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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>CPIA</td>
<td>World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</td>
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<td>CRA</td>
<td>Conflict Risk Assessment</td>
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<td>CRVA</td>
<td>Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKRS</td>
<td>ECOWAS Directorate of Peacekeeping and Regional Security</td>
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<td>ECOWARN</td>
<td>ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECPF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework</td>
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<td>EWD</td>
<td>ECOWAS Directorate of Early Warning</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>GSDRC</td>
<td>Governance and Social Development Resource Centre</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ECOWARN’s Incident Reports</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad</td>
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<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>New Zealand Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>RASALAO</td>
<td>Réseau d’Action sur les Armes Légères</td>
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<td>REWARD</td>
<td>Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa</td>
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<td>RPM</td>
<td>Rally for Mali</td>
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<td>SitReps</td>
<td>ECOWARN Situation Reports</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UMEOA</td>
<td>West Africa Economy and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Office in Mali</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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Message from the President of the ECOWAS Commission

The 15 Member-States of the ECOWAS Community represent a thriving region of the world, with a population of approximately 366 million and a rich human and topographical diversity. From the coastline to the mountain peaks of Fouta Djallon, across the Sahara and the mangroves of the Niger Delta, ECOWAS is home to diverse families, communities, and nations.

Over the last decade, the region has witnessed significant progress in lifting the standard of living for millions. However, along with the richness of natural resources, human capital and great opportunity, there are also challenges to contend with such as natural disasters, pandemics, ethno-sectarian tensions, and security threats caused by extremism and terrorism.

Global developments and changes such as advances in technology, human migration and climate change, have added new levels of complexity, presenting new challenges for strategic planning and preparedness as we look ahead to the future.

This is where Early Warning plays a critical role in helping ECOWAS to understand the changing dynamics so as to strengthen decision making and early response at the regional and national levels. The Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs) serve as an important resource in this regard. These reports are useful for strengthening the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework action plans as well as to serve as reference materials for an in-depth understanding of the human security dynamics in our Member States, and for our partners across the region.

I therefore invite national stakeholders, all ECOWAS institutions and our partners to make use of these reports for the entrenchment of peace and progress for the benefit of the Citizens of ECOWAS.

Jean-Claude Brou
President of the ECOWAS Commission
Statement from the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission

ECOWAS takes pride in finalizing this CRVA report which aims to identify structural vulnerabilities, event driven risks and existing resilience factors in each Member State of the Community. Indeed, this is a remarkable feat towards boosting the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union, with ECOWAS setting the pace for the development of an African-owned data set that can be tapped into to enhance human security analysis and accurate forecasting to assist policymakers to make informed decisions on pressing issues in the region. This information can be used as a baseline for ECOWAS and its partners to inform early warning and response efforts, particularly in this time when Early Warning and Response Mechanism is being deployed at the National level.

The CRVA research leverages ECOWARN data—gathered by Field Monitors—to establish a country baseline for monitoring patterns and trends across human security pillars. By comparing ECOWARN data to other data sets, and complementing quantitative data with qualitative findings, the assessments also help the Early Warning Directorate of ECOWAS to gather more robust data that is rich, reliable and empirical. The resulting findings are more representative in terms of geography, time, and theme for each country and needs to be updated periodically.

ECOWAS will consolidate this achievement by applying the knowledge and skills embodied in the CRVA Manual. My conviction for this emanates from the fact that the training of all EWD staff in the development of the CRVA Index, which marks the climax of transfer of knowledge and skills from the USAID REWARD technical staff to ECOWAS, will allow ECOWAS to independently conduct future CRVAs. Already, the EWD has initiated a process to put to practice the defined methodological framework to conduct Regional Risk and Resilience Assessment in the Lake Chad Basin, thereby serving as the first pillar in implementing the decision of the joint ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to engage communities in peacebuilding processes.

We hope the Member States of our Community take ownership of this report and anchor development and peace initiatives upon it, in addressing the risks and vulnerabilities in their communities. As we decentralize Early Warning and Response to the ECOWAS countries, the Commission stands ready to accompany each Member States in the implementation of the actionable recommendations embodied in the CRVA report.

Finda Koroma
Vice President, ECOWAS Commission
Preface

The ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate has made giant strides in the practice of data driven early warning, through the qualitative and quantitative analysis of incidents and situations from multiple sources, with the added benefit of original data generated through the ECOWARN system. Indeed, the Center’s state-of-the-art technological tools places it at a vantage position to monitor and analyze risks and vulnerabilities in the ECOWAS region, cutting across the key areas of human security.

ECOWAS has played, and continues to play, a critical role in the monitoring of threats to human security across the region including the Sahelo-Saharan, Mano River, Gulf of Guinea, Lake Chad and Senegambia conflict systems to improve response for the prevention and management of conflict escalation.

Beyond a narrow focus on violent conflict alone, and consistent with its mandate to promote the socioeconomic and political integration of the sub-region, ECOWAS applies a human security lens with a view towards enhancing the well-being of the population in accordance with the ECOWAS Vision 2020. Thus, this report highlights risks, structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors across five dimensions (demographic, economic, security, governance and rule of law) at the national and sub-national levels.

Each CRVA report represents a myriad of perspectives and experiences from affected stakeholders including community leaders, civil society, administrative officials, security agents, traditional and religious leaders, just to mention a few. In this way, the CRVA report serves as a strategic document to provide an overview of the human security challenges in each ECOWAS member state as well as the social and institutional resilience factors that can help manage those challenges.

We hope that this report will be useful for strategic planning in addressing issues of human security as well as to provide insights to a multitude of stakeholders including policy and decision makers in the public and private sectors for conflict-sensitive engagement within the region.

Dr. Abdou Lat Gueye
Director, ECOWAS Early Warning
Executive Summary

From 2016 to 2019, ECOWAS collected quantitative and qualitative data in Mali to better understand the structural vulnerabilities that may exist, and how those vulnerabilities affect the everyday lives of individuals and communities. This research was done in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD) project, as part of a broader assessment of the entire West African region. As part of this process, a series of focus group discussions and interviews were conducted in October 2016 in Mali to contextualize the findings and to learn more about resilience factors that mitigate risk and promote human security. The purpose of this report is to summarize these insights and perspectives, so that national stakeholders can build on their successes, and also to serve as a baseline for ECOWAS’s monitoring of patterns and trends. The report provides an overview of national and subnational vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience factors, as well as conclusions and recommendations.

The CRVA was conducted by ECOWAS to update and expand upon the Conflict Risk Assessment (CRA) 2013-2014 country reports. To better understand the sub-national patterns and trends, the research design began with a desktop study involving a social network analysis based on a survey of peace and security actors in the country and a scoping of experts to be consulted during the fieldwork. This was followed by a Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis of patterns and trends in escalation dynamics and a quantitative analysis of relative structural vulnerabilities by country and human security pillar.

In Mali, high levels of vulnerability were found in the areas of Population/Demographics and Security, while moderate levels of vulnerability were found in Economics/Resources, Politics/Governance and Rule of Law.

Since 2012, Mali has faced significant security and political challenges. The beginning of 2012 saw the emergence of a Tuareg rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), in the North. Other armed groups, such as Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) have also contributed to violence and insecurity in the north and across the country. The proliferation of armed groups, weak state presence in the north and center of Mali, cross-border conflict issues, and conflict over land and resources have displaced thousands and affected humanitarian conditions more broadly. Environmental challenges such as floods and drought have also impacted human security for the people of Mali.

However, there were also strong social and institutional resilience factors for effective dispute resolution and peacebuilding in Mali, including the role of traditional leadership, civil society, as well as democratic principles and legislation. Civil society organizations have been active throughout the country, with some groups actively providing health, youth, and refugee services. Traditional leaders have also played a role in mitigating conflict and mediating disputes. Although elections have been fraught with low pockets of violence and low turnout, Mali has taken significant strides to strengthen its democratic institutions, including a secular constitution with minority religious groups being protected by law, media freedom, and a push to increase female political representation by requiring 30 percent of appointed and elected official positions be filled by women.

The following report aims to provide an overview so that regional and national stakeholders can have a clear picture of the challenges faced by the country,
as well as the capacities that can be leveraged and built upon for the promotion of sustainable human security in Mali.

Though risk/incident data naturally fluctuates and may therefore have changed since the publication of this report, the structural vulnerabilities are reflective of medium- and long-term trends. These reports focus on the identification of structural vulnerabilities and resiliencies, and how they may impact upon events and developments as they occur.
Introduction

Research Process

The CRVA assesses structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors according to five human security pillars as identified by ECOWAS in a 2016 scoping paper. The pillars are: 1) Economics and Resources, 2) Politics and Governance, 3) Population and Demographics, 4) Rule of Law, and 5) Security. Findings in this report describe how risks flow from vulnerabilities in the context of Mali both within and across the five pillars. In recognition of the fact that violent conflict has underlying social, economic, political, and security drivers but expresses itself differently depending on the context, a holistic human security framework was used in this assessment, and will be used for the CRVAs in all ECOWAS member states. Furthermore, the analysis also breaks out gender considerations and external factors as cross-cutting issues that need to be understood for effective early warning and response.2

As shown in the graphic below, the research was conducted in three main phases: Desktop Study, Field Research, and Analysis and Validation.

Phase 1: Desktop Study

The Desktop Study included a preliminary assessment of structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors.

For the assessment of structural vulnerabilities, the research used data from dozens of sources, including ECOWARN Situation Reports (SitReps). Drawing on these pre-existing data sets,3 a CRVA Index was created to measure the relative levels of vulnerability across five human security dimensions in Mali.

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1 The EWD Scoping Paper was developed by ECOWAS to help inform the CRVA process, with the human security pillars identified based on best practice approaches such as ECOWARN guidelines and the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) framework.
2 EWD Scoping Paper on “Risk Assessment of Five ECOWAS Pilot Countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina Faso”
3 Data sources used in the development of the CRVA Index include Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, World Bank, the Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace.
For the assessment of event-driven risks, event data, including from ECOWARN’s Incident Reports (IncReps), was triangulated against data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to estimate the locations and type of conflict issues at the sub-national level over time. Using multiple sources allowed for cross-validation, the filling of gaps, and the ability to identify trends in indicators and sub-indicators using queries and key word searches.

For the assessment of social and institutional resilience factors, a survey was deployed to all of ECOWAS’s in-country contacts to learn more about the peace and security actors working to manage and reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the country. Respondents (including representatives of religious institutions, public sector actors, civil society, youth groups, and development actors, among others) were also asked to name organizations that they have partnered with in the last two years on issues of peace and security. Data was then uploaded to a Stakeholder Network Map for quantitative analysis and to identify leverage points, spheres of influence, and social capital. Based on this analysis, key technical experts were identified and were contacted for the next phase of the research.

**Phase 2: Field Research**

The Field Research began with a scoping workshop in Bamako. Using the Stakeholder Network Map, highly-networked technical experts were convened in a workshop to validate the initial desktop findings and suggest a way forward for the qualitative analysis in the field. The Scoping Workshop was also used to tailor and sensitize the broader research questions and the Key Informant Interview (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) instruments and questionnaires based on local context. Additionally, the Scoping Workshop also served to attain references and contacts for key actors and stakeholders in the field who would be consulted over the course of the next two weeks during the KII and FGDs. Thus, the desktop study phase informed the research questions that needed further context and validation in the field, as well as the sample of respondents to be engaged (what was asked, where, and to whom).

A team of experts and researchers then conducted an in-country assessment between November 14th and November 19th, 2016 with participants from the regions of Bamako, Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and Timbuktu. This team included representatives from the ECOWAS Directorates of Early Warning (EWD) and Political Affairs (DPA), as well as participants from USAID and affiliated experts. The KII and FGDs conducted during this in-country assessment collected qualitative data and information regarding various perspectives on structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risk factors, and social and institutional resilience factors relating to the different conflict issues across the country. These transcripts have been collated, streamlined to reduce repetition and vagueness, and categorized under headings for analysis and prioritization during Phase 3.

**Phase 3: Analysis and Validation**

After the quantitative, GIS, and survey data was validated and contextualized in the field, and the qualitative data was collected, organized and summarized, this report was drafted and was then validated by ECOWAS and USAID. This report will serve as a baseline and resource for more targeted early warning products and analysis/planning towards strategic and operational prevention of human insecurity within the country of Mali as well as associated conflict systems (e.g. the Sahel) more broadly.
Terminology and Conceptual Definitions

In this CRVA report:

“**Vulnerability**” is defined as any structural factor that has the potential to be a conflict driver. These can include such things as youth unemployment, poverty, inequality, climate, patronage, demographic factors, etc.

“**Risk**” is defined as any event-driven factor that has the potential to be a conflict trigger. Risk factors can include specific controversies or events such as disasters or elections that may occur.

“**Resilience**” is defined as any social or institutional factor that has the potential to help mitigate or manage risks and vulnerabilities. These include political, cultural, and community leadership with significant social capital to influence conflict dynamics in a constructive way, including public sector, private sector, religious institutions, civil society, opinion leaders, development workers, etc. Resilience factors can include institutions that play a stabilizing role in the short, medium, or longer term.

The CRVA analysis was conducted according to the framework depicted in the figure below, whereby event-driven risk factors flow out of the structural vulnerabilities (per the red downward arrow) while social and institutional resilience factors mitigate and prevent those risks and vulnerabilities (per the green upward arrow).

For ECOWAS, this framework is useful in that it is aligned with the existing ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which is a strategic tool to strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa. Key to the ECPF are the categories of **“Operational Prevention,”** or measures applicable in the face of crisis, and **“Structural Prevention,”** or measures that ensure that crises do not arise or re-occur. The CRVA framework is aligned with the ECPF such that identified Vulnerability Factors are to be mitigated by Structural Prevention measures, and Risk Factors are to be mitigated by Operational Prevention measures. This alignment is important for the utility and actionability of this report by users in West Africa.
Literature Review

A Human-Centric Approach to Early Warning

In academic literature, the human security lens to conflict early warning is a change from the more state-centric approaches that were in vogue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Historically, early warning was focused on prevention and mitigation of conflict between states. In the post-Cold War period with a surge in intra-state conflict, early warning was focused on identifying the drivers and impacts of civil conflict on states. At that time, analysis focused on terminology of state “collapse” and “failure,” emphasizing impacts to neighboring countries or regions, and perpetuating a comparative paradigm of poverty and limited economic growth and conflict in contrast to more developed countries.4

However, as a more interconnected human and global security approach emerged in the 2000s, conceptions of state fragility and conflict analysis evolved in both development aid and policy approaches. As the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) describes, “At a very broad level, fragility is the result of a dynamic interplay between internal factors (including violent conflict, poverty, economic and structural conditions, weak formal institutions), and external factors (including international political economy, regional and global insecurity).”5 While not discounting the role of the state as a key vehicle for managing and preventing conflict, the human-centric approach looks first and foremost at the impact of demographic, economic, political, and security conflict drivers on individuals and communities as well as the role that a wide variety of social and institutional factors play in preventing conflict. Thus, the human security framework provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats that affect individuals’ lives, whether this is through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political or economic factors.

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security outlines a human-centric approach to security in five principles: 1) People-centered, with a focus on protecting basic human freedoms; 2) Multi-sectoral, encompassing a broad understanding of threats and causes of insecurity; 3) Comprehensive, taking into account different types of individuals’ security from economic to social; 4) Context-specific, emphasizing the need to analyze specific conflict contexts and root causes of insecurity; and 5) Prevention-oriented, highlighting locally tailored risk prevention and mitigation measures through early warning mechanisms.6 This focus on cross-cutting issues and situation-specific analysis and response are central to the CRVA process and broader objectives of integrated conflict early warning and response by ECOWAS and its partners. For the CRVAs, this involves identifying conflict risks, vulnerabilities and resiliencies across the human security pillars of Population and Demographics, Politics and Governance, Security, Economics and Resources, and Rule of Law.

Many indices and development frameworks have emerged for measuring resilience and fragility, from the Fund For Peace’s Fragile States Index7 to the African Development Bank (AfDB) and World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)8 and Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Index of African Governance.9 Today, leading international development actors and multilateral

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5 “Topic Guide on Fragile States”, Mcloughlin, C., Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), August 2009
7 Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace
8 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB)
9 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Mo Ibrahim Foundation
agencies such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the AfDB have also produced strategies, practice areas, and tools, which seek to address the drivers of fragility. The AfDB, for example, has a 2014-2019 Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, with a focus on building member state capacities and focusing on “fragile situations rather than fragile states alone.”

As the AfDB Strategy notes, however, “there is no single solution and no predefined ‘toolbox’ for addressing fragility.” Older academic and policy conceptions of “state failure” used analysis centered on “traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression,” as outlined in a 2009 paper by the United Nations Human Security Unit. Newer models of analysis have taken on a broader human security lens, which was in “response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to acquire transnational dimensions and move beyond traditional notions of security that focus on external military aggressions alone.”

Thus, a human-centric approach, as opposed to a state-centric approach, is important for analyzing risks and vulnerabilities to society for robust early warning and response mechanisms. Human security provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats which affect individuals’ lives, whether through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political, or economic factors. As such, the CRVAs seek to draw upon the more dynamic and interrelated aspects of risk and vulnerability, which look at capacities and pressures within a society with a view to identifying structural vulnerabilities, resiliencies and risks across key human security pillars. As defined by the United Nations General Assembly, “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people.” This approach is also in line with the ECOWAS Vision 2020 which seeks to promote peace, prosperity, and cohesion across the region, and includes a focus on strengthening many human security aspects within member states.

Research Questions

Based on the initial desktop findings, the team developed a set of framing questions broken out by the five human security pillars. These framing questions were not asked verbatim in the field, but rather informed the design of the KII and FGD instruments. These instruments included simple, open-ended questions intended to prompt a discussion during which respondents could express their opinions, experiences, and perceptions about the ways in which they had been impacted by vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience factors in Mali.

Politics and Governance: What is the most recent iteration of the Mali Peace Accord? Has there been an improvement and how? What do you think has worked with this peace agreement? The Mali Peace Accord has been criticized for lacking the inclusion of women. How are women involved in the Malian peace process in line with UN resolution 1325? If you were given the opportunity to participate in the peace agreement, what would be the one thing you would do differently? What challenges to the implementation of the peace agreement remain?

11 Ibid.

13 General Assembly resolution 66/290, October 2012
14 ECOWAS Vision 2020: Towards a Democratic and Prosperous Community, ECOWAS, June 2010
Given the current security landscape, what are some of the concerns with upcoming elections in 2018? What measures are in place to ensure fair and free elections in a secure environment? Will such political transitions help consolidate the peace process or derail it? To what extent do women participate in the political decision-making process in Mali? What are the main barriers affecting the role of women in a) peacebuilding, b) politics and c) governance including electoral processes in Mali? Why don’t more women participate in the political process? How do we ensure more women are involved in the political process? Do you think that women are viable political actors, who are playing a positive role in the future political, governance and security arrangements of northern Mali? If yes, how? If not, why? Are certain groups excluded from the political processes?

**Population and Demographics:** Describe the relationship among ethnic groups/communities in your region. Have you witnessed tensions among communities? Has religion been a source of conflict or a resource for peace in your community? Does migration and displacement contribute to conflict over land and resources? To what extent do issues of refugees and internal displacement affect social cohesion? Is the youth bulge a factor for sustainable growth? Does it put a strain on resources or public services? To what extent are adverse climatic conditions affecting food security and security in general? What types of social services are available/accessible in your community (health, education, sanitation, water, electricity)?

**Economics and Resources:** Are traders and convoys able to transport goods to and from the market, especially in north? What specific challenges and/or opportunities exist for women and men in the emerging environment? To what extent can women help strengthen safety and security in Malian communities? Beyond security assistance, how has foreign aid affected/benefited your community?

**Security:** Who provides security/law and order in your community? As a part of the overall conflict landscape, to what extent does terrorism threaten the safety and security of the population of Mali? In addition to UN and French military forces, to what extent does the government rely on proxies to maintain peace and security as well as law and order? With the prevailing socio-political and security situation, could the government of Mali protect its borders with a potential withdrawal of the French and UN troops? What is the prevailing security situation in your region?

**Rule of Law:** To what extent do issues of drug trafficking, human trafficking and criminality fuel the conflict in Mali? What are other types of criminal activities are fueling the conflict? When you have a dispute where do you go for resolution? Have you used the court system in the past? Do you know someone who has used the court system? How did the process play out? Do you have access to equitable justice and legal services? Are there constraints or limitations to the functioning of the judicial system? To what extent is corruption, political patronage, impunity or nepotism a problem in Mali? Are you aware of any legal framework protecting women and girls against violence? If yes, who were the perpetrators? How was the situation dealt with for both the victim and the perpetrator?

**Description of the Sample**

Data collected and analyzed for this research included hundreds of ECOWARN SitReps, ECOWARN IncReps, ACLED event data, and a scoping survey, as well as transcripts and notes from FGDs and KIIIs in the field. Other sources, integrated to form a vulnerability index (the CRVA Index), included Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event...
The graph above shows the trends in risk layered against vulnerability. The y axis on the left (0-80) shows the level of vulnerability with a score of over 60 reflecting higher levels of vulnerability. The y axis on the right (0-300) shows the number of conflict fatalities by month.

The heatmap above shows hot spots of human security fatalities between 2015 and 2018.

The map above shows the locations where fieldwork focused on in October 2016.
Database, World Bank, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Upssala University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace. A complete breakdown is included in Appendix A.

Data Analysis

ECOWARN data shows a gradual rise in vulnerability (with a major spike during the coup d'état in March 2012) as measured by taking a monthly average of the SitReps, as well as an increase in risk, as measured by fatalities recorded in the ECOWARN IncReps and ACLED data. The most violent month reported during this seven year period was July 2016, during which clashes between Tuareg militias killed dozens.

The CRVA Index, shown above, indicates that in Mali the human security pillars that exhibit the most severe levels of vulnerability are Population and Demographics and Security. Data suggests that even Rule of Law (the best performing sector) is still more vulnerable than other countries in the region. See Appendix B for a brief description of how the indicators and sources were selected as well as how the data was normalized, scaled, and integrated. In the graph above, the lower the score on the y axis (0-10), the more vulnerable the human security pillar.

Event data shows hotspots, patterns, and trends at the sub-national level, including communal tensions in Mopti and insurgency in Gao and Kidal. Conflict in Mali has had a spillover effect in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso as well. Field research was undertaken to validate and contextualize these findings through Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions.

Quantitative data show rising vulnerability in Mali, and areas of greatest structural weakness in the Population/Demographics and Security pillars. Corroborating these findings on structural vulnerabilities, the GIS and Event show rising levels of lethal violence over the last seven years. As illustrated in the pages below, in addition to validating these desktop findings, the field research also helped to highlight the complex political dynamics at the local level in the context of the Mali Peace Accords.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

This report seeks to layer, triangulate, and juxtapose quantitative, GIS, and qualitative data in a way that is accurate, meaningful, and representative. However, limitations to this analysis include the two-year date range for the event/GIS data and the seven-year date range for the ECOWARN SitReps. If there are conflict cycles that fall outside those parameters, there will be constraints on the ability to analyze those patterns in this report. Furthermore, this research sought to ensure representativeness in the sample of stakeholders engaged through KII (12 prominent individuals) and FGDs (14 focus group discussions). To the extent that these stakeholders were representative, they added vital contextualization and validation of the desktop research. However, another limitation in this study was that due to security considerations, the research team was unable to travel outside of the capital, Bamako, to conduct interviews.
Scope and limitations also apply to the use and purpose of the study. The CRVA reports support the objectives of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). In particular, the CRVA reports identify vulnerabilities across the human security pillars in order to inform structural prevention. Structural prevention, as defined in the ECPF, comprises “political, institutional (governance) and developmental reforms, capacity enhancement and advocacy on the culture of peace.” While this report can also be used to inform operational prevention, which includes “early warning, mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament and preventive deployment using interactive means such as good offices and the ECOWAS Standby Force,” it seeks primarily to identify the key areas of structural vulnerability at the national and sub-national levels for strategic planning by ECOWAS and other partners in the peace and security space. However, inasmuch that operational prevention can be informed by patterns and trends in the event-driven risk factors highlighted in this report, the CRVA should serve as a baseline analysis of dynamics that are closely monitored over time. Thereby, in addition to informing strategic planning on structural vulnerability issues, the CRVA will also inform early warning products such as weekly, monthly, and quarterly situation reports that inform analysts and potential responders as to heightened conflict risk across one or more indicators, and propose recommendations on response. The CRVA reports can also be used as a foundation to inform more detailed case studies around identified risks, vulnerabilities and resiliencies for a country of interest or concern.

While many reports that seek to identify structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors focus almost exclusively at the national level, ECOWAS seeks to support a more decentralized early warning and response infrastructure across the region. As such, the CRVA reports also take into consideration dynamics at the sub-national level. These sub-national factors are critical to consider as they help analysts and potential responders understand the context in which specific events (risks) are occurring, which may be markedly different from the national context. A mapping of sub-national level risks, vulnerabilities, and resiliencies can also help inform strategies for engaging at the local level for structural prevention. In particular, as defined by the ECPF, taking “measures to ensure the crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do no re-occur.”

Finally, as also noted in the ECPF, conflict in West Africa tends to be highly interconnected, which often leads to cycles of violence that cross borders and can keep countries emmeshed for decades. The CRVA reports, covering all fifteen member states of ECOWAS, are also useful in helping to inform and understand the dynamics of specific regional conflict systems, such as those that occur across the Mano River and Sahel. These regional conflict systems are influenced and interconnected not only historically and culturally, but also share many of the same structural vulnerabilities that give rise to risks and the eventual outbreak of violence, decade after decade. Thus, the CRVA reports present an opportunity to view not only the specific national and sub-national factors that lead to structural vulnerability and heightened risk, they also help highlight the nature of regional conflict systems, and the need for a holistic and systemic lens in both analysis and response.
Country Background

The Republic of Mali declared independence from colonial rule in 1960, after 68 years of occupation under the French administered territory known as French Sudan. The country’s first president was deposed in a coup by members of the military in 1968, placing Lieutenant Moussa Traoré into power. Traoré went on to lead a restrictive single-party state for over two decades. Post-colonial Malian rule during the period included the establishment of martial law and military administration in the northern regions to quash a rebellion by the ethnic Tuareg population. Though accounting for only about five percent of the population, the Tuareg are almost exclusively concentrated in the Northern regions of Mali which border Algeria and Niger, while the Bambara, Senofu, Fulani and other ethnic groups are concentrated in the south, center and west of the country.

Following violent student protests calling for a multi-party state, and a military coup led by the President’s head guard, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, President Traoré was ousted in 1991. This paved the way for a civilian government led by M. Alpha Oumar Konaré, heralding constitutional reforms and the establishment of a multi-party legislative system during the 1990s. However, the period was also marked by outbreaks of violence in the North involving Tuareg pastoralists, driven by ethno-nationalism, environmental pressures, and political grievances. Historically, the socio-economic inequalities between Northern Mali and Southern, Central, and Western Mali were a result of some governance challenges and environmental pressures that impacted agricultural livelihoods and food security. By the early 1990s, many of the northern Tuareg population had returned from other North African countries where they had lived in the 1970s and 1980s after severe droughts drove them from Mali. Some returned with military training and equipment from Libya, having fought in campaigns backed by that country’s former long-time leader, Muammar Qaddafi.

Though political brinkmanship between parties also caused discontent during the 1990s, the first successful democratic transition of power took place from President Konaré to successor Touré following elections in 2002. The subsequent decade of President Touré’s rule helped spur rapid growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which rose from $US 3.9 billion in 2002 to $US 12.44 billion a decade later. Much of this growth was due to increased Foreign Direct Investment, which rose from $US 72.35 million in 2003 to $US 646.6 million in 2009. The economic growth however, also coincided with rapid population growth, with the population increasing by 38 percent, and a concentration of wealth in the south and west, which only exacerbated existing inequalities between the Northern population and the rest of the country. In 2006, a new uprising by the Tuareg combatants led to violent clashes with the Malian army and security forces, before eventually reaching a peace agreement brokered by Algeria. The agreement was wrought with mistrust and in-fighting, and scattered incidents of violence in 2007 prevailed.

19 “GDP (current US$)”, World Bank
20 “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)”, World Bank
21 “Population, total”, World Bank
In January 2012, an emergent Tuareg rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), began an armed separatist fight against the Malian government. This push was precipitated by the civil war in Libya and subsequent collapse of Qaddafi’s regime in 2011 that saw an influx of weapons into Mali. The insecurity that ensued created a vacuum for other armed Islamic groups to join the northern Mali conflict, including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).

In March 2012, Malian soldiers – who had been overrun by armed Tuaregs – deposed President Touré in response to his inability to quell the Tuareg rebellion. Under pressure from ECOWAS, the military peacefully established an interim government led by former parliament speaker Dioncounda Traoré. The coup enabled the MNLA to declare an independent Azawad territory in April 2012, but they were overtaken by the stronger Ansar Dine and MUJAO groups who seized control of the Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal regions. A new northern counter-offensive led by the Malian army, with French and African military assistance, was launched in January 2013, resulting in the Malian army regaining control of most of the North, though pockets of insecurity prevailed. In April 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established to deploy a peacekeeping force of over 12,000. The parties to the Malian conflicts engaged in peace talks led by Algeria and the international community. These talks culminated in the Algiers Accord in June 2015, which was signed by representatives of the government, loyalist fighters, and a coalition of rebel groups. The Malian Peace and Reconciliation Agreement did not offer independence to the Northern regions, but promises a more advanced decentralization as a means of bridging the economic gaps between the North and the rest of the country. However, the enforcement of the peace agreement has proven a challenge amidst ongoing insecurity, including assaults on UN peacekeepers, and terrorist attacks on civilian targets such as the Bamako Radisson Blu hotel in December 2015.

In attempts to address poverty and continue the economic growth that stalled during the 2013 insecurity, a focus on improving agricultural productivity, infrastructure, and economic diversification is being pursued by the government, alongside support by international partners. Mali’s reliance on exports such as cotton and gold, which together account for 78 percent of its exports, leaves the economy susceptible to shocks from volatile commodity prices.

25 “MINUSMA Fact Sheet”, United Nations Peacekeeping
26 “Mali”, Peace Insight, Peace Direct
27 “Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for Extension, Augmentation of Access and Modification of Performance Criteria – Press Release; Staff Report; And Statement by the Executive Director for Mali”, IMF, June 2106.
29 “Mali”, Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC)
### National-Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resiliencies

Based on desktop research using the ECOWARN and ACLED data sets, surveys of peace and security actors in key regions in Mali, field research that included Key Informant Interviews (KII)s and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and participatory analysis by the CRVA field research team, the following National Level risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience factors were identified:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>Population and Demographics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Large youth bulge and rapid population growth</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Adverse climate conditions (drought, flooding, pest infestation) exacerbated by climate change</td>
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<td>• Harmful socio-cultural practices</td>
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<td>• Cross-border migration</td>
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<td>• Internally displaced persons (IDPs)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low capacity health services, particularly maternal and reproductive health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Security                   | • Ongoing insecurity in Northeast |
|                            | • Porous borders and regional security pressures |
|                            | • Large ungoverned land mass and harsh terrain of the Sahara Desert |
|                            | • Weak presence and capacity of security and defense forces |
|                            | • Inefficient coordination among multiple security actors |
|                            | • Proliferation of arms |
|                            | • Limited implementation of the 2015 Peace Agreement |

| Politics and Governance    | • Weak state presence in the north and center of the country |
|                            | • Perceptions of corruption and nepotism in government |
|                            | • Lack of confidence in government institutions |
|                            | • Manipulation of ethnic identities and tribal affiliations |
|                            | • Embezzlement of public funds |
|                            | • Low representation of women and youth in politics and decision-making |
|                            | • History of military coups |

| Economics and Resources    | • North-south and urban-rural development disparities |
- Illicit economies, including drug trafficking and trans-Saharan arms trade
- High levels of poverty, especially concentrated in the north-east
- Unequal distribution of wealth
- Food insecurity and malnutrition
- Low participation of women in the formal economy
- High unemployment rates
- Forced marriage
- Undiversified economy - vulnerable to exogenous shocks

### Rule of Law
- Lack of trust in judicial institutions
- Low capacity of law enforcement agencies
- Limited government presence to provide law and order
- Perceptions of corruption in the judicial system
- Lack of state authority in the northern and central parts of Mali

### Event-Driven Risks

#### Population and Demographics
- Displacement and return/reintegration of refugees
- Competition over access to scarce natural resources
- Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)
- Climate change and drought/flood cycles

#### Security
- Recurrence of rebellions in northern Mali
- Ineffective implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)/security provision of the Peace Agreement
- Proliferation of armed/militia/terrorist groups
- Land-based inter-communal conflicts
- Attacks on UN personnel and compounds
- Armed attacks on soft targets such as hotels
- Reported public security force abuses

#### Politics and Governance
- Elections
- Slow implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement
- Chieftaincy and succession issues

#### Economics and Resources
- Exogenous commodity shocks
- Labor protests
### Rule of Law
- Crime
- Mob justice/vigilantism

### Social and Institutional Resilience Factors
- Moderate religious leaders
- Civil society groups, including NGO and humanitarian actors
- Women’s organizations
- Community leaders
- UN peacekeeping Mission (MINUSMA)
- France anti-terrorism strategy in the Sahel region

Key themes that emerged in the CRVA research include the fact that despite the signing of the peace agreement in 2015 to resolve the Malian crisis, the security situation has been deteriorating. This has extended beyond the northern regions of Goa, Timbuktu, and Kidal to the rest of the country, impacting on social and community cohesion and also has negatively impacted on the state’s ability to provide basic social services in affected areas.
## Population and Demographics (Most Vulnerable Pillar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>Risks</th>
</tr>
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| • Large youth bulge and rapid population growth  
• Adverse climate conditions (drought, flooding, pest infestation) exacerbated by climate change  
• Harmful socio-cultural practices  
• Caste system  
• Cross-border migration  
• Internally displaced persons (IDPs)  
• Low capacity health services, particularly maternal and reproductive health | • Displacement and return/reintegration of refugees  
• Competition over access to scarce natural resources  
• Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)  
• Climate change and drought/flood cycles |

### Vulnerabilities and Risks

Like many countries in West Africa, Mali has a large youth population – nearly half of the population is under the age of 14 – coupled with a relatively high rate of population growth. While the youth population holds significant potential as a driver of economic growth, high levels of unemployment and illiteracy compounded by the exclusion of youth from decision-making processes have turned the so-called “youth bulge” into a vulnerability. Youth in Mali have been drawn to illicit economic activities or criminality as well as to extremist groups. Growing population pressures may also hinder the delivery of basic social services and threaten food security and sustainable development.

### Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

To manage these pressures, civil society organizations are actively providing services around health, youth development and refugee resettlement. Government social programs are key to mitigating risks, especially as the peace agreement is gradually being implemented across the North. Healthcare providers, including international health partnerships, also play a role in promoting social wellbeing as regards clinical and public health.
## Security (Second Most Vulnerable Pillar)

### Vulnerabilities

- Ongoing insecurity in Northeast
- Porous borders and regional security pressures
- Large ungoverned land mass and harsh terrain of the Sahara Desert
- Weak presence and capacity of security and defense forces
- Inefficient coordination among multiple security actors
- Proliferation of arms
- Limited implementation of the 2015 Peace Agreement

### Risks

- Recurrence of rebellions in northern Mali
- Ineffective implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)/security provision of the Peace Agreement
- Proliferation of armed/militia/terrorist groups
- Land-based inter-communal conflicts
- Attacks on UN personnel and compounds
- Armed attacks on soft targets such as hotels
- Reported public security force abuses

### Vulnerabilities and Risks

Security challenges throughout Mali include separatist violence, extremist violence, communal violence, illicit economic activity, and criminality. The security situation has deteriorated since non-state armed groups took over parts of the north in 2012. Since 2014, violence related to the separatist movement in northern Mali has been concentrated in the Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu regions of the country. One of the main separatist groups, the CMA (*Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad*), maintains control over several towns in Kidal. Violent clashes between the pro-territorial integrity GATIA (*Groupe d’Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés*) and the CMA has continued in northern Mali. In 2015, the different armed factions signed the Algiers Peace Agreement. While efforts have been made to enforce the terms of the agreement throughout the country, violence continues and is spreading south toward the center of the country.

Extremist violence has also been a serious threat to security in Mali. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and groups such as Ansar Dine, MUJAO and Al-Mourabitoun continue to inflict violence on the civilian population, UN and international forces, and the Malian Defense Forces. In recent years, there have been multiple terrorist attacks reported throughout Mali. In 2015, extremist attacks occurred in every major region in Mali over the course of the year. Attacks began in northern Mali and spread down to the central and southern regions, where spikes in violence continued throughout 2016. Many of these attacks have targeted the Malian army and security forces, as well as UN peacekeepers, making Mali the deadliest UN peacekeeping operation to date. In 2015, there was an attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, which led to the deaths of 20 people, including expatriate workers and travelers. In 2016, 77 people were killed when a suicide bomber drove into a military camp in Gao.

Inter-communal violence has also been a risk factor threatening security in Mali. Some communal conflict has roots in the perennial conflicts between farmers and herders over access to scarce natural resources.
In addition, insecurity in northern Mali has displaced thousands of people, resulting in significant movement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Nearly 140,000 Malian refugees remain in camps in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania, and the United Nations estimates that there are more than 35,000 IDPs inside Mali. The return and reintegration of these populations may prove to be a challenge for both the government and for local communities, who are already facing significant economic and resource constraints.

Illicit economic activities, such as arms, drugs, and human trafficking, pose another threat to security in Mali. In the North, porous borders allow illegal goods to flow into Mali. Mali has connections to the broader Sahelian arms flows and there is documented evidence of weapons in Mali that originated in Qaddafi-era Libya. There is also evidence of other arms trade routes from Sudan, and from other parts of West Africa.

Criminality has also become a serious security threat in various parts of Mali. Reports of armed robbery have increased, especially in cities and regions that lack a strong security presence and robust judicial systems. Reported human rights abuses by armed elements also undermine security. Abuses have caused the population to lose trust in government forces, which has the potential to drive the population to seek protection from non-state actors, such as vigilante or armed groups, or join extremist groups.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Social and institutional entities that play an important role in managing the vulnerabilities and risks described above include public security forces and International partners, as well as civil society-led conflict early warning networks such as the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). Especially in areas where public security actors do not have a presence, traditional leaders play a critical role in striking alliances and mediating disputes to help prevent escalation.

30 “Mali”, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)

Politics and Governance (Third Most Vulnerable Pillar)

**Vulnerabilities**
- Weak state presence in the north and center of the country
- Perceptions of corruption and nepotism in government
- Lack of confidence in government institutions
- Manipulation of ethnic identities and tribal affiliations
- Embezzlement of public funds
- Low representation of women and youth in politics and decision-making
- History of military coups

**Risks**
- Elections
- Slow implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement
- Chieftaincy and succession issues

**Vulnerabilities and Risks**

Since the restoration of an elected government in 2013, politics and governance in Mali has been a source of vulnerability, as the Malian government has faced a number of challenges including reasserting and securing control over parts of the North and implementing the provisions of the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord.

Implementation of many of the provisions of the Algiers Peace Accord has been slow and parts of the country have yet to see any significant restoration of government services or administration. Political rights have slowly improved, although the government has been accused of continued media censorship. Illiteracy and lack of communication mean that there are many people and groups who do not know the exact terms of the agreement, especially in rural areas. In addition, the government in Bamako has struggled to regain trust among local populations, who point to instances of corruption, nepotism, and neglect. A number of observers have pointed to the exclusion of women and youth from the peace process and from government more generally as shortcomings of the process.

**Social and Institutional Resilience Factors**

Mali has historically been a model of representative governance in the region. But with the recent civil war and coup d’état, community leaders, women leaders, and civil society organizations, have emerged as critical players in the promotion of accountability and trust in state institutions, as well as advocating for political rights and good governance.
Economics and Resources (Fourth Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities

- North-south and urban-rural development disparities
- Illicit economies, including drug trafficking and trans-Saharan arms trade
- High levels of poverty, especially concentrated in the north-east
- Unequal distribution of wealth
- Food insecurity and malnutrition
- Low participation of women in the formal economy
- High unemployment rates
- Forced marriage
- Undiversified economy - vulnerable to exogenous shocks

Risks

- Exogenous commodity shocks
- Labor protests

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Mali’s economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and gold mining, making the economy vulnerable to shifts in global commodity prices. In addition, the country suffers from significant economic inequality. The GINI coefficient—a measure of income or wealth distribution which ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality)—is assessed as being 33 in Mali.\(^{32}\) While this measure has been improving over the past 20 years, according to the World Bank, over a quarter of the country’s income is captured by the top ten percent of households.\(^{33}\) This translates into unequal access to economic resources, with a widening gap between rich and poor.

Since the start of conflict in 2012, Malians have reported inflation, dissatisfaction with salaries and rising unemployment, in part due to the insecurity in Northern and Central Mali, a withdrawal of government services, and the destruction of infrastructure. This situation has threatened food access in many communities. Vulnerabilities around security and the economy feed are mutually reinforcing. As insecurity negatively impacts employment, the resulting unemployment creates further incentives for involvement in criminality, which in turn negatively impacts security.

Illicit economies, particularly drug trafficking, have played a significant role in Mali and the wider Sahel region generally. Drug trafficking is a cross-cutting issue that affects security, governance, health and economics. Terrorist and extremist groups in Mali and other local groups have historically been complicit in and benefitted from these illegal trades, highlighting the complex nature and interconnectedness of conflict drivers and vulnerabilities in the country.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Livelihoods, trade, and social services are adversely affected by insecurity in Mali. However, civil society groups are actively involved in humanitarian relief, the provision of social services, and economic development. Other entities that play a role in managing the vulnerabilities and risks described above include government ministries tasked with rural development, humanitarian assistance, economic development, education, employment, and public works. Although portions of the country remain under-governed, these ministries are working to

\(^{32}\) “GINI index (World Bank estimate)”, World Bank

\(^{33}\) “Income share held by highest 10%”, World Bank
resume the delivery of basic social services in the North. For the promotion of longer term sustainable economic development in Mali, the involvement of international financial institutions is critical.
Rule of Law (Least Vulnerable Pillar)

### Vulnerabilities
- Lack of trust in judicial institutions
- Low capacity of law enforcement agencies
- Limited government presence to provide law and order
- Perceptions of corruption in the judicial system
- Lack of state authority in the northern and central parts of Mali

### Risks
- Crime
- Mob justice/vigilantism

### Vulnerabilities and Risks
A major vulnerability in the area of Rule of Law is the lack of state authority in the northern regions of the country, which has led to the ineffectiveness of the judicial system in regions such as Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao. An ongoing risk factor undermining the rule of law is the prevalence of illicit economic activity, which has continued without major consequences. Even when traffickers are caught, they often go free without punishment. This has contributed to widespread distrust in the judicial system amongst the Malian population, which has been further exacerbated by reports of corruption, nepotism and impunity. The system is perceived as inaccessible to the poor, as judicial results are usually only obtainable with a monetary cost.

### Social and Institutional Resilience Factors
Vulnerabilities and risks with regards to Rule of Law remain elevated in Mali. To mitigate those pressures, the United Nations has worked to build capacity for dispute resolution at a local level, where community leaders are key actors in mediation and arbitration. Religious leaders also have significant influence in Mali and play an important role in spreading peace messages to communities, especially youth, to avoid violence. Civil society helps to educate community members as to their legal rights and assists with access to justice.
External Factors

The Malian economy is highly susceptible to the effects of international price volatility and climate change, namely intensifying cycles of drought and flooding. These trends have an impact on food security and livelihoods, and also have the potential to create inter-communal conflicts by creating greater competition for resources and shifting herding and farming patterns. Drug trafficking and regional smuggling networks have played a significant role in Mali’s illicit economy. Extremist groups in Mali are connected to regional and international networks of recruitment, supplies and funding. The fall of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, for example, led to the return of many Tuareg fighters to Mali and an infusion of weapons into the Sahel region. Regional and international efforts to combat these networks may impact illicit funding patterns within the country.

Neighbors within the region (primarily Algeria, but also Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania) have been key players in the Malian crisis and 2015 Peace Accords. ECOWAS played a mediating role in the immediate aftermath of the 2012 coup, and the African Union’s International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was the predecessor to the United Nations peacekeeping force (MINUSMA). Among other activities, MINUSMA has a mandate to protect civilians and to support the implementation of the peace agreement, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities.

With historic colonial ties and ongoing military operations in the country, France continues to exert influence in the country as well—Operation Barkhane is a regional French counter-terrorism effort operating in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania. The United Nations, international donors and non-governmental organizations also play a key role in both supporting the Malian government’s efforts and in pushing for reforms. Shifting trends within these regional and international networks and counter-terrorism efforts around the globe will inevitably affect the calculations of extremist groups operating within Mali.

Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced due to conflict in Mali, and more than 140,000 Malians continue to live as refugees in countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. Repatriation of these populations may place additional pressures on social services and communities in Mali in the future.

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Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali

Gender Considerations

As a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Option Protocol to CEDAW and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), the Government of Mali has made extensive regional and international commitments to safeguard the rights of its female citizens. However, discrimination on the basis of gender and the poor recognition of women’s rights persist in the country.

Although the 1992 Malian Constitution recognizes gender equality and bars gender-based discrimination, a majority of the country’s legal and institutional frameworks include directives that curtail the government’s ability to fulfill its regional and international obligations.

In August 2009, the National Assembly approved a draft of a new Family Code, which was meant to replace that of 1962. The 1962 Family Code included stipulations that established the husband as the head of the family and set the age of marriage for girls at 15. The draft Family Code of 2009 looked to expand and protect women’s rights by lifting the minimum age for girls to marry to 18, removing the obligation for a woman to obey her husband, acknowledging civil marriage as the only legal form of marriage, and granting women equal inheritance rights.

After sustained and passionate objections were levelled by Islamic groups, many of whom included women, President Amadou Toumani Touré declined to sign the proposed code into law and sent it back to parliament for more deliberations.

Ultimately, the revised family code, which was finally passed in 2011, reflected much of the same provisions that were featured in the 1962 Family Code. In addition to statutory law, customary and religious laws shape women’s rights in the country and often include provisions that limit women’s rights.

Gender representation in political participation and decision-making in Mali is limited. Out of the 1,141 candidates who vied for seats in the 2013 parliamentary elections, only 156 were women. Out of those 156 women, only 14 were elected to the 147-member National Assembly. As of 2017, there are 13 women in the National Assembly (8.84 percent). The September 2015 reorganization of the cabinet slightly increased female representation, from 10 percent to 16 percent, with women making up 5 of the 31 ministerial positions.

To address the issue of female under-representation in political participation, a proposal for a 30 percent gender quota law was advanced in 2006. Ultimately though, the law was abandoned after passionate debate in the National Assembly. Finally, in November 2015, Mali did pass a gender quota law which requires that at least 30 percent of elected or appointed officials be women. While it is premature to evaluate the impact of the law, the composition of the newly established interim authorities in the northern regions, less than three percent of which are women, highlights the gaps in the implementation of the gender quota legislation.

Relative to political positions, women are better represented within the judiciary. For example, the President Magistrate of the Constitutional Court is

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35 “Social Institutions & Gender Index: Mali”, OECD
37 Ibid.
38 “Social Institutions & Gender Index: Mali”, OECD
39 “Mali: Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), Inter-Parliamentary Union
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
43 “Mali: Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), Inter-Parliamentary Union
a women, Manassa Danioko, but she is one of only two women in this nine member institution. Female representation and participation in the Malian peace process illustrate similar trends to those evident in the aforementioned situations. The peace process, which began with the July 2014 Algiers mediation process and extends to the current implementation phase, is characterized by low levels of female representation. As of January 2016, The Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children and the Family was not represented in the nation’s coordination committee for the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation.

The prevailing insecurity and the occupation of parts of Northern Mali by non-state armed groups have had a particularly negative impact on women and girls. According to reports from local populations and human rights organizations, armed groups in the north have forced women and girls to wear veils or headscarves in public and flogged or publicly stoned women who were accused of breaking the law. Cases of rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage are also reported in regions that are occupied by armed groups. As noted in the fieldwork, the lack of a trustworthy or effective judicial system means that women often feel that they cannot rely on the system for justice.

Gender-based violence is widespread in Mali and although the Malian Penal Code, which was amended in 2001, refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and all forms of sexual violence as “crimes against humanity,” there are no specific legislations that address gender-based violence. In 2012-2013, thirty-eight percent of Malian women indicated that they had endured physical violence since the age of 15. Of these women, sixty-five percent said their current or most recent husband were their abusers and twenty percent reported that their parents were their abusers.

The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, on the topic of justice and reconciliation, refers to conflict-related sexual violence. On this issue, the agreement mentions the establishment of an International Committee of Inquiry to investigate, among other things, sexual crimes. However, as of June 2017, this vehicle to promote reconciliation, peace and justice had not been created.

Additionally, cases of violence against women, such as sexual assault, go unpunished because there is either no local judicial system in place or corruption and nepotism allow perpetrators to go free. Furthermore, due to the pre-existing gender roles and the economic and social marginalization of women in Malian society, women and girls are particularly vulnerable to poverty following displacement.

The livelihoods of women and girls in Mali are primarily dependent on agricultural production and, to a lesser extent, informal trade. Analysis from the 2012-2013 DHS Report on Mali indicates that in the twelve months preceding the study, forty percent worked in sales and services and about a quarter worked in the agricultural sector. However, issues relating to credit and land tenure

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44 “Constitutional Court of Mali: Mrs Danioko Manassa, new President”, Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions of Africa, February 2015.
45 Ibid.
47 Ibid.

49 “Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2012-13 – Final Report”, USAID
50 Ibid.
52 “Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2012-13 – Final Report”, USAID
undermine their ability to pursue economic development and empowerment.

There are no laws that explicitly bar women from accessing financial services; however, issues such as low income, lack of financial literacy, lack of sufficient collateral and poorly-documented credit histories have presented challenges. The existence of government-run and privately-run micro-credit schemes, along with loan capacity-building programs for women-owned small and medium enterprises (SMEs), have slightly diversified credit opportunities for women. However, only a handful of creditors are women.

In Mali, land tenure and property rights are governed by both customary and statutory law. Generally, women are only allowed access to land through their husbands or other male relatives. This structure of land access, however, places women at a disadvantage since their control, given to them by their families, is temporary. In particular cases where fallow land is available, women have greater access to land because the land is considered undesirable. This form of access has endured setbacks, however, due to developments in agricultural technology and technique, such as permanent cropping, plow farming, and cash cropping, which have lengthened cultivation periods. The consequent shorter fallow periods have adversely impacted the ability of Malian females to achieve financial stability. As a result of these impediments as well as high illiteracy rates, women in Mali represent a largely underutilized potential labor force.

Women in Mali are particularly vulnerable in the areas of health and reproductive empowerment. The life expectancy for women in Mali is just short of 58 years. In addition, the maternal mortality rate is 587 per 100,000 live births and 55 percent of women aged 20-24 were married or in some kind of similar union before the age of 18. FGM is one of the most pervasive health challenges that women are subjected to. Without legislation that criminalizes FGM, the practice continues to be widespread in the country. Data shows that as of 2014, FGM prevalence rates had not decreased in the last 20 years. Prevalence rates in females aged 15-49 in 2013 was calculated to be 91.4 percent, up from 85.2 percent in 2006, despite some efforts to increase awareness of the detrimental effects of FGM. However, the prevalence of HIV among females aged 15-24 is only 0.6 percent, though as of 2013, the latest year for available data, only 23.7 percent of females aged 15-24 had comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS.

Since 1972, through initiatives such as the Association Malienne pour la Promotion et la Protection de la Famille (AMPPF), the Government of Mali has accepted and promoted family planning services. Due to such measures, knowledge of contraception is widespread among women in Mali. According to the DHS, 85 percent of women in Mali are aware of at least one contraceptive method. However, there is a disconnect between this widespread knowledge of contraception and its use, with only 10.3 percent of women aged 15-49 reporting using any kind of contraception.

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53 “Mali Finance for Food Security and Women Entrepreneurs”, USAID
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 “Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2012-13 – Final Report”, USAID
64 “Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2012-13 – Final Report”, USAID
Bamako

Bamako is the capital of Mali, located on the Niger River in the south of the country. It is the sixth-fastest growing city in the world, with a population of 2,158,000 as of 2014. Mali’s urban population has grown quickly, from 28.4 percent in 2000 to 40.7 percent in 2016. Bamako’s population includes members of all ethnic groups in the country, as well as foreign nationals.

**Structural Vulnerabilities**

- Weak security sector and DDR processes
- Proliferation of self-defense groups
- Poverty, unemployment, inflation and dissatisfaction with salaries
- Poor infrastructure and education system
- Lack of confidence in institutions
- Corruption in government and the judicial system
- Growing ethnic tensions
- Non-participation or exclusion of women, youth and marginalized communities in governance
- Displacement and return of refugees/IDPs

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66 “The world’s fastest growing cities and urban areas from 2006 and 2020”, The City Mayors Foundation
67 “Bamako”, Mali Data Portal
68 “Urban population (% of total)”, World Bank
Population and Demographics

Displacement due to conflict and the exclusion of women and youth from decision-making processes are ongoing vulnerabilities in Bamako. A rise in regionalism, escalating tensions between ethnic groups, or a non-implementation of the Algiers Peace Accord were also identified as potential risk factors. Resilience factors include the provision of social services, including education, and the involvement of local communities in development processes.

Security

While Bamako has seen lower levels of conflict fatalities than other parts of the country, the region has been affected by incidents of terrorism, notably the attacks on the Radisson Blu hotel in December 2015 and on the European Union Training Mission headquarters in March 2016. These attacks were claimed by AQIM and al-Mourabitoun. As the capital city and seat of government, Bamako has also been the site of protests and strikes, some of which have escalated to violence. Interviews in the field also highlighted a perceived rise in crime and drug trafficking, and found a lack of confidence in the ability of Malian forces to secure the region without foreign assistance.

Politics and Governance

There is a lack of trust in government institutions and in the state’s ability to control the country’s borders and Northern region. Participants in the field work also noted the general non-participation or exclusion of women and youth in political processes.

Economics and Resources

“In Bamako, the biggest problem is insecurity, especially in the peripheral neighborhoods. Now people return to their homes at 8 o’clock and everyone closes their doors. It is necessary to reinforce the security forces who are already on the ground doing patrols, so that the population can sleep with both eyes shut.”

- Interview with female Bamako resident

Since 2012, Bamako residents have reported dissatisfaction with salaries, inflation, poverty and unemployment as key economic concerns. The presence of MINUSMA staff and peacekeeping troops has resulted in rising prices for food and other goods in the district, which has negatively impacted some local residents.

Rule of Law

There is a widespread lack of trust in the judicial system, due to perceptions of impunity and corruption. Land-based disputes were also identified as a risk factor, in cases where landowners do not feel they have received justice through the judicial system. Women also reported that corruption in the judicial system has undermined justice around reports of rape and sexual violence.
Mopti Region

The Mopti region is in central Mali and is bordered by Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The region had a population of 2,426,000 as of 2014. The largest ethnic groups in the region are the Fulani, Bambara, and Dogon. Considered a crossroads between the north and south of the country, tourism, trade, animal husbandry and agriculture have historically played an important role in the regional economy. However, the Mopti region has one of the highest proportion of people living below the poverty line.

| Structural Vulnerabilities | • High unemployment  
| • Weak economic administration and lack of access to capital and loans  
| • Deterioration of infrastructure, including roads  
| • Lack of social services  
| • Non-implementation of Peace Accord  
| • Lack of presence of interim authorities  
| • Displacement of population  
| • Manipulation of ethnic identities and tribal affiliations  
| • Poor relationships between youth and security forces  
| • Marginalization and non-inclusion of women and youth  |

| Event-Driven Risks | • Elections  
| • Return of refugees leading to greater competition for land  
| • Climate change and drought/flood cycles  |

| Social and Institutional Resilience Factors | • NGO and Humanitarian groups  
| • MINUSMA-led economic activities  
| • Community leaders  |

69 “Mopti”, Mali Data Portal  
Population and Demographics

Mopti is home to a number of ethnic groups, including the Bozo, Songhai, Dogon, Fulani, Malinke and Bambara. Tensions between these groups have reportedly increased since 2012, due in part to ongoing conflicts between pastoralist and farming communities as well as marginalization of specific groups. In addition, Mali has a large youth population, many of whom are unemployed or underemployed and feel marginalized in decision-making processes.

“**There is social tension that is tied above all to the problems between the Fulani and the Bambara. The Fulani are herders, the Bambara are farmers. So these tensions are always going to exist. Perhaps the government can find some ways and means to pacify them, but these tensions will always exist.**”

- Interview with Mopti resident

Abuses by security forces and ongoing grievances around economic and social opportunities may impact youth recruitment into extremist groups in Mopti.

Security

The Mopti region has seen recurrent inter-communal conflicts between pastoralist and farming communities, particularly between the Fulani, Dogon and Bambara ethnic groups. While these tensions are rooted in competition for natural resources (namely, arable land and water access), land conflicts have been exacerbated by displacement and an escalation in tensions between ethnic groups since the start of the 2012 crisis. In addition, armed conflict spiked in the region in 2016, with attacks by both the Macina Liberation Front and militias.

There is a widespread sense that international and Malian security forces have been ineffective at securing the Mopti region beyond the administrative center. Abuses by both state security forces and non-state armed groups have continued, including sexual violence against women, and residents report that it is still difficult to travel.

Politics and Governance

The interim administration is not yet fully in place in many parts of Mopti. There is a sense that the government has not yet done enough to address the conflicts between pastoralist and farming communities in Mopti and that the government does not fully comprehend the grievances of local communities.

Economics and Resources

Insecurity in the Mopti region has had a negative impact on the regional economy, with a slowdown in trade due to deteriorating infrastructure and insecurity along roads. Much of the population lacks basic social services, including health care, schools, telecommunications, electricity and water, although there are a number of non-governmental organizations and humanitarian groups operating in the area to provide these services. Without a strong government and administrative presence, there is a sense among residents that instability will continue to negatively affect the economy. With the Mopti regional economy heavily dependent on agriculture, the area is also vulnerable to intensifying cycles of drought and flooding due to climate change.

Residents also reported mixed feelings on the economic impacts of MINUSMA and other international forces in Mopti. These groups have created jobs for local residents, but also have contributed to rising housing prices.
Rule of Law

There is the perception that the judicial system in Mopti does not serve the people equally, with widespread allegations of corruption, nepotism, inaccessibility for the poor and impunity for the wealthy. Due to this mistrust and the sparse government presence in rural parts of the region, community leaders have taken on a primary role in dispute resolution at the local level.
The Gao region is located in eastern Mali and shares a border with Niger. As of 2014, it had a population of 646,000. The largest ethnic groups in the region are the Tuareg and Songhai. Gao has recently been seriously affected by the ongoing conflict, as demonstrated by the January 2017 attack in which a suicide bomber killed 77 people in a military camp.

### Structural Vulnerabilities
- Absence of Malian security forces
- Illicit economy (arms trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking)
- Ethnic tensions between rebel groups
- Markets are vulnerable to terrorist attacks
- Proliferation of sophisticated weaponry
- Food insecurity: lack of access to food and water
- Insecurity

### Event-Driven Risks
- Delay in implementation of peace agreement
- Clashes between communities
- Increase in conflict between farmers and herders

### Social and Institutional Resilience Factors
- Civil Society groups
- Women and youth groups
- Community grassroots organizations
- Traditional and religious leaders

72 "Gao", Mali Data Portal
Security

Gao has experienced delays in the implementation and enforcement of the Algiers Accord. Field respondents noted that because of illiteracy and lack of communication, many people and groups do not know the terms of the agreement. Moreover, armed rebel groups have not yet been reintegrated into society or into government security forces. Currently, there is a lack of trust between citizens and security forces. Arms and drugs trafficking continues to plague the region, especially as corruption has grown among administrators.

“There is still mistrust. Because it takes a day to lose trust, but it takes several years to regain it. There are still displaced people who are afraid to return home. ... They cannot forget, it is not easy, but they are trying to understand one another.”

- Interview with Gao resident

Politics and Governance

During interviews, field respondents emphasized the lack of government involvement in the region and noted that it would be difficult or impossible to facilitate secure elections in Gao. Local elections were held in late 2016 however polls were canceled in multiple districts due to security concerns. There is little trust in the government amongst the general population, because the government has not guaranteed safety and security in the region. Additionally, women have been excluded from the political process, as no women are currently involved in the interim authority in the region.

Economics and Resources

Gao has experienced notable increases in consumer prices. The local economy has been affected by the insecurity, particularly on a very local level as markets themselves are vulnerable to robberies and attacks. There is a lack of economic opportunity in Gao, especially for youth. Economic difficulties and poverty have exacerbated the security situation, motivating people to engage in illicit economic activities and criminal activities. Due to the poor conditions of the roads, food insecurity is also an issue in Gao, as it is difficult to reach rural populations.

Rule of Law

Field respondents emphasized that there is little rule of law in Gao. Resistance groups make and enforce the law arbitrarily and effective justice mechanisms, from proper arrest and detention to investigation and prosecution, are notably absent. This results in criminals not being charged or being released without consequence.
Kidal Region

The Kidal region is located in northeastern Mali and shares a border with Niger and Algeria. As of 2014, Kidal had a population of 80,000. The largest ethnic group in the region is Tuareg. Much of the population is reliant on livestock raising and, to a lesser extent, agriculture for their livelihood.

**Structural Vulnerabilities**
- Lack of infrastructure, leading to higher prices and food insecurity
- Economic stagnation
- Ethnic tensions
- Lack of judicial system
- Absence of Malian security forces
- Unemployment, especially among youth
- Insecurity

**Event-Driven Risks**
- Continued drug trafficking
- Increased presence of extremist groups

**Social and Institutional Resilience Factors**
- Local non-governmental organizations
- Women and youth groups
- Community based organizations
- Traditional and religious leaders

**Population and Demographics**

According to those interviewed, many people have been displaced over the past few years due to the violence in northern Mali, including large groups of displaced people who have either moved from, or returned to, Kidal. Some residents felt that because many of the people who left Kidal due to violence have not returned, there has been a loss

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75 “Kidal”, Mali Data Portal
77 “Northern Mali at a glance”, OECD
of leadership and those trained to provide essential civil service functions.

Security

The security situation in Kidal remains tenuous. According to reports, the region has experienced clashes between the GATIA (Groupe d'Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés) and the CMA (Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad). Violence related to the separatist movement in northern Mali has been concentrated in Kidal and fighting has erupted multiple times over the past year. Rival armed factions signed the Algiers Peace Accord in June 2015, but field respondents emphasized that little has been done to enforce implementation of the peace agreement. The lack of Malian security forces in the region was cited as a structural vulnerability. The region has been dependent on foreign forces to maintain any semblance of peace, but there have also been several reports of attacks on these forces since the signing of the agreement. In addition to separatist violence, violence involving extremist groups, such as AQIM and MUJAO was reported in Kidal. There are also security issues surrounding arms trafficking and drug trafficking. Youth who are not able to find work are often drawn to trafficking as a source of income.

“Today there are conflicts between the CMA and the GATIA... They're the ones fighting each other. The real problems we are suffering from started at the signing of the Accord. And it’s at that point that our communities started to kill each other. ... There is fighting, even last night there was fighting. There is always fighting, deaths, hundreds of deaths.”

- Interview with Kidal resident

Politics and Governance

A temporary authority was installed in the Kidal region, but there is still little government presence and a lack of an authority recognized by the people. There have been disputes over the future of elections in Kidal and the organization of a future administration. Notwithstanding the key role played by women in Tuareg society, in Kidal women are still excluded from the political process and the quota for women in government has not been enforced.

Economics and Resources

Kidal has suffered economically due to the security concerns in the region and lack of infrastructure. A lack of state involvement or presence has led the economy in Kidal to remain largely stagnant. Despite insecurity, some traders have resumed their activities, but armed groups are the only forces facilitating the transportation of food and other goods throughout the region. Corruption has grown, leading to the growth of drug trafficking. Arms and human trafficking has also increased in response to a lack of legal economic opportunities. An increase in NGOs presence in the region has been identified as a resiliency factor, allowing some commerce to develop.

Rule of Law

The lack of presence of state authorities in the region has led to the absence of an organized judicial system in Kidal. It is perceived that corruption and nepotism are prevalent. The city of Kidal is controlled by CMA and law and order are supposed to be maintained by a commission put in place by the group, but this has been largely unsuccessful. Previously Kidal had one court and a judge, but the region has not had a judge since 2012. Field respondents emphasized the lack of rule of law in the region and the perception of rampant corruption and growing criminality.
The Timbuktu region is in northern Mali and is bordered by Mauritania and Algeria, as well as Burkina Faso to the south. As of 2014 data, it had a population of 807,000. The largest ethnic groups in the region are Moor and Tuareg. Tauoudenni, the salt-mining center of Mali, is located in the far north of the region.

**Structural Vulnerabilities**
- Lack of government forces or authority
- Prevalence of illicit economic activity
- Insecurity

**Event-Driven Risks**
- Extremist violence
- Communal violence

**Social and Institutional Resilience Factors**
- Local non-governmental organizations
- Women and youth groups
- Community grassroots organizations
- Traditional and religious leaders

**Population and Demographics**
During the crisis, many people left Timbuktu and traveled toward southern Mali. Most of these people are afraid to return until there is peace in the region and economic opportunities.

**Security**
Timbuktu has seen a growth in criminality throughout the region. Field respondents noted the prevalence of armed robberies, stating that people are sometimes afraid to go outside. Illicit economies, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and arms trafficking, are also a

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78 “Tombouctou”, Mali Data Portal
widespread security issue. There have been multiple reports of clashes involving the CMA and GATIA. Interviewees emphasized the lack of cooperation between the government and armed groups. Additionally, violence is also perpetrated by extremist groups such as MUJAO and AQIM. Insecurity in Timbuktu has also contributed to sexual and gender-based violence, and there have been widespread reports of rape and forced marriage.

**Politics and Governance**

Due to insecurity, there is little faith that a fair and secure election could be organized in Timbuktu. Field respondents emphasized that until the security situation is managed, it will be impossible to hold elections that result in successful leadership.

**Economics**

The economy in Timbuktu has suffered due to the poor security situation and an absence of reliable infrastructure. The region lacks employment opportunities and much of the population is impoverished. Trade flow in and out of Timbuktu has been stunted due to the danger of robbery on the roads, leading to an overall increase in prices of basic goods. No road exists between Timbuktu and Kidal and other roads out of Timbuktu are unreliable, making movement throughout northern Mali difficult and sometimes impossible. Additionally, there is a lack of educational opportunity as there are no universities in the region, which may provide an incentive for youth to join armed groups.

**Rule of Law**

Rule of law in Timbuktu has been threatened by the prevalence of illicit economic activity. Even when traffickers are arrested, they are often released without facing consequences. Incidents of robbery are rarely investigated or resolved, causing a lack of faith in the judicial process and little expectation of justice. There are also reports of perceived corruption, nepotism, and political sponsorship within the region.

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“Timbuktu is a vast region. And there are also currently a lot of problems. There are terrorist groups and there are other people who are not affiliated or identified with any group. So they are engaging in banditry, and this is a threat to everyone.”

- Interview with Timbuktu resident
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali

Conclusion and Recommendations

Mali presents a highly complex set of conflict drivers and risk factors at the regional, national, and subnational levels. The country has historically been peaceful, but when war broke out in 2012 between the Malian government and Northern rebels, it led to a political crisis and a coup d’état. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda affiliates took advantage of the instability to capture territory. Communal violence also spiked due to the prolonged absence of state authority in certain areas, the proliferation of weapons, and longstanding competition for resources between farmers and herders. Insecurity in Mali has spilled over into neighboring countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, where an AQIM attack killed over a dozen people in 2016, and Burkina Faso.

With respect to the conflict in Northern Mali, a peace agreement has since been signed between the Malian government, the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and the militia Group Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA). In response, continental actors including the Sahel G5, ECOWAS, and the African Union (AU) have intervened alongside the UN, with additional bilateral cooperation from Algeria, France, Germany, Canada, and United States, to promote a peaceful implementation of the agreement. However, there is still little consensus among the signatories as to the practical implementation of that agreement and Mali remains in a condition of limbo, often described as “No peace, no war.”

Population and Demographics

- Support programs to address youth unemployment (including private sector initiatives, training institution collaboration for employment, training and vocational skills and entrepreneurship, youth entrepreneurship funding, etc.)

- Provide greater support and programming to women and children who have been displaced and affected by violence

- Good governance of natural resources including land tenure and ownership laws

Security

- Government should create a collaboration framework between security actors to better address underlying vulnerabilities and risk factors

- Sanction violators of the Peace Agreement

- Ensure full implementation of counter terrorism measures and security provisions of the Peace Agreement

Politics and Governance

- Support national-level dialogue efforts between signatories of the Peace Agreement to resolve outstanding disagreements

- Sanction violators of the Peace Agreement

- Encourage renewed engagement between regional and international organizations and the Malian government to align strategies in addressing the root causes of conflict

- Take necessary measures to fast track the implementation of the peace agreement to ensure peaceful elections

Economics and Resources

- Expand access to social basic services

- Improve access to humanitarian services

- Improve access to micro-credit services especially to women, youths and vulnerable population

Rule of Law

- Support informal mechanisms for dispute resolution and traditional tools of conflict
mediation, particularly in underserved areas

- Strengthen the application of the rule of law
### Appendix A: Data Sample

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<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Global Integrity</td>
<td>In practice, the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections is/are protected from political interference</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Global Integrity</td>
<td>In practice, the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections make/s timely, publicly available reports before and after a national election.</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>EIU Democracy Index</td>
<td>Electoral process and pluralism</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>EIU Democracy Index</td>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>EIU Democracy Index</td>
<td>Functioning of Government</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Average Voter Turnout Parliamentary</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
<td>Corruption Perception</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Political and Social Integration</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Mo Ibrahim Index</td>
<td>Personal Safety</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>UN, ECOWAS, AU</td>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Conflict Fatalities per capita</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Scale</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UPPSALA</td>
<td>Presence/Conflict with Non-State Armed Groups</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale - Amnesty</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale - State</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale - HRW</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Refugees by country of origin per capita</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Refugees by country of origin (difference 2015-2014) per capita</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>IDPs by Country of Asylum per capita</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>IDPs by country of asylum (difference 2015-2014) per capita</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global Integrity</td>
<td>In practice, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global Integrity</td>
<td>In practice, national-level judges give reasons for their decisions/judgments.</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global Integrity</td>
<td>In practice, allegations of corruption against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body.</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global Integrity</td>
<td>In practice, the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective.</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global Integrity</td>
<td>In practice, the mechanism for citizens to report police misconduct or abuse of force is effective.</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WB Human Rights and Law Report</td>
<td>% of Women on Constitutional Court</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>WB – Women, Business, and Law</td>
<td>Does the law mandate equal remuneration for work of equal value?</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>WB – Women, Business, and Law</td>
<td>Does the law mandate nondiscrimination based on gender in hiring?</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>WB – Women, Business, and Law</td>
<td>Is dismissal of pregnant workers prohibited?</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Gini WYD</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Income Share Held by Highest 10%</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Population with Improved Sanitation (Urban-Rural Difference)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Population with Improved Water Source (Urban-Rural Difference)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>UN Stats</td>
<td>Children under 5 moderately or severely underweight, percentage</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Depth of the food deficit (kilocalories per person per day)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Prevalence of Underweight, weight for age (% of children under 5)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>UN Stats</td>
<td>Literacy, 15-24, Women</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>School enrollment, primary and secondary (gross), gender parity index (GPI)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, female (%) (modeled ILO estimate)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>UN Stats</td>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Population Growth</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>UN Stats</td>
<td>Prevalence of underweight, weight for age, female (% of children under 5)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Contraceptive prevalence, any methods (% of women ages 15-49)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>World Bank Data</td>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, female (years)</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>WB – Women, Business, and Law</td>
<td>Percentage of women aged 20-24 years old who were married or in a union before age 18</td>
<td>15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>ECOWARN</td>
<td>IncReps</td>
<td>352 (after reducing for duplicates and relevance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Desktop</td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2 Field Research</td>
<td>Risk and Vulnerability</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
<td>Broken out by Men, Women, and Youth</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2 Field Research</td>
<td>Risk and Vulnerability</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>Prominent individuals and local experts</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Vulnerability Index

Index Data Sources

Based on the five human security pillars, a series of indicators were identified based on relevance and measurability. Data sources were then identified from recognized institutions such as the World Bank, United Nations, as well as universities, research institutions, and think tanks. A full list of data sources is attached in Appendix A. During selection and testing of the index, the availability of data was assessed to ensure an even distribution of scores.

Process: Calculating the Scores

The index is scored on a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the highest level of vulnerability, and 10 the lowest level of vulnerability. Each raw data set is normalized and scaled, before being integrated into the indicator and pillar scores.

1. Normalization

An index, by definition, integrates and compares data sets with very different curves and distribution. As a first step, therefore, it is necessary to normalize the data so that it can be properly compared. Without framing the data within the context of the wider group of numbers, its meaning can become skewed. Therefore, the process of finding the mean and calculating the Standard Deviation (SD) of the data set, then using those elements to approximate a normal distribution, can be used to provide this meaning. The Gaussian normalization formula is outlined below.

\[
f(x, \mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \sigma} e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}}
\]

Where \( \mu \) is the mean
\( \sigma^2 \) is the variance

SD is the quantity calculated to indicate the extent of deviation for a group of numbers as a whole. Normal distribution is then used to find how the variables are approximately normally distributed. In the context of this tool, it will help to understand where countries sit in relation to each other within the group distribution of a particular data set.

For raw data sets that have gaps (e.g. data is unavailable for some countries but not others), country data points are left blank. This ensures countries are not provided with an artificial score, where data does not exist.

2. Scaling

To create an index where countries are scored within a defined range, the data sets must be scaled so the scores can be integrated. This process of scaling transforms the normalized data into a number between 1 and 10, with 10 representing the lowest level of vulnerability. The below formula was applied to standardize the distribution values from [min, max] to [MIN, MAX], matching the new scale of values both for the highest and lowest edges of the distribution.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment:

\[ X = MIN + \frac{MAX - MIN}{(max - min)} \times (x - min) \]

3. Aggregation

Each indicator may be made up of either one or multiple data sources. In cases where multiple data sets were used to make up the one indicator, the data sets were each scaled to preliminary index scores (1-10), as outlined in the above steps. The average was then taken of these scores to reach a final index score for that indicator. This process was repeated at the pillar level, first averaging, then scaling the indicator scores.
Appendix C: Additional References


Appendix D: Matrix of Vulnerabilities, Risks, Resilience Factors, and Recommendations by Human Security Pillar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MALI</th>
<th>VULNERABILITIES</th>
<th>RISKS</th>
<th>RESILIENTS</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics &amp; Governance</td>
<td>Perceived corruption and nepotism in government, Lack of confidence in government institutions, Manipulation of ethnic identities and tribal affiliations, Embezzlement of public funds, Low representation of women and youths in politics and decision making, Recurrence of military coups</td>
<td>Weak state presence in the north and center of the country, Low turnout and low confidence in electoral processes, Slow implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement, Chieftaincy and succession issues, Fragmentation of the State, Proliferation of separatist ideology</td>
<td>Existence of accountability mechanism to address grievances, Truth and reconciliation commission, The signature of the Peace Agreement, Engagement of the International community</td>
<td>Support national-level dialogue efforts between signatories of the Peace Agreement to resolve outstanding disagreements, Sanction violators of the Peace Agreement, Encourage renewed engagement between regional and international organizations and the Malian government to align strategies in addressing root causes of conflict, Take necessary measures to fast track the implementation of the peace agreement to ensure peaceful elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population &amp; Demographics</td>
<td>Demographic pressures due to large youth bulge and population growth, Adverse climate conditions (drought, flooding, pest infestation) due to climate change</td>
<td>Displacement and return/reintegration of refugees, Competition over access to scarce natural resources, Food insecurity and malnutrition, FGM, forced marriage</td>
<td>“Joking relationship”, Existence of dynamic Civil society groups, including NGOs, media, Women’s organizations and humanitarian actors, Existence of family planning program</td>
<td>Support programs to address youth unemployment (including private sector, training institution collaboration for employment, training and vocational skills and entrepreneurship, youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Harmful socio-cultural practice**
- Caste system
- Cross-border migration

**Sensitization campaign against FGM**
- Internship in public administration for graduate youths

**Economic shock**
- from volatile commodity prices
- Illicit economy
- Labor protests
- Inflation
- Increase in unemployment
- Slow economic growth

**Support from bilateral and multilateral financial partners**
- Vibrant informal economic sector
- Agricultural programs to support farmers and herders
- Fiscal reforms

**Recurrence of rebellions in the North**
- Porous borders
- Large ungoverned land mass and

**Implementation of “Loi de programmation militaire”**
- Inter-religious dialogue

**Economics & Resources**
- Disparities between north-south and in urban-rural development
- Illicit economies, including drug trafficking and trans-Saharan arms trade
- Unequal distribution of wealth
- Food insecurity
- Low participation of women in the formal sector of the economy
- High unemployment
- Undiversified economy - vulnerable to exogenous shocks

**Participation of women in the formal sector of the economy**
- High unemployment
- Undiversified economy - vulnerable to exogenous shocks

**Security**
- Recurrence of rebellions in the North
- Porous borders
- Large ungoverned land mass and

**Entrepreneurship funding, etc.**
- Provide greater support and programming to women and children who have been displaced and affected by violence
- Good governance of natural resources including land tenure and ownership laws

**Economic shock from volatile commodity prices**

**Expand access to social basic services**
- Improve access to humanitarian services
- Improve access to micro-credit services especially to women, youths and vulnerable population

**Ineffective implementation of the security provisions of the Peace Agreement**

**Implementation of “Loi de programmation militaire”**
- Inter-religious dialogue

**Government should create a collaboration framework between security actors to better address underlying**
| Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | Parishelli, Christian

### Harsh Terrain of the Sahara Desert
- Land-based conflicts
- Recurrence or escalation of conflict in the north
- Land-based inter-communal conflicts
- Multiplication of militia groups
- Weak presence of security and defense forces
- Inefficient coordination among multiple security actors
- Existence of dynamic civil society groups, including NGOs, media, women’s organizations and humanitarian actors
- Influential community leaders
- UN peacekeeping Mission (MINUSMA)
- Anti-terrorism strategies in the Sahel region
- Sanction violators of the Peace Agreement
- Full implementation of counter terrorism measures and security provisions of the Peace Agreement

### Rule of Law
- Lack of trust in judicial institutions
- Low capacity of law enforcement agencies
- Limited government presence to provide law and order
- Perception of corruption in the judicial system
- Lack of state authority in the northern and central parts of Mali
- Corruption within law enforcement and court system
- Mob justice/vigilantism
- Justice sector reforms
- Traditional alternative dispute mechanism
- Support informal mechanisms for dispute resolution and traditional tools of conflict mediation, particularly in underserved areas
- Strengthen the application of the rule of law