a healthy diet, contributing to greater food security.

### **Lines of Effort:**

1. **Foster a business enabling environment for inclusive economic growth.** The United States will work with governments to streamline regulatory processes and services, including via digitalization of government services such as records, databases, permitting, and tax collection. This will include efforts to address structural impediments to investment; support business incubation and acceleration to strengthen value chains by helping businesses produce higher-value goods in the agricultural and emerging sectors, and ensure all populations are incorporated into economic development policies.
  - **Promote legal certainty.** Weak rule of law is often cited as the top factor limiting new investment in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. We will work with the private sector, governments, and civil society to strengthen transparency, promote business ethics, and foster predictable legal and regulatory business environments.
  - **Promote investment-enabling reforms.** The United States will partner with regional governments, multilateral development banks, and the private sector to promote reforms to address structural impediments to investment and facilitate greater private sector participation in these economies, leveraging U.S. government partnerships with these entities to support business development and create jobs.
  - **Embrace technological solutions.** The United States will leverage rights-respecting technology to facilitate economic growth, increase opportunities for excluded populations, promote financial inclusion, and strengthen education and workforce development in coordination with the private sector. This will include extending existing technological solutions to our areas of focus, and guarding against unintended consequences of technological expansion.
  - **Expand opportunity for women, youth, and minorities.** The United States will work to ensure government programs and financial capital reach underserved groups, including small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs),

youth, women- and indigenous-owned businesses, businesses serving rural areas, and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

**2. Enhance and diversify trade.** The United States will work with a variety of stakeholders to increase trade, diversify industry, and create decent work for citizens in the region, while working with governments to promote reforms needed to facilitate this growth.

- **Facilitate trade.** The United States will work with governments to expand and diversify trade by reducing malfeasance and corruption in customs regimes; promoting prioritization of lending and technical support for infrastructure projects that facilitate trade; aligning and integrating regional customs systems; harmonizing regulatory certification requirements; and supporting business compliance with internationally recognized labor rights, environmental protections, and complex international trade rules.
- **Partner with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).** The United States will partner with IFIs and MDBs to diversify donors and provide a wide range of financing options to governments and private sectors in the region. We will leverage the IFIs and MDBs to prioritize support for infrastructure development that facilitates trade and investment while incorporating transparency and good governance priorities in their financing and technical assistance initiatives.
- **Private sector partnerships.** The United States will partner with private sector companies to sustainably grow economies by attracting greater private investment while encouraging governance, economic, and other reforms to support business-enabling environments that create decent work. We will conduct outreach to U.S. and vetted multinational businesses that already operate in the region, as well as business chambers of commerce in Central America.
- **Promote cross-border energy infrastructure.** The United States will develop cleaner and more efficient cross-border energy systems including new energy delivery infrastructure to facilitate increased reliability and cross border power integration and trade.

**3. Enhance workforce development, health, and education.** The United States will support workforce training and vocational education programs, including improving the quality of existing education and increasing children enrolled in education and food programs that ensure children's basic nutritional needs are met; expand access to clean and potable water; and support a stronger COVID-19 response.

- **Increase access to quality education.** The United States will support governments in providing youth with appropriate, safe, and accessible educational opportunities; and ensuring educational and vocational offerings

reflect labor market needs so youth are able to access decent work upon completion of their studies.

- **Improve health.** The United States will support water and sanitation programs to expand access to clean water. The United States will support programs to strengthen health systems to address current and future public health challenges.

**4. Build resilience to address climate change and food insecurity.** The United States will partner with governments, MDBs, IFIs, and the private sector to facilitate the development of agricultural practices to ensure farmers can better respond to the impacts of climate change and extreme weather events, which have contributed to food insecurity.

- **Increase resilience.** The United States will support improved agriculture production and income generation to reduce food insecurity while supporting sustainable food systems. We will support efforts to improve crop resilience, adopt environmentally and economically sustainable agricultural practices, and improve land and water management; improve the resilience of residential, commercial, and public buildings and core public infrastructure; mitigate the impacts of and support a more rapid recovery from hurricanes and other severe weather events.
- **Enhance renewable energy.** The United States will support new electricity generation projects, including in renewable energy and power grid improvement; a more efficient regulatory framework, especially for distributed generation, increased reliability, grid sustainability, and cross-border power integration and trade. We will focus on investment categories including power generation with a focus on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and storage; residential, commercial, and public buildings; and water efficient agriculture.

## **Pillar II: Combating corruption, strengthening democratic governance, and advancing the rule of law**

Governance challenges, including widespread corruption, undercut progress on economic opportunity, protection of human rights, and civilian security. Private companies cite corruption as an impediment to investment. Weak democratic institutions, coupled with rampant impunity, have lowered citizens' trust in their governments and the independence of judicial systems. Contested elections and opaque government decision-making have led to violence.

As seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, governments all too often fail to provide needed services to their citizens and lack of government investment in infrastructure, education, health, and civilian security has hobbled advancement. We will partner with civil society and independent media so they can maintain their critical oversight role and will work with civil society, the private sector, governments, and international institutions to advocate for sustainable progress in these areas.

## Strategic Objectives:

1. *Strengthen Democratic Institutions to Improve Governance and Rule of Law:* Governments enact and implement legislative reforms towards transparent and participatory policy making and electoral processes, including broad civic engagement. Oversight is instituted at all levels of government.
2. *Combat Corruption:* Governments are freed from entrenched networks of corruption and impunity. They develop and strengthen independent and transparent systems to eliminate conflicts of interest, including in selection of judges and other government personnel.
3. *Improve Government Service Delivery:* Governments improve capacity to raise and manage public resources, initiate reforms to improve fiscal and operational transparency, and provide services to all citizens.

## Lines of Effort:

1. **Strengthen democratic institutions to improve governance and rule of law.** The United States will work with countries to promote reform agendas across all branches of government so government better serves all citizens. This will include a focus on adequately resourcing judicial and oversight institutions, ensuring their independence, and promoting reform of personnel selection and retention processes.

- **Strengthen the independence of the justice sector.** The United States will promote a merit-based, independent process for nomination and selection of justice and oversight officials, and establish anti-corruption norms limiting immunity of officials from prosecution and banning candidates for office with disqualifying criminal records. We will promote adequate funding of justice institutions so they have the resources to serve the country.
- **Promote transparency.** The United States will work with partners to promote transparency in electoral systems through reform and enforcement of electoral campaign finance rules and open list systems to allow for direct representation. We will empower independent audit and oversight institutions to monitor use of public funds, and promote transparency in government processes, including open government mechanisms and the promotion of open data. We will explore how to leverage the concept of “vetted units” to bring trusted actors into key roles in oversight bodies, including in legislative committees.
- **Improve efficacy of legislative branches.** The United States will work with partners to root out corruption in legislative branches and improve the transparent and efficient functioning of those bodies.
- **Empower public and private sector actors.** The United States will partner with civil society and independent media so they have the tools, knowledge, and networks needed to safely identify government neglect and abuse, raise

awareness, and demand accountability. We will partner with the private sector to advocate for necessary reforms and regulations to promote transparency.

**2. Prioritize an anticorruption agenda.** The United States will work regionally, bilaterally, and, if we must, unilaterally to root out corruption and enhance transparency across the region.

- **Support civil society and media organizations.** Across Central America, citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and media organizations have led efforts to promote transparency and demand improved governance. The United States will expand support for NGOs and other entities in the region focused on governance promotion to encourage local leadership of such efforts and foster resiliency and sustainability.
- **Prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute corruption.** The United States will work with partners to develop and implement a variety of anti-corruption tools aimed at preventing, detecting, investigating, and ultimately punishing corruption at all levels and in all branches of the government, and throughout society. We will identify, support, and partner with prosecutorial teams that demonstrate a commitment to holding corrupt actors to account.
- **Sanction corrupt actors.** The United States will use various tools, including financial sanctions and visa restrictions, to signal we will not tolerate corruption and antidemocratic behavior. We will press governments to strengthen transparency, accountability, and the rule of law with decisive and meaningful reforms.

**3. Improve administration of public resources.** The United States will work with governments to establish proper budgeting, management, and use of public resources at the local and national levels to enhance service delivery for all citizens, including in underserved areas and vulnerable populations.

- **Improve government finances.** The United States will work with governments to review fiscal policy to identify gaps and incongruences in taxation, and opportunities to progressively expand the tax base, incentivizing individuals and businesses to move into the formal economy and to transition public procurement to a competitive, transparent, and merit-based system to curb political influence and diminish the opportunities for corruption.
- **Target key populations.** The United States will work with governments to establish strategies to provide services in marginalized communities, including IDPs, high-threat crime areas, and regions with highest outbound migration.



### **Pillar III: Promoting respect for human rights, labor rights, and a free press**

Respect for human rights, labor rights, and press freedom are essential elements to democratic and social development in the region. Marginalized populations, including women and girls, indigenous, Afro-descendent, and LGBTQI+ populations, often suffer discrimination and may be victims of hate crimes. Victims of violence at the hand of the state or criminal organizations suffer from systemic violations of their rights under the law (including redress, protection, and recognition), IDPs particularly at risk. Labor rights activists, human rights and environmental defenders, and independent journalists face violence and intimidation. Authorities often do not hold perpetrators of these crimes accountable and labor law enforcement is weak. We will work with partners in the region, including civil society, to promote respect for human rights for all citizens.

#### **Strategic Objectives:**

1. *Enhance Respect for Human Rights:* Governments prevent, reduce, and mitigate risk factors and reduce human rights violations. Civil society organizations and a robust free press hold government actors accountable. At-risk populations have national and international recourse, including U.S. government support and advocacy.
2. *Enhance Respect for Labor Rights:* Governments ensure labor laws are enforced as required by CAFTA-DR, with a particular emphasis on freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, addressing child labor and forced labor, and promoting decent work in safe, healthy, and inclusive workplaces free from discrimination.
3. *Promote a Free Press:* Governments respect the independence of all forms of media so citizens can access information necessary to make informed decisions and hold governments accountable.

#### **Lines of Effort:**

1. **Strengthen respect for human rights.** The United States will work with governments and civil society to strengthen legal frameworks, promote the enforcement of laws that protect citizens' rights, support regional and domestic early warning systems to track risks for violations, and build institutional capacity to protect citizens' rights.
  - **Protect human rights defenders and at-risk populations.** The United States will work with governments and civil society to protect marginalized individuals and groups, including human rights and environmental defenders, youth activists, LGBTQI+ people, indigenous people, IDPs forcibly displaced by violence, labor rights activists, and other individuals who are at risk of persecution or abuse.

- **Respond promptly and decisively to ensure accountability.** The United States will work with governments so they decisively respond when human rights violations occur, extending access to justice for all citizens, and reducing impunity by ensuring justice and security actors hold perpetrators accountable.
  - **Curb extrajudicial killings.** The United States will support efforts to curb abuses by security personnel, including the police, and hold perpetrators accountable.
  - **Strengthen civil society protections.** The United States will work with governments and civil society organizations to ensure that civil society and media groups are able to hold governments accountable without legal restriction and free from intimidation.
2. **Strengthen respect for labor rights.** The United States will work with governments to strengthen legal frameworks and the enforcement of labor laws, promote decent work, and support workers in exercising their freedom of association and collective bargaining rights.
- **Protect trade unionists and the right to organize.** The United States will work with governments to ensure laws that protect the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively are in place and are effectively enforced. The United States will work with governments to empower workers to claim their rights, protect labor rights activists, and build the capacity of democratic, worker-led organizations.
  - **Improve legal frameworks, enforcement, and awareness.** The United States will work with governments to ensure laws that protect fundamental labor rights are in place and enforced, with appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms and proactive outreach to communities, unions, civil society, and employers. The United States will promote labor rights compliance among employers, including accountability in the supply chains of priority sectors. The United States will work with governments, employers, and worker organizations to promote constructive dialogue on labor issues to improve legal frameworks, inform enforcement strategies, and strengthen worker voices related to labor and employment issues.
3. **Promote a free press.** The United States will work with governments and civil society to ensure citizens have access to information from independent sources to inform their choices.
- **Strengthen independent media.** The United States will support a regulatory environment that ensures independent media can operate without fear of reprisal or intimidation, and will support development of media that can serve as an effective oversight tool to those in power.

## **Pillar IV: Countering and preventing violence, extortion, and other crimes perpetrated by criminal gangs, trafficking networks, and other organized criminal organizations**

U.S. assistance contributed to important advances in the professionalism and capability of law enforcement and security services throughout Central America, in particular with the capacity of vetted units, community policing, and violence prevention initiatives. Homicide rates have decreased and capacity to seize illicit drugs has increased in recent years, though violence against women and children has increased. Gangs and extortion remain a threat, and transnational crime is on the rise. Challenges remain with uneven capabilities among law enforcement and security services, inadequate resourcing of security needs, the impact of the pandemic on law enforcement, and the military's role in policing.

Obtaining clear and meaningful commitments from our partners to tackle corruption and support transparency is a foundational element for sustainable progress across the criminal justice systems of Central America. Increasing security within communities is key to generating hope for citizens in the region so they can move safely to school and work, but also to attract investment. We will work with partner governments and community organizations to build professional security forces and focus on violence prevention and intervention to build a more secure region.

### **Strategic Objectives:**

1. *Professionalize Security Forces:* Governments support the development of accountable security forces that earn the respect of the citizens they serve. This includes adopting budgets for security forces that enable them to be sufficiently staffed, trained, equipped, and compensated, and have internal oversight to strengthen accountability. Governments establish legal limitations on the use of militaries in civilian policing and implement plans for the removal of militaries from civilian policing.
2. *Counter Organized Crime:* Security forces counter organized crime and using place-based strategies, disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations and other criminal actors in key corridors to improve citizen security.
3. *Build Safe Communities through Violence Prevention and Intervention:* Governments make legal and policy reforms in violence prevention, support rehabilitation and re-insertion into society of former gang members and individuals previously incarcerated, and provide protection to at-risk youth and victims of violence, and other marginalized populations, including prevention of human trafficking.

## Lines of Effort:

**1. Professionalize security forces.** The United States will support the development of well-trained civilian law enforcement and other security forces that can provide effective, accountable services with respect for the rule of law and human rights. We will work with governments so civilian law enforcement has the resources and capacity to assume full responsibility for civilian security, enabling the drawdown of military from policing roles.

- **Improve civilian policing.** The United States will work with governments to target resources at the most pressing security challenges, while ensuring intelligence-led and community policing concepts are introduced and implemented nationwide, designed to increase dialogue and trust with populations, and establish community-based solutions to crime that respect human rights.
- **Enhance accountability.** The United States will work with governments to build accountability into security forces through initiatives to support audit and oversight functions to root out and address misconduct and poor performance.

**2. Counter organized crime.** The United States will work with governments to increase capacity of law enforcement and other security forces to address the unique transnational and national threats to the region, such as drug trafficking, gangs, extortion, smuggling, corruption, and money laundering, including through vetted and specialized units, regional cooperation, and legislative reform to increase penalties for organized crime.

- **Build trusted partners.** The United States will work with and expand vetted and specialized units to build capacity to address complex crimes, including human and drug trafficking, and ensure trusted partners that can work with the United States and others in the region.
- **Promote regional cooperation.** The United States will promote coordination and information sharing among countries in the region to address transnational crime, including to combat narcotics and other illicit trafficking.

**3. Build safe communities.** The United States will work with governments, law enforcement, community organizations, and others to build trust between the community and government, prevent crime, and provide alternatives to youth considering a life of crime.

- **Create safe spaces.** The United States will work with municipalities and community organizations to increase the availability of safe spaces, such as parks and youth centers, and improve the safety of public transportation, so that citizens can engage in economic and social life without fear
- **Create meaningful alternative for at-risk youth.** The United States will work with a diverse range of stakeholders from government, civil society, and the private sector to prevent youth from joining gangs, including through opportunities to play, learn, work, and feel connected with their families and communities.

- **Reintegrate offenders.** The United States will work with governments and civil society to support offenders' efforts to disengage from gangs and reintegrate into communities by addressing trauma, community resiliency, education and economic opportunity, and case management services.

## **Pillar V: Combating sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence**

Across the region, gender-based violence (GBV)--including, but not limited to, intimate partner violence, rape, gender-based murder of women and girls (femicide)--and other crimes, including sex and labor trafficking, significantly hinder the ability of women and girls to participate fully in society and contribute to their families and communities. Women and youth from historically marginalized communities often face even higher levels of GBV. In all three countries, women and youth subjected to violence or human trafficking lack sufficient access to justice and protection services. The ability of law enforcement to combat sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence remains a challenge, and domestic violence has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. We will work with partner governments, civil society organizations, and others to combat violence in the region.

### **Strategic Objective:**

1. *Combat sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence:* Governments and civil society take steps to prevent sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence; hold perpetrators accountable; and protect and provide services for victims.

### **Lines of Effort:**

1. **Combat sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence.** The United States will work with governments and civil society to prevent, address, and support victims of sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence.
  - **Prevent and prosecute sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence.** The United States will work with governments in the region to implement existing legislation relating to sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence, and ensure law enforcement and the justice sector is equipped to investigate and prosecute these crimes, reducing impunity for these crimes. We will work with community-based organizations to change the culture around gender-based violence and empower women.
  - **Support victims.** The United States will work with governments and civil society to increase support and protection for survivors of these crimes, and break down stereotypes and cultural norms that permit these crimes to continue.
  -

## Implementation Sequencing Highlights

### Short-Term:

- **Build Partnerships:** We will build a coalition of people, organizations, and businesses committed to creating economic opportunity and fostering political will for structural reforms in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
- **Mobilize Investment:** We will work with the private sector to mobilize investment in the region to create economic opportunity.
- **Address Acute Causes:** We will address humanitarian needs from the fall 2020 hurricanes, provide training and finance to jump start the economies after COVID-19 and hurricane devastation, and provide critical support to those in need of food assistance. We will focus on education and training for youth.
- **Communicate:** We will ensure people in the region know about the United States' commitment to supporting good governance, economic opportunities, and security so they understand help is on the way to build hope for a better future at home. We will communicate clearly to governments in the region that the United States wants to be a partner in their success, but that this partnership requires a shared commitment to inclusive and transparent democratic governance.

### Medium Term:

- **Promote Reforms:** We will focus our efforts on deepening implementation of initiatives that promote reforms fundamental to addressing root causes of migration, employing the full range of U.S. government tools to combat corruption and promote political will where necessary.
- **Create Economic Opportunity:** We will expand our partnership with foundations, civil society, and the private sector to deliver new economic opportunities to citizens in the region, and mobilize appropriate technological solutions.
- **Fight Corruption:** We will launch a regional anti-corruption initiative and work closely with partners to prosecute corruption and transnational criminal operations, including illicit political finance, migrant smuggling and trafficking cases, that will help improve governance in Central America.
- **Combat Insecurity:** We will target security assistance on the most common security-related drivers of migration, including extortion and gender-based violence.
- **Address Climate Change and Improve Disaster Preparedness:** We will work with partners to reinforce national and regional preparedness and disaster response capabilities and implement programs to adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change.
- **Communicate:** We will continue to communicate progress and actions to build hope across society.

### **Long-Term:**

- **Deepen Partnerships:** We will solidify and expand implementation across the pillars, informed by constant feedback and consultation from stakeholders in Congress, civil society, international organizations, the private sector, and partner governments.
- **Institutionalize Programs:** We will aim for institutionalization of longer-term structural changes in governance to ensure strong democratic institutions and governments that invest in the well-being of their societies. We will assess our progress and increase the sustainability of our efforts by transferring increased ownership to partners in the region.
- **Integrate Regionally:** We will seek deeper economic and political integration across Central America, and with North America, to safely and humanely manage migration and to help realize a vision of a more prosperous and stable region.

## **Public Diplomacy Strategy and Benchmarks**

### **Public Diplomacy Messaging Strategy**

The Department will focus its messaging tools and experience to persuade potential migrants to remain in country and forego dangerous migration journeys.

The Department uses message testing and audience analysis to develop persuasive messages and target them at demographics at higher risk for potential migration. The Department issues social media and radio advertising using content based on testimonials from returned migrants and on statements by prominent U.S. leaders.

Based on testing to identify the most persuasive messages, the Department emphasizes U.S. government partnerships with civil society, the private sector, and host-country governments to increase inclusive economic growth, combat corruption, and decrease violence. In addition to these positive messages, the Department also emphasizes the risks from irregular migration.

These efforts will be coordinated with related public messaging objectives included in the Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, a strategy which was also developed pursuant to Executive Order 14010 on “Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address the Causes of Migration, to Manage Migration Throughout North and Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum Seekers at the United States Border.”

### **Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning**

The Department of State and USAID are developing a robust logic model that will guide development of a monitoring, evaluation and learning plan (MEL) for this strategy. The logic model and accompanying MEL plan will further articulate short-, medium-, and long-term outcomes that build upon and link to each other. It will build in inter-agency assessments of evidence generated through indicator data collection and independent evaluations, which we will use to gauge our and our partners’ progress, make course corrections when needed, and expand successful interventions. The Department and USAID have identified a preliminary list of illustrative benchmarks (see below) that will be incorporated into the strategy MEL plan. The Department and USAID expect to update and adjust the MEL plan in consultation with congressional and other stakeholders throughout strategy implementation.

### **Illustrative Benchmarks:**



- Governments in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala demonstrate political will, in part by investing their own resources to address the factors driving irregular migration; in addition, governments take steps that not only remove constraints, but in fact enable achievement of Root Causes Strategy objectives.
- Businesses, especially SMEs and small farms, formalize their workforce.
- Government interactions are digitized; businesses use these streamlined services to formalize work.
- Local anti-corruption prosecutors bring to bear sufficient pressure to reduce current corruption and deter future corrupt actors.
- Government budget and procurement processes are clear and transparent.
- Anti-impunity and anti-corruption prosecutorial units within executive branch agencies, Attorney General's Offices, and specialized courts and tribunals have the resources, independence, and protection necessary to carry out their jobs.
- Governments adopt and implement all measures to guarantee, as provided in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the rights and protection of the press, civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and civil society activists, including anti-corruption activists, labor rights activists, and indigenous, Afro-descendent, LGBTQTI+, and women's rights activists.
- Governments change laws and regulations and uphold them; security forces undergo training and use new technology, which in turn improves law enforcement and militaries' behavior to respect human rights and counter corruption in units.
- Additional programs exist for violence prevention and victim protection, including GBV, and human trafficking.

## **Appendix 2: Country Commitment Metrics Analysis**

The Department of State and USAID have committed to using context data to monitor and assess progress towards achieving the strategic objectives of the U.S. Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Irregular Migration in Central America (Root Causes Strategy). Often gathered by independent third-parties, context indicator data help policymakers monitor regional and national operating environments, including country commitment to reform. This report compares country-specific values to regional and historical averages (i.e., benchmarks) as appropriate. (See Appendix 3 for analysis of performance metrics.)

The cross-cutting question of migration intentions represents a prime example of a country commitment metric. Data from Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2021 AmericasBarometer surveys reveals that the percentage of citizens intending to leave Guatemala and Honduras registered the largest increase in the history of the AmericasBarometer. El Salvador registered a more modest increase (see Figure 1). Not all who express an intention to leave will actually embark on the journey, however. Of those who expressed an intention to leave their countries, less than a quarter had taken concrete steps to do so. Nevertheless, increased intentions may portend elevated migration levels and those who intend to emigrate predominantly show interest in the United States as their destination. LAPOP also reported the lack of economic opportunities, food insecurity, and crime and violence as the main motivations for migrating in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For more information, see Lupu, Noam, Mariana Rodríguez, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister (Eds.) 2021. *Pulse of Democracy*. Nashville, TN: LAPOP, available at [https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2021/2021\\_LAPOP\\_AmericasBarometer\\_2021\\_Pulse\\_of\\_Democracy.pdf](https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2021/2021_LAPOP_AmericasBarometer_2021_Pulse_of_Democracy.pdf)

### Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? Yes/No




Figure 1. *Migration Intentions, 2004-2021*

## Pillar 1: Addressing Economic Insecurity and Inequality

**Business enabling environment:** In 2020 the economies of northern Central America precipitously declined because of both the COVID-19 pandemic and tropical storms Eta and Iota: Honduras and El Salvador experienced declines in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth rates approaching 10 percent, while Guatemala had a more modest decline of three percent (see Figure 2). Unemployment also sharply rose across the region, with the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimating that the total unemployment rate nearly doubled in each northern Central American country from 2019 to 2020 (see Figure 3). Moreover, unemployment among youth, a key demographic for the Root Causes Strategy, likely has risen more sharply. According to the ILO, the drop in the employment rates of young workers globally has been 2.5 times greater than that incurred by the general population during the pandemic, and a larger share of young workers have become inactive.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2021, International Labour Office, Geneva: ILO, 2021, available at [https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/WCMS\\_795453/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/WCMS_795453/lang--en/index.htm)




Figure 2. *GDP Per Capita Growth Rate*




Figure 3. *Unemployment Rate*

A lack of proper regulatory enforcement, as measured by the World Justice Project, is impeding private sector development in the economies of northern Central America. El Salvador scores on par with the Latin America and Caribbean regional average for regulatory enforcement,<sup>3</sup> while Guatemala and Honduras perform far below this average.<sup>4</sup> Further, the weak regulatory environments in these economies also drive informality, and shadow economies adversely affect formal businesses. Firm-level surveys conducted across the three northern Central America countries in recent years show competition from informal firms as a major constraint for a sizable share of registered businesses.<sup>5</sup> On average across the three countries, 45.4 percent of formal firms surveyed cite this as a significant hurdle to doing business,<sup>6</sup> and all three countries in northern Central America lag behind the regional average for Latin America and the Caribbean of 39.6 percent.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, in all three economies, firms listed the practices of informal businesses as one of their top three biggest obstacles.<sup>8</sup>

**Trade:** While El Salvador outperforms regional averages and its neighboring countries on export sophistication, all three northern Central America countries have room to improve and expand their economies through trade diversification (see Figure 4) while also exploiting the advantages of integration through the Central American Common Market. As a group, Central American countries showed a much smaller decline in exports than the rest of the region in the first half of 2020 (i.e., exports fell by less than half that of other subregions in Latin America), partly due to the importance of trade within Central America. Nevertheless, the region remains vulnerable to volatility, since a large share of export-sector employment in Central America consists of low-tech manufacturing industries (e.g., food, beverages, and tobacco; textiles, clothing, and footwear; and others such as the maquila assembly of electronics and medical equipment, and plastics, wood, and paper).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> World Justice Project. (2020). WJP Rule of Law Index 2020. World Bank, available at <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/>

<sup>4</sup> World Justice Project. (2020). WJP Rule of Law Index 2020. World Bank, available at <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/>. Guatemala and Honduras rank 25 and 30, respectively.

<sup>5</sup> World Bank Enterprise Surveys, available at <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/enterprisesurveys>

<sup>6</sup> World Bank Enterprise Surveys, available at <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/enterprisesurveys>

<sup>7</sup> World Bank Enterprise Surveys, available at <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/enterprisesurveys>

<sup>8</sup> World Bank Enterprise Surveys, available at <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/enterprisesurveys>

<sup>9</sup> Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).(2020). International Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean, available at [https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/46614/1/S2000804\\_en.pdf](https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/46614/1/S2000804_en.pdf)




Figure 4. *Export Sophistication*

Education, Workforce Development, Health, and Social Protection: On two key metrics of education, lower secondary school completion rate and learning-adjusted years of school (which factors in education quality)<sup>10</sup>, El Salvador performs better than the Central American average, while all three northern Central American countries lag behind averages for all of Latin America and the Caribbean (see Figures 5 and 6). The suspension or closure of face-to-face learning in schools and other settings due to the COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated gaps in educational access, quality, and learning outcomes.<sup>11</sup> This, in turn, has negative implications for preparing youth to enter the workforce. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), the COVID-19 pandemic has severely disrupted education and training and has negatively affected the transition of many individuals from school, vocational training, or university to the labor market. This has negative implications for the

<sup>10</sup> Lower-secondary completion rates in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have seen modest improvements since 2015, but still remain below averages for Latin America (all three countries) and Central America (Guatemala and Honduras). This indicator reflects an upper estimate of the actual lower secondary completion rate; the numerator may include late entrants and overage children who have repeated one or more grades of lower secondary education as well as children who entered school early.

<sup>11</sup> Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2020). *Education in the time of COVID-19*, available at [https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/45905/1/S2000509\\_en.pdf](https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/45905/1/S2000509_en.pdf)

longer-term employment probabilities, wages, and skills development of a substantial cohort within the workforce.<sup>12</sup>





Figure 5. *Education Quality*

<sup>12</sup> International Labour Organization. (2021). *World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2021*, available at [https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/WCMS\\_795453/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/WCMS_795453/lang--en/index.htm)

### Lower Secondary Completion Rates in the Northern Triangle 2014 - 2018



Data Source: UNESCO, Institute for Statistics (UIS) Database

Figure 6. *Lower Secondary Education Completion Rate*

El Salvador's child health score<sup>13</sup> for 2020 nearly matches the Latin America and the Caribbean average, and the score for Honduras registers slightly below average for Central America; Guatemala's score consistently ranks far below all regional averages (see Figure 7). Nevertheless, in 2020, vaccination coverage rates—a key determinant of child health—declined region-wide due to funding shortfalls, vaccine misinformation, instability, COVID-19 restrictions on movement, and reluctance to access health facilities for fear of COVID-19 transmission.<sup>14</sup> As of November 2021, the percentages of eligible population with full COVID-19 vaccination register near 61 percent in El Salvador, 21 percent in Guatemala, and 37 percent in Honduras. Further, social protection coverage rates—the percentage of the population covered by at least one social protection benefit (e.g., unemployment, family leave, retirement) for all three countries remain lower than

<sup>13</sup> The Child Health Indicator comprises three underlying indicators: access to at least basic sanitation; access to at least basic water; and child mortality (ages 1–5). For more information, see <https://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/nrpi-chi-2020/>

<sup>14</sup> Pan-American Health Organization. (July 2021). COVID-19 pandemic leads to major backsliding on childhood vaccinations, new WHO, UNICEF data shows. For more information, see <https://www.paho.org/en/news/15-7-2021-covid-19-pandemic-leads-major-backsliding-childhood-vaccinations-new-who-unicef-data>



averages both for Central America and for Latin America and the Caribbean (see Figure 8).





Figure 7. *Child Health*



Data Source: International Labour Organisation (ILO), Labor Statistics Database (ILOSTAT)

Figure 8. *Social Protection Coverage*

**Global Climate Change and Food Insecurity:** Despite vulnerability to climate change,<sup>15</sup> all three countries of northern Central America score poorly, compared to regional averages, on the quality of environmental policy, as measured by the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (see Figure 9).<sup>16</sup> The populations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras remain more food insecure compared to averages for Central America and Latin America and the Caribbean, with food insecurity rising region-wide in 2020 (see Figure 10). The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021 report shows that the average prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the populations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras has increased from the 2014-2016 triennia to the most recent 2018-

<sup>15</sup> Germanwatch (2021). *Global Climate Risk Index, 2021*, available at <https://germanwatch.org/en/19777> Guatemala and Honduras are more vulnerable to global climate change than average for Central America, while these countries and El Salvador are more vulnerable than the average for all of Latin America and the Caribbean.

<sup>16</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020). *Transformation Index (BTI)*, available at <https://bti-project.org/> The BTI Environmental Policy indicator scores countries' environmental policies on a one to ten scale, with higher scores representing more advanced environmental policy regimes. This indicator measures the soundness of environmental stewardship and natural resource management, factoring a wide array of macroeconomic policies with environmental consequences, such as energy and tax policies, national climate plans, and incentives at the firm and household levels. The indicator also considers whether legislation and regulations are effectively executed, as well as the influence of societal stakeholders beyond the government, including the private sector and civil society

2020 triennia from 42.4 to 47.1, 42.7 to 49.7, and 41.6 to 45.6 respectively.<sup>17</sup> As a comparison, Central America as a whole shifted from 27.9 to 34.8 in the same time period, an increase largely driven by the aforementioned countries.<sup>18</sup> Further, perception surveys conducted by Vanderbilt University's Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2021 also revealed increasing levels of self-reported food insecurity, a key motivating factor for migration, in Guatemala and Honduras, with a slight decline in El Salvador.<sup>19</sup>




Figure 9. *Environmental Policy*

<sup>17</sup> FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. (2021). *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021: Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all*, available at <https://doi.org/10.4060/cb4474en> Individual country estimates are presented as triennia to mitigate for sampling variability.

<sup>18</sup> Mexico and Costa Rica make up the other two countries included to calculate the prevalence of food insecurity for the Central American region.

<sup>19</sup> Vanderbilt University. *Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)*, available at <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/> LAPOP surveys for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras include two questions related to food security: (1) In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food? and (2) In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?




Figure 10. *Severe Food Insecurity*

## Pillar 2: Combating Corruption, Strengthening Democratic Governance, and Advancing the Rule of Law

**Democratic Governance and Rule of Law:** Honduras and Guatemala historically have performed worse than regional averages on the Varieties of Democracy liberal democracy index,<sup>20</sup> and liberal democracy scores for all three northern Central America countries have declined since 2015.<sup>21</sup> El Salvador, in particular, experienced democratic backsliding in 2020. Likewise, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras consistently score lower than regional averages on the World Justice Project's overall rule of law index, with scores for all three countries falling since 2015. In Guatemala and Honduras, survey data further reflects this in citizens' declining trust in their countries' judicial systems (see Figure 11).

<sup>20</sup> The Varieties of Democracy liberal democracy index measures the quality of democracy defined as constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. The index, which ranges from zero to one (higher is better), also takes into account the level of electoral democracy. For more information, see <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/reference-material-v11/>

<sup>21</sup> The World Justice Project uses national household surveys and the opinions of legal experts to measure rule of law experience and perception in countries worldwide. The scale runs from zero to one (higher is better). For more information, see <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2020>




Figure 11. *Trust in the Judicial System*

**Combat Corruption:** On nearly all well-known measures of public corruption, all three northern Central America countries continue to score lower than regional averages for Central America and Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>22</sup>

Transparency International surveys indicate respondents perceive Honduras and Guatemala as significantly more corrupt than Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole. For both countries, the perceived degree of public sector corruption has increased over the 2015 to 2020 period. Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have increased the space for opportunism and malpractice from public officials, especially in the realm of public health-related acquisitions and procurement of PPE, ventilators, and other necessary supplies.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Measures of public corruption include Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Global Corruption Barometer, Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) corruption indicators (control, executive, judicial, political, public sector, and regime), World Justice Project's absence of corruption index, Vanderbilt University's Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) perceptions of political corruption, and the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator on control of corruption.

<sup>23</sup> For example, the Honduras-based National Anti-corruption Council has identified approximately \$68 million in alleged acts of corruption in its Corruption in the Times of COVID-19 report. For more information, see <https://www.cna.hn/investigaciones/investigaciones-2021/>

**Government Service Delivery:** The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators show government effectiveness in northern Central America as substantially lower than average for Latin America and the Caribbean overall; scores have remained poor in Guatemala and Honduras, in particular, over the last five years.<sup>24</sup> Relatedly, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP decreased in Honduras (19.2 percent) and slightly increased in El Salvador (21.9 percent) in 2020; Guatemala (12.4 percent) remained far below the regional average, with the lowest ratio of all countries in the region.

### **Pillar 3: Promoting Respect for Human Rights, Labor Rights, and a Free Press**

Freedom House downgraded El Salvador’s status from “free” to “partly free” in 2020, reflecting a worsening of political rights and civil liberties in the country, and Freedom House has categorized Guatemala and Honduras as “partly free” for the last 20 years.<sup>25</sup> Northern Central America countries rate at or near regional averages on Varieties of Democracy’s diagonal accountability index, which measures oversight by civil society organizations and media activity (see Figure 12).<sup>26</sup> However, El Salvador’s civil society and media effectiveness score has dropped substantially from 2017 to 2020. This coincides with a gradual decline in press freedom in El Salvador and Honduras, as measured by the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, and small improvements in Guatemala. Guatemala and Honduras perform poorly compared to the Latin America average score, with Honduras also below the Central America average and Guatemala slightly above in 2020 (see Figure 13).<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> The World Bank. World Governance Indicators. <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi> World Governance Indicator on government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.

<sup>25</sup> Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2020: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties, [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/FIW2020\\_book\\_JUMBO\\_PDF.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/FIW2020_book_JUMBO_PDF.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> See Varieties of Democracy. The V-Dem Dataset, <https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html>

<sup>27</sup> See Reporters Without Borders. World Press Freedom Index, <https://rsf.org/en/index>




Figure 12. *Diagonal Accountability*




Figure 13. *Press Freedom*

**Pillar 4: Countering and Preventing Violence, Extortion, and other Crimes Perpetrated by Criminal Gangs, Trafficking Networks, and other Unlawful Organizations**

**Professionalize Security Forces:** Perception survey data from the Department of State’s Office of Opinion Research shows a majority of citizens in Guatemala and Honduras have little or no trust in their national police, with the percentage growing larger in 2020. El Salvador reported similar results up until 2019, when

the majority switched to reporting a lot or some trust in national police (see Figure 14).




Figure 14. *Trust in Police*

**Organized Crime:** According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime Index, northern Central America countries have higher criminality scores than the average for Latin America and the Caribbean; scores for Guatemala and Honduras register higher than the Central America average.<sup>28</sup> According to the Global Initiative for Transnational Organized Crime, which produces the index, the presence of sophisticated criminal organizations like Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 and the association of large human trafficking and drug markets play major contributing factors to these scores.

<sup>28</sup> Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2021). *Global Organized Crime Index*.

<https://ocindex.net> In the 2021 Global Organized Crime Index (the first year the index was produced), the Central America average criminality score was 6.17; El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras scored 6.94, 6.48, and 6.98. The index scores countries from one to ten, where a higher score indicates more severe criminality. The criminality scores consist of the average of ten criminal markets and four criminal actor types. While encompassing a range of activities, criminal markets consist of the political, social, and economic systems surrounding all stages of the illicit trade and/or exploitation of commodities or people. Criminal actor scores come from assessments of the structure, control and influence of groups engaged in organized criminal activities. For more information, see <https://ocindex.net/>



**Violence Prevention and Intervention:** High homicide rates have declined over recent years, with a particularly pronounced reduction in El Salvador following a sharp spike in 2015 (see Figure 15). More recent data on homicides over the course of the pandemic indicate that all three countries saw a downward trend in homicide rates in 2020, but these declines did not continue into 2021. Overall, homicide rates remain higher than regional averages, especially in El Salvador and Honduras, and in all three countries, higher than the World Health Organization's (WHO) definition of endemic violence (a rate of 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants or higher). Beyond homicide rates, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras citizens' perceptions of safety continue to fluctuate, with feelings of insecurity increasing in Guatemala and Honduras in 2020 and dropping substantially in El Salvador (see Figure 16) despite an uptick in disappearances.




Figure 15. *Homicide Rate*

Do you generally feel safe or unsafe when you walk in your community during the night?





Figure 16. *Safety at Night*

## Pillar 5: Combating Sexual, Gender-Based, and Domestic Violence

Despite the progress on general violence reduction, gender-based violence remains highly prevalent in northern Central America. According to the most recent available data (from 2020) on rates of femicide, defined as the number of women killed by gender violence per 100,000 women, Honduras had the highest rate in all of Latin America by a wide margin at 4.7, followed by El Salvador in fourth at 2.1, and Guatemala in ninth at 1.3 (see Figure 17). This prevalence extends to other types of gender-based violence as well. In 2018 the World Health Organization reported that the percentage of women who had experienced intimate-partner violence at some point in their lifetime (defined as physical or sexual violence from a male partner) stood at 21 percent in El Salvador and Guatemala, and 17 percent in Honduras.<sup>29</sup> Although we lack more recent data, the World Health

<sup>29</sup> World Health Organization. (2021). *Violence against women prevalence estimates, 2018: global, regional and national prevalence estimates for intimate partner violence against women and global and regional prevalence estimates for non-partner sexual violence against women*, available at <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240022256>

Organization expects gender-based violence to have increased globally during the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>30</sup>



Data Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPALSTAT Database

Figure 17. *Femicide Rates*

<sup>30</sup> World Health Organization. (2021). *COVID-19 and violence against women: What the health sector/system can do*, available at <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-SRH-20.04>

### **Appendix 3: Performance Metrics Analysis**

The Department of State and USAID, in collaboration with interagency partners<sup>1</sup>, have linked an initial set of performance metrics to Root Causes Strategy (RCS) pillars and strategic objectives. These initial metrics capture what U.S. departments and agencies are currently measuring, primarily outputs, which are appropriate for the first year of Root Causes Strategy implementation as we focus on program execution. As funding and programs expand in future years, State and USAID will collaborate with other departments and agencies to expand the performance metrics to further incorporate measurement of longer-term outcomes.

Performance metrics monitor results of programs implemented by the U.S. Government and its partners, compared to pre-established targets and/or previous years' results. This report reflects program results occurring in fiscal year 2021 (i.e., October 2020 to September 2021), much of which predates the launch of the RCS. As such, the results data analyzed in this section depict initial progress and establish an important benchmark or comparison for assessing RCS results data in future years' reports. Where available, this section also describes the fiscal year 2021 results relative to targets (exceeded, met, not met) and prior year results (increased, no change, decreased) (See Appendix 2 for analysis of country commitment metrics.)

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government departments and agencies that provided data for this report include Department of Commerce, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Labor (DOL), Department of State (State), Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Inter-American Foundation (IAF), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). State bureaus providing results data include Bureau of Energy Resources; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; and the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons.

## Pillar 1: Addressing Economic Insecurity and Inequality

### Business enabling environment

FY 2021	Sales	<p>These indicators track outcomes of USAID's agricultural, non-agricultural, and environment assistance programs. Increased productivity and production of small-holders or firms helps reduce poverty, a key root cause of migration, through improved livelihoods and broad-based economic growth.</p> <p><b>USAID</b> (one activity in El Salvador, three in Guatemala, and two in Honduras) assist local producers and firms, which reported that use of digital technologies and e-commerce platforms spurred sales during a time of gradual reopening of economies.</p>
<i>Value of annual sales of producers and firms receiving USG assistance (EG.3.2-26)</i>		
Guatemala	\$76,552,570	
Honduras	\$61,967,304	
<i>Value of firms' incremental sales generated with USG assistance</i>		
El Salvador	\$94,100,000	
<i>Sales of firms receiving USG assistance</i>		
Guatemala	\$15,039,761	
<i>Value of new non-agricultural sales generated by firms receiving assistance</i>		
Guatemala	\$167,676,903	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): \$415,336,538</b>		
<p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: <b>Not met</b></i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Increased</b></i></p>		

FY 2021	Jobs	<p>These indicators track U.S. Government contributions to agricultural and non-agricultural private sector job creation and stability in northern Central America. This support addresses a key root cause of migration from Central America by providing income, helping reduce poverty, and strengthening ties to individuals' communities.</p> <p><b>USAID</b> (one activity in El Salvador, three in Guatemala, and two in Honduras) reported that introduction of COVID-19 health protection measures, crop diversification, improved agriculture practices and technologies, orientation towards local markets, and digitization drove increases in private firms' sales during a time of general rebound in international and local market demand.</p>
<i>Number of jobs associated with Root Causes Strategy implementation</i>		
El Salvador	6,036	
<i>Number of full-time equivalent jobs created with USG assistance (EG.3-9)</i>		
Guatemala	29,819	
<i>Full-time equivalent employment of firms receiving USG assistance</i>		
Guatemala	21,073	
<i>Number of direct jobs generated through the implementation of infrastructure projects with USG assistance</i>		
Honduras	375	
<i>Number of new or better jobs as a result of USG assistance</i>		
Honduras	13,275	
<i>Number of jobs attributed to USDA assistance (FFPr SI 20)</i>		
Guatemala	718	
Honduras	13,272	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 84,568</b>		
<p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: <b>Exceeded</b></i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Increased</b></i></p>		

FY 2021	Firms	<p>These indicators track U.S. Government contributions to the viability and/or expansion of new and existing private sector firms, including small and medium enterprises. This in turn supports inclusive, broad-based economic growth, empowerment, and stability—the lack of which contribute to a root cause of irregular migration from Central America.</p> <p>The <b>Department of Commerce, Inter-American Foundation (IAF)</b> and <b>USAID</b> (one regional activity, one activity in El Salvador, three in Guatemala, and one in Honduras) focus support on local firms owned by women, youth, and other key demographics, in areas of out-migration. By building technical and technological capacity and expanding access to credit, positioned firms to better adapt to local and international market trends, as well as changes brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<i>Number of firms receiving USG-funded technical assistance to export (EG.2.2-1)</i>		
Other Central America	561	
<i>Number of small, and medium-sized enterprises supported by USG assistance (EG.5-12)</i>		
El Salvador	625	
Honduras	617	
Other Central America	118	
<i>Number of firms receiving USG-funded technical assistance for improving business performance (EG.5.2-1)</i>		
El Salvador	74	
Guatemala	265	
<i>Number of microenterprises supported by USG assistance (EG.5-3)</i>		
El Salvador	3,900	
Guatemala	143	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 6,303</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b> <i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i>		

## Trade

FY 2021	Trade	<p>This indicator tracks U.S. Government contributions to reducing costs to traders and transporters, a key barrier to inclusive economic growth through cross-border trade.</p> <p>The <b>Department of Commerce</b> and <b>USAID</b> (one regional activity) assist regional local authorities and private entities with cross-border commerce through training, adoption of technology, and compliance monitoring.</p> <p>USAID's implementer could not report fiscal year 2021 results data derived from pre-established methodologies due to lack of commitment from government customs agencies. To address the gap, USAID's implementer coordinated with freight forwarders to analyze their Global Positioning System (GPS) data and streamline company procedures, leading to an average 30 percent reduction in border crossing times for these companies. Going forward, through a USAID partnership with the private sector, USAID's implementer will develop a dashboard displaying companies' GPS data to monitor border crossing times.</p>
<i>Average time (in hours) to trade goods along trade corridor receiving USG assistance (EG.2.1-2)</i>		
El Salvador	24 hours	
Honduras	108 hours	
Other Central America	46 hours	
<b>FY21 RESULT (average): 66 hours</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: <b>Not met</b></i> <i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>		

## Education, Workforce Development, Health, and Social Protection

FY 2021	Education (primary)	<p>These indicators track the overall reach of U.S. Government support for inclusive, quality education, a critical step toward improving learning outcomes for children and youth.</p> <p><b>USAID</b> (one activity in El Salvador, two in Guatemala, and two in Honduras) and the <b>Department of Agriculture (USDA)</b> assist schools and learners, as well as the community structures that support them. Programs also aim to mitigate violence by partnering with schools and community centers to create and maintain safe spaces. For USDA, assistance to schools includes the provision of commodities for school feeding and/or the rehabilitation of school infrastructure.</p> <p>For USAID, increases in the number of primary school learners in Guatemala showed a link to expansion of hybrid learning in the COVID-19 context, while decreases in Honduras related to a two-year decline in enrollment in supported schools. Similarly, increases in the number of secondary school learners in Guatemala and Honduras attribute to outreach to out-of-school youth in high-risk areas and adoption of remote learning practices, while a decrease in El Salvador related to a three-month pause on in-school activities while the government conducted a curriculum standardization exercise.</p> <p>USDA programs in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua reported mixed results on the parent-teacher associations indicator. For USAID, activities in El Salvador and Honduras set fiscal year 2022 targets based on new and expended activities.</p>
<i>Number of learners in primary schools or equivalent non-school based settings reached with USG education assistance (ES.1-3)</i>		
Guatemala	2,060,727	
Honduras	359,545	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 2,420,272</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i></p>		
FY 2021	Education (secondary)	<p>USAID programs in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua reported mixed results on the parent-teacher associations indicator. For USAID, activities in El Salvador and Honduras set fiscal year 2022 targets based on new and expended activities.</p>
<i>Number of learners in secondary schools or equivalent non-school based settings reached with USG education assistance (ES.1-4)</i>		
El Salvador	2,837	
Guatemala	3,201	
Honduras	53,895	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 59,933</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Decreased</i></p>		
FY 2021	Education (nutrition)	
<i>Number of students enrolled in school receiving USDA assistance (FFpr SI 9)</i>		
Guatemala	132,621	
Honduras	12,663	
Other Central America	69,632	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 214,916</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Decreased</i></p>		

FY 2021	Education (community)	
<i>Number of parent teacher associations or community governance structures engaged in primary or secondary education supported with USG assistance (ES.1-13)</i>		
Guatemala	892	
Honduras	1,065	
Other Central America	710	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 2,667</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i> <i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Increased</b></i>		



FY 2021	Workforce Development	
<i>Number of individuals trained in enterprise development/workforce development</i>		These indicators track the reach and short- and medium-term outcomes associated with U.S. Government-supported workforce development programs, which by their nature focus on youth, a key population for addressing the root causes of migration from Central America.
El Salvador	3,910	
Guatemala	7,203	
Honduras	16,232	
Other Central America	6,106	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 32,871</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>		
<i>Percent of individuals who complete USG-assisted workforce development programs (EG.6-14)</i>		USAID programs (one activity each in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) reported results that reflected start-up of a new activity in El Salvador and close-out of an activity in Honduras. In all three countries, programs focus on communities with high levels of out-migration as well as at-risk youth. For example, the USAID activity in El Salvador developed a trial social reinsertion program for former gang members. Challenges cited by implementers include the effects of Hurricanes Eta and Iota and the COVID-19 pandemic on local economies and employment, as well as limited access to technology needed for remote learning. To sustain results, implementers worked to strengthen ties to the private sector.
Guatemala	97%	
Honduras	71%	
<b>FY21 RESULT (average): 84%</b>		Across Central America, IAF funded 68 grants to grassroots and civil society organizations that provided training in enterprise development and employment skills.
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Exceeded</i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Decreased</i>		
<i>Percent of individuals with new employment following participation in USG-assisted workforce development programs (EG.6-12)</i>		
El Salvador	63%	
Guatemala	31%	
Honduras	30%	
<b>FY21 RESULT (average): 41%</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not met</i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Decreased</i>		

<b>FY 2021</b>	<b>Energy Programming Reach</b>	<p>This indicator tracks the reach of U.S. Government programs to expand coverage and reliability of energy, and these programs remain essential for inclusive and broad-based economic growth.</p> <p>The Department of State's <b>Bureau of Energy Resources</b> provides technical assistance and capacity building in the region on power sector governance and management.</p>
<i>Number of beneficiaries with improved energy services due to USG assistance (EG.7.1-1)</i>		
El Salvador	6,384,697	
Guatemala	15,264,720	
Honduras	7,090,014	
Other Central America	14,502,149	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 43,241,580</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>		

<b>FY 2021</b>	<b>Food Security Programming Reach</b>	<p>The food security programming reach indicators track the number of individuals reached by USDA programs. The child food security indicator tracks the reach of nutrition interventions among young children, and these interventions remain essential to prevent and treat malnutrition and to improve child survival. Agricultural technological assistance, financing and investment indicators track U.S. Government contributions to reducing poverty and hunger through support for inclusive agriculture-led economic growth.</p> <p><b>USAID</b> (multiple activities in Guatemala and Honduras) and <b>USDA</b> have focused programs on food-insecure, impoverished, and/or marginalized populations, including women, children, and indigenous communities across northern Central America.</p> <p>For USAID, restrictions related to COVID-19 hindered in-person outreach to communities in Guatemala, thus negatively affecting fiscal year 2021 results. In contrast, access to agricultural finance and private sector investment expanded through digitization of processes for smallholder producers to gain access to credit in Guatemala, and, in Guatemala and Honduras, new public-private partnerships with international and local companies.</p>
<i>Number of individuals participating in USDA food security programs (FFPr SI 22 and MGD SI 30)</i>		
El Salvador	3,070	
Guatemala	303,679	
Honduras	44,303	
Other Central America	109,653	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 460,705</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: <b>Increased</b></i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Decreased</b></i>		
<b>FY 2021</b>	<b>Child Food Security</b>	
<i>Number of children under five (0-59 months) reached with nutrition-specific interventions through USG-supported nutrition activities (HL.9-1)</i>		
Guatemala	69,874	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 69,874</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: <b>Not met</b></i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>		

FY 2021	Agriculture Technology Assistance	
<i>Number of individuals in the agriculture system who have applied improved management practices or technologies with USDA assistance (FFPr SI 4)</i>		
Guatemala	6,063	
Honduras	14,769	
Other Central America	46	
<p align="center"><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 20,878</b></p> <p align="center"><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Increased</b></p> <p align="center"><i>Change from FY20 to FY21:</i> <b>Decreased</b></p>		
FY 2021	Food Security Resource Mobilization	
<i>Value of agriculture-related financing accessed as a result of USG assistance (EG.3.2-27)</i>		
Guatemala	\$21,280,390	
Honduras	\$33,134,541	
Other Central America	\$12,520,175	
<i>Value of new USG commitments and private sector investment leveraged by the USG to support food security and nutrition (EG.3.1-14)</i>		
Guatemala	\$6,641,470	
Honduras	\$501,233	
<i>Amount of public and private capital leveraged as a result of USG assistance</i>		
Honduras	\$15,542,593	
<p align="center"><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): \$89,620,402</b></p> <p align="center"><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p align="center"><i>Change from FY20 to FY21:</i> <b>Increased</b></p>		

<b>FY 2021</b>	<b>Natural Resource Management Program Reach</b>	<p>This indicator tracks U.S. Government contributions to sustainable economic growth and social development through natural resource management and/or biodiversity conservation efforts.</p> <p><b>USAID</b> programs (one regional activity, one activity in Guatemala, and one interagency agreement with the U.S. Forest Service) provide technical assistance and training to local actors. For example, USAID's regional activity reported it helped local producer associations formalize and adopt standard governance and business practices. Likewise, the activity in Guatemala (which ended in July 2021) helped local producers build alliances for ecotourism (e.g., birdwatching) and promoted sustainable livestock practices, among other things.</p>
<i>Number of people with improved economic benefits derived from sustainable natural resource management and/or biodiversity conservation as a result of USG assistance (EG.10.2-3)</i>		
Guatemala	3,404	
Honduras	459	
Other Central America	730	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 4,593</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i>  <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21:</i> <b>Increased</b></p>		

## Pillar 2: Combating Corruption, Strengthening Democratic Governance, and Advancing the Rule of Law

### Democratic Governance and Rule of Law

FY 2021	Judicial Capacity	<p>These indicators track U.S. Government contributions to strengthening partner governments' judicial systems, essential for transparency and accountability in democratic societies, as well as performance of those systems, measured by prosecutions and convictions.</p> <p>The Department of State's <b>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)</b> and <b>USAID</b> (one activity each in El Salvador and Guatemala, and one regional activity) provide training to justice sector actors, including judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and other personnel. In addition to investigative and prosecutorial methods and technologies, training also covers human rights, use of community-based systems, and human rights, among other things. Virtual or remote training during the COVID-19 pandemic helped sustain results during fiscal year 2021.</p> <p>In Guatemala, USAID paused assistance to the Public Ministry after the reporting period because of actions taken by the Attorney General.</p>
<i>Number of judicial personnel trained with USG assistance (DR.1.3-1)</i>		
El Salvador	265	
Guatemala	1,095	
Other Central America	162	
<i>Number of justice sector personnel trained with USG assistance</i>		
Guatemala	4,121	
Honduras	6,198	
Other Central America	2,500	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 14,341</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Decreased</i></p>		
FY 2021	Prosecutions	
<i>Number of open prosecutions</i>		
El Salvador	115,892	
Guatemala	99,222	
Honduras	70,495	
Other Central America	1,637,618	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 1,923,227</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Decreased</i></p>		
FY 2021	Convictions	
<i>Number of convictions</i>		
El Salvador	1,531	
Guatemala	6,999	
Other Central America	8,162	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 16,692</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i></p>		

## Combat Corruption

FY 2021	Anti-corruption	
<i>Number of government officials receiving USG-supported anti-corruption training (DR.2.4-1)</i>		These indicators track U.S. Government contribution to strengthening the capacity of partner government officials to manage accountability systems and processes, take action against corrupt acts, and be aware of the ethical norms related to their official roles.
El Salvador	1,511	
Honduras	654	
<i>Number of individuals affiliated with non-governmental organizations receiving USG-supported anti-corruption training (DR.2.4-3)</i>		<b>USAID's</b> work in El Salvador and Honduras supports the national and local judicial systems and institutions.
El Salvador	1,979	
Honduras	371	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 4,515</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i>		
<b>Exceeded</b>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21:</i>		
<b>Increased</b>		Generally, training and capacity building efforts (e.g., social auditing, advocacy, transparency, accountability) moved virtual during the COVID-19 pandemic, and thus able to sustain and even overperform targets by providing for multiple cohorts and reaching trainees countrywide. Additionally, the 2021 elections in Honduras, and general regional backsliding in transparency and access to information environments have increased local communities/CSO demand for USAID anti-corruption and transparency efforts.

## Government Service Delivery

FY 2021	Government Services Capacity	<p>These indicators track U.S. Government contributions to sustainably increasing access to safe drinking water, a public service essential for long-term development. Lack of access to safe, reliable, and affordable drinking water negatively affects health outcomes and diverts time and financial resources away from other development needs, thus putting other development outcomes at risk. Increased financing for water and sanitation increases the availability and sustainable management of safe water and sanitation for underserved and vulnerable populations.</p> <p><b>USAID</b> (one activity) and <b>USDA</b> strengthen water and sanitation services in Central America—assisting schools, public financial management, economic plans, and other technical assistance. USAID assisted municipalities in the Western Highlands with the installation of chlorinators and improved water quality control and surveillance in 135 water systems serving 102 communities, thereby exceeding its annual target.</p>
<i>Number of people receiving improved service quality from an existing basic or safely managed drinking water service as a result of USG assistance (HL.8.1-3)</i>		
Guatemala	103,670	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 103,670</b>  <i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b> <i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i>		
<i>Number of schools using an improved water source (MGD SI 27)</i>		
Guatemala	515	
Honduras	609	
Other Central America	426	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 1,550</b>  <i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b> <i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i>		
<i>Number of schools with improved sanitary facilities (MGD SI 28)</i>		
Guatemala	417	
Honduras	658	
Other Central America	29	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 1,104</b>  <i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b> <i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i>		
FY 2021	Government Services Resource Mobilization	
<i>Value of new funding mobilized to the water and sanitation sectors as a result of USG assistance (HL.8.4-1)</i>		
Guatemala	\$4,401,476	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): \$4,401,476</b>  <i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b> <i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>		

### Pillar 3: Promoting Respect for Human Rights, Labor Rights, and a Free Press

FY 2021	Human Rights Programming Reach	<p>This indicator tracks U.S. Government support to human rights defenders so that they can report and advocate on behalf of human rights.</p> <p>The Department of State's Bureau of <b>Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)</b> as well as <b>USAID</b> (one activity in El Salvador) programs reach human rights defenders across northern Central America. As the region has experienced ongoing threats to human rights defenders, demand for USAID support has increased. In El Salvador, the activity exceeded targets in fiscal year 2021 by operating virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<i>Number of human rights defenders trained and supported (DR.6.1-2)</i>		
El Salvador (USAID only)	223	
Other Central America	999	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 1,222</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21:</i> <b>Increased</b></p>		

FY 2021	Labor Programming Reach	<p>This indicator tracks U.S. Government support to labor rights organizations so that they can report and advocate on behalf of labor rights.</p> <p>The <b>Department of Labor</b> addresses labor rights through its training and capacity-building programming across northern Central America.</p>
<i>Number of individual actors within a system with increased capacity that enables them to better address labor rights issues, claim their rights or fulfill their duties (OTLA 2a)</i>		
El Salvador	38	
Guatemala	80	
Honduras	69	
Other Central America	247	
<i>Number of individuals provided with training to improve enforcement of, or compliance with, child labor, forced labor, or other worker rights or policies (TI)</i>		
Honduras	53	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 487</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21:</i> <b>Increased</b></p>		



FY 2021	Press	<p>This indicator tracks U.S. Government contributions to improving journalists' abilities to investigate and report on human rights violations, a key aspect of government accountability and transparency.</p> <p><b>USAID</b> (one activity each in El Salvador and Guatemala) and <b>DRL</b> programs mitigate mis/disinformation efforts and ties its work to relevant current events.</p>
<i>Number of journalists trained and supported (DR.5.2-2)</i>		
El Salvador (USAID only)	13	
Guatemala (USAID only)	20	
Other Central America	361	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 394</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i></p>		

FY 2021	CSO Advocacy	<p>This indicator tracks U.S. Government contributions to strengthening civil society organizations to mobilize society, ideas, and resources to bring about democratic change and/or its consolidation, a critical means for citizens to express their needs and concerns to their governments.</p> <p><b>USAID</b> (one activity in El Salvador, three activities in Guatemala, and three activities in Honduras) and <b>DRL</b> support civil society organizations to engage in advocacy in their communities; programming likewise engages government institutions and serves as a convener with local civil society.</p> <p>USAID activities' results exceeded targets and increased over the prior year, largely due to a welcome increase in CSOs' and local communities' interest, alongside USAID's ability to reach people virtually. Local youth and indigenous CSOs, in particular, expressed interest in social auditing and civil accountability efforts. In El Salvador, engagement with CSOs ahead of legislative and municipal elections may have further increased the activity's result.</p>
<i>Number of civil society organizations receiving USG assistance engaged in advocacy interventions (DR.4.2-2)</i>		
El Salvador (USAID only)	8	
Guatemala (USAID only)	113	
Honduras (USAID only)	236	
Other Central America	157	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 514</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i></p>		

## Pillar 4 - Countering and Preventing Violence, Extortion, and other Crimes Perpetrated by Criminal Gangs, Trafficking Networks, and other Unlawful Organizations

### Professionalize Security Forces

FY 2021	Human Capacity	
<i>Number of civilian police trained by INL</i>		These indicators track U.S. Government contributions to building the capacity of partner governments' military and law enforcement capabilities.
Guatemala	1,718	
Honduras	1,983	
Other Central America	1,806	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 5,507</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>		The Department of State's <b>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs</b> , alongside <b>INL</b> , professionalizes security forces across northern Central America. Their effort incentivizes engagement with women as leaders in the sector. Training activities operated virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic; conversely, physical inspection of security force sites could not occur.  <i>Due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions in fiscal year 2021, Embassy Guatemala has been unable to assess if Model Police Precincts remain operational. As of fiscal year 2020, Guatemala had 94 operational MPPs.</i>
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Increased</b></i>		
<i>Number of individuals that have attended U.S. funded courses in key decision-making roles</i>		
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 100</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>		
El Salvador	54	
Guatemala	37	
Honduras	1	
Other Central America	8	
<i>Number of foreign national women who participate in USG-funded training related to security, justice, criminal justice, law enforcement, and/or peacekeeping</i>		
Honduras	2,466	
Other Central America	987	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 3,453</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Decreased</b></i>		

<b>FY 2021</b>	<b>Physical Capacity</b>
<i>Number of operational Model Police Precincts</i>	
El Salvador	19
Honduras	47
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 66</b>	
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>	
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>	
<i>Number of operational Place-Based Strategy sites</i>	
El Salvador	3
Honduras	4
Other Central America	90
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 97</b>	
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>	
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Increased</b></i>	
<i>Number of operational Police Service Model sites</i>	
El Salvador	19
Honduras	3
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 22</b>	
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>	
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>No change</b></i>	
<b>FY 2021</b>	<b>Arrests</b>
<i>Number of arrests by INL-supported vetted units and task forces</i>	
Guatemala	39
Honduras	518
Other Central America	3,861
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 4,418</b>	
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>	
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Increased</b></i>	

## Organized Crime

FY 2021	Seizure of Illegal Assets	<p>These indicators track U.S. Government contributions to strengthening partner countries' militaries and law enforcement to combat transnational criminal organizations.</p> <p>INL programming trains and supports police and specialized task forces to seize illegal assets and drugs across northern Central America to effectively combat transnational threats and crime, enhance law enforcement resiliency against transnational crime, and reduce associate violence.</p> <p>The <b>Department of Defense</b> supports partner nations' military and law enforcement to monitor, detect, and disrupt illicit trafficking.</p>
<i>Value of assets seized by INL-supported units</i>		
El Salvador	\$7,311,249	
Honduras	\$473,374	
Other Central America	\$6,840,863	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): \$14,625,486</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i></p>		
FY 2021	Seizure of Illegal Drugs	
<i>Value of illicit drugs seized</i>		
El Salvador	\$116,823,358	
Guatemala	\$382,391,266	
Honduras	\$173,983,578	
Other Central America	\$4,445,304,867	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): \$5,118,503,069</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i></p>		
FY 2021	Events Disrupted	
<i>Number of events disrupted with USG support to partner nations military and law enforcement to monitor, detect, and disrupt illicit trafficking</i>		
El Salvador	10	
Guatemala	32	
Honduras	52	
Other Central America	125	
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 219</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i></p>		

## Violence Prevention and Intervention

FY 2021	Prevention Program Reach		
<i>Number of vulnerable persons benefiting from USG-supported social services (ES.4-1)</i>		<p>These indicators track the reach of U.S. Government crime prevention and intervention programs (including those funded through the Central America Regional Security Initiative) focused on at-risk youth.</p> <p>The Department of State's <b>Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons J/TIP</b> and <b>INL</b>, as well as <b>IAF</b> and <b>USAID</b> (four activities each in El Salvador and Guatemala, and one activity in Honduras), engage directly with at-risk youth across northern Central America as well as the entire system surrounding them: state and local institutions (government and non-governmental), licit and illicit livelihoods and its associated entities/actors, and other community structures.</p>	
El Salvador	20,103		
Guatemala	43,361	<p>Programs supporting youth outreach centers or other forms of community spaces tended to re-open and resume in-person, peer-to-peer, virtual, radio, or other forms of engagement during the past fiscal year. Topics include violence prevention, alternative livelihoods, soft skills, compassion, positive communication, and self-esteem. IAF grantees in Central America improved civic engagement education and skills to participate in democratic processes, resolve conflicts, and hold local governments accountable. Engaging with youth online proved sustainable during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>	
Other Central America	495		
<i>Youth trained in soft skills/life skills through USG-assisted programs (YOUTH-1)</i>		<p>Due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, training for police officers to teach Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) in El Salvador and Honduras did not occur in fiscal years 2020 and 2021.</p>	
El Salvador	266		
Guatemala	2,539	<p>Due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, training for police officers to teach Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) in El Salvador and Honduras did not occur in fiscal years 2020 and 2021.</p>	
<i>Number of at-risk youth reached through primary prevention interventions (e.g., outreach centers)</i>			
Honduras	69,767		
<i>Number of individuals trained in civic education and/or conflict resolution</i>			
El Salvador	234		
Guatemala	803	<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 150,337</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21:</i> <b>Increased</b></p>	
Honduras	3,442		
Other Central America	9,327		
<p><b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 150,337</b></p> <p><i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target:</i> <b>Exceeded</b></p> <p><i>Change from FY20 to FY21:</i> <b>Increased</b></p>			
FY 2021	Community Engagement		

<i>Number of training activities with key actors (parents, youth, community leaders) in violence prevention methodology through civic education, conflict resolution, and protective factors against drug abuse and trafficking-in-persons</i>	
Other Central America	6,794
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 6,794</b>	
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>	
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i>	

<b>FY 2021</b>	<b>GREAT Program</b>
<i>Number of police officers trained to teach the Gang Resistance Education and Training program</i>	
Guatemala	84
Other Central America	39
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 123</b>	
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>	
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>	
<i>Number of youth graduated from the Gang Resistance Education and Training program</i>	
El Salvador	1,376
Guatemala	5,839
Honduras	42,056
Other Central America	2,107
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 51,378</b>	
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>	
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Increased</i>	

## Pillar 5 - Combating Sexual, Gender-Based, and Domestic Violence

FY 2021	Programing Reach	<p>These indicators track U.S. Government contributions to mitigating the harmful effects of gender-based violence.</p> <p>The Department of State's <b>J/TIP and INL</b>, and <b>USAID</b> (one activity in Guatemala and two activities in Honduras) reported on various programs to prevent violence that disproportionately affects women and girls, as well as address its negative effects. USAID programs spanning education, economic growth, democracy, and civil society strengthening, also integrated gender-based violence efforts into implementation. Greater focus on providing gender-based violence prevention services, outreach to survivors, and partnership with other international actors enabled implementers to meet targets in fiscal year 2021. The USAID/Guatemala activity did not meet its annual target due to funding uncertainty. In all three northern Central America countries, USAID plans to expand its interventions in this area, subject to the availability of funding.</p>
<i>Number of people reached by a USG funded intervention providing gender-based violence services (e.g., health, legal, psychosocial counseling, shelters, hotlines, other) (GNDR-6)</i>		
Guatemala	47	
Honduras	20,179	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 20,226</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: <b>Met</b></i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Increased</b></i>		
FY 2021	Human Capacity	
<i>Number of gender-based violence victims/marginalized persons successfully completing economic, educational programs</i>		
Guatemala	259	
Other Central America	194	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): 453</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: <b>Exceeded</b></i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: <b>Not available</b></i>		

## Cross-Cutting Indicators

### Resource mobilization

<b>FY 2021</b>	<b>CSO Resources</b>	This indicator tracks progress in mobilizing non-donor resources, especially from local sources. Contribution of financial or in-kind resources reflect one measure of commitment. Mobilizing non-donor resources improves the sustainability of development activities and outcomes.
<i>Value of non-donor resources mobilized for local development priorities (CBLD-10)</i>		
El Salvador	\$1,916,200	The <b>IAF</b> works with local partners to mobilize local/regional, cash, and in-kind resources throughout Central America.
Guatemala	\$2,452,766	
Honduras	\$2,894,532	
Other Central America	\$4,776,346	
<b>FY21 RESULT (sum total): \$12,039,844</b>		
<i>FY21 result compared to FY21 target: Not available</i>		
<i>Change from FY20 to FY21: Not available</i>		



B R E N R O O M

# FACT SHEET: Update on the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America

APRIL 19, 2022 • STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

## April 2022

Vice President Harris has led the Root Causes Strategy, which aligns U.S. Government efforts to address the economic, governance, and security drivers of irregular migration from Central America. The Biden-Harris Administration's comprehensive strategy combines significant U.S. Government resources with substantial private sector investments to support the long-term development of the region. To advance the strategy, the Vice President met with regional leaders and traveled to Guatemala, Mexico, and Honduras to launch new initiatives that sustainably address the root causes of migration. The Vice President also brought together private sector leaders through her Call to Action initiative that has generated more than \$1.2 billion in commitments to create new jobs and opportunities for people in the region. In addition, she has engaged partners around the world to generate new commitments.

These are long-term efforts, but under the Vice President's leadership, the Biden-Harris Administration is seeing significant progress toward creating hope for people in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras that a better life can be found at home. Highlights to date include:

- U.S. initiatives are providing micro and small businesses access to \$100 million in financing to support economic recovery in the region.
- To combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Government has delivered more than 15 million free-of-cost vaccine doses bilaterally and in partnership with COVAX to countries in northern Central America.
- The U.S. Government has provided \$26.4 million to El Salvador, \$81.5 million to Guatemala and \$57.1 million to Honduras to support the fight against COVID-19.
- U.S. Government support for private sector companies helped create more than 70,000 jobs.

- The U.S. Government's \$300 million *Centroamérica Local* initiative is empowering local organizations to address the drivers of irregular migration.
- U.S. support for the region's agricultural sector is generating increased incomes for families and producers.
- Additional U.S. funding for school feeding programs is improving food security in northern Central America.
- A new Department of Justice Anti-Corruption Task Force, which was announced by the Vice President in June 2021, is prioritizing prosecutions against corrupt actors in the region.
- U.S. sanctions and visa restrictions are targeting perpetrators of corruption and serious human rights abuse.
- U.S. training professionalized over 5,000 civilian police across the region.
- A new task force to prevent migrant smuggling and human trafficking, which was announced by the Vice President in June 2021, is disrupting trafficking operations and its work has already led to the indictment of eight leaders of human smuggling organizations.
- U.S. programs are supporting victims of unaccompanied migrant children, gender-based violence, and survivors of human trafficking.
- New U.S. Government programs and scholarships are improving access to education for nearly 18,000 returning/potential migrants and at-risk youth.
- U.S. Government partnerships with local organizations are increasing income-generating opportunities for thousands of indigenous women and girls.
- U.S. programs are empowering women entrepreneurs to launch and scale their businesses across the region.
- The U.S. Government is supporting at-risk youth across the region to strengthen their ability to resist gang recruitment.
- New programming in northern Central America is focused on increasing collective action to address child and forced labor and improve occupational safety and health conditions for workers in the region.

As part of the Vice President's *Call to Action*:

- Microsoft is connecting four million people to broadband across the region, with over one million already connected to date.
- Nespresso will invest \$150 million to double the number of farmers it works with in the region and begin to source coffee from El Salvador and Honduras.
- Mastercard is bringing five million people into the formal financial economy while digitizing one million micro and small businesses.
- Parkdale Mills is investing \$150 million to support a new yarn spinning facility in Honduras and an existing facility in Virginia, supporting 500 jobs in each location.
- PepsiCo is investing at least \$190 million in northern Central America through 2025 to improve its plants and expand distribution routes.
- Grupo Ariposa is providing over 70,000 small-business owners with access to credit and digital services.

*For additional details, please review the [Report on the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America](#).*

## Appendix 5: Migration Data

Data on the number or demographic makeup (e.g., sub-national origins, age, sex) of individuals emigrating from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are often incomplete and/or untimely. Recognizing this gap, the Department of State and USAID have collaborated with other U.S. Government agencies and international organizations to assemble a suite of migration-related data that play an important role in helping U.S. Government departments and agencies (1) refine the geographic and demographic focus of existing and new programs, (2) monitor and adapt to changing migration-related dynamics, and (3) over time, assess the collective efforts of the U.S. Government, private sector, civil society, and partner government efforts to address the root causes of migration in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and partner governments via a partnership with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) serve as two key sources of migration data.

**CBP encounter data:** On a limited basis beginning in 2015, USAID began receiving and analyzing origin data provided by CBP for unaccompanied child migrants to identify the departments and municipalities in Central America with high rates of out-migration.<sup>1</sup> Since then, USAID has notably expanded this effort. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by USAID and CBP in March 2020 grants USAID regular access to additional data collected from Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran migrants encountered by CBP officials at the U.S.-Mexico border.<sup>2</sup> Importantly, the dataset includes de-identified data on migrants' city and country of birth and permanent residence. Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate two ways USAID use data to identify areas of relatively high out-migration based on CBP's encounter data.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> These data were used to underpin a USAID-commissioned study on the statistical links between violence, development, and waves of Central American migrants to the United States [violence-development-and-migration-waves](#)

<sup>2</sup> USAID does not share information on its program beneficiaries with CBP under this, or any other, agreement.


<sup>3</sup> As of March 2020, with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Border Patrol officers ceased collection of sub-national origin information for migrants expelled using a [public health order known as Title 42](#), limiting the availability of these data for analysis and use. As of the May 20, 2022 federal court ruling, Title 42 remains in place.



**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

## Where do people encountered by CBP originate?

Percentage of country's total encounters, by department, from 2015 - 2021



**GEOCENTER**

Figure 1. *Where Do People Encountered by CBP Originate?*



## What proportion of CBP encounters are female?

Percent female by department between 2015 - 2021




Figure 2. *What Proportion of CBP Encounters are Female?*

**IOM and partner government returnee data:** In addition, through a regional grant to the IOM, USAID supports the overhaul of national government migration data systems essential for tracking data on migrants returning from the United States and Mexico, which IOM publishes on an online dashboard. USAID uses these data to further refine the geographic and demographic focus of its programs, to better understand priority needs of returning and would-be migrants, and to monitor and adapt to changing migration-related dynamics.