SELECT GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE LITERATURE REVIEWS

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN THE MENA AMONG RELIGIOUS AND OTHER MINORITIES IN CONFLICT SETTINGS

Contract No. GS-10F-0033M / Order No. 7200AA18M00016, Tasking N008

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SELECT GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE LITERATURE REVIEWS
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**ACRONYMS**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-supported literature review explores gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) against ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The review is an activity under the USAID Gender-Based Violence Learning Agenda, which seeks to promote deeper understanding of the dynamics of GBV globally with the aim of informing USAID programming. The review, therefore, addresses the following question(s):

How does gender-based violence (GBV, to include sexual violence) targeting members of religious minorities differ from other kinds of GBV in conflict settings? Are there differences in GBV targeting minority women in conflict vs. non-conflict settings? What, if any, governmental and unofficial policies are in place to respond to GBV targeted against religious minorities? What do we learn from descriptive statistics, policy analysis, and case studies from the MENA region, and from rigorous evaluation of interventions to reduce GBV in the MENA?

While a fair amount has been written on GBV in conflict settings, the current paper looks specifically at GBV against members of religious and other minorities, focusing mainly on the MENA, but also drawing comparisons with other parts of the world. As GBV against minorities occurs frequently in unstable environments, the paper provides an overview of gender-based violence, including sexual violence in conflict settings. We also discuss the relationship between conflict and GBV among minorities, with an emphasis on countries in the MENA where USAID has presence; how GBV targeting members of religious minorities is different from other kinds of GBV in conflict settings; and whether there are differences in GBV targeting minority women in conflict vs. non-conflict settings. We then consider the strengths and shortcomings of well-established rubrics to analyze relevant state and non-state policies and responses to GBV, assess interventions to reduce GBV in the MENA, and conclude with recommendations.

KEY FINDINGS

The literature has little information on, and few assessments of, GBV/SGBV targeted against religious and ethnic minorities (REM) in the MENA, and even fewer case studies of interventions.

The literature suggests that a multifaceted strategy is most effective at reducing GBV in general, however. Addressing cultural norms and legal frameworks, raising awareness, and documenting and monitoring violence and interventions that focus on perspectives of survivors and perpetrators are all essential.

Given the lack of information on GBV in the MENA, there are very few policies concerning GBV among REM. And while the guidelines for analyzing laws, policies, and programs relevant to GBV are helpful, they do not address intersectionality, especially the different impacts upon religious and ethnic minorities. Moreover, such guidelines focus on GBV generally rather than conflict-related GBV specifically.

Examining GBV against religious and ethnic minorities in specific MENA countries during conflict, in Iraq we find that increases in violence against women and girls are a byproduct of the 2003 U.S. invasion. Poor women are especially at risk, regardless of ethnicity or religious conviction. In conflict-affected Iraq, women and girls are particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based
violence, including trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has engaged in widely reported trafficking and enslavement of Yazidi women and children.

Yazidis in war-torn Syria face similar circumstances: women and girls are forced into sexual slavery, and are tortured and separated from their families.

Perpetrators of conflict-related GBV in Libya have also targeted minority groups since the 2011 revolution. Victims include indigenous women and girls, as well as displaced and migrant communities in Libya.

In Yemen, where civil war rages on, migrants and displaced persons are subject to GBV and various forms of SGBV. According to USG reporting, Government of Yemen Security Belt Forces (SBF) are involved in a range of crimes, including abduction and rape of women and girls, and financial extortion of families and communities.

In addition to GBV in these conflict settings, migrants and refugees, largely REM populations in their host countries, face GBV across the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Experts’ recommendations include:

- **Multisectoral interventions are most effective.** Preventing GBV against women and girls requires “systematic, sustained programming across the social ecology (i.e., the delicate equilibrium of interacting social, institutional, cultural, and political contexts of people’s lives) to transform gender-power inequalities” (Michau et al. 2015, 1672).

- **Feminist, socio-ecological, and intersectional approaches highlight the structural antecedents of GBV.** Interventions that adopt socio-ecological approaches have been effective in multiple settings. But regardless of the structural perspective, the critically important goal remains women’s equality (Human Rights Watch 2017).

- **Physical prevention, case management, and emergency health and mental-health services** are urgently needed for survivors and the vulnerable.

- **Legal and policy reform, documenting and monitoring violence, and awareness-raising:** Legal and policy reforms are needed to address GBV in conflict, and must address the differential impacts upon religious and ethnic minorities. Advocacy, access to justice, and culturally appropriate interventions are all enhanced by a greater ability to document and monitor violence.

- **Access to justice, advocacy, and interventions that focus on perspectives of survivors and respect cultural norms:** REM voices must be heard in order to design effective programming and to establish efficient policy. Successful programs provide avenues for survivors to engage in advocacy. Program designers can develop survivor-centered interventions and ensure access to justice by learning from successful practices:

  - **Use truth commissions.** Institutional processes of this type are mandated to clarify the events of armed conflicts. Efforts to address GBV among minorities should include the development of investigative techniques and methods that enable women to speak about their experiences using truth-commission platforms and reconciliation processes where possible.
• **Understand that conflict affects different populations in different ways.** Recognizing that armed conflict differentially impacts specific sectors of society will help unearth those crimes that are most difficult to identify and document.

• **Encourage survivor participation.** Survivor involvement is key to identifying the scope and impact of crimes of sexual violence, and also plays a key role in designing population-specific reparations.

• **Center projects and legislation on addressing conflict-related violence.** Programs and policies that focus on violence during armed conflicts can highlight the causes of violence against women regardless of armed conflicts. Such recognition can motivate communities to move beyond a return to prior sociocultural conditions, and to transform those conditions in order to address the structural roots of violence.

• **Focus on survivors, but engage bystanders as well.** Several experts (Skalli 2014; Grove 2015; Abdelmonem 2019) recommend this strategy, and have further observed that engaging entire communities is key to preventing future GBV (Lilleston et al. 2018; Kabonesa and Namuggala 2019).

• **Interventions to promote coping with and recovering from GBV in MENA must be survivor-centered.** Analysts suggest the following to aid coping and recovery among women and girls who have survived GBV in conflict and other fragile settings in MENA:
  
  • Strengthen women’s/girls’ social networks
  • Reduce survivors’ feelings of idleness and isolation
  • Increase women’s/girls’ knowledge
  • Increase women’s/girls’ self-confidence
  • Address stigma among individuals and families
  • Gain family confidence by including community members in educational efforts to prevent GBV and providing cash transfers (e.g., for school necessities) to allow women and girls to participate in programming.

A two-page summary for this Literature Review can be found at: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XM4P.pdf
INTRODUCTION

Experts have written a fair amount on gender-based violence (GBV) in conflict settings (USAID 2013). Our paper, however, looks specifically at GBV against members of religious and ethnic minorities (REM), focusing mainly on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but also drawing comparisons with other parts of the world. As GBV against minorities occurs frequently in unstable environments, this paper provides an overview of GBV, including sexual violence in conflict and fragile settings. We also discuss the relationship between conflict and GBV among minorities, with an emphasis on MENA countries where USAID has a presence; how GBV targeting members of religious minorities is different from other kinds of GBV in conflict settings; and whether there are differences in GBV targeting minority women in conflict vs. non-conflict settings. We then consider the strengths and shortcomings of well-established rubrics to analyze relevant state and non-state policies and responses to GBV, assess interventions to reduce GBV in the MENA, and conclude with recommendations.

DEFINITIONS

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

According to the USAID, GBV is described as “violence that is directed at an individual based on his or her biological sex, gender identity, or perceived adherence to socially defined norms of masculinity and femininity. It includes physical, sexual, and psychological abuse; threats; coercion; arbitrary deprivation of liberty; and economic deprivation, whether occurring in public or private life. GBV can include female infanticide; child sexual abuse; sex trafficking and forced labor; sexual coercion and abuse; neglect; domestic violence; elder abuse; and harmful traditional practices such as early and forced marriage; ‘honor’ killings; and female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)” Women and girls are most at risk and most affected by GBV (USAID 2013). Consequently, the terms “violence against women” and “gender-based violence” are often used interchangeably. However, boys and men can also experience GBV, as can sexual and gender minorities. Regardless of the target, GBV is rooted in structural inequalities between men and women and is characterized by the use and abuse of physical, emotional, or financial power and control.

FOCUS COUNTRIES

This review focuses on MENA countries where USAID implements programming: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. These countries reflect broad ethno-religious diversity, as they are, combined, home to numerous ethnic groups and religious minorities. (See Table 1 in Annex A for a full list of minority groups by country.)

INTERSECTIONALITY AND RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

While this review addresses the status of religious and ethnic minorities, a robust analysis must consider other dimensions of vulnerability and how these factors combine: intersectionality. For example, the stigmatization of female-headed households may render minority women more vulnerable to GBV in conflict settings than women of the majority religious or ethnic group (Fitriyah 2016). Minority women in the MENA often face marginalization and thus grave challenges in securing resources, gaining access to land, obtaining gainful employment, and achieving financial independence. GBV against religious and ethnic minority women in conflict settings exacerbates their stigmatization due to resulting unmarried status, single parenthood, and pregnancy, especially among those who
give birth to a child after a rape has occurred and whose children are born of mixed ethnicity (Bailliet 2007). Women from religious and ethnic minority groups are more likely to experience multiple vulnerabilities, with exponential negative effects on their lives. Such amplified harms from GBV against minority groups require multisectoral assistance for survivors of GBV in conflict, as noted by the UN Security Council (2019, 31):

“The delivery of multi-sectoral assistance for all survivors of sexual violence, including the clinical management of rape, medical, psychosocial and legal services, including comprehensive sexual and reproductive care such as access to emergency contraception and safe termination of pregnancy and HIV prevention, awareness and treatment, as well as reintegration support for survivors, including shelters, where appropriate, and economic livelihood programmes – particular attention should be paid to the diverse range of victims: ethnic or religious minorities; women and girls in rural or remote areas; those living with disabilities; female heads of households; widows; male survivors; women and children associated with armed groups; women and children released from situations of abduction, forced marriage, sexual slavery and trafficking by armed groups; children born of wartime rape; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, who may require specialized responses.”

CONFLICT SETTINGS

Conflict settings are fragile contexts that may encompass specific areas within a state, or cross state borders. Such settings are characterized by two key elements: fragility and conflict. Fragility refers to conditions where social cohesion is low as groups contest state power and how that power should be distributed and applied. Government capacities are weak and severely eroded. Institutions thus often lack widespread legitimacy and are vulnerable to the interference of external political and economic forces. Non-state actors operate parallel to the state further undermining state institutions’ authority and capacity, all of which contribute to instability and insecurity for populations in these settings. Conflict, meanwhile, is ever-present in varying degrees and form. Social divisions are deep and states do not have a monopoly over the use of violence due to the presence of armed actors (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy 2020). People have limited access to critical health, housing, education, and other services, and infrastructure is poor. Conflict often results in population displacement (i.e., internal displacement and refugee flow), making the whole population and/or specific segments, such as REM and women, vulnerable. Several countries in this review—Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen—are in the midst of conflict.

THE MENA CONTEXT, GBV AND DATA LIMITATIONS

International sources establish that “seven out of 10 women in conflict settings and in refugee populations are exposed to gender-based and sexual violence” (UN Women 2019). Adolescent girls are prime targets of GBV, which includes incest, sexual abuse, intimate partner violence, early and forced marriage, marital rape, female genital mutilation, sexual exploitation, and trafficking (UNAIDS 2019a). Note that children under 18 years of age constituted about half of the refugee population in 2017, up from 41 percent in 2009 but similar to more recent years (UNHCR 2018a, 3).

Table 1 (Annex A) offers comprehensive information on GBV issues for the MENA countries receiving assistance from USAID, namely:

- Categories that designate minority status (e.g., language, race/ethnicity, religion, region of residence, refugee status);
Child marriage is prevalent in the MENA region. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), technical experts, and multiple members of the international donor community consistently maintain that child marriage itself is a form of GBV. According to UNICEF’s *A Profile of Child Marriage in Middle East and North Africa*, marriage rates for girls under 18 in the region vary from a high of one in three in Sudan and Yemen, to almost one-in-four (24 percent) in Iraq, to a low of one-in-50 in Tunisia (2018, 4). While a number of MENA countries have made strides in reducing child marriage rates, double-digit child marriage rates are largely located in conflict settings, as noted above (UNICEF 2018); in fact, economic stress and living in fragile and conflict settings appear to drive child marriage. According to UNICEF (2018), in all MENA countries, with the exception of Algeria, Syria, and Yemen, women from the poorest households are at least twice as likely to have married in childhood as are women from the richest households (see Figure 1 from UNICEF). Women and adolescent girls belonging to marginalized groups face more elevated risks of violence, discrimination and stigma (UNAIDS 2019a). “At least 17 million women report have experienced forced sex in childhood,” and “nine million girls aged 15–19 years experienced forced sex this year” (2019a, 17).

MENA countries have little comparable data on experiences of sexual violence in childhood as reported by women aged 18 to 29, nor do countries have comparable data on experiences of non-partner sexual violence in the past 12 months among girls aged 15 to 19 (UNICEF 2017, 17). Data on GBV among girls from racial and ethnic minority groups is even sparser. However, overall percentages by country provide a sense of the context for all girls, and relative frequency of GBV in conflict and fragile settings. The percentages of girls experiencing forced sex from ages 15-19 in the MENA and other countries for which there are comparable data from 2005-2016 are shown in Figure 1 below. Jordan, reporting 13 percent of adolescents that have had forced sex, has one of the highest percentages on that measure in the world, available data shows. Approximately six percent of girls aged 15 to 19 have experienced forced sex in Egypt.
Figure 1. Percentage of Girls Aged 15 to 19 Years Who Ever Experienced Forced Sex

(Source: UNICEF 2017, 80)

Note: Data for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Jordan, Mali, and Peru refer to ever-married girls who have experienced forced sex committed by a husband or partner. Source: UNICEF global databases, 2017, based on DHS and MICS, 2006-2016.
As noted by Stark and Ager (2011), current methods of estimating the incidence of GBV in complex emergencies and conflict settings tend to rely on nonprobability samples. Researchers conduct population-based monitoring infrequently. In their systematic review of published literature, Stark and Ager attempted to quantify the magnitude of GBV in emergency settings. They found that intimate partner violence, physical violence, and rape were the three categories of violence most frequently measured. Further, rates of intimate partner violence tended to be quite high across all of the studies—much higher than most of the rates of wartime rape and sexual violence perpetrated by individuals outside of the home. The authors indicated that “direct comparisons of rates of violence were hindered by different case definitions, varying recall periods, and other methodological features” (Stark and Ager 2011, 134).

GBV WITHIN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT SETTINGS IN THE MENA

As previously noted, within the MENA, this review focuses on countries where USAID operates: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. While most of these countries are challenged by stability—which over the past decade has stemmed from various local, regional, and global crises—Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen remain conflict settings. Each of these countries is listed (in alphabetical order) in Table 1 (Annex A), along with details of GBV against minority groups, how it differs from GBV perpetrated against other groups, as well as governmental and unofficial policies in place to respond to GBV targeted against religious minorities. In the section below, we examine GBV and SGBV among ethnic and religious minorities in each of the countries.

GBV AGAINST RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES WITHIN CONFLICT SETTINGS

IRAQ

Iraq is comprised of an Arab majority (75 percent), and multiple minority ethnicities including Kurds (20 percent), Turks (3 percent), Afro-Iraqis (1 percent), Chaldo-Assyrians (2–5 percent), Yazidis (1.4 percent), and Shabaks (.7 percent). Iraq is largely Muslim (95-98 percent), within which can be found Shia Muslims (64–69 percent of total population) and Sunnis (29–34 percent). There is a very small population of Christians (1 percent) and other minority religions (1-4 percent) (CIA 2015).

In Iraq, sources indicate that the status of women was improving before the 2003 U.S. invasion, but the disruptions from the war impacted women negatively and continue to do so. One of the byproducts of the conflict is an increase in violence against women (Al-Ali 2018). Banwell (2015, 711) observes, “Since April 2003, at least 400 women and girls, some as young as eight years old, have been raped during or after the war. … [Moreover,] increases in sexual violence against women account for the dramatic rise in [honor] killings since the invasion. … The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry for Human Rights reported 166 [honor] killings during 2007 and 163 in 2008.”

Interpersonal and structural GBV in Iraq includes domestic violence, abduction, honor killings, rape, trafficking and forced prostitution (Banwell 2015). It appears that poor women are especially at risk, regardless of ethnicity or religious conviction. In conflict settings, women and girls are particularly vulnerable to sexual and GBV, including trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation. According to reports, women and girls are kidnapped and forced to marry or serve as sexual slaves in many conflict-affected countries around the world. One widely reported example of this practice in Iraq is the trafficking in persons and enslavement of women and children of the Yazidi ethno-religious group by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The UNHCR reported in October 2015 that ISIS was holding
approximately 3,500 civilians, mostly Yazidi women and children (UNODC 2015). According to Nadia Murad, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, over 350,000 of Yazidis, comprising 80 percent of the population, remain displaced and reside in camps (UN 2019).

The government of Iraq has faced criticism in efforts to address the plight of Yazidis. In the view of an Iraqi delegate to the UN, the state appears to have turned the page on a somber part of history since recovering all its territory from the grasp of ISIS, which is accused of committing numerous human rights violations. But the government appears increasingly more receptive to assisting Yazidis in recent years. For example, the government is considering practical measures to return all displaced persons to their homes and provide them with redress for their suffering. A new bill for Yazidi survivors—aimed at providing compensation, rehabilitation, and reintegration into society—was presented for debate before the Iraq government in 2019. In addition, a list of persons accused of human trafficking was also submitted to the Iraq national prosecutor’s office for investigation, and evidence of crimes committed by ISIS is being collected for evaluation and prosecution. Iraq also developed a National Strategy to Combat Violence against Women, as part of its commitment to UN Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (UN 2019).

LIBYA

In Libya, Arab and Berber ethnicities comprise the country’s majority (97 percent), while Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, and Tunisians represent 3 percent of the population. The religious majority is Muslim, of which most are Sunni (97 percent); minority religious groups are largely Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and Jewish. Conflict in Libya has caused the internal displacement of over 200,000 people, and disrupted the local economy and public services. Additionally, migrants and asylum seekers in detention in Libya “faced beatings, extortion, sexual violence, and forced labor in unofficial and quasi state-run detention centers, at the hands of guards, militias, and smugglers” (Human Rights Watch 2018).

Conflict-related GBV in Libya also targets minority groups. The principal linguistic-based minorities are the Tuareg (Berber/Amazigh), and Tebu (UK Home Office 2019). Inas Miloud, Chairperson of the Tamazight Women’s Movement, said that her Amazigh people are the indigenous inhabitants of Libya. Since the 2011 revolution, she has been working with indigenous women and girls affected by sexual and GBV, as well as displaced and migrant communities in that country. Miloud recalls:

In 2018, hundreds of stories were collected from Libyans relating experiences of sexual and gender-based violence, which primarily affects women and girls, she continued. Their testimonies outline a common pattern of physical violence, rape, sexual harassment, verbal abuse, abduction and domestic violence, she emphasized, noting that patriarchal norms, amplified by the presence of armed groups and the widespread availability of weapons, are the central cause of gender-based violence and the lack of security for women. Patriarchal notions of family [honor], coupled with fear of retaliation, ensure that domestic violence as well as sexual and gender-based violence are rarely reported, she continued, underlining that indigenous women are even further marginalized due to entrenched decades-old discrimination against minority communities. Critically, the peace process led by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) largely excludes Libyan women and indigenous groups, she pointed out. As a result, the Libyan Political Agreement does not reflect many crucial issues, such as gender equality, sexual and gender-based violence and fear of reprisals for activism on women’s rights (UN 2019).
SYRIA

In Syria, half of the population is Arab, but the Alawites (15 percent), Kurds (10 percent), and “Levantine” people (10 percent) are significant minorities. Druze, Ismaili, Imami, Nusai, Assyrians, Turkomen, and Armenians combined comprise about 15 percent in total. Syria is also religiously diverse. Though the majority is Muslim (87 percent) and predominantly Sunni (74 percent), 13 percent are Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia; 10 percent are Christian, 3 percent Druze, and a few practice Judaism. However, the Christian population may be considerably smaller as a result of Christians fleeing the country during the ongoing civil war (CIA 2020). In Syria, 12.6 million people were forcibly displaced as of the end of 2017 (UNHCR 2018a, 6), and 6.6 million as of the end of 2018 (UNHCR 2019).

A report on the effects of the conflict on trafficking in persons in Syria and neighboring countries published in 2015 by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) highlighted the increasing numbers of Syrian victims of trafficking in the region over the last few years. According to the study, trafficking increased substantially since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, although cases often remain unreported.

The same study points out that for Syrian victims, trafficking often starts in the country of asylum where they moved for protection from the conflict zone. Traffickers take advantage of the vulnerabilities that stem from displacement. Even if victims have international protection, they are still trafficked within the host country or to other countries in the MENA region. In Syria, the perpetrators of trafficking are not criminal networks, but rather family members, acquaintances and neighbors.

Trafficking in persons also occurs along the route to a safer place. A survey conducted between December 2015 and March 2016 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on the recent mixed migration flows, captures the severity of this phenomenon. More than seven percent of the 2,385 people surveyed by IOM reported at least one trafficking or other exploitative experience during their journey. The rate recorded among Syrian nationals was about nine percent (UNODC 2016, 61-63).

ISIS is also accused of genocide as well as other war crimes against the Yazidis enslaved in Syria. According to the UN Human Rights Council:

ISIS has sought to destroy the Yazidis through killings, sexual slavery; enslavement; torture; and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious bodily and mental harm; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of their own religious community, and erasing their identity as Yazidis. The public statements and conduct of ISIS and its fighters clearly demonstrate that ISIS intended to destroy the Yazidis of Sinjar, composing the majority of the world’s Yazidi population, in whole or in part (UN Human Rights Council 2016, 1).

Although men, women, and children of both sexes suffer under such conditions, the literature found no data on the numbers of Yazidi women and girls subjected to GBV in Syria.
YEMEN

Yemen’s population is predominantly Arab, but also includes Afro-Arabs, South Asians, and Europeans (CIA 2020). Muslim groups there include the Shafii (55 percent, in the South and Southeast of Yemen) and the Zaydi (45 percent, in the North and Northwest). According to the CIA World Factbook 2010 estimates, Muslims are 99.1 percent of the population in Yemen. The other .9 percent includes members of the Jewish, Baha’i, Hindu, and Christian religions, many of whom are refugees and foreigners.

In Yemen, the Shia insurgency (2004-14), Yemeni crisis (2011–present), and Yemeni civil war (2015 to the present) all likely contribute to patterns of GBV in the country. U.S. Department of State indicates that Government of Yemen Security Belt Forces (SBF) that are funded and directed by the UAE, committed rape and other forms of serious sexual violence targeting foreign migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other vulnerable groups. Since 2017, the SBF has controlled the Al Basateen area of the Dar Saad district of Aden, which hosts a population of at least 40,000 refugees and IDPs. Residents reported that SBF regularly abducted and raped, or threatened to rape, women to extort money from their families and communities. The authorities did not conduct investigations or make arrests in relation to these violations, which were still being reported in May [2018] (U.S. Department of State, Report on Yemen 2019b, 4).

GBV AGAINST MINORITY GROUPS WITHIN OTHER FRAGILE SETTINGS IN THE MENA

EGYPT

Egypt’s ethnicities include over a dozen ethnic groups. For example, there are Turks, Greeks, Abazas, and Bedouin Arab tribes in the Sinai Peninsula and in the deserts to the east, as well as the Siwis in the Siwa Oasis and Nubians along the Nile. Others include Copts, Beja, Greeks, Sa’idi, Bishari, Syro-Lebanese, Ababda, El homaydat, Huteimi, and Magyarab peoples, Malays, Arabs, and Egyptian Americans. The religious affiliation is largely Sunni Muslim (90 percent), and a number of Christian sects comprise the minority. Though a majority of Christians are Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include members of the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican faiths. Minorities also include Shi’a Muslims and Bahá’í as well as several smaller groups including Ahmadis, Quranists and Jehovah’s Witnesses (Minority Rights Group International: Egypt n.d.).

However, SGBV in Egypt does not appear focused on minorities. There are no data or articles that provide evidence that GBV against religious or other minority groups differs from GBV against majority groups in Egypt. Most GBV is perpetrated by family members or by a spouse/ex-spouse. The literature does point to the use of the state apparatus to either directly pacify social and political protest, or to withdraw protective services in public spaces, thereby indirectly resulting in sexual assault of women by security personnel/military/police or sexual assault perpetrated by rioters with impunity (Skalli 2014; Grove 2015). Most currently, Syrian and Sudanese refugees may be minorities who are vulnerable to SGBV in Egypt.

While insurgency in Egypt likely exacerbates SGBV, neither data nor articles found provide evidence of GBV against religious and ethnic minorities, except for among the country’s refugee population. As such, it is highly likely that hosts of refugees may sexually exploit vulnerable refugees. For example, reports find that refugees in Egypt tend to face domestic violence, sexual harassment in public spaces, exploitation and harmful traditional practices. Through direct interaction with both refugees and medical partners, humanitarian organizations found that female genital mutilation is
prevalent in African refugee communities and child marriage is especially widespread among Syrians in Egypt (CARE and UNHCR 2017).

**JORDAN**

In Jordan, the official majority as of 2015 is Jordanian in origin (69.3 percent). Smaller percentages are Syrian (13.3 percent), Palestinian (6.7 percent), Egyptian (6.7 percent), and Iraqi (1.4 percent), while others represent smaller ethnic groups (2.6 percent are Armenian or Circassian) (CIA 2020). According to 2010 estimates, 97.2 percent of Jordanians are Sunni Muslim. Only a handful are Christian (2 percent), most of whom are Greek Orthodox, but some are Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant. One percent or less in Jordan are Buddhist (0.4 percent), Hindu (0.1 percent), Jewish (less than 0.1 percent), or belong to folk religions, other faiths, or are unaffiliated (less than 0.1 in each category) (CIA 2020).

In 2017 and 2018, one in 14 people in Jordan was a refugee under the responsibility of UNHCR. When Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s mandate are included, the figures rise to one in three. There are 755,050 refugees in Jordan representing 57 refugee nationalities (UNHCR 2018a; 2018b, 2, 23). In 2018, Jordan hosted 2,242,600 Palestine refugees under the mandate of UNRWA (UNHCR 2019, 2). Jordan has the second largest number of refugees relative to its national population; it is highly likely that hosts or refugees may sexually exploit other more vulnerable refugees. We did not find literature concerning minority-directed GBV, although such violence may be directed at vulnerable widows of fallen Jordanian soldiers or the refugee populations. All of the literature found on widowhood in Jordan focuses on refugees who are widows. Literature concerning interventions among religious and ethnic minorities was not found.

**LEBANON**

In Lebanon, ethnicities are Arab (95 percent) and Armenian (4 percent). According to 2017 figures, religious groups include mostly Muslims (57.7 percent), including Sunni (28.7 percent) or Shia (28.4 percent); a small percentage is Alawite or Ismaili. Christians comprise over a third of the population (36.2 percent), with Maronite Catholics the largest Christian group. Fewer than 10 percent are Druze (5.2 percent), and there are only small percentages of Jews, Baha’is, Buddhists, and Hindus (CIA 2020).

As the figures above show, Lebanon is a country of many religions with no single dominant group. Demographics are controversial, and there has been no population census since 1932. Some minority groups are defined primarily by religion and others by ethnicity, although most communities in Lebanon and throughout the region do not necessarily like to be described as minorities Minority Rights Group International 2020). The above figures (with the exception of the Palestinians, who are regarded as transitory and denied Lebanese citizenship) refer to Lebanon’s official population of approximately 4.5 million. However, up to 1.5 million Syrian refugees are also now residing in the country. Though the large majority of the Syrian refugee community in Lebanon is Sunni Muslim, the population is not homogeneous and includes Syrian Alawites, Christians, Shi’a, Druze, Isma’ilis and Yazidis, all of whom have sought refuge in Lebanon. Sources do not cite use of GBV against refugees targeted due to their ethnic or religious minority status in Lebanon, and do not provide evidence of GBV against other minorities such as Maronites, Sunnis, or Druze.

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1Although census figures estimate a small percentage of Palestinians, some, however, estimate the Palestinian population represents at least 50 percent of the population in Jordan (HRW 2010).
Lebanon hosted the largest numbers of refugees relative to their national populations in 2017 and 2018: approximately one in four people is a refugee (UNHCR 2018b, UNHCR 2019, 3). UNHCR addresses GBV in the refugee populations in host countries. In Lebanon, during 2016 to 2018, the GBV response, mitigation, and prevention strategy reached target numbers for a range of services in safe places, including GBV awareness-raising sessions, emotional support groups, life-skills training, legal support, psycho-social support, and individual case management (UNHCR 2019b). Lilleston et al. (2018) evaluated the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) approach to service delivery and found the strategy successfully provided needed services and support among GBV survivors.

**MOROCCO**

Morocco is largely Arab-Berber (99 percent); other ethnicities comprise about 1 percent of the population. The population is 99 percent Sunni Muslim, though a very few are Shia (less than 0.1 percent). About 1 percent is Christian, Baha’i, or Jewish. Minorities and indigenous people in Morocco include the Berber and Saharawis (CIA 2010; Minority Rights Group International: Morocco n.d.).

However, we did not find literature that discussed GBV against the country’s minority groups. As to refugees, Morocco has been cited for forcible expulsions of migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa (Amnesty International 2018). Although inhospitable conditions for migrants and refugees in Morocco are ripe for GBV against minorities, sources do not provide data or examples.

**TUNISIA**

In Tunisia, most people are Arab (98 percent); a small minority is non-Jewish European (1 percent), Jewish, or of another ethnicity (1 percent). Though the vast majority is Sunni Muslim (99 percent), some identify as Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha’i (1 percent total).

Tunisia has absorbed approximately 1,853 refugees from Syria, Eritrea, and elsewhere, yet information on GBV against minority groups is limited. Approximately 20 percent of Tunisian women are subjected to gender violence in their lifetime, but minority groups are not singled out (WEF 2018). Although Tunisia has undergone considerable disruption since the Arab Spring of 2011, including ongoing ISIS insurgency from 2015 to the present, we found no reports of GBV resulting from ISIS-supported insurgency.

It is possible that violence against Tunisian women is underreported to international organizations and in the literature. In an interview with the author, a graduate student from Tunisia noted that the Arab Spring did coincide with increased sexual violence and GBV against women there. She said that HarassMap* has been used in Tunisia as a tool for outing GBV perpetrators (Zerai interview 2019). However, GBV does not appear to be targeted toward religious or ethnic minority groups.

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* After Spring 2011, unprecedented levels of “violent sexual harassment against women, protestors, activists, and those who simply use the streets” (Skalli 2014: 244) occurred in North Africa, according to Loubna Hanna Skalli (2014). Women in Egypt and Morocco engaged in cyber activism (and direct physical confrontations of perpetrators) by developing the HarassMap software application, which provided the capability to collect geocoded information on timing and location of SGBV episodes (Skalli 2014). HarassMap was also utilized by activists from Tunisia (Tunisia Live 2012).
STATE AND NON-STATE POLICIES AND RESPONSES AND EVALUATION OF INTERVENTIONS

The literature shows that a multifaceted strategy is most effective at reducing GBV in general (Michau et al. 2015). Addressing cultural norms (Mora 2013), legal frameworks (Al-Ali 2018; Mora 2013, Bayan Global 2016; UN Women 2017), awareness-raising (Grove 2015; Michau et al 2015), documenting and monitoring violence (Michau et al. 2015) and interventions that focus on the perspectives of survivors (Fitriyah 2016; Lilleston, et al. 2018; Mulumba and Namuggala 2014) and perpetrators (Kabonesa and Namuggala 2019) are key to reducing GBV. However, there are very few studies concerning GBV among religious and ethnic minorities.

With an eye on the ratification of relevant treaties (see Table 2, Annex B), Bayan Global’s (2016) analysis of national strategies for prevention of GBV and UN Women’s 2017 examination of policies to end violence against women in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Figure 2, Annex C) offer rubrics for analyzing laws, policies, and programs pertaining to GBV. But these analyses do not address intersectionality, however, or GBV’s different impacts on religious and ethnic minorities. Nor do they focus on conflict-related GBV.

Before creating an appropriate and effective response to conflict-related GBV among religious and other minorities, humanitarian groups must first create awareness of the problem. As discussed above, no MENA country has data on non-partner sexual violence or conflict-related GBV in various minority groups.

Amidst the dearth of information on GBV targeted at religious or other minorities, even fewer case studies of interventions exist. The most relevant examples would be work with refugees. For example, as noted above, Listleston and colleagues (2018) assess a highly effective intervention in Lebanon, where a combination of psychosocial support activities, risk mitigation activities, and individual case management facilitated coping with and recovering from GBV. However, the focus of the intervention by the International Rescue Committee in Lebanon did not necessarily target REM. However, two case studies from the MENA are worth noting:

**Egypt: Prevention and Response to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence.** In partnership with UNHCR Egypt, CARE International in Egypt initiated its Prevention and Response to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence program to tackle sensitive topics and delve into the root causes of issues often considered taboo. CARE adopted rights-based, survivor-centered, and community-development approaches, employing innovative methods for GBV survivors (UNHCR 2017).

CARE conducted awareness-raising activities to highlight the different types of SGBV and their harmful consequences. It also implemented a case-management system to assist SGBV survivors and facilitate their recovery. Case management was provided to all asylum-seeker and refugee SGBV survivors, whether women, men, girls, or boys. Case managers provided the survivors with emotional support while focusing on four pillars of response: health care; safety, including safe housing; psychosocial support; and legal assistance.

The UNHCR/CARE program turned to art therapy to help survivors to come to terms with having endured violence, change their perspectives on SGBV, and improve their self-esteem. CARE began using art therapy as a tool to help prevent and respond to SGBV among African, Iraqi, and Syrian asylum-seekers and refugees; most were Syrians.

**Iraq, Kurdistan Region: Free Yezidi Foundation’s Mental Health Intervention.** This project screened 200 Yazidi women at the beginning and end of a six-month mental-health
intervention using the World Health Organization (WHO)-5 wellbeing scale and the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ). The researchers collected data from focus group discussions among service users, as well as in-depth interviews conducted with the project team (Womersley and Arikut-Treece 2019).

The WHO-5 answers showed a 74 percent increase in self-reported well-being among service users who completed the program. According to the HTQ results, an 81.25 percent baseline rate of posttraumatic stress disorder decreased to 45 percent upon completion of the program.

Analysis of interviews and focus-group discussions highlighted the impact of collective, multiple losses and family separations; the fact that not all Yezidi held in captivity have returned; fear of ongoing attacks; and daily stressors related to poor living conditions.

The results highlight how the political, legal, and sociocultural environment affects both the prevalence of trauma and psychosocial rehabilitation. The findings further show the usefulness of socio-ecological frameworks for research and practice, engaging in advocacy, and establishing agendas for mental health and psycho-social support for individual and collective self-determination (Womersley and Arikut-Treece 2019).

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

After drawing from the literature concerning GBV in fragile settings broadly and lessons learned from GBV in MENA, we have delineated recommendations outlined below:

**Multisectoral interventions are most effective.** According to Michau and colleagues, preventing GBV against women and girls requires “systematic, sustained programming across the social ecology (i.e., the delicate equilibrium of interacting social, institutional, cultural, and political contexts of people’s lives) to transform gender-power inequalities” (2015, 1672). Human Rights Watch further posits a five-point plan to curtail sexual violence in Somalia that could be highly relevant in MENA countries in conflict. The five intervention points include physical prevention, emergency health services, access to justice, legal policy reform, and promotion of women’s equality (2014).

**Feminist, socio-ecological and intersectional approaches highlight the structural antecedents of GBV.** Michau et al. also recommend intervention designs based on an “intersectional gender-power analysis”; “to be born a girl in a patriarchal society is a fundamental risk factor for various types of gender-based violence. This gender-based risk is often compounded by other forms of discrimination and inequality based on, for example, race, class, ethnicity, caste, religion, disability, HIV status, migration status, sexual orientation, and gender identity, which affect both exposure to violence and experiences of response” (2015, 1674). While the structural perspective is necessary, the critically important goal is women’s equality (Human Rights Watch 2017). Building from these frameworks, interventions that take socio-ecological approaches into account are shown to be effective in multiple settings, including among Yezidi survivors in Kurdistan, as noted above (Womersley and Arikut-Treece, 2019).

**Physical prevention, case management, and emergency health and mental-health services are necessary.** Human Rights Watch notes the urgency of physical prevention and emergency health services to those assaulted. UNHCR’s work among Syrian refugees in Egypt highlights the need for case management and emotional support (2017). The Free Yezidi Foundation...
study described above also notes the importance of especially mental health services to address trauma resulting from GBV against women from religious and ethnic minority groups.

**Legal frameworks, policy reform, documenting and monitoring violence, and raising awareness are also critical.** Legal framework and policy reforms are needed to address GBV in conflict (Al-Ali 2018; Mora 2013; Bayan Global 2016; UN Women 2017). While the guidelines shown in Figure 2 (Annex B) for analyzing laws, policies, and programs relevant to GBV are helpful, they do not address intersectionality, especially the different impacts upon religious and ethnic minorities. And their focus is general, not conflict-related, GBV. An appropriate and effective response to conflict-related GBV among religious and ethnic minorities first requires creating awareness of the problem (UNHCR 2017; Grove 2015; Michau, et al. 2015; Skalli 2014). The MENA region largely lacks comparable data on experiences of non-partner sexual violence, not to mention data on conflict-related GBV in various minority groups. Advocacy, access to justice, and culturally appropriate interventions intersect with greater ability to document and monitor violence as elaborated below.

Access to justice, advocacy, and interventions that focus on perspectives of survivors and appreciate cultural norms are additional components of effective programming. Consistent with recommendations offered in regards to conflict-related GBV generally (e.g., Figure 3, Annex D), religious and ethnic minority groups’ voices must be heard in order to design effective programming and to establish efficient policy (Fitriyah 2016; Lilleston, et al. 2018; Mulumba and Namuggala 2014). Avenues for survivors to engage in advocacy are central to success, according to the Free Yezidi Foundation (Womersley and Arikut-Treece, 2019). Mariana Mora (2013) suggests relevant ways to ensure access to justice for survivors, which include:

**Using truth commissions.** These and other institutional processes are mandated to clarify the events occurring during armed conflicts. Efforts to address GBV among minorities should include the development of techniques and methods that enable women to speak about their experiences using truth-commission platforms and reconciliation processes where possible.

**Understanding that conflict affects different populations in different ways.** Recognizing that armed conflict differentially impacts specific sectors of society permits the unearthing of those crimes that are most difficult to identify and document.

**Encouraging survivor participation.** Survivor involvement is key to identifying the scope and impact of crimes of sexual violence, and also plays a key role in designing population-specific reparations.

**Centering projects and legislation on addressing conflict-related violence.** Programs and policies that focus on violence during armed conflicts can highlight the ways that violence against women exists even without armed conflicts. Such recognition can motivate communities to move beyond a return to prior sociocultural conditions, and to transform those conditions in order to address the structural roots of violence.

Figure 3, Annex D, provides greater detail on these recommendations.

Relevant ways to ensure access to justice and survivor-centered interventions include:

**Focusing on survivors, but engaging bystanders.** The high usage of HarassMap across several MENA countries, including Egypt (Skalli 2014; Grove 2015; Abdelmonem 2019),
Morocco (Skalli 2014), and Tunisia (Tunisia Live 2012; Zerai 2019a) shows that this tactic can work. HarassMap of course is more available to middle class and wealthy women, given poor women’s limited access to smartphones (Zerai 2019b). Finally, engaging entire communities is key to preventing future GBV (Lilleston et al. 2018; Kabonesa and Namuggala 2019). Truth commissions, as well as this type of prevention, are more relevant post-conflict.

Interventions to promote coping with and recovering from GBV in MENA must be survivor-centered. In terms of coping with and recovering from GBV in conflict and other fragile settings in MENA, several recommendations can be drawn from a review of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) program for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (Lilleston et al. 2018) and studies addressing GBV in other parts of the world (Yount et al. 2017; and Mora 2013):

- Strengthen women’s/girls’ social networks
- Reduce survivors’ feelings of idleness and isolation
- Increase women’s/girls’ knowledge
- Increase women’s/girls’ self-confidence
- Address stigma among individuals and families
- Gain family confidence by including community members in educational efforts to prevent GBV and providing cash transfers (e.g., for school necessities) to allow women and girls to participate in programming

Again, as is the case with prevention and truth commissions, such efforts to cope and recover from GBV endured in conflict will be more effective post-conflict.
ANNEX A. GBV IN MENA AGAINST RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES BY COUNTRY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Race/ Ethnicity data:</th>
<th>Religion data:</th>
<th>Refugee populations, receiving:</th>
<th>Refugee populations, sending:</th>
<th>Conflict(s)</th>
<th>Evidence of sexual and GBV/SGBV/CRSV here?</th>
<th>Synthesize descriptive statistics (GBV, SGBV--all women/girls; ethnic/religious minority groups; refugees/displaced; conflict zones; and change overtime)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Turks, Greeks, Abazas, and Bedouin Arab tribes in the Sinai Peninsula and the deserts to the east, as well as the Siwis in the Siwa Oasis and the Nubian people along the Nile. Others include Nubians, Copts, Beja, Greeks, Sa’idi; Bahari, Syro-Lebanese, Ababda, El houmaydat, Huteimi, and Magyarab peoples, Malays, Arabs, and Egyptian Americans</td>
<td>Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10% (2015 est.) (CIA World Factbook)</td>
<td>200k received</td>
<td>22k sending</td>
<td>Egyptian crisis (2011–14); January 25, 2011 – ongoing 2011 Egyptian Revolution and Aftermath; Egyptian crisis (2011–14); February 23, 2011 – ongoing Sinai insurgency; November 22, 2012 – July 3, 2013 Egyptian protests; June 28, 2013 – July 3, 2013 June 2013 Egyptian protests; July 3, 2013 – ongoing Political violence in Egypt; 2013 – ongoing Insurgency in Egypt (2013–present)</td>
<td>Global Gender Gap Report 2018 34% prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; Yes; but not conflict oriented. According to Egypt DHS, 4% of ever-married women report that they have experienced sexual violence by their current or most recent husband (2014). Almost one quarter of women are married by age 18; and more than 10% of young women age 15-19 have begun childbearing: 7% have had a child and 4% were pregnant at the time of the survey. Teenage childbearing is more common in rural areas (14%) than urban areas (5%) (Egypt DHS, 2014).</td>
<td>Global Gender Gap Report 2018 34% prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; See infographic from UNICEF concerning child brides, 17% under 18 and 2% under 15 (2018:4). Elghossain et al 2019 in 2005 DHS 16% of adolescents (married, ages 15-19) had ever experienced physical IPV (DHS data) and in 2009 19% (married, ages 16-20) had ever experienced sexual IPV. Elghossain et al 2019 in 2014 DHS 6% of adolescents (ever married, ages 15-19) had ever experienced sexual IPV (DHS data). Note that all adolescents in DHS sample are child brides (n=240) and are thus experiencing SGBV. In a 1998 school-based simple random sample study of adolescents ages 12-18, (cited by Elghossain et al 2019), 7% of girls report sexual abuse; and in a 2011-12 school-based study,41.3% of girls report sexual abuse (mean age of sample, 16.1).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Of total pop, ethnic groups include: Arab (75%), followed by Kurds (20%), Turkmen 3% (3 million), Afro-Iraqis (1 million), Chaldo-Assyrians 2-5% (500,000-1.5 Million), Yazidi 1.4% (500,000) and Shabaks0.7% (250,000). And according to CIA World factbook (1987 data): Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, other 5% (includes Turkmen, Yazidi, Shabak, Kaka’i, Bedouin, Romani, Assyrian, Circassian, Sabean-Mandeans, Persian)</td>
<td>Muslim (official) 95-98% (Shia 64-69%, Sunni 29-34%), Christian 1% (includes Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Assyrian Church of the East), other 1-4% (2015 est.) (CIA World Factbook)</td>
<td>None noted by UNHCR</td>
<td>3.3M displaced; 361k refugees; some to Jordan (UNHCR 2017, p71)</td>
<td>Iraq War (2003–2011); Iraqi Civil War (2014–2017); Iraqi–Kurdish conflict (2017); Iraqi insurgency (2017–present)</td>
<td>Yes, post conflict SGBV. Banwell 2015; &quot;since April 2003, at least 400 women and girls, some as young as eight years old, have been raped during or after the war. … Increases in sexual violence against women account for the dramatic increase in honour killings since the invasion….The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry for Human Rights reported 166 honour killings during 2007 and 163 in 2008.&quot; p 711;</td>
<td>See infographic from UNICEF concerning child brides, 24% under 18 &amp; 5% under 15 (2018:4). In a 2011 college-based study focused on adolescent experiences before age 17, (cited by Elghossain et al 2019), 3% of girls and boys (not disaggregated) report sexual abuse. See Table Y. for details.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Race/Ethnicity data:</td>
<td>Religion data:</td>
<td>Refugee populations, receiving:</td>
<td>Refugee populations, sending:</td>
<td>Conflict(s)</td>
<td>Evidence of sexual and GBV/GBV/CRSV here?</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Jordanian 69.3%, Syrian 13.3%, Palestinian 6.7%, Egyptian 6.7%, Iraq 1.4%, other 2.6% (includes Armenian, Circassian) (2015 est.) (CIA World Factbook)</td>
<td>Muslim 97.2% (official; predominantly Sunni), Christian 2.2% (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant denominations), Buddhist 0.4%, Hindu 0.1%, Jewish &lt;0.1, folk &lt;0.1, unaffiliated &lt;0.1, other &lt;0.1 (2010 est.) (CIA World Factbook)</td>
<td>Jordan continued to host the second largest number of refugees relative to its national population, where 1 in 14 people was a refugee under the responsibility of UNHCR; When Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate are included, the figures rise to 1 in 3 for Jordan. There are 755,050 refugees in Jordan representing 57 refugee nationalities. See pp 2, and 23 <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/">https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/69826.pdf">https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/69826.pdf</a></td>
<td>None noted by UNHCR</td>
<td>War of Attrition (1967–1970); Black September (1970–1971); October War (1973); Sabah War (2009–2010); Libyan Civil War (2011); Intervention against ISIS (2014–); Intervention in Yemen (2015+)</td>
<td>Global Gender Gap Report 2018 23% prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; According to Jordan DHS (2017-18), 15% of women age 25-49 were married by age 18. There is some variation by in age at first marriage by nationality: Jordanian women marry at a median age of 22.9, while the median age of first marriage among Syrians is 3 years earlier, at 19.6. Five percent of ever-married adolescent women age 15-19 have begun childbearing; that is, they are already mothers or are pregnant with their first child. Teenage childbearing is most common in Ma’arat (13%) and least common in Tafiela and Karak (2%). In regards to other SGBV, 5% of currently married women and 14% of divorced/separated/widowed women have experienced sexual violence from a spouse.</td>
<td>Global Gender Gap Report 2018 23% prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; See infographic from UNICEF concerning child brides: 8% under 18 and 0 under 15 (2018:4). According to Amaireh, in a Syrian refugee camp in Jordan, 51.3% of females and 13% of males were victimized through early or forced marriage (as cited in McAlpine 2016). Elghossain et al 2019, in 2015 (facility-based convenience sample) 4% (n=126 interviewed) of engaged/married Palestinian refugee adolescents had ever experienced physical IPV. Elghossain et al 2019, in 2012 DHS 13% of adolescents (ever married, ages 15-19) had ever experienced sexual IPV (DHS data). Note that all adolescents in DHS sample are child brides (n=166) and are thus experiencing SGBV. See Table Y. for details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1%</td>
<td>Muslim 57.7% (28.7% Sunni, 28.4% Shia, smaller percentages of Alawites and Ismailis), Christian 36.2% (Maronite Catholics the largest; Christian group), Druze 5.2%, very small numbers of Jews, Bah’a’is, Buddhists, and Hindus (2017 est.)</td>
<td>Lebanon continued to host the largest number of refugees relative to its national population, where 1 in 6 people was a refugee under the responsibility of UNHCR; rec’ed approximately 1m refugees; sent 5k; When Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate are included, the figures rise to 1 in 4 for Lebanon. See pp 2, 3, and 23 <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/">https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/</a></td>
<td>None noted by UNHCR</td>
<td>Nahr al-Bared fighting (2007); Lebanon conflict (2008; 2011-17)</td>
<td>Global Gender Gap Report 2018 35% prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; yes, mostly refugees</td>
<td>Global Gender Gap Report 2018 35% prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; yes, mostly refugees; See infographic from UNICEF concerning child brides: 6% under 18 and 1% under 15 (2018:4). In a 2005-6 (data collection year) school-based study of adolescents aged 11-16, (cited by Elghossain et al 2019), 17.3% of girls and boys (not disaggregated) report sexual abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Berber and Arab 97%, other 3% (includes Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, and Tunisians)</td>
<td>Muslim (official; virtually all Sunni) 96.6%, Christian 2.7%, Buddhist 0.3%, Hindu &lt;0.1, Jewish &lt;0.1, folk religion &lt;0.1, unaffiliated 0.2%, other &lt;0.1 (2010 est.)</td>
<td>received 9k (UNHCR 2017, p 65) <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/">https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/</a></td>
<td>sending 11k; UNHCR 2017, pp 23 and 72 <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/">https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/</a></td>
<td>2011 Libyan Civil War; 2011 – ongoing Post-civil war violence in Libya; 2014 – ongoing Second Libyan Civil War</td>
<td>yes, not conflict but human trafficking</td>
<td>Information is not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Race/Ethnicity data:</td>
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<td>Refugee populations, receiving:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Arab-Berber 99%, other 1%</td>
<td>Muslim 99% (official; virtually all Sunni, &lt;0.1% Shia), other 1% (includes Christian, Jewish, and Baha’i); note - Jewish about 6,000 (2010 est.)</td>
<td>rec’d 4715 (UNHCR 2017: 66); “In the mid-1990s, Morocco developed into a transit country for asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa and illegal labor migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia trying to reach Europe via southern Spain, Spain’s Canary Islands, or Spain’s North African enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla. Forcible expulsions by Moroccan and Spanish security forces have not deterred these illegal migrants or calmed Europe’s security concerns. Rabat remains unlikely to adopt an EU agreement to take back third-country nationals who have entered the EU illegally via Morocco. Thousands of other illegal migrants have chosen to stay in Morocco until they earn enough money for further travel or permanently as a ‘second-best’ option. The launching of a regularization program in 2014 legalized the status of some migrants and granted them equal access to education, health care, and work, but xenophobia and racism remain obstacles.” (CIA World Factbook)</td>
<td>3000 sent (UNHCR 2017: 72)</td>
<td>1911–1912 Second Franco-Moroccan War; 1920–1926 Rif War; 1914–1921 Zaian War; 1942 North African Campaign; 1957–1958 Ifni War; 1963 Sand War; 1970–ongoing Western Sahara conflict; 1975–1991 Western Sahara War; April 11, 2002 – ongoing Insurgency in the Maghreb</td>
<td>A significant portion of girls under 18 and under 15 are married, according to UNICEF (2017). And women report sexual abuse in childhood. See next cell for details.</td>
<td>See infographic from UNICEF concerning child brides: 16% under 18 and 3% under 15 (2018:4). In a 2004 household systematic sampling study of adult women, (cited by Elghossain et al 2019), 9.2% report sexual abuse in childhood, including physical abuse and pornographic conversations or phone calls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Rep</td>
<td>Arab ~50%, Alawite ~15%, Kurd ~10%, Levantine ~10%, other ~15% (includes Druze, Ismaili, Isami, Nasairi, Assyrian, Turkoman, Armenian)</td>
<td>*Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%), Christian 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining in Damascus and Aleppo). Note: the Christian population may be considerably smaller as a result of Christians fleeing the country during Qamishli massacre (2004); Syrian Civil War (2011+)</td>
<td>None noted by UNHCR</td>
<td>12.6M forcibly displaced as of end of 2017 (UNHCR, p 6); 6.3 M Total refugees from Syria; 5.3M refugees to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan; See pp 3 and 23 <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/">https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/</a></td>
<td>Global Gender Gap Report 2018 25% prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; &quot;A report on the effects of the conflict on trafficking in persons in the Syrian Arab Republic and neighbouring countries published by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in 2015 highlighted the increasing numbers of Syrian victims of trafficking in the Middle East over the last few years, in line with UNODC’s data. According to the study, the incidence of trafficking has substantially increased since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, although trafficking</td>
<td>Global Gender Gap Report 2018 25% prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; See infographic from UNICEF concerning child brides: 13% under 18 and 3% under 15 (2018:4). According to Amaireh, in a Syrian refugee camp in Jordan, 51.3% of females and 13% of males were victimized through early or forced marriage (as cited in McAlpine 2016).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Race/Ethnicity data:</td>
<td>Religion data:</td>
<td>Refugee populations, receiving:</td>
<td>Refugee populations, sending:</td>
<td>Conflict(s)</td>
<td>Evidence of sexual and GBV/SGBV/CRSV here?</td>
<td>Synthesize descriptive statistics (GBV, SGBV—all women/girls; ethnic/religious minority groups; refugees/displaced; conflict zones; and change overtime)</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Race/ Ethnicity data:</td>
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<td>Evidence of sexual and GBV/SGBV/CRSV here?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>predominantly Arab; but also Afro-Arab, South Asians, European (CIA World Factbook)</td>
<td>Muslim: Shafii 55% (S/SE); Zaydi 45% (N/NW); According to CIA World Factbook: &quot;Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha’i, Hindu, and Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2010 est.)&quot;</td>
<td>rec’d 271k from: Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia, &amp; Syria</td>
<td>2.1M displaced (UNHCR 2017, p 6) &amp; 25k refugees fleeing from Yemen</td>
<td>Shia insurgency in Yemen (2004-14); Yemeni Crisis (2011–present); Yemeni Civil War (2015+)</td>
<td>yes. Two-thirds of Yemeni women have heard of female circumcision and 19% of women report that they are circumcised, according to Yemen DHS (2013). The median age at first marriage is 18.2 for women ages 25-49. A significant proportion of women marry very early: 18% of women were married by age 15. Eleven percent of adolescent women age 15-19 are already mothers or pregnant with their first child. Teenage pregnancy is much higher among girls with no education than among those with higher education (18% compared to 2%). Teenage pregnancy varies by governorate from a low of 7% of women age 15-19 in Hajjah and Shabwah to a high of 15% in Ibb, Al-Baidha, and Sadah.</td>
<td>See infographic from UNICEF concerning child brides: 32% under 18 and 9% under 15 (2018:4)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Egypt

Differences from SGBV against majority? No data or articles found to provide evidence that SGBV against religious or other minority groups differs from SGBV against majority groups. Most SGBV is perpetrated by family members or spouse/ex-spouse. The literature points to the use of the state apparatus to either directly pacify social and political protest, or to withdraw protective services in public spaces, resulting in sexual assault of women by security personnel/military/police or sexual assault perpetrated by rioters with impunity (Skalli 2014; Grove 2015). Most currently, Syrian and Sudanese refugees may be minorities who are vulnerable to SGBV in Egypt.


Differences in SGBV in conflict versus non-conflict settings? While insurgency in Egypt likely exacerbates SGBV, neither data nor articles found provide evidence of political conflict-related SGBV, except for among the refugee population. As such, it is highly likely that hosts or refugees may sexually exploit vulnerable refugees. For example, "according to various reports, the types of SGBV faced by refugees in Egypt include domestic violence, sexual harassment in public spaces, exploitation and harmful traditional practices. Through direct interaction with both refugees and medical partners, it was found that female genital mutilation is prevalent in African refugee communities and child marriage is especially widespread among Syrians" (https://www.refworld.org/pdfs/5a388dd246.pdf).

Evaluation of interventions to reduce SGBV/CRSV CARE’s experience with projects targeting Egyptians has indicated that art therapy is highly effective not only in raising awareness of violence against women but also in changing project participants’ attitudes towards that violence. CARE began using art therapy as a tool to help prevent and respond to SGBV among African, Iraqi and Syrian asylum-seekers and refugees, the majority of them Syrians, in the cities of 6th of October and Obour in the greater Cairo area." (https://www.refworld.org/pdfs/5a388dd246.pdf).

Iraq

“Interpersonal and structural GBV in Iraq includes: domestic violence, abduction, honour killings, rape, trafficking and forced prostitution”; Banwell 2015. It appears that all poor women are in jeopardy, regardless of ethnicity or religious conviction. “Interpersonal and structural GBV in Iraq includes: domestic violence, abduction, honour killings, rape, trafficking and forced prostitution”; Banwell 2015. It appears that all poor women are in jeopardy, regardless of ethnicity or religious conviction.

State policies & responses Legislation on domestic violence: no, according to Global Gender Gap Report 2018 (http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf); “The KRG passed the Family Violence Law in 2011, with the aim of criminalising domestic violence and honour killings. However, officials have not enforced this law. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that numbers of male family members have continued to attack and kill female relatives since the introduction of the law.” Banwell 2015:711 “Arranged and forced marriages are also used as a means for traffickers to transport women internally and internationally. In some cases the family are responsible for forcing the girl into marriage in order to alleviate dire economic circumstances…. These are sophisticated and complex criminal networks. Younger girls, especially under the age of 16, are the most lucrative. Girls as young as 11 and 12 can be sold for as much as $30,000, while older women are sold for as little as $2000…. HRW accuses the Iraq government of doing little to tackle trafficking in girls and women. They state that there have been no criminal prosecutions of those engaged in human trafficking and negligible support for victims. Furthermore, despite the

Differences in SGBV in conflict versus non-conflict settings? Iraq is a post-conflict setting. These issues are very relevant in currently, as noted in Banwell 2015. According to NADIA MURAD, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, “More than 350,000 of them — 80 per cent of Iraq’s Yazidi population — are still displaced in camps” (https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13790.doc.htm).

Evaluation of interventions to reduce SGBV/CRSV While Iraq has been accused or turning a blind eye to the victimization of “enslaved thousands of Yazidi girls and women”, “noting that genocide against Yazidis continues today” (NADIA MURAD, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate), "MOHAMMED HUSSEIN BAHR ALULOOM (Iraq) said his country has turned the page on a somber part of history since recovering all its territory from the grasp of Da'esh, which carried out atrocious crimes unprecedented in the history of humanity. Outlining practical measures to return all displaced persons to their homes and provide them with redress for their suffering, he said a new draft bill for Yazidi survivors — aimed at providing compensation, rehabilitation and reintegration into society — was brought up for debate in the Government this month. Also noting that a list of persons accused of human trafficking has been submitted to Iraq’s national prosecutor’s office, he said evidence of crimes..."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Evaluation of interventions to reduce SGBV/CRSV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Mostly women and children, primarily Yazidi.</td>
<td>No data or articles found to provide evidence that SGBV against religious or other minority groups differs from SGBV against majority groups. Most SGBV is perpetrated by family members or spouse/ex-spouse.</td>
<td>Implementation of counter-trafficking laws in 2012, enforcing this law has not been a priority for authorities (Banwell 2015: 713-14).</td>
<td>It appears most conflict in which Jordan is involved is taking place off their soil. So it is unlikely that conflict-related SGBV is taking place, unless it is happening with vulnerable widows of fallen Jordanian soldiers or among the refugee populations. All of the literature found on widowhood in Jordan focuses on refugees who are widows.</td>
<td>Info on interventions among religious/other minorities was not found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanese society ethnic minorities, include Circassians, Kurds, Turkomans, Chechens, and Armenians. Research from the last decade notes intrafamily femicide as an issue in Jordan (Fadia Faqir 2010). Human Rights Watch notes a rise in this practice until 2016 (<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/03/how-end-honor-killings-Jordan">https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/03/how-end-honor-killings-Jordan</a>). However these are carried out by family members and not necessarily directed toward religious or other minorities. As host the second largest number of refugees relative to its national population, it is highly likely that hosts or refugees may sexually exploit other more vulnerable refugees.</td>
<td>Legislation on domestic violence: yes, according to Global Gender Gap Report 2018 <a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf">http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf</a></td>
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UNHCR is addressing SGBV in the refugee population in Lebanon (2016–2018). Their SGBV response, mitigation, and prevention strategy is successful. For example, "In 2017, the SGBV sector achieved nearly 70% of its target for numbers for people who access a range of services available in safe spaces in Lebanon (including awareness raising sessions, emotional support groups, life-skills training, legal support, psycho-social support and individual case management.)." Source: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/5c23c2ad4.pdf "Some UNHCR community-based activities have shown promising results in relation to prevention but they are, so far, on a relatively small scale and evidence of their effectiveness and impact is limited. (p 41) 84% of women and adolescent girls taking part in activities report feeling a greater sense of empowerment after their participation, which is a step towards gender equity; but these initiatives are very localised and reach a limited number of girls. There are also encouraging approaches being

Legislation on domestic violence: yes, according to Global Gender Gap Report 2018 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf | All of the literature found on SGBV in Lebanon focuses on refugees. | Info on interventions among religious/other minorities was not found. |
Libya

The principal linguistic-based minorities are the Amazigh, Tuareg and Tebu. These minority groups are predominantly Sunni Muslim but identified with their respective cultural and linguistic heritages rather than with Arabic traditions (The U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Libya 2017 as quoted in https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/777959/Libya_Ethnic_Groups_-_CPIN_-_v3.0_February_2019_.pdf). "INAS MILOUD, Chairperson, Tamazight Women’s Movement, said that her Amazigh, or Berber, people are the indigenous inhabitants of Libya, adding that since the 2011 revolution, she has been working with indigenous women and girls affected by sexual and gender-based violence, as well as displaced and migrant communities in that country. ... She went on to recall that in 2018, hundreds of stories were collected from Libyans relating experiences of sexual and gender-based violence, which primarily affects women and girls. They continued. Their testimonies outline a common pattern of physical violence, rape, sexual harassment, verbal abuse, abduction and domestic violence, she emphasized, noting that patriarchal norms, amplified by the

"The political and security situation in Libya continues to be deeply divided, as three authorities including the Tripoli based UN-backed Government of National Accord, vie for political legitimacy, control of territory, resources and infrastructure. Armed conflict and political instability have impacted the lives of more than three million people across the country, displacing hundreds of thousands and disrupting people’s access to basic services, including fuel and electrical power, as well as severely constraining life-saving protection and humanitarian assistance. The protection crisis in Libya is characterised by violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, restricted access to safety and freedom of movement, forced displacement, severity and pervasiveness of gender-based violence. All parties to the conflict have committed breaches of international law including torture, unlawful killings, indiscriminate attacks, abductions, kidnapping, disappearances and the forceful displacement of people. The number of people with mental health and psychosocial problems increased substantially as a result of the conflict, including severe psychological distress for the conflict affected population, as well as contamination from explosive hazards affecting human security and access." Libya Protection Sector Strategy 2018-2019

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<th>Evaluation of interventions to reduce SGBV/CRSV</th>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Minorities and indigenous people in Morocco are the Berber and Saharawis. <a href="https://minorityrights.org/country/morocco">https://minorityrights.org/country/morocco</a></td>
<td>The literature points to the use of the state apparatus to either directly pacify social and political protest, or to withdraw protective services in public spaces, resulting in sexual assault of women by security personnel/military/police or sexual assault perpetrated by rioters with impunity (c). Morocco is cited for forcible expulsions of migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa. However though inhospitable conditions for migrants and refugees in Morocco are ripe for conflict related SGBV there, sources do not provide data or examples.</td>
<td>Legislation on domestic violence: no, according to Global Gender Gap Report 2018 [<a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR">http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR</a> _2018.pdf](<a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR">http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR</a> _2018.pdf)</td>
<td>SGBV is widespread in Morocco. There has been a rise in SGBV post Arab Spring (2011). See Skalli 2014 and Grove 2015.</td>
<td>OMAR KADIRI (Morocco), stressing that indignation was no longer enough, called for additional efforts to punish perpetrators and support survivors in rebuilding their lives. Drawing links between those efforts and sustainable development, he said women’s participation in public life — including in the elaboration of peace agreements — is also crucial. Warning against attempts to link religion with sexual violence, he outlined Morocco’s national efforts to combat radicalization, empower women, train preachers and Imams to bolster tolerance, and deploy female peacekeepers. In addition, his country is involved with the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network and other important regional frameworks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>SGBV/GBV/CRSV against religious &amp; other minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Rep</td>
<td>In conflict situations, women and girls are particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence, including trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation. Women and girls are reportedly kidnapped and forced to marry or serve as sexual slaves in many conflict-affected countries around the world. One widely reported example of this practice is the trafficking in persons and enslavement of women and children of the Yazidi ethno-religious group by ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported in October 2015 that Islamic State was holding approximately 3,500 civilians, mostly women and children, primarily Yazidis.</td>
<td>Legislation on domestic violence: no, according to Global Gender Gap Report 2018 <a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf">http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf</a></td>
<td>Importantly, ISIS has committed the crime of genocide as well as multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Yazidis, thousands of whom are held captive in the Syrian Arab Republic where they are subjected to almost unimaginable horrors” (UN Human Rights Council, 1: 2016). “ISIS has sought to destroy the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of their own religious community, and erasing their identity as Yazidis. Public statements and conduct of ISIS and its fighters clearly demonstrate that ISIS intended to destroy the Yazidis of Sinjar, composing the majority of the world’s Yazidi population, in whole or in part” (UN Human Rights Council, 1: 2016).</td>
<td>Info on interventions among religious/other minorities was not found.</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Reports of SGBV resulting from ISIL insurgency there are unavailable.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation on domestic violence: no, according to Global Gender Gap Report 2018 <a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf">http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf</a></td>
<td>Reports of SGBV resulting from ISIL insurgency there are unavailable.</td>
<td>Info on interventions among religious/other minorities was not found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>In Yemen the Shia insurgency in Yemen (2004-14); Yemeni Crisis (2011–present); Yemeni Civil War (2015+) are all likely to affect SGBV there.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation on domestic violence: no, according to Global Gender Gap Report 2018 <a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf">http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf</a></td>
<td>Residents reported that SBF regularly abducted and raped, or threatened to rape, women to extort money from their families and communities. The authorities did not conduct investigations or make arrests in relation to these violations, which were still being reported in May”, according to the U.S. State Department’s International Human Right Report for Yemen (March 2019: 4).</td>
<td>Info on interventions among religious/other minorities was not found.</td>
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ANNEX B. TREATIES
Table 2. Ratification of Treaties Relevant to SGBV

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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1981 Articles 2, 16, 29 (2)</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>Acceded in 2007 and 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1986 Articles 2 (f) (g), 9 (1) (2), 16, 20 (1)</td>
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<td>1994 Article 14 (1)</td>
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<td>Acceded both in 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1992 Articles 9 (2), 16 (1) (c) (d) (g)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1991 Articles 14, 20, 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceded in 2007 and 2006</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1997 Articles 9 (2), 16 (1) (c) (d) (f) (g), 29 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceded to #2 in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1989 General reservation and articles: 2, 16 (c) (d)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Acceded both in 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1993 Article 29 (1) and declaration to article 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Acceded in 2003 and 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2003 Articles 2, 9 (2), 15 (4), 16 (1) (c) (d) (f) (g), 16 (2), 29 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1993 General reservation and reservations to articles 14, 20, 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceded both in 2003, #2 with reservations to Article 3 (1) (a) (ii) and 3 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1985 General declaration and articles 9 (2), 16 (c) (d) (f) (g) (h), 29 (1) Declaration to article 15 (4)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1992 General declaration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceded in 2003 and 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1984 Article 29 (1)</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<td>Acceded in 2007 and 2004</td>
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women is an international treaty on women’s rights adopted by the United Nations in 1979. The main idea of CEDAW is simple: women should have equal rights with men in every aspect of their lives.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was adopted in by the United Nations on November 20, 1989. It was the first international treaty to guarantee children civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, including freedom from violence, abuse, hazardous employment, exploitation, abduction or sale, including freedom from violence, abuse, hazardous employment, exploitation, abduction or sale.
ANNEX C. POLICIES
Figure 2. State and non-state policies and responses to sgbv in the MENA: established rubrics for analyzing laws, policies and programs

**State Strategies and Responses (Bayan Global et al. 2016):**

- Prevention of GBV: high-visibility national strategies
- Prevention of GBV: legal reforms
- Intervention to provide appropriate services to survivors
- IPV: Document and raise awareness via nationally representative household surveys
- Early/forced marriage Document and raise awareness via nationally representative household surveys:
  - CEDAW signatories (and other relevant UN conventions and regional agreements)
  - Commission/support quantitative and/or qualitative studies of GBV

**Non-State Strategies and Responses (UNDP and UN Women 2017):**
(Extrapolated from work in Latin America and the Caribbean)

- Seek legislative consistency between domestic violence, intrafamily violence, and violence against women policies and/national plans.
- Examine the strength of institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, including: dependency of efforts, which government agencies and levels of government are responsible for policies, and the existence of interagency coordination mechanisms.
ANNEX D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Figure 3. Recommendations relevant to SGBV against minority groups from Mariana Mora (2013)

1. Truth commissions and other institutional processes mandated to clarify the events occurring during armed conflicts require methodologies that can identify the different forms of violence perpetrated against specific population groups, including, but not limited to, women. Investigative techniques should prioritize ways to identify the factors that cause gender violence to go unreported in order to develop methods that enable women to speak about their experiences. Training both women and men to understand the importance of exposing gender dimensions of armed conflict violence, as well as integral psychosocial support services, is key.

2. Latin America provides several lessons.
   b. Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) as a war crime is often subsumed by other types of violence during conflict, and not recorded as a crime in itself.
   c. Recognizing the impact of war on women and girls permits the unearthing of CRSV war crimes, which are often the most difficult to identify and document, and may otherwise remain invisible.
   d. Survivors’ access to justice and reparation necessitates intentional focus on and documentation of CRSV.

3. Citizen participation is key, both when recognized as part of judicial reforms, as well as when survivors are supported by NGOs. Such participation permits not only identifying the scope and impact of crimes of sexual violence, but also plays a key role in designing population-specific reparations that respond to the particular ways in which women victims are impacted by armed conflicts.

4. Advances in legal reforms and truth commissions, while effective in identifying the effects of armed conflicts and follow-up work with victims, do not necessarily translate into equitable reparations and the sentencing of the perpetrators. Approaches should recognize that such challenges stem from broader flaws in national justice systems and key branches of government’s lack of political will.

5. A gender-sensitive approach to identifying the causes and consequences of violence during armed conflicts can highlight the ways that violence against women exists independent of armed conflicts. This has direct impacts in the definitions of reparations for victims of gender violence, understood not in terms of a return to prior sociocultural conditions, but rather as a necessary transformation of those conditions in order to address the structural roots of violence.
ANNEX E. SOURCES OF INFORMATION


Kabonesa, Consolata and Victoria Flavia Namuggala (Makerere University), interview by Assata Zerai, July 2, 2019.


