CLOSING CIVIC AND POLITICAL SPACES

MAY 2019

Exploring opportunities for CSOs in the MENA region to advocate for claiming Spaces
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Research Team:

1- Emad Emam – Lead Researcher
2- Osama Gouhar – Researcher
3- Sabrine Abdel Rahman – Palestine Researcher
4- Abdel Samea Abdulhalh – Morocco Researcher
List of Abbreviations:

CSOs  Civil Society Organizations  
MENA Middle East and North Africa  
FGDs Focus Group Discussions  
LTA Legitimacy, Transparency and Accountability  
NGO NGO Non-governmental Organization  
CBOs Community Based Organizations  
HRBA Human Rights-Based Approach  
INGOs International Non-Governmental Organizations  
PLC Palestinian Legislative Council  
LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender  
LGBTQ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Queer or Questioning  
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals  
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women  
MPs Members of Parliament  
WR Women Rights  
CPC Criminal Procedures Code  
CVE Countering Violent Extremism  
RDFL The Lebanese Democratic Women’s Gathering  
MOI Ministry of Interior  
MOJ Ministry of Justice  
BDS Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement  
OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories  
EU European Union  
CVT Center for Victims of Torture  
TAG Transparency Accountability and Governance  
I4C Innovation for Change  
PA Palestinian Authority
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ндîâغوي وعژ: موجزلغوي وصف تتباين التعريفات والترجمات لمصطلح Advocacy من بلد لبلد. تكون بعض التعريفات والترجمات بناء على فهم مختلف لمصطلح Advocacy، اً لان كل من الفلاح والقضاء او دفع، نظرًا لتباين الترجمة للكلمة من الإنجليزية أو من الفرنسي في الدول المتحدثة بالفرنسية. ومع ذلك تبقى خيرة (كسب التأييد) ثرو ديناميكية ضمن الترجمات المستخدمة في المنطقة العربية؛ كما أنها تحتوي على الكثير من المقصود في تعريف المصطلح.
INTRODUCTION:
Shrinking political space is about power imbalance. It happens when those with power use it to restrict citizens’ rights to freely organize and associate. The global trend of shrinking civic and political space tends to mute citizens’ voices and threatens civil society’s existence (Oxfam 2018). Reports as well as international civil society actors, assert that closing civic space has become a global trend not just spread in a number of countries that are described as undemocratic and not only practiced by authoritarian regimes. Organizational reports agree that this is not a new trend and some report half a decade of shrinking political space as a global challenge facing public policy making. However, even though the space for some actors has been systematically closing it has also been opening for other actors. It is important to note that restrictions have been imposed on civil society actors including human rights defenders, activists, movements and marginalized and disempowered groups. However, at the same time it has been opening for more conservative and far right groups who have been supporting policies that close the space more for democratic forces around the world (IDS, 2018).

However, both CIVICUS (2018) and IDS (2018) note that it is also important to see the positive effects of the work of civil society actors in continuing their resistance of shrinking political space. Civil society actors, including organizations, human rights defenders, and movements around the world have been trying to occupy spaces whether physically or virtually in response to such restrictions and in efforts to make use of the opportunities offered by technology and globalization (IDS, 2018). “In the face of the challenges set out above, civil society fought back and won some tremendous victories. We came out onto the streets and spoke out online in huge numbers, and in some cases protest moments formed into movements that kept up momentum for change” (CIVICUS, 2018).

Eventually these aspects of closing civic spaces are forcing NGOs globally and regionally to fall within the framed agenda of securitization. This affects the tendency of these NGOs to address root-causes of marginalization in a structural way rather than a quick technical solution or service provision. Accordingly, capacities to develop advocacy competencies are not promoted.

The Innovation for Change network is a global network of people and organizations who want to connect, partner and learn together to find positive approaches to overcome barriers to closing civic space and restrictions to our basic freedoms of assembly, association and speech. The Helper Hub is comprised of Counterpart and CIVICUS, who provide direct technical support, and Tides, the fiscal agent, assist the regional hubs to become viable and self-sufficient for identifying and addressing civic space challenges and potential solutions.

In the light of this, Innovation for Change has conducted this research to explore spaces for civil society capacity to engage in advocacy work to claim civic space in the MENA region. This research is aimed at:

1- Developing regional and national understanding around the closing of civic spaces using the power analysis framework. Through which a deeper analysis for spaces for CSO engagement are well developed.

2- Assessing capacity gaps for CSOs at regional and national levels that can be later support in designing advocacy capacity building plans and advocacy curriculums.

3- Presenting some key learnings from advocacy and campaigning work in the region as well as good examples and case studies.

The mapping exercise was commissioned in 5 countries in the region (Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco) through on the ground data collection. This has been substantiated by an online survey targeting CSOs activists around the region. The findings of this research will be an asset for developing advocacy programs, networks and synergies at both country and regional levels. It will
also help sharpen learning resources and related curricula addressing shrinking civic and political spaces.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
The research was conducted to examine the underlying factors that affect or limit CSOs capacities to initiate effective advocacy programming in the MENA region. This involves a comprehensive study for both advocacy capacities and understanding of CSOs and power structures for operating environment of theses CSOs. The latter focuses on the trends of power holders to restrict political and civic spaces.

MAJOR LEARNINGS AROUND ADVOCACY
There is some remarkable learning to be shared and addressed as a result of this research. The understanding of advocacy as process-oriented not result-oriented which limited advocacy work to techniques away from a politicalized action is one main learning. The interaction between micro and macro levels to create a backbone for an inclusive advocacy process is another learning. This is complemented by the tendency of NGOs to depoliticize their programming to survive the shrinking political spaces in their countries of operation.

ADVOCACY IS POLITICAL OR TECHNICAL?
In our development work key words such as advocacy, policy influence and campaigning lie at the heart of our fabrics as CSO workers, donor agencies, activism communities, etc. Even though, these words with their related activities have gained strong focus by these actors, there is still a common challenge that these terms are becoming shallower. Though, the paradigm of NGOs interventions has expanded to include programs on advocacy, policy change and campaigns, the actual interpretation of these programs have reduced them to techniques. These techniques are denuded from the original meaning of these programs which aims at creating structural change to address power imbalances. One of the main reasons behind this, that policy making arena is by nature stimulating and engage strong focus on public relation and representation to reach to the right entry to influence decision making processes. It also has a strong focus on visible power when it comes to address certain policies and laws.

In some countries, this has accordingly shifted the focus of CSOs to employ resources to affect laws and policy making at macro level, without proper connection or conjunction with institutions in charge of putting these laws into actions and social norms and public values. While advocacy refers to addressing the combination of policies, institutions, and culture that either contribute or perpetuate an issue, major trends now are either focused on the very macro process of policies or micro level of awareness making.

The consideration of advocacy as an integral change process that involves these 3 levels (Policies, Institutions and Social norms) has not yet become an organizational systematic practice. Therefore, approaches to advocacy due to such tendency to “technicalization” have failed to consider the realities of power and privileges which exclude people from the engagement in decision making processes.

WHAT IS SHRINKING SPACES? IS IT CIVIC OR POLITICAL?
Politics is central to development discourse, yet remains peripheral. Though, advocacy was brought to the top of the agendas of NGOs in the past 20 years, civil-society narrative has not yet fulfilled its potential to ‘bring politics back in (Flower and Beikart 2013). Though the discourse around shifting NGOs into “a civil society” as an active actor in the political category has brought the idea addressing power imbalance to the manufacturing of civil society, yet, civil-society has not managed to ‘establish politics as a central concern within development’ (Hickey, 2009).
There can be various reasons for civil society tendency to be apolitical and shift away from its role as part of the political arena. Remarkably, this is very crucial when it comes to address the overlap between political and civic when it comes to spaces of citizens’ engagement.

In the light of the above, this mapping exercise outlines some remarkable reflections around civil society tendency to be apolitical. The securitization of civil Society sector coupled with over technicalization of programs are one of the remarkable reasons around why civil society organizations are getting more and more depoliticized. This is of course in addition to the donor agencies agendas shaped by bilateral agreements and donor countries interest. Riddell (2007) argues that until aid is de-coupled from the systemic problems stemming from the bilateral interests of donor countries, the quest for greater effectiveness will remain undermined.

As for securitization, the mapping exercise captures two trends for securitization. First trend is around governments in the region view issues around right to associate or to organize as a security agenda. New laws drafted by governments around organizing civil society are granting the upper hand for deciding on funding approvals and new programs for security apparatus. Meanwhile, major agendas addressed by CSOs are becoming a major interest of security agencies such as youth participation, decentralization, gender (especially issues related to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Queer or Questioning LGBTQ), and of course radicalization programs.

The other correlated trend for securitization, that CSOs accordingly have developed a coping mechanism around adapting to security agendas. So, when there is a discussion on policy or programs around those issues dominated by security apparatus, CSOs intuitively shape their discourse in a way that is acceptable by security or in other words come up with a ‘securitized’. This means that CSOs themselves get securitized. So, the significance of securitization here is around government restricting NGOs in invited spaces, while NGOs voluntarily /proactively adapt to theses spaces and work according to the set boundaries of the government. Therefore, the deliberate disconnection by CSOs from politics is securitization. Claiming spaces of engagement beyond allowed/invited/invited spaces is a political process. Meanwhile, shifting the discourse around these spaces being civic spaces is another way of abiding by securitization and avoiding politicization. And therefore, the tendency to depoliticize advocacy work is shaping the discourse around closing spaces into closing civic spaces.

There are several definitions of shrinking civic and political spaces that were addressed by various actors working on this issue. Therefore, in the light of the above, the ActionAid position on shrinking political space drafted in 2014 puts a very relevant definition for shrinking political space. Shrinking political space occurs when those with power use it to inhibit or restrict political participation, association, assembly, organizing, dissent, and use of legitimate resources.

HOW THIS RESEARCH IS ADDRESSING ADVOCACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY CAPACITIES IN A POLITICAL SENSE?
There has been constant skepticism around producing manuals, curricula and learning documents (like this one), as they tend to help increase this sense of “technicalization”. Sometimes they act like “recipe books” or “cookbooks” for social change as per the American Adult educator Myles Horton (Veneklen, Miller 2008). Accordingly, the design of this research was not meant to be another recipe in the cookbook for advocacy. It was founded on the concept of democratizing power, since the power analysis framework has been employed in this research to identify opportunities and challenges to address structures of marginalization.

The research team incorporated an analytical approach that explores strengths and gaps as well as opportunities for civil society organizations to initiate advocacy programs around civil society spaces
in the MENA region through focusing at both levels of organization internally and the socio-political environment. Thus, the research methodology combined both power analysis as framework for analyzing the external environment for CSOs operation as well organizational capacity for advocacy. The combination of the capacity assessment tools with the power analysis framework for both internal and external environments have enriched the data collection and analysis through providing a multidimensional data that presents well substantiated evidences on the facts of civil society activism in the region and accordingly the possible solutions to spell out challenges around closing or shrinking civic spaces.

REPORT OUTLOOK
This final report consists of 4 main sections, in which the research team outlines major learning and recommendation from data collection and desk research. The first section is around the developed mapping and analysis framework for the research through which the research team aimed to develop a learning document on using power analysis as a framework to identify opportunities and challenges to address shrinking civic space.

The second section of this report is to explore regional analysis and findings around both advocacy capacities of organizations as well as regional views on closing civic space. This is in addition to a macro analysis for the trends of shrinking civic spaces. The regional findings are built on results of the online survey that was conducted as part of this research.

Section III entails the country level analysis based on data collected from Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine through several FGDs and in-depth interviews that took place in each of these countries. It briefly explains the status of civic freedoms in each country based on secondary data. It also puts together recommendations for programming and capacity development in each country. It also highlights trends across the different countries such as the gap between local and national CSOs in Tunisia, the challenge of building constituency to shape policies in Morocco, the good examples for national networks in Jordan and Lebanon to address gender based violence, and the long term labor of Palestinian CSOs to shift from charitable organizations to politically active organizations that work on addressing power imbalances.

Finally, section IV of the research brings together the overall recommendations for programming around campaigning and advocacy in the region based on both regional and country analysis. The final recommendations of this exercises are outlined around 4 areas: 1) developing learning for advocacy in the region, 2) capacity development interventions, 3) priorities for advocacy programming, and 4) a proposed program framework to address shrinking political space at national and regional levels.

- In terms of developing learning curricula around advocacy in the region, the report recommends the development of an integrated curricula in Arabic that takes into consideration the regional diversity and different dialects. It also addresses the need to rethink the political sense of advocacy. The politicization of advocacy does not only refer to the arena of policy making at global, national and local levels, it also refers to changing structures and cultures. This will help organizations build a strong foundation on advocacy that can contain their desired rush for technical solutions such as implementing awareness raising activities.

- Meanwhile, in terms of the capacity development interventions for advocacy, the report recommends endorsing advocacy as an integrated process. In other words, building the case for advocacy cycle that can serve as a skeleton for capacity development trainings all-through advocacy cycle (Planning, Implementation and Evaluation). The rights-based approach to
eradicate poverty and address inequality is pre learning for CSOs before building foundation on advocacy. The fact that the concept of rights-based approach programming has not been genuinely developed by these CBOs that focus on community services. Learning Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and integrating it in the heart of CSOs programming is key to enable them to be well positioned around the politics of advocacy. This will enrich their perspectives on service provisions from a duty bearer- right holder angle.

- For advocacy programming, the report addresses shrinking political spaces at both macro and micro levels. Despite the closing of spaces at the upper/macro level, there is a growing created space at the micro level. Recently adopted laws around decentralization propose good entries for change where Community Based Organizations (CBOs) can engage in community politics and bringing people to the forefront to dialogues with local level duty bearers. The experience from Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco reinforces that social accountability and local governance is possible at micro levels. Moreover, such work has to be complemented at the macro-level with power analysis to take this model of democratizing the city/district to the national level.

- The report also outlines some recommended actions to be taken forward by CSOs to address the trend of shrinking political spaces. It highlights the importance of ensuring protection and safety of activists and human rights defenders. This is as well as the importance of developing counter narrative by civil society to address the growing agenda of securitization that is used as a justification to close political space.

Finally, the annexes of this report include relevant Arabic learning resources and 3 case studies on successful advocacy campaigns for more shared learning.
SECTION I: MAPPING AND ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK:

This section is an attempt to put together a theoretical learning framework for studying advocacy capacities, gaps and opportunities from power perspectives. This is founded on 2 pillars of analysis: 1st) internal organizational capacities with reflection on how CSOs view advocacy, and 2nd) is around the operating environment for CSOs from a power lens. The 2 layers of analysis under this research are interconnected as they affect each other. Organizational capacities to conduct advocacy that can create structural changes in the area of shrinking civil society spaces is not primarily about the capacities or the CSOs themselves, it is governed by the social, political and economic landscape in which those organizations are active. This research seeks to outline a framework for advocacy to address closing civic spaces in the MENA region based on the understanding of the 2 layers of analysis.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY FOR ADVOCACY:

Organizational capacities to maintain strong advocacy campaigns that aim at creating structural change are assessed based on 4 main pillars; 1) legitimacy, 2) Credibility, 3) Accountability, and 4) Power. This is adapted from the CIVICUS Legitimacy, Transparency and Accountability Program (LTA). Similarly, Miller & Covey (1997) identify the same four characteristics which are required of organizations who want their advocacy work to be effective and lead to meaningful, sustainable change. Since this mapping is about advocacy to address the closing of political spaces, this assessment framework can capture the significant data on organizational capacities vis a vis the socio-political context. Data collection tools to assess organizational advocacy capacities are based on those four pillars.
The assessment of advocacy capacities is meant to create a connection between internal capacities (i.e. communication, policy analysis) from one side with the ability of organizations to mobilize, lobby and create a momentum for change.

II. ADVOCACY AND POWER: A VISION ON TRANSFORMATION:
Advocacy is conceptualized in many ways by theorists and practiced in various ways by activists and their organizations around the world, as well as by actors in the private and public sectors. Miller and Covey (1997) propose that for comprehensive, sustainable advocacy to occur, impact must be successfully achieved at three levels.

Covey and Miller (2007) also present a different framework for looking at Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGOs) advocacy approaches. They write that since power is embedded within the institutions and relationships that define our society and our daily lives – in the family, neighborhood associations, religious groups, corporations, the courts, and governmental and international agencies – it is an essential ingredient to effective advocacy and social change. Yet how does power work in the political process? How does it affect advocacy? Who gets access to power and influence? Who is denied power? And what do grassroots organizations and NGOs need to do in order to promote more balanced relations of power? The ways in which organizations answer these questions shape their approaches to advocacy and their long-term effectiveness. When groups do not ask themselves these kinds of questions, they may develop advocacy strategies that do not respond to the power relations in their societies. This highlights the significance of exploring power dimensions at both organizational and external levels when exploring gaps and opportunities for advocacy.
To raise the questions about power, Covey and Miller later identified three common advocacy and empowerment approaches. These are presented separately for analytical purposes, recognizing that the boundaries between them are never neat and can sometimes overlap and change.

FIGURE 4: ADVOCACY AND EMPOWERMENT APPROACHES- ADAPTED FROM COVEY AND MILLER 2007

Over the past few years the collective work on advocacy has gained more credibility and influence. Yet it was found that these victories are often incomplete, quickly overturned, and can even undermine organizations and social movements that are crucial to sustaining long-term change. In the rush to embrace new approaches, important strategies have been eclipsed (Valrie and Miller, JASS 2013). Therefore, organizations and movements’ reflection on power, legitimacy, accountability and rootedness have boosted those efforts for influencing decision making processes.

Nevertheless, NGOs experiences in policy and advocacy have achieved some good quick wins to influence certain policies at global, regional and national levels; they tended to exclusively focus on visible power vis a vis invited spaces as means to channel their advocacy work. This is due to the exciting nature of policy work aimed at the very visible dimensions of power. Meanwhile, this resulted in the disconnect between the work of those organizations and their constituencies and made it easy to be overpowered. This highlights the importance of focusing on other forms of power especially in terms of invisible (culture) and hidden (interest) when addressing advocacy and policy change. Though, due to the crystallization of powerless-powerful equation in women and gender issues, development theorists first read power in the framework of women empowerment. Jo Rowlands’ Questioning Empowerment: Working with Women in Honduras 1997, addressed the issue of power in development through looking in-depth in the concept of empowerment, which is the major focus of development and social practices. In her experience working with women’s empowerment in developing countries, Rowlands found it interesting and irritating. The first because involving empowerment is coherent to address equality, liberation and justice; while the latter, it is irritating, because power seems utterly fundamental, yet it is “rarely explicitly addressed” (Rowlands 1997-V) and there should be more encouragement to explore the usefulness of addressing power coupled with empowerment for better “activism, gender planning, project planning and evaluation” (Rowlands 1997-Vi).

“The discourse about power in development has been and remains predominantly about transformations which are bottom-up” (Chambers, 2006). Hence, development is about empowerment of the marginalized and powerless groups and thus it is the continuous struggle of the less powerful to retain more power, not necessarily from others who are more powerful, to improve their quality of
life. When such struggle and challenge “become strong and extensive enough, they can result in the total transformation of a power structure” (Batiwala, S. 1995).
III. THE POWER ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR THE MAPPING EXERCISE:

In order to decide how knowledge of power is embedded in the practice of organizations and activists in conducting advocacy work, the analytical framework was founded on the basis of identifying how levels, forms and spaces of power are shaping the advocacy work of those stakeholders. The research team integrated the power cube framework as a research framework. Through looking into spaces, forms and levels of power, a concrete understanding of opportunities vis-à-vis challenges and risks was developed.

Power analysis can be used to understand the power structures that hinder social change, by understanding levels, forms, and spaces where power operates, and accordingly this leads to drafting the strategies that respond to such complexity, in order to achieve the power transformation process for justice and equality.

The Power Cube framework presented by John Gaventa in 2007, can be seen as the most developed and multi-dimensional tool to analyze power in certain social and political context. Power Cube is designed to work through levels, spaces and forms of power. Power Cube can work in the three areas of understanding power and strategizing for and evaluating power transformation.

![Power Cube Diagram](https://www.powercube.com)

Along with studying organizational capacities for advocacy considering the power as a pillar for this, this study will also help to uncover the character of power in 5 countries in the MENA region, especially those related to closing civic and political spaces. Moreover, it will seek to identify opportunities for civil society activists to expand/open civic spaces and identify what blocks real engagement of civil society.
1. **SPACES OF POWER (CLOSED, INVITED, AND CLAIMED)** What are the closed, opened and claimed spaces for CSOs to influence decision making processes at local and national levels?

The data collection tools integrated questions that define spaces where CSOs are either invited to or from where they are blocked. Interviewed CSO workers answered questions around formal invited spaces where government welcomes civil society to take part in drawing policies. The questions also included:

- Who makes decisions related to the development of policies of the CSO activism in your country? What are the relevant platforms? Who is invited to participate?
- Has this been changed over the past few years (5 years)? What has been made available or what closed? Vice versa?
- Did CSOs manage to claim any spaces for participation in terms of policy making at local and national levels through specific campaigns? What cases?
- To which extent NGOs in your country are willing to engage in opening/accessing closed spaces for activism? Examples? What do you think they need to reach this?
- In terms of who is invited, who has more space and credibility with government?
  - INGOs and Donors,
  - National CSOs, and/or
  - Movements and other informal groups
- How you see the interaction between formal institutions and informal institutions in the country at national and local levels?

2. **FORMS OF POWER (VISIBLE, INVISIBLE, AND HIDDEN)** In what way forms of power are operating to hinder/support engagement of CSOs?

   a. **Closed spaces:**
   This is about the areas where decision is made by “a set of actors behind closed doors” (Gaventa 2005) where there is no access.

   b. **Invited spaces:**
   It is a space that is opened by the authority or the power holder for the people to take part in decision making. An example for this is the elections where “people [as users, citizens or beneficiaries] are invited to participate” through voting (Gaventa 2005).

   c. **Claimed/created spaces:**
   It is a created space that has been claimed by the collective power of the powerless against “power holders or created more autonomously by them” (Gaventa 2005).

   d. **Visible power:**
   “Observable Decision-making” (VeneKlasen and Miller quoted in JASS 2007) It is about the decision-making process that is visible and definable for the public. It could be the rules, the legal framework, the authorities that are entitled to make decisions.

   e. **Hidden power:**
   “Setting the Political Agenda” (Ibid) The power that control and manipulate decision making process and agendas, such as: “surveillance by intelligence agencies, corruption and influence-buying, lobbying, membership of elite networks and associations threats of violence, etc” (Pettit 2012).

   f. **Invisible power:**
   “Shaping Meaning and what’s Acceptable” (VeneKlasen and Miller quoted in JASS 2007) It is also referred to as informal power, which includes different “psychological and ideological boundaries for participation... such as processes of socialization, culture and ideology perpetuate exclusion and inequality” (Ibid).
Mapping interviews with CSO workers included in-depth questions around how they address/deal with various forms of power. This includes the legal framework that governs NGOs’ work in each country as a fundamental aspect to shrink, close or open civic spaces.

- What are the relevant existing legislations that govern activism of CSOs and social and political groups in your country? And how this legal framework is being interpreted by actors?
- What are the coping mechanisms by NGOs to respond to such legal framework in terms of registration, access to funds and launching national or local level advocacy work?
- To which extent you see NGOs are capable or willing to understand invisible powers (culture, traditions, community norms) and how this can positively or negatively affect advocacy work? Do you know some examples from your experiences?
- At community level, how do you see the influence of traditional power (tribal for example) can be a support or barrier for CSOs and to which extent those CSOs are able to understand and work within this framework?
- In case formal spaces for advocacy and policy influence are closed, what are the alternative informal spaces that NGOs mostly use? Give examples?
- What are the reasons for them to use those spaces?

3. LEVELS OF POWER

With reference to forms and spaces, how CSOs are interacting with closing civic spaces at 3 levels:

1. local level: How power structure interacts at community level, who are the main power holders? How do you engage with them? What spaces/forums available to influence local agendas?
2. national level: How power structure interacts at country level, who are the main power holders? How do you engage with them? What spaces/forums available to influence national agendas?
3. regional levels: How power structure interacts at regional level, who are the main power holders? How do you engage with them? What spaces/forums available to influence regional agendas?
DATA COLLECTION TOOLS
The research integrated 3 data collection methods:

ONLINE SURVEY:
A generic short survey has been shared with CSO activists in the MENA countries with focus on capacities and opportunities to initiate advocacy in countries of interventions. The survey included data from 72 CSO representatives from across the MENA region.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FGD):
The objective of the focus group discussions was to provide an opportunity to a select group of respondents with shared characteristics for in-depth discussion around their perceptions of their work at CSO level and how they initiate advocacy to address civic engagement issues in their areas of operation. The research team conducted a total of 10 FGDs in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco and Tunisia. Involving CSOs workers from:
- Youth-led organizations
- Women-led organizations
- Community-based organizations
- Organizations focusing on policy making and national level advocacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Conducted FGDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2 FGDs of total number of 27 in Beqaa Valley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2 FGDs of total number of 17 people in Tunis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1 FGD targeting 10 people in Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1 FGD for a total of 10 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2 FGD for a total number of 10 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH KEY INFORMANTS (KII)
In each country, the research integrated 8-10 in-depth interviews. The total number of individual interviews per country was from 6-10 key informants. The target sample under the individual interviews included:
- National CSOs activist and leaders,
- Leadership of INGOs engaged in national and regional advocacy around CSOs and spaces of engagement,
- Activists and leaders from social movements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of KII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1 (Gulf area and regional perspectives)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE FRAMEWORK
Under this assignment the research team unpacked 3 dimensions of power and translated them into data collection tools targeting CSO activists in the MENA region. The analysis of the collected data
was based on using power analysis tools such as the Power Twister\(^1\). The following lines extracted from Valrei Miller, via JASS 2013 explains the function of power twister.

The Power Twister summarizes an extensive analysis of power and action approaches in graphic form. It illustrates how different aspects of power interact to shape the challenges and possibilities of political action on civic engagement. The two columns at the left of the matrix describe the manifestations and forces of what feminists’ call ‘power over’ – visible, hidden and invisible – complete with concrete examples of how these forms of power operate. The column at the far right includes a variety of strategies that reflect the vision and exercise of ‘vital power’, another concept from feminism, an expression of power that nourishes and advances a more egalitarian, caring notion of agency and action – ‘power within’, ‘power with’, and ‘power to.’ These forms of power and strategy are used to resist, challenge and transform ‘power over’ and are placed within the block where they are applied most frequently, recognizing that strategies overlap, interact and operate holistically. In reading the twister from left to right, the forms of ‘power over’ and their relationships to the mix of approaches needed to transform them can be readily seen. Even though these categories and dynamics are presented separately, in practice they are constantly in motion, interacting and affecting each other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Through which dimensions does Power Over Operate in the Echo-System of Organizations in terms of closing spaces? At local, national and regional levels?</th>
<th>How organizations interact with power dynamics and vice versa?</th>
<th>What are the capacity gaps for organizations to address this structure of Power?</th>
<th>What are the spaces and opportunities at local, national and regional levels?</th>
<th>What are the best strategies to respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visible: &lt;Making and enforcing rules&gt;</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Building Collective Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidden: &lt;Setting The Agenda&gt;</td>
<td>Claimed</td>
<td>Controlling Engaging and Negotiating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invisible: &lt;Shaping meaning, values of what is normal or common sense&gt;</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Building conscious and changing norms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8: Power Twister as an Analysis Framework.**

---

\(^1\) Adapted from Valrei Miller, via JASS 2013. JASS used the analysis to help marginalized groups and their allies a) name power dynamics that undermine and exclude people from political participation and b) identify and develop a multiple mix of strategies necessary for overcoming these forms of discrimination and exclusion.
SECTION II: REGIONAL ANALYSIS:

This section provides a regional and global outlook for the phenomenon of shrinking political spaces as a growing global and regional trend. The section starts with an overview around how shrinking political spaces is trending and what are the drivers and motives that are pushing this way. This also is complemented by the findings from the regional online survey that targeted 72 activists from various countries in the region.

UNDERSTANDING CLOSING POLITICAL SPACES AT REGIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVELS:

There are several definitions for shrinking political and civic spaces developed by various actors. Notably, there is still a separation between the terms “civic” and “political” in framing the trend. This goes in line with the tendency to depoliticize the issue (more specifically the work on it) and therefore some actors prefer the term civic as a less impulsive term when it comes to engagement with governments. Perhaps that is due to the negative connotation that accompanies the term political. Precisely, development work is inherently political and any attempts to think that civil society and its work is ‘apolitical’ is not just myopic but also treacherous (ActionAid SPS 2014).

In other words, when we mobilize the power lens in defining the term politics, it is about privilege, power and domination. Meaning, who gets what, when and why? Based on what resources? And how it is allocated? It is the win-lose relationship as defined by Gaventa and Cormwall. “Power and politics is understood as a product of conflicts between actors to determine who wins and who loses on key clearly recognized issues, in a relatively open system in which there are established decision-making arenas” (Gaventa and Cormwall, 2008). Politics is about resource allocation and distribution and is therefore central to development and decision making. When politics fails, injustice in various forms reigns and when it works, equity and dignity for all is the outcome (ActionAid SPS 2014).

Meanwhile, the understanding of invisible and hidden power brings to the surface the argument of Antonio Gramsci about civil society expansion to include public sphere in the political struggle and contestation over resources and their allocations. Therefore, in light of the above, the ActionAid position on shrinking political spaces drafted in 2014 puts a very relevant definition for shrinking political space. ‘Shrinking political space occurs when those with power use it to inhibit or restrict political participation, association, assembly, organizing, dissent, and use of legitimate resources’.

An analysis by CIVICUS showed that in 2015, significant violations of civic space were recorded in over 100 countries, up from 96 in 2014. Essentially this means that about 86% of the world’s population, or 6 out of 7 people, live in states where their basic rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression are being curtailed or denied. While varying in manifestation and severity, shrinking political and civic space is happening all over the world in so-called democracies, outright dictatorships or hybrid regimes. In many countries, vague provisions in laws are applied arbitrarily under the guise of public management, anti-money laundering, anti-terrorism, national security, public morals, protection of national sovereignty among others.
Some reports stress on the importance of looking into closing civil spaces not as a stand-alone challenge but through situating it in the wider global context or as part of wider political struggle between the three main powers at play, civil, political and economic forces (IDS, 2018). Some of these reports also identify the causes and drivers of shrinking political spaces (IDS, 2018; CIVICUS, 2018). Capitalism and the fact that it does not provide any alternatives for the marginalized 99%. This is because the promise of capitalism bringing higher benefits for increased populations has proven to be faulty as it has only been systematically profitable to the richest 1%. However, it is also important to note that the alternative development models provided by some states, such as the Chinese model for example which provides a “tightly-directed state capitalism” have also been used to promote economic development but also to suppress human rights and democracy. This not only benefits a 1% of rich economic actors but it also ensures to maintain and preserve the status quo for the few people in powerful positions (CIVICUS, 2018).

Conservative and far rights governments have been gaining more grounds recently. They have been supporting nationalism, militarization and hate speech against refugees, migrants, lesbian gay bisexual transgender queer and intersex groups (LGBTQI), women, indigenous people, as well as other minority groups around the world. This has been reinforced by a growing sense of securitization in many countries, where NGO are only allowed to be active in the “invited spaces”. They have been emphasizing the importance of borders (both physical and symbolic) to isolate their states from other nations and other people. This also affects civil society actors as they usually face backlash in their attempts to hold such duty bearers into account, and they are usually accused of not supporting state security or national interests (CIVICUS, 2018).

State leaders have been increasingly identifying themselves with people in power and separating themselves from the people. Caring about their personal gain and entering into marriages with capitalists and elite politicians have been a trend that became clearer with the revealing of truths around tax havens. This is also shown by the lack of separation of powers and the use of powers such as the legislature and the judiciary to support impunity and at the same time impose more restrictions on civic spaces (CIVICUS, 2018). In addition, reviewed reports identify tactics/actions taken by governments to restrict civic spaces such as physical harassment, intimidation including use of violence to disperse protests, criminalization and detention of human rights defenders, civil society actors and journalists, administrative restrictions, stigmatization, censorship of media, co-optation and closing of newly created/opened spaces (Van der Borgh and Terwindt 2012 and ACT Alliance 2011 retrieved from IDS, 2018; Gaebbe 2017, retrieved from IDS, 2018). Other reports also identify the use of legal and policy frameworks to impose more restrictions or close civic spaces completely; this includes issuing restrictive NGO laws, anti-protest laws and Anti-terrorism laws (ICNL, retrieved from IDS, 2018).

Attacks on independent media and journalists have also increased and as described by CIVICUS (2018) been “taken to the next level”. CIVICUS 2018 lists the top seven reasons for attacking journalists around the world. Journalists were mostly attacked due to political reporting, followed by protest reporting, then corruption reporting. Reporting ethnic/political/religious differences came next, followed by human rights activism, then crime reporting and at the bottom of the list was conflict reporting. Additionally, undermining the freedom of media is also used whether by purchasing media channels, directing the spending of public advertising to favorable media channels or issuing legislations against reporting “fake news” (CIVICUS, 2018). Of 180 countries assessed by Reporters
Sans Frontier’s 2018 index on freedom of the press, 17 countries had free press, followed by 30 less free countries, 63 partly Free, 48 not free, and 22 completely closed (RSF, 2018).

Alongside the attacks on independent media, restricting cyber freedoms have also been a trend in many countries. Even though most reports on restrictions of the internet come from Asia, Middle East and Africa, it is also worth noting that ending net neutrality in the United States of America, through which those who pay more will gain more privileges and better access has been considered a blow in the face of freedom of internet. Leaders restrict the internet as they see its strength in providing communication between people as well as allowing them to share information and validate such information whether around political issues, corruption or other issues (CIVICUS, 2018). In its 2018 report on Freedom of the Net: the Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, Freedom House assessed 65 countries. “26 have been on an overall decline since June 2017, compared with 19 that registered net improvements. The biggest score declines took place in Egypt and Sri Lanka, followed by Cambodia, Kenya, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Venezuela” (Freedom House, 2018).

CIVICUS (2018) also reports what they call “the rise of uncivil society” (p.12). It is worth noting that civil society is all the same and all of civil society actors are fighting for the same aims: the ugly truth is that the definition of the common good has become very controversial and it has also been defined in contradictory ways by various actors, as “socially conservative forces are claiming civil society space, among them pressure groups that seek to rob women of their reproductive rights, think tanks that act as outriders for nationalist and xenophobic ideas and market fundamentalism, and protest movements against LGBTI, refugees and migrants’ rights. These regressive forces working within the civil society arena are becoming increasingly emboldened” (CIVICUS, 2018). It is important to note that this is taking place as conservative and far right governments, that are supporting such groups, are increasingly gaining more grounds (CIVICUS, 2018; IDS, 2018). “For Poppe and Wolff (2017), civic space struggles are about contests over norms that reflect competing worldviews and values: the values in relation to which civic space is contested in different contexts reflect distinctively different underlying perceptions of justice” (IDS, 2018).

Globally, due to the rise of fundamentalist groups whether in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) or their strength in causing turbulence in some countries in Europe, concepts of nationalism are reasserted but narrowed as presidents together with ruling elites are the considered the sovereign and not the people. Multilateral institutions, such as United Nations (UN) bodies, are continuously being undermined with richer and stronger states continuing to use their right to veto decisions that block their interests. This is also in addition to the cuts to the UN funding in 2017 which does not represent even 0.5% of the global spending on arms deals (CIVICUS, 2018). When they raise human rights concerns, they are attacked as propagators of cosmopolitan values and utopian standards, and as agents of unwelcome overreach that hinder the pursuit of national self-interest. Otherwise, they are hijacked as vehicles to advance neoliberalism and corporate agendas (CIVICUS, 2018).

The increasing role of the private sector in delivering basic services and in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) brings forward the threat to some difficult goals related to “decent work, income inequality and responsible consumption and corruption” (CIVICUS, 2018). In fact, this requires working on changing power structures and systemic changes tackling root causes of poverty, marginalization and exclusion rather than their symptoms (ActionAid, 2010).

It is important to note that the #MeToo campaign showed how sexual abuse is engraved at the global level and how it affects women’s lives (CIVICUS, 2018). However, statistics show that still one third of women around the world are facing violence and it is described internationally as a global pandemic (World Bank, 2018). Repressive states have also been using sexual harassment against politically active women; as CIVICUS (2018) notes, “percentages of reports on women involved in
activism by region” are the highest in the Americas, followed by Asia, then Europe, then the MENA region, and finally Africa.

The MENA region as well is witnessing a strong attack on civil society and it is becoming a regional trend. Laws and procedures regulating CS work is getting tougher, where CS activism in the arena of advocating for structural change is getting pushed away before governments. Egypt has enacted a new law in 2017 that adds tremendous restriction on NGOs activism especially programs related to advocacy, research and lobbying. The same law is allowing NGOs to be more involved in service provisions as a means to cover the government inability to provide services. Meanwhile, there is ongoing discussion in Jordan to adapt a like-minded approach to restrict civic space through amending laws regulating NGOs’ work. Though, it is considerably the most successful example of democratic transition of the Arab spring countries, government in Tunisia is now discussing a new law to restrict NGOs work.
REGIONAL FINDINGS ON ORGANIZATIONS CAPACITIES:
As part of this assignment, the research entailed a data collection survey that targeted CSO activists from the region, where 72 (40 males and 32 females) respondents have been surveyed. Respondents represent national organizations working in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Mauritania and Sudan. It also included organizations covering more than one country in the MENA region. This online survey covered main areas of studying organizations capacities to do advocacy as well as CSOs’ views on shrinking civic spaces in the region.

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT POLITICAL SPACE IS SHRINKING?
Interviewed CSOs believe that the spaces they can claim to influence decision-making processes have increased over the past 5 years. 73 CSO representatives in the region were included in the mapping exercise, from which a percentage of 68.5% think that their ability to influence decision-making processes through official forums at community/ national level in the last 5 years have increased. 24.7% view that space available stayed as it is. This is very interesting when we study it vis a vis the phenomenon of closing civic spaces and the restrictive laws.

The above can be interpreted at 2 main levels; 1st) the capacity of those CSOs has improved and accordingly their exposure to learning and ability to influence decision-making increased, 2nd) the democratic spaces available for these NGOs to do policy influence increased. The latter does not mean that there is good progress in countries in transition to democracy, it might mean that fluidity created by the effect of Arab spring has actually encouraged those NGOs to keep engaging in advocacy work. The following table explains answers from mapping survey respondents around this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Level – Capacities of CSOs have improved?</th>
<th>2nd Level – Space available has political mobility changed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Organizations networks have increased which helped get more exposure to policy change forums. Organization managed to get access to regional networks that contributed to enhanced capacities for advocacy.</td>
<td>- A repressive regime stimulates better capacities of CSOs to be able to navigate within a restrictive framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Domain of activities expanded and accordingly new topics were added to the organizational mandate.</td>
<td>- The municipal elections and the decentralization scheme in some countries helped create a local platform for CSOs to engage when addressing local development policies and plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Advocacy programming is helping the organization to improve its own ability to influence policies.</td>
<td>- Some organizations managed to sign agreement protocols with the government which kept them in the loop for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Organizations managed to build credibility and trust of local community which helped it to be in the frontline for shaping community development agendas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Advocacy is a longer-term change process and building constituency is what takes time and reinforces capacity to influence policies even under a framework of repressive regime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Organizations developed clear strategy for advocacy and outreach which created a systematic approach to policy change.

- Some organizations got securitized in the sense that they go in-line with government agendas which gives them the space to be in decision-making forums.

### How Organizations Are Building Their Constituency For Change?

**Figure 9: How Respondents View Public Engagement**

- There is an overall commonality around people’s ability to influence NGOs programs especially that pertaining to advocacy. 26% of respondents indicated that people benefiting from organizations program can access budget, while only 37% indicated that target groups can take part in planning or at least somehow affect the program design processes. While people ability to choose or elect organizations and campaigns leaders is the least among all NGO workers perception. Only 22% of respondents indicated that target groups can take part in the selection of their campaign leader.

- Meanwhile, there is a good progress around organizations capacities to use social media to outreach their local communities. 91% can see that their organizations are able to keep people tuned in to their campaigns progress through social media. 94% of CSOs targeted by the survey believe that their campaigns have direct impact on people.

- The above outlines that organizations legitimacy to conduct advocacy work can be a key area for development and progress. Lack of organizational legitimacy by default affects both credibility and organizational accountability and transparency. In light of the growing sense of securitization coupled with restrictive laws on CSOs to conduct advocacy and campaigns, there is an overarching challenge of people being represented as a lead for the advocacy programming. This eventually influences the approach of CSOs in advocacy, meaning that most of the advocacy programs are either led by NGOs or led by experts.
HOW IS ADVOCACY CENTERED WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS’ WORK PROCESSES?

This survey question refers to organizational processes to implement advocacy campaigns which includes:

1- Adapting clear strategy for policy change:
   a. A good percentage of respondents indicated that their organization has a clear commitment to change policies or laws affecting target groups. It has become a necessity that each organization has a basic idea around policy reform related to their areas of work. This includes both national and local levels policy influence.
   b. It is important to mention that both online and offline data collection show that organizations at different levels are more aware of the rights-based approach to development. And community-based organizations can view themselves as Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) advocates who can push for policy and practice change at the local level. Of course, there is an obvious confusion at this level around awareness and behavior change as part of advocacy, since it only focuses on the people/right holders. This reflects the need to work around the 2 sides of HRBA to guarantee initiating a structural change. The two sides include first duty bearers through lobbying, dialogues and pressure. On the other side the right holders, through organizing the public and initiating behavior and awareness raising programs.

![Is your organization willing to influence policies at Local/national level?](image)

![Does your Organization have a clear policy strategy?](image)

FIGURE 10: VIEWS ON ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL.
2- Building evidence to inform planning:
   a. There is a remarkable development as well when it comes to organizations’ tendency to systematize data collection and community assessment tools to inform planning. Almost 93% of organizations included in the survey indicated that program planning should come after collecting relevant data that shall shape the planning.

![Figure 11: Views on Data Collection as a Regular Organizational Practice.](image)

**DOCUMENTING KNOWLEDGE, EVALUATION AND GENERATING LESSONS LEARNT:**
   b. There is a significant need for evaluation and generating lessons learnt around campaigning and advocacy at both mid and short term. The data collected indicated that 43% of interviewed organizations have a clear system for evaluation, documentation and collecting lessons learnt for advocacy. While 3% mentioned that there is no system for evaluation or learning, 54% clarified that learning and evaluation might take place but not in a systematic way. In other words, learning happens as part of group dynamic and reflections, while the organizations themselves are not yet able to create a plan and a system for learning and evaluation of advocacy work.
   c. This provides a strong insight around the need of those NGOs to adopt a systematic approach for evaluation and learning of advocacy. It is challenging to measure longer term policy change which in some cases can take 10 years of collective struggle. However, developing indicators around engagement of policy makers, changes in community attitudes, change in institutional capacities of law implementing agencies can be possible to identify milestones for a longer term change.

![Figure 12: Organizations ‘Views on Learning and Evaluation Systems.](image)
WHAT ARE THE ADVOCACY TECHNIQUES USED BY CSOs?

- Data collected listed a number of techniques that CSOs are using to influence decision-making processes in their advocacy work. It is worth mentioning that CSOs explained good examples and experience around making connections with policy makers either MPs, local authority, ministries, and community leaders. This also can be analyzed more in terms of who is getting invited and why. Some organizations belong to privileged community groups which is helping them to get invited into policy-making forums and meetings with policy makers. The country level analysis will give deeper perspectives on this when it comes to analyzing invisible and hidden power.
- Cooperation with government and getting access to decision making platforms are significant means to channel advocacy messages. There are certain levels and ways by which organizations are getting space in those forums and platforms. The following shows means and ways by which NGOs can get invited for decision-making platforms and engagement with government. It was highlighted in most of the answers that municipal committees and local authorities are key entry points for cooperation between CSOs and government.

![Image of How Do You Engage with Decision Makers]

**Figure 13: Means NGOs Follow to Engage with Decision-Makers**

- Meanwhile there are 14 CSOs in the survey who did not developed any cooperation with the government for various reasons, such as:
  - Government views NGOs as opponents.
  - Laws are restricting NGOs’ engagement in decision-making platforms.
  - Government does not accept any CSOs monitoring over its activities.
  - Local government is not from another ethnic/religious group than the NGO.
Alliance building with like-minded groups is also one of the important techniques that NGO can do to improve their influence. CSOs indicated that alliance with other CSOs is the most important and then the alliance with media as well as workers and student unions. Political parties in most of the countries included in the survey were the least to build alliance with.

Who did we build alliance with?

- Alliance with political parties
- Alliance with parliament members
- Alliance with other partner NGOs.
- Alliance with TVs and Newspapers
- Alliance with Labour/student union
- Alliance with universities and research centers
- Others

Figure 14: CSOs views on alliance building

Putting and mobilizing different community groups or decision makers is a key area of assessment of targeted CSOs. The use of media in ensuring that campaign progress is reaching people was one of the key highlights when the research addressed CSOs willingness to engage with public. 91% of respondents confirmed that people follow up campaigns through media.

Interestingly, means of media used to outreach people are to a big extent similar to means used to outreach decision-makers. Although usage of social media outlets differs from a country to another, there is consensus that Facebook is the most relevant social media tool to outreach both people and government. Others include press release and policy papers for government officials, while disseminating promotional material such as brochures and posters is the most common to outreach people.
### GOOD EXAMPLES FOR CAMPAIGNS IN YOUR COUNTRY?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Campaigns Example</th>
<th>Lessons learnt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>- Women’s quota in the parliament</td>
<td>- Assessing needs and design achievable objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sexual harassment law campaign in 2014.</td>
<td>- Cluster efforts and building alliances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- No for military trails campaign in Egypt after 2012. Though it did not change</td>
<td>- Use relevant media tools to communicate with people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the fact of civilians litigated under military trails, but it managed to put</td>
<td>- Use art to break barriers and reach-out to communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spotlight on the issue.</td>
<td>- Effectively use the limited space given to NGOs, building alliances,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Egyptians against Coal 2014.</td>
<td>using international mechanisms when negotiating with the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This campaign led by CSOs to influence government’s decision to use coal as a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>means to produce electricity in power plants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>- The campaign to lift Government reservations on CEDAW agreement. Campaign</td>
<td>- Lobby with political parties to reach out to MPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>managed to convince MPs to lift the reservations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>- The campaign to adapt a law on the right to information. This campaign managed</td>
<td>- Engage with MPs and include them in the drafting process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to present a draft law for plenary discussion at the Iraqi House of Representatives in 2011.</td>
<td>- Multi-stakeholder’s engagement and collective planning for the campaign through bringing everybody to the campaign design process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Further details are included in Jordan country</td>
<td>- Local campaigns to choose municipality members beyond tribal and traditional power setups.</td>
<td>- Effective usage of social media to mobilize people around desired change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Create a nation-wide coalition from</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FIGURE 15: BEST MEANS OF SOCIAL MEDIA TO REACH OUT GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE

![Pie chart showing the best means of social media to reach out government and people](image-url)

- **Facebook** is the best to reach out people, with 70% effectiveness.
- **Twitter** is the second best, reaching 60% of people.
- **Youtube** is the third best, reaching 30% of people.
- **Instagram** is the fourth best, reaching 20% of people.
- **TV channels** are the least effective, reaching only 10% of people.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Campaigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Lebanon | - Campaign to annul article 308 from penal code in 2017.  
- Dhabahtouna campaign to reduce higher education fees. Another campaign to change grading system at universities.  
- Various interested stakeholders and activists to take collective action to change policies.  
- Most affected groups to lead the campaign is a key to success (university students in the case of Dhabahtouna).  
- Campaign to annul article 522 from penal code.  
- Local campaign in Bekaa valley on criminalizing celebratory random shooting.  
- You Stink campaign around garbage collection in Beirut which has developed later to a political campaign to address injustice.  
- The Campaign against early marriage led by WR active CSOs.  
- Freedom of expression campaign.  
- Domestic worker’s rights.  
- Engaging citizens who are directly affected by the issue of the campaign is a key learning to guarantee stronger lobbying and mobilization.  
- Expanding the definition of civil society to include labor unions and student movements as part of the collective action to address structural changes.  
- Tailoring campaign demands based on the needs of target groups.  
- Usually these campaigns are successful because they highlight some of the most trending issues. |
| Mauritania | - Campaign to disarm radical groups.  
- The campaign’s success was built on the good connection with MPs and Government.  
- Due to the high sensitivity of the issue and how it can be politically used. The campaign managed to create dialogues outside the frame of traditional media which help to build trust with local communities. |
| Morocco | - Environment Protection Campaign  
- Campaign to change Civic Law to allow Amazigh to give Amazighi names for their kids.  
- Involving communication experts to help draft a grounded message.  
- Further details are included in Morocco country report. |
### Tunisia
Further details are included in Tunisia country report.

- Campaigns to promote Public Health to Pregnant women in Gafsa and Sidi Bou Zied.
- Campaign to adapt the new bill No.58 on fighting violence against women.
- Campaign to remove section 12 of Law no.52 on Drug use that managed to commute sentences of drug use.
- The campaign to review the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) especially Law No.5 related to the right to legal counseling.
- Campaign to involve CSOs in decision-making on water policies which managed to create an agreement on CSOs engagement to draft water strategy in Tunisia.

- The availability of accessible health data base can help tailor required evidences to launch campaigns.
- Building alliances and connections with parliament members.
- Contextualization of campaigns objectives and solutions is a key learning from the water strategy campaign.
- Engagement of lawyers and justice sector professionals with CSOs in advocating to change policies and also inviting them to support alternative legislation proposals.

### Support needed by NGOs to improve programming around advocacy?

The need for improving capacities of CSOs was highlighted as the first required support for CSOs to conduct advocacy work. Furthermore and due to the fact that there is reluctance to fund advocacy and research work by donors and INGOs, surveyed organizations listed the need for financial support to conduct campaign work as the second required support.

The importance of connecting partners to national and regional networks was highlighted as the third required support for CSOs.

**Support Required to Improve Advocacy Programming**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Support</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Development</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New learning and curriculum in Arabic</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support networking</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 16: Area of Support Needed by Partners.**

### Areas of capacity development included:

The following outlines basic areas of capacity development expressed by the survey participants:
| 1. | Specialized research training for organizations to be able to develop evidence and generate necessary research data for advocacy campaigns. |
| 2. | Monitoring and evaluation for campaigns and measuring long and midterm policy change. |
| 3. | Community mobilization skills and developing sensitized messages for campaigns. |
| 4. | Improving capacities for lobbying and engaging with decision-makers. |
| 5. | Creative activism and effective usage of social media for campaigning. |
| 6. | Capacities to conduct strategic advocacy planning sessions within the organization to identify longer term policy and advocacy plans. |
| 7. | Improving Organizational accountability and transparency as well as building constituency. |
| 8. | Providing online resources for campaigning. |
| 9. | Improving Capacity on Communication. |
| 10. | Developing capacities of CSOs to conduct online campaigns. |
SECTION III: COUNTRY ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

There are several laws and regulations regulate civic freedoms in Jordan. Some of these laws have been in place for a long time and others have been newly issued. Among those governing freedom of association is the Societies Law 51 of 2008 and its later amendment Law 22 of 2009 (ICNL, 2019). Among its many restrictions on the operation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), this law stipulates that CSO’s registration applications can be rejected without justification. It stipulates that CSOs are required to receive licenses prior to the collection of donations from the public. It also “provides that CSOs may not pursue any political objectives that are governed by Jordan’s Law on Political Parties, but the definition of “political” is not defined by either the Law on Political Parties or Law 51” (USAID, 2018, p.20). According to the Civic Freedoms Monitor, “the 2009 amendments streamlined and liberalized the 2008 Law on Societies, they have nevertheless been criticized by domestic and international CSOs for not going far enough” (ICNL, 2019). Additionally, it is needless to say that the tribal context in Jordan is embedded deeply in society and “operates alongside the formally established legal system. The tribes in Jordan play a political role, offer an alternative judicial system, and provide services to communities” (ICNL, 2019).

Another law that promulgates that unregistered societies are illegal is Jordan’s Penal Code 16 of 1960. It also stipulates that individuals who implement activities with unregistered societies are subject to two years’ imprisonment. Another law that governs not-for-profit companies and some types of CSOs is the Companies Law 73 of 2010. In addition to the provisions of the Jordan’s Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Law 46 of 2007 which imposes restrictions on financial transactions with penalties for non-compliance, there are restrictions provided by the law in Jordan on CSO’s access to funding whether foreign or domestic (USAID, 2018).

As for freedom of expression, several laws are available in Jordan to restrict it, including the Penal Code articles criminalizing defamation and the denigration of government, the Press and Publications Law in 2012 (the amendments of which require the registration of websites with the government and imposes liability on the owners of the website in relation to their content).

New amendments to the 2015 Cybercrimes Law were proposed by the government in the end of 2018. These amendments impose more restrictions on freedom of online expression. In addition to long prison sentences and provisions stipulating “severe criminal penalties” (ICNL, 2019), the draft amendment’s vague language poses a challenge as it uses terms such as “spreading rumors” (ICNL, 2019) with no clear definitions. However, on the positive side the law also clearly defines “hate speech”, reduce[s] the maximum penalty for the offense of defamation to two years’ imprisonment, and no longer allow[s] for pre-trial criminal detention for individuals charged with defamation” (ICNL, 2019).

Additionally, despite the availability of the Access to Information Law since 2007, it has not been fully implemented and requests for information are usually met with “lengthy delays and are limited by the State Secrets and Documents Law” (USAID, 2018).
Freedom of Assembly in Jordan is governed by Law 7 of 2004 which establishes Jordanian’s right to participate in public assemblies, contrary to non-Jordanians. A notification about the assembly is required at least 48 hours prior to holding it. Organizers who fail to notify the government may be published by imprisonment and fines. “Jordan’s Instructions Regulating Public Assemblies and Demonstrations of 2011 prohibit slogans, cheers, pictures, or symbols that “compromise state sovereignty, national unity or law and order” (Article 2(c)). Vague language in Law 7 also grants the administrative governor the right to disperse an assembly “if the assembly or demonstration’s objectives change” (Article 7)” (USAID, 2018).

**INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION?**

According a survey conducted by the USAID, only 36% of respondent CSOs and activists were familiar with the legal framework governing freedom of association and 37% were somewhat familiar. Of the registered CSOs who were surveyed, only 2% indicated that it took them more than 90 days to receive official registration notices following submission of their documents. 19% indicated that it was time consuming and expensive. This however was contradicted by the results of the focus group discussions and interviews of the same survey which sited that it took one of the organizations 4 years to complete the process. This is in addition to reported delays in receiving approvals to implementation of activities)” (USAID, 2018).

**OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR NGOs**

- Registered CSOs in Jordan 5,966 (according to the Jordanian Ministry of Social Development, retrieved from USAID, 2018)
- Freedom ratings: Partly Free 5/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Civil Liberties: 5/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Freedom of the Net 2018: Partly Free Score 49/100 (Freedom House, 2018)
- Corruption Perception Index 2018: Rank 58/180 – Score 49/100 (Transparency International, 2018)

According to the survey conducted by USAID on the state of civic freedoms published in the MENA in 2018, 46% of the respondent civil society organizations felt free to exercise freedom of association. 43% felt free to exercise the right to assembly. 47% of respondents to this survey felt free to exercise their freedom of expression and 31% felt free to participate. “Most (70%) of the surveyed stakeholders viewed CSOs as helpful in protecting individuals’ access to civil and political rights. Other actors identified as enablers of civic freedoms were the media (32%), donors/international organizations (32%), and local governmental authorities (32%)” (p.69). Surveyed CSOs related this to the Jordanian mobilization movement that emerged during the Arab Spring in 2011 and then continued afterwards in Jordan. A lot of emphasis is also placed on the importance of the “physical space” which is generally centralized in Amman, the capital, through cultural centers, artistic places, coffee shops and social hubs (p.69). Universities were also identified as both enabling and restricting environment, as they could be spaces for exchanging ideas, mobilization and organization, but at the same time are influenced by the
government. Major contributors to restrictions on such freedoms were also identified as 44% related this to religious figures, 39% considered this to be led by government institutions, 35% security forces and 33% political parties. Corruption and nepotism were also similarly cited by 82% of the respondents as a great threat to civic freedoms. “Roughly half of all stakeholders cited official practices and procedures (50%) and inequality of political power (49%) as primary threats to civic freedoms; rules and regulations (40%) were also cited by many” (USAID, 2018)

**RESPONSE/CURRENT MITIGATION ACTIONS (WHO IS DOING WHAT TO ADDRESS THIS?)**

73% of the USAID survey (2018) respondents identified the need for stronger public support for CSOs, while 69% cited the importance of developing internal capacity of CSOs. 51% also indicated that it is important to advocate for legal and policy reform to ensure civic freedoms in Jordan (USAID, 2018).
### Analysis of Forms and Spaces of Power for CSO Engagement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Through which dimensions of Power Over Operate in the Echo System of CSOs in terms of closing spaces?</th>
<th>How organizations interact with power dynamics and vice versa?</th>
<th>What are the spaces and Opportunities at local, national and regional levels?</th>
<th>What are the capacity gaps for organizations to address this structure of Power?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visible Power:</strong>&lt;br&gt;○ There is a common agreement between most of the interviewed that the law organizing the work of CSOs is not clear in terms of registration as well as access to funds and it puts restrictions on the activities of civil society.&lt;br&gt;○ There is more than one way to register an NGO either under the ministry of social affairs or the ministry of industry as a non-profit business. In both ways the ministry of interior</td>
<td>○ Within the current restrictions on NGO activities, local and national organizations are able to find coping mechanisms and techniques to navigate these restrictions.&lt;br&gt;○ 2 national coalitions were formed by national level CSOs to address the issue of the new law and start a conversation with government and parliament to ensure that the proposed law will not be as restrictive as the current.&lt;br&gt;○ The latest amendment of article 308 in Jordan in 2016 is a good example for a collective work for NGOs, activists, and political parties to</td>
<td><strong>Invited Spaces:</strong>&lt;br&gt;○ The Parliament in Jordan leads on drafting policies and legislations. There are some MPs who also represent CSOs; however most of them belong to charitable organizations.&lt;br&gt;○ The new decentralization scheme, though it is not in action yet, presents a good opportunity to shift the focus on policy making at local level. CBOs are currently struggling to understand and activate local governance systems, through which they can affect decision-making processes at local levels.&lt;br&gt;○ At regional level, there are some coalitions and movements that managed to create some significant</td>
<td>○ Few organizations are able to understand the whole cycle of advocacy starting with building evidences, creating agency for change, engage in high level lobbying and networking.&lt;br&gt;○ At the level of visible power and since public policy making processes in Jordan is not standardized, NGOs are still struggling to explore entries for influencing policies at all levels.&lt;br&gt;○ Creation of evidence and conducting rigorous programming was highlighted as a major need to plan successful campaigns. NGOs do not have to do the whole cycle of informing their programming and campaigns, they can still refer to research institutes – though they are very few- that can help generate primary data. However, the need to build capacities around evidence-based programming is a significant one.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
has the upper hand in approving certain NGO activities.
- There is an ongoing discussion at policy level to review the current NGO law to make it more restrictive. Meanwhile, there are campaigns by NGOs that addresses this new proposed law.
- The status of securitization is imposing more restrictive laws on CSOs activities. The new law on electronic crimes can also be used as a restriction on liberties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hidden Power:</th>
<th>Claimed Spaces:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o The growing discourse on security and countering terrorism grants the NGOs in Jordan are developing better willingness and capacity to involve in decision-making processes and policy making especially.</td>
<td>o Though Jordan was not part of the storming changes of the “Arab Spring”, there is a strong sense of social and political change. This was of course endorsed by the political will of the government and the king to drive such change.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Platforms, for example, the Arab Initiative for Education who is the only Arab member of the International Federation for Education Emergencies. Creative activism and usage of social media in a creative way that can mobilize the public around advocacy demands is still a significant area of development for organizations.
government and security apparatus a strong dominance on the work of CSOs.

- There are few organizations who managed to show a good case for policy analysis to address political change issues related to freedom of expression, the party system, and the election system.
- The bigger challenge in this perspective is this one-to-one closed dialogue between government from one side and aid agencies/UN agencies from the other. UNDP and EU have offices in Ministries and universities, they hold discussions with the those representing social and/or political power such as tribes or royal NGOs.

- There is no dynamic interaction between the components of governance (the public sector, the private sector, and CSOs). The very notion of civic engagement is not clearly and procedurally defined, and this affects community-based organizations’ understanding of their role.

- The advocacy campaign on Preserving the Ancient (Perennial) or Rare Rumi Olive Trees in the Irbid-Jordan has also political movements on the ground that managed to claim spaces at local and national levels.
- The example of Zabhtouna campaign by university students in 2015 who managed to challenge decisions related to higher education fees is one of the good examples of people-led campaign. The campaign also referred to relevant laws and State budgets that substantiated their advocacy demands.
- The advocacy campaign on Preserving the Ancient (Perennial) or Rare Rumi Olive Trees in the Irbid-Jordan has also safety.
- Greater knowledge of legal framework and compliance under which these organizations are less subjected to government sanctions.
- Understanding people-centered advocacy or advocacy by people is a key learning for CSOs in Jordan. It is remarkable that leads of national NGOs at the level of Amman understand well what does advocacy mean in terms of creating structural change; however, most of the examples of campaigns are either NGO-led or Experts-led. The few examples of Zabhtouna or Strike of Al Dowar Al Rabea. The forest movement are significant in showing the case of advocacy by people.
- Meanwhile, at local level, CBOs’ understanding of campaigning is very shallow and restricted to awareness activities. As indicated above, the invited space for centralization, though it is still inactive, can grant these local level organizations better opportunities to shape local level policies. Hence,
government, but they do not challenge its views. This is in addition to the reluctance to bring CSOs to the conversation.

- Being a conflict-affected country is also another way for the government to control the agenda of NGOs as well as granting the **funneling** of funds into either the government budgets or to these NGOs who are in good terms with the government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highlighted strong sense of grounding and bringing people to the forefront of advocacy work.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- It has been highlighted all over the interviews and reflection meetings with stakeholders, that there is a huge gap of mistrust between NGOs and social movements. It is still a classical discussion at the global level; however, there is an opportunity to bring social activism into campaigns while respecting all restrictions and boundaries that social movements are genuinely created with. Meaning, social movements can be brought to the campaigns work not by institutionalizing them, but by perceiving their notion as a movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Al Quds Centre for political studies &amp; Rasheed Organization &amp; Al Hayt Centre initiated investing in CBOs’ deeper understanding of advocacy will create a strong momentum from below on social and political changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- This has to be coordinated and networked with national level work. The need for networking between national and local level programming is a key in that matter.</td>
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</table>
campaigns that investigated source of funding for political campaigns as well as voting fraud which created a good sense of mobilization around these political demands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Invisible Power:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Closed Spaces:</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o There is a specificity around Jordanian local community and traditional powers. They play a very important role in terms of allowing/granting space for local level campaigns. The notion of CSOs development and growth in Jordan granted them with good connections with local community. Meaning that CSOs since 1967 played</td>
<td>o In line with decentralization of governance system, there is a big sense of centralization around NGOs’ work. There are the powerful national level NGOs based in Amman and have good tools and connections in terms of affecting national level policies. However, there is a disconnect between those national level and other CBOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o This is granting NGOs, especially CBOs the relevant space to do local campaigns, but mostly in issues that are socially acceptable by traditional powers. For example, the campaign against random shooting in weddings few years ago, managed to collect around 800k signatures mostly from people belonging to tribes. It also managed to mobilize tribes’ leaders.</td>
<td>o There is a good space to initiate campaigns and programs at community level. But this has to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o On the contrary, there is a rejection for campaigns addressing political or gender</td>
<td>o Understanding of local governance system is a key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Developing capacities to tweak messages around social and political changes, within a relevant framework which people can relate to and that is able to navigate the effect of invisible traditional powers, is a strong need for CBOs working at local level.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Sense of specialization is important in terms of driving change. The example of successful campaigns in Jordan were mostly led by specialized organization in their thematic focus.</td>
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an important role to address the issues of refugees. Though most of these organizations are service-oriented/charitable, they developed a strong bond with their communities. Some of these CBOs are also an actual representation of community traditional powers (tribal).

issues. The latest example of shutting down a national program on art and Combating Violent Extremism (CVE) due to the spread of videos for girls dancing at schools as part of an art activity.

- There is some ongoing progress by CBOs to address some tribal traditions such as tribal “Jalwah”, though they are making very little progress, but it is remarkable that some CBOs are able to bring this issue to local level forums.

very well tweaked around people’s interests to create momentum for change and avoid rejection.

- Relatively NGOs are being more involved with policy making processes at national level. However, there is a strong influence of securitization which controls who is invited to national level dialogues around laws and national strategies and who is not.

- UN agencies are most likely to be invited for policy dialogues and in some cases UN and agencies, USAID and EU lead policy forums with the government. Social and political movements are the least invited for dialogues with government.
Remarks on Areas of Organizational Advocacy Capacities:

When analyzing legitimacy, credibility and accountability of organizations to engage with people in decision-making processes, there is a big gap of organizational systems to integrate those aspects. The interviews as well as FGDs showed that most NGOs (both national and local) are not yet able to make those aspects as fabrics of their work. Analysis also showed very weak systems of accountability and proactive disclosure of information and data for target groups.

Hence, as a means to promote people-centered advocacy, capacities of organizations around building accountability and legitimacy systems is a strong asset. For instance, when asked about who is in charge of identifying problematic issues that NGOs should respond to, people came at the third place, as donors are the first and national NGOs are the second. The following two graphs form FGDs conducted in Jordan outline answers of participants around organizations’ sense of representativeness and accountability.

![Figure 17: Views of Participants in Jordan around Ownership of Programming](image-url)
Can community access budgets of CSOs?

Can community take part in designing programs and campaigns strategies?

Can community choose leadership of organizations especially community engagement?

Can community evaluate NGOs program?

Can community follow up CSOs program via social media?

Views on Legitimacy and credibility of CSOs

**Figure 18**: Views of Participants in Jordan around Organizational Legitimacy
Jordan Conclusion and recommendation:

1. Networking and creation of alliances at both vertical and horizontal levels is a basic requirement for advancing advocacy work. Vertical here refers to national level organizations networking under specialized themes. Such networks should also bring those organizations who have better capacity and connections to engage in policy making. While the horizontal level refers to the connection between national level NGOs and CBOs.

2. National level organizations are relatively able to initiate advocacy and campaigns, while the capacities to create evidence is still a large area for development. While CBOs are well connected and in most cases well aligned with local power structures, capacities to understand advocacy and make it as an embedded part of programming is still a big area for development.

3. Local level NGOs should be better positioned around HRBA framework as an entry to integrate advocacy as an embedded part of their programming. This will also help them tweak their social and political messages for change in a way that is more relevant for people and that can also mobilize or in worst cases navigate local traditional powers when it comes to gender or political change programming.

4. At both national and local levels, advocacy campaigns would be better if shifted from advocacy for people and with people to advocacy by people. People-led advocacy campaigns have demonstrated stronger impact on structures of power imbalances.

5. The decentralization scheme provides a big opportunity for CBOs to engage with people in shaping decision-making processes at local level, especially around social accountability, local budgeting, priorities of local expenditures. This can create a strong momentum from below to meet the openness that national level NGOs can manage to create from above.

6. Creative activism and innovative usage of social media is a strong area of development for both national and local level organizations. It can also help to bring creative messaging about issues that are sensitive for local communities, especially those related to gender issues.

7. Collective actions and multi-stakeholders engagement processes helped bring the best success in influencing policies in Jordan in the past 5 years when mentioning the article 308 campaign. Though, this was backed by political will, the sense of collective movements of various engaged stakeholders managed to isolate opponents from the conservative powers.

8. Social movements are still genuine and potential. There is an area to rethink of engaging with social movements in campaigning work, considering the fact that social movements cannot be institutionalized. I4C is encouraged to rethink of a learning model for engaging organizations with social movements in social and political campaigns initiated genuinely by people.

9. Back to representation and advocacy by people, CSOs should really seek to change internal systems of structures in a way that allows people to be in the center of their programming. People can decide on program priorities, access information related to programs and budgets and able to evaluate impact of these programs. I4C can also support NGOs in terms of readdressing organizational development areas in a way that ensures participation and ownership of people.

10. Since donors and UN agencies have already created entries with national government, national and local CSOs can advocate to make donor programs more inclusive. This can be another way to bring CSOs to the high-level discussions around policies.
THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The work of CSOs in Lebanon is regulated by the Law on Cooperative Societies 1325/1909 and its 2006 amendments which is considered an enabling one compared with other countries in this research consultancy. According to this law, in order to form an association, a notification has to be sent to the Ministry of Interior and no permits are needed for the process. “Secret” or undeclared associations are prohibited and subject to dissolution by authorities (Article 6)” (USAID, 2018, p.18). However, the Ministry of Interior, in efforts to complicate the process, requires that relevant ministries as well as the General Security Directorate become part of reviewing CSOs registration files prior to approving and issuing the notification receipts necessary for completing the registration process (USAID, 2018).

Additionally, some government agencies are required by the Right to Access to Information Law of 2017 to share information regularly. According to this law, individuals can go through a process to obtain information from government. This is in case the information does not touch upon national security or personal information (USAID, 2018). Freedom of opinion is also guaranteed by the Lebanese Constitution “within the limits established by law” (Article 13) (USAID, 2018).

The right to assembly is regulated by various laws and decrees. These are the Public Assemblies Law of 1911, Decree 4082 of 200 (of the Ministry of Interior) and the Penal Code. Similar to all other countries in this research consultancy a notification is required prior to holding any assembly. These assemblies may be prevented in case they are deemed disruptive of security, order, morality, interests. The law also regulates where these assemblies can take place; for instance, assemblies are not allowed to take place in public roads or around specific government buildings. Violators are fined or imprisoned or subject to both (USAID, 2018).

INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION

According to the USAID survey (2018) on the state of civic freedoms in the MENA, 60% of respondent CSOs reported feeling free to exercise their freedom of association. 59% felt free to exercise their right to assembly while a 70% reported they can express their opinions freely. However, only 27% reported feeling free to participate. As for familiarity with laws and procedures, 84% of surveyed CSOs reported familiarity with laws regulating the right to association. Also, 84% indicated they were familiar with the laws regulating freedom of expression and 83% reported familiarity with laws on freedom of assembly.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR NGOs

- 8,500 registered CSOs (based on government statistics retrieved from USAID, 2018)
- Freedom ratings: Partly Free 5/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Civil Liberties: 4/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
The operating environment for CSOs in Lebanon, compared to other countries in the MENA region, is considered a progressive one. This is because, there are no challenges for Lebanese CSOs in receiving funding. Approvals are not required by the law to fundraise for donations from domestically. As for advocacy and lobbying activities, even though formal mechanisms are not clarified by the law, CSOs have no challenges, legally, to implement such activities. However, in some cases the government has used the libel and defamation law against some CSO members for expressing their opinions (USAID, 2018).

**RESPONSE/CURRENT MITIGATION ACTIONS (WHO IS DOING WHAT TO ADDRESS THIS?)**
- Three priority areas were identified by surveyed CSOs in the USAID survey on the State of Civic Freedoms (2018). The first is internal capacity development, which was cited by most surveyed CSOs (84%). Legal and policy reform came second as cited by 60% of respondent CSOs. The third priority area was to build stronger public support which was reported by 54% of participant CSOs in this survey.

**ANALYSIS OF FORMS AND SPACES OF POWER FOR CSO ENGAGEMENT:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visible Power</th>
<th>How organizations interact with power dynamics and vice versa?</th>
<th>What are the spaces and opportunities at local, national and regional levels?</th>
<th>What are the capacity gaps for organizations to address this structure of Power?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o The Lebanese NGO Law issued in 1909 from the Ottoman Empire that no longer exists.</td>
<td>o Given the sectarian nature of the Lebanese society, most NGOs are formed by religious leaders but often go beyond these lines to provide services to many who are outside their religious</td>
<td>o Lebanon is among one of the countries in the MENA region known for freedom of opinion and expression.</td>
<td>o Some provisions of the NGO Law are vague.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Registration of associations in Lebanon shall be through notification in the Ministry of the Interior.</td>
<td></td>
<td>o The absence of modern laws governing the work of CSOs or movements made it a flexible area for the formation of NGOs as well as the activities of independent movements.</td>
<td>o Cybercrimes law has loose and vague terminology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The approval of registration is dependent on their objectives which means that a number of associations may not obtain the final registration.</td>
<td></td>
<td>o Recently, the Right to</td>
<td>o Lebanese civil society is not financially sustained. This means that organizations are forced to be project based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Cybercrimes law is used against civil society workers and activists using charges such as &quot;assaulting the head of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o There is no common agenda among CSOs therefore each works on their own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o There is no prioritization among CSOs especially with regards to needed policy or legal changes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
state or religions”.

access Information was passed in Lebanon but there are obstacles pertaining to the amount of information available from government institutions.

or amendments. This means that in meetings with parliamentarians they do not represent themselves as one big block of organizations that able to conduct advocacy interventions on changing the laws. However, each works on their own (e.g. Abaad’s work on abolishing article 522 (rape law).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invisible Power</th>
<th>Claimed Spaces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>○ Lebanese civil society organizations succeeded to continue working even during wars, and internal and external conflicts in times when the state has failed to fulfil its commitments in providing services. This NGOs considerable experience in dealing with local communities, but a large proportion of these associations were established in a sectarian manner or through politicians affiliated with specific communities.</td>
<td>○ There is now a ministry of Women's Affairs, which concerns all Lebanese women issues. ○ A coalition of civil society organizations succeeded to push a draft law prepared by one of the NGOs to abolish Article 522 of the Penal Code pertaining to the acquitting rapists in case of marrying their victims. ○ This model represents one of the successful examples of cooperation between Lebanese civil society and</td>
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<td>Hidden Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>o It is not enough to register the association through the notification; the association must have a lawyer or legal consultant with strong connections to help in pushing the registration process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Respondents to the FGD questions were not in agreement around the conditions for obtaining external fund. Some pointed out that the funding is only for local organizations officially registered; that is, not only through notifying the Ministry of Interior and having a bank account. Others indicated that if the amount of funding is less than ten thousand dollars, this does not require the submission of any documents on the form of registration to the Bank.</td>
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<tr>
<td>o There is a large number of associations formed through the Religious leaders or politicians and thus the services of these associations respond either to geographical needs (also governed by one sectarian group) or only those who belong to the sect/group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>o There is a relationship between the political parties and a number of associations where some NGOs sought parliamentary.</td>
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</table>

| A sectarian society suffering from economic problems. |
| Parliamentarians representing sectarian parties. |
| Power is at play in Lebanon among the following actors: |
| Minister of the government. |
| Religioso leaders. |
| Business men and corporates. |
| Local CSOs. |
| Internatio. |

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<th>Closed spaces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o The Cybercrimes law is used to track activists in Lebanon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>o The sectarian domination of Lebanese society and the rule of the religious leaders in Lebanese politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o There is a growing concern around NGOs not being able to maintain accountability and transparency. Target communities are not invited either to share their views around programming, take part in electing board, decide on priorities and evaluate or check budgets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to convince political parties to adopt one or more of their goals and to formulate these goals in a form of a draft bill to be submitted to the House of Representatives.

CSOs.

Remarks on Areas of Organizational Advocacy Capacities:
Similar to Jordan, when analyzing legitimacy, credibility and accountability of organizations to engage with people in decision making processes, there is a big gap of systems in organizations to integrate these aspects. There is a fundamental challenge of sustaining organizations work due to the tough competition over funds; that is why both national and local level organizations are forced to accept funding which turns them into project based organizations. A few NGOs gained legitimacy in their local community as they were able to delink themselves from the sectarianism. For example *ABA’AD* and the Lebanese Democratic Women’s Gathering (RDFL) managed to keep close contacts with religious leaders from various sects while presenting themselves as neutral professional social change makers.

The following figures outline answers of group of CSO workers and volunteers in Bekaa’ valley around the engagement of people in the programs as well as their engagement as social workers and volunteers.
LEBANON CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. There is no clear process for measuring the needs of the local community. Most of local organizations already made plans for the society and sometimes by available funding opportunities from donors.
2. Sectarian control over society in Lebanon has made many organizations lose hope in mobilizing people towards any changes in policies.
3. Community participation in many associations is only limited to follow events or news on social media or even receiving aid from associations.
4. The community does not participate in selecting the leadership of the associations or in evaluating their performance. Even Volunteers in many CSOs have no idea about the structure or the budget of their organizations.
5. There is confusion between the concepts of advocacy and campaigns.
6. Organizations still need to network at the national level in Lebanon to specify which policies need to change and how they can push for this change. Same should happen at the regional level.
7. There is a need to exchange experiences and programs to identify which policies need to change at the national level and what is the process of change, especially with problems that have regional dimension such as youth involvement in terrorism, refugees and illegal migration, etc.
THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal environment in Morocco for freedom of association seems to have gone through some improvement in 2016 and 2017, the loopholes in these laws continue to present challenges to freedom of association in Morocco (CIHRS, 2018; IFEX, 2018). Civic Association is regulated by a number of laws, the first is Decree 1-58-376 of November 1958 (as amended by Decree 1-733-283 of 1973 and Decree 1-02-206 of 2002). As it was issues in 1958 and despite the fact that it seems to be an empowering law, it is somehow outdated and requires amendment to comply with the new constitution of Morocco as well as international standards. This is in addition to the loopholes that give way for authorities “to obstruct the activities of civic associations and human rights organizations” (CIHRS, 2018).

Another law regulating freedom of association is the Decree to Implement the Decree on the Right to Establish Associations (Decree 2-04-969 of 2005) (ICNL, 2019). This law has been criticized by civil society actors as its vague wording represent a challenge to the establishment of associations based on their objectives, specifically Article 3. In addition to the fact that, violators of this law may be fined, imprisoned or subject to both punishments, this law provides the primary court jurisdiction to dissolve any association in case of violations (USAID, 2018).

Even though the provisions of this decree stipulate that any individual can establish an association whatever the purpose with only a notification of government to which they respond in 60 days, in case the government does not respond the association will face challenges executing financial transactions (USAID, 2018). Additionally, this also contradicts with the Moroccan Penal Code (Article 206) which stipulates “imprisonment of five years in addition to a fine of up to 10,000 dirhams for any person who receives from a foreign person or organization, in any form, support intended or used to finance an activity or advocacy capable of infringing the integrity, sovereignty, or independence of the kingdom, or undermining the fealty owed by citizens to the state and the institutions of the Moroccan people” (CIHRS, 2018).

Additionally, the notification process is not as easy as it seems and some associations resort to the support of intermediary organizations such as the National Council on Human Rights (CNDH) (CIHRS, 2018). Even though this law presents some restrictions to associations seeking public donations, other laws such as the Decree on Public Benefit Status for Associations, and Ministerial Circular on the Requirements and Process of Awarding Public Benefit Status do not provide clarity either on qualifications for such benefits (USAID, 2018).

As for freedom of information, which is provided by the Moroccan Constitution, it is regulated by the Law on Freedom of Information of 2018. In addition, the Moroccan Constitution provides citizens with rights to participate (articles 14 and 15); and to establish this right to participate, Law No. 44-14 Concerning the Methods and Conditions of Exercising the Right of Submitting Petitions to the Public Authorities, and Law No. 64-14 on Determining the Conditions and Modalities of Practicing the Right of Presenting Motions in the Field of Legislation were adopted later on (USAID, 2018).

Freedom of expression on the other hand is governed by more than one law. The Press and Publication Law of 2016 is described by the USAID (2018) as a law that has “important and positive changes to the 2002 Press Code, such as eliminating prison sentences as possible penalties for offenses such as reporting that is deemed critical of the monarchy or public officials (p.15). This is however contradicted by the Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2003 which
continue to prescribe imprisonment for some taboo issues touching on religion, the monarchy, minorities, Moroccan Sahara or inciting terrorism (USAID, 2018; Chalfaouat, 2015; CIHRS, 2018).

Freedom of Assembly is regulated by Law 76 which requires notification of government for assemblies 24 hours prior to the event. However, it also stipulates that those who notify the government shall receive a stamped receipt of acknowledgement. It is to the discretion of the government officials to restrict a public assembly in writing in case it presents a threat to security (USAID, 2018).

INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION
According to the survey conducted by USAID On the state of civic freedoms published in the MENA in 2018, the majority of respondents reported familiarity with the legal frameworks regulating their work in Morocco (83% on freedom of expression, 82% on freedom of assembly and 87% on freedom of association). In relation to the right to civic association, according to a survey conducted by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights (CIHRS), respondent civil society organizations (CSOs) indicated that the Ministry of Interior represent a major obstacle in the registration process, as it is the “sole oversight body for the registration process” (CIHRS, 2018, p.27). Additionally, based on a survey conducted by the USAID (2018) with civil society organizations and activists, 53% of the respondents felt free to exercise the right to association. 47% of the respondents indicated they felt free to assembly, and 36% felt free to participate. This is in addition to 52% who felt free to exercise the right to express their opinions. It is however important to note that this depends if taboo issues, mentioned above, are addressed by journalists or civil society actors, they are often harassed and may be imprisoned in some cases (Chalfaouat, 2015).

Operating environment for NGOs
- 130,000 registered CSOs (based on government statistics retrieved from USAID, 2018)
- Freedom ratings: Partly Free 5/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Civil Liberties: 5/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Freedom of the Net 2018: Partly Free Score 45/100 (Freedom House, 2018)

Overall and due to the turbulent and challenging context in the Middle East and North Africa region, Moroccan State agencies prioritize responding to security fears as a justification to restricting civic rights and liberties. It is however, agreed by various sources that it also depends on the types of issues addressed by civil society organizations, activists or journalists (CIHRS, 2018, Chalfaouat, 2015; USAID, 2018). According to CIHRS (2018), even though contradictory to the Moroccan Constitution, the atmosphere where national and international civil society organizations are operating in Morocco, even though might be empowering (USAID, 2018), it is also filled with challenging barriers. These challenges are sometimes due to the legal framework with its vague language and loopholes, administrative obstacles, harassment by security forces, and punishments in cases of transgression in relation to taboo issues (CIHRS, 2018; ICNL, 2019).
RESPONSE/CURRENT MITIGATION ACTIONS (WHO IS DOING WHAT TO ADDRESS THIS)?
According to the USAID Survey (2018), surveyed CSOs reported three main areas that need prioritizing to alleviate restrictions on civic freedoms in Morocco. These three areas are strengthening organizations’ internal capacities (74%), advocating for legislative reforms (59%) and engagement with the media (36%).

ANALYSIS OF FORMS AND SPACES OF POWER FOR CSO ENGAGEMENT:

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<th>Through which dimensions of Power Over Operate in the Echo System of CSOs in terms of closing spaces?</th>
<th>How organizations interact with power dynamics and vice versa?</th>
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</tr>
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</table>
| **Visible Power** | ○ The law organizing civil society work is still old and has not been amended or modified. It also does not reflect the changes in the constitution of the kingdom.  
○ Though the 2002 amendment allows NGOs to conduct activities by notification, it is still practically not possible since some logistical paperwork can freeze work.  
○ NGOs can submit requests to the parliament as per the law, but with the condition of collecting 25000 signatures. This again highlights the importance of NGOs working together to push advocacy agendas and collectively gather signatures.  
○ There is a challenge around the | ○ There are some good initiatives in terms of using evidence and research to inform campaigns and advocacy. Research centers and think tanks involve decision-makers in this process.  
○ The involvement of legal experts in designing policy proposals is also a good practice by NGOs in Morocco. It showed success in terms of how the government opens up for these proposals. | ○ The current influence of civil society organizations in Morocco is still limited and restricted to invited space by the government. Political will is controlling the level of effectiveness of CSOs, not the other way round. Thus, CSOs currently need to improve mobilization to influence political will and accordingly be able to claim spaces.  
○ Openness for political change is also related to the political conditions. The years from 2011-2014 witnessed more openness as an indirect effect of the Arab spring. The following years after 2015, the invited space for change was more restricted. | ○ The democratic spring in 2011 is a remarkable milestone in terms of engagement of CSOs in the political arena. Before 2011, politics was solely the business of government and political parties. NGOs became more aware about the political role of advocacy and seized the chance of political openness after 2011.  
○ Advocacy was understood as the capacity to protest certain policy or practice. This was due to the role of labor unions in such interventions.  
○ Advocacy is now being conceptualized to include techniques with clear concepts and definitions.  
○ The fundamental challenge in |

| 56 |
| **legal recognition of coalitions or alliances frameworks.** | **In terms of getting invited to decision-making processes, this is not the case for the government. NGOs conduct policy forums and invite government and in most of the cases government is reluctant to take part.**  
  
  - The recent success to change to the family code was supported by informal groups and was endorsed by the King.  
  - The political mobility of the February 20th was led by informal groups and similar to other countries, there was no connection between informal groups and established organization.  
  - The labor unions and related business associations have a strong influence over economic policies since they can access established channels with parliament. Meanwhile “charitable organizations” have less access and most of the connections depend on personal relations. | **Morocco is the separation between advocacy and accountability, or in other words understanding advocacy as a complete process. CSOs in Morocco can engage in advocacy and share some policy demands and proposals, but later on, there is no proper accountability mechanism through which those NGOs can actually ensure that demands are being followed up or addressed.** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Invisible Power**  
  - Implementing women and gender programs is a common challenge for most of the organizations, since it was expressed in the interviews | **NGOs are struggling to deal with social norms, but there is confusion among people around NGOs and political** | **Legitimacy is not only guaranteed by law, there is lack of understanding with NGOs around representation as a driver to exist in policy making forums.** |
| **Claimed Spaces**  
  - There is a notable impact for CSOs in influencing policies at various levels. The access to information law No. 313 is a good example for | **There is a notable impact for CSOs in influencing policies at various levels. The access to information law No. 313 is a good example for** | **There is a notable impact for CSOs in influencing policies at various levels. The access to information law No. 313 is a good example for** |
that organizations are not yet able to change community norms.
- It has been mentioned in most of the interviews that addressing gender and sexuality issues is a common challenge when working with local communities.
- Islamic organizations as well as parties are able to keep their programs well aligned with invisible powers at local communities which challenge NGOs agendas when it comes to addressing gender issues.
- The struggle of Amazigh-related movements to guarantee inclusion of Amazighs as an ethnic minority in the 2011 constitution is remarkable considering the long history of Amazighs struggle. However, this struggle was not supported by other CSOs and it was considered as an Amazighi issue.

| Hidden Power |  |
|--------------|  |
| o Openness of the government to accept policy change proposals depends on the identity of the parties. | o The sense of securitization has affected the ability of NGOs to influence certain policies. For example, there are need to capacitate social workers within organizations for them to be able to design programs that address invisible powers. |
| o Remarkably the struggle of Amazighs was not taken forward by other CSOs to ensure inclusivity of various community groups. |  |
| NGOs leading campaigns to influence policies. |  |
| o The campaign entitled “digital code will not pass” is a very good example to engage people directly in the process. Online debates were very intense since the issue is very connected to people’s affairs. | o There is need to build capacities of NGOs around community sensitive/centered programming. |
| o The intense mobilization in 2017 around the rape law is also another example, since the issue is related to people and also it addresses traditional powers. | o Following 2011, social media was used as a strong means for advocacy. There are good examples for using social media in advocacy. However, this still needs to be complemented by the significant advocacy work related to policy analysis, research, longer term advocacy plans and following up. |
| Closed spaces |  |
| o There is no clear mechanism around CSOs engagement with parliament to attend hearing sessions and to |  |
submitter. Meaning; if the policy proposal is submitted by a CSO that belongs to the opposition, it will not be taken forward by the government.

- Political system allows actors to engage in one way or another in politics; however, it does not allow them to achieve successes. Some NGOs are under the threat of shutdown, like what happened with Jozour recently.
- There is a frame of barriers (red lines) for organizations not to cross. This includes a manifestation of nationalism mixed with religion.

was no engagement of civil society around the discussion around rehabilitation of extremists or those accused by terrorism. Most of the CSOs avoided any engagement in this discussion to avoid being seen as “terrorism supporter”.
- The past few years witnessed a couple of campaigns to address political influence of major private businesses in Morocco.

follow up on a certain bill.
- NGOs affiliated to political parties can get more access to decision-making processes, since it can be a deal for elections between the government and political parties.
- The ministries have a clear mandate around priorities, and this varies from a ministry to another in terms of relationship with civil society. Ministry of Interior controls the governance agenda and there is a disconnect between MoI and CSOs. In case there is any engagement with CSOs, it is limited to procedural consultation.

new civil society law, right to information, taxation laws, and the right to assembly. However, the main challenge for NGOs is how to take these policy proposals into actual laws.
- The examples of campaigns to boycott big businesses due to their political influence provides potential for capitalization. There is a huge need to provide some good examples of campaigns addressing business interest over politics.

**Remarks on Areas of Organizational Advocacy Capacities:**
The political openness with the democratic spring in 2011 is a major pinpoint that flipped the focus on CSOs to engage in advocacy as a political process. There is a unique legal framework around collection of signatures to pass a policy proposal to the parliament which is by default a challenge as it requires a collection of 25000 signatures. Also, there is no possibility of forming coalitions under a recognized legal framework which constitutes another barrier for doing collective advocacy work. In light of the above, the need for representation and capacities of organizations in building their constituency is a major concern when it comes to policy change.

The remarkable point in the analysis of CSOs legitimacy through the FGDs was that there was consensus about the public inability to choose organizations’ leadership. This is critical when viewing the above context around required constituency for policy influence.
Who sits with decision makers?

Who is in charge of the results?

Who mobilizes resources?

Who proposes solution?

Who identifies problem?

Engagement in Programming, whose program?

**Figure 21: Public Engagement in Programs**
Views on Legitimacy and Credibility of NGOs

- Community can access CSOs budget
- Community can take part in program design
- Community can choose leadership
- Community can follow up CSOs program via social media
- Community can evaluate NGOs program

**Figure 22: Participants from Morocco views on legitimacy**
Morocco Conclusion and recommendation:

1. A collective action in editing/upgrading the outdated civil society law is a very potential area of intervention for CSOs in Morocco. There is need to form a national coalition and refresh the previous conversation around the civil society law that emerged as a result of the democratic spring in 2011.

2. Educational curriculum and related organizational development capacity building interventions should consider strategies and techniques to involve the public in decision making processes and building constituency for change.

3. Social media is a promising area of interventions in Morocco when it comes to campaigning; however, this needs to be complemented by on the ground campaigning work as well as policy and research related work to enact strong advocacy programming.

4. Some campaigns have reached some good quick wins in terms of putting the required policy/practice change on the agenda of decision-makers, but those quick wins are not brought to a durable effect or change. Therefore, there should be more focus on both campaign design and learning around “what to do after big quick wins”. It is usually the case that organizations lose motivation/focus around change once they reach to a high-level policy engagement win, such as discussing a draft law with parliament or drafting a joint strategy with government. Integrated strategic advocacy planning should be part of both advocacy learning and programming. This has to ensure follow up mechanisms on policy and advocacy demands.

5. To complement the above, proper capacity development around monitoring and tracking strategic advocacy plans is an essential area of learning for organizations.

6. Similar to the other 4 countries targeted by this research, the need to be rooted and embedded at local community level is significant and key to bring about HRBA agendas while being able to dance with systems of local powers and politics. This should also include proper training for social workers on lobbying and persuading strategies.
THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA
Legal Framework
Freedom of Association in Tunisia is governed by Decree 88 of 2011 which establishes and protects the exercise of this right. It could be said that this law is among the progressive laws in the MENA region as it does not impose restrictions on the types of activities CSOs implement, unlike other countries in this research consultancy (USAID, 2018). It is however important to note that the provisions of this law also prohibits organizations from including in “their bylaws, data, programs, or activities that incite violence, hatred, fanaticism, or discrimination on the basis of religion, race, or religion” (ECNL, 2018, p.114). This law requires a notification with detailed information for registration published in the Gazette and sent to the Prime Minister’s office in Tunis which somewhat centralizes the process of registration. Response is received within 30 days and in case there was no response, the association is considered legally registered on the date of the notification letter. Bank accounts, contracts and agreements can only be set up once these steps are taken. This law also requires that funding can only be received by organizations from countries with diplomatic relations with Tunisia. The law also supports the process of public funding for organizations as it requires the state to allocate this in the public budget. This is also protected by Decree 5183 of 2013 on the Control of the Standards, Procedures, and Criteria for Public Funding of Associations governs this system of public funding (USAID, 2018). However, in addition to the fact that transfers are strictly regulated by the Central Bank of Tunisia, CSOs cannot have foreign currency bank accounts and funds with no ability to transfer funds abroad except for specific transfers (ECNL, 2018).

Additionally, in compliance with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the government of Tunisia is currently planning to enter changes to laws that affect the operations of civil society organizations. “The enacted and proposed changes may unduly burden CSO funding, violate their privacy rights, and pose other challenges. For instance, recently proposed amendments to Tunisia’s Counterterrorism Law could affect CSOs’ access to foreign funding” (ICNL, 2019). This is in addition to a requirement that CSOs obtain a license for foreign funding which expires following the approval of each transfer (ICNL, 2019).

In 2018, to ensure financial transparency the government also issued Law 52 of 2018. This law requires the registration of CSOs with the National Registry of Institutions which also requires detailed information about the CSO. This entity can approve or deny the registration with no justification provided by the law. This is in addition to imprisonment penalties and prison sentences in case the CSO does not register (ICNL, 2019).

Regarding access to information, this is protected by Law 2016-22 on the Right of Access to Information of 2016. As for Freedom of expression however the legal framework provides some challenges which restrict the right to exercise free speech. For example, “Article 125 of the Tunisian Civil Penal Code calls for up to one year in prison and a fine for insulting public officials who are executing their duties, Tunisian Code of Military Justice broadly prohibits the defamation of the military, attacks on its honor, and the undermining of morale (Article 91). A new antiterrorism law passed in July 2015 included some protections for journalists, including a measure to strengthen the right of journalists to shield their sources, but also authorized expansive new surveillance powers for state security and intelligence forces” (USAID, 2018).

Freedom of Assembly on the other hand is regulated by Law 69-4 of 1969, which is similar to other laws in other countries in the Mena, requires notification 3 days before holding an assembly. This law prohibits unplanned protests, it allows government officials to prevent them and it also stipulates imprisonment
for violators. This is also in addition to the fact that the state of emergency in Tunisia has been continuously extended since November 2015, which allows the government to put this law in effect (USAID, 2018).

INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION?
According to a survey conducted by USAID in 2018 on the state of civic freedoms in the MENA, 61% of surveyed CSOs felt free to exercise their right to association, 66% felt free to assembly, 58% felt free to express their opinions, and 53% felt free to participate. Only 28% of the respondents to this survey indicated that laws and regulations are the main threat to exercising civic freedoms and liberties. Corruption on the other hand had the majority of responses (78%) and political inequality came next (45%). A vast majority of 96% indicated they were familiar with laws governing the right to association. 91% reported they were familiar with laws regulating freedom of expression. 85% were familiar with laws on freedom of assembly.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR NGOS

- Registered CSOs in Tunisia 120,000 (according to official government statistics).
- Freedom ratings: Free 2.5/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Civil Liberties: 3/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Freedom of the Net 2018: Partly Free Score 38/100 (Freedom House, 2018)
- Corruption Perception Index 2018: Rank 73/180 – Score 43/100 (Transparency International, 2018)

As an Arab Spring country with a progressive law on associations which was issued following consultations with CSOs, the provisions of this law are considered among the progressive laws that allows organizations to operate in a somewhat empowering field. However, practices and implementation of this progressive law still do represent a challenge to CSOs in Tunisia. The registration process for CSOs represent a challenge as a centralized process available only in the Capital Tunis as well as delayed responses from government officials beyond the prescribed 30 days of the law. Additionally, it is also worth noting that the numbers of CSOs in Tunisia are increasing due to the recent political changes post 2011 revolution. Some might view this as a challenge as it might mean that effectiveness and consolidation of effort might be questionable while others view it as a positive result to the revolution.

RESPONSE/CURRENT MITIGATION ACTIONS (WHO IS DOING WHAT TO ADDRESS THIS?)
The USAID survey on the state of civic freedoms (2018) finding indicated that there are three main areas of priorities for improving civic freedoms in the Republic of Tunisia. The first of these areas which was noted by 68% of surveyed CSOs was internal capacity development of CSOs. The second priority area was advocating for legislative and policy reform which was reported by 58% of respondent CSOs. The last priority area (48% of respondents) was engagement with media.

ANALYSIS OF FORMS AND SPACES OF POWER FOR CSO ENGAGEMENT:
Through which dimensions of Power Over Operate in the Echo System of CSOs in terms of closing spaces?

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</table>
| - The current active law No.88 organizing the work of CSOs has been seen as a good law by most of the interviewed CSO workers. Since it does not require proactive notification and the approval is as per notification. | 1. A coalition has been formed by a number of national NGOs to influence the making of the new law. The coalition led by Bawsala, Mourakiboun, ASF, Fidh and others seeks to lobby international actors against the law, though the current drafting process is supported by the US embassy. | Open Spaces
- There is quite a good number of examples of national organizations that function at national level that managed to use the space available to monitor parliament sessions. They managed to show a case for policy reforms in laws pertaining to their area of work. These NGOs managed to put their name on any related discussion around their area of focus.
- IWATCH: anti-corruption related policies
- Bawsala: Governance
- Mourakiboun: Election monitoring.
- Tunisian Observatory for Economy: Monitoring monetary policies.
- SHAMS: LGBTQI rights
- Mnemty: Fighting racism.

Regardless of good examples for those organizations influencing decision-making processes, interviews showed that there is tendency to shrink those spaces, because the government fears civil society | o There is an overall remark around linking good policy and advocacy work that is taking place at national level with CBOs and local communities. There are good and potential cases of successful advocacy with/for people. This has to be readdressed in a way that actually brings affected people to the front line of the campaigns. Building foundational capacities of CBOs around advocacy is key for this and then creating the local/national two ways communication and linkage with national organizations. |

o In terms of building a strong advocacy case, some national NGOs
government to revisit the NGO law and add more restrictions on CSOs especially on receiving foreign funds.

less and less. “An example is the law of the national database of associations which was passed despite the pressure of CSOs.”

developed a strong understanding as well as a fingerprint on campaigns. This is not the case for local level CSOs. There is a good possibility to do peer exchange between national and local levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invisible Power</th>
<th>- CBOs are struggling to tweak messages around women’s rights, gender issues and LGBT to some local communities.</th>
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<td>- Due to the active political atmosphere in Tunisia, there is a huge potential for the activism of social and political movements. <em>Manish Msame7</em> is one of the pioneers that was basically formulated at national and local levels to fight against the reconciliation law.</td>
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<td>- Similar to Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco, it is still challenging to create cooperation between movements and NGOs; however, there are some few examples of cooperation on joint campaigns such as the campaign on minimum wages.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Claimed Spaces</th>
<th>o The coalition to protect freedom of assembly managed to create space of engagement with the US embassy and meeting with congressmen to push against the proposed law.</th>
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<td>o Since Tunisia is going through an intense process of legal reforms, a good number of organizations managed to show the case of capacity to propose alternative laws which is based on rigorous data and evidence.</td>
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<td>o In relation to that, key players from national NGOs managed to build strong capacities in terms of developing evidence and creating narrative for their campaigns through researches and online platform for data collection.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>o Capacities to tweak messages around gender and LGBT groups is much needed specially at local community levels.</td>
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</table>
**Hidden Power**

Due to the monitoring role that CSOs plays to track and follow up government plans. This includes their strong engagement in monitoring government performance to fight corruption and to influence policies. Well known businessmen supported media started pointing fingers at NGOs accusing them of supporting foreign agendas.

The above reforms for the law

| - International NGOs are so far not influenced by the proposed law as it might be mostly selectively applicable on national NGOs proposing agendas against the government. |
| - The application of this draft law will also affect NGOs capacity to conduct advocacy as there will be more restrictions on operating activities day by day. |
| - This also will force some organizations to get securitized, meaning applying government agendas. |
| - In the case of Tunisia, national CSOs are in some cases more privileged and have more access to policy making forums more than INGOs which differs from the case of Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco. “There was some work between "Manich Msamah" and IWatch but then the movement was more radical than the organization which led this collaboration to stop”. |

**Closed spaces**

- The proposed changes for the current law are drafted behind closed doors without any consultation with CSOs. Interestingly the US embassy is leading consultation processes with the government on the law; however, space for other NGOs engagement is very slim.
- Campaigns mostly take place at national level. There is an obvious lack of engagement of CBOs in such advocacy work. Since most of the work is going at the central level for advocacy with central government and central parliament.
- There is a growing concern around NGOs not being able to maintain accountability and transparency. Target communities are not invited either to share their views around programming, take part in electing board, decide on priorities or evaluate or check budgets.

**Remarks on Areas of Organizational Advocacy Capacities:**

Similar to other countries, interviews showed a big gap in terms of people ownership for campaigns and advocacy work. This is somehow due to the disconnect between national and local level programming. At the same time, there is still lack of clear understanding around the role of civil society, since most of these organizations emerged after 2010. The example of successful campaigns to influence drafting law-making processes are successful from an
outcome-oriented perspective. However, the process-oriented aspect highlights big challenges around the capacity of institutions to implement progressive laws, this is coupled with cultural barriers to demand the application of these progressive laws. For example, amendment of law No.5 on the right to legal counseling in 2016 is still challenging to be implemented on the ground due to lack of institutional capacities (MoI, MoJ, Justice sector professional, police officers...) as well as the poor knowledge of people around these reforms.

When analyzing legitimacy, credibility and accountability of organizations to engage with people in decision-making processes, there is a big gap of organizational systems to integrate those aspects. Interviews as well as FGDs showed that most NGOs (both national and local) are not yet able to make those aspects as fabrics of their work.

Hence, as a means to promote people-centered advocacy, capacities of organizations around building accountability and legitimacy systems is a strong asset. For instance, when asked about who is in charge of identifying problematic issues that NGOs should respond to, people came at the third place, as national CSOs are the first and donors are the second. The following two graphs form FGDs conducted in Tunisia outline answers of participants around organizations’ sense of representativeness and accountability.
Who sits with decision makers?
Who is in charge of the results?
Who mobilizes resources?
Who proposes solution?
Who identifies problem?

Engagement in Programming, whose program?

Community can access CSOs budget
Community can take part in program...
community can choose leadership
Community can follow up CSOs...
Community can evaluate NGOs...

Views on Legitimacy and Credibility of NGOs

FIGURE 24: TUNISIA PARTICIPANTS VIEWS ON ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY.

FIGURE 23: TUNISIA PARTICIPANTS VIEWS ON OWNERSHIP OF PROGRAMS.
Tunisia Conclusion and recommendation:

1- Building the capacities of local level CSOs to conduct campaigns at local level that aim to improve the lives of people at community level is a key area of intervention when it comes to capacity development. Local CBOs will need foundational capacity development around advocacy and campaigns.

2- National-local level networks are a big area for developing inclusive advocacy plans. While national CSOs have access to decision-making platforms, they mostly plan and design advocacy programs that are mainly CSOs/ expert-led.

3- The decentralization process as well as the recently elected municipal councils can present a good entry for such networking between macro and micro level organizations. Campaigns around access to service, improve quality of services, gender responsiveness of services...etc. can be tailored with an overall agenda of participation and transparency as well as a very grounded interest for improving services.

4- Both local and national level CSOs would better readdress the issue of legitimacy, accountability and representation, since there is a foreseen crackdown on these NGOs. It has been noted from interviews and FGDs that so far public full engagement with CSOs is still a huge area for learning and development.

5- Since CSOs in Tunisia are involved in high-level policy making programs around legal and constitutional reforms, there is need to provide them with high caliber experts in these technical areas (taxation, digital security).

6- Due to the complexity of some issues which these CBOs are addressing, there is a need to connect struggles. This should not be only from local to national, it can also be from national to regional and global levels. There is a good example of including CSOs working on monetary issues with the global tax justice campaign led by ActionAid and Oxfam.

7- Inclusive advocacy is a key required learning for organizations. Here it refers to advocacy as a change in power structure which does not refer exclusively to “visible power” (laws and regulations which is a remarkable success in Tunisia), it refers to “invisible and hidden power” content and institutions.
THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Various laws and regulations govern the work of CSOs in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Overall, freedom of association is guaranteed by the Palestinian Basic Law - the Palestine Temporary Constitution (ICNL, 2019). This is in addition to Law 1 of 2000 on Charitable Associations and Community Foundations, Regulation on Non-Profit Companies (Regulation 3 of 2010) and the Implementing Regulations for Law 1 of 2000 (Council of Ministers Decision 9 of 2003) (ICNL, 2019). Similar to a number of other countries, according to Law 1 of 2000, the Ministry of Interior is the relevant government agency in relation to CSOs registration process (Referencing the Law). Even though Law 1 of 2000 is considered by Palestinian CSOs as one progressive law in the MENA region, the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued another law on social security in 2016, currently in enforcement, which imposes more financial burdens on CSOs in relation to social security cuts for permanent and full-time employees. Additionally, a review of this law and the Companies Law (parts pertaining to not-for-profit companies) are currently under consideration by the PA. The registration of not-for-profit companies were ceased by the Palestinian Authority in 2018 pending the review process (ICNL, 2019).

As for access to information, even though several draft bills were under review by the PA but with delayed progress; the PA still imposes regulations on all the West Bank’s licenses for all television and radio. The Ministries of Interior, information and telecommunication must approve all applications which also means that all content and sources of finances are reviewed prior to the approval. This is done on annual basis (Freedom House, 2017). “Critics accuse the PA of arbitrarily increasing licensing fees – even though prices are supposed to correspond to the strength and reach of the broadcast frequency – in order to force certain outlets off the air” (Freedom House, 2017).

The internet is also regulated by the Electronic Crimes Law 16 of 2017, which allows the detention of anyone who criticizes the authorities as well as journalists. Punishments include imprisonment reaching to 25 years for disruption of what the law describes as “public order”, “national unity” or “social peace” (Amnesty International, 2018).

As for freedom of the press, it is regulated by the 1995 Press and Publication Law. Added to the fact that Israeli forces obstruct the work of journalists on the ground with their check points and human rights violations, this law also imposes administrative burdens and restricts content undermining “the general system” or ‘national unity’, or that is “inconsistent with morals” (Freedom House, 2017). This is in addition to criminalizing of defamation which also led to the prosecution of a number of journalists (Freedom House, 2017).

Freedom of Assembly on the other hand is governed by Law 12 of 1998 on Public Assemblies. This law enabled security forces to disperse protests using excessive force in both the West Bank and Gaza (Freedom House, 2017).

INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
The initial bill of Law 1 of 2000 included restricting provisions for the work of CSOs in Palestine which was the reason for the launch of an advocacy campaign by CSOs to pressure the Palestinian Authority (PA) to amend this bill. This campaign was successful, and the bill was amended accordingly and became what is considered the most progressive and least restrictive NGO laws in the MENA region. This law, which does not impose restrictions on
funding, only requires organizations to register with the Ministry of Interior to establish a CSO. It also does not require licensing or approval from the Palestinian Authority (PA) to register a CSO if it meets the requirements for registration. However, similar to a number of other countries, the Ministry of Interior sometimes complicated this process with delays and not registering some CSOs which is a violation of this law (interview with Issam Abedi, November 2018).

Currently, Palestinian CSOs are working on a campaign to advocate against the newly enforced Law on Social Security and representatives of this campaign are in discussions with the PA (ICNL, 2019).

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR NGOS

- Freedom ratings: Not Free 6/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Civil Liberties: 5/7 (1 being most free, 7 being least free) (Freedom House, 2018).
- Corruption perception Index: Not Ranked (ICNL, 2019)

Even though the Laws governing freedom of association are not restricting the work of CSOs in Palestine, the current discussions for amending Law 1 of 2000 as well as the Companies Law imply the possibility of imposing restrictions on the work of CSOs. According to the Civic Freedom Monitor, CSOs are currently concerned that any changes to the current provisions “will lead to additional restrictions” (ICNL, 2019).

In its current form, the law allows for the free engagement of CSOs in debates on policy, it imposes no restrictions to domestic or foreign funding. However, as the Ministry of Interior implements scrutiny on the activities of associations in order to ensure that funds are spent in an appropriate manner, this allows “inappropriate government intervention in NGO activities by the government” (ICNL, 2019).
## Analysis of Forms and Spaces of Power for CSO Engagement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Through which dimensions of Power Over Operate in the Echo System of CSOs in terms of closing spaces?</th>
<th>How organizations interact with power dynamics and vice versa?</th>
<th>What are the spaces and Opportunities at local, national and regional levels?</th>
<th>What are the capacity gaps for organizations to address this structure of Power?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visible Power</strong>&lt;br&gt;○ The current law is ok in terms of giving NGOs the freedom to conduct either advocacy or community service programs. However, the approval from MoI is a constant challenge.&lt;br&gt;○ There is no legal framework that organizes the work of labor unions which is another problem that limits CS work.&lt;br&gt;○ Same as Tunisia and Jordan, there is a draft CSO law that shall add more restrictions on NGOs’ work.&lt;br&gt;○ The occupation is adding another layer of crackdown on CSOs. Human rights defenders (HRDs) are usually attacked by the occupation especially the ones active in Zone C from the West Bank.</td>
<td>○ Most CSOs are unable to push for agendas of political/structural changes and are mostly fitting within the allowed space to provide community services.</td>
<td><strong>Open Spaces</strong>&lt;br&gt;The invited space for NGOs to take part in policy making is mostly manipulated. There are specific names of NGOs who are most of the time invited to decision-making forums.</td>
<td>○ There is a conceptual misunderstanding around the role of CSOs as vehicles to promote accountability at micro and macro levels. The restricted space that was made available for CSOs to play a charitable role, contributed to this confusion around the role of CSOs.&lt;br&gt;○ Building a database and generating evidence is an area of development that CSOs should work to build.&lt;br&gt;○ Policy analysis skills and capacity to generate data to be presented with advocacy demands.&lt;br&gt;○ Strategic advocacy planning is required for CSOs to integrate advocacy in their programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invisible Power</strong>&lt;br&gt;○ Some NGOs are not able to tune with the reality of their</td>
<td>○ The good representation of NGOs through a large base of general assembly is a</td>
<td><strong>Claimed Spaces</strong>&lt;br&gt;○ There are few examples of NGOs that have been working in</td>
<td>○ Building trust with local communities and expanding organization’s constituency is a key area for improvement for</td>
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communities, the rejection of NGOs’ programs is not because people are reluctant to change, it is because NGOs are introducing an elitist discourse.

- Traditional power can provide good support for organizations working in local communities. If the organizations are able to come up with a grounded discourse, traditional and tribal powers can help them outreach people.
- However, support of community traditional powers is limited to issues that are in-line with traditions. The campaign for the solidarity law which was rejected by tribes is a good example for this.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Hidden Power</th>
<th>Closed spaces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Spaces for NGO activism in the past 5 years have tremendously shrunk. The security apparatus controls agendas of NGOs and the type of activities in Palestine, means to protect them from any crackdown.</td>
<td>- There is a growing concern around NGOs not being able to maintain accountability and transparency. Target communities are not invited either to share their views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It has been viewed by all interviews that INGOs have the upper hand to shape agendas and therefore are invited to policy forums with the community development for the past 20 years. The experience of Making Market Work for Poor with olive sector agriculture in West Bank is a good example of mobilizing small farmers as drivers of change.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The BDS campaign is one of the good examples for successful campaigns as it managed to put people in the frontline.</td>
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<td>- There are some good examples for government collaboration with CSOs to conduct collective campaigns. For example, the campaign to boycott goods produced in the settlements “Inta W’damirak” in 2012 led by CSOs and the ministry of finance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The campaign between 2011 to 2013 on taxation is a good example for a political campaign that emerged as an influence of the Arab Spring.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Engaging in larger alliances and capacity to initiate a multi-stakeholder engagement processes.</td>
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<td>- Specialized trainings for national level advocacy against crimes of the occupation.</td>
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especially in Gaza Strip.
- Shaming NGOs with supporting foreign agendas or political groups is a technique that security always uses to isolate CSOs.
- Government.
- National CBOs can also be invited but this depends on their political affiliation and how the PA welcomes their discourse.
- Around programming, take part in electing boards, decide on priorities or evaluate and check budgets.
- The absence of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) as a platform for making policies adds to the confusion around duty bearer - right holder equation. The law-making framework so far is unclear and accordingly spotting the right space to push for policy change is a challenge.

**Remarks on Areas of Organizational Advocacy Capacities:**
The Palestinian civil society shares a strong history with people in both West Bank and Gaza. They are viewed as civil organizations rather than NGOs, since they were all formed to provide community services for local communities before the official existence of the PA. Those organizations started as community committees and doctors volunteering to do community work and so far there are certain processes to choose leadership and elect boards by a general assembly. This is changing the views around public engagement with CSOs comparing to other countries included in the survey. However, in most of the interviews there were contradictory opinions around this good sense of community engagement being translated into actual day to day organization accountability practices. CSOs in Palestine are exposed to various levels of crack down either by the Government in Gaza or West Bank or by the occupation authorities. This highlights the fundamental need to build constituency and agency as the first protection line. The following 2 graphs outline mapping participants’ answers with regard to the questions on public engagement. This contradiction can be seen in the difference between the 2 graphs. The one on the left actually says that people have a strong hands-on for CSOs programs, meanwhile the other one on the right says that it is mostly donors and national CSOs who decide on everything with regards to programs and campaigns.
Community can access CSOs budget
Community can take part in program...
Community can choose leadership
Community can follow up CSOs...
Community can evaluate NGOs program

Views on Legitimacy and Credibility of NGOs

Who identifies problem?
Who mobilizes resources?
Who sits with decision makers?

Engagement in Programming, whose program?

**Figure 25:** Palestine’s Participants Views on NGO Legitimacy.

**Figure 26:** Palestine’s Participants Views on Ownership of Programs.
Palestine Conclusion and recommendations:

1. Though the Palestinian civil society plays a historical role in responding to community needs and leads community driven development, it suffers from multiple layers of crackdown. This is either by tribal setups, political groups, governments (Gaza and West Bank) and of course the occupation authority. Therefore, the argument around building agency and constituency as a means for protection is the most winning one in the framework of such complex levels of marginalization.

2. Though the existence of the occupation authorities confuses the HRBA equation in terms of demanding duty-bearers, it helps develop a strong bond between the 3 actors of the governance system (CSOs, Government and Market) where campaigns done by the 3 actors and putting people at the heart of the process. Examples around BDS and boycotting campaigns are good and are considered a recommended learning resource for building a case for a multi-stakeholder engagement program and advocacy by people.

3. The political sense of advocacy work should be highlighted in the work of CSOs in Palestine, in a way that helps to maintain strong engagement of people to address structural causes of injustice and marginalization. The historical impression of Palestinian NGOs seen as service providers, due to the non-existence of PA before Oslo 1994, can be further invested in a way that brings the focus on influencing policies.

4. There is need to enhance local capacities around doing international level advocacy. This is in addition to connecting struggles of Palestinian people against occupation to global levels.

5. Research skills and generating evidence to support campaigns is one of the key learnings that NGOs seek to develop to enhance advocacy capacities.
SECTION IV RECOMMENDATIONS

In the previous 2 sections both regional and country-specific recommendations were introduced following findings and analysis. However, the following recommendations were developed generally to capture key learnings based on the process of mapping CSOs advocating to address closing political spaces.

Recommendations around developing advocacy curriculum:
- There is common confusion around the meaning and translation of advocacy in various dialect in the region. This is as well as the classical mix between awareness as technical response from NGOs to educate the public and advocacy as political word that means addressing power imbalances. And therefore, it is highly recommended that this advocacy curriculum and training materials take into consideration:
  - A common definition that clearly defines it as a political process.
  - The cultural difference and dialect challenge between Mashreq and Maghreb in wording.
  - A good explanation for the political sense of advocacy as a concept before explaining techniques and ways to do advocacy. This framing should highlight arenas of formal politics (legislatures) and informal politics (happening in civil society, family and community). It should also give proper contextualized answers for questions like what is politics? Where and how does it happen? What do you need to be political? What women and unprivileged groups need to do in order to participate in politics? How to begin discussion with local communities around politics?
- The politicized sense of advocacy does not only refer to the arena of policy making at global, national and local levels; it also refers to changing structures and cultures. This will help organizations build a strong foundation on advocacy that can contain their desired rush for technical solutions such as doing awareness.
- The public policy making framework can be a good addition to the curriculum. CSOs need to be aware about the flow of policy making in each country to be able to define spaces where and when they can engage to change policies.
- The triangle analysis tool to map legal and political solution adapted from Merge Schuler (Empowerment and the law 1986) is a key analysis tool that can be used to strategize for advocacy and campaigns.
- Power tools are most relevant tools to be included as a framework for analysis. Power analysis tools will help to break down the concept of politicizing advocacy in a way that is comprehensive for CBOs working on community development aspect.
- The paradigm of people-centered advocacy or in other words advocacy by people should be a major learning for the curriculum. Concrete examples and case studies on difference between advocacy with, advocacy for and advocacy by people should be introduced.

Recommendation around capacity development for advocacy
- The rights-based approach to eradicate poverty and address inequality is pre learning for CSOs before building foundation on advocacy. this is because the concept of rights-based approach programming has not been genuinely developed by CBOs that focus on community services. Learning from the HRBA and integrating it in the heart of CSOs programming is key to enable them to be well positioned around the politics of advocacy. This will enrich their perspectives on service provision from a duty bearer- right holder angle.
- Building a case for advocacy which entails building capacities around advocacy cycle (planning, implementation and evaluation) can be the skeleton for capacity development training. This can be outlined as following:
Planning:
- Research skills and generating evidence.
- Strategic advocacy planning.
- Power analysis.

Implementation:
- Creative activism and effective usage of social media.
- Designing info-graphics and policy briefs.
- Lobbying skills and persuasive strategies.
- Non-violent direct actions with reference to beautiful trouble handbook. (check annex 2)
- Policy analysis and drafting policy papers.
- Online campaigns and social media boot camps.

Evaluation:
- Measuring policy change and learning.
- Learning and sharing campaigns success.
- Writing success stories.

- There is a need to build an expert roster in very specialized areas for policy reforms (such as taxation, monetary policies, legal reforms...etc.). Those experts can provide immediate support for these NGOs based on their track-record in advocacy cycle and engagement in policy making in their countries.
- Integrating accountability and building legitimacy which can help to 1st) ensure that advocacy and campaigns programs are people-led and 2nd) to provide a layer of protection against any crackdown by the government.
- There is a major need for organizations to be able to fund policy, research and advocacy work and since the nature of advocacy work is not a short term result-based process, national NGOs suffer to attract donors and resource mobilization to fund such programs. Therefore, it will be an addition to design a fundraising training only for advocacy and research projects for national NGOs. This can integrate innovative ways for funding through crowd funding or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
- There is a priority also to create a pool of trainers who are well aligned around the concepts presented above in terms of definition and understanding of advocacy. Conducting advocacy regional Training of Trainers where potential trainers can come together to discuss curriculum and enhance it, then to replicate this in their home countries.
- The experience of civil society organizations with power analysis is still in a growing phase and the level of power literacy is getting improved. There should be a well-developed inspirational learning trajectory that can contribute to the growth of the power literacy among social workers in the region. The power cube framework is a recommended tool that can be used as a learning tool that can present a holistic understanding for power structures when addressing a certain policy change.

**Recommendations around advocacy programming:**
- Along with the more closed space at the upper/macro level, there is a growing created space in the below/micro level. Recently adopted laws around decentralization is proposing good entries for change where Community Based Organizations (CBOs) can engage in community...
politics and bring people to the forefront to dialogues with local level duty bearers. The experience from Tunisia and Jordan reinforces that social accountability and local governance is really possible in such micro level. Moreover, such work has to be complemented at the macro-level analysis of power, in order to take this model of democratizing the city/district to the national level.

- The exciting nature of policy work aimed at the visible dimensions of power has made the work of some CSOs focusing on visible power (Laws, policies...etc.). This highlights the importance of focusing on other forms of power especially in terms of invisible (culture) and hidden (interest) when addressing advocacy and policy change in a structural way.

- Due to the complexity of some issues which CSOs are addressing, it is highly recommended to connect struggles and build solidarity at various levels. This should not be only from local to national, it can also be from national to regional and global levels. There is a good example of CSOs working on monetary issues with the global tax justice campaign led by ActionAid and Oxfam.

- Social movements are still genuine and potential, there is an area to rethink of engaging with social movements in campaigning work considering the fact that social movements cannot be institutionalized. CSOs are encouraged to rethink of a learning model for engaging organizations with social movements in social and political campaigns initiated genuinely by people.

- Cooperation with government has been viewed as a success factor for some campaigns that managed to build bilateral agreement with government. This redirects the conversation back to the “social contract”, but this has to bring people in the heart of this process as a way to avoid those CSOs being securitized. In other words, rushing for cooperation with government, without positioning people at the center of this cooperation, can eventually lead to these CSOs being government agenda implementers.

- A key intervention that INGOs and regional NGOs can actually provide is facilitating regional learning forums and support building regional alliances around thematic issues for advocacy (gender, LGBT, governance, tax policies, transitional justice, etc).

- Increasing CSOs knowledge around the legal framework and disseminating information around compliance to national laws should be addressed as an area for improvement. Designing small booklets explaining the flow chart for registrations, approvals, and accessing funds per country will be a good reference and resource for partners in the region.

Recommendation for a program framework to address shrinking political space:
The following outlines a set of recommended actions for a program framework to address shrinking political spaces at 3 levels of interventions (Local, national and regional).

- Promote participatory and inclusive democracy processes; with focus on the decentralization framework as a scheme to engage citizens at local level in shaping their reality.

- To ensure protection and facilitate litigation for activists subjected to threats, while providing legal and technical support for human rights activists and partners. This is in addition to building capacities of activists and their organizations in areas like digital security, response in hostile context, safety..etc.

- To address the securitization agenda, NGOs at various levels should develop a counter narrative that defines the role and importance of expanded political space for CSOs and people.
- To use visual and creative tools to expand political spaces is an effective means for campaigning in that matter. A capacity development for activists and their organizations in creative activism and alternative art is therefore a necessity.

- To draft policy alternatives for current laws that hinder freedoms of assembly and contribute to closing of civic spaces. This to be a significant reference in campaigning against shrinking political space at country level.
Annexes

ANNEX I: CASE STUDIES:

CASE STUDY 1: PRESERVING THE ANCIENT (PERENNIAL) OR RARE RUMI OLIVE TREES IN THE IRBID-JORDAN

BACKGROUND:
This campaign marked the first time for Tibneh Charity Association to work on a rights-based issue rather than charity work. This is considered a paradigm shift in the life of the Association. This shift emerged as a result of the Association’s participation in the USAID CIS Advocacy Support Fund grant process. A primary component of the grant process included an advocacy training using the New Tactics in Human Rights Program’s Strategic Effectiveness Method which facilitates the collective identification of locally-defined priorities. As a result, the Association launched the Preserving the Ancient (Perennial) or Rare Rumi Olive Trees in the Town of Tibneh/Irbid Governorate campaign. It has been observed in recent years that the number of ancient (perennial) and rare Rumi olive trees is constantly decreasing. This constitutes a red flag and warning sign that this legacy is threatened with extinction. After analyzing the main factors causing the decline in the number of trees in the study area, “Tibneh”, it was found that the most important factor is the lack of enforcement of the relevant legislation and laws which state that olive trees can only be removed or cut with the consent of the Minister of Agriculture, and under the most difficult circumstances. The lack of knowledge of relevant stakeholders with regards to these legislations has also contributed to many infringements. The problem has manifested in Rumi olive trees being uprooted and transferred from their natural habitat to make way for new roads and public buildings on agricultural land in the villages. In addition, trees were being sold as firewood or to be used for the decoration of gardens and houses. The campaign process began by documenting the extent and magnitude and seriousness of the problem. This revealed the rapid decline in the number and cultivated area of the ancient Rumi olive trees due to the ongoing attacks and absence of any official monitoring or enforcement of the relevant Instructions. As a result, the Association was able to clarify the importance of olive trees as a natural and historical legacy, as well as their economic importance to the community. The campaign contributed to breaking two stereotypes: On the one hand, the perceived lack of cooperation from government agencies and their staff with local communities; and on the other hand, and the seemingly weak role of civil society organizations and community-based organizations in local development.

RESULTS:
This campaign raised great interest in its cause within the Tibneh and surrounding areas. The Association mobilized support from all stakeholders. Despite the small size and limited experience of the Association, it nonetheless was able to implement an organized campaign through which the first civic coalition was established, comprising seven charitable and specialized associations in Al-Koorah district. This mobilization and engagement of decision makers resulted in the campaign achieving its main goal – the enforcement of Instructions (G2) of 2016 issued under the Jordanian Agriculture Law. These Instructions are called the “removal and transfer of fruit-bearing olive trees of rare or ancient Rumi varieties for 2016.” These Instructions make it difficult to remove or cut the Rumi olive trees without the consent of the Minister and only under the most difficult circumstances.
LESSONS LEARNT
The success of the campaign and the enforcement of these Instructions manifested in several ways:

- Increased knowledge and understanding of government staff: The Association trained the staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and other ministries on the Instructions and the foundations of uprooting and transferring of Rumi olive trees. Numerous violations occur as a result of wrongful permission granted to uproot and transfer the trees. The training increased their knowledge of the Instructions and how to implement them and protect Rumi olive trees from violations.

- Increased accountability and power of government staff to enforce the law: A critical aspect of enforcement of the Instructions has been the approval by the Ministry of Agriculture to grant all staff of the Forestry Division the capacity of the judicial police and to include olive trees under their authority as well as forest trees.

- Allocation of special protections: The campaign succeeded in gaining the first piece of land allocated to receive the Rumi olive trees and to prevent their cultivation outside the town of Tibneh.
CASE STUDY 2: CAMPAIGN "A WHITE DRESS DOES NOT COVER RAPE" - LEBANON

BACKGROUND
In August 2017, Article 522 of the Lebanese Penal Code was repealed. This article from the penal code states that "If a valid contract of marriage is made between the perpetrator of any of the offenses mentioned in this section [that is rape or abduction], and the victim, the prosecution is suspended. If judgment was already passed, the implementation of the punishment is suspended" (Wikipedia, 2018). This Article dates to back to 1942. Articles from 503 to 521 under Chapter VII of the Penal Code were also amend. The repeal of Article 522 came after two weeks of the annulling of a similar article in Jordan - Article 308.

The Main strategy of the campaign was based on working on two parallel tracks. The first was centered on mobilizing Lebanese public opinion with respect to this discriminatory article against women to raise awareness. The second track of the campaign was to work with parliamentarians and political parties to vote for repeal the article.

RESULT:
- A large number of local Organizations and international organizations had been mobilized to work on the same subject.
- Live examples were used at the same time to communicate the risk of having such an article to society.
- On the International Women's Day, a mass demonstration took place. With a large turn-out, this played the role of pressure on the Lebanese parliamentarians by CSOs.
- Videos and short movies were used to illustrate the idea to the community through companies specializing in digital content.
- Conducting a number of statistics and studies in cooperation with government and non-government bodies.
- Attracting a number of parliament members in the parliament to agree on voting for repealing the law and build a strong coalition within the parliament to ensure the approval of the majority of Members of Parliaments.
- Cooperation with the Lebanese government represented by the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was present and strongly supporting the abolition of the law.
- During each parliamentary session, one of the members of ABAAD Organization stood in a symbolic prison outside parliament as an expression of oppression and injustice on the victims of the law.
- Street campaigns were launched to inform people about the seriousness of the law.
- Communication with the clergy to familiarize them with the seriousness of the law and the importance of changing it.

LESSONS LEARNED
- The importance of coordination between civil society organizations.
- Work on social and legal aspects at the same time.
• Understanding the dynamics of decision-making in the community. Campaigners realized that they would not achieve their goals without convincing the religious leaders who have great influence in Lebanon and direct the work of Lebanese politicians.
• The use of media must be through the specialists and the digital content must be professional and directed towards the audience.
CASE STUDY 3: LE BARDO CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE RFR - TUNISIA

BACKGROUND:
The government of Tunisia agreed with the RFR Company to build a fast train that cuts the City of Le Bardo in two halves. This agreement was done without consulting the local community who immediately started a campaign against the project to stop it. The community believed that this project also presented danger for women and girls from the local community as it introduced tunnels under the fast train which could be places where women can be sexually harassed. The local community mobilized the local municipality to stop the project but the municipality did not have the power to stop it. They also had lobbying action with the Governor of Le Bardo. However, this was a decision the Prime Minister can make. The Campaign then had a re-strategizing workshop in which they agreed to conduct a stakeholder and power analysis to try to reach the hidden powers behind this project.

RESULTS:
Following the stakeholder and power analysis, the local community with the help of local CSOs and AT, the found out that the European Union (EU) is the funding agency for this project which they saw as an opportunity. They could reach the RFR company as well through their analysis. Meetings with the EU resulted in asking the community to provide a practical alternative to the current project plan to make it safer for women. The community and CSOs then hired a research consultant with experience in architecture and in urbanization projects who provided them with this request. In their power analysis also AT could set up a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss the campaign demands. The latest news from Tunisia informs that the Governor of Le Bardo just halted the RFR project for good.

LESSONS LEARNT
- Power analysis was crucial in identifying the hidden hands behind the project.
- The local community was the leading and initiator of this campaign which represents advocacy by the people which helped them in changing power relations and solving root causes rather symptoms of the issue.
- The roles of CSOs were clear from the beginning which enabled the community to take the lead.
- Youth and women from the local community were among the most important players in the campaign.
CASE STUDY 4: BUILDING ADVOCACY COALITION TO REFORM THE ASSOCIATIONS LAW- JORDAN

background

The Jordanian civil society sector growing fast. Civil society associations operate under a law issued in 1956 called the "Charitable associations" Law, which is implemented by the Ministry of Social Development. The huge expansion of the non-governmental organization sector led to the need to amend this law, beginning in 1995, which was later called the Social Unions and Institutions Act. This law includes the conditions for the granting of licenses by different ministries and governmental bodies according to the objectives and purposes of establishing each organization, such as the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the Supreme Council for Youth. In addition, several additional laws have been enacted to regulate the registration and operation of civil society organizations. An independent law was finally passed in 1997 to civil and non-profit organizations.

In 2006, Partners Jordan and the Justice Center for Human Rights Studies worked together to lead a coalition of Jordanian NGOs with the support of the Ministry of Political Affairs to work towards the adoption of a unified law for NGOs. A draft law was prepared with the participation of all concerned parties using participatory and collaborative methodologies. The project was submitted to the prime minister for consideration in November 2006. But in May 2007, the government issued new regulations that made it harder for registered NGOs to work.

The main goal of the campaign

Amend the NGOs law to reach a unified law in line with the Jordanian constitution, human rights and international standards.

Work strategy

In 2006, Partners Jordan and justice Center "Adalah" initiated and mobilized national NGOs to form a coalition that included many of these organizations. Partners Jordan and Adalah were tasked by other coalition NGOs to assume the Alliance Secretariat. In 2007, the Law of NGOs was sent by the Ministry of Social Development to the Parliament for approval. However, this law severely hampered the work of associations and interfered with all its work and decisions.

Alliance Members:

- Protection and Freedom of Journalists Center
- Jordan Environment Association
- Tekeyet Om Ali
- Jordanian Women's Union
- New Jordan Center
- Women's Rehabilitation Center
- National association for Freedom and Democracy
Methodology and steps:

1. A questionnaire was designed and distributed to Jordanian civil society organizations in March 2006 in order to explore the problems arising from the current law. The questionnaire outputs were used to draft a proposed project law in April 2006. Partners Jordan and Adalah held meetings with civil society organizations in the three Jordanian regions to gather views on the proposed draft law, which was incorporated into the following draft law.

2. A legal advisor was hired to work with the members of the coalition who have experience in drafting laws. It was important to use an external adviser to avoid tensions within the coalition and to ensure the objectivity and professionalism of the final result.

3. The Ministry of Political affairs formed a ministerial committee consisting of members from seven ministries. The members of the Committee exchanged their proposals which were included in the draft law.

4. Weekly meetings were held with coalition members to discuss the implications of the law by both the ministerial committee and non-governmental organizations working in this field.

5. Once consensus was reached between the members of the Ministerial Committee and Coalition members and a large number of civil society organizations, Adalah and Partners Jordan submitted the law project to the Ministry of Political affairs in July 2006.

6. The international community has been kept engaged in the process through a continuous series of memos, meetings, telephone calls and e-mails.

7. An international organization with experience was requested to prepare a comprehensive comparative study of the draft law proposed by the Government with international standards.

8. Collaborative planning meetings were held with decision-makers at the Ministry of Social Development.

9. Awareness Workshops: Partners Jordan organized 12 one-day workshops in twelve governorates in Jordan, attended by about 600 different NGOs, to guide them on the Alliance's efforts and to present a comparative study on gaps in the current law with respect to Human rights and international standards.

10. Media coverage: Coalition members have established strong contacts with many media outlets to put pressure on policymakers to cooperate with the coalition.

11. A detailed analysis of the Associations Law proposed by the Government in relation to the Jordanian Constitution and the laws of associations applicable in other Arab countries and in line with international standards.

12. Attend meetings with the relevant parliamentary committee to convince its members of the proposed changes by the coalition.

13. Individual meetings were held with deputies from different parties to launch a movement that recognizes the changes proposed by the coalition.

I. Results and Impact
As a result, the Prime Minister withdrew the law project from the Parliament and requested to be returned to the Government in order to reformulate it with more participation from civil society and other relevant parties with harmony with international standards and best practices. A first attempt was made in this redrafting process but did not meet the minimum expectations of NGOs in Jordan or at the international level. In response, the civil society coalition established by Partners Jordan and Adalah to present its reservations to the government on the draft law and to try to play a constructive advocacy role to adopt a new law.

**Results obtained and expected**

- The enactment of a new association law that included (to a certain extent) the Alliance's proposals. But did not respond to their most important claims (registration, funding, litigation).
- Change in the NGO registration process to ensure greater transparency and reduce government interventions through a board of directors, representing four members, including non-governmental organizations.
- The fines imposed on NGOs have been reduced.
- The process of registration and receipt of funding has been improved in accordance with the Government's binding implementation schedules.

**The results obtained were not foreseen**

- The Government's commitment to cooperate planning and participation with civil society organizations throughout the drafting period of the amendments.
- The coalition was able to mobilize small and local associations and organizations in the governorates and to mobilize public opinion.

**Lessons learned**

- The importance of establishing close ties with the local community.
- Provide a continuous flow of information and updates on the progress of alliances.
- The importance of media coverage by involving the media in the entire stage of cooperative planning and adopting a neutral language rather than accusations and negativity.
ANNEX II: LEARNING RESOURCE:

1- THE NEW TACTICS WEB RESOURCE IN ARABIC AROUND ADVOCACY IN THE MENA REGION

https://www.newtactics.org/ar

A program of the Center for Victims of Torture (CVT), New Tactics emerged from CVT’S experience as a creator of new tactics, a leader of coalitions, and as a center that also advocates for the protection of human rights from a unique position – one of healing and of reclaiming civic leadership. Read about the New Tactics team.

Since 1999, New Tactics has created unique resources – organized around the analysis of potential solutions rather than that of specific issues, geographic regions, or target groups – that allow advocates to clearly recognize the unique elements of their situation, and to seek promising approaches that have worked elsewhere in order to apply them to new regions or issues. New Tactics develops and disseminates these unique resources in three key ways:

Creating and sharing information and materials: New Tactics developed a range of online materials for human rights defenders to use in their work. These publications are available in our Resource Library and include:

- An award-winning book documenting 80 innovative human rights tactics
- 49 detailed case studies on practical applications of tactics
- A searchable online collection of over 220 innovative tactics
Inspired by the concept of a “pattern language,” Beautiful Rising teases out the key elements of creative activism:

STORIES
Accounts of memorable actions and campaigns, analyzing what worked, or didn’t, and why.

TACTICS
Specific forms of creative action, such as a flash mob or blockade.

PRINCIPLES
Time-tested guidelines for how to design successful actions and campaigns.

THEORIES
Big-picture ideas that help us understand how the world works and how we might change it.

METHODOLOGIES
Strategic frameworks and hands-on exercises to help you assess your situation and plan your campaign.
3- TRANSPARENCY ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE (TAG) PROJECT- TRAINING MATERIAL IN ARABIC

https://tagegypt.wordpress.com/

This website includes strong advocacy resource learning for development workers in Arabic. It is an outcome of a learning trajectory of the 2 years’ project funded by Ford Foundation and implemented by Plan international in Egypt. All the learning material belong to Coady international institute.

Anانتقديء:
الدليل التدريبي لورشة العمل الأولى "بناء مواطن واعي"
TAG first workshop manual Feb 2013 – Arabic
TAG first workshop manual Feb 2013 – English
دليل التيسير بالمشاركة
co-facilitation – Coady Arabic
الدليل التدريبي لورشة العمل الثانية "ابحاج مداخل التغيير"
TAG second workshop manual Dec 2013 – Arabic
TAG second workshop manual Dec 2013 – English
املاء القدرات على تحليل " علاقات القوى"
Arabic- POWER – A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE
الدليل التدريبي لورشة العمل الثالثة "أدوات المسألة الاجتماعية"
TAG Third workshop manual March 2014- Arabic
TAG Third workshop manual March 2014- English
الدليل التدريبي لورشة العمل الرابعة "المساهمة في صياغة السياسات"
TAG Fourth workshop manual Sept 2014 – English
TAG Fourth workshop manual September 2014 – Arabic
دليل التيسير لرحلة ناج و الذي يحتوي أغلب الأنشطة والأدوات التي تم استخدامها في ورش العمل
TAG tool kit final
ANNEX III: DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

ONLINE SURVEY
Objective of the survey:

Innovation for Change MENA Hub is conducting a regional mapping to identify 1) successful advocacy and campaigning actions and advocacy and campaigning tools, platforms and training resources around issues related to the closing of civic space; 2) the training needs of CSOs in the areas of advocacy, campaigning and networking.

You are invited to participate in this mapping if you are a member of I4C MENA Hub or an organization based in the MENA region. Your responses will be confidential, and we do not collect identifying information such as your name, email address or IP address. Inserting your name and your email is optional if you would like to receive the results of this survey. All data is stored in a password protected electronic format and will be only used to accomplish the objectives stated above.

If you have any questions about the research study, please contact mena@innovationforchange.net

Survey for civil society organizations in Arab countries

Basic Information:
Name (optional): …………………………………………………………………………
Sex: ……………………………………………………………………………………………
Age: ……………………………………………………………………………………………
Email (optional): …………………………………………………………………………………

1. What is the name of your organization? (optional)

2. Country/countries of Intervention?

3. What is the idea or service your organization provides to the community?
4. What are the target groups of your organization’s activities?

5. From the following options, how do you describe your organization's relationship with the public? (Multiple selections are allowed)
   - The public benefits from the activities of the organization.
   - The public can see the organization's budget and expenditure.
   - The public participates in the formulation of the organization's work plan.
   - The public participates in the selection of organization leaders through a Board of Trustees.
   - The public follows the activities of the organization through social media.

6. Does the organization have a clear policy commitment (Strategy) to change legislation/policies affecting target groups?
   - Yes
   - No

7. Do you think that you and your organization are able to influence development policies at the local or national level through official forums?
   a. Yes – Give examples:
   b. No – Explain Why?

8. How do you view your ability to influence decision making processes through official forums at your community/ national level in the last 5 years?
   a. My ability as organization to influence decision making processes has increased
   b. My ability as organization to influence decision making processes has decreased
   c. My ability as organization to influence decision making processes has stayed the same

9. Please explain your previous answer:

10. Is there any cooperation between your organization and ministries in the country/local government at your community? In other words, does the government involve your organization in any part of the decision-making process?
    a. If yes, how this is happening?
    b. No, explain why?
11. **Do working processes at your organization include mechanisms for consistently collecting data around target groups?**

*Mark only one oval.*

- Yes
- No

12. **(Continued from Question 11) Are these data regularly used to guide program and policy work design and implementation?**

*Mark only one oval.*

- Yes
- No

13. **20. Does a clear guideline exist in your organization for the recording and dissemination of learning, including specific guidance applicable to Advocacy?**

*Mark only one oval.*

- Yes
- No
- Some times

14. **What are the successful advocacy campaigns related to issues of civic space that either you or your organization experienced in your country in the last 5 years? What is making it a success?**

15. **Have these campaigns built strong alliances?**

*Check all that apply.*

- [x] Alliances with political parties
- [x] Alliances with parliamentarians
✓ Alliances with civil society partner organizations
✓ Alliances with universities or research centers
✓ Alliances with TV channels or newspapers
✓ Alliances with student or labor unions
✓ Other:

16. What are the lessons learnt from these campaigns that you think other organizations have to capitalize on?

17. To mobilize people through communication tools I use? (Multiple choice)
   a. Facebook
   b. Twitter
   c. Instagram
   d. Youtube
   e. TV channels
   f. Others

18. To mobilize decision makers through communication tools, I use? (Multiple choice)
   a. Facebook
   b. Twitter
   c. Instagram
   d. YouTube
   e. TV channels
   f. Others

19. What forms of support can be provided to you or your organizations to conduct successful campaigns?
Check all that apply.

✓ Financial support
✓ Capacity Development (Such as………………………………………………………………………………………………………..)
✓ New learning and Curriculums (Such as………………………………………………………………………………………………………)
✓ Networking (Such as…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………)
✓ Others (Such as……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….)
INTRODUCTION

Objective of the research:

1. Identify CSOs focusing on advocacy and campaigning in the region around issues related to the closing of civic spaces.
2. Identify successful advocacy and campaigning actions and identify advocacy and campaigning tools, platforms and training resources around issues related to the closing of civic spaces.
3. Identify challenges and lessons learned by CSOs in their campaign work. There will be three case studies presenting successful campaigning and a deeper analysis of activities that contributed to their success in this region.
4. Identify the training needs of CSOs in the areas of advocacy, campaigning and networking.

Note on Data confidentiality and Permission to Record

**Forms of Power**

1. What are the relevant legislations existing that govern the activism of CSOs and social and political groups in your country? And how this legal framework is being interpreted by actors?
2. What are the coping mechanism by NGOs to respond to such legal framework in terms of registration, access to funds and launching national or local level advocacy work?
3. To which extent you see NGOs are capable or willing to understand invisible powers (culture, traditions, community norms) and how this can positively or negatively affect advocacy work? Do you know some examples from your experiences?
4. At community level, how do you see the influence of traditional power (tribal for example) can be a support or barrier for CSOs and to which extent those CSOs are able to understand and work within this framework?
5. In case formal spaces for advocacy and policy influence are closed what are the alternative informal spaces that NGOs mostly use? Give examples?
6. What are the reasons from them to use those spaces?
1. Who makes decisions related to the development of policies of the CSO activism in Jordan? What are the relevant platforms? Who is invited to participate?
2. Has this been changed over the past few years (5 years)? What has been made available or what closed? Vice versa?
3. Did CSOs manage to claim any spaces for participation in terms of policy making at local and national levels through specific campaigns? What cases?
4. To which extent NGOs in your country are willing to engage in opening/accessing closed spaces for activism? Examples? What do you think they need to get reach this?
5. In terms of who is invited, who got more space and credibility with government?
   a. INGOs and Donors.
   b. National CSOs
   c. Movements and other informal groups?
6. How you see the interaction between formal institutions and informal institutions in the country at national and local levels?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. In area of focus, what are the relevant regional, national or local platforms that you recommend CSOs to be active in in terms of advocacy and policy influence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the best ways to work with National, Regional and Local Governments to create safe spaces where CSOs to be heard and laws and legislation prohibiting CSOs (or reducing space) can be negotiated?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign and Advocacy Focused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the most successful campaigns in your country? And why you think they were successful?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the strategies adopted by the organizers of these campaigns?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the risks to your organization doing advocacy work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the successes achieved by civil society organizations made a change in the public policies of the state? What made it successful? What are the lessons learnt?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Are organizations are building its constituency for change through involving local communities to decide and lead advocacy work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. In your understanding what gives the legitimacy for NGOs to lead advocacy on policy change at national and local levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What are the most learnings needed by NGOs in the areas of advocacy, campaigning and networking? And what are the core competencies NGOs should have to lead advocacy work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. How you use media and to reach whom? Best media tools to outreach people? Best media tools to reach government?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Which works better and why? Advocacy at Macro level? or at Micro level?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Focus Group Discussions Collection Guide

Introduction

- **Objective of the research:**
  5- Identify CSOs focusing on advocacy and campaigning in the region around issues related to the closing of civic spaces.
  6- Identify successful advocacy and campaigning actions and identify advocacy and campaigning tools, platforms and training resources around issues related to the closing of civic spaces.
  7- Identify challenges and lessons learned by CSOs in their campaign work. There will be three case studies presenting successful campaigning and a deeper analysis of activities that contributed to their success in this region.
  8- Identify the training needs of CSOs in the areas of advocacy, campaigning and networking.

Note on Data confidentiality and Permission to Record
Select that which applies:

- FGD for Leaders
- FGD for Women
- FGD for Youth
- Mix of Organizations

Place and date:

Number of respondents:

- Male ..... 
- Female .... 
- Total ..... 

What are the names of the organizations you belong to?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Target Groups</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Written Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Opening Question on Advocacy

How you and your organization understand the word advocacy? How you translate in your language and in your work?

Legitimacy and Credibility

Do you feel that you have become more or less successful at influencing decisions in your community related to your area of work during the past 5 years—or has it stayed the same?
Is there cooperation between your organization and ministries in the country? Or the government involves your organization in apart of decision making process? If yes, how this is happening?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Org 1</th>
<th>Org 2</th>
<th>Org 3</th>
<th>Org 4</th>
<th>Org 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public can see the organization's budget and expenditure</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public participates in the formulation of the organization's work plan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public participates in the selection of organization leaders through a Board of Trustees</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public follows the activities of the organization through social media</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accountability

How you envision your work in the following terms: Please choose for your organization answers for those questions?

| Who identify the problem? من يحدد المشكلة؟ | Who propose the solution مبادر من يقترح الحل؟ | Who manage the project من ي管控 المشروع؟ | Who mobilizes the resources من يجمع الموارد؟ | Who ensure the link with other stakeholders من هو من سيعمل على حاصل الاتصال مع الشريكين؟ | Who is responsible for the result من هو من سيكون مسؤول عن النتيجة؟ | Who sits with government local or national to influence decisions من هو من سيجلس مع الحكومة المحلي أو الوطني لتأثير القرارات؟ |
1. Do you think that you and your organization are able to influence development policies at local or national level through official forums? Please explain?

2. Has your ability to influence through official forums increased or decreased during the past 5 years, or has it stayed the same? Please explain.

3. What are the relevant legislations existing that govern the activism of CSOs and social and political groups in your country? And how this legal framework is being interpreted by actors?

4. To which extent you see NGOs are capable or willing to understand invisible powers (culture, traditions, community norms) and how this can positively or negatively affect advocacy work? Do you know some examples from your experiences?

5. At community level, how do you see the influence of traditional power (tribal for example) can be a support or barrier for CSOs and to which extent those CSOs are able to understand and work within this framework? Are traditional leaders and religious leaders influential? If Yes, how so? If No, why not?

6. What are the main unofficial/informal ways, outside of official forums, which you have available to make your views heard? Give examples.
1. Have you or your organization participated in any decision-policy law making activities at your community or at national level in the past 5 years? What was it? If yes, what forums you were involved in? How did you participate? You feel you were able to influence decisions?

2. If no why not?

3. What are the main obstacles that people like you face in official forums when they try to influence decision making processes?

4. In terms of who is invited, who got more space and credibility with government?
   a. INGOs and Donors.
   b. National CSOs
   c. Movements and other informal groups?

5. How you see the interaction between formal institutions and informal institutions in the country at national and local levels?

Conclusion Question:

What are the most learnings needed by NGOs in the areas of advocacy, campaigning and networking? And what are the core competencies NGOs should have to lead advocacy work?

Closing of the FGDs and telling what are the next steps?
ANNEX III: LIST OF REFERENCES


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