USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

ZAHLE, LEBANON. WIKIMEDIA COMMONS.

USAID/LEBANON
CITIZEN PERCEPTION SURVEY (CPS)

DECEMBER 2019

DISCLAIMER: This report was prepared by Social Impact's Lebanon PMSPL II project. Findings in this report do not necessarily represent the views of USAID.

USAID/LEBANON
CITIZEN PERCEPTION SURVEY (CPS)

December 2019

Contracted under AID-268-C-15-00001
Performance Management and Support Program for Lebanon (PMSPL II) for USAID/Lebanon

Social Impact, Inc., Corporate Office
2300 Clarendon Boulevard Suite 1000
Arlington, VA, 22201
Tel: (703) 465-1884
info@socialimpact.com

Social Impact, Inc. – Lebanon Office
Arz Street
Librex Bldg. Bloc B – 3rd Floor
Zalka, Metn, Lebanon
Tel: +961-1-879260

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION & PURPOSE 6

2 METHODOLOGY 6

2.1 QUESTIONNAIRE 6
2.2 SAMPLING 6
2.3 DATA COLLECTION 7
2.4 ANALYSIS 9
2.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 9
2.6 STRUCTURE OF REPORT 14
2.7 DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS 14

3 POLITICAL ECONOMY: FINDINGS 15

3.1 ECONOMIC SITUATION 15
3.2 SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL STATUS 17
3.3 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 19
3.4 CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS 20
3.5 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS 22
3.6 TOP PRIORITY FOR NEW GOVERNMENT 24
3.7 SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICES 27
3.8 OBSTACLES TO PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY 29
3.9 ASSISTANCE WITH PUBLIC SERVICES 31
3.10 OFFSHORE OIL RESERVES 34
3.11 SOURCES OF INFORMATION 35
3.12 FOREIGN SUPPORT 36
3.13 SECURITY AND CONFLICT 38
3.14 SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 40

4 POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONCLUSIONS 41

5 ECONOMIC GROWTH: FINDINGS 43

5.1 MEASUREMENT OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT 43
5.2 LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT 44
5.3 PERCEPTIONS OF JOB QUALITY 54
5.4 WILLINGNESS TO WORK IN SPECIFIC SECTORS 57
5.5 HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES 58
5.6 BANK ACCOUNT & SAVINGS 60
5.7 ACCESS TO FINANCING FOR PERSONAL PURPOSES 64
5.8 ENTREPRENEURSHIP 68
5.9 BUSINESS ACCESS TO FINANCING 73
5.10 PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 77

5.11 RECYCLING 79
5.12 RENEWABLE ENERGY 83
6 ECONOMIC GROWTH: CONCLUSIONS 87
7 GENDER: FINDINGS 89
7.1 ATTITUDES ABOUT GENDER NORMS & WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT 89
7.2 EXPERIENCES OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION 98
7.3 ATTITUDES ABOUT WOMEN IN SPECIFIC SECTORS 100
7.4 PERCEPTION OF MOST VULNERABLE POPULATION 102
8 GENDER: CONCLUSIONS 104
9 REFERENCES 106
ANNEX I: DETAILED METHODS 109
ANNEX II: QUESTIONNAIRE 118
ANNEX III: DATA TABLES 139
ANNEX IV: SCOPE OF WORK 140

ACRONYMS

BDL	Banque Du Liban
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CPS	Citizen Perception Survey
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DEFF	Design Effect
DDL	USAID Development Data Library
EDZ	Electricité de Zahlé
EGA	Economic Growth Assessment
EU	European Union
ICC	Intra-cluster Correlation
IE	Impact Evaluation
ILO	International Labor Organization
Ii	Information International
ISF	International Security Forces
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LL	Lebanese Lira (Lebanese Pound)
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODK	Open Data Kit
PEA	Political Economy Assessment
PMSPL II	Performance Management and Support Program for Lebanon II
PPS	Probability Proportional to Size
PSU	Primary Sampling Unit
RFP	Request for Proposals
SI	Social Impact, Inc.
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
US	United States
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

TABLES

Table 1. Allocation of Sample Across Governorates 7
Table 2. Sample Demographics 11
Table 3. Sample Confession, Identity, and Political Affiliation 12
Table 4. Confessional Breakdown by Governorate, Based on Residence 13
Table 5. Confidence in Leaders to Meet Citizens' Needs, by Governorate 21
Table 6. Top Priority for New Government, by Governorate 26
Table 7. Perceived Obstacles to Public Service Delivery, by Governorate 30
Table 8. Seeking Assistance with Public Services, by Governorate 33
Table 9. Perception of Foreign Support, by Governorate 37
Table 10. Labor Force Participation, Employment, and Unemployment, by Confession and Sex 52
Table 11. Perception of Job Quality, by Governorate 56
Table 12. Willingness to Work Across Various Sectors, by Sex, Age Group, and Location 57
Table 13. Willingness to Work Across Various Sectors, by Governorate 57
Table 14. Top Household Expenses 59
Table 15. Reasons for Not Having Bank Account, by Governorate 62
Table 16. Savings, Currency Preference, and Use of Online Banking 63
Table 17. Business Ownership, Sector, and Employees, by Governorate 70
Table 18. Business Ownership, Sector, and Employees, by Sex, Age Group, and Location 71
Table 19. Thinking of Starting a Business, by Governorate 72
Table 20. Thinking of Starting a Business, by Sex, Age Group, and Location 72
Table 21. Perceived Constraints to Private Sector Development 78
Table 22. Attitudes about Gender Norms and Women's Empowerment, by Governorate 92
Table 23. Attitudes about Gender Norms and Women's Empowerment, by Confession 93
Table 24. Attitudes about Gender Norms and Women's Empowerment, by Governorate and Sex 96
Table 25. Experiences of Gender Discrimination, by Governorate 99
Table 26. Attitudes about Women in Specific Sectors, by Governorate 101
Table 27. Attitudes about Women in Specific Sectors, by Age Group and Location 101
Table 28. Perception of Most Vulnerable Population, by Governorate 103
Table 29. Perception of Most Vulnerable Population, By Sex, Age Group, and Location 103
Table 30. Allocation of PSUs and Sample by District (Caza) 110

FIGURES

Figure 1. Sampled Towns and Villages 8
Figure 2. Perception of Economic Situation in Lebanon 16
Figure 3. Perception of Economic Situation in Own Household 16
Figure 4. Subjective Social Status, by Confession 17
Figure 5. Subjective Social Status, by Governorate 18
Figure 6. Perception of Government Effectiveness 19
Figure 7. Confidence in Leaders 20
Figure 8. Trust in Institutions, Change over Five Years 22
Figure 9. Trust in Institutions, Change over Five Years, by Governorate 23
Figure 10. Top Priority for Government 25
Figure 11. Top Three Issues for Government to Address, Among Youth, by Education Level 25
Figure 12. Satisfaction with Public Services 27
Figure 13. Satisfaction with Public Services, by Governorate 28
Figure 14. Perceived Obstacles to Public Service Delivery 29
Figure 15. Seeking Assistance with Public Services 32

Figure 16. Perceived Benefit of Exploiting Offshore Oil 34
Figure 17. Primary Source of Information about Current Issues 35
Figure 18. Perception of Foreign Support, by Confession 36
Figure 19. Perceptions of Coordination and Security in the South 39
Figure 20. Perceptions of Possibility of Violent Conflict in Next Five Years 39
Figure 21. Satisfaction with Handling of Refugee Crisis, by Governorate 40
Figure 22. Satisfaction with Handling of Refugee Crisis, by Confession 40
Figure 23. Measurement of Economic Activity 43
Figure 24. Labor Force Participation, Employment, and Unemployment 47
Figure 25. Labor Force Participation, Employment, and Unemployment, by Governorate and Sex 48
Figure 26. Labor Force Participation, Employment, and Unemployment, by Governorate & Age Group 49
Figure 27. Labor Force Participation, Employment, and Unemployment, by Education and Sex 50
Figure 28. Unemployment Rate, by Governorate, Age Group, and Sex 51
Figure 29. Reasons Not Working, Among Economically Inactive and Unemployed 53
Figure 30. Perception of Job Quality, by Sex and Age Group 55
Figure 31. Top Household Expense, by Location 58
Figure 32. Access to Bank Account, by Governorate, Age Group, and Sex 61
Figure 33. Reasons for Not Having Bank Account, By Sex, Age Group, and Location 62
Figure 34. Access to and Sources of Financing for Personal Purposes 64
Figure 35. Access to Financing for Personal Purposes, by Governorate 65
Figure 36. Access to Financing for Personal Purposes, by Sex, Age Group, and Location 65
Figure 37. Sources of Financing for Personal Purposes, by Governorate 66
Figure 38. Sources of Financing for Personal Purposes, by Sex, Age Group, and Location 67
Figure 39. Business Ownership, by Sex, Age Group, and Location 69
Figure 40. Thinking of Starting a Business 69
Figure 41. Access to and Sources of Financing for Business 73
Figure 42. Access to Financing for Business, by Governorate 74
Figure 43. Access to Financing for Business, by Sex, Age Group, and Location 74
Figure 44. Sources of Financing for Business, by Governorate 75
Figure 45. Sources of Financing for Business, by Sex, Age Group, and Location 76
Figure 46. Recycling, by Governorate 80
Figure 47. Reasons for Not Recycling 80
Figure 48. Reasons for Not Recycling, by Governorate 81
Figure 49. Willingness to Pay for Weekly Recycling Service, by Governorate and Location 82
Figure 50. Renewable Energy Use, by Governorate 84
Figure 51. Reasons for Not Using Renewable Energy 84
Figure 52. Reasons for Not Using Renewable Energy, by Governorat 85
Figure 53. Willingness to Pay for Converting to Solar Water Heater, by Governorate and Location 86
Figure 54. Attitudes about Gender Norms and Women's Empowerment, by Sex 91
Figure 55. Attitudes about Gender Norms and Women's Empowerment, by Confession and Sex 94
Figure 56. Experiences of Gender Discrimination, by Confession 98
Figure 57. Attitudes about Women in Specific Sectors, by Sex 100
Figure 58. Perception of Most Vulnerable Population 102

1 INTRODUCTION & PURPOSE

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Lebanon commissioned Social Impact (SI), through its Performance Management and Support Program for Lebanon II (PMSPL II) activity, to conduct a sub-nationally representative Citizen Perception Survey (CPS). The purpose of the CPS is to provide robust data to validate some of the findings from recent assessments conducted for USAID/Lebanon, including political economy, gender, and economic growth assessments. The CPS provides in depth findings from across Lebanon's citizenry on topics raised by the assessments, which primarily utilized qualitative data from sector experts, government officials, other stakeholders, and a small number of focus group discussions. The findings from the CPS are currently being used to inform the development of USAID/Lebanon's new Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS).

2 METHODOLOGY

SI designed and managed the CPS, and subcontracted a Lebanese firm, Information International (Ii), to administer the survey between May and July 2019. An overview of the CPS methodology is presented below, with additional detail included in Annex I.

2.1 QUESTIONNAIRE

SI designed the questionnaire with feedback from USAID/Lebanon, integrating best practices from other existing surveys and literature. Some survey questions were suggested by USAID as well as members of the assessment teams. SI consulted existing validated survey tools, such as the Arab Barometer, and prior surveys commissioned by USAID in Lebanon. Ii reviewed the questionnaire to ensure questions were properly contextualized, translated the questionnaire into Arabic, and back translated it to English to ensure intended meanings and concepts were preserved. The instrument was pre-tested and piloted prior to data collection. The final CPS questionnaire is provided in Annex II.

2.2 SAMPLING

SI calculated sample size requirements based on standard parameters for population-based surveys, as well as inputs such as design effects gleaned from similar surveys in this context.[1] To allow for sub-national representation (i.e. stratification) by each of the nine governorates,[2] the required sample size from this calculation was multiplied by nine and then proportionally allocated across each of the governorates based on population estimates obtained from the Lebanon Ministry of Health Statistical Bulletin for 2016.[3]

All nine governorates and all 26 districts in Lebanon are represented in our sample. Within each district, the number of clusters (primary sampling unit [PSUs], comprised of villages, towns, or sub-sections of large villages and towns), were first selected by probability proportional to size (PPS), i.e. larger towns and villages had a higher probability of being chosen within each district.[4] Households were then selected systematically from within each PSU using a random-walk approach, originating from a central landmark in each PSU and using a random number table to select buildings/dwellings to be interviewed. Within each sampled household, respondents were selected from among eligible individuals (Lebanese citizens, aged

[1] Population proportion 50%, margin of error ±5 percentage points, confidence level 95%, design effect 1.75
[2] Includes Keserwan-Jbeil, the newest governorate not yet fully implemented, formerly part of Mount Lebanon governorate.
[3] Ministry of Health Statistical Bulletin provides governorate-specific population estimates; the 2016 Statistical Bulletin was the most recent Statistical Bulletin available at the time that the CPS survey was designed.
[4] District- and PSU-level population information was held by Information International.

18 to 65), based on whose birthday would occur next, taking into consideration the assigned sex for each interview in order to enforce gender balance across the respondent pool.

2.3 DATA COLLECTION

Following the finalization of the questionnaire, enumerator training was held in May 2019 in Beirut, led by Ii and attended by SI representatives. Enumerators were recruited from each governorate to ensure cognizance of local norms in each location. Enumerator training consisted of classroom-based lessons, practical exercises and mock interviews, and a pilot exercise. Fieldwork was conducted between May and June 2019.

All data collection was conducted electronically using tablets with SurveyCTO, a mobile data collection software built upon the Open Data Kit (ODK) platform. SI programmed the electronic survey, including a range of robust constraints, validations, to tightly enforce survey logic and maintain a high level of quality control. In addition to these front-end controls, SI completed independent high-frequency (twice-weekly) data quality checks throughout the duration of data collection.

A total of 8,091 households were interviewed from across Lebanon. The allocation of the sample by governorate shown is shown in Table 1[5] and a map of sampled towns and villages is provided in Figure 1.

TABLE 1. ALLOCATION OF SAMPLE ACROSS GOVERNORATES

Governorate & District	N (%)	Estimated Governorate Population[6]
Akkar	573 (7.1%)	306,733 (7%)
Baalbek-Hermel	605 (7.5%)	323,883 (7%)
Beirut	754 (9.3%)	407,453 (9%)
Beqaa	552 (6.8%)	297,080 (7%)
Keserwan-Jbeil	485 (6.0%)	260,192 (6%)
Mount Lebanon	2,397 (29.6%)	1,290,553 (30%)
Nabatieh	611 (7.6%)	329,803 (8%)
North	1,171 (14.5%)	632,222 (15%)
South	943 (11.7%)	507,995 (12%)
Total	*8,091 (100%)*	*4,355,914 (100%)*

[5] A summary of the allocation of the sample across districts is provided in Annex I.
[6] Source: Ministry of Health 2016 Statistical Bulletin. See also footnote 3.

FIGURE 1. SAMPLED TOWNS AND VILLAGES



2.4 ANALYSIS

SI independently conducted the data analysis and prepared the results. While the sample was designed using probability proportional to size methods, sampling weights were applied to account for the clustered design (for detail, see Annex I). Results presented in this report are weighted estimates.

Most results are disaggregated by governorate, sex, age group (youth/non-youth), and settlement type (rural/urban), while a small number of indicators are further disaggregated in other ways to highlight important findings between additional sub-groups of interest in this context. Youth is defined according to USAID definitions, comprised of individuals between the ages of 18 and 29, inclusive. PSUs (e.g. villages or towns) were classified as urban/rural using information held by Ii, based on proximity to the urban centers or centers of the district, population size, and main economic activities.

2.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE

Characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 2 and Table 3; each table contains information about (a) the sample of respondents that were interviewed (unweighted sample); and (b) characteristics of the sample after application of household sampling weights. The unweighted data shows information about the *actual* households or individuals that were sampled for the survey. The weighted data adjusts for the cluster design, and describes the *adjusted* sample upon which all results presented in the report are based.[7] Weighted estimates are accompanied by 95% confidence intervals, which can be interpreted as the likely range within which the true population parameter lies.[8] It is important to note some caveats for interpretation. The CPS was designed as a household survey and respondents were limited to those aged 18 to 65. Information necessary for the application of individual-level weights were thus not collected as part of the CPS, meaning that weighted estimates approximate characteristics only for this relevant sub-set of Lebanon's population. In addition, as with most population-based household surveys, the questionnaire was administered during normal business hours which may affect, to some extent, who is available in any given household to respond to the survey, including in terms of age, education level, and relationship to head of household. The intention of presenting weighted sample characteristics for the CPS is thus to demonstrate the demographic characteristics that underlie the results presented in the remainder of the report. A description of the weighted estimates of sample characteristics is below.

Demographics: In our sample, the average age was about 39 years of age. The sample was comprised of about 69% non-youth (ages 30-65) and 31% youth (ages 18-29). In total, about two thirds of the sample were either the head of household, or spouse of head of household. In another 31% of cases, the respondent was the child of head of household. The sample was split evenly with 50% females and 50% males. About 52% of the sample had secondary or tertiary education, while 10% had only primary, and 3% had no education. In our sample, just about two thirds (64%) reported total family monthly income of between 500 to 2000 United States Dollars (USD); 14% reported less, and 17% reported more.[9]

[7] In our case, because of aspects of the way the sample was designed (specifically, allocation of the sample proportional to size, and selection of clusters with probability proportional to size), the unweighted and weighted estimates are similar.
[8] Technically, the 95% confidence intervals can be interpreted as follows: if 100 independent samples were to be taken from the population, the estimated quantity in 95 of the 100 samples would lie within that range.
[9] Income was measured on the survey through a multiple-choice question with the ranges as shown in the tables; raw numbers were not requested in order to mitigate the sensitivity of the question to some degree, so reporting mean or median is not possible.

Confession, Identity, and Political Affiliation: In terms of confessional breakdown, our sample was comprised of about 28% Sunni, 25% Shia, and 20% Maronite, with another 13% in other Christian denominations (Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, and Armenian Catholic) and 9.5% in other Muslim (Druz and Alawi). Just under 4% of the sample refused to indicate their confession. The survey also asked respondents to indicate the most important identifier for themselves, other than Lebanese. Most frequently, respondents identify with region (31%) over any other identifier, other than Lebanese, while another 20% said their most important identifier is religion. This in and of itself is a major finding, indicating that strong local affiliations supersede other ways that citizens might identify themselves.

Despite the question asking for identifier *other than Lebanese*, still over 13% of the sample insisted on answering the question with "Lebanese only".[10] Another 12% said their most important identifier other than Lebanese was their local community or city, 5% said tribe/extended family, and 2% said political affiliation, while 6% refused to indicate.

The CPS also asked respondents to indicate which of the political parties most represented them. Over half of the sample (just over 55%) responded that "no party represents me." This is also another important finding in its own right, indicating that the majority of citizens do not feel that any political party represents them, and echoing sentiments of the latest widespread protests across the country.

The second most frequent response lagged far behind that, with 11% indicating that Hezbollah was the party that best reflected their interests. Each of the other parties were mentioned by less than 10% of citizens, and about 3.5% refused to indicate the party which they felt most represented their interests.

Confessional Breakdown by Governorate: We also present the confessional breakdown by governorate (Table 4). This is shown to underscore the point that in some cases governorate and confession are tightly linked, while in other cases confessional identity within a given governorate is more diverse. For example, the governorates of Akkar (Sunni 71%), Baalbek-Hermel (Shia 72%), Keserwan-Jbeil (79% Maronite), Nabatieh (70% Shia), and North (64% Sunni), all contain populations more than two thirds of respondents are of a single confession. In contrast, Beirut, Beqaa, Mount Lebanon, and South demonstrate relatively more diversity. It is also important to emphasize that CPS results are based on current residence, which may be expected to differ from confessional distribution based on official voter registration data, because registration is by birthplace. Confessional breakdown in the CPS also represents percentage of households, which may differ to a small extent from the distribution by individual, which is not estimated by the CPS across the entire population.

As might be expected, Beirut and Mount Lebanon display the greatest amount of confessional diversity, with no single confession representing more than about one third of the respondents from each of those governorates. In Beqaa, the highest percentage of respondents were Sunni (about 47%), but also included a sizable portion of other Christian denominations (26%). Half of the respondents from South governorate were Shia, while another 28% were Sunni.

[10] This category was created for those who used the "other, specify" category to insist on Lebanese only despite the wording of the question; for this reason, the true percentage of people who would prefer to answer with "Lebanese only" might be underestimated, since only those who felt strongly enough to insist will be captured in that line.

TABLE 2. SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

Characteristic	Unweighted (sample)	Weighted (analysis)
Age	Mean	Mean [95% Confidence Interval]
Mean	39.5 (Standard deviation: 14.0)	39.4 [39.0,39.8]
Median	39 (Interquartile range: 27, 50)	n/a
Age Group	N (%)	% [95% Confidence Interval]
Youth (18-29)	2543 (31.4%)	31.4% [30.2,32.7]
Non-Youth (30-65)	5548 (68.6%)	68.6% [67.3,69.8]
Sex	N (%)	% [95% Confidence Interval]
Female	4,041 (49.9%)	49.9% [49.6,50.2]
Male	4,050 (50.1%)	50.1% [49.8,50.4]
Relationship to Head of Household	N (%)	% [95% Confidence Interval]
Head of household	2,957 (36.5%)	36.8% [35.9,37.8]
Spouse of head of household	2,471 (30.5%)	30.5% [29.7,31.4]
Child of head of household	2,497 (30.9%)	30.6% [29.4,31.9]
Parent of head of household	82 (1.0%)	1% [0.7,1.2]
Sibling of head of household	66 (0.8%)	0.8% [0.6,1.1]
Other relative of head of household	11 (0.1%)	0.2% [0.1,0.3]
Other, specify	7 (0.1%)	0.1% [0.0,0.2]
Highest Level of Education Completed	N (%)	% [95% Confidence Interval]
None	247 (3.1%)	3.2% [2.8,3.7]
Primary	788 (9.8%)	10.1% [9.3,10.9]
Intermediate	1,763 (21.9%)	21.3% [20.4,22.3]
Secondary	2,487 (30.8%)	31% [29.9,32.2]
Tertiary (university or higher)	2,313 (28.7%)	28.7% [27.5,30.0]
Vocational training after primary	124 (1.5%)	1.5% [1.3,1.8]
Vocational training after secondary	324 (4.0%)	4% [3.5,4.5]
Don't know	4 (0.0%)	0% [0.0,0.1]
Refused	15 (0.2%)	0.2% [0.1,0.3]
Total Family Monthly Income	N (%)	% [95% Confidence Interval]
Less than 500 USD	1,081 (13.4%)	13.8% [12.7,14.8]
501-1000 USD	2,286 (28.3%)	29.4% [28.1,30.6]
1001-2000 USD	2,784 (34.4%)	34.5% [33.3,35.8]
2001-3500 USD	1,198 (14.8%)	14.2% [13.3,15.2]
3501 or more USD	280 (3.5%)	3.1% [2.7,3.5]
Don’t know	175 (2.2%)	2% [1.6,2.4]
Refused	287 (3.5%)	3.1% [2.6,3.8]

TABLE 3. SAMPLE CONFESSION, IDENTITY, AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Characteristic	Unweighted (sample)	Weighted (analysis)
Confession	N (%)	% [95% Confidence Interval]
Sunni	2,244 (27.7%)	28% [26.1,29.9]
Shia	1,896 (23.4%)	25.2% [23.2,27.2]
Maronite	1,727 (21.3%)	19.9% [18.3,21.6]
Other Christian *	1,133 (14%)	13.1% [11.6,14.7]
Other Muslim *	716 (8.8%)	9.5% [8.2,10.9]
Other, specify	48 (0.6%)	0.5% [0.3,0.7]
Don't know	3 (0.0%)	0% [0.0,0.1]
Refused	324 (4.0%)	3.8% [3.3,4.4]
Most important identifier, other than Lebanese	N (%)	% [95% Confidence Interval]
Region	2396 (29.6%)	31.2% [29.8,32.6]
Religion	1610 (19.9%)	20% [18.9,21.2]
Respondent insisted: Lebanese only	1293 (16.0%)	13.4% [12.4,14.5]
Local community/city	920 (11.4%)	12.2% [11.4,13.1]
Ethnicity	604 (7.5%)	7.2% [6.5,7.9]
Tribe/extended family	427 (5.3%)	5.1% [4.5,5.8]
Political affiliation	176 (2.2%)	2.2% [1.9,2.5]
Other, specify	45 (0.6%)	0.6% [0.4,0.8]
Don't know	155 (1.9%)	1.8% [1.5,2.2]
Refused	465 (5.7%)	6.3% [5.5,7.2]
Political Party Affiliation **	N (%)	% [95% Confidence Interval]
No Party Represents Me	4,580 (56.6%)	55.4% [53.9,56.9]
Hezbollah	802 (9.9%)	10.8% [9.7,12.0]
Future Movement	518 (6.4%)	6.3% [5.6,7.2]
Free Patriotic Movement	433 (5.4%)	5.1% [4.3,5.9]
Lebanese Forces	411 (5.1%)	4.8% [4.0,5.7]
Amal	406 (5.0%)	5.5% [4.9,6.3]
Progressive Socialist Party	301 (3.7%)	4% [3.3,4.8]
Kataeb	85 (1.1%)	0.9% [0.7,1.2]
Marada	50 (0.6%)	0.8% [0.6,1.1]
Tachnaq	47 (0.6%)	0.6% [0.3,1.2]
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	34 (0.4%)	0.4% [0.3,0.6]
Other, Specify	114 (1.4%)	1.6% [1.3,1.9]
Don't Know	28 (0.3%)	0.3% [0.2,0.5]
Refused	282 (3.5%)	3.5% [3.0,4.1]

*Notes: * Other Christian includes Greek Orthodox (8.3%), Greek Catholic (3.9%), Armenian Orthodox (1.2%), and Armenian Catholic (0.6%). Other Muslim includes Druz (8.4%) and Alawi (0.5%). While Druz is usually thought of as a distinct religion, in government allocations of public offices they are categorized as Muslims, i.e. within the 50% Muslim share of power. **Question in the survey asked which political party most represented them. "Which of the political parties most represent you?"*

TABLE 4. CONFESSIONAL BREAKDOWN BY GOVERNORATE, BASED ON RESIDENCE

Percent and [95% Confidence Interval]
Key: Darker shading denotes higher percentage

Confession	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Sunni	71% [59.2,80.6]	12% [6.1,22.4]	33.5% [27.2,40.4]	46.6% [34.9,58.7]	0.4% [0.1,1.4]	7% [4.9,9.9]	5.3% [2.9,9.7]	63.7% [59.7,67.5]	27.8% [21.2,35.6]
Shia	0%	72% [60.5,81.1]	24.9% [19.7,31.0]	10% [4.7,20.1]	8.8% [3.2,21.6]	14.9% [11.3,19.3]	70.3% [60.7,78.4]	0.4% [0.2,1.1]	49.9% [42.8,57.0]
Maronite	8.8% [4.4,16.7]	5.4% [2.1,13.0]	14.9% [10.5,20.5]	9.4% [5.9,14.5]	79% [67.0,87.4]	27.4% [24.0,31.0]	9.7% [5.0,18.1]	16.9% [13.8,20.6]	6.8% [4.5,10.0]
Other Christian	15.6% [9.1,25.5]	8.8% [4.1,17.8]	11.8% [8.5,16.2]	25.5% [17.4,35.6]	6.2% [2.3,15.7]	12.9% [11.2,14.9]	10.7% [6.2,17.8]	16.3% [13.1,20.0]	9.3% [6.1,14.0]
Other Muslim	4% [1.3,11.6]	0.1% [0.0,0.7]	3.2% [1.9,5.2]	5.6% [2.8,10.9]	0%	31.9% [27.1,37.0]	3.9% [1.8,8.2]	1.1% [0.5,2.3]	0.3% [0.1,1.0]
Other, specify	0%	0.4% [0.1,2.5]	0.9% [0.5,1.9]	1.4% [0.4,4.9]	0.5% [0.1,1.9]	0.7% [0.5,1.1]	0%	0%	0.6% [0.2,1.4]
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0% [0.0,0.3]	0%	0.1% [0.0,0.6]	0%
Refused	0.5% [0.2,1.6]	1.4% [0.6,3.0]	10.8% [8.2,14.2]	1.6% [0.8,3.0]	5.3% [2.8,9.6]	5.2% [4.1,6.6]	0%	1.4% [0.9,2.2]	5.3% [3.7,7.5]

Note: Quantities are the weighted estimates of confessional breakdown by governorate that result following the application of survey weights. Household-level weights were applied. Individual-level weights were not applied. CPS results are based on current residence, which may be expected to differ from confessional distribution based on official voter registration data, because registration is by birthplace. Confessional breakdown in the CPS also represents percentage of households, which may differ to a small extent from the distribution by individual, which is not estimated by the CPS across the entire population.

2.6 STRUCTURE OF REPORT

Results of the CPS are presented in three sections in alignment with the assessments that SI Lebanon completed for USAID/Lebanon ahead of the new CDCS, including: (1) Political Economy, (2) Economic Growth, and (3) Gender. Important gender differences under political economy and economic growth are discussed in those sections, while the gender section mainly discusses gender norms and attitudes toward women's empowerment.

In the body of this report, disaggregations that highlight important differences in results across sub-groups are discussed. Given the breadth of the dataset, the report does not discuss results across all possible disaggregations for every indicator, particularly where results for sub-groups do not differ meaningfully from the overall results. However, data tables showing all disaggregations, as well as confidence intervals and the results of statistical tests for significance of differences in results by sub-group, can be found in Annex III. Additional on-demand analysis can also be conducted upon request by USAID.

2.7 DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS

Following review and approval by USAID/Lebanon, the CPS final report will be posted on the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) and the de-identified dataset will be posted on the USAID Development Data Library (DDL). Preliminary results were provided at two time points during data collection to USAID, to provide inputs for early stages of the new CDCS development. Initial analysis of the final results was presented to Program Office and Technical Office staff at USAID/Lebanon in October 2019. Further dissemination can be conducted upon request by USAID.

3 POLITICAL ECONOMY: FINDINGS

The USAID Political Economy Assessment (PEA) was completed in March 2019. This study was designed to increase USAID, wider United States (US) Embassy, and donor community understanding of political economy constraints and opportunities that affect development programing. As with the other assessments covered in this report, the assessment used desk research and qualitative field work to answer a set of research questions. The CPS was designed to validate key findings from the report through a population-based survey. PEA findings were used to inform CPS instrument design.

3.1 ECONOMIC SITUATION

The CPS asked respondents about their perception of the economic situation in Lebanon, as well as the economic situation of one's own household. Findings show that an overwhelming majority (90%) of citizens believe the Lebanese economy is either bad or very bad and 79% believe it has gotten somewhat or much worse over the past five years (Figure 2). This finding, though perhaps not unexpected in the context of known issues as highlighted in the PEA, is critical important especially insofar as it accurately projects the driving attitudes toward the current economic and political crisis and related public protests across Lebanon.

An overwhelming majority (90%) of citizens believe the Lebanese economy is either bad or very bad and 79% believe it has gotten somewhat or much worse over the past five years.

Looking ahead, almost half of the population believes the situation will continue to worsen (46%) and a further 21% believe it will stagnate in its current state over the next five-year period. The CPS results track closely with findings from other surveys. Past Arab Barometer surveys have found that the vast majority of Lebanese citizens thought the economic situation was bad or very bad (96% in 2007, 93% in 2011, and 90% in 2016). In the 2016 Arab Barometer, 86% of respondents did not believe the economy was likely to get better during the next five years.[11] These results collectively demonstrate that over the last decade, Lebanese citizens have consistently viewed the economic situation as bad or very bad at any given point in time, while simultaneously expecting a continued downward trend.

There was little deviation across governorates, with the important exception of Nabatieh, where relatively fewer (68%) described the current situation as bad/very bad (not shown). In Nabatieh, a sizable proportion of citizens perceived the former, current, and future economic situations to be average and unchanging (41% 5 years ago, 30% currently, and 46% in 5 years). One potential contributing factor to this result could be that Hezbollah provides a range of social services to certain segments of the governorate, which could shield some from the consequences of broader economic downturn them to a certain extent. It is worth noting that Hezbollah is not the only political party that provides social services and characterizing the reach of such services provided by different parties or non-governmental organizations is beyond the scope of this survey. At the national level, there was no substantial difference in outlook between youth and non-youth, male and female, or urban and rural residents, relative to the overall results.

Sentiment about one's own household was somewhat more optimistic than perceptions of the overall economy (Figure 3). More than half (54%) said that their own household's current economic situation is

[11] Arab Barometer (2007); Arab Barometer (2011); Arab Barometer (2016)

average, 13% said it is good/very good, and 33% said it is bad/very bad. Still, 71% said that their economic situation was somewhat or much better five years ago. More than a third (37%) said that they expect their own household's economic situation to be somewhat or much better in the next five years, while 26% expect it to be the same, and 20% expect it to be somewhat or much worse.

FIGURE 2. PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC SITUATION IN LEBANON



FIGURE 3. PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC SITUATION IN OWN HOUSEHOLD



3.2 SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL STATUS

Respondents were asked to rate on a ten-point scale how they perceived their own household's standing relative to (a) others in Lebanon, and (b) others in their community, defined however most meaningful to them.[12] The scale ranged from 1 (worst off) to 10 (best off). Results demonstrate pervasive pessimism with regard to citizens' perception of their own standing relative to others in Lebanon as well as relative to others within their own communities. Most rate themselves worse off (1 through 5), relative to others in Lebanon (77%) as well as relative to others in their own community (64%) (Figure 4).

Breakdown by major confessions shows that Sunni are more likely to see themselves as worse off compared to others in Lebanon but are less pessimistic about their standing in their own communities. Maronite and Shia groups more closely resembled the overall results. In all governorates, most rated themselves worse off relative to others in Lebanon (Figure 5), with particular pessimism evident in Nabatieh, Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel, North, and Beqaa, where 89% or more rated themselves between 1 and 5. In Nabatieh, 89% also rated themselves between 1 and 5 relative to their own community. Only in Mount Lebanon and South governorates did more than 50% rate themselves between 6 and 10 relative to their own community.

FIGURE 4. SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL STATUS, BY CONFESSION



[12] MacArthur scale of subjective social status (Adler & Stewart 2007); questions e8 and e9 on CPS questionnaire (see Annex II).

FIGURE 5. SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL STATUS, BY GOVERNORATE

3.3 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS

The CPS uncovered deep dissatisfaction with government on a number of levels, validating previous surveys in Lebanon[13], as well as reinforcing the backdrop against which the recent large-scale protests have occurred. The CPS found that more than three in four respondents thought the new government will be less effective in addressing Lebanon's challenges compared to its predecessors (Figure 6), and only 14% agreed that the new government would be more effective than its predecessors. Low levels of sentiment were observed across all governorates, with the highest level of optimism not exceeding 29%, as observed in Akkar governorate. The lowest level of optimism was expressed in Nabatieh, where only 2% thought the new government will be more effective than its predecessors. There were no meaningful differences in the percentage of citizens reporting disagree or strongly disagree, between males and females (76% and 78%, respectively), youth and non-youth (77% each), or rural and urban residents (78% and 77%, respectively).

FIGURE 6. PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS



[13] Arab Barometer 2016; others TBD [will be filled in final draft]…

3.4 CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS

Respondents were asked to indicate their confidence in each of several groups of leaders, with confidence measured as the level of agreement or disagreement about whether each group of leaders effectively address citizen needs. Overall, confidence in leaders is low across the board – there were no groups in which a majority of citizens expressed confidence (Figure 7). However, there were still important variations worth noting. Citizens expressed the highest level of confidence (47%) in municipal leaders – this was the only group where the percentage of agreement exceeded the percentage of disagreement.

Still, the takeaway regarding municipalities is not exclusively positive, since more than one third disagreed or strongly disagreed (35%) that municipalities were effectively meeting citizen needs. Further, this varies substantially by governorate (Table 5). In Beirut (23%) and Nabatieh (25%), confidence is low, compared to Beqaa (60%), Nabatieh (76%), and South (67%). It is also worth noting that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) received the second-highest level of confidence (32%) compared to others. This may highlight the growing role of civil society in providing alternatives to traditional state services.

Levels of confidence were particularly low for members of parliament (MPs) and Ministers. This result is relatively consistent across governorates. Confidence in civil servants is also low overall but varies across governorates – from 5% in Keserwan-Jbeil to 49% in Beqaa. Residents of Akkar are much more likely to have lower confidence in leaders of political parties. They are also more likely to report lower confidence in the Qaemaqam, along with those from Keserwan-Jbeil and Mount Lebanon. Similarly, confidence in the governor (muhafiz) for each governorate varies widely, ranging from 38% in Beqaa to 86% in Nabatieh. It is worth noting that large portions of citizens say "don't know" about local appointed administrative leaders (muhafiz and qaemaqam), which suggests lack of knowledge of the specific individual or work of those officials. Lastly, confidence in CSOs is higher in Keserwan-Jbeil (51% agreement) and Nabatieh (42% agreement) compared to other areas.

FIGURE 7. CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS



Note: Leader groups are sorted in descending order based on the value of agreement (agree or strongly agree).

TABLE 5. CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS TO MEET CITIZENS' NEEDS, BY GOVERNORATE

Agreement= "Agree or Strongly Agree"; Disagreement= "Disagree or Strongly Disagree"

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Leaders of major political parties									
Disagreement	81%	64%	71%	64%	69%	68%	61%	68%	51%
Neutral	6%	16%	16%	10%	16%	15%	14%	10%	21%
Agreement	10%	18%	11%	21%	15%	14%	24%	13%	28%
Don't Know	2%	2%	1%	5%	0.2%	3%	0%	9%	0.3%
Refused	0.4%	0.2%	1%	0.2%	1%	0.3%	0%	0.3%	0%
MPs or Ministers									
Disagreement	82%	86%	84%	72%	73%	85%	87%	76%	77%
Neutral	8%	7%	8%	9%	15%	7%	6%	10%	11%
Agreement	9%	5%	6%	17%	12%	5%	7%	11%	12%
Don't Know	1%	2%	1%	2%	0.3%	2%	0%	3%	0%
Refused	0.4%	0%	1%	0%	0.3%	0.1%	0%	0.2%	0%
Muhafiz									
Disagreement	65%	51%	50%	38%	67%	53%	86%	50%	48%
Neutral	11%	18%	26%	15%	15%	15%	7%	13%	16%
Agreement	13%	14%	9%	28%	7%	11%	7%	11%	23%
Don't Know	11%	16%	15%	19%	11%	21%	0.4%	26%	14%
Refused	0%	0%	1%	0%	0.4%	0.1%	0%	0.1%	0.1%
Qaemaqam									
Disagreement	65%	49%	42%	31%	67%	53%	88%	43%	47%
Neutral	10%	16%	25%	12%	15%	15%	7%	11%	11%
Agreement	13%	8%	7%	19%	7%	7%	5%	9%	8%
Don't Know	13%	27%	25%	38%	11%	25%	0.4%	37%	34%
Refused	0%	0%	1%	0%	0.2%	0.1%	0%	0.1%	0.4%
Municipal Leaders									
Disagreement	51%	46%	53%	30%	20%	28%	15%	55%	16%
Neutral	16%	13%	23%	10%	33%	16%	9%	16%	17%
Agreement	33%	39%	23%	60%	46%	54%	76%	25%	67%
Don't Know	1%	2%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	4%	0.1%
Refused	0%	0.3%	0.4%	0.2%	0%	0.1%	0%	0.4%	0%
Civil Servants									
Disagreement	58%	54%	63%	37%	77%	59%	68%	50%	72%
Neutral	12%	14%	22%	11%	18%	19%	13%	18%	17%
Agreement	28%	28%	14%	49%	5%	20%	19%	22%	10%
Don't Know	2%	4%	1%	3%	0.4%	2%	0%	10%	1%
Refused	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0.1%	0.1%	0%	0%
CSOs									
Disagreement	59%	53%	32%	43%	31%	43%	43%	44%	50%
Neutral	10%	15%	24%	11%	16%	19%	15%	15%	21%
Agreement	27%	25%	33%	37%	51%	30%	42%	25%	26%
Don't Know	4%	6%	10%	10%	1%	8%	0.3%	16%	3%
Refused	0%	0.2%	1%	0%	1%	0.1%	0%	0.1%	0.2%

3.5 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

Respondents were asked whether their level of trust in various institutions had increased, decreased, or stayed the same over the last five years.[14] Citizens expressed high levels of increased trust in institutions related to security, especially the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), for which 86% of citizens reported increased trust in the last five years, followed by General Security (51%) and Internal Security Forces (ISF)/Police (39%) (Figure 8). Conversely, approximately two thirds of respondents reported decreased trust in Parliament and the Council of Ministers over the last five years. A sizeable portion also reported decreasing trust in the Banque du Liban (BDL) (43%) and the Judiciary (41%). Citizen trust in municipalities, in contrast, is somewhat more favorable, with 35% reporting increased trust in the last five years.

Approximately two thirds of respondents reported decreased trust in Parliament and the Council of Ministers over the last five years. The only institutions that saw a net increase in trust were those associated with security (LAF, general security, ISF/Police) and municipalities.

Changes with regard to trust in municipalities varied across governorates (Figure 9), with the greatest increases observed in South (58%), Nabatieh (57%), Mount Lebanon (44%) and Beqaa (41%). Results in Nabatieh are also notable for key differences from the overall trend, where trust has increased substantially for the LAF but not for General Security or ISF/Police, and where decreased trust in BDL was particularly pronounced (92%).

FIGURE 8. TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS, CHANGE OVER FIVE YEARS



[14] The questionnaire asked about changes from the past but did not ask citizens to rate their past or current *levels* of trust. In some cases, current levels can be inferred to some degree from the previous section regarding confidence that specific types of leaders meet citizen needs.

FIGURE 9. TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS, CHANGE OVER FIVE YEARS, BY GOVERNORATE



Note: Services are sorted in descending order based on the overall results shown in the previous figure. In this figure, labels have been abbreviated for brevity; LAF=Lebanese Armed Forces; ISF=Internal Security Forces; BDL=Banque du Liban; Ministers=Council of Ministers.

3.6 TOP PRIORITY FOR NEW GOVERNMENT

In an open-ended survey question, respondents were asked to list what they thought were the top three priorities for the new government to address; each of these open-ended responses were categorized into a set of issues for analysis. All issues were further grouped into broad categories. Results for the top priority are presented below.

Overall, most citizens (55%) believed that the economy should be the top priority for the new government to address, while more than a third (34%) believed the top issue to be governance (Figure 10). Within the category of Economy, citizens most frequently mentioned the following topics: economic situation, lack of opportunity/unemployment, refugees/migrant labor, cost of living, and poverty. Within governance, corruption was the top issue, mentioned by 22% of citizens. The general pattern holds across governorates, with some variation (Table 6). For example, in Nabatieh, 60% of citizens listed corruption as the top issue. Refugees/migrant labor was a bigger concern in Beqaa (11%) and Keserwan-Jbeil (14%), compared with other areas. Poverty was mentioned by 10% of citizens in Akkar.

Citizens listed the economy, corruption, and lack of opportunities and unemployment as the top priorities that need to be addressed by the new government. Among youth, corruption was much more likely to be mentioned by those with higher levels of education, validating reflecting the sentiments of those involved in recent widespread protests.

Among youth, the top issues were corruption (23%) and lack of opportunity (22%) followed by the economic situation (20%). Of particular note is that the higher the education level among youth, the more likely they were to mention corruption as the top priority (Figure 11), supporting empirically a phenomenon that has been previously noted anecdotally among protesting youth. Overall, there were no major differences between the responses of men and women. Results in urban and rural areas were also similar, though with alternation of the top two issues – corruption was the top issue in rural areas (27%, compared to 18% in urban) while the economy was the top issue in urban areas (26%, compared to 21% in rural).

It is important to acknowledge overlaps between many issues, for example, corruption and the economy, or the economic situation and lack of opportunity. The assignment of topics and categories to open-ended responses was done in such a way as to faithfully represent the responses given without making further assumptions (i.e. many respondents explicitly stated "economic situation" without specifying further). Similarly, in interpreting results it is useful to consider that some issues that may appear to have been mentioned infrequently (e.g. sectarianism, 1.6%) might be implied under other responses (e.g. politics).

FIGURE 10. TOP PRIORITY FOR GOVERNMENT



FIGURE 11. TOP THREE ISSUES FOR GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS, AMONG YOUTH, BY EDUCATION LEVEL

Percent (%) mentioning each issue as the top priority that needs to be addressed by government



TABLE 6. TOP PRIORITY FOR NEW GOVERNMENT, BY GOVERNORATE

Red highlight = Any issue mentioned by at least 10% of citizens within each governorate and total

Issue	Category *	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South	Total
Economic Situation	Economy	**25%**	**22%**	**28%**	**30%**	**18%**	**27%**	**18%**	**22%**	**21%**	**24%**
Corruption	Governance	**11%**	**26%**	**16%**	**23%**	**20%**	**17%**	**60%**	**14%**	**25%**	**22%**
Lack of Opportunity / Unemployment	Economy	**25%**	**21%**	**12%**	**15%**	9%	**15%**	3%	**20%**	**19%**	**15%**
Politics/ Governance	Governance	9%	5%	8%	5%	**11%**	8%	9%	**15%**	7%	9%
Refugees / Migrant Labor	Economy	4%	6%	6%	**11%**	**14%**	5%	0%	5%	4%	6%
Cost of Living	Economy	6%	5%	7%	4%	3%	5%	3%	4%	6%	5%
Poverty	Economy	**10%**	3%	3%	5%	1%	3%	1%	4%	6%	4%
Pollution / Garbage	Infrastructure/ Public Services	2%	0%	3%	0%	3%	5%	2%	3%	3%	3%
Regional Conflict / Instability	Conflict/ Instability	0%	1%	3%	1%	6%	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%

*Notes: * Categories map to those shown in the previous figure. Any topic mentioned by at least 5% of citizens in any single governorate is shown in the table above; the remaining topics not listed in this table can be found in Annex III.*

3.7 SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICES

Satisfaction with public services was generally low (less than 50% satisfied or very satisfied) and varied widely across service types (Figure 12). Satisfaction was highest with security services (52%) and education (46%), and lowest with roads (19%) and electricity (16%).

There is generally low satisfaction with all services across governorates, with some notable variation (Figure 13). There is noticeably higher satisfaction in general within Nabatieh. Satisfaction with security is highest in South (69%) and Nabatieh (60%), and satisfaction with education is highest in Beirut (53%).

One stark result is that despite low satisfaction with electricity in all other areas, satisfaction with electricity services in Beqaa was 60%. This likely reflects the situation in the town of Zahle, located in Beqaa valley, where local power company, Electricité de Zahlé (EDZ) commissioned the construction of a new power plant that allowed EDZ to provide more reliable power service to residents in Zahle and 15 surrounding municipalities starting in early 2015.[15] Residents of Beqaa also report higher satisfaction with water services than other municipalities, which may also be related to the progress made by EDZ provides power to water pumping stations.[16] Satisfaction with garbage collection is also higher in Beqaa compared with other governorates.

FIGURE 12. SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICES



[15] Washington Post 2016; Blog Baladi 2016
[16] Blog Baladi 2016

FIGURE 13. SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICES, BY GOVERNORATE

Percent (%) Satisfied or Very Satisfied

Note: Services are sorted in descending order based on the overall results shown in the previous figure. In this figure, labels have been abbreviated for brevity: security means "security services", garbage means "garbage collection", sewage means "sewage treatment" and heatlh means "health services", all as written out fully in Figure 12.

3.8 OBSTACLES TO PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

The greatest perceived obstacle to public service delivery was corruption, cited by 79% of respondents, followed by government inefficiency (46%) and no accountability system (46%) (Figure 14). This signals that challenges are largely perceived as domestic managerial problems rather than a result of sectarianism (cited only by 1% as a reason) or foreign influence (cited by less than 1% as a reason). Further underscoring the findings, they are generally well in alignment with the list of specific demands that have been made by recent protestors, as observed by an informal poll conducted by the American University of Beirut (AUB) among protesters.[17]

Corruption was consistently the top obstacle mentioned across all governorates (Table 7). Across governorates, in some cases the second and third most frequently cited obstacle varied. Specifically, in the governorates of Akkar and North, inadequate citizen participation/voice were the second most frequently mentioned obstacle. Also, in Akkar, the third most frequently cited obstacle was the price of services.

Likewise, the top three obstacles mentioned regardless of sex, age group, or rural vs. urban residence were corruption, government inefficiency, and lack of accountability system.

FIGURE 14. PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY



Note: Question allowed up to 3 responses, thus percentages exceed 100.

[17] Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB), see: https://twitter.com/ifi_aub/status/1190343244082810880

TABLE 7. PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY, BY GOVERNORATE

Red highlight = Top three responses in each governorate

Obstacle	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Corruption	**74%**	**87%**	**80%**	**82%**	**71%**	**77%**	**91%**	**76%**	**77%**
Government inefficiency	34%	**59%**	**44%**	**47%**	**65%**	**47%**	**42%**	**42%**	**42%**
No accountability system	25%	**60%**	**51%**	**55%**	**40%**	**50%**	**56%**	28%	**49%**
Lack of political will	33%	31%	36%	29%	37%	35%	36%	36%	34%
Inadequate citizen participation/voice	**41%**	19%	30%	38%	34%	33%	18%	**43%**	25%
Too costly (price of services)	**35%**	17%	23%	13%	20%	18%	32%	26%	22%
Inadequate budget/ resources	21%	13%	14%	14%	12%	15%	10%	19%	21%
Poorly skilled/ unmotivated civil servants	19%	12%	18%	12%	8%	16%	11%	16%	24%
Sectarianism/Quotas/ Political Issues	1%	0.3%	1%	0%	3%	0.2%	0%	0.2%	0.1%
Foreign policies/pressure	0%	0%	0.1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0.1%
Other, Specify	2%	0%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.2%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	0.2%	0%	0.1%	0%	0.4%	0%
Refused	0.2%	0%	0%	0.2%	0%	0.1%	0%	0%	0%
There are no obstacles	0%	0%	0.1%	0%	0%	0.1%	0%	0.1%	0%

Notes: Question allowed multiple responses (select all that apply); therefore, total percentages in each governorate may exceed 100. Obstacles are sorted in descending order based on the overall results shown in the previous figure.

3.9 ASSISTANCE WITH PUBLIC SERVICES

Respondents were read a list of public services, and for each were asked to indicate the entity from which they most frequently sought assistance when facing problems with that service in their community. The municipality was the most frequently cited source from which citizens sought assistance for sewage treatment (66%), garbage collection (85%), roads (78%), and water (43%), in line with the mandate of local governments (Figure 15). A sizable portion of citizens also said they seek assistance directly from a plumber for sewage treatment (21%) and water (22%). For water services, another 27% of respondents said that they seek assistance from a civil servant or public institution (other than the municipality).

For services implemented jointly by municipal and national governments, citizens most frequently sought assistance from civil servants or another non-municipal public institution (46% for electricity, 59% for security services, 32% for education, and 23% for health services). For electricity, another 30% said they seek assistance from an electrician, while 15% consult the municipality. For security services, 14% consult their municipality while more than 1 in 10 (11%) said they seek assistance from a political party. For education, almost a fifth (19%) said they seek assistance from a Minister. For health services, more than a fifth (22%) seek assistance from a pharmacist/dispensary, and 12% from a Minister.

The overall top three entities sought for support for services within the mandate of municipalities generally remained consistent across governorates, though in some cases there are notable deviations from this pattern (Table 8). For sewage treatment, the overall ranking was consistent across locations except in Nabatieh, where few to none sought support from a plumber, instead opting to consult a civil servant or non-municipal public institution. For garbage collection, it is notable to point out that the vast majority across the board consult a municipality, though in Beirut, Keserwan-Jbeil, and Mount Lebanon, 25%, 16%, and 10%, respectively, also said that they consult their concierge when there are problems with garbage collection in the community. For water, the relative ranking of the top three source of support varies slightly between governorates, but the notable variation worth highlighting is that in Nabatieh and South governorates, 75% and 61% of citizens, respectively, consult their municipality – a much larger percentage than in other governorates where less than half said the same. For roads, the notable discrepancies between governorates include that in Beirut, more than 1 in 10 said they did not know where to seek support. In Keserwan-Jbeil, more than one fifth (21%) said they consult a member of parliament. In Nabatieh, a fifth said that they consult a civil servant or non-municipal public institution.

For services implemented jointly by municipal and national governments, there was a much wider diversity of responses across governorates. For electricity, the municipality was the second or third most frequent response in most places other than Nabatieh, where it was the most frequent with 42% of citizens there saying that they sought support from the municipality when faced with electricity problems in their community. For security services, a civil servant/non-municipal public institution was the most frequently consulted across all governorates. In Nabatieh (30%) and South (25%), a higher proportion relative to other governorates also reported consulting their municipality for problems with security services. The most between-governorate variation emerged for health services and education. In Baalbek-Hermel (41%) and North (27%), the most frequent place support was sought was a pharmacist/dispensary, while in Keserwan-Jbeil it was non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/United Nations (UN)/international organizations. In Keserwan-Jbeil, the third most frequent response was doctor/hospital (16%) which did not appear in any other governorate's top three.

For education, there was diversity between governorates, though civil servant/public institution and Minister were in most of the top three. In Akkar (34%) and South (38%), citizens most frequently sought support directly from a Minister. Keserwan-Jbeil's top three was different than all other governorates, including school or school administration (21%), no one/myself (18%), or NGO/UN/International Organization (10%). Beqaa and Nabatieh displayed different results in that they were the only governorates where the majority said they seek support from a civil servant/non-municipal public institution. In Baalbek-Hermel, the third most frequent response was relative/friend/neighbor (12%).

FIGURE 15. SEEKING ASSISTANCE WITH PUBLIC SERVICES

Top 3 entities from which citizens seek assistance, for each public service listed

Key: Municipality/Mayor | Civil Servant/Public Institution | Any other entity



Figures show top 3 Sources of Assistance mentioned for each public service. For full list, see Data Tables (Annex III).

TABLE 8. SEEKING ASSISTANCE WITH PUBLIC SERVICES, BY GOVERNORATE

Top 3 entities from which citizens seek assistance, for each public service listed

Key: Shaded in blue= Municipality/Mayor | Shaded in red= Civil Servant/Public Institution | No shading= Any other entity

Service		Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Sewage Treatment	1	Municipality (65%)	Municipality (66%)	Municipality (54%)	Municipality (81%)	Municipality (53%)	Municipality (66%)	Municipality (80%)	Municipality (60%)	Municipality (72%)
	2	Plumber (22%)	Plumber (28%)	Plumber (35%)	Plumber (12%)	Plumber (23%)	Plumber (21%)	Civil servant (19%)	Plumber (25%)	Plumber (17%)
	3	Civil servant (5%)	Civil servant (2%)	Civil servant (4%)	Civil servant (4%)	Minister (7%)	Civil servant (4%)	NGO/UN/IO (0%)	Civil servant (6%)	Civil servant (6%)
Garbage Collection	1	Municipality (93%)	Municipality (95%)	Municipality (65%)	Municipality (96%)	Municipality (81%)	Municipality (80%)	Municipality (99%)	Municipality (79%)	Municipality (95%)
	2	Civil servant (3%)	Concierge (2%)	Concierge (25%)	Civil servant (1%)	Concierge (16%)	Concierge (10%)	Civil servant (1%)	Civil servant (8%)	Concierge (3%)
	3	Relative/Friend (2%)	Civil servant (1%)	NGO/UN/IO (2%)	Refused (1%)	NGO/UN/IO (1%)	Civil servant (4%)	Political party (0%)	Don't know (3%)	Myself (1%)
Roads	1	Municipality (76%)	Municipality (87%)	Municipality (67%)	Municipality (83%)	Municipality (63%)	Municipality (84%)	Municipality (80%)	Municipality (66%)	Municipality (91%)
	2	Civil servant (7%)	Political party (3%)	Don't know (12%)	Civil servant (4%)	MP (21%)	Civil servant (6%)	Civil servant (20%)	Myself (8%)	Civil servant (5%)
	3	Minister (6%)	Myself (3%)	Civil servant (9%)	MP (3%)	Civil servant (5%)	MP (2%)	Political party (0%)	Civil servant (8%)	Myself (2%)
Water	1	Municipality (44%)	Municipality (39%)	Civil servant (35%)	Municipality (48%)	Civil servant (44%)	Municipality (41%)	Municipality (75%)	Plumber (31%)	Municipality (61%)
	2	Plumber (30%)	Plumber (34%)	Municipality (28%)	Civil servant (28%)	Municipality (32%)	Civil servant (32%)	Plumber (19%)	Civil servant (28%)	Civil servant (22%)
	3	Civil servant (14%)	Civil servant (21%)	Plumber (23%)	Plumber (18%)	Plumber (20%)	Plumber (18%)	Civil servant (4%)	Municipality (28%)	Plumber (12%)
Electricity	1	Civil servant (38%)	Electrician (46%)	Civil servant (60%)	Civil servant (53%)	Civil servant (52%)	Civil servant (53%)	Municipality (42%)	Electrician (39%)	Civil servant (43%)
	2	Electrician (36%)	Civil servant (33%)	Electrician (29%)	Municipality (22%)	Electrician (32%)	Electrician (26%)	Civil servant (38%)	Civil servant (39%)	Municipality (23%)
	3	Municipality (15%)	Municipality (13%)	Municipality (3%)	Electrician (19%)	Private Company (7%)	Municipality (11%)	Electrician (20%)	Municipality (12%)	Electrician (22%)
Security Services	1	Civil servant (47%)	Civil servant (65%)	Civil servant (61%)	Civil servant (75%)	Civil servant (80%)	Civil servant (62%)	Civil servant (57%)	Civil servant (51%)	Civil servant (34%)
	2	Minister (13%)	Relative/Friend (11%)	Political party (11%)	Municipality (9%)	Municipality (15%)	Municipality (14%)	Municipality (30%)	Municipality (11%)	Political party (28%)
	3	Municipality (12%)	Political party (11%)	Relative/Friend (9%)	Relative/Friend (6%)	Political party (2%)	Political party (13%)	Political party (13%)	Don't know (7%)	Municipality (25%)
Health Services	1	Minister (21%)	Pharmacist (41%)	Civil servant (22%)	Civil servant (33%)	NGO/UN/IO (28%)	Civil servant (29%)	Municipality (34%)	Pharmacist (27%)	Minister (21%)
	2	Municipality (19%)	Civil servant (21%)	Pharmacist (21%)	Pharmacist (30%)	Pharmacist (27%)	Pharmacist (15%)	Civil servant (33%)	Civil servant (19%)	Municipality (20%)
	3	Civil servant (19%)	Minister (11%)	Minister (12%)	Municipality (9%)	Doctor/Hospital (16%)	Minister (14%)	Political party (16%)	Minister (13%)	Pharmacist (16%)
Education	1	Minister (34%)	Civil servant (41%)	Civil servant (23%)	Civil servant (51%)	School (21%)	Civil servant (36%)	Civil servant (54%)	Civil servant (26%)	Minister (38%)
	2	Civil servant (25%)	Minister (21%)	Minister (14%)	Minister (12%)	Myself (18%)	Minister (16%)	Municipality (26%)	Minister (25%)	Civil servant (17%)
	3	Don't know (13%)	Relative/Friend (12%)	Don't know (14%)	Don't know (9%)	NGO/UN/IO (16%)	Don't know (10%)	Political party (18%)	Don't know (15%)	Myself (10%)

3.10 OFFSHORE OIL RESERVES

The discovery of offshore oil and gas in Lebanon has the potential to boost government revenues but carries with it the risk of "resource curse", whereby revenues do not lead to greater economic development due to a lack of proper public financial management coupled with increased reliance on these resources and declining investment in other sectors.[18] The risk of resource curse is greater where public institutions are weak, corruption is widespread, and elite capture is common – such as the case in Lebanon.

More than half of citizens (67%) said they believe that exploiting offshore oil reserves will improve the lives of most Lebanese people (Figure 16). Results are relatively consistent across all governorates, in that a majority of citizens regardless of governorate believe that exploiting these resources will improve the lives of most Lebanese people, even given the current[19] political situation. On the other hand, a more pessimistic perspective may take the view that support of exploiting these resources could be much higher, and that the fact that one in three citizens do not believe exploitation of these resources will bring benefits to most Lebanese is reflective of the poor view of national government expressed in other ways in the CPS. Perceptions across other sub-groups were consistent with the overall results and did not meaningfully differ between youth (68%) and non-youth (66%), males (65%) and females (68%), or rural (68%) and urban (65%) residents.

FIGURE 16. PERCEIVED BENEFIT OF EXPLOITING OFFSHORE OIL

Percent (%) who believe that exploitation will improve lives of most Lebanese people



[18] Chaaban 2016
[19] At the time of the survey in May-June 2019

3.11 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Respondents were asked to list all sources from which they obtained most of their information about economic, social, and political issues in Lebanon. The most frequently mentioned sources of information included local television (mentioned by 76% of citizens), social media (63%), and other internet sources (31%) (not shown).[20] Respondents were also asked to choose their main source of information from among all of those that they listed (Figure 17). The results of that question demonstrate important differences between youth (18-29) and non-youth (30-65), with youth primarily relying on social media (66% said it was their main source), while non-youth primarily rely on local television (60% said it was their main source). These results held across governorates.

Use of social media for information about economic, social, and political issues in Lebanon is widespread. Youth cite social media as their main source of information in this regard. Non-youth primarily rely on local television, however, more than half of non-youth also listed social media as one of their sources of such information.

The results, while perhaps not unexpected, suggest important differences in terms of potential outreach strategies for programming to different age groups. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the widespread use of social media across the board. While non-youth cite local television as their main source of information, 52% of non-youth mentioned social media as one of the sources from which they obtain information about current event (not shown).

FIGURE 17. PRIMARY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT ISSUES



Note: The "All Other" category includes International media, Periodicals, Local radio, Local newspapers, and any responses in the 'other, specify' category.

[20] Question asking about all sources allowed selection of all that apply; therefore, percentages for that question exceed 100.

3.12 FOREIGN SUPPORT

Respondents were asked to select up to two countries that, in their view, provide the greatest support to Lebanon. Overall, the most frequently cited countries were Saudi Arabia, mentioned by 37%, and Iran, mentioned by 26%. Behind the overall results are substantial differences by confession (Figure 17).[21] Saudi Arabia is the most frequent response among Sunni (71%), while Iran is the most frequent response among Shia (63%). The most frequent response among Maronites was the European Union (EU) or specific EU countries (32%). The US was mentioned by only 17% of citizens overall; among Shia this percentage was only 6%.

Perceptions of foreign support to Lebanon differ by confessional breakdown. Sunnis most frequently cite Saudi Arabia (71%), Shiites most frequently cite Iran (63%), and Maronites most frequently cite the EU (32%).

Across governorates, Saudi Arabia was the most frequently mentioned country in Akkar (74%), Beirut (34%), Beqaa (52%), and North (67%) (Table 9). Iran was the most frequently mentioned in Baalbek-Hermel (57%) and South (37%). "None" was the most frequent response in Mount Lebanon (26%) and Nabatieh (53%), while EU was the most frequent response in Keserwan-Jbeil (36%). Support for the US ranged between 11-28%, with one exception in Nabatieh, where the US was mentioned by only 0.4%.

FIGURE 18. PERCEPTION OF FOREIGN SUPPORT, BY CONFESSION



Note: Question allowed up to two responses, thus total percentages in each group may exceed 100. Foreign sources of support in each panel are sorted in descending order based on the "total" results in the first panel. "Other Gulf Countries" includes Kuwait, UAE, Oman.

[21] For breakdown among other confessions, see Data Tables, Annex III.

TABLE 9. PERCEPTION OF FOREIGN SUPPORT, BY GOVERNORATE

Shaded in red=Most frequent response | *Shaded in blue=Second most frequent response*

Country	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
None	4%	6%	19%	13%	**33%**	**26%**	**53%**	6%	19%
Iran	9%	**57%**	**31%**	22%	12%	22%	**44%**	12%	**37%**
Saudi Arabia	**74%**	**26%**	**34%**	**52%**	20%	**30%**	1%	**67%**	**27%**
Syria	2%	17%	11%	5%	3%	3%	5%	2%	6%
Russia	4%	**26%**	8%	6%	1%	7%	31%	4%	9%
Qatar	26%	15%	18%	**25%**	8%	14%	0.1%	**25%**	22%
United States	**28%**	11%	13%	19%	18%	20%	0.4%	22%	17%
European Union / EU countries	26%	11%	20%	16%	**36%**	24%	0.1%	19%	23%
Other Gulf (Kuwait, UAE, Oman)	1%	0.1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	4%	1%
Other, specify	0%	0.2%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Don't know	5%	8%	3%	8%	2%	5%	0%	8%	4%
Refused	1%	1%	4%	1%	1%	2%	0%	1%	0.4%

Note: Question allowed up to 2 responses, thus total percentages in each governorate may exceed 100.

3.13 SECURITY AND CONFLICT

Respondents were asked about their perceptions of the security in the south of the country as well as the likelihood of a return to armed conflict. Most respondents (63%) were satisfied with the coordination between the Government of Lebanon, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and other armed groups to keep peace in the south and border areas (Figure 19). The lowest satisfaction was registered in Nabatieh (42%) and Keserwan-Jbeil (49%), while the highest was reported in Baalbek-Hermel (74%), Akkar (71%), and Mount Lebanon (70%).

Moving beyond coordination, most respondents perceived the current situation in the south to be secure (61%) (Figure 19). There was substantial geographic variation in this belief, ranging from 80% agreement in the South and only 40% in Nabatieh. The largest differences between satisfaction with coordination and perceptions of security in the south were registered for Akkar and South. In the former, respondents were 24 percentage points more likely to be satisfied with coordination than perceive the situation to be secure. The reverse held in the latter, with respondents from South 21 percentage points more likely to perceive security than support the coordination efforts.

Nearly two thirds of citizens expressed the belief that violent conflict in Lebanon precipitated by regional conflict is likely or very likely in the next five years. About one in four believe that domestic conflict is likely or very likely in the next five years.

When asked about likelihood of future violence, one in four citizens expressed the belief that renewal of violent domestic conflict is likely or very likely within the next five years (Figure 20). Citizens perceived violent international conflict to be much more probable, with 59% or citizens saying this prospect was either likely or very likely. Respondents from Akkar (40%), North (39%), and Beqaa (30%) viewed domestic violence as more likely than their peers from other governorates. Interestingly, respondents from those same governorates reported the lowest probability of conflict originating from outside of Lebanon. With three in four respondents viewing international conflict as likely or very likely, Nabatieh had the highest prevalence of this belief in the country.

FIGURE 19. PERCEPTIONS OF COORDINATION AND SECURITY IN THE SOUTH



FIGURE 20. PERCEPTIONS OF POSSIBILITY OF VIOLENT CONFLICT IN NEXT FIVE YEARS



3.14 SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

Overall, citizens across governorates expressed strong dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the Syrian refugee crisis (Figure 21). Only 16% overall reported being satisfied or very satisfied with the government's response. The highest satisfaction was reported by those in Akkar (26%), Beirut (24%), and North (22%). The lowest satisfaction levels were in Keserwan-Jbeil (6%) and Nabatieh (6%). By confession, the highest level of satisfaction was expressed by Sunni (19%), followed by Maronite (16%), and the lowest by Shia (13%).

FIGURE 21. SATISFACTION WITH HANDLING OF REFUGEE CRISIS, BY GOVERNORATE



FIGURE 22. SATISFACTION WITH HANDLING OF REFUGEE CRISIS, BY CONFESSION



Note for all other confessions, see Annex III.

4 POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONCLUSIONS

Citizens overwhelmingly perceived the economy to be performing poorly. Large majorities thought the economic situation had degraded over the previous five-year period and expected poor macroeconomic performance to get worse over the next five years. These findings were consistent across all sub-populations with a small but significant anomaly in Nabatieh, where a significant share of the population believed the economy to be average and largely unchanging over the 10-year period in question. While sentiment about one's own economic situation was somewhat more optimistic than perceptions of the overall economy, respondents perceived their own social status to be worse than the national average as well as other members of their community.

Moving from economic performance to governance, respondents expressed deep dissatisfaction with government on a number of levels, validating previous surveys in Lebanon, as well as reinforcing the backdrop against which the recent large-scale protests have occurred. Satisfaction with the government's handling of the Syrian refugee crisis and public services was low, with citizens blaming corruption as the primary cause of poor public service provision. Three in four respondents thought the new government would be less effective in addressing Lebanon's challenges compared to its predecessors. This sentiment held across all sub-populations and was particularly acute among respondents from Nabatieh. This dissatisfaction was further underscored by the low confidence citizens expressed in government leaders, especially for MPs and Ministers who did not have the confidence of 81% of the citizenry.

This crisis of confidence is further exacerbated by diminishing levels of trust over the past five years, particularly regarding parliament and the Council of Ministers. Approximately two thirds of respondents reported decreased trust in Parliament and the Council of Ministers over the last five years with only 5% reporting increased trust in each of them over the same time period. The only institutions that saw a net increase in trust were those associated with security (LAF, general security, ISF/Police) and municipalities. Compared to all non-security organs of the national government, municipalities were viewed quite favorably – more people had confidence in municipal leaders than did not, and there was a net increase in citizens' trust in municipal governments over the past five years. This phenomenon is likely explained by the closer proximity and hence responsiveness of these government bodies. Substantiating this is the fact that large pluralities of citizens sought assistance from municipal leaders with issues relating to garbage collection, roads, and sewage treatment.

Mirroring the two phenomena elaborated above, the majority of citizens believed that the economy should be the top priority for the new government (55%), followed by governance issues (34%), including corruption most prominently. The hindrance that poor governance plays in managing the national economy likely influences the result that one in three respondents did not think exploiting the significant offshore oil reserves would improve the lives of most Lebanese people.

Given the significant economic and governance problems and compounded by regional instability, most citizens expected a return to armed conflict in the next five years. Respondents were much more likely to think this conflict would be precipitated by international rather that domestic events, with the highest expectation of international conflict in Nabatieh.

Lebanese citizens perceived Saudi Arabia and Iran to be the two largest providers of foreign support, with Sunni respondents much more likely to cite the former and Shiite respondents much more likely to note the latter. The US was mentioned as one of the top two providers of foreign assistance by only 17% of

the citizenry, behind not only Saudi Arabia and Iran but also the EU and its member states. Perceptions of US support were the highest in Akkar and North and the lowest in Nabatieh.

COMPARISON WITH POLITICAL ECONOMY ASSESSMENT

The PEA found that sectarianism and the confessional system have inhibited Lebanon's political and economic development as well as the emergence of a consistent view of national identity. According to the PEA, sect is the primary political marker in Lebanon and has taken on an even greater salience in the context of a fragmented political landscape. Lebanon's state suffers from significant capacity constraints and has poor legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry. Lastly, the nation's political economy is beholden to a wide array of international interests. Contrary to the ubiquity of sect in forming political identities, the CPS found that respondents most frequently identified with their region (31%) rather than religion (20%) or another designator. Similarly, contrasting the perception of a weak national identity was the fact that, despite asking for an identifier *other than Lebanese*, still over 13% of the sample insisted on answering the question with "Lebanese only". Note that this survey was conducted prior to the protest movement in October 2019, which was characterized by a strong anti-confessional orientation and mobilized large segments of the population around national demands, a factor that is likely to have expanded this "Lebanese only" cleavage.

The CPS did, however, substantiate the political fragmentation and disenchantment detailed in the PEA, with over half of the citizenry stating that no party represents their interests. With regard to state capacity and legitimacy, the CPS confirmed particularly low levels of citizen perceptions of government effectiveness, confidence in leaders, trust in government institutions, and satisfaction with public services. Lastly, the CPS substantiated the role of international factors in mediating Lebanon's stability and development, from dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the refugee crisis, to a prevailing sense that internationally-precipitated conflict will affect Lebanon in the next five years, to wide heterogeneity in perceptions of sources of foreign support.

5 ECONOMIC GROWTH: FINDINGS

The USAID Economic Growth Assessment (EGA) was completed in November 2018. This study was designed to analyze changing economic conditions in order to provide recommendations on USAID's existing economic growth portfolio and identify potential areas of programmatic expansion over the next five-year period. The assessment used desk research, qualitative field work, and an online poll of 3,000 Lebanese citizens to answer a set of research questions. As noted in the assessment report, "online polling is biased in favor of younger, tech-savvy respondents of higher socioeconomic status with access to smartphones and the internet."[22] The CPS was designed to validate key findings from the report through a population-based survey. The EGA findings were used to inform CPS instrument design.

5.1 MEASUREMENT OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT

Before presenting the findings, it is important to summarize our approach to measuring employment in the CPS. Given the CPS sampling approach of targeted respondents in the 18-65 age range, we include all respondents in the calculation of employment measures. We used the same definition and measures (survey questions) as the International Labor Organization (ILO), to align with global standards, and report on three primary employment outcomes:

a) **Labor force participation rate** – the proportion of the population that is either (i) employed, or (ii) unemployed. In other words, the labor force distinguishes those who are economically active from those that are not. This statistic is calculated by the summing the number of employed and unemployed persons and divided by the working age population.

b) **Employment rate** – the proportion of the population that has either (i) worked for more than one hour for pay, profit, or family gain in the last week, or (ii) not attended work during the previous week but had a job or business from which they were temporarily absent. This statistic is calculated by dividing the number of employed persons by the working age population.

c) **Unemployment rate** – the proportion of the labor force that was (i) not employed in the past week, and (ii) actively seeking work in the past four weeks. In other words, the unemployment rate is the share of unemployed persons among the economically active. This statistic is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed persons by the total labor force.

The CPS operationalized the above definitions through the survey questions depicted below in Figure 23.

FIGURE 23. MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY



[22] USAID Lebanon Economic Growth Assessment, p. 12

Given time constraints of the CPS (with a goal to complete an interview in approximately 30 minutes), it was not feasible for the CPS to include all comprehensiveness as would be done in a formal labor force survey, though the CPS does capture the most important categories and questions to estimate labor force participation, employment rates, and unemployment rates. Some limitations and caveats to consider when interpreting CPS findings are described below.

- The CPS did not measure whether a person had found a job to start in the next three months, nor whether the person was available to start a job within two weeks. This might have made a marginal and likely negligible difference in the estimation of those who are economically active.
- The CPS included ages 18 through 65, while the ILO definitions generally refer to ages 15+, with some variation allowed on a country to country basis, based on practices undertaken by each country's central statistics agency when carrying out labor force surveys. This could result in small variations between our estimates and those published in other sources of data.
- The CPS started during Ramadan due to time pressures for completing data collection. Therefore, it is possible that temporary absences reported in the CPS may be higher than what would typically be expected. Similarly, as the survey was conducted during the workday, there is an increased chance of surveying (and overestimating) unemployed or inactive persons.
- The CPS did not collect household rosters as part of the CPS as part of an effort to keep the instrument as brief as possible given our objectives. Therefore, applying individual-level weights to employment estimates is not possible, since we do not have the ages for all individuals within each household surveyed. This could result in small variations between our estimates and those published in other sources of data.

In addition to those caveats and limitations above, it is also worth pointing out that the CPS did not attempt to measure informal vs. formal sector of employment, nor to measure "underemployment" among those that are employed. These are typically part of formal labor force surveys, and would have provided interesting depth or further context, but ultimately will not have affected estimation of the labor force or employment or unemployment rates.

5.2 LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT

THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE, OR THE SHARE OF THE WORKING AGE POPULATION THAT WAS (I) EMPLOYED, (II) TEMPORARILY ABSENT FROM WORK, OR (III) ACTIVELY LOOKING FOR WORK, WAS ESTIMATED AT 65% (

Figure 24; Figure 25). The remaining population (35%) were economically inactive. The highest labor force participation rates were observed in Beirut (74%), Keserwan-Jbeil (73%), and Beqaa (72%). Nabatieh was a clear outlier with a labor force participation rate of only 43%, a figure 18 percentage points lower than the next lowest governorate (Akkar). With a little less than half of women economically active (48%), female labor force participation was much lower than that of males (81%).

While education status was not a strong predictor of male labor force participation, the relationship between these two variables was very pronounced for females. Women with more education were much more likely to be economically active (Figure 27). For example, whereas the participation rate among women with no education was 28%, the figure for women with tertiary education was 63%. Economic inactivity among women was particularly acute among rural females, which had a participation rate of only 37%. Christian respondents were more likely to be economically active than Muslim respondents, a phenomenon that was particularly acute among women (Table 10). Whereas Maronite and Other

Christian respondents had labor force participation rates of 56% and 57% respectively, the comparable figures for Sunni, Shia, and Other Muslims were 46%, 39%, and 45%, respectively.

The same pattern of low economic activity among Muslim women held when comparing to Muslim men. Whereas Maronite and Other Christian females were 27% and 23% less likely to be economically active than males from the same confession, all three Muslim groupings of women were 37% less likely to be in the labor force than males from their confession. Sunni respondents had the lowest labor force participation rate (58%), or seven percentage points below the national average. As noted above, the CPS did not distinguish between formal and informal sector work. Therefore, it is not possible to disentangle participation of different sub-groups of interest in the formal versus informal economy.

The labor force participation rate was estimated at 65% overall, with a large gender disparity (48% women vs. 81% men). Women with higher levels of education were much more likely to be economically active. Among females and non-youth whose highest education level was primary school, those with vocational training were much more likely to be economically active compared with those without this training.

Other factors correlated with low economic activity included being a youth (58% labor force participation) and rural (57% labor force participation). Lastly, respondents with vocational training were significantly more likely to be economically active than those that did not, a finding that was particularly compelling for females and non-youth with only a primary school level of education.[23] For example, among females whose highest education level was completion of primary school, those that received such training were more twice as likely to be economically active (63%) as those that didn't (30%). The comparable figures for non-youth were 80% for those that received training and 54% for those that didn't. Perhaps surprisingly, youth with primary education and training were less likely to be economically active, though this result maybe driven by additional time investments in education in the short term. There were positive correlations for vocational training after secondary school, though they were not as pronounced.

The primary reasons for economic inactivity were looking after children (30%), undergoing school/training (27%), illness or disability (13%), inability to find a job (11%), retirement (7%), and the attitude of family/spouse (6%); all other reasons were mentioned by less than 5% of citizens (Figure 29). The most common response among females was childcare (40%) a figure twenty times that of male respondents (2%). Males were much more likely to be economically inactive due to education (43%, versus 21% among women) and retirement (23%, versus 2% among women). The primary drivers of youth inactivity were schooling (72%), inability to find a job (12%), and childcare (11%), whereas the most common reasons for inactivity among non-youth were looking after children (41%) illness/disability (21%), and retirement (12%).

[23] It is important not to infer causality in these comparisons. Respondents with training do not necessarily participate in the labor force at higher frequencies than non-recipients *because* of the training. There may be other factors that explain the differential participation rates. One likely reason is that individuals that are able to afford training (both from a financial and opportunity cost perspective) are more likely to have access to social support and/or assets that mediate positive economic behavior.

THE EMPLOYMENT RATE, OR THE SHARE OF THE WORKING AGE POPULATION THAT (I) WORKED FOR MORE THAN ONE HOUR FOR PAY, PROFIT, OR FAMILY GAIN IN THE LAST WEEK, OR (II) WERE TEMPORARILY ABSENT FROM WORK, WAS ESTIMATED AT 58% (

Figure 24; Figure 25). The remaining 42% were either unemployed or economically inactive. The highest employment rates were observed in Beirut (66%) and Beqaa (67%). Nabatieh had the lowest employment rate (39%), though it was just three percentage points below that of the next governorate (Akkar). As with labor force participation, women (41%) were much less likely to be employed than men (78%), especially among Muslim respondents (Table 10). Mirroring the findings about labor force participation, increased levels of education correlated strongly with higher female employment and to a much lesser degree male employment as well. Also tracking with findings from labor force participation, employment rates were higher among Maronite and Other Christian respondents than among Muslims, though unlike the labor force findings, Shia, not Sunni, respondents had the lowest employment rate (51%) or seven percentage points below the national average.

The employment rate was estimated at 58% overall. Vocational training was associated with higher employment rates across the board, with the exception of youth receiving training after completing only primary school. As with labor force participation, this positive relationship was the strongest among females and non-youth respondents with only a primary education.

Other factors correlated with low employment included being a youth (45% employment rate) and living in a rural area (49% employment rate). As with the labor force findings, receipt of vocational training was associated with higher employment rates for all male/female and youth/non-youth respondents across both primary and secondary education, with the only exception being youth receiving training after completing only primary school (Figure 27). A similar mechanism is likely playing out where these respondents are sacrificing short-term employment in hopes of improved career prospects in the future. As with the labor force figures, the correlation between training and employment was the strongest among females and non-youth respondents with only a primary education. Females with training among this population were 31 percentage points more likely to be employed than females without, and non-youth in this population with training were 27 percentage points more likely to be employed than those without.

THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, OR THE SHARE OF THE LABOR FORCE THAT WAS (I) NOT EMPLOYED IN THE PAST WEEK, AND (II) ACTIVELY SEEKING WORK IN THE PAST FOUR WEEKS, WAS ESTIMATED AT 11% (

Figure 24; Figure 25). The highest unemployment rate was observed in Akkar and Keserwan-Jbeil (both 15%), while the lowest was registered in Beirut and Beqaa (both 8%). Given its low labor force participation, the unemployment rate in Nabatieh was only 9%. The female unemployment rate (16%) was almost twice that of the male rate (8%) and was particularly high among non-Sunni or Shia Muslim respondents (29%). Interestingly, education was negatively associated with unemployment for males and positively associated with unemployment for females. In other words, less educated males were more likely to be unemployed, while more educated females were more likely to be unemployed (among the economically active population).

The unemployment rate was estimated at 11% overall. The female unemployment rate was almost twice that of the male rate (16% vs. 8%). Youth unemployment was substantially higher, estimated at 23%. Female youth were more likely to be unemployed than male youth (26% vs. 20%), though both were substantially more likely to be unemployed than non-youth (4% and 10% male and female non-youth, respectively).

Muslim respondents had higher unemployment rates than Christians and, with an unemployment rate of 23%, youth were almost four times more likely to be unemployed than non-youth (6%). Vocational training was associated with reductions in unemployment females, youth with a secondary degree, and non-youth with a primary degree. Male unemployment was negatively associated with receipt of training regardless of whether they had primary or secondary degrees.

Overall, unemployment was estimated at 11%, with youth unemployment substantially higher, estimated at 23% (Figure 26). Female youth were more likely to be unemployed (26%) than male youth (20%), though both were substantially more likely to be unemployed than their non-youth counterparts (4% male non-youth, and 10% female non-youth). The primary reasons for unemployment were inability to find a job (70%), undergoing school/training (20%), looking after children (6%), being dismissed/laid off (4%), a job of limited duration having ended (3%), and retirement (3%). As with the labor force participation, females were much more likely to be unemployed because of childcare (12%) than males. Conversely, males were more likely to be unemployed because they could not find a job (74%) or because of schooling (24%) than females. Youth were more likely to be unemployed because of schooling (34%) than non-youth. Conversely non-youth were more likely to be unemployed because of childcare (11%), dismissal/layoff (9%), and retirement than youth (6%).

FIGURE 24. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT



FIGURE 25. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, BY GOVERNORATE AND SEX



Note: Labor force participation and employment rates are calculated using a denominator of the total working age population, while unemployment rate is calculated as the share of those unemployed out of those who are economically active. See section 5.1 above for detailed definitions.

FIGURE 26. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, BY GOVERNORATE & AGE GROUP



Note: Labor force participation and employment rates are calculated using a denominator of the total working age population, while unemployment rate is calculated as the share of those unemployed out of those who are economically active. See section 5.1 above for detailed definitions.

FIGURE 27. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, BY EDUCATION AND SEX



Note: Labor force participation and employment rates are calculated using a denominator of the total working age population, while unemployment rate is calculated as the share of those unemployed out of those who are economically active. See section 5.1 above for detailed definitions.

FIGURE 28. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, BY GOVERNORATE, AGE GROUP, AND SEX

Key: **Female** | **Male**



TOTAL:
MALE Youth: 20% | FEMALE Youth: 26%
MALE Non-Youth: 4% | FEMALE Non-Youth: 10%

Note: Labor force participation and employment rates are calculated using a denominator of the total working age population, while unemployment rate is calculated as the share of those unemployed out of those who are economically active. See section 5.1 above for detailed definitions.

TABLE 10. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, BY CONFESSION AND SEX

	Female	Male	Total
Labor Force Participation Rate			
Maronite	56%	83%	70%
Sunni	46%	83%	65%
Shia	39%	76%	58%
Other Christian	57%	80%	69%
Other Muslim	45%	82%	64%
Employment Rate			
Maronite	49%	79%	64%
Sunni	39%	76%	57%
Shia	32%	71%	51%
Other Christian	51%	75%	63%
Other Muslim	32%	74%	53%
Unemployment Rate			
Maronite	13%	5%	8%
Sunni	15%	9%	11%
Shia	17%	8%	11%
Other Christian	10%	6%	8%
Other Muslim	29%	11%	17%

Note: Labor force participation and employment rates are calculated using a denominator of the total working age population, while unemployment rate is calculated as the share of those unemployed out of those who are economically active. See section 5.1 above for detailed definitions.

FIGURE 29. REASONS NOT WORKING, AMONG ECONOMICALLY INACTIVE AND UNEMPLOYED



Note: Figures show reasons mentioned by at least 5% of any group; for complete list of responses, see Annex III (Data Tables). All figures are sorted in descending order based on the "Total" results.

5.3 PERCEPTIONS OF JOB QUALITY

Respondents who were working at the time of the survey were asked about their job quality through a battery of five questions, as well as whether they worked in an environment free from gender discrimination and whether obtaining employment through personal connections was widespread.

Most working respondents felt they worked a sufficient number of hours (84%) and in an environment free of gender discrimination (77%) (Figure 30). In contrast, less than half felt they had good working conditions (43%), a good salary (33%), or good benefits (31%). The vast majority (88%) agreed that obtaining employment through personal connections is extremely widespread.

Respondents from Nabatieh viewed themselves as having significantly better working conditions than respondents from other governorates, especially with regard to having a good salary, working conditions, job stability, and benefits (Table 11). Across all four items, these respondents were at least 10 percentage points more likely to agree with these statements. The two other governorates where the average respondent viewed their employment in positive terms were Beqaa and South.

Governorates with the lowest reported levels of working conditions were North, Akkar, and Baalbek-Hermel. Respondents in all three of these locations especially cited having an insufficient number of hours (ranging from 12-21 percentage point difference from national averages). With only 49% of respondents in Nabatieh saying they work in an environment free of gender discrimination, discrimination in the workplace was much more frequently reported in Nabatieh than any other governorate (28 percentage point difference with national average). Conversely, gender discrimination in the workplace was least frequent in Keserwan-Jbeil and Beirut. Lastly, the perception that obtaining employment through personal connections was widespread was most prevalent in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. It was the least prevalent in Akkar, Nabatieh, and North.

Most of these results did not differ meaningfully between youth and non-youth, or females and males, with a small number of exceptions. Youth (41%) and females (45%) were less likely to feel they had job stability compared with non-youth (50%) or males (49%); females were less likely to feel they had a good salary (30%) compared to males (35%).

FIGURE 30. PERCEPTION OF JOB QUALITY, BY SEX AND AGE GROUP

Percent (%) Agree or Strongly Agree



TABLE 11. PERCEPTION OF JOB QUALITY, BY GOVERNORATE

Percent (%) Agree or Strongly Agree

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
I have a good salary.	38%	32%	32%	44%	25%	27%	52%	33%	35%
I have good working conditions.	42%	38%	47%	49%	47%	38%	58%	38%	51%
I work a sufficient number of hours.	63%	71%	91%	84%	95%	89%	85%	72%	91%
I have job stability.	45%	45%	47%	50%	49%	46%	62%	44%	49%
I have good benefits.	30%	35%	25%	39%	24%	28%	43%	30%	37%
I work in an environment free of gender discrimination.	69%	72%	90%	71%	92%	85%	49%	60%	87%
Obtaining employment through personal connections is extremely widespread.	71%	86%	97%	92%	92%	96%	77%	79%	92%

5.4 WILLINGNESS TO WORK IN SPECIFIC SECTORS

Respondents were asked to indicate their willingness to work in seven industries identified in the Economic Growth Assessment. The only sector where a majority of respondents expressed a willingness to work was in industrial manufacturing (55%) (Table 12). Women were less likely to be willing to work as plumbers (12%), electricians (14%), mechanics (14%), carpenters (15%), or in industrial manufacturing (41%), whereas men were less likely to be willing to work as tailors (39%) or beauticians (31%). The largest sex-disaggregated differences in willingness to work were registered for electrician (42 percentage point difference) and mechanic (41 percentage point difference). There were few substantial differences between youth and non-youth, with youth marginally less willing to work as tailors, carpenters, plumbers, and electricians and more willing to work as a beauticians. Rural respondents were less likely to want to work as beauticians.

Respondents from Keserwan-Jbeil, Beirut, and Nabatieh were the most open to working across sectors, while those from Baalbek-Hermel and Akkar were the least willing (Table 13). Industrial manufacturing was the least popular in Akkar, while respondents from Keserwan-Jbeil and Beirut were significantly more willing to work as tailors and beauticians than the national average.

TABLE 12. WILLINGNESS TO WORK ACROSS VARIOUS SECTORS, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION

Percent (%) saying "yes"

	Female	Male	Youth	Non-Youth	Rural	Urban	Total
Carpentry	15%	53%	29%	36%	30%	37%	34%
Plumbing	12%	45%	23%	30%	25%	31%	28%
Electrician	14%	56%	31%	37%	31%	38%	35%
Mechanic	14%	55%	32%	35%	32%	36%	34%
Tailor	51%	39%	39%	48%	42%	48%	45%
Beautician	58%	31%	50%	42%	39%	49%	45%
Industrial manufacturing	41%	67%	56%	54%	51%	56%	54%

TABLE 13. WILLINGNESS TO WORK ACROSS VARIOUS SECTORS, BY GOVERNORATE

Percent (%) saying "yes"

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Carpentry	32%	25%	41%	39%	38%	31%	39%	36%	28%
Plumbing	24%	21%	34%	30%	30%	27%	34%	29%	24%
Electrician	30%	27%	43%	36%	44%	33%	40%	35%	30%
Mechanic	31%	29%	41%	37%	39%	33%	37%	33%	32%
Tailor	42%	34%	56%	46%	63%	40%	52%	45%	41%
Beautician	36%	38%	55%	48%	57%	44%	42%	40%	47%
Industrial manufacturing	41%	45%	58%	54%	59%	49%	82%	49%	61%

5.5 HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES

Respondents were provided a list of common household expenses and were asked to indicate their top three expenses in the last year. Nearly a quarter (23%) of households said that their top expense was food. Another 22% said their top expense was housing, and 21% said their top expense was education. Other expenses frequently mentioned as #1 expense were health care (13%), electricity (10%), and gas/fuel (8%).

Housing was the largest expense among urban households, mentioned almost twice as often than rural households. Respondents from Beirut (36%) and South (32%) were the most likely to report housing as the top household expense. Rural households spent the most on food and, notably, were twice as likely to report gas/fuel as their biggest expense than urban households (6% and 12%, respectively). Respondents from Akkar were the most likely to cite food (38%), while residents of Nabatieh (33%) and Beqaa (22%) were most likely to cite gas/fuel. With 20% of respondents reporting electricity as the top household expense, North was anomalous.

FIGURE 31. TOP HOUSEHOLD EXPENSE, BY LOCATION



Note: Figure shows any item that at least 5% of households reported as their top expense. For the full list see Annex III.

TABLE 14. TOP HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES

Percent (%) of households who listed each item as their #1, 2, and 3 household expenses.
Most frequent response for #1, 2, and 3 household expenses for each governorate highlighted in red.

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
#1 Expense									
Housing	10%	14%	**36%**	14%	19%	**27%**	11%	21%	**32%**
Food	**38%**	19%	16%	18%	**28%**	22%	26%	**27%**	14%
Water	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	2%	3%	1%
Electricity	8%	6%	4%	11%	2%	8%	7%	20%	13%
Gas and Other Fuels	4%	16%	3%	**22%**	9%	4%	**33%**	2%	8%
Transportation	3%	1%	0%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%
Education	19%	**27%**	23%	14%	25%	26%	15%	14%	21%
Clothing	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Healthcare services	15%	15%	16%	16%	16%	12%	6%	13%	10%
Other, specify	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Don't know	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
#2 Expense									
Housing	2%	4%	20%	3%	9%	9%	2%	5%	5%
Food	20%	13%	16%	17%	18%	**22%**	8%	23%	7%
Water	4%	3%	4%	4%	2%	4%	2%	8%	5%
Electricity	**21%**	20%	18%	**26%**	13%	21%	**29%**	**27%**	22%
Gas and Other Fuels	12%	**25%**	3%	18%	19%	8%	10%	5%	8%
Transportation	4%	2%	2%	3%	1%	4%	6%	3%	4%
Education	15%	16%	**21%**	12%	**21%**	18%	28%	13%	**27%**
Clothing	7%	2%	1%	2%	0%	2%	2%	3%	3%
Healthcare services	17%	15%	15%	14%	16%	13%	13%	13%	19%
Other, specify	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
#3 Expense									
Housing	1%	3%	5%	3%	4%	4%	2%	2%	4%
Food	**19%**	**25%**	22%	**24%**	**27%**	16%	11%	**19%**	10%
Water	6%	3%	10%	8%	3%	5%	3%	7%	5%
Electricity	15%	17%	**25%**	20%	25%	**23%**	**36%**	**19%**	**22%**
Gas and Other Fuels	14%	21%	7%	14%	15%	11%	10%	11%	14%
Transportation	7%	4%	6%	5%	2%	8%	8%	4%	5%
Education	7%	5%	8%	9%	8%	11%	6%	12%	11%
Clothing	11%	7%	6%	3%	2%	5%	7%	9%	8%
Healthcare services	18%	15%	12%	14%	13%	17%	17%	17%	19%
Other, specify	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%	0%	1%	2%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Note: For North, #3 highlighted expenses round to 19% tying as the third expense, including electricity (18.7%) and food (18.6%).

5.6 BANK ACCOUNT & SAVINGS

Respondents were asked whether they had access to a bank account.[24] Overall, less than half of respondents (43%) reported having access (

Figure 32). Factors correlated with low access included: being a woman, being a youth, and being a rural resident. In the full sample, 34% of women report access to a bank account, compared to 53% of men; 40% of youth had access compared to 45% of non-youth, and 41% of rural residents had access compared to 45% of urban residents. Overall, respondents from South (61%), Mount Lebanon (57%), Beirut (49%), and Keserwan-Jbeil (48%) were the most likely to report having access, while those from North, Akkar, and Nabatieh were the least. Interestingly, Keserwan-Jbeil was the only governorate in which female youth were more likely to have a bank account than male youth.

Overall, the gender disparity in terms of access to bank account considerably narrows among youth, with about half of both male and female respondents reporting access to a bank account. Across governorates, the extent of the persistence of the gender gap among youth varies. In one exception, a greater percentage of female youth (35%) compared to male youth (21%) in Keserwan-Jbeil, reported access to a bank account.

Overall, less than half of respondents (43%) reported having access to a bank account, including 34% of women and 53% of men. However, this gender disparity considerably narrows among youth, with about half of both male and female respondents reporting access to a bank account. The main reasons for not having a bank account included an inability to meet the required terms and unemployment, as well as inconvenience and lack of financial literacy.

The main reasons for not having a bank account included an inability to meet the required terms (34%) and unemployment (31%) (Figure 33). Secondary barriers were inconvenience (18%) and lack of financial literacy (12%). There were few significant differences in this phenomenon across sub-populations with the exception of rural respondents citing a more frequent inability to meet terms and preferring alternatives than urban respondents (not shown). Inability to meet required terms was cited as the most common reason for not having a bank account in Baalbek-Hermel (62%), Keserwan-Jbeil (52%), Beqaa (51%) and South (30%). Unemployment was cited as the most common reason in Akkar (45%), Keserwan-Jbeil (45%), Beirut (44%), and Mount Lebanon (44%) (Table 15). Respondents in North were most likely to cite inconvenience (32%), while those from Nabatieh most frequently noted that they preferred alternatives (25%). Other important regional differences included high rates of individuals not accessing banking services due to challenges with financial literacy in Beqaa (26%) and Keserwan-Jbeil (21%), a higher prevalence of negative financial history as the primary factor inhibiting banking access in Nabatieh (14%) and South (10%) than in the rest of the country (4% total), and higher rates of respondents reporting banking fees as the primary cause for not having a bank account in Keserwan-Jbeil (13%) and Nabatieh (8%).

Respondents were asked in what currency they keep their bank account, a hypothetical question about currency preferences, and whether they use e-banking and/or online banking applications (Table 16). It is important to note that the timing of this survey preceded the liquidity crisis of September 2019 and

[24] Exact wording of question was: "Do you (or a family member on your behalf) maintain one or more bank accounts?"

political turbulence starting in October 2019. As such, the extent to which these items continue to be accurate is an open question. Among respondents with a bank account, 53% said their accounts were in Lebanese Lira (LL), 20% were in USD, and 26% were in both LL and USD. While savings exclusively in LL were the most common across all governorates, it was especially the case in Nabatieh (80%), Baalbek-Hermel (69%) and Akkar (66%). Mixed USD/LL and USD savings were roughly equally prevalent in Beirut, Beqaa, Mount Lebanon, and North, while blended accounts were much more popular in Keserwan-Jbeil and South. All respondents were asked whether they would prefer to save money (1) in LL and receive high return, or (2) in USD for less return. Most respondents (61%) preferred the former, while 34% preferred the latter. This result holds across governorates. Overall, e-banking or online applications were infrequently used (13%).

FIGURE 32. ACCESS TO BANK ACCOUNT, BY GOVERNORATE, AGE GROUP, AND SEX

FIGURE 33. REASONS FOR NOT HAVING BANK ACCOUNT, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION



Note: Question was select all that apply; therefore, percentages within a group may exceed 100.

TABLE 15. REASONS FOR NOT HAVING BANK ACCOUNT, BY GOVERNORATE

Red highlight = Top issue mentioned in each governorate

	Akkar	Baalbek -Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South	Total
Unable to meet required terms	25%	62%	41%	51%	52%	29%	24%	24%	30%	34%
Unemployment	45%	17%	44%	14%	45%	44%	5%	26%	29%	30%
Inconvenience	15%	9%	16%	15%	12%	18%	16%	32%	9%	18%
Lack of financial literacy	16%	11%	12%	26%	21%	9%	8%	11%	9%	13%
Prefer alternatives	3%	1%	3%	1%	9%	7%	25%	2%	15%	7%
Don't trust banks	4%	7%	5%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	3%	5%
Negative financial history	0%	0%	0%	1%	4%	1%	14%	6%	10%	4%
Bank fees	3%	0%	2%	1%	13%	3%	8%	3%	4%	4%
Other, specify	2%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	1%	3%	1%
Don't know	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	3%	1%	1%
Refused	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%

Note: Question was select all that apply; therefore, percentages within a group may exceed 100.

TABLE 16. SAVINGS, CURRENCY PREFERENCE, AND USE OF ONLINE BANKING

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South	Total
Currency: savings *										
LL only	66%	69%	45%	47%	58%	50%	80%	51%	47%	53%
USD only	15%	10%	24%	23%	11%	22%	13%	25%	18%	19%
Both	18%	18%	30%	28%	31%	25%	7%	24%	31%	25%
Don't know	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	3%	1%
Refused	0%	2%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Currency: preference **										
LL + high return	74%	64%	55%	56%	74%	55%	67%	58%	55%	60%
USD + lower return	23%	27%	35%	39%	22%	39%	32%	35%	37%	34%
Don't know	2%	7%	7%	4%	4%	6%	1%	5%	7%	5%
Refused	1%	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	0%	3%	1%	1%
Use e-banking or online applications *										
% Yes	8%	10%	11%	10%	9%	17%	16%	11%	16%	13%

** Among respondents with a bank account; **Among all sample*

5.7 ACCESS TO FINANCING FOR PERSONAL PURPOSES

The survey asked respondents to indicate whether they were able to access financing for personal purposes if they needed it. The survey question was worded as follows: "Are you currently able to access financing (loans) for personal purposes (mortgage, student loan, personal loan), if needed/desired?" Those who answered yes were asked to indicate their main sources of financing. Note that the wording of this question means that the interpretation of the results must be in relation to *if needed* and doesn't allow us to distinguish the percent that would have said that they are not able but do not need it. In other words, it does not necessarily identify the "unmet need" for finance, but rather simply allows us to infer the percentage of households that are not able to access it *were they to need it*.

Overall, 74% of citizens said that they are not currently able to access financing if needed, 9% said they were able to access financing but not in a sufficient amount to meet their needs, and 16% said that they were able to access enough to meet their needs (Figure 34). Across governorates, the highest level of access was reported in South (37%), and the lowest in Akkar (14%) (Figure 35). Females were less likely to have access (18%), compared to males (30%) (Figure 36). There were no meaningful differences between youth and non-youth, or urban and rural residents, in terms of accessing financing if needed.

Among those who had access to financing for personal purposes (whether sufficient to meet all needs or not), the most commonly cited source was commercial banks (62%) (Figure 34). This holds across governorates (Figure 37), with the notable exception of Nabatieh where collateral loans were the most prevalent (73%). Microfinance institutions (MFI) were also commonly mentioned in Baalbek-Hermel (28%), Beqaa (25%), Keserwan-Jbeil (28%), and to a lesser extent South (19%). Commercial banks were the most common source of financing regardless of sex, age group, or urban/rural residence (Figure 38). Females were more likely to rely on family or friends (31%), compared to males (17%). Youth were also more than twice as likely to do so (36%) compared to non-youth (16%). Rural residents were nearly twice as likely to mention collateral loans (24%), compared to urban residents (13%). Of note is that the current financial crisis has reportedly made commercial bank loans much harder to obtain, which might suggest that results could be slightly different if respondents were to be asked again about this in the near future.

FIGURE 34. ACCESS TO AND SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR PERSONAL PURPOSES



Note: respondents were able to list all that apply; therefore, sum of percentages may exceed 100.

FIGURE 35. ACCESS TO FINANCING FOR PERSONAL PURPOSES, BY GOVERNORATE



FIGURE 36. ACCESS TO FINANCING FOR PERSONAL PURPOSES, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION



FIGURE 37. SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR PERSONAL PURPOSES, BY GOVERNORATE



Note: respondents were able to list all of their "main sources of financing" for personal purposes as applicable; therefore, sum of percentages for sources of financing may exceed 100.

FIGURE 38. SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR PERSONAL PURPOSES, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION



Note: respondents were able to list all of their "main sources of financing" for personal purposes as applicable; therefore, sum of percentages for sources of financing may exceed 100.

5.8 ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Respondents were asked whether they own a business, and if they did what sector it was in, what their workforce looked like (number of employees and number of full- and part-time employees), and whether they would be willing to hire employees with training but no experience. All non-current business owners were then asked about whether they are considering starting a business and what sector it would be in.

A quarter of the population reported owning a business at the time of the survey (Figure 39). Males were two and a half times more likely than females to own a business, non-youth were three times more likely to own a business than youth, and urban residents were just over 1.5 times more likely to own a business than rural residents. While entrepreneurship was widespread, the majority of these businesses qualify as micro-enterprises (Table 17). All but a few businesses employed between 0-9 full-time employees and only one in five reported hiring 1-9 part-time employees. There were no substantive differences in business size across the sub-populations of interest (Table 18). It is worthwhile to note again here that as with employment, the CPS did not attempt to distinguish and did not ask any specific questions related to formal versus informal sector.

A quarter of the population reported owning a business at the time of the survey. Males were two and a half times more likely than females to own a business, non-youth were three times more likely to own a business than youth, and urban residents were just over 1.5 times more likely to own a business than rural residents. The vast majority of businesses were micro-enterprises with less than 10 full-time employees.

Entrepreneurship was most prevalent in Beqaa (35%) and North (33%). It was by far the least prevalent in Nabatieh (4%) (Table 17). The vast majority of businesses were in the wholesale, retail, trade, and repairs sector. The lowest such percentage was in Nabatieh, which had a much larger share of businesses in real estate, renting, and business activities (13%), agribusiness (13%), manufacturing (9%), and construction (9%) than other governorates. Other governorates with relatively large agribusiness sectors included Baalbek-Hermel and Keserwan-Jbeil (both 6%). Beirut and South had larger shares of businesses engaged in personal care services (both 6%). Females were more likely to own businesses in the wholesale, retail, trade, and repairs and personal care services sectors, while males had a more diversified range of businesses (Table 18). The sectors in which male entrepreneurs were much more prevalent included real estate, renting, and business activities, hotels and restaurants, and transport, storage, and communications. Youth were more likely than non-youth to own businesses in technology/ICT and personal care services. Rural entrepreneurs had more businesses in agribusiness and hotels and restaurants, while urban business owners were more likely to own enterprises in the wholesale, retail, trade, and repairs sector.

Across all business owners, only 37% reported being willing to hire employees with relevant training but no direct experience (Table 17; Table 18). Respondents in South were much more willing to do so than entrepreneurs from other governorates (56%), while those from Keserwan-Jbeil were the least likely to be willing to take this risk (23%). Females and rural entrepreneurs were less willing than males and urban business owners (6 and 7 percentage point differences, respectively), while youth were 11 percentage points more willing than non-youth.

Respondents that did not own a business at the time of the survey were asked whether they were thinking about starting one. Nine percent of this population reported having such plans, with rates higher among

men than women (4 percentage point difference) and urban than rural respondents (7 percentage point difference) (Figure 40; Table 20). Entrepreneurial desire among non-business owners was highly variable across governorates, with the highest prevalence in North (26%), Akkar (15%), Baalbek-Hermel, and Beqaa (both 13%), and the lowest in Keserwan-Jbeil and Nabatieh (both 2%) (Table 19). Respondents did not substantively differ in the types of business they would like to start other than the desire for agribusiness being higher in Baalbek-Hermel than other governorates.

FIGURE 39. BUSINESS OWNERSHIP, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION



FIGURE 40. THINKING OF STARTING A BUSINESS



TABLE 17. BUSINESS OWNERSHIP, SECTOR, AND EMPLOYEES, BY GOVERNORATE

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Owns business									
% Yes	22%	20%	26%	35%	21%	23%	4%	33%	20%
Sector of business									
Wholesale, retail, trade, repairs	78%	70%	69%	78%	74%	74%	51%	79%	67%
Real estate, renting, business activities	1%	2%	4%	3%	1%	2%	13%	2%	3%
Manufacturing	6%	5%	3%	5%	4%	4%	9%	6%	2%
Construction	1%	2%	1%	1%	0%	1%	9%	1%	1%
Hotels and restaurants	3%	8%	7%	6%	3%	3%	4%	5%	7%
Transport, Storage, and Communications	2%	1%	2%	2%	5%	3%	0%	1%	3%
Financial intermediation	0%	1%	2%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Tourism (other than hotels and restaurants)	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Agribusiness	0%	6%	0%	2%	6%	1%	13%	0%	1%
Technology/ICT	2%	2%	3%	2%	0%	2%	0%	1%	5%
Waste collection/disposal	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Recycling	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Renewable energy	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Creative industries	2%	3%	2%	1%	2%	3%	0%	2%	3%
Personal care services	2%	1%	6%	1%	3%	3%	0%	2%	6%
Other, specify	2%	0%	2%	0%	2%	1%	0%	3%	0%
Full-time employees									
0-9	98%	99%	97%	99%	100%	97%	100%	91%	99%
10-49	1%	1%	2%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
50-99	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
100+	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	9%	0%
Part-time employees									
None (0)	76%	69%	77%	79%	78%	81%	91%	82%	81%
Between 1-9	23%	30%	22%	20%	22%	17%	4%	17%	19%
Between 10-19	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	5%	0%	1%
Between 20-29	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Between 30-39	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Between 40-49	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Between 50-69	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
More than 100	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Don't know	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Willing to hire those with relevant training but no experience									
% Yes	34%	30%	41%	33%	23%	35%	49%	39%	56%

TABLE 18. BUSINESS OWNERSHIP, SECTOR, AND EMPLOYEES, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION

	Female	Male	Youth	Non-Youth	Rural	Urban	Total
Owns business							
% Yes	13%	33%	10%	30%	16%	29%	23%
Sector of business							
Wholesale, retail, trade, repairs	81%	72%	73%	74%	70%	76%	74%
Real estate, renting, business activities	1%	3%	1%	3%	3%	2%	2%
Manufacturing	2%	5%	3%	5%	6%	4%	4%
Construction	0%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Hotels and restaurants	3%	6%	5%	5%	7%	4%	5%
Transport, Storage, and Communications	0%	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%	2%
Financial intermediation	0%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Tourism (other than hotels and restaurants)	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Agribusiness	1%	2%	1%	2%	4%	1%	2%
Technology/ICT	1%	2%	4%	1%	2%	2%	2%
Waste collection/disposal	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Recycling	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Renewable energy	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Creative industries	2%	2%	3%	2%	1%	3%	2%
Personal care services	5%	2%	5%	3%	2%	3%	3%
Other, specify	2%	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Full-time employees							
0-9	97%	96%	98%	96%	99%	96%	97%
10-49	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
50-99	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
100+	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused	2%	2%	1%	3%	0%	3%	2%
Part-time employees							
None (0)	83%	78%	75%	80%	79%	79%	79%
Between 1-9	16%	21%	23%	19%	19%	20%	19%
Between 10-19	0%	1%	1%	1%	2%	0%	1%
Between 20-29	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Between 30-39	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Between 40-49	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Between 50-69	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
More than 100	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Willing to hire those with relevant training but no experience							
% Yes	33%	39%	47%	36%	32%	39%	37%

TABLE 19. THINKING OF STARTING A BUSINESS, BY GOVERNORATE

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Thinking of starting business									
% Yes	15%	13%	7%	13%	2%	5%	2%	26%	6%
Sector of business									
Wholesale, retail, trade, repairs	75%	51%	51%	66%	55%	49%	52%	68%	64%
Real estate, renting, business activities	2%	4%	3%	0%	0%	5%	12%	5%	3%
Manufacturing	3%	3%	2%	2%	0%	3%	0%	5%	0%
Construction	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%
Hotels and restaurants	6%	8%	10%	9%	0%	11%	28%	6%	8%
Transport, Storage, and Communications	3%	5%	3%	4%	0%	2%	0%	1%	2%
Financial intermediation	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Tourism (other than hotels and restaurants)	2%	4%	7%	3%	0%	9%	0%	3%	2%
Agribusiness	3%	12%	0%	6%	34%	2%	7%	1%	0%
Technology/ICT	0%	0%	5%	2%	11%	3%	0%	1%	11%
Waste collection/disposal	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Recycling	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Creative industries	2%	5%	3%	5%	0%	5%	0%	2%	4%
Personal care services	2%	5%	5%	2%	0%	3%	0%	2%	2%
Other, specify	2%	0%	3%	0%	0%	2%	0%	1%	0%
Don't know	3%	2%	3%	0%	0%	2%	0%	2%	4%

TABLE 20. THINKING OF STARTING A BUSINESS, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION

	Female	Male	Youth	Non-Youth	Rural	Urban	Total
Thinking of starting business							
% Yes	8%	12%	9%	9%	6%	13%	9%
Sector of business							
Wholesale, retail, trade, repairs	61%	63%	54%	67%	60%	63%	62%
Real estate, renting, business activities	1%	6%	4%	4%	6%	3%	4%
Manufacturing	1%	5%	4%	3%	3%	4%	4%
Construction	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Hotels and restaurants	9%	7%	10%	7%	6%	9%	8%
Transport, Storage, and Communications	0%	4%	4%	2%	4%	2%	2%
Financial intermediation	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
Tourism (other than hotels/restaurants)	6%	2%	5%	3%	4%	4%	4%
Agribusiness	2%	5%	1%	5%	8%	2%	4%
Technology/ICT	3%	2%	5%	1%	1%	3%	2%
Waste collection/disposal	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Recycling	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Creative industries	6%	1%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Personal care services	5%	1%	3%	2%	1%	3%	3%
Other, specify	2%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Don't know	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%
Refused	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%

5.9 BUSINESS ACCESS TO FINANCING

The survey asked current business owners: "For your business, are you currently able to access financing (debt, loans, guarantees) for business purposes, if needed/desired?" Any who answered yes were asked to indicate their main sources of financing. Note that because the percentage of business owners is about a quarter of the respondent population, the analytical sample size for these questions, asked only among business owners, is substantially smaller than he overall total, especially once disaggregations are done. Note also that as with the question related to financing for personal purposes, results do not necessarily identify the "unmet need" for finance, but rather simply allows us to infer the percentage of current business owners that are not able to access it *were they to need it*.

Overall, 69% of business owners said that they are not currently able to access financing if needed, 8% said they were able to access financing but not in a sufficient amount to meet their needs, and 21% said that they were able to access enough to meet their needs (Figure 41). Business owners across governorates reported wide ranges of access to financing, with the lowest in Keserwan-Jbeil (13%), and the highest in Nabatieh (80%), a clear outlier (Figure 42). Females were less likely to have access (22%), than males (31%) (Figure 43). Youth business owners were slightly more likely to have access (33%) than non-youth (28%), as were rural business owners (33%) relative to urban (27%) (Figure 43). It is perhaps worth noting, to further contextualize the findings, that the current economic crisis that has further unfolded since the data were collected may impact business growth by further limiting access to financing.

Among business owners who had access to financing for their businesses (whether sufficient to meet all needs or not), the most commonly cited source was commercial banks (68%) (Figure 41). This holds across governorates (Figure 44), again with the notable exception of Nabatieh where collateral loans were the most prevalent (55%) and with frequent use of informal lenders (19%). In Beirut, use of commercial banks (44%) also appears to be displaced to some extent by higher access to equity finance (22%). Business owners in Keserwan-Jbeil reported higher use of family or friends (33%) compared to other places.

Commercial banks were the most common source of financing regardless of sex, age group, or urban/rural residence of the business owner (Figure 45). Youth were more than twice as likely to use MFIs (31%) and family and friends (21%), compared to non-youth (13 and 14%). Female business owners were slightly more likely to rely on family and friends (18%) compared to males (14%).

FIGURE 41. ACCESS TO AND SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR BUSINESS



Note: business owners were able to list all that apply; therefore, sum of percentages may exceed 100.

FIGURE 42. ACCESS TO FINANCING FOR BUSINESS, BY GOVERNORATE



FIGURE 43. ACCESS TO FINANCING FOR BUSINESS, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION



FIGURE 44. SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR BUSINESS, BY GOVERNORATE



Note: business owners were able to list all of their "main sources of financing" as applicable; therefore, sum of percentages for sources of financing may exceed 100.

FIGURE 45. SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR BUSINESS, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION



Note: business owners were able to list all of their "main sources of financing" as applicable; therefore, sum of percentages for sources of financing may exceed 100.

5.10 PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

All respondents were read a list of possible obstacles to private sector development and were asked to rank their perceived top three. Overall, citizens ranked access to finance as the top constraint (mentioned by 25% of citizens), followed by lack of political will (18%), labor market policies (18%), lack of transparency/governance (11%), and regulations (11%) (Table 21).

Citizens ranked access to finance as the top perceived constraint to private sector development in Lebanon, followed by lack of political will, labor market policies, lack of transparency/governance, and regulations.

In the governorate of Nabatieh, 60% of citizens ranked access to finance as the number one obstacle to private sector development. This finding stands somewhat in contrast to other findings from this survey, in that citizens in Nabatieh reported the highest level of access to finance for personal purposes "if needed" (see Section 5.7). In Nabatieh, access to finance for personal purposes is available through the Hezbollah backed Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association that gives loans against collateral deposits; this may be insufficient for business purposes, which thus may explain the discrepancy. Relatedly and perhaps further emphasizing this point, the earlier question relates to one's own household, while this question explicitly related to private sector development more generally in Lebanon, which may account for some of the difference.

Governorates whose ranking diverged from the overall results include Akkar and North, where lack of political will registered as the top constraint, mentioned by 23% and 24% of citizens, respectively, as well as Beqaa and Keserwan-Jbeil, where labor market policy was ranked as the top obstacle, mentioned by 25 and 46% of citizens, respectively.

Women were substantially more likely to report access to finance as the number one constraint (31%) compared to men (20%), whereas men were slightly more likely to rank as number one lack of political will (22% compared to 14% among women), and labor market policy (20% compared to 16% among women). Youth were slightly more likely to rank access to finance as the top constrain (27%) compared to non-youth (24%), while non-youth were more likely to list lack of political will (20%) compared to youth (15%). There were no large differences between the responses of urban versus rural residents.

TABLE 21. PERCEIVED CONSTRAINTS TO PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Most frequent response within each government, for each rank, highlighted in red

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South	Total
#1 obstacle										
Access to finance	16%	44%	38%	24%	33%	23%	60%	16%	39%	25%
Lack of political will	23%	13%	15%	18%	0%	12%	0%	24%	11%	18%
Labor market policies	6%	26%	23%	25%	46%	20%	7%	15%	22%	18%
Lack of transparency/governance	10%	8%	12%	14%	21%	15%	12%	11%	6%	11%
Regulations	9%	5%	5%	4%	0%	16%	21%	15%	5%	11%
State-owned enterprises	14%	0%	7%	9%	0%	10%	0%	7%	12%	7%
Insufficient supply of skilled workers	18%	2%	0%	7%	0%	3%	0%	6%	2%	6%
Don't know	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	2%
None	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Other, specify	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
#2 obstacle										
Labor market policies	11%	48%	36%	31%	54%	23%	12%	11%	19%	21%
Lack of transparency/governance	19%	6%	12%	8%	21%	13%	21%	19%	12%	15%
Lack of political will	19%	3%	12%	14%	0%	13%	40%	16%	9%	14%
Access to finance	10%	23%	10%	18%	13%	10%	0%	12%	18%	13%
Insufficient supply of skilled workers	18%	3%	5%	11%	0%	9%	7%	12%	9%	10%
State-owned enterprises	13%	5%	5%	2%	12%	15%	0%	12%	7%	10%
Regulations	4%	8%	15%	14%	0%	12%	0%	8%	13%	9%
Don't know	2%	3%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	7%	7%	4%
None	2%	0%	3%	2%	0%	1%	20%	2%	4%	2%
Other, specify	1%	0%	3%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%
#3 obstacle										
Access to finance	18%	8%	15%	25%	21%	15%	8%	14%	15%	15%
Labor market policies	13%	17%	12%	11%	0%	17%	32%	11%	25%	14%
Lack of political will	16%	26%	10%	20%	0%	9%	0%	12%	4%	13%
Regulations	11%	19%	15%	8%	23%	13%	32%	10%	11%	12%
Lack of transparency/governance	15%	5%	20%	7%	12%	11%	0%	12%	18%	12%
Insufficient supply of skilled workers	9%	5%	12%	5%	0%	14%	0%	11%	4%	9%
State-owned enterprises	10%	3%	6%	3%	21%	10%	8%	13%	3%	9%
Don't know	2%	10%	3%	2%	0%	2%	0%	10%	14%	7%
None	6%	5%	0%	21%	10%	4%	20%	5%	5%	6%
Other, specify	0%	2%	8%	0%	13%	2%	0%	2%	0%	2%

Note: List of constraints 1, 2, and 3, are sorted in descending order based on the "Total" column. In Akkar, for #2 constraint, lack of transparency was reported by 19.1%, while lack of political will by 19%. In Nabatieh, for #3 constraint, labor market policies was 32.1% while regulations was 31.7%.

5.11 RECYCLING

Overall, 18% of households reported recycling at the time of the survey (Figure 46). Among those that did not, 42% had an interest in doing so. The highest reported levels of recycling were in Beqaa (31%) and North (28%), while the lowest were in Baalbek-Hermel (10%), Keserwan-Jbeil (11%), and Akkar (13%).

Interest in recycling among non-recycling households was ranged between a low of 22% in Akkar, to a high of 54% in Beqaa. In other words, findings show that interest in recycling is much higher than actual practice. Overall, the main reasons for not recycling included, "not accessible" (48%), "not convenient" (25%), "makes no difference" (19%), and "not enough space in the home"" (14%) (Figure 47).

There was no difference between females and males in terms of the prevalence of recycling (18%), but interestingly females were more likely to say they were interested in recycling (44%) compared to males (39%). The same difference was observed between urban (44%) and rural (39%) residents. There was a smaller difference between youth (43%) and non-youth (41%).

Inaccessibility was consistently mentioned as the biggest barrier across all governorates, mentioned by between 41% (North) and 54% (Akkar) (Figure 48). The exception to this was Nabatieh – while 43% there did mention inaccessibility as a barrier, this was surpassed by 46% saying that recycling was not convenient. Nabatieh also differed from other governorates in that nearly a quarter (24%) of citizens there mentioned that recycling was also too expensive. In Keserwan-Jbeil more than one third of households (34%) mentioned not having enough space in the home. Likewise, more than one fifth of households in Beirut (21%) also mentioned lack of space in the household as a barrier. Across governorates, anywhere between 10 to 30% of citizens also believed that recycling makes no difference, while anywhere between 9 and 17% said that it is not important. Overall these findings show that while there is diffuse doubt about whether recycling is effective or important, by far the bigger barriers are practical ones (e.g. accessibility, convenience, space in the home).

Respondents were asked how much they would be willing to pay for a weekly recycling service (Figure 49). Willingness to pay for a weekly recycling service was reported to be on average just over 5,500 Lebanese Pounds (LL) (~3.67 USD), with a median of 4,000 LL (~2.67 USD). The lowest average willingness to pay was observed in Nabatieh (average of 411 LL, just over 0.25 USD, and median of 0), while the highest is in Akkar (mean of about 10,500 LL, or about 7 USD, and a median of 5,000 LL, or about 3.33 USD). Willingness to pay was higher in urban areas, compared to rural. Women and men were willing to pay similar amounts for a weekly recycling service – women were willing to pay 4460 LL (2.97 USD) on average with median 3000 LL (2 USD), and men were willing to pay 4544 on average (3.03 USD) with median 2500 (1.67 USD).

Note that 16% said that they did not know how much they would be willing to pay. The level of "don't know" responses lowers the analytical sample size for estimating willingness to pay – it was lowest in Nabatieh (0.9%) and the highest in Beirut (21.6%). It was also approximately the same level in Akkar, Keserwan-Jbeil, Mount Lebanon, and North governorates.

FIGURE 46. RECYCLING, BY GOVERNORATE



FIGURE 47. REASONS FOR NOT RECYCLING



Question was select all that apply; therefore, sum of percentages in each governorate may exceed 100.

FIGURE 48. REASONS FOR NOT RECYCLING, BY GgovernorATE



Note: sorted in descending order based on Total responses shown in previous figure. Question was select all that apply; therefore, sum of percentages in each governorate may exceed 100.

FIGURE 49. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR WEEKLY RECYCLING SERVICE, BY GOVERNORATE AND LOCATION

Amounts in Lebanese Pounds (LL)



Note: Top 99th percentile of data trimmed to exclude outliers, resulting in cutting 4 observations from the analytical sample size. Note that 16% said "don't know" to this question.

5.12 RENEWABLE ENERGY

Overall, 23% of households reported using renewable energy technology such as solar water heating (Figure 50). Given that the wording of the survey question, which specifically mentioned solar water heating as an example, results should be interpreted mostly in relation to solar water hearing. Among those that did not, only 23% had an interest in doing so.

The highest reported levels of renewable energy use were in Nabatieh (45%) and Beqaa (30%), while the lowest were in Keserwan-Jbeil (13%), and Mount Lebanon (17%) (Figure 50). Not only did Nabatieh have the highest level of reported use, those who did not currently use renewable energy also had the highest level of interest in doing so (38%), along with citizens from North governorate (38%). The lowest level of interest was registered in Keserwan-Jbeil, where only 7% of those not currently using renewable energy technologies were interested in doing so. Men were more interested (25% of non-users) in doing so relative to women (21%), youth were slightly less interested (22%) than non-youth (24%), but urban residents were substantially more interested (27%) compared to rural residents (17%).

In Beirut, only 18% of respondents reported using renewable energy at the time of the survey, while 29% of those who did not were interested in doing so. Similarly, in North governorate, 22% reported currently using renewable energy, while 38% of those that did not were interested in doing so. Other than these two governorates, the level of interest among respondents without access to renewable energy was not substantially higher than the level of current users.

Among those that are not currently using the technology, more than half (52%) cited cost as a main barrier (Figure 51). This was consistently the most frequently mentioned barrier across all governorates, mentioned by 35% in South to 63% in Beqaa (Figure 52). Additional major barriers included inconvenience (22%), and inaccessibility (21%). These three barriers almost uniformly held up as the main three cited across governorates, though in Keserwan-Jbeil, much more so than other governorates citizens there cited the belief that renewable energy sources produce unreliable energy (31%), produce an insufficient amount of energy (18%), or have no benefit (10%). Also, in South, "satisfied with current energy sources" was the third-most cited reason for not using, by 25% of citizens there.

Respondents were asked how much they would be willing to pay to convert to a solar water heater (Figure 53). Willingness to pay in the full sample was on average 363,320 LL (~240 USD), with a median of 50,000 LL (about 33.3 USD). The lowest average willingness to pay was observed in Nabatieh (mean of 1415 LL, or less than 1 USD, and a median of 0), while the highest is in Beirut (mean of about 575,500, or about 383.67 USD, and a median of 200,000 LL, or about 133.33 USD). Women reported lower levels of willingness to pay for converting to a solar water heater, compared to men. Women reported an average of 217,794 LL (about 145 USD) and median of 20,000 (about 13.3 USD), while men reported an average of 346,475 LL (about 231 USD) and a median of 100,000 LL (about 67 USD). Actual costs may vary between about 500 and 1000 USD, substantially above the reported willingness to pay from the CPS.

Note that a substantial portion (36%) said that they did not know how much they would be willing to pay. The level of "don't know" responses lowers the analytical sample size for estimating willingness to pay – it was lowest in Nabatieh (0.9%) and was the highest and acutely problematic in Keserwan-Jbeil (73%). The level in the rest of the governorates was in around one third, and higher than that in Mount Lebanon (41%) and Beirut (59%). While the level of "don't know" responses may be an interesting finding in and of

itself, it also means that care should be taking when interpreting the willingness to pay numbers, since they are based on a smaller analytical sample size – in some cases substantially so.

FIGURE 50. RENEWABLE ENERGY USE, BY GOVERNORATE



FIGURE 51. REASONS FOR NOT USING RENEWABLE ENERGY



FIGURE 52. REASONS FOR NOT USING RENEWABLE ENERGY, BY GOVERNORAT



Note: sorted in descending order based on Total responses shown in previous figure. Question was select all that apply; therefore, sum of percentages in each governorate may exceed 100.

FIGURE 53. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR CONVERTING TO SOLAR WATER HEATER, BY GOVERNORATE AND LOCATION

Amounts in Lebanese Pounds (LL)



Note: Top 99th percentile of data trimmed to exclude outliers, resulting in cutting 4 observations from the analytical sample size. Note that 36% said "don't know" to this question.

6 ECONOMIC GROWTH: CONCLUSIONS

The labor force participation rate, or the share of the working age population that was (i) employed, (ii) temporarily absent from work, or (iii) actively looking for work, was estimated at 65%. The remaining population (35%) were economically inactive. The employment rate, or the share of the working age population that (i) worked for more than one hour for pay, profit, or family gain in the last week, or (ii) who were temporarily absent from work, was estimated at 58%. The unemployment rate, or the share of the labor force that was (i) not employed in the past week, and (i) actively seeking work in the past four weeks, was estimated at 11%.

Rates varied across governorates and by sub-groups. Female labor force participation (48%) was much lower than that of males (81%). Women with more education were much more likely to be economically active than lower-educated females. Christian respondents were more likely to be economically active than Muslim respondents, a phenomenon that was particularly acute among women. This finding may be partly related to the difference in family sizes, with Muslim respondents reported higher average family sizes compared to Christians.[25] Youth and rural residents were much more likely to be economically inactive, compared to their non-youth, urban counterparts. Women were a stark 20 times more likely to be inactive because of childcare (40%) relative to men (2%). Youth unemployment was estimated at 11%. Female youth were more likely to be unemployed (26%) than male youth (20%), though both were substantially more likely to be unemployed by their non-youth counterparts (4% male non-youth, and 10% female non-youth).

While most employed respondents reported working sufficient hours, they were unhappy with the quality of their jobs, as measured through stability, working conditions, salary, and benefits. Most of these results did not differ meaningfully between youth and non-youth, or females and males, with a small number of exceptions. Youth and females were less likely to feel they had job stability compared with non-youth or males, while females were less likely to feel they had a good salary compared to males.

Respondents were asked about their top three household expenses. Nearly a quarter of households said that their top expense was food, while one fifth said housing, and another fifth said education. Housing was the largest expense among urban households, mentioned almost twice as often than rural households. Rural households spent the most on food and, notably, were twice as likely to report gas/fuel as their biggest expense than urban households.

Less than half of the population had access to a bank account. While women were significantly less likely to have an account than men, the disparity in access seems to be shrinking among younger populations. Most respondents with bank accounts held them in LL and preferred higher rates of return to currency stability. These questions were asked prior to the liquidity crisis in September 2019, so whether these results would hold to the same extent today is an open question. The main reasons for not having a bank account included an inability to meet the required terms and unemployment. There were few significant differences in this phenomenon across sub-populations with the exception of rural respondents citing a more frequent inability to meet terms and preferring alternatives than urban respondents.

Overall, three quarters of citizens said that they are not currently able to access financing if needed, 9% said they were able to access financing but not in a sufficient amount to meet their needs, and 16% said

[25] Average family sizes reported include Maronite 3.9, Sunni 4.9, Shia 4.3, Other Christian 3.8, and Other Muslim 4.

that they were able to access enough to meet their needs. Among those who had access to financing for personal purposes (whether sufficient to meet all needs or not), the most commonly cited source was commercial banks, a finding which holds across governorates with the notable exception of Nabatieh where collateral loans were the most prevalent. Microfinance institutions (MFI) were also commonly mentioned in several governorates. Females were nearly twice as likely to rely on family or friends for financing compared to males. Youth were also more than twice as likely to do so compared to non-youth. Rural residents were nearly twice as likely to mention collateral loans, compared to urban residents.

A quarter of the population reported owning a business at the time of the survey. Males were two and a half times more likely than females to own a business, non-youth were three times more likely to own a business than youth, and urban residents were just over 1.5 times more likely to own a business than rural residents. While entrepreneurship was widespread, the majority of these businesses qualify as micro-enterprises. All but a few businesses employed between 0-9 full-time employees and only one in five reported hiring 1-9 part-time employees. There were no substantive differences in business size across the sub-populations of interest. Across all business owners, just over a third reported being willing to hire employees with relevant training but no direct experience; youth were more willing to hire these type of workers than non-youth.

Nine percent of non-business owners reported that they were thinking about doing so, with rates higher among men than women (4 percentage point difference) and urban than rural respondents (7 percentage point difference). Entrepreneurial desire among non-business owners was highly variable across governorates. The vast majority of existing and planned businesses are in the Wholesale, retail, trade, and repairs sector.

Overall, 69% of business owners said that they are not currently able to access financing if needed, 8% said they were able to access financing but not in a sufficient amount to meet their needs, and 21% said that they were able to access enough to meet their needs Among business owners who had access to financing for their businesses (whether sufficient to meet all needs or not), the most commonly cited source was commercial banks. This holds across governorates, again with the notable exception of Nabatieh where collateral loans were the most prevalent, along with frequent use of informal lenders. In Beirut, use of commercial banks also appears to be displaced to some extent by higher access to equity finance. Commercial banks were the most common source of financing regardless of sex, age group, or urban/rural residence of the business owner; though, as noted in the findings, this may be impacted to some extent by the current economic crisis and reported challenges in obtaining commercial bank loans. Youth were more than twice as likely to use MFIs and family and friends, compared to non-youth. Female business owners were slightly more likely to rely on family and friends compared to males.

All respondents were read a list of possible obstacles to private sector development and were asked to rank their perceived top three. Overall, citizens ranked access to finance as the top constraint (mentioned by 25% of citizens), followed by lack of political will (18%), labor market policies (18%), lack of transparency/governance (11%), and regulations (11%). Women and youth were more likely to report lack of access to finance as a constraint to private sector growth.

Participation in recycling and usage of renewable energy technologies were limited, though there was a fair amount of interest in households that did not have access to these services. Overall, 18% of households reported recycling at the time of the survey. Among those that did not, 42% had an interest in doing so. Females, urban residents, and youth were more likely to say they were interested in recycling than

their male, rural, non-youth counterparts, respectively. Inaccessibility was consistently mentioned as the biggest barrier across all governorates. Overall, 23% of households reported using renewable energy technology such as solar water heating. Among those that did not, only 23% had an interest in doing so. Among those that are not currently using the technology, more than half (52%) cited cost as a main barrier. This was consistently the most frequently mentioned barrier across all governorates. In Keserwan-Jbeil, concerns about unreliable and insufficient energy were also pronounced, compared to other areas.

COMPARISON WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH ASSESSMENT

The Economic Growth Assessment (EGA) found that Lebanon's position on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) declined in 2018, with the worst performance registered in macroeconomic stability and institutions domain. Female labor force participation was estimated at approximately 20 percent compared with 70 percent for men. The primary challenges for women to enter and remain in the labor market were reported as: home responsibilities (e.g. childcare, elderly care, housework), societal factors (e.g. attitudes of family and marital status), and discriminatory laws and regulations.

The CPS substantiated the challenges with Lebanon's macroeconomic health and the strength of government institutions. Large majorities of respondents expressed deep dissatisfaction with the current economic situation and conveyed a pessimism about future economic prospects. Perceptions of government effectiveness and trust in institutions including the central bank were very low, as described in the political economy section. The CPS found a female labor force participation rate two and a half times larger than that estimated by the Assessment (48 percent) but substantiated many of the barriers faced by women in the labor market (e.g. the most common reason for economic inactivity among women was childcare).

7 GENDER: FINDINGS

The USAID Lebanon Gender Assessment was completed in January 2019. This study was designed to identify opportunities for USAID/Lebanon to address sector-specific gender gaps and integrate gender more intentionally across its portfolio. As with the other assessments covered in this report, the assessment used desk research and qualitative field work to answer a set of research questions. The CPS was designed to validate key findings from the report through a population-based survey. Gender assessment findings were used to inform CPS instrument design.

7.1 ATTITUDES ABOUT GENDER NORMS & WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

Respondents were asked to express the extent of their agreement or disagreement with 15 statements designed to solicit attitudes about a range of gender norms and women's empowerment: 10 of these statements were positively-framed (wherein agreement signals holding a gender positive attitude) and 5 statements were negatively-framed (where agreement signals gender negative attitude).

Across the full set of statements, respondents of both sexes generally reported holding positive attitudes toward equitable gender norms. Within the positively-framed items (Figure 54A), the most agreement was registered for the statement that "*a woman should be protected by law against domestic violence*" (97%). The only statements that registered less than 80% agreement were "*women and men should have equal rights to their inheritance*" (64%) and "*women should have quota in elections*" (76%). Among the negatively-framed items (Figure 54B), only 8% of respondents agreed that "*university education for males is more important than for females*." However, close to half of respondents agreed with the following gender-

inequitable statements: "*husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family*" (47%) and "*in general, men are better at political leadership*" (42%).

Disaggregating responses by sex illustrates significant discrepancies in gender attitudes (Figure 54). Males held, on average, less gender-positive attitudes across all 15 prompts. The largest differences between the sexes were registered in: equality of ability in political leadership (18 percentage point difference), husbands having final say in family decisions (16 percentage points), women questioning their husband's opinions (13 percentage points), and equality of rights to inheritance (13 percentage point difference).

Across governorates, respondents from Nabatieh had by far the lowest level of support of positive gender norms (Table 22). The finding held across both positively- and negatively-framed items. The greatest divergence between the opinions in Nabatieh and the rest of the country was in whether women should have quotas in elections (50 percentage point difference) and whether husbands should have the final say in decision making (40 percentage point difference). Interestingly, these same respondents were more likely to think that *"women should have the right to pass citizenship to her children"* (16 percentage point difference) and to disagree with the statement that "*when women get rights, they are taking rights away from men"* than the national average (11 percentage point difference). Other governorates that exhibited low levels of support for positive gender norms included North, Akkar, and Baalbek-Hermel. Respondents from Keserwan-Jbeil had the highest level or support, followed by Beirut, and Mount Lebanon. Interestingly, respondents from these three governorates were less likely to agree with the statement "*women should have the right to pass citizenship to her children*" than the national average, a finding at least partially influenced by the unusual level of support for this item in Nabatieh.

Sunni and Shia respondents were the least likely to hold positive gender norms, while Maronite and Other Christians were the most likely to do so (Table 23). The items that registered the largest levels of differential responses between these confessions were that "*women and men should have equal rights to their inheritance*" and that "*husbands should have the final say in all decisions concerning the family.*" There were no substantive differences in perceptions of gender norms between youth and non-youth. The same held for rural and urban respondents, with the exception of one item: rural respondents were 14 percentage points more likely to agree with the statement that *"husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family."*

Respondents were also asked two questions about women's economic empowerment. Fifty-six percent of respondents thought that women face more barriers than men in accessing employment and 37% thought the same regarding loans/financing (Figure 54C). As with the other items noted above, women were significantly more likely to report barriers than men. Importantly, women were much more likely to report barriers with access to employment (62%) than loans/financing (41%). Respondents from Nabatieh were the least likely to report women having more difficulty in accessing employment and were second only to respondents from Beirut with regard to accessing loans/financing (Table 22). Conversely, respondents from Beqaa, Baalbek-Hermel, and Akkar were the most likely to cite barriers to economic empowerment for females. Sunni respondents were more likely to cite barriers to both economic opportunities than respondents from other confessions and rural respondents were more likely to cite loan/financing barriers than urban respondents (42% and 33%, respectively) (Table 23).

Findings about gender attitudes by confession suggest that, although Christians are more supportive toward gender equality, they hold relatively more conservative positions toward women ability to pass citizenship to children, possibly indicating demographic fears that may supersede concerns related solely

to gender norms and empowerment (Figure 55). Muslims, on the other hand, are not as enthusiastic toward gender equality, especially when it comes to changing civil status codes or political empowerment but are more forthcoming in supporting a woman's right to pass citizenship to her children. This, in turn, may be indicative of strong confessional politics, that supersede concerns related only to gender attitudes.

FIGURE 54. ATTITUDES ABOUT GENDER NORMS AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT, BY SEX

Percent (%) Agree or Strongly Agree with each statement



TABLE 22. ATTITUDES ABOUT GENDER NORMS AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT, BY GOVERNORATE

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Positively framed norms									
Women should be protected by law against domestic violence.	95%	95%	98%	97%	99%	98%	100%	94%	98%
A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes.	87%	88%	96%	91%	98%	96%	89%	84%	96%
Woman are empowered to run for public office in Lebanon.	87%	87%	95%	93%	98%	95%	74%	86%	89%
Women could be involved equally with men in reforestation projects.	84%	82%	88%	93%	91%	93%	68%	86%	91%
Women and men should have equal chances to occupy leadership positions.	83%	84%	93%	92%	98%	93%	67%	81%	87%
A woman can become an elite personality such as a President, Prime Minister, or Speaker of the House.	81%	77%	90%	91%	96%	94%	74%	80%	90%
Women could be involved equally with men in water management committees.	83%	79%	92%	91%	97%	93%	60%	84%	89%
Women should have the right to pass citizenship to her children.	84%	82%	75%	84%	78%	75%	98%	87%	85%
Women should have quota in elections.	71%	89%	87%	93%	80%	85%	26%	71%	73%
Women and men should have equal rights to their inheritance.	60%	56%	69%	67%	94%	76%	41%	56%	50%
Negatively framed norms									
Husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family.	52%	57%	24%	43%	15%	43%	87%	54%	44%
In general, men are better at political leadership than women.	52%	52%	31%	41%	20%	37%	63%	50%	37%
A good woman never questions her husband's opinions, even if she is not sure she agrees.	50%	62%	15%	56%	9%	34%	46%	49%	30%
When women get rights, they are taking rights away from men.	32%	16%	11%	19%	6%	13%	5%	33%	12%
University education for males is more important than for females.	12%	9%	3%	9%	1%	3%	17%	19%	6%
Barriers for women									
Women face more barriers than men when it comes to access to professional	70%	65%	50%	72%	57%	58%	31%	56%	52%
Women face more barriers than men when it comes to access to loans/finance.	56%	51%	19%	46%	34%	32%	27%	39%	41%

TABLE 23. ATTITUDES ABOUT GENDER NORMS AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT, BY CONFESSION

	Maronite	Sunni	Shia	Other Christian	Other Muslim
Positively framed norms					
Women should be protected by law against domestic violence.	98%	95%	97%	98%	98%
A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes.	97%	85%	91%	97%	96%
Woman are empowered to run for public office in Lebanon.	95%	86%	85%	94%	96%
Women could be involved equally with men in reforestation projects.	91%	84%	81%	93%	92%
Women and men should have equal chances to occupy leadership positions.	95%	81%	81%	93%	92%
A woman can become an elite personality such as a President, Prime Minister, or Speaker of the House.	94%	80%	82%	93%	94%
Women could be involved equally with men in water management committees.	95%	83%	77%	93%	94%
Women should have the right to pass citizenship to her children.	74%	86%	87%	83%	77%
Women should have quota in elections.	81%	71%	69%	84%	85%
Women and men should have equal rights to their inheritance.	90%	42%	47%	93%	75%
Negatively framed norms					
Husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family.	29%	55%	60%	33%	55%
In general, men are better at political leadership than women.	29%	50%	49%	32%	48%
A good woman never questions her husband's opinions, even if she is not sure she agrees.	24%	48%	44%	32%	46%
When women get rights, they are taking rights away from men.	14%	22%	14%	19%	12%
University education for males is more important than for females.	6%	12%	9%	9%	4%
Economic Empowerment					
Women face more barriers than men when it comes to access to professional	54%	62%	52%	55%	56%
Women face more barriers than men when it comes to access to loans/finance.	30%	44%	38%	29%	37%

FIGURE 55. ATTITUDES ABOUT GENDER NORMS AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT, BY CONFESSION AND SEX

A) POSITIVELY-FRAMED NORMS



B) NEGATIVELY-FRAMED NORMS







C) ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT







TABLE 24. ATTITUDES ABOUT GENDER NORMS AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT, BY GOVERNORATE AND SEX

A) POSITIVELY-FRAMED NORMS

	Akkar		Baalbek-Hermel		Beirut		Beqaa		Keserwan-Jbeil		Mount Lebanon		Nabatieh		North		South	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Women should be protected by law against domestic violence.	97%	94%	98%	92%	99%	96%	99%	96%	99%	99%	98%	98%	100%	99%	97%	91%	99%	97%
A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes.	93%	81%	97%	79%	100%	92%	98%	84%	99%	96%	97%	95%	97%	82%	92%	76%	98%	93%
Woman are empowered to run for public office in Lebanon.	86%	88%	92%	81%	95%	94%	95%	91%	100%	96%	95%	94%	84%	63%	87%	85%	93%	86%
Women could be involved equally with men in reforestation projects.	85%	83%	88%	77%	89%	87%	96%	90%	91%	90%	95%	91%	75%	60%	86%	85%	94%	88%
Women and men should have equal chances to occupy leadership positions in their communities.	85%	81%	90%	78%	95%	91%	96%	88%	98%	97%	95%	91%	76%	58%	85%	76%	94%	81%
A woman can become an elite personality such as a President, Prime Minster, or Speaker of the house.	82%	80%	88%	66%	93%	86%	94%	87%	98%	95%	95%	93%	84%	63%	83%	78%	96%	84%
Women could be involved equally with men in water management committees.	84%	82%	84%	74%	95%	90%	95%	88%	98%	97%	95%	91%	65%	56%	85%	84%	93%	86%
Women should have the right to pass citizenship to her children.	88%	81%	88%	76%	77%	73%	86%	83%	81%	75%	81%	70%	98%	98%	88%	85%	93%	77%
Women should have quota in elections.	72%	70%	94%	84%	91%	83%	96%	90%	82%	79%	91%	79%	41%	12%	70%	71%	77%	70%
Women and men should have equal rights to their inheritance.	65%	56%	68%	44%	75%	63%	74%	59%	97%	92%	81%	70%	49%	34%	60%	52%	61%	39%

B) NEGATIVELY-FRAMED NORMS

	Akkar		Baalbek-Hermel		Beirut		Beqaa		Keserwan-Jbeil		Mount Lebanon		Nabatieh		North		South	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family.	48%	56%	45%	68%	16%	32%	36%	50%	7%	23%	35%	51%	80%	93%	49%	60%	30%	58%
In general, men are better at political leadership than women.	47%	57%	39%	65%	26%	36%	34%	48%	17%	23%	25%	49%	47%	79%	46%	54%	24%	49%
A good woman never questions her husband's opinions, even if she is not sure she agrees.	44%	56%	53%	72%	9%	20%	53%	58%	5%	14%	30%	38%	31%	60%	43%	55%	22%	37%
When women get rights, they are taking rights away from men.	29%	35%	14%	18%	10%	12%	15%	23%	4%	7%	12%	14%	5%	5%	31%	35%	11%	13%
University education for males is more important than for females.	11%	13%	7%	11%	2%	3%	7%	12%	1%	2%	3%	3%	13%	21%	16%	22%	4%	7%

C) ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

	Akkar		Baalbek-Hermel		Beirut		Beqaa		Keserwan-Jbeil		Mount Lebanon		Nabatieh		North		South	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Women face more barriers than men when it comes to access to professional opportunities.	73%	66%	76%	54%	53%	47%	79%	65%	64%	49%	63%	53%	37%	26%	59%	54%	62%	42%
Women face more barriers than men when it comes to access to loans/finance.	58%	53%	59%	42%	22%	16%	52%	39%	42%	26%	36%	28%	32%	22%	42%	37%	48%	34%

7.2 EXPERIENCES OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION

Female respondents were asked whether they ever experienced five types of gender discrimination. Two of these related to having their personal property taken against their will by husbands and/or family members (money and assets), two related to being prevented from performing autonomous acts by husbands and/or family members (visiting parents and working outside the home), and one related to being scolded and compelled to do something by family members or in their workplace.

Prevalence rates for all of these items were low across the full study sample (Figure 56). The most frequently cited act of discrimination was prevention of employment outside the home. However, this was reported only by six percent of the population. The other items were cited by two to three percent of respondents.

Across the full set of prompts, respondents from Keserwan-Jbeil, South, Mount Lebanon, and Beirut were the least likely to report having experienced gender discrimination. The lowest rates were registered in Keserwan-Jbeil, where no women reported having their property taken (either money or assets), having been prevented from visiting parents, or being scolded/compelled to do something. Conversely women living in North, Akkar, Beqaa, Nabatieh, and Baalbek-Hermel were the most likely to have experienced these types of infringements. North was a clear outlier, with higher rates of each of the five discriminatory behaviors that any other governorate.[26] One in four women reported at least one of the five discriminatory behaviors in this governorate, a rate more than twice that of the national average (Table 25). The largest differences between North and national responses were registered for economic items: females living in this governorate were 9 percentage points more likely to cite being prevented from working outside of the home, 8 percentage points more likely to have been scolded and compelled to do something (this includes within the family as well as place of employment), and 5 percentage points more likely to have had their money taken against their will. Gender discrimination was more prevalent among non-youth, urban, and Sunni Respondents, who had prevalence rates twice that of other confessions.

FIGURE 56. EXPERIENCES OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION, BY CONFESSION



[26] Prevention of visiting parents was cited by 6.33 percent of female respondents in Baalbek-Hermel and 6.28 in North.

TABLE 25. EXPERIENCES OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION, BY GOVERNORATE

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Husband/family member took your money against your will.	3%	4%	2%	6%	0%	2%	1%	8%	1%
Husband/family member took your land/jewelry/poultry/livestock against your will.	2%	2%	1%	3%	0%	2%	2%	5%	1%
Husband/family member prevented you from visiting your parents.	4%	6%	2%	4%	0%	1%	4%	6%	1%
Husband/family member prevented you from working outside the home.	11%	4%	3%	6%	2%	3%	10%	15%	2%
Have been scolded & compelled to do something by family member or in your workplace.	4%	2%	1%	3%	0%	2%	1%	11%	1%
Experienced at least one or more of the above	**14%**	**10%**	**8%**	**11%**	**2%**	**6%**	**11%**	**25%**	**4%**

7.3 ATTITUDES ABOUT WOMEN IN SPECIFIC SECTORS

Respondents were asked to express the extent of their agreement or disagreement with statements regarding female suitability for different types of employment and workforce readiness training. Specifically, the survey inquired about employment in industrial manufacturing employment, employment in the professional sector, and technical/vocational educational training.

In the full sample, there was strong agreement that all three items were suitable for women (Figure 57). Only 15 percent of respondents did not think technical/vocational training was suitable for women, while two thirds of respondents agreed that industrial and professional sectors were suitable for women. Women were more likely to express agreement with all three items, with sex disaggregated differences in the 6-7 percentage point range.

There was little geographic variation with regard to perceptions of suitability of technical/vocational training for women (Table 26). However, there were stronger differences in perceptions of women's employment in the two sectors. Respondents from South were the least likely to support women's employment in these fields while those from Beqaa had the highest levels of support. Nabatieh and Keserwan-Jbeil demonstrated an interesting pattern, with respondents reporting very different opinions for the suitability of women's employment in the two sectors. In Nabatieh, respondents were very supportive of women's employment in manufacturing (81% agreement) but had low levels of support for women's employment in professional services (47% agreement). The inverse held in Keserwan-Jbeil, where support for professional services was 77% but industrial manufacturing was only 51%. There were no significant differences of opinion among youth/non-youth and urban-rural sub-populations.

FIGURE 57. ATTITUDES ABOUT WOMEN IN SPECIFIC SECTORS, BY SEX



TABLE 26. ATTITUDES ABOUT WOMEN IN SPECIFIC SECTORS, BY GOVERNORATE

Suitability for women (% saying yes):	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Employment in industrial manufacturing	62%	63%	64%	77%	51%	64%	81%	73%	59%
Employment in the professional sector	60%	71%	62%	83%	77%	67%	47%	69%	44%
Technical and vocational educational training	85%	84%	88%	93%	83%	86%	87%	90%	84%

TABLE 27. ATTITUDES ABOUT WOMEN IN SPECIFIC SECTORS, BY AGE GROUP AND LOCATION

Suitability for women (% saying yes):	Youth	Non-Youth	Rural	Urban	Total
Employment in industrial manufacturing	63%	68%	67%	66%	66%
Employment in the professional sector	59%	67%	63%	65%	64%
Technical and vocational educational training	84%	88%	86%	88%	87%

7.4 PERCEPTION OF MOST VULNERABLE POPULATION

Respondents were asked who they viewed as the most vulnerable population in Lebanon. Cited by 59% of respondents, the poor were seen as the most vulnerable group in Lebanon. This finding held across all governorates, though there was significant variation. The highest frequency of this opinion was stated in Nabatieh (97%) and the lowest in Beirut (45%). The second-most frequently cited vulnerable population, the disabled, were identified by 14% of the citizenry. This population exhibited high degree of regional variation, with 23% of respondents in Beirut believing them to be the most vulnerable but only 2% of Nabatieh agreeing. While women were only cited as the most vulnerable group by only 5% of national respondents, almost one in five respondents in Akkar viewed them as the most vulnerable group. More than 10% of respondents in Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, Keserwan-Jbeil, and North believed that youth were the most vulnerable, with Keserwan-Jbeil the only governorate where youth ranked themselves as the most vulnerable group. Respondents from Nabatieh exhibited a district pattern in their responses, with almost universal agreement that the poor were the most vulnerable. Only three percent of these respondents cited other groups as the most vulnerable.

There were few differences between the sexes on this question, though females were more than twice as likely to report women as the most vulnerable group (7% versus 3%). Urban respondents were much more likely to identify the disabled as the most vulnerable population than rural respondents (17% vs 10%).

There was strong agreement that disabled people face discrimination in the workplace nationally (82%) and across all governorates (not shown). The highest level of agreement was registered in Nabatieh (96%) and the lowest in South (70%). Likewise, there was high level agreement across other sub-groups with no meaningfully different responses between females (83%) and males (83%), or urban (81%) and rural (84%) residents. Youth were slightly less likely to agree with the statement (78%) compared to non-youth (84%).

FIGURE 58. PERCEPTION OF MOST VULNERABLE POPULATION



TABLE 28. PERCEPTION OF MOST VULNERABLE POPULATION, BY GOVERNORATE

	Akkar	Baalbek-Hermel	Beirut	Beqaa	Keserwan-Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	Nabatieh	North	South
Women	19%	6%	3%	7%	1%	2%	0.3%	7%	2%
Youth	8%	11%	8%	16%	13%	6%	0.3%	11%	5%
Children	4%	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%	0.3%	6%	2%
Refugees	4%	3%	8%	2%	1%	4%	0.0%	2%	6%
Foreign domestic workers	5%	2%	9%	4%	2%	8%	0.0%	3%	3%
Disabled	9%	13%	23%	19%	15%	17%	2%	12%	11%
The poor	51%	63%	45%	50%	50%	57%	97%	55%	69%
Elderly	0.3%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0.4%	0%
Other, specify	0.4%	1%	3%	1%	12%	3%	0.3%	2%	2%
Don't know	0.1%	0.2%	0%	0.2%	0%	0.1%	0%	0.3%	0.3%
Refused	0%	0%	0.3%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0.2%	0%

TABLE 29. PERCEPTION OF MOST VULNERABLE POPULATION, BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND LOCATION

	Female	Male	Youth	Non-Youth	Rural	Urban
Women	7%	3%	5%	4%	5%	4%
Youth	7%	10%	10%	8%	7%	9%
Children	3%	2%	2%	3%	2%	3%
Refugees	3%	4%	5%	3%	3%	4%
Foreign domestic workers	5%	5%	4%	5%	4%	5%
Disabled	14%	14%	14%	14%	10%	17%
The poor	59%	60%	59%	60%	66%	54%
Elderly	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other, specify	2%	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

8 GENDER: CONCLUSIONS

Lebanese citizens generally hold positive attitudes toward gender norms and women's empowerment. The survey asked about perceptions of gender norms across three broad domains: legal rights, empowerment, and family relations. With regard to legal protections, there was strong and broad-based support for women being protected against domestic violence and the belief that extension of rights to women does not infringe on the rights of men. However, significant proportions of the population did not think that women should be able to pass citizenship to their children or hold equal right to inheritance as men. The former is likely drive by fears of refugee-driven immigration while the latter is at least partially influenced by Islamic beliefs. Respondents displayed a range of opinions supportive of women's empowerment, including that it is equally important for males and females to be educated, that women are empowered to run for public office, should have equal chances to occupy leadership positions, and have the capacity to become national-level elected politicians. These responses supported the idea that women should have equality of opportunity. Though a minority of respondents thought females are equally able to act as political leaders, three in four thought there should be a quota system for women in elections. Lastly, with regard to the role of women within the household, respondents thought that women should be allowed to work outside the home if they want to but maintained traditional beliefs of power dynamics between husbands and wives. These are evidenced by large shares of the population that think a good woman never questions her husband and that husbands should have the final say in household decisions.

These beliefs did not seem to translate into widespread discrimination against women within the household. Prevalence rates of experiences with family members taking personal possessions or prohibiting freedom of movement and economic empowerment were very low across the sample of women. Respondents from North, Akkar, Beqaa, Baalbek-Hermel, and Nabatieh experienced the highest rates of gender discrimination, a phenomenon most acute in North.

Females reported higher rates of support for gender empowerment across all indicators, with the largest disparities in responses between the sexes measured in items relating to aptitude of females for political leadership and household power dynamics. Findings about gender attitudes by confession suggest that, although Christians are more supportive toward gender equality, they hold relatively more conservative positions toward women ability to pass citizenship to children, possibly indicating demographic fears that may supersede concerns related solely to gender norms and empowerment. Muslims, on the other hand, are not as enthusiastic toward gender equality, especially when it comes to changing civil status codes or political empowerment but are more forthcoming in supporting a woman's right to pass citizenship to her children. This, in turn, may be indicative of strong confessional politics, that supersede concerns related only to gender attitudes. Factors correlated with relatively lower levels of support or women's empowerment and equitable gender norms included: (i) being Sunni or, to a lesser degree, Shia, and (ii) living in Nabatieh, North, Akkar, or Baalbek-Hermel. Factors positively correlated with these gender equitable beliefs included: (i) being Maronite or Other Christian, and (ii) living in Beirut or Mount Lebanon

There was strong agreement across the population that women were suitable for manufacturing and professional sector work though, a majority of respondents thought women face more barriers in accessing professional opportunities than men. Factors correlated with perceptions of these structural challenges included: (i) being a woman, (ii) being Sunni, and (iii) living in Beqaa, Baalbek-Hermel, and Akkar. Conversely, only one in three respondents thought women face more barriers in accessing financing than men.

The poor were viewed as the most vulnerable population by an overwhelming majority of respondents, though there was also broad recognition of the fact that disabled people face discrimination in the workplace.

COMPARISON WITH GENDER ASSESSMENT

GOVERNANCE

The Gender Assessment found that the legal environment in Lebanon presented a barrier to women's entry into political office. While there was a perception that the number of women running for office and participating in elections was increasing, "patriarchal" social norms favoring men as better suited for politics, mixed opinions on using gender quotas to address gender gaps in representation, and a relative lack of resources inhibited women's ability to run for and secure political office.

The CPS did not address the legal environment directly, as average citizens likely do not have direct knowledge of this phenomenon. Contrary to the finding the support for gender quotas in elections had mixed support, the CPS found relatively widespread support for quotas across males/females and all governorates with the exception of Nabatieh. This difference may be a function of sampling, in that the Gender Assessment primarily asked this question of government officials. Regarding gendered social norms, the CPS substantiated the finding that Lebanese view men as better suited for politics, a finding fairly widespread among both men and women. However, both sexes expressed strong support for women's ability to occupy high office, the desirability for equality of chance in occupying high office, and women's empowerment to seek elected office.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The Gender Assessment found the absence of a supportive legal environment (e.g. lack of sexual harassment policies/laws, poorly defined or enforced labor law protections, and inequitable social security provisions) to be a hinderance to women's participation in the workforce. Furthermore, gendered stereotypes and social norms (e.g. perceptions that women should not work outside the home or that they are suited only to certain types of work) inhibited women's ability to enter and succeed in the workforce. With regard to access to finance, the Gender Assessment found that while males and females faced similar barriers in accessing loans, personal status, property laws, and gendered stereotypes disproportionately affected women's ability to secure finance.

While the CPS did not address the legal environment, strong majorities of male and female respondents reported working in environments free from gender discrimination. Both sexes believed that women faced more barriers to professional opportunities but, contrary to the Gender Assessment, the perception that access to loans was inequitable was far less widespread. Regarding gender norms, the perception that married women should not work outside the home was seldom reported by either sex, and held across all sub-populations. The discrepancy between Gender Assessment and CPS on this finding could potentially be related to the fact that the survey question asked specifically about 'married' women, whereas the Assessment spoke about the whole female population. Finally, regarding the labor market, while the CPS found strong support from males and females regarding the suitability of women in traditionally male sectors (e.g. industry), respondents sorted themselves into traditional gender roles when asked about personal interest in working across various sectors (e.g. females much less likely to want to work in industrial manufacturing).

9 REFERENCES

Adler, Nancy & Stewart, Judith, "The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status," *Psychosocial Working Group*, (March 2007), https://macses.ucsf.edu/research/psychosocial/subjective.php.

Adler, Nancy, "MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status – Adult Version," *Stanford SPARQtools,* (2000), http://sparqtools.org/mobility-measure/macarthur-scale-of-subjective-social-status-adult-version/.

Arab Barometer. 2006-2007 Wave I Questionnaire.

Arab Barometer. 2010-2011 Wave II Questionnaire.

Arab Barometer. 2012-2014 Wave III Questionnaire.

Arab Barometer. 2016-2017 Wave IV Questionnaire.

Arab Barometer Survey Project. 2007. Lebanon Report.

"Arab Youth Survey," *ASDA'A BCW* (2019), https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/about_the_survey.html.

Atallah, Sami, "Lebanon Country Report," *Arab Barometer II,* pp. 1-24 (September 2012), Arab Barometer, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Lebanon_Public_Opinion_Survey_2011.pdf.

Barshad, Amos, "The World's Most Dangerous Census," *The Nation,* (October 17, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/lebanon-census/.

"Central Data Catalogue," *The World Bank*, https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/?country[]=lebanon#_r=1571237629452&collection=&country=&dtype=&from=1890&page=1&ps=&sid=&sk=lebanon&sort_by=rank&sort_order=desc&to=2019&topic=&view=s&vk=.

Ceyhun, Huseyin, E., "Lebanon: Five Years after the Arab Uprisings," *Wave 4 Lebanon Country Report*, (October 20, 2017), Arab Barometer, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Lebanon_Public_Opinion_Survey_2016.pdf.

Chaaban, Jad & Harb, Jana, "Macroeconomic implications of windfall oil and gas revenues in Lebanon," *The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) Policy Paper,* pp. 2-28 (2015), https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/publications/1450350528-jana_harb-paper_eng.qxp_lcps.pdf.

Chaaban, Jad, "Avoiding the Resource Curse in Lebanon," *The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS)*, Policy Brief No. 18, (January 2016), https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/publications/1459424105-policy_brief_18_web.pdf.

Farida, Moe & Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z., "Corruption and economic growth in Lebanon," *Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society 52nd Annual Conference,* pp. 2-27 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6239186.pdf.

Hamden, Kamal, "Micro and Small Enterprises in Lebanon," *ERF Research Report*, No. 0417, pp. 1-48, https://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PRR0417.pdf.

Karaki, Jameel W., "Access to Welfare in Lebanon: The Case Study of How Hezbollah's Social Welfare Programs are Replacing the Absence of a Strong State in Lebanon," *Thesis*, pp. 1-41 (April 2013) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308938402_Access_to_welfare_in_Lebanon_The_Case_Study_of_How_Hezbollah's_Social_Welfare_Programs_are_Replacing_the_Absence_of_a_Strong_State_in_Lebanon.

Kelly, Caitlin; Alias, Amirah; Miller, Anna; & Prelis, Lakshitha, S., "Using Media to Engage with Lebanese Youth on Identity and Social Cohesion," *Search for Common Ground, Children & Youth Case Study Series*, pp. 5-15 (2015) https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Using-Media-to-Engage-with-Youth-on-Identity-and-Social-Cohesion-in-Lebanon.pdf.

"Labor Force and Economic Activity Rates," *CAS (*2009), http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/Mics3/MISC3_new/Labor%20force%20in%202009.pdf.

"Labor Force and Economic Activity Rates," *CAS*, pp. 54-254 (2004), http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/PDFs/Labor%20force%20and%20economic%20activity%20rates-2004.pdf.

"Lebanese youth use social media to challenge old political class," *The Associated Press* (August 27, 2015), https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/716701/lebanese-youth-use-social-media-to-challenge-old-political-class.

"Lebanon launches its first labour force survey to meet mounting economic and labour market challenges," *International Labour Organization (ILO)* (January 31, 2018), https://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/news/WCMS_616454/lang--en/index.htm.

Lebanon Economic Monitor, (October 30, 2018), The World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/publication/lebanon-economic-monitor.

Lebanon's Economic Update – April 2019, (April 2019), The World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/publication/economic-update-april-2019.

"Lebanon Report," *Arab Barometer Survey Project,* https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Lebanon_Public_Opinion_Survey-2007.pdf.

"Lebanon SME Strategy," *Inventis*, (December 16, 2014), https://www.economy.gov.lb/media/10311/launching-of-the-sme-strategy-december-16-2014.pdf.

"Lebanon," *Macro Poverty Outlook*, pp. 162-163, (October 2019), The World Bank, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/715681570664068959/EN-MPO-OCT19-Lebanon.pdf.

"Lebanon's youth bearing the brunt of unemployment, regional instability," *The Arab Weekly*, (August 6, 2017), https://thearabweekly.com/lebanons-youth-bearing-brunt-unemployment-regional-instability.

"Lights, Handguns, Action," *Business in Lebanon,* (February 26, 2015), *The Economist,* https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/02/26/lights-handguns-action?frsc=dg%7Ca.

Maamari, Bassem, E. & El Zein, Hala, "The Impact of Social Media on the Political Interests of the Youth in Lebanon at the Wake of the Arab Spring," *Social Science Computer Review*, 32(4), pp. 496–505 (2014) https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0894439313512777.

"Mind the Gap – A Labor Needs Assessment for Lebanon," *UNDP (2016),* https://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/img/SocialandLocalDevelopment/Mind%20the%20gap%20final%2022%20March%20.pdf.

Mneimneh, Razan, "Lebanon's president says unemployment is at 46 percent. Is it true?" *Step Feed,* (April 4, 2018), https://stepfeed.com/lebanon-s-president-says-unemployment-is-at-46-percent-is-it-true-7375.

Najid, "How EDZ Brought 24/7 Electricity to Zahle? Full Story + Exclusive Pictures," *Blog Baladi*, (February 8, 2016), https://blogbaladi.com/how-edz-brought-247-electricity-to-zahle-full-story-exclusive-pictures/.

Naylor, Hugh, "In a country where outages are the norm, a Lebanese town now has power 24/7," *Washington Post*, (August 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/a-lebanese-town-has-electricity-247-and-thats-a-big-deal-for-the-middle-east/2016/08/26/1d71aa42-63de-11e6-b4d8-33e931b5a26d_story.html.

"Poll 'Ipsos" – Republic': Lebanese on the Budget⋯ No Confidence," *Al Joumhouria* (June 24, 2019), http://www.aljoumhouria.com/news/index/476478.

"Projects in Lebanon," *The World Bank*, https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-summary?lang=en&searchTerm=&countrycode_exact=LB.

"Protests in Lebanon's Capital Over Worsening Economic Crisis," *The Associated Press* (September 29, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/protests-in-lebanon-s-capital-over-worsening-economic-crisis-1.7918960.

Raz, Daniela, "Youth in Middle East and North Africa," *Arab Barometer – Wave V*, pp. 2-19 (August 2019), Arab Barometer, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Youth_Report_Public-Opinion_Middle-East-North-Africa_2019-1.pdf.

Stukel, Diana M, "Feed the Future Population-Based Survey Sampling Guide," *Feed the Future Survey Implementation Document*, pp. 1-114 (April 2018), FHI 360, https://www.fantaproject.org/sites/default/files/resources/FTF-PBS-Sampling%20Guide-Apr2018.pdf.

"Survey of Syrian Refugees and Host Communities , 2015-2016," *The World Bank*, (July 9, 2019) https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3471/related-materials.

Temsah, Rena, "Factors keeping Lebanese youth unemployed," *Executive Magazine,* (March 14, 2019), https://www.executive-magazine.com/opinion/factors-keeping-lebanese-youth-unemployed.

Thomas, Kathrin, "Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa," *Arab Barometer – Wave V,* pp. 2-25 (August 2019), Arab Barometer, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB_Women_August2019_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer.pdf.

USAID. 2019 (unpublished). Gender Assessment. Produced by Social Impact, Inc. for USAID/Lebanon.

USAID. 2019 (unpublished). Economic Growth Assessment. Produced by Social Impact, Inc. for USAID/Lebanon.

USAID. 2019 (unpublished). Political Economy Assessment. Produced by Social Impact, Inc. for USAID/Lebanon.

USAID. 2012. (unpublished). Survey of Lebanese Citizens' Priority Concerns and Attitudes towards Civic Engagement. Produced by Management Systems International (MSI) for USAID/Lebanon.

"Youth-Led NGOs in Lebanon Learn Social Media Techniques," *NET MED Youth (UNESCO and EU) News* (October 23, 2015), https://www.netmedyouth.org/news/youth-led-ngos-lebanon-learn-social-media-techniques.

ANNEX I: DETAILED METHODS

SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATIONS

To estimate the sample size needed to estimate a proportion of 50%, with a margin of error of ±5 percentage points (0.05), with 95% confidence, we use the following equation: $\frac{p*(1-p)}{(m.e./z)^2}$ where p=the proportion to be estimated (in this case set at 50%); m.e.=margin of error (set at 0.05); and z= the z-statistic corresponding to 95% confidence, in this case 1.96. The assumption of a proportion (p) of 50% is used as it is the most conservative assumption that can be used within this equation (any value below or above that will yield a smaller sample size, all else equal).

The resulting sample size is 384. Given the desire for governorate-level representativeness, the sample size becomes the per-governorate sample size. That per-governorate sample size is further multiplied by the design effect (DEFF), which accounts for the extra sample size needed to achieve the desired level of precision given the two-stage cluster sample approach, relative to what would be needed if it were a simple random sample across each governorate. For this activity, we assumed a DEFF of 1.75, based on research into other similar surveys such as the Arab Barometer.

Multiplying the sample size estimated using the equation above by DEFF=1.75, we obtain a new sample size of 672. This per governorate sample size was inflated a final time to account for the expected response rate. Given background research and discussions with local data collection firms, SI anticipated a non-response rate of about 25% of households that were approached for an interview. Therefore, the sample size is divided by the expected response rate (75%) to inflate the per-governorate sample size needed to achieve the required attempted sample size:

$$\left[\frac{p*(1-p)}{(m.e./z)^2} * DEFF\right] \Big/ response\ rate$$

The final per-governorate sample size (for attempted interviews given the expected response rate) was thus calculated as 896. This was multiplied by nine (one for each governorate), and then that number 8,064 was proportionally allocated across governorates based on their population, to achieve an overall sample size representative of the national population. The per-governorate populations used for this allocation were derived from population estimates provided in a 2016 Ministry of Health Statistical Bulletin, which was the most updated available at the time of planning the CPS. These population numbers intentionally exclude all Palestinian and Syrian refugees given the focus of the Lebanon CPS.

In the absence of a reliable sampling frame from which to draw a random sample, the CPS employed a two-stage cluster sampling approach, with clusters drawn from within districts and then households systematically sampled from within clusters. Clusters are thus the primary sampling units (PSUs), and were comprised of villages and towns, or in the cases of large villages and towns, sub-sections of the same. Ten households were sampled per cluster, in line with the design effect estimate described above.

Fewer households per cluster increases the overall number of clusters needed to achieve the required sample size, which reduces the intra-cluster correlation (ICC). The ICC implied by the design effect of 1.75 is 0.08, based on the equation: DEFF = 1+ρ(m-1) where ρ (rho) is the intra-cluster correlation and m is the number of households per cluster.

An assumption of 10 households sampled per cluster is used in the calculation of the number of clusters. This may be a relatively low ICC considering the level of anticipated homogeneity within clusters in Lebanon. However, 1.5 is a common standard assumption for DEFF in opinion polling and using data from similar surveys in the recent past showing similar design effects for key indicators, SI determined that 1.75 (a slightly higher DEFF than found in other sources) was an acceptable and slightly more conservative DEFF for designing the sampling approach for this study. In practice, the number of households per PSU varied slightly in some cases due primarily to logistical reasons, though the effect on the results is negligible and accounted for in sample weighting described in the following section.

In practice, Ii was able to achieve a much higher response rate than expected, and further, achieved a final sample size that was equivalent to this attempted interview size, making the CPS sample even more robust than initially anticipated. The allocation of PSUs and final sample of interviewed households by district is provided below in Table 30.

TABLE 30. ALLOCATION OF PSUS AND SAMPLE BY DISTRICT (CAZA)

Governorate	District (Caza)	PSUs	Sample (# interviews completed)
Akkar	Akkar	57	573
Baalbek-Hermel	Baalbek	48	489
Baalbek-Hermel	Hermel	11	116
Beirut	Beirut	76	754
Beqaa	Rachaiya	7	70
Beqaa	West Beqaa	16	161
Beqaa	Zahleh	32	321
Keserwan-Jbeil	Jbeil	17	174
Keserwan-Jbeil	Keserwan	31	311
Mount Lebanon	Aaley	26	260
Mount Lebanon	Baabda	91	906
Mount Lebanon	Chouf	33	332
Mount Lebanon	Metn	90	899
Nabatieh	Bint Jbeil	18	175
Nabatieh	Hasbaiya	6	60
Nabatieh	Marjaayoun	14	139
Nabatieh	Nabatieh	24	237
North	Batroun	8	84
North	Bcharreh	5	47
North	Koura	11	110
North	Minieh-Danniyeh	27	270
North	Tripoli	54	540
North	Zgharta	12	120
South	Jezzine	5	52
South	Saida	44	448
South	Sour	44	443

SAMPLING WEIGHTS

A multi-stage cluster sample was drawn because no population-wide sampling frame of ultimate sampling units (households) exists. The first stage of sampling was to draw primary sampling units (PSUs) representing towns and villages as described above, from within districts in each governorate. Finite population correction (FPC) was not used in the sample size calculation given the small percentage of the overall population being sampled from each governorate. Ii first divided the PSUs within each district (caza) into strata based on their resident population. The final stage weight is given by the number of households sampled within each PSU, relative to the population of the PSU (estimated resident population divided by the national average household size).

The calculation of sampling weights follows procedures prescribed in the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance III Project (FANTA) manual for population-based surveys.[27] The first stage probability was calculated to reflect the probability of each cluster being selected from within each district. The second stage probability was calculated to reflect the probability of each household being selected from within each cluster (PSU). These probabilities were calculated according to the following formulas:

Stage 1 probability for each PSU:

$$\frac{Number\ of\ clusters\ (PSUs) selected\ in\ district * Number\ of\ households\ selected\ from\ the\ PSU}{Total\ number\ of\ households\ selected\ from\ all\ clusters\ in\ the\ district}$$

Stage 2: Selection of households from within PSUs

$$\frac{Number\ of\ households\ selected\ in\ PSU}{Total\ number\ of\ households\ in\ PSU}$$

Following this, stage 1 and stage 2 probabilities were multiplied to reflect the probability that the PSU and household within that PSU were both selected, and the household weight was calculated as the inverse of this: Household weight = 1 / (Stage 1 probability * Stage 2 probability). Household weights were applied to the data during analysis using Stata 15.0 software, employing the suite of commands compatible with Stata's -svy- function.

NOTES ON DATA QUALITY

The Lebanon CPS dataset was conducted professionally and resulting data was of high quality, requiring minimal cleaning prior to analysis. A summary of data quality and any related data quality steps taken to prepare the final dataset for analysis is below.

RESPONSE RATE

- Interviewers successfully accessed the dwelling in 99.7% of attempts. Among the 23 cases where they could not access, the main reasons were that entry was restricted e.g. gated (12, 52%), not allowed inside the compound (8, 35%), or another reason (3, 13%).
- Someone at home in 98.4% of cases where dwelling accessible (98.1% of all attempts). Out of the 141 cases where they were not able to find someone, most times the household was simply out (113, 80%), otherwise the household was out for an extended period of time (17, 12%), dwelling was vacant

[27] https://www.fantaproject.org/sites/default/files/resources/FTF-PBS-Sampling%20Guide-Apr2018.pdf

(6, 4.3%), dwelling was not found (2, 1.4%), or another reason (3, 2%) one of which was listed as "did not want to continue" which may be recoded as a refusal.

- Eligible respondents were available in 97.8% of cases where someone was home (96% of all attempts). Out of the 188 cases where an eligible respondent was not found, the main reasons included no Lebanese citizen present (54, 29%), no one within eligible age range (77, 41%), or another reason (57, 30%). Most "other" responses were variations on refusals, which may be recoded as such.
- Out of all eligible respondents, 95.3% consented to be interviewed (91.5% of all attempts). Out of the 404 refusals, most were due to inability to spare the time (269, 67%), some were not interested in the topic (81, 20%), others were concerned about privacy or safety (52, 13%), 1 was reportedly Syrian, and 1 refused to specify.

The geographic distribution by each stage of this process is shown below, along with the sex and age distribution of those who refused to participate in the study. Overall, those who refused were just slightly younger and were slightly more likely to be female than those who completed interviews.

Could not access dwelling

Governorate	#	%
Beirut	5	21.74
Keserwan-Jbeil	1	4.35
Mount Lebanon	15	65.22
South	2	8.7
Total	*23*	*100*

No one home

Governorate	#	%
Beirut	31	21.99
Keserwan-Jbeil	15	10.64
Mount Lebanon	57	40.43
North	2	1.42
South	36	25.53
Total	*141*	*100*

No eligible respondent available

Governorate	#	%
Beirut	23	12.23
Keserwan-Jbeil	27	14.36
Mount Lebanon	108	57.45
Nabatieh	5	2.66
North	11	5.85
South	14	7.45
Total	*188*	*100*

Refused to participate

Governorate	#	%
Akkar	3	0.74
Baalbek-Hermel	1	0.25

Beirut	69	17.08
Beqaa	1	0.25
Keserwan-Jbeil	6	1.49
Mount Lebanon	177	43.81
Nabatieh	59	14.6
South	*88*	*21.78*
Total	*404*	*100*

Sex of those who refused to participate

Sex	#	%
Female	228	56.44
Male	176	43.56
Total	*404*	*100*

Age of those who refused to participate

Measure	Age
mean	37
median	35
min	18
max	65
n	404

INTERVIEWS EXCLUDED FROM FINAL DATASET

Due to interview duration

A total of 265 observations were dropped from the dataset based on short duration, in accordance with Ii's strict implementation of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards. The summary of the interview duration for these dropped observations is below, along with the total number of observations dropped by governorate.

Interview duration (minutes)	N	Mean	Min	Max
Dropped observations	265	19	4	23

Governorate	Freq.	Percent of total dropped
Akkar	27	10.19
Baalbek-Hermel	30	11.32
Beirut	15	5.66
Beqaa	13	4.91
Keserwan-Jbeil	6	2.26
Mount Lebanon	73	27.55
Nabatieh	3	1.13
North	55	20.75
South	43	16.23
Total	*265*	*100.00*

Due to interviewer observations

Based on questions answered by the interviewer after the end of the questionnaire for each respondent, we observed that in 33 cases, others were present during the interview and the respondent was observed to be impatient, nervous, uncooperative, or hostile. These observations are dropped from the final dataset. The remainder of the interviews which were either marked as someone unwelcome present or respondent felt impatient, etc. will be kept for the purposes of analysis. Given that they are a small percentage of the total interviews done, there is a low likelihood that exclusion would substantially alter the results. A summary of the 33 dropped observations is below.

Governorate	#	%
Akkar	3	9.09
Baalbek-Hermel	3	9.09
Beirut	15	45.45
Beqaa	2	6.06
Mount Lebanon	1	3.03
North	4	12.12
South	5	15.15
Total	*33*	*100*

Due to duplication of submissions

Two observations were dropped from the dataset because they were exact duplicates of other submissions. One was an exact duplicate in all fields, while the other was an exact duplicate until a certain point in the survey, empty thereafter, and lacked even a system-generated unique identifier in the appropriate field.

Due to technical issues on electronic device

One observation was dropped due to a technical issue on the device, that interview was later re-conducted and successfully submitted. Another observation was dropped as it was submitted in error during the first week of data collection as an interviewer was practicing.

Due to early termination of interview

During data collection, there were four partially completed interviews. The interviews were stopped at the respondents' request during or just following Module C of the interview. In these cases, the respondent either had to leave the house (1), declined to continue because of questionnaire length (1), or simply refused to continue (2). These four observations are excluded from the final dataset.

DATA CORRECTIONS

Minimal corrections were necessary. Corrections made to the data fell into the following categories:

Field(s)	Correction	# observations affected	% of variable's values
a3	Correct incorrectly entered primary sampling unit. All corrections were within same governorate and caza.	48	0.6%
d2_m	Incorrect Arabic translation until form version 1905210754. Responses from older form versions dropped.	333	4%
e3, e4	Incorrectly programmed constraints until form version 1905232121. Observations outside valid range input into previous form versions were dropped.	47	e3: 18% e4: 0.6%
f1	From partial completion to completed	1	0.0001%

various	Recoded other/specify responses in cases where there was a suitable already among pre-determined response options.	Varies by var. Range: 0-1340; Mean: 144; Median: 58	Varies by var. Range: 0-17%; Mean: 2% Median: 1%
c37	Positive 98 and 99 were recoded as -98 and -99, the quantities that were used to indicate "don't know" and "refused"	Don't know: 439 Refused: 16	DK: 16% Refused: 0.6%
c41	Positive 98 and 99 were recoded as -98 and -99, the quantities that were used to indicate "don't know" and "refused"	Don't know: 524 Refused: 13	DK: 36% Refused: 0.9%

REMAINING ISSUES

Field(s)	Issue	Form versions affected	# observations affected	% of dataset
b8_rank2 b8_rank3	Other/specify text field did not appear in early form versions (programming error)	1905171813 1905202045	11	0.1%
c1_ta_4 c1_ta_iv	Other/specify text field did not appear (programming error)	All	2	0.0002%
c10_a – c10_f	Missing observations where data expected; survey programming error identified and fixed rapidly.	1905162352 1905171813 1905202045	208	2.6%
e1_ii	Highest level of education is missing in some cases. Programming erroneously did not mark as "required", allowing some to skip the question incorrectly.	All	26	0.3%

POSSIBLE KNOWN BIASES

- Bank account: There could be systematic underreporting of households having a bank account based on fears/sensitivities about providing financial information in a survey, as well as possible bias based on who was available at home for an interview.
- Household income: There could be systematic underreporting of income based on fears/sensitivities about providing financial information in a survey. There is also a possibility that households that were accessible to the interviewers, and those that were more likely to be available for the interview, could be of lower socioeconomic status, based on either their working status, accessibility of their home (e.g. gated/guarded buildings of some higher income households), or willingness to spare the time.
- Household business: There could be systematic underreporting of households having a business based on fears/sensitivities about providing this information in a survey, especially if the business is informal or unregistered. More likely, a person running this business may not have been at home or available for the survey, so there is a possibility that respondents who were available may be less likely to own a business.
- Currently working: There is a possibility that respondents who were available for the survey may be less likely to be currently working.

ITEM NON-RESPONSE

There were no issues with item non-response that raise any concerns for analysis, especially with respect to refusals to questions throughout the survey. Below we list instances where "don't know" or "refused" responses comprise at least 5% of a variable's valid responses. In most of these cases, "don't know" is an informative response in and of itself; as such, the cases listed below are not viewed as problematic for analysis.

Field	Response	# responses	% of variable
b3: Economic situation in Lebanon five years from now	"Don't know"	1216	15%
b6: Economic situation of household five years from now	"Don't know"	1981	24.5%
b19_c: Agreement with: *muhafiz* addresses citizen needs	"Don't know"	1448	17.9%
b19_d: Agreement with: *qaemaqam* addresses citizen needs	"Don't know"	2117	26.2%
b19_g: Agreement with: civil society addresses citizen needs	"Don't know"	632	7.8%
b20_a: Trust in institution: Banque du Liban	"Don't know"	785	9.7%
b20_e: Trust in institution: Judiciary	"Don't know"	439	5.4%
b21_b: Satisfaction with govt. coordination to keep peace in South	"Don't know"	624	7.7%
b22: Rating of current security vs. volatility in the South	"Don't know"	481	5.9%
b24: Rating of possibility of renewal of violent conflict in Lebanon	"Don't know"	467	5.8%
b25: Which 2 countries provide greatest support for Lebanon	"Don't know"	444	5.5%
c1_ta: Activities from which temporarily absent in last week	"Don't know"	6	23.1%
c1_ta: Activities from which temporarily absent in last week	"Refused"	3	11.5%
c19: Prefer to save in LL for high return or USD for less return	"Don't know"	429	5.3%
c33_rank3: Third ranked constraint to private sector development	"Don't know"	36	6.2%
c37 Willingness to pay for weekly recycling service	"Don't know"	462	16.9%
c37 Willingness to pay for weekly recycling service	"Refused"	24	0.9%
c41 Willingness to pay to convert to solar water heater	"Don't know"	544	37.8%
c41 Willingness to pay to convert to solar water heater	"Refused"	28	1.7%
d2_h: Women face more barriers than men in access to finance	"Don't know"	610	12.8%
e5: Other than Lebanese, most important identifier of who you are	"Refused"	468	5.8%
bc: Agreement to provide name & phone number for backchecks	"Refused"	717	8.9%

POSSIBLE OUTLIERS & ANOMALOUS VALUES

There were very few continuous fields on this survey given the nature of the questions asked, and for those questions there were no major issues with outliers. A small number of outliers were flagged and validated by Ii calling back respondents to check the accuracy of the inputs. In some cases, responses were amended to reflect the accurate response.

BACK CHECKS

Out of the total survey respondents, 91% (7,379) consented and provided their name and phone number for potential back-checks. Back-checks were completed for 6% (n=477) of the total sample. Overall, the distribution of back checks was in line with the distribution of the main survey across governorates. Likewise, the age and gender profile of those reached by back checks was in line with the main survey: 49% female respondents, 51% male respondents, and a mean and median age of 39. Based on considerations about the local context and phone-based back checks, this backcheck form did not seek to directly validate the survey responses; rather it about whether specific topics were addressed during the main interview, and about the interviewers' performance. The back-check results did not raise any flags with regard to interviewer performance and indicated that all required sections of the interview that were asked about on the backcheck form were addressed in the original interview.

One issue flagged by the backcheck results is that one household who said that there was no one by respondent name at household + was not visited by an interviewer. Upon further investigation by SI and Ii, it was concluded that the respondent's phone number was recorded incorrectly (either given incorrectly by the respondent or recorded incorrectly by the interviewer), and thus the phone number called during the back-check was in fact a wrong number and not the intended respondent.

ACCOMPANIMENT/DIRECT OBSERVATION

Interviewers were each directly observed on multiple occasions by supervisors and marked on a series of topics related to the degree to which they were following survey protocols, establishing rapport with respondent households, administering the consent form and survey according to instructions, and behaving professionally and respectfully. Supervisors filled in a separate accompaniment form recording the results of these direct observations. A total of 410 accompaniments were conducted, representing 5% of the total sample. Any given interviewer was observed anywhere between one to fourteen times during data collection. Overall the results showed that interviewers were conducting the survey properly – the main issues marked in the accompaniment forms were interviewers who did not have their ID or survey manuals on their person at the time of the observation.

In a very small number of cases, interviewers were marked as having some challenge with the consent form, response choices, pace, and comfort with the survey. However, there were no overall patterns in the accompaniment form results that would have indicated any significant or persistent issue across interviewers, nor for any specific interviewers. Supervisor observations were used by Ii to course correct.

ANNEX II: QUESTIONNAIRE

MODULE A: SAMPLING, CONSENT, BASIC RESPONDENT INFORMATION

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
a1.	**Enumerator ID**	*Will be drop-down list from a pre-load*
a2.	**Governorate**	*Will be drop-down list from a pre-load*
a3.	**Caza**	*Will be drop-down list from a pre-load*
a4.	**Primary Sampling Unit (PSU)**	*Will be drop-down list from a pre-load*
a5.	**Date of Survey**	__ __ | __ __ | 2019 *D D | M M | 2019*
a6. _a	**Were you able to access the dwelling?**	[1] Yes [2] No → **NC0_i**
a6_b	**Anyone at home?**	[1] Yes [2] No → **NC1**
a7.	**Eligible respondent available?** *(M or F member of household (Lebanese citizen), age 18-65.)*	[1] Yes [2] No → **NC2**
a8.	**CONSENT SCRIPT:** My name is [interviewer name]. I am working with a survey firm called Information International. We are conducting a citizen perception survey nation-wide in Lebanon with a development organization called Social Impact. As part of this study, we plan to interview about 8 thousand households from across the country. Your household has been randomly selected to participate. As part of this survey, we would like to ask you to answer some questions related to your perceptions about current economic, political, and social issues as well as satisfaction with current employment and economic situation and satisfaction with public services in Lebanon and in your community. The survey will take approximately 30-35 minutes. Your participation is voluntary and you may choose not to participate. You may also choose not to answer any specific question in the survey for any reason and you may request to end the survey at any time. There is no direct benefit for participating, and there is no consequence if you choose not to participate. Your personal identifying information will be kept confidential by the research team. Results of the survey will be aggregated for analysis and may be published at the conclusion of the study. Your personal information will not be disclosed in any publication and will be stored securely by the research team. However, your views are important and we hope that you will take the time to participate. If you have any questions about the study or your rights as a participant, you may contact [Field Coordinator contact] or Social Impact at [Social Impact IRB Contact]. If you have any questions for me, you are free to ask at any time during the interview. Do you have any questions before we begin? **Do you agree to participate?**	[1] Yes [2] No → **NC3**
a9.	**i) Sex of respondent** **ii) Age of respondent**	i) [1] Female [2] Male ii) #:___ (years) Don't know: -98 | Refused: -99

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
a10.	**What is your relationship to the head of household?**	[1] Head of household [2] Spouse of head of household [3] Parent of head of household [4] Child of head of household [5] Sibling of head of household [6] Other relative of head of household [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
a11.	**What is your marital status?**	[1] Unmarried [2] Married [3] Divorced/Separated [4] Widow/Widower [5] Engaged [6] Living with a partner [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
a12.	**Including yourself, how many people are members of this household?** *Note on definition of household members:* *A household consists of a single person or group of persons (related or unrelated) who contributes to or benefits from any pooled expenses for food and essential items for living. Members of the group may pool their incomes to some extent.* *A household is not the same as the dwelling (the physical structure or space). Note that it is possible that not everyone who lives in the dwelling is a member of the household. Likewise, it could be that a single household spans more than 1 dwelling (e.g. a family and their in-laws who live next door) if they meet the definition of household above.*	#: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

MODULE B: POLITICAL ECONOMY & CITIZEN SATISFACTION

We will start with some questions about current issues and public services in Lebanon.

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
b1.	**How would you describe the current economic situation in Lebanon?**	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first:* [1] Very good [2] Good [3] Average [4] Bad [5] Very Bad [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b2.	**How would you describe the economic situation in Lebanon five years ago, compared to today?**	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first:* [1] Was much better five years ago [2] Was somewhat better five years ago [3] Was same as today five years ago

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
		[4] Was somewhat worse five years ago [5] Was much worse five years ago [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b3.	**How do you think the economic situation in Lebanon five years from now will compare to the current situation?**	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first:* [1] Will be much better [2] Will be somewhat better [3] Will be the same as current situation [4] Will be somewhat worse [5] Will be much worse [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b4.	**How would you describe your household's current economic situation?**	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first:* [1] Very good [2] Good [3] Average [4] Bad [5] Very Bad [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b5.	**How would you describe your household's economic situation five years ago, compared to today?**	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first:* [1] Was much better five years ago [2] Was somewhat better five years ago [3] Was same as today five years ago [4] Was somewhat worse five years ago [5] Was much worse five years ago [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b6.	**How do you think your household's economic situation 5 years from now will compare to the current situation?**	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first:* [1] Will be much better [2] Will be somewhat better [3] Will be the same as current situation [4] Will be somewhat worse [5] Will be much worse [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b7.	**In your opinion what are the top 3 major challenges currently facing Lebanon? (Top of mind)**	*Open-ended text fields – can specify up to three* **#1:** _____ **#2:** _____ **#3:** _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b8.	**I will read to you a number of topics related to livelihoods, society, politics, and the environment.** **Among those topics, please rank what you think should be the three most important priorities of the new government. You may also specify something that is not on this list.** *Enumerator reads one by one before any responses are recorded. Read through only the broad issues and provide the additional explanation only if asked by the respondent to*	**#1:** _____ **(most important)** **#2:** _____ **#3:** _____

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
	clarify any specific issue. You may repeat the choices (the broad categories) multiple times as needed. **a. Cost of living** *e.g. housing, food, transportation, merchandise, etc., cost of education, cost of electricity, cost of telecommunications, cost of healthcare, cost of water).* **b. Social Issues** *Drugs, Gender equality, Gender-based violence, child labor, petty crime/violence, Social protection (pensions/assistance)* **c. Sectarianism in society** *disparities in employment, law enforcement, social separation, religious extremism, etc.* **d. Public services & infrastructure** *Electricity, roads, water, sewerage, telecommunications, garbage collection, health care facilities* **e. Security, Stability, Conflict** *Regional conflict/war , Internal conflicts, Armed political groups, Proliferation of small arms, Security and safety* **f. Governance Issues** *Politicized judicial institutions, corruption in the government, Confessional political system, Electoral reform, Public participation in decision-making, Political stability* **g. Economic Growth** *Job creation, employment, private sector development, foreign direct investment* **h. Media Issues** *Politicized media, Freedom of expression* **i. Environmental Issues** *Use of alternative energy sources, solid garbage management, contamination of drinking water, wastewater treatment, climate change, deforestation, quarries, pollution, loss of biodiversity* **j. Other, specify: _____**	[-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b9.	**I will now read you a list of specific public services. For each, please indicate your current level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with each of these public services, using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is very dissatisfied and 5 is very satisfied.** **a. Sewage treatment** **b. Garbage collection** **c. Electricity** **d. Roads** **e. Health services** **f. Education** **g. Security services** **h. Water**	*Record #1 through 5:* a: _____ b: _____ c: _____ d: _____ e: _____ f: _____ g: _____ h: _____ i: _____ *Choices for each include:* [1] Very dissatisfied [2] Dissatisfied [3] Neutral [4] Satisfied [5] Very satisfied [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
b10.	**In your opinion, which of the following <u>three</u> issues represent the greatest obstacles in Lebanon to improved public service delivery?**	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first.* [1] Inadequate budget/resources [2] Poorly skilled/unmotivated civil servants [3] Government inefficiency [4] Too costly (price of services) [5] Lack of political will [6] Corruption [7] Inadequate citizen participation and voice [8] No accountability system [9] No obstacles [-96] Other (specify) [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused **#1:** _____ (greatest obstacle) **#2:** _____ **#3:** _____
b11.	**I will read you the same list of public services again. Please tell me to whom do you turn to for assistance when confronting problems with each of these at the community level.** *Read available response choices to respondent before recording any responses. Enumerator reads items and records responses one by one.* **a. Sewage treatment** **b. Garbage collection** **c. Electricity** **d. Roads** **e. Health services** **f. Education** **g. Security services** **h. Water**	(a) __ Specify if (a) other: _____ (b)__ Specify if (b) other: _____ (c)__ Specify if (c) other: _____ (d)__ Specify if (d) other: _____ (e)__ Specify if (e) other: _____ (f)__ Specify if (f) other: _____ (g)__ Specify if (g) other: _____ (h)__ Specify if (h) other: _____ (i)__ Specify if (i) other: _____ *Choices for each include:* [1] Civil servant / Public institution [2] Municipality/ Mayor [3] Political party [4] Member of Parliament [5] NGO [6] Relative, friend, neighbor [7] Plumber *(only shows for sewage and water)* [8] Concierge [9] Electrician *(only shows for electricity)* [10] Pharmacist *(only shows for health services)* [11] Minister [-96] Other (specify) [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b12.	**To what extent do you agree or disagree that the government formed in late January 2019 will be more effective in addressing Lebanon's challenges compared to its predecessors? Please respond on a scale of 1 through 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree.**	[1] Strongly disagree [2] Disagree [3] Neutral [4] Agree [5] Strongly Agree [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b13.	**Did you vote in the 2018 elections?**	[1] Yes → **b15** [2] No [-99] Refused → **b15**
b14.	**Why not?**	*Select all that apply.* [1] Did not like any of the candidates or platforms [2] Was threatened/intimidated [3] Did not think it would make a difference

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
		[4] Illness or disability/access [5] Was abroad [6] Registration problems [7] Did not understand the voting process [8] Transportation problems [9] Not eligible [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b15.	**Have you voted in past parliamentary or municipal elections? *(before 2018)***	[1] Yes [2] No [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b16.	**Given the current political situation, do you think exploiting offshore oil reserves will improve the lives of most Lebanese people?**	[1] Yes [2] No [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b17.	**How do you get most of your information about economic, social, and political development issues in Lebanon?**	*Do not read response options. Select all that apply.* [1] Social media [2] Local newspapers [3] Local radio [4] Local television [5] International media [6] Internet [7] Periodicals [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b18.	**Among those, which is your main source information?**	*Drop-down list shows anything selected in b17.*
b19.	**I will now read you a list of different groups. For each group, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement about whether the group effectively addresses citizens' needs. Please answer on a scale of 1 through 5, with 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree:** *Enumerator reads and records response one by one.* **a. Leaders of major political parties** **b. MPs or Ministers** **c. Muhafiz** **d. Qaemaqam** **e. Municipal Leaders** **f. Civil Servants** **g. Civil Society Organizations**	(a) __ (b)__ (c)__ (d)__ (e)__ *Choices for each include:* [1] Strongly Disagree [2] Disagree [3] Neutral [4] Agree [5] Strongly Agree [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b20.	**I will read you a list of institutions in Lebanon. Please tell me whether, in the past five years, your trust in these institutions has increased, decreased, or stayed the same:** *Enumerator reads and records response one by one.* **a. Banque du Liban (BDL)** **b. Council of Ministers** **c. Parliament** **d. Municipalities**	(a) __ (b)__ (c)__ (d)__ (e)__ (f)__ (g)__ (h)__

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
	e. Judiciary **f. Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)** **g. Internal Security Forces (ISF) / Police** **h. General Security**	*Choices for each include:* [1] Increased [2] Decreased [3] Stayed the same [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b21.	**On a scale of 1 through 5, with 1 being completely dissatisfied and 5 being completely satisfied: How would you rank your current level of satisfaction with:** **(a) the Lebanese Government's handling of the Syrian refugee crisis?** *(including providing relief services to refugees, handling security situations of refugees, mitigating host-refugee tensions, negotiating refugee returns, obtaining international aid, etc.).* **(b) government's coordination with the UNIFIL and other armed groups to keep the peace in the South/border areas**	(a): _____ (b): _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused *Choices for each include:* [1] Completely dissatisfied [2] Somewhat dissatisfied [3] Neutral [4] Somewhat satisfied [5] Completely satisfied [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b22.	**In your opinion, how would you describe the current situation in the South, in terms of how vulnerable or secure it is? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "very volatile" and 5 being "very secure".**	*Read response options first:* [1] Very volatile [2] Volatile [3] Neutral [4] Secure [5] Very secure [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b23.	**In your opinion, how would you describe the possibility of a renewal of violent conflict (civil conflict/war) in Lebanon within the next five years?** **Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "very unlikely" and 5 being "very likely".**	[1] Very unlikely [2] Unlikely [3] Neutral [4] Likely [5] Very likely [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b24.	**In your opinion, how would you describe the possibility of a renewal of violent conflict (external) in Lebanon within the next five years? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "very unlikely" and 5 being "very likely".**	[1] Very unlikely [2] Unlikely [3] Neutral [4] Likely [5] Very likely [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
b25.	**In your opinion, which two countries provide the greatest support for Lebanon?**	[1] Iran [2] Saudi Arabia [3] Syria [4] Russia [5] Qatar [6] United States [7] European Union / EU countries [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

MODULE C – PART 1: ECONOMIC GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS

I will now ask you some questions about your current employment/activities, and any business you might own.

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
c1.	**During the last week, have you worked (for at least one hour), doing any of the following activities:**	*Select all that apply.* [1] **In a regular job (at least one hour) for pay (in cash or in kind) for someone who is not a member of the household** *for example, a private enterprise or company, an NGO, or any other individual* [2] **In the non-agricultural sector on your own account or in a business enterprise belonging to you or someone in your household (even unpaid)** *for example, as a trader, shopkeeper, barber, dressmaker, carpenter, maid/domestic worker, driver, car washer, hairdresser, caterer, baby-sitter etc.* [3] **In any occasional job for pay or profit that was not for family or self** *for example, sold goods in the street, helped someone with his/her business, sold some homemade products, washed cars, repaired cars, etc.* [4] **On a farm owned or rented by you or a member of your household (even unpaid) whether in cultivating crops or in other farm maintenance tasks, or cared for livestock belonging to you or a member of your household** **[5] Was temporarily absent from one or more of the above activities** [0] No, not currently working → **c4** [-98] Don't know → **c11** [-99] Refused → **c11**
c1_ta	**During the last week, from which of the following activities were you temporarily absent?**	*Select all that apply.* [1] **In a regular job (at least one hour) for pay (in cash or in kind) for someone who is not a member of the household** *for example, a private enterprise or company, an NGO, or any other individual* [2] **In the non-agricultural sector on your own account or in a business enterprise belonging to you or someone in your household (even unpaid)** *for example, as a trader, shopkeeper, barber, dressmaker, carpenter, maid/domestic worker, driver, car washer, hairdresser, caterer, baby-sitter etc.* [3] **In any occasional job for pay or profit that was not for family or self** *for example, sold goods in the street, helped someone with his/her business, sold some homemade products, washed cars, repaired cars, etc.* [4] **On a farm owned or rented by you or a member of your household (even unpaid) whether in cultivating crops or in other farm maintenance tasks, or cared for livestock belonging to you or a member of your household** [-98] Don't know

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
		[-99] Refused
c1_ta_i	**IF c1_ta = 1:** **Why were you temporarily absent from your regular job?**	[1] Undergoing school, education, or training [2] Off-season [3] Bad weather [4] Free days due to flexible work time [5] Annual leave [6] Maternity leave [7] Own illness, injury, or temporary disability [8] Slack work for technical or economic reasons [9] Suspension through employer (with right to return to work) [10] Labor dispute, strike, or lock-out [11] Bankruptcy, closing down (closure) [12] Looking after children [13] Looking after ill / elderly / incapacitated / disabled adults [14] Lack of reliable/safe/affordable transportation [-96] Other, specify [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c1_ta_ii	**IF c1_ta = 2:** **Why were you temporarily absent from the business enterprise?**	[1] Undergoing school, education, or training [2] Off-season [3] Bad weather [4] Free days due to flexible work time [5] Annual leave [6] Maternity leave [7] Own illness, injury, or temporary disability [8] Slack work for technical or economic reasons [9] Suspension through employer (with right to return to work) [10] Labor dispute, strike, or lock-out [11] Bankruptcy, closing down (closure) [12] Looking after children [13] Looking after ill / elderly / incapacitated / disabled adults [14] Lack of reliable/safe/affordable transportation [-96] Other, specify [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c1_ta_iii	**IF c1_ta = 1:** **Why were you temporarily absent from the occasional job?**	[1] Undergoing school, education, or training [2] Off-season [3] Bad weather [4] Free days due to flexible work time [5] Annual leave [6] Maternity leave [7] Own illness, injury, or temporary disability [8] Slack work for technical or economic reasons [9] Suspension through employer (with right to return to work) [10] Labor dispute, strike, or lock-out [11] Bankruptcy, closing down (closure)

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
		[12] Looking after children [13] Looking after ill / elderly / incapacitated / disabled adults [14] Lack of reliable/safe/affordable transportation [-96] Other, specify [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c1_ta_iv	**IF c1_ta = 1:** **Why were you temporarily absent from the farm?**	[1] Undergoing school, education, or training [2] Off-season [3] Bad weather [4] Free days due to flexible work time [5] Annual leave [6] Maternity leave [7] Own illness, injury, or temporary disability [8] Slack work for technical or economic reasons [9] Suspension through employer (with right to return to work) [10] Labor dispute, strike, or lock-out [11] Bankruptcy, closing down (closure) [12] Looking after children [13] Looking after ill / elderly / incapacitated / disabled adults [14] Lack of reliable/safe/affordable transportation [-96] Other, specify [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c2.	**Which of these activities is your main job?**	*[Drop-down list from choices in c1 or c1_ta]* [-98] Don't know → **c10** [-99] Refused → **c10**
c3.	**Is your <u>main</u> job full time or part time?**	[1] Full-time → **c10** [2] Part-time (usual work is less than normal daily working hours, or fewer than normal working days per week) → **c8** [-98] Don't know → **c11** [-99] Refused → **c11**
c4.	**What are the reasons that you are not working?**	*Select all that apply.* [1] Looking after children → **c6** [2] Looking after ill / elderly / incapacitated / disabled adults → **c6** [3] Own illness or disability → **c6** [4] Undergoing school, education, or training → **c6** [5] Could not find a job → **c6** [6] Off-season → **c6** [7] Lack of reliable/safe/affordable transportation → **c6** [8] Attitude of family/spouse → **c6** [9] Job of limited duration has ended → **c6** [10] Maternity leave → **c6** [11] Discriminatory / unsafe work environment → **c6** [12] Retired → **c11** [13] Dismissed/laid off → **c6** [14] Do not want a job (specify reason) [-96] Other, specify: _____ → **c6** [-98] Don't know → **c6** [-99] Refused → **c6**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
c5.	**Why do you not want a job?**	Open text field then → **c11**
c6.	**In the last 4 weeks, have you looked for work (even if for a minor job of as little as one hour per week) or tried to establish your own business?** *"Looking for work" can include any of the following: asking friends/relatives about work, reading and responding to newspaper advertisements, contacting public employment office, contacting an employment agency, applying for jobs, taking tests or interviewing for jobs, looking for land of premises for own business, etc.*	[1] Yes → **c11** [2] No [-98] Don't know → **c11** [-99] Refused → **c11**
c7.	**What is the main reason you did not look for work in the last four weeks?**	[1] Looking after children (personally and NOT as a job or volunteer for some agency) → **c11** [2] Looking after ill / elderly / incapacitated / disabled adults (personally, and not as part of a job or volunteer for some agency) → **c11** [3] Own illness or disability → **c11** [4] Undergoing school, education, or training → **c11** [5] Retired → **c11** [6] Planning to start a business → **c11** [7] Believes that no work is available → **c11** [8] Awaiting results for job application or recruitment → **c11** [9] Waiting for a call from a public employment office → **c11** [10] Not qualified to work → **c11** [11] Lack of reliable / safe / affordable transportation → **c11** [-96] Other, specify: _____ → **c11** [-98] Don't know → **c11** [-99] Refused → **c11**
c8.	**What is the main reason that you are working part-time instead of full-time?**	[1] Looking after children (personally, not as a job or volunteer for some agency) → **c10** [2] Looking after ill/elderly/incapacitated/disabled adults (personally, not as a job or volunteer for some agency) → **c10** [3] Own illness or disability → **c10** [4] Undergoing school, education, or training → **c10** [5] Could not find a full-time job → **c10** [6] Off-season → **c10** [7] Slack work for technical or economic reasons → **c10** [8] Lack of reliable/safe/affordable transportation → **c10** [9] Do not want a full-time job (specify reason) [-96] Other, specify: _____ → **c10** [-98] Don't know → **c10** [-99] Refused → **c10**
c9.	**Why do you not want a full-time job?**	*Open text field*
c10.	**I will now read you a list of statements that pertain to your <u>main job</u>. For each of them, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. Please answer on a scale of 1 through 5, where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree.** **(a) "I have a good salary."** **(b) "I have good working conditions."**	(a) __ (b)__ (c)__ (d)__ (e)__ (f)__ *Choices for each include:* [1] Strongly Disagree

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
	(c) "I work a sufficient number of hours." **(d) "I have job stability."** **(e) "I have good benefits."** **(f) "I work in an environment free of gender discrimination."**	[2] Disagree [3] Neutral [4] Agree [5] Strongly Agree [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c11.	**I will now read you a set of statements about employment and work more generally in Lebanon. For each of them, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. Please answer on a scale of 1 through 5, where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree.** **(a) "Obtaining employment through personal connections is extremely widespread."** **(b) "Employment in industrial manufacturing is suitable for women."** (c) **"Employment in trades such as carpentry, plumbing, electrician, mechanic, tailor, beautician, etc., is suitable for women."** **(d) "Technical and vocational educational training is suitable for women."**	(a) __ (b)__ (c)__ (d)__ *Choices for each include:* [1] Strongly Disagree [2] Disagree [3] Neutral [4] Agree [5] Strongly Agree [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c12.	**Hypothetically, would you personally be willing to work in each of the following:** **(a) carpentry** **(b) plumbing** **(c) electrician** **(d) mechanic** **(e) tailor** **(f) beautician** **(g) industrial manufacturing**	(a) __ (b)__ (c)__ (d)__ (e)__ (f)__ (g)__ *Choices for each include:* [1] Yes [2] No [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c13.	**<u>only if respondent = head of household or spouse of head of household:</u>** **I will now read you a list of typical household expenses. After I am finished reading the list, please rank your top 3 household expenses within the last year from this list, with the first being the one for which your household spent the most during the past year. You can also specify something that is not on the list that I read.**	*Enumerator first read the full list of typical household expenses:* [1] Housing (Rent or Mortgage) [2] Food [3] Water [4] Electricity [5] Gas and Other Fuels [6] Transportation [6] Education [7] Clothing [8] Healthcare services [-96] Other (specify) **#1:** _____ (most spending) **#2:** _____ **#3:** _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
c14.	**Are you currently able to access financing (loans) for <u>personal purposes</u> (mortgage, student loan, personal loan), if needed/desired?** *Probe if they say "yes" to differentiate between 1 and 2.*	[1] Yes – sufficient to meet needs [2] Yes – but not in sufficient amount to meet needs [3] No → **c16** [-98] Don't know → **c16** [-99] Refused → **c16**
c15.	**What are the main sources of financing that you access for personal purposes?**	*Select all that apply.* [1] Commercial bank [2] Microfinance institution [3] Family or friends [4] Collateral loan [5] Local or informal lender/loan-shark [-96] Other, Specify:_____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c16.	**Do you (or a family member on your behalf) maintain one or more bank accounts?**	[1] Yes → **c18** [2] No [-98] Don't know → **c19** [-99] Refused → **c19**
c17.	**Why do you (or a family member on your behalf) <u>not</u> maintain a bank account?**	*Select all that apply.* [1] Don't trust banks → **c19** [2] Lack of financial literacy → **c19** [3] Unemployment → **c19** [4] Inconvenience → **c19** [5] Bank fees → **c19** [6] Negative financial history → **c19** [7] Prefer alternatives → **c19** [8] Inability to meet required terms → **c19** [-96] Other, Specify:_____ → **c19** [-98] Don't know → **c19** [-99] Refused → **c19**
c18.	**Is this account(s) in LL, USD, or both?**	[1] LL only [2] USD only [3] Both [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c19.	**Hypothetically, would you prefer to save your money in the bank in LL (and receive high return) or USD (for less return)?**	[1] LL and receive high return [2] USD for less return [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c20.	**Do you make use of any online financial applications, such as e-banking or online transfers for personal purposes?**	[1] Yes [2] No [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c21.	**Do you currently own a business?**	[1] Yes [2] No → **c30** [-98] Don't know → **c30** [-99] Refused → **c30**
c22.	**IF OWNS A BUSINESS:** **What type of business?** *(sector)*	[1] Wholesale, retail, trade, repairs [2] Real estate, renting, business activities [3] Manufacturing [5] Construction [6] Hotels and restaurants [7] Transport, Storage, and Communications

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
		[8] Financial intermediation [9] Tourism (other than hotels and restaurants) [9] Agribusiness [10] Technology/ICT [11] Waste collection/disposal [12] Recycling [13] Renewable energy [14] Creative industries [-96] Other, Specify:_____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c23.	**How many full-time employees do you employ?**	[1] 0-9 (micro) [2] 10-49 (small) [3] 50-99 (medium) [4] 100+ (large) [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c24.	**How many part-time employees do you employ?**	[0] None (0) [1] Between 1-9 [2] Between 10-19 [3] Between 20-29 [4] Between 30-39 [5] Between 40-49 [6] Between 50-69 [7] Between 70-89 [8] Between 90-99 [9] More than 100 [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c25.	**In your opinion, what are the <u>three</u> most significant constraints to growing your business? (Top of mind) You may also say "none" if you do not think there are constraints.**	**#1:** _____ (greatest constraint) **#2:** _____ **#3:** _____
c26.	**For your business, are you willing to hire individuals with relevant training, but without previous work experience?**	[1] Yes [2] No [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c27.	**For your business, are you currently able to access financing (debt, loans, guarantees) for <u>business purposes</u>, if needed/desired?** *Probe if they say "yes" to differentiate between 1 and 2.*	[1] Yes – sufficient to meet needs [2] Yes – but not in sufficient amount to meet needs [3] No → **c29** [-98] Don't know → **c29** [-99] Refused → **c29**
c28.	**What are the main sources of financing that you access for <u>business purposes</u>?**	*Select all that apply.* [1] Equity finance [2] Commercial bank [3] Microfinance institution [4] Family or friends [5] Collateral loan [6] Local or informal lender/loan-shark [-96] Other, Specify:_____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
c29.	**Do you make use of any online financial applications, such as e-banking or online transfers for business purposes?**	[1] Yes [2] No [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused After this question those who own businesses → **c33**
c30.	**IF DOES NOT OWN A BUSINESS:** **Are you thinking about starting a new business?**	[1] Yes [2] No → **c33** [-98] Don't know → **c33** [-99] Refused → **c33**
c31.	**What type (sector) of business?**	[1] Wholesale, retail, trade, repairs [2] Real estate, renting, business activities [3] Manufacturing [5] Construction [6] Hotels and restaurants [7] Transport, Storage, and Communications [8] Financial intermediation [9] Tourism (other than hotels and restaurants) [9] Agribusiness [10] Technology/ICT [11] Waste collection/disposal [12] Recycling [13] Renewable energy [14] Creative industries [-96] Other, Specify:_____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c32.	**In your opinion, what are the three most significant constraints to starting your business? You may say "none" if you don't believe there are no constraints. (Top of mind)**	**#1:** _____ (greatest constraint) **#2:** _____ **#3:** _____
c33.	**In your opinion, which of the following issues are the most significant obstacles to private sector development in Lebanon in general? Please rank the top 3, with the first one being the greatest obstacle. You may also say "none" if you think there are no obstacles.**	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first.* [1] Regulations [2] Labor market policies [3] Access to finance [4] Lack of transparency/governance [5] State-owned enterprises [6] Insufficient supply of skilled workers [7] Lack of political will [8] No constraints [-96] Other (specify) **#1:** _____ (greatest obstacle) **#2:** _____ **#3:** _____ [-98] Don't know | [-99] Refused

MODULE C – PART 2: RECYCLING, RENEWABLE ENERGY

I will now ask you just a few questions about recycling and renewable energy.

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
c34.	**Do you recycle waste at your home?**	[1] Yes → **c38** [2] No [-98] Don't know → **c36** [-99] Refused → **c36**
c35.	**Why not?**	*Select all that apply.* [1] Recycling collection is not accessible to me [2] Not convenient / takes too much effort or time [3] Recycling collection too expensive [4] Not enough space in the home [5] Don't know what is recyclable [6] Forget to do so [7] Don't believe it makes a difference or has any benefit [8] Don't think it is important [-96] Other, Specify:_____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c36.	**Do you have any interest in recycling?**	[1] Yes [2] No → **c38** [-98] Don't know → **c38** [-99] Refused → **c38**
c37.	**How much would you be willing to pay for a weekly recycling service?**	#:_____ per week *Circle one:* LL / USD
c38.	**Do you use renewable energy technologies like solar water heating at your home?**	[1] Yes → **d1** [2] No [-98] Don't know → **c40** [-99] Refused → **c40**
c39.	**Why not?**	*Select all that apply.* [1] Technology is not available/accessible to me [2] Not convenient [3] Too expensive [4] Too much effort [5] Don't know what it is [6] Don't understand the technology [7] Doesn't produce sufficient energy [8] Doesn't produce reliable energy [9] Don't believe it makes a difference / has no benefit [10] Don't think it is important [11] Satisfied with current energy source(s) [12] Fear of theft/vandalism [-96] Other, Specify:_____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
c40.	**Do you have any interest in using renewable energy technologies?**	[1] Yes [2] No → **d1** [-98] Don't know → **d1** [-99] Refused → **d1**
c41.	**How much would you be willing to invest, for example, to convert to a solar water heater?**	#:_____ *Circle one:* LL / USD

MODULE D: GENDER

We are now getting toward the end of the interview. I will now ask you some questions about your perception about gender issues in Lebanon.

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
d1.	**In your opinion, what is the most vulnerable group in Lebanon?**	*Enumerator read all options to respondent first.* [1] Women [2] Youth [3] Children [4] Refugees [5] Foreign domestic workers [6] Disabled / people with special needs [7] The poor [-96] Other, Specify:_____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
d2.	**I will now read you several statements. For each of these, please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each, using a five-point scale where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree.** **a) A woman can become an elite personality such as a President, Prime Minster or speaker of the House.** **b) A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes.** **c) Women and men should have equal rights to their inheritance.** **d) Women and men should have equal chances to occupy leadership positions in their workplace, community organizations, etc.** **e) In general, men are better at political leadership than women.** **f) University education for males is more important than university education for females.** **g) Women face more barriers than men when it comes to access to professional opportunities.** **h) Women face more barriers than men when it comes to access to loans/finance.** **i) Husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family.** **j) Women should be protected by law against domestic violence.** **k) Women should have the right to pass citizenship to her children.** **l) Women should have quota in elections.** **m) A good woman never questions her husband's opinions, even if she is not sure she agrees with them.** **n) Woman are empowered to run for public office in Lebanon.** **o) Women could be involved equally with men in water management committees.**	**Spaces for (a) through (s), where:** *Choices for each include:* [1] Strongly Disagree [2] Disagree [3] Neutral [4] Agree [5] Strongly Agree [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
	p) Women could be involved equally with men in reforestation projects. **q) When women get rights, they are taking rights away from men.** r) **Disabled people face discrimination in the workplace in Lebanon.**	
d3.	**Have any of the following things ever happened to you?** **a) Spouse or other family member took your money when you didn't want him to.** **b) Spouse or other family member took your land/jewelry/poultry/livestock when you didn't want him to.** **c) Spouse or other family member prevented you from visiting your parents.** **d) Spouse or other family member prevented you from working outside the home.** **e) Scolded and compelled to do something by a member of your family or in your workplace?**	**a)** **b)** **c)** **d)** [1] Yes [2] No [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

MODULE E: RESPONDENT & HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION

We are on the final section now. I have only a small number of questions left. I will now ask you some questions about your household. We are asking these questions to make sure that we talk to a wide range of households as part of our study.

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
e1. _i	**What is your total family monthly income? I will read you categories so that you do not have to say a specific amount.** *This includes wages and salaries, farming or other agricultural activities, casual work, household-owned businesses, pensions, remittances from abroad, transfers from local sources, social assistance/welfare, and other sources of income. This excludes any in-kind payments received instead of money for labor over the last month.*	[1] Less than 500 USD [2] 501-1000 USD [3] 1001-2000 USD [4] 2001-3500 USD [5] 3501 or more USD [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
e1_ii	**ii) What is the highest level of education that you have completed?**	[1] None [2] Primary [3] Intermediate [4] Secondary [5] Tertiary (University or higher) [6] Vocational training after Primary [7] Vocational training after secondary [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
e2.	**Does your family receive remittances from someone living abroad?**	[1] Yes, monthly [2] Yes, a few times a year → **e4** [3] Yes, once a year → **e4** [4] No → **e4** [-98] Don't know → **e4** [-99] Refused → **e4**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
e3.	**If you think about all the income you receive in a month, on average what proportion would you estimate comes from remittances?**	%: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
e4.	**If you think about all the income you receive in a month, on average what proportion would you estimate comes from social assistance / welfare / pensions (i.e. social entitlements)? You can say 0 if none.**	%: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
e5.	**Aside from Lebanese, if you had to choose one most important identifier of who you are, what would you say?** *If needed, enumerators you can clarify: "We are only asking this question to make sure that we are speaking to a wide range of individuals in our survey."*	*Enumerator read all choices to respondent first:* [1] Religion (e.g. "I am a Shia, Sunni, Druze, Maronite, Orthodox, Armenian, Catholic." [2] Ethnicity (e.g. "I am an Arab, Kurd, Armenian, Copt, etc.") [3] Region (e.g. "I am a Southern, Northerner, Bekai, Mount Lebanese , Beiruti, etc.") [4] Local community or city where I live (e.g. "I am a Saidawi, Zahlawi, Baalbaki, Tripolis, Beiruti, etc.") [5] Tribe or extended family (e.g. "I am Shehabi, Ireslani, Zayteri, Assadi, Khazeni, etc.") [6] Political affiliation (e.g. "I am I am Aouni, Amali, Ishteraki, Kataabi, Mostakbal, Tashnaqi, Kowati, etc.") [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
e6.	**What is your denomination?** *If needed, enumerators you can clarify: "We are only asking this question to make sure that we are speaking to a wide range of individuals in our survey."*	[1] Maronite [2] Greek Orthodox [3] Greek Catholic [4] Armenian Orthodox [5] Armenian Catholic [6] Sunni [7] Shia [8] Druz [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
e7.	**Which of the political parties most represent you?** *If needed, enumerators you can clarify: "We are only asking this question to make sure that we are speaking to a wide range of individuals in our survey."*	[1] Amal [2] Free Patriotic Movement [3] Future Movement [4] Hezbollah [5] Kataeb [6] Lebanese Forces [7] Marada [8] Progressive Socialist Party [9] No party represents me [-96] Other, specify: _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
e8.	Think of this ladder as showing where people stand <u>in Lebanon</u>. At the top of the ladder are the people who are best off – those who have the most money, the best education, and the most respected jobs. At the bottom are the people who are worst off – those who have the least money, the least education, and the least respected job or no job. The higher up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to the people at the top; the lower you are, the closer you are those at the bottom. **Where would you place yourself on this ladder? Point to the rung where you think you stand at this time of your life relative to other people in Lebanon.**	*Enumerator show picture to respondent:* **Rung #:** _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused
e9.	Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in your <u>community</u>. People define community in different ways; please define it in whatever way is most meaningful to you. At the top of the ladder are the people who have the highest standing in their community. At the bottom are the people who have the lowest standing in their community. **Where would you place yourself on this ladder?** **Point to the rung where you think you stand at this time of your life relative to other people in your community.**	*Enumerator show picture to respondent:* **Rung #:** _____ [-98] Don't know [-99] Refused

THANK YOU, THIS IS THE END OF THE INTERVIEW.

MODULE F: INTERVIEW RESULT & NOTES (FILLED AFTER INTERVIEW COMPLETED)

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
f1.	**Final Result of Contact**	[1] Completion. → **N1** [2] Partial completion, need to re-visit. [3] Partial completion, cannot re-visit. [-96] Other, specify:_____
f2.	**Explanation of partial completion**	*(open text field)*

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
N1	**Other Interviewer Notes on the interaction/interview**	*(Open text field)*
N2	**Was anyone other than you and the respondent present and able to listen to the respondent's answers during the interview?**	[1] Yes – was disruptive/unwelcome/distracting to respondent [2] Yes – not distracting/was requested by respondent [3] No
N3	**Overall, would you say that the respondent's attitude toward the interview was:**	[1] Friendly/engaged/cooperative [2] Impatient/nervous/uncooperative/hostile

N4	**END OF FORM.**	**END OF FORM.**

MODULE NC: NO CONTACT OR NO CONSENT

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS
NC0_i	**(Not able to access dwelling)** **Reason not able to access dwelling**	[1] Dwelling gated/guarded, entry was restricted [2] Was not allowed inside plot/compound [-96] Other, specify:
NC0_ii	**What type of dwelling/building is this?**	[1] Apartment in a gated/guarded apartment building [2] Stand-alone home that is gated/guarded [-96] Other, specify:
NC1	**(No one home)** **Reason no one home at selected household:**	[1] No one home [2] Entire household absent for extended period [3] Dwelling vacant [4] Dwelling destroyed [5] Dwelling not found [-96] Other, specify:
NC2	**(No eligible respondent)** **Why no eligible respondent?**	[1] Not Lebanese citizens [2] No one within eligible age range [-96] Other, specify:
NC3	**(No consent)** **If appropriate, please ask why they do not wish to participate:**	[1] I am unable to spare the time [2] I do not want to spare the time [3] I am not interested in the topic of this survey [4] I am concerned about privacy [5] I am concerned about safety [-96] Other, specify [-99] Refused to say
NC4	**(No consent) Thank you for your time.**	**END OF FORM.**

ANNEX III: DATA TABLES

See attachment.

ANNEX IV: SCOPE OF WORK

BACKGROUND

USAID/Lebanon informs its programmatic activities through assessments, and special studies. Recently, a Gender Assessment, an Economic Growth Assessment, and a Political Economy Assessment have been undertaken. This is part of a continuing commitment to understand the community it serves, to serve it better and more efficiently.

PURPOSE

The Citizen Perception Survey (CPS) was requested to examine, confirm, and further inform what will be learned from the recent Gender Assessment, Economic Growth Assessment, and Political Economy Assessment. Gender Assessment finding are available, the EGA findings should be known by early November, and the PEA findings by late November. A key objective of this survey is to serve as a resource document for a soon-to-be revised Country Development Strategy Statement (CDCS). The questions asked by the CPS are to be tightly linked to helping USAID/Lebanon achieve its Development Objectives.

IMPLEMENTATION

A three-step process is proposed to achieve a meaningful CPS that serves as a resource document for the CDCS. Each step is summarized below, and subsequent sections elaborate with further detail. Step one is the design phase, which will begin with a norm-setting exercise with the Mission to ensure all parties fully understand the objectives and desired timeline for the survey. This norm-setting exercise would serve to clarify/refine the scope, research questions, and timing of the CPS.

The design phase will then proceed with (a) research into other CPS surveys and instruments from which to draw best practices and validated survey questions; (b) design of a questionnaire that will fulfill the learning objectives of the CPS and informational needs for the CDCS; and (c) clarification of various pieces of information required to inform a high quality and appropriate sampling plan for the CPS (see sidebar, next page). In addition, this stage will involve Once critical information is clarified, SI will draft a comprehensive Request for Proposals (RFP) that details all necessary technical specifications for data collection firms and will initiate the process of competitively procuring a local data collection firm. Phase one is implemented by SI home office staff from the Impact Evaluation (IE) division, drawing on its extensive experience designing, planning, and implementing large-scale surveys and overseeing the work of local data collection firms.

Step two is the data collection phase. Once a local firm has been selected through a competitive procurement process, SI will oversee the firm's successful completion of a number of steps to prepare for and carry out data collection, including but not limited to translation and back-translation of questionnaires, development of training materials and data collection manuals, and establishing a quality assurance system which aligns with SI's requirements. SI personnel will actively manage and oversee field work through a combination of on-the-ground and remote activities, using the Evaluation Quality, Use, Impact (EQUI) quality assurance framework.

Step three includes data analysis, reporting, and dissemination conducted by SI home office in collaboration with PMSPL II and the Mission. SI will conduct analyses in line with the final scope of work to be determined based on further discussion with the Mission about informational needs and analytical priorities, resulting

in a final report along with a findings presentation to the Mission and, if requested, dissemination to other interested stakeholders. If desired, SI will develop a Findings Brief in English and Arabic distilling the main findings from the report oriented toward a broader, non-technical audience.

STEP ONE: DESIGNING THE CPS

The key to any successful survey is to match the survey sample design and the questionnaire to the objectives and expectations of the stakeholders. The design team will take the following steps to ensure a successful CPS. The responsibility for a successful outcome rests not only with the design team, but rests also with the stakeholders and especially the Mission.

- Set the specific objectives for the survey, including the specific indicators of interest to be measures with clear definitions
- Define the unknowns, or enquiries that are a result of the Gender Assessment, Economic Growth Assessment, and Political Economy Assessment
- Define the informational needs for the CDCS, and practical implications including timing/schedule
- Conduct background research on citizen perception surveys to identify validated tools and gather best practices
- Draft a citizen perception survey, matching question wording to the concepts being measured, and the population being studied, building on the background research; simultaneously, draft the intended data analyses plan that will satisfy the information needs identified in order to "start with the end in mind".
- Collaborate with USAID Program Office, Technical Offices and PMSPL to finalize a questionnaire and identify a set of questions that will be responsive to the information needs identified.
- Conducting sample size calculations, develop a sampling plan, and if feasible assess the quality of any sampling frame that may be available at this stage, in collaboration with USAID/Lebanon and PMSPL. These deliberations will determine whether sampling will involve stratification, e.g. by region, areas where USAID is most active, or other criteria; the specific sampling technique to be employed; and then depending on the sampling design, whether any statistical adjustments (e.g. weighting) must be applied during analysis for proper representativeness.
- Design the RFP for a data collection firm to include the procedures for field work, enumerator training and oversight, quality control (including random spot-checks and call-backs), and data management and transfer. Electronic data collection will be a requirement, which affords benefits including higher quality data and more rapid turnaround between data collection and reporting. SI's IE team will leverage extensive experience managing electronic data collection including in Arabic to collect high quality data. The RFP will include provision for the design team to:
    - Attend enumerator training in person, to ensure that the field teams are trained comprehensively on data collection procedures, data quality control, ethical data collection practices, and data submission; and oversee a pilot
    - Conduct a comprehensive set of independent quality checks during data collection including pre-programmed validations and controls into the electronic survey form, audits of enumerator performance programmed into the survey, direct observation and co-enumeration of interviews, set up procedures for random spot-checks and back-checks (i.e. call-backs), among other measures to boost enumerator performance and ensure high quality data.

STEP TWO: IMPLEMENTING THE CPS

The Citizen Perception Survey will be implemented by a Consulting Firm selected through a competitive procurement process, made efficient by the SI Impact Evaluation (IE) division's numerous resources, guidance, tools, and templates to facilitate procurement and fieldwork preparations. The selected data collection firm will be responsible for the following tasks:

- Translate and back-translate data collection instruments
- Collaborating with SI, pre-testing instruments
- Conduct data collection and conduct field-based data quality assurance in accordance with the subcontract and CPS requirements
- Upload forms (including questionnaires and quality assurance forms) on a regular and timely basis to enable SI's quality assurance checks
- Reconcile any issues raised by SI's independent quality checks
- Provide for SI access through a secure server to all data collected/submitted forms.

STEP THREE: DATA ANALYSIS, REPORTING, & DISSEMINATION

After validating the data collected by the firm, the Team in collaboration with stakeholders will implement the intended data analysis plan. Each of the questions posed to be answered will be considered and elaborated through standard quantitative data analyses, and appropriate statistical methods. A report will be produced elaborating the findings, while also reporting levels of confidence in the results. The CPS data file will be retained by SI/PMSPL II as a resource for further analysis. A findings presentation to the Mission, followed by other dissemination as directed by USAID and the development of a Findings Brief in English and Arabic can follow the submission of the final report, based on the needs and interest of USAID.

DELIVERABLES

The SI Team will be responsible for the following deliverables:

- Report on Previous and Concurrent Surveys: Conduct a search for similar perception or satisfaction surveys that have been done in the past 10 years. Report on the quality of those surveys (sample design, size, quality control, analysis) and which of the surveys found might serve as a reference points for triangulating findings.
- Develop a Questionnaire(s): Develop one or more questionnaires in collaboration with USAID/Lebanon, Social Impact and PMSPL II. The questions developed are intended to help further elaborate findings from the Gender Assessment, Economic Growth Assessment, and Political Economy Assessments, as well as to substantiate findings from recent evaluations.
- Develop a Sample Survey Design: in collaboration with USAID/Lebanon, Social Impact and PMSPL II prepare a sampling plan that will answer questions with an agreed degree of precision, and according to any agreed sampling stratifications or sub-samples. As part of this, SI will assess the presence and reliability of a sampling frame, or otherwise develop a plan to develop one together with the data collection firm.
- Draft an RFP & manage the procurement and selection of a local data collection firm.
- Data Analysis Report: Submit a report as agreed with USAID/Lebanon and PMSPL
- Data Analysis Presentation: The consulting firm will present their data analyses findings to USAID and separate stakeholders as requested.
- Preparation of a de-identified data file for submission to the DDL

The local data collection firm will be responsible for the following deliverables:

- Routine Progress Reports: According to SI's standard procedures, the local data collection firm will be required to report weekly or bi-weekly (depending on contract terms), including on quality control, survey progress, enumerator performance, and other topics.
- Data Quality Control: The firm will be required to carry out agreed upon data quality assurance measures including ensuring a sensible supervisor-enumerator ratio, delivering a high-quality enumerator training and pilot, daily debriefs, direct supervision, co-enumeration, back-checks, random spot checks, and others to meet SI standards
- Training manuals: Collaborating with SI, develop comprehensive and high-quality manuals for enumerators and supervisors.
- Training & Pilot Report: Develop a report to summarize enumerator training and the pilot, according to SI's standard templates that will be customized for this activity.
- Obtain local permissions: From relevant national approving agencies and/or permissions from local government administration or community officials as relevant to ensure access to required geographic areas or populations to successfully conduct the survey.
- Data Collection: The firm will collect the data as agreed within the subcontract, submitting all forms for all interview attempts and submitting all ancillary quality assurance forms, plus a final data collection completion report.

Workplan (Illustrative, to be revised based on dates of assignment)

	month	1				2				3				4				5				6				7			
	week	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
Step 1	Stakeholder consultations																												
	Research current and previous surveys																												
	Develop questionnaire (English); Draft Analysis Plan			X																									
	Assess sampling frame; Develop sampling strategy				X																								
	Draft the data collections RFP																												
	Electronically program survey																												
	Seek IRB approvals as needed (SI & local)																												
	Data collection firm procurement																												
Step 2	Mobilize data collection firm, translate & pre-test survey																												
	Set up data quality assurance systems																												
	Train enumerators; Conduct Pilot																												
	Data collection and quality assurance																												
	Data validation and cleaning																												
Step 3	Analysis																												
	Draft findings report																							X					
	USAID feedback																												
	Submit final findings report																										X		
	Present findings to stakeholders																											X	
	Prepare a data file for submission to the DDL																												X