SOUTHERN AFRICA TRADE HUB: FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

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E3 Analytics and Evaluation Project

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Cover Photo: Warehouse site under construction
Credit: Southern Africa Trade Hub

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# ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<td>ACTE</td>
<td>African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECOM</td>
<td>Architecture, Engineering, Consulting, Operations, and Maintenance</td>
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<td>AGCI</td>
<td>African Growth and Competitiveness Initiative</td>
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<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>ASIF</td>
<td>Agricultural Storage Investment Facilities</td>
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<td>AVC</td>
<td>Agricultural Value Chain</td>
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<td>BOBS</td>
<td>Botswana Bureau of Standards</td>
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<td>BURS</td>
<td>Botswana Unified Revenue Services</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Coordinated Border Management</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
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<td>COR</td>
<td>Contracting Officer’s Representative</td>
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<td>CTFP</td>
<td>SADC Comprehensive Trade Facilitation Program</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>Development Credit Authority (USAID)</td>
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<td>DCOP</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Party</td>
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<td>DFI</td>
<td>Development Finance Institution</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<td>E3</td>
<td>Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (USAID)</td>
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<td>EG</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>ERB</td>
<td>Energy Regulation Board</td>
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<td>FTF</td>
<td>Feed the Future</td>
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<td>GET FiT</td>
<td>Global Energy Transfer Feed-in Tariff</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Implementation Agreement</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<td>ICP</td>
<td>International Cooperating Partner</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>IPP</td>
<td>Independent Power Provider</td>
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<td>MMEWD</td>
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M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MSI Management Systems International
MT Metric Tons
MW Megawatt
NAPI National Action Programs on Investment
NBM National Bank of Malawi
NEP National Enquiry Point
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSW National Single Window
PE Performance Evaluation
REA Rural Electrification Authority
REEEP Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership
REFIT Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff
RERA Regional Electricity Regulators Association of Southern Africa
SACU Southern Africa Customs Union
SADC Southern Africa Development Community
SATH Southern Africa Trade Hub
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
SOW Statement of Work
SPG Strategic Partnership Grant
STTA Short-Term Technical Assistance
TBT Technical Barriers to Trade
TFA Trade Facilitation Agreement
TFM Trade Facilitation Measure
TFP SADC Trade Facilitation Program
TOC Theory of Change
TOR Terms of Reference
TRR Office of Trade and Regulatory Reform (USAID/E3)
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
WCO World Customs Organization
WRAP Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production
WRS Warehouse Receipt Systems
WTO  World Trade Organization
ZAMACE  Zambia Agricultural Commodities Exchange
ZESCO  Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents findings, conclusions, and recommendations from a final performance evaluation of the USAID Southern Africa Trade and Competitiveness project (the “Southern Africa Trade Hub” hereafter). The evaluation was commissioned by USAID/Southern Africa and the Office of Trade and Regulatory Reform in USAID’s Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (USAID/E3/TRR) and was designed and implemented by the E3 Analytics and Evaluation Project.¹

Project Summary

The Southern Africa Trade Hub project was awarded to AECOM International Development with a period of performance from September 2010 to September 2015 (including one option year that was executed). Due to a range of factors, including the wrapping up of key activities with host country governments, the project was extended until March 20, 2016, with a subsequent extension to April 30, 2016, to facilitate continuity with follow-on work.

The Trade Hub’s overarching goal was originally: increased international competitiveness, intra-regional trade, and food security in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region. This objective was to be accomplished through the advancement of the regional integration agenda and increased trade capacity of regional value chains in selected sectors. The delivery of targeted technical assistance was expected to help the SADC region, including public and private sector actors and civil society organizations, to realize the advantages of greater regional and global trade linkages and export-oriented business development through assistance in eight results areas.

The project was initially designed to take an integrated approach to two high-level United States Government (USG) priorities: the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, which became the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative, and the African Growth and Competitiveness Initiative (AGCI). The project was also designed to act as one of three USG trade Hubs in sub-Saharan Africa to increase exports to the U.S. under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and to provide “Aid-for-Trade” assistance as mandated by USG commitments under the Doha round of negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In late 2012, the regional focus for the project was redefined from the 15 countries in the SADC region to Southern Africa as defined by USAID’s Africa Bureau, which in practical terms includes the five Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) countries (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland) and three FTF focus countries (Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia). The project beneficiaries were broadened to include not only SADC but also member state governments and the private sector.

Development Hypothesis

The Southern Africa Trade Hub project launched in 2010 with two overarching objectives and eight Intermediate Results (IRs), but in November 2012 was reorganized to have one objective (“technical focus”) with the following five IRs:

Technical Focus: Advancement of the Regional Trade, Investment, and Integration Agenda:

¹ The E3 Analytics and Evaluation Project is implemented by team lead Management Systems International (MSI) in partnership with Development and Training Services and NORC at the University of Chicago.
• IR 1.1: Improved Trade Facilitation
• IR 1.2: Greater Competitiveness in Agricultural Value Chains
• IR 1.3: Increased Trade and Investment in the Textile and Apparel Sector
• IR 1.4: Strengthened Regulatory Capacity for the Clean Energy Sector
• IR 1.5: A Better Enabling Environment

Evaluation Purpose and Intended Uses

The primary purpose of the performance evaluation is to inform USAID’s decision-making processes with respect to its strategic approaches for achieving the intended results of its work on trade facilitation in Southern Africa. The recommendations and lessons identified by the evaluation are intended to provide practical guidance and feasible measures to support the sustainability of outcomes achieved to date, as well as best practices and areas of improvement that can be used in subsequent programs of this type.

Evaluation Questions

The performance evaluation answers the following evaluation questions (EQs) per USAID’s Statement of Work, which is attached as Annex A:

- **Relevance**
  - EQ1: In what ways has the project been successful or not in achieving results towards its stated objectives?

- **Management**
  - EQ2: How has the management structure as implemented supported or hindered project performance?
  - EQ3: What are the management factors influencing the achievement and non-achievement of project objectives?

- **Promising practices**
  - EQ4: What are the key strategic, programmatic, technical, and managerial features of the project that should be taken into account when implementing a new Southern Africa Trade and Competitiveness Hub Project in the region?

- **Sustainability**
  - EQ5: What mechanisms have been put in place to ensure sustainability of the project achievements?
  - EQ6: Based on the findings and conclusions from the preceding questions, what factors have been identified that are likely to positively affect the sustainability of project achievements?

Findings and Conclusions by Evaluation Question

**EQ1: In what ways has the project been successful or not in achieving results towards its stated objectives?**

**IR 1.1 Improved Trade Facilitation Findings**

**Overall Performance and Constraints.** During the period reviewed by the evaluation team, the Trade Hub demonstrated significant improvements in performance and results of IR 1.1 Trade Facilitation activities. A number of respondents including Trade hub and USAID personnel contributed greater progress in IR 1.1 results and improved relationships with key government stakeholders during
this period to the change in staff of Trade Hub Chief of party and (COP) and Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) positions in particular, as well as the addition of other key project management roles. These management structures that improved performance across the components will be discussed in greater detail under Evaluation Question 2.

It should be noted that two USAID respondents observed that over the whole project period, the actual results of IR 1.1 activities were disproportionate to expectations as this component had the largest budget. These USAID respondents and Trade Hub personnel concurred that this discrepancy may be due to the project having missed opportunities by not addressing ”low hanging fruit” in terms of not identifying less time and resource intensive trade facilitation objectives to implement.² A number of USAID and Trade personnel noted that this oversight in the IR 1.1 strategy is mostly contributable to the original project COR’s focus on National Single Windows (NSWs), a long-term intensive trade facilitation activity, during the early stages of the project. Another constraint for the Trade Hub’s IR 1.1 component noted by two USAID respondents was that while the Trade Hub did implement trade facilitation seminars and roundtables with counterparts and beneficiaries in South Africa, the Southern Africa Mission has not yet established a collaborative working relationship on trade facilitation objectives with key South African counterpart agencies.³

**SADC Trade Facilitation Program Final Report.** The Trade Hub helped SADC complete the development of an SADC Trade Facilitation Program (TFP) Final Report, which identifies 27 key trade-related activities in one document and was unanimously adopted by the SADC Ministers of Trade in March 2016. The SADC TFP outlines a harmonized approach to trade facilitation for SADC’s Member States to guide the planning and implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) recommendations, and other trade protocols and guidelines.⁴

Respondents from SADC, the Trade Hub, and USAID concur that the adoption of the TFP was a significant development for driving regional consensus and implementation of the WTO TFA. These respondents noted that the TFP will serve as a comprehensive reference for planning and allocating resources for SADC Secretariat’s trade facilitation programs over the next few years. Some respondents anticipate that the TFP will guide implementation of a joint approach for regional trade facilitation that could potentially relieve trade bottlenecks across SADC member states.

Although respondents were in agreement that the SADC TFP is a great success, interviews revealed that a number of challenges emerged during the course of the work. Respondents from both USAID and Trade Hub personnel indicated that there were delays in start-up, completion, and finalization of the draft. This resulted in the trade facilitation team falling behind on the timelines for this milestone.

**National Single Window Development in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia.** During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub has made significant progress on milestones towards the development of National Single Windows (NSWs) in the three target countries despite some setbacks in the first two years of the project. The Trade Hub provided embedded advisors to deliver targeted trainings, policy development planning and coordination, as well as other capacity building and technical support to counterpart agencies responsible for implementing NSWs. Respondents credit the project with successfully generating awareness, buy-in, ownership, and commitments to implementing an NSW by the

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² Personal communication with a Trade Hub staff member in Gaborone on March 14, 2016 and Personal communication with two USAID Southern Africa Mission personnel interviewed on March 9, 2016 in Pretoria.
³ It should be noted that he Trade Hub has engaged South Africa government and private sector partners in activities under the other IR areas, most notably through the Strategic Partnership Grants implemented under IR 1.2.
⁴ In the Trade Hub Work Plan this activity is called “Sub-Committee on Customs Cooperation (SCCC, a SADC Sub-Committee) Approves the Comprehensive Trade Facilitation Program (CTFP) Report (Milestone Activity 1A). It was originally called the CTFP, but the SADC Council of Ministers decided to call it the “Trade Facilitation Programme” in recognition that it does not encompass infrastructure needs or issues.
critical agency stakeholders in the target countries. The completion of NSW roadmaps in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia is one of the key milestones a number of respondents noted is a concrete demonstration of progress. In the target countries, the Trade hub also facilitated reviews of the compliance of customs legislation and the readiness of the legal and business environments for NSW development and implementation.

These improvements have played a major role in fast-tracking key steps over the past 18 months which include: progress in decision-making by national level NSW technical working groups; appointments of personnel responsible for designing and implementing the NSWs; and notably, in Namibia, the government allocated resources including US $1 million over two years and other resources to for establishing the NSW. A number of USAID and Trade Hub personnel, as well as counterpart agency representatives that participated in NSW activities observed that the work of the Trade Hub’s embedded advisors was critical in achieving these results. A number of USAID and Trade Hub personnel also attributed the Trade Hub’s progress on the NSWs and other IR 1.1 activities during the final evaluation period to the change in personnel for the Trade Hub COP and USAID COR.

While the NSW support provided by the Trade Hub moved counterparts through some of the major milestones for NSW development, the NSWs have not yet been realized and several challenges remain, to varying degrees, in the targeted countries. USAID and Trade Hub personnel noted that the fact that NSWs were not achieved during the project period is understandable as establishing an NSW is a challenging, long-term, resource-intensive, and complex process. Additionally, respondents noted that as the NSWs have not yet been launched, it is difficult to measure results in terms of consequential increases in trading in the region.

Several USAID and counterpart respondents suggested that embedded advisors should be employed in future similar efforts to maintain the momentum of the Trade Hub’s progress. Two respondents from a Malawi counterpart agency stated that the Trade Hub’s technical assistance activities for the NSW were beneficial but they would have preferred to receive support to the “hard components,” such as the procurement of technology and hardware, as well as infrastructure upgrades at the borders, would have had a greater impact in achieving the realization of an NSW and a modernized customs system.

Interviews with Trade Hub personnel that participated in NSW activities revealed that there were several contextual factors that played a role in delaying progress on NSW and were outside of the Trade Hub’s manageable interest. These respondents mentioned contributory factors including: variation in the capacities and resources of country agencies to implement an NSW; differing priorities related to interventions by International Cooperating Partners (ICPs); certain security concerns; and insufficient cooperation between neighboring countries.

**Namibia Trade Information Portal.** In another major trade facilitation activity, the Trade Hub successfully partnered with the Namibia Ministry of Finance and Namibia’s Customs and Excise to develop the Namibia Trade Information Portal, which was and launched on July 22, 2015. The Portal is a powerful tool and resource that facilitates easy access to all necessary information to would-be importers and exporters. Respondents involved in this activity credit this achievement to the Trade Hub’s facilitation of a long and intensive collaborative process between the US Government and Namibian agencies. Respondents also stated that the Namibia Trade Information Portal effectively serves

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5 The work of the Trade Hub’s embedded advisors across the IR activities were universally commended by project and USAID personnel as well as counterparts and other participants. Some of these respondents referring to NSW specific activities are cited here: Personal communication with three USAID Southern Africa Mission personnel, one interviewed on March 8, and two interviewed on March 9, 2016 in Pretoria; Interview conducted remotely with a representative of a Namibian counterpart agency on March 22 2016; Personal communication with two respondents from different Botswana counterpart agencies, interviewed in Gaborone on March 16 and 31, 2016 respectively.

6 Interview conducted remotely with two representatives of a Malawi counterpart agency on March 22, 2016.
as a blue print for other countries to build similar platforms. To date, SADC is using it as a blueprint for their regional information portal. Respondents noted the continuing challenge for counterpart agencies to provide the required resources and expertise to maintain the effective functioning of the portal and continuously update information. Sustainability of the portal will depend on the host government's long-term commitment of resources.

**Customs Modernization Programs.** As part of Customs Modernization Programs, the Trade Hub provided legal review advisors to assist the BURS in drafting a new customs laws in Botswana. The advisors reviewed the proposed legislation with business analysts and legal advisors from BURS to ensure it complies with the standards and requirements of international and regional agreements and policies (including the Kyoto Protocol, WCO, SACU, and SADC). Two project participants from counterpart agencies in Botswana praised the Trade Hub legal reviews in that they helped produce draft laws that form the basis of a modernized customs system, including the requirements for establishing an NSW.  

**Coordinated Border Management (CBM).** The Trade Hub also conducted a Coordinated Border Management (CBM) monitoring assessment in Malawi at two major crossings (Mwanza on the Mozambique border and Songwe on the Tanzania border). The Trade Hub assessed the capacity and sustainability of border agencies at these locations to be successful partners in implementing a CBM program. The assessment found that the Joint Border Committees previously established by the Trade Hub were still operational and meet regularly and that the communication and coordination between various agencies had improved.

**Cross-border Gender Assessment and Trade Audits.** The Trade Hub assisted SADC in conducting Cross-border Gender Assessment to identify where constraints for small traders that tend to be women, on the Malawi and Zambian border in December 2015 to January 2016. With the Trade Hub support SADC also conducted comprehensive trade audits in all 15 member states which informed the development of trade facilitation programs, and identified gaps in harmonization.

**Customs to Business Forums.** During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub facilitated the formation of Customs to Business Forums that greatly redressed strained relationships between the traders and customs agents at the borders. While Trade Hub personnel and an SADC participant have commended the short-term outcomes these committees in improving customs to business relations, they noted that these are structures that were not institutionalized by the end of project.

**IR 1.1 Improved Trade Facilitation Conclusions**

During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub demonstrated significant improvements in performance and results of IR 1.1 Trade Facilitation activities, especially noting three major achievements attained through successful collaboration with key counterparts: the unanimous adoption of the SADC TFP by the SADC Council of Ministers; the progress in key milestones towards NSW realization in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia; and the launch of the Namibia Trade Information Portal.

The Trade Hub used embedded advisors effectively, and these experts proved critical supporting counterparts to make progress towards these major achievements and other results.

Although NSWs have not yet been established in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia, these are long-term complex processes and Trade Hub support enabled partner governments to achieve key milestones in progress towards NSW realization in the target countries.

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7 Personal communication with representatives from two Botswana counterpart agencies interviewed in Gaborone on March 16 and 31, 2016, respectively.
The Trade Hub has been successful in navigating and coordinating domestic agencies within member states, as well as, encouraging collaboration between member states to implement trade facilitation interventions. Maintaining political buy-in and coordinating counterparts at all levels will require significant leadership and engagement from the future Trade Hub.

The Trade Hub has been effective at generating buy-in from key counterparts in the SADC Secretariat and member states, which has resulted in some governments making commitments of resources and personnel for trade facilitation objectives. However, there is significant variation the capacities and resources of host countries, and the continued support of the future iteration of the Trade Hub will be critical moving forward. In particular, the lack of resources and capacities in Malawi will likely compromise the momentum towards NSW realization.

The Trade Hub could have been more strategic in identifying trade facilitation interventions that are "low hanging fruit" in terms achieving short-term objectives with less resources while having a great potential for high impacts in enhancing the flow of regional trade. For example, the Trade Hub's facilitation of Business to Customs Forums and Joint Border Committees was less resource intensive that long-term processes like NSW development, but have produced have addressed identified needs and produced positive results.

IR 1.2 Greater Competitiveness in Agricultural Value Chains Findings

Overall Performance and Constraints. During the final evaluation period, project participants interviewed endorsed the three major Trade Hub IR 1.2 activities as having delivered positive results and successes that were frequently featured in weekly highlights and success stories. Through these activities the Trade Hub demonstrated the ability to coordinate a broad range of stakeholders to achieve concrete enhancements to key agricultural food chains in rural areas.

The Strategic Partnership Grants (SPGs) were perceived as being very successful by USAID, Trade Hub personnel, and the grantees who by and large expressed satisfaction with the level of professionalism that the Trade Hub displayed in disbursing the grants and that the providing technical assistance had beneficial impacts for the growth of their businesses. During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub generated momentum for completing implementation of the live grants despite the number of challenges that delayed start-up, notably coordination with the South African government. As the Trade Hub deliberately targeted private sector entities with sufficient capacity, respondents concur the successes results will be sustainable. A couple of grantees noted that the Trade Hub did not implement a comprehensive or systematic approach to communicate the SPG program to potential applicants as well as to communicate the work being done to the other grantees, as this would have allowed for potential synergies and opportunities to collaborate.

The Trade Hub provided technical assistance to and coordinated with a range of local public and private sector partners, including commodities exchange bodies, famers, traders, banks, and insurance providers to launch Warehouse Receipt Systems (WRS) in Mozambique and Zambia. A WRS enables farmers to safely store goods (usually grains or oilseeds) in exchange for a warehouse receipt (WR). A WR allows transparent market prices by documenting the amounts and quality of commodities deposited with a warehouse operator, allowing farmers to choose when to sell their crops and at what price. Producers can use the WR as secure collateral to obtain optional insurance and collateral finance from insurance companies and banks. Through the WRS activity, the first warehouse receipt was issued in Mozambique in May 2015 and has led to increased access to financing for participating farmers. The Trade Hub supported the Zambia Agricultural Commodities Exchange (ZAMACE) to launch a WRS in
Fall 2015. In early 2016 ZAMACE had certified four warehouse operators with up to 300,000 MT of grain and oilseeds.\(^8\)

The WRS activity was seen as a success by different categories of respondents including Trade Hub personnel, various USAID representatives, and WRS participants. The early adopters that entrusted the WRS with their commodities did see a profit margin after settling all the costs that they incurred. Trade Hub personnel were confident that, with time there would be even greater participation by the farmers as more realize the benefits of the system, and awareness of it spreads. Noting these successes, some private sector participants that were interviewed suggested that the Trade Hub should look into working with the private sector to set up warehouses closer to border posts.

The issuing of the first warehouse receipt in Mozambique is a particularly noteworthy achievement, given some of the difficult operating conditions, which led to delays in start-up and posed challenges during implementation. These conditions included: the departure from Mozambique of one of the original prospective partner companies; intermittent electricity supply; a complicated and challenging banking system; and opaque structured trade and related regulatory environment.

At the time of the evaluation, a former Trade Hub staff member confirmed that after the project closed, the Board of the European Investment Bank (EIB) approved the USD 35m **Agricultural Storage Investment Facilities (ASIF)** credit line to the National Bank of Malawi (NBM) for warehouse investments. This is slated to fund a portfolio of over 40 new warehouses, comprising over 240,000 MT of new capacity, by some estimates increasing by over 50 percent the private sector storage capacity in Malawi. Through this investment pipeline the Trade Hub has created a financial instrument that incentivizes (through concessionality) agri-businesses and companies to focus on rural businesses. Similar to the WRS this activity required the Trade Hub to effectively interact with a wide range of stakeholders and has the potential to address an existing commercial gap (i.e., the lack of investment in rural areas, specifically in storage), and to potentially have significant impact on reducing food security risks resulting from shortage of warehousing and storage.

**IR 1.2 Agricultural Value Chains Conclusions**

During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub generated momentum to complete implementation of the live SPG grants. The SPGs were found to deliver beneficial impacts for the grant recipients and the broader FTF goals, such as food security. By and large, the SPG recipients interviewed were appreciative of the project support, and most confirmed that their outputs had improved, exposure increased, and/or expansion was fast-tracked as a result.

The Trade Hub has provided evidence to private sector actors, including farmers, warehouse operators and banks, that the WRS is a viable and technically sound solution for providing producers and farmers groups with access to safe storage in rural areas, as well as the ability to obtain cheaper financing and sell at higher prices.

Through ASIF, the Trade Hub has addressed an existing commercial gap, the lack of investment in rural areas for agricultural storage. The Trade Hub successfully coordinated a diverse array of stakeholders to create an investment pipeline, which incentivizes agri-businesses and companies to aggregate the focus on rural businesses. The Trade Hub's success has generated interest from private sector partners to continue this work.

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\(^8\) Zambia Daily Mail article posted on December 31, 2015, “ZAMACE certifies 4 warehouse operators,” retrieved at https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=54471
WRS, ASIF and SPGs demonstrated the benefits of consistently demonstrating short-term success (SPGs and WRS) to help build trust and interest among stakeholders, which can ultimately help to keep them focused on long-term objectives.

**IR 1.3 Increased Trade & Investment in the Textiles and Apparel Sector Findings**

Respondents from USAID, the Trade Hub agreed that despite the small budget for IR 1.3 activities (as compared to IR 1.1 and IR 1.2), the project managed to achieve several concrete results and generate greater visibility for USAID as a donor supporting this sector in the region. The Trade Hub also implemented seminars and workshops to improve awareness of the benefits and processes of AGOA engagement and the WRAP certification process. Trade Hub and USG personnel that supported these activities confirmed that project support helped generate market linkages between regional suppliers and international buyers and retailers at important trade shows, such as Source Africa and MAGIC. The visibility gained from the textile trade shows, addressed some “market failure” resulting from information asymmetry between major US buyers and the suppliers in Southern Africa, most specifically Lesotho.

There were, nevertheless, a number of challenges in the area of fulfilling orders including supply-side capacity constraints that the firms face. As the firms that get the orders from major buyers often face challenges with raising working capital to fulfill the orders. A couple of experts also observed that there is a need for greater engagement and interaction in terms of building linkages between buyers and sellers, before tradeshows and activities to establish relationships beyond tradeshows events. It is worth noting that respondents had mixed reviews of the 2016 Las Vegas MAGIC show, which was implemented by another contractor, not the Trade Hub.

**IR 1.3 Textiles and Apparel Conclusions**

The Trade Hub was successful in creating initial business linkages between US buyers and manufacturers in two of the targeted countries in the region (Lesotho and Swaziland). However, there are sustainability concerns for those manufacturers to respond to repeat orders and maintain these business relationships, they must be able to fulfill orders on a consistent basis, which may be heavily reliant on external factors such as their ability to raise capital to expand operations.

There is a need for greater exposure of manufacturers to US buyers beyond trade shows as many U.S. buyers are still unfamiliar with manufacturers in Southern Africa and will most likely not make any purchases without having a solid relationship with suppliers.

Additionally, many of the mixed reviews from the 2016 MAGIC show were a result of the fact that the Trade Hub contracted with a firm for support that does not specialize in textile and apparel sector. The firm that helped support the 2016 MAGIC show did not have the same industry contacts as the firm that supported the MAGIC show in the previous year, and as a result, was not able to set up as many face-to-face meetings between manufacturers and buyers.

**IR 1.4 Strengthened Regulatory Capacity for the Clean Energy Sector Findings**

The final evaluation focused on the major IR 1.4 activities performed in Zambia over the last 18 months including the following: development of the Renewable Energy Feed in Tariff (REFIT) policy and mechanism; and capacity-building support for the Rural Electrification Authority (REA). All Zambia respondents, including USAID personnel and private and public sector participants, positively endorsed that the Trade Hub concretely contributed to strengthened regulatory capacity for the clean energy sector in Zambia through both activities. These KII findings corroborated the positive assessment of USAID Southern Africa respondents on the performance of these activities.
All respondents knowledgeable of this activity positively endorse the Trade Hub support in developing the REFIT Policy, and credit this result with directly contributing to strengthening Zambia’s regulatory capacity in the clean energy sector. The policy removes regulatory barriers to renewable energy regulation and procurement, which creates a more enabling environment. In the context of this improved enabling environment, the Trade Hub facilitated the development of a model power purchase agreement, which is a mechanism for independent power providers (IPPs) to make agreements with ZESCO to supply the grid. The Trade Hub also developed a solar price discovery curve, which informs prospective IPPs of the exact tariff for a new renewable energy technology, and therefore, how profitable their investments will be.

While there was overwhelming agreement that the REFIT policy development was a successful achievement, respondents mentioned several concerns about contextual challenges that raised questions of whether the success of project achievements can and will have lasting impacts. First, respondents noted the constraints posed by Zambian government, which has yet to release the REFIT policy, noting that this is outside of the Trade Hub’s manageable interest. The delay in the release of the REFIT policy has affected the plans of IPPs as they are either unable to move forward with their plans, or are “forced” to negotiate with Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO).9

Second, respondents also noted that the Trade Hub support didn’t include the drafting of an implementation agreement that outlines the respective obligations of the government and the IPPs. It should be noted that the project omitted an implementation plan from their scope of work for this activity based on the advice of the Energy Regulation Board (ERB), the key client agency for this activity. The ERB suggested that to bring about consensus on the content of the Implementation agreement would have been outside the project’s manageable interest and delayed the completion of the activity.

Third, respondents mentioned that the Trade Hub completed a price discovery curve only for solar technologies. According to participating counterparts, in order to take the Trade Hub’s work to its logical conclusion, price discovery curves should be developed for other renewable energy technologies such as wind, mini-hydro, and bi-fuel.

Fourth, respondents mentioned that the different donors that are implementing parallel processes to USAID support for the REFIT should be better coordinated in the future, namely the Global Energy Transfer Feed-in-Tariff (GET FiT), and Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP).

Lastly, while the project was able to develop a policy framework, which was effectively what the Trade Hub set out to do according to its Scope of Work (SOW) the substantive stage of the actual release of the policy has not materialized yet.

Respondents concurred that the Trade Hub’s capacity building support to the REA was very successful. The training was viewed as being very beneficial for the institution (its board members, staff, and technical staff), both from the sense of tangible skills attained, and learning from best practices in other parts of the region. However, counterparts noted that it would be both important and difficult to track the results of this capacity building work.

**IR 1.4 Clean Energy Conclusions**

The Trade Hub was viewed by all relevant stakeholders interviewed as concretely strengthening the regulatory capacity of the clean energy sector in Zambia.

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9 Personal communication with a private sector project participant, interviewed in Lusaka, Zambia on March 16, 2016.
The Trade Hub’s support saw successful completion and approval of the REFIT Policy.

Despite these successes, there are several concerns for institutionalization of the REFIT policy. First the Zambian government has yet to release the REFIT policy. While this is beyond the control of the Trade Hub, it has significantly affected the plans of IPPs as they are either completely unable to move on their plans at the moment, or are “forced” to negotiate with ZESCO.

Capacity building efforts were successful, however, it is difficult to track the results of this capacity-building work.

Some respondents expressed programmatic overlap between REFIT, GetFIT and RIEEP. As such, coordination amongst donors and stakeholders is critical.

**IR 1.5 A Better Enabling Environment Findings**

During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub implemented a range of activities under IR 1.5, which were seen by USAID and Trade Hub personnel to provide high impact results for the investment of resources investments, especially when compared to the budgets for IR 1.1 activities. Respondents from counterpart agencies endorsed the Trade Hub activities as having a range of beneficial impacts for their ability to do their work and noted their enthusiasm for continuing participation in similar efforts in the future.

The Trade Hub provided support, including training and new equipment, to counterpart agencies that launched National Enquiry Points (NEP) in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland, as well as, the re-launch of the NEP in Zambia. Through collaborative capacity building effort, the Trade Hub enabled the national standards bodies from six SADC member states to comply with a requirement of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (1995), to reduce TBTs by establishing NEPs, which are single government points of contact that provide documentation on conformity assessment procedures, technical regulations and standards for trade. A counterpart noted the ministry viewed the NEP as a “major success story” for the participating Botswana agency. However, the respondent noted that their challenge in working with the Trade Hub was understanding how project decisions are made in terms of what types of assistance the project will provide. For example, the respondent noted that the agency submitted a proposal for the NEP activity that noted the needs in the areas of regulatory and conformity assessments that weren’t addressed by Trade Hub assistance, in addition to the TBT issues, which were addressed. The respondent noted that while at the time of the evaluation, the Botswana NEP was not yet fully functional because of internal administrative issues, and the pending establishment of their TBT Committee, they will be able to carry the work forward and had a positive outlook for the sustainability of the NEP.

In response to an SADC request, the Trade hub supported partners to complete Investor Road Maps (IRM)s for countries that had not previously completed an IRM exercise including Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, and Zambia. The Trade Hub also supported counterparts in Lesotho and Swaziland to complete audits of IRM implementation.

The common theme in the road maps was the need to identify actionable reforms and get them implemented. The road maps have resulted in National Action Programs on Investment (NAPI),

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10 The Southern Africa Trade Hub placed gender integration milestones under IR 1.5 Enabling Environment in its work plan. As gender is a cross-cutting issue, the evaluation team assessed these efforts in terms of the relevance and success of results, management, promising practices, and sustainability there is a separate section on gender integration following the evaluation questions.

11 Personal communication with a representative of a participating counterpart agency in Gaborone, Botswana on March 17, 2016.
which respondents anticipate will provide guidance on the best way to improve the investment climates and create attractive business environments.

The needs assessment done towards the preparation of the NAPI identified specific areas that require improvements and support especially among trade supporting institutions.

The Needs Assessment and NAPI have also identified the root causes of why the past strategies and policies have not been implemented in the five countries. An SADC respondent mentioned that one of the five NAPI components is gender specific.

The Trade Hub director for this activity noted that SADC found the IRMs to be a successful achievement and requested for the project to support five more member states to complete IRMs, but this was not possible in the remaining period of performance.

Two Trade Hub personnel reported that the Trade Hub's support to developing Investor Road Maps (IRMs) in Lesotho and Swaziland has been quite successful, and in their view, this activity likely contributed to improvements in competitiveness rankings, but it was outside of the scope of this evaluation to generate evidence of this. Despite these successes there is a need for further assessments to ensure that the changes bring about tangible increases in trade and regional integration. There are also some continuing problems with countries implementing their road maps and there is still a need for greater buy-in and awareness.

**IR 1.5 Enabling Environment Conclusions**

The hub supported seven member states comply with their WTO TFA obligations through the establishment of NEPs. Stakeholders indicated that the establishment, or in some cases, the re-establishment of NEPs proved to be a success.

The long-term success of NEPs is heavily contingent on the political commitment as well as the ability of domestic government agencies within each country to coordinate with each other.

Investor Roadmaps were helpful in helping to shape regulatory regimes, however, more efficient and streamlined regulation does not necessarily translate to increased investment and trade.

There is still significant room for increasing awareness of enabling environment activities and achievements among government and private sector stakeholders in order to create change.

**EQ2: How has the management structure as implemented supported or hindered project performance?**

USAID and Trade Hub respondents agreed that there were five changes in the management structure that the project implemented, which were most salient for enhancing performance. First the Trade Hub moved the location of the head field office from Gaborone, Botswana to be close to the USAID Southern Africa Mission in Pretoria, South Africa, which enabled more effective coordination and communication with the client. Second, the collaborative management style of the new USAID Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) and alternate COR greatly improved the working relationship between the Trade Hub and the Mission. Third, the positive, enabling, and client focused management style of the new Chief of Party (CoP) facilitated better performance and improved morale of the Trade Hub staff and consultants, especially among technical personnel. Fourth, the addition of a Strategic Communications Advisor facilitated better communication with USAID, project participants, and key stakeholders. These respondents accredited the addition of this role with increasing the quality and quantity of communication materials that the project and USAID used to regularly communicate
Trade Hub results and garner support from external and internal audiences. Fifth, USAID and project participants that had interacted with the project’s embedded advisors positively endorsed the technical support provided by these experts.

Respondents noted three salient points in terms of management structures implemented by the project that hindered performance. The three most salient aspects of the management structure that hindered performance included: the absence of a Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP) position that was focused on overall management and oversight, an understaffed and insufficiently integrated M&E personnel; and the absence of a full-time Gender Advisor. As noted by several USAID respondents and the Trade Hub’s gender advisor and other project personnel,

**EQ3: What are the management factors influencing the achievement and non-achievement of project objective?**

Many USAID and Trade Hub respondents agreed that there were changes in the way the project addressed six management factors, which were most salient for enhancing performance. These factors include: alignment with USAID policies and procedures; implementing a proactive outreach and consultation strategy for identifying potential SPG recipients; effectively managing relationships with a diverse array of actors under the WRS activities; implementing a strengthened communication strategy; and the shift in the style of senior management to be more client focused and responsive to stakeholders. One of the management factors that improved performance was a result of USAID decreasing the number of technical IR areas from 13 to five, which was a more feasible scope for the project to implement.

Management factors that presented challenges for improving performance were implementing activities across eight countries, which required a great deal of travel and logistical support and that was difficult to track and monitor on a consistent basis. The project also found balancing the needs of counterparts at both the bilateral and multilateral levels challenging.

**EQ4: What are the key strategic, programmatic, technical, and managerial features of the project that should be taken into account when implementing a new Southern Africa Trade and Investment Hub Project in the region?**

**Summary:** The evaluation team captured promising practices that have been identified by stakeholders. These practices were viewed as extremely positive and as helping to contribute to realizing the Trade Hub’s achievements. As a result, these practices should be considered during implementation during the new Southern Africa Trade and Investment Hub Project. The identified promising practices utilized by the Trade Hub include:

- The development and implementation of effective internal and external communication strategies
- Balancing short-term activities with long-term results
- Using embedded advisors
- Employing a client-centered approach
- Targeting capacity building approaches
- Engaging in activities that can be replicated
- Actively participating as a convener and deal broker to bring private sector actors together
- Using technology to help achieve results
- Ensuring a participatory approach to encourage local ownership
• Project support for agency counterparts to participate in knowledge exchange visits to ministries in other countries that successfully implemented similar policy reforms and interventions
• Identifying the right partners to maximize business linkages and sustainability
• Empowering Trade Hub staff and sectoral experts

**EQ5: What mechanisms have been put into place to ensure sustainability of project achievements?**

Under IR 1.1 Trade Facilitation, the Trade Hub has been successful in creating an awareness of trade facilitation activities through public launches and has encouraged partner countries to formally commit to trade facilitation activities. However, stakeholders indicate that prolonged political commitment from member states is necessary and that, without Trade Hub support, those countries with fewer resources may experience greater difficulty in allocating budget and human resources to trade facilitation activities.

Under IR 1.2 Agriculture Value Chains, the Trade Hub targeted organizations with strong operational capacity for SPGs. For the WRS and ASIF, the Trade Hub played a vital role in bringing private sector actors together and linking pre-existing business interests. However, the agriculture sector is particularly vulnerable to external factors (drought, currency fluctuations, commodity prices, etc.), which may affect private sector investment in the long-run.

Under IR 1.3 Textiles and Apparel, the Trade Hub was successful in creating initial linkages between manufacturers and buyers as well as introducing social responsibility through an initial training on the WRAP certification process. Nevertheless, there is significant room to expand linkages as well as deepen understanding of social responsibility.

Under IR 1.4 Clean Energy, the Trade Hub actively involved counterparts such as the REA and the ERB early in needs assessments and intervention design. This has resulted in partners demonstrating their significant ownership over continuing the work. However, there needs to be a greater understanding of the Zambia’s national grid capacity as well as the finalization of the REFIT policy. In terms of Enabling Environments, stakeholders point the need to increase capacity in regards to the intersection of standards and regulatory environments.

**EQ6: Based on the findings and conclusions from the preceding questions, what factors have been identified that are likely to positively affect the sustainability of project achievements?**

Outlined in this section are factors that can positively affect the long-term sustainability of project achievements. The list of factors is based on the findings and conclusions from the previous questions (EQ5) and represent factors that are both under the direct control of the Trade Hub as well as those factors that are external.

**Contextual Factors:** Currency stability, ample rainfall levels, consistent electricity, and political consistency will positively affect the long-term sustainability of project achievements. These factors can help to ensure private sector investment and operations as well as a consistent supply of agricultural commodities.

**Continued Political Commitment:** Formalized commitment through public decrees, laws, executive or ministerial orders by officials at the highest levels can help to sustain activities through changing political environments.
Local ownership: Local partners are an integral part of helping to continue activities and achievements. This can only happen if local partners are actively involved in the process and understand the benefits of activities.

Choosing the Right Partners: Collaborating with partners that already have significant operational capacity and have a vested interest in project activities and achievements, can more easily carry on activities with minimal or no involvement by the Trade Hub. This is true for both public and private sector partners. On the public sector side, government of Namibia was perceived as having the capacity needed to carry forward the trade information portal established by the project. On the private sector side, the capacity of SPG recipients was a key consideration for their selection and was viewed as contributing to the long term sustainability of the interventions funded by the grants.

AGOA: Providing assistance through awareness building campaigns about the renewal of AGOA and education on the benefits of engagement through this mechanism can be a positive force in incentivizing American retailers and buyers to investigate opportunities with regional textiles and apparel suppliers.

Cross-Cutting Issues: Gender Integration Efforts

A comprehensive review of project documents revealed that the Trade Hub’s gender integration related planning statements by IR, work plan results, related milestones, and indicators disaggregated by sex are vague and are weak tools for assessing performance towards gender integration. Gender integration was included under IR 1.5 Enabling Environments, instead of being identified as a separate cross-cutting set of activities. Furthermore, the evaluation team found that there was a lack of consistent budget and dedicated staff for Gender Integration efforts. During the first years of the project, the Trade Hub did not have a full-time gender expert on staff, but rather, employed a gender advisor as a part-time consultant to provide short-term technical assistance during quarterly trips. Additionally, a number of gender activities were completely omitted due to budgetary constraints.

It should be noted that over the last 18 months, the project has done a lot to reinvigorate the gender integration approach. For example, the project added a training for women in business on persuasive communication and negotiation skills in Namibia and Zambia in 2016. Respondents also found that the current COP was very supportive as the project has tried to fit in two years of gender integration work into a period of a little over a year at the end of the project. Nevertheless, the project’s gender mainstreaming efforts were constrained by the lack of consistent staff dedicated to designing and implementing a gender strategy.

Recommendations

In order to build on the achievements of the previous Trade Hub and effectively design and implement new and follow-on activities across all the results areas, the future implementing partner should:

1. Undertake a stakeholder and results mapping exercise to ensure that the future iteration of the Trade Hub makes informed decisions about new and follow-on activities, as well as builds on the results, knowledge, and relationships generated by the previous project.

2. As part of the review process described above, be sure to assess former Trade Hub activities that were considered complete, in order to ascertain whether the intended results and objectives have been sustained by the stakeholders.

3. Implement a formalized process to assess requests for support from USAID and host country counterparts.
4. Assess the differences in the resources and capacities of key counterparts across the target countries to inform work plans and country-specific activity SOWs with ambitious but achievable objectives, milestones, and indicator targets.

5. Conduct comprehensive feasibility studies for proposed activities to assess their viability and sustainability and inform activity SOWs.

6. Conduct early consultations with counterparts and other stakeholders so they can participate in identifying the needs and constraints, as well as designing interventions.

If implementing similar or follow-on IR 1.2 activities, such as the Warehouse Receipt Systems (WRS) or grant mechanisms, the future implementing partner should:

7. Use the review, design, and feasibility study processes described in this report to assess opportunities to incorporate regional integration strategies for the WRS.

8. Follow up with Strategic Partnership Grant (SPG) recipients to learn from their challenges and identify opportunities to leverage sustained results for growth and food security objectives.

9. Design and employ a systematic outreach strategy to inform a wide range of potential applicants about the grant program benefits and criteria well before the application period.

10. After awards are made, introduce the grantees to each other to enable recipients to identify and build synergies between private sector entities in the same value chain (e.g., producers, processors, warehouse operators, and laboratories).

If implementing follow-on textile and apparel sector activities in the target countries, the future implementing partner should:

11. Investigate opportunities to increase access to financing for regional suppliers and manufacturers, especially in Lesotho.

12. Increase the awareness of counterparts in Botswana of successful approaches of other SADC member states in stimulating investments for and improving the competitiveness of the textile and apparel sector.

To address the management structures and factors that hindered the performance of the previous Trade Hub, the future implementing partner should:

13. Employ a full-time designated senior gender advisor to help implement gender integration as a cross-cutting objective across the results areas.

14. Start each activity design process with a gender assessment to identify the intervention’s potential impacts on gender disparities and opportunities to increase women’s empowerment and engagement in targeted sectors.

15. Ensure monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is integrated across all results areas, and that time and resources are provided for initial and refresher M&E trainings for all staff and consultants.

16. Continue the strategic communication advisor position established during the last 18 months of the project.

17. Establish a feedback mechanism that so stakeholders can alert the project where they felt their needs were overlooked or call out ways in which implementation can be improved.

18. Employ a full-time person designated to manage and coordinate personnel issues.

In order to implement some of the promising practices identified by the final evaluation, the future implementing partner should:

19. Continue the practice of embedding advisors in government and regional organizations for trade facilitation and other long-term interventions and policy reform activities.
20. Use the project design, review, and feasibility study processes described in this report to learn from and coordinate with other international cooperating partners (ICPs) working on the same results.

21. Continue to use study exchange visits, workshops, and seminars to build on the efforts of the previous Trade Hub in generating awareness of the purposes and potential benefits of proposed trade facilitation interventions.

22. Design a mix of activities under each results area that strikes a balance between short- and long-term results, especially for long-term trade facilitation reforms.
In order to increase the likely success and sustainability of the future Trade Hub interventions, USAID should:

23. Take a convening role to help coordinate other donors and ICPs working on trade facilitation issues and identify opportunities for the Trade Hub to leverage complementary efforts.

24. Engage the embassy, including ambassadors or trade representatives, to engage with counterparts when host country agencies lack the awareness, capacity, or commitment to implement trade facilitation reforms.

25. Work closely with the future implementing partner to ensure the project has the structure, budget, and other resources necessary to effectively research, design, and implement a well-considered gender integration strategy across all results areas.

26. Work closely with the future implementing partner to make sure the project has as a messaging plan implemented as part of its overall communication strategy to clearly convey the benefits of gender integration for achieving USAID Development Objectives and host country development plans.

27. Ensure that the management structure of the next Trade Hub has the necessary resources to employ a senior M&E advisor from start-up through close-out.
INTRODUCTION

This report presents findings, conclusions, and recommendations from a final performance evaluation of the USAID Southern Africa Trade and Competitiveness project (the “Southern Africa Trade Hub” hereafter). The evaluation was commissioned by USAID/Southern Africa and the Office of Trade and Regulatory Reform in USAID’s Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (USAID/E3/TRR) and was designed and implemented by the E3 Analytics and Evaluation Project.12

Activity Description

The Southern Africa Trade Hub project was awarded to AECOM International Development through Contract No. 674-C-00-10-00075-00, with a period of performance from September 2010 to September 2015. The project was initially designed to take an integrated approach to two high-level United States Government (USG) priorities: the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, which became the Feed the Future (FTF) program, and the African Growth and Competitiveness Initiative (AGCI). The AGCI expired in September 2010 and was replaced by the African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion Initiative (ACTE),13 which is building trade capacity across sub-Saharan Africa. The Southern Africa Trade Hub was also designed to act as one of three USG Trade Hubs in sub-Saharan Africa to increase exports to the U.S. under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and to provide “Aid-for-Trade” assistance as mandated by USG commitments under the Doha round of negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The Southern Africa Trade Hub project was awarded with a total ceiling of $82,610,195. However, the actual obligations during the evaluation period (October 2011 – September 2015) were $52,656,705, of which $1,800,000 is bi-lateral South Africa FTF funds for grants under contract. The project base contract end date was September 2014, and an option year was executed that extended the project through September 2015. Due to a range of factors including the conclusion of key activities with some Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) member states, the project was extended until March 20, 2016.

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12 The E3 Analytics and Evaluation Project is implemented by team lead Management Systems International (MSI) in partnership with Development and Training Services and NORC at the University of Chicago.
13 ACTE was launched at the AGOA Forum in Lusaka, Zambia in June 2011.
The project was initially designed to achieve results under two objectives: (1) Advancement of the Regional Integration Agenda and (2) Increased Trade Capacity of Regional Value Chains, which each contained four intermediate results (IRs). In November 2012, the project’s Statement of Work (SOW) was reorganized to focus on a single result or technical focus: Advancement of the Regional Trade, Investment, and Integration Agenda, with five IRs that are presented in the following section.

The 2012 project reorganization also reduced the funding allocated ($10 million rather than $16 million per year) and the number of countries in which the project would work. The area of operations for the project changed from the 15 countries in the SADC region to Southern Africa as defined by USAID’s Africa Bureau, which in practical terms includes the five Southern Africa Customs Union countries (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland) and three FTF focus countries (Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia). The project beneficiaries were broadened to include not only SADC but also member state governments and the private sector. Also at this time, the contractor changed its Chief of Party and other key personnel.

A mid-term evaluation of the project was completed by Pragma Corporation and Management Systems international in 2014. Significant changes in the approach, management, and activity of the project have occurred since then.

**Theory of Change**

As noted in the previous section, the Southern Africa Trade Hub launched in 2010 with two overarching objectives and eight IRs, but in November 2012 it was reorganized to have one objective (“technical focus”) with the following five IRs:

- **Technical Focus: Advancement of the Regional Trade, Investment, and Integration Agenda:**
  - IR 1.1: Improved Trade Facilitation
  - IR 1.2: Greater Competitiveness in Agricultural Value Chains
  - IR 1.3: Increased Trade and Investment in the Textile and Apparel Sector
  - IR 1.4: Strengthened Regulatory Capacity for the Clean Energy Sector
  - IR 1.5: A Better Enabling Environment

The project did not provide a formal theory of change (TOC) diagram or narrative or a results framework.
PURPOSE, AUDIENCE, AND INTENDED USES

The primary purpose of the performance evaluation is to inform USAID’s decision-making processes with respect to its strategic approaches for achieving the intended results of its work on trade facilitation in Southern Africa.

The primary audiences for this evaluation are the Regional Economic Growth Office within USAID/Southern Africa, USAID/E3/TRR, and staff and stakeholders for the future iteration of the Southern Africa Trade Hub.

The findings, conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned from the evaluation will, where relevant, inform decisions about the implementation of future USAID trade and investment programming. The recommendations and lessons identified by the evaluation will provide practical guidance and feasible measures to support the sustainability of outcomes achieved to date, as well as best practices and areas of improvement that can be used in subsequent programs of this type.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The performance evaluation answers the following evaluation questions (EQs) per USAID’s Statement of Work, which is attached as Annex A:
• **Relevance**
  o EQ1: In what ways has the project been successful or not in achieving results towards its stated objectives?

• **Management**
  o EQ2: How has the management structure as implemented supported or hindered project performance?
  o EQ3: What are the management factors influencing the achievement and non-achievement of project objectives?

• **Promising practices**
  o EQ4: What are the key strategic, programmatic, technical, and managerial features of the project that should be taken into account when implementing a new Southern Africa Trade and Competitiveness Hub Project in the region?

• **Sustainability**
  o EQ5: What mechanisms have been put in place to ensure sustainability of the project achievements?
  o EQ6: Based on the findings and conclusions from the preceding questions, what factors have been identified that are likely to positively affect the sustainability of project achievements?

**METHODOLOGY**

This section describes the overall methodology that was used to answer the evaluation questions.

**Data Collection Methods**

This performance evaluation relied on two data collection methods: key informant interviews (KIIs) and a desk review of performance reports and other project documents. The evaluation team was provided with the comprehensive collection of project documents for the desk review shortly before fieldwork began.

During the final two weeks of the Trade Hub’s period of performance (March 7 – 18, 2016), the evaluation team conducted in-country data collection in three of the eight countries where the Trade Hub operated: South Africa, Botswana, and Zambia. Respondents included: 16 Trade Hub staff and consultants; 9 USAID personnel from the Southern Africa Regional Mission and the Zambia Mission; 20 project beneficiaries and stakeholders located in and around Gaborone, Johannesburg, Lusaka, and Pretoria; and 2 representatives from other donors. After the Trade Hub’s period of performance ended, the evaluation team continued to conduct remote interviews at the convenience of contacted respondents through April 11, 2016.

**Sampling Considerations**

The evaluation team selected respondents based on several factors. The team identified respondents who participated in or were knowledgeable about the activities selected to be evaluated, then determined whether these respondents participated during the last 18 months of the Trade Hub contract. The team also considered convenience and the availability of potential respondents.

The evaluation team contacted all potential respondents who met these criteria and were located in and around the four cities the team visited during the two weeks of field work. For several weeks following the fieldwork, evaluation team members made themselves available to conduct remote interviews with respondents who were not available to meet in person. The team also requested remote interviews
with project stakeholders of selected activities based in Malawi and Namibia. It should be noted that and the evaluation team made an effort to contact and conduct remote interviews with key Trade Hub personnel who had already demobilized.

In order to select the activities, the evaluation team looked at activities that occurred in the last 18-20 months of the contract, or from the time the mid-term evaluation was completed (August 2014) through the final performance evaluation (PE) design (February 2016). As the Trade Hub was a complex program with five IR components and discrete sets of activities under each component, the evaluation team had to be selective of activities to focus on. The evaluation team consulted with USAID to prioritize activities for examination in the evaluation that occurred in the last 18-20 months of the Trade Hub contract, had a high profile among a range of participants and stakeholders, had more complex and long-term objectives, and required more resources than others. The team also prioritized activities for which USAID wanted to determine whether or not performance had improved since the mid-term evaluation.

**Evaluation Field Work Schedule**

The initial document review started in late February and was followed by fieldwork in early March. To conduct the interviews, the team leader worked over a week with two local experts in South Africa, followed by a week of field work with two experts in Botswana. Local teams did an additional week of data collection after the team leader had left. One team member from South Africa also traveled to Zambia to conduct interviews. Interviews were also conducted in Washington, DC. While most of the interviews were done in person, the team also conducted interviews via Skype and telephone.

**Strengths and Limitations**

The evaluation focused on the Trade Hub’s performance over the last 18 months. Given the diversity of activities undertaken by the Trade Hub and the limited scope of this evaluation, the evaluation team focused on certain key activities under the five results.

The data collection was done over the last couple of weeks of the Trade Hub and primarily relied on in-depth interviews. Given the overall scope of this evaluation, the evaluation team did not travel to distant project sites to verify results, but was be able to visit project sites (grantee offices) near the capital cities visited. Moreover, these visits were to conduct interviews and did not include a verification component.

Despite the limited time for data collection, the evaluation team was able to meet with and/or speak with most of the key individuals at the Trade Hub and within the USAID Regional Economic Growth office, as well as with key donors, stakeholders, and beneficiaries.

**TEAM COMPOSITION**

The evaluation team was comprised of staff and consultants from Management Systems International (MSI) under the E3 Analytics and Evaluation Project who are external to USAID. The evaluation team members have signed Conflict of Interest (COI) forms to document the independence of this final performance evaluation of the USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub project. The composition for the evaluation team includes:

- Ali Hayat, Team Leader/Evaluation Specialist
- Isaac Ndung’u, Trade Facilitation Specialist (based in Botswana)
- Cynthia Chikura, Trade Facilitation Specialist (based in South Africa)
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

EQ1 Relevance: In what ways has the project been successful or not in achieving results towards its stated objectives?

IR 1.1 Improved Trade Facilitation

IR 1.1 Findings

During the period reviewed by the evaluation team, the Trade Hub demonstrated significant improvements in performance and results of IR 1.1 Trade Facilitation activities. A number of respondents, including Trade Hub and USAID personnel, contributed to greater progress in IR 1.1 results and improved relationships with key government stakeholders during this period, which involved changes in staff—particularly of Trade Hub Chief of Party and (COP) and Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) positions—and the addition of key project management roles. These management changes, which improved performance across the components, will be discussed in greater detail under EQ2.

Two USAID respondents observed that, over the whole project period, the actual results of IR 1.1 activities were disproportionate to expectations, as this component had the largest budget. These USAID respondents and Trade Hub personnel concurred that this discrepancy may be due to the project’s having missed opportunities by not addressing “low hanging fruit,” meaning that they did not identify less time- and resource-intensive trade facilitation objectives to implement.\(^\text{14}\) A number of USAID and Trade Hub personnel noted that this oversight in the IR 1.1 strategy is mostly attributable to the original project COR’s focus on National Single Windows. Below is a summary of the project’s performance by results, including their successes, limitations, and challenges.

While the Trade Hub did implement trade facilitation seminars and roundtables with South African counterparts and beneficiaries, a constraint for the Trade Hub’s IR 1.1 component noted by two USAID Southern Africa personnel was that the Mission is in the process of establishing a closer working relationship on trade facilitation objectives with key South African government agencies.\(^\text{15}\) Another respondent from the regional Mission noted that as South Africa is well ahead of other countries in the region in trade facilitation as well as in other results areas, other country partners would benefit from greater interaction, and that the future iteration of the Trade Hub presents important opportunities for closer collaboration with South African partners on trade facilitation.

Table 1 presents the major IR 1.1 activities the Trade Hub implemented during the period under review and notes which ones the team collected primary data on.

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\(^{14}\) Personal communication with a Trade Hub staff member in Gaborone on March 14, 2016 and Personal communication with two USAID Southern Africa Mission personnel interviewed on March 9, 2016 in Pretoria.

\(^{15}\) The Trade Hub has engaged South Africa government and private sector partners in activities under the other IR areas, most notably through the Strategic Partnership Grants implemented under IR 1.2.
TABLE 1: IR 1.1 TRADE FACILITATION ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Evaluated for Final PE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Single Window</td>
<td>Malawi, Namibia, Botswana</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia Trade Information Portal</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Trade Facilitation Program Final Report</td>
<td>South Africa, Botswana</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Modernization Program</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRALAC Center Seminar on Trade Law</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated Border Management Monitoring Assessment</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated Border Management Workshop</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundtable on Trade Facilitation (US Embassy South Africa)</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Hub Presentation on Transit Solutions to Reduce the Cost of Trade at WCO IT Conference and Exhibition</td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance for the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in Lesotho</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Connectivity Pilot Project</td>
<td>Botswana and Namibia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Assessments at Border Crossings</td>
<td>Malawi and Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs to Business Forums</td>
<td>Malawi and Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Audits for SADC Member States</td>
<td>15 SADC Member States</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SADC Trade Facilitation Program Final Report

The Trade Hub helped SADC complete the development of the SADC Trade Facilitation Program (TFP) Final Report, which identifies 27 key trade-related activities in one document and was unanimously adopted by the SADC Ministers of Trade in March 2016. The SADC TFP outlines a harmonized approach to trade facilitation for SADC’s Member States to guide the planning and implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) recommendations and other trade protocols and guidelines.\(^\text{16}\)

**Results and Successes.** Respondents from SADC, the Trade Hub, and USAID concur that the adoption of the TFP was a significant development for driving regional consensus and implementation of the WTO TFA. These respondents noted that the TFP will serve as a comprehensive reference document for planning and allocating resources for the SADC Secretariat’s trade facilitation programs over the next few years. Some respondents anticipate that the TFP will guide implementation of a joint programmatic approach for regional trade facilitation that could potentially relieve bottlenecks to trade across SADC member states. Respondents from the SADC Secretariat noted that the Trade Hub was instrumental developing the TFP, which clearly lays out a blueprint for the SADC’s role in assisting member states to implement trade facilitation reforms over the next five years. This observation was echoed by a respondent from the Ministry of Trade in Botswana who acknowledged that the “Trade Hub played key role during validation of SADC’s TFP.”\(^\text{17}\)

**Challenges and Constraints.** Although respondents were in agreement that the SADC TFP is a great success, interviews revealed that a number of challenges emerged during the course of the work. Respondents from both USAID and Trade Hub personnel indicated that there were delays in start-up,

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\(^{16}\) In the Trade Hub Work Plan this activity is called Sub-Committee on Customs Cooperation (SCCC, a SADC Sub-Committee) Approves the Comprehensive Trade Facilitation Program (CTFP) Report (Milestone Activity 1A). It was originally called the CTFP, but the SADC Council of Ministers decided to call it the “Trade Facilitation Program” in recognition that it does not encompass infrastructure needs.

\(^{17}\) Personal communication with respondent from the Department of International Trade in the Botswana, Ministry of Trade on March 31, 2016.
completion, and finalization of the draft. This resulted in the trade facilitation team falling behind on the timelines for this milestone.

A respondent from the SADC Secretariat pointed to the challenges ahead by observing that a considerable amount of work is required to implement the TFP and the SADC Secretariat. To address this, the Secretariat will be meeting with international cooperating partners (ICPs) to garner the resources for trade facilitation interventions. An SADC respondent also expressed concern regarding the prospects for success of member states implementing key areas of the SADC TFP for which they are responsible, and anticipated that most member states were “unlikely to mobilize resources” necessary to undertake action on TFP objectives in their respective countries. Additionally, other respondents from the Trade Hub, USAID, and counterpart agencies noted that SADC member states have varying levels of resources and capacity to implement regional and national level trade facilitation interventions outlined in the TFP and/or introduced by the Trade Hub.

**National Single Window Development for Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia**

**Results and Successes.** During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub has made significant progress on milestones towards the development of National Single Windows (NSWs) in the three target countries, despite some setbacks in the first two years of the project. The Trade Hub provided a series of targeted trainings, as well as facilitated workshops and technical working group meetings with a range of key counterparts responsible to achieve the initial milestones for NSW development. The completion of NSW roadmaps in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia is one of the key milestones a number of respondents noted is a concrete demonstration of progress.

To provide ongoing support to the respective NSW processes, the Trade Hub embedded expert advisors in counterpart agencies including: the Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS), the Malawian Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Namibian Ministry of Trade and Industry. The embedded advisors and other Trade Hub personnel provided capacity-building trainings, including NSW familiarization, terms of reference, project management, change management, and data harmonization. Respondents from across the stakeholder groups credited these embedded advisors with providing excellent knowledge dissemination and facilitating planning for NSW the through these trainings and workshops. Respondents from counterpart agencies in Botswana and Namibia noted that the project management trainings were particularly helpful for them to better coordinate long and complex change processes in their respective countries. The project management training included staff from multiple departments to ensure that they would be ready for eventual harmonization towards NSW and other customs modernization activities. Respondents from the BURS Customs Department acknowledged that previous training did not cover project management and found it to be timely and relevant to their needs. One BURS respondent further noted that the training on data harmonization empowered staff and provided insights into the new Customs Management System among other areas.

The Trade hub also facilitated reviews of the compliance of customs legislation and the readiness of the legal and business environments for NSW development and implementation in the target countries. The Trade Hub worked with the Malawi Revenue Authority to establish a technical working group and facilitated a review of legislation that identified priority laws that will be affected by NSW implementation. Counterparts in Malawi noted that the legal review informed the final draft of the customs act, which is currently awaiting parliament approval. In Namibia, the Trade Hub conducted the first stage review of the legal environment and made recommendations to harmonize relevant laws with international standards for customs modernization. The Trade Hub also hosted the inaugural workshop of the Namibia NSW Legal Technical Working Group to assess the legal implications and requirements for implementing the NSW. Counterparts in Namibia noted that Trade Hub activities to support the harmonization of customs standards and the legal reviews were major milestones. Botswana
counterparts acknowledged that the Trade Hub facilitated the review of their draft customs legislation, after which a Cabinet memo was prepared, which is a key step towards passing a law.

Respondents from USAID and the respective counterpart agencies credit these project approaches with successfully educating counterparts on the purpose and potential costs and benefits of NSW implementation. In addition to awareness building and knowledge dissemination, these respondents noted that the Trade Hub successfully generated the buy-in, ownership, and commitments to implementing an NSW from the critical stakeholders. Over the past 18 months, these improvements have played a major role in fast-tracking key steps, which include progress in decision-making by national level NSW technical working groups and appointments of personnel responsible for designing and implementing the NSWs. A number of USAID and Trade Hub personnel, as well as counterpart agency representatives that participated in NSW activities, observed that the work of the Trade Hub’s embedded advisors was critical in achieving these results.18

Respondents in Botswana noted that the Trade Hub implemented support to the NSW process in a way that was linked to work on other trade facilitation reforms, such as customs connectivity and a trade information portal. The sequencing of these linked interventions helped to build stakeholder relationships and understanding of the potential of an NSW to enhance the country’s competitiveness and increase trade. Consequently, there is greater government ownership, and a commitment to move forward with the NSW even after end of project support. A project participant in Botswana was of the view that the NSW awareness and support generated by the Trade Hub was evident when the Government investigated ways to address fast declining competitiveness rankings, and NSW was suggested as a solution. The President of Botswana gave the directive for NSW to proceed, and the process is now at an advanced stage. The Trade Hub delivered necessary preparatory training for all the relevant agencies in addition to the BURS. The Government has hired a consultant to proceed, moving forward from where Trade Hub ended in supporting NSW implementation.

In Namibia, the Minister’s performance agreement explicitly states the NSW as a key deliverable for which he is accountable. In Namibia the Cabinet also established a steering committee, which developed the NSW priorities and work plan. Also in Namibia, the government allocated resources, including $1 million over two years and office space, for establishing the NSW.

**Challenges and Constraints.** While the Trade Hub facilitated counterparts to achieve some of the major milestones for NSW development, several respondents noted that the NSWs have not yet been realized, and challenges remain, to varying degrees, in the targeted countries. USAID and Trade Hub personnel noted that the fact that NSWs were not achieved during the project period is understandable, as establishing an NSW is a long-term and complex process that requires a continuous stream of highly motivated and skilled experts. Additionally, respondents noted that as the NSWs have not yet been launched, it is difficult to measure results in terms of consequential increases in trading in the region.

A Trade Hub staff member noted that these sequenced capacity-building and planning processes are challenging and require “huge investments,” and the requisite resources and expertise were not always available.19 This respondent explained that the Trade Hub’s technical assistance approach was what the project was able to provide with the given the financial resources for these activities. USAID and

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18 The work of the Trade Hub’s embedded advisors across the IR activities was universally commended by project and USAID personnel as well as counterparts and other participants. Some of these respondents referring to NSW specific activities are cited here: Personal communication with three USAID Southern Africa Mission personnel, one interviewed on March 8, and two interviewed on March 9, 2016 in Pretoria; Interview conducted remotely with a representative of a Namibian counterpart agency on March 22 2016; Personal communication with two respondents from different Botswana counterpart agencies, interviewed in Gaborone on March 16 and 31, 2016 respectively.

19 Personal communication with Trade Hub personnel in Gaborone, Botswana, March 17, 2016.
counterpart respondents suggested that embedded advisors should be employed in future similar efforts to maintain the momentum of the Trade Hub’s progress.

USAID and Trade Hub personnel noted that the Trade Hub’s initial primary focus to push the NSW agenda forward emanated from the former USAID Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) of the Trade Hub contract and was not beneficial for IR 1.1 performance during the early stage of the project. Interviews with Trade Hub personnel revealed that NSW had not initially been well received by some of counterparts and that it was not easy to “sell” NSW to partner countries, especially when they had not asked for it. A USAID respondent reported that initially there was little enthusiasm for NSW implementation among key stakeholders in Malawi. To remedy this, the Trade Hub facilitated the engagement of senior U.S. Embassy staff with key counterparts, to build interest and support for NSW development, and communicate that this objective fit well with the broader FTF strategy.

It is interesting to note that while Malawi counterparts found that frequent changes in Trade Hub management structures and personnel were viewed as disruptive, a number of Trade Hub and USAID respondents found that the Trade Hub’s progress on the NSWs and other IR 1.1 activities during the final evaluation period is partially attributable to the change in personnel of the senior project management and the USAID COR.

Interview findings revealed that further work is needed to assess the current needs and garner consensus of Malawi partners on the appropriate approach for NSW realization. Two respondents from a Malawi counterpart agency stated that the Trade Hub’s technical assistance for NSW development was beneficial, but Trade Hub support to the “hard components,” such as the procurement of technology and hardware, as well as infrastructure upgrades at the borders, would have had a greater impact in achieving the implementation of an NSW that is part of a modernized customs system. These respondents hope the future iteration of the Trade Hub will address these needs, which would require a larger donor investment for the next iteration of the Trade Hub project.

Interviews with Trade Hub personnel who participated in NSW activities revealed that there were several other contextual factors that played a role in delaying progress on NSW and were outside of the Trade Hub’s manageable interest. These factors included: variation in the capacities and resources of country agencies to implement an NSW; differing priorities related to interventions by ICPs; certain security concerns; and insufficient cooperation between neighboring countries. In particular, respondents viewed Malawi as having far less capacity than Namibia, which respondents viewed as a much stronger partner in terms of both capacity and resources.

Namibia Trade Information Portal

Results and Successes. In partnership with the Namibia’s Ministry of Finance and Customs and Excise agency, the Trade Hub helped develop the Namibia Trade Information Portal, which was launched in July 2015. The Portal is a web-based platform that provides a comprehensive and accessible collection of trade, customs, and compliance information. It is intended to reduce the time and effort required for domestic and international traders to find current information and forms for doing business in Namibia. The Trade Hub intended for the coordination and development work for the Namibia Trade Information Portal to be a complementary activity in facilitating the work of NSW realization. The Trade Hub also intended for the Portal to serve as a blue print for other countries. Several respondents confirmed that SADC is using it as a blueprint for their regional trade information portal. Although the

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20 Personal communication with Trade Hub personnel in Gaborone, Botswana, March 17, 2016.
21 Interview conducted remotely with two representatives of a Malawi counterpart agency on March 22, 2016.
The process of setting up the portal took longer than initially envisaged, upon completion it was deemed as an impressive success by a number of respondents.

**Challenges and Constraints.** While the Portal has been launched, it will require an ongoing commitment of resources and expertise from the Namibian government to maintain functioning and update with current information. Several Trade Hub and USAID personnel noted that despite these challenges, the government of Namibia is a strong partner and there is a high likelihood of the counterpart agencies being able to sustain the Portal without ongoing support from the Trade Hub.

**WTO TFA Readiness Assessments in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia**

The Trade Hub conducted a number of other trade facilitation support activities where needs were identified by USAID, counterparts, and other key stakeholders. In Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia the Trade Hub facilitated workshops and conducted readiness assessments for other governmental agencies to generate awareness of the WTO TFA and the incumbent obligations among private sector actors, including service support providers.

**Results and Successes.** The Trade Hub helped Botswana to carry out a TFA Needs Assessment, which was viewed by respondents as being instrumental in enabling Botswana’s early notification of the TFA. Botswana is now at the stage of developing a proposal that will help source funds and technical expertise. The Trade Hub was also involved in capacity building for SADC to facilitate workshops to increase member states’ knowledge and awareness of the importance of trade facilitation, which was critical in that it contributed to the relevance of trade facilitation in regional economic integration.

**Other IR 1.1 Trade Facilitation Activities**

**Coordinated Border Management.** The Trade Hub also conducted a Coordinated Border Management (CBM) monitoring assessment in Malawi at two major crossings (Mwanza on the Mozambique border and Songwe on the Tanzania border). The Trade Hub assessed the capacity and sustainability of border agencies at these locations to be successful partners in implementing a CBM program. The assessment found that the Joint Border Committees previously established by the Trade Hub were still operational and met regularly and that the communication and coordination between various agencies had improved.

**Customs Modernization Programs.** As part of Customs Modernization Programs, the Trade Hub provided legal review advisors to assist the BURS in drafting new customs laws in Botswana. The advisors reviewed the proposed legislation with business analysts and legal advisors from BURS to ensure it complies with the standards and requirements of international and regional agreements and policies (including the Kyoto Protocol, WCO, SACU, and SADC). Two project participants from counterpart agencies in Botswana praised these legal reviews in that they helped produce draft laws that form the basis of a modernized customs system, including the requirements for establishing an NSW.23

**Customs to Business Forums.** During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub facilitated the formation of Customs to Business Forums that greatly redressed strained relationships between the traders and customs agents at the borders. While Trade Hub personnel and an SADC participant have commended the positive short-term outcomes of these committees in improving customs to business relations on Malawi and Zambia border crossings, they noted that these structures were not institutionalized at the end of project.

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23 Personal communication with representatives from two Botswana counterpart agencies interviewed in Gaborone on March 16 and 31, 2016, respectively.
Customs Connectivity Pilot Project. Trade Facilitation team had implemented a connectivity project between Namibia and Botswana borders that did not succeed despite significant resources spent. While acknowledging the difficulties, an USAID respondent observed that this could have been managed better by the project and that the Trade Hub should have been able to identify and address the issues earlier. Trade Hub personnel and participating counterparts noted that this activity did not succeed due to technical issues (different software being used by Botswana and Namibia) and lack of motivation on the part of both governments.

Trade Audits for SADC Member States. With the Trade Hub support, SADC also conducted comprehensive trade audits in all 15 member states which informed the development of trade facilitation programs and identified gaps in harmonization. These trade audits were necessary to establish baseline measures for the effectiveness and functioning of customs departments in the region.

Gender Assessments at Border Crossings. The Trade Hub assisted SADC to conduct gender assessments at border posts between Malawi and Zambia during December 2015 to January 2016. The study draws attention to gender-sensitive areas, such as constraints for small and informal traders, who tend to be women. The findings emphasize the need to fast-track implementation of simplified trade regimes designed to streamline and enhance regional trade processes for small traders, especially women.

IR 1.1 Conclusions

During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub demonstrated significant improvements in performance and results of IR 1.1 Trade Facilitation activities, especially noting three major achievements attained through successful collaboration with key counterparts: the unanimous adoption of the SADC TFP by the SADC Council of Ministers; the progress in key milestones towards NSW realization in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia; and the launch of the Namibia Trade Information Portal.

There is still need for USAID Southern Africa to establish a closer collaborative working relationship on trade facilitation objectives with counterpart agencies in South Africa, which could be a constraint for similar interventions in the future.

The Trade Hub used embedded advisors effectively, and these experts proved critical in supporting counterparts to make progress towards NSW development through targeted trainings, change management, policy assessment and development support, and other capacity-building and technical assistance.

Trade Hub support enabled partner governments in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia to achieve key milestones in advancing NSW development, including:

- Raising awareness and educating all key stakeholders in the purpose and potential benefits and costs of NSW implementation;
- Generating buy-in, ownership, and commitment of all key counterparts to implement NSWs;
- Trade audits and stakeholder consultations to identify gaps for the harmonization of customs standards, including the interoperability of cross-border agency data sets;
- First stage legal reviews of draft customs legislation, identification of priority laws that will be affected, and other legal readiness assessments of the implications and requirements for NSW implementation;
- Stakeholder consultations and awareness/communication campaigns;
- The completion of NSW roadmaps; and
- Business sector readiness assessments.
The Trade Hub has been successful in navigating and coordinating domestic agencies within member states, as well as encouraging collaboration between member states to implement trade facilitation objectives. Maintaining political buy-in and ensuring coordination at all levels going forward will require significant leadership and engagement from the future iteration of the Trade Hub.

Trade facilitation objectives require governments to commit significant amounts of resources over a long-term horizon in order to ensure adequate staff capacity, including necessary hardware such as the procurement of IT equipment. Counterparts need to be well equipped and trained to maintain consistent engagement with regional partners and international organizations in order to effectively enforce policies and regulations. The Trade Hub has been effective at creating initial buy-in by governments, which has resulted in the short-term commitments of resources. Nevertheless, there is significant variation in member states’ capacity to fund such interventions, and continued support from the future iteration of the Trade Hub will be critical moving forward.

The Trade Hub has made significant gains in regard to its collaboration with SADC and member states around trade facilitation activities. However, many results are yet to be seen given the long-term nature of trade facilitation efforts. A major concern is that the SADC Secretariat and a number of member states do not have adequate resources and will likely need ongoing donor support to implement regional and national level trade facilitation interventions outlined in the TFP and/or introduced by the Trade Hub. As an activity under the WTO TFA and the SADC TFP, NSWs are a major ongoing trade facilitation area in which donor support and the collaboration of ICPs will be vital.

In particular, the lack of resources and capacities in Malawi for NSW realization will likely compromise the ability of counterparts to build on the gains made. Additionally, the Trade Hub was successful in getting Malawi counterparts to support and commit to NSW realization, but Malawi partners requested future donor assistance to provide different interventions for NSW realization that are expensive investments, such as the procurement of technology hardware and infrastructure upgrades.

In order to accomplish more with the project budget for IR 1.1 activities, the Trade Hub could have been more strategic in identifying trade facilitation interventions that are “low hanging fruit,” achieving short-term objectives with fewer resources while having a great potential for high impacts in enhancing the flow of regional trade. Coordinated Border Management (CBM) interventions are less time- and resource-intensive than establishing an NSW, and they have great potential for ameliorating major bottlenecks and constraints in trading across borders.

This has been evidenced by the Trade Hub’s facilitation of Business to Customs Forums and Joint Border Committees that have ushered in a structured approach for improving engagement between relevant agencies (such as customs, police, and agriculture) and traders and increasing the efficiency of customs processes.

IR 1.2 Greater Competitiveness in Agricultural Value Chains

IR 1.2 Findings

During the final evaluation period, project participants interviewed endorsed the three major Trade Hub IR 1.2 activities as having delivered positive results and successes that were frequently featured in weekly highlights and success stories. Through these activities the Trade Hub demonstrated the ability to coordinate a broad range of stakeholders to achieve concrete enhancements to key agricultural food chains. Table 2 below presents the major IR 1.2 activities the Trade Hub implemented during the period under review and notes which ones the team evaluated.
### TABLE 2: IR 1.2 AGRICULTURE VALUE CHAINS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Evaluated for Final PE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse Receipts System (WRS) Development</td>
<td>Mozambique and Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued support to Malawi WRS</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Storage Investment Facilities (ASIF)</td>
<td>Malawi and Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-Certification System for Agricultural Exports</td>
<td>South Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Partnership Grants (Agriculture Knowledge/Technology Transfer Programs)</td>
<td>Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa National Seed Organization (SANSOR)</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC SPS Regional Strategy Development</td>
<td>Botswana/United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Seed Center and SADC Harmonized Seed Protocol</td>
<td>Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Strategic Partnership Grants

During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub was tasked with completing and closing out the 12 live Strategic Partnership Grants (SPGs). 24 Through its SPG program, the Trade Hub aims to facilitate increased investments and technology transfer between agricultural value chain firms in Southern Africa and ones in the three FTF countries of Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. The Trade Hub committed and dispersed grant funds for four SPGs during FY 2014 and for the final nine SPGs during early FY 2015. During FY 2015, the Trade Hub reviewed, updated, and discussed the Grantee Handbook with grantees and visited with all active SPG grantees in Southern Africa to discuss grant administration, reporting requirements, cost share documentation, and other administrative and compliance-related matters. The Trade Hub reviewed grantee deliverables with recipients to ensure that implementation was on track. 25

**Results and Successes.** According to all respondents who participated, the SPGs yielded successful results at different levels. Respondents from both the Trade Hub agricultural team and USAID were extremely pleased at the performance and results generated by the SPGs. USAID respondents noted that the SPGs were “easy to accomplish, more tangible, [and the project could] build a story around up and down the value chain.” 26 While it is easier to build stories for the SPGs than for activities that have long-term or less tangible benefits, such as under IR 1.1 Trade Facilitation, some of the USAID respondents expressed concern that the IR1.2 component has been perceived as successful largely because of the SPGs and little else, as the bulk of success stories come from SPGs.

All of the SPG recipients interviewed displayed gratitude for the support that they have received, and they all acknowledged the beneficial impacts of the grants to their firms, as well as for the broader goals of the grant program (e.g., food security). The SPG recipients interviewed, by and large, also expressed satisfaction with the level of professionalism that the Trade Hub displayed in disbursing the grants and providing technical assistance. For instance, one SPG recipient noted that the Trade Hub had the right contacts and extensive sector-specific knowledge that helped his team connect with key market stakeholders. A result of the Trade Hub’s expertise, networks, and support, the grantee decided to go forward with using the grant to invest in establishing a lab, which was an investment that the firm was not prepared to undertake without Trade Hub support.

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24 The evaluation team interviewed representatives of firms that received grants during the period of performance covered by this evaluation including the following: Vermuelen; Deltamune; Deltamune-Vet Labs (the laboratory); Intertek Laboratories; Lumuno Organic Farms (Zhauns Business Opportunity); PMD Packaging Systems; Cargill; and ETG Agro.
26 Interview with a USAID Respondent March 8, 2016 Pretoria South Africa.
Furthermore, most of the SPG recipients interviewed believe that the support provided will be sustainable. The SPG recipients acknowledged that any concerns for sustainability related largely to contextual dynamics and factors outside of the Trade Hub’s control (e.g., climate change; electricity supply; trade barriers, such as export bans; and other policy, regulatory, and/or political issues). Several respondents noted that the sustainability of the Mozambique Warehouse Receipt Systems (WRS) pilot will be wholly contingent on the future iteration of the Trade Hub extending support. These respondents note that establishing a sustainable WRS is a complex task in itself, and in this challenging context, the WRS will require support for between 3 and 5 years, and could not be sustainable after an 18-month pilot.

In the case of Deltamune, the grant has facilitated the establishment of an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) accredited test laboratory with services in Zambia, the first services of its kind to be available in the country and the first in the Southern Africa region outside of South Africa. In addition to improving food safety, these lab services will speed up trade for Zambian exporters, as they will have access to in-country testing (as opposed to sending samples to South Africa). One of the private sector respondents affiliated with the grant added that the lab in Zambia is addressing food safety and security through physical grade and nutrition analysis. The respondent shared the expectation that the presence of the lab in the country would significantly improve the food quality standards in Zambia and support the agricultural community at large, especially the groundnut industry as aflatoxin testing is being developed as a priority for the lab.

Similarly, aflatoxin management is a major supply chain issue for trading groundnuts in Mozambique, and one of the reasons the Trade Hub selected Intertek in South Africa and Mozambique as an SPG recipient. Intertek will provide important agribusiness services, including aflatoxin testing, grain lab services, and independent arbitration services, through their certified agricultural lab. Key direct beneficiaries of this SPG will be commercial grain and oilseed traders who will be able to test their products locally (at lower costs and with speedier results). It was also clear from the interviews that there were (or will be) a number of indirect beneficiaries, such as smallholder farmers who will benefit from increased international trade. All of this, in turn, improves Mozambique’s competitiveness.

**Challenges and Constraints.** A Trade Hub respondent noted the challenge for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that have the greatest needs for grant funding and technical support but are unable to meet the cost share requirement (this was in the context of the WRS). The team working on this result underscored that this paradox is due to a Trade Hub strategy to identify and award grants to partners with significant capacity, as they are more likely to complete the grants as well as sustain the benefits of the investments. Sustainability was a critical consideration for the Trade Hub, as the SPG activity aimed to generate outcomes that would support the conditions for more structured trade.

The Trade Hub implemented a “call for proposals” for the SPGs, but the call generated little traction in the private sector, so the Trade Hub took an alternative approach. Two of the SPG recipients interviewed noted that they did not think the Trade Hub implemented a comprehensive or systematic way to communicate the SPG program to potential applicants, as they only heard of the grant program by chance and could have easily missed this opportunity. Some SPG recipients also observed that they did not know about the work of the other grantees, and this knowledge could have helped facilitate potential synergies and complementary opportunities.

**Warehouse Receipt Systems Established in Mozambique and Zambia**

The Trade Hub provided technical assistance to and coordinated with a range of local public and private sector partners, including commodities exchange bodies, farmers, traders, banks, and insurance providers to launch Warehouse Receipt Systems (WRS) in Mozambique and Zambia. A WRS enables farmers to safely store goods (usually grains or oilseeds) in exchange for a warehouse receipt (WR), which is issued
electronically via a web-based platform. A WR allows transparent market prices by documenting the amounts and quality of commodities deposited with a warehouse operator, allowing farmers to choose when to sell the goods and at what price. Additionally, commodity prices in the region are usually lower just after harvesting time, increasing in the weeks and months following; through safe storage, the WRS gives farmers the ability to choose to sell the goods at a later date and (typically) more favorable price. Producers can use the WR as secure collateral to obtain optional insurance and collateral finance from insurance companies and banks.

**Results and Successes.** The Trade Hub worked with SPG recipients ETG and Cargill to establish a WRS at selected warehouse sites in Mozambique, and provided training to warehouse operators and emerging grain traders. Through the WRS activity, the first warehouse receipt was issued in Mozambique in May 2015 and increased access to financing for participating farmers. The Trade Hub supported the Zambia Agricultural Commodities Exchange (ZAMACE) to launch a WRS in December 2015. In early 2016, ZAMACE had certified four warehouse operators with up to 300,000 MT of grain and oil seeds.

The WRS activity was seen as a success by different categories of respondents, including Trade Hub personnel, various USAID representatives, the technical expert on the Mozambique WRS, and WRS participants. Respondents viewed the issuing of the first warehouse receipt in Mozambique in May 2015 was a noteworthy success given the contextual challenges. The early producers who entrusted the WRS with their grain did see a profit margin after settling all the costs that they incurred (i.e., their loans and storage fees), with some reportedly making a net gain of up to 80 percent. Trade Hub staff members were hopeful that the news from the early adopters would inspire broader confidence in the system. They, and the lead technical expert, were confident that with time there would be even greater participation by the farmers as more realize the benefits of the system, and awareness of it spreads. Noting these successes, some private sector participants who were interviewed suggested that the future iteration of the Trade Hub should to look into working with the private sector to set up warehouses closer to border posts. Through the Trade Hub WRS activity, USAID and partner Appsolve (the IT company that designed the customized online system for the WRS using Oracle software) received an Oracle Sustainable Innovation Award (2015).

**Challenges and Constraints.** At the time of this evaluation, five months had lapsed since the WRS was established in Zambia, and the volume of receipts was low. However, the Trade Hub personnel interviewed, including the technical expert, were confident this was as a result of a combination of factors, including: the adverse weather conditions that led to floods in some places and droughts in other areas; the fear of adopting a new technology; and the lack of information about the activity. They were all of the view that five months was conventionally considered a short time for the uptake of such a system. They were therefore overwhelmingly keen to have the pilot extended and taken up in the upcoming iteration of the Southern Africa Trade Hub.

Trade Hub personnel viewed the issuing of the first warehouse receipt in Mozambique as a particularly noteworthy achievement, given the difficult conditions that led to the delays in start-up and posed challenges during implementation. These difficult conditions included: the departure of one of the original prospective partner companies; an intermittent electricity supply; a complex and challenging banking system; and an opaque structured trade and related regulatory environment. During implementation in Mozambique, legislation was passed that made the Commodities Exchange of Mozambique (BMM) the sole licensing agent in the country, which eliminated the prospect of private sector storage operators. Notwithstanding this development, the BMM allowed the piloting of the WRS

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27 Zambia Daily Mail article posted on December 31, 2015, "ZAMACE certifies 4 warehouse operators," retrieved at https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=54471
activity. The BMM respondents expressed their appreciation of the WRS pilot and its results. Trade Hub personnel interviewed reported that there seemed to be enthusiasm to change the legislation in order to allow private sector participants to become storage operators.

**Agricultural Storage Investment Facilities**

After consultations during FY 2013 with the Agricultural Commodity Exchange and other agricultural value chain (AVC) stakeholders in Malawi, the Trade Hub developed the Agricultural Storage Investment Facility (ASIF) to facilitate commercial long-term financing at competitive U.S. dollar rates to operators to develop decentralized agricultural storage.28 The Trade Hub developed ASIF in response to the need for commercial financing for agricultural warehouses, as identified by stakeholders. Further stakeholder consultations revealed that the available financing was very expensive and was not long-term or structured, and that this lack of investment options for agricultural storage was a major obstacle to growth and productivity. Based on these consultations, the Trade Hub sought to build a concrete approach to address the identified bottlenecks.

**Results and Successes.** The Trade Hub’s approach encompassed several key actions during FY 2014. The Trade Hub created a pipeline of investments in excess of $35 million that five agribusinesses were willing to undertake if appropriate financing was made available. These investments would create more than 40 warehouses, representing 240,000 MT of new capacity, which would increase Malawian private sector warehousing by more than 50 percent.29 The Trade Hub solicited investors and ascertained their capacity to provide appropriate financing, as well as the best structure and terms for the investment facility. While at this time local Malawian banks did not have strong interest, the Trade Hub identified investment funds and development finance institutions (DFIs) with significant interest and received expressions of interest from investors to provide over $30 million.30

The Trade Hub expanded ASIF to Zambia and consulted and worked with local partners, adapting and using the Malawi ASIF templates and documents. The Trade Hub developed the Zambian pipeline of over $80 million of agribusiness warehouse investment interest from eight agribusinesses, representing 480,000 MT of new capacity, which would increase Zambian private sector warehousing by approximately 50 percent. After soliciting investors, six local banks informally expressed their interest to participate.31

With so many interested parties, the Trade Hub hosted the ASIF Investors Conference in September 2014 in which over 30 institutions participated, including: storage operators, financiers and investors, commodity exchanges, service providers, and development organizations from Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, and South Africa, as well as the USAID Development Credit Authority (DCA) team, the USAID Southern Africa Regional Mission, and the Malawi and Zambia Missions.

Overall the project succeeded in generating $240 million in expressed interest of investment in agribusiness in Malawi ($130m) and Zambia ($140m) through a total of seven investment lines/structures. The Trade Hub’s work over the last year and half focused on unlocking these investments.

At the time of the evaluation, a former Trade Hub staff member confirmed that after the project closed, the Board of the European Investment Bank (EIB) approved the $35m ASIF credit line to the National Bank of Malawi (NBM) for warehouse investments. This is the final approval required from the EIB side, and the NBM has already signed off on the term sheet. The credit line is slated to fund a portfolio of

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29 The ASIF Story, an informal note, email communication with Adam Gross, March 2016
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
over 40 new warehouses, comprising over 240,000 MT of new capacity, by some estimates increasing by over 50 percent the private sector storage capacity in Malawi.

Through the European Union investment pipeline, the project created a financial instrument that incentivizes (through concessions) agri-businesses and companies to focus on rural businesses. Similar to the WRS, this activity required the Trade Hub to effectively interact with a wide range of stakeholders, including agribusinesses, farmer associations, SMEs, investment banks, DFIs, USAID regional and country missions, and the DCA.

**IR 1.2 Conclusions**

During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub generated momentum to complete implementation of the live SPG grants. The SPGs were found to deliver beneficial impacts for the grant recipients and the broader FTF goals, such as food security. By and large, the SPG recipients interviewed were appreciative of the project support, and most confirmed that their outputs had improved, exposure increased, and/or expansion was fast-tracked as a result.

The Trade Hub has provided evidence to private sector actors, including farmers, warehouse operators, and banks, that the WRS is a viable and technically sound solution for providing producers and farmers’ groups with access to safe storage in rural areas, as well as the ability to obtain cheaper financing and sell at higher prices.

Through ASIF, the Trade Hub has addressed an existing commercial gap, the lack of investment in rural areas for agricultural storage. The Trade Hub successfully coordinated a diverse array of stakeholders to create an investment pipeline, which incentivizes agri-businesses and companies to aggregate the focus on rural businesses. The Trade Hub’s success has generated interest from private sector partners to continue this work.

WRS, ASIF, and SPGs demonstrated the benefits of consistently demonstrating short-term success to help build trust and interest among stakeholders, which can ultimately help to keep them focused on long-term objectives.

**IR 1.3 Increased Trade and Investment in the Textile and Apparel Sector**

**IR 1.3 Findings**

USAID and Trade Hub personnel agreed that despite the small budget for IR 1.3 activities (as compared to IR 1.1 and IR 1.2 budgets), the project managed to achieve several concrete results and generate greater visibility for USAID and the Trade Hub in this sector. Trade Hub and USG personnel who supported these activities confirmed that project support helped generate market linkages between regional suppliers and international buyers and retailers at important trade shows, such as Source Africa and MAGIC. Table 3 below presents the major IR 1.3 activities the Trade Hub implemented during the period under review and notes which ones the team evaluated.

**TABLE 3: IR 1.3 TEXTILE AND APPAREL ACTIVITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Evaluated for Final PE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source Africa</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGIC Trade Show</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Textile and Apparel Promotion</td>
<td>South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRAP Seminars</td>
<td>Botswana and Lesotho</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source Africa, Origin Africa, and MAGIC Trade Shows

The Trade Hub provided support to the 2015 Source Africa and Origin Africa trade shows in coordination with the East Africa Trade and Investment Hub, with a strong focus on early matchmaking between regional suppliers and U.S.-based buyers. Source Africa is an annual Pan-African textile, clothing, and footwear tradeshow to encourage linkages between buyers, manufacturers and suppliers; attract investment into manufacturing capacity in Africa; and accelerate job creation in the region. To support Source Africa 2015, the Trade Hub fielded a regional sector expert to be responsible for: implementing the media outreach and communication plan; canvassing U.S. buyers and retailers to attend; facilitating introductions between U.S. buyers and regional suppliers; and supporting smaller suppliers with branding and merchandising for their exhibits. The Trade Hub also sponsored a series of seminars on the renewal and impacts of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) at Source Africa 2015. These seminars served as a forum for buyers, suppliers, and other industry players to interact directly with USG officials, sector policy experts, and analysts. Potential AGOA beneficiaries learned about AGOA processes, the ethical compliance standards, and other quality requirements that U.S. buyers expect from suppliers. Additionally, buyers learned about the products and services offered by African suppliers and producers.

The Trade Hub also supported seven companies from Lesotho and Botswana and one South African footwear producer to attend the MAGIC 2015 trade show in Las Vegas. The Trade Hub budget for IR 1.3 activities was very limited during the extension period. The Mission decided to use another USAID-funded contract, the Management Support and Technical Assistance Services (MSTAS) Project, to organize the participation of regionally based textile and apparel companies in the 2016 MAGIC show, while the Trade Hub facilitated introductions between the MSTAS project and the appropriate regional suppliers.

Other IR 1.3 Activities

The Trade Hub sponsored Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) seminars in Botswana and Lesotho for textile and apparel companies to educate suppliers on the certification process. In Durban, the Trade Hub hosted a Regional Export and Trade Facilitation workshop for South African business chambers, textile and apparel businesses and manufacturers, regional traders, and local government officials.

Results and Successes. USAID and Trade Hub personnel and several project participants who were interviewed stated that the IR 1.3 activities achieved positive and concrete results and improved the visibility of USAID and the Trade Hub in the sector with a relatively small portion of the overall project budget. Both USAID and Trade Hub personnel, including technical consultants, viewed the market linkages that generated at the textile tradeshows, such as Source Africa and MAGIC, as a significant success under this IR because of the business that the intervention generated for the textile firms that participated. The interviews revealed that the visibility gained from the textile trade shows addressed some “market failure” resulting from information asymmetry between major U.S. buyers and the textile firms in Southern Africa, most specifically Lesotho.

Two respondents related the success story of a woman-owned apparel company (Luqy) that received a large order from a new buyer whom the owner met at the MAGIC 2015 trade show. This Lesotho-based supplier reported the result of orders over $4 million and that she was able increase in the number of people employed as a consequence of an order which came about at the trade show.

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32 USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub FY2015 Annual Report p. 38
33 USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub FY2015 Annual Report p. 41
34 USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub Annual Report FY2015 p. 40
another example of successful buyer-supplier linkages created by these activities, a respondent noted that as recently as four years ago, the American clothing retailer Philip van Heusen did not buy from Africa, and now has more than four African suppliers as a result of MAGIC and Source Africa.

Challenges and Constraints. Respondents also identified a number of challenges for participating suppliers that have not yet increased capacity or accessed the necessary capital to fulfill large orders from new buyers. Sector experts who worked with the Trade Hub noted that in Lesotho, major banks do not recognize letters of credit, which decreases access to financing for firms that would like to make larger sales and/or expand product lines. These respondents noted that increasing access to financing is an identified need of the apparel and textile sector that U.S. agencies including USAID should coordinate with other international donors and institutions to find innovative solutions.

Two sector experts who participated in IR 1.3 activities also observed that there is a need for more consistent and long-term engagement in order to effectively build linkages between buyers and sellers. Respondents mentioned that future activities should make an effort to introduce buyers and sellers with enough time before tradeshows, and to establish relationships beyond tradeshow events. These respondents proposed that the next iteration of the Trade Hub could build on these results by showcasing a few factories to give U.S. retailers and buyers the opportunity to learn about the benefits and costs of buying from Southern Africa suppliers as compared to other sourcing destinations.

The evaluation team interviewed an owner of a textile and apparel firm (and member of a textile exporters association) who noted that Trade Hub support for the sector in Botswana was weak. The respondent also mentioned that the project’s communication with him was sporadic and that staff were unresponsive to the firm’s inquiries to engage or receive project support. The respondent did acknowledge that the Botswana government lacks a strategy to support the sector, in contrast with government approaches in Lesotho and Swaziland, and that the contextual constraints may have also contributed to his perception of weak IR 1.3 results in Botswana.35

It is worth noting that respondents had mixed reviews of USAID support for the 2016 Las Vegas MAGIC show, which was implemented by another contractor, not the Trade Hub. One respondent who participated in the Trade Hub IR1.3 activities was of the view that the 2015 show was more beneficial—in terms networking to arrange meetings between U.S. buyers and African suppliers—than was the 2016 show. The respondent noted that the 2016 MAGIC show would have produced better results if USAID had assigned the task to a contractor that was experienced in organizing trade shows in the textile and apparel sector. The tradeshows support team was only able to set up a few appointments between buyers and suppliers in advance of the trade show.

IR 1.3 Conclusions

The Trade Hub was successful in creating initial business linkages between U.S. buyers and manufacturers in two of the targeted countries in the region (Lesotho and Swaziland). However, there are sustainability concerns. For those manufacturers to respond to repeat orders and maintain these business relationships, they must be able to fulfill orders on a consistent basis, which may be heavily reliant on external factors such as their ability to raise capital to expand operations.

There is a need for greater exposure of manufacturers to U.S. buyers beyond trade shows, as many U.S. buyers are still unfamiliar with manufacturers in Southern Africa and will most likely not make any purchases without having a solid relationship with suppliers.

35 Personal communication March 14, 2016 in Gaborone, Botswana
Additionally, many of the mixed reviews from the 2016 MAGIC show were a result of the fact that the Trade Hub contracted for support with a firm that does not specialize in the textile and apparel sector. The firm that helped support the 2016 MAGIC show did not have the same industry contacts as the firm that supported the MAGIC show in the previous year, and as a result, was not able to set up as many face-to-face meetings between manufacturers and buyers.

**IR 1.4 Strengthened Regulatory Capacity for the Clean Energy Sector**

**IR 1.4 Findings**

The final evaluation focused on the major IR 1.4 activities performed in Zambia over the last 18 months, including the development of the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) policy and mechanism and capacity-building in the Rural Electrification Authority (REA). All Zamia respondents, including USAID personnel and private and public sector participants, positively endorsed that the Trade Hub concretely contributed to strengthened regulatory capacity for the clean energy sector in Zambia through both activities. These KII findings corroborated the positive assessment of USAID Southern Africa respondents on the performance of these activities. Table 4 below presents the major IR 1.4 activities the Trade Hub implemented during the period under review and notes which ones the team evaluated.

**TABLE 4: IR 1.4 CLEAN ENERGY ACTIVITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Evaluated for Final PE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) Policy Development</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFIT Mechanism Development and Capacity Building for Energy Regulation Board (ERB)</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building for the Rural Electrification Authority (REA)</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable Energy and Independent Power Producer Policy Development for Swaziland</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Capacity of the Swaziland Energy Regulatory Agency</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration with Regional Electricity Regulation Association (RERA)</td>
<td>Namibia, Malawi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Renewable Energy Feed in Tariff (REFIT) Policy Development in Zambia**

The regulatory capacity for the clean energy sector was on the Zambian government’s agenda prior to the Trade Hub’s assistance. At the time of the Trade Hub’s initial involvement, the government had commenced a process for procuring 30 MW of solar power from independent power providers (IPPs) in four specific remote locations across the country to increase the electricity supply and improve rural electrification. It was clear from all stakeholder interviews that Zambia completely lacked the overarching regulatory frameworks and pricing structures necessary to support renewable energy generation and procurement. These obstacles caused the planned solar pilot to stall and blocked the government and Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO), the state-owned electricity utility, from making new procurements of new renewable energy from IPPs available on the grid.

**Results and Successes.** The Trade Hub provided technical assistance to private and public sector partners to develop enabling energy policy and regulatory frameworks that would encourage investment and increase renewable energy supply. The Trade Hub built the capacity of energy regulators, as well as rural electrification agencies and other bodies responsible for implementing clean energy projects.
During FY2015 the Trade Hub continued technical assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Zambian Ministry of Mines, Energy, Water, and Development (MMEWD) to develop a REFIT policy. The REFIT policy enables the government to procure renewable energy from IPPs at pre-determined prices, which encourages the private sector to invest in creating renewable energy sources. The Trade Hub and the DOE consulted with a wide range of stakeholders to inform the draft policy and facilitated the REFIT policy Validation Workshop in Lusaka in March 2015. The Trade Hub completed the Draft REFIT policy to address stakeholders’ concerns, and MMEWD DOE formally accepted the draft policy in April 2015.

All respondents knowledgeable of this activity positively endorse the Trade Hub support in developing the REFIT policy and credit this result with directly contributing to strengthening Zambia’s regulatory capacity in the clean energy sector. The policy removes regulatory barriers to renewable energy regulation and procurement, which creates a more enabling environment. In the context of this improved enabling environment, the Trade Hub facilitated the development of a model power purchase agreement, which is a mechanism for IPPs to make agreements with ZESCO to supply the grid. The Trade Hub also developed a solar price discovery curve, which informs prospective IPPs of the exact tariff for a new renewable energy technology, and therefore, how profitable their investments will be.

**Constraints and Challenges.** While there was overwhelming agreement that the REFIT policy development was a successful achievement, respondents mentioned several concerns about contextual challenges that raised questions of whether the success of project achievements can and will have lasting impacts. First, all stakeholders interviewed noted that the key challenge to the completion and formal acceptance of the REFIT policy is the fact that the government has still not released the policy. It is assumed that government bureaucratic processes are to blame, and it should be noted that this obstacle lies outside of the Trade Hub’s manageable interest. According to a private sector respondent in Zambia, the failure to share the policy has affected the plans of IPPs: either their planned investments are stalled or they have been “forced” to negotiate with ZESCO.

A second issue of concern raised by respondents was that Trade Hub support did not include the drafting of an implementation agreement (IA) that outlines the respective obligations of the government and the IPPs, and this step should have been implemented as a logical extension of the Trade Hub’s technical assistance to the REFIT policy. A model IA is one of the legal documents that usually accompanies a draft standard Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), which the Trade Hub developed and presented to stakeholders. According to several respondents, the complete utilization of the partnerships is contingent on the existence of an IA, as they cannot move to implement without one. According to Trade Hub personnel, the project omitted the IA from their terms of reference (TOR) for this activity based on the advice of their key local counterpart, Energy Regulation Board (ERB), which suggested it would be difficult for the project to bring about consensus on the agreement. The respondent noted that process of consultation, development, and consensus building for IAs, or similar procurement-related documentation, involves a much larger scope and range of agencies, which would have delayed the REFIT policy work they knew could be implemented, and the project chose to include only what was within their manageable interest to implement.

Another process – GET FiT – under the German Development Bank (KfW) is offering to develop the model IA. They have held a stakeholder workshop, with a view to operationalize the IA in 2017. Respondents felt that 2017 would be too far given their already existing concerns about ongoing delays with the release of the REFIT policy, and the fact that Zambia is also currently facing an energy crisis.

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36 Southern Africa Trade Hub FY2015 Annual Report p. 46
37 Southern Africa Trade Hub FY2015 Annual Report p. 47
38 Personal communication with a private sector project participant, interviewed in Lusaka, Zambia on March 16, 2016.
Respondents noted the issue of supplying the subsidy for the feed-in tariff, where the government basically guarantees the private sector a certain tariff, making it viable for the private sector to produce that type or renewable energy. The government will have to find the resources for the subsidy, and there could be models in which users share in that cost, but whatever the solution, the government still guarantees the price.

The overall REFIT policy covered the entire renewable energy regulatory environment, but the Trade Hub’s support developing a price discovery curve and indicative prices applied only to solar power generation. Several respondents noted that in order to take the Trade Hub work to its logical conclusion, the price discovery curve work should have covered wind, mini-hydro, and biofuels. Even when the IAs are completed, there will be a need to have established tariffs for the other technologies. Respondents recommended that if USAID were to extend its clean energy assistance, the future iteration of the Trade Hub should consider developing the price discovery curves for these other technologies.

On coordination, some respondents were of the view that the parallel processes—REFIT, GET FiT, and Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)—should be better coordinated in the future. REEEP is for the large-scale IPP procurement market-related bidding processes (instead of set tariffs, as is the case with the smaller-scale procurement under REFIT). In passing, one respondent explained that there were, in his view, some minor inherent contradictions in the respective work.

Related to all of these challenges, some of the respondents expounded upon the question of, at what point is success measured? They all agreed that the result was a good one from the point of view of developing a policy framework, which was effectively what the Trade Hub set out to do, according to its TOR. But, overwhelmingly, they expressed concern that the substantive stage—the actual release of the policy—has not materialized. This, they explained, raised a parallel debate regarding at what point results are measured. Alternatively, according the remaining respondents, this makes it important to build in or enhance the process of tracking and follow-up. Others went further, raising issues relating to an even more subsequent phase, that of funding, for example, sourcing of funds for the feed-in tariffs (for which the government will pay, although it presently does not have the funds). Another respondent further raised the issue about funding mechanisms to assist Zambian nationals to participate in REFIT. A number of respondents suggested looking into a possible role for the Power Africa process for these funding aspects.

**Rural Electrification Authority (REA) Capacity Building in Zambia**

The second broad aspect of Trade Hub support in Zambia was the capacity-building for the REA, which encompassed capacity building training for the REA board and trainings for REA staff in project management and how to draft proposals. The Trade Hub also provided local experts to review the smart subsidies policy and train staff in the policy.

**Results and Successes.** As noted above, Zambian respondents across all respondent groups—private sector, public sector, and USAID—positively endorsed the Trade Hub REA capacity-building activities. Findings from the Zambia KIs corroborated the assessment of USAID Southern Africa of Trade Hub performance of this activity. The REA respondent confirmed that all three capacity-building aspects were very successful and the trainings were very beneficial for the institution (its board members, staff, and technical staff), both from the sense of tangible skills attained, and learning from best practices in other parts of the region. However, the respondent did raise an issue regarding what he perceived to be difficulties surrounding the tracking of results in capacity-building work (see below).

**Challenges and Constraints.** While confirming these successes of the REA capacity-building activities, the REA respondent indicated that tracking the results of capacity-building interventions can
be very challenging, and currently they do not create baseline measures for skills and knowledge in order to measure against these after the trainings.

**IR 1.4 Conclusions**

The Trade Hub was viewed by all relevant stakeholders interviewed as concretely strengthening the regulatory capacity of the clean energy sector in Zambia. The Trade Hub's support also saw successful completion and approval of the REFIT policy.

Despite these successes, there are several concerns for institutionalization of the REFIT policy. First the Zambian government has yet to release the REFIT policy. While this is beyond the control of the Trade Hub, it has significantly affected the plans of IPPs, as they are either completely unable to move on their plans or are “forced” to negotiate with ZESCO.

Capacity-building efforts were successful; however, it is difficult to track the results of this capacity-building work.

Some respondents expressed programmatic overlap between REFIT, GetFIT, and RIEEP. As such, coordination amongst donors and stakeholders is critical.

**IR 1.5 A Better Enabling Environment**

**IR 1.5 Findings**

During the final evaluation period, the Trade Hub implemented a range of activities under IR 1.5, which USAID and Trade Hub personnel saw as providing high-impact results for the investment of resources, especially when compared to IR 1.1 activities. Respondents from counterpart agencies endorsed the Trade Hub activities as having a range of beneficial impacts for their ability to do their work and noted their enthusiasm for continuing participation in similar efforts in the future. Table 5 presents the major IR 1.5 activities the Trade Hub implemented during the period under review and notes which ones the team evaluated.

**TABLE 5: IR 1.5 ENABLING ENVIRONMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Evaluated for Final PE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of National Enquiry Points on Technical Barriers to Trade</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Standards Related to Products and Services</td>
<td>Lesotho and Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and Implementation of Investor Roadmaps (IRM)</td>
<td>SADC member states</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Audits of IRM Implementation</td>
<td>Lesotho and Swaziland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGOA Activities</td>
<td>Botswana and Gabon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration with SADC Secretariat and Other International Cooperating Partners</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Integration</td>
<td>Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39 The Southern Africa Trade Hub placed gender integration milestones under IR 1.5 Enabling Environment in its work plan. As gender is a cross-cutting issue, the evaluation team assessed these efforts in terms of the relevance and success of results, management, promising practices, and sustainability. There is a separate section on gender integration following the evaluation questions.
**WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) National Enquiry Points (NEPs) Established**

During FY 2015, the Trade Hub provided support to counterpart agencies to launch National Enquiry Points (NEPs) in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland, and to re-launch the NEPs in Botswana and Zambia. An NEP is designed to reduce time and technical constraints to trade by providing a single government point of contact that provides documentation on conformity assessment procedures, technical regulations, and standards for trade.

**Results and Successes.** Through capacity-building efforts, the Trade Hub enabled the national standards bodies from six SADC member states to comply with requirements of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (1995) to reduce TBTs by establishing NEPs. In addition to new equipment, the Trade Hub provided technical assistance, including trainings on product and service standardization and bench marking. Trade Hub experts presented case studies of how other countries addressed challenges in establishing NEPs (e.g., aflatoxin removal) to counterparts in order to share lessons learned and best practices. The Trade Hub also facilitated public awareness workshops to introduce businesses to NEP services.

Respondents from the Trade Hub, USAID, and counterpart agencies agreed that the launches of the NEPs in six member states were a successful result. A Trade Hub respondent explained that NEPs in Botswana and Zambia had previously been established but were not functional, and that project support enabled the responsible agencies to re-launch NEPs. A USAID respondent said that the successful work on establishing NEPs, along with trade facilitation milestones and structured trade, are examples of the Trade Hub’s improved performance in the last 18 months. The success of the NEPs was corroborated by a counterpart who noted that the ministry viewed the NEP as a “major success story” for the participating Botswana agency’s work with the Trade Hub. The counterpart explained that prior to the Trade Hub support, the agency was designated to serve as the NEP for Botswana but it was not operating in that capacity and lacked the capacity to efficiently manage the NEP function.

**Challenges and Limitations.** While confirming that the NEP was a major success for the participating Botswana agency, a counterpart noted that their challenge in working with the Trade Hub was understanding how project decisions are made in terms of what types of assistance the project will provide. For example, the respondent noted that the agency submitted a proposal for the NEP activity that noted the needs in the areas of regulatory and conformity assessments that were not addressed by Trade Hub assistance, in addition to the TBT issues that were addressed. The respondent noted that what the project could accomplish in the remaining period of performance was likely a factor in this decision, but how and why the project makes these decisions is still unclear.

The Botswana counterpart identified several needs that the agency hopes USAID and the future Southern Africa Trade and Investment Hub will address, including reviewing key pieces of legislation and regulations for alignment with international best practices. The respondent noted that the agency needs further support to some extent with standards development and conformity, as well as ongoing capacity building to address changing systems and standards. The respondent also mentioned a contextual constraint in that the government needs to better coordinate the several bodies involved in regulatory services, specifically in the area of testing. Currently, standards can be accelerated, but testing labs may not be accredited, which becomes a trade impediment. There is a proposal for the Botswana Bureau of Standards (BOBS) to become an apex body and other agencies to deal with specific industries or areas. The respondent noted that, while at the time of the evaluation, the Botswana NEP was not yet

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40 Personal communication March 17, 2016 Gaborone, Botswana.
41 For example, the respondent also noted that in Botswana there is a high level of border trade by informal traders where no standards are applied. An African Traditional Medicines Committee has been formed at the SADC level to address the amount of trade in traditional medicines.
fully functional because of internal administrative issues and the pending establishment of its TBT committee, it will be able to carry the work forward. The respondent had a positive outlook for the sustainability of the NEP.

**Milestone Activity 1B Development of National Action Programs on Investment (NAPI) for Five SADC Member States**

**Results and Successes.** Following a request by SADC, the Trade Hub completed Investor Road Maps (IRMs) in five countries (Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, and Zambia). Investor roadmap work had been done in Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia previously. The common theme in the road maps was the need to identify actionable reforms and get them implemented. The road maps have resulted in National Action Programs on Investment. They are expected to improve the investment climates and create attractive business environments.

The needs assessment done to support the preparation of the NAPI identified specific areas that require improvements and support, especially among trade-supporting institutions. The needs assessment and NAPI have also identified the root causes of why the past strategies and policies have not been implemented in the five countries. The NAPI have a concrete gender component that will ensure that the activities are adequately engendered.

**Challenges and Limitations.** The Trade Hub respondents were of the view that the work on IRMs in Lesotho and Swaziland was very successful, as there had been an improvement in those countries’ competitiveness rankings. They acknowledged, however, that mere movement up the rankings does not necessarily reflect improvement in trade or investment flows, noting that further assessment would be needed to ensure that the changes bring about tangible increases in trade and regional integration.

Moreover, while formulating a strategy is a good thing, the requisite activities to make it effective are necessary. The SPS strategy required national workshops to get endorsements and create awareness among member states. The Trade Hub closed before this could be done.

The Trade Hub respondents also indicated that there were some continuing problems with countries implementing their road maps. They also noted that there was still a need for greater buy-in and awareness as they often discovered that the private sector was still following the old practices. The Trade Hub’s annual progress checks on IRMs in Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia indicated that there was progress in Lesotho and Swaziland, but little in Namibia.

The Trade Hub respondents also mentioned that the agreement had been to do NAPI work in 10 countries, but that in the time they had, they only managed to do work in 5 member states.

Lastly, the Trade Hub respondents also noted that further assessments would be needed to measure tangible increases in trade and regional integration resulting from their NAPI work.

**IR 1.5 Conclusions**

The Trade Hub supported seven member states to comply with their WTO TFA obligations through the establishment of NEPs. Stakeholders indicated that the establishment—or in some cases, the re-establishment—of NEPs proved to be a success.

The long-term success of NEPs is heavily contingent on the political commitment as well as the ability of domestic government agencies within each country to coordinate with each other.

IRMs were helpful in shaping regulatory regimes; however, more efficient and streamlined regulation does not necessarily translate into increased investment and trade.
There is still significant room for increasing awareness of enabling environment activities and achievements among government and private sector stakeholders in order to create change.

**EQ2 Management: How has the management structure as implemented supported or hindered project performance?**

**EQ2 Findings**

In order to answer EQ2, the evaluation team presents the findings and conclusions on whether and how management structures that the project implemented—such as financial administration, operations, and personnel—supported or hindered the project’s performance.

In summary, many of the USAID and Trade Hub respondents agreed that five changes in the management structure that the project implemented were most salient for enhancing performance. First, the Trade Hub moved the location of the head field office from Gaborone, Botswana, to be close to the USAID Southern Africa Mission in Pretoria, South Africa, which enabled more effective coordination and communication with the client. Second, the collaborative management style of the new USAID Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) and Alternate COR greatly improved the working relationship between the Trade Hub and the Mission. Third, the positive, enabling, and client-focused management style of the new Chief of Party (COP) facilitated better performance and improved morale of the Trade Hub staff and consultants, especially among technical personnel. Fourth, the addition of a Strategic Communications Advisor facilitated better communication with USAID, project participants, and key stakeholders. These respondents accredited the addition of this role with increasing the quality and quantity of communication materials that the project and USAID used to regularly communicate Trade Hub results and garner support from external and internal audiences. Fifth, USAID and project participants who had interacted with the Trade Hub’s embedded advisors positively endorsed the technical support provided by these experts.

Respondents noted three salient points in terms of management structures implemented by the project that hindered performance. The three most salient aspects of the management structure that hindered performance included: the absence of a Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP) position that was focused on overall management and oversight, and not combined with a senior technical position; understaffed and insufficiently integrated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) personnel; and the absence of a full-time gender advisor.

**Change in Location of Head Trade Hub Field Office**

The Trade Hub maintained a head field office in Gaborone, Botswana, another office in South Africa, and embedded advisors in Malawi and Namibia. During FY 2014, the Trade Hub moved its main office from Gaborone to Centurion to be located closer to the USAID Southern Africa Mission in Pretoria. Both the USAID and Trade Hub personnel interviewed noted that the moving the head field office improved communication and coordination between the Trade Hub and the Mission. Trade Hub personnel interviewed indicated that communication with the client improved greatly, and they were able have regular and consistent communication through face-to-face meetings with USAID, as well as other project participants based in South Africa. Several Trade Hub personnel elaborated that, from an operations standpoint, it was useful to have the COR and the Trade Hub headquarters in the same metropolitan area and country, as it facilitated the approval process and made it easier to reach USAID directly. An SPG recipient interviewed also noted that he was impressed overall with interactions with the Trade Hub before the move, and was especially impressed with the improvement in communication with the Trade Hub after the move to South Africa (where his company is based).
However, it should be noted that the move was not looked on favorably by all stakeholders. One stakeholder from SADC noted that the move was not well received by SADC (which is based in Gaborone).

**Changes in Key Personnel**

USAID and Trade Hub respondents indicated that under the previous USAID COR, the project had very little decision-making power or independence to operate, which reflects the findings of the mid-term evaluation. These respondents noted that once the new USAID management team took over, the relationship between the Trade Hub and USAID greatly improved. The respondents elaborated that the new COR and DCOR implemented an oversight and management approach that emphasized working collaboratively with the project staff, which improved overall coordination.

Trade Hub and USAID personnel noted that changes in project personnel also contributed to the improved efficiency of project operations and relations with internal and external stakeholders. These respondents stated that the new COP created a positive atmosphere and actively worked to empower staff. Trade Hub staff elaborated that the new COP was an effective manager who allowed technical experts the room to operate, and that past COPs also tried to play technical roles, which was often a source of frustration for the team. The Trade Hub short-term technical assistance (STTA) consultants who were interviewed noted that in addition to empowering them to make technical decisions, the new COP also allowed them to interact directly with the client, which increased efficiency and allowed them to accomplish more. Trade Hub personnel also indicated that previous key personnel did not understand regional dynamics as well as the new project leadership. The change in personnel was also associated with improvement in relations between the Trade Hub and USAID, as well as with government counterparts and regional organizations.

**Development of Strategic Communication Advisor Role**

The Trade Hub introduced a strategic communication advisor position during the last 18 months. Several USAID and Trade Hub personnel who were interviewed noted that this role was critical in generating the necessary news stories to communicate objectives and results to external and internal audiences. The project and USAID were able to use these more positive and regular materials to build the support the Trade Hub and USAID needed. The strategic communication advisor also effectively managed the relationship with different missions and engaged senior officials, including the ambassadors. It should be noted that one USAID respondent suggested that there was room for improvement in the communication between the Trade Hub field office and AECOM headquarters.

**Embedded Advisors**

Four USAID personnel who interacted with activities that the Trade Hub’s embedded advisors implemented in Namibia and Malawi positively endorsed the technical support that these experts provided. They noted that the technical support the embedded advisors provided was critical in setting policy, gaining national support, and maintaining momentum for long term-objectives, particularly IR 1.1 trade facilitation activities to support NSW and the launch of the Namibia Trade Information Portal. In Malawi, for example, there was no energy around progressing with the NSW. An embedded advisor brought this to USAID’s attention, and the Mission coordinated with the U.S. Embassy in Lilongwe for the ambassador to firmly promote the NSW agenda with counterparts. The ambassador’s engagement was critical to keep the NSW issue alive with Malawi counterparts. Both Trade Hub and USAID personnel interviewed noted that that embedded advisors were preferable to STTA consultants, because they could provide the continuity in regards to achieving long-term objectives while also helping to complete short-term tasks, which were critical in maintaining the interest of the government officials. A representative of a Namibian counterpart agency noted that their work with the Trade Hub on the
Namibia Trade Information Portal went really well, and the embedded advisor was helpful in developing strategies and moving the policy discussion forward. The embedded advisor was also described as being critical in milestone management, studies on project impact, and communications strategies, as well as providing excellent advisory (horizon) services.

Absence of a Formal DCOP Position

USAID and Trade Hub personnel interviewed reported that the Trade Hub did not employ a DCOP, as previously the director of agriculture value chains acted as the DCOP, and that a standalone DCOP position was officially scrapped. USAID project personnel interviewed felt that, given the size and complexity of the Trade Hub activities, having a DCOP would have benefited the project and improved efficiency in terms of overall management.

Understaffed and Insufficiently Integrated M&E Resources

Respondents noted that the management structure and resources for M&E presented several challenges and constraints for the Trade Hub to ensure the integration of M&E into all activities across eight countries. USAID and Trade Hub personnel interviewed noted that the Trade Hub only employed one M&E manager and, during the last year of the project, added one M&E assistant to implement performance monitoring and management plans. The M&E manager was responsible for overseeing the implementation of M&E and reporting requirements for all activities by coordinating with the STTA consultants and embedded advisors in the eight countries where the project was implemented. These respondents noted that the M&E manager was supported by an assistant in charge of data entry; however, this position was not filled until the last year of the project. One USAID respondent noted that the SPGs were activities that required a great deal of resources for monitoring, and it may have been more efficient to hire local M&E officers to monitor these activities and in addition to the embedded advisors who were part of the extended country teams outside of Botswana and South Africa. USAID and Trade Hub respondents noted that the M&E manager was not allowed to travel. As a result, the M&E manager often had a difficult time coordinating with the over 30 experts in the field to ensure monitoring and reporting requirements were met or that M&E strategies were properly integrated into all activities.

Absence of Full-Time Gender Advisor

There was a lack of consistent budget and dedicated staff for gender integration efforts. Originally AECOM had fielded a regional gender advisor, but the project wanted to have an STTA approach and an expatriate with a higher level of expertise. Over the last year and half, the project has done a lot to reinvigorate the gender integration approach. The gender advisor found that the current COP was very supportive; however, she observed that gender was not fully integrated in the different results and that in future there is a need to effectively integrate gender mainstreaming strategies into project activities. Several USAID respondents noted that the Trade Hub’s approach to gender integration lacked a coherent and consistent strategy. One Trade Hub staff member believed that if the Trade Hub had gender experts with deep regional experience, it would be able to implement the work more effectively.

Lack of Strategic Approach for Gender Integration

The Trade Hub did not have a strategic plan for gender integration, a well-thought-out personnel structure, or consistent resources for achieving it. These management structures constrained what the project was able to achieve in terms of gender integration across IR activities, and the Trade Hub missed some of the many opportunities in this region to address the differentiated effects that trade policies and interventions have on women. As a number of respondents from across the results areas pointed out, there are many missed opportunities for gender integration in the region: many small traders are
women; women are also active in targeted agricultural food chains, especially in processing; women comprise the majority of the employees in the textile and apparel sector, and there are even women who have become employers and leaders in this sector; and increasingly, women who are involved in informal businesses have the potential to become entrepreneurs and run sustainable SMEs.

**EQ2 Conclusions**

The Trade Hub greatly improved communication and coordination with USAID South Africa after moving the location of the head field office from Gaborone to be closer to the Mission in Pretoria.

During the period of performance being evaluated, the Trade Hub accomplished a clear and positive turnaround in performance and improved relationships with the client and stakeholders. These changes were clearly associated with changes in key personnel positions: the USAID COR and the Trade Hub COP.

The addition of the strategic communication advisor made a big difference and significantly improved the Trade Hub’s relationship with the regional Mission, bilateral missions, and with other key stakeholders and counterparts. The strategic communication advisor increased the quality and quantity of communication materials, especially the weekly reports and success stories that the project and USAID used to regularly communicate Trade Hub results and garner support from external and internal audiences.

The embedded advisors were very useful at generating interest, sharing knowledge, and building the policy-making and management skills of the national counterparts with whom they worked. They were credited with building the interest, knowledge, and capacities of national and regional counterparts towards achieving long-term trade facilitation policy goals, while supporting the achievement of short-term results, which in turn helped keep momentum going for these initiatives.

Given the scale and complexity of this project, it would have been beneficial to have a DCOP who was not also playing a senior technical role in order to improve efficiency and overall management of the contract.

A number of factors constrained the ability of the project to efficiently implement M&E strategies across all activities in the eight countries, including the fact that the Trade Hub was understaffed in terms of M&E support roles, the fact that the M&E manager was not involved from the inception of program activities, the centralization of M&E supervision into one role, and the lack of an M&E assistant until the last year of the project.

Because of the lack of resources and strategic plans for gender integration, the Trade Hub missed opportunities to implement technical assistance that enhances trade expansion and competitiveness while leveraging synergies to improve gender equality. There is room for improvement in how the Trade Hub interventions addressed gender-related constraints. Improving on the Trade Hub’s gender integration efforts in future programming is an opportunity to improve in gender equality and increase the productivity and growth potential of marginalized groups in the economy.
EQ3 Findings

In order to answer EQ3, the evaluation team presents the findings and conclusions on whether and how management factors—such as procedures and approaches, as well as the dynamics that shape challenges and opportunities for the Trade Hub mechanism—supported or hindered the project’s performance.

Many of the USAID and Trade Hub respondents agreed that there were changes in the way the project addressed six management factors that were most salient for enhancing performance. These factors include: alignment with USAID policies and procedures; implementing a proactive outreach and consultation strategy for identifying potential SPG recipients; effectively managing relationships with a diverse array of actors under the WRS activities; implementing a strengthened communication strategy; and the shift in the style of senior management to be more client-focused and responsive to stakeholders. One of the management factors that improved performance was a result of USAID’s decreasing the number of technical IR areas from 13 to 5, which was a more feasible scope for the project to implement.

Some management factors presented challenges for improving performance. Implementing activities across eight countries required a great deal of travel, which was difficult to monitor. The project also found balancing the needs of counterparts at both the bilateral and multilateral levels to be challenging.

Alignment to USAID Policies and Procedures

Trade Hub staff noted that prior to August 2014, the project did not properly follow USAID procedures, resulting in a number of ineffective management practices. Several Trade Hub staff noted that there was a significant amount of required travel and that expense reports used to take around two months to completely process and pay. Now expense reports can be completed in 5 to 10 days. SPG recipients also reported that they did not encounter any issues or bottlenecks with the disbursement and timeliness of payments from the Trade Hub. The grantees indicated that they found the SPG process to be very straightforward and easy to follow.

Change in SPG Approach

During the period of performance being evaluated, the Trade Hub changed its approach for implementing the SPGs. During the initial stages of the Trade Hub's operation, staff used an approach that relied on advertising in order to disseminate the opportunity to apply for SPGs. However, the Trade Hub altered this approach and implemented a strategy in which the Trade Hub staff started actively identifying and contacting private sector actors. The staff would then have initial consultations, and if the lead was promising, have further collaborative brainstorming sessions to ascertain the capacities of the businesses and identify grant possibilities.

Effective Relationship Management with a Diverse Array of Actors - WRS

Respondents noted that in order to implement the IR 1.2 WRS activities, the Trade Hub successfully brought together and managed a diverse array of actors, including: farmers, farmer associations, and agribusinesses (e.g., Cargill, ETG); USAID Missions, academics, and policy experts; technical service providers (e.g., Appsolve); and government and regional stakeholders.
Feasible Technical Focus and Intended Results

In FY 2013, and in line with Modification No. 8, the Trade Hub refocused its technical assistance delivery from 13 to 5 IR areas. As an IR represents a discrete set of technical objectives and activities, the project is still complex, but more feasible in scope. USAID and Trade Hub personnel interviewed said that the reduction in the number of discrete technical results pursued by the Trade Hub allowed the project team to be more focused and increase effectiveness.

Communication

The Trade Hub had an effective approach for communication with external stakeholders. There were local and regional stakeholders, and there was a need to build relations with all of them. The Trade Hub communicated with the stakeholders by creating information products, including weekly reports, monthly reports, and country reports, and by re-doing their website. Communication was made inclusive and participatory, and included USAID as well.

USAID personnel and counterparts interviewed in Zambia and Namibia acknowledged the effectiveness of the changes in communication strategies implemented by the Trade Hub in supporting the achievement of results and overall performance. Agency counterparts, SPG recipients, and other project participants interviewed also acknowledged that the Trade Hub’s improved communication enhanced relations with their respective organizations. In Namibia, for instance, the Trade Hub conducted additional workshops to introduce counterparts to the NSW effort. Seminars and conferences were also held to improve understanding of the NSW and the trade information portal.

Responsiveness

Key counterparts in Botswana (Ministry of Trade, SADC, BURS) acknowledged that the Trade Hub was very responsive, always ready to help, and modeled their interventions to their needs. USAID respondents noted the client-centered approach of the Trade Hub helped improve performance.

Challenges Implementing Activities Across Multiple Countries

The Trade Hub’s operations in eight countries meant that there was a lot of travel, which was difficult to track and verify for the USAID team. Operating in multiple countries also meant that the Trade Hub had to adjust to varying dynamics and cultural and political contexts. For example, organizing and implementing activities in Mozambique required more time and resources than in other countries, and personnel needed to plan accordingly. Operating in multiple countries also provided opportunities for the Trade Hub to take its successes from individual countries and replicate them in others. In the standards areas for instance, the Trade Hub initially worked with Lesotho, Zambia, and Malawi, and then took up another three countries in the following years.

Challenges in Working at Both Bilateral and Multilateral Levels

Over time, the Trade Hub ended up doing more bilateral engagement, as opposed to working at the regional level. The focus on SADC and regional integration work reduced in year three, and the Trade Hub moved towards more bilateral relations and interactions. This was partially due to the demand-driven nature of the Trade Hub. The Trade Hub team noted that any time they had to choose between competing bilateral and regional priorities, they consulted the USAID Southern Africa Regional Economic Growth Office (REGO), as it was the Trade Hub’s main client. According to the representative of another donor agency working on regional integration, it was not clear why the Trade Hub was based in Gaborone, the entry point to SADC, as “the hub was more focused on bilateral work and its regional focus was not always clear.”
Coordination with Other Donors

Respondents reported that the Trade Hub had weak coordination with other donors. When working with other donors, clarity of mutual expectations and coordination were lacking, and donors implemented activities in parallel with the Trade Hub, instead of reaching consensus on what each other should focus on, and acting on their respective priorities as agreed. This was due to a number of factors. The Trade Hub initially relied on SADC, expecting that it would play the role of improving coordination between the different donors by letting the donors know what other donors were doing. However, this did not work. Both SADC staff and other donors acknowledged that the beneficiaries were not always honest about the type of assistance they are receiving from different donors, and that this too led to some duplication of effort. Lastly, once the Trade Hub work plans were agreed to, it became difficult for the Trade Hub to make adjustments that would allow it to figure out complementarities with other donors.

EQ3 Conclusions

Since August 2014, the Trade Hub made internal changes to make its policies and procedures consistent with USAID procedures, which improved effectiveness.

That the Trade Hub successfully brought these diverse actors together to implement a complex set of achievements speaks to the collaborative approach of the Trade Hub and to a unique and distinct ability to manage and coordinate diverse sets of interests to pursue a common objective.

The Trade Hub was better able to effectively manage a complex project with a more feasible scope when the number of IRs was reduced from 13 to 5.

The Trade Hub also improved communications internally, with USAID, and with key counterparts and participants. It increased the quality, consistency, and timeliness of project information through the introduction of weekly newsletters (progress reports) and more frequent success stories that were disseminated broadly, including to all the missions.

EQ4 What are the key strategic, programmatic, technical, and managerial features of the project that should be taken into account when implementing a new Southern Africa Trade and Investment Hub Project in the region?

EQ4 Findings

The evaluation team captured promising practices identified by stakeholders. These practices were viewed as extremely positive and helpful contributions to realizing the Trade Hub’s achievements. As a result, these practices should be considered during implementation of the new Southern Africa Trade and Investment Hub Project. The identified promising practices utilized by the Trade Hub include:

- The development and implementation of effective internal and external communication strategies
- Balancing short-term activities with long-term results
- Using embedded advisors
- Employing a client-centered approach
- Targeting capacity building approaches
- Engaging in activities that can be replicated
- Actively participating as a convener and deal broker to bring private sector actors together
- Using technology to help achieve results
- Ensuring a participatory approach to encourage local ownership
- Encouraging knowledge sharing between stakeholders
- Identifying the right partners to maximize business linkages and sustainability
- Empowering Trade Hub staff and sectoral experts

**Effective Internal and External Communication Strategies Findings**

Communication was a theme that carried across almost all interviews, and many respondents said that prioritizing communication with all the stakeholders (regional partners such as SADC and SACU, bilateral missions, counterpart agencies, other donor agencies, grantees, and other participants) was crucial to achieving the milestones targets. Respondents from USAID, stakeholder agencies, and the Trade Hub emphasized that the Trade Hub’s change in the COP and hiring of the strategic communications advisor allowed the project to implement a strong communication culture that should be carried forward by the future Trade Hub project. USAID respondents emphasized the project’s ability to communicate a “good news story” through actively and strategically communicating the successes that the Trade Hub had achieved. Effectively communicating small success stories often resulted in generating momentum and support for more complex and difficult-to-achieve results. The Trade Hub personnel interviewed also identified communication—internally, between home office and field office, between the client and the implementer, and with key stakeholders—as a key factor in the success they achieved. All REFIT respondents and the REA respondent noted that the Trade Hub’s broad-based communication plan for REFIT was a promising practice.

**Balance of Demonstrating Long- and Short-Term Results**

Interviews with USAID respondents revealed the importance of a multi-pronged approach combining long-term objectives with short-term, discrete projects, which are relatively easy to complete, and which help the project gain the trust and confidence of local stakeholders. These respondents viewed the trust, confidence, and positive energy generated from these “small wins” as critical to pursuing the harder, long-term objectives, such as NSW.

**Embedded Advisors**

Several stakeholders of IR 1.1 activities noted that the ability of the Trade Hub to identify, recruit, and deploy knowledgeable and committed trade facilitation experts in partner agencies was key for the Trade Hub’s achieving the results. USAID respondents who worked with the embedded advisors expressed the view that this practice had positive and tangible impacts when it came to driving some of the longer-term reforms in each of the countries. This was seen as highly beneficial by the respective public authorities and viewed as building long-term linkages and relationships between the Trade Hub and the offices that were supported by these advisors.

There were a number of respondents from USAID and the private sector who opined that the agriculture value chain work would have benefitted immensely if it had embedded advisors in each of the FTF countries.

**Client-Centered Approach**

A number of respondents identified the client service attitude of the Trade Hub management in the last 18 months as a promising practice. Almost unanimously, respondents who had contact with the COP acknowledged that he was an excellent manager who was able to accelerate the process of developing results across all the technical results areas. They noted that, in the last 18 months, the Trade Hub was
able to tell a coherent development story. USAID respondents universally stated that the Trade Hub’s performance largely depended on the partnership between USAID South Africa and the project. These respondents affirmed that the notion of “one team with a common objective” was critical to achieving the milestones. The Trade Hub COR and DCOR appreciated that with the change in the COP, the Trade Hub took on more of a client-centered approach, which clearly contributed to improved coordination and the achievement of results.

**Targeted Capacity-Building Efforts and Approach**

Respondents appreciated the Trade Hub’s ability to identify the needs of stakeholders and design and implement tailored trainings targeting capacity gaps. For example, several counterparts noted that the Trade Hub delivered project management training, which addressed a key capacity gap. Similarly, respondents noted that the Trade Hub’s willingness to build the capacity of the customs departments, and sponsoring these counterparts to participate in other forums, was viewed as quite effective. When it came to the Readiness Assessments for Other Governmental Agencies (OGAs) for Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia Agreement on Trade Facilitation, the Trade Hub’s collaboration with UNCTAD ensured the capacity building was specific to the WTO requirements.

**Tangible and Replicable Results – The Trade Information Portal (Namibia)**

The Trade Hub ensured that the Namibia Trade Information Portal was completed and satisfied counterparts’ and stakeholders’ expectations. The portal also addressed several requirements in the SADC Protocol on Trade, and it can serve as a model for others to replicate: SADC used it as a blueprint for the development of its trade information portal.

**Sectoral Expertise and Deal Broker Role**

Over and above that, private sector respondents acknowledged the Trade Hub performed an important deal brokering role, especially in the case of the SPGs. The agricultural team was also praised for knowing the right people and the decision-makers, especially in the Zambian and Botswana markets. The knowledge of the key people in the FTF markets was deemed to be a key attribute in the success of the SPGs.

**Use of Technology**

The use of technology as a means of improving banking penetration and access to finance for rural and remote farmers through the WRS and the innovations delivered by Appsolve offers a lot of promise. This new platform could lower the transaction costs associated with banking and could also be used to disseminate market information, climate, and weather forecasts. It was highlighted that future iterations of the Trade Hub should continue to look into innovation-related solutions to improve the agricultural value chains.

**Trade Hub’s Inclusive and Participatory Approach**

In Zambia, respondents identified the Trade Hub’s inclusion of all the relevant stakeholders for various phases of its work as a promising practice. The majority of the stakeholders interviewed made this observation, including government and regulatory authorities and private sector participants. Both the ERB and REA counterparts credited the Trade Hub’s ability to implement a participatory approach when they collaborated to formulate the design for their respective activities. The ERB collaborated closely with the Trade Hub to design the SOW for the REFIT policy development, and the REA was actively involved in defining capacity-building needs. Both counterparts stated that they felt in control of the
processes at all times, and that “imposed interventions” can sometimes unsettle the same people whom
the intervention is intended to assist.\footnote{Personal communication with a counterpart agency representative based in Lusaka, Zambia interviewed remotely via Skype on March 21, 2016.}

**Knowledge Exchange Visits to Counterpart Agencies in Other Countries**

Counterparts from participating agencies complimented the Trade Hub-sponsored knowledge exchange visits as a promising practice for staff members to learn from government ministries in other countries that faced similar challenges in implementing change and policy reforms. For example, the Botswana counterpart that received project support under IR 1.5 to send delegates to the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) to learn about NEP benchmarking confirmed that the knowledge-sharing exercise was beneficial for the agency’s capacity-building goals. A counterpart that participated in the REA capacity-building work under IR 1.4 found the Namibia study trip to be an effective exercise to share and instill best practices and learn from how other country ministries overcame similar obstacles to change.

**Finding the Right Partner**

Respondents also opined that the selection of participants for international trade shows needed to be strategic, in that it should be more informed by the ability of the firms to meet the orders. An indicator that emerged during discussions was that, in the Southern Africa region, one of the easiest proxies for AGOA export readiness was when a firm was already exporting to South Africa. The importance of partnering with a respected textile and apparel leader, a firm that has a proven track record and understands the “mind-set” of the buyers, cannot be over emphasized. It was observed that the team can, in that regard, work at developing the regional “sourcing southern Africa” brand.

**Partnering with Firms with Sufficient Capacity to Implement the SPGs**

The Trade Hub found that in order for SPGs to be successful, they had to identify partners that had the capacities to implement the grants.

**EQ4 Conclusions**

Adding the strategic communication advisor role and prioritizing an integrated communication strategy greatly improved the Trade Hub’s relationships with all the stakeholders, was crucial to achieving the milestone targets, and should be replicated in the future Trade and Investment Hub project. Additionally, the depth of expertise of the embedded advisors was crucial in building consensus and persuading governments to provide resources for long-term trade facilitation objectives. Finally, the Trade Hub’s shift to a more client-centered approach clearly contributed to improved coordination and the achievement of results and should be applied in the future Trade and Investment Hub project.

**EQ5 Findings**

This section examines the mechanisms and structures that the Trade Hub has put into place to ensure the long-term sustainability of project activities and achievements. In terms of trade facilitation, the Trade Hub has been successful in creating an awareness of trade facilitation activities through public launches and has encouraged partner countries to formally commit to trade facilitation activities. However, stakeholders indicate that prolonged political commitment from member states is necessary
and that, without Trade Hub support, those countries with fewer resources may experience greater difficulty in allocating budget and human resources to trade facilitation activities. For agriculture value chains, the Trade Hub targeted organizations with strong operational capacity for SPGs. For the WRS and ASIF, the Trade Hub played a vital role in bringing private sector actors together and linking pre-existing business interests. However, the agriculture sector is particularly vulnerable to external factors (e.g., drought, currency fluctuations, and commodity prices) that may affect private sector investment. For textiles and apparel, the Trade Hub was successful in creating initial linkages between manufacturers and buyers as well as introducing social responsibility through an initial training on the WRAP certification process. Nevertheless, there is significant room to expand linkages as well as deepen understanding of social responsibility. In clean energy, ERB was involved early and has demonstrated significant ownership over this activity. However, there needs to be a greater understanding of Zambia’s national grid capacity as well as the finalization of the REFIT policy. In terms of enabling environments, stakeholders point the need to increase capacity in regards to the intersection of standards and regulatory environments.

**Sustainability of IR 1.1 Improved Trade Facilitation**

**Results and Successes.** The Trade Hub has been successful in creating awareness of and initial commitment by government officials to trade facilitation activities. Public launches have helped to create an understanding of the operations and benefits of NSWs and trade portals. The Trade Hub has also been successful in encouraging governments to commit to sustaining trade facilitation efforts. In Namibia, the NSW has been publicly identified as a key deliverable by the ministry. In Malawi, the cabinet has drafted a memo that includes roles and responsibilities on how the NSW will be maintained.

**Challenges and Constraints.** Budgetary constraints pose a threat to the sustainability of NSWs and trade portals. Government stakeholders indicated that financial resources vary between member states and so too does the willingness to commit those resources to trade facilitation activities. Stakeholders elaborated that continuing trade facilitation activities in states with limited resources without the financial support of USAID would be difficult.

Trade facilitation is a long and continuous process that requires prolonged political engagement over several years from all SADC member states. In order to sustain activities such as NSW and trade portals, it is necessary to secure political commitment at the highest levels from the member state. Namibia represents a strong and committed partner, as the minister has made NSW a key deliverable and is held accountable for its delivery.

**Sustainability of IR 1.2 Agricultural Value Chains**

**Results and Successes.** In terms of SPGs, the Trade Hub targeted recipient organizations that were operational and had the capacity to take on a grant with minimal Trade Hub oversight. Recipient organizations were actually required to provide matching funds for the grant. In many cases, grants were used to scale up already existing activities. Through the WRS activities, the Trade Hub played a vital role in bringing private sector actors together and facilitating business interests.

**Challenges and Constraints.** Transferring of the Trade Hub-sponsored activities to the private sector represents the Trade Hub’s main approach to long-term sustainability. However, at this point, stakeholders indicate that the Trade Hub’s leadership is still necessary in certain contexts. One example of this is in Mozambique (WRS), where the stakeholders indicated that the private sector may not be ready to take over completely for the Trade Hub given the lack of marketplace actors (i.e., financial institutions, distributors, etc.). On the other hand, in Zambia, the marketplace and private sector actors are much more mature and would require less support from the Trade Hub.
External factors may also affect sustainability. As an example, SPG recipients pointed to the current economic environment in Zambia. They noted that the unreliable electricity supply, fluctuations in the value of the currency, economic recession, and foreign investment can greatly impact their operations.

**Sustainability of IR 1.3 Textile and Apparel Sector**

**Results and Successes.** The Trade Hub was successful in creating initial linkages between international buyers and retailers through trade shows such as Source Africa and MAGIC. Government and private sector stakeholders were also introduced to social responsibility via an initial training on WRAP certification. The initial meetings and workshops conducted represent a solid introduction to social responsibility, specifically WRAP certifications.

**Challenges and Constraints.** Despite success in creating business relationships, consistent support is necessary to increase and maintain linkages between regional suppliers and international buyers. Despite the Source Africa and MAGIC trade shows and the renewal of AGOA, many U.S. and international buyers are still unfamiliar with African manufacturers. Many retailers have not had the opportunity to travel to Southern Africa to establish relations or view the operations of the African manufacturers. Future apparel and textile sector activities would benefit from consistent support from a regional sector expert that is known to retailers in relevant tradeshows, understands how to leverage AGOA opportunities, and has a strong network with current U.S. buyers and retailers.

**Sustainability of IR 1.4 Clean Energy**

ERB was involved early and has demonstrated significant ownership over this activity. The Trade Hub allowed ERB to drive the articulation of the program objectives and outline an agenda for activities. However, at this point, the REFIT policy has not been finalized. Additionally, only foreign-owned IPPs will be taking up REFIT when it is finalized.

**Challenges and Constraints.** Currently, the national grid may not have the capacity to accept significant increases in electricity. To this point, no capacity or integration study has been conducted to ascertain the absorptive capacity of the grid or the resources that would be necessary to upgrade it.

REFIT is heavily reliant on government subsidies in order to make the tariff viable for IPPs. Without this financial support, the tariff would not be sustainable for private power producers.

**Sustainability of IR 1.5 A Better Enabling Environment**

Government stakeholders indicated that the intersection of standards and regulations and regulatory environments is still an uncertain area for the government and regulatory bodies. As more products are developed and the market evolves, there is a need to use evidence and analysis to ensure that standards are being met and that regulations are appropriate.

**EQ5 Sustainability Conclusions**

**Trade Facilitation:** Continued high-level political engagement by each member state is required. Trade facilitation is a long-process in which prolonged political engagement, possibly over multiple political administrations, is necessary for true regional coordination and integration. Given this fact, political commitment may vary over time between countries.

**Agricultural Value Chain:** WRS is still in a period of incubation and would not be able to continue without funding and leadership from the Trade Hub. The eventual shifting of activities to private sector led does represent a viable strategy, however, if at any point private sector entities feel that profit expectations are not being met, they may also end their commitment.
Partnering with SPG recipients that already have significant operational capacity and the ability to match grants is an important factor in the sustainability of activities subsequent to Trade Hub support.

**Textiles and Apparel:** Many international retailers are still not familiar with manufacturers in Southern Africa. Most retailers are not likely to make purchases without having solid relationships with suppliers and knowing that their production capacity is up to standard. Without increased interaction, face-to-face meetings, and factory visits by retailers, it will be difficult to see a sustained business relationship.

Many stakeholders were introduced to the WRAP certification process; however, without further interaction or training, it may be hard to see a commitment by factory owners to achieving a WRAP certification. Since significant resources have to be spent in order to achieve the certification, business owners will need to have a deep understanding of the process and benefits.

**Clean Energy:** There will need to be further investigations into the current capacity of the national grid as well as what resources (human, budgetary, and technical) will be needed to increase capacity.

Local ownership (ERB) is critical to ensuring continuation of activities without the Trade Hub; however, the government’s release of the REFIT policy, as well as the development of the implementation agreement and cost discovery curves for viable renewable energy technologies (other than solar), will be necessary to ensure participation by IPPs.

**Enabling Environment:** There is still significant room for capacity building of both industry and government officials in the area of standards and regulations to ensure that regulations are fair and meet the needs of a changing marketplace.

**EQ6 Based on the findings and conclusions from the preceding questions, what factors have been identified that are likely to positively affect the sustainability of project achievements?**

This sections provides conclusions on the factors that can positively affect the long-term sustainability of project achievements. The factors outlined below are based on the findings and conclusions from the previous questions and represent both factors that are under the direct control of the Trade Hub and factors that are external.

**Contextual Factors:** Currency stability, ample rainfall levels, consistent electricity, and political consistency will positively affect the long-term sustainability of project achievements. These factors can help to ensure private sector investment and operations as well as a consistent supply of agricultural commodities.

**Continued Political Commitment:** Formalized commitment through public decrees, laws, and executive or ministerial orders by officials at the highest levels can help to sustain activities through changing political environments.

**Local ownership:** Local partners are an integral part of helping to continue activities and achievements. This can only happen if local partners are actively involved in the process and understand the benefits of activities.

**Choosing the Right Partners:** Collaborating with partners that already have operational capacity and a vested interest in project activities and achievements means that they can more easily carry on activities with minimal or no involvement by the Trade Hub. This is true for both public and private sector partners. On the public sector side, the government of Namibia was perceived as having the
capacity needed to carry forward the trade information portal established by the Trade Hub. On the private sector side, the capacity of SPG recipients was a key consideration for their selection and was viewed as contributing to the long-term sustainability of the interventions funded by the grants.

**AGOA:** Providing assistance through awareness-building campaigns about the renewal of AGOA and education on the benefits of engagement through this mechanism can be a positive force in incentivizing American retailers and buyers to investigate opportunities with regional textile and apparel suppliers.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to build on the achievements of the previous Trade Hub and effectively design and implement new and follow-on activities across all the results areas, the future implementing partner should:

1. **Undertake a stakeholder and results mapping exercise** to ensure that the future iteration of the Trade Hub makes informed decisions about new and follow-on activities, as well as builds on the results, knowledge, and relationships generated by the previous project. This process should inform the initial logical or results frameworks, work plans, and feasibility studies for designing individual activity SOWs. It is necessary to ascertain whether the milestones and results of previous Trade Hub interventions have been sustained or reforms have not been fully institutionalized. Examples include the project’s work on NSW development in Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia, the Botswana Trade Information Portal, coordinated border management, and the WRS pilot in Mozambique. This process should include encompass the following:
   - A desk review of previous Trade Hub annual and final reports, mid-term and final evaluations, and key sector sources conducted by senior project management and technical staff.
   - Initial consultations with key counterparts to assess their current priorities, capacities, and commitments.
   - A stakeholder mapping exercise to map the relationships established by the Trade Hub, as well as identify new and potential partners.

2. **As part of the review process described above,** be sure to assess former Trade Hub activities that were considered complete, in order to ascertain whether the intended results and objectives have been sustained by the stakeholders. The future project can use the assessment to prioritize resources where key outcomes have not been sustained. For example, some activities that should be included in this review include:
   - IR 1.1: Namibia Trade Information Portal
   - IR 1.4: REFIT policy development noting that respondents felt these tasks remained: the government release of the REFIT policy; the development of a model IA and price discovery curves for renewable technologies (besides solar)
   - IR 1.5: SADC requests to implement IRMs for other member states; further support for NEPs

3. **Implement a formalized process** to assess requests for support from USAID and host country counterparts that considers: available resources; alignment with Mission development objectives and project IRs; and milestones and indicator targets that are ambitious, measurable, and achievable. This process will enable the future implementing partner to decide whether to undertake new requests in a way that mitigates challenges posed by the project’s demand-driven nature. The Trade Hub’s success on the TFP work is a good example of how the previous project struck this balance. A more formalized approach to processing requests will also help the project transparently communicate its decision-making processes and manage the expectations of key stakeholders.
4. Assess the differences in the resources and capacities of key counterparts across the target countries to inform work plans and country-specific activity SOWs with ambitious but achievable objectives, milestones, and indicator targets.

5. Conduct comprehensive feasibility studies for proposed activities to assess their viability and sustainability and inform activity SOWs. These feasibility studies should be conducted especially for interventions that involve long-term objectives and a complex array of actors (e.g., NSW realization, trade information portals, and WRS). These feasibility studies should identify the following:
   - Interests and priorities of relevant stakeholders;
   - Necessary resources required respectively from the host government and the project;
   - Estimated timeframes for achieving key milestones and long-term objectives;
   - Critical assumptions and contextual challenges that may be outside the project’s manageable interest;
   - How to integrate gender-sensitive design for interventions to effectively address gender integration and women’s empowerment;
   - Opportunities to work with new public and private sector partners, or to engage further existing counterparts and beneficiaries; and
   - Opportunities to leverage or complement parallel efforts by other donors.

6. Conduct early consultations with counterparts and other stakeholders so they can participate in identifying the needs and constraints, as well as designing interventions. Early and participatory engagement will help the project garner buy-in and commitment for proposed activities.

If implementing similar or follow-on IR 1.2 activities, such as the WRS or grant mechanisms, the future implementing partner should:

7. Use the review, design, and feasibility study processes described above to assess opportunities to incorporate regional integration strategies for the WRS, which was implemented in three different countries. While there may be limits to this given that countries are at different stages of development, it would still be beneficial in terms of identifying best practices and lessons learned, as well as being able to link the interventions in the different countries to the extent possible.

8. Follow up with SPG recipients to learn from their challenges and identify opportunities to leverage sustained results for growth and food security objectives. These consultations should inform the criteria and selection process of for future grant awards.

9. Design and employ a systematic outreach strategy to inform a wide range of potential applicants about the grant program benefits and criteria well before the application period. There is room to improve awareness campaigns for similar grant award mechanisms, while noting the communication strategies and effective private sector engagement implemented by the previous Trade Hub.

10. After awards are made, introduce the grantees to each other to enable recipients to identify and build synergies between private sector entities in the same value chain (e.g., producers, processors, warehouse operators, and laboratories).

If implementing follow-on textile and apparel sector activities in the target countries, the future implementing partner should:

11. Investigate opportunities to increase access to financing for regional suppliers and manufacturers, especially in Lesotho.

12. Increase the awareness of counterparts in Botswana of successful approaches of other SADC member states in stimulating investments for and improving the competitiveness of the textile and apparel sector.
To address the management structures and factors that hindered the performance of the previous Trade Hub, the future implementing partner should:

13. Employ a full-time designated senior gender advisor to help implement gender integration as a cross-cutting objective across the results areas. The gender advisor should be well integrated into the overall management structure so that he or she can work with teams across result areas with responsibilities including but not limited to: co-design work plans and activity SOWs; conduct gender assessments for new activities; and liaise with counterparts and stakeholders to increase engagement for gender integration strategies and objectives. Since the project engages so many stakeholders in different countries, ideally the senior expatriate gender advisor would be assisted by a regional gender expert to allow for sensitivity to local context, while coordinating high-level and strategic responsibilities.

14. Start each activity design process with a gender assessment to identify the intervention’s potential impacts on gender disparities and opportunities to increase women’s empowerment and engagement in targeted sectors. If the assessment findings demonstrate that a sector has traditionally excluded women, the activity should to start with a women’s empowerment component.

15. Ensure M&E is integrated across all results areas, and that time and resources are provided for initial and refresher M&E trainings for all staff and consultants, so they can be held accountable for meeting monitoring and reporting requirements. The future implementing partner should determine whether additional mid-level M&E staff should be based in countries where there are several activities to ensure M&E requirements are met.

16. Continue the strategic communication advisor position established during the last 18 months of the project. This strategic communication advisor should work with senior project manager to review the communications strategy, procedures, tools, and products employed in the last 18 months of the Trade Hub, as they were considered very effective by a wide range of stakeholders.

17. Establish a feedback mechanism that so stakeholders can alert the project where they felt their needs were overlooked or call out ways in which implementation can be improved.

18. Employ a full-time person designated to manage and coordinate personnel issues, such as identifying, recruiting, and on-boarding the many subject matter experts for long and short-term technical assistance, as well as the financial administration and coordination for the extensive regional travel of project personnel.

In order to implement some of the promising practices identified by the final evaluation, the future implementing partner should:

19. Continue the practice of embedding advisors in government and regional organizations for trade facilitation and other long-term interventions and policy reform activities.

20. Use the project design, review, and feasibility study processes described above to learn from and coordinate with other ICPs working on the same results. This will enhance the likelihood of sustainability and make for more strategic investments.

21. Continue to use study exchange visits, workshops, and seminars to build on the efforts of the previous Trade Hub in generating awareness of the purposes and potential benefits of proposed trade facilitation interventions, including how they align with international standards and best practices, as well as existing commitments and processes.

22. Design a mix of activities under each results area that strikes a balance between short- and long-term results, especially for long-term trade facilitation reforms.
In order to increase the likely success and sustainability of the future Trade Hub interventions, USAID should:

23. Take a convening role to help coordinate other donors and ICPs working on trade facilitation issues and identify opportunities for the Trade Hub to leverage complementary efforts. This should involve collaborating with the future implementing partner, host country counterparts, SADC, and other regional economic communities to develop a Trade Hub strategy that appropriately balances interventions between working at the regional and bilateral levels. This will help U.S. investments address the imbalance of host country resources, create synergies, and avoid duplication of efforts. For example, USAID should build on existing relationships to support SADC to mobilize member states and ICPs to implement the TFP, while working with the Trade Hub to identify and implement feasible milestones towards individual TFP objectives. USAID should also leverage its position as the chair of the TIFI thematic group to coordinate and identify appropriate activities for the Trade Hub or other ICPs.

24. Engage the embassy, including ambassadors or trade representatives, to engage with counterparts when host country agencies lack the awareness, capacity, or commitment to implement trade facilitation reforms (e.g., as USAID and the Trade Hub did to generate the support of Malawi counterparts for NSW development).

25. Work closely with the future implementing partner to ensure the project has the structure, budget, and other resources necessary to effectively research, design, and implement a well-considered gender integration strategy across all results areas.

26. Work closely with the future implementing partner to make sure the project has as a messaging plan implemented as part of its overall communication strategy to clearly convey the benefits of gender integration for achieving USAID Development Objectives and host country development plans. The future implementing partner should be held accountable for clearly communicating this message first to all staff, personnel, and partners working on the project and then to all project beneficiaries and stakeholders as they become involved with activities across IRs or technical components.

27. Ensure that the management structure of the next Trade Hub has the necessary resources to employ a senior M&E advisor from start-up through close-out. This position should be based in the country where the Trade Hub headquarters and results leadership is based. The senior M&E advisor role should be cross-cutting and integrated into the overall management structure of the Trade Hub.
ANNEX A: EVALUATION SOW

Performance Evaluation of Southern African Trade Hub and Assessment Survey of Trade Facilitation Measures

This Statement of Work describes two research activities required by USAID/Southern Africa: (1) the design and implementation of a final performance evaluation of the USAID Southern Africa Trade and Competitiveness Program (the “Southern Africa Trade Hub,” or SATH project, hereafter), and (2) the design and implementation of an assessment survey on the costs and benefits of implementing selected trade facilitation measures (TFMs) in the Southern Africa region. The primary purpose of the performance evaluation is to gather and synthesize information regarding the SATH project’s performance to date and assess achievements versus expected results. The objective of the assessment survey is to provide useful guidance to USAID/Southern Africa in its oversight of future trade facilitation-related activities.

I. Activity Description and Background

SATH Project

USAID’s SATH project was awarded to AECOM International Development under Contract No. 674-C-00-10-00075-00, with a period of performance from September 2010 to September 2015. The project was initially designed to take an integrated approach to two high-level United States Government (USG) priorities: the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, which became the Feed the Future (FTF) program, and the African Growth and Competitiveness Initiative (AGCI). The AGCI expired in September 2010 and was replaced by the African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion Initiative (ACTE), which is building trade capacity across sub-Saharan Africa. SATH was also designed to act as one of three USG Trade Hubs in sub-Saharan Africa to increase exports to the U.S. under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and to provide “Aid-for-Trade” assistance as mandated by USG commitments under the Doha round of negotiations at the World Trade Organization.

Image Credit: USAID

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43 ACTE was launched at the AGOA Forum in Lusaka, Zambia in June 2011.
The SATH project was awarded with a total ceiling of $82,610,195. However, the actual obligations during the evaluation period (October 2011 – September 2015) were $52,656,705, of which $1,800,000 is bilateral South Africa FTF funds for grants under contract. The project base contract end date was September 2014, and an option year was executed that extended the project through September 2015. Due to a range of factors including the conclusion of key activities with some Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) member states, the project was extended until March 20, 2016.

The SATH project was initially designed to achieve results across two objectives: (1) Advancement of the Regional Integration Agenda, and (2) Increased Trade Capacity of Regional Value Chains, which each contained four intermediate results (IRs). In November 2012, the SATH project scope of work was reorganized to focus on a single result or technical focus: Advancement of the Regional Trade, Investment, & Integration Agenda, with five IRs that are presented in the following section. The 2012 project reorganization also reduced the funding allocated ($10 million rather than $16 million per year) and the number of countries in which the project would work. The area of operations for the project changed from the 15 countries in the SADC region to Southern Africa as defined by USAID’s Africa Bureau, which in practical terms includes the five Southern Africa Customs Union countries (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland) and three FTF focus countries (Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia). The project beneficiaries were broadened to include not only SADC but also member state governments and the private sector. Also at this time, the contractor changed its Chief of Party and other key personnel.

A mid-term evaluation of the project was completed in 2014, although significant changes in the approach, management, and activity of the project have occurred since then.

Costs and Benefits of Trade Facilitation Measures

Given the prominence of trade facilitation on the world development stage as an arena where existing evidence suggests the next wave of gains from trade can be realized, there has been a concerted emphasis among development partners to assist developing and least developed countries in implementing the requirements of the World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) signed in Bali in 2013. This is based on the premise that the adoption of trade facilitation measures will, in the long run, benefit all economic actors. However, these measures also often have varying degrees of set-up costs. There is an acknowledged dearth of reliable quantitative information on the cost of implementation of specific trade facilitation measures, including for the Southern Africa region (Duval 2006).

In the absence of quantitative information on the costs and benefits of trade facilitation measures, Duval (2006) argued that expert surveys, although they have recognized limitations, could be used to examine the relative cost of implementation of a range of such measures. This type of study can help develop a common understanding on the trade facilitation measures that have the least set-up costs while unlocking maximum benefit.

The SATH project developed a Comprehensive Trade Facilitation Programme (CTFP) draft, which was submitted to the SADC Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment Directorate. The CTFP was developed in consultation with key stakeholders from SADC member states in response to a request of the SADC Secretariat. The CTFP outlines a harmonized approach to trade facilitation for SADC Member States to use as a blueprint to help meet the recommendations of the TFA. The CTFP uses a five-year timeline and covers 28 trade facilitation measures such as National Single Windows, Trade Information Portals, appeals procedures, and an interregional transit management system.

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44 The CTFP draft will be made available to the evaluation team by USAID. Unless stated otherwise, all references made to the CTFP refer to the draft version.
II. Development Hypothesis

As noted in the previous section, the SATH project launched in 2010 with two overarching objectives and eight IRs, but in November 2012 it was reorganized to have one objective (“Technical Focus”) with the following five IRs:

Technical Focus: Advancement of the Regional Trade, Investment, & Integration Agenda:

- IR 1.1: Improved Trade Facilitation
- IR 1.2: Greater Competitiveness in Agricultural Value Chains
- IR 1.3: Increased Trade & Investment in the Textiles and Apparel Sector
- IR 1.4: Strengthened Regulatory Capacity for the Clean Energy Sector
- IR 1.5: A Better Enabling Environment

It has yet to be confirmed whether a formal Theory of Change (TOC) diagram or narrative was prepared as part of the 2012 project reorganization. The evaluation team will inquire if a TOC (possibly called a Results Framework) was developed for the project and, if not, the evaluation team may work collaboratively with USAID to prepare a TOC should it be deemed useful to the evaluation objectives.

III. Existing Data Sources

The evaluation and assessment survey will build upon the following documentation that will be provided by USAID/Southern Africa, to be supplemented by additional documentation located by the evaluation team.

- The SATH project contract, including all modifications
- The SATH project Monitoring and Evaluation Plan and Indicator Table, including any Data Quality Assessments completed
- Summarized list of project targets by intervention area (extracted directly from the contract)
- All Contractor Performance Assessment Reports for the SATH project
- SATH project Annual Work Plans
- SATH project Value Chain Analysis Report
- USAID/Southern Africa Annual Reports (PPR)
- SATH Project Annual Reports
- Mid-Term Evaluation of the Southern Africa Trade Hub, 2014\(^{45}\)
- USAID/Southern Africa FTF Strategy
- Summary of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
- SADC Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment Trade Thematic Group Strategy
- Draft Comprehensive Trade Facilitation Program
- Miscellaneous studies and reports prepared by the SATH project
- Cost and Benefits of Implementing Trade Facilitation Measures under Negotiations at the WTO: an Exploratory Survey (Duval 2006), including survey instrument

The evaluation team will seek out additional sources of information, including contemporaneous evaluations of trade facilitation programs, which may be useful for designing the instruments to be used in the evaluation and assessment survey.

\(^{45}\) http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K8GT.pdf
IV. Purpose, Audience, and Intended Use

Purpose

The primary purpose of the performance evaluation is to inform USAID’s decision-making processes with respect to its strategic approaches for achieving the intended results of its work on trade facilitation in Southern Africa. To that end, it is expected that the evaluation team will gather and synthesize information regarding the SATH project’s performance to date and assess achievements versus expected results. Given the changes in scope, staff, and management of the SATH project since the mid-term evaluation was conducted, a major component of the performance evaluation will be to assess changes in performance since the mid-term evaluation. This will include documenting whether, or to what extent, the SATH project achieved its objectives, and describing any changes in project approaches and performance since the mid-term evaluation.

The recommendations and lessons identified by the evaluation should provide practical guidance and feasible measures to support the sustainability of outcomes achieved to date, as well as best practices and areas of improvement that can be used in subsequent programs of this type.

The purpose of the assessment survey is to provide estimates on implementation costs and benefits associated with selected trade facilitation measures, which may provide some useful guidance to USAID/Southern Africa and other missions and Agency offices involved in designing and overseeing future trade facilitation-related activities.

Intended Use

The performance evaluation findings, conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned from the evaluation will be used to inform decisions about the implementation of future USAID trade hub programming.

The assessment survey will be used by USAID/Southern Africa and its implementing partners to guide the priorities and work plans for the future iteration of the Trade Hub and other activities to support trade facilitation in the region.

Audience

The primary audiences for this evaluation and assessment Survey are the Regional Economic Growth Office within USAID/Southern Africa, the Trade and Regulatory Reform Office within USAID’s Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (USAID/E3/TRR), and staff and stakeholders for the future iteration of the Trade Hub.

V. Evaluation Questions

The performance evaluation will seek to answer the following evaluation questions (EQs):

Relevance

- EQ1: In what ways has the project been successful or not in achieving results towards its stated objectives?

Management:

- EQ2: How has the management structure as implemented supported or hindered project performance?
- EQ3: What are the management factors influencing the achievement and non-achievement of project objectives?

Promising Practices:
- EQ4: What are the key strategic, programmatic, technical, and managerial features of the project that should be taken into account when implementing a new Southern Africa Trade and Investment Hub Project in the region?

Sustainability:
- EQ5: What mechanisms have been put in place to ensure sustainability of the project achievements?
- EQ6: Based on the findings and conclusions from the preceding questions, what factors have been identified that are likely to positively affect the sustainability of project achievements?
VI. Gender Considerations

USAID guidance and policies, including its Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy and Automated Directives Systems (ADS) 203.3.1.5, require that project designs, performance monitoring, and evaluations adequately address gender concerns. The ways in which gender will be taken into account for the performance evaluation and assessment survey will be proposed in the evaluation team’s Evaluation Design Proposal. The evaluation team is expected to be responsive to USAID’s dual expectations for treating gender appropriately: (a) gathering sex disaggregated data, and (b) identifying gender differential participation in and benefits from aspects of the project, where differences on this basis are possible. It is envisioned that gender-sensitive approaches will be relevant to the evaluation questions investigating both the participation of women in the SATH project, including the management structure, and the differential impacts of the project based upon gender.

VII. Research Design and Data Collection Methods

Timing Considerations

Due to timing considerations, specifically the close-out of the SATH project by March 2016, USAID expects that the final performance evaluation and assessment survey will be carried out in separate stages, with performance evaluation activities occurring first. Data collection under the performance evaluation will need to commence in time to reach project staff and other stakeholders involved in project implementation before demobilization occurs around February 2016. The evaluation team’s data collection planning should also consider that a workshop is being organized by USAID/Southern Africa for mid-January 2016, which will allow for opportunities to collect data from key project personnel and participants.

Performance Evaluation Design

The proposed design for the performance evaluation should be informed by the mid-term evaluation of the project that was completed in 2014. In addition, the evaluation design and data collection approaches should consider the relatively brief duration since the previous evaluation as well as the short period of time available for data collection given the upcoming project closure.

In developing the evaluation design, the evaluation team should consult with USAID on a sampling strategy for prioritizing which activities and countries to visit for data collection. It is expected that the evaluation team will inventory activities across the five current project IRs that have been conducted since the mid-term evaluation, and focus the evaluation research on those activities that are of particular interest to the Mission.

Performance Evaluation Data Collection Methods

USAID expects that the performance evaluation will incorporate a mixed-methods approach that will collect and analyze both primary and secondary qualitative and quantitative data. Data collection methods may include, as appropriate:

- Review of project documentation and performance data
- Review of relevant trade and customs data
- Semi-structured key informant interviews, which may include project participants/beneficiaries and stakeholders including representatives from the private and public sectors

46 Depending on the timing of secondary data, the evaluation team may find it useful to review publically available data sets such as the World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI) or the “Doing Business” report series.
In-person observations at selected activity sites

After desk review of forthcoming performance data, prior to the commencement of data collection the evaluation team will draft and submit for USAID’s approval a final version of the Performance Evaluation Design Proposal that will include a Getting to Answers Matrix linking each evaluation question to the project activity and related performance indicators, expected data sources, and data collection and analysis methods. This matrix will show how performance indicators and secondary and primary data to be collected will be triangulated to verify the quality of the data and evidence. The Final Design Proposal will also include instruments to be used with each identified method, along with an analysis plan that explains how data collected from the various sources will be integrated to answer the evaluation questions.

Assessment Survey Design

As a separate activity from the performance evaluation, the evaluation team will also design and implement an assessment survey that is expected to inform the following:

1. An analysis of the costs and benefits to the public and private sectors of different trade facilitation measures described in the CTFP draft
2. A ranking of the most cost-effective measures identified from the list generated above, according to their feasibility in the current political environment.
3. Recommendations to inform USAID’s future trade facilitation-related activities.

The proposed approach for this survey should draw upon the work of Duval (2006) within the Southern Africa context as well as more recent research on the feasibility of implementing the trade facilitation measures in the TFA. The survey should encompass the following SADC members: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The approach will include surveys of targeted key informants, as well as a review of secondary data and other analyses related to the 2013 TFA that is publically available.

It is expected that the survey will focus on the following cost components:

- **Regulatory/Legislative Costs**: Extent to which new legislation will be needed, requiring expertise and time;
- **Institutional Costs**: Extent to which new institutions will be needed, additional units in existing institutions, or restructuring within existing institutions;
- **Human Resources Training Costs**: Extent to which government officials will need to be trained for efficient implementation of the trade facilitation measure;
- **Equipment/Infrastructure Costs**: Extent to which new/additional equipment will be needed for implementation of the measure, as well as to ensure its effectiveness (e.g., if docs are published online but small and medium enterprises do not have internet access because of inadequate national communications infrastructure);
- **Political Costs**: Extent to which such measures will be resisted by staff within relevant institutions or by policy makers because of fears of losing political support they need; and
- **Recurring/Operating Costs**: Costs associated with maintaining the new/additional systems associated with the trade facilitation measure (e.g., replacement of computers and software for e-customs or e-trade document systems, salary/wages of dedicated additional staffs or experts).

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47 As they are not currently publically available documents, USAID will attempt to make available to the evaluation team the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility (TFAF) needs assessments completed through 2015 during the desk review process.

48 At the time of this writing there are certain restrictions on USAID’s ability to work in Zimbabwe. As new restrictions are implemented or current restrictions removed, the evaluation team must adjust its focus accordingly.
Assessment Survey Data Collection Methods

The evaluation team will prepare an Assessment Survey Design Proposal (which will be separate from the Performance Evaluation Design Proposal) describing its proposed approach, sampling strategy, work plan, and draft instrument(s) to carry out this survey, which will be finalized in consultation with USAID. The data collection instrument(s) should be field tested, and any final changes incorporated in consultation with USAID.

VIII. Data Analysis Methods

The Evaluation Design Proposal should describe the proposed data analysis methods relevant for the types of data collected that will inform the answer to each evaluation question. The Design Proposal should also include a Getting to Answers matrix that will link proposed data analysis methods to each evaluation question.

IX. Strengths and Limitations

Performance Evaluation

The primary limitation anticipated for the performance evaluation is that budget and time constraints are likely to require a sampling strategy that will not allow for examination of a representative range of SATH project activities to answer the evaluation questions. In its Evaluation Design Proposal, the evaluation team should describe any strengths or additional limitations identified for the performance evaluation design.

Trade Facilitation Measures Assessment Survey

In its Survey Assessment Design Proposal, the evaluation team should describe any identified strengths or limitations for the proposed survey assessment design.

X. Deliverables and Reporting Requirements

It is anticipated that the evaluation team will be responsible for the following deliverables. A final list of deliverables, including specific due dates, will be proposed in the Evaluation Design Proposal for USAID approval.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverable</th>
<th>Estimated Due Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final Performance Evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Draft Evaluation Design Proposal, including sampling plan, data collection and analysis methods, draft data collection instruments, team composition, proposed timeline, and estimated budget</td>
<td>o/a January 8, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Final Evaluation Design Proposal</td>
<td>o/a 1 week following receipt of USAID comments on the draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Outbriefing to USAID Mission and interested parties at the end of field research</td>
<td>To be proposed in the Evaluation Design Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings/conclusions/recommendations to USAID</td>
<td>To be proposed in the Evaluation Design Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Draft Evaluation Report</td>
<td>To be proposed in the Evaluation Design Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Final Evaluation Report</td>
<td>To be proposed in the Evaluation Design Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Evaluation Report Summary</td>
<td>To be proposed in the Evaluation Design Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment Survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Assessment Survey Design Proposal, including sampling plan, data collection and analysis methods, draft data collection instruments, team composition, proposed timeline, and estimated budget</td>
<td>o/a April 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Draft Assessment Survey Report</td>
<td>To be proposed in the Assessment Survey Design Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Presentation of preliminary survey findings to USAID and selected invitees</td>
<td>To be proposed in the Assessment Survey Design Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Final Assessment Survey Report</td>
<td>To be proposed in the Assessment Survey Design Proposal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All documents will be provided electronically to USAID no later than the dates indicated in the Evaluation Design Proposal. All debriefs will include a formal presentation with slides delivered both electronically and in hard copy for all attendees.

**XI. Team Composition**

It is expected that evaluation team members will have relevant prior experience in Africa, familiarity with USAID’s objectives, approaches, and operations, and prior evaluation/assessment experience. In addition, individual team members should have the technical qualifications identified for their respective positions. SADC nationals should be considered for each of these roles.

The evaluation team should consist of a range of experts and supporting staff, based on the specific tasks and sub-tasks required to carry out the activities described in this Statement of Work. In its Evaluation Design Proposal and Survey Assessment Design Proposal, the evaluation team should propose specific positions and individuals to carry out the required activities for each of those respective activities, including CVs of core team members.

At this stage, it is expected that the performance evaluation team may include the following positions:
- **Team Leader (Evaluation Specialist):** The Team Leader will have a minimum of a Master’s Degree in a relevant discipline (International Trade Law, Economics, etc.) and at least five years’ of experience in donor-funded performance evaluations in Africa. The Team Leader will have excellent analytical and report writing skills as well as demonstrated skills in applied economic analysis, project management, and survey administration. S/he will also possess sound knowledge of regional integration; particularly in SADC and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU).

- **Trade and Integration Expert:** The Trade and Integration Expert will have a minimum of a Master’s Degree in a relevant discipline (International Trade Law, Economics, etc.) and eight years of experience in international trade. S/he should have experience with USAID evaluation projects in Africa and have demonstrated abilities in applied economic analysis. The expert will have sound knowledge of regional integration particularly in Southern Africa along with familiarity with SADC and the SACU.

- **Customs and Trade Facilitation Advisor:** The Customs and Trade Facilitation Advisor will have a minimum of a Master’s degree in a relevant field (Economics, Business Management, etc.) and at least eight years’ experience in trade facilitation and transport at the national, regional, and/or international level (preferably in Southern Africa). S/he will possess excellent analytical and report writing skills as well as demonstrated experience in customs operations, trade policy and trade facilitation at national, regional, and international levels. The Advisor will also have experience with transport planning, policy and customs reform and a demonstrated ability to evaluate development reforms in a developing country context. S/he will possess a sound knowledge of and experience with modern trade facilitation tools as outlined in the TFA, WTO and WCO Conventions on customs and trade facilitation (including efforts to harmonize customs and transit procedures in Southern Africa), and USAID programs including the Agency’s Evaluation Policy.

- **Agricultural Economist:** The Agriculture Economist will have a minimum of a Master’s Degree in Agricultural Economics and at least eight years’ experience in international trade with an emphasis on agricultural products. S/he will have excellent analytical and report writing skills as well as demonstrated skills in applied economic analysis and survey administration. S/he will also have a sound knowledge of agricultural policies in Southern African and familiarity with SADC and the SACU.

- **Researchers/Logisticians (x2):** Researchers supporting the evaluation team will have a minimum of a Bachelor’s Degree and at least two years’ experience in international trade with an emphasis on agricultural projects. They will have excellent analytical and report writing skills and proven experience with carrying out semi-structured interviews. They will possess sound knowledge of agricultural policies in Southern Africa and familiarity with SADC and the SACU. They will also provide logistical support to the evaluation team including the scheduling of interviews and travel preparations.

- **Activity Coordinator:** The Activity Coordinator should hold a minimum of a Bachelor’s Degree with at least two years of relevant research and evaluation experience. The Activity Coordinator is expected to help coordinate, support, and oversee the evaluation team’s efforts across the required tasks to ensure their successful completion.

Home Office support may also be provided by the contractor carrying out this evaluation, including technical guidance, research assistance, administrative oversight, data analysis, and logistical support.

**XII. USAID Participation**

An interactive and collaborative process is envisioned between the evaluation team, USAID/Southern Africa, and USAID/E3/TRR to carry out this activity. USAID and the evaluation team will be engaged during the design process to consider options for answering the evaluation questions and designing the assessment survey, to ensure agreement on the focus and approaches for the design and delivery of the performance evaluation and assessment survey. The desirability of USAID participation in evaluation activities such as data collection will be considered prior to the initiation of field research.
XIII. Scheduling and Logistics

Tasks included in this SOW are expected to be completed from o/a November 2015 to August 2016. A preliminary timeline is included on the following page for the performance evaluation tasks. The specific dates for completion of tasks for the assessment survey are pending further discussion between USAID and the evaluation team but it is anticipated that they will be completed by August 2016. In the Evaluation Design Proposal and Survey Assessment Design Proposal, the evaluation team will include more detailed schedules with specific dates of completion for the respective tasks and deliverables under this Statement of Work.

It is anticipated that the evaluation team will be responsible for procuring all logistical needs related to this Statement of Work, such as work space, transportation, printing, translation, and any other forms of communication. USAID will offer some assistance as appropriate in providing introductions to partners and key stakeholders as needed, and will ensure the provision of data and supporting documents as required.
<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary document review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schedule interviews/site visits</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Draft Evaluation Design Proposal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID provides comments on Draft Evaluation Design Proposal</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Final Evaluation Design Proposal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>In-Country Research</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outbrief to Mission</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Data Analysis and Report Drafting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present Preliminary Findings/Conclusions/Rec’s to USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Submit Draft Evaluation Report</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID provides comments on Draft Evaluation Report</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Submit Final Evaluation Report</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
XIV. Reporting Requirements

The format of the evaluation report should follow USAID guidelines set forth in the USAID Evaluation Report Template and the How-To Note on Preparing Evaluation Reports. The format will include an executive summary, table of contents, list of acronyms, evaluation design and methodology, findings, conclusions, and recommendations and lessons learned. The report will be submitted in English and should not be more than 40 pages, excluding annexes.

A copy of the final evaluation report will be delivered to the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) within 30 days of USAID’s acceptance of the final evaluation report and approval to post it on the DEC.

A brief summary of the evaluation report, not to exceed 15 pages and excluding any potentially procurement-sensitive information, should also be submitted electronically in English for dissemination among implementing partners and stakeholders.

All members of the evaluation team should be provided with USAID’s mandatory statement of the evaluation standards they are expected to meet, shown in the text box below, along with USAID’s conflict of interest statement that they sign where necessary before field work starts.

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**USAID EVALUATION POLICY, APPENDIX 1
CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT**

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.
- The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists, and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people’s opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical, and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.
Data Management

The storage and transfer of data collected for this evaluation will adhere to the requirements laid out in USAID’s Automated Directives Systems (ADS) 579. The evaluation team should also follow applicable Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidance on data security and confidentiality. Final datasets are expected to be submitted to USAID in a format consistent with ADS 579.

XV. Estimated Budget

The evaluation team will propose for USAID’s approval estimated budgets as part of its Evaluation Design Proposal and Assessment Survey Design Proposal, considering costs required to complete all tasks under these respective activities, including those costs already incurred to date during the design stages.

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49 See USAID’s Automated Directives Systems
ANNEX B: SUCCESS OF GENDER INTEGRATION EFFORTS – FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Project resources and structure for supporting gender integration efforts

The evaluation Team found that there was a lack of consistent budget and dedicated staff for Gender Integration efforts. Originally AECOM had a fielded a regional gender advisor, but the project wanted to have an STTA approach and an expatriate with a higher level of expertise. In 2012, AECOM brought on a gender advisor as a part time consultant to provide short-term technical assistance (STTA) for gender during quarterly trips. She led the gender integration with 80 days of level of effort (LOE) per year. During 2012 to Sept 2013. As stated in the Mid-term evaluation (August 2014), under the previous COP (John James) there were budget cuts so gender activities were entirely omitted. Over the last year and half, project has done a lot to reinvigorate the gender integration approach. The gender advisor found that the current COP was very supportive as the project has tried to fit in two years of gender integration work into a period of a little over a year at the end of the project.

USAID observations on the Trade Hub’s overall approach to gender integration

The USAID COR and Deputy COR for the project observed that the Hub’s gender mainstreaming work focused on empowering women entrepreneurs and training them in persuasive communication/negotiation skills. For the future iteration of the Trade Hub, they noted there is potential for increasing on gender awareness and sensitivity at key border posts. This could build on some initial gender assessments that the Hub did in February 2016 in Zambia and Namibia to make border posts more women friendly. A future iteration of SATH could also look at how to build capacity to increase female staff at the border posts and more female government officials in trade and customs roles. They also considered including women traders, policy makers but they are not sure what a more gender aware program would entail and would like to know more about which approaches have worked and which have not. They also noted that in the trade facilitation agenda calls for is a simplified trade regime, which is a set of procedures that could bring about benefits for smaller traders that are more likely to be women.

The other USAID representatives interviewed reflected the polarized observations of project participants, stakeholders and beneficiaries as to whether or not it is possible to consider and address gender in a meaningful way in the types of activities that SATH implements. For example, one USAID respondent noted that there was a fairly high level of gender considerations in the enabling environment activities but noted that it is difficult to consider and address gender with these types of activities where the project is not working with discrete beneficiaries. This respondent noted for example, that some of the Strategic Partnership Grants (SPGs) to peanut farmers in Zambia [an activity under IR 1.2 AVC], had more gender considerations, and that this is possible where the project is working with small farmers. This respondent believed that the IR 1.4 Strengthened Regulatory Capacity for Clean Energy activities cannot mainstream gender.

Two of the other USAID respondents found that the Trade Hub’s approach to gender mainstreaming was weak, and described it as an “add women and stir” mind set and recommended steps that could have been taken to address gender in a more meaningful way across the IR activities. One of these
respondents pointed to the lack of clarity and direction for gender mainstreaming in project planning documents and pointed to the Gender Integration section under each of the IRs in the Work plan (except 1.4 clean energy). And that they did staff training on gender sensitivity which good place to start. But For gender to be effectively integrated, it needs to be part of the design and on SATH it was fundamentally lost. This respondent estimated 80 percent of the food passes through the women’s hands – gender could have been better integrated in the IR 1.2 AVC activities. One of these USAID respondents noted the lack of gender assessments to inform a gender mainstreaming strategy and that to really bring about gender mainstreaming activity implementers cannot just include women participants and beneficiaries and hope this will lead to change. Respondent noted that implementers need to understand the differences between women’s empowerment and gender mainstreaming (gender gaps); then to address these, implementers need to start each activity with a gender “census” to identify the gender disparities/differences. This will help the future iteration of the Trade Hub to ensure interventions are designed to support equal access to opportunities. If the result of gender assessment/census points to the fact that it is a sector where women have been traditionally excluded, the activity needs to start with a women’s empowerment component. For example, she noted that she did not see an SPG (activity under IR 1.2 AVC) with a gender dimension and that the Hub did not have criteria to select partners based on gender mainstreaming.

Findings on project structure and budget, and overall approach for gender integration

The project’s gender mainstreaming efforts were constrained by the lack of consistent staff or consultants dedicated to designing and implementing a gender strategy. SATH did increase gender integration efforts during last year and a half of project. For example, the Project thought of added a training for women in business on persuasive communication and negotiation skills under IR 1.5 Enabling Environment in Namibia and Zambia in 2016. These efforts were still disparate and not directed by a strategy to integrate gender effectively across all IR activities.

Findings for EQ1 on the relevance of SATH gender integration efforts in achieving results, milestones, and indicator targets

In order to answer EQ 1 on the achievement of gender related results the evaluation team will compare findings against the planned results and milestones as well as indicator data related to gender integration/mainstreaming or women’s empowerment that the project planned to achieve. The approved Southern Africa Trade Hub – FY 2015 Work Plan (which covers October 2014 – September 2015) the only specific gender related result and milestones are for the “Gender Integration” Activity which falls under IR 1.5. In addition to this Result and related milestones, in the FY 2015 WP, each IR has a paragraph of the plan for gender integration for the component activities (except 1.4 Clean Energy). These planning statements are brief and general about what the project will do to integrate gender in each activity. The inclusion of Gender Integration only under IR 1.5 was a major constraint for ensuring gender integration across the activities. For the future iteration of SATH, the Gender Advisor recommended that gender integration should be implemented in a more strategic and cross-cutting way.

It should be noted that targets were not met for one indicator disaggregated by sex:

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50 The milestones included under Result 1.3.11 Gender is Effectively Integrated in all Trade Hub Activities in the FY 2015 Work Plan are: 1. Train the Trainer in Gender Integration for Botswana and Lesotho Women's Association completed Q1 FY15; 2. Training of Trade Hub grantees in gender integration completed Q2 FY15; 3. Assessment of gender integration in selected Trade Hub Activities completed Q3 FY15.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person hours of training completed in technical energy fields supported by USG assistance</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percent reached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3,744</td>
<td>3,632</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings on gender mainstreaming efforts across the IR activities

- Implementers have not clearly communicated to IR 1.2 SPG recipients and IR 1.3 project participants if there are gender criteria for project participants and beneficiaries
- The AVC/ food security components would be a good place to make a more targeted effort

Conclusions

The gender integration planning statements by IR, WP results, related milestones, and indicators disaggregated by sex are very limited and unambitious given the scope of the SATH project.

The gender integration related planning statements by IR, WP results, related milestones, and indicators disaggregated by sex are also very vague and not helpful for assessing performance towards gender integration.

It is inherently problematic for accountability to include gender only under IR 1.5, despite that the project did try to prevent the impression this structure meant that the other technical staff that they are not responsible for Gender integrations of their activities by providing gender training to project staff.

The lack of consistent budget and dedicated staff, as well as vague and/or unambitious milestone goals and targets for Gender Integration efforts resulted in the absence of a clear strategy that could be implemented across the IR activities. SATH did increase gender integration efforts during last year and a half of project. For example, the Project thought of added a training for women in business on persuasive communication and negotiation skills under IR 1.5 Enabling Environment in Namibia and Zambia in 2016. However, these efforts were still disparate and not directed by a strategy to integrate gender effectively across all IR activities.
ANNEX C: ACTIVITY INVENTORY

To better understand the overall strategic approach that the Hub employed in regard to each IR, the evaluation team conducted an inventory of Hub activities. The inventory identifies and maps all of the activities conducted by the Hub since the mid-term evaluation. The evaluation team utilized the documentation from the Hub Milestones (agriculture value chains, clean energy, communications, enabling environments, and trade facilitation) in combination with the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 SATH annuals reports in order to identify discreet Hub activities. Once all activities were identified, the evaluation team “mapped” activities by type (i.e. training/workshop, capital expenditure, report/guidelines, etc.) for each IR. The graphs below illustrate the findings from the inventory and mapping process as they relate to each IR.

FIGURE C1: CLEAN ENERGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report/Guidelines</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training/Workshop</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE C2: AGRICULTURE VALUE CHAIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training/Workshop</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report/Guidelines</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software system</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Project</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsletter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE C3: AGRICULTURE VALUE CHAIN GRANTS

Agriculture Value Chain Grants

- Training/Workshop: 16
- Capital Expenditure: 7
- Report/Guidelines: 6
- Marketing: 1
- Human Resources: 1
- Assessment: 1
- Cooperative development: 1
## ANNEX D: RESPONDENT LIST

### Southern Africa Trade Hub Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Name (Title, first, last)</th>
<th>Title, Organization</th>
<th>Country where interview took place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Craig Dunlop</td>
<td>Ag Value Chain Specialist, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dale Carls</td>
<td>Finance Director, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Makore</td>
<td>Enabling Environment Director, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sediba Majinda</td>
<td>Operations manager, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greg Maassen</td>
<td>Chief of Party, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Magdelene Mabua</td>
<td>Trade Facilitation Specialist, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Cosmas Mamhunze</td>
<td>AGOA Trade and Investment Specialist: Trade Hub, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kevin Kabunda</td>
<td>Private Sector Engagement Specialist, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Lawrence Lubanga</td>
<td>M&amp;E Officer, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Gerrit Struyf</td>
<td>Director of Agriculture, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Mccotter</td>
<td>Senior Communications Advisor, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Melkin</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor (Namibia), AECOM</td>
<td>Remote Interview (phone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lis Meyers</td>
<td>Gender Integration Expert (Organization: Banyan Global)</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Glancy</td>
<td>Director Trade Facilitation, AECOM</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Shumaker</td>
<td>HQ Project Manager, AECOM</td>
<td>Remote Interview (phone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Gross</td>
<td>Agriculture Consultant, AECOM</td>
<td>Remote Interview (phone)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### USAID and USG Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Name (Title, first, last)</th>
<th>Title, Organization</th>
<th>Country where interview took place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Pleva</td>
<td>COR SATH, USAID Southern Africa</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evans Chinembiri</td>
<td>Activity Coordinator, USAID Southern Africa</td>
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<td>Mark Wilt</td>
<td>Office Director, USAID Southern Africa</td>
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<td>Nancy Whitney</td>
<td>COR SATH, USAID Southern Africa</td>
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<td>Patricia Rwasoka-Masanganise</td>
<td>M&amp;E Officer, USAID Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Benjamin</td>
<td>Agriculture Team Lead, USAID Southern Africa</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gail Strickler</td>
<td>Former USTR for textiles and Apparel</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Chansonnette Yun</td>
<td>Economic and Commercial Officer, US Embassy</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angela Kabuswe</td>
<td>Economic Growth Officer, USAID Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government counterparts/Stakeholders</td>
<td>Title, Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bevan Simataa</td>
<td>Officer, Namibia Customs and Excise</td>
<td>Remote Interview (phone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nancy Nyamilandu</td>
<td>Officer, Malawi Revenue Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norah Lydia Ngatjizeko</td>
<td>Ministry of Industrialization, Trade &amp; SME Development Namibia</td>
<td>Remote Interview (phone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willie Shumba</td>
<td>Senior Programme Officer, Customs: SADC</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orbert Yuyi</td>
<td>Director of Export Development, Botswana Trade and Investment Centre (BITC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Keolebogile Segomolo</td>
<td>Director of Standards, Botswana Bureau of Standards (BOBS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Thembi Langa</td>
<td>Senior Program Officer, SADC</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Malvern Rusike</td>
<td>Investment Advisor, SADC-TIFI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Chiluba Mwape</td>
<td>Sanitary and Phytosanitary, SADC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Shirley Moncho</td>
<td>Director, Department of International Trade Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Alice Kolagano</td>
<td>Customs Manager, Botswana Unified Revenue Authority (BURS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Mate</td>
<td>IDC Zambia</td>
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<td>Alfred Mwila</td>
<td>ERB Zambia</td>
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<td>Clement Sasa</td>
<td>OPPPI Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geoffrey Musonda</td>
<td>Rural Electrification Authority, Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<th>Private Sector Beneficiaries and Participants</th>
<th>Title, Organization</th>
<th>Country where interview took place</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>André van der Vyver</td>
<td>UT Grain Management (Pty)</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Spencer</td>
<td>PMD Packaging</td>
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<tr>
<td>Penny Ndlela</td>
<td>Lemon and Lime Marketing</td>
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<td>Juan Vermuelen</td>
<td>Vermulen</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maureen Grosvenor</td>
<td>Appsolve (PTY) Ltd.</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stefan Swanepoel</td>
<td>Deltamune</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Botha</td>
<td>Intertek Laboratories</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daniel Schuurman</td>
<td>Cargill</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sean Shields</td>
<td>ETG Agro</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarsem (TK) Kumar</td>
<td>Executive Chairman, Dinesh Textiles</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title, Organization</td>
<td>Country where interview took place</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nametso Violet Ntsosa-Carr</td>
<td>Vice President, Women in Business Association</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sipho Phiri</td>
<td>Western Power Zambia</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
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<td>Judith Mwila</td>
<td>AWEP Zambia</td>
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<td>Khama Mbewe</td>
<td>Lumono Organic Farms,</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>Telana Rapp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clay Hickson</td>
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<td>Janet Labuda</td>
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<td>Karla Magruder</td>
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<td>Madeleine McDougall</td>
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<td>Leslie McDermott</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marie Wilke</td>
<td>Regional Trade Advisor, GIZ</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jocelin Cornet</td>
<td>First Secretary Regional Cooperation, European</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Delegation to Republic of Botswana and SADC</td>
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