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# EVALUATION OF USAID/SOUTH SUDAN'S DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE IRI PROJECT — 2012-2014



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# **EVALUATION OF USAID/SOUTH SUDAN’S DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE IRI PROJECT 2012 – 2014**

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Monitoring and Evaluation Support Project

## **DISCLAIMER**

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# CONTENTS

**ACRONYMS.....II**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..... 1**  
    Recommendations ..... 5

**INTRODUCTION..... 7**  
    Purpose of Evaluation..... 8  
    Audience and Intended Users..... 8  
    Evaluation Questions ..... 8

**BACKGROUND..... 9**  
    IRI’s Assistance Initiatives..... 9

**METHODOLOGY.....11**  
    Desk Review ..... 11  
    Information Gathering..... 12  
    Data and Information Analysis..... 12  
    Limitations ..... 13

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS.....13**  
    Question 1: Did the project achieve the right focus and balance in terms of design, theory of change/development hypothesis, and democratic needs of South Sudan at the time of implementation?..... 14  
    Question 2: What were the intended and un-intended results of project interventions?..... 17  
    Question 3: To what extent was IRI’s operational model cost efficient and cost effective in achieving the project’s expected results?..... 23  
    Question 4: What have been the specific and differential effects of IRI’s project on males and females in terms of political participation and legislative strengthening?..... 25  
    Question 5: To what extent has IRI’s technical assistance to political parties and legislative strengthening strategies been sustainable? ..... 29  
    Question 6: To what extent has IRI’s technical assistance to the Legislative Assemblies strengthened accountability and oversight in the government of South Sudan?..... 31  
    Recommendations ..... 33

**LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS..... 36**  
    Reviewed Documents ..... 38  
    Other References ..... 43

**ANNEXES..... 48**  
    Annex i: Evaluation Scope of Work ..... 48  
    Annex II: List of Consulted Individuals..... 54  
    Annex iii: Interview Guide ..... 58  
    Annex iv: Question Guides – IRI Evaluation Focus Group Discussions..... 61  
    Annex v: Evaluation Team Biographies..... 62

## ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
AOR	Agreement Officer's Representative
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
COS	Council of States
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)
CPSS	Communist Party of South Sudan
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DF	Democratic Forum
DG	Democracy & Governance
DI	Democracy International
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan/ Government of South Sudan
HRDO	Human Rights Development Organization
ICSS	Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (2005)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
INC	Interim National Constitution of Sudan (2005)
IR	Intermediate Result
IRI	International Republican Institute
JEPDE	Joint Engagement for Peace and Democratic Governance
KII	Key Informant Interview
LTTA	Long Term Technical Assistance
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MESP	Monitoring & Evaluation Support Project
MSI	Management Systems International
NCC	National Constitutional Conference
NCP	National Congress Party
NCRC	National Constitutional Review Committee
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEA	National Elections Act (2008/2012)
NEC	National Elections Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLA	National Legislative Assembly
NL-WPC	National Legislature Women Parliamentarians' Caucus
NUDP	National United Democratic Party
ORB	Opinion Research Business
PDCO	Peace and Development Collaborative Organization
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PPA	Political Party Act
PPC	Political Party Council
PPIDG	Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance
PPLA	Political Parties Leadership Academy
PPLF	Political Parties Leadership Forum

PPRC	Political Parties Resource Centre
PURE	Peace, Unity, Reconciliation & Equality Party
RoSS	Republic of South Sudan
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SDA	Southern Democratic Alliance
SLA	State Legislative Assembly
SO	Strategic Objective
SOW	Scope of Work
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM-DC	Sudan People's Liberation Movement – Democratic Change
SPLM-WL	Sudan People's Liberation Movement- Women's League
SSANU	South Sudan African National Union
SSCC	South Sudan Council of Churches
SSDF	South Sudan Democratic Forum (Now DF)
SSLP	South Sudan Labor Party
SSLS	South Sudan Law Society
SSNYP	South Sudan National Youth Party
SSPPYL	South Sudan Political Parties' Youth League Coalition
SSWEN	South Sudan Women's Empowerment Network
SSYPADO	South Sudan Youth for Peace and Development Organization
STTA	Short Term Technical Assistance
SUCCESS	Systems to Uphold the Credibility and Constitutionality of Elections in South Sudan
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
TCSS	Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (2011)
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDP	United Democratic Party
UDSF-M	United Democratic Salvation Front-Mainstream
UN WOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAP	United Sudan African Parties
USG	United States Government
USSP	United South Sudan Party
WDN	Women's Democracy Network
WPM	Women Politics Media
YEAF	Youth Empowerment and Advocacy Forum

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes the post-implementation performance evaluation performed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Support Project (MESP) of the USAID/South Sudan-funded “Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance” (PPIDG) activity. Initially designed as a 32-month, \$17 million effort, implemented from January 2012 to August 2014, the PPIDG project was extended by four months to December 2014.

When the 2005 Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, there was a general sense that South Sudan’s<sup>1</sup> political actors would have to be prepared to lead the new country when independence was reached. To that end, the international community facilitated implementation of the agreement and made efforts to ensure that its two signatories — the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) — met their obligations.

Once the CPA’s most significant political milestones were reached,<sup>2</sup> the scope and concentration of technical assistance and support diminished. For example, the more than \$140 million portfolio of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to support elections, civil society, and political parties in the pre-independence period, was cut by more than half in 2012. Similar activities carried out by the United Nations and its agencies were also significantly cut or discontinued. Yet, this was precisely when South Sudan would need its greatest levels of assistance. Although the path to peace and independence was difficult, building the new country would prove even more challenging.

Among the most significant findings, the evaluation team found that:

- IRI’s long-term presence in Southern Sudan afforded it critical knowledge regarding on-the-ground developments and realities and allowed it to cultivate close and long-term relationships with leaders. These relationships were crucial for its programmatic planning and strategizing.
- PPIDG was a natural progression from IRI’s previous work.
- PPIDG was part of a much broader USAID strategic initiative that included other organizations: PPIDG worked with political parties and legislative assemblies; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) worked on civil society and civic education strengthening initiatives; and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) worked with electoral authorities. This holistic approach was as vital and essential as it was successful.
- IRI — and certainly other USAID implementing partners — contributed greatly toward facilitating, not only the independence of South Sudan, but also laying the foundation for its construction. IRI’s work with political parties introduced foundational and internal documents (constitutions, by-laws, codes of conduct, etc.) and was central in designing the

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<sup>1</sup> The Republic of South Sudan was born on June 9, 2011, following the January referendum of that same year that determined its secession from Sudan.

<sup>2</sup> The most significant political milestones of the CPA were the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum.

processes in which several parties were to elect their authorities. This was particularly important with the SPLM/A.

- PPIDG's work with Youth Leadership Academies is an important legacy. Even today, academy participants point to these as key milestones in their personal lives and professional careers.
- Similarly PPIDG's work in development of Women's Leagues in some parties represents another lasting legacy of the PPIDG project as does its organization of Women's Caucuses in the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) and in several state legislatures.
- Although not a central component of PPIDG's initial design, its conduct of public opinion surveys was one of its most successful and significant contributions.
- IRI was instrumental in the formation and organization of the Political Parties Leadership Forum (PPLF), an independent forum where political party representatives could meet, debate, conduct research, and undertake analysis. The PPLF's simple existence allowed for the development — albeit very modest — of some political parties and organizations.
- PPIDG contributed to creating and increasing awareness on the importance of democratic principles by exposing South Sudanese citizens — many for the very first time — to democratic exercises and ideals. Along with the projects implemented by NDI and IFES, the initial establishment of a democratic culture in South Sudan — however minimal — is an important achievement. Young people in particular crave and yearn for greater openness, inclusion, and consensus.
- Having served as the primary beneficiary of IRI's technical assistance and support initiatives since 2004, the SPLM/A continued to be a focus of the PPIDG project in the post-independence period. The SPLM/A was really the only political organization capable of leading the construction of the new nation. Although PPIDG provided training to other parties, these lagged behind while the SPLM/A surged. As a result, other political parties were unable to keep up with the fluid political situation enveloping the country.
- The post-referendum/independence euphoria in South Sudan was not conducive to building democracy. While the SPLM/A quickly moved to consolidate its power, the new authorities were preoccupied with the financial, technical, and administrative issues related to the country's secession from Sudan.
- The 2013 outbreak of war and the resulting requirement to suspend activities and evacuate the country, severely hampered the PPIDG project's effectiveness. Once re-engagement was authorized, PPIDG's project scope was substantially reduced.
- The SPLM/A's entrenchment in power resulted in a polarization of positions within the government and the opposition. Other actors were squeezed-out, excluded from any discussions related to an end of hostilities and the future of the country.
- Based on the on-the-ground realities during PPIDG's design phase and at the time of its initial implementation, PPIDG's focus on national needs was adequate. It followed the natural progression of its previous work and the unfolding of South Sudan's post-independence political landscape. While it's important to note that IRI's project strategy and

design did meet the requirements of what was immediately needed in the post-independence period, it was also shortsighted, rendering it unable to adapt and address the ever-changing demands of a very fluid political situation. PPIDG's relatively small budget was not compatible with its ambitious scope. It simply attempted to do too much, with too little. This, in turn, resulted in a general lack of strategic flexibility.

- By trying to address so many needs, PPIDG sacrificed strategic cohesion. Indeed, IRI's programmatic strategy was seemingly disjointed, focused on stopgap measures, and not building the longer-term capacity of beneficiaries and/or counterparts. PPIDG's various components (political party development, legislative strengthening, etc.) were not linked with each other, but rather were implemented as separate and unrelated initiatives. Even within the same project components, there was an apparent lack of coordination and cohesiveness.
- Perhaps unable to assimilate what its new role in the building of South Sudan should be, the SPLM/A moved aggressively to consolidate its power. Understanding that its adversaries were now internal, the ruling party quickly diminished — or altogether — closed democratic spaces. The quickly unfolding post-independence situation in the country greatly altered IRI's — and other implementing partners' — ability to ensure meaningful results. The political and practical inertia of this particular period skewed results and project perspectives.
- PPIDG's efforts in support of political parties and legislative strengthening contributed to the development of a pluralistic and democratic system. While this system may be weak and still in its nascent stages, it is in place. Before independence, the people of South Sudan had very little — if any — exposure to democratic practices, systems, actors, and mechanisms. South Sudan has laid the initial framework for its continued political development; in large measure thanks to IRI's assistance and that of USAID's broader DG portfolio.
- While much of the technical assistance and support provided to non-SPLM/A parties was essential, it was also relatively basic. Given the state of political parties in the country, training on fundamental issues was sorely needed. IRI moved quickly to fill that gap and address those needs. But the generalized lack of a cohesive strategy for political parties — combined with their low absorption, professional, and organizational capacities — did not allow for their longer-term development. Instead, IRI's fill-gap strategies addressed immediate, short-term needs. Given the lack of a comprehensive training strategy, many of the beneficiary political parties became increasingly dependent on IRI's assistance, unable to perform many essential duties and activities on their own.

While the proliferation of political parties cannot be directly attributed to IRI, the availability of technical assistance and support to political organizations made the endeavor attractive to many actors. But, the newer parties were simply incapable of and unprepared to receive assistance.

- The deteriorating political situation in South Sudan contributed to the proliferation of political parties, with many new political organizations or parties emerging along ethnic lines, further contributing to the existing tensions and instability.
- PPIDG's political party work was most successful with the SPLM/A. Besides making considerable strides in building the party's organizational development and capacity, IRI introduced important elements to promote the internal democratization of the SPLM/A, for example, party conventions and processes to elect party authorities. Ironically, it was these



very processes that were incorporated into the party's bylaws that in some ways facilitated, or allowed for the party's split into factions and, subsequently, the outbreak of the 2013 civil war. Needless to say, these internal party procedures themselves did not cause the party's split, but rather the SPLM/A's inability and/or unwillingness to abide by them and apply the results and decisions that emerged from the mechanisms and procedures adopted to internally democratize the party.

- PPIDG was implemented under the same challenging operating conditions as the initiatives implemented by NDI and IFES. However, IRI's budget was significantly smaller in comparison and insufficient for PPIDG's ambitions strategy. Seeking to work with all political parties and legislatures diluted PPIDG's achievements.
- One of PPIDG's greatest successes was in designing and implementing strategies that directly targeted women and encouraged, promoted, and facilitated their participation. The number of women participants in IRI activities is impressive, and the quantity of activities designed specifically for women also constitutes an important milestone. Beyond simply promoting and facilitating women's participation, PPIDG implemented strategies to ensure this involvement was not just symbolic, but effective.
- PPIDG essentially designed, developed and implemented two political party assistance models: one for the SSPLM/A and another for all other parties. This two-pronged approach created the perception among non-SPLM/A political parties that IRI was favoring the ruling party.
- Numerous examples emerged of successful legislative oversight. Executive level officials were summoned to testify, and in some cases, parliamentary procedures led to impeachment and removals from office. While these successful examples cannot be solely attributed to PPIDG, it certainly played an instrumental role in the development of these capacities.
- The militaristic mentality brought about by the SPLM/A is pervasive at all levels of government. Decisions are not made, but rather orders are given. Thus, while laws, procedures, and processes may be in place, respect for the rule of law is not. The government continues to be run the same way its precursor liberation army was run. The application of the law is arbitrary, capricious, and uneven. Furthermore, the lack of an independent judiciary does little to promote respect for the rule of law, transparency, and accountability.

The evaluation team believes PPIDG's original strategic vision and implementation approach was aligned with the immediate needs of the post-independence period. That being said, it was also unnecessarily wide and unrealistic. Whether USAID requested the large scope or IRI proposed it is unclear. What is clear is that PPIDG attempted to do too much, with too little. Consequently, its implementation strategy suffered, as did the effectiveness and efficiency of its efforts. The strategy was not geared toward the longer-term, capacity development requirements that were needed. Rather, it revolved around stopgap measures that sought to address the needs of the immediate term.

## Recommendations

The evaluation team presents a series of recommendations aimed at designing viable democracy assistance strategies for South Sudan in the future that focuses on the local level — where policies are implemented, with those that have their fingers on the pulse of the people, and where greater results can be achieved. Some recommendations in this report are summarized below:

- Focus all efforts on building and safeguarding peace: Any future initiative(s) must incorporate strategies aimed at promoting peace.
- Political party work should be more strategically focused.
  - Criteria for which party investment should emphasize those with organizational, professional, and absorption capacities — based on organization requirements.
  - Identify a core of political party members for support, with special attention to women and youth.
  - Develop specific training modules with training of trainer activities and easily reproducible materials, such as CDs and an Internet platform for wide distribution.
  - Partner with international party federations, such as Socialist International, Liberal International, Center Democrat International, etc. to provide training, exchange, and mentoring.
- Political party members, legislators, civil society and media representatives can learn important lessons from other countries in the region (Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania) through international exchange programs and mentoring.
- (Re)build and strengthen a nationwide network of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to assure nation-wide information gathering and dissemination and to monitor local developments. The following priorities and steps should be incorporated into any strategy in engaging civil society:
  - **Leverage** the South Sudanese Council of Churches' national network of churches and clergy.
  - **Engage with youth & women** in building and strengthening a nationwide network — traditionally marginalized citizens can be very effective agents of change.
  - **Incorporate** local level political parties, CSOs, state legislatures, *payam* and *boma* representatives, and tribal leaders/chiefs into the network, feeding a bottom-up approach with people less influenced by politics and more focused on local solutions.
  - **Deploy** a permanent public information and civic education campaign to inform the populace on specific issues, such as: the peace agreement, democracy and nation building, the (development of) South Sudanese identity, role of political

parties, CSOs, and good citizenship. Existing platforms (Internews/EyeRadio) can be relied on to develop and disseminate these campaigns.

- **Use** the nationwide network of local leaders, authorities, political parties, and faith-based organizations to foster a democracy dialogue through town-hall gatherings, etc.
- Build on PPIDG's success in public opinion surveys.
- Incorporate civic education into the national curriculum.
- It is important to note that in 2013, IRI undertook discussions within the PPLF and with the PPC Chairman to discuss the 2012 Political Parties Law and the PPC's roles and responsibilities. Four years later, however, and given the country's new reality, the evaluation team believes it is necessary to do an independent analysis of the aforementioned Political Parties Act and Political Parties Council to ensure legal compatibility and coherence.
- USAID should take advantage of the current opening that the peace process represents to develop a program strategy informed by a comprehensive assessment. Feed this analysis with a thorough **meta-analysis** of results from prior studies and both internal (all three components) and external (comparative internationally) insights on Democracy and Governance (DG) in fragile states and conflict-prone environments.

# INTRODUCTION

From 2004 to 2014, the International Republican Institute (IRI) provided ongoing technical assistance and support to political parties in Sudan, including what was initially Southern Sudan — now, the Republic of South Sudan. IRI also provided key assistance to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, the pre-cursor to today’s South Sudanese National Legislative Assembly.<sup>3</sup> While IRI received separate and/or complementary funding from other sources throughout this 10-year period, most of its activities were implemented under USAID’s Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) mechanism.

The scope of this evaluation focuses only on the final phase of IRI’s involvement in South Sudan, covering the 2012 and 2014 period: The 36-month<sup>4</sup> “Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance in South Sudan (PPIDG)” activity was modified seven times including two no-cost extensions. PPIDG was implemented after the 2010 electoral process in Sudan, and the subsequent 2011 referendum to determine Southern Sudan’s independence. Hence, its objectives were designed to address the situation faced by the newly created Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS). Its goal was to strengthen political parties and provide governance assistance to GRSS’s nascent institutions in a bid to create a more pluralistic, competitive and accountable political system through the following four objectives;

1. Improve the organization and professional development of political parties;
2. Increase the capacity of political parties to develop issue-based platforms that represent core constituents;
3. Improve the effectiveness of political party members as representatives in national and state legislative assemblies; and
4. Increase the participation of political parties in the making of public policy.

Following the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, USAID and its implementing partners evacuated South Sudan, temporarily suspending project activities. In June 2014, IRI received authorization from USAID to return to South Sudan and re-initiate the implementation of its project activities. Given the still-unstable situation in the country, however, IRI’s activity scope was significantly reduced, focusing on four very specific tasks:

- Certification of Youth Leadership Academy participants;
- Certification of state legislative assembly workshop series participants;
- Democracy dialogues; and
- Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) survey.

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<sup>3</sup> The 2005 CPA allowed for the creation and formation of a regional legislative assembly in what was then Southern Sudan. Following its independence in 2011, the Republic of South Sudan established its National Legislative Assembly.

<sup>4</sup> IRI’s Cooperative Agreement was originally slated as a 32-month, \$17 million initiative.

## **Purpose of Evaluation**

This post-implementation performance evaluation was designed to assist the USAID/South Sudan Mission in making decisions on future investment in support to political parties and legislatures in South Sudan. It examines activity achievements, as well as the associated underlying causes for achievement and/or non-achievement and documents lessons learned and best practices to inform future programming of similar activities in South Sudan and elsewhere. The evaluation presents a series of recommendations for immediate, medium, and long-term assistance initiatives aimed at strengthening South Sudan's political system, its political parties, and its legislative bodies.

## **Audience and Intended Users**

Diverse stakeholders are among the intended audience: the USAID/South Sudan Mission's Democracy and Governance (DG) team, the USAID Africa Bureau, IRI as the implementing partner, and other organizations involved in related or similar activities. It is expected that the recommendations presented in this document will guide USAID engagement in South Sudan, and provide insights to IRI and other implementing partners, on how to improve similar interventions. The evaluation was guided by the questions presented below.

## **Evaluation Questions**

1. Did the project achieve the right focus and balance in terms of design, theory of change/development hypothesis, and democratic needs of South Sudan at the time of implementation?
2. What were the intended and un-intended results of project interventions?
3. To what extent was IRI's operational model cost-efficient and cost-effective in achieving results?
4. What have been the specific and differential effects of IRI's project on males and females in terms of political participation and legislative strengthening?
5. To what extent has IRI's technical assistance to political parties and its legislative strengthening strategies been sustainable?
6. To what extent has IRI's technical assistance to the Legislative Assemblies strengthened accountability and oversight in the government of South Sudan?

## BACKGROUND

The 2005 CPA between the GoS and the SPLM/A represented a blueprint for ending the country's long civil war. Designing and brokering the agreement required significant involvement from the international community, particularly the United States. Recognizing the importance and historical significance of the agreement, the world was nearly unanimous in its support. And while the CPA has not been fully implemented, key milestone events of the agreement were successfully conducted, namely, the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum were successfully completed. The latter resulted in the eventual secession of Southern Sudan from the north in 2012.

The agreement's signing was a historic achievement. Without the continued and uninterrupted support of the international community, the CPA would have, more than likely, not been possible. Indeed, countries from around the globe, along with multi-lateral organizations, invested considerable resources — financial, human, material, and other — to guide the CPA's implementation. As an integral — if not the leading — part of this broad-based, international effort, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) played an instrumental role. USAID's support — which included a comprehensive DG programmatic strategy — was the backbone of the broader international effort. As part of USAID's comprehensive program, PPIIDG provided crucial advice, guidance, and technical support, focusing on the development of political parties, particularly the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A led the fight for independence, culminating in the 2011 referendum that called for secession from Khartoum.

Just six months after its decision to secede from the north, South Sudan became the world's newest nation. However, the post-independence euphoria was short-lived. Barely four years after its birth, South Sudan continues to struggle to build itself as a nation. Internal power struggles have bred uncertainty and instability. Despite the recent signing of a peace agreement, the wounds of the December 2013 war are still painfully fresh. The country's highly militarized political class and system, coupled with its highly politicized military and paramilitary structures, have created a political system which fails to meet its charge.

Despite the international community's best intentions, its post-independence vision and strategy seems to have been incomplete. In retrospect, while everyone pulled in the same direction to achieve independence, no one appeared sufficiently ready for what was to come next: the construction of South Sudan. Moreover, opinions on how to proceed varied. The excitement of building a new nation was swamped by politics and power-grabs. Instead of moving forward with a consensus, the SPLM/A moved to protect all it had fought for and gained. The quickly evolving post-independence situation caught many flat-footed.

### **IRI's Assistance Initiatives**

Following South Sudan's independence, USAID and IRI found it necessary to build the organizational capacities of both political parties and the country's legislative assemblies. Although political organizations had operated in Southern Sudan, their cumulative knowledge and expertise remained low. Operating in restive pre-independence Southern Sudan, under the overall authority and administration of the Khartoum-led regime, there had been little hands-on experience to be gained. And while IRI did work with various Southern Sudanese parties, its focus remained on

helping transform the SPLM/A into a political party and prepare it for governing the future Republic of South Sudan.

After the secession of Southern Sudan, IRI continued working mainly with the SPLM/A and other parties. In line with the 2011 Interim Constitution of South Sudan (ICSS), elections were expected to be held in 2016. To that end, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) drafted and passed the Political Parties Act (PPA) in 2012 and called for the establishment of the Political Parties Council (PPC). Among other matters, the PPA addressed the various procedures and requirements needed to form a political organization and register it as a party. The passage of the PPA put forth an exhaustive list of prerequisites, which, in turn, put pressure on political party leaders to fully understand and institutionalize their parties. Many non-SPLM parties, most of which were formed after South Sudan's independence, required substantial support to build their institutional capacity. Despite its considerably longer history, however, the SPLM also recognized its need for support in this and other areas.

Since its January 2012 inception, PPIDG focused on conducting workshops to review political parties' governing documents; provision of technical assistance on internal democratic principles; skills training on politics, democracy and governance; and organization of multiparty initiatives to promote political pluralism. PPIDG also worked to promote and facilitate the participation of women and youth in the emerging country's political processes.

Concurrently, PPIDG worked with the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) and South Sudan's 10 state legislatures to strengthen the capacities of legislators and the institutional capacity of the assemblies themselves. PPIDG introduced innovative initiatives to the legislative process (such as public hearings), provided skills training on basic parliamentary functions and developed constituency outreach initiatives.

In an effort to increase the participation of women parliamentarians in their legislatures, PPIDG supported the National Legislature Women Parliamentary Caucus (NL-WPC) through material support and technical assistance. PPIDG also conducted public opinion polls to provide policy makers with information regarding citizens' needs. PPIDG conducted a total of four public opinion polls — two national, one regional and one focusing on the internally displaced persons that resulted from the 2013 conflict.

As a mechanism to promote dialogue among political actors, PPIDG supported the establishment of the Political Parties Leadership Forum (PPLF). IRI provided specific assistance to the PPLF secretariat, which is comprised of a Political Parties Resource Centre (PPRC or Resource Center) — a venue that houses a library, meeting rooms and Internet facilities. Through the Resource Center, PPIDG also hosted a series of topical debates, thus fostering a platform where political competition and consensus building could be nurtured.

After its December 2013 evacuation and suspension of activities, IRI received authorization in June 2014 to return to South Sudan and resume its program activities, focusing on four areas as a condition of re-entry into the country: certification of youth leadership academy participants; certification of state legislative assembly workshop series participants; democracy dialogues on key national issues; and the fielding of a three-county survey research project focused on internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees.

# METHODOLOGY

The design of this post-implementation performance evaluation was crafted to assess the achievement of planned results, documenting the reasons for achievement or non-achievement of these results, allowing for the identification of changes, adjustments, additions, omissions and/or discrepancies. The capacity building component of PPIDG was the only PPIDG area which yielded quantitative information about beneficiaries. Consequently, most tools used for the conduct of this evaluation were qualitative in nature: Key Informant Interviews (KII), Group Meetings (GM), and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). This approach was directly aligned with the evaluation questions themselves, with the exception of question three, which required some exploration of financial statements.

## Desk Review

Preliminary contacts were made with IRI before travelling to the field to gather secondary data. Following USAID's request, the evaluation team analyzed both the pre-2012 and the period covered by the evaluation in two sets of documents made available by the Mission:

- 2004-2011: 663 documents
- 2011-2014: 501 documents.
- Documents supplied by IRI, which were previously missing: 25 documents.

As described below it was difficult to get pre-PPIDG information. The evaluation team identified 158 items from this array for deep review can be classified as follows:

- **Periodic Project Reports:** weekly (few were found), quarterly, semi-annual, annual, and final;
- **Administrative and legal:** legal acts pertaining to political parties, constitution, and elections;
- **Evaluation reports:** mid-term USAID contracted or internal to IRI<sup>5</sup>;
- **National and international studies:** on political parties, governance, and other topics.

Considerable effort was made to gather a complete set of project reports for the two periods, helping the team reconstruct the story of interventions by the same implementing partner over a ten-year period. The resulting narrative helped build a detailed picture of the intervention within a fluid context to frame the evaluation exercise.

The evaluation team's document review was framed by the evaluation questions. No survey was planned and the team did not have access to the PPIDG database of trained political party staff.

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<sup>5</sup> With the notable exception of a report produced by Integrity Research (2011), which was deemed by IRI as internal and outside the scope of this evaluation.



PPIDG’s limited existing data<sup>6</sup> was used (see Table 3) as a means to answer specific questions. The team was able to build a decade-long narrative of continuity and breaks in IRI’s activities, as well as reasons for changes. These findings helped shape questionnaires for KIIs and focus groups.

## Information Gathering

IRI provided the evaluation team lists of key informants who could be contacted. Group and focus group meeting composition was decided directly by the evaluation team: one group meeting with political parties and two state legislative assembly focus group meetings in Western Bar El Ghazal and Lakes states. A total of 54 individuals were either interviewed or met in face-to-face meetings. Interview guides and focus group themes (presented in the inception report to USAID) supported semi-structured information gathering. Tables 1 and 2 provide a disaggregated picture of these individuals.

Female	20
Male	34
<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>

Method→ Source ↓	KII	GI	FGD	Total
USAID	4			4
IRI	11			11
Parliamentarians			16	16
Political Parties	4	15		19
Other implementers & beneficiaries	4			4
<b>Total</b>				<b>54</b>

## Data and Information Analysis

Data were analyzed as follows to understand PPIDG during its three-year duration:

- Analysis of reports from 2004 to 2014 produced a narrative in which recurrent themes and activities were identified;
- The evaluation team was able to understand the breadth and reach of PPIDG by analyzing the IRI’s final report.

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<sup>6</sup> Quantitative data presented in reports was intervention-based (output oriented); it gave little information on individual beneficiaries, other than gender and political affiliation.

- Interviews were enriched with the narrative and data at hand. Post-interview discussions within the team helped integrate individually produced hand-written notes. Themes emerged from this preliminary processing of information.

Interpretation was based on recurrence analysis, triangulation, and patterns identified in transcripts.

## Limitations

Preliminary contacts were made with IRI before travelling to the field.

- The time span between the end of the PPIDG and this evaluation constrained access to key informants and a recall bias during interviews which was only partially mitigated by in-depth knowledge of written sources and cross-referencing with other interviews;
- Turnover of key USAID and IRI staff during the course of implementation considerably increased the number of *potential* interviewees. However, it also had the effect of reducing the useful and relevant information the evaluation team could access from staff that had only spent a small number of months in South Sudan.
- Finally, the nature and structure of information and data found in IRI's reports limited methodological options. Indeed, the output-based presentation of data (by interventions, with limited variables on individual beneficiaries) and silo-like description of interventions made analyses or measures of outcomes, in most cases, difficult. The exception was gender (See Question 4) which benefited from an external evaluation, though only excerpts could be accessed.

## FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS

Since before the signing of the Sudanese 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), IRI provided technical assistance and support to Sudanese<sup>7</sup> political parties and emerging political movements and organizations. Following the CPA's signing, IRI also provided support to the regional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. This assistance was delivered differently before and after independence. While pre-independence assistance focused on supporting the implementation of the CPA, and more specifically the 2011 referendum, post-independence DG needs were less clear. Although there was virtual unanimity on the part of the international community in support of the referendum — and Southern Sudan's independence — building the emerging nation's political system became much more challenging.

Priorities in the emerging South Sudan shifted quickly, significantly, and frequently — requiring IRI to quickly adjust similar to: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the United Nations (UN).

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<sup>7</sup> IRI's initial entry in Sudan, dating back to 2004, included the Southern region of the country, which later became the Republic of South Sudan.

The evaluation team had to develop its findings and conclusions in this dynamic context. This evaluation focuses on IRI's post-independence assistance. South Sudan's short history as a nation is tumultuous, unstable, and disappointing. The short-lived euphoria of independence gave way to internal power struggles, ethnic-based competition, and tribal distrust. The December 2013 outbreak of war was the culmination of abuse of power, disregard for democratic principles and the rule of law, and ultimately, a general unpreparedness to build a new nation. Against this backdrop, IRI implemented the PPIDG project in South Sudan.

### **Question 1: Did the project achieve the right focus and balance in terms of design, theory of change/development hypothesis, and democratic needs of South Sudan at the time of implementation?**

When considering the PPIDG project's goals and objectives, the evaluation team found that IRI's focus, design and project strategy were adequate for addressing the emerging needs of the immediate post-independence period, and also anticipated developments. IRI's strategy and project design assumed a set of conditions which would be established that would be conducive to implementing the PPIDG project. Unfortunately, the relatively rigid approach did not allow for the quick adjustments needed to address the unexpected developments.

#### **Findings:**

- **Political and democratic construction of South Sudan:** PPIDG can be viewed as a continuation of work IRI had been undertaking in the country for years. Indeed, as a whole, IRI's comprehensive initiatives in South(ern) Sudan, including PPIDG, contributed to the building of the new, sovereign and independent nation.
- **Focus on political parties and legislative bodies complemented other initiatives:** Just as the PPIDG project was part of a broader institutional strategy going back years, IRI as an implementing partner in South(ern) Sudan was part of a broader and integral USAID DG strategy, embracing civil society and civic education support initiatives implemented by NDI and the electoral support efforts implemented by IFES. Alone, these initiatives would not have been as successful, but as part of a concerted strategy, they appear to have been successful. Similarly, USAID's strategy was nested in a broader effort by the international community.
- **IRI's project focus was adequate and appropriate:** Based on the on-the-ground realities during the project's design phase and at the time of its initial implementation, PPIDG's focus was adequate. Following the natural progression of its previous work — and the unfolding of South Sudan's post-independence political landscape — PPIDG's strategy effectively addressed the needs of what was expected. Multiple political parties were active in the country and many were represented in the NLA. PPIDG's planned activities were based on the assumption that the political situation would progress democratically. When this did not occur, IRI's work became less apt, particularly as it emphasized longer-term impact. A series of factors exogenous to IRI complicated implementation. Other implementers were also confronted with an increasingly complex political and operating environment.

- **General lack of strategic flexibility and focus:** While PPIDG’s initial approach responded to what was immediately needed in the post-independence period, it was also shortsighted, rendering it generally unable to adapt and effectively address the ever-changing demands of a very fluid political situation.
- **Lack of budget realism and strategic focus:** PPIDG’s ambitious scope exceeded its budget realities. Its work — to varying extents — with all of the country’s political parties significantly diluted its resources. Its provision of assistance to all 10 of the country’s state legislatures, as well as the NLA, also affected its ability to focus on more crucial needs. On one hand, PPIDG’s efforts to address many, if not all, the post-independence needs should be commended. As the only international organization working in the area of political party development and legislative strengthening, IRI attempted to fill all the gaps. On the other hand, in so doing, it appears to have stretched itself too thin, sacrificing strategic cohesion. IRI’s programmatic strategy was disjointed, focused on stop-gap measures, and did not build the longer-term capacity of beneficiaries and/or counterparts.

For example, state and national respondents mentioned that many of the training activities delivered to political parties and state legislatures were one-time, stand-alone efforts, with little follow-up. When follow-on activities were organized, they were often delivered to different participants, reducing cumulative impact.

Although PPIDG provided a significant amount of training and technical assistance to political parties, many respondents felt these initiatives were “islands,” disconnected from other efforts. Respondents felt greater efforts should have been made at promoting PPIDG training uniformity, or at least coordination, with their parties to guarantee an optimization of the training and capacity building efforts. Even within parties, IRI’s training strategy lacked cohesion. In the course of its work with state legislators in Western Bahr El-Ghazal and Lakes states, for example, the training they received was significantly different than that received by their national-level colleagues. This disconnect resulted in lack of organization within the party and incoherent — and even contradictory — positions on various issues. In one case, state legislators lobbied for assistance to enhance access to water, only to have their national-level counterparts — from the same party — request assistance for improved electricity coverage.

- **Political and practical *inertia* skewed results and perceptions of PPIDG:** Having led the fight for — and successfully delivering — independence to the people of Southern Sudan, the SPLM/A felt entitled to lead the new country. Perhaps unable to assimilate its new role in the building of South Sudan, the ruling party moved aggressively to consolidate its power. Understanding that its adversaries were now internal, the SPLM/A quickly diminished or closed democratic spaces, greatly altering all implementing partners’ ability to succeed. For example, support that was initially provided to the National Constitutional Review Council (NCRC) was suddenly suspended after disagreements over its composition. The new government’s shifting priorities and budgetary constraints also contributed to this issue, complicating assistance from many providing assistance to the NCRC.

While the SPLM/A had genuinely worked to transform itself from a military movement to a political organization in the pre-independence period, it now sought to ensure its grip on

power. DG implementing partners were faced with completely new challenges. Although the SPLM/A — and other Southern Sudanese parties — were in complete agreement regarding independence, once independence was reached, this consensus quickly evaporated. The SPLM/A wanted to consolidate its power, while the other parties wanted to share it and proceed in harmony. According to several former IRI staffers, and given IRI's historic relationship with the SPLM/A, IRI was perceived as favoring the ruling party.

Meanwhile, most of South Sudan's other parties began to show that they were fundamentally unprepared to operate in the new environment. Most were — and continue to be — unable to meet the requirements to register as a political party. Others were unable to even establish an office, much less a party headquarters. Certainly, the SPLM/A benefitted greatly from IRI's assistance over the years. But, IRI's assistance to other parties was less successful as those groups lacked the SPLM/A's absorptive and organizational capacity to benefit in the same way. With independence, the gap between the SPLM/A and other parties widened.

## Conclusions:

- **Foundation for continued work:** PPIDG, considered together with prior USAID investments, provides a strong platform on which to build. SPLM/A has taken advantage of many of the tools and expertise provided by IRI through the years. Other parties, such as the National Congress Party (NCP), the Sudan African National Union (SANU) party and the African National Congress (ANC) party have demonstrated promise. The knowledge and expertise gained by these parties can be advanced and further cultivated. In addition, many South Sudanese citizens have become aware of political processes and parties' roles through interaction with political parties, establishing a level of awareness that was previously lacking. Despite having concluded the PPIDG project in 2014, IRI's contributions are still evident. Given the time lapse, however, and the political developments in the country since IRI's departure, many of IRI's contributions will need to be significantly strengthened and/or rebuilt.
- **Current situation is a window of opportunity:** With a peace agreement in place, the country may be ready to focus on its physical, economic, and political reconstruction. There is an opportunity for USAID and the international community to re-engage. Scheduled 2018 elections are an important landmark objective to work towards. These will be the first elections in South Sudan, and the first real competition among candidates, parties, and ideas. Ensuring that the playing field is as even as possible will be important in guaranteeing the success and credibility of these elections, as well as respect for its results.
- **Strategy was myopic:** While adequate for the immediate period following independence, and largely consistent with the expectations of what would be needed in the initial phases of South Sudan's political construction, the PPIDG strategy was short-sighted. PPIDG did not see the advantages of working with a select — and reduced — group of political parties, party members, and state legislatures. Several political party representatives interviewed for this evaluation agreed that PPIDG's wide beneficiary scope limited it to only basic, albeit

important, training initiatives.<sup>8</sup> As a result, IRI focused only on the immediate- and short-terms. Coupled with the relatively brief period to implement PPIDG, interventions proved inadequate for longer-term development.

- **Overly ambitious objectives, activity plan, and scope:** PPIDG’s scope was wide, essentially attempting to address all post-independence needs. As one respondent said, “IRI was trying to do a little of a lot, as opposed to doing a lot of a little.” This approach may have been in response to USAID directives. Regarding its work with political parties, the evaluation team found that on more than one occasion IRI suggested to USAID a reduction in the number of beneficiary organizations, but USAID felt that PPIDG should make itself available to all parties willing to receive assistance. The evaluation team felt that narrowing the number of target beneficiaries, and deepening its support to them, may have rendered greater results in the longer term.
- **Lack of strategic coordination:** The general lack of strategic cohesion and coordination in PPIDG’s design and implementation led to isolated, uneven, and inefficient results. IRI’s efforts to try and address all the needs, while commendable, resulted in diluted resources, efforts, and ultimately, impact.

Political party members and legislators interviewed by the evaluation team pointed out that there was a general “lack of strategic direction” in the training and assistance they received. While stressing the usefulness of IRI’s support to them as professionals and individuals, they felt the assistance did less to strengthen their parties. The stand-alone initiatives may have benefitted individuals, political parties at the state level, and state legislators, but not these organizations as a whole. Respondents mentioned feeling a general disconnect with other colleagues.

Several SPLM/A members interviewed for the evaluation also pointed out the heavy focus of PPIDG initiatives on the legislatures. Efforts to provide training and know-how to executive level members at the national and state levels, as well, would have ensured greater coordination and cohesion within parties and the national and state governments.

## **Question 2: What were the intended and un-intended results of project interventions?**

A series of factors affected PPIDG outcomes. These included the lack of will of domestic actors to apply the expertise and knowledge being transferred, the low organizational capabilities of South Sudanese political parties and legislatures, and the limited professional capacity of individual political party members and legislators. Hence, positive and negative changes cannot be completely, or even primarily, attributed to PPIDG interventions. Instead, we consider PPIDG as a critical player in a broader USG and international community strategy.

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<sup>8</sup> The SPLM/A was the only exception. Its general capacity, geographical reach, and experience – along with its previous history with IRI – allowed it to benefit significantly more than other parties receiving assistance. IRI assistance to the SPLM/A included significantly more advanced training.

## Intended Results

- **Development of pluralistic and democratic political system:** IRI's efforts in support of political parties and legislative strengthening in South Sudan contributed to the development of a pluralistic and democratic system. While this system may be weak and still in its nascent stages, it is in place.

Before independence, the people of South Sudan had very little — if any — exposure to democratic practices, systems, actors, and mechanisms. After independence, citizens have been made, at least initially, aware of democracy. Democracy building is a permanent endeavor. Despite some failures along the way, South Sudan has laid the initial framework for its continued development, in large measure thanks to IRI's assistance and that of USAID's broader DG portfolio.

- **Internal development and democratization of political parties:** PPIDG's work with political parties introduced important elements related to their development and internal democratization. Direct assistance led to development of political parties' foundational and internal documents (constitutions, by-laws, codes of conduct, etc.). PPIDG also played a central role in designing the processes in which several parties were to elect their authorities. This was particularly important with the SPLM/A. Never before had the SPLM/A, or other parties and/or organizations, undergone such fundamental processes. As a direct result of IRI's work in South Sudan, the above-mentioned examples represent important precedents in the country.
- **Increased operational effectiveness and efficacy of national and state legislatures:** As part of its broader support for the political construction of South Sudan, PPIDG provided assistance to national and state legislative assemblies. While precursor assemblies had existed in what was previously Southern Sudan, these had limited powers and authority and acquired little practical experience.

With independence, South Sudan's legislative bodies — and their member parliamentarians — needed significant training and technical assistance. PPIDG's support in the strengthening the country's legislative assemblies appears to have improved their operational effectiveness and efficacy to varying degrees among states and parliamentarians. Within the NLA, as well, the difference among parliamentarians is often times vast.

Here again, PPIDG's intention of addressing all needs may have reduced success (as its time and resources were spread thin) but they did set the stage for the ongoing development of these governing bodies, even after the conclusion of the PPIDG.

- **Promoted and supported wider participation of citizens:** During its pre-2012 work, IRI supported citizen participation in the CPA process and the 2010 elections and 2011 referendum. Beyond simply voting in the elections and referendum, IRI initiatives also identified political parties as an important vehicle within which to become involved. While political party development efforts may have shifted in the post-independence period, IRI's efforts to attract and facilitate the participation of citizens continued. For example, IRI introduced targeted interventions to increase the participation of women and youth.

PPIDG's work with Youth Leadership Academies constitutes an important legacy. Even today, academy participants point to these as key milestones in their personal lives and professional careers. Youth Leadership Academy participants interviewed by the evaluation team expressed their gratitude, insisting that much of the knowledge and many of the tools gained from these academies are used and practiced in their daily lives.

Similarly, PPIDG's support to the development of Women's Leagues in some parties represents another legacy. PPIDG's role in the organization of Women's Caucuses in the NLA and in several state legislatures represents a significant and lasting achievement. Along with other previous and current USAID initiatives, PPIDG strived to promote women's participation and involvement. The population is majority women. Their involvement in the country's development is critical. Formation of these women's' caucuses is an important element in the future democratic development of South Sudan.

- **Introduction of polling/opinion surveys:** IRI introduced public opinion polling in South Sudan in 2011, conducting its first survey under its previous cooperative agreement with USAID. Subsequently, IRI conducted three additional surveys under the PPIDG project. While not a central focus of PPIDG, this component can be seen as one of the project's most successful and significant contributions. Public opinion surveys conducted by PPIDG provided citizens, CSOs, media, political parties and the government valuable information regarding citizens' perceptions. While perhaps not sufficiently exploited by the country's political actors, the surveys represent the introduction of an important instrument to inform policies, party platforms, and civic education efforts. PPIDG's work and partnerships with local individuals and organizations has created an important — albeit somewhat inexperienced — cadre of public opinion survey organizations and workers.

Coupled with the focus group activities carried out by NDI, IRI's public opinion surveys contributed significantly to keeping a finger on the pulse of public perceptions in the emerging country. NDI's focus group work was also an essential component of the broader USAID initiatives to seek and obtain information regarding the feelings and perceptions of South Sudanese citizens.

- **Political Parties Leadership Forum (PPLF):** PPIDG was instrumental in the formation and organization of the PPLF, an independent forum where political party representatives could meet, debate, conduct research, and undertake analysis. Besides lending critical support in the establishment of the PPLF's physical space, PPIDG provided assistance and facilitated the work of its secretariat. For some parties supported by IRI, the PPLF was the only physical space where it could convene and conduct business. PPLF's existence allowed for the development — albeit very modest — of some political parties and organizations. As the country's democratic spaces began closing, the PPLF served as an important mechanism and physical venue for non-SPLM/A parties to discuss, analyze, debate and propose solutions. Political party members and representatives interviewed for this evaluation unanimously pointed to the PPLF as an essential tool for democratic development of South Sudan.
- **Increased awareness in the democratic construction of South Sudan:** IRI's initiatives in the country contributed to creating and increasing awareness on the importance of



democratic principles. IRI exposed South Sudanese citizens for the very first time to democratic exercises and ideals as part of the 2010 elections and 2011 referendum. More recently, PPIDG crafted initiatives targeting women and youth, representing an important landmark in South Sudan's political development. Traditionally marginalized groups (women and youth) represent agents of change to build and further democratic awareness. Along with the activities implemented by NDI and IFES, PPIDG contributed to the initial establishment of a democratic culture in South Sudan — an important achievement.

- **Strengthened cadre of SPLM technocrats:** Certainly, IRI's efforts in South(ern) Sudan, aimed to strengthen SPLM members. Understanding the SPLM/A was the inevitable torch-bearer of independence — and then the construction of South Sudan — efforts were made to ensure a relatively ready and prepared group of technocrats were available to manage and oversee the new country. Through its work with the SPLM/A — going back to the pre-CPA period — IRI made important contributions to encouraging the development of mid-level party technocrats. Many of these party members have held — and continue to hold — important management positions within the government.

## Unintended Results

- **SPLM/A strengthened:** As the primary beneficiary of IRI's support since 2004, the SPLM/A continued being a PPIDG focus in the post-independence period. While other parties may have had organizational and professional capacity to build upon, the SPLM/A was really the only political organization capable of leading the construction of the new nation. As PPIDG, other interventions, and the international community sought to provide support to the SPLM/A-led government in the very critical stage of post-independence, it also strengthened the party itself. Although PPIDG also provided training to other parties, those groups lagged behind while the SPLM/A surged. As a result, other political parties were simply unable to keep up with the fluid political situation enveloping the country. As the ruling SPLM/A strengthened itself internally, it also consolidated its power in the government. The capacity gap between the SPLM/A and other parties widened and the political playing field became increasingly uneven. It's important to note, however, that this was not caused by SPLM/A efforts to weaken other parties, or IRI's more tailored approach with the ruling party, but rather the smaller parties inability to absorb the trainings being delivered and translate this knowledge into viable actions.
- **Creation of dependency:** While much of the support provided to non-SPLM/A parties was essential, it was also relatively basic. Given the state of political parties in the country, training on fundamental issues was sorely needed. The country's political parties, including the SPLM/A, did not even have foundational documents. All of them lacked an internal constitution, codes of conduct, rules and regulations, and other basic documents. Others did not have a clear understanding of the roles of political parties in a democratic political system; some continue lacking this understanding today. Thus, IRI moved quickly to fill that gap and address those needs, however basic they may have been. But the generalized lack of a cohesive and comprehensive strategy for political parties — combined with their low absorption, professional, and organizational capacities — did not allow for their longer-term development. Instead, PPIDG's fill-gap strategies addressed immediate, short-term needs.

Given the lack of a comprehensive training strategy, many of the beneficiary political parties became increasingly dependent on PPIDG's assistance, unable to perform many essential duties and activities on their own. Political party representatives interviewed by MSI in Lakes State described their previous — and successful — organization of town hall meetings; with PPIDG support. Since the close of the PPIDG project, they never even attempted to organize a similar event.

As a result, the stand-alone approach implemented by PPIDG in its provision of training to political parties ultimately resulted in a gradual loss of capacity, relative to the SPLM/A. Without follow-on activities to build-upon what was achieved, the accumulated knowledge was lost in many cases.

- **Creation of expectations:** IRI's contributions to the development of South Sudan's political system are extremely important. During the pre-independence period, IRI's support to Southern Sudan political parties and organizations was instrumental, particularly the assistance provided to the SPLM/A. After independence, South Sudan's emerging political parties — as well as those that already existed — were anxious to play roles in the political construction of their new country. Given IRI's long history in support of South(ern) Sudan, there were considerable expectations in the country's political class. In a group meeting with numerous opposition party officials, the evaluation team was told of their expectations and potential benefits that IRI's support would provide. IRI was known to be the only organization working with political parties, so there was an assumption that its support would address all their challenges. But with so many potential beneficiaries and needs — and a relatively small budget — not all expectations would be met. And though PPIDG attempted to address all of the emerging requirements, it simply lacked the time, financial resources, long-term strategy, and adequate counterparts to do so.
- **Proliferation of political parties:** While the proliferation of political parties cannot be directly attributed to IRI, the availability of technical assistance and support to political organizations made the endeavor attractive to many actors. Indeed, many of the more than two dozen political parties<sup>9</sup> that exist in South Sudan can be categorized as “briefcase organizations”. Some individuals have “created” political parties as a vehicle to project themselves in the country's political landscape; others seek to leverage financial benefits and/or rewards. The Labour Party of South Sudan (LPSS), the South Sudan Liberal Party (SSLP), and the Communist Party of South Sudan CPSS), for example, were established after the 2011 referendum. Others include: National Union Democratic Party (NUDP), and the Peace, Unity, Reconciliation and Equality (PURE) party.
- **Polarization of positions along ethnic lines:** The deteriorating political situation in South Sudan has also contributed to the proliferation of political parties. Local experts with whom the evaluation team met described the fissures in the SPLM/A (December 2013) as having taken place in other parties. Information from focus groups point toward this trend. While participants unanimously supported the existence of a multi-party political system in South Sudan, they mentioned the importance of ensuring these should not be regionally, ethnically,

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<sup>9</sup> The Political Parties' Council is currently reviewing several requests made by political organizations to be legally recognized and registered as political parties. Once this process concludes, it is expected that the current number of political parties in South Sudan will be reduced significantly.

or tribally based. Some of the new political organizations or parties that have emerged have done so along ethnic lines, further contributing to the existing tensions and instability.

- **Fissures in ruling party:** Among the political parties with whom it worked, IRI was most successful with the SPLM/A. Besides making considerable strides in building the party's organizational development and capacity, IRI introduced important elements to promote the internal democratization of the SPLM/A, such as party conventions and processes to elect party authorities. Ironically, these important processes may have been what sparked, or facilitated, the party's split into factions and the outbreak of the 2013 civil war. However, these internal democratization mechanisms themselves did not cause the party's split. Rather, it was the SPLM/A's inability and/or unwillingness to accept the decisions that emerged from these mechanisms themselves.

## Conclusions

- **PPIDG was part of a broader, well-defined strategy:** PPIDG was an essential component of a broader USAID DG strategy to support the independence of South Sudan and its political development. Along with NDI's civil society and civic education support project and IFES' electoral support initiative, IRI's political party development and legislative strengthening efforts represented a well-designed assistance package.
- **IRI's long relationship SPLM/A was advantageous to project implementation:** IRI's work with the SPLM/A dating back to 2004 was extremely important. These historical links allowed for trust and confidence to build, and for IRI to thoroughly understand the on-the-ground situation. This trust and familiarity proved key in continuing its work with the SPLM/A in the post-independence period.
- **Level of intensity much lower than pre-independence period:** The uncertain post-independence panorama forced international donors to re-examine their involvement in the emerging nation. Levels of financial support decreased, as did the levels of intensity in the assistance that was provided. USAID's pre-independence DG support budget of more than \$140 million was significantly cut, as was the number of implementing partners.
- **Political developments moved too fast:** Following years of armed and political struggle, South Sudan was suddenly independent. Although the CPA process started in 2005, Southern Sudan's decision to secede from Sudan came quickly. Once the 2011 referendum was conducted, the formal independence of South Sudan was only months away. No one was prepared for post-independence, not the SPLM/A, not the country's other political parties, nor the international community. Respondents all agreed that post-independence strategy was lacking. While everyone's focus was on conducting the referendum — and ostensibly achieving independence — no one was ready for what was to come after.
- **Militarization of SPLM and politicizing of SPLA:** As a political party the SPLM continues struggling to make the transition from a movement that has its origins in a military organization. The SPLM's structures, attitudes, behavior, and internal processes and procedures continue to be highly militaristic. Decisions are rarely — if ever — made by consensus, and the removal and/or reassignment of officials are done at will. The SPLA, on

the other hand, has become completely politicized. Lacking independence from the government, the SPLA serves as the ruling party's defense forces, not South Sudan's.

- **Ethnic/tribal divisions, polarization:** While ethnic and tribal divisions existed even before the independence of Sudan in 1956, the political situation in today's South Sudan has resulted in greater ethnic and tribal divisions. Although tensions already existed before the current political crisis, these were exacerbated by some of the country's political actors. But, while pre-independence Southern Sudan had a common enemy, South Sudan's enemies are now from within; the ethnic/tribal-based violence — encouraged in many cases by leaders — represents a significant challenge in soothing and closing the wounds of 2013.

### **Question 3: To what extent was IRI's operational model cost efficient and cost effective in achieving the project's expected results?**

The fluid and quickly developing post-independence political situation in South Sudan had many requirements; most of which USAID and its implementing partners tried to address. PPIDG developed an all-encompassing strategy to try and meet a variety of the urgent needs.

A main PPIDG component sought to support all the country's political parties, a substantial end in itself. Another component strengthened legislative bodies, the SSNLA, and the 10 state legislatures — a challenging task, particularly given the security situation and the geographical challenges and logistical hurdles required to work in all 10 states. Although not initially central to its strategy, PPIDG also conducted a series of public opinion surveys — ultimately, a very successful component.

Given the relatively small budget with which it would operate, however, the scope of the PPIDG Project and the amount of beneficiaries and activities that were proposed were quite ambitious. The team made significant efforts to meet its targets. And, while PPIDG was not designed to address South Sudan's longer-term political development needs, by establishing important precedents, IRI was instrumental in laying some groundwork for future activities.

### **Findings**

- **Implemented through cooperative agreement:** Compared to IFES, for example, whose electoral support was through a contract — a more rigid mechanism — IRI was implemented through a cooperative agreement, allowing for greater flexibility in the design and conduct of activities, strategic direction, and decision-making.
- **Well-balanced mix of international and local staff:** While numerous staffing changes occurred during the activity, the evaluation team found that overall IRI deployed a well-balanced mix of international, regional, and local staff. Although the evaluation team was not able to determine exact figures, interviews with IRI respondents suggested a 25/60/15 split among expats, regional, and local staff, respectively. This model can help boost regional expertise and increase local experience.

- **Smaller budget; same operating conditions:** The PPIDG project was implemented under the same challenging operating conditions as initiatives implemented by NDI and IFES. However, PPIDG’s budget was significantly smaller in comparison. While IFES and NDI managed \$70 million and \$63 million projects, respectively, PPIDG had a budget of only \$17 million. Funds were not sufficient for what PPIDG proposed. The scope was too ambitious. Seeking to work with all political parties and legislatures diluted the impact of the PPIDG.
- **Initially weak M&E strategy:** Its M&E framework was largely a continuation of IRI’s pre-2012 projects. Since it was based on measuring outputs instead of outcomes the initial M&E plan was inadequate for the proper measurement of impact and results. It did not allow for timely identification of possible shortcomings and formulation of needed adjustments or course corrections. IRI did eventually identify this challenge and incorporated improvements into its M&E framework.
- **Challenges fielding appropriate staff in timely manner:** Like other implementing partners, IRI encountered challenges fielding staff. Coupled with USAID’s staffing changes, this turnover had adverse effects on implementation. New staff — both IRI and USAID — may have had different opinions on what to do and how to do it, resulting in a loss of time and an under-optimization of achievements and resources.
- **Significant reduction in scope after December 2014:** The 2013 outbreak of war forced IRI to suspend its activities and evacuate staff. Once it was authorized to return to South Sudan and re-engage in mid-2014, IRI focused its attention on implementing four very specific activities, as ordered by USAID. As a result, PPIDG was unable to build on the successes it had achieved prior to the civil war. Six months later, PPIDG concluded.

## Conclusions

- **Project strategy, activities plan and scope were not compatible with financial constraints:** As explained previously, the evaluation team found that IRI’s project proposed to do too much with too little. Narrowing its universe of beneficiaries would have helped the PPIDG project achieve greater, deeper, and more enduring results.

**Short-lived impact and diminishing rate of returns:** As a result of the above, most of the impact achieved by the PPIDG was short-lived. The decision to work with all political parties and legislatures diminished its capability to build on past successes. Coupled with the low absorption capacity of beneficiaries, the cumulative effect of PPIDG was muted.

- **Cost efficiency and effectiveness not optimized:** The general lack of focus, particularly as it refers to the number of beneficiaries and counterparts, resulted in sub-optimal productivity. But it’s also important to understand that PPIDG occurred in a particularly critical and challenging period. Expectations of IRI — indeed, of all implementing partners — was very high. Very transparently and in good faith, IRI sought to address all emerging needs. In retrospect, however, the broad-based approach followed by the PPIDG project may have been ineffective.

## **Question 4: What have been the specific and differential effects of IRI's project on males and females in terms of political participation and legislative strengthening?**

IRI's interventions in gender sensitization and support to women legislators date back to a previous cycle of activities. Indeed, the first documented meeting dates back to June 2006, where the semi-annual report stated: "In June 2006 at the request of three female Committee Chairpersons, IRI held a meeting where the legislators shared their desire for IRI to assist in the development of a Women's Caucus within the SSLA. Currently there are thirty women within the SSLA out of a total of one hundred and seventy members."<sup>10</sup> Throughout the 2006 to 2012 period, the Institute expanded its network among women legislators, to include groups from the States, and backed them through activities, such as support to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly Women's Forum<sup>11</sup> in November 2007 which culminated in the official launch of the SSLAWF in October 2008 or its help on developing strategic plans.

At the heart of its approach was training. In a June 2007 workshop, delivered by IRI and Mercy Corps, topics covered: Role of women's caucus; Value and development of a work plan; Overview of the League's strategic plan; Role of women in politics; Gender mainstreaming; Engendering the Budget Process; Principles in the Development of a Constitution; Gender Legislation; the INC & ICSS; Strategic Planning; Fundraising; Principles of Good Governance and Democracy; Tools for Strengthening Linkages between MPs and CSOs; Gender Mainstreaming Instruments; Event Planning.<sup>12</sup> Although during that period, IRI also did an SPLM specific Women League conference, the June 2007 workshop included USAP, NCP, and SPLM.

As elections and the referendum approached, activities focused on women groups and league were less visible, nevertheless interventions were reported until the end of the previous cycle with, e.g. a March 2011 SSLA Women Parliamentarians' Caucus Meeting<sup>13</sup>, with SPLM only participants.

In an evaluation report<sup>14</sup> commandeered by IRI at the end of this cycle, evaluators made clear their assessment of IRI's work in this sector: "Activities such as the women's candidate training and the extensive work with the Parliamentary Women's Caucus have provided women across the party spectrum with the practical skills required to represent themselves effectively."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> International Republican Institute. 2006. Sudan. USAID Cooperative Agreement No. - 623-A-00-04-00072-00. CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: March 31 - September 30, 2006. Juba: IRI, p. 8. It must be noted that reporting before 2006 was spotty; therefore validation comes from documents the team could consult.

<sup>11</sup> International Republican Institute. 2008. Sudan: Political Party Development, Legislative Strengthening. USAID Cooperative Agreement No. - 623-A-00-04-00072-00. CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: October 2007-March 2008. Juba: IRI, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> See: Semi Annual Report: April 1, 2007 – September 30, 2007, p. 9. SPLM Women League Conference, p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> See Quarterly Report: January - March 2011, p. 10.

<sup>14</sup> IRI did not forward the report to the evaluation team, so quotes are from a secondary source.

<sup>15</sup> The quote is from the report authored by Integrity Research and Consultancy, "An Evaluation of IRI's Political Party Program in South Sudan," December 30, 2011, p. 25 as it appears in IRI's final report: International Republican Institute. 2012. CEPPS/IRI Final Report. Sudan: Political Party Development. USAID Cooperative Agreement No.: 623-A-00-04-00072-00. Washington: IRI, p. 33.

## Findings

- **Comprehensive interventions.** After 2012, and the deployment of the cycle of activities under review, the general thrust in this sector remained quite similar as it built on established networks, on requests from stakeholders, and on lessons learned from the 2006-2011 period. However, there was an added dimension to interventions: an attempt to enhance men’s understanding of the importance of women’s full participation, moving beyond tokenism, in public affairs.

The October 2012 – September 2013 Work Plan<sup>16</sup> set the tone. Under Objective 1 of the new cycle, the 1.2 set of activities had as one set of intervention “Multiparty Gender Mainstreaming Nationwide Training Program”. (Table 3 offers a summary of activities under all objectives throughout 2012-2014.)

**Table 3: Activities Targeting Women Legislators<sup>17</sup>, 2012-2014.**

<b>Objective 1 : Improve the Organizational and Professional Development of Political Parties</b>			
<b>Activity Date</b>	<b>Activity Name</b>	<b>Participants</b>	
		<b>M</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>March 30-31, 2012</b>	ANC Women Sector Development Workshop	1	32
<b>August 2-3, 2012</b>	SPLM-DC Women League Development Workshop	0	29
<b>August 7-9, 2012</b>	UDSF-M Women and Youth Strategic Planning Workshop	43	13
<b>October 3-4, 2012</b>	UDF Women Leadership Training	4	32
<b>December 3, 2012</b>	Constitutional Development Sensitization Workshop for Women in Political Parties	0	20
<b>January –February 2013</b>	SPLM Women League Assessment	38	360
<b>March 12-13, 2013</b>	ANC Women Sector Constitution Development Workshop	20	20
<b>March 19-23, 2013</b>	National Women Empowerment Training of Trainers Program	2	26

<sup>16</sup> International Republican Institute. 2012. CEPPS/IRI October 2012 – September 2013 Work Plan. South Sudan: Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance in South Sudan. Associate Agreement No. AID-668-LA-12-00001. Washington: IRI.

<sup>17</sup> Table built from: Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening. 2015. CEPPS Final Report. South Sudan: Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance. USAID Associate Cooperative Agreement No. AID-688-LA-12-00001, under the Leader Cooperative Agreement No. DFD-A-00-08-00350-00. Washington: CEPPS: IRI, IFES, NDI, tables at the end of each section on Objectives.

April –May 2013	National Women Empowerment Program – State Trainings	20	589
June 25-27, 2013	SPLM Women League Draft Constitution Review Workshop	7	106
September 6-7, 2013	SPLM Women League Charter Development Workshop	1	24
<b>Objective 2 : Increase the Capacity of Political Parties to Develop Issue-Based Platforms that Represent Core Constituents</b>			
April 24-25, 2012	Young Women in Politics Training	0	33
December 2012- August 2013	The Debate Show on: Women Rights (March 21)	13	67
September 17-18, 2013	Status of Women Representation in South Sudan Workshop	0	35
December 11-12, 2013	Women Political Leaders Communication and Media Workshop	0	26
July 23- August 29, 2014	Women Peace Dialogues on Political Parties and Peace Process	0	259
<b>Objective 3 : Improve the Effectiveness of Political Party Members as Representatives in National and State Legislative Assemblies</b>			
September– December 2013	Gender Committee Public Hearings	312	188
October 30, 2013	Technical Assistance to the NLA Gender Committee	6	4
December 5, 2013	Launch of the NL-WPC Strategic Plan	8	48
<b>Total</b>		<b>475</b>	<b>1911</b>

With a mixed-bag of party-level training workshops (Objective 1), media sensitization on the Debate Show (Objective 2), and technical support to gender focused public hearings (Objective 3), PPIDG covered a broad spectrum of interventions to push the gender mainstreaming agenda. PPIDG worked with 10 parties to create or consolidate women’s leagues. It also supported the National Legislature- Women Parliamentary Caucus (NL-WPC) develop a strategic plan which resulted in public funds allocated to it.

Although impressive, the wealth of actions in the sector met with the constraints and obstacles found in societies with unequal sharing of power between genders. There is little, if any, indications that IRI *measured* the levels of success or of changes (or lack of) brought by these actions. Monitoring remained weak despite IRI’s overwhelming compliance to planned activities. IRI’s



Endline report<sup>18</sup> gave voice to women involved in their training for women empowerment. Women interviewed for the assessment felt they were limited to membership mobilization and serving as a labor force for male political organizations. The report concludes the section with: “Women political party representatives participating in this assessment identified cultural and traditional norms that limit women’s participation in politics as the biggest challenge they face.

- **Quantitatively very successful:** By designing and implementing strategies that directly targeted women and encouraged, promoted, and facilitated their participation, IRI was very successful. Indeed, one of the PPIDG’s greatest successes has to do with its specific efforts aimed at encouraging women to become more involved in the country’s political discourse. The number of women participants in IRI activities is impressive, and the quantity of activities designed specifically for women also constitutes an important milestone. Beyond promoting and facilitating women’s participation, IRI also implemented strategies to ensure this involvement not just symbolic, but effective.

To that end, IRI formulated strategies to train women and improve their role as community leaders, party members, legislators, and advocates. The support provided by IRI in the creation of women’s leagues in political parties was also key, raising awareness about the significant role women must play in the country’s development. Similarly, IRI support in the establishment women’s caucuses — both at the national and state levels — was an important accomplishment.

Just as importantly, IRI accompanied these efforts by designing strategies to sensitize men. The biggest obstacles to women’s participation are men. By raising awareness among males, IRI helped South Sudan take an important first step in genuinely and fully recognizing the need for women’s involvement.

Women encountered in prior focus groups, but especially in Rumbek, emphasized how PPIDG’s activities helped them achieve objectives which would have been beyond their grasps before<sup>19</sup>.

## Conclusions

- **Introduction of inclusive culture:** PPIDG played a positive role in introducing a culture of inclusion, gender equality in parties and government, and promotion of diversity, not only for women, but also for youths. Its activities highlighted the important role of women in democratic construction and brought the topic in the public arena, echoing NDI’s own qualitative work.
- **Important precedents have been established:** The work IRI initiated in a very short period of time must be viewed as an important first step in a much longer process of behavioral change and social consensus on gender roles and power sharing.

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<sup>18</sup> International Republican Institute. 2014. South Sudan Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance Program: Endline Assessment Report. Washington: IRI, p. 11. Although very informative, the report made no attempt to measure how many women or political parties were of a given opinion.

<sup>19</sup> A more systematic approach would have included survey or better yet a tracer study of a random sample of participants

- **Women’s empowerment still faces obstacles/challenges:** The ultimate limits to IRI’s activities were spelled out in the Endline assessment<sup>20</sup> it produced. As participants in focus groups or interviews tried to assess results, an important finding (1.9) was identified: “Women politicians improved their capacity to participate in politics, but they still do not feel confident enough to take more active roles in an environment that still doesn’t recognize them as equal and relevant stakeholders.” This finding was triangulated during meetings.

In many ways, success was inhibited by cultural norms, illiteracy levels in the female population, and attribution of functions in political parties could not be significantly modified in a 30-month period, plagued with a crisis of great proportion and repercussions.

## **Question 5: To what extent has IRI’s technical assistance to political parties and legislative strengthening strategies been sustainable?**

IRI’s efforts to strengthen political parties and legislative strategies to be sustainable must be seen in the context of their counterparts’ willingness and ability to assimilate the expertise being transferred and apply it. The evaluation team assessed IRI’s technical assistance to political party development and legislative in terms of sustainability.

### **Findings**

IRI’s most significant legacy is the precedent it established. While its strategy and activities may not have been successful in ensuring sustainability, sustainability may not have been the most pressing issue at the time.

- **Project strategy addressed immediate, post-independence needs:** Understanding IRI’s previous involvement and history in South(ern) Sudan, and the very fluid post-independence political developments, IRI moved to address the immediate needs that emerged. Recognizing the 2012-2014 period within which the PPIDG project was implemented constituted the initial phases of the construction of South Sudan, the needs were many. IRI’s focus turned to addressing the many — and ever increasing — requirements in the immediate and short-term.
- **Very basic and fundamental knowledge/tools transferred:** Save for few exceptions, most of the training, expertise, and knowledge transferred by IRI to its South Sudanese beneficiaries and counterparts was very basic, i.e., office and computer skills, public speaking, researching, “how a bill becomes a law”, etc. The general capacity of the assistance recipients, in most cases, did not allow for more thorough, in-depth training. While the very basic training provide by IRI represented essential building blocks, the PPIDG project lacked the necessary financial capacity to provide follow-on initiatives. On the other hand, other, more established, older parties were able to move beyond basic training initiatives. Parties like the SPLM, SPLM-DC, NCP, among others, were much better able to grow and develop in their capacities, taking advantage of IRI’s more advance trainings.

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<sup>20</sup> Op. cit.

- **Political parties unprepared and unable to absorb assistance:** As mentioned previously, the post-independence period saw a proliferation of political organizations, many lacking even the most basic of capabilities. While IRI had been working very closely with the SPLM — and to a lesser extent other parties — for several years, the newer parties were simply incapable of and unprepared to receive assistance.

Again, IRI's willingness to provide support to all parties is admirable. Particularly during this period, it was important to promote transparency, openness, fairness, and equality. Unfortunately, the numerous recipients (all political parties and all legislatures) of support diluted the project's resources.

- **Two political party assistance models:** Regarding its work with political parties, IRI essentially designed, developed and implemented two assistance models: one for the SPLM/A, and another for all other parties. In fact, IRI deployed a dedicated program officer for the SPLM/A, and another for all other parties. Similarly — and understandably — the assistance package being offered to the governing SPLM/A was significantly different than the assistance offered to other parties. This two-pronged approach created the perception among non-SPLM/A political parties that IRI was favoring the ruling party.

While it was clear that the SPLM/A's organizational and developmental capacity was significantly superior to that of other parties, IRI's tailored approach with the ruling party caused some uneasiness. For example, of its two Youth Leadership Academy initiatives, one was dedicated only to the SPLM/A, while the other was organized for all the other parties. The other parties IRI was supporting simply did not have the level of capacity of the SPLM/A; thus while IRI was providing other parties with much more basic and fundamental training, it was delivering more advanced assistance to the SPLM/A.

Ultimately, while there may have been a perception of favoritism toward the SPLM/A by IRI, this was inaccurate and unfair. In fact, IRI's potential for providing essential assistance was probably slowed down and significantly diluted by the other parties lower — substantially, in many cases — capacity.

- **Strategy aimed to work with all state legislatures:** Similar to its approach with political parties, IRI made itself available to work with all 10 of the country's state legislatures. And in this case as well, the levels of professional and organizational capacity were not uniform; in many cases, they were drastically different. Coupled with the mobilization constraints due to the security situation and to geographic and accessibility challenges, IRI's assistance to the state legislatures was very uneven. Here too, a general lack of follow-on initiatives rendered the initial support less than effective. State legislators interviewed by the evaluation team praised IRI's assistance, but lamented the lack of a more comprehensive strategy.
- **General lack of strategic cohesiveness and coordination:** IRI's project strategy lacked cohesiveness and coordination. Its various components (political party development, legislative strengthening, etc.) were not linked with each other and were implemented as separate and unrelated initiatives. Even within the same project components, there was an apparent lack of coordination and cohesiveness.

For example, political party representatives interviewed by MSI indicated that while IRI provided assistance to both national and local level members as part of its political party development component, the support provided was not uniform. In several cases, local party members were unaware of what national party members were doing, and vice-versa. The lack of coordination and communication provoked confusion within the parties, and even resulted in differing opinions on policy matters.

Several respondents also indicated that the PPIDG project was too focused on legislative strengthening issues, when executive level officials at both the local and national levels needed guidance and assistance, as well. In this regard, the lopsided provision of assistance resulted in procedural bottlenecks, as the legislatures were able and prepared to move issues forward, only to have initiatives stall in the executive.

## Conclusions

Political party development and legislative strengthening are not short-term endeavors. Building sustainable democracy and its institutions is a long and drawn-out process that requires steady evolution and a reasonably stable operating environment. It requires many years and more than one election cycle – and South Sudan has yet to experience one. Strengthening legislatures sufficiently is also an evolutionary process that requires considerable time.

As mentioned above, with \$17 million and 36<sup>21</sup> months with which to work, IRI set-out to contribute — along with other assistance providers — in laying the foundation for the construction of South Sudan’s political system. And despite significant challenges — including an increasingly difficult operating environment, the outbreak of war, and all that it entails, IRI made its mark.

Ultimately, however, given circumstances on-the-ground conditions at the time, sustainability was simply not realistic element in PPIDG’s strategy, as USAID and IRI (correctly) applied adaptive management in response to political upheaval. Much more important, immediate, issues had to be addressed. Before building a long-term democratic political system, South Sudan (and USG assistance) had to focus on preserving and consolidating something much more fundamental: its independence. The immediate period after independence was simply not conducive to long-term building, but rather to immediate stop-gap measures and strategy. In fact, as described elsewhere in sustainable institutional impact was limited.

### **Question 6: To what extent has IRI’s technical assistance to the Legislative Assemblies strengthened accountability and oversight in the government of South Sudan?**

IRI’s efforts to strengthen accountability and oversight must be seen in the context of their counterparts’ willingness to assimilate the expertise being transferred and apply it. Such politically-charged issues as accountability and oversight are very difficult to introduce into emerging

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<sup>21</sup> IRI was forced to suspend its activities for several months following the December 2013 outbreak of war.

democracies, much more so in a post-conflict nation that has never before even experienced democracy. A democratic culture must be built, mentalities need to change, and attitudes and behaviors must be adapted.

Nevertheless, several precedents were established as a result of PPIDG interventions, examples that can surely be used to build upon in future interventions. Like other areas of PPIDG's broader efforts, results in this component were uneven. Some state legislatures had more capacity than others, and similarly, some legislators absorbed the expertise more efficiently than their colleagues, both at the state and national levels.

## Findings

- **Goal consistent with efforts to build democratic system:** PPIDG's efforts to strengthen accountability and oversight helped to introduce to South Sudan the foundational principles, elements and precepts for the initial construction of a participatory democratic system with checks and balances, including the roles and responsibilities of lawmakers and citizens. PPIDG's support in developing the country's political party system, training and sharing knowledge and expertise with legislators, and promoting and facilitating the participation of women and youth all represent essential elements in a democracy.
- **There are examples of successful oversight functions:** There are numerous examples of successful legislative oversight actions. In interviews with numerous state legislators, the evaluation team was made aware of several instances where executive level officials were summoned to testify. In some examples, these state parliamentary procedures led to impeachments and removals from office. At the national level, there are numerous examples of government ministers and other high-ranking officials being summoned to testify before NLA committees. While these successful examples cannot be solely attributed to PPIDG, it certainly played an instrumental role in the development of these capacities.
- **SPLM/A influence and hegemony:** As the SPLM/A has consolidated its power at all levels, balance and impartiality have been sacrificed. The governing party's complete control of the legislative, executive and judicial apparatus have tipped the balance toward a lack of impartiality. Hence, the SPLM/A can respect or ignore the application of the law. The extent to which oversight functions are administered and applied equally and fairly is questionable, but the ruling party's penchant for politically motivated actions and retributions is not.
- **Militaristic mentality and culture:** The military mentality brought about by the SPLM/A is pervasive in all levels of government. Thus, while laws, procedures and processes may be in place, a respect for the rule of law is not. The government continues to be run the same way its precursor liberation army was run. The application of the law is arbitrary, capricious, and uneven. Furthermore, the lack of an independent judiciary does little to promote respect for the rule of law, transparency, and accountability.

## Conclusions

- **Oversight function precedents:** While there are examples of genuine and successful oversight functions, these are uneven and isolated. IRI's contributions in this regard, though basic and fundamental, were important. Precedents have been set and the foundation to develop and build upon has been set. In addition, these successful examples have created a

general awareness among the population. And despite the SPLM/A's complete control, these successes represent a significant starting point in South Sudan.

- **Assistance provided was elemental:** IRI was instrumental in promoting, facilitating and introducing basic principles and strategies related to the oversight functions of legislative assemblies. Unfortunately, the initial knowledge and skills that were introduced were not built upon. More than a year after the project's conclusion, some of the progress that was made has been lost.
- **Entitlement mentality of officials:** The lack of a democratic culture has led to a considerable disregard for the rule of law. This, too, has contributed to a lack of respect for the rule of law, transparency, equality and fairness.

## Recommendations

The evaluation team presents a series of recommendations aimed at designing viable democracy assistance strategies for South Sudan in the future that revolves focusing at the local level. Unlike national level leaders and actors, local level legislators, political party representatives, and religious and civic leaders are on the frontlines of the country's construction. While national level leaders and authorities legislate, it is local level leaders and authorities implement. Local level actors have their fingers on the pulse of the South Sudanese people. Increased local level focus in future initiatives would garner deeper support and produce more enduring results. A bottom-up approach would offset purely political decisions made at the national level. The evaluation team has produced the following recommendations:

- **Focus building and safeguarding peace:** Any future initiative(s) must incorporate strategies aimed at promoting peace and reconciliation. The achievement and safeguarding of peace must be at the center of future programming.
- **Targeted re-engagement with political parties:** Future political party development efforts must be focused. The provision of assistance to all political organizations and/or parties is unrealistic, ineffective, and counter-productive. Future assistance providers must narrow their target beneficiaries/counterparts. In addition, priority should be given to local-level party members. Below are the recommended steps in doing so.
  - **Establish criteria:** Future assistance should develop stringent, but practical, criteria to determine provision of assistance to political parties. Assistance must be targeted to parties that have sufficient organizational, professional, and absorption capacities.
  - **Conduct a needs assessment:** To establish criteria and determine which parties to potentially work with, needs assessments should be conducted for all political organizations. By obtaining a full understanding of the state of parties in the country, assistance providers and significantly narrow field of assistance recipients.
  - **Identify core political party members:** As a concurrent or follow-on activity to the needs assessments, assistance providers should identify a core group of political party

members, with special attention given to women and youth. By further narrowing the field of beneficiaries, assistance providers can more fully build the capacity of a select group of leaders within the parties. However, given the still unstable situation in the country, and existing and on-going inter-party sensitivities, any identification, or “single-ing out” of individuals must be done carefully and strategically.

- **Establish commitment for counterparts:** For support to continue, assistance recipients should meet established goals and demonstrate continued commitment. Procedures should be developed to ensure milestones are being met.
- **Develop a Training menu:** Instead of offering open-ended and uncoordinated assistance, training curriculums should be developed. Subsequently, training packages can be offered for more tailored assistance.
- **Create a Training-of-Trainers strategy:** Relying on a developed training curriculum, and building the capacity of a select group of political party leaders, assistance providers can conduct training of trainer activities. Easily reproducible materials, i.e. CDs, Internet platform can be developed for wide distribution of materials.
- **Promote women and youth leadership:** Special initiatives should be developed to increase the involvement and participation of women and youth. The highly successful Youth Leadership Academy initiatives should be re-launched. In addition, support to state-level Women’s Caucuses/leagues should be re-initiated.
- **Establish Partnerships/affiliations with international party federations:** Efforts should be made to facilitate the establishment and strengthening of ties between South Sudanese political parties and international political party federations, i.e. Socialist International, Liberal International, Center Democrat International, etc.
- **Establish intra-party dispute resolution mechanism:** Due to the schism and fracturing within the SPLM/A, dispute resolution techniques could be incorporated to mitigate issues into solvable disputes opposed to catalyst for violence and fracturing.
- **International exchanges:** South Sudanese political party members, legislators, civil society and media representatives can learn important lessons from other countries in the region. (Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania). Regional colleagues/partners can serve as mentors.
- **Building/strengthening of CSOs nationwide network:** Efforts should be made to (re)build and strengthen nationwide network of CSOs. A CSO network can ensure nationwide coverage and dissemination of information. A network would also be instrumental in gathering information and monitoring local developments.

- **Local level engagement with political parties:** Being able to keep a finger on the pulse of local-level developments will prove very beneficial to CSOs and international donors. As part of broader efforts to inform and provide civic education, local CSOs should also engage political party members. To build consensus and effectively share local-level concerns and objectives, political actors must also be brought-in to the fold. Funding efforts towards building and strengthening a nationwide network of CSO's should require the participation of all actors, including political party members. **South Sudanese Council of Churches:** The South Sudanese Council of Churches has an expansive network throughout the country. A very effective way to spread information is through the country's churches and clergy.
- **Engagement with youth & women:** In building and strengthening a nationwide network, special attention should be given to women and youth.
- **Local level, grass roots engagement:** A nationwide network of CSO can spearhead and organize efforts to gather local level political parties, CSOs, state legislatures, *payam* and *boma* representatives, and tribal leaders.
- **Permanent public information/civic education campaign:** A permanent public information and civic education campaign should be deployed to inform the populace on specific issues, such as the peace agreement, democracy and nation building, the (development of) South Sudanese identity, role of political parties, CSOs, good citizenship. Existing platforms (Internews/EyeRadio) can be used to develop and disseminate these campaigns.
- **Community/democracy dialogues:** A nationwide network and local town-hall gatherings can be organized with local leaders, authorities, political parties, and faith-based organizations. By bringing local actors together, citizens can buy-in to efforts and have ownership over local initiatives.
- **Data collection:** By designing specific strategies for CSO data gathering and dissemination, information can be quickly gathered and shared. Special mechanisms and protocols can be developed to maximize effectiveness in collection and sharing of data for designing of strategies.
- **Public opinion surveys and focus group strategies:** One of PPIDG's greatest successes was its public opinion surveys component. While still new to the country, these exercises are unparalleled in terms of their effectiveness, accuracy, and efficiency. Efforts should be made to ensuring the conduct of regular and periodic surveys. Accompanied with focus group exercises by NDI, these mechanisms can be useful in developing positions and policies.
- **Incorporation of civic education in national curriculum:** Fostering South Sudan democratic culture will be a generational process. But a genesis needs to take place. Efforts should be made to introduce a civics component into the country's education curriculum. Introducing young South Sudanese to the principles of democracy, transparency,



accountability, good citizenship, and the roles, rights and responsibilities of citizens is a first step in building the country's democratic culture.

- **Independent analyses of Political Parties Act (2012) and Political Parties Council:** Both the Political Parties Act and the Political Parties Council were established in a swift and hurried manner. A close examination of both should be independently conducted to ensure legal compatibility and coherence.
- **Immediate assessment/development of program strategy:** USAID should immediately conduct a comprehensive assessment to inform a program strategy and approach. Given the current opening that the peace process represents, USAID must be prepared to quickly and effectively address assistance requirements that will arise.
- **Conduct of meta-analysis:** USAID should conduct a meta-evaluation of its DG work in South Sudan to bring together all results from prior assessments and both internal and external insights on DG in fragile states and conflict-prone environments.

## LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

USAID's initial and stated strategies were designed to support the implementation of the 2005 CPA. Inevitably, the CPA's key political milestones led to the facilitation, or organization, of the 2011 referendum; which, in turn was conducted to decide Southern Sudan's cessation — or not — from the Khartoum-led regime. While supportive of implementation of the CPA, USAID's longer-term DG program for South Sudan did not adequately take into account the post-independence scenarios that emerged. USAID's focus — along with the international community as a whole — was on Southern Sudan's independence. What was to happen afterwards was generally an afterthought. This resulted in strategies that could not mitigate the SPLM/A's rush to protect the power it had gained and now wanted to consolidate.

Quickly moving and unfolding political developments in post-independence South Sudan overtook implementing partner efforts, including those that were already in the programmatic pipeline. These developments culminated in the 2013 outbreak of war. The environment for democratic assistance has worsened, although recent progress in peace talks may represent an important opportunity to re-engage. To do so, USAID must be creative and innovative, perhaps relying more on untraditional partnerships. The international community — and USAID in particular — can continue to be an essential source of support; indeed, the international community's responsibilities in the country are not over.

The evaluation team feels there are strategies that can be implemented to effectively build the capacity and facilitate the development of the country's political parties. This, however, does not mean a carte blanche for all organizations. Realities on-the-ground require a focused and limited approach to political parties and legislative assemblies. USAID and its DG partners on the ground should implement some, if not all, of the below-outlined points during this uncertain period.

- Information-gathering activities should be considered. Especially during this largely uncertain period, focus group and polling initiatives can serve as valuable tools to compile information and design information dissemination strategies. By understanding the pulse of the country, USAID will have a better understanding of how to react and answer to emerging realities.
- USAID should expand its outreach and collaboration with faith-based organizations. The South Sudan Council of Churches, for instance, has an unequaled reach throughout the country and the ability to disseminate important information effectively and widely.
- USAID and its implementing partners can design and develop public service announcements and other information dissemination campaigns aimed at informing the public and creating a groundswell of support regarding peace-building efforts and related initiatives, i.e. political parties, CSO's, youth women, etc.

# REFERENCES

## Reviewed Documents

The evaluation team reviewed project documents provided by USAID and IRI, as well as dozens of external reports and other information. The main documents are listed below. This list is not exhaustive.

### Annual, Semi-Annual, and Quarterly Reports

Table 5: Semi-Annual, Annual, and Quarterly Report: 2006-2011

2006
USAID Semi-Annual Narrative Report: October 16, 2005- March 30, 2006. CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: March 31 - September 30, 2006.
2007
CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: October 1, 2006 – March 31, 2007. CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: April 1, 2007 – September 30, 2007.
2008
CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: October 2007-March 2008. CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: April - September 2008. CEPPS/IRI Annual Report: October 2007 - September 2008.
2009
CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: October 2008 - March 2009. CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: April- September 2009.
2010
CEPPS/IRI Semi Annual Report: October 1, 2009 - March 31, 2010. CEPPS/IRI CEPPS/IRI Quarterly Report: April 2010 - June 2010. CEPPS/IRI CEPPS/IRI Quarterly Report: October 2010 - December 2010. CEPPS/IRI CEPPS/IRI Quarterly Report: July 2010 - September 2010. CEPPS/IRI CEPPS/IRI Annual Report: October 2009 - September 2010.
2011

CEPPS/IRI CEPPS/IRI Quarterly Report: April - June 2011.  
 CEPPS/IRI CEPPS/IRI Quarterly Report: January - March 2011.  
 CEPPS/IRI CEPPS/IRI Quarterly Report: July-September 2011.

Table 6: Annual and Quarterly Reports with Attachments: 2012-2015

FY/Q	Reports and Attachments
FY 2012	
Q2	January - March 2012
	No attachments
Q3	April - June 2012
	Attachments:
	Appendix A: Results of Post-training Evaluation Surveys for FY12Q3 Attachment B: Internal Evaluation of Strategic Public Policy Development and Supplementary Skills Training Program. (Author: J. Turitto) Attachment C: Preparation Guide for The Debate Show and Other Media Appearances
Q4	July 1, 2012 - September 30, 2012 Note: Indicated as Final report
	Attachments:
	Attachment A: Survey of Greater Equatoria Public Opinion. May 21-June 15, 2012 (Authors: ORB International, Samahi, and International Republican Institute) Attachment B: Internal Evaluation of IRI'S Nationwide Training Program on the Political Parties Act: "Registering Your Political Party In The Republic Of South Sudan" (Author: J. Turitto) Attachment C: Public Opinion in Greater Equatoria: Review of Samahi Research (Author: ORB International) Attachment D: Guide to the Political Parties Act, 2012: Registering a Political Party in the Republic of South Sudan Attachment E: IRI South Sudan Program Activities Report (by Location*). July 1, 2012 - September 30, 2012 Attachment F: The New Nation (excerpts) (Author: The New Nation)

FY/Q	Reports and Attachments
	Attachment G: Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan Riek Machar Celebrates the Grand Opening of the Political Parties' Leadership Forum Secretariat Office
FY 2013	
Q1	October – December 2012
	Attachments:
	Attachment A: IRI South Sudan Program Activities Report (by Location*). October 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012  Attachment B: Basic Parliamentary Functions (Author: IRI)  Attachment C: Preparation Guide for The Debate Show and Other Media Appearances
Q2	January – March 2013
	Attachments:
	Attachment A: IRI South Sudan Program Activities Report (by Location*). January 1, 2013 - March 31, 2013.  Attachment B: Internal Evaluation of The Foundation of The National Legislative Assembly: A Two-Week Training for Assembly Staff Members. Baseline Report - March 2013 (Author: J. Turitto)  Attachment C: In South Sudan Legislative Staff Strengthen the National Assembly. March 9, 2013  Appendix D: Report on the Results of IRI's Post-training Evaluation Surveys for FY13Q2 (Author: J. Turitto)  Appendix E: Constitution: Presidential Term limit and Federal System of Government Top Citizens Concerns (Author: F. Apiliga Lagu)
Q3	April - June 2013
	Attachments:
	Appendix A: Report on the Results of IRI's Post-training Evaluation Surveys for FY13Q3  Attachment B: PPLF Secretariat and Resource Center Continues Increased Usage by Parties  Attachment C: Government Interference during Fieldwork for IRI's Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion, 2013  Attachment D: Caucus Advocates for Greater Role for Women in South Sudan

FY/Q	Reports and Attachments
	Attachment E: IRI South Sudan Program Activities Report (by Location*). April 1, 2013 - June 30, 2013  Attachment F: Training Report. National Women Political Empowerment Training Program. Theme: Women, Information and Politics: For Practical Leadership and Effective Decision Making. April–May 2013
Q4	July – September 2013 Note: Indicated as Final report
	Attachments:
	Appendix A: Results of Post-training Evaluation Surveys for FY13Q4  Attachment B: Political Parties Resource Center Usage  Attachment C: Internal Evaluation of Public Opinion Poll Survey Results  Attachment D: The Debate Show. Final Report  Attachment E: IRI South Sudan Program Activities Report (by Location*). July 1, 2013 - September 30, 2013.  Attachment F: Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion. April 24 to May 22  Attachment G: IRI Poll: Majority of South Sudanese Believe Independence has Made Their Lives Better
FY 2014	
Q1	October – December 2013
	Attachments:
	Attachment A: IRI South Sudan Program Activities Report (by Objective). October 1, 2013 - December 10, 2013  Attachment B: National Legislature Women-Parliamentarians’ Caucus. 2014- 2017 Strategic Plan  Attachment C: Technical Assistance Public Hearing: On Early and Forced Marriage, Child Abuse and Children without Parental Care by the National Legislative Assembly Committee of Gender, Social Welfare, Religious Affairs, Youth and Sports  Attachment D: South Sudan Political Parties. Report of the Political Parties delegation visit to Abyei Area
Q2	January – March 2014
	Attachments:

FY/Q	Reports and Attachments
	Attachment A: Political Parties support request to the International Republican Institute [IRI] Attachment B: Political Parties to H.E. General Salva Kiir Mayardit. Request by the Political Parties to Meet your Excellency Attachment C: Road Map of the Political Parties on the Resolution of the Conflict
Q3	April – June 2014
	Attachments:
	Attachment A: Political Parties Leadership Forum. Conduct of Business Regulations 2014 Attachment B: Suggested Amendments to the Political Parties Act 2012 Attachment C: Political Parties Leadership Forum (PPLF). Charter of National Action for Overcoming the Country's Current Crisis
Q4	July 1, 2014 - September 30, 2014 Note: Indicated as Final report
	Attachments:
	Attachment A: Prevention of the Delegation of the Political Parties from Travel to the Peace Talks in Addis Ababa Attachment B: Position of the Political Parties on the Transitional Government Attachment C: South Sudan Youth Organizations. Position Paper on South Sudan IGAD Led Peace Process Attachment D: South Sudan Women Network for Peace Attachment E: Political Parties Resource Center Usage
FY 2015	
Q1	October 1, 2014 - December 15, 2014
	Attachments:
	Attachment A: Analysis of Political Parties Resource Center Usage Attachment B: The Consultative Meeting on the 2015 Draft Electoral Calendar Attachment C: Survey of South Sudan Internally Displaced Persons & Refugees in Kenya and Uganda Attachment D: Political Parties Leadership Forum. Date: 22 November 2014. Press Statement Attachment E: Charter of The National Alliance To Build a National Democratic State

FY/Q	Reports and Attachments
Final Report	
Final	Report
	Attachments:
	<p>Attachment A: CEPPS/IRI: Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance in South Sudan. CEPPS/IRI Performance Management Plan</p> <p>Attachment B: Internal Evaluation of Public Opinion Poll Survey Results</p> <p>Attachment C: The Debate Show. Final Report</p> <p>Attachment D: Internal Evaluation of IRI's Nationwide Training Program on the Political Parties Act: "Registering your Political Party in the Republic of South Sudan" (Author: J. Tuiritto)</p> <p>Attachment E: South Sudan Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance Program: Endline Assessment Report</p>

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# ANNEXES

## Annex I: Evaluation Scope of Work

### Scope of Work for MSI Evaluation of IRI Project

Activity Name:	Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance in South Sudan
Award Number:	AID-668-LA-12-00001
Procurement Instrument:	Cooperative Agreement
Total Estimated Cost Estimate:	\$17,000,000
Initial project period:	2008–2012
Revised Program Beginning/End Dates:	January 1, 2012 to December 15, 2014
Key Modifications:	October 2012 and October 2014
Agreement Officer’s Representative (AOR):	Patrick T. Riruyo

#### 1. Evaluation Focus

The evaluation will focus on the project to strengthen political parties and provide governance assistance to South Sudan legislative assemblies in order to create a more pluralistic, competitive and accountable political system in South Sudan. It will review both the processes and the deliverables and their effectiveness in the context of South Sudan in the aftermath of its independence.

#### 2. Background

The project supported the objectives of USAID’s Governing Justly and Democratically program in South Sudan by conducting activities to strengthen political competition, consensus building, and good governance. IRI was a post-CPA initiative as a part of the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) and project activities awarded to IRI was for four years from (2008–2012). This portion of CEPPS project was implemented in the whole of Sudan including contested Abyei area, and areas where popular consultations was to be conducted like Nuba Mountain and Southern Blue Nile. However, after independence, the project was revised to focus on Political Competition, Consensus Building, and Civil Society in South Sudan. Objectives of the project included: Improve the organizational and professional development of political parties; Increase the capacity of political parties to develop issue-based platforms that represent core constituents; improve the effectiveness of political party members as representatives in national and state legislative assemblies; and Increase the participation of political parties in the making of public policy. Political Parties in South Sudan are often characterized by weak organizational structures, low membership capacity and an absence of internal democratic principles.

Following South Sudanese independence in 2011, it was important to build the organizational capacities of political parties to ameliorate these deficiencies. In order to accomplish this, project activities included workshops to review governing documents; technical assistance on internal democratic principles, skills trainings on politics, democracy and governance; and multiparty initiatives to promote political pluralism while strengthening the participation of women and youth in political processes. Similarly, the project worked with the National Legislature and State Legislative Assemblies to strengthen both the legislators' capacities and the institutional capacity to execute parliamentary functions. The project introduced innovative activities including public hearings as part of the legislative process; supplementary skills trainings on basic parliamentary functions; and constituency outreach initiatives. To increase participation of women parliamentarians in their legislative roles, it supported the National Legislature Women Parliamentary Caucus (NL-WPC) through material and technical assistance. It also fielded public opinion polls to provide policy makers with a tool for understanding citizens' needs and priorities to inform policy making.

Following the outbreak of violence in South Sudan on December 15, 2013, The International Republican Institute (IRI), the implementing partner received guidance from USAID to evacuate and temporarily suspend program activities. On June 4, 2014, IRI received approval to return to South Sudan to resume activities and it worked without interruption until the close of the program. In response to the shift in U.S. Government policy towards South Sudan, the project focused on implementing four program activities approved by USAID as a condition of re-entry into the country. These included the certification of youth leadership academy participants; certification of state legislative assembly workshop series participants; democracy dialogues on key national issues; and the fielding of a three-country survey research project focused on internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees.

### **3. Existing Information**

Key project documents below will be made available on a CD to the evaluation team. The documents include, but will not be limited to:

- CEPPS IRI Award Agreement AID-668-LA-12-00001
- CEPPS IRI Sudan Work Plan
- CEPPS IRI South Sudan Work Plan
- CEPPS IRI Annual Performance Management Plan (PMP)
- CEPPS IRI project Modification documents
- CEPPS IRI Sudan Quarterly and Annual Reports
- CEPPS IRI South Sudan Quarterly and Annual Reports, and
- CEPPS IRI Opinion Poll reports

### **4. Evaluation Purpose**

This is a performance evaluation meant to assist the mission in making decisions on future investment in support to political parties and legislative strengthening programs in South Sudan. The performance evaluation will determine the project's achievement of project goals and results, and

associated underlying reasons for achievement and/or non-achievement; and document lessons learnt and best practices to inform future programming of similar project activities. This evaluation report is intended to inform: USAID/South Sudan Mission's DG Democracy and Governance (DG) team, the USAID Africa Bureau, IRI as the implementing partner, and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) as the development counterpart. USAID will use the report to determine if the project has achieved project goals, and improve future programming of similar projects. The intent is that IRI will likewise benefit from the findings in designing future programming.

## **5. Evaluation Questions**

1. Did the project achieve the right focus and balance in terms of design, theory of change/development hypothesis, and democratic needs of South Sudan at the time of implementation?
2. What were the intended and un-intended results of project interventions?
3. To what extent was IRI's operational model cost efficient and cost effective in achieving the project's expected results?
4. What have been the specific and differential effects of IRI's project on males and females in terms of political participation and legislative strengthening?
5. To what extent have IRI's technical assistance to political parties and legislative strengthening strategies been sustainable?
6. To what extent has IRI's technical assistance to the Legislative Assemblies strengthened accountability and oversight in the government of South Sudan?

## **6. Evaluation Methods**

This exercise requires a mixed (qualitative and quantitative) method. However, the third party may propose a suitable methodology for this study. Both primary and secondary data from multiple sources will be used to allow triangulation and to inform findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The methodology will generate a credible evidence to address the stated evaluation questions above. The tools will include individual interview from key project stakeholders, Focus Group Discussions and desk reviews.

## **7. Data Analysis Plan**

Focus group interviews and individual interviews will be transcribed and analyzed, qualitative data will be integrated from different sources. Some relevant findings will be disaggregated by gender. In addition, some findings might be disaggregated by findings as well.

## **8. Strengths and Limitations of the Evaluation Methods**

This evaluation comes at a time when South Sudan is experiencing civil war, political unrest with a compromise peace agreement signed though some key provisions contested by the government of South Sudan. This coupled with rainy season posing some limitations on in-country travel can be challenging and may affect representativeness and reliability of the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations. In addition, the presence of observer(s) at some point, including project and USAID staff, may also affect findings during collection of primary data. The evaluation team maybe ought to propose a clear strategy of how they intend to lessen possible subjectivity and anticipated limitations during this evaluation in the explanation of their methodological approach.

## **9. Team Composition and Level-of-Effort**

The evaluation consultants will consist of 3 main team members; a Team Leader with minimum of 8 years experiences and 2 technical experts. USAID representative will join the exercise on part time basis, and in selected trips or meetings. The Team Leader will take full responsibility for managing the team, organizing its work, and ensuring quality control and delivery of a final report acceptable to USAID standards. A mixture of international and local experts in the subject matters will be critical to a quality evaluation report. Core expertise in democracy and governance is required for the leadership and with extensive experiences in evaluations of DRG projects. USAID will require two senior international staffs and one mid-level staff from the country or region. At least one of the three must be local staff. The team will be in South Sudan for approximately three weeks to a month, based out of Juba but conducting visits to other states as necessary.

## **10. Schedule and Logistics**

Management Systems International (MSI) will provide overall management and support to the evaluation team including office and meeting space where the team can access internet, printing documents. This support will include coordinating and arranging team's meetings with key stakeholders. MSI will also provide other logistical arrangements e.g. travel, and accommodation needed by consultants in the course of this evaluation. The consultants, however, will have to procure services like accommodation, and flight travels. Participating USAID would make own arrangements for travel or attendance of specific meetings of interests.

## **11. Evaluation Deliverables**

USAID/South Sudan DG team expects the following deliverables from the evaluation team:

### **(a) Pre-Field Work Briefing and Report**

The team will present the inception report and approaches detailing the evaluation design to USAID in an oral PowerPoint presentation and review meeting in which USAID and other parties involved in the evaluation may raise questions and issues and request adjustments, if necessary, to that plan prior to the start of field work. This meeting will be held within 1 work day after the submission of the team's inception report detailing the following:



1. A summary of the key findings that emerged from the team’s review of existing documents organized to answer each study question. A comprehensive list with citations of all documents and reports that were reviewed and included. Bullet points of clearly identified gaps that the team will fill through field data collection and analysis.
2. A detailed description of the study design, including:
  - a. Any suggestions from the evaluation team about changes in the methodological approach proposed in the SOW.
  - b. A detailed description of the methodological approach and tools by study question proposed, and detailed data analysis plan – a detailed description of data analysis methods in relation to the study questions and the specific data collection methods.
  - c. A draft work plan that includes the timeline for the study as well as scheduled field location visits and interviews is a required element of the detailed design.

The COR will approve or request adjustments of the team’s inception report within 1 - 2 work days after this meeting is held.

### **(b) Draft Report**

The full draft of the study report (A 27 - 30 page report that has all of the details). The report will be based on USAID’s evaluation report template.

### **(c) Debriefings**

The second debriefing will be held with a wider audience that includes USAID team, and any other invited stakeholders. The Mission reserves the right to request the team to omit all findings of sensitive nature during presentations to wider audience. After the debriefing all quantitative and qualitative data sets, including debriefing slides and soft copies of all documents and reports reviewed, will be transferred to USAID DG team.

### **(e) Final Report**

The study team is required to produce 2 versions of the report. The final study reports are due in 5 working days after the study team receives USAID comments.

The final reports include:

- a) A 6-page summary report that has an overview of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and
- b) A 27 - 30 page report that has all of the details.

The final version of the study reports will be submitted to USAID electronically. And the reports format is restricted to font 11 Garamond, but heading and sub-headings is required to be in Gill sans MT 12.

## Evaluation Report Requirements

USAID requires that evaluation reports are 27 – 30 pages maximum. The report format should be restricted to font 12 Garamond, and should be arranged as follows:

1. **Executive Summary:** concisely state the most significant findings, conclusion and recommendations (1 - 3 pages), per format developed by MESP for previous Executive Briefs
2. **Table of Contents:** (1 page);
3. **Introduction:** Purpose, audience and Questions: (1 page);
4. **Background:** brief overview of the project, strategies, and activities (2 page);
5. **Methodology:** describe evaluation methods, including detailed limitations, constraints and gaps (1 page);
6. **Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations (FCR):** organized FCR by questions, highlighting data quality, and reporting as bases for verification of spot checks, issues, and results as applicable (17–20 pages);
7. **Issues:** Provide list of key technical and/or administrative, if any (1 page),
8. **Lessons learnt and future directions:** (1page);
9. **References:** (including bibliographical documentation, meetings. Interviews and focus group discussion);
10. **Annexes:** annexes that document the evaluation SOW, tools, schedules, and interview lists, and list of tables/charts.

## Annex II: List of Consulted Individuals

Surname Name	Gender	Position	Organization
Gretchen Birkle	F	Regional Director: Africa	IRI
Elizabeth Lewis	F	Senior Program Officer: Africa Division	IRI
Michael Eddy	M	Former Director of Democracy & Governance	USAID
Lam Akol (Dr.)	M	Chairman	DCP
Gabriela Serrano	F	Former Country Director	IRI
Sara Taylor	F	Former Democracy and Governance	USAID
Antipas Nyok De Kucha	M	Secretary for Political Affairs & Mobilization	SPLM
Mathew Mayor Ayuong	M	Secretary General	NCP
David Ali	M	Graduate Youth Leadership Academy	
Patrick Riruyo	M	Agreement Officer's Representative	USAID, South Sudan
James	M		SSDF
Anne Itto	F	Former Secretary General	SPLM
Clement Jumo Mbugoniwa	M	Party Leader	USSP
Sebastiano Uchom	M	Chairperson	UDF
Andrew Philipson	M	Ag.(?) Chairman	NJMP
Albino John Laku Hai Neem (?)	M		DUP
Peter Lomude (?)	M	Secretary General	USSP
Martin Aligo Ake	M	Secretary General	National Alliance of PP

<b>Surname Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Steward Soroba (?)	M	Deputy Chairman	UDP
Theresa Siricio Iso Womi (?)	F	Chairperson	SANU-National
Juma Saeed Worju	M	Secretary General	SSNP
Garang Thuc	M	Chairman	Pure Party
Komieko Kon (?)	M	Chairman	MSDF (?)
Paskalina Philip	F	Chairperson (? CP)	SSDA
Sarah Nene	F	Secretary General	NUDF
David William	M	Secretary General	UDF
Maximo Zal Divar (?)	M	Former Country Director	IRI
Deborah Ensor	F	?	Internews
Stephanie Jean Shackelford	F	Former Resident Country Program Officer	IRI
Angela Wambaga	F	Former Resident Country Director	IRI
Paul Fagan	M	Former Director, Africa Division	IRI
Robina Numisisi	F	Former Resident Country Program Officer	IRI
Jelena Savic	F	Former Resident Country Program Officer	IRI
Santell Barnes	M	Former Resident Country Program Officer	IRI
Aisha Jore Ali	F	Team Leader	Samahi Research
Agim Atmoi Agiu (?)	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Western Bar el Ghazal
Mario Alyibango	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Western Bar el Ghazal

<b>Surname Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Evodio Ukun	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Western Bar el Ghazal
Harun Abaker Harun	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Western Bar el Ghazal
Pio Joseph	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Western Bar el Ghazal
Viola Alexander	F	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Western Bar el Ghazal
Mary Stephen	F	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Western Bar el Ghazal
Anyar Anyar Dor (?)	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Western Bar el Ghazal
Madhieu Makuas	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Lakes
David Kockedhia	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Lakes
Daniel Lumwel Ahomabar	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Lakes
Chol Kuotwel	M	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Lakes
Preskilla Ayor	F	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Lakes
Racheal Yar	F	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Lakes
Veronica Umjuma	F	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Lakes
Hellena Nyibol	F	Member of Parliament	State Assembly, Lakes
James Turitto	M	Former Resident Country Program Officer	IRI
Kenedy Luba	M	Team Leader	Opinion Research Center
Carrie Gruenloh	F	Former Democracy & Governance Adviser (?)	USAID

<b>Surname Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organization</b>

## Annex III: Interview Guide

### IRI Evaluation – Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance in South Sudan

#### Key Informant Interview Guide

Evaluation Questions	Interview Guide	Responses
1. Did the project achieve the right focus and balance in terms of design, theory of change/development hypothesis, and democratic needs of South Sudan at the time of implementation?	<p>a. How did the project meet democratic needs in the period after independence?</p> <p>b. Do you believe the project played a role in supporting South Sudan’s political development?</p> <p>c. How well designed do you think the project was to address the development needs of South Sudan?</p> <p>d. Do you think the project addressed the post-independence needs of the country?</p> <p>e. What are the best examples of program successes?</p> <p>f. In what ways did the program contribute to the overall democratic needs of South Sudan?</p> <p>g. What, if any, program achievements were difficult to measure/ demonstrate?</p>	
2. What were the intended and un-intended results of project interventions?	<p>a. What is your general understanding of what the IRI’s project set-out to achieve?</p> <p>b. Do you believe the project accomplished its objectives/ goals?</p> <p>c. What are some of the direct results of the IRI program?</p> <p>d. Are some of these results still evident today?</p> <p>e. Do you think the project may have directly, or indirectly influenced other outcomes?</p> <p>f. Do you think there were surprises, or unexpected results?</p> <p>g. What specific factors produced these un-intended results?</p>	
3. To what extent was IRI’s operational model cost efficient and cost effective in achieving the project’s expected results?	<p>a. How strong do you think were IRI’s financial management systems?</p> <p>b. Did IRI have the program/financial flexibility to address emerging needs or requirements?</p>	

Evaluation Questions	Interview Guide	Responses
	d. Was the IRI project's budget structure conducive to appropriately meeting its objectives?	
4. What have been the specific and differential effects of IRI's project on males and females in terms of political participation and legislative strengthening?	<p>a. Did the project design specific strategies aimed at promoting the participation of women?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who did these strategies rely on for implementation? i.e. political parties, CSO's</li> </ul> <p>b. Did the project design specific strategies aimed at promoting the participation of youth?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who did these strategies rely on for implementation? i.e. political parties, CSO's</li> </ul> <p>c. Did the project implement strategies to inform and educate about the importance of inclusion?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were any of these targeting political parties internally?</li> </ul> <p>d. What kind of activities did the project implement to increase the capacity of women legislators?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are these results still evident today</li> </ul> <p>e. What role did IRI play in supporting the Women's Caucus?</p> <p>f. How have these strategies changed the political position of youths and females?</p>	
5. To what extent have IRI's technical assistance to political parties and legislative strengthening strategies been sustainable?	<p>a. What do you believe is the most important contribution made by the IRI project?</p> <p>b. Did IRI's assistance give political parties the tools and knowledge to operate more openly and democratically?</p> <p>c. Did IRI's training improve the structure and functions of political parties?</p> <p>d. Do you believe IRI's work promoted political parties to be more representative of their constituents?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do political parties make efforts to reach-out to, inform and interact with citizens?</li> </ul> <p>e. Are political parties better able to research, draft, introduce, and lobby for legislation?</p> <p>f. To what extent have technical assistance models matched local realities?</p>	



Evaluation Questions	Interview Guide	Responses
<p>6. To what extent has IRI's technical assistance to the Legislative Assemblies strengthened accountability and oversight in the government of South Sudan?</p>	<p>a. Are the processes undertaken and decisions made by legislatures informed to the public?</p> <p>b. Do CSOs have access to legislators?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are their mechanisms for citizen-input into legislative matters?</li> </ul> <p>c. Do legislatures exercise oversight over executive decisions?</p> <p>d. Are legislators held accountable for improprieties?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are their legal frameworks in place to monitor and discipline improprieties?</li> </ul> <p>e. To what extent does the work of the National/State Legislature reflect the will and expectations and needs of South Sudanese citizens?</p>	
<p>OTHER</p>	<p>a. How do you think this evaluation can be most helpful to current and future USAID democracy &amp; governance initiatives in South Sudan?</p> <p>b. What contextual issues should we keep in mind in assessing IRI's performance?</p> <p>c. Who should we meet?</p> <p>d. Any further comments?</p>	

## Annex IV: Question Guides – IRI Evaluation Focus Group Discussions

As part of the work to be carried-out in its assessment of IRI’s “Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance in South Sudan” Project, the MSI evaluation team plans to conduct a series of focus group discussions. The evaluation team will organize these discussions around specific themes related to IRI’s project, such as:

- IRI role in supporting political development of South Sudan, i.e. political parties;
- Facilitation of political party openness and inclusion, women & youth strategies;
- Organizational capacity/institutional strengthening of political parties; sustainability issues and accumulated know-how;
- Short, mid, long term project strategy, i.e. party and platform development, constitutional development, legislative strengthening;
- Recommendations for continued, on-going, future work;
- Facilitation of women’s and youth participation.

Based on the progress of its fieldwork, the evaluation team may incorporate all, or only some, of the above-listed themes. The evaluation team will organize three focus group activities (Wau, Rumbek & Juba). Participants will be largely members and representative’s political parties with whom the IRI project was directly, or indirectly, involved. Each focus group will consist of between 8-10 participants, and will include both women and men. Given IRI’s work with women legislators, the evaluation team will conduct a women-only focus group.

The evaluation team used the below list of questions to guide the discussions:

1. What role do you think political parties should play in the democratic development of South Sudan?
  - a. Do you think South Sudan’s political system should be based on a multi-party model?
  - b. How would you qualify the current state of political parties in South Sudan?
  - c. Do you feel political parties are truly representative of their constituents?
2. What support did you/your party receive from IRI?
  - a. Did this support make you/your party better/more successful?
  - b. Is the information/training received still being used today?
3. How would you qualify the work and effectiveness of the National/State Legislative Assembly?
  - a. What support did the state assembly receive from IRI?
  - b. Is the information/training received still being applied today?
4. Tell us how you feel about the role of the international community in helping build and strengthen democracy in South Sudan?

## **Annex V: Evaluation Team Biographies**

### **Luis Arturo Sobalvarro, Team Leader**

Luis Arturo Sobalvarro has 20 years of experience working on democracy strengthening initiatives throughout the world. Focusing on electoral and political development assistance, he has designed, developed, managed and implemented related programs in more than 20 countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. Mr. Sobalvarro has served as a staff member in several international organizations, including the International Republican Institute (IRI), the International City and County Management Association (ICMA), Democracy International, and IFES. In addition, he has undertaken numerous consultant assignments for the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank, (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and The QED Group, among others. More recently, Mr. Sobalvarro served as a Deputy Chief of Party and Chief of Party for USAID-funded elections assistance programs in El Salvador and Honduras, respectively. Mr. Sobalvarro holds a B.A. in International Affairs and Economics from The American University in Washington, D.C.

### **Dr. Raymond Gervais, Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist**

A Canadian citizen with a PhD in Historical Demography, Dr. Gervais has been living, travelling, and working in Africa for the past 45 years. He has been performing consultancies for more than a dozen bilateral and multilateral agencies since 1985. Since 2012 he is a credentialed evaluator, member of the Canadian Evaluation Society.

### **Beny Gideon Mabor, Constitutional Advisor**

Mr. Mabor is a South Sudanese national and a trained lawyer from the University of Juba in South Sudan and Kenya School of Government. Mabor is a renowned human rights activist practicing with number of regional and international human rights institution such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Network. He has spent 12 years working both in the Government of South Sudan and non-governmental organizations on full time and on consultancy basis specifically on democracy, governance and social accountability matters.