

MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS SYSTEMS STRENGTHENING (ADISS) ACTIVITY

Evaluation Report



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The design on the cover page was produced by identifying the 20 most recurrent themes in responses to the quantitative survey, under Question 17.

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Acronyms

ADISS	-	Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening
ALAC	-	Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre
AMEP	-	Annual Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
AOR	-	Assistance Officer's Representative
ARIC	-	Audit Report Implementation Committee
CBO	-	Community-Based Organization
CDCS	-	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CDD	-	Center for Democratic Development
CHRAJ	-	Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice
CSO	-	Civil Society Organization
DCMC	-	District Citizens Monitoring Committees
DFID	-	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DO	-	Development Objective
DRG	-	Democracy, Rights and Governance
DVLA	-	Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority
EOCO	-	Economic and Organized Crime Office
FGD	-	Focus Group Discussion
GACC	-	Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition
GAIT	-	Government Accountability Improves Trust
GAS	-	Ghana Audit Service
GII	-	Ghana Integrity Initiative
GOG	-	Government of Ghana
ICT	-	Information, Communication and Technology
KII	-	Key Informant Interview
LANets	-	Local Accountability Networks
MMDA	-	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MOJAGD	-	Ministry of Justice and Attorney-General's Department
MSC	-	Most Significant Change

NCCE	-	National Commission for Civic Education
NACAP	-	National Anti-Corruption Action Plan
NDC	-	National Democratic Congress
NPP	-	New Patriotic Party
OPD	-	Out-Patients Department
PAC	-	Public Accounts Committee
PFM	-	Public Financial Management
RFTOP	-	Request for Task Order Proposals
SAC	-	Social Accountability Clubs
SADISC	-	Strengthening Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems through Citizen Engagement
SEND	-	Social Enterprise Development Foundation
SOW	-	Statement of Work
STAAC	-	Strengthening Action Against Corruption
TMG	-	The Mitchell Group
UNCAC	-	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
WANEP	-	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WACSI	-	West Africa Civil Society Institute

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Activity's Objectives

The purpose of the Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening (ADISS) activity is to build upon previous anti-corruption investments and increase the capacities of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to motivate citizens to apply pressure on policy makers and institutions to reduce corruption in Ghana. Two key objectives are identified: (a) strengthen collaborative institutional synergies to ensure follow-up on Public Accounts Committee recommendations; and (b) improve civil society reporting, tracking and advocacy for stronger anti-corruption efforts.

The ADISS activity is being implemented in fifty (50) districts across Ghana's ten regions by the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) Consortium consisting of the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), Ghana Anti-Corruption Consortium (GACC), and Social Enterprise Development Foundation (SEND-Ghana). The Consortium began implementing the ADISS activity in September 2014 with a four-year USAID grant totally US \$1,972,000.

Mid-Term Evaluation

This mid-term evaluation by The Mitchell Group, Inc. (TMG) assesses the ADISS activity's performance, the appropriateness and the adequacy of implementation strategies and methodologies (see SOW Appendix A). TMG mobilized an Evaluation Specialist, an Anti-Corruption Specialist, and a Local Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist to answer five USAID/Ghana identified evaluation questions: 1) How has the ADISS activity performed to achieve project results? 2) What is the adequacy of the activity's timeframe and cost to achieve its purpose? 3) To what extent are the ADISS interventions and structures designed to enhance sustainability and ownership of anti-corruption by state institutions, civil society and communities? 4) What are specific recommendations for the ADISS Activity to improve on effectiveness and results? 5) What are future recommendations for USAID/Ghana to effectively address corruption in Ghana? To these questions were added four sub-questions.

Background

Public sector corruption in Ghana constitutes a major development problem for public service delivery and private sector investments. Ghana has several anti-corruption laws, but the limited, selective and reluctant enforcement of these laws has been problematic.

Non-state institutions such as the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC), SEND-Ghana

and the GII, a local chapter of Transparency International, have joined a growing constituency to advocate for the full implementation of applicable laws. These CSOs have been particularly active in supporting Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and grassroots organizations to hold public officials accountable.

Methodology

The team adopted a mixed-methods, qualitative and quantitative approach for data gathering. Using a standard questionnaire, the qualitative tools featured Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), totaling 249 informants. The quantitative instrument, comprising two open-ended questions and 15 statements measured on a Likert Scale, consisted of a survey of 273 respondents in fifteen districts. Two complementary approaches were implemented: first, a simple cross-sectional design that shows a snapshot at one point in time across different subgroups, such as the districts falling under the guidance of the different ADISS supported partners, was adopted. Secondly, the team utilized “Most Significant Change (MSC)” methodology, which encouraged respondents to identify the most striking, noteworthy changes they observed linked to the ADISS activity’s interventions.

The team selected KII interviewees and FGD participants based on USAID and GII Consortium stakeholder lists and recommendations. In addition, some KIIs were identified based on snowball sampling, i.e., interviewees suggesting other individuals to be interviewed. Similarly, FGD participants and survey respondents were recommended by the ADISS activity’s network partners and their Anti-Corruption Champion focal points in the districts.

Findings and Conclusions

Question 1: How has the ADISS activity performed to achieve project results?

A primary finding is that at the end of Y2 the activity had almost met or exceeded targets for six of eight indicators. However, six of the indicators are output indicators and, therefore, do not measure impact. A second finding is that the ADISS activity raised awareness of corruption, thanks to public education and sensitization efforts by the CSOs. Third, the ADISS activity’s support for aware, better educated and equipped Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) that belong to an expanding network of accountability groups has created a growing constituency for reform at the grassroots level. This constituency could form the core of an evolving culture of awareness imbued with a sense of obligation to stand up for probity and integrity in public affairs.

Recommendations:

USAID and Consortium Partners: Review the ADISS Results Framework, Annual Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (AMEP), and the activity's focus to come to a renewed understanding of expected results and achievable objectives.

Consortium Partners: Expand broadcast media coverage of accountability efforts, investigative journalism training and support, and public meetings to sustain momentum.

Sub-Question 1: To what extent have all ADISS components contributed to achievement of results?

The main finding is that capacity strengthening for CSOs, including the Consortium members, public awareness and citizen education constitute the strengths of the program. The corruption reporting mechanisms show promise, but the uptake is limited. Broadcast media and investigative journalism, which deserve greater attention, complement the mechanisms. In the team's view, the most underperforming and disappointing project component has been the state accountability institutions. Although the indicator target for establishing CSO-state institution collaborative relationships was exceeded/met in Y1 and Y2, it is unclear how such relationships have improved accountability.

Recommendation:

The Consortium Partners should develop and implement mentorship plans for the Consortium's CBO network partners.

Sub-Question 2: Have civil society reporting mechanisms such as the "IPaidABribe" ICT platform, the use of social media and Information, Communication and Technology (ICT), and the decentralization of the Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) increased exposure of corruption?

Based on the KIIs, FGDs, surveys and the team's reviews of the ADISS activity's reports, citizen use of reporting mechanisms has increased over the past two years, and has increased exposure of corruption. However, the number of users remains low despite high awareness of these mechanisms, and despite an avowed knowledge on the part of people familiar with accountability initiatives about where to report corruption. It also is unclear how use of the mechanisms is exposing corruption, and whether exposure is leading to prosecutions and reductions in corrupt behavior.

Recommendations:

Consortium Partners: Continue to educate the public on the value of citizen reporting mechanisms, how they work, and the results that can be expected.

USAID: Consider expanding the ALACs to a big population center like Kumasi.

Question 2: What is the adequacy of the activity's time frame and cost to achieve its purpose?

The main finding is that more time and resources are needed to achieve the activity's objectives.

Timeframe. Informants advocated that (1) the social media and ICT reporting mechanisms should receive more training and that radio programming should be expanded; (2) the ADISS activity's coverage be deepened and widened throughout the 50 operational districts; and (3) that education and awareness-raising were long-term propositions.

Resources. Budget categories appear to be reasonably apportioned, and the team heard no concerns about pipeline. But the lack of a contingency fund and inflexibility in spending has limited the Consortium's ability to respond to targets of opportunity. The ADISS's process-intensive activities require more time to achieve the ADISS activity's Key Objectives.

Recommendation:

USAID: Provide resources to state institutions, as well as to CSOs, so that the partnership can be collaborative and productive. Consider a cost or no-cost extension to the project closely tied to a revised results framework.

Question 3: To what extent are the ADISS interventions and structures designed to enhance sustainability and ownership of anti-corruption by state institutions, civil society, and communities?

The team noted four striking design elements that promoted sustainable actions and outcomes. First, USAID has placed ownership of the activity with the GII Consortium, which has strategically integrated accountability with other activities such as health, education, sanitation and infrastructure. Second, the Consortium has supported a coalition of grassroots accountability organizations with funding and training, and the Consortium's mentors and coaches, the Anti-Corruption Champions, receive minimal stipends for specific assignments. Third, the ADISS activity has raised public awareness about the risks and costs of corruption, and in concert with the grassroots CBOs' networks,

has provided citizens with entry points to engage in activities, e.g., social accountability citizen report cards. Fourth, public awareness and citizen reporting mechanisms offer communities the means to expose, prevent and curb corruption.

Recommendations:

USAID: Join forces with other donors to leverage and sustain collective gains. Send a message to stakeholders that the international community is united to assist Ghanaians to honor commitments to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and other accountability protocols.

Consortium Partners: Stay focused on capacity-strengthening and mastery of the corruption reporting tools, look for targets of opportunity, emphasize outcomes and implement the exit strategy. It is difficult to instill project ownership in under-resourced state institutions, but investments in civil society and citizen groups are gaining traction and paying dividends.

Sub-Question 1: Given a change in government and a new Government of Ghana (GOG) Administration and newly articulated strategies to combat corruption - how relevant are the two primary project objectives?

Ghana's electoral democracy is a beacon for Africa. However, patronage drives competition in Ghana's neo-patrimonial system where dominant parties vie for supremacy based on spoils and political favors. The new Administration's rhetoric is encouraging, but FGD participants and KII informants were unconvinced that promises would translate to outcomes. Because most reforms occur within a new administration's first two years, political support for passage of bills, such as the Right to Information (RTI), should be at their highest over the next 16 months.

Recommendations:

USAID: Join with other donors and support civil society to press the GOG to keep commitments to UNCAC, to key provisions within the NACAP and to pass the RTI.

Consortium Partners: Limit the number of accountability targets, harness the power of collective action and aim for 1-2 highly visible wins.

Sub-Question 2: What are the opportunities and challenges in working with state institutions and anti – corruption CSOs?

In this answer, the team lists challenges and opportunities in working with state institutions and anti-corruption CSOs separately, and then offers conclusions and

recommendations.

State Institutions. The overarching issue constraining working with state institutions is political will. In the fight against corruption in Ghana, the trends are negative, and public perception is that it is growing worse. In Ghana's neo-patrimonial system, public assets and offices are the spoils that go to the victor. Even though the major parties have alternated at the ballot box, both major parties reward their constituents with political favors, lucrative contracts, and plum rent-seeking positions. Opportunities are limited for shifting, uneven and generally weak political will for reform.

CSOs. Political will is less a factor in working with CSOs, but it handicaps efforts to establish the collaborative relationships that the ADISS activity seeks to foster. The time and energy devoted to establishing cooperation and collaboration divert attention from more productive activities, and dilute the impacts. Unpredictable, inconsistent, and gaps in funding present other challenges. Capacity deficiencies, especially turnover in the CSO sector, also plague progress.

Despite these challenges, the CSOs provide checks on government performance. The CBOs maintain close ties to the average citizen; faith-based organizations provide a moral compass for society; and the media inform, critique, and advocate for reforms.

Recommendations:

USAID: Convene a stock-taking exercise with the GII Consortium, accountability sector donors and other implementers. Utilize this mid-term evaluation as a discussion document. Find and share targets of mutual opportunity with accountability sector donors.

Consortium Partners: Enlist the media to reinforce collective advocacy efforts and lobbying to achieve 1-2 key victories in the accountability domain. Examples of these are the RTI bill, amendments to the Asset Declaration Provisions of the Code of Conduct of Public Officers, and funding for Audit Committees to execute their mandates under the PFM law.

Recommendation:

USAID and Consortium Partners should move toward greater focus on outcomes in the Results Framework with relevant indicators, targets, objectives and processes for measuring them (see Annex B).

Summary Conclusions:

- At the mid-point, ADISS appears to be on track to achieving its targets as defined by its performance indicators. More clarity in the Results Framework and less reliance on output indicators going forward will increase confidence in this finding. ADISS has performed best in regards to CSO capacity-building, CBO network strengthening, and raising public awareness about the risks and costs of corruption. The effectiveness of the consortium partners themselves has been boosted by their extensive experience and good reputations in their respective districts.
- ICT and ALAC corruption reporting mechanisms are providing citizens with outlets to report corruption, but the uptake has been weak. The use of "IPaidABribe" increased significantly in Y2 after it became available off-line. Further adjustments and modifications to these tools, and increased public awareness of them are needed.
- ADISS's weakest link has been its pursuit and prosecution of corruption, and follow up by state-civil society coalitions on Public Accounts Committee (PAC) recommendations. The absence of political will to capacitate and fund public accountability institutions, has contributed to low performance.
- Perhaps ADISS's greatest strength is its support to grassroots networks of citizens and accountability CBOs. These actors represent a growing constituency for reform, which is fostering a culture of integrity throughout ADISS districts. If nurtured and sustained, this movement could be ADISS's most lasting contribution to enhanced accountability in Ghana.

2. INTRODUCTION

In 2014 USAID/Ghana initiated the Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening (ADISS) activity. The activity pursues two key objectives: (a) strengthen collaborative institutional synergies to ensure follow-up on Public Accounts Committee recommendations; and (b) improve civil society reporting, tracking and advocacy for stronger anti-corruption efforts. The ADISS activity is being implemented in fifty (50) districts across the ten regions of Ghana by the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) Consortium consisting of: the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), Ghana Anti-Corruption Consortium (GACC), and Social Enterprise Development Foundation (SEND-Ghana). Implementation began in September 2014

Box 1: Municipal assembly asking for involvement:

Assistant Planning Officer in Kumasi Municipal Assembly: “We are preparing the 2018-2021 Medium Term Development Plan; we need civil society buy-in.” After participating in ADISS’s survey on perceptions of corruption in the municipality, he had a second encounter with ADISS during the workshop on the dissemination of results (day 1) and discussions of PAC report (day 2). He welcomed this timely workshop as they were preparing town hall meetings on their planning report.

funded by a USAID grant valued at US \$1,972,000, The Sub-Recipient Agreements were signed and approved in January 2015. This mid-term evaluation by The Mitchell Group, Inc. (TMG) assesses the ADISS activity’s performance and the appropriateness and adequacy of the activity’s implementation strategies and methodologies (see SOW Appendix A). For this evaluation TMG mobilized an Evaluation Specialist, an Anti-Corruption Specialist, and a Local M&E Specialist. With TMG Headquarters support, the team performed a desk review, and developed methodologies, tools and instruments to determine the objectives outlined in the SOW. These objectives translated to five research questions: 1) How has the ADISS Activity performed to achieve project results? 2) What is the adequacy of the activity's timeframe and cost to achieve its purpose? 3) To what extent are the ADISS interventions and structures designed to enhance sustainability and ownership of anti-corruption by State institutions, Civil Society and communities? 4) What are specific recommendations for the ADISS activity to improve on effectiveness and results? 5) What are future recommendations for USAID/Ghana to effectively address corruption in Ghana? Two sub-questions to Question 1, and two sub-questions to Question 3 were added for a total of seven questions. This report answers the first three questions organized by “findings,” “conclusions” and “recommendations.” Answers to Questions 4 and 5 are grouped under the “recommendations” to the first three questions

(see Appendix 2 for team in-country schedule).¹

3. BACKGROUND

Public sector corruption constitutes a significant development problem for Ghana. Thirty-five percent (35%) of Afro-barometer respondents in 2013 reported that corruption in Ghana had increased significantly in the period from 2011-2013. Sixty-six percent (66%) of these same respondents reported that the educational system was corrupt and 71% felt the judiciary was corrupt. In 2014 an Afro-barometer analyst remarked: "Over time, the number of Ghanaians who trust public institutions or officials has declined significantly. Most respondents say that the government has performed poorly in arresting the canker of corruption."² The analyst concluded that Ghanaians widely believed that civil society did not adequately hold government accountable for applying and enforcing sanctions against corruption.³ Despite this assessment, many Ghanaians believe that ordinary citizens can fight corruption. Per a media commentator, it is a simple matter of "refusing to pay bribes and... reporting corruption when it occurs."⁴

Ghana has enacted many anti-corruption laws. Among these are the Public Procurement Act of 2003 (Act 663), the Internal Audit Agency Act of 2003 (Act 658), the Whistle Blowers Act of 2006 (Act 720), the Financial Administration Act of 2003 (Act 654), and the Public Office Holders Declaration of Assets and Disqualification Act of 1998 (Act 550). Missing is the Right to Information Act; a sunshine law whose passage is dependent on draft regulations.

However, the limited, selective and reluctant enforcement of these laws renders them toothless, as well as an apparent political will to revise and correct gaps in this legal framework. The evaluation team's own survey⁵ of the ADISS' network members (273) gives a mixed picture with 47% agreeing with a statement on this topic (Current laws are

¹. Western region: Nzema East and Sekondi-Takoradi; Great Accra Region: Ga South.

². Afro-barometer 2013; 2014.

³"Despite the belief that reporting corruption is one way of fighting the canker, those interviewed say the most common reasons that Ghanaians do not report corruption are because they are afraid of the consequence (25%), they believe nothing will be done even if they report it (18%), officials to whom a corruption report could be made are also corrupt (8%), and they believe that corruption is normal or everyone does it (7%)." Ibid, p. 8

⁴Armah-Attah, D. 2014. "Perceived corruption escalates, trust in institutions drops: A call for ordinary Ghanaians to get involved in the fight." Accra: CDD-Ghana, p. 1

⁵. See Appendix D: Survey Analysis for details on all the demographics and analyses of responses.

sufficient to help stop corruption), 38% disagreeing, but a surprisingly high 15% not wishing to state their position⁶. A 2017 corruption survey by the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) concluded that “Six in every ten respondents were of the view that these institutions' efforts at arresting corruption were ineffective.”⁷

In line with the Afro-barometer's 2014 findings, non-state institutions such as the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC), SEND-Ghana and the GII, a local chapter of Transparency International, have joined the fight to reduce corruption and advocate the full implementation of applicable laws. These CSOs have been particularly active in advocating that civil society hold public officials accountable for their actions. Surveyed Ghanaians during the field work overwhelmingly agreed (88%) that “CSOs are beginning to raise public awareness against corruption”. These actions, supported by the ADISS activity, dovetail with pronouncements from the new administration, which has expressed its intention to fight corruption.⁸

4. METHODOLOGY

The team adopted a mixed-methods, qualitative and quantitative approach for data gathering. Using a semi-structured questionnaire, the qualitative tools featured KIs and FGDs, totaling 249 informants.⁹ The quantitative instrument, comprising two open-ended questions and 15 statements measured on a Likert Scale, consisted of a survey of 273 respondents in fifteen districts (see Appendix C). Initially the evaluators planned to compare their results with the baseline data in JMK's 2015 report.¹⁰ However, the differing approaches in data gathering tools, and the significantly different lines of questioning between the 2015 baseline survey and this mid-term evaluation allowed for limited points of comparison. To overcome this obstacle two complementary approaches were implemented: first, a simple cross-sectional design that shows a snapshot at one point in

⁶. See section on methodology. The questionnaire in Appendix C offered in Q. 8. Agree includes both degrees (agree/strongly), the same applies to disagree.

⁷Ghana Integrity Initiative. 2017. “Corruption is Eating Us Up. A Call to Action.” Accra: Ghana Integrity Initiative, p. 7.

⁸ During the mission's field mission: Ghana Business and Finance Magazine, 2017. We can't lose fight against corruption - President Akufo-Addo. Ghana Business and Finance Magazine. June 19, 2017; Takyi-Boadu C, 2017. I'll Stop Corruption – Nana. Daily Guide. June 19, 2017.

⁹. See Table 3 in Annex F. This table eliminated double counts.

¹⁰. JMK Consulting. 2015. Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Project. Baseline Survey Report. Final Report. Accra: GII Consortium. The baseline survey was developed around the theme of perceptions of corruption in institutions which then brought in sub-themes such as participants bribing and/or reporting on corrupt practices.

time across different subgroups, such as the districts falling under the guidance of the different ADISS partners, was adopted. Secondly, the team utilized “Most Significant Change (MSC)” methodology, which encouraged respondents to identify the most striking, noteworthy changes they observed linked to the project’s interventions.

The team selected KII interviewees and FGD participants based on USAID and GII Consortium stakeholder lists and recommendations. In addition, some KIIs were identified based on snowball sampling, i.e., interviewees suggesting other individuals to be interviewed. Similarly, FGD participants and survey respondents were recommended by ADISS network partners and their Anti-Corruption Champion focal points in the districts. To identify respondents for the surveys, the team employed non-randomized, purposive¹¹ methods, canvassing input from a cross-section of the Ghanaian public engaged in trades from hairdressers to market sellers and motorcycle drivers.¹²

The team limited FGDs to a maximum of ten participants (see Table 1 for a numeric description of informants and survey participants). The quantitative surveys in the 15 selected districts were based on an estimated 725 direct beneficiaries in the activity, with a minimum purposive sample size of 270, which ensured representativeness in the intervention zones. Although this purposive survey could not comply with the rules governing a fully randomized survey, it remains in line with USAID criteria of a confidence level above 95% with a margin of error under 5%¹³.

Within the constraints of time and resources, the selection of regions and districts captured 1) the geographic, resource and political diversity of Ghana; 2) the activities of the three consortium members; 3) political strongholds of the two major parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP); 4) the oil-rich Western Region; and 5) a sampling of urban, peri-urban and rural districts. Hence, the team conducted KIIs, FGDs and quantitative surveys in ten districts – two districts in each of five of Ghana’s ten regions - Greater Accra, Northern, Ashanti, Western and Volta Regions. Additionally, the enumerators conducted the quantitative surveys in Brong-Ahafo, Eastern, Upper West, Upper East, and Central regions where ADISS consortium

¹¹. As a potential second option, randomization would have required greater resources in time and human investment at the outset and in control activities.

¹². Annex F describes the significant set of informants of the qualitative operations; Annex E offers a presentation of the demographics and responses of the survey population.

¹³. The size of the sample had to be at least 251 to meet the criteria; a planned sample size of 270 was chosen to allow for a non-response rate. The final number was 273 (see Table 1), this offers a coverage rate (# in sample/# direct beneficiaries) of 37.6%.

partners implemented their activities.

The summary of these gathering operations are found in the following table:

Table 1: Results of Information and Data Gathering Operations

Type of Operations	ADISS Partner Implementer	Expected or maximum final numbers	Achieved
Quantitative			
Survey	5 districts per implementing partner	270	273
Districts included in the sample: Kumasi Metro, Ejisu-Juaben, Pru, Cape Coast, New Juaben, Ga South, Ashaiman, Yendi, Tamale Metro, Bolga Central, Wa, Central Tongu, Akatsi South, Nzema East, Sekondi-Takoradi			
Qualitative			
Key Informant Interviews: total		40 + 15-20	80
Accra (Capital)	Consortium	15-20	40
Adidome	GII	4	5
Akatsi	GII	4	4
Ashiaman	GII	4	0
Ejisu	GACC	4	4
Ga South	SEND Ghana	4	4
Kumasi	GACC	4	4
Nzema East	GACC	4	4
Sekondi-Takoradi	GACC	4	4
Tamale	SEND Ghana	4	6
Yendi	SEND Ghana	4	5
Focus Group Discussions: total		200	190
Accra (Capital)	Consortium	0	27
Adidome	GII	20	16
Akatsi	GII	20	16
Ashiaman	GII	20	13
Ejisu	GACC	20	17
Ga South	SEND Ghana	20	16
Kumasi	GACC	20	17
Nzema East	GACC	20	17
Sekondi-Takoradi	GACC	20	13
Tamale	SEND Ghana	20	19
Yendi	SEND Ghana	20	19

Survey: In Kumasi Metro and Bolgatanga Central, numbers were above the planned 18. Survey results are analyzed in Annex E.

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs): The high number of KIIs performed in Accra reflected

the disproportionate influence of the capital city.

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs): In many districts, it became difficult at very short notice to mobilize participants, however, the team made good faith efforts to get the most relevant participants to the FGDs.

Validation Workshop: Twenty-seven participants attended the validation workshop in Accra. The workshop assembled key informants, who enriched preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations of the report.

Quality control: The team ensured quality control through 1) selection of experienced enumerators from the WANEP and Trans4orm Ghana networks, and selection of non-ADISS enumerators to reduce the risk of conflict of interest; 2) rigorous enumerators' training (see June 24 entry in the mission schedule in Appendix B); 3) pre-testing of the questionnaire to troubleshoot potential issues with translation into local languages; and 4) monitoring of field operations by the team.

Limitations: The team calls attention to the under-representation of women in the sample of KII, FGD, and surveys; many factors, cultural and personal, contributed to this result. Additionally, the team mitigated the selection bias of FGD participants by triangulating data from our various sources. Lastly, certain key informants were unavailable.

5. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Question 1: How has the ADISS activity performed to achieve project results?

Findings

To answer this question, the team compared the results in quarterly and annual reports against the indicators and targets in the Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (AMEP), and triangulated findings with KII interviews, FGDs, direct observations, and surveys. The

Box 2: Engaging authorities on accountability in Adidome

During the KII in Adidome, the anti-corruption champion spoke of a forthcoming meeting of the ADISS supported Social Accountability Club (SAC) with members of the District Assembly (DA) on July 10-11. As was the case in Ejisu, the SAC met with resistance. However, during a follow-up conversation at the July 10-11 workshop was confirmed that fourteen SAC and DA members were present at the meeting, including the Assistant District Executive, the Accounting and Planning Officers, which discuss recommendations of the Public Account Committee's report for Adidome. The July workshop was considered a success and will be followed-up in coming months to monitor implementation of the recommendations discussed.

Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (AMEP) listed 37 activities consisting of capacity-strengthening workshops; ICT and social media for advocacy for legal reforms; partnership-strengthening; public forums; public awareness campaigns; and mentoring of CSOs and Anti-Corruption Champions to name a few.

First, at the end of Y2 the project had almost met, or exceeded targets for six of the project's eight indicators. However, six of the indicators are output indicators and do not measure impact. Second, owing to sensitization and education campaigns by CSOs, the ADISS significantly raised public awareness of corruption. Third, ADISS's investment in supporting accountability networks of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) is helping create a critical constituency for reform at the grassroots level. Below we present the findings organized by Sub-IRs, Outcomes and Outputs per the ADISS's Results Framework (RF).

Sub-IR 1.2.1: Increased capacity of CSOs to advocate on behalf of citizens for improved government services

The team notes that per AMEP indicators, only the number of people trained is being reported. Although the indicator targets for Y1 and Y2 were achieved, it is difficult to assess the amount of capacity CSOs have added resulting from ADISS training and support (see Recommendations).

Outcome 1.1 Increased civil society engagement in effective direct lobbying and law reform advocacy.

This outcome includes three outputs: 1) advocacy around anti-corruption legislative gaps, 2) anti-corruption advocacy capacity of civil society, and 3) the establishment of collaborative relationships between CSOs and accountability institutions. Regarding "advocacy around anti-corruption legislative gaps," the ADISS activity is behind schedule due to the lack of the timely completion of a study on the subject. Although the study is now complete, for the purposes of this report we can only say there has been a lack of a clear focus on advocacy up to now, which represents a weakness to be addressed in the second half of the activity (see Recommendations).

For Outcome 2, "anti-corruption advocacy capacity of civil society," the team had no way to objectively measure anti-corruption advocacy capacity increases by civil society beyond the pre- and post-test which the ADISS administered at training workshops. These tests are measures of short-term retention of information, but do not measure cumulative gains in capacity.

However, from the survey results in Table 2 it can be inferred that capacity is increasing. Most respondents believed that civil society is the leading actor in fighting corruption, and 93% of surveyed individuals involved in anti-corruption felt their knowledge had increased in the past two years. In response to Q17, "In your opinion, what should be done to fight corruption in your community?" 36 respondents affirmed the role of the CSOs in raising awareness and leading the fight against corruption.

It can also be surmised that overall capacity is increasing owing to the support for accountability-oriented CBOs such as the District Citizens Monitoring Committees (DCMCs); Local Accountability Networks (LANets); and Social Accountability Clubs (SACs) (see Table 3 in Annex F for statistics on informants from these organizations). This tactic has broadened and deepened program reach while simultaneously fostering local ownership and sustainability.

KIIs and FGDs in the districts support the notion of increased CSO capacity. In Adidome District, informants asserted that their participation in the ADISS activity equipped them to better monitor public works, and to fight corruption in other areas because they had acquired the basics of issue identification, community mobilization, and public speaking. In Akatsi South, the CBO members avowed that support from the ADISS partner, GII, helped them to uncover and expose an illicit school construction project that failed to meet code. Ultimately, they succeeded in getting the school demolished and rebuilt.

Integral to the rise and success of citizen accountability networks has been the establishment of and support for Anti-Corruption Champions. In the ADISS's districts, Anti-Corruption Champions are volunteer residents, elected by the community of anti-corruption activists to encourage, guide and facilitate the design and implementation of accountability activities with and between CBOs and the District Assemblies. The Anti-Corruption Champions have helped translate learning into action, and mobilized mass action around key policies, proposals, laws and perceived violations.

They also have contributed to *heightened awareness of corruption, knowledge of its definition and recognition of its forms*. Although this finding is not a stated result in the ADISS Results Framework, it is a pre-requisite for lobbying and citizen-supported anti-corruption advocacy and reporting (see Outcome 3.1). FGD participants in Tamale, Yendi, Nzema East and Akatsi South remarked that "Knowledge on corruption continues to increase. People are aware it is not only the police and politicians who are corrupt."

FGD participants shared personal experiences ranging from making extra payments to access the Out-Patients Department (OPD) and secure a hospital bed, to bribing school

officials for admissions. Bribery has permeated the realm of the sacred – influencing the selection of church leaders, and impacted the realm beyond - acquiring a space in the hospital morgue for preserving deceased family members and for reserving space in the cemetery for their interment.

Broadcast media and investigative journalism deserve credit for raising awareness. When FGD participants were asked about what worked in ADISS’s interventions, most of them cited support to the media. From information gathered in KIIs, the support was twofold: 1) Support for access to timeslots on popular radio talk shows structured around informing citizens about corruption with a Q&A segment for listener input; and 2) training of journalists in investigative methods to cover stories from districts. In one instance, participants mentioned how a journalist, who had attended ADISS supported workshops, received reports on corruption from ADISS’s networks, and investigated them. ADISS facilitated his visits to 53 MMDAs.¹⁴ The results of this investigation are forthcoming, but should contribute to Outcome 3.2. The printed press has considerable influence and leverage.

Finally, regarding *developing partnerships with anti-corruption institutions*, the team notes that targets were met for the indicator “Number of CSOs and accountability institutions partnered for collaborative anti-corruption initiatives.”¹⁵ KIIs with the staff of NCCE, CHRAJ and other anti-corruption institutions indicated a desire and willingness to form partnerships with the CSOs and with each other. CHRAJ serves on the board of the ALACs, and the GII Consortium extended standing invitations to institutions like the NCCE and CHRAJ to travel with them to the field, to participate in meetings with communities, and to participate in training sessions. However, we were informed that because state institutions were poorly resourced, they lacked funding for joint action.

Table 2 presents selected results of the quantitative survey, which corroborate KII and FGD findings related to awareness raising and the role of the CSOs and the media to promote it.

¹⁴. KII, investigative journalist, June 21, 2017.

¹⁵This indicator is included under IR 1.2.3 in the RF, but seems relevant to the output “collaborative relationships between CSOs, accountability institutions established.”

Table 2: Results of the Evaluation Survey

Questions or Statements	Yes	Not sure	
Do you know what corruption is?	99%	1%	
	Agree	Disagree	Neutral
My knowledge on corruption has increased in the past two years.	93%	3%	4%
CSOs are beginning to raise public awareness against corruption.	95%	2%	3%
The media has played a large role in raising awareness on corruption.	97%	2%	1%
CSOs are working as hard as they can to reduce corruption in Ghana.	91%	4%	5%

Outcome 1.2: Strengthened Advocacy and Legal Advice Center (ALAC) for citizens' reporting and documentation of corruption-related cases

There are no performance indicators to report against for this outcome, nor for the outputs: 1) ALAC strengthened/decentralized; 2) citizens have sufficient knowledge on the costs and impacts of corruption; and 3) actions on corruption reported-referrals tracked. Therefore, a clear standard as to whether or not the results have been achieved is not available. However, we discuss this outcome under Sub-question 2 regarding the decentralization of the Advocacy and Legal Advice Centers (ALAC), and whether it has increased exposure of corruption.

Sub-IR 1.2.2: Strengthened CSO and National Audit Authority oversight of government services

Outcome 2.1: MDAs actively enforce the recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee

This Sub-IR has one outcome comprising three outputs: 1) Policy dialogues with Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) organized, 2) PAC recommendations implemented, and 3) implementation of PAC recommendations tracked. The outcome has two indicators associated with it at the output level: "Number of mechanisms for external oversight of public resources supported by the USG, and number of tracked PAC recommendations being implemented." The first is a standard indicator and strictly measures outputs. At the end of Y1, the target of two mechanisms was not met. The explanation received by the team was that the Consortium did not prioritize this activity against others, and ran out of time to achieve it. Per the Y1 Annual Report, the Consortium was preparing to implement these tasks early in Y2. Per the Y2

Annual Report, the target had been lowered to one mechanism, and that had been achieved in the form of a survey across the 50 project districts to assess the implementation of audit recommendations in the Auditor General's Report and PAC of Parliament.

The second is a custom indicator designed to track whether PAC recommendations regarding the Auditor General's reports of audited accounts, which was cited for financial malfeasance, were being implemented. As with the first indicator, no results were achieved in Y1, in this instance against a target of 50. The indicator disappears from the Y2 Annual Report and was no longer tracked or reported.

One promising finding from the team's site visits revealed an important complementarity between ADISS's district survey reports and the Public Accounts Committee's (PAC) reports and recommendations. Indeed, in Adidome (see Box 2), anti-corruption CBOs used district reports to underscore citizens' perceptions of corruption and corrupt institutions, and validate the risk of corruption using PAC reports. This was a commendable example of utilizing PAC district reports to initiate dialog between citizen groups and district assemblies, and generate more accountable governance in Ejisu, Yendi, and Adidome Districts.

Sub-IR 1.2.3: Strengthened government anti-corruption and accountability efforts.

This Sub-IR has two outcomes: Increased use of anti – corruption reporting mechanisms and institutions by citizens and increased investigations, sanctions and prosecution of corruption – related cases.

Outcome 3.1: Increased use of anti – corruption reporting mechanisms and institutions by citizens

Four outputs were linked to this outcome: IPaidABribe platform established, citizens report corruption using appropriate mechanism, Anti-corruption Champions trained, and citizens engage in anti-corruption activism to advocate change.

As analyzed in the answer¹⁶ to sub-question 2.1, the IPaidABribe platform was established and adjusted to meet challenges of reporting requirements.

¹⁶ . See Question 1, Sub-question 2 for more details.

Training was a significant sector of activity. After the selection process in the first year of the intervention, all 50 Champions were trained to carry “out public education on available reporting mechanisms at the district level through community radio stations, social groups meetings (churches mosques, markets, etc.)”¹⁷, among other capabilities.

Outcome 3.2: Increased investigations, sanctions and prosecution of corruption – related cases

Two outputs were part of the outcome: Accountability institutions prosecute corruption and Anti-Corruption (AC) institutions performance tracked.

The sole indicator’s description “Number of reported corruption cases referred to accountability institutions worked/ resolved/prosecuted” placed the consortium in a position of information broker. Indeed, the ADISS noted in its second year report that 33 cases had been referred, of which 18 had been resolved. Tracking of anti-corruption institutions was limited to three: Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the Ghana Audit Service and the Attorney-General’s Department. Although the latest (second) annual report considers the target to be achieved, it was not clear what methodology was used to track their performance.¹⁸

Conclusions

Based on collective evidence from the KIIs, FGDs and the quantitative surveys, the team arrives at three main conclusions for Q1. First, our site visits confirmed the positive impact of the CSO’s efforts and the media to transform an entrenched acceptance of petty and bureaucratic corruption in Ghanaian society to a culture of awareness about and resistance to corruption. The team sensed that an array of activities – media sensitization, public awareness campaigns, durbars and training workshops – had cumulatively made average citizens more aware about the scale, dangers and risks of corruption, and educated the public about where to report it. If these activities continue to generate momentum, it is a reasonable to posit that local constituencies for anti-corruption reform

¹⁷ . Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity. Year Two Annual Report (October 2015 – September 2016). P. 9.

¹⁸ . The report: Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity. Report on the Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Functions of Anti-Corruption State Institutions for the Period 2011-2014. Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ. Attorney General Department. Ghana Audit Service covered the period before ADISS was implemented and therefore was of little use.

will resist, curb and fight against a culture of tolerance of corruption. Awareness constitutes a prerequisite for advocacy, and without it there can be no sustained demand for reform.¹⁹

Secondly, in support of the first conclusion, the budding, flowering and growth of local accountability networks, led by the Anti-Corruption Champions, represent a potent force for civic engagement in public affairs and improved governance that builds on previous USAID and other donor investments. Even though the evaluation team had no objective criteria on which to base an assessment of capacity, anecdotal evidence shows progress toward achieving Sub-IR 1.2.1 “Increased capacity of the CSOs to advocate on behalf of citizens for improved government services.”

Third, although significant gains have accrued under the first Sub-IR, Sub-IRs 1.2.2 “Strengthened CSO and National Audit Authority oversight of government services,” and 1.2.3 “Strengthened government anti-corruption and accountability efforts” exhibit gaps and deficiencies. Of the shortcomings, the lack of more concerted implementation and tracking of PAC recommendations stand out, as does performance tracking of accountability institutions’ prosecuting of corrupt behavior.

Finally, the evaluation team observes that ADISS’s two-pronged approach to impact corruption through bottom-up training and capacity strengthening – though logical and compelling - has stretched the capacity of the Consortium. The approach is consistent within the Theory of Change, but implementing many diverse, process-intensive activities risks diluting the intended impact, particularly Outcome 3.2.

Recommendations

USAID and the Consortium Partners

Clarify results and AMEP framework. USAID, in close consultation with the Consortium, should review the ADISS Results Framework and AMEP to ensure a clear, focused and shared understanding of the hierarchy of outputs, outcomes, and objectives. A fresh look at indicators, targets and the PIRS would be helpful as the ADISS activity moves into the second half of the activity’s lifecycle (See Annex B).

Narrow ADISS activity’s focus. The Consortium’s efforts across 50 districts and Accra have

¹⁹. In 4/20 FGDs, the recurrence analysis placed the notion of aware/awareness in the top 20. In 19 of 20 FGDs, participants stated that rising awareness was the most significant result of the Consortium’s activities.

spread its efforts thin. Focusing on fewer strategic targets of opportunity could enhance project performance and increase the likelihood of obtaining fewer, but highly visible results.

Consortium Partners

Expand broadcast media coverage of accountability efforts. To sustain momentum, engage broadcast media more fully in awareness creation, sensitization, education, tracking, reporting, investigative journalism and public education. FM radio talk shows provide an outlet for public dialog, debate and learning, are cost-effective and can yield a multiplier effect.

Train and support investigative journalists. Ghana has a lively, open written press. Investigative journalists have scored highly visible wins in shedding light on grand corruption. Survey respondents indicated a 97% agreement rate regarding the positive role of the media in accountability.

Hold more community dialogs and durbars and broaden ADISS activity's reach to outlying towns. Participants in KIs and FGDs praised community durbars, but lamented that too few of them were held. Durbars are organic, culturally appropriate forums to sensitize and educate the public, and to air ideas, debate and to reach consensus on key issues, including public service delivery impacting citizen welfare and quality of life. CBO accountability networks and Anti-Corruption Champions should use this and similar forums to reach beyond administrative centers, and to go to outlying towns and population centers.

Consortium Partners. Developing partnerships with anti-corruption institutions. KIs with staff of NCCE and CHRAJ underscored the importance of including them in field visits. The NCCE representative in Yendi reported how valuable it was for him to be trained in ICT, IPaidABribe and ALAC, make presentations at community meetings, and fully engage with civil society on accountability.

Sub-Question 1: To what extent have all ADISS components contributed to achievement of results?

Findings

The team defines “components” as the key ADISS activity interventions. These include: 1) capacity strengthening for CSOs (Outcome 1.1, Output 2); 2) raising public awareness and increasing citizen knowledge of the costs and impacts of corruption (Outcome 1.2, Output

2); 3) citizen reporting mechanisms “IPaidABribe” and ALACs (Outcome 3.1, Outputs 1, 3 and 4); 4) support for the media; 5) assistance for public accountability institutions like CHRAJ; and 6) enhancement of the performance of the GII Consortium partners.

Our main finding is that capacity strengthening for CSOs, including the Consortium members, public awareness and citizen education constitute the strengths or the program. The corruption reporting mechanisms show promise, but the uptake is limited. Broadcast media and investigative journalism, which deserve greater attention, complement the mechanisms. In our view, the most underperforming and disappointing project component has been the state accountability institutions. Although the indicator target for establishing CSO-state institution collaborative relationships was exceeded/met in Y1 and Y2, it is unclear how such relationships have improved accountability.

Given the prominent role of CSOs in accountability, the survey results in Tables 3 and 4 illustrate citizens’ perceptions of the CSO’s contribution.

Table 3: Results of the Evaluation Survey: CSO Coverage and Perceptions

Questions or Statements	Yes	No	I don't know
Is any CSO in your district working to stop corruption?	91%	3%	6%
	Agree	Disagree	Neutral
CSOs are beginning to raise public awareness against corruption.	95%	2%	3%
	Agree	Disagree	Neutral
Corruption issues have become hot topics because of the campaign of anti-corruption CSOs.	96%	1%	3%

Table 4 (below) shows high public recognition of accountability CSOs. Nearly half (49%) of the respondents identified at least one of the ADISS activity’s partners. Interestingly, half (48%) mentioned other CSOs, which testifies to a rich array of grassroots organizations working on transparency and accountability.²⁰

²⁰ Respondents were given the possibility of mentioning in their answer more than one CSO, for a total of 457 responses from the 263 respondents, 10 choose not to answer this question or did not know of any CSO.

Table 4: Number of Reponses from Respondents Who Included these CSOs in their Answers to Q16: “Which CSO or NGO do you know who is working on anti-corruption in your district? In Ghana.”

CSOs in answers	Responses	%
ADISS	5	1%
GACC	49	11%
GII	91	20%
SEND Ghana	77	17%
LANets	16	4%
Others	219	48%
Total Number of Responses	457	
N: 273		

In addition, the GII Consortium – an NGO subset of CSOs – has a long-term presence in ADISS’s districts where they have built relationships and established reputations. KII informants and FGD participants attested to the Consortium’s contributions some of which include raising awareness; developing whistleblower tools and training manuals; sponsoring ICT campaigns such as “I am aware”; sourcing Anti-Corruption Champions from their networks and establishing District Citizens Monitoring Committees (DCMC). In sum, partners have leveraged the ADISS activity’s support to become more proficient agents of change in their areas of expertise.

Conclusions

ADISS’s key components include CSOs, broadcast media and ICT, state institutions, informed and engaged citizens and the GII Consortium partners. At this mid-point of the ADISS activity, the data collected by the team attests to the success of interventions surrounding capacity-strengthening for the CSO and CBO networks; public education and awareness-raising; tapping into and leveraging the expertise and experience of the ADISS’s Consortium partners. These investments are gaining traction and paying dividends.

In the team’s view, the ADISS activity has undervalued the role of broadcast media and investigative journalism. As a civil society linkage institution, media could be connected more strategically, intentionally and systematically to other components to broaden, deepen, sustain and advance accountability. For the ADISS activity to achieve Sub-IR 1.2.3, public accountability institutions must become far more engaged and integrated with the higher-performing elements of the project.

Recommendations

USAID.

Coordinate ADISS and G-SAM. If overlap exists between the 50 ADISS and 50 G-SAM districts, share G-SAM district audit findings with the DCMCs for citizen advocacy and pressure for corrective measures and good accountability practices. Consider how enforcement of G-SAM audits might bolster the intent of Outcome 2.1 (enforcement of PAC recommendations).

Consortium Partners.

Training and Mentoring. Develop and implement mentorship plans for the Consortium's CBO network partners. GII, GACC and SEND could further expand their networks in the districts so that it reinforces the training, and effective transfer of Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) to grassroots structures. Mentorship plans and processes should specify goals and identify activities, especially for the anti-corruption champions, who are pivotal to the success of the ADISS's interventions in the districts.

Put Additional Value on Media. Develop a broadcast media outreach strategy to more fully engage community FM radio as a full-fledged accountability partner. Provide more support to investigative journalists and their associations to complement and sustain the high-performing components of the activity.

Sub-Question 2: Have civil society reporting mechanisms such as the "IPaidABribe" ICT platform, the use of social media and ICT, and the decentralization of the Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) increased exposure of corruption?

Findings

Examples of civil society reporting mechanisms include "IPaidABribe," the ALACs, hotlines, and whistleblower tools. "Exposure of corruption" is thought of as uncovering bribery, graft, embezzlement and other forms of abuse of public office for private gain. Based on the KIIs, FGDs, surveys and our reviews of the ADISS activity's reports, we find that citizen use of reporting mechanisms has increased over the past two years, and thereby increased exposure of corruption. However, the number of users remains low despite high awareness of these mechanisms, and despite an avowed knowledge on the part of people familiar with accountability initiatives about where to report corruption. It also is unclear how use of the mechanisms is exposing corruption, or whether exposure is leading to prosecutions and reductions in corrupt behavior.

Per the ADISS Y2 annual report, 9,661 citizens were made aware of the ALAC and the IPaidABribe mechanisms, and survey results indicate that 76% of respondents agreed with the statement “I am familiar with ‘IPaidABribe’, and 43% knew someone who had used the ALACs. More than 87% of the respondents said they knew where to report corruption when they found it. Per the Y2 annual report, a cumulative total of 108 reports had been registered for the two mechanisms – 68 for “IPaidABribe” in Y2, and 33 for the ALACs in Y2. These numbers represent significant jumps from Y1 when only 31 people utilized these reporting tools.²¹ Per the comments in the Y2 Annual Report table, this sharp increase is explained by having made the “IPaidABribe” tool available at events, in addition to making forms available and explaining how to use them so that people without internet access could make a report.²² The Consortium notes in the report that targets in Y3 will be adjusted to reflect this result.

The “IPaidABribe” website and ICT platform and the ALACs are mechanisms that allow citizens to take an active role in resisting corruption. The ALACs are walk in centers (physical locations) to which citizens can go to report corruption they have experienced as victims or as observers. Center staff provide advice on how and where to file complaints. Although GII established the first ALAC before ADISS,²³ the GII Consortium expanded the ALACs to Tamale and Wa, and hired and trained project officers to staff each location. In early 2017 GII established an ALAC Steering Committee and at the time of this evaluation was developing an MOU with each public institution member.²⁴

KIIs and FGDs revealed a felt need for these mechanisms. Discussants and interviewees expressed their knowledge of and appreciation for these mechanisms; during an FGD in Kumasi, where participants said they were sensitized by the ADISS activity on the “IPaidABribe” website, also learned about the ALAC.²⁵ During the FGD in Ejisu, one recommendation was to open an ALAC in Kumasi in light of the importance of Kumasi as a regional hub. A District Planning Officer in Ga South recommended that the information about the ALAC should be shared more widely and more centers (ALAC sites) be opened.²⁶

²¹ The team notes that the figures provided for Y1 and Y2 in the Annual Reports do not add up to the cumulative total listed, and the cumulative total does not match the figures for the mechanisms discussed in the “Comments” section of the results table in the report.

²² The ADISS Baseline Report noted that mechanisms such as IPaidABribe and ALAC were hardly used by citizens.

²³ See GII 2014 Annual Report, <https://www.tighana.org/assets/Uploads/The-2014-Annual-Report-GII.pdf>

²⁴ Reported in KII in Accra with representatives of the DPP, the Judicial Services, EOCO and CHRAJ, all of whom had agreed to participate and who had sent representatives to the first meeting in May 2017.

²⁵ FGD 2 Kumasi, June 6.

²⁶ See KII of Francis Abofra on July 21 at the Ga South District Assembly.

This recommendation was supported by the Officer at the ALAC center in Tamale, who observed that the distance between the ALAC centers in Accra and Tamale was too great. In many other FGDs, it was apparent that knowledge of the ALACs correlated with physical proximity as participants in Tamale and Yendi seemed to be more aware of them than participants elsewhere.

In attempts to make them relevant, the Consortium has introduced innovations to the reporting mechanisms. For example, the Consortium has created and publicized a WHATSAPP platform for reporting to an ALAC so that citizens can now report acts of corruption by public officials to an ALAC via WhatsApp. As noted, the Consortium has created a paper form that is taken to events, training sessions, and citizen forums so that citizens can register reports to be forwarded to an ALAC or to staffers who maintain the IPaidABribe website. Although these measures are not ideal for confidentiality and sustainability, they indicate a demand by citizens for such reporting tools. Suggestions for improving the ALACs included a need to publicize them better, staff them with legal professionals, and for the GOG to provide clients with faster response times.

Conclusions

Corruption reporting mechanisms such as “IPaidABribe” and the ALACs are gaining visibility, and acceptability. By design, the platforms cater to low literate populations, who might be the most likely to suffer from corruption, and need to report it. Internet access to the “IPaidABribe” IT platform presents an obstacle to greater patronage of this tool, and walk-ins to ALACs may be limited by location and by the need for discretion. Innovations such as paper forms and the WhatsApp have permitted the Consortium to jump these hurdles and increase patronage rates.

Nonetheless, compared to high perceived levels of corruption and the high public awareness of these tools, patronage is relatively low; there is much room for growth in the use of these outlets, and the relationship between the use of these tools and exposure of corruption should be more evident. The public may need more education on the use of and expectations for these tools before confidence in them becomes widespread.

Recommendations

USAID:

USAID should consider expanding the ALACs to a big population center like Kumasi. The Tamale location does not serve Kumasi. Based on suggestions the team received in the

KIIs and FGDs, Kumasi, because of its size and importance as Ghana’s second largest city, could have a multiplier effect for accountability reporting in the country.

Final Evaluation. Because results in Y2 showed vast improvements over Y1, the team anticipates similar rates of increase in the use of these tools in the latter half of the project. For the final evaluation, the team recommends a performance evaluation that will further assess the value of these reporting mechanisms.

Consortium Partners:

Education. Continue to educate the public on the value of citizen reporting mechanisms, how they work, and the results that can be expected. Broadcast media can be instrumental in this endeavor.

Question 2: What is the adequacy of the activity’s time frame and cost to achieve its purpose?

Per the Consortium’s Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (AMEP), the purpose of the ADISS activity is to achieve Key Objective 2, “Collaborative institutional synergies strengthened to ensure follow up on Public Accounts Committee recommendations,” and Key Objective 3, “Improved civil society reporting, tracking and advocacy for stronger anti-corruption efforts.”²⁷

The team’s findings are based on KIIs with the GII Consortium and other donors, FGDs in the districts, results of survey question 17, and the analysis of the ADISS activity’s documents. The team did not review disbursements or disbursement schedules, procurement procedures, or conduct a pipeline analysis.

Findings

Based on interviewees and FGDs, the main finding is that more time and resources are needed to achieve the activity’s objectives. This finding is predictable given the vested interests in the activity by many of the team’s interlocutors. Even so, several key informants and FGD participants advanced thoughtful, reasonable arguments in favor of extending the ADISS activity and increasing its funding.

ADISS is not a service delivery activity; it is a capacity-building, culture-changing, awareness-raising and commitment-building activity.

²⁷ See page 17 of the Cooperative Agreement.

Timeframe. First, the interlocutors felt that the social media and ICT reporting mechanisms had begun to gain traction in Y2 and that a wider use of these tools would require broader sensitization, training and outreach, and that radio programming should be expanded. Second, respondents urged that the ADISS activity's coverage be deepened and widened throughout the 50 operational districts. Third, informants thought that education and awareness-raising were long-term propositions, and in order for citizens to internalize concepts, principles, and strategies, they needed additional time to apply their knowledge and put into practice the learning they have acquired through workshops, durbars and information campaigns. For example, the "Report on the Cost of Corruption in the Health and Education Sectors in Ghana and Its Impact on The Lives of Citizens," which will further inform the public about the cost of corruption, has not yet been circulated widely enough for participants to understand its implications. Fourth, informants considered the activity's timeframe and funding unrealistic to achieve Outcome 2.1 "MMDAs actively enforce the recommendations of Public Accounts Committee (PAC)", and Outcome 3.2 "Increased investigations, sanctions and prosecution of corruption-related cases." Fifth, participants expressed a desire to see the current momentum sustained, and did not want to see their relationships with the Consortium and with USAID end. The feeling was that the ADISS activity – and more specifically ADISS-supported accountability interventions – was a partnership; it was worthwhile, needed nurturing, and has long term horizons.

In addition to the opinions shared by the interlocutors, the team observed that there were external circumstances that impacted implementation. First, the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for November and held in December 2016 distracted public sector institutions and civil society that caused delays and postponements to activities. Second, GII registration in the SAM system expired requiring re-registration from Washington, DC. No funds could be disbursed by USAID until registration was complete. Third, passage of key laws, such as the Right to Information Act and the Public Financial Management Law, requires the adoption of new regulations, and hinges on political will. Although the GII Consortium and affiliated networks have lobbied for adoption of the new regulations, passage of legislation is a complex process involving multiple stakeholders, and cannot be accomplished within a four-year time frame.²⁸

²⁸At a June 20 meeting GII Consortium members stated: "Given delays in start-up and funding disbursements, interruptions owing to the national elections, and the time required to adopt regulations to fully enact the Passage of the Public Financial Management Law, the project merits an extension."

Resources. Regarding budget, the lack of a contingency fund and inflexibility in spending limited the Consortium’s ability to respond to targets of opportunity. For example, when the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA) sought support to post license fees and other service costs, the Consortium had to find funds from other sources. Similarly, the Consortium had to find non-ADISS funds to respond to a request to support roundtables on the Office of the Special Prosecutor Bill. Otherwise, budget categories appear to be reasonably apportioned, and the team heard no concerns about pipeline. However, Ghana has experienced an average 14.5% inflation rate over the past two years and the Cedi has lost nearly 22% of its value against the dollar since the ADISS activity was launched. Typically, inflation exerts upward pressure on salaries, utilities, rents, running costs and imported items. In view of these circumstances, expectations about completion the ADISS-supported activities with the present timeframe should be adjusted accordingly.²⁹

Conclusions

A budget of approximately \$2m over four years for an activity, like the scope of the ADISS, to be implemented by national and local NGOs is reasonable. However, it could be argued that if more funds were available, public education, awareness-raising, CSO capacity-building and the addition of ALACs could be expanded. But such an expansion in all 50 districts across Ghana’s ten regions would require more resources.

The real threat to the ultimate success of the ADISS activity is time. Instilling a culture of integrity and changing social attitudes and behavior are long term propositions. It takes time to build relationships, form partnerships, and to move from cooperation to collaboration. Citizen tolerance for corruption is favorably changing, but needs continual reinforcement. Political will is fickle³⁰ and legal reform is process-intensive.

Striking the right balance between the complexity of the ADISS activity, its four-year time frame and available resources represents a significant challenge. On the bright side, the ADISS builds on the shoulders of Government Accountability Improves Trust (GAIT) and accountability foundations laid over two decades. The program’s dual-pronged, multi-sector approach is appropriate, but what can be achieved by a new Consortium within a four-year period has to be realistic.

²⁹Among the 500 replies to survey question 17, there were numerous references to financial constraints and a need for sustained funding, such as: “CSOs should focus on districts and communities and conduct massive public sensitization and awareness raising on corruption. There should be greater funding of NGOs/CSOs and CBOs activities at the grassroots.”

³⁰H. Blair and G. Hansen, “Weighing in on the Scales of Justice”, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAX280.pdf

Recommendations

For USAID:

Direct Assistance to State Institutions. If USAID stays the course with the ADISS activity's two-pronged demand, i.e., and supply-side approach, the Audit Committees will need funding to travel to the districts and conduct other essential business. Achieving the ADISS activity's objectives through public sector institutions-civil society partnerships requires that both sides be resourced, and that there be adequate time to form and operationalize the partnership.

Cost Extension. Given the delays, the process-intensive nature of the ADISS supported activities and the need to sustain the current momentum, USAID should consider a cost or no-cost extension to the ADISS activity. Such an extension should be closely tied to a revised results framework (see Annex B).

Question 3: To what extent are the ADISS interventions and structures designed to enhance sustainability and ownership of anti-corruption by state institutions, civil society, and communities?

Findings

Sustainability is one of the thorniest challenges in donor-funded programs. Supporting transparency and accountability for public services such as water, electricity, health care, etc. in emerging countries comes with many challenges. These are public goods that people want, but frequently they have to pay a bribe to get them. Where there is weak political will, lack of independence of adequately funded government accountability institutions and an ingrained culture of corruption, sustainability of anti-corruption interventions becomes more difficult. Nearly half of the FGDs (9/20) insisted that the anti-corruption movement in Ghana would continue regardless of donor assistance.³¹ But the

Box 3: Health Insurance Service Delivery Improvement in Nzema East:

"Due to ADISS we have put in measures to ensure our services are rid of corrupt practices. Our staff are very awake to what could be described as a corrupt practice and therefore very alert on duty. The Deputy Scheme Manager thinks the vigilance of staff about corruption has not only improved service delivery but also won them support from the public."

KII, July Nzema East, July 14

³¹ . FGD 2 Tamale, June 29: "It [anti-corruption interventions] will continue. Capacity will have been built; awareness is high. People will have tasted the sweetness of accountability e.g. in infrastructure (monitoring of public works)."

other half (11/20) felt that external funding would be required to continue and sustain the current momentum.³²

The team found that the ADISS activity has adopted an approach that mitigates some of the constraints to fighting corruption, and the approach reinforces sustainability. The team noted four striking design elements in this activity, which their field observations, interviews and FGDs confirm is promoting sustainable actions and outcomes.

First, USAID has placed the onus on the GII Consortium for the success or failure of the activity. The Consortium members are Ghanaian entities with a stake in the future of their country. They own the activity and will ultimately be responsible for its imprint on Ghanaian society. They cannot walk away at the end of the activity, because they have a vested interest in the interventions and will be accountable for their success or failure. Wisely, they have integrated accountability with other activities into their other sectoral interventions such as health, education, sanitation and infrastructure.

Second, the Consortium has put together a coalition of grassroots accountability organizations, supported them through funding and training, modelled appropriate behavior, mentored and coached them to strengthen their organizations. Led by Anti-Corruption Champions, who receive minimal stipends for specific assignments, the networks that have been created require minimal funding, and it is possible they will be sustainable, if they follow the Adidome example (see Box 2). The foundation and capacity that has been built up thus far, and will continue to grow over the next two years, will not vaporize when the ADISS activity reaches its completion date.

Third, the ADISS activity has raised public awareness about the risks and costs of corruption, and in concert with the grassroots CBOs' networks, has provided citizens with entry points to engage in activities, e.g., social accountability citizen report cards³³. An informed citizenry can take actions such as petitions for the right to information, letter-writing campaigns to name and shame corrupt officials, participate in durbars, town-hall meetings, and neighborhood committees. When these actions produce results, they encourage even greater participation, further enhancing the possibility of sustainability

³² . FGD 1, Aktasi, July 4: Participants are not sure of continuation of campaign. It is too early. It can only be sustained if the last 2 years are used to intensify education in all districts in the area and more local people are empowered to resist and report corruption.

³³ . The Citizen Report Card (CRC) is a simple tool, often a very short questionnaire, administered after a public service has been provided to the targeted beneficiaries. It gives public agencies systematic feedback on quality of services. See: World Bank's fact sheet: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPCENG/1143380-1116506267488/20511066/reportcardnote.pdf>.

beyond the life of the ADISS activity.

Fourth, public awareness and citizen reporting mechanisms offer communities the means to expose, prevent and curb corruption. It is probable that the ALACs and the ICT platform tools, such as IPaidABribe, will require donor support beyond the ADISS activity, unless the ADISS activity is extended with additional funding. These interventions are relatively inexpensive and will require minimal funding.

Conclusions

Handing ownership of the ADISS activity to the GII Consortium and their CBO network partners bodes well for sustainability. Sustainability is tied to the successful outcomes of their ongoing capacity-building activities such as training workshops; public information and awareness-raising; coaching and mentoring for CBOs and anti-corruption champions; citizen engagement opportunities; social accountability tools and corruption reporting mechanisms; and partnerships between the CSOs and state institutions, although this is the weakest link in the sustainability chain. All of these contribute to sustainability, as well as enhancing the activity's impact, if CHRAJ, NCCE, PAC, EOCO and others

become genuinely independent and adequately resourced. These institutions have a will and a desire to execute their mandates, but in the absence of political will at higher levels, it will be difficult to make such partnerships viable and collaborative going forward.

Perhaps most encouraging to the team was the presence of nascent grassroots accountability coalitions consisting of small, but vigorous organizations like LANets, SACs, and DCMCs. These were mentioned elsewhere in this report as the seeds of a growing constituency for reform for a culture of integrity. Visible wins at the district level can nourish this vibrancy.

Recommendations

Not much can be added to sustain actions beyond what the ADISS activity is already doing. However, the team offers the suggested recommendations below:

Box 4: Change of reactions in Yendi:

An anticorruption champion described one community dialogue: "At the beginning of the meeting, participants were very pessimistic about the success of the anti-corruption campaign, but when the municipal director of NCCE explained corruption and its forms, the response was greater openness and less pessimism: they discovered they could do something."

USAID:

Donor Coordination. USAID should consider joining forces with DFID and other donors in a more concerted fashion to leverage and sustain collective gains. Ghana STAR I showed glimmers of success that sent a message to the GOG and to civil society that the international community was united to assist Ghanaian citizens to honor their government's commitments to UNCAC and other accountability protocols. As Ghana enters middle-income country status, Ghanaians are proud of their political-economic achievements, but they realize how fragile and volatile they are and they must be sustained.

Consortium Partners:

Stay Focused on Capacity-building. Re-double efforts to assess and strengthen the capacity of the CBO accountability networks. Develop coaching and mentoring plans for select CBOs' members such as their leadership, traditional authorities, faith-based leaders – as well as and District Assemblymen and women - who want probity in public affairs. The CBOs represent organic, voluntary and mass member organizations linking average citizens to their communities and larger concerns. Adding value to individuals and organizations is lasting, and constitutes a tangible contribution of ADISS.

Pick Low-hanging Fruit. Consortium partners and their networks should take a fresh look at where they can find quick wins. These might include weekly media reports on results of "IPaidABribe", radio call-in programs and talk shows around citizen action to uncover, resist, prevent or pursue anti-corruption in the community, town or district.

Master the Tools. Effective tools live beyond the project. Continue to educate the public through media and the CBOs' networks about the benefits of the ADISS activity's tools and how to use them. Successful use of tools can stimulate and sustain accountability efforts.

Dig in for the Long-Haul. Develop and launch social accountability programs such as Report Cards, Score Cards and performance ratings, use information from accountability engagements with governments in town hall, and palaver tree meetings and public hearings, participatory budgeting, and neighborhood mutual accountability programs. Form mutual accountability pacts between the Consortium, state and network partners. These accountability methods can harness the ideas and energy of youth and women, and prepare them to be accountability advocates.

Emphasize Outcomes. As mentioned elsewhere, monitoring and reporting on higher level

results will help shift the focus of the ADISS activity away from outputs and toward greater impacts and sustainable results (see Annex B).

Implement the Exit Strategy. Pursuant to the work plan,³⁴ the Consortium has formulated an exit strategy.³⁵ As the project moves closer to Y3, the ADISS activity's stakeholders need to take stock and ensure that they are on track to making the plan operational.

Sub-Question 1: Given a change in government and a new GOG Administration and newly articulated strategies to combat corruption - how relevant are the two primary project objectives?

Findings

The two primary objectives are Key Objective 1, "Collaborative institutional synergies strengthened to ensure follow up on Public Accounts Committee recommendations," and Key Objective 2, "Improved civil society reporting, tracking and advocacy for stronger anti-corruption efforts."³⁶

Ghana's electoral democracy is a beacon for Africa, and 2016 marks the third time that the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) have peaceably traded places as the party in power. However, patronage drives competition in Ghana's neo-patrimonial, client list system, and the dominant parties vie for supremacy based on rent-seeking, spoils and political favors.

Combatting corruption has featured in every recent government agenda. Institutions such as CHRAJ and EOCO have risen from these platforms. However, these administrative innovations are exceptional, and most often campaign promises go unfulfilled. Lately the tendency has been to pander to public sentiments and to punish highly visible offenders, if they belong to another party, depending on who is in power. Neither major party wishes to expose loyal members, which not only would give the party a black eye, but also jeopardize support.

At an Anti-Corruption event in October 2015, former President Mahatma's Deputy Chief of Staff underscored the urgency of the matter: "the time to get involved is not now, it

³⁴Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity. 2017. Year Three Workplan Narrative (1St October 2016 – 30 September 2017). Accra: ADISS. P. 4. Emphasis added.

³⁵A forward-looking FGD participant in Akatsi (July 4) raised the issue with his question: "Do they have an exit plan?"

³⁶ See page 17 of the Cooperative Agreement.

was yesterday.”³⁷ In February 2017, barely a month after being sworn in, Vice President Mahmudur Batumi vowed that the Administration would pass the Right to Information (RTI) Act, set up a Special Prosecutor’s Office and amend the criminal code to make corruption a felony.³⁸

The new Administration’s rhetoric is encouraging, but based on the past, FGD participants and KII informants were unconvinced that the government would keep its promises. As Table 7 indicates, respondents displayed a healthy skepticism regarding government pronouncements, but did show more confidence for change at district levels.³⁹

Table 7: Results of the Evaluation’s Survey as Compared to the Baseline Survey Results

Evaluation Survey			
Statements	Agree	Disagree	Neutral
The District Assembly and other state agencies are working to stop corruption	54%	28%	18%
Current laws are sufficient to help stop corruption	47%	37%	15%
Current corruption laws need modification and additions	91%	4%	5%
Baseline Report⁴⁰			
Assessment of government actions in the fight against corruption	Effective	Ineffective	Neither
	40%	50%	10%

Conclusions

Successive administrations have campaigned on corruption platforms promising to prosecute offenders, institute new policies and take stricter measures against corruption. Most promises have gone unfulfilled. Exceptions to the rule include the adoption of National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) in 2011 and CHRAJ’s commitment to roll out the plan.⁴¹ The foundational issue is that Ghana’s elites benefit from its neo-patrimonial system built on finding and keeping loyal supporters and rewarding them with patronage and favors. The new broom in town is unlikely to abandon the status quo.

That said, associational life in Ghana is flourishing, and CSOs enjoy space in which to

³⁷Graphic Online. Oct. 21, 2015, Government Committed to Fighting Corruption. Mr. Osei Kofi at an inaugural ceremony of the National Ethics Advisory Committee (NEAC) and the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) Monitoring and Evaluation Committee.

³⁸. Daily Guide, Feb 3, 2017

³⁹. FGD 1 Ga South, July 21

⁴⁰. JMK Consulting. 2015. Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Project. Baseline Survey Report. Final Report. Accra: GII Consortium. P. 19.

⁴¹. Ghana News Agency, April 26, 2013

operate. The average Ghanaian is better informed regarding the costs, risks and dangers associated with corruption. Ghana's media is vibrant and vigorous and is professionalizing. Investigative journalists have scored highly visible wins. The middle class is educated and growing. Together these forces represent constituencies for reform.

The bottom line is that most reforms typically occur within a new administration's first two years. Political support for passage of bills such as the Right to Information (RTI) will be at their highest levels over the next 16 months. The best timing to push on Key Objectives 1 and 2 is now.

Recommendations

USAID:

Coalition of the Willing. A version of this recommendation appears elsewhere, but is relevant to this topic. Join forces with like-minded donors to apply pressure on the GOG to honor Ghana's commitment to United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), to implement key provisions within NACAP and to encourage passage of essential laws such as the RTI. Press the GOG to turn political rhetoric into results.

Consortium Partners:

Targets of Opportunity. Collaborative efforts between and among CSOs and state institutions to date have borne little fruit. To build confidence and momentum, select 1-2 key targets – low hanging fruit – harness the power of CBOs, and make a concerted effort with key state institutions to achieve one or two highly visible wins.

Stay the Course. District-level accountability efforts fly under the radar, but they are the building blocks of institutional checks and balances. Continue to strengthen citizen engagement with the Municipal, Metropolitan and District Assemblies (MMDAs) for transparent and accountable service delivery in health, education, water, sanitation, rural development and infrastructure.

Sub-Question 2: What are the opportunities and challenges in working with state institutions and anti – corruption CSOs?

Findings

State Institutions.

The overarching challenge working with state institutions is political will. As described in the introduction to this report, corruption in Ghana is not perceived to be as pervasive as

in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the trends are negative, and public perception is that corruption is getting worse. In Ghana's neo-patrimonial system, public assets and offices are the spoils that go to the victor. Even the major parties have alternated at the ballot box, and the party in power rewards its constituents with political favors, lucrative contracts, and plum rent-seeking positions. Consequently, the opportunities are limited due to shifting, uneven and generally weak political will for reform.

Weak political will for accountability stifles leadership, independence, resourcing, and prosecutions. NCCE and CHRAJ managers conceded that their lack of funding has constrained their collaboration with the Consortium and its networks.⁴² The Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) report dismissed CHRAJ "as largely ineffectual."⁴³ Public officials and CSO leaders alike expressed pessimism regarding the future of the CSO-state institution partnerships because "government only paid lip service to the fight against corruption."⁴⁴ Failure to prosecute known offenders was disheartening to communities as expressed in FGDs in Adidome (July 3rd) and in Nzema East (July 14). Responses to Q17 of the survey triangulated these findings. Forty-two respondents mentioned the need for punishment and 97 respondents cited the need to enforce laws on corruption.

NCCE's predicament illustrates the severity of underfunding. NCCE has been providing civic education to schools and communities since 1993, but because of dwindling funding, the agency can barely pay its staff. In-service training and actual site assessments are things of the past. Field visits are possible only because of the ADISS activity's support. An NCCE director declared: "Corruption is not a topic to talk about periodically. [Discussion] needs to be continuous and visible, and invigorating. We must find ways to go to the communities."⁴⁵ The team notes, however, that unless agencies like NCCE maintain and increase their capacity they will become obsolete.

Public agencies are buffeted by political challenges as well. In the Akatsi FGD, a member of the District Assembly admitted that it would be difficult to curb corruption because politicians needed money to run for office and campaign contributors expect to be reimbursed with favors. Furthermore, the party takes its percentage off the top of agency

⁴² KII: July 4.

⁴³ Adam Smith International. 2016. STAAC Inception Phase Report. Accra: Adam Smith International.

⁴⁴ KII: June 29.

⁴⁵ KII: June 29

allocations.

These challenges are formidable, but Ghana's accountability institutions are staffed by many well-intentioned individuals. Given the chance, they are ready to contribute to working with their CSO counterparts to enhance scrupulousness and decency in public affairs.

CSOs.

Political will is less a factor in working with CSOs, but it handicaps efforts to establish collaborative relationships that the ADISS activity seeks to foster. The time and energy devoted to establishing cooperation and collaboration divert attention from more productive activities, and dilute the interventions' impacts.

Unpredictable, inconsistent, and gaps in funding present other challenges. Few national NGOs qualify for direct funding, and those that do must adapt to donor project cycles, rules and restrictions. NGOs scramble to keep staff, maintain a modicum of activity, and avoid losing credibility with beneficiaries. Loss of momentum is a well-documented hazard of interventions. The struggle to stay afloat can lead to unhealthy competition between and among CSOs.⁴⁶

Capacity deficiencies, especially personnel turnover in the CSO sector, also plague progress. Agencies spend considerable time and money training CSO members, only to discover that groups have dissolved or members have left their organizations. Additionally, the non-hierarchical structure of the CSOs' umbrellas and networks makes it difficult to know who to train and where to concentrate resources.

Despite these perennial challenges, there are good reasons to support civil society efforts to promote accountability. The CSOs provide checks on government performance. The CBOs maintain close ties to the average citizen. Faith-based organizations provide a moral compass for society, and the media encourages and informs critique and advocates for reforms. As linkage institutions, these change agents can be instrumental in horizontal and vertical bridging, thereby strengthening social cohesion for stable growth and

⁴⁶See also: West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) 2017, "The State Of Civil Society Organizations' Sustainability In Ghana. Striving, Surviving or Thriving? Accra: WACSI. The report identifies financial sustainability as a key element in the survival and flourishing of CSOs.

peaceful change in Ghana.⁴⁷

There are good models for cooperation and collaboration in Ghana to emulate:

- CDD cooperates frequently with SEND Ghana and GACC, particularly through funding from the West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI)⁴⁸;
- GII cooperated with GACC and CDD in the preparation of three roundtables on the proposed Office of Special Prosecutor Bill⁴⁹;
- GACC is itself a cross-sectoral coalition of public, private and CSO institutions/organizations, which by its composition and nature stimulates collaboration⁵⁰; and
- GII started the ALAC Steering Committee in late April-early May 2017 with invitations to EOCO, CHRAJ, and DPP of the Ministry of Justice and Attorney-General's Department (MOJAGD), the Judicial Service and the Ghana Audit Service, among others. These efforts presented significant opportunities to translate these good relationships into a sustainable working relationship between the public institutions and the anti-corruption CSOs.
- STAAC plans to support GACC's current strategic planning exercise, as it reviews its implementation of its past strategy and develops its new strategy for the term ahead.

Conclusions

A conclusion could be reached that the challenges to working with state institutions and CSOs far outweigh the opportunities. However, internal and external checks and balances are vital to healthy institutional performance, and the struggle to optimize them never ends. As a CSO representative observed, "serious responses to the reporting of corruption [are needed] to encourage an increase in reporting...Civil society is doing a lot, but where are the responses? Look at Anas, 'nothing happened, no prosecutions.' It is the response to the complaints that is important; otherwise people will not be encouraged." Addressed creatively and innovatively, challenges such as this can be opportunities.

Recommendations

To USAID:

⁴⁷See Adam Smith International. 2016. STAAC Inception Phase Report. Accra: Adam Smith International.

⁴⁸ . KII of Senior Programmes Director of CDD.

⁴⁹ See <http://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/recruitment-process-of-special-prosecutor-must-be-transparent.html>

⁵⁰ See institutional membership of GACC at http://gaccgh.org/maincat_select.cfm?corpnews_catid=5#.WXimHLpFytC

Take Stock. To promote cooperation, collaboration and non-competitive behaviors, and to seize opportunities jointly, invite the ADISS Consortium's partners and accountability sector donors to participate in a stock-taking exercise. Sponsor the event along with sharing the results of the mid-term evaluation.

Joint Exercises with DFID. Join with DFID in lobbying for the beneficial ownership of company shares legislation, since this is a DFID priority. In turn, seek DFID and EU collaboration in intensifying pressure on the GOG for passage of the RTI.

Consortium Partners:

Reinforce Advocacy. Build upon the collaborative relationships manifested by the public accountability institutions' participation in the GACC and on the ALAC Steering Committee to advocate and lobby for the passage of the regulations necessary to implement the Audit Committee and PAC recommendations.

Reinforce Lobbying. Achieve a demonstrable success or win such as advocacy, letter-writing and lobbying for the passage of the RTI Bill, amendment to the Asset Declaration provisions of the Code of Conduct of Public Officers, or regulations and funding for the Audit Committees to fulfil their mandates under the Public Financial Management (PFM) law. Although passage of laws and funding disbursements rest with the GOG, pressure on the GOG for transparency and results in one or two areas could produce results. Magnify the reach and effect of the effort by involving journalists and the media, including social media.

Summary Conclusions

- At the mid-point, ADISS appears to be on track to achieving its targets as defined by its performance indicators. More clarity in the Results Framework and less reliance on output indicators going forward will increase confidence in this finding. ADISS has performed best in regards to CSO capacity-building, CBO network strengthening, and raising public awareness about the risks and costs of corruption. The effectiveness of the consortium partners themselves has been boosted by their extensive experience and good reputations in their respective districts.
- ICT and ALAC corruption reporting mechanisms are providing citizens with outlets to report corruption, but the uptake has been weak. The use of "IPaidABribe" increased significantly in Y2 after it became available off-line. Further adjustments and modifications to these tools, and increased public awareness of them are needed.
- ADISS's weakest link has been its pursuit and prosecution of corruption, and follow up by state-civil society coalitions on Public Accounts Committee (PAC)

recommendations. The absence of political will to capacitate and fund public accountability institutions, has contributed to low performance.

- Perhaps ADISS's greatest strength is its support to grassroots networks of citizens and accountability CBOs. These actors represent a growing constituency for reform, which is fostering a culture of integrity throughout ADISS districts. If nurtured and sustained, this movement could be ADISS's most lasting contribution to enhanced accountability in Ghana.

Annexes

Annex A: Statement of Work

Annex B: Results Framework Development

Annex C: Mission Schedule

Annex D: Survey Questionnaire

Annex E: Survey Analysis

Annex F: Analysis of Informants Data

Annex G: Key Informant Interview Guidelines: Generic

Annex H: Focus Group Discussions Guidelines of Themes: Generic

Annex I: List of Documents and Other Sources

ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF WORK⁵¹

PURPOSE

The purpose of the performance evaluation is to assess the performance of the Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening (ADISS) activity and the implementing partner, the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) Consortium since October 30, 2014 against the activity's goal, benchmarks, and associated results (both outputs and outcomes). This is to enable USAID to determine how well the activity has performed, and the appropriateness and adequacy of its implementation strategies and methodologies. The findings will inform the continuous implementation of the ADISS activity, and will also inform future programming and project designs in the accountability and anti-corruption sector. The findings may also be shared widely with Government of Ghana (GOG) and other civil society organizations engaged in fighting corruption and promoting accountability and transparency in government processes and service delivery, and other donors working on anti-corruption and transparency issues in the country. The audience of the performance evaluation will be USAID/Ghana Mission, the Democracy, Rights and Governance (DRG) Office of USAID/Ghana, the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) Consortium, and other state institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) working to improve transparency and reduce corruption in Ghana.

In accord with the guidelines of USAID's Evaluation Policy, USAID Ghana seeks to contract professional services to conduct a third-party mid-term performance evaluation of its Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) program scheduled for completion on September 30, 2018. This evaluation will appraise the program at its current juncture of just over two years completed within a four-year timeframe to determine the following:

- 1) Learn to what extent the activity has performed per the award work plan projected activities, outputs and results;
- 2) Measure the appropriateness of the activity's strategies (including outreach and communication activities) and methodology employed to promote accountability and combat corruption through national — based mechanisms;
- 3) Assess the adequacy of the activity's timeframe and cost to achieve its goal and objectives;
- 4) To determine the extent to which systems and processes to enhance sustainability of interventions and structures are being implemented and institutionalized

⁵¹ . From the February 24, 2017 RFTOP

across the project;

Provide future recommendations for USAID/Ghana to effectively address anti — corruption measures.

BACKGROUND

Country context

Corruption in Ghana's public sector constitutes the development problem this project seeks to address. Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer (2013) identifies public sector corruption in Ghana as a major development problem. Thirty-five percent (35%) of respondents report that over the last two years corruption in Ghana has increased a lot. Sixty-six percent (66%) report that the educational system is corrupt and 71% feel the judiciary is corrupt. Again, the Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey results released in 2012 also indicates that most Ghanaians view public officials as corrupt.

Ghana currently has two significant deficits about fighting this canker. Civil society does not gather necessary information nor mobilize advocacy to ensure accountability within government. The Ghanaian government does not carry out a vital role that only the government can fill: enforcement of administrative or criminal sanctions and improvement of policies resulting from exposure of malfeasance. Thus, corruption persists at high-levels and economic development faces barriers.

Since independence Ghana has pursued several public policies to reduce corruption. These include the public execution of persons for corruption, the passage of draconian decrees that imposed long custodial sentences on corrupt public officials, the promotion of a policy of zero tolerance for corruption, and the seizure of assets believed to be dishonestly acquired. Currently the country has several laws designed to combat corruption and economic crimes. These include the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663), the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003 (Act 658), Whistle Blowers Act 2006, (Act 720), and the Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act 654), and the Public Office Holders - Declaration of Assets and Disqualification Act, 1998 (Act 550) and others. However, the limited and somewhat selective enforcement of these laws and the slow sanctioning of culpable public officials are impeding progress in the fight against corruption. Though it is acknowledged that some governmental effort, both past and present, has been invested in enforcing these laws, the results only paint half-hearted efforts to stem the rising tide of corruption in Ghana.

Non-state institutions such as the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC), SEND-Ghana

and the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), a local chapter of Transparency International, have joined the fight to reduce corruption and advocate the full implementation of applicable laws. These CSOs have over the years been particularly active in advocating the need for civil society to hold public officials accountable for their actions.

Project overview

To address these challenges, in 2014 USAID/Ghana initiated the four-year US \$ 1,972,000 ADISS activity. ADISS' purpose is to renew and build upon on-going anti-corruption efforts and increase the capacities of anti-corruption Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to motivate citizens to apply pressure on policy makers and institutions with the aim of reducing corruption in Ghana. The ADISS activity is being implemented in fifty (50) districts across the ten regions of Ghana. The activity seeks to achieve the following two key objectives:

1. Strengthen collaborative institutional synergies to ensure follow-up on Public Accounts Committee recommendations; and
2. Improve civil society reporting, tracking and advocacy for stronger anti-corruption efforts.


By working through civil society organizations (CSOs), USAID seeks to build the capacity of transparency and accountability of civil society organizations to successfully carry out lobbying and advocacy campaigns which can be applied to all relevant legislation reform processes and parliamentary action, and to maximize citizen documentation and information on corrupt acts using ICT and social media platforms. By working with CSOs, ADISS is intended to increase use of anti — corruption reporting mechanisms and institutions by citizens, increase investigations, sanctions and prosecution of corruption — related cases, support Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) to actively enforce the recommendations of Public Accounts. Committee (PAC), increase civil society

By working with CSOs, ADISS is intended to increase use of anti – corruption reporting mechanisms and institutions by citizens, increase investigations, sanctions and prosecution of corruption – related cases, support Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) to actively enforce the recommendations of Public Accounts Committee (PAC), increase civil society engagement in effective direct lobbying and law reform advocacy, and strengthened Advocacy and Legal Advice Center (ALAC) for citizens' reporting and documentation of corruption-related cases.

The result of these interventions should be increased advocacy by civil society for legislative change related to accountability and increased documentation and exposure

of corruption through civil society reporting mechanisms. The degree to which these results are being achieved and the efficacy of the strategies being used in the implementation of the activity will be assessed in this performance evaluation. Below is the Results Framework of the activity:

**Figure 1:
Results Framework of ADISS**



OBJECTIVE

Evaluation objectives and scope

The overall objective of the mid — term performance evaluation is to assess the performance of the ADISS activity and the performance of the implementing partner, the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) Consortium since 2014 against the activity goals, benchmarks, and associated results (both outputs and outcomes). The mid-term performance evaluation will also provide important recommendations for USAID to consider in future anti-corruption and accountability programming. The evaluation should:

- Gather data indicative of the success or failure of specific interventions in achieving the expected results identified in Cooperative Agreement 641-A-00-14-00007 between USAID and the activity implementer.
- Indicate whether the interventions are designed and being implemented in a manner that is likely to achieve the expected results within the allotted timeframe.
- Consider how ADISS has successfully or unsuccessfully built upon previous anti-corruption programming and the status of the sector for future initiatives.
- Provide technical and broad recommendations for improvements or changes in the approach and any other suggestions to maximize the effectiveness of the ADISS activity
- Provide recommendations for future USAID anti — corruption and accountability - related programs given the entrenched challenges for USAID to have greater impact.

STATEMENT OF WORK

The following are the research questions, and may be modified upon further discussions with the selected contractor.

1) How has the ADISS Activity performed to achieve project results?

This question focuses on the overall progress of the activity over its years of implementation towards agreed activity targeted outputs, purpose, and outcomes. Other sub-questions to be answered include:

- To what extent are the strategies (including outreach, collaboration and communication activities) and the methodology being employed by ADISS, effective in promoting accountability and contributing towards combatting

corruption? This question seeks to identify the appropriateness and adequacy of the methodology being used by the GII Consortium to combat corruption and what impact has been made.

- Which medium has been most effective for citizens to report incidences of corruption to CSOs and the relevant state authorities in Ghana, and in what contexts?
- Has civil society reporting mechanisms such as the establishment of the "IPaidABribe" ICT platform, the use of social media and ICT, and the decentralization of the Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) increased exposure of corruption?
- Which activities have not been implemented as agreed upon in the cooperative agreement and work plans, and the reasons for, and impacts of such deviations, if any?
- Are there evidences to show that CSO monitoring of corruption increase incidents of successful sanctioning (administrative reforms or criminal prosecutions)?

2) What is the adequacy of the activity's timeframe and cost to achieve its purpose? Specifically, the Consultant should address the sub — questions below:

- Is the four-year period adequate to achieve the targeted results of the activity?
- Is the total amount allocated adequate to achieve the targeted results of the activity?
- What recommendations if any, could be made to ensure that key results are captured?

3) To what extent are the ADISS interventions and structures designed to enhance sustainability and ownership of anti-corruption by State institutions, Civil Society and communities?

Specifically, the Consultants should address the following questions

- Given a change in government and a new Government of Ghana Administration and newly articulated strategies to combat corruption - how relevant are the two primary project objectives?
- How is ADISS perceived by especially targeted CSOs and anti — corruption state institutions?

- What structures or measures of sustainability and ownership has ADISS developed, and how were they developed?
- What is the extent of effectiveness of these measures of sustainability in addressing public sector corruption in Ghana?
- What are the opportunities and challenges in working with state institutions and anti-corruption CSOs?

4) What are specific recommendations for the ADISS activity to improve on effectiveness and results?

- Are there mid-program adjustments, if any, that could improve the effectiveness of the Activity?
- What changes if any, are needed in program objectives or in methods and approaches related to working with CSOs, communities and State institutions.
- How effective and efficient has the consortium been in working as a unit towards targeted results?

5) What are future recommendations for USAID to effectively address corruption in Ghana?

- Beyond ADISS, what are other measures that USAID needs to consider in future programming to make greater impact on corruption?
- How can USAID leverage other programmatic interventions (i.e. in health, education, economic growth), to further the impact of anti-corruption efforts?
- How can USAID leverage the work of other donors and international organizations also working on anti-corruption?
- What additional approaches or interventions should USAID consider?

Methodology

The evaluator is required to develop an evaluation design detailing the proposed evaluation methodologies, sampling strategy, data collection methods, data collection tools, data analysis plan, limitations, and implementation and management approach for the overall conduct of the performance evaluation. The evaluator is encouraged to propose methodologies that yield the highest — quality and most credible evidence that corresponds to the research questions, taking into consideration time, budget and other practical considerations. A case study design is being suggested to the evaluators to help

USAID gain an in — depth understanding of how ADISS is being implemented to achieve its targeted results, and to what extent the ADISS interventions and structures are being designed to enhance sustainability and ownership of anti-corruption. The key elements of the evaluation design will be shared with the implementers of the ADISS activity and USAID before being finalized.

It is suggested that the evaluator uses qualitative and quantitative methods to gather in-depth information in responding to all the research questions and objectives of the performance evaluation. This will include both in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The evaluator is expected to draw the study sample from about 20%- 30% out of the 50 districts. Both quantitative and qualitative data collection instruments, such as questionnaire, focus group discussions and in-depth key informant interviews, etc., are expected to be used by the contractor in gathering data to address the objectives of the performance evaluation.

USAID estimates that the methodology will utilize in-depth interviews with key informants on corruption, including officials of government, anti-corruption specialists, community leaders, local civil society organizations and other international donors. USAID also encourages the use of focus group discussions evenly spread across the project implementation districts (list of districts attached) to elicit information about how the activity has performed, and the extent to which structures for sustainability have been established and institutionalized.

The rigor and feasibility of the proposed research design and methodology to addressing the objectives of the study will factor into the technical evaluation processes by the Technical Evaluation Committee. USAID requests that the evaluator also complete the following table as part of its detailed design and evaluation plan.'

Evaluation question	Data source	Data collection method (including sampling methodology) where applicable)	Data analysis method
How has the ADISS Activity performed to achieve project results?			

Evaluation question	Data source	Data collection method (including sampling methodology) where applicable)	Data analysis method
What is the adequacy of the activity's timeframe and cost to achieve its purpose?			
To what extent are the ADISS interventions and structures designed to enhance sustainability and ownership of anti-corruption by State institutions, Civil Society			
What are specific recommendations for the ADISS activity to improve on effectiveness and			
What are future recommendations for USAID to effectively address			

Data sources:

The evaluation should utilize, but not be limited to, information from the following sources:

- Cooperative Agreement AID 641-A-14-00007.
- Quarterly reports submitted so far to USAID/Ghana.
- Interviews with recipient and sub-grantees, and public institution representatives such as of the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the Ghana Audit Service (GAS), the Attorney-General's Office, the Internal Audit Agency, the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO), the Ghana Police Service, the Judicial Service and the Public Procurement Authority, Ministry of Justice and Attorney General's office.
- Site visits related to USAID anti-corruption programming districts.

- Data sources related to public sector corruption, national corruption - related scores, other government statistics, organization coordination, and trainings.
- Targeted focus groups of government representatives at the national and district levels, civil society representatives, private sector representatives, and others. At least one focus group should involve citizens who participated in activities intended to sensitize the public on the cost and effect of corruption, and means of minimizing its incidence.
- Document review, including all relevant implementer and USAID reports and memoranda and any informative secondary literature, including public surveys.

ANNEX B: RESULTS FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT

This report has already noted challenges related to the ADISS results framework and the reporting against it, which proved to be a hindrance to effective evaluation. Indeed, this is one of the more significant findings from this mid-term evaluation. Further, in line with the recommendation for further focus in the second half of the ADISS activity, revisiting of the logic behind the RF and making some changes to its structure, may be in order. With this in mind, an additional section has been added here to provide some evidence regarding these issues and suggestions on possible solutions.

Current reporting challenges

In conducting the evaluation, the team encountered a significant inconsistency across reporting documents regarding particularly the level of results and indicators, as demonstrated by the following few examples:

- Fifth Quarter Progress Report (Oct.-Dec. 2015). Component 2, Outcome 1: Established collaborative relationships between CSOs, accountability institutions and other stakeholders to fight corruption. This outcome was Output 2 in the Year One Work Plan (Sept. 2014-Sept. 2015).
- First annual report for 2015 lists in the table of contents six outcomes, but the body of the report describes six outputs. The second annual report gives a list of five outcomes.
- January to March 2016 Progress Report. Component 2, Output 4: Increased monitoring of PAC recommendations and ARIC's actions on them. This output was listed as an Objective in the Fifth Quarter Progress Report (Oct.-Dec. 2015).
- April-June 2016 Progress Report (April-June 2016). Outcome 2: Strengthening ALAC for citizen's reporting and documentation of corruption-related cases appears for the first time in ADISS report (as worded).
- January-March 2017 Progress Report (Jan.-March 2017) lists three outcomes, but the comment by USAID indicated that there should be five outcomes.

This inconsistency created a challenge for the team in terms of understanding the hierarchy and importance of results and what was actually achieved, making assessment of performance difficult.⁵² This was exacerbated by a style of activity reporting that mainly lists activities as "planned" vs. "achieved," with varying levels of detail. This format permits

⁵² For example, it was difficult to accurately measure and track progress in quarterly reports because of the fluctuations in the number, types, and labeling of results.

rapid determination of whether activities were implemented, but lacks analysis regarding the “how and why” of successes and shortfalls. The observed gains from the significant number of interventions would be more readily disseminated and analyzed if ADISS progress reports were less output-based (see below), and if the results frameworks followed a more consistent pattern, or at least if changes from quarter to quarter were documented and explained.

Clarifying and Re-assessing the Logic Model

Part of the challenge for moving beyond output reporting, in the team’s assessment, is a need to re-examine the logic and assumptions of the results framework. Two factors are most important in this regard:

- Assumptions about government performance in response to civil society mobilization.
- Clarity about cause and effect between the output and outcome and goal level.⁵³

Regarding assumptions, the implied theory of change in both Outcome 2.1 and Outcome 3.2 in the original RF and the new RF (and the goal statement in the new RF) is that “IF civil society and citizens are more active in identifying corruption and pressing for government action, THEN government will respond with the desired actions.” However, if anti-corruption specialists have learned anything in the past 20 years of work in governance and development, it is that there are deeply-rooted political-economic dynamics that drive corruption, with patronage and mutual protection being a core mechanism for holding together electoral coalitions and other, more informal, networks of influence. Very rarely do those in power change these patterns on their own, even when successive governments make fighting corruption a central message of their campaigns. In Ghana, as in many other countries, decades of successful elections and generally stable governance have not fundamentally altered this dynamic, as evidenced by years of poor performance on corruption indices and in the “court of public opinion.”

It is not unheard of for civil society pressure to have some positive influence on actions like prosecutions and improved management of public resources, but the examples are

⁵³ In this discussion, both the original and the new RF are considered; hence, the use of “goal” in this statement, which does not appear in the original RF.

few enough—especially in the absence of broad-based social movements⁵⁴ or highly independent prosecutorial powers.⁵⁵ With evidence lacking of such a major change in Ghana, the assumption that new levels of prosecutions will result from the ADISS activity's inputs is fraught with uncertainty, at best. The activity's limited progress on this issue seems to bear this out. This, along with the issue of concentrating limited resources for greatest impact, is the key reason for the evaluation's recommendation to reduce or remove emphasis on reporting cases or getting prosecutions. Even the remaining results area focused on PAC recommendations will require significant steps to be taken by the government, e.g., adoption of necessary regulations to implement the new Public Financial Management Law, allocation of resources to the former ARICs/now Audit Committees), and concentrating on these would give the ADISS activity the opportunity to create more momentum in a narrower area.

Regarding the second issue—cause and effect between outputs and outcomes—the team observes that, for instance, sub-IR 1.2.1 (and in the new RF, the goal statement) puts capacity as the main outcome, while Outcome 1.1 (and outcome 1 in the new RF) are generally the result of capacity rather than the precursor to it. Confusion as to the level of results was also caused by the fact that in the first AMEP, it was not always clear which indicators were meant to be at the output level, and which at the outcome level, which confirms the evaluation team's analysis. This seems to have improved in the 2016 AMEP.

Identifying meaningful results indicators

It is evident from the new RF that USAID is seeking to simplify and clarify the results and the reporting. The current version represents some *positive developments*, including:

- Removal of the Transparency International CPI as an outcome indicator. The CPI is notoriously difficult to interpret without significant additional information, and small changes are generally within the margin of error and are not likely to indicate real differences in a country's performance from one year to another.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ For example, the massive public protests in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador that led to major prosecutions (including of a sitting President) in Guatemala, and the establishment of stronger anti-impunity units in Honduras and El Salvador. See Eric L. Olson, "A Glimmer of Hope in Central America," Feb. 24, 2016, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/glimmer-hope-central-america>.

⁵⁵ As is the case with the broad-reaching "car wash" scandal investigations in Brazil. But even in this case the political power structure has been able to push back when investigations reached the highest levels. See VOA News, "Brazil Shutting Down 'Car Wash' Corruption Task Force," 6 July 2017. <https://www.voanews.com/a/brazil-car-wash-corruption-task-force/3932189.html>

⁵⁶ See the discussion of the CPI in U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, "How-to guide to corruption assessment tools," *U4 Expert*

- Inclusion of a more targeted output indicator (# of ARIC dialogue sessions held) under Outcome 2 (though this indicator may not be as useful if it relies on resources being provided to ARICs/Audit Committees that have not been forthcoming up to now).
- Inclusion of a strong outcome-level indicator for Outcome 2 (% of audit recommendations implemented by MDAs and MMDAs, though this may be made more feasible by narrowing to a percentage of *targeted* recommendations, if the list of recommendations is quite long.
- A reduced number of output indicators, which may help move the ADISS activity toward more focused attention to achieving results at the outcome level.

We note, however, that the USAID standard indicators included at the outcome level under Outcome 1 and at the output level for Outcome 2 have not been well-defined in the AMEPs up to now. Especially for Outcome 1, a clear definition of what, exactly, is expected to count as a “USG-supported anti-corruption measure,” and what constitutes its “implementation,” is needed in order for this indicator to be used as a meaningful measure of the ADISS activity’s performance.⁵⁷ One option in this regard would be to target selected actions on an annual basis. This would help with defining the strategic focus of the ADISS activity for the year and also provide a stronger basis for learning whether such a strategic focus improves achievement of results. A similar review and refinement should be made of the standard indicator under Output 2.

Additionally, with regard to Output 2, the team also proposes consideration of whether there are other relevant ways to assess responsiveness and accountability of government to citizens, beyond the PAC recommendations (given the prior actions by Parliament and government that are required but outside the control of the project). For instance, many of the advocacy initiatives the team learned about during field visits had to do with oversight of construction or other public services, e.g., a poorly constructed school in Adidome. It might be possible to measure outcomes in terms of public service issues addressed, for instance with citizen report card measures.⁵⁸

Answer, 2013. <http://www.u4.no/publications/how-to-guide-for-corruption-assessment-tools/>; and also Jetson Leder-Luis, “The 2016 CPI and the Value of Corruption Perceptions,” *Global Anti-Corruption Blog* 10 February 2017. <https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2017/02/10/the-2016-cpi-and-the-value-of-corruption-perceptions/>

⁵⁷ In the past two AMEPs, the generic definition of the indicator is used, and it is not clear if the “actions” listed in the Indicator Reference Sheet are the targeted actions to be “implemented” in a year. The fact that these remained the same from one year to the next, and that they do not track well with the actions listed in the “targets” table, suggest they are not.

⁵⁸ See Pekkonen, Anu, “Citizen Report Cards,” http://www.pgexchange.org/images/toolkits/PGX_H_Citizen%20Report%20Cards.pdf.

With regard to Outcome 3, the evaluation has already recommended that this outcome be jettisoned to allow greater focus on achieving more probable outcomes. However, if it is decided that the ADISS activity will continue in this vein, USAID may want to consider whether lower-level indicators—somewhere between citizens reporting and government acting—may be more appropriate. For instance, this could be a place for strong collaboration between the ADISS Consortium and journalists, with a measure about the number of news stories about reported wrongdoing across the country or in specific districts.

Using the Results Framework Definition Process to Build Consensus and Understanding

The confused reporting noted above, along with the limited achievement of outcome-level results, raised the question of whether there is clear consensus and understanding across all the ADISS principals (USAID and implementing partners) about the higher-level goals and focus of the activity. A large portion of reporting (and indicators in the original results framework) addressed interventions and outputs, but there was little discussion of whether and how these were making progress toward higher objectives.

The mid-term evaluation and ensuing decisions about future direction, and particularly the finalization of the new results framework, offers an ideal opportunity for USAID and the ADISS implementers to assure this consensus exists for the second half of the activity. The process of formulating the new results framework can be a forum for establishing this consensus, including agreement on a more complex and nuanced type of reporting, in addition to interventions and indicators that incentivizes learning and adaptation. Given the very difficult challenge of pushing government to act, from a position of relative weakness, there should be room for strategic re-direction based on documented learning from interventions. This approach can be an incentive for implementers to assure they have strategically targeted their interventions (in order to make the case they've done everything possible before abandoning a particular activity or objective), as well as reward learning instead of just production of outputs.

Recommendations

The following recommendations for USAID follow from the discussion above:

- Revise the ADISS activity and results framework to reflect a move away from expecting results on prosecutions in order to concentrate more resources on achieving meaningful outcomes on civil society advocacy and citizen mobilization

around needed law reforms and

- When finalizing the new RF, assure that capacity leads to outcomes rather than being the outcome.
- Review and refine the definitions and targets of the USAID standard indicators on a yearly basis.
- Consider alternative or additional outcome-level indicators.
- Assure that revision and finalization of the results framework is done in such a way that there is clear consensus on focused, strategically-chosen objectives. These should be reported on not just in terms of indicators and activities, but also with hard-headed assessments of the likelihood of further progress, and processes for agreeing on re-direction if needed.

ANNEX C: MISSION SCHEDULE

Schedule of Meetings during the Evaluation Team's Field Mission

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
June 19	Evaluation team meeting		
Accra	Raymond Gervais	The Mitchell Group	Team Leader
	Phyllis Cox	The Mitchell Group	Anti-corruption Specialist
	Vincent Azumah	WANEP	Local Specialist
	Dana Akpene Adodoh	WANEP	Logistician
June 20	Meeting USAID team		
Accra	Joy Searcie	USAID-DRG	Evaluation Manager
	Yaw Akuamoah	USAID-DRG	M&E Adviser
	Daniel Baako	USAID Program Office	M&E Adviser
	Meeting US Embassy		
Accra	Jimmy Mauldin	US Embassy	Economic Counselor
	Navarro Moore	US Embassy: Political Section	Deputy Chief
	Meeting USAID		
Accra	Steven E. Hendrix	USAID	Deputy Mission Director
	Meeting with ADISS team		
Accra	Linda Ofori-Kwafo	ADISS	GII Executive Director
	Mary Awelana Addah	GII	Program Manager
	Joyce Danquah	GII	ADISS Coordinator

Date /Location	Event/Name	Organization	Position
	Mehail Boachi	GII	Corporate Affairs Manager
	Godfred Amoah	GACC	Accounts Officer
	Kwesi Boateng Assumany	GACC	Program Officer
	Nana kwesi Barning Adah	SEND Ghana	Intern
	Harriet Nuemah Agyemang	SEND Ghana	Snr. Program Officer
	Meeting - Key Informant Interview		
Accra	Dr. Benjamin Agordzo	Ghana Police Service	Director, <i>Transformation of Ghana Police Service</i>
June 21	Meeting ADISS team (follow-up)		
Accra	Linda Ofori Kisefo	ADISS	Executive Director
	Mary Awelana Addah	GII	Program Manager
	Joyce Danquah	GII	ADISS Coordinator
	Mehail Boachi	GII	Corporate Affairs Manager
	Meeting SEND Ghana		
Accra	George Osei-Bimpeh	SENG-Ghana	Country director
	Meeting Investigative Journalist		
Accra	Azure Awuni Manasseh	Joy FM/ Multi Media Group	Journalist
	Meeting with Key Informant		

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
Accra	Hon Dr. Ayine, MP	Parliament	MP, member of PAC
June 22	FGD 1		
Ashiaman	Bernard Aryee	Daily Guide News Paper	Journalist
	Diana Appeageyi	Ashiaman Women's Assoc.	Activist
	Raymond Amegah	AIFACOMD	Teacher
	Courage Alormasor	NADMO	Civil Servant
	Hon. Mama Dorla Nutifafa Worname	Ashiaman Women in Progressive Development	Queen Mother and Anti-Corruption Activist
	Seaney Samuel McDonald	Full Gospel Church Int.	Pastor
	Innocent Adamadu	Africa Inst. For ADR Studies	Social Developer
	FGD 2		
Ashiaman	Bruce-Nyade Godwin	Benefit Youth Keepfit Club	Youth Activist
	Isaac Esuman	Biblioneef Ghana,	Entrepreneur
	Kate Yayra Kpei	Unemployed Graduate	Women's Right Activist
	Michael Kpotosu Mensah	Blakpatsona Zonal Council	Civil Servant
	Philip Hoggar	Ghana Education Service	Civil Servant
	Michael Gyampoh	Ghana Education Service/WAEC	Civil Servant

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
	Meetings with Key Informants		
Accra	Hon. James Avedzi, MP	Parliament	MP, Chair of PAC
	Mr. Henri Bebauer and Mr. Kweku Lartey Obeng,	GIZ	Team Leader and Program Manager, respectively
June 23	Meetings with Key Informants		
Accra	Korieh Duodu,	STAAC	Team Leader
	Nic Lee	DFID	Governance Advisor
	Mr. Samuel Akuamoah	NCCE	Public Institution
June 24	Enumerators' Training	District	
Kumasi	Isaac Frimpong	Kumasi Metro	WANEP Monitor
	Kwaku Adusei	Ejisu Juaben	WANEP Monitor
	Oteng Maxwell	Tamale Metropolis	WANEP Monitor
	Wahab Yakubu	Yendi Municipality	WANEP Monitor
	Angela Helegbe	Sekondi-Takoradi	WANEP Monitor
	Moses Dennis Awuah Ackah	Nzema East	WANEP Monitor
	Theresa Boakye Yeboah	Pru District	WANEP Monitor
	Saforo Esther Kensemah	New Juaben	WANEP Monitor
	Raymond W. Achor	Bolgantanga	WANEP Monitor
	Muniru Zion	Wa Municipality	WANEP Monitor
	Esther Hukporti	Adidome Central Tongu	Trans4orm Network Ghana

Date /Location	Event/Name	Organization	Position
	Ernest Hinson	Ashiaman	Trans4orm Network Ghana
	Esmé Boateng	Cape Coast	Trans4orm Network Ghana
	Edidison Agbesi	Akatsi South	Trans4orm Network Ghana
	Ernest Cobbina	Ga South/Weija	Trans4orm Network Ghana
June 26	Meetings with Key Informants		
Ejisu	Honorable Adams Boakye-Yiadom	Okese- FM	General manager
	Benjamin Kyere	NCCE	District director
	John Amoah Owusu Agyemang	LANET in Ejisu	Chairman
	Stephen Sarfo Tenkorang	District police in Ejisu	District police commander
	FGD 1		
Ejisu	Obed Amuzu K. D. Saxiour	LANET (Ejisu)	Member
	John Amoah Owusu-Agyemang	LANET(Ejisu)	LANET President
	James Christian Owusu	LANET(Ejisu)	Member
	Boateng Kwasi Dickson	LANET(Juabeng)	Member
	Francis Kwame Onyinah	LANET(Okyerekrou)	Member
	Ernest Boakye	LANET(Okyerekrou)	Member
	Sampson Adu Agyeman	LANET(Juabeng)	Member
	Thomas Dadzie	LANET(Ejisu)	Focal Point
	FGD 2		
Ejisu	Adwoa Ajranewao Frimpong	Okese FM	Secretary
	Agyemang Boateng Boniface	Ejisu Youth Development	Treasurer

Date /Location	Event/Name	Organization	Position
	Paul Akwasi Agyemang	Save Ejisu Today (Set)	Staff
	Ohene Gyan Kwame	Save Ejisu	Member
	Asante Johnson	Save Ejisu Today (Set)	Member
	Declerk Korankye	Okese Fm	Presenter
	Evelyn Ofori	EPA Network For Women & Children Initiative	Woman Organizer
	Kwaku Adusei	Save Ejisu Today (Set)	Staff
	Dadzie Emmanuel	Lanet Ejisu	Member
June 27	Meetings with Key Informants		
Accra	Jacob Essilfie	Ghana Audit Service	Assistant Auditor General
	Alhaji Adia Abdul-Latif	Judicial Service	Head of Public Complaints Unit
	Dr Sayibu Pabi Gariba	Ghana Police Service, PIPS	Dep. Dir. General PIPS
	C/Supt Frederick Agyei	CID	Dir. Legal and Prosecutions
Kumasi	Charles Adjei	Kumasi Municipal Authority	Assistant planning officer
	Aba Oppong	GAC in Kumasi	Anti-corruption champion
	Prince Nadom	4 th Infantry Army	Major
	FGD 1		
Kumasi	Processus Alan-ngmen	LANET	Member
	Divine Johnson Dorlah	LANET-KMA	Member
	Abdallah Sulaiman	Office of the regional Imam	Imam

Date /Location	Event/Name	Organization	Position
	Mustapha Alhassan	National Democratic Congress	Member
	Benjamin Maxwell	International Model Diplomats for Integrated Development	Member
	Hajia Hawa Yusif	Market women Association	Member
	Aminu Sherif	MFCS	Member
	Ali Arime-Yawo	Peoples National Convention	Member
	FGD 2		
Kumasi	Mutawakill Alhassan	Youth In need	Member
	Abdullah Usman	Youth Beyond Borders	Member
	Gideon Kofi Gyimah	Makarios Music Production	Member
	Helena Ninsou	Tiyah Development	Member
	Lewis Mensah	NPP Kumasi	Member
	Mohammed E. Jalilu	LANET-KMA	Anti-corruption Champion
	Isaac Frimpong	WANEP Enumerator	Enumerator
	Ahmed Ibrahim	Wadata Printing Press	Member
	Amin Sherif	Ghana Print Association	Member
June 28	Meetings with Key Informants		
Accra	Dominic Hammond	CHRAJ	Deputy Chief Investigator
	Selase Kove-Seyram	Lead, Operations and Strategy, Tiger Eye Foundation	Journalism and media
	Anas Aremeyaw Anas	Executive Director, Tiger Eye Foundation	Journalism and media

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
June 29	Meetings with Key Informants		
Accra	Korieh Duodu (2 nd meeting)	STAAC	Team Lead
	Seyram Awushie Agbemenya Heikki Wendor	ARAP ARAP	Program Officer Advisor
	Mariya Gorbanova	GIZ seconded to GII	M&E focal point advisor
Tamale	El Hadj Abdu W. Saani	Regional Directory NCCE	Director
	Mohamed Mumuni	Send-Ghana	Learning, M&E coordinator
	Abdel Rakman Banit	ADISS and National Youth Authority	Anti-corruption champion
	Alassane Seydou and Natomah Baani	CHRAJ	Anti-corruption officer Assistant
	Eugene Yirbuor	USAID-Ghana	Tamale Sub-Office Coordinator
	FGD 1		
Tamale	Abdul Basit Abdul Rahaman	SEND-Ghana	Anti-corruption champion
	Helen Baba	DCMC	Member
	Ziblim A. Shaibu	NYA	Member
	Alhaji A. Razak Saani	NCCE	Regional Director
	Stephen Azantilow	CHRAJ	Regional Director
	Mumuni Mohammed	SEND-Ghana	Team leader
	Nuhu Abukari	NPC	Member
	Hajia Alima Sagito	Savannah Integrated Rural Development	Executive Director

Date /Location	Event/Name	Organization	Position
	Salifu I. Adishetu	Women in Peacebuilding Movement	Member
	Hajia Zartu Abdul- R	Women in Peacebuilding Movement	Member
	FGD 2		
Tamale	Oteng Maxwell	NCCE	Officer
	Iddrisu Abibata	CDD	Program officer
	Balaarah Abdulai	CDD	Program officer
	Abubakari Issah	ADISS	Anti-corruption champion
	Issahaku Ibrahim	Sch. For Life	Executive Director
	Ebenezer Awuku	GES	Education officer
	Joseph Makido Azam	SEND Ghana	ALAC officer
	N. Adam Baani	CHRAJ	Anti-corruption officer
	Stephen Lincoln Osei-Bonsu	WANEP-Ghana	Representative
June 30	Meetings with Key Informants		
Accra	Edward Cudjoe	EOCO	Head of Legal Dept
	Aborampah Mensah	CDD	Senior Programs Officer
	Yvonne Atakora Obuobisa	Ministry of Justice	DPP
Yendi	Idrissu Abdel Latifa	ADISS	Anti-corruption champion
	Abubakar Shani	Send-Ghana	Focal person
	El Hadj Hassan Souleymane	NCCE	Municipal Director
	El Hadj Hamed Abubakar Yusuf Agyapong Kantanka	Municipal Administration	Municipal Chief Executive

Date /Location	Event/Name	Organization	Position
	Sarfo		Administrator
	FGD 1		
Yendi	Alhassan Abukari	YMA	Member
	Iddrisu A-Rahaman	GES	Education officer
	Hudu A. Rashid	GES	Education officer
	Mustapha Kuyinia	YMA	Member
	Ziblim O. Rabiyu	YMA	Member
	Atiah A. Peter	Path One Peace Centre	Executive Director
	Mohammed Zaria	DCMC	Member
	Abass Yakubu	CHRAJ	District Director
	Ibrahim Abu	PMYMA	Member
	FGD 2		
Yendi	Mahama Zuweira	DCMC	Member
	Abdulai Musah Jumah	DCMC	Member
	Mizinyawa Ali Ziawu Rahaman	YMA	Member
	Dawuni Abdul Yakubu	PWD	Officer
	Mohammed Izirideen	YMA	Assemblyman
	Abukari Sulemana Gunu	GES	Education Officer
	Wahabu Yakubu	GES	Education Officer
	Rashid Alaru Fusheini	COHBS	Member
	Mohammed Abdul Fatawu	YMCA	Member
	Iddrisu Nurudeen	DCMC	Member

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
July 03	Meetings with Key Informants		
Adidome	Mudini Alao	ADISS	Anti-corruption champion
	Gabrel Atsem	Social Accountability Club	Assistant organizer
	Richard Siamgeh	NCE	District Director and Coordinator of GII activities
	Carlos Quaye	CHRAJ	District Director
	Evelyn Agbese	SAC	Organiser
	FGD1		
Adidome	Philemon Yankah	SAC	Member
	Gbor Freeman	SAC	Member
	Gbeve Samuel	SSNIT Pensioners Association	Member
	Gideon Gidisu	PPAG	Member
	Bethar Ama Okropal	CHRAJ / PPAG	Staff
	Gbeku J. Mawutor	SAC	Member
	Afadi Godsway	SAC	Member
	FGD2		
Adidome	Bright Agbenyo	NADMO	Staff
	Roselyn E. Attah	Anator Quarry	Staff
	Kenneth K. Logo	District Assembly	Assembly Member
	Carf Amenuvor	SAC	Member
	Atsem K. Gabriel	SAC	Member

Date /Location	Event/Name	Organization	Position
	Shuaib Abdul-Rauf	COMBONI TECH Vocational Institute, Sogakope	Teacher
	Mudini Alao	SAC	Anticorruption Champion
	Marcathy Bliss	ADISEC (GES)	Staff
	Cephas Kodjo Abebu	Dela Radio	Presenter
July 04	Meetings with Key Informants		
Akatsi	Torgbui Ahortor III	SAC	Chairman of SACs
	Godwin Agboada	NCCE	District Director
	Michael Tormati	CHRAJ	District Director Akatsi North and South
	Lydia Amegatse	SAC	Member
	FGD1		
Akatsi	Francis Gotah	NCCE Director	Retired
	Alfred Bedzo	SAC	Member
	Promise Adedzi	SAC Association of Small Scale Industries	Member
	Alberta E. Lumor	NCCE SAC (Represent Women)	Member
	Peter Gatsi	GRPTU, Branch 1 Akatsi	Vice Chairman, GPRTU
	Philemon Tsekpo	Akatsi South District Assembly	Deputy Planning Officer
	FGD2		
Akatsi	Awudi Cosmas Kwami	Government Pensioners	Member
	Margaret Kumor	SAC	Vice Chairperson

Date /Location	Event/Name	Organization	Position
	Cephas Y. Amegatsey	SAC	Treasurer
	Victoria Nazah Gidiglo	SAC	Past President / Former DCE
	Patrick M. K. Tengey	SSNIT	Pensioners
	Wotorli Diana	Ghana Library Board	Director
	David Yevugah	SAC	Member
	Moses Dewu	Apostolic Vision Church International	Pastor
	Daniel A. Fly Kadzahlo	Kaleawo FM SAC	SAC Secretary
	Alhaji Dauda Inikoye	Faith Based organisation	Moslem Counsellor
July 6	Team Meeting		
Accra	Raymond Gervais	The Mitchell Group	Team Leader
	Phyllis Cox	The Mitchell Group	Anti-corruption Specialist
	Vincent Azumah	WANEP	Local Specialist
	Diana Akpene Adodoh	WANEP	Logistician
July 7	Meetings with Key Informants		
Accra	Linda Ofori-Kwafo	ADISS	GII Executive Director
	Beauty Nartey	ADISS	GACC Executive Director
July 10	Validation Workshop		
Accra	Yaw Duah Akuamoah	USAID	
	Joy Searcie	USAID	
	E. Mensah-Ackman	USAID	

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
	Eva Osei	USAID	
	Benedict Doh	GII	
	Linda Ofori-Kwafo	GII	
	Kweku Obeng	GIZ	
	Phyllis Cox	Mitchell Group	
	Raymond Gervais	Mitchell Group	
	Beatrice Akua Mahmood	EFGGFD	
	Clement Tandoh	CARE	
	Beatrice Brew	WANEP	
	Mohammed Nurudeen S.	OXFAM	
	Ernest Konadu Abassah	GIZ	
	Toffa Akpene Afi	WANEP	
	Beauty E. Narteh	GACC	
	Mary A. Addah	GII	
	Joyce Danquah	GII	
	Mariya Gorbanova	GII/GIZ	
	Harriet Nuamah Agyemang	SEND GHANA	
	Michael Boadi	GII	
	George Osei-Bimpeh	SEND GHANA	
	Vincent Azumah	WANEP	
	Samuel A. Baaye	CDD	
	Rexford K. Asiama	CDD	

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
	Kwesi Boateng Assumaney	GACC	
	Jacob S. Essilfie	Ghana Audit Service	
July 13	Meetings with Key Informants		
Sekondi-Takoradi	Nana Amua Sekyi	CHRAJ Western Regional Office	Regional Director
	Mercy Merisebe Quarshie	Metro Assembly Office, Sekondi	Assembly member and Anti-Corruption Champion
	Kwame Tugbenu	Sekondi-Takoradi NCCE Metro Office	NCCE Metro Director
	Olivia Adiku	Ghana Police Service	Regional PRO
	FGD1		
Sekondi-Takoradi	Hon. Mercy Quarshie	LANET	Chairperson
	Michael Agyei	STMA	
	Samuel Quansah	LANET	member
	Gabriel Kwesi Arhinful	STMA	
	Angela Helegbe	WANEP	Monitor
	Aaron Dandori	STMA	
	Louise Aggrey	NCCE	
	FGD2		
Sekondi-Takoradi	Harriet Osei Adeaba	LANET	
	Fred Nyantekyi	STMA	
	Joyce Cudjoe	LANET	

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
	James Amoasi	STMA	
	Hannah Dadzie	STMA	
	Emelia Duncan	STMA	
July 14	Meetings with Key Informants		
Nzema East	Olivia Botwe	Ghana Revenue Authority Office	District Cashier
	Evans Tongo	Nzema East District CHRAJ Office	Chief Bailiff
	Victor Dzorvakpor	District National Health Insurance Office	Deputy Manager
	Bernard Azonawane	NCCE	Municipal Director
	FGD1		
Nzema East	Nana Akom-Nda III	Chief Upper Axim	
	Robert Tetteh	Nzema East Assembly	
	Nana Awusah I	Nzema East Municipal Assembly	
	Sylvester Arthur	WAG	
	Nana Kwaw Tendenle	Chief Upper Axim	
	Adjara Moro	LANET	
	Francis Kwaw	LANET Sec	
	Matthew Essien	Assemblyman	Urban Council- Chairman
	Prince A. Armah	GPRTU	
	FGD2		

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
Nzema East	Nicholas Quaicoe	NEMA, Axim	
	Prudence Yankey	UCSOND, Axim	
	John Amoako	ISD, Axim	
	Christian Agbomsom	LANET	
	Ransford Eric Nyamson	UCSOND	
	Solomon Elvis Ken Eshun	LANET	
	Nicholas Mensah	LANET	
	Awuah Ackah Moses	WANEP	Monitor
July 21	Meetings with Key Informants		
Ga South	Francis Abofra	Ga South Assembly	District Planning Officer
	Ernest Ortsin	Women Gate Foundation	Program Manager
	Beatrice Andzie	Information Services Dept.	Journalist
	Robert Kwaku Ahordagbe	Ga South Assembly	Presiding Member
	FGD1		
Ga South	Ernest Ortsin	Women Gates Foundation	
	Philip Semabiah	Farmer	Former Denkyira Municipal Assembly Member
	Nii Kwei Aplaku I	Traditional chief	
	Abigail Yeboah	PM's Office	

<i>Date /Location</i>	<i>Event/Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Position</i>
	Joana Polley	Women Gates Foundation	
	Nii Ayikwei Okwabi	Traditional chief	
	Beatrice Andzie	DCMC	
	Nora M. Agbemaflle	DCMC	
	Hon. Robert Ahordagbe	Presiding Member	
	FGD2		
Ga South	Godfrey Sam	Ga South Social Welfare	
	Folrence Adeeku	Ga South Social Welfare	
	Esther Anaman	Ga South Information Services Department (ISD)	
	Elizabeth Armah	Ga South Urban Transport	
	Francis Acheampong	Ga South Transport	
	Frimpong Yaw Michael	Ga South ISD	
	Joyce Asabea	Ga South ISD	
	Mina Amoah	Presiding Member's Office Ga South	

ANNEX D: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

ADISS Mid-Term Evaluation Survey Questionnaire						
Name of District						
Respondents Age Group (tick)		18 - 25	26 - 35	36 - 45	46 - 55	56 and above
Sex		Male		Female		
Questions						
1	Do you know what corruption is?	Yes	No	I am not sure		
2	Is any CSO in your district working to stop corruption?	Yes	No	I don't know		
3	Have you participated in any anti-corruption CSO activity?	Yes	No	I don't remember		
		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
4	CSOs are beginning to raise public awareness against corruption					
5	My knowledge on corruption has increased in the past two years					
6	I know where to report corruption when I find it					
7	The District Assembly and other state agencies are working to stop corruption					

8	Current laws are sufficient to help stop corruption					
9	Current corruption laws need modification and additions					
10	I am familiar with “I paid a bribe”					
11	I know people who have used ALAC					
12	The media has played a large role in raising awareness on corruption					
13	Corruption issues have become hot topics because of the campaign of anti-corruption CSOs					
14	CSOs are working as hard as they can to reduce corruption in Ghana					
15	Anti-corruption campaigns need to be implemented in all districts of Ghana					
16	Which CSO or NGO do you know who is working on anti-corruption in your district? In Ghana?				
17	In your opinion, what should be done to fight corruption in your community? Regionally or nationally?				

ANNEX E: SURVEY ANALYSIS

Sampling Description

Sample Size

The Team administered the mid-term evaluation survey questionnaire in 15 districts across the ten regions of the country (questionnaire found in Annex D). Table 1 below presents the sampling per district and region. The total dataset comprises 273 respondents.


Table 1: Sample Size by Region and District: Planned and Surveyed.

REGION	DISTRICT	SAMPLE	NUMBER OF PERSONS
		TARGET	SURVEYED
ASHANTI	KUMASI METRO	18	20
ASHANTI	EJISU-JUABEN	18	18
BRONG AHAFO	PRU	18	18
CENTRAL	CAPE COST	18	18
EASTERN	NEW JUABEN	18	18
GREAT ACCRA	GA SOUTH	18	18
GREAT ACCRA	ASHAIMAN	18	18
NORTHERN	YENDI	18	18
NORTHERN	TAMALE METRO	18	18
UPPER-EAST	BOLGA CENTRAL	18	19
UPPER-WEST	WA	18	18
VOLTA	CENTRAL TONGU	18	18
VOLTA	AKATSI SOUTH	18	18
WESTERN	NZEMA EAST	18	18
WESTERN	SEKONDI-TAKORADI	18	18
		270	273


Demographic Characteristics of Sample

Graphs 1 and 2 below show the sex and age of respondents. The respondents were over 18 years old with the largest number of respondents aged between 36 and 45 years old. The 26-35 age group was the next largest group. Adults 18-25 years old were the least represented in the dataset. A sex distinction leads to 72% of male and about 28% of women.

Graph 1: Respondent by Sex (N= 266)



Graph 2: Respondent by Age Groups (N= 265)




Level of Participation in Anti-Corruption CSO Activities by Region (Q⁵⁹ 3)

Graph 3 below depicts the level of respondent participation in CSO anti-corruption interventions across districts. A close look at the graph reveals five different districts where the level of participation in anti-corruption CSO activities are above the average. Pru, Central Tongu, Cape Cost and Kumasi are on top with 94% of the respondent participation in any anti-corruption CSO activities. On the other hand, Wa district lags with about 56%.

In addition, Bolga Central appears quite peculiar as 21% of the respondents in this district said that they do not remember if they participated in any anti-corruption activities. A sex disaggregation of this statistic indicates that 30% of men and 13% of women do not remember if they participated in any anti-corruption action.

⁵⁹ . Question 3: Have you participated in any Anti-Corruption CSO Activity.

Graph 3: Percentage of Respondents by District who Participated in CSO Anti-Corruption Activities.




Knowledge of Corruption (S 5)

As shown in Graph 4, when asked about the growth of their knowledge about corruption, respondents across the districts replied positively, agreeing strongly with the statement: "My knowledge on corruption has increased in the past two years."

However, there were exceptions, such as the Ashaiman District, which displayed a relatively high level of disagreement. A few respondents from districts gave neutral responses, which could be an indication of a previous, high-level knowledge of corruption, or perhaps could be interpreted as a lack of a substantial increase in their knowledge base. This response was most notable in Tamale and Sekondi-Takoradi Districts, with Bolgatanga District not far behind.


Graph 4: Percentage of Respondents by District on the Increase of their Knowledge of Corruption



CSOs Awareness Against Corruption (S 4)

Per statement 4, “CSOs are beginning to raise public awareness against corruption,” Graph 5 show that about 95% of the respondents agreed with the statement, although the strength of agreement varied somewhat based on sex, region and age group. The graph below depicts the modest disparities in these sociodemographic variables for those who “agree” and “strongly agree.” On the side of strong agreement, the graph reveals a difference of 10% between male (48%) and female (about 38%). The districts of Pru and Nzema East exhibited the most widespread strong agreement.

Graph 5: Percentage of Respondents by District on the CSOs Effectiveness in Raising Awareness on Corruption.




Notably, in seven districts - Yendi, Tamale, New Juaben, Kumasi, Central Tongu, Cape Coast and Akatsi South, 100% of the respondents agreed with the statement while the lowest percent of agreement (78%), which still is remarkably favorable, was in Wa and Ashiaman.

Where to Report Corruption (S 6)

The majority (88%) (See Graph 6 below) of the respondents know where to report corruption when they find it. However, the discrepancies among districts are noteworthy. In Akatsi South, Pru, Tamale, Ejisu-Juaben, Ga South over 80% (sometimes up to 100%) of the respondents said they knew where to report corruption, while in Kumasi, Takoradi, Ashiaman and Wa, were under the 80% mark. These findings reveal an uneven awareness across districts about knowing where to report corruption and the work still to be done. Given the public's fear of reprisals for reporting corruption, an alternative explanation (to explore) is that respondents in some districts have a higher discomfort about reporting it.

Graph 6: Percentage of Respondents by District on Knowledge of Reporting Mechanism


(IPaidABribe and ALAC).



Agencies’ Works to Stop Corruption (S 7)

About half of the respondents (See Graph 7) expressed agreement with the statement, “The District Assembly and other state agencies are working to stop corruption.” Indeed 54% of respondents agreed with the statement while 17% and 19% expressed neutrality and disagreement respectively. The gaps between districts are notable in some instances. Ashiaman showed only 28% agreement with the statement, while Cape Coast indicated the most agreement (78%). The team suggests this be probed for explanations of the disparity between districts, since answers might suggest adjustments to program activities. But comparing responses to S4 regarding CSOs and responses to S7 (see Graph 7 below) about MMDAs, respondents clearly felt that civil society was doing more than government to counter corruption.


Graph 7: Percentage of Respondents by District on District Assemblies and other Agencies' Role in Anti-Corruption



Current Laws on Corruption (S 8 & 9)


Although statements 8 and 9 can be lumped together (See Charts 8 and 9) because they share the topic about current anti-corruption laws, there are dissimilarities in results which have to be identified. The high rates of disagreement can be related to the wording of the statement: "Current laws are sufficient to help stop corruption". The most notable opponents to the statement are: Ashaiman, Central Tonga, Ga South, Pru, Wa, Yendi. Wa and Yendi, which are also the districts that host ALAC offices outside Accra: the correlation may not be fortuitous. The reverse is also worth attention: Akatsi South, Cape Coast, Nzema East, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Tamale Metro have responses above the average of 47%. Finally, because of the sensitive nature of the subject: there are very high levels of neutral responses. Similar to Statement 7, asking individuals to question national institutions or legal frameworks is not a simple step to make for individuals.

Graph 8: Percentage of Respondents by District on Current Laws to Help Stop Corruption



However, in an interesting change of attitude, stating clearly that something has to be done does not produce the same hesitation. In response to statement 9 about the need for modifications to current laws, the surveyed sample was in agreement with an average of 91%. Central and Nzema East were again over the average of disagreement; neutral responses were greater in Akastsi South and Tamale Metro.


Graph 9: Percentage of Respondents by District on Current Laws and Need for Modifications



Knowledge of IPaidABribe (S 10)

As shown in Graph 10 below, statements on a computer-based reporting mechanism are very context sensitive, since familiarity and to access to computers, ability to brows the site, participation in a training workshop, and so many other factors. Bolga Central and Ashaiman have high percentage of respondents who admit not knowing about the site, in contrast all respondents in Ejisu-Juaben and Ga South knew about it. During a KII in Ejisu, the team learned of the very pro-active role of Okese FM, a local radio station, as a vehicle for disseminating information on anti-corruption and how to report it.


Graph10: Percentage of Respondents by District on Knowledge of IPaidABribe



Use of ALAC (S 11)

Statement 11 calls upon two factors: proximity to the service provider (ALAC office) and robustness of the anti-corruption network in a district (I know people...). (Graph 11) Strangely, neither Tamale Metro nor Wa have markedly higher than the average rates of agreement responses. Akatsi South, Ga South, and Cape Coast have the largest agreement groups. During field information gathering, informants in Kumasi and Ejisu complained that the Ashanti region as a whole should have its own ALAC office, and the data does indicate a need, at least for Kumasi Metro.


Graph11: Percentage of Respondents by District on Use of ALAC



Role of Media in Awareness on Corruption (S 12)

Almost all respondents (96.70%) (Graph 12) agreed with the statement “The media has played a large role in raising awareness on corruption.” About 63% of the respondents strongly agreed and 34.43% agreed with the statement. The youngest age group (18-25) expressed strong agreement with the statement (78%), while in older groups, at least 60% strongly agreed with the statement. Nzema East expressed the highest level (83.33%) of strong agreement, followed by Tamale (77.78%), Pru (77.78%), and Cape Coast (72.22%). In Wa, respondents were less committal with half “strongly agreeing” and half “agreeing.”


Graph 12: Percentage of Respondents by District on the Role of Media



Corruption Issues and the Anti-Corruption Campaign (S13)

Across the country, anti-corruption CSOs have played a key role in the fight against corruption. The survey found 96% of the respondents agreed with the statement that “Corruption issues have become hot topics because of the campaign of anti-corruption CSOs”. Very little dissent was registered, the notable exceptions were: Ashaiman and Wa. In other districts, a low level of “neutral” responses were compiled, e.g. in Kumasi Metro and Wa. More qualitative or a more detailed survey would be required to confirm a working hypothesis: CSOs have gained momentum in the fight against corruption, this has not been unnoticed.

Graph 13: Percentage of Respondents by District on Corruption as an Important Topic.



CSOs Working Hard on Corruption Issues (S14)

Respondents agreed (91%) that over the next four years corruption will decrease because of the efforts of CSOs in the country who are working hard in this respect. Both men and women agreed (Graph 14) with the statement “CSOs are working as hard as they can to reduce corruption in Ghana”. In a similar fashion, in Yendi, Cape Coast and Akatsi Districts, 100% of respondent agreed with the statement. Statements 14 and 15 point in the same direction: CSOs are recognized as proponents of increased visibility of the anti-corruption agenda and are working hard to fight this canker.


Graph 14: Percentage of Respondents by District on CSOs Work on Reducing Corruption



Result of Need to Implement in All Districts of Ghana (S 15)

Although this topic was never raised in KIIs and FGDs, the statement was of interest to measure the buy-in by members of the ADISS supported networks as to the felt need to expand the activity to a greater number of districts. There was no disagreement on the issue, but the data does not include in Ashiman, Central Tongu, and Ejisu-Juaben: all districts agreed that it would be a positive step in fighting corruption if more districts were made aware of it and mobilized to counter its negative effects.

Graph 15: Percentage of Respondents by District on Need to Implement in All Districts




ANNEX F: ANALYSIS OF INFORMANTS DATA

In a very short period, the evaluation met with several key informants (KIIs) and groups of informants (FGDFs) in the targeted districts proposed in the evaluation work plan report and approved by the mission. In table 1, the gender and methods utilized to gather the information.

**Table 1 : Number of Informants
by Gender and Methods**

Gender/Type	FGD	KII	Grand Total	%
Female	50	19	69	26%
Male	140	60	200	74%
Grand Total	190	79	269	
%	71%	29%		

The gender unbalance may be a combination of a selection bias, outside of the control of the team, and a symptom of cultural constraints, as is the case in many countries. Focus group discussions involved greater number of individuals.



In table 2, the same information is broken by information gathering sites. It must be noted that Accra center has a larger percentage of women than the average. Also of note: the number of women who agreed to meet with the evaluation team was higher than men in Sakondi-Takoradi district.

**Table 2 : Number of Informants
by Gender and Sites**

Sites	F	M	Grand Total
Accra Center	25	42	67
Adidome	3	18	21
Akatsi	4	16	20
Ashiaman	3	10	13
Ejisu	2	19	21
Ga South	9	11	20
Kumasi	3	17	20
Nzema East	4	17	21
Sekondi-Takoradi	10	7	17
Tamale	4	21	25
Yendi	2	22	24
Grand Total	69	200	269

The production of a table with all the informants' organizations affiliation would have been too long a list. The choice was made, after eliminating the 19 double-counts, to select the organizations with the most informants. What the table shows is that the evaluation team was successful in finding and interviewing (individual or group) a good sample of stakeholders.

Table 3 : Number of Informants by Organizations

ADISS	5
CDD	5
CHRAJ	10
DCMC	7
GACC	4
GES	5
GII	6
GIZ	4
LANET	21
NCCE	11
SAC	16
SEND GHANA	8
STMA	7
USAID	7
WANEP	5
Total	121
N=	249
%	49%

ANNEX G: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDELINES: GENERIC

Date:	Location:
Name:	
Administration:	
Position:	
Years in position:	
Notes on interview:	

An introductory presentation will be developed.

1. General views on corruption

What are your views on how and why corruption has developed in Ghana?

What motivates individuals to adopt corrupt behavior?

How widespread has it become?

2. Effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions

When did you first hear of the ADISS activity?

How effective have it been in exposing corruption in all its forms: rent-seeking, and bribery?

Was the network able to counter actions, raise awareness, and bring the judicial branch of government to change anti-corruption laws?

Has ADISS' outreach, collaboration, communication activities, and methodology been effective in combatting corruption?

Generally, are accountability awareness campaigns impacting public thought and behavior?

Have civil society reporting mechanisms such as the "IPaidABribe" ICT platform and the use of social media increased exposure of corruption?

Has CSO-monitoring of corruption led to administrative reforms or criminal prosecutions? If not why?

What are the opportunities and challenges in working with state institutions and anti –

corruption CSOs?

3. Sustainability

Do you think a four-year activity, such as ADISS, will make a difference?

Do you feel ADISS has been effective in ensuring sustainability of their actions, in the long-term?

What measures of sustainability implemented by ADISS strike you as most effective?

4. Moving forward

How can ADISS be more effective in its interventions and networking?

What changes can be made to improve working with CSOs, communities and State institutions in this sector?

How can funding organizations improve their activities in the sector?

ANNEX H: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS GUIDELINES OF THEMES: GENERIC

Date:

Location:

Name of group:

Number of participants:

List of participants:

Notes on focus group:

Introductory short question:

We would like, in an open and transparent manner, to discuss a problem which may have affected your life in one way or another. May we ask you to share some of your experiences where forms of corruption were involved and in what specific sectors of your life they occurred?

1. Effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions (Q.1)

If you think it is unacceptable, then please tell us what you with others have done to counter it. Was ADISS part of what you did? Tell us a bit more about what you know of their services, on the web or in your communities.

Have civil society reporting mechanisms such as the "IPaidABribe" ICT platform, the use of social media and ICT, and the decentralization of the Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) increased exposure of corruption?

What are your views on ADISS' actions, activities, and services? Would you say they worked? Give us examples of what you feel worked. Then tell us what you think did not work.

2. Sustainability (Q.3)

Do you think ADISS awareness campaigns and structures like "IPaidABribe" and ALAC are sustainable? Are the interventions (that you are aware of) enhancing ownership of anti-corruption efforts by state institutions, civil society, and communities?

3. Looking forward (Q4-5)

If we look to the future, do you see ways for organizations, such as ADISS, to make public sector services more transparent, equitable, and effective?

What should they do to help communities limit the negative effects of corruption?

Lastly, do you have any ideas on how corruption can be limited? How can anti-corruption measures and actions have greater impacts?

ANNEX I: LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SOURCES

1. Table of GII Consortium and ADISS Reports

Reports	GIJ Consortium	ADISS
Progress reports		
Oct. 2014-Jan. 2015	X	
January-March 2015	X	
April-June 2015	X	
July-Sept. 2015	Included in 2015 Annual report	
Oct.-Dec. 2015 (Q5)		X
January-March 2016		X
April-June 2016		X
July-Sept 2016		X
Oct. 2016-Dec. 2016		X
Jan.-March 2017		X
Annual Work Plans		
Sept. 2014-Sept. 2015		X
Oct. 2015-Sept. 2016		X
Oct. 2016-Sept. 2017		X
Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan		
Year 2015		X
Year 2016		X
Annual Report		
2015	X	

Reports	GII Consortium	ADISS
2016		X

2. Other documents⁶⁰

Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity. 2014. Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Project Consortium Agreement. Accra: GII, GACC, SEND-Ghana.

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⁶⁰ . The bibliographic references of all the reports are repeated in this section.

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Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity. 2016. Gaps in Ghana's Anti-Corruption Legislation. Accra: ADISS.

Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity. 2016. July – September 2016 Quarter Report. Accra: ADISS.

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Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity. 2017. October 2016-September 2017 Annual Work Plan. Accra: ADISS.

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Similar but adapted reports were produced on these districts:

Ada West	Ejisu – Juaben	Nkoranza North
Agona West Municipal	Ellembele	Nzema East
Akatsi North	Fanteakwa	Pru District
Akatsi South	Ga South Municipal	Savelugu Nanton Municipality
Akuapem North	Ga West	Sefwi Wiawso
Ashiaman	Jaman North District	Sekondi
Ashanti Akim Central Municipality	Jirapa District	Sisala East District
Assin North Municipal	Kasena Nankana Municipal	South Dayi
Atebubu	Kasena Nankana West District	Tain District
Atwima	Kpando	Tamale Metropolis
Bibiani	Kumasi Metropolis	Tolon District
Bolgatanga Municipality	Lawra District	Wa Municipal
Cape Coast Metropolitan	Mampong Municipal	West Mamprusi District
Central Tongu	Mfantseman Municipal	Yendi Municipality
East Akim	Nadowli District	Yilo Krobo
Effutu Municipal	New Juabeng	

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3. <http://www.sendwestafrica.org/index.php/news1/item/145-let-manifestos-demonstrate-commitment-to-fight-corruption>
4. <https://www.tighana.org/assets/Uploads/Press-Release-National-Anti-Corruption-Action-Plan.pdf>
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6. <https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption/global-legal-insights---bribery-and-corruption/>
7. http://www.gaccgh.org/maincat_select.cfm?corpnews_catid=9#.WSeMpmjyvSF
8. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34210925> - 22 judges
9. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-landrights-women-lawmaking-idUSKBN18K34R>
10. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201705290957.htm> article on why corruption matters and mentioning education particularly. May 30, 2017
11. <http://citifmonline.com/2017/05/27/eoco-to-review-documents-presented-by-anti-corruption-protectors/>
12. <http://citifmonline.com/2017/05/31/kwesi-anning-commends-govt-for-galamsey-fight/>
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16. Example of ALAC, GII and NCCE working together

⁶¹ . Collected from April 22 through July 22, 2017.

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 19. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09614524.2016.1191439?src=recsys&journalCode=c dip20> useful article on sustainability of CSOs.
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 27. <http://citifmonline.com/2017/06/14/retrieve-looted-state-cash-supreme-court-orders-auditor-general/> Shows role of Occupy Ghana. And this shows depth of work done: <http://citifmonline.com/2017/02/13/new-law-to-force-auditor-general-recover-misappropriated-state-funds/>
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 32. Concerning MacArthur award in Nigeria for Tiger Eye, <https://www.thecable.ng/cable-foundation-gets-macarthur-grant-investigative-journalism>
 33. <http://www.ipaidabribe.or.ug/> Uganda
 34. <http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/issues/corruption/142038-not-on-my-watch-pledge-fight-corruption-philippines> Philippines I paid a bribe website.
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