ASSESSMENT OF LINKAGES BETWEEN PUBLIC INSECURITY AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

Final report

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The preparation of this report was led by Jody Pollock

Under the supervision of Marco López Silva

In collaboration with Alessandra Rountree, Ana Eugenia López and Mirel Ruiz

With advice from Estefanía Vela Barba.

And with additional help from Elena Atkinson, Héctor Flores, Rodrigo Galindo, Daniel Lozano, Andrea Marelle, Adrián Morales, and Andrés Santiago Ramos

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# Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In October 2015, USAID/Mexico hired C230 Consultores to conduct an assessment to analyze the linkages between public insecurity and Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in Mexico in order to inform crime and violence prevention, criminal justice reform and human rights programming under USAID/Mexico’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014-2018. Based on literature review, interviews with Government of Mexico (GOM) and civil society organizations (CSOs), two in-depth case studies, and stakeholder and GBV intervention mapping, this report provides data analysis and recommendations for USAID/Mexico, GOM counterparts, and other stakeholders for effective approaches for GBV interventions in Mexico.

GBV IN MEXICO

The lack of accurate, updated, disaggregated and geo-referenced data is an important obstacle for identifying and addressing GBV in Mexico. Official crime statistics underestimate GBV, largely because of vast underreporting, and the majority of studies in Mexico only measure intimate partner violence (IPV), leaving out other forms of GBV, including violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people. Existing data collection tools for GBV, including national surveys and a national database of information on violence against women (VAW), are insufficient.¹

VAW is not trivial: almost half of all Mexican women over 15-years-old have experienced violence in their most recent romantic relationships,² and almost 70% have experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes.³ Around a third of adult Mexican women have experienced violence in public spaces.⁴ GBV against children is also common: Over 40% of all Mexican teachers report witnessing bullying in schools among both boys and girls, though the kinds of bullying they experience differ by gender identity and sexual orientation.⁵ There has also been a recent increase in violence against LGBTIQ people: Over the past decade, over 1,200 people have been murdered because of their sexual orientation and/or gender expression.⁶

GBV POLICY IN MEXICO

Since the 1970s, Mexico has increasingly incorporated gender into its legal framework, both by ratifying and incorporating international treaties into its legislation (including CEDAW, Belém do Pará and the Beijing Declaration) and by creating new GOM institutions (including INMUJERES, CONAVIM, and FEVIMTRA, among others) that make gender equality a transversal policy priority.

The current national policy on GBV is defined in the Programa Integral para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia Contra las Mujeres (PIPASEVM) 2014-2018. As in prior years, combatting VAW and domestic violence remains at the center of most GOM policies. The current administration has focused on harmonizing the Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia (LGAMVLV) at the local level, on increasing the participation of the education and health sectors in the prevention and detection of VAW, and on improving the prosecution of VAW within the criminal justice system. PIPASEVM and other GOM interventions designed to combat GBV have faced significant implementation challenges, including weak interagency coordination, mismatched federal, state and municipal legal frameworks, a lack of attention to the diverse types and forms of GBV, a lack of public funding available for both public and private interventions, and a lack of productive collaboration with civil society.
PUBLIC INSECURITY AND GBV IN MEXICO

This report utilizes two key analytical lenses: 1) a gender perspective on public insecurity and 2) an examination of GBV as a manifestation of public insecurity. The first analytical lens highlights the different experiences, perceptions and impacts that public insecurity has on a person or a group of people based on their sex, gender identity and sexual orientation. The second analytical lens, which defines GBV as a manifestation of public insecurity, is based on an understanding of insecurity as crime and violence that occurs both in public and in private.

Men and women experience and perceive violence and safety differently. In Mexico, men are far more likely than women to both perpetrate and be victimized by violence in the vast majority of crimes, with the exception of sexual harassment, rape and kidnapping, which women suffer in greater proportion. Although women are less likely to experience most crimes, they have a slightly greater fear of crime, and are more likely to limit their participation in public spaces in response.

In Mexico today, the common GOM understanding of GBV in Mexico is often limited to VAW, which, in turn, is often limited to IPV. Violence against children, against the LGBTIQ community and against men because of their gender identity is rarely considered. This has led to the creation of laws, institutions and public interventions that emphasize IPV in heterosexual relationships. It also reflects an understanding of GBV as separate from public insecurity, rather than as a manifestation thereof. This leads to a disarticulation of those institutions and legal frameworks designed to address GBV and those designed to address other forms of crime and violence.

In the security policy agenda in Mexico, GBV has largely taken a backseat to drug trafficking and organized crime. The prioritization of combatting organized crime (and the consequent lack of attention paid to GBV) is reflected in public budgets, the training of security personnel, and the incomplete implementation of VAW laws, as well as in the perpetration of GBV by security officers.

GBV proliferates, increasing not only in prevalence but also in intensity, in societies where there is a growing use of violence and pervasive impunity. Though the data is limited, there are certain factors that appear to exacerbate and facilitate GBV, including the increasingly visible and extreme use of force and generalized violence, the normalization thereof, and the persistence of impunity. Given that these factors are present in Mexico, it is safe to assume that GBV in Mexico has increased alongside a similar growth in organized crime.

CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

In Mexico, public GBV prevention interventions are mainly concentrated in the security, health, and education sectors. The majority of current GBV prevention interventions led both by GOM and CSOs are secondary or ex post facto, designed to prevent recidivism and to mitigate the immediate consequences of abuse by providing victims with services. Few interventions in Mexico are primary (i.e. interventions before violence begins) or tertiary (i.e. interventions that address long-term trauma and recidivism).

According to available research, successful GBV prevention interventions tend to be comprehensive, targeted, long-term, mixed-gender and integrated with other development programs. Working with children and youth in the home, in schools and in broader community efforts to prevent GBV by shaping attitudes and behaviors about gender and violence from a young age is a promising area of opportunity. Some examples include public health home visitation programs to encourage non-violent parent-child relationships, school-based workshops that offer...
practical conflict resolution skills to youth, and expanded efforts to create safer urban spaces for people of all ages, genders and sexual orientations.

RULE OF LAW
As of 2015, only around one in ten crimes are reported in Mexico, and of those, only 4.5% reach convictions. In other words, there is around a 95% rate of impunity on reported crimes, and less than 1% of crimes are punished. Impunity for GBV is rampant, which can be attributed to three problems: 1) underreporting of GBV, 2) an inadequate legal framework (particularly when it comes to LGBTIQ people), and 3) lax implementation of the existing legal framework.

The new criminal justice system has great potential to improve access to justice for all victims of crimes in Mexico. That said, without the appropriate gender-sensitive tools, resources and training necessary, the reform could create obstacles to justice for victims of GBV. For example, the presumption of innocence is a hallmark of the new criminal justice system in Mexico, and it necessitates highly-trained police officers, medical and forensic examiners, public prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges, as well as technical and financial resources for the collection and analysis of the evidence needed to meet the higher burden of proof.

Under the new criminal justice system, GBV victims often face roadblocks that include the lack of appropriate, private and safe spaces to report crimes, discrimination and revictimization throughout the legal process, insufficient criminal investigations, and lack of protection mechanisms for victims and witnesses. Oral trials present new challenges like protecting the safety and integrity of victims while testifying, and alternative justice mechanisms like mediation and conciliation, though prohibited by Belém do Pará and LGAMVLV in cases of VAW, continue to be applied inappropriately, putting victims at further risk. Finally, sentences and reparations are rarely designed with a gender perspective. In sum, the new criminal justice system requires an infusion of new technical and human resources in order to safeguard the rights of both the victim and the accused, particularly in complicated cases like GBV.

HUMAN RIGHTS
The recent rise in organized crime in Mexico is correlated with a rise in grave violations of human rights, particularly femicide, which has been on the rise since 2007, and human trafficking, which some studies estimate will triple worldwide over the next few years because of its high profitability.

A gender perspective on grave human rights violations – specifically femicide, human trafficking, torture, enforced disappearances and violence against human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists – reveals important patterns in the perpetration of these violations, which often utilize gendered tactics to threaten, torture, disappear, and even kill victims. For example, women and LGBTIQ victims experience much more sexual violence during torture as compared to heterosexual men. A gender perspective can also provide a more comprehensive look at who suffers from these human rights violations. For example, though over 80% of the primary victims of enforced disappearance in Mexico are men, the burden of caring for family members and seeking justice from authorities in their absence most often falls on women. Policymakers and CSOs should be aware of the differential experiences and needs of victims according to their sex, gender identity and sexual orientation in order to design appropriate prevention and victim care interventions.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations listed below and described in depth in Chapter 7 were designed to inform USAID/Mexico, its partners, GOM and CSO counterparts, as well as other relevant stakeholders, of several key areas of opportunity for effective GBV interventions in crime and violence prevention, rule of law and human rights.

CROSS-CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS

► 1. Promote the implementation of a transversal gender perspective in all public security interventions.

► 2.a. Support municipal diagnostics of GBV or develop a practical methodological guide on how to measure GBV at a local level.

► 2.b. Support CSO efforts to improve data collection.

► 3.a. Build state and municipal capacity to implement the national GBV policy and legal framework.

► 3.b. Create pathways for collaboration between local GOM and CSO actors working on GBV interventions.

► 4.a. Support the development of GBV M&E in practice.

► 4.b. Support the M&E of ongoing GBV interventions.

CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

► 5. Develop a “best practices checklist” for GBV prevention.

► 6.a. Include GBV prevention within broader crime and violence prevention interventions in schools and communities.

► 6.b. Support transformative primary and tertiary prevention interventions in homes, schools and communities to address root causes and long-term effects of GBV.

► 6.c. Work with local security officers to prevent GBV in their communities.

► 7.a. Work with educators and healthcare professionals to detect and serve at-risk children and youth.

► 7.b. Introduce new prevention models, with an emphasis on children and youth, into CJMs.

► 8. Address masculinities as a central component of GBV and crime and violence prevention.

RULE OF LAW

► 9.a. Work with student lawyers to train future justice operators on the implications of the reform for GBV victims.

► 9.b. Train current security officers and justice operators on the practical ways they should intervene in cases of GBV.

► 9.c. Support CJMs to improve the quality of victim care.
10.a. Train forensic and medical investigators on how to incorporate a gender perspective into their work.

10.b. Support forensic and medical equipment upgrades.

10.c. Encourage collaborations between CSOs and special prosecutors for GBV crimes to improve access to justice.

11. Train justice operators on how to design and implement protection orders.

12.a. Train justice operators on how they should and should not apply alternative justice processes for GBV.

12.b. Explore how to design and monitor appropriate alternative justice mechanisms for GBV.


13.b. Train judges and other justice operators to use a gender perspective in their rulings.

13.c. Encourage creative reparations.

**HUMAN RIGHTS**


15.a. Support targeted interventions that address femicide in high-risk communities where organized crime is most present.

15.b. Collaborate on human trafficking prevention with other international development offices and transnational CSO networks.

16. Develop a mechanism to assess and improve the implementation of these and other protocols.

17. Support the development of citizen observatories and accountability mechanisms for the Gender Alert.

18.a. Create mechanisms to monitor torture and GBV.

18.b. Combat sexual torture in collaboration with CSOs.

19.a. Train justice operators on appropriate treatment of family members seeking justice.

19.b. Collaborate with CSOs on programs that engage with family members of the disappeared.


20.b. Create an M&E tool for the *Mecanismo de Defensa y Protección de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas.*
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THIS REPORT

Given the strong social, cultural and economic ties, common security concerns, and the shared border between Mexico and U.S., the USAID/Mexico Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) supports Mexican efforts to address key challenges to improve citizen security, justice, and environmental sustainability with program approaches tailored to the unique U.S.-Mexico relationship. USAID/Mexico’s focus relates to two high-level priorities of both the U.S. and Mexican Governments: 1) mitigating the effects of global climate change and 2) strengthening security under the Merida Initiative.

Specifically, the USAID/MEXICO CDCS focuses on four Development Objective areas – 1) Crime and Violence Prevention, 2) Rule of Law, 3) Human Rights and 4) Combatting Global Climate Change. For the first three areas, USAID/Mexico identified the need to conduct an assessment to analyze Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in Mexico. In a 2012 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the United States and Mexico prioritized working towards gender equality, recognizing that gender inequalities, discrimination, and violence are barriers to the realization of human rights. Therefore, the overarching goal of the assessment is to analyze the linkages between public insecurity and GBV in Mexico in order to inform crime and violence prevention, criminal justice reform and human rights programming under USAID/Mexico’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014-2018. This report will provide data and analysis based on sound evidence to USAID/Mexico, GOM counterparts, and other stakeholders in Mexico to guide decisions about how GBV interventions should be implemented and replicated across the country.

The specific objectives of this assessment include:

A. Identify the linkages between public insecurity and GBV in Mexico.
B. Map out national civil society and GOM interventions to address GBV prevention, protection and assistance in Mexico.
C. Identify gaps, opportunities, best practices and lessons learned from current GBV interventions in Mexico and Latin America.
D. Provide recommendations for effective approaches for GBV interventions in Mexico as they relate to crime and violence prevention, criminal justice reform and human rights.

1.2 DEFINING GENDER AND GBV

For definitions of all key terms, as well as a glossary of commonly-used acronyms, see Annex B.

Gender: Gender is the socially defined set of roles, behaviors, interests, rights, responsibilities, entitlements, and obligations that are assigned to and expected of females and males. The social definitions of what it means to be female or male vary among cultures and change over time. Gender identity is an individual’s personal sense of being
male or female. For transgender people, their birth-assigned sex and their gender identity do not match.\(^4\)

Incorporating a “gender perspective” implies the process of identifying and assessing the differential implications of any action on a person or a group of people given their sex, gender identity and sexual orientation.\(^5\) For example, to analyze the impact of a new healthcare policy in Mexico, policymakers would have to consider that over 70% of unremunerated care of children, the elderly and sick family members is provided by women.\(^6\) Therefore, any such policy will have differential impacts on women as caregivers.

**GBV:** Any violence that is directed at an individual based on their gender identity or their perceived level of adherence to socially defined norms of masculinity and femininity. GBV is rooted in structural inequalities between men and women and is characterized by physical, sexual, and psychological abuse, threats, coercion, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and economic deprivation, whether occurring in public or private life. Women and girls are the most at risk and most affected by GBV, so the term Violence Against Women (VAW) is often (erroneously) used interchangeably with GBV. However, boys and men can also experience GBV, as can sexual and gender minorities, including the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ)\(^7\) population. GBV takes on many forms and can occur throughout the life cycle. Some common types of GBV include child sexual abuse, sexual coercion and abuse, sex trafficking and forced labor, forced sterilization and obstetric violence, domestic violence, among many others.

### 1.3 METHODOLOGY

Since GBV is a complex issue, USAID/Mexico and C230 Consultores agreed to limit the report to what would be the most relevant for USAID/Mexico and its partners. The types of GBV considered in this report are physical violence, sexual violence and psychological violence, and the relevant modalities of GBV are family-based GBV, school-based GBV, community-based GBV, institutional GBV, and femicide, as defined in the *Ley General de Acceso a las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia* (LGAMVLV).\(^8\)

To produce this report, C230 Consultores designed a methodology with the following four key components. *For a complete summary of the methodology, see Annex C.*

1. **Literature review:** C230 Consultores completed a comprehensive review of relevant documents, including international and national studies, policy documents and evaluations, news reports, and surveys produced by the GOM, academia, international organizations, think tanks and other civil society organizations (CSOs). A complete bibliography is available in Annex A.

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\(^a\) Patrimonial violence and economic violence, as well as workplace GBV, are not directly relevant to the work of USAID/Mexico and are therefore excluded from the analysis.
2. **Interviews with current USAID/Mexico partners:** C230 Consultores interviewed current and former USAID/Mexico implementing partners on their current and planned interventions within the areas of crime and violence prevention, criminal justice reform and human rights. These interviews emphasized how USAID/Mexico’s partners incorporate a gender perspective and confront the issue of GBV in their work.

3. **Case studies:** In order to capture a sample of state and municipal interventions, C230 Consultores conducted two case studies. The first case study focuses on Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, where USAID/Mexico has worked for many years as part of the targeted communities identified in the Merida Initiative. The second case study was conducted in Ecatepec, State of Mexico, chosen for its recent high-profile cases of GBV. In addition to literature review, C230 Consultores conducted field visits and interviewed 19 key GOM and CSO actors between the two sites.

4. **Stakeholder and GBV intervention mapping:** C230 Consultores identified current GOM and CSO GBV interventions through a systematic review based on criteria and a classification system of public programs and policies, defined in Annex C. Sources of information for the mapping exercise included literature review, official requests for information, and interviews with federal GOM institutions and national CSOs. Unfortunately, the information available on these interventions was often insufficient to conduct a thorough evaluation. In order to highlight potentially replicable interventions, C230 Consultores took into account two principal factors: 1) the reported effect of the intervention on GBV according to existing evaluations, and 2) the quality of information available. If an intervention presented a reasonably credible potential for success (as measured by the reported effect) and at least a basic level of information available (even if the evidence is not decisively strong), C230 Consultores considered it for this assessment.

Gender transformative interventions change gender norms, attitudes and behaviors in order to achieve gender equality, while gender sensitive interventions consider gender without necessarily changing norms, attitudes and behaviors. For example, public daycare centers that offer services to working mothers are gender sensitive, but they are not necessarily gender transformative because they do not seek to challenge traditional gender roles by promoting the inclusion of fathers in childcare. Gender neutral interventions are those that do not consider (i.e. are blind to) gender. Gender
insensitive interventions are those that reject the idea of gender inequality. For example, an intervention that explicitly defines women as “natural caregivers” is gender insensitive.

Limitations
The report was prepared for USAID/Mexico, GOM and other stakeholders as the principal audience. Therefore, the findings and recommendations are not exhaustive for the topic of GBV in general.

The lack of reliable data on GBV in Mexico was a key limitation throughout the preparation and analysis of the report. This problem will be described in depth in Chapter 2.

In terms of the case studies, both local governments were undergoing administrative transitions while C230 Consultores was carrying out research for this report. These transitions made conducting interviews difficult, although they provided insight into how frequent GOM turn-over can interrupt GBV interventions.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This introductory section is followed by Chapter 2, a summary of historical and current GOM policies that address gender equity and GBV, as well as a note on the role of civil society. Chapter 3 offers two analytical lenses for the report: a gender perspective on public insecurity and an analysis of GBV as a specific manifestation of public insecurity in Mexico. Chapter 4 is dedicated to analyzing key sites of GBV prevention, including the home, the school and the community, with the intention of identifying areas of opportunity for crime and violence prevention interventions. Chapter 5, dedicated to the criminal justice reform, is structured according to key moments in access to justice for victims of GBV, including reporting a crime, due process, and sentencing and reparations. Chapter 6 is organized according to five grave human rights violations — femicide, human trafficking, torture, enforced disappearances, and violence against human rights defenders and journalist — that are key to USAID/Mexico human rights programming. Finally, Chapter 7 provides final reflections and recommendations. Throughout the report, the right-hand column will highlight key findings and direct readers to related recommendations in Chapter 7 when applicable.
CHAPTER 2. GBV IN MEXICO

2.1 RISK FACTORS FOR VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRATION OF GBV

A variety of factors at the individual, households, community and society levels increase the risk of both experiencing and perpetrating GBV. Risk factors are not in and of themselves direct causes of victimization or aggression, but they can contribute (individually or together) to an increased likelihood.

Research on risk factors for GBV in Mexico is limited. The Programa Integral para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia Contra las Mujeres (PIPASEVM) 2014-2018 lists the following main risk factors for VAW: discriminatory attitudes towards women, the prevalence of prejudices and stereotypes that denigrate women, and perceptions about the alleged "natural" superiority of men. Unfortunately, the PIPASEVM does not go into detail about how these risk factors were identified or defined.

The vast majority of the international empirical research available on GBV focuses on intimate partner violence (IPV) and sexual violence perpetrated by men against women, of which the most common risk factors for victimization and perpetration are summarized in the table below. Those factors that have the strongest reported effect or are consistently reported across studies are in bold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factors for IPV and sexual violence²</th>
<th>Perpetration by men</th>
<th>Victimization of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIVIDUAL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Low income</td>
<td>- Young age</td>
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<td>- Low education</td>
<td>- Low education</td>
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<td>- Exposure to child abuse</td>
<td>- Exposure to child abuse</td>
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<td>- Sexual abuse</td>
<td>- Sexual abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Intra-parental violence</td>
<td>- Intra-parental violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Antisocial personality</td>
<td>- Separated/divorced marital status</td>
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<td>- Substance abuse</td>
<td>- Substance abuse</td>
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<td>- Alcohol abuse</td>
<td>- Alcohol abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Illicit drug use</td>
<td>- Depression</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Social acceptance of violence</td>
<td>- Prior victimization</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RELATIONSHIP</strong></td>
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<td>- Multiple sexual partners/infidelity</td>
<td>- Multiple sexual partners/infidelity</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Economic, educational and employment</td>
<td>- Economic, educational and employment disparities between partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>disparities between partners</td>
<td>- Conflict and tension in the relationship</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Conflict and tension in the relationship</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Low resistance to peer pressure</td>
<td>- Conflict and tension in the relationship</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNITY</strong></td>
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A low level of education is the most consistent risk factor associated with both perpetration and victimization of IPV and sexual violence. Adult perpetrators of IPV are significantly more likely than nonperpetrators to have witnessed IPV as children. This is not to say that all male witnesses of IPV necessarily become perpetrators of IPV, but it is an important risk factor. If violence is experienced or witnessed at an early age, it is often normalized as part of “being a man.” Boys who are exposed to abuse become susceptible to aggression, impulsivity, an absence of empathy and remorse, and are more likely to perpetrate violence in the future. The effect is different for women: Studies have found that girls who experience or witness physical, sexual or emotional violence as children are at much greater risk for experiencing emotional abuse by a romantic partner later in life. In Mexico, over two-thirds of women who had experienced IPV in the last year had also experienced violence in their homes as children.

Many of these risk factors can be generalized to other forms of GBV, including violence against LGBTIQ victims, children and men, but little research has been done to prove this generalization, which is a widely recognized gap in the literature. No official GOM planning instrument mentions GBV against LGBTIQ people, but Letra Ese, a Mexican LGBTIQ CSO, has identified social exclusion as a risk factor for all forms of crime and violence against LGBTIQ people since they are often targeted because of their perceived weaker social and support networks. Also, being “out of the closet” and living openly as a LGBTIQ person has been found to increase the risk of experiencing violence. A 2015 Inter-American Human Rights Commission (CIDH) report found that risk factors for transgender people in Latin America include discrimination, lack of recognition of their gender identity, certain high-risk jobs like sex work, and a high degree of criminalization.

### 2.2 THE CONSEQUENCES OF GBV

The negative consequences of GBV are profound, extending beyond the health and happiness of individuals to the well-being of communities and even nations. At the individual level (for victims, perpetrators and others affected by violence), GBV is linked to multiple immediate and long-term physical, mental, sexual and reproductive health consequences. The majority of available research focuses on victims of IPV, who face increased risks of current and future ill health, including susceptibility to alcohol and drug abuse. Women who have suffered IPV are more likely to be long-term users of health services, thereby increasing health care costs.
On average, IPV victims have more surgeries, doctor visits, hospital stays, visits to pharmacies and mental health consultations over their lifetimes than non-victims, even after the violence has stopped.\textsuperscript{12}

Many of these outcomes are also common for LGBTIQ victims. One 2012 online survey in Mexico found that 51\% of LGBTIQ victims of homophobic bullying suffered from depression and 25\% admitted to having suicidal thoughts.\textsuperscript{14}

Witnessing GBV, and in particular witnessing IPV and domestic violence as a child, can also lead to negative short- and long-term consequences for educational outcomes, mental health, and relationships with same-sex peers and dating partners. One review of multiple studies found that both male and female children who had witnessed IPV were significantly more violent and more likely to experience posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than nonwitnesses. Several studies found that boys who had witnessed IPV were more likely than girl witnesses to express outward aggression, in particular towards same-sex peers. In other words, there appears to be a learned response among boys who witness IPV to engage in violence as a way to resolve problems. Girls, meanwhile, are more likely to internalize their response and develop depressive symptoms.\textsuperscript{15}

GBV also has an important impact on families, communities and society at large, including lower productivity, reduced economic output and growth, and increased pressure on social and health services.\textsuperscript{16} The economic toll is not negligible, both in terms of direct costs in health expenses and social services for victims and in terms of the reduced productivity of victims, which leads to lower earnings, profits and even loss of employment. Domestic violence can cause a decrease in the victim’s individual productivity,\textsuperscript{17} and more broadly, GBV is estimated to cause the loss of between 1 and 2\% of the global gross domestic product.\textsuperscript{18}
2.3 CURRENT CONDITIONS OF GBV IN MEXICO

2.3.1 The data problem

There is no doubt GBV is a serious problem in Mexico, but the lack of accurate, updated, disaggregated and geo-referenced data is an important obstacle for identifying and addressing GBV in Mexico. Official crime statistics underestimate GBV, and the majority of studies in Mexico only measure intimate partner violence (IPV), leaving out other forms of GBV.\(^\text{19}\) State-level and municipal-level information is hard to come by, making targeted local interventions difficult to design based on evidence.\(^\text{20}\) Additionally, crime data are often not disaggregated by sex.\(^\text{21}\)

GBV is vastly underreported\(^\text{22}\) not only because of shame, fear, and distrust of public institutions, but also because of the lack of institutional infrastructure, which discourages victims from following through on the complicated process of reporting crimes and entering into legal procedures.\(^\text{23}\) A 2010 study of Latin American women victims of violence found that only a third sought help from public health services, and only 13% had filed a formal complaint with the police.\(^\text{24}\) In Mexico, it is estimated that less than 10% of women victims of IPV seek assistance or report the crime to authorities,\(^\text{25}\) and only one in ten sexual assaults are reported.\(^\text{26}\)

Mexico has tried to estimate the prevalence of VAW through other mechanisms like the *Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica de las Relaciones en los Hogares* (ENDIREH), a national household survey, and the *Banco Nacional de Datos e Información sobre Casos de Violencia contra las Mujeres* (BANAVIM), a database on VAW managed by *Comisión Nacional de Seguridad* (CNS). However, neither has been sufficient. ENDIREH only collects data on IPV and violence in public spaces suffered by women 15-years-old and up. ENDIREH has been conducted three times (in 2003, 2006 and 2011), so the most recent survey is now five years old, and INEGI has not announced when the next survey will be conducted. Part of the delay is due to the fact that the ENDIREH is one of the most expensive surveys that INEGI conducts.\(^\text{27}\) Also, the three existing versions of ENDIREH are impossible to compare to examine trends in VAW because their methodologies and survey questions differ year to year.\(^\text{28}\) For its part, BANAVIM is outdated and lacks the majority of the information it supposedly collects.\(^\text{29}\) Neither ENDIREH nor BANAVIM collect data on violence against children or against LGBTIQ people.

Letra Ese estimates that only a third of crimes against LGBTIQ people are reported nationally.\(^\text{30}\) Victims and their family members and friends are often dissuaded from reporting these crimes because of prejudice and hostility from authorities, as well as a general distrust of public institutions. And when crimes are reported, they are often misunderstood or miscategorized by authorities, producing inaccurate registries. One example is the misrepresentation of trans women as “men dressed as women” or as “gay men.” The lack of accurately disaggregated data gets in the way of combatting this violence.\(^\text{31}\)
Given the lack of data and underreporting on GBV in Mexico, it is important to note the limitations of the following information, which summarizes the main types of GBV in Mexico.

### 2.3.2 Intimate partner violence (IPV) and domestic violence

In 2011, almost half (47%) of all women 15-years-old and up report having experienced violence during their most recent relationship. Women in the State of Mexico are the most likely to have experienced IPV, at over half (58%) of the female adult population. Of the women who had experienced IPV, the most common kinds of violence they report are psychological and emotional violence (92%), economic violence (52%), physical violence (30%), and sexual violence (16%). Sexual violence is underreported in surveys like this.

### 2.3.3 Violence against women in public spaces

In 2011, around a third (32%) of women 15 and over report having experienced violence in public spaces (including streets, plazas, public meeting places, etc.). The majority report having been intimidated (87%), while more than a third (38%) report sexual abuse, and almost a tenth (9%) report physical abuse in public spaces. These kinds of attacks are most often perpetrated by strangers (89%), followed by neighbors (11%), friends (10%), and authorities (1%).

### 2.3.4 Violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people

The lack of information on GBV is amplified in the case of violence against the LGBTIQ community in Mexico. There are no official GOM statistics available on this violence, so Letra Ese is the only source (both public and private) of data on violence against the LGBTIQ community in Mexico. Their most recent count puts the total number at 1,218 people murdered because of their sexual orientation and/or gender expression between 1995 and 2014. Of the victims, 80% were men, 19% were transgender, and 1% were women. Most victims (80%) had experienced previous non-lethal attacks. According to the data available, there has been an increase in violence against LGBTIQ people in Mexico in recent years, which some CSOs attribute in part to greater public awareness of (and backlash to) sexual diversity.

In general, crimes perpetrated against LGBTIQ victims are characterized by high levels of violence and cruelty, including cases of victims who have been stoned to death, decapitated, burned, and mutilated. In many cases, victims are tortured, humiliated and submitted to acts of extreme degradation before they are killed.

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*Letra Ese depends on public funding, so in 2012 and 2013, when the GOM did not approve their proposals, Letra Ese could not produce their reports on LGBTIQ violence, resulting in two years of missing data. (Interview with Director, Letra Ese, Mexico City, February 2016).*
2.3.5 Children, adolescents and GBV

The most recent data on how GBV in Mexico affects children and adolescents is from the 2009 Informe Nacional sobre Violencia de Género en Educación Básica, which surveyed elementary and middle school students. Bullying in schools is common for both girls and boys (43% of teachers reported witnessing bullying), but the kinds of bullying they experience differ by gender. Girls in elementary and middle school are more likely than boys to have their hair pulled, be pushed, be touched without consent and be mocked or insulted. Boys in elementary and middle school are more likely to experience physical assaults, including being punched, slapped, kicked, and hit with objects.

Boys are often bullied for failing to meet stereotypical male characteristics. A sixth of students said their classmates had mocked boys for displaying effeminate gestures in public, and over a fifth said boys who do not like to play sports are harassed. Similarly, for girls, almost a quarter of the students reported that girls who don’t comply with female stereotypes are told that they behave “like men.”

In terms of gender stereotypes and violence, 44% of elementary school boys and 37% of elementary school girls agreed with the statement that if a woman is disrespected it must be because she provoked it. Interestingly, it appears the gap between boys’ and girls’ opinions widens with age: 42% of middle school boys agree with this statement, while only 29% of middle schools girls agree.

A 2012 survey of homophobic bullying conducted by Mexican CSOs found that 74% of gay men, 50% of lesbians and 66% of transgender people had experienced bullying in school. A third (32%) of the bullying involved physical violence, and most occurred in middle school. Almost half (48%) of the respondents said that teachers and other authorities did nothing to prevent or sanction this bullying.

2.4 GENDER EQUALITY AND GBV POLICY IN MEXICO

For more detail on international and national GBV law and policy, see Annex E.

2.4.1 GBV in international law

All international treaties to which Mexico is a party are elevated to binding law on par with the Constitution. This is particularly relevant for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ratified by Mexico in 1981, and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, commonly known as Belém do Pará, adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1994. One year after the signing of Belém do Pará, UN Women adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, unanimously ratified by 189 countries, including Mexico.
International treaties on GBV have almost exclusively emphasized VAW, without specific protections for LGBTIQ people. A 2012 Inter-American Court of Human Rights case set the precedent that sexual orientation is included as a “suspect class” to be considered as a grounds for discrimination, and several recent UN Human Rights Council resolutions express “grave concern” for acts of violence against LGBTIQ people, but gender identity and sexual orientation are still not enshrined in human rights treaties as explicit categories of protection.

The human rights framework in Mexico is more than adequate to address VAW, but there are significant gaps in secondary laws, institutional design and policy implementation, as well as a lack of protections for LGBTIQ people.

2.4.2 Mexico’s legal and political response to GBV

Since the 1970s, Mexico has increasingly incorporated gender into its public policies, both by creating new institutions and by making gender equality a transversal policy priority. The GOM began intervening in VAW and domestic violence in the early 1990s, a focus that has continued to shape GOM policy today. At the turn of the millennium, Mexico began a wave of institution building that included the creation of the Instituto Nacional de Mujeres (INMUJERES) in 2001, along with local counterparts, the Instancias de Mujeres en las Entidades Federativas (IMEFs), which all 32 states have set up as of 2007.

While the majority of the relevant legal framework established in this period will be analyzed in depth in Annex E, it is worth examining one milestone law passed in 2007, the Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia (LGAMVLV), which is significant for the following contributions:

### Box 2.1: Contributions of the LGAMVLV

**A. Sistema Nacional**

The LGAMVLV creates the Sistema Nacional para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres (hereafter referred as “the Sistema Nacional”), made up of ten federal institutions and 32 IMEFs that implement programs to address VAW, as well as an advisory board of 11 institutions. SEGOB chairs the Sistema Nacional and INMUJERES is the Executive Secretary. The Sistema Nacional has state and municipal counterparts, which are supposed to allocate resources to address VAW in their jurisdictions.

**B. Defining VAW for the first time in Mexican law**

The LGAMVLV defines five main types of VAW (psychological, physical, patrimonial, economic, and sexual), as well as the main modalities in which VAW occurs (family, work and teaching, community, institutional, and femicide). Regardless of the modality, the defining quality of VAW, according to the law, is the exercise of power of the perpetrator over the victim from within an asymmetrical relationship of power.

**C. Femicide**

The LGAMVLV was the first law to define femicide in Mexico. It is “the extreme form of violence against women, produced by the violation of their human rights, in the public and
private spheres, formed by the misogynistic set of behaviors that can lead to social and state impunity and may culminate in homicide and the violent deaths of women.61 Femicide will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

D. Gender Alert
The LGAMVLV establishes a new mechanism known as the Gender Alert, which announces when levels of VAW have become enough to disturb the peace and prevent the full exercise of women’s human rights in a given territory (i.e. in municipalities in a specific state). The processes for how to request and declare the Alert are complex, non-transparent and unclear,62 and its implementation is even murkier (see Box 6.1).

E. Protection orders
The LGAMVLV introduced protection orders (órdenes de protección) as a legal mechanism to be issued when a woman’s life is at risk: they set off a series of actions, which can include restraining orders and police protection, depending on the needs of each victim.63 Protection orders will be discussed in Chapter 5.

F. BANAVIM
BANAVIM was created to record and collect data from state and municipal agencies in order to develop better diagnostics on VAW in Mexico.64 Since 2013, BANAVIM has been integrated into the Sistema Único de Información Criminal under SEGOB.65

After the passage of the LGAMVLV, the late 2000s saw a flurry of activity on issues of VAW, including the creation of new federal institutions and legislation on healthcare responsibilities (including NOM-046-SSA2-2005,66 discussed in Chapter 4) and on human trafficking (the LGPSEDTP,67 discussed in Chapter 6). In 2008, the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) created the Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia Contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas (FEVIMTRA), discussed in Chapter 6.

In 2009, SEGOB created the Comisión Nacional para Prevenir y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres (CONAVIM), a deconcentrated institution that coordinates GOM actors to address VAW through the Programa Integral para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres (PIPASEVM), which articulates the national policy on VAW for the GOM.68 In 2010, CONAVIM launched the Centros de Justicia de la Mujer (CJMs), which centralize public services like medical, psychological and legal aid for victims of VAW into one location. CJMs are run on a state-by-state basis. There are currently 26 CJMs operating in 19 states, but they vary in services and in quality.69

In the late 2000s, Mexico was the subject of several Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) cases (see Annex E). In the 2009 ruling in González et al. v. Mexico (widely referred to as “Campo Algodonero”), Mexico was found responsible for failing to prevent and properly investigate the murders of three women in Ciudad Juarez in the state of Chihuahua. Campo Algodonero set an important precedent: States are not only responsible for respecting human rights, but also for protecting human rights, particularly when they are aware of a persistent problem of violence like VAW. As a result, Mexico was required to
implement certain measures both as reparations for victims and as prevention for VAW, although it has been criticized for failing to fulfill these commitments.70

2.4.3 Current GBV policy in Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration

For a full list of current GBV interventions by sector, see Annex F.

Like its predecessors, the current Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (PND) includes gender equality, but this PND is unique for requiring that a gender perspective be a transversal strategy implemented by all government actors.71 Taken as whole, the GBV policy of the current administration is an extension of prior years’ efforts to harmonize the LGAMVLV at the local level, to increase the participation of the education and health sectors in the prevention and detection of VAW, and to improve the prosecution of VAW within the criminal justice system. There is a continued focus on VAW (and not GBV as understood in a broader sense). There have been a handful of legal reforms and new programs created (like the PIPSAVEM 2014-2018), though they do not differ substantially from their predecessors. In sum, despite the new mandate for all GOM actors to use a gender perspective, today's GBV policy looks very much like the GBV policy of the past decade.

The current national policy on GBV is defined in the PIPASEVM 2014-2018,72 developed by the Sistema Nacional in 2013. The PIPASEVM has two main priorities. The first is an emphasis on preventing and reducing risk factors for victims of VAW in schools, workplaces, and communities. The second is a focus on access to justice for victims of VAW. In line with this, most current GOM interventions emphasize service provision for VAW victims, protocols for how to work with VAW victims for justice operators and healthcare providers, school-based VAW awareness campaigns, and re-education programs for male perpetrators of VAW. The PIPASEVM focuses almost exclusively on domestic violence against women, which is no different from previous national policies. The five main objectives of the PIPASEVM 2014-2018 are outlined in Annex F, along with a report on the progress in achieving these goals, according to its official indicators.73 The PIPASEVM is ambitious, but the official indicators are unable to accurately measure its activities, and with the information available, it seems the PIPASEVM has not accomplished much in its first two years.

The implementation of GBV policy in Mexico during President Peña Nieto’s administration has faced significant challenges, many of which have been inherited from previous administrations. These include weak interagency coordination, mismatched federal, state and municipal legal frameworks, a lack of attention to the diverse types and forms of GBV, and a lack of public funding available for both public and private interventions. Regional disparities in the coverage and quality of victims’ services continue to mean that some victims have more and better access to care than others. And, as mentioned earlier, the lack of good data on GBV at the
national, state and municipal levels makes designing effective interventions to prevent, attend, sanction and eradicate GBV next to impossible. It seems that in the eyes of most Mexican citizens, even the best laws on paper are not being implemented on the ground. According to the 2015 Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE), two thirds of respondents (66%) say the law is respected little or not at all.

2.5 CIVIL SOCIETY GBV INTERVENTIONS IN MEXICO

The feminist movement in Mexico began in the early 20th century with a focus on political and economic rights. By the 1970s, the movement diversified to include sexual and reproductive rights and the eradication of VAW. In the early 2000s, several civil society organizations (CSOs) began providing services for VAW victims to fill in gaps where the GOM response was inadequate or absent, including shelters for victims, legal aid, psychological treatment, etc. The last two decades have seen CSOs take a more active role in lobbying for gender equity and GBV policy, pushing for milestones like the legalization of abortion in Mexico City and the passage of the LGAMVLV in 2007. CSOs today continue to focus on public policy advocacy, research, and monitoring and evaluation.

The LGBTIQ movement was initially a small adjacent movement of the feminist movement and it started to gain force during the 1970s and 1980s. Initial actions focused on raising awareness about sexual diversity, HIV, and the right to medical care, later incorporating transgender and queer rights, equal access to marriage, and adoption rights. Compared to CSOs that work on VAW, few CSOs work with the LGBTIQ community, and those that do tend to work primarily on issues like HIV prevention, marriage and adoption, without much of a focus on violence specifically.

In Mexico, joint CSO-GOM interventions tend to suffer from dependent relationships or non-cohesive efforts. Some Mexican CSOs depend almost entirely on public funding, but their role is to implement their own interventions without much else but financial support from the GOM. On other occasions, CSOs fill in where the GOM is lacking, offering trainings, writing reports, developing methodologies, etc., often without the credit or the funding they deserve in exchange. Some CSOs prefer working with international or academic institutions over working directly with the GOM, preferring to maintain a certain level of political independence.

There is lack of productive collaboration between CSOs and the GOM.

Recommendation 3.b.
CHAPTER 3. PUBLIC INSECURITY AND GBV IN MEXICO

Though Mexico’s current level of public insecurity is moderate compared to other Latin American countries,¹ homicide rates have grown significantly in the past two decades, a security deterioration that can be attributed to increased drug-related violence and organized crime and the lack of GOM capacity to address it.² Both the rate of victimization³ (objective insecurity) and the fear of victimization⁴ (subjective insecurity) have risen in the last five years. Impunity is also a serious obstacle to justice in Mexico: Only around one in ten crimes is reported, and of those, less than 5% reach convictions.⁵ For an analysis of public insecurity in Mexico, see Annex D.

This report utilizes two key analytical lenses: 1) a gender perspective on public insecurity and 2) an examination of GBV as a manifestation of public insecurity.

The first lens requires identifying the differential experiences, perceptions and impacts that public insecurity has on a person or a group of people based on their sex, gender identity and sexual orientation. Crimes that may appear at first glance gender neutral (i.e. everyone is affected at the same rate) may reveal important patterns that should guide policy decisions. For example, 70% of victims of car theft in Mexico City are women, indicating that women are perhaps being targeted more than men.⁷ Using this analytical lens, it becomes clear that all crime and violence (and not just GBV) could be gendered.

The second analytical lens, which defines GBV as one manifestation of public insecurity, is based on an understanding of insecurity as crime and violence that occurs both in public and in private. This is not the perspective that is currently being used to design GBV interventions in Mexico. As discussed in Chapter 2, the common understanding of GBV in Mexico is often limited to violence against women (VAW), which in practice is often limited to intimate partner violence (IPV) committed by men against women. In every interview conducted with GOM institutions, C230 Consultores asked about interventions to prevent, attend, sanction or eradicate GBV against the LGBTIQ community. The GOM responses

“The war against drugs is a whole different story from violence against women. You combat them with entirely different elements and different tools.”
- High-ranking official, SEGOB

⁶ For an analysis of public insecurity in Mexico, see Annex D.
were limited to either they do not attend that population, they have no information on that kind of violence, or it is not their responsibility. Violence against men because of their gender identity is essentially considered inconceivable.

This has led to a logical policy conclusion: the creation of laws, institutions and public interventions that heavily emphasize IPV in heterosexual relationships. It also reflects an understanding of GBV as separate from public insecurity, rather than as a manifestation thereof. This leads to a disarticulation of those institutions and legal frameworks designed to address GBV and those designed to address public insecurity (understood as homicide, robbery, kidnapping, etc.).

The current GOM understanding of GBV and public insecurity

Interventions on crime and delinquency, e.g. drug trafficking, homicide, theft, kidnapping, etc.
Example institutions: CNS, SEIDO, Secretaria de Defensa

Interventions on VAW, e.g. domestic violence in heterosexual relationships
Example institutions: INMUJERES, CONAVIM, FEVIMTRA

3.1 A GENDER PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC INSECURITY IN MEXICO

Men and women experience and perceive violence and safety differently. Worldwide, men are more likely to be victims of homicide, physical assault, and robbery, while women are overwhelmingly more likely to be victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. These trends hold true in Mexico, where victims of homicide are mostly male, making up over 88% of total homicide victims in 2014. Meanwhile, almost 80% of the victims of sexual harassment, rape and kidnapping are women. Although women in Mexico are less likely to experience most crimes (except those mentioned above), they have a slightly greater fear of crime.

Public insecurity turns both public and private spaces into hostile spaces. Private spaces (i.e. the home) were long excluded from the purview of the State, and as a result, public security institutions have tended to focus on preventing violence in public spaces. However, for many women and children, private spaces can be just as, if not more, dangerous. In Mexico, one out of two homicides of women occurs in the home, and 67% of women have experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes. Women in Mexico are also more likely than men to suffer crimes at the hands of someone they know.
Reflecting global trends, men are the majority perpetrators for all types of crime in Mexico, including homicide, domestic violence, sexual violence, human trafficking, child abuse, and organized crime. This reflects gender norms that often (though not always) define men and masculinity through violence and aggression. Though multiple masculinities may co-exist within one society, physical strength and toughness are common expectations of men. Men often commit violent acts as a means of constructing and expressing their masculinities, and violent competition between men is often used to claim and dominate territory. Therefore, public security policy in Mexico should explicitly consider theories of masculinities and the role of aggression in how many men perform their gender as a way to address crime and violence both among men and against women. Promoting non-violent masculinities, for example, could prevent GBV while also contributing to the prevention of other forms of public insecurity.

Mexican men and women change their behavior in reaction to public insecurity in different ways. This can be attributed in part to the fact that women have a greater fear of sexual aggression, which can lead to a greater fear of other crimes, stemming from the belief that any victimization has the potential to escalate into sexual assault or rape. Men and women respond differently to their subjective insecurity, and women often limit their participation in public spaces more so than men. A 2015 survey found that both men and women in Mexico perceive public streets as unsafe spaces (64% of men and 71% of women), but women are more likely than men to limit their participation in public spaces (i.e. going on walks, leaving the house at night, etc.) in response.

### 3.2 GBV AS PART OF PUBLIC INSECURITY IN MEXICO

The public policy agenda in Latin America, including in Mexico, struggles to understand GBV as part and parcel of public insecurity. There is a tendency to think of gender and GBV as “add-ons” to security policies, rather than understanding them as integral to security. GBV is considered separate from other “more important” kinds of violence, like drug-related or organized crime violence. This sentiment was repeatedly expressed by several federal, state and local GOM officials in interviews.

Beyond understanding that GBV is public insecurity, it is important to understand how different kinds of insecurity can exacerbate GBV. While there is no clear statistical evidence that proves that GBV in Mexico has increased alongside an increase in generalized public insecurity, there are enough indications to say confidently that they are deeply intertwined. Of the available literature, studies have found that GBV proliferates in societies where there is a growing use of violence and pervasive impunity. GBV not only increases in prevalence, but also in intensity. As violence related to organized crime has become more common and more visible in the last decade in Mexico, the forms of VAW have become...
increasingly crueler: the percentages of murders of women committed with firearms, explosives, and sharp weapons have increased over time.

A 2012 study commissioned by CONAVIM found that when homicides of men increase in certain municipalities, one year later the rate of change in homicides of women increases drastically. While the number of men killed continues to far outpace the number of women killed, as more men are killed, the risk of women being killed the following year increases. It is unclear, however, whether this is due to natural population growth or to an increase in organized crime violence.

Northeastern states that have been heavily afflicted by organized crime in recent years (Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas) have seen the risk of homicide for women jump up more than 400% from 2001 to 2010. Northwestern states (Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sinaloa and Sonora), which have been battling high rates of generalized insecurity, have seen the risk of homicide for women increase by 200% in the same period.

The study also found that there is a “contagion” effect of VAW: municipalities with a rise in the rate of homicides of women begin to “infect” neighboring municipalities, who pick up on this rise in VAW. One of the authors of this study has pointed out that this relationship is not necessarily directly causal, and that there is no hard evidence currently available on how GBV and public insecurity are related.

In the public agenda for security policy in Mexico, GBV has largely taken a backseat to the war on drugs and organized crime. The prioritization of combatting organized crime (and the consequent lack of attention paid to GBV) is reflected in public budgets, the training of police and security personnel, and the incomplete implementation of GBV laws. Several experts say that the problem has simply not been deemed important enough to merit up-to-date data collection and analysis, ongoing monitoring and evaluation of GOM interventions, an increase in funding, or the full attention of the security sector. In other words, the political discourse surrounding the importance of VAW tends to be just that, discourse.

Applying a gender perspective to any public policy, let alone to public security, is not a straightforward task. Because of that, it can be easier for justice operators to ignore gender: it is much simpler to categorize the homicide of a woman as the unfortunate side effect of organized crime than it is to understand the deeply embedded social structures that led to her death. Investigating and prosecuting femicides is more complicated and politically-charged than simply investigating these deaths as homicides. As a result, the gender component may be erased.

In a context in which fighting organized crime is the main mission, security forces may think of GBV as a distraction, even when there are laws and protocols that on paper say VAW (if not GBV) is important. For example, some CSOs say that women who call to report domestic violence are often ignored or thought of as less urgent than other crimes. The lack of a police response can even end up...
empowering aggressors, who see there are no repercussions to their violent actions. This impunity will be explored further in Chapter 5. Critics point out that the police are not often being trained to handle GBV. So, even when they do take the call and intervene, they sometimes do so to the detriment of the victim, returning her to a dangerous situation of domestic violence “for the sake of the family unit.”

Furthermore, it is sometimes the very same public officials who should be ensuring public security who are the perpetrators of GBV. As a result of efforts to combat organized crime, Mexico has experienced a vast expansion of military and police presence. Although this expansion was intended to guarantee public safety, because security officers in Mexico are often perpetrators of VAW, the militarization of public spaces can create unsafe situations for women and LGBTIQ people. In 2010, this was highlighted in two landmark Corte IDH rulings that identified a permissive culture of VAW and sexual torture within the Mexican military (see Annex E). If the expansion of the military and police presence had been designed with a gender perspective, however, it may have been able to account for this risk and the lack of trust that women and LGBTIQ people have for security officers. This was an oversight of the GOM response to organized crime and drug trafficking with real consequences for GBV.

GBV (and in particular VAW) is the persistent partner and often “invisible” manifestation of other forms of public insecurity, particularly organized crime. The constant reproduction of violent images tied to organized crime in the news media, as well as in mass media forms like “narcocorridos” or “telenovelas,” normalizes violence. In these situations, GBV becomes more invisible: alongside shocking public executions, mass graves and killings of mayors and other public figures, GBV is made to seem “mundane” and “business as usual.”

Though the data is limited, there are certain factors that appear to exacerbate and facilitate GBV, including the increasingly visible and extreme use of force and generalized violence, the normalization thereof and the persistence of impunity. Given that these factors are present in Mexico, it is safe to assume that GBV in Mexico has increased alongside a similar growth in organized crime.

**CONCLUSION**

Analyzing public insecurity with a gender perspective shifts how policymakers and civil society should intervene to prevent crime and violence, to ensure access to justice and to guarantee human rights. For example, if men are both the most frequent perpetrators and victims of most kinds of violence in Mexico, this sends an important signal about the role of masculinities in the perpetuation of public insecurity as well as the need for a greater analysis of the vulnerabilities that men face. A transversal gender perspective is essential to any public security policy, as are tailored interventions that specifically address GBV as part of public insecurity.
CHAPTER 4. CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

At the turn of the millennium, Mexican security policy began incorporating prevention into its citizen security policies, inviting a more comprehensive set of public and private actors to participate in social crime and violence prevention (see Annex D). A broad-based gender perspective on crime and violence prevention entails understanding the vulnerabilities, risk factors and types of crime and violence experienced by men and women. For example, youth unemployment is commonly considered a risk factor for recruitment into organized crime groups. However, when you break this down by gender, the facts are counterintuitive: Though the vast majority (97%) of youth who are charged for crimes related to organized crime are young men, the majority of the unemployed youth population is made up of young women. It is clear, then, that the relationship between unemployment and participation in organized crime is not straightforward. Gender is a key variable to consider in prevention policies that address this relationship.

This chapter focuses on the prevention of GBV as a subset of broader crime and violence prevention. It begins with an analysis of international GBV prevention, followed by a review of interventions in the home, the school and the community.

4.1 A REVIEW OF GBV PREVENTION STRATEGIES

Evidence-based studies on the effectiveness of GBV prevention interventions are few and far between, particularly in developing countries. Of those studies that do exist, methodological limitations like absence of control groups, selection bias, and short evaluation periods make their findings largely inconclusive. Long-term impacts like transformations of social behaviors are not only hard to identify and link back to an initial intervention, but also costly to measure. Lack of reliable and standardized data on the prevalence of GBV also gets in the way of researchers measuring how a particular intervention has (or has not) affected actual rates of violence (beyond measuring changes in attitudes). As a result, much of the available evidence on effective (and ineffective) GBV prevention interventions is mostly anecdotal. That said, the available evidence suggests the following factors can contribute to the success of a prevention intervention:

- **A solid foundation built on gender theory.** Successful prevention seeks to tackle the underlying causes of violence and reduce risk factors rather than simply providing information or creating empathy for victims.
- **A comprehensive perspective.** Coordinated initiatives that address both individual risk factors and structural issues (like legal and policy frameworks) are more effective in tackling GBV. One example is a community-based program...
That combines training teachers for early GBV detection with public awareness campaigns. This is most effective when there is an institution responsible for ensuring that these efforts are complementary.

- **Targeted.** Prevention programs that target a certain type of violence, age group, and culture show the best results. For example, school-based programs designed for a specific age group and for certain types of violence experienced at that age (e.g. dating violence or bullying) are the most effective.\(^9\)

- **Long-term.** Long-term interventions are ideal,\(^10\) though the exact duration depends on the type of intervention and target audience. Children tend to need longer and more intensive programs than adults.\(^11\) Short-term interventions can be risky due to the potential to create a backlash because of sudden shifts in power dynamics between men and women and the lack of follow-up.\(^12\)

- **Integration with other development programs.** Embedding GBV prevention into other interventions, particularly those that are gender-related (e.g. HIV, sexual and reproductive health, livelihoods programs) has worked in certain contexts. Addressing only GBV does not produce the same information intake and application as addressing it as an integral part of development.\(^13\)

- **Mixed-gender.** Recent trends in GBV prevention have transitioned away from women-only interventions to broader approaches intended to transform social norms and systems of gender inequality, including both men and women.\(^14\) Most successful interventions combine mixed-gender and single-gender activities, depending on the topic being discussed.\(^15\) Another new direction in GBV prevention is working with men on building non-violent masculinities.

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**Box 4.1: GBV prevention through “healthy masculinities”**

Addressing harmful masculinities can be a way to prevent social violence and GBV, especially because some traditional notions of masculinity are linked with greater risk and perpetration of violence.\(^16\) There is a growing acknowledgment that men and boys cannot be left out of the conversation.\(^17\) Some interventions work with men to change both their gender identities (i.e. the way they see themselves as men) and their gendered practices (e.g. the use of violence, sexual practices, etc.). A 2014 study on engaging men for GBV prevention found that the most successful interventions are gender transformative, promoting more equitable relationships, using affirmative messages, encouraging men to reflect on costs of hegemonic masculinity for both men and women, and recognizing men’s diverse life experiences.\(^18\) Engaging boys and men in practical activities that can teach through modeled behavior can be more effective than workshops that emphasize theory.\(^19\)

It is important to create communication and accountability channels between these interventions and those that work with women in order to create positive feedback loops.\(^20\)

In 2014, with the support of USAID/Mexico, the Monterrey-based CSO Pro Superación Familiar Neolonesa A. C. (known as Supera) began piloting Jóvenes por la Equidad, a model to address young men and their relationship with violence. It consists of a four-month-long intervention in high-risk communities, including health and public service fairs, sports and arts, and healthy masculinity and non-violence workshops. The timing of the activities is strategic: mural painting, hip-hop workshops, and movie nights are planned in the afternoons and evenings, when young men might otherwise participate in violent or illegal activities.\(^21\) A 2015 evaluation showed a positive relationship between participation in the program and positive attitudes towards gender equality and non-violent masculinities.
Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico

which in turn, lowers the risk factors of these young men participating in delinquency.\(^{22}\)

### 4.2 GBV PREVENTION IN MEXICO

In the context of GBV, the typology of prevention is different from that used for other kinds of crime and violence prevention. Primary prevention of GBV refers to interventions that aim to stop violence before it takes place. It is considered the most effective form of prevention but also the most difficult to achieve.\(^{24}\) Secondary prevention or *ex post facto* prevention of GBV refers to both mitigating the immediate consequences of abuse by providing victims with services and preventing the recurrence of violence by working with perpetrators.\(^{25}\) Tertiary prevention of GBV refers to interventions that reduce long-term trauma and provide long-term follow-up for high-risk perpetrators, like sex offenders.\(^{26}\)

**Typology of GBV prevention\(^{27}\)**

In Mexico, public GBV prevention interventions are mainly concentrated in the security, health, and education sectors. Although these interventions are supposed to be interinstitutional, they tend to be designed and operated within each sector separately. Interviews with the GOM indicate that GBV prevention is often fragmented between agencies, and there is a lack of coordination to avoid duplicating efforts. There also tends to be a lack of collaboration between the GOM and CSOs who are working on GBV prevention, as described in Chapter 2.

With the exception of a few public information campaigns and workshops like those of PRONAPRED, most GOM interventions for GBV focus on secondary prevention, or *ex post facto* prevention, including counseling victims and/or aggressors to stop the cycle of violence in the short-term. C230 Consultores found no examples of tertiary prevention – that is long-term care for victims and perpetrators – in Mexico.

**Box 4.2: PRONAPRED and primary GBV prevention**

PRONAPRED funds “skills and values” prevention workshops for youth (primarily on sex education) and women (primarily on topics like VAW, empowerment and human rights), representing 10% of the program’s total budget. The workshops vary in length from less than a month to eight months, though empirical studies have shown that longer interventions are more effective. These interventions have not been evaluated to measure whether they prevent GBV. One criticism of PRONAPRED is that the burden of prevention is often placed on women, whether intentionally or not, as most of the programs that address VAW under PRONAPRED are directed towards women as victims, while few programs work directly with men (who are most often the aggressors). Also, some activities funded under PRONAPRED may be gender insensitive, reinforcing stereotypes. For
example, Zumba classes are offered to women, while sports activities are offered to men.\textsuperscript{28}

One of the most common \textit{ex post facto} prevention strategies in Mexico is re-education programs for aggressors, though there is little evidence to prove they are working. These interventions focus on maintaining the integrity of the family by rehabilitating aggressors so they can return without violent behavior, although many argue this fails to prioritize the safety of individual victims.\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ex post facto} interventions like this are particularly limited when it comes to youth victims and aggressors, many of whom lack access to and face discrimination from the relevant GOM authorities.\textsuperscript{30} Broadly speaking, a review of multiple studies of GBV prevention interventions worldwide found that most \textit{ex post facto} interventions with aggressors have had relatively little success in reducing recidivism, and many report high attrition rates.\textsuperscript{31} There is also an international tendency to move away from \textit{ex post facto} interventions, which tend to be short-term and limited in scope, and towards transformative primary prevention, which seeks to address root causes of GBV before violence begins.\textsuperscript{32}

Aside from re-education programs, most prevention interventions in Mexico focus on victim-centered services, seeking to end the cycle of violence (particularly in cases of family-based violence and IPV) through a combination of psychosocial counseling,\textsuperscript{33} skills and employment programs, and legal services. Prevention is one of the pillars of the CJM model according to the CJM Methodological Handbook, which lists activities like data collection and analysis, educational programs, public awareness campaigns and citizen participation as prevention.\textsuperscript{34} However, in practice, there are few reports of these activities being implemented, and no evaluation thereof. As a whole, CJMs are more focused on providing immediate attention to adult victims than on preventing future violence.

One area of opportunity that would combine primary prevention with \textit{ex post facto} prevention is to address children and youth witnesses and victims of GBV who are known to be at higher risk for perpetrating or experiencing GBV in the future. Prevention interventions with children and youth are essential to avoiding intergenerational transmission of violence.\textsuperscript{35} Internationally, most interventions that address this population are located within the health sector, involving a combination of psychological treatment and behavioral therapy.\textsuperscript{36} In Mexico, the at-risk population of children and youth is largely unattended, with the exception of certain limited services available at the \textit{Desarrollo Integral de la Familia} (DIF). Though CJMs are supposed to offer spaces and care for children, in practice, they often fall short of this goal. The CJF in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, for example, has a recreational area with games and activities under the supervision of a child educator, but it is designed for young children and there are no spaces for adolescents. There is a sense that this recreational area mostly serves as a distraction and a space to keep children “out of the way,” rather than as a space to address the needs of children and adolescents as victims themselves or as witnesses to violence.\textsuperscript{37}
Like the GOM, Mexican CSOs also tend to focus on \textit{ex post facto} prevention and victims’ services. Some emphasize women’s empowerment (i.e. livelihoods programs) as a pathway to exit violent, economically-dependent relationships.\textsuperscript{38} Public awareness campaigns are common among advocacy and human rights organizations, like Amnesty International.\textsuperscript{39} Some CSOs offer short-term prevention workshops (on topics like peaceful conflict resolution), primarily aimed at youth and women.\textsuperscript{40} Mexican citizens often trust CSOs implicitly more than certain GOM institutions. Because of this, CSOs often have greater access to at-risk and victimized populations. However, the dearth of stable funding sources means most CSOs are limited to short-term interventions without monitoring and evaluation.

\section*{4.3 SITES OF GBV PREVENTION}

In the line with USAID/Mexico’s prevention programming, this section focuses on three sites of intervention: the home, the school and the community. These sites are important staging grounds for prevention of GBV among children and youth, who tend to be more receptive to changes in attitudes and behaviors than adults.\textsuperscript{41}

\subsection*{4.3.1 Home-based GBV prevention}

Home-based interventions have the potential to target risk factors associated with multiple types of GBV, including child abuse and intimate partner violence (IPV). Also, witnessing violence during childhood has been found to be one of the major risk factors for future victimization or perpetration.\textsuperscript{42} However, as an intervention site, the home is one of the hardest to access, as it is seen as a private space.

In Mexico, national and state DIFs are among the public institutions that work directly with families. However, the capacity of DIF is limited because its legal framework is directed towards \textit{ex post facto} service provision and does not include primary prevention. Some DIFs have also been criticized for favoring reconciliation and mediation to preserve the family unit, rather than to prevent future violence.\textsuperscript{43}

In the health sector, nurses and doctors are trained to detect VAW and provide specialized healthcare after violence has occurred. In rural areas, some CSOs that offer health-based programs have had success in intervening to identify and address IPV in the home with community health promoters.\textsuperscript{44}

The police also work with families, although they are rarely trained to facilitate prevention of GBV. Traditional understandings of municipal police see their role as limited to patrolling public spaces, but more recent approaches have begun to incorporate police into more proactive prevention models, particularly through building trust and communication with community members to help them identify risk factors and detect conflicts before they can escalate.\textsuperscript{45} The most successful interventions to train police to prevent GBV include not only on-the-street police,
but also high-ranking officials and decision-makers. These interventions work best when they are on-going training programs, preferably taught by fellow police officers in collaboration with social workers or other professionals. Proactive arrests of aggressors in cases of IPV (as opposed to issuing citations or warnings) have mixed results: only sometimes do they reduce recidivism.

Community policing is currently being piloted in Mexico, and an optional 2012 public security protocol provides guidelines for how police should intervene ex post facto in cases of VAW. Some police have been reluctant to intervene in “private” matters like domestic violence and have emphasized conciliation and mediation to keep families “intact” rather than focusing on prevention of violence. There is an important area of opportunity to reinforce the role of police in prevention.

In addition to police intervention, some examples of home-based GBV prevention around the world, which could serve as innovative models for Mexico, include:

**Healthy child-parent relationships.** Interventions that focus on child-parent relationships are intended to prevent child abuse, contributing to long-term GBV and public insecurity prevention. Early childhood is a stage where individuals learn about important problem-solving and emotional management skills, as well as gender roles and the acceptability of violence. Some promising strategies include parent training programs that include lessons on positive reinforcement, non-violent disciplinary techniques, problem-solving and behavior management skills.

**Early childhood home visitation.** These programs send nurses or mid-wives directly into homes of pregnant women or families with newborns as a prevention strategy. Pregnancy and post-partum are periods of greater and more direct contact with public institutions, so nurses and mid-wives can provide personalized care to help new parents and to identify warning signs and situations of violence before they escalate. The home visitors can offer training on parenting and child development, intervene in crises and link families with other service providers. Home visitation interventions have had some success in preventing violence in the United States and in Europe. In Mexico, this kind of intervention has been attempted informally in rural areas, with an emphasis on childhood nutrition and violence prevention (see Annex F for more information).

**Gender equitable parenting.** Fatherhood has become an important way to engage men in challenging unequal gender norms and values. Often, fathers face social and institutional contexts that restrict their role to providing economic support, excluding them from other caregiving activities. Interventions addressing parenting can range from one-on-one training of new fathers to policy reforms to extend paternity leave, change healthcare systems, or offer day-care services for working fathers. However, the link between these interventions and GBV prevention is weak, and results have been mixed or inconclusive.
4.3.2 School-based GBV prevention

The education system is a key site for GBV prevention. Working with a captive audience of children and adolescents in schools can shape the socialization of gender and violence from a young age. Schools can be safe spaces to build support networks for GBV victims and to intervene in the critical years in which children and youth form their identities. Schools are also key sites to address masculinities as they are spaces within which peer violence is present, patterns of aggression and hierarchies among men are established, social norms around sexual orientations are reinforced, and power relationships between teachers and students model important positive (and negative) behaviors.

Bullying in schools is often gendered, as described in Chapter 2. This disproportionately affects LGBTIQ youth, many of whom are coming out at vulnerable moments in middle school and high school. This kind of bullying includes both direct aggressions as well as exposure to homophobic language and messages, which can be reinforced by the inaction of authority figures in schools. Many school-based interventions seek to change school cultures by promoting respect, encouraging peer support for victims and rejection of aggressive attitudes. For example, Gay-Straight Alliances and similar student clubs are promising ways to provide support to students and to build broader awareness of sexual diversity.

Successful interventions engage both teachers and students in examining their own views and experiences with gender and violence. The most effective programs are age-appropriate. For early childhood, key components include educating children about different kinds of touch, self-esteem, and self-protection strategies. For high school and university students, dating violence and rape prevention interventions are common. Separating boys and girls in these interventions tends to produce better prevention results.

Most school-based prevention in Mexico focuses on incorporating a broad gender perspective into general anti-violence curricula (see Annex F). A review of school-based interventions shows a positive effect in raising awareness and changing attitudes on dating violence and rape (when compared to control groups). However, these interventions resulted in little or no change in rates of perpetration, i.e. changing attitudes in the short term does not automatically translate into changing behaviors. Another critique is that these interventions tend to be theory-orientated, with few skills-building components to help students react to and deal with conflicts and build healthy relationships in practice.

4.3.3 Community-based GBV prevention

Community-based GBV prevention is common in developing countries, though formal evaluations of these interventions are scarce. Some attempt to empower women or strengthen their economic positioning in a given community, while
others aim to change broader structural elements that facilitate GBV. The latter can include interventions to change gender norms or modify environmental design with a gender perspective. Community-based prevention is most effective when it pairs broader awareness campaigns with community participation in the design, implementation and evaluation of interventions.\(^6^7\)

**Public awareness campaigns.** Public awareness campaigns intend to create gradual long-term changes. In the short-term, they have little impact, but in the long-run, if well-designed, they can reach large audiences and contribute to shifting gender attitudes and behaviors.\(^6^8\) It is still unclear whether or not interventions that seek to raise awareness and change beliefs about gender as a means to prevent GBV are, in fact, preventing GBV. The relationships between gender attitudes and behaviors are complex and often bidirectional, so cultural interventions are difficult to predict and manage.\(^6^9\) Public information campaigns are primarily effective in changing individuals’ knowledge, attitudes, and social norms regarding IPV and sexual violence, but not necessarily in reducing rates of GBV.\(^7^0\) Therefore, they must be complemented by other strategies designed to change behaviors.\(^7^1\)

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**Box 4.3: Violentómetro**

In 2009, INMUJERES and the Instituto Politécnico Nacional designed the Violentómetro, a public awareness campaign to prevent GBV.\(^7^2\) It involves the public display of a “ruler” that lists a progression of 30 violent actions, ranging from hurtful jokes and blackmail to rape and homicide. They are categorized into stages of violence, and warn the public to 1) be careful, 2) react to stop the violence and 3) seek professional assistance.\(^7^3\) The idea is that visualizing stages of violence will help people recognize and prevent violence. The Violentómetro has been displayed on the campus of universities and GOM offices in Mexico City.

The Violentómetro has been praised for promoting awareness, but it has not been rigorously evaluated. One study with a sample of 26 students found that the Violentómetro was being used primarily as a tool for *ex post facto* prevention to help viewers identify violence in their own lives or violence being experienced by friends and family.\(^7^4\)

Some primary prevention interventions targeted to Latin American youth outside of school spaces have utilized social networks (i.e. YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) to send positive messages regarding healthy, non-violent dating relationships,\(^7^5\) while others have used theater and creative expression to model what a violent relationship looks like compared to a non-violent one.\(^7^6\) Most of these interventions focus on heterosexual romantic relationships between young people, and little is targeted towards LGBTIQ relationships or towards same-sex peer friendships.

**Public health interventions.** Health care providers are often the first point of contact for victims of GBV. Training health care agents to identify and respond to cases of GBV, as well as lead community prevention efforts, has been shown to
improve the identification of IPV, which can prevent future violent events and provide victims with referral and risk assessment options.\footnote{77}

In 2009, then President Calderón issued Executive Norm NOM-046-SSA2-2005\footnote{78} to establish health sector criteria for the detection, prevention, care and counseling for victims of VAW. NOM 046 obligates health workers to provide emergency contraception, inform victims of abortion options (if legal in a given state) and guarantee this service if required, as well as report cases of family or sexual violence to Ministerios Públicos (MPs) along specific guidelines. The Secretaría de Salud (SSA) is in charge of implementing NOM-046, and has published a handbook with guidelines on how to conduct a risk assessment and construct security plans for victims.\footnote{79} Early detection can prevent violence from escalating. However, C230 Consultores was unable to find systematic monitoring or evaluation of the NOM-046 and how effective it has been in preventing GBV.

**Community empowerment and mobilization.** Some interventions work with community members as “agents of change” through participatory processes and advocacy to change gender norms and relevant policies in their communities. This might include citizen observatories, advocacy campaigns, community outreach, and neighborhood watches, and so on. Community-based interventions can both prevent GBV and create social capital in high-risk communities, thereby contributing to the prevention of other forms of social crime and violence.\footnote{80} Community leadership is important to the sustainability of these interventions: the success of community empowerment programs often hinges on the quality of the facilitators and requires long-term follow up.\footnote{81} It is important to involve both women and men in community-based interventions so as to avoid backlash effects that respond to changing power dynamics and gender roles in the community.\footnote{82}

**Improving the safety of urban environments.** Public spaces, like streets, plazas and parks, are not always safe spaces, especially for women.\footnote{83} Some GBV prevention strategies focus on upgrading urban environments to make them safer (or at least feel safer), including improved street lighting, gender-segregated public transportation, and passing local ordinances against street harassment.\footnote{84} This kind of crime prevention through environmental design (abbreviated as CPTED) is limited as a GBV prevention strategy because it targets violence in public spaces, generally perpetrated by strangers, leaving out the majority of victims of GBV, who often face violence in private or semi-private spaces.\footnote{85} In other words, it may be difficult to prevent GBV through a tool like CPTED.\footnote{86}

Interestingly, CPTED interventions like street lighting are often perceived by women as effective, even when data on crime rates do not show improvement.\footnote{87} In other words, CPTED could lead to an improvement in subjective security, even when not necessarily matched by an increase in objective security. Similarly, other studies have identified certain spaces, like bathrooms, changing rooms,
transportation, and other sex-segregated spaces, as key to creating inclusivity and safety for LGBTIQ people, in particular transgender people, though this research remains scarce in Mexico. These findings point to the hypothesis that an improvement in subjective security for women and LGBTIQ people could be a strategy to encourage their fuller participation in public spaces.

Box 4.4: Creating safe spaces in Mexican cities
With support from USAID/Mexico, Gente Diversa, a CSO that works to empower women, has implemented a local branch of the international initiative “Safe Cities Free of Violence against Women and Girls” in Baja California, Mexico. Gente Diversa began detecting high-risk public spaces and advocating for better safety in these locations with local authorities. Based on a similar experience in Tijuana, Gente Diversa developed a handbook for GBV and social violence prevention that has been used in Ensenada and Mexicali, Baja California. Each city created its own agenda and all three participate in a state-wide network for knowledge exchange. An evaluation of Safe Cities reported positive results, but quantitative indicators were limited to the number of workshops and training sessions held. Improvements in qualitative variables like “social cohesion” and the self-perceived “social strength of women” were reported based on surveys of female participants. The long-term impact of the Safe Cities program in Mexico has yet to be evaluated.

In another urban GBV prevention intervention almost a decade ago, Mexico City launched Viajemos Seguras, a public-private program to provide women with safe and violence-free public transportation options. It includes women-only “pink” buses, taxis and Metro cars, a program to train public transport operators, and special units for VAW victims in highly-transited Metro stations (a program which continues today). While women-only taxis and buses have been less successful in meeting the female demand for transportation, creating gender-segregated wagons on trains and buses has been more viable and sustainable. INMUJERES reports that this intervention has reduced reports of sexual harassment cases on the Metro from five a day to one a day.

CONCLUSION
GBV prevention interventions in Mexico are not taking advantage of the full range of prevention strategies available. The overwhelming focus on ex post facto, secondary, prevention, which by itself has not proven to be particularly effective, is short-sighted and ignores the question of how to prevent violence before it begins. These interventions should be complemented by primary prevention, which could be implemented by the same stakeholders (including CJMs, police, healthcare providers and CSOs) that currently offer ex post facto care and attention to victims and aggressors. Primary prevention should focus on intervening in key sites for childhood and youth development. This could include home visitation programs to encourage healthy parent-child relationships and school-based workshops that focus on practical non-violence skills and address targeted forms of GBV such as dating violence. Broader structural approaches, including creating safer urban spaces for all citizens, public awareness campaigns and community empowerment, are also promising. USAID/Mexico and its partners should support prevention interventions that are based on a strong understanding of gender, that can be folded into other crime and violence prevention activities (understanding GBV as part of public insecurity), and that intend to be gender transformative.
CHAPTER 5. RULE OF LAW

5.1 IMPUNITY AND GBV

According to the 2015 Global Impunity Index, Mexico ranks second worst in impunity of the 59 countries studied. As of 2015, only around one in ten crimes is reported in Mexico, and of those, only 4.5% reach convictions. In other words, there is around a 95% rate of impunity on reported crimes, and less than 1% of crimes are punished. Impunity is notable for GBV crimes, which can be attributed to three problems: 1) underreporting of GBV, 2) an inadequate legal framework (particularly when it comes to LGBTIQ people), and 3) lax implementation of the existing legal framework. These three problems are self-reinforcing: lax implementation can lead to distrust in public institutions, which can lead to underreporting. Underreporting leads to underestimation of the gravity of the problem, which in turn reduces the pressure upon GOM to undertake the necessary legal and political reforms.

Widespread impunity means there is little to no consequence for perpetrators of GBV, thereby sending the message that such violence is tolerated. Impunity creates distrust in public authorities when reported crimes face no repercussions. It comes as no surprise, then, that only one of every ten female victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) in Mexico has sought help from public institutions.

5.2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM AND GBV

In June 2008, Mexico passed a Constitutional criminal justice reform, mandating the transition from the inquisitorial legal system to an accusatorial model. In broad terms, the accusatorial model relies on the presumption of innocence, high-quality evidence, and oral testimony, elements that are thought to create the conditions for more efficient, accessible and transparent justice. Early results of the transition to the new criminal justice system seem positive (see Annex D).

However, the system is still not fully functional just a few months away from the constitutionally-mandated deadline of June 2016. In many cases, state and federal secondary legislation are still awaiting approval, so as of May 2016, the reform has only been fully adopted in six states. Also, some critics worry the reform is limited because the justice operators from the previous criminal justice system are the same operators under the new system. In other words, the game changes, but the players do not. Training operators in new procedures and in their implications for the accused and for the victim is, therefore, essential. Unfortunately, while the majority of MPs (88%) have been trained, only 5% of judges nationwide have.

The reform is an important opportunity to improve access to justice in Mexico, but
without proper training, resources, and the application of a gender perspective in the justice sector, the new system could potentially have negative implications for victims of GBV. The presumption of innocence is a hallmark and a sign of progress of the new criminal justice system in Mexico, but it also necessitates highly-trained police officers, medical and forensic examiners, MPs, defense lawyers and judges, as well as technical and financial resources for the collection and analysis of the evidence needed to meet the higher burden of proof. This was a concern expressed repeatedly by both the GOM and CSOs during interviews.  

What follows is a summary of the obstacles that GBV victims will likely face under the new system. It is organized chronologically, from the moment a victim reports a crime to the legal proceeding to sentencing and reparations. The analysis is from the point-of-view of the victim, so concerns regarding the accused are excluded.

5.3 REPORTING A CRIME

5.3.1 Deciding whether or not to report crimes and press charges
As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of crimes – and particularly GBV-related crimes – go unreported in Mexico. Shame, fear, misinformation about the legal process, and distrust of authorities all play into the decision of whether or not a GBV victim reports a crime. Most victims do not even make it to this first step.

Pressing charges should not always be the first choice for a GBV victim, depending on the particularities of their situation. For example, some victims may first need safe shelter or medical attention or psychological treatment. However, first-contact officers often pressure victims to press charges, sending the (false) message that it is the only way to gain access to other services. On the flipside, there are also reports of justice operators pressuring victims not to press charges, emphasizing the negative consequences of doing so, like “breaking up the family.”

Most GBV victims are entering into a justice system about which they know little. The Ley General de Victims (LGV) establishes the figure of the legal adviser to accompany victims throughout the process, but the responsibility for training and managing these advisers is unclear. Most states have yet to create this figure.

5.3.2 Revictimization
When victims do decide to press charges, they are often revictimized by discriminatory treatment, inadequate infrastructure (including safe, fully-equipped facilities, trained personnel, and resources to process reports), and lengthy, expensive legal processes. Pressing charges for any crime is a long and slow process, but GBV crimes are often considered less of a priority to investigate and prosecute. The process begins with a formal statement to an MP, followed by medical and psychological tests and treatment, as necessary. Wait times are long (up to multiple days), and victims are at risk for revictimization, largely because

The new criminal justice system requires proper training, resources and the application of a gender perspective in order to ensure access to justice.

Pressing charges is a complicated decision, and victims are often pressured to decide without understanding the implications.

Recommendation 9.b.

“Maybe the victim’s biggest problem isn’t the legal problem, but it’s the only one we currently know how to deal with.”
- Special Prosecutor, FEVIMTRA

Revictimization is common because of lack of infrastructure, trained personnel and technical resources.

Recommendation 9.b.
justice operators are rarely trained\(^\text{25}\) in how to use a gender perspective in the investigations and prosecutions of crimes related to GBV. The lack of knowledge of legal frameworks regarding GBV,\(^\text{26}\) as well as the lack of sensitivity\(^\text{27}\) and awareness of the special needs of GBV victims (like providing emotional support, childcare facilities, reintegration mechanisms, etc.)\(^\text{28}\) means that reporting a crime is often painful and scary.\(^\text{29}\) Victims often face skeptical MPs and investigators, who either refuse to believe their testimony or fall into victim blaming based on the victim’s clothing, sexual history, perceived adherence to gender norms, etc.\(^\text{30}\) There are no mandatory protocols on GBV for justice operators, which places victims at risk for revictimization and prevents the collection of standardized data on the prevalence and characteristics of GBV reported.\(^\text{31}\)

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<th>Box 5.1. AMPEVIS in Ecatepec, State of Mexico</th>
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<td>In the 1980s, Mexico City created the Agencia Especializada para Delitos Sexuales (AEDS) within the Ministerio Público, setting a precedent for MPs that specialize in VAW that has since been replicated across Mexico in the state-run Agencias del Ministerio Público Especializada en Violencia Intrafamiliar y Sexual (known as AMPEVISs).(^\text{32})</td>
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However, largely because of a dearth of capacity (in terms of personnel, funding and technical resources), the AMPEVISs are largely inefficient and overloaded. Revictimization is common, and given the institutional design of the AMPEVIS, even seems inevitable.\(^\text{33}\) In the State of Mexico, there are 15 AMPEVISs, which are supposed to serve all 125 municipalities in the state.\(^\text{34}\) Some victims have to travel across the state to reach an AMPEVIS, and even when they get there, they are unlikely to receive the services they need, and may have to travel again to reach another GOM institution, like DIF. Victims often have to go to multiple sites and repeat their testimonies multiple times. For example, at the AMPEVIS in Ecatepec, there are only four MPs trained to handle cases of VAW. The AMPEVIS receives around 80 cases a day, which exceeds the capacity of the current personnel to handle the high demand.\(^\text{35}\) The AMPEVIS in Ecatepec only has two part-time external psychologists available, who are not physically in the same facilities as the MPs. There are also no medical professionals available for victims.

AMPEVIS should be equipped with special facilities that offer privacy and safety to victims and their families.\(^\text{36}\) However, the physical spaces of AMPEVIS are often uncomfortable and exposed. In Ecatepec, the four MPs are seated in the middle of the Prosecutor’s Office without privacy, and there is no dedicated space for children, so they often have to sit in the same space while their caretaker describes the violence they have experienced.

After reporting a crime, victims are often at risk for retaliation from their aggressors. In terms of physical safety, options for victims are limited. According to LGAMVLV, the GOM should guarantee the availability of shelters (secure spaces that offer free housing, clothing and food, as well as medical, legal, psychological and educational and job training services) for victims for up to three months.\(^\text{37}\) Nationwide, there are 72 short-term and medium-term public and private shelters.\(^\text{38}\)

### 5.3.3 Protection orders

Protection orders, a mechanism established in the LGAMVLV to provide urgent measures to protect victims from further violence, are rarely utilized.\(^\text{39}\) One study found that from January 2011 to June 2012, only 7% of VAW victims were issued

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\(^\text{25}\) Justice operators are rarely trained in how to use a gender perspective in the investigations and prosecutions of crimes related to GBV.

\(^\text{26}\) The lack of knowledge of legal frameworks regarding GBV.

\(^\text{27}\) As well as the lack of sensitivity.

\(^\text{28}\) Awareness of the special needs of GBV victims.

\(^\text{29}\) Reporting a crime is often painful and scary.

\(^\text{30}\) There are no mandatory protocols on GBV for justice operators.

\(^\text{31}\) Places victims at risk for revictimization and prevents the collection of standardized data.

\(^\text{32}\) In the 1980s, Mexico City created the Agencia Especializada para Delitos Sexuales (AEDS) within the Ministerio Público, setting a precedent for MPs that specialize in VAW.

\(^\text{33}\) Revictimization is common.

\(^\text{34}\) In the State of Mexico, there are 15 AMPEVISs.

\(^\text{35}\) The AMPEVIS receives around 80 cases a day.

\(^\text{36}\) AMPEVIS should be equipped with special facilities.

\(^\text{37}\) Nationwide, there are 72 shelters.

\(^\text{38}\) Nationwide, there are 72 short-term and medium-term public and private shelters.

\(^\text{39}\) Protection orders, a mechanism established in the LGAMVLV, are rarely utilized.
orders. It seems that many victims and justice operators simply do not know protection orders exist. According to interviews conducted by C230 Consultores with justice operators, there is widespread confusion about how to request and apply protection orders because there are no clear national guidelines and each state designs their own (often incomplete) processes. Even when an order is emitted, there is often a lack of police and other security personnel to ensure the victim’s safety. The inability of the justice system to keep victims safe after reporting a crime contributes to distrust of the GOM.

There seems to be a lack of creativity in the design of most protection orders: most justice operators assume that restraining orders and police patrols are the only options. The design problem goes all the way back to the LGAMVLV, which says protection orders can last for up to a maximum of 72 hours, while UN Women recommends protection orders should be permanent until a judge determines there is no risk for the victim. Orders should also ideally be designed with the specific victim’s needs in mind. For example, according to an interview with FEVIMTRA, one victim simply asked that her parking spot be changed so her boss, who had sexually assaulted her at workplace, would no longer park next to her every day. FEVIMTRA arranged for a change in her parking situation — a measure that did not require full police surveillance or anything too complicated to provide.

5.3.4 Dropping the charges
According to interviews with justice operators and CSOs, many victims who initially report crimes wind up retracting their complaints or dropping the charges. This phenomenon can be attributed to a number of factors, including lack of knowledge about the process and potential repercussions of reporting a crime, revictimization by authorities, fear of retaliation from the aggressor (particularly in cases of domestic violence or IPV), economic dependency on the aggressor, and social pressure by family and friends to drop charges. This has important implications for impunity. Often the only proof against a suspect is the oral testimony of the victim, so when she or he decides to retract the statement or drop charges, there is no longer a case to be made against the suspect. This can also create a vicious cycle in which authorities do not support victims reporting GBV because they assume they will drop the charges, anyway.

5.4 DUE PROCESS

5.4.1 Criminal investigation
In March 2015, FEVIMTRA issued two optional protocols for the investigation of sexual violence and femicide (see Annex E), though there are no public records of their implementation so far.

One of the innovations of the new criminal justice system is an increased importance placed on forensic evidence in proving guilt. This implies that for a case
to end in a conviction, MPs, police, detectives and forensic investigators must undertake more complete criminal investigations. However, this reform was largely unaccompanied by an infusion of new human, technical and financial resources in order to ensure the quality of these investigations. Baja California, for example, sends their rape kits to be processed in other states because the state does not have the appropriate equipment. Furthermore, the lack of trained medical examiners and forensic investigators means many cases are not investigated in a timely and professional manner, leading to contamination of crime scenes and evidence as well as unnecessary delays. Often, the existing medical exams are insufficient for GBV, particularly in case of sexual violence.

MPs have the discretion to prioritize caseloads and direct resources towards strategic priorities. GBV is often not a priority because MPs prefer to focus on other crimes like drug-related violence. Victim blaming also negatively affects investigations when justice operators fail to properly consider and investigate crimes because the victim “asked for it” and “doesn’t deserve their time.”

The failure to carry out appropriate investigations is especially relevant for crimes against LGBTIQ people. Investigations are often tainted by the prejudices of the investigators based on the gender identity or sexual orientation of the victim. Justice operators also often do not understand the differences between sexual practice, sexual orientation and sexual identity, which results in inaccurate categorization and incomplete records and investigations.

5.4.2 Classification of the crime
The lack of training of justice operators on international and national legal frameworks regarding GBV often creates confusion around how to prosecute certain GBV crimes and which legal system has the authority to do so. The MP has the last word on how to classify the crime. Sometimes GBV is converted or classified as a crime that hides the gender component. For example, domestic violence might be classified as a “riña” (dispute). This misclassification can be due to lack of training in how to apply a gender perspective, or for a political act. For example, a governor could pressure MPs to classify rape as sexual assault or femicide as homicide to bend state statistics.

5.4.3 Legal proceedings
Oral trials
Because the reform is being implemented state by state, some states have transitioned to oral trials only for certain categories of crimes, which do not always include GBV. Also, there is a risk that MPs prioritize the cases in which they are almost certain of obtaining a conviction, which are unlikely to be cases of GBV.

When GBV cases go to trial, there are particular concerns for GBV victims. Victims are often afraid or ashamed of testifying in court, and when they do so,
their vocal tone is often wavering and weak, casting doubt upon their testimony. By contrast, their aggressors may present as charismatic, confident and strong, which can lead the judge to further question the victim’s testimony.68 Another common problem with oral testimony in cases of VAW is that judges and other legal professionals evaluate victims and the veracity of their statements against the so-called “normal” victim’s emotional and psychological reactions. If a victim does not act according to “type,” her or his credibility may be questioned.69 This is common not only in the courtroom but throughout the entire reporting, criminal investigation and legal process. Some justice operators even say that if a victim does not “show up bleeding,” she will not be believed.70

Box 5.2. Specialized Courts for VAW in Guatemala
The UN has cited specialized courts for VAW and GBV in Brazil, Spain, the UK and the US as a best practice for being more responsive to gender and the specific needs of GBV victims.71 These courts are better at providing protection measures for victims and centralizing services and both civil and criminal procedures to reduce the time victims are in court. This can include, for example, allowing victims to testify in one sitting for both the prosecution in a criminal proceeding and for the civil proceeding to obtain child support.72

In 2008, Guatemala created special regional courts73 on femicide and VAW,74 accompanied by a campaign called “Specialized Justice for Me.”75 intended to raise awareness about the criminalization of femicide and the new court system. The specialized courts work around the clock, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.76 They are presided over by three female judges who must rule with a gender perspective,77 and the courts also employ psychologists and social workers, as well as daycare facilities for children while their caretakers are in court.78

Preliminary data are promising. In ordinary courts in Guatemala, only 7.5% of femicide and VAW cases result in conviction. By comparison, by 2013, over 30% of the cases in the specialized court resulted in conviction.79 According to the Office of the Attorney General in Guatemala, these courts have been successful because the judges are thoroughly trained on gender issues, which makes them more open-minded and avoids revictimization.80

Mediation and conciliation
There are ongoing debates about whether (and which) alternative justice mechanisms are appropriate in cases of GBV.81 Alternative justice mechanisms may avoid unnecessary lengthy court proceedings, but they can also become pathways to impunity for GBV, particularly because these alternative agreements are not monitored after their initial approval, leaving victims unprotected.82

Mediation and conciliation are expressly prohibited by Belém do Pará83 and are discouraged by the LGAMVLV84 because they lead to revictimization, putting victims in vulnerable situations.85 Few states86 have internalized these restrictions into their local laws, however. In one 2012 study, of 17 women in five states87 under the new justice system who had reported experiencing VAW, not a single one made it to an oral trial. Every case was resolved out of court through judge-approved agreements.
In other words, GBV victims are sometimes being forced into “reconciling” with their aggressors, increasing the risk of repeat aggression, particularly in cases of domestic violence or IPV. MPs are often not trained to deal with alternative justice mechanisms specifically in cases of GBV, and the agreements reached at the end of the mediation and/or conciliation often do not deal with the causes and consequences of the violence. Furthermore, aggressors often do not comply, and there is no monitoring or recourse to this failure. In one recent case, a woman in Chihuahua was murdered by her husband the day after the conciliation process.

Box 5.3. Alternative justice mechanisms and domestic violence in Nuevo Leon

Alternative justice mechanisms are a key component of this reform to make the justice system more efficient and to decrease the emotional and economic tolls a legal process can have on victims. For victims of GBV, alternative justice mechanisms can sometimes lead to faster solutions that keep families or partners together (if that is what the victim wants), but they are also highly risky if not negotiated and monitored appropriately. In Nuevo Leon, cases of family violence are supposed to be exempt from all alternative justice mechanisms, though this exemption is often not applied in practice. Some of these mechanisms include the following:

**Suspensión de procedimiento a prueba** allows the accused to request the termination of the judicial process in exchange for a damage compensation plan to be fulfilled between 6 months to a year. The pre-trial judge can adjust the plan and mandate conditions, including living arrangements, restricted visitation rights, and psychological treatment, etc. Despite the prohibition on using suspensión in cases that represent risk for victims, it is commonly used in Nuevo Leon in cases of domestic violence. This approach has been criticized for placing victims in a vulnerable situation, and Nuevo Leon’s IMEF does not recommend suspensión, positing that it is being used to shuttle cases out of over-loaded courts without considering risks for victims. Follow-up mechanisms to ensure the victims' safety and fulfillment of the reparations plan are weak, if not absent, and when conditions are not fulfilled, criminal procedures are rarely re-opened.

**Granting a pardon** is allowed for non-serious crimes and must be reached by settlement between the accused and the victim through conciliation or mediation. Domestic violence should be excluded from the option to pardon. However, in practice, interviews with justice operators and CSOs in Nuevo Leon referred to pardons as relatively common in cases of domestic violence. For victims, granting a pardon may be voluntary, or it may be the result of social pressure from family, friends and even public authorities. Regardless, it is inappropriate in cases of domestic violence because of the high risk for repeat victimization and the lack of monitoring and further intervention from the justice system.

5.5 SENTENCING AND REPARATIONS

In 2013, in response to several Corte IDH rulings, the SCJN published an optional protocol for how to judge with a gender perspective. It is difficult to know whether it is being applied because of a general lack of transparency in the Mexican judicial system. There is little public information available on court sentences, whether for GBV or other crimes. Even though all 32 states judiciaries are obligated to publish their rulings, only 17 comply, and it is hard to tell if they comply fully and publish all rulings. As a result, it is next to impossible to monitor and evaluate whether or not judges are effectively applying a gender perspective in their
Furthermore, because many GBV cases end in mediation and conciliation (of which no data is officially collected), there’s no way of knowing how many GBV cases have passed through the new criminal justice system and how well they have been carried out.\textsuperscript{107}

Box 5.4. Analyzing court rulings in Mexico with a gender perspective\textsuperscript{108}
Equis, a Mexican CSO that works on access to justice for women, has developed a unique methodology to analyze court rulings with a gender perspective. In 2012, Equis reviewed 240 court judgments (including at least one case from each state), of which only 7.5\% (18 rulings) refer to an international human rights treaty and less than 2\% (4 rulings) mention the LGAMVLV. Not a single judgment issued protection measures for the victim.\textsuperscript{109} In response to these findings, Equis recommends that Mexico promote an accountable and transparent judiciary. The lack of information on court proceedings, rulings and sentencings makes it impossible to identify obstacles to access to justice and improve the new criminal justice system, not only for GBV, but for all crimes. There also need to be mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning justice operators and public officials who discriminate against women and/or who do not exercise due diligence in investigating and punishing VAW.\textsuperscript{110}

The new criminal justice system places new emphasis on reparations as a way to achieve not just sanction and punishment but also restorative justice. The idea is that sending an aggressor to prison does little to directly benefit the victim.\textsuperscript{111} The LGV establishes that victims have the right to reparations, including restitution, rehabilitation, compensation, satisfaction and a guarantee of no repetition.\textsuperscript{112} In practice, however, reparations are complicated. Judges often (wrongly) argue that reparations should only be provided when they are explicitly requested. When reparations are granted, they often fail to take into account the full extent of the psychological, emotional, and physical harm suffered by the victims, particularly in cases of GBV. Reparations are often narrowly defined as monetary compensation, which is a limited interpretation of what they can and should be.\textsuperscript{113} Creative reparations could, for example, require a public apology from the perpetrator.\textsuperscript{114} One innovative case of reparations is the ruling in the school-based sexual abuse of a child in Yucatan in which the judge found that not only should the child receive reparations, but the entire community, as a victim to the crime that took place in their school, should also receive reparations. The judge ruled that all school staff be trained to identify sexual abuse.\textsuperscript{115}

CONCLUSION
The new criminal justice system has great potential to improve access to justice for all victims of crimes in Mexico. That said, without the appropriate and gender-sensitive tools, resources and capacity building necessary, the reform could create obstacles to justice for victims of GBV. The conditions that lead to underreporting of GBV crimes, revictimization during the reporting and legal process, and impunity for perpetrators need to be identified and addressed. Training current and future justice operators, as well as ensuring the availability of necessary technical resources, are essential, as are creating new mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the results of the new criminal justice system for victims of GBV.
CHAPTER 6. HUMAN RIGHTS

The Constitutional human rights reform of 2011 reinforced the status of international treaties, including CEDAW, Belém do Pará and other conventions against torture, enforced disappearances and human trafficking, as binding law in Mexico. The current Programa Nacional de Derechos Humanos (PNDH) 2014-2018 sets two main objectives: the implementation of the 2011 reform and the creation of an independent mechanism for monitoring and evaluation of the PNDH.

Applying a gender perspective to human rights means identifying the differentiated experiences of victims according to their sex, gender and sexual orientation, and designing appropriate gender-sensitive and gender-transformative interventions in response. For example, ensuring the right to health for a transgender woman (who might require special hormone therapies or surgeries) means providing different kinds of health services than the services required to ensure the right to health for a woman who was born female.

GBV is a violation of human rights. This chapter analyzes five grave violations of human rights with a gender perspective and with the intention of highlighting GBV within those violations. These violations were identified as relevant to USAID/Mexico activities: 1) femicide, 2) human trafficking, 3) torture, 4) enforced disappearances, and 5) violence against human rights defenders and journalists.

For more information on each human right violation and the international and national legal frameworks to address them, see Annex G.

6.1 FEMICIDE

The term femicide became part of the human rights vernacular in Latin America with the ratification of Belém do Pará, and as of 2015, 17 Latin American countries, including Mexico, have criminalized femicide in their Códigos Penales. In Mexico, the Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia (LGAMVLV) first defined femicide in 2007, but it was not until 2011 that it was criminalized in the Código Penal Federal. Femicide was introduced as an alternative to the supposedly neutral term “homicide,” with the objective of highlighting VAW in its most extreme form. Femicide is, essentially, the murder of a woman because she is a woman. According to the LGAMVLV, in order to be classified as femicide, a homicide must present signs of sexual violence, degrading injuries, previous harassment or threats, abusive prior relationships between victim and aggressor, a defenseless victim, and/or the public display of the cadaver.

Given Mexico’s federal system, states are the responsible authorities when it comes to prosecuting most crimes, so the Código Penal Federal has no direct
bearing on the *Códigos Estatales Penales*. As of 2016, all 32 states have criminalized femicide, although each state has defined the crime according to its own criteria. The heterogeneous criminalization of femicide has created obstacles to its effective prosecution. In 11 states it is all but impossible to prove the crime, according to a report by UN Women. For example, in Guerrero and San Luis Potosí femicide is defined as the murder of a woman designed to cover up the act of rape (although it is almost impossible to prove this with evidence), the murder of a woman with “contempt” or “hate” (although there are no legal definitions of these terms), or the murder of a woman with inhuman treatment or torture. The legal definitions of femicide vary from state to state, as do the legal procedures to investigate, prosecute and sanction the crime. For example, in the State of Mexico, in order for a murder to be classified as a femicide, the cadaver must present “degrading mutilations,” the interpretation of which is left up to the judge.

Although the ruling in *Campo Algodonero* requires Mexico to issue criteria for forensic investigations of femicides, only 10 states include investigation protocols in their laws, and only seven have published them. This means that many homicides of women are never investigated properly as femicides. In 2015, the *Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación* (SCJN) ruled in *Amparo en Revisión* 554/2013 that any violent death of a woman (even when suspected a suicide) should be investigated for whether or not it is a femicide, see Box F.4.

Because of the lack of standard criminalization and reporting, the data on femicide is relatively weak. Researchers often use proxy calculations. One study that counts the violent deaths of women as femicides (regardless of the legal definition) estimates that over 1,900 femicides were committed between 2007 and 2012. Another study found that 3,892 women nationwide were killed between 2012 and 2013, but only 613 (16%) were investigated as femicides.

A 2014 study found that homicides of women have been on the rise since 2007, while femicides in the home have maintained steady between 2006 and 2012. This finding implies that more women are being killed outside of their homes in recent years. A similar study found that between 1985 and 2010 there was a new pattern of femicide in public spaces, probably correlated with an increase in organized crime activities and the use of personal firearms. The greatest risk for experiencing femicide in public spaces is for women between 15- and 39-years-old, the study found, which is probably linked with the increased presence of young women in the labor market and in political spaces.

There has been a geographical shift in femicides correlated with a shift in organized crime violence. Femicides were previously concentrated in Central and Southern Mexico, but by 2010, the center of the epidemic had shifted to the North. In 2010, more than a quarter of all femicides occurred in just five municipalities: Juarez, Chihuahua; Tijuana, Baja California; Chihuahua, Chihuahua; Culiacan,
Sinaloa; and Ecatepec de Morelos, the State of Mexico, cities that also suffer from violence stemming from organized crime and drug trafficking.²⁰

**GOM and CSO interventions**

Most GOM interventions have emphasized legal reforms (i.e. the criminalization of femicide), awareness and political pressure mechanisms like the Gender Alert, and the creation of specialized agencies like the *Fiscalía Especializada para los Delitos de Violencia contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas* (FEVI-MTRA) to deal with femicide. Last year, FEVI-MTRA published an optional protocol on how to investigate femicides with a gender perspective.²¹

**Box 6.1: The Gender Alert in practice**

In July 2015, SEGOB declared a Gender Alert for 11 municipalities in the State of Mexico, activating the mechanism for the first time.²² One month later in August 2015, SEGOB declared a second Gender Alert for eight municipalities in Morelos. Other states, including Nuevo Leon, are currently under investigation by the *Comisión Nacional para Prevenir y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres* (CONAVIM) to decide whether or not to declare the Alert, but no additional Alerts have been announced as of May 2016.

CSOs in Mexico have focused their attentions on aiding victims’ families and on research, advocacy and activism campaigns. For example, the *Observatorio Ciudadano Nacional del Feminicidio* (OCNF) unites 36 Mexican CSOs to monitor GOM interventions on femicide and VAW. In 2011, OCNF ran the *Campaña Nacional por la Tipificación del Feminicidio* to pressure authorities to respond to femicide,²³ which led in part to the reform of the *Código Penal Federal*.²⁴

### 6.2 HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Given Mexico’s proximity to the United States (which is a major consumer of trafficking), as well as other key social and political factors, including poverty, inequality, corruption, migration and weak rule of law, Mexico has become a country of origin, transit and destination for human trafficking. Because of this, Mexico has the fifth most trafficking victims in Latin America. Exact data is scarce: estimates range between 50,000 and 500,000.²⁵ Trafficking for sexual exploitation is the most common, followed by labor exploitation and the sale of children.²⁶

As in the rest of the world,²⁷ women are the most common victims of human trafficking in Mexico, followed by men and girls.²⁸ Risk factors for falling victim to trafficking in Mexico include poverty, low education, dysfunctional family relationships and living in rural areas.²⁹ The identity groups most vulnerable include indigenous people, people with mental and/or physical disabilities, and migrants (particularly from Central America), LGBTIQ people, and in particular homeless LGBTIQ youth,³⁰ are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and human trafficking because of social alienation and lack of support networks.³¹ Furthermore, responses to trafficking of LGBTIQ victims are often thwarted by...
discrimination among service providers\textsuperscript{32} and underreporting of victims (especially male victims who face social stigma around reporting sexual violence).\textsuperscript{33}

Trafficking may triple worldwide over the next few years because of how profitable it is.\textsuperscript{34} Transnational networks of organized crime are directly implicated in human trafficking in the region.\textsuperscript{35} Between 2012 and 2013, 70\% of the human trafficking cases that the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women of Latin America and the Caribbean received were linked to drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{36} In Mexico, nearly a third of the trafficking cases investigated by PGR are also investigated for organized crime.\textsuperscript{37}

**GOM and CSO interventions**

In 2012, Mexico criminalized human trafficking in the *Ley General para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas y para la Protección y Asistencia a las Víctimas de estos Delitos* (LGPSEDTP).\textsuperscript{38} The current *Programa Nacional para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas, y para la Protección y Asistencia a las Víctimas de estos Delitos 2014-2016*\textsuperscript{39} and the LGPSEDTP are gender sensitive: they include special considerations for women, children and youth as the most vulnerable victim populations. For example, when the victim is pregnant, sanctions for the crime are greater. However, the *Programa Nacional* has been unsuccessful according to its official indicators: only 2\% of all public officials have been trained on trafficking and only 16\% of all trafficking cases from 2013 to 2015 have been resolved.\textsuperscript{40}

**6.3 TORTURE**

Despite a robust legal framework to prevent and sanction torture in Mexico, it remains widespread, according to many reports,\textsuperscript{41} although the GOM continues to contest the findings of organizations like Amnesty International, the UN, and OAS.\textsuperscript{42} Because of underreporting and a flawed registration process,\textsuperscript{43} it is difficult to measure the number of torture victims. PGR does not disaggregate the available data by sex. Other sources estimate that the majority of victims of torture in Mexico are men, most of who are from poor and marginalized communities and/or are undocumented migrants,\textsuperscript{44} a pattern which is repeated\textsuperscript{45} among women victims.\textsuperscript{46}

Both men and women experience sexual torture, like nudity and electric shocks to the genitals, which are used to humiliate and shame the victims.\textsuperscript{47} Gender roles affect how men and women perceive and cope with this suffering.\textsuperscript{48} Torture of LGBTIQ victims often involves particularly extreme cruelty, like dismemberment and other forms of mutilation.\textsuperscript{49} Sexual violence is also commonly utilized as “punishment” for LGBTIQ victims during torture.\textsuperscript{50} Sexual torture is a greater component of the torture that women experience,\textsuperscript{51} and the fear of rape (given profound cultural stigma associated with rape) and of pregnancy or not being able to have children after torture can add to the trauma for female victims.\textsuperscript{52} Women are at particular risk for sexual torture immediately after being detained\textsuperscript{53} and when
they are held in military bases and police facilities; yet few measures have been taken in Mexico to protect them in these spaces. In one survey of over 800 prisoners, almost two thirds (both men and women) reported being beaten, and of those, almost a third of the women had suffered sexual violence while only 6% of the men had. It is important to note that men who have experienced sexual torture may face additional barriers and stigma to reporting it.

Non-sexual torture also often reinforces gender roles: for example, a woman may be beaten in front of her husband to force a confession, or she may be forced to wash her torturer’s clothing. Women also suffer from psychological violence meant to assert male dominance of their torturers, including threats to their family in order to obtain information from their family members or partners.

GOM and CSO interventions
As a whole, the international and national legal framework has not yet translated into effective safeguards to prevent and sanction torture. The problem lies in lack of enforcement and in local laws that are not compliant with federal regulation. In response to these deficiencies, in 2015, both the SCJN and the PGR published obligatory guidelines for federal and state MPs, forensic and medical investigators, and police officers. There is, however, still no official legal definition of “sexual torture,” and many of these cases continue to be processed in military courts, despite two 2010 Corte IDH rulings: Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico and Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico (see Box F.2 and Box F.3). These cases highlight the vulnerabilities that women (and in particular indigenous women) face in areas that have experienced a rapid militarization of public spaces as part of the “war on drugs.” In response to these rulings, Mexico reformed its Código de Justicia Militar in 2014 in order to avoid processing human rights violations of civilians under military jurisdiction, though some critics say this has been ineffective.

In 2014, Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez (Centro Prodh) launched a national campaign against sexual torture, intended to create solidarity networks among survivors and to raise awareness about the systematic sexual torture experienced by women detained by security officers. In response, in November 2015, CONAVIM launched the Mecanismo de Seguimiento sobre Casos de Tortura Sexual contra las Mujeres, about which little information is available.

6.4 ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES
Worldwide, the majority of the disappeared are men, many of whom are targeted for political activism. In Mexico, men are the majority of the victims in the Registro Nacional de Personas Extraviadas y Desparecidas (RNPED), according to PGR. As of February 2016, around 83% of the victims are male, most of whom are reported missing from the states of Guerrero, Tamaulipas and Veracruz. Some experts and activists say this statistic could also reflect the underreporting of the

Sexual torture is still largely invisible in the Mexican legal framework.

Men are the majority of primary victims of enforced disappearance, but secondary victims (those left behind) tend to be women.
disappearances of women. Female victims of enforced disappearances are more exposed to certain kinds of violence, including sexual violence and other abuses related to their biological functions and their roles as mothers. For example, pregnant women who have been disappeared are often separated from their infants after childbirth. Enforced disappearances are also often linked to crimes of human trafficking, to which women are particularly vulnerable.

Victims of enforced disappearance are not just the directly disappeared, but also those left behind, who are secondary victims. In addition to emotional trauma, families of the disappeared often face financial difficulty in their absence. Female relatives most often bear the burden of both caring for family members of the disappeared and seeking answers and justice from authorities. Many are forced to enter the labor market for the first time, particularly when the missing person used to be the primary household breadwinner. Given their lack of experience and training, most are often forced to accept low paid and insecure jobs. Furthermore, many of these female relatives often become victims of intimidation, persecution and violence, particularly if they are vocal about demanding justice. In some cases, they fall prey to scams and extortionists who take advantage of their need for information. For partners of an LGBTIQ disappeared person, the obstacles to justice are notable: they are often denied recognition of a marriage or cohabitation and are denied reparations or other public benefits for victims and their families.

GOM and CSO interventions
In 2001, the Mexican Congress criminalized enforced disappearance in the Código Penal Federal. As of January 2015, only 12 states have criminalized enforced disappearance in their Códigos Penales, and the GOM has been accused of failing to respond in a timely manner to disappearances. When a crime is reported, authorities rarely take immediate action to search for the victim or the perpetrators, and instead often cast suspicion on the disappeared person and associating them with organized crime, especially when the missing person is male. There have been reports that justice operators misinform families that a person must be missing for several days before a formal complaint can be filed. They regularly ask relatives, who are mostly women, to undertake activities that should be carried out by authorities (e.g. interviewing witnesses, tracking down suspects, etc.). Not only are victims’ relatives not equipped to do so, but carrying out such tasks can also put them at risk: in several cases, families’ investigative efforts—encouraged by MPs—have resulted in threats and attacks. Also, Mexico has not taken any specific measures to ensure that women and girls affected by enforced displacement receive differential treatment.

Even though the UN International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance recognizes that relatives of the disappeared are also victims of enforced disappearance, Mexico has failed to take action to protect these victims. Many families remain in legal limbo without clear social supports after a
disappearance. Because the disappeared is not declared dead, his or her relatives cannot claim social security and pension benefits in their name. The disappeared person’s debts also continue to generate interest and sometimes housing lenders continues to charge mortgage payments, which can mean the family members left behind are evicted. This is particularly true for female relatives who may have depended on the disappeared person’s financial support.86

Box 6.2: GOM and CSOs collaborate to improve searches in Nuevo Leon
The Monterrey-based CSO Ciudadanos en Apoyo a los Derechos Humanos A.C. (CADHAC) records enforced disappearances and works with family members in Nuevo Leon. In 2011, CADHAC founded AMORES, an association for relatives of the disappeared, made up of mostly mothers and female partners of victims.88 That same year, CADHAC and AMORES began working with the Procuraduría General de Justicia de Nuevo Leon (PGJNL) to review files of missing persons.89 Periodic meetings between GOM and civil society have been productive, leading to more dedicated resources for the search process, more empathic and better-trained staff, and a better legal framework both for primary and secondary victims of disappearances.90 In May 2014, CADHAC put forth the proposal for the Ley de Declaratoria de Ausencia por Desaparición en el Estado de Nuevo León, which was approved in April 2015. This law facilitates certain administrative procedures for relatives (like issuing passports and suspending mortgage payments) that had previously been difficult while their disappeared relatives remained in legal limbo (not officially declared “dead”).91 In September 2015, the UN recognized CADHAC and AMORES’s collaboration with PGJNL as a best practice worldwide.92

6.5 VIOLENCE AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND JOURNALISTS

In the last decade, Mexico has become one of the riskiest countries for journalists and human rights defenders (HRD). Both men and women journalists and HRDs face attacks, but the violence they experience differs by gender. Worldwide, more male journalists are killed than female journalists.93 In Mexico, according to some reports over 90% of journalists killed are men94 and around 80% of aggressions are against male journalists.95 It is unclear if this is because a larger proportion of journalists are men, or if more dangerous beats are covered by men.96

Violence against female HRDs and journalists is largely underreported.97 CIMAC, a Mexican CSO that works with women journalists, reports that of the female journalists that have suffered violence, only 10% file police reports, and of those, many retract their reports because of revictimization.98 Of the data available, violence against female journalists in Mexico spiked in 2009 and again in 2013 and 2014,99 which coincides with an uptick in organized crime violence. Female journalists and HRDs often face threats of sexual defamation or violence.100 Interestingly, compared to the threats male journalists receive, a higher proportion of the threats female journalists receive are from State agents.101 This could reflect the increased militarization of public spaces and the backlash of State agents against women journalists and HRDs in “their territory.”102 One example is the 2006 “Caso Atenco” clash between security officers and female HRDs which led to two
deaths, many counts of arbitrary detention and 31 counts of sexual torture.

According to a 2016 study, LGBTIQ people are particularly vulnerable to violence as HRDs or journalists, since exercising these professions places them into situation of “triple vulnerability”: for their sexual orientation or gender identity, for their profession, and for the specific causes they tend to defend. Trans women HRDs who advocate for the rights of sex workers are at the most risk.

**GOM and CSO interventions**

In 2012, Congress passed the *Ley para la Protección de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas* (LPPDDHP), and as of 2015, states have passed 20 local laws to protect journalists, and 29 more are in process (some states have more than one law on journalists). Perhaps the most innovative GOM intervention has been the *Mecanismo de Defensa y Protección de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas*, a tool designed to offer protection measures for at-risk HRDs and journalists. However, the capacity of the *Mecanismo* is simply too low to respond to the demand for protection. Furthermore, the budget assigned to the *Mecanismo* varies from year to year, creating uncertainty and even risking the full collapse of the *Mecanismo* if attacks against HRDs and journalists continue at such a fast pace.

In addition, the lack of a gender perspective in the design and implementation of the *Mecanismo* leads to situations that can re-victimize HRDs and journalists. For example, some protection measures, such as evacuation or temporary relocation, only protect an individual, meaning that HRDs and journalists with children must leave them behind. Furthermore, there is no special training for operators in how to provide differential treatment for women and men HRDs and journalists.

In response to ineffective government interventions, some journalists have formed independent safety collectives like *Periodistas de a Pie* and *Red de Periodistas de Ciudad Juárez*, both headed by female journalists. These collectives are seen by female journalists as way to share and disseminate information, connect to international networks, and share safety protocols.

**CONCLUSION**

A gender perspective on grave human rights violations can reveal important patterns in the perpetration of these crimes, which often utilize gendered tactics to threaten, torture, disappear, and even kill victims. A gender perspective also reveals the kinds of GBV suffered by victims within each human rights violation, and can lead to more sensitive data collection and service provision, particularly for those groups (like LGBTIQ victims) who face multiple kinds of discrimination. Policymakers and CSOs should be aware of the differential experiences and needs of victims according to their sex, gender identity and sexual orientation in order to design appropriate prevention and attention interventions.
CHAPTER 7: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following findings and recommendations are based on a review of literature, interviews with the GOM and CSO stakeholders, and information collected from the case studies, as well as ongoing dialogue with USAID/Mexico. The recommendations were designed to inform practitioners and relevant stakeholders of the key areas for addressing GBV.

CROSS-CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDING 1. Public insecurity is experienced differently by women and men in Mexico.

Men are the majority perpetrators and victims of violence in Mexico. Women are less likely than men to experience most crimes, except sexual violence and kidnapping. Women tend to fear crime more than men, and they are more likely to limit their participation in public spaces as a result.

► RECOMMENDATION 1. Promote the implementation of a transversal gender perspective in all public security interventions.

GOM and civil society stakeholders could focus their efforts on designing, implementing and monitoring public security interventions with a gender perspective. This requires deeper analysis than recording sex-disaggregated data. Interventions could, for example, address how women and men respond differently to subjective insecurity.

FINDING 2. GBV in Mexico is underreported, underestimated and poorly measured.

The most recent national surveys on IPV and VAW are now five years old, and time trends of GBV are impossible to track and compare. There is little data on GBV against children, LGBTIQ people, and men. Municipal information is unavailable, and most official crime statistics are not disaggregated by sex. Also, little is known about risk factors for GBV in the Mexican context.

► RECOMMENDATION 2.a. Support municipal diagnostics of GBV or develop a practical methodological guide on how to measure GBV at a local level.

The GOM and civil society could contribute to building a stronger, more accurate database of the current conditions, risk factors, and consequences of GBV by supporting municipal diagnostics. This could include conducting case studies of GBV in targeted municipalities, which can be utilized not only to identify and address GBV more effectively in those sites, but also as pilot studies to contribute to a methodological guide for how to measure GBV locally. This guide could be used by current and future USAID/Mexico partners, as well as GOM and CSO actors, to document GBV, establish a baseline of current conditions, and monitor and evaluate the results and impacts of public and private GBV interventions.

► RECOMMENDATION 2.b. Support CSO efforts to improve data collection.

Several CSOs in Mexico have identified the GBV information deficit and have been attempting to fill in the gaps on their own, but data collection, analysis and reporting is time-consuming and resource-intensive. The GOM and civil society could support CSOs like Letra Ese, one of the only organizations gathering data on violence against LGBTIQ people, and ADIVAC, a well-respected CSO that collects information on victims of sexual
violence. One option is to help these CSOs build their technical capacity to collect, clean and analyze data.

FINDING 3. State and municipal capacity to implement GBV interventions is weak.
Lack of appropriate training and resources (human, financial, technological), high turn-over rates, slow data collection, and the higher priority placed on combating drug trafficking and organized crime make implementing local GBV interventions difficult. As a result, national policies are often relegated to existing only on paper, without the local actions to make them a reality. For example, the PIPASEVM 2014-2018 lays out national policies and goals for preventing, attending, sanctioning and eradicating VAW, but as its own official indicators show, not much progress has been made in the two years since it was published (see Annex F for more information).

► RECOMMENDATION 3.a. Build state and municipal capacity to implement the national GBV policy and legal framework.
Local GOM actors could benefit from ongoing capacity building in the on-the-ground skills necessary to turn policy into practice. Any capacity building must be accompanied by ongoing follow-up activities to ensure the implementation of the skills learned, as well as monitoring and evaluation.

► RECOMMENDATION 3.b. Create pathways for collaboration between local GOM and CSO actors working on GBV interventions.
Given that municipal governments generally turn over every three years and state governments every six, there is often a lack of the institutional continuity and program planning necessary to address GBV. Local CSOs can support sustainable GBV interventions, but they are often isolated from GOM actors. There are few mechanisms in place to bring the GOM and CSOs together, and long-term alliances based on complementary roles are rare, if not absent. This is a missed opportunity to build the stronger synergies that can outlast short-term political regimes at the local level. Relevant stakeholders that work at municipal and/or state levels can levy their connections with GOM actors and local CSOs to bring them to the table together. For example, where CJMs fall short, either because of limited capacity or limited jurisdiction, local CSOs can step in to meet the diverse needs of GBV victims. Practitioners and relevant stakeholders should encourage new collaborations between CJMs and CSOs to broaden the range of services available for victims, including long-term shelter and job skills training.

FINDING 4. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of GBV interventions is rare.
It is impossible to determine what works (and what doesn't) in preventing and addressing GBV without proper monitoring and evaluation, both of which are absent in the majority of GOM and CSO interventions in Mexico. This is due to a combination of the lack of political will, money, time and personnel to design and implement M&E. Most current indicators only count the number of men and women participating in activities, rather than more comprehensive indicators of the impact on GBV and other kinds of crime and violence.

► RECOMMENDATION 4.a. Support the development of GBV M&E in practice.
USAID already has several materials (i.e. the Toolkit for Monitoring and Evaluating Gender-Based Violence Interventions) that can serve as a starting point to help GOM, CSOs and USAID/Mexico partners monitor and evaluate their interventions. These
materials could be distributed and complemented by practical case studies that document GBV M&E in Mexico and/or in Latin America. The GOM and CSOs could mine their own past experiences with GBV M&E in the region to offer examples. These materials could be accompanied by training on the design, measurement and analysis of indicators.

► RECOMMENDATION 4.b. Support the M&E of ongoing GBV interventions.
Many ongoing GOM and CSO GBV interventions claim impacts that are impossible to prove without data from proper M&E. The interventions may be there, but nobody knows if they work, how and why. CSOs and select GOM partners need support in understanding the results and impacts of their GBV interventions. This could include potentially replicable interventions like the Violentómetro, Safe Cities and the Gender Police.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

FINDING 5. Successful GBV prevention interventions tend to be comprehensive, targeted, long-term, mixed-gender and integrated with other development programs.

► RECOMMENDATION 5. Develop a “best practices checklist” for GBV prevention.
This could be a practical tool for the GOM and civil society stakeholders to be used when designing and monitoring crime and violence prevention interventions. It should be accompanied by a practical workshop to train operators in its application.

FINDING 6. Most GBV prevention in Mexico is ex post facto.
Most GBV prevention interventions emphasize victim-centered services, seeking to break the cycle of violence once it has already begun. Some GOM and CSO actors also work with aggressors to prevent recidivism, although the results of these interventions are unclear. Few interventions in Mexico focus on primary prevention, addressing GBV as a problem to be attacked from its origins, or tertiary prevention, addressing long-term effects and risks for both victims and perpetrators.

► RECOMMENDATION 6.a. Include GBV prevention within broader crime and violence prevention interventions in schools and communities.
GBV should not be treated as “separate” from public insecurity: GBV prevention should be included explicitly in any school-based or community-based interventions that address other forms of crime and violence prevention. Many relevant stakeholders already include information on gender in their curricula, but most have not specifically incorporated GBV within their prevention programming. This is a missed opportunity.

These interventions should emphasize practical skills training for prevention, particularly in schools. One example is to offer teen dating workshops that emphasize not just the importance of healthy relationships in theory, but also what a healthy, non-violent relationship actually looks like in practice. This might include, for example, how to ask for and give consent to sexual acts. Another option is to work with school administrators and teachers to teach them not only how to detect but also how to respond to risk factors for experiencing or perpetrating GBV, including bullying based on gender or sexual identity.
RECOMMENDATION 6.b. Support transformative primary and tertiary prevention interventions in homes, schools and communities to address root causes and long-term effects of GBV.

Homes, schools and communities are key sites for GBV prevention. Home visitation programs that work with the family unit to prevent domestic violence and reduce risk factors for experiencing or perpetrating other forms of violence have had some success in other contexts. This could be an area of opportunity: relevant stakeholders could experiment with teaching non-violent conflict resolution and healthy parenting skills in the home to prevent GBV and reinforce social violence prevention.

Community-based prevention is most effective when it complements public awareness campaigns with active interventions. For example, upgrading urban environments (including public spaces and public transportation systems) could improve the subjective security of women, leading to an increased participation in public spaces. This has already been attempted in some Mexican cities and has recently garnered public support from SEDATU, providing a solid starting point for further experimentation and documentation.

RECOMMENDATION 6.c. Work with local security officers to prevent GBV.

Local police forces are in a privileged position to intervene in their communities, so, if trained properly, they can learn not only how to respond appropriately to cases of GBV both in the home and in public spaces, but also how to prevent GBV. The GOM and civil society stakeholders could adjust their curricula when working with security officers (judges, police, MPs and forensic investigators) to emphasize prevention. Long-term training programs that include all ranks, from street officers to high-level decision-makers, have had some success in GBV prevention in other contexts.

FINDING 7. At-risk children and youth who have witnessed or experienced GBV lack services and appropriate prevention interventions.

In Mexico, this at-risk population is largely unattended, or even seen as a distraction in certain spaces like CJMs and AMPEVIS, where the focus tends to be on adult women victims. This is a missed opportunity to engage children and youth to address both immediate needs and prevent future perpetration and victimization.

RECOMMENDATION 7.a. Work with educators and healthcare professionals to detect and serve at-risk children and youth.

The GOM and civil society could capitalize on the proximity of educators and healthcare professionals to at-risk children and youth to prevent the intergenerational transmission of violence. There are some promising interventions based on school counseling and psychological and behavioral therapies that would be worth experimenting with in Mexico. Also, student clubs like Gay-Straight Alliances can provide specialized support to at-risk students and build awareness of sexual diversity.

RECOMMENDATION 7.b. Introduce new prevention models, with an emphasis on children and youth, into CJMs.

The GOM and CSOs could encourage CJMs to experiment with new prevention models. CJM personnel could be trained in how to work with children and youth as witnesses and victims of violence through counseling and therapeutic activities. For example, CJMs could
experiment with home-visitation programs that reach at-risk families to emphasize healthy parenting and relationship skills. Practitioners who work with CJMs should design interventions tailored to each CJM, as they are managed on a state-by-state basis.

**FINDING 8. Few GBV interventions address the role of men in violence.**

Men are the majority of both victims and perpetrators of violence, but their role in prevention has thus far been limited. Few GOM and CSO interventions work with men to address the relationship between masculinity and power, weapons, substance abuse, and violence before a violent act. The result is that the work of prevention is often placed entirely upon women (mostly those who are already victims). There is a missed opportunity to address the damaging effects of violent masculinities both against women and among men.

▶ **RECOMMENDATION 8. Address masculinities as a central component of GBV and crime and violence prevention.**

Incorporating a fuller understanding of masculinities and violence should be a central element in the theory of change prevention interventions. Of the CSOs interviewed for this report, only Gendes and Supera (a former USAID sub-grantee) actively work on masculinities. The GOM and CSOs could include a deeper analysis of masculinities in their programming, as well as explore new partnerships or projects that emphasize the role of men in crime and violence prevention. This strategy should be accompanied by consultation with CSOs and GOM actors who may be resistant to what they might see as diverting support and energy away from working with women.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RULE OF LAW**

**FINDING 9. Justice operators have not been trained in the implications of the criminal justice reform on cases of GBV.**

For the most part, justice operators do not understand how the reform can have differential impacts on victims of GBV. As a result, they are largely unaware of how they should modify their actions and decisions with a gender perspective.

▶ **RECOMMENDATION 9.a. Work with student lawyers to train future justice operators on the implications of the reform for GBV victims.**

The next generation of lawyers in Mexico will be the first to operate solely under the new criminal justice system. Relevant stakeholders who work with law schools should take advantage of this opportunity; Law clinics are key sites of student training and they provide both an opportunity to apply classroom learning and to support victims without access to other legal aid. Law clinics in Mexico have not yet fulfilled their potential when it comes to training students to deal with cases of GBV in the courtroom. Students need more practical training in the implications of the reform on GBV, which could be accomplished through mock trials, through studies of real GBV cases, and through workshops on how to argue based on international precedents like CEDAW and Belém do Pará. The GOM and civil society stakeholders could support law clinics and work with law schools to incorporate a transversal gender perspective into their curricula.

▶ **RECOMMENDATION 9.b. Train current security officers and justice operators on the practical ways they should intervene in cases of GBV.**
Some CSOs already offer trainings for justice operators, so they can increase their scope to include sessions on practical skills specifically related to handling GBV. For example, the GOM and civil society stakeholders could design workshops that, through real examples and role-playing activities, would show police, criminal investigators and MPs how to help victims understand the implications of reporting or crime or dropping charges.

Another option is to utilize research grants to document how early adopters of the criminal justice reform, like Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon, have dealt with cases of GBV in practice both in the courtroom and in alternative justice mechanisms. These real-life cases could be used to identify both best practices and potential pitfalls, which could be shared with justice operators as learning materials.

► RECOMMENDATION 9.c. Support CJMs to improve the quality of victim care.
The GOM currently sees the CJMs as a key institutional offering for victims of VAW, so practitioners and relevant stakeholders could work to improve the quality of the services provided therein. The capacity of CJM service providers (both justice operators and not) could be improved through trainings and workshops on a variety of topics, including gender and GBV, the criminal justice reform, safety and risk assessments for victims, etc.

FINDING 10. Faulty criminal investigations impede access to justice.
Given limited human, technical and financial resources, MPs often prioritize other criminal investigations over those of GBV cases. When they do investigate GBV, it is difficult to produce the physical evidence necessary to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in crimes like rape. Also, prejudice against women and LGBTIQ victims often results in biased investigations.

► RECOMMENDATION 10.a. Train forensic and medical investigators on how to incorporate a gender perspective into their work.
Criminal investigators are key players in the new criminal justice system, and should be receiving just as much training as other actors like police, MPs and judges. Relevant stakeholders who already work with justice operators could incorporate criminal investigators into their trainings. They could also bring in criminal investigators from other countries with accusatorial systems (i.e. Colombia, USA, Chile, etc.) to organize seminars and workshops on handling evidence and conducting investigations in cases of GBV.

► RECOMMENDATION 10.b. Support forensic and medical equipment upgrades.
The GOM and civil society stakeholders could build alliances to ensure the forensic, scientific and medical resources necessary to properly investigate and analyze evidence in cases of GBV.

► RECOMMENDATION 10.c. Encourage collaborations between CSOs and special prosecutors for GBV crimes (AMPEVISs) to improve access to justice.
The AMPEVISs could be an important partner, but they are limited by lack of capacity. Stakeholders could support CSOs interventions that provide human and technical support for improving the capacity and quality of services available in the AMPEVISs.

FINDING 11. Protection orders are not being used effectively.
There is widespread confusion about how to request and apply protection orders for VAW victims. Even when an order is emitted, there is a lack of creativity in their design to meet specific needs of specific victims. Furthermore, these orders are only available for women, leaving out LGBTIQ victims who may need protection.

► **RECOMMENDATION 11. Train justice operators on how to design and implement protection orders.**

Justice operators need a better understanding of how protection orders can and should function. Trainings should emphasize the necessity of appropriate protection measures and should incorporate real-life examples of protection orders and their results in ensuring the safety of victims. One way to inform these trainings is to create a working group of victims, MPs and police to identify lessons learned based on their experiences. This could be complemented by research on international best practices in protection orders.

**FINDING 12. Mediation and conciliation are employed inappropriately for GBV.**

Alternative justice mechanisms are a hallmark of the criminal justice reform, but they are often misused in cases of GBV, leading to re-victimization, recidivism and impunity.

► **RECOMMENDATION 12.a. Train justice operators on how they should and should not apply alternative justice processes for GBV.**

Belém do Pará prohibits and the Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia (LGAMVLV) strongly discourages the use of mediation and conciliation in cases of VAW. Police officers, MPs, defense lawyers and judges need special training on how alternative justice mechanisms should and should not be applied in cases of GBV. It is one thing to tell justice operators not to use mediation and conciliation, but it is another to show them why these mechanisms can be harmful when not utilized correctly through case studies and real-life examples. Also, little monitoring and evaluation is being done on alternative justice mechanisms in cases of GBV, which is an area of opportunity.

► **RECOMMENDATION 12.b. Explore how to design and monitor appropriate alternative justice mechanisms for GBV.**

If mediation and conciliation are out of the question, then what alternative justice mechanisms do work for cases of GBV? Little is known about successful alternative justice interventions for GBV in accusatorial criminal justice systems, so relevant stakeholders could study this question and then train justice operators in best practices.

**FINDING 13. Sentences and reparations often lack a gender perspective.**

There is little judicial transparency in Mexico, so it is hard to monitor how cases are being judged with (or without) a gender perspective. Court rulings are rarely published, and cases that are diverted into alternative mechanisms are not evaluated. Also, judges rarely mention the international and national legislation and precedents for VAW in their rulings.

► **RECOMMENDATION 13.a. Support transparency of judicial outcomes.**

The GOM and civil society could support the existing efforts of CSOs in monitoring the sentences and reparations of GBV cases judged under the new criminal justice system. The documentation and evaluation of legal outcomes could inform capacity building
trainings for judges and other justice operators to help them identify when a case has been judged with a gender perspective and when it has not.

► **RECOMMENDATION 13.b. Train judges and other justice operators to use a gender perspective in their rulings.**
The GOM and CSOs can train judges on what it means to apply a gender perspective in practice, which requires judges to understand the differences in status, power, roles, and needs between men, women and LGBTIQ people. Workshops could include the review and evaluation of real cases based on the application of the optional SCJN protocol on how to judge with a gender perspective.

► **RECOMMENDATION 13.c. Encourage creative reparations.**
The GOM and civil society stakeholders could support the research and design of more complete reparations plans for GBV victims based on international best practices and on experiences in early-adopter states in Mexico.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS**

FINDING 14. Little data is available on how grave violations of human rights in Mexico are gendered.

► **RECOMMENDATION 14. Support CSOs in the documentation of the gendered aspects of grave violations of human rights.**
Documentation and analysis of the gendered aspects of human rights violations is key. The first step is disaggregating information on victims by sex. This should be followed by designing and measuring indicators on the differentiated experiences of victims according to the sex, gender identity and sexual orientation.

FINDING 15. The rise in organized crime is correlated with a rise in grave violations of human rights, particularly femicide and human trafficking.

► **RECOMMENDATION 15.a Support targeted interventions that address femicide in high-risk communities where organized crime is most present.**
The GOM and civil society stakeholders should support GBV interventions that target communities that already suffer from organized crime and drug-trafficking violence.

► **RECOMMENDATION 15.b Collaborate on human trafficking prevention with other international development offices and transnational CSO networks.**
Transnational networks of organized crime also sustain the networks of human trafficking around the world. The GOM and civil society stakeholders could support transnational prevention initiatives with other regional and international development agencies from other countries, and transnational networks of CSOs.

FINDING 16. Official protocols for femicide, sexual violence and violence against the LGBTIQ community are optional, and therefore, rarely implemented.
PGR and FEVIMTRA have recently published several protocols to guide justice operators, but they are non-mandatory and are neither monitored or evaluated publicly so it is hard to measure how well they are being implemented, if at all.

► **RECOMMENDATION 16. Develop a mechanism to assess and improve the implementation of these and other protocols.**
There is a need to build follow-up tools, including M&E, for the protocols on femicide, sexual violence and violence against the LGBTIQ community. The GOM could work with relevant actors (PGR and FEVIMTRA primarily) and/or with CSOs to develop an observatory of protocol implementation as well as recommendations for improvement. Furthermore, if relevant stakeholders develop new protocols for justice operators, they should be accompanied by enforcement and M&E tools.

**FINDING 17. The Gender Alert is a political tool without clear institutional design.**
The Gender Alert was initially designed in the LGAMVLV as a mechanism to respond to femicide and VAW. However, once declared in a certain territory, there are no clear guidelines for the division of responsibilities, activities and goals, timelines for fulfilling goals, and repercussions for failing to do so. In practice, the Alert is a tool of political pressure and a way to raise awareness about VAW. Its translation into concrete actions is up to each state, with little oversight from the federal government and no public M&E.

► **RECOMMENDATION 17. Support the development of citizen observatories and accountability mechanisms for the Gender Alert.**
The effective implementation of the Gender Alert in states where it has been declared (i.e. the State of Mexico and Morelos) requires transparency and accountability, two things which are currently missing. The GOM and civil society stakeholders could support the establishment of local citizen observatories in the states and/or municipalities affected by the Gender Alert, bringing together local CSOs, academics, journalists and HRDs. These observatories could be independent or work directly with relevant GOM actors. Practitioners and relevant stakeholders could offer these initiatives seed funding and capacity building to ensure their sustainability.

**FINDING 18. Torture is more common against men, but women suffer proportionally more sexual torture, which is largely invisible in the Mexican legal framework.**
The majority of victims of torture are men, but women suffer from more sexual torture. There are no protocols on how to address the differential needs of male, female and LGBTIQ victims.

► **RECOMMENDATION 18.a. Create mechanisms to monitor torture and GBV.**
Civil society monitoring is a key way to pressure authorities to recognize and respond to torture. Practitioners and relevant stakeholders could support CSOs to engage in on-site monitoring (in detention facilities, prisons, mental institutions, etc.) and documentation of victims’ experiences with an emphasis on gender. This data can then inform more appropriate GOM responses to victims’ differential needs.

► **RECOMMENDATION 18.b. Combat sexual torture in collaboration with CSOs.**
The GOM could take a specific interest in sexual torture as a clear manifestation of GBV and grave violations of human rights. It could build upon the work of CSOs that document
the stories of women survivors to raise awareness about sexual torture. They could also support the development of specific materials and capacity building workshops on the prevention of sexual torture, training justice operators (in particular, police) on how to prevent sexual torture during detentions. Finally, GOM and CSO stakeholders could promote dialogue on the monitoring and evaluation of the Mecanismo de Seguimiento de Casos de Tortura Sexual Cometida Contra las Mujeres, of which there is little information.

FINDING 19. Men are more often forcibly disappeared, but women more often pick up the pieces left behind.

The vast majority of the disappeared are men, and female relatives (mothers, spouses, daughters) most often bear the burden of both caring for families of the disappeared and in seeking answers and justice from authorities. No current GOM interventions address families of the disappeared.

► RECOMMENDATION 19.a. Train justice operators on appropriate treatment of family members seeking justice.

The GOM and civil society stakeholders can support the training of justice operators (i.e. police and MPs) in how to assist family members, not only in facilitating the search process for the disappeared but also in addressing their needs as victims themselves.

► RECOMMENDATION 19.b. Collaborate with CSOs on programs that engage with family members of the disappeared.

The GOM and civil society can support CSOs that recognize family members of the disappeared as rights holders and victims, accompanying them in their efforts to seek justice and providing legal, medical and psychological assistance. This could be accomplished through the civil society mechanism or other partner sub-grantee programs. It is important to encourage active dialogue between these CSOs and the justice sector.

FINDING 20. Journalists and HRDs do not receive the protection they need based on their differential gender needs.

The Mecanismo de Defensa y Protección de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas is currently under-performing, and should be improved to address the differential gender needs of men, women and LGBTIQ HRDs and journalists.


The GOM and civil society stakeholders could support the study and documentation of specific cases of GBV to highlight the unique risks and needs of women, men and LGBTIQ HRDs and journalists.

► RECOMMENDATION 20.b. Create an M&E tool for the Mecanismo.

The GOM and civil society stakeholders could support the development of an M&E tool that measures the design and implementation of the Mechanism from a gender perspective. This tool could be paired with training for relevant GOM partners on how to design appropriate protection measures for women, men and LGBTIQ journalists.
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Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico


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Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico

Fiscalía Especial para la Atención de delitos relacionados con actos de violencia contra las mujeres en el país. “Modelo de Fiscalías Especializadas para la Atención de Delitos Relacionados con la Violencia contra las Mujeres a Nivel Local.” FEVIM, n.d.


“Informe del Grupo de Trabajo Conformado para Atender la Solicitud de Alerta de Violencia de Género contra las Mujeres en el Estado de Nuevo León,” 2015.

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Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico


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Public information request Oficio No. 213700000/0866/2016 to the Subprocuraduría para la Atención de Delitos Vinculados a la Violencia de Género, Procuraduría General de Justicia of the State of Mexico, received 16th of March, 2016.


ANNEX B. DEFINITION OF TERMS & GLOSSARY

B.1 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS*

Bisexual: A person who is attracted to two sexes or two genders, but not necessarily simultaneously or equally. This used to be defined as a person who is attracted to both genders or both sexes, but since there are not only two sexes (see intersex and transsexual) and there are not only two genders (see transgender), this definition is inaccurate.

Gay: Men attracted to men. Colloquially used as an umbrella term to include all LGBTIQ people.

Gender: Gender is the socially defined set of roles, rights, responsibilities, entitlements, and obligations of females and males in societies. The social definitions of what it means to be female or male vary among cultures and change over time. Gender identity is an individual’s internal, personal sense of being male or female. For transgender people, their birth-assigned sex and their own internal sense of gender identity do not match.

Gender-Based Violence (GBV): Violence that is directed at an individual based on his or her biological sex, gender identity, or perceived adherence to socially defined norms of masculinity and femininity. It includes physical, sexual, and psychological abuse; threats; coercion; arbitrary deprivation of liberty; and economic deprivation, whether occurring in public or private life.

Gender equality and gender equity: Gender equality is a development goal; gender equity interventions are the means to achieve that goal. Gender equality is achieved when men and women have equal rights, freedoms, conditions, and opportunities for realizing their full potential and for contributing to and benefiting from economic, social, cultural, and political development. Equality does not mean that women and men become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities, and opportunities do not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equity is the process of being fair to women and men. To ensure fairness, measures must often be available to compensate for historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from otherwise operating on an equitable basis, or a “level playing field.”

Homosexuality: Sexual, emotional, and/or romantic attraction to the same sex.

Intersex: Intersex is a set of medical conditions that feature congenital anomaly of the reproductive and sexual system. That is, intersex people are born with "sex chromosomes," external genitalia, or internal reproductive systems that are not considered "standard" for either male or female. The existence of intersexuels shows that there are not just two sexes and that our ways of thinking about sex (trying to force everyone to fit into either the male box or the female box) is socially constructed.

Lesbian: A woman attracted to a woman.

LGBTIQ: lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transsexual, transvestite, intersex, queer.

Queer: An umbrella term to refer to all LGBTIQ people. A political statement, as well as a sexual orientation, which advocates breaking binary thinking and seeing both sexual orientation and gender identity as potentially fluid. A simple label to explain a complex set of sexual behaviors and desires. For example, a person who is attracted to multiple genders may identify as queer.

Sex: Sex is the classification of people as male or female. At birth, infants are assigned a sex based on a combination of bodily characteristics including: chromosomes, hormones, internal reproductive organs, and genitalia.

Sexual Orientation: The deep-seated direction of one’s sexual (erotic) attraction. It is on a continuum and not a set of absolute categories. Sometimes referred to as affection, orientation or sexuality. Sexual orientation evolves through a multistage developmental process, and may change over time. Asexuality is also a sexual orientation.

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Transgender: A person who lives as a member of a gender other than that expected based on anatomical sex. Sexual orientation varies and is not dependent on gender identity.

Transsexual: A person who identifies psychologically as a gender/sex other than the one to which they were assigned at birth. Transsexuals often wish to transform their bodies hormonally and surgically to match their inner sense of gender/sex.

Transvestite: Someone who dresses in clothing generally identified with the opposite gender/sex. While the terms ‘homosexual’ and ‘transvestite’ have been used synonymously, they are in fact signify two different groups. The majority of transvestites are heterosexual males who derive pleasure from dressing in “women’s clothing”. (The preferred term is ‘cross-dresser,’ but the term ‘transvestite’ is still used in a positive sense in England.)

Violence against women (VAW): Violence against women is a political and legal framework constructed by women's human rights activists from around the world to forge solidarity and recognition of the specific exclusions and wrongs experienced by women in many different contexts globally.

## B.2 GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional al Desarrollo</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEDS</td>
<td>Agencia Especializada en Delitos Sexuales</td>
<td>Specialized Agency for Sexual Offenses</td>
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<td>ADIVAC</td>
<td>Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de Personas Violadas</td>
<td>Association for the Comprehensive Development of Victims of Sexual Violence</td>
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<td>Agencia del Ministerio Público Especializadas en la Atención a la Violencia Intrafamiliar y Sexual</td>
<td>Specialized Public Prosecutors for Family and Sexual Violence</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>Administración Pública Federal</td>
<td>Federal Public Administration</td>
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<td>BANAVIM</td>
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<td>National Bank on Data and Information of VAW Cases</td>
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<td>Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>Centro de Apoyo a la Violencia Intrafamiliar</td>
<td>Support Center Victims of Domestic Violence</td>
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<td>Estrategia de Cooperación para el Desarrollo</td>
<td>Country Development Cooperation Strategy</td>
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<td>Mexican National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples</td>
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<td>Center for the Advancement of Women and Gender Equity</td>
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<td>Executive Commission for Attention to Victims</td>
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<td>Specialized Centers for Family Violence</td>
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<td>Centro de Capacitación para Erradicar la Violencia Intrafamiliar</td>
<td>Center for Training for the Eradication of Family-based Violence</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convención sobre la Eliminación de toda forma de Discriminación contra la Mujer</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CEDH</td>
<td>Comisión Estatal de Derechos Humanos de Nuevo León</td>
<td>Nuevo León Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>Executive State Commission for Attention to Victims</td>
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<td>Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez</td>
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<td>Centro de Estudios Sobre Impunidad y Justicia</td>
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<td>Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica</td>
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<td>Centro de Justicia Familiar</td>
<td>Center for Family Justice</td>
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<td>Centro de Justicia para las Mujeres</td>
<td>Justice Center for Women</td>
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<td>Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights</td>
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<td>Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos</td>
<td>National Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>Centro Nacional de Equidad de Género y Salud Reproductiva</td>
<td>National Gender Equity and Reproductive Health Center</td>
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<td>CNS</td>
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<td>National Security Commission</td>
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<td>CODES</td>
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<td>Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Estado de México</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission of the State of México</td>
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<td>National Commission of Superior Courts of Justice of the United Mexican States</td>
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<td>National Council for Evaluation of Social Development</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
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<td>Inter-American Court of Human Rights</td>
<td>Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos</td>
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<td>Crime Prevention through Environmental Design</td>
<td>Programa Integral para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres</td>
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<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil</td>
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<td>National System for the Comprehensive Development of the Family</td>
<td>Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia</td>
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<td>National System for the Prevention, Attention, Sanction and Eradicating Violence against Women and Human Trafficking</td>
<td>Dirección General de Información en Salud (Antes Sistema Nacional de Información en Salud)</td>
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<td>Índice Global de Impunidad</td>
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<td>Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales</td>
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<td>National Institute of Social Development</td>
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<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía</td>
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<td>Violencia de la Pareja Íntima</td>
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<td>Ley de Asistencia Social</td>
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<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transvesti, Transsexual, Intersexual and Queer</td>
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<td>Organización de Estados Americanos</td>
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<td>The National Network of Shelters</td>
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<td>National Victims Registry Database</td>
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<td>Registro Nacional de Datos de Personas Extraviadas o Desaparecidas</td>
<td>National Registry of Missing or Disappeared Persons</td>
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<td>Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación</td>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
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ANNEX C. METHODOLOGY

To produce this report, C230 Consultores designed a Data Collection and Analysis Plan, approved by USAID/Mexico in December 2015, with four key components, as summarized below.

C.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

C230 Consultores completed a comprehensive review of relevant available documents, including international and national studies, policy documents and evaluations, news reports, and surveys produced by GOM, academia, international organizations, think tanks and other CSOs. The literature review was used to analyze best practices and areas of opportunity documented in Mexico and Latin America, including any available information on impact evaluations of GBV interventions in the region.

C.2 INTERVIEWS WITH CURRENT USAID/MEXICO PARTNERS

C230 Consultores interviewed 17 current and former USAID/Mexico implementing partners on their interventions within their given program areas. These interviews emphasized how USAID/Mexico partners incorporate a gender perspective and confront the issue of GBV in their work.

C.3 CASE STUDIES

In order to capture a sample of state and municipal interventions, one in-depth case study was conducted in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, where USAID/Mexico has worked for many years, and a second in-depth case study was conducted in Ecatepec, State of Mexico chosen for its recent high-profile cases of GBV. In addition to a literature review, C230 Consultores conducted field visits and interviewed 22 key GOM and CSO actors between the two sites. Three researchers traveled to Monterrey from January 25 - 29, 2016, and two researchers traveled to Ecatepec and other municipalities in Estado de México over seven days during the months of December 2015 and February 2016.

C.4 STAKEHOLDER AND GBV INTERVENTION MAPPING

Based on the key criteria (defined below), C230 sent official requests for information to the appropriate GOM actors through the Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales (INAI). The responses to INAI requests, along with literature review and interviews of key public actors and literature review, were used to map relevant public interventions. Because INAI requests are not available for private interventions, information on private interventions was limited to literature review and interviews.

C.4.1 Criteria of inclusion for public and private GBV interventions

A. Categories of public interventions: There is confusion regarding the words “program” and “policy” in Mexico; they are used to refer to a wide variety of GOM interventions with different function, scales, levels of institutionalization and duration. For the sake of clarity, C230 developed the following classification system, which is used throughout the report:
1. **Institutions:** GOM organizations which are legally-existing entities, like Secretarías, Comisiones e Instituciones.

2. **Laws:** Official GOM legal documents issued by federal and state legislative bodies, as well as international treaties and conventions. This category also includes legally-binding court precedents, like those of Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) and the Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN).

3. **Planning instruments:** Official documents that define objectives, strategies and lines of action. Planning instruments are not necessarily attached to a specific budget line or institution. They are sometimes referred to as “Plan” (e.g. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo) or “Programa” (e.g. Programa Sectorial de Desarrollo Social).

4. **Interventions:** This category includes the following sub-categorizations:
   a. **Operational programs:** Institutionalized programs with official operating rules (Reglas de Operación) or operational guidelines (Lineamientos). They tend to be relatively stable, transcending changes in leadership, and usually have a clearly-identifiable budget line in the Federal Expenditure Budget (PEF).
   b. **Projects:** Interventions similar to operational programs but that do not have formal operational rules.
   c. **Funds:** Public money assigned to achieve specified objectives by financing aligned projects and activities. Funds are distinct from specific budget lines in the PEF because they can be managed by specific Secretarías.
   d. **Mechanisms:** This category includes a series of mechanisms that can be triggered by institutions in specific contexts or events.
   e. **Campaigns:** These are short term public awareness initiatives intended to create a change in attitude of a defined target population.
   f. **Others:** This category includes norms and protocols, which serve to guide public interventions.

5. **Budget lines:** Within the PEF, budget lines assign and classify public money to achieve certain GOM goals. Budget lines may also be earmarked for certain populations, like women.

**B. Categories of private interventions:** National interventions were defined as those that operate in three or more states of Mexico, as well as those that influence public policy or legislation at a federal level. State and local private interventions only were considered if they fell within the bounds of the two case studies in Monterrey, Nuevo León and Ecatepec, Estado de México. The private interventions included in the study fit into the following categories:

1. **Private programs and services:** National, state and local programs that aim to prevent, attend, sanction and eradicate GBV. These programs may or may not be operated by GBV-specific CSOs.
2. **Capacity building training and funding:** Private activities and donor funds dedicated to GBV capacity building for GOM and CSOs.
3. **Advocacy and citizen observatories:** This included private monitoring of GBV policy and outcomes, often hosted within private academic institutions.
4. **Prevention campaigns and initiatives:** This included private campaigns and initiatives aimed at GBV prevention, including educational programs like the new masculinities workshops hosted by Supera in Monterrey.

**C. Types and modalities of GBV addressed:** The types of GBV considered in this report are Physical Violence, Sexual Violence and Psychological Violence, and the modalities of GBV are Family-based GBV, School-based GBV, Community-based GBV, Institutional GBV, and
Femicide, as defined in the LGAMVLV.

D. Explicit GBV actions: Interventions that explicitly included actions to prevent, attend, sanction and eradicate GBV were considered, as well as those intended to prevent re-victimization of and discrimination against GBV victims. Specific terms including violence against women, family violence, family abuse (maltrato), intimate-partner violence, dating violence (violencia en el noviazgo), sexual abuse, abuse of girls, human trafficking, rape, and femicide had to be explicitly mentioned in the objectives, strategies and lines of action of the intervention.

E. Availability of information: Only interventions with sufficient official information available were considered.

C.4.2 Information solicited in INAI requests

From December to March 2015, C230 Consultores sent out 42 formal information requests to 9 federal public institutions through the INAI, as well as 16 formal information requests to Nuevo Leon public institutions and 28 formal information requests to public institutions of the State of Mexico. The requests asked for the following information (at minimum) of the public interventions identified:

a. Organigram of the structure of the planning and implementation of the intervention, including any relevant interinstitutional coordination
b. Official objectives, strategies and lines of action as they relate to GBV
c. Target population
d. Assigned budget
e. Key Performance Indicators
f. Contact information

Federal information requests

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State of Mexico information requests

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C.4.3 Interviews with GOM and CSO actors

C230 Consultores interviewed 33 key stakeholders, including GOM actors, CSO representatives and other service providers, in order to complement the information received in INAI requests and in the literature review.

The safety and security of the interviewees as well as the interviewers was a priority. C230 Consultores considered potential risks, including the political, social and psychological repercussions of interviewing certain stakeholders, before all interviews. Interviews took place in spaces agreed upon by C230 Consultores and the interviewee(s). Notes from the interviews were handwritten and then transferred to secure Word documents for analysis. These notes are only available to C230 Consultores.
ANNEX D. THE MEXICAN CONTEXT

D.1 MEXICO IN CONTEXT

D.1.1 Socio-economic context

Mexico is an upper middle income country with a population of more than 121 million, making it the largest Spanish-speaking nation in the world. It generally has high economic and development indicators (i.e. life expectancy, Gross National Income per capita, and gross school enrollment ratio), which tend to be slightly above average when compared to other Latin American countries and other upper middle income countries. However, Mexico ranks relatively poorly when compared to high income countries, including other members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), of which Chile is the only other Latin American country member. Among OECD countries, Mexico scores the worst ratings for income inequality (Gini index) and poverty.

D.1.2 Political-institutional context

Mexico is a Democratic Federal Republic with a presidential and bicameral representation system. The GOM is divided into the Federation and 32 state jurisdictions. The Constitution distributes power in three ways: 1) an exclusive power of the Federation; 2) a power of both the Federation and the states, with the Federation establishing “general guidelines”; and 3) an exclusive power of the states.

This division in powers is relevant for GBV. If, for example, GBV is seen as a health problem, the Federation has the stewardship to set the rules on health interventions. If GBV, on the other hand, is seen as a problem requiring the intervention of the criminal justice system, then both the Federation and states have certain controls over it, though it is mostly a state responsibility. The Código Penal Federal is limited to federal crimes and crimes committed in “federal territories” (i.e. spaces under control of the federal government, like airports) and the Federation has no authority over State criminal or civil and family law. So, when Congress criminalized femicide in the Código Penal Federal in 2011, for example, this in no way affected Códigos Penales Estatales. Therefore, involving federal authorities in addressing GBV in Mexico is necessary, but insufficient.

In 2000, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) was ousted from the Presidency for the first time since it came to power in 1917. After two consecutive terms led by the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) from 2000 to 2012, the PRI won back the Executive Branch in 2012 with current President Enrique Peña Nieto. The past three years have seen a push for a series of structural reforms broadly intended to improve legal and political frameworks across a variety of key public sectors, including a major reform to the criminal justice system.

D.2 PUBLIC INSECURITY IN MEXICO

D.2.1 Current trends in public insecurity in Mexico

Public insecurity limits basic freedoms: It discourages political participation and social integration, drastically reduces quality of life, and creates distrust between neighbors, friends, and public
institutions. Out of fear, citizens limit the places they visit, the routes they take, and people they spend time with.³

Though Mexico’s level of insecurity is moderate compared to other Latin American countries,⁴ homicide rates have grown significantly in the past two decades, a security deterioration that can be attributed to increased drug-related violence and organized crime and the lack of GOM capacity to address it.⁵ Waves of high-profile violence began in 2005, and upon entering office in 2006, President Felipe Calderón declared a tough stance on crime, announcing a “war” on drug cartels, which also led to an increase in media attention. The number of public security institutions has since multiplied, and the military has taken on a prominent role in domestic security. There was a sharp increase in violent crime starting in 2007, which most analysts identify as a turning point. The homicide rate peaked in May 2011, followed by a slow gradual decrease.⁶ Even if this downward trend continues, homicide rates are not expected to reach pre-2007 levels until 2020.⁷

When President Enrique Peña Nieto took office in 2012, his administration shifted strategies, seeking to reduce visibility of public insecurity in the media.⁸ The new security strategy, as outlined in the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2013-2018 (PND),¹⁰ is to achieve a “Mexico at Peace” through two complementary strategies: 1) social prevention of violence and 2) timely and effective police intervention.¹¹

However, Mexico is still struggling. In October 2015, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights declared that Mexico is in the midst of a serious human rights crisis characterized by “extreme insecurity and violence; gross human rights violations, especially forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and torture; critical levels of impunity; and inadequate and insufficient attention to victims and their families.”¹² In 2015 alone, the National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) received 663 complaints of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 50 of torture, 36 of deprivation of life, and 11 of forced disappearances.¹³ Furthermore, in addition to drug-related violence, organized crime networks have recently diversified their arsenal of profitable crimes, leading to an increase in kidnappings, extortion and robberies.¹⁴ In 2014, the economic cost of crime and violence in Mexico was estimated at $233 billion USD for that year alone,¹⁵ equivalent to around 1.3% of Mexico’s GDP.¹⁶

According to the 2015 Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE),¹⁷ the rate of victimization has been steadily rising since 2010, with a significant increase
between 2011 and 2012. The last three years (2013 - 2015) have held relatively steady. It is important to note that an overwhelmingly majority of crimes go unreported: ENVIPE estimates around 93% of crimes are not reflected in official crime statistics.

Public insecurity can be understood in two dimensions: the objective (i.e. crime rates) and the subjective (i.e. fear of crime or perceptions of insecurity). Subjective insecurity may or may not be directly correlated with objective insecurity, but both play into how safe or unsafe people feel. Fear of victimization is often exaggerated when compared to the likelihood of being a victim, but both have important impacts on how people change their behavior in response to insecurity.

Subjective insecurity has followed a similar trend as rate of victimization. In 2012, 65% of Mexicans reported their state was insecure, a figure that rose to over 72% in 2013, where it has remained relatively stable since. Mexicans also express little hope for improvement: 65% of urban adults think the security situation will not get better in the next year.

Impunity is a serious obstacle to justice in Mexico: Only around one in ten crimes is reported, and of those, less than 5% reach convictions. Largely as a result of this, Mexican citizens do not trust their public institutions to resolve the growing problems of crime and violence. As of 2015, over
77% of Mexicans have little to no trust in their government when it comes to public security.25 When a 2014 survey asked why crimes so often go unreported in Mexico, almost two-thirds of respondents (63%) said because reporting a crime is “useless.”26

D.2.2 Citizen security and recent public security reforms in Mexico

Public security is one of the principal functions of the State.27 Recently, many countries, including Mexico, have begun incorporating the concept of citizen security into their public security regimes in order to emphasize the importance of a democratic institutional framework with citizen participation at its core.28 A citizen security approach involves not only traditional security institutions (i.e. police, prosecutors, public defenders, courts, and correction centers) but also a wide range of other governmental and non-governmental institutions (i.e. human rights organizations, victims’ services, and community engagement programs).29 Citizen security is not just punishment, it is also prevention. It generally includes efforts to strengthen criminal justice systems, enhance the enforcement of human rights, promote community participation, and build capacity in conflict resolution.30 In an effort to improve citizen security over the last decade, Mexico has made some significant changes to its public security institutions,31 including the following:

A broader approach to crime prevention

Since 2005, the federal government has gradually incorporated a more comprehensive set of actors into its security policies, including specialized crime prevention institutions and interventions. This strategy also places emphasis on strengthening and professionalizing state and municipal institutions.32 In 2013, the Secretaría de Gobernación (SEGOB) launched the National Programa Nacional de Prevención del Delito (PRONAPRED), intended to support local crime prevention in certain high-risk communities.33

The Constitutional criminal justice reforms of 2008

In June 2008, after facing pressure to restructure an inefficient system, Congress passed a Constitutional criminal justice reform,34 mandating the transition from the inquisitorial legal system (associated with the Continental European tradition) to an accusatorial model (associated with the common law Anglo-Saxon tradition). In broad terms, the accusatorial model relies on the presumption of innocence, high-quality evidence, and oral testimony, elements that are thought to create the conditions for more efficient, accessible and transparent justice.35 Pre-trial procedures are strengthened to improve judicial impartiality, independence and separation of powers, and to reduce the number of cases handled in court. Other expected improvements include better enforcement of sentences, fewer inmates awaiting trial in jail, and better prison conditions.36

The reform can be an opportunity to improve access to justice for victims. Under the new system, victims can take a more active role in their own cases, including deciding whether or not to testify in court.37 They have access to a wider range of legal benefits, including legal advisers (asesores jurídicos) and the new emphasis on restorative justice and reparations is intended to bring victims’ rights to the fore.

The criminal justice reform seeks to reduce the risk of judicial errors, including the condemnation and imprisonment of innocent people.38 The shift to oral, recorded, live and public trials is intended to improve transparency and lead to faster court cases. Oral trials give both victims and suspects the opportunity to testify in front of a judge.39
According to the criminal justice reform, minor crimes (those that would be sanctioned by less than five years in prison) can avoid the courtroom and instead pass through a process of mediation and conciliation between the victim and the aggressor, accompanied by an MP and a specialist in alternative justice. These alternative mechanisms were designed to encourage mechanisms for alternative justice as a way to make the courtroom more efficient and to avoid sending people to already-overcrowded jails and prisons.

Early results of the transition to the new criminal justice system seem positive. States that have transitioned have fewer people in prison still awaiting trial in comparison with states that have not transitioned. Transitioned states have decreased incarcerations for minor crimes by 60%, a drop that is attributed to the effective utilization of alternative justice mechanisms. Additionally, the public’s perception of the new criminal justice system is that it is faster and most transparent than the former system.

The Constitutional human rights reform of 2011
This Constitutional Reform recognizes international human rights treaties as binding law, elevating these treaties and conventions on par with the Constitution. Also, the State is now constitutionally mandated to seek reparations for victims of human rights violations. In 2013, Congress passed the Ley General de Víctimas (LGV), which created the Sistema Nacional de Atención a Víctimas and the Comisión Ejecutiva de Atención a Víctimas (CEAVs), which provide victim services and administer the Registro Nacional de Víctimas. The criminal justice reform has gradually been incorporated at federal and state levels and is constitutionally mandated to be in place by June 2016.
ANNEX E. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON GBV IN MEXICO

E.1 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GBV

The first broad-based attempt to deal with VAW was the UN World Conference on Women, held in Mexico City in 1975. The Conference, along with the UN Decade for Women (1976-1985), launched a new era in global efforts to achieve gender equality. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the first international legal document that details women’s human rights, including a definition of discrimination against women and the provision that States must include gender equality in their national policy frameworks. CEDAW has been ratified by 189 of 197 UN countries (including Mexico), making it the second most widely-ratified human rights treaty, after only the Convention on Human Rights of the Child. CEDAW has become a milestone in international law as a platform to address VAW, although it never explicitly mentions violence.

CEDAW laid the groundwork for future international agreements, including the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, referred to as Belém do Pará, adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1994. Belém do Pará highlights the human rights violations suffered by women in the Americas and emphasizes the responsibility of States to prevent, sanction and eradicate VAW. All 32 member states of the OAS, including Mexico, have ratified Belém do Pará, making it the only specific and binding international legal instrument on VAW in Latin America.

Belém do Pará defines VAW as “any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere.” This definition was revolutionary at the time for three reasons: 1) It defines discrimination, in a broad sense, as violence against women, explicitly linking inequality with violence; 2) It defines VAW as not only sexual and physical, but also as psychological violence; and 3) It recognizes that VAW occurs both in public spaces and behind closed doors. Belém do Pará establishes that OAS member states are responsible to intervene to ensure protection and security for women in both public and private spheres. However, Belém do Pará only addresses VAW, so its application is limited in addressing other forms of GBV.

In 1995, one year after the passage of Belém do Pará, UN Women adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, unanimously ratified by 189 countries, including Mexico. It defines 12 areas of critical concern regarding the treatment of women, including poverty, education, health, violence, armed conflict, the economy, power and decision making, the media, the environment and the rights of girls. Though not legally binding, the Beijing Platform asks States to prevent VAW, study its causes and consequences, prosecute perpetrators, and take measures to eliminate it. Every five years, UN member states are asked to report voluntarily on their progress. Mexico submitted reports in 2005, 2010 and 2015, noting some progress in its legislative and policy frameworks to protect women’s rights, though there is still a long way to go.

International policies on GBV have almost exclusively emphasized VAW, without specific protections for LGBTIQ people. In 2008, 66 UN member States (including Mexico) voted in support
of a statement that human rights treaties should include protections against abuses based on sexual orientation and gender identity. However, as of 2016, the General Assembly has not officially adopted this statement. In 2011 and again in 2014, the UN Human Rights Council adopted resolutions that expressed “grave concern” for acts of discrimination and violence against LGBTIQ people. These resolutions have been criticized for failing to clearly identify the rights of LGBTIQ people and failing to enshrine gender identity and sexual orientation as explicit categories of protection.

E.2 NATIONAL LAWS ON GBV IN MEXICO

In 1975, after the UN World Conference on Women, Mexico reformed the Constitution to declare that men and women are equal before the law. In response, states reformed their Civil and Penal Codes to prohibit discrimination based on sex, a change which primarily affected family, contract and labor law.

The early 1990s marked a shift in the criminalization of VAW and the formation of the local feminist movement as a political actor. The 1989 gang rape of 19 women by Federal District Prosecutor Javier Coello Trejo’s bodyguards led to a mass mobilization of feminists, political organizations and civil society groups, putting pressure on GOM to recognize VAW as a public problem and to pass legislation to address sexual violence. In response, President Carlos Salinas committed to reforming the justice system, which led to the creation of several benchmark institutions within the Federal District Prosecutor’s Office, including specialized agencies on VAW.

The rest of the decade was marked by a focus on domestic violence. In 1996, Congress passed the Ley para Prevenir y Atender la Violencia Intrafamiliar, which mandated public intervention in cases of domestic violence. In 1999, President Zedillo enacted the Norma Executiva NOM-190-SSA1-1999, which set a standard for healthcare providers to act in cases of domestic violence. That same year, the then Comisión Nacional de las Mujeres launched the first Programa Nacional contra la Violencia Familiar.

Since 1995, gender equality has been included as a part of Mexico’s Programa Nacional de Desarrollo, but it wasn’t until 2000 under President Vicente Fox that it was matched for the first time by budget allocations. The Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (INMUJERES) was created in 2001 as the first national government agency dedicated to implementing the national policy on gender equality. INMUJERES is matched at the local level by Instancia de Mujeres en las Entidades Federativas (IMEFs), which have been set up in all 32 states as of 2007. The activities and structure of the IMEFs depend on the policy priorities of their states, but all work on issues of gender equality and VAW, to different degrees of success.

The early 2000s ushered in a focus on domestic violence. In 2003, Congress passed the Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminación (LFPED), which prohibits discrimination based on sex, gender, sexual preference, marital status, and family status. Between 2000 and 2005, under the Programa Nacional para una Vida Libre de Violencia, 28 states passed local legislation on domestic violence. Public health agencies began to provide specialized medical and psychological services to VAW victims, and 21 states and the Federal District set up care centers for victims of family-based violence. Also in 2005, in a big win for the feminist movement, the Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN) criminalized marital rape, which had previously been considered “an undue exercise of conjugal rights,” and therefore not a punishable offense.
In 2006, Congress passed the *Ley General para la Igualdad entre Mujeres y Hombres* (LGIHM)\(^{23}\) to guarantee substantive equality between women and men in the public and private sectors.\(^{24}\) The law created the *Sistema Nacional para la Equidad entre Hombres y Mujeres* and established a requirement that PNDs must include mechanisms for the prevention, attention, sanction and eradication of VAW. In response to the LGIHM, 18 states have passed local laws for gender equality.\(^{25}\)

One year after the LGIHM, Congress passed the *Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia* (LGAMVLV),\(^{26}\) a milestone that defines VAW as a violation of human rights for the first time in Mexican law. The LGAMVLV creates the *Sistema Nacional para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres*, made up of ten federal institutions and 32 IMEFs that implement programs to address VAW, as well as an advisory board made up of 11 invited institutions. The LGAMVLV is also significant for defining VAW, femicide and protection orders, as well as for creating the Gender Alert and BANAVIM.

### Sistema Nacional para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres\(^{27}\)

E.3 PRECEDENTS SET BY THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SCJN

In the late 2000s, Mexico was the subject of several Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) cases, which set key precedents for GBV policy. The sentences and precedents are obligatory for Mexico and the region.

**Box E.1: González et al. v. México (“Campo Algodonero”)**

In November 2001, eight dead women who had been raped and tortured were found in a cotton field in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. In 2002, the mothers of three of the women presented a petition against Mexico to the Corte IDH, arguing that the human rights of their daughters and their families had been violated because of a failure to prevent, investigate and sanction these crimes.\(^{28}\)

In the ruling, Mexico was found responsible for “the lack of measures for the protection of the
victims, [...] the lack of prevention of these crimes, in spite of full awareness of the existence of a pattern of gender-related violence that had resulted in hundreds of women and girls murdered; the lack of response of the authorities to the disappearance [of the victims]; the lack of due diligence in the investigation of the homicides [...] as well as the denial of justice and the lack of an adequate reparation." Campo Algodonero is significant because it raises the standard of compliance for States: they are not only responsible for failing to respect human rights, but also for failing to protect human rights. In other words, States are responsible not only for directly killing people, but for failing to implement measures to protect people from being killed, particularly when States are aware of a persistent problem of violence, like VAW.

In response to the ruling, Mexico published the case in local and national news outlets and compensated victims for material and moral damages (including reimbursing legal expenses). Mexico also publicly apologized to the families and built a memorial to the victims in Ciudad Juárez. However, Mexico has not fulfilled the majority of the requirements of the ruling, which include: conducting a federal criminal case on the incidents; investigating and sanctioning the public officials involved: investigating and sanctioning those responsible for harassing relatives of the victims; creating a national database on disappearances and murders of women; conducting VAW workshops for citizens of Chihuahua; and providing medical, psychological and psychiatric care to relatives of the victims.

Box E.2: Rosendo Cantú et al. v. México
This case was brought by Rosendo Cantú, a member of the Me’phaa indigenous community in Guerrero, a state with a heavy military presence. One day, Cantú was washing clothes at a river near her home. Eight male soldiers approached her and interrogated her. She was threatened and hit with a gun, physically abused, her skirt and underwear were stripped away, and she was raped by two of the men. She reported the crime, but the case was filed away under military jurisdiction. The case is significant for the discussion of rape as a form of torture, the proper limits of the military jurisdiction, and special needs of women, minors, and indigenous peoples.

In response to the 2010 ruling, Mexico was required to conduct an investigation into the case, including examining the conduct of public officials involved. It is also supposed to take legislative measures to limit the use of special military courts and standardize protocols for the care of VAW victims. However, critics say that Mexico has failed to comply with these requirements.

Box E.3: Fernández Ortega et al. v. México
In 2002, Inés Fernández Ortega, a woman from an indigenous community in Guerrero, was raped and tortured by military personnel. The State failed to undertake due diligence on the investigation and sanction of these crimes. This case also dealt with the use of the military justice system to investigate and prosecute human rights violations, and the difficulties encountered by indigenous women in access to justice. The 2010 ruling required Mexico to review the conduct of negligent public officials, limit the use of military courts, and avoid discrimination in the justice system. The ruling reiterates that cases dealing with human rights violations of civilians — like Ms. Fernández Ortega and Ms. Rosendo Cantú — cannot be processed under military jurisdiction.

In May 2015, the Corte IDH reported that Mexico continued to misuse its military courts, even after a 2014 reform to the Mexican Military Justice Code. One of the biggest criticisms in this report was the lack of military capacity to investigate crimes like rape and torture of civilians.
In 2010, 29-year-old Mariana Lima, the wife of a police officer in the State of Mexico, was reported dead of an apparent suicide. According to testimonies given by her mother, sister, and best friend, her husband constantly beat, raped, and threatened to kill her. Mariana died on the day she told her husband she was leaving him. In spite of these testimonies, the MP ruled the case was a suicide, based on the husband’s testimony, who claimed he found her dead in their home. The victim’s mother challenged this ruling up to the SCJN. The Court determined that authorities had failed to conduct the investigation in adherence with human rights law, particularly with regards to the mandate of incorporating a gender perspective. Because of the victim’s age and gender, combined with her family’s testimonies, authorities should have pursued a line of inquiry consistent with femicide. The Court ordered authorities to reopen the case and conduct the investigations necessary, though CSOs report that authorities have been slow to take action.

### E.4. PGR PROTOCOLS

**Protocol for investigation with a gender perspective for sexual violence.**

This protocol establishes basic guidelines for the investigation of sexual violence. It defines sexual violence broadly, including harassment and indecent exposure, stressing that is always accompanied by psychological violence. The protocol reinforces the right of victims to report crimes in privacy and to receive protection (especially for minors).

**Protocol for investigation with a gender perspective for femicides.**

This protocol establishes basic guidelines that justice operators must follow in case of the violent death of a woman. It outlines the evidence that must be gathered by investigators, including the victim’s personal history and social context, psychological profiles of the victim and the suspect, as well as evidence of previous criminal conduct of the suspect. To establish whether the homicide was gender-motivated, investigators must consider the context of the crime, the circumstances and disposal of the body, the relationship between victim and aggressor, and the vulnerability and inequality of power of the victim (in relation to the aggressor) at the time of the crime.
E.5 KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN GOM GBV POLICY IN MEXICO, 1975-2016

[Diagram showing key developments in GOM GBV policy in Mexico, 1975-2016]
## E.6 TABLE OF CURRENT LAWS ON GBV IN MEXICO

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<td>Sistema Nacional para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres</td>
<td>Programa Integral para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres 2014-2018</td>
<td>Gender Alert; Protection Orders; BANAVIM</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>Ley General para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas y para la Protección y Asistencia a las Víctimas de estos Delitos (LGPSETP)</td>
<td>Comisión Intersecretarial para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas</td>
<td>Programa Nacional para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas y para la Protección y Asistencia a las Víctimas de estos Delitos 2014-2018</td>
<td>Fondo de Protección y Asistencia a las Víctimas de los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>Ley para la Protección de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas</td>
<td>Junta de Gobierno, Consejo Consultivo y Coordinación Ejecutiva Nacional</td>
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<td>Mecanismo de Protección para Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Ley General de Víctimas (LGV)</td>
<td>Sistema Nacional de Atención a Víctimas (SNAV), CEAV</td>
<td>Programa de Atención Integral a Víctimas 2014-2018</td>
<td>Asesor Jurídico de la Víctima; Fondo para la Protección de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas</td>
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<td>Fondo de Ayuda, Asistencia y Reparación Integral a Víctimas; Registro Nacional de Víctimas</td>
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<td>Project</td>
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<td>Mechanism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Project</td>
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ANNEX F. CURRENT GBV INTERVENTIONS BY SECTOR

The following descriptions of GBV policies reflect the responses to official information requests, as well as the results of literature review and interviews.

F.1 SEGOB INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS GBV

*Secretaría de Gobernación* (SEGOB) is a central player in current GBV policy, particularly because of its role as the Chair of the *Sistema Nacional para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres* (Sistema Nacional). CONAVIM, which is under SEGOB is responsible for the design of the *Programa Integral para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres* 2014-2018 (PIPASEVM 2014-2018), as well as the creation of the *Centros de Justicia de las Mujeres* (CJMs). CONAVIM is also responsible for declaring and monitoring Gender Alerts. See the table at the end of this Annex for more information on the PIPASEVM 2014-2018.

Box F.1: A new federal initiative to centralize GBV data

In 2016, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) began financing a project to design and launch the *Plataforma Analítica para la Prevención de la Violencia contra las Mujeres en México* (hereafter referred to as the “Plataforma”) with the *Secretaría de Gobernación* (SEGOB). The Plataforma intends to centralize current official data sources (including ENDIREH and BANAVIM), as well as crowdsourced data from social networks like Facebook and Twitter, to identify trends in VAW.\(^1\) SEGOB wants to eventually integrate the *Plataforma* with the CNS initiative “Plataforma México,” which centralizes other crime and prevention data (not including GBV).\(^2\) The *Plataforma* is in the early design stages, and SEGOB hopes it will be ready for use by 2017.\(^3\)

F.2 INMUJERES INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS GBV

The main objective of *Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres* (INMUJERES) is to mainstream a gender perspective across all GOM agencies, and it is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the *Programa Nacional para la Igualdad de Oportunidades y No Discriminación contra las Mujeres* (PROIGUALDAD 2013-2018).\(^4\) INMUJERES is not supposed to directly implement the actions of PROIGUALDAD, so its role is mostly limited to coordinating other GOM actors. Objective 2 of PROIGUALDAD is to prevent, attend, sanction and eradicate VAW. This includes five strategies (none of which are to be implemented by INMUJERES directly): (i) preventing VAW, (ii) promoting peaceful conflict resolution in schools, (iii) strengthening victim services, (iv) ensuring a violence-free life for indigenous, disabled, migrant and laborer women and girls, and (v) guaranteeing justice for VAW victims. This Objective is measured by three indicators:\(^5\)

1. The number of victims served by CJMs and shelters, which has more than doubled in a few years from 2,118 in 2011 to 5,660 in 2014.
2. The number of VAW-related crimes prosecuted in state courts, which is intended to be measured against the 2011 baseline of 14,150 cases. No new information is available for recent years, though the goal is to reach 25,000 cases by 2018.
3. The number of gender-related crimes reported to MPs, which dropped slightly from 34,763 in 2012 to 32,608 in 2014.

**F.3 SSA INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS GBV**

Under Secretaría de Salud (SSA), the main agency that deals with GBV is the Centro Nacional de Equidad de Género y Salud Reproductiva (CNEGSR), which is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the Programa de Acción Específico, Prevención y Atención de la Violencia Familiar y de Género (PEPAVFG) 2013-2018 in state health services. PEPAVFG stands out for being one of the only public programs to (at least in name) address GBV broadly, not just VAW. It seeks to improve the early detection of GBV primarily through standardized intake and reporting protocols, expanded psychological and referral services for victims, and increased “reeducation” programming for men. However, despite its name, PEPAVFG is directly almost exclusively towards women. Objective 1 is to reduce health damages caused by family-based violence on women.

In addition to PEPAVFG, all public health operators are obligated to apply NOM 046 (and the associated Modelo Integrado para la Prevención y Atención de la Violencia Familiar y Sexual. Some public health centers (though not all) also offer specialized services for VAW victims, including medical and psychological attention, counselling, risk evaluation and rehabilitation.

The CNEGSR also offers public funds to support municipal shelters for GBV victims. These shelters are mostly operated by CSOs, though there are a handful of public shelters. CNEGSR funding is distributed yearly through a public call for proposals, and it supports over 40 shelters, many of which depend upon SSA for up to 90% of their total budget. These shelters focus on immediate services for victims, including up to three months of shelter, as well as psychological, legal and job skills training services.

The Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública (INSP), a public research center and university under SSA, designed the Programa de Reeducación para Víctimas y Agresores de Violencia de Pareja, a training model to be used by health operators. The Program was piloted in four states in 2009, and is meant to be replicated in all 32 states by the state Secretarías de Salud. There are no public evaluations of this Program on record.

The Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF) is also housed within SSA, although the relationship is not always so clear between the two. DIF is the main public institution responsible for the protection of children and it designs national policies that aim to prevent child abuse and provide services for victims. Their operational programs include the Programa para la Protección y el Desarrollo Integral de la Infancia and the Programa de Atención a Familias y Población Vulnerable. DIF also offers capacity building and funding for state and municipal DIFs and CSOs, as well as adoption services, shelters, orphanages, and day care centers. DIF also manages the Procuraduría de Defensa de Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes, which handles child abuse cases, including domestic violence, as well as legal aid for victims.

**F.4 SEP INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS GBV**

The Subsecretaría de Planeación y Evaluación de Política Educativa of the Secretaría de Educación (SEP) coordinates programs related to GBV, including workshops and trainings for middle and high school students and teachers in high-risk areas (defined by same criteria adopted
by PRONAPRED.\textsuperscript{14} SEP has also launched awareness campaigns, like “Cápsulas para la no violencia,” short videos on non-violence that are broadcast in Telesecundarias\textsuperscript{15} and used as supplemental material in other schools. In 2014, in coordination with PRONAPRED, SEP launched the Estrategia nacional para impulsar la convivencia escolar pacífica con perspectiva de género en la educación básica, a special training program for elementary school teachers that seeks to decrease risk factors for youth violence. However, there is little information available.

Box F.2: Abriendo Escuelas para la Equidad, 2008-2013

In 2008, the Organization of Ibero-American States and SEP piloted a new program, “Abriendo Escuelas para la Equidad” to keep schools open on Saturdays to offer artistic, cultural and sports activities that address GBV, as well as medical, psychological and legal counseling for victims of violence. It initially ran in 119 schools in 2008, growing yearly until reaching 900 schools in ten states in 2011 with a total of more than 55,000 participants, including students, teachers, parents and community members. Evaluations in 2009 and 2010 indicated that Abriendo Escuelas was producing positive results in subjective security: over 60% of student participants said they thought school violence (not specifically GBV) was decreasing.\textsuperscript{16} However, the evaluations did not measure these results against control groups, nor did they measure objective security (i.e. actual rates of violence).

In 2013, Abriendo Escuelas was reduced to 400 schools in municipalities prioritized by PRONAPRED in 8 states\textsuperscript{17} under the new name “Project for the inclusion of a gender perspective.” This new project focused on offering support services for victims of GBV in schools, training for teachers and developing projects for non-violence with a gender perspective. After one year under the new system, the project received no further funding in 2014 and 2015.\textsuperscript{18}

In 2015, the Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP) announced plans to support schools to address GBV and social violence, including training modules for teachers and parents and early detection tools for GBV. Part of this proposal is to create state-level GOM institutions in charge of school-based violence, as well as a phone line for counseling and referral services, reporting harassment, and accessing information on violence in schools.\textsuperscript{19} This model is still in early stages, and SEP has yet to announce clear next steps.

F.5 SEDESOL INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS GBV

The Instituto de Desarrollo Social (INDESOL), a desconcentrated agency\textsuperscript{20} of Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL), manages the Programa de Apoyo a Instancias de Mujeres (PAIMEF), a federal program that provides funds to support the Instancias Estatales de Mujeres (IMEFs) and CSOs working on VAW and gender equality. In 2014, PAIMEF broadened its funding criteria to include not only actions that strengthen and support the institutionalization of IMEFs but also CSO interventions that prevent VAW and provide attention to victims. PAIMEF funds can be used for prevention public awareness campaigns, training programs and promoting networks and alliances between local actors against VAW. However, prevention is a relatively small percentage of PAIMEF: In 2010, only 15% of the activities funded by PAIMEF were focused on prevention.

A recent review of federal budget programs found that PAIMEF has low coverage: it only reached 0.82% of its target population in 2015.\textsuperscript{21} Previous evaluations of PAIMEF show a lack of clear indicators as to whether or not these funds prevent and address VAW because IMEFs that receive PAIMEF funding report on actions taken and amount of budget used, but not on results.\textsuperscript{22}
F.6 PGR INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS GBV

Within Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), Fiscalía Especializada en Delitos de Violencia contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas (FEVIMTRA) is in charge of coordinating the actions of 13 federal agencies under the Programa Nacional para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas y para la Protección y Asistencia a las Victorimas de estos Delitos 2014-2018. As part of its services, FEVIMTRA also runs a specialized shelter for human trafficking victims, a highly secured space that offers protection and other services for women victims. There is just one and its location is secret for security reasons. In 2015, in response to CEDAW and CIDH rulings, PGR designed and published several protocols for justice operators on topics like femicide, sexual violence and justice for the LGBTIQ community. However, these protocols are optional, and there is little information about their implementation.

F.7 CDI INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS GBV

The Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas (CDI) offers culturally-pertinent community outreach services for indigenous people and works with local authorities to shift gender norms. Casas de la Mujer Indígena (CAMI), an initiative of CDI, strengthens and trains women’s organizations to deal with violence and reproductive health issues. There are 24 CAMIs located in the indigenous regions of Mexico. CAMIs have been found to create local leaders that advocate for changes in local policies on reproductive health and VAW. Several components of the CAMIs are worth replicating, including culturally-sensitive activities, direct participation of local authorities, and linkages with local and national CSO networks.
### F.8 OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS OF THE PIPASEVM 2014-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Actions Required</th>
<th>Progress According to Official Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 1. Promote harmonization of laws and cultural transformation to contribute to non-violence against women.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objective 1</strong> is evaluated according to an index of progress, which measures the percentage of legislative harmonization at the state level. This index is based on the number of state laws and regulations on equality and VAW that match the LGAMVLV, the LGIMH, and the international regulatory framework of CEDAW and Belem do Pará. In 2012, only 5 (15%) of the Mexican states were fully aligned. By 2014, seven states had harmonized their laws and regulations, bumping the index up to 21%. In other words, only a fifth of the country is meeting this indicator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reform national and state laws and regulations to eliminate discriminatory provisions against women in accordance with international standards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Promote the criminalization of sexual violence within marriage or intimate partnerships, obstetric violence and forced marriage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Promote the prohibition of conciliation or mediation in cases of VAW.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Promote the homologous criminalization of the crime of femicide according to the Código Penal Federal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 2. Implement prevention strategies to reduce risk factors for VAW.</strong></td>
<td>The official indicators for Objective 2 are:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Incorporate VAW prevention into the educational curricula to promote non-violent masculinities and egalitarian relationships in schools.</td>
<td>- The number of official SEP documents that have incorporated gender equality, human rights, non-discrimination and prevention of VAW. This includes official curricula, protocols for student care, operating rules, among other. By 2014, there were 29 such documents, indicating a 32% increase from 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish early detection and reporting mechanisms for VAW identified in schools.</td>
<td>- The number of public schools with people who have capacity to intervene, both individually and collectively, in cases of VAW. In 2012, only 32 schools had this capacity, while in 2014 this figure increased slightly to 46 schools. The goal is to increase the number of schools with trained professionals to 8,122 by 2018. No information is provided on how this goal was set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Inform all healthcare service providers of their obligations for detection, reporting and services for VAW victims under NOM 046 and monitor compliance.</td>
<td>- Percentage of women discharged from hospitals who have suffered injuries related to VAW. This number increased slightly from 1.15% in 2012 to 1.18% in 2014. This indicator is measured with information from the Sistema Nacional de Información en Salud (SINAIS) of SSA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Identify risk factors for VAW in public spaces and transportation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Install emergency systems in transportation and public spaces (including parks, gardens, sports arenas, and shopping centers).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Train specialized security agencies to address VAW.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Objective 3. Guarantee access to comprehensive care services for victims of VAW.

- Expand free, specialized and accessible care services for victims of VAW.
- Promote interagency protocols of care for victims of VAW.
- Provide job skills and financial training to at-risk women, incentivize private sector employment for women, and promote access to mortgage loans for women.

Objective 3 is measured by the number of women and children victims of VAW served by certain state institutions, including CJMs, public shelters and Agencia del Ministerio Público Especializada en Violencia Intrafamiliar y Sexual (AMPEVIFs). In 2013, almost 28,000 victims were treated for VAW-related needs. This number is expected to grow by over 200% by 2018. This indicator also only considers the absolute number of victims served, rather than the coverage of the care, which would require comparing that number to the total potential target population. Furthermore, there is no indicator on the dissemination or application of the protocols of care for victims of VAW.

Objective 3 is also measured according to levels of women’s empowerment, measured by their effective influence or intervention capacity in the family or partner decision-making process in three areas: personal aspects, reproductive issues and key decisions. This indicator assumes a direct relationship between women’s empowerment and an ability to break the cycle of violence, although there is debate about how certain empowerment initiatives like job skills training impact risk factors for VAW. Some studies have even shown that throwing off the economic balance of a household can lead to increased risk for domestic violence.

### Objective 4. Ensure women’s access to justice through effective investigation, reparations and punishment.

- Ensure free legal advice and promote timely medical and psychological care to women in situations of violence and their families.
- Design a national protocol for issuing protection orders for women victims of violence.
- Create a reparations fund for VAW victims and establish for reparations in accordance with international standards.
- Promote the systematization and registration of court rulings in cases of VAW that incorporate a gender perspective.
- Strengthen AMPEVIFs.

Objective 4 is measured by the percentage of protection orders granted to women victims of GBV who request them. Though protection orders have existed as a legal mechanism since the 2007 passage of the LGAMVLV, there is a lack of data on their usage. The PIPASEVM uses statistics from the Observatorio Ciudadano Nacional del Feminicidio (OCNF) to measure the baseline of this indicator, which they estimate at 7% in 2013. The goal is to increase the percentage to 12% by 2018, to reflect a five-point increase over five years. However, according to the most recent information available from BANAVIM, protection orders are issued in only 0.4% of reported cases of VAW.

### Objective 5. Strengthen interinstitutional coordination for the prevention, attention, sanction and eradication of violence against women.

- Build a strategy and establish tools for monitoring and evaluation progress in the eradication of VAW.

Objective 5 is measured by the number of Centros de Justicia para las Mujeres (CJMs) in Mexico. In 2015, there were 26 CJMs in 19 states, surpassing the official goals for 2015 and 2016. However, the existence of CJMs does not guarantee the quality of the services offered. Wide variation in quality of services nationwide has been documented as an obstacle to the effective implementation of the ideal
- Strengthen the integration and management of BANAVIM to obtain reliable statistical information.
- Generate information and systematize good practices on the prevention, attention, sanction and eradication of VAW.

The second official indicator for Objective 5 is the percentage of women 15-years-old and up who have reported having experienced at least one act of violence during a given period. In 2011, ENDIREH reported that 63% of women had experienced at least one act of VAW either in their most recent relationship or within the last 12 months. The goal is to reduce this percentage to 59% by 2018.

### F.9 TABLE OF CURRENT GOM GBV INTERVENTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year created</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Responsible Unit (Operational Unit)</th>
<th>Budget line</th>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Programa de Fortalecimiento a la Transversalidad de la Perspectiva de Género</td>
<td>Operational Program</td>
<td>INMUJERES (IMEFs)</td>
<td>SHCP S-010 Fortalecimiento a la Transversalidad de la Perspectiva de Género</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Unidades de Igualdad de Género in all GOM institutions</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>INMUJERES (IMEFs)</td>
<td>SHCP S-010 Fortalecimiento a la Transversalidad de la Perspectiva de Género</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>PAIMEF</td>
<td>Operational Program</td>
<td>INDESOL (IMEFs and CSOs)</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Gender Alert</td>
<td>Mechanism</td>
<td>CONAVIM (State and municipal governments)</td>
<td>SEGOB E-015 Promover la atención y prevención de la violencia contra las mujeres</td>
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<td>Protection Orders</td>
<td>Mechanism</td>
<td>State and municipal governments</td>
<td>No specific budget line assigned</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Abriendo Escuelas para la Equidad</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Subsecretaría de Planeación y Evaluación de Políticas Educativas</td>
<td>SEP E-032 Diseño y aplicación de políticas de equidad de género</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>NOM-046-SSA2-2005</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>BANAVIM</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>CNS (State and municipal governments)</td>
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<td>Refugio Especializado de Atención Integral y Protección a Víctimas de Trata de Personas y Violencia Extrema</td>
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<td>Operational Program</td>
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<td>SSA P-017 Atención de la Salud. Reproductiva y la Igualdad de Género en Salud</td>
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<td>CJMs</td>
<td>Project</td>
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<td>SEGOB E-015 Promover la atención y prevención de la violencia contra las mujeres</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>Programa para la Protección y el Desarrollo Integral de la Infancia</td>
<td>Operational Program</td>
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<td>Programa de Atención a Familias y Población Vulnerable</td>
<td>Operational Program</td>
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<td>SEGOB Dirección General de Derechos Humanos (Comisión Intersecretarial para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas and CSOs)</td>
<td>SEGOB P-015 Promover la prevención, protección y atención en materia de trata de Trata de Personas</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>Mecanismo de Protección para Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas</td>
<td>Mechanism</td>
<td>Unidad para la Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de la Secretaría de Gobernación (Unidad de Recepción de Casos y Reacción Rápida; Unidad de Evaluación de Riesgos, y Unidad de Prevención, Seguimiento y Análisis)</td>
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<td>CNEGSR</td>
<td>SSA P-017 Atención de la Salud. Reproductiva y la Igualdad de Género en Salud</td>
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<td>PRONAPRED</td>
<td>Operational Program</td>
<td>SEGOB Subsecretaría de Prevención y Participación Ciudadana (State and municipal governments and CSOs)</td>
<td>SEGOB U-006 Programa Nacional de Prevención del Delito</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Asesor Jurídico de la Víctima</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>CEAV</td>
<td>SHCP E-033 Atención Integral a Víctimas y Ofendidos</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>Ayudas para Refugios para Mujeres y Niños</td>
<td>Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Protocolo de Investigación Ministerial, Policial y Pericial con Perspectiva de Género para la Violencia Sexual</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>PGR Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas (FEVIMTRA)</td>
<td>No specific budget line assigned</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Protocolo de investigación ministerial, policial y pericial para el delito de feminicidio</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>PGR Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas (FEVIMTRA)</td>
<td>No specific budget line assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Registro Nacional de Víctimas</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>CEAV</td>
<td>SHCP E-033 Atención Integral a Víctimas y Ofendidos</td>
</tr>
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ANNEX G. HUMAN RIGHTS IN MORE DETAIL

Because of space constraints, C230 Consultores could not include all relevant background information for several of the grave human rights violations identified in Chapter 6. This Annex offers a summary of key legal frameworks with regard to human trafficking, torture, enforced disappearances and violence against human rights defenders and journalists.

G.1 HUMAN TRAFFICKING

In the last 10 years, human trafficking has become the third most profitable business after drugs and arms dealing.\(^1\) Worldwide, around 21 million people are trafficked,\(^2\) of which the majority are sold into labor exploitation, of which over half of the victims are women, and around 4.5 million are sold into sexual exploitation, of which 98% are women and girls.\(^3\)

In 2000, member states signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (known as the Palermo Convention), followed by its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children in 2003.\(^4\) Together, they established an international framework to prevent and sanction human trafficking. Mexico ratified the Protocol in 2003, obligating Mexico to adopt legislative and other measures to prevent and criminalize human trafficking, like the LPST passed in 2007.\(^5\)

In 2012, Congress reformed the Ley de Prevención y Sanción de la Trata de Personas (LPST) and renamed it as the Ley General para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas y para la Protección y Asistencia a las Víctimas de estos Delitos (LGPSEDTP).\(^6\) This reform aimed to standardize the criminalization and sanctions of human trafficking across Mexico and to require greater coordination between the federal, state and municipal governments.\(^7\) The LGPSEDTP mandates the creation of a planning instrument called the Programa Nacional para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos en Materia de Trata de Personas y para la Protección y Asistencia a las Víctimas de estos Delitos.\(^8\)

Between its founding in 2008 and 2014, FEVIMTRA handled 651 cases of human trafficking.\(^9\) FEVIMTRA also provides services for victims and coordinates the Amber Alert in the case of disappearances of minors.\(^10\) The Amber Alert is primarily a mechanism to circulate press releases that include photos, names and descriptions of missing minors. In Mexico City, for example, the Amber Alert has been activated 92 times since 2011, from which they have managed to recover 87 missing children.\(^11\) However, the Amber Alert has been accused of being inefficient and inaccessible for most families of missing children.\(^12\)

In addition to FEVIMTRA, several other GOM actors have recently become more involved in the fight against human trafficking. SEGOB added the prevention of human trafficking (particularly for women and children) as a Line of Action within its most recent Programa Nacional de Seguridad Pública\(^13\) and Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) has established regional coordination mechanisms with 12 states\(^14\) to prevent trafficking and assist victims.\(^15\) INMUJERES and CNDH have also been active in training public officials as part of the Programa Federal,
including workshops that vary from informational sessions on trafficking, detection of victims, and service provision for victims.\textsuperscript{16} However, none of these programs are monitored and evaluated.

**G.2 TORTURE**

Torture is widespread throughout Latin America, and little progress has been made regionally.\textsuperscript{17} Several international CSOs and multilateral organizations\textsuperscript{18} say that torture has been used increasingly in Mexico since the “war on drugs” under President Calderón - with a spike in 2013 and 2014 at the beginning of the Peña Nieto administration - as a tool to obtain forced confessions and extract information about organized crime.\textsuperscript{19}

![Torture complaints received and cases investigated by PGR, 2006 - 2014\textsuperscript{20}]

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{torture_complaints.png}
\caption{Torture complaints received and cases investigated by PGR, 2006 - 2014\textsuperscript{20}}
\end{figure}

It is difficult to estimate exact numbers of victims in Mexico because of underreporting and a registration process that some experts consider flawed.\textsuperscript{21} Some CSOs estimate that in 2014 there were at least 10,400 cases of torture and ill treatment by state-level authorities alone.\textsuperscript{22} Amnesty International, using a different methodology, counted 2,323 complaints of torture with state-level human rights commissions between 2008 and 2013.\textsuperscript{23}

Torture has been outlawed internationally since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,\textsuperscript{24} a prohibition which was later reinforced by the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture\textsuperscript{25} and the 1987 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,\textsuperscript{26} both ratified by Mexico in 1987.

Torture is prohibited in Article 20 of the Mexican Constitution,\textsuperscript{27} and in 1991, Congress passed the Ley Federal para Prevenir y Sancionar la Tortura (LFPST),\textsuperscript{28} which establishes basic provisions to prevent and punish torture. The LFPST has been widely criticized,\textsuperscript{29} and there is currently an initiative in Congress to replace it with the Ley General para Prevenir, Investigar y Sancionar los Delitos de Tortura y otros Tratos o Penas Crueles Inhumanos o Degradantes.\textsuperscript{30} The new law would divide torture into two separate crimes (“torture” and “cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment”), sanction the death of a victim more severely, and create a Registro Nacional de los Delitos de Tortura y otros Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos y Degradantes.\textsuperscript{31} However, some critics argue the reform is insufficient.\textsuperscript{32}

In 2003, PGR adopted a modified form of the Istanbul Protocol, a set of international guidelines for assessing and reporting cases of suspected torture. The Mexican adaptation\textsuperscript{33} has been criticized for lack of transparency and inability to meet demand.\textsuperscript{34} Between 2003 and 2013, there were 1,219 reports of potential torture requiring medical examination filed with the PGR.\textsuperscript{35} However, only 472
examinations were carried out during that period, and only 12 resulted in torture charges being filed. In response to these deficiencies, in 2015, both the SCJN and the PGR published obligatory guidelines for federal and state MPs, forensic and medical investigators, and police officers. It is too soon to evaluate this effort, but some critics are skeptical that it will represent a change in the status quo.

As a whole, the international and national legal framework has not yet translated into effective safeguards to prevent and sanction torture. The problem lies in lack of enforcement and in local laws that are not compliant with federal regulation. While the CNDH received more than 100 complaints of torture and over 4,700 complaints of ill-treatment from 2007 to 2011, only two federal officials have been sentenced for torture since 1994. Furthermore, there seems to be a tacit acceptance of torture as “business as usual” in the legal community. Some judges continue to accept confessions obtained through torture, even though the Constitution prohibits it.

G.3 ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES

Enforced disappearance – the forcible deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons acting with the authorization or support of the State – became an increasingly common tool of military dictatorships and oppressive regimes in Latin America in the second half of the 20th Century. It is a human rights violation that often goes hand in hand with other violations, like torture and extrajudicial killings. Victims often include political activists, human rights defenders, witnesses and lawyers.

It is difficult to estimate the gravity of the problem in Mexico because of underreporting and deficiencies in the official databases for missing persons. In August 2014, SEGOB and PGR announced there were 22,322 victims of disappearances in Mexico. According to official data as of July 2015, there are more than 27,000 victims listed in the Registro Nacional de Datos de Personas Extraviadas o Desaparecidas (RNPED) run by SEGOB. RNPED, however, has been criticized because records often lack photographs, DNA, dental information, and other identifying characteristics (and even when the authorities have this information, it often does not get transferred to the system). The RNPED also does not distinguish between causes of disappearance (enforced by State agents, enforced by non-State actors, or voluntary), making it impossible to tell if someone chose to go missing or was forced to go missing.

In 1992, in response to the enforced disappearances that plagued Latin America, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which defines any act of enforced disappearance as a flagrant violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. Almost ten years later, in 2001, the Mexican Congress criminalized enforced disappearance in Article 215-A of the Código Penal Federal, although this reform has been criticized for failing to explicitly recognize the role of State agents in this crime.

In 2002, the OAS ratified the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, and Mexico ratified it that year, with a reservation on the use of civil courts for military cases. Four years later, UNHCR adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which includes in the definition of “victim” not only the disappeared person but also any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced disappearance, like family members. Mexico ratified it in 2008 and the Convention came into force in December 2010. However, despite Mexico’s international commitments, as of January
2015, only 12 states have criminalized enforced disappearance in their Códigos Penales Estatales.\textsuperscript{61}

In one successful case, in 2014, Nuevo Leon began implementing the Protocolo de Búsqueda Inmediata de Personas Desaparecidas to detail the immediate actions to be taken by law enforcement and justice personnel when someone is reported missing.\textsuperscript{62} The Protocol calls for the creation of a database of missing persons, as well as a new office within Procuraduría General de Justicia de Nuevo Leon called the Grupo Especializado de Busqueda Inmediata (GEBI) to speed up the search process and provides relatives with the initial findings of the investigation after 72 hours.\textsuperscript{63} As a result of these efforts, from 2014 and 2015, of the more than 1,500 people reported missing in Nuevo Leon, more than 1,400 were found, of which almost 1,300 were found alive.\textsuperscript{64}

G.4 VIOLENCE AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND JOURNALISTS

In the last few decades, Mexico has become one of the riskiest countries in the world for journalists and human rights defenders (HRD). A 2016 report by the International Federation of Journalists ranks Mexico as the third most dangerous country in the world to be a journalist, following Iraq and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{65} In the last 25 years, 120 media workers in Mexico have been killed likely for practicing their profession.\textsuperscript{66} However, confirmed homicides only speak to part of the problem. From 2006 to 2012 under President Calderón, there were on average 32 aggressions\textsuperscript{67} against journalists per year, and it seems being a journalist has become increasingly more dangerous. Reported aggressions spiked to 59 in 2013 and 63 in 2014 under President Peña Nieto.\textsuperscript{68}

It appears organized crime tends to kill journalists outright while the government threatens and harasses journalists to silence them. Of those murdered in Mexico, 75% were killed by members of organized crime, while 60% of other kinds of aggressions are carried out by State authorities.\textsuperscript{69} HRDs are also at high risk.\textsuperscript{70} Regionally, 87% of attacks committed against HRDs in Mexico and Central America are by State actors, particularly municipal authorities.\textsuperscript{71}

Mecanismo de Protección para Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas

The Ley Para La Protección de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas (LPPDDHP) establishes the Mecanismo de Protección para Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas (hereafter referred to as “the Mecanismo”), a tool designed to offer protection measures for at-risk HRDs and journalists.\textsuperscript{72} SEGOB reports that 142 HRDs and 211 journalists requested protection measures between October 2012 and January 2016, of which over half (58%) were men.\textsuperscript{73}

The Governing Board of the Mecanismo, composed of SEGOB, Comisión Nacional de Seguridad (CNS), PGR, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), CNDH and four national CSOs on an Advisory Council, coordinates and supervises the units responsible for determining the specific protection measures to be undertaken by state authorities. The potential beneficiary (whether an HRD, a journalist or a family member) may request protection once they have suffered from attacks that have damaged their physical, psychological, moral and/or financial integrity. In response to their needs, the Mecanismo can provide urgent measures (evacuation, temporary relocation, military escort, and protection of buildings), general protection measures (providing
cellphones, radios, or satellite telephones, bulletproof vests, metal detectors, armored cars, and the installation of cameras, locks, or lights in private or public residences) and preventative measures (instructions, manuals, self-defense courses, and bodyguards). In 2013, the most commonly granted measures included bodyguards and transportation security, phones and panic buttons, police patrols, an emergency directory, self-defense manuals and support in the filing of complaints. 

Protection measures are state and/or municipal responsibilities, although, paradoxically, the LPPDDHP establishes that the decisions of the Governing Board are binding only for federal authorities, not for states. This means that state and municipal authorities are not legally accountable to carry out the protection measures.

The Mecanismo does not have an official monitoring and evaluation system in place. It is only officially evaluated by SHCP to measure the efficient spending of the budget assigned to the Mecanismo (it scored 3 out of 5 in 2015). However, this budget scoring does not measure the effective application of the Mecanismo in securing protection for journalists and HRDs.

Overall, the capacity of the Mecanismo is simply too low to respond to the demand for protection. One study found that in 2013 and 2014, only 303 HRDs and journalists were registered in the Mecanismo, when there were 1,187 attacks reported during that same period. Furthermore, the budget assigned to the Mecanismo varies from year to year, creating uncertainty and even risking the full collapse of the Mecanismo if attacks against HRDs and journalists continue at such a fast pace. In 2016, because of the recent budget cuts, the Cámara de Diputados has fused the specific budget line originally dedicated to the Mecanismo with two other budget lines dedicated more broadly to human rights in the Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación (PEF). In other words, if the money for the Mecanismo was lacking before, now it will be even more limited.
ANNEX H. UNEXPLORED AREAS OF RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION

The following research topics came up throughout the course of this assessment as potential areas of future investigation, largely because of the lack of available information.

**GBV against men**
Even though the majority of perpetrators and victims of violence are men, there are few studies about how gender stereotypes also contribute to violence against men.

**GBV against LGBTIQ people**
There is little systematized data on violence against LGBTIQ people in Mexico. Only one CSO, Letra Ese, collects this information nationally.

**GBV against children and youth**
Because ENDIREH only surveys women 15-years-old and up, there is little information available on GBV against children and adolescents in Mexico. The most recent data is from a 2009 school-based report. In particular, little is known about GBV against boys and young men.

**Internet-based GBV**
Little has been done on internet-based GBV (including human trafficking, child pornography, cyber assault, etc.) in Mexico, both in terms of understanding the extent of the problem and in terms of how to address it. Some recent studies point to the increasing use of information technology in perpetration of GBV, particularly against women. In Mexico, the main types of internet-based GBV identified in a 2016 study were 1) non-consensual distribution of personal information and/or images, 2) personal threats, 3) libelous online comments designed to damage the reputation of the victim, and 4) online stalking and harassment.¹ There are currently no GOM regulations or protocols in place to confront this kind of violence.

**Media coverage of GBV**
Little research has been done in Mexico on the relationship between media coverage of violence and its impact on GBV. It would be interesting to explore this relationship and how USAID/Mexico might intervene given its work with journalists through partners like Freedom House, Artículo 19 and Cencos. It would also be relevant to research not only the media coverage on GBV, but how the media, in their daily content, generates and perpetuates GBV, mainly by portraying women as sex objects and by replicating stereotypes.²

**The role of women in police and security forces**
There is some evidence³ to show that when women are integrated into security forces, rates of VAW and revictimization perpetrated by authorities decrease. Furthermore, according to data from 39 countries, the presence of women police officers correlates positively with reporting sexual assault.⁴ It would be worth exploring the Mexican experience of women in police and security forces.
ANNEX I. CITATIONS

Executive Summary


9 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, “Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENV/PIE)”.


11 Marcela Lagarde and de los Ríos, “Geografía Política de los Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres,” in Serie por la Vida y la Libertad de las Mujeres (México: Red de Investigadoras por la Vida y la Libertad de las Mujeres, A. C., 2010), pg. 11.


15 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, “Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENV/PIE)”.


26 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, “Violencia contra Personas LGBTI: Informe temático de la CIDH,”


28 Interview with Member of Education Area, Member of Project Area, Ciudadanos en Apoyo a los Derechos Humanos, A.C. (CADHAC), January 28, 2016.

Chapter 1: Introduction


2 In September 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations Espinosa signed the, “MOU for the Promotion of Gender Equality, the Empowerment of Women and Women’s Human Rights,” which lays the groundwork for bilateral engagement on women’s issues, including but not limited to: economic empowerment and opportunity for women and girls; social development that supports gender equality; strengthening citizen security (with focus on women and girls); and increased access to justice.

3 This section is based on USAID, United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally (United States: USAID, 2012).

4 Ibid.

5 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1997 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13), chap. 1, resolution 1, annex II.

Chapter 2: GBV IN MEXICO


6 Interview with Director, Letra Ese, Mexico City, Mexico, February 2016.


8 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Violence contra personas lesbianas, gays, bisexuales, trans e intersex en América, QEA/SerI/III. Doc. 36. (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. 2015).


10 Ibid., 102.


16 United Nations, World’s Women, 141.


20 In Mexico, only 7 out of 100 crimes committed are reported, and of those, less than 1% are sanctioned. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, “Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción Sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVYPE)” (INEGI, 2015); Centro de Estudios Sobre Impunidad y Justicia CESUJ, “Índice Global de Impunidad México IGI-MEX 2016” (Universidad de las Americas Puebla, February 2016), http://simomexico.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/02-IGI-MEX得不到_full_020216.pdf.

21 Interview with Head of Research, Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México CRIM-UNAM, February 19, 2016.
Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico

27 Interview with Special Prosecutor, Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia Contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas (FEVIMTRA), February 10, 2016.
28 Roberto Castro, “Problemas conceptuales en el estudio de la violencia de género. Controversias y debates a tomar en cuenta.”
30 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Violencia contra personas lesbianas, gays, bisexuales, trans e intersex en América.
31 Ibid.
33 Psychological and emotional violence, according to ENRIDEH, includes insults, slurs, intimidation, imposition of tasks and restrictions, etc.
34 Economic violence, according to ENRIDEH, includes denying women access to or control basic monetary resources, blackmail or economic manipulation, limiting their ability to work, and stripping their assets.
35 Physical violence, according to ENRIDEH, includes the intentional use of force or of a weapon to harm physical integrity and to intimidate and control women.
36 Sexual violence, according to ENRIDEH, includes the subjugation of women through the use of his body attacking their sexual freedom. It includes the unwanted to agree to participate in a sexual act against their will, and the attempt or completion of such acts.
38 Intimidation, as defined by ENRIDEH, consist of situations where women are afraid of an attack or of sexual abuse, or when they suffer offensive language about their body or with a sexual language.
39 Sexual abuse, as defined by ENRIDEH, includes being touched without consent, forced to have sex, forced to watch scenes or sexual acts or forced to do sexual acts for money.
40 Physical abuse, as defined by ENRIDEH, includes physical attacks that leave visible marks.
41 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, “Panorama de violencia contra las mujeres en México. ENRIDEH 2011.”
42 Ibid.
43 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Violencia contra personas lesbianas, gays, bisexuales, trans e intersex en América.
46 The sample included 395 public elementary and secondary schools, and the survey was given to 26,319 boys and girls. Secretaría de Educación Pública and Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia, Informe nacional sobre violencia de género en la educación básica en México (Mexi: Secretaría de Educación Pública: Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia, 2009).
47 The survey also measured violence at home: Almost a third of students reported experiencing violence from their mothers (“My mother hits me”), while over a fifth reported violence from their fathers (“My father hits me”). However, it is impossible to determine how much of this violence is gender-based (e.g. “My mother hits me because I do not conform to gender norms”).
48 Secretaría de Educación Pública and Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia, Informe nacional sobre violencia de género en la educación básica en México.
49 Youth Coalition, Foro EneHache, and Coalición de Jóvenes por la Educación y Salud Sexual. “Presentación de Resultados. Primera Encuesta Nacional Sobre Bullying Homofóbico.”
54 Guerrero launched the first IMEF in 1987, and Veracruz launched the last one in 2007.
56 Youth Coalition, Foro EneHache, and Coalición de Jóvenes por la Educación y Salud Sexual. “Presentación de Resultados. Primera Encuesta Nacional Sobre Bullying Homofóbico.”
57 Workshop with Researcher of Dirección de Investigación Aplicada en Política, Seguridad y Justicia Penal (DIAP), Coordinator of the GBV Observatory of Campeche, Coordinator of the Law Clinic for Trafficking in Instituto Tecnolócico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and Independent lawyer, Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia A.C (INSYDE), December 9, 2016.
58 See Article 49 of the LGAMVLV. Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 See Article 21, Congresso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, “Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia.”
62 Federal and state human rights commissions, CSOs and/or international organizations can request the Gender Alert. If SEGOB, as the President of the National System, decides the case has merit, the state in question must file a report with CONAVIM, which then sets up an expert panel to validate the information, in the style of “Special Rapporteurs.” CONAVIM writes a full report, including recommendations, for the National System to review and vote on whether or not to declare the Alert. Once an Alert is declared, the state must take actions to improve the prevention, attention, sanction and eradication of VAW, with an emphasis on the named municipalities. The state report to a federal interagency panel responsible for monitoring the progress of the Gender Alert.
63 See Article 28 and Article 30, Congresso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, “Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia.”
Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico

67 It was officially inaugurated in 2009 under the then Ministry of Public Security Secretariat of Security Public (SSP).
66 Ley General para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar los Delitos de Ataque y Respeto a las Víctimas de estos Delitos.

Chapter 3: Public insecurity and GBV in Mexico

4 Interview with Researcher, Centro de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (CRIM-UNAM), January 19, 2016.

4 Interview with Researcher, Centro de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (CRIM-UNAM), January 19, 2016.
Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico


5) While 43% of men reported that fear of crime prevented them from going out at night and 28% reported not going on walks, 57% and 38% of women, respectively, reported these same behavior changes. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, “Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE).”


7) Ibid.

8) Wright, “Country Profile: Mexico.”


11) Ibid.

12) Interview with Head of Research, Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (CRIM-UNAM), February 19, 2016.


14) Marcela Lagarde y de los Ríos, Geografía Política de los Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres, Vol. 4., in Serie por la Vida y la Libertad de las Mujeres (México: Red de Investigadoras por la Vida y la Libertad de las Mujeres, A. C., 2010). Pg. 11.


18) Ibid.

19) Mutilated female cadavers found in the desert of Chihuahua have often been classified as violence related to organized crime rather than having been investigated and prosecuted as femicide. Jessica Wright, “Country Profile: Mexico.”


22) Ibid.


24) In March 2014, multiple civil society organizations, including Centro Prodh, reported before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in Washington D.C. that there are at least 128 open complaints of sexual torture, which included sexual abuse, rape, rape threats, forced nudity, and use of misogynistic slurs on those detained by the armed forces.

25) Interview with Deputy Director, Subsecretaría de Prevención y Participación Ciudadana, Secretaría de Gobernación, January 18, 2016.

26) Jessica Wright, “Country Profile: Mexico.”

27) Interview with Head of Research, Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (CRIM-UNAM), February 19, 2016.

28) Interview with General Director, Renace, Justicia y Solidaridad, January 25, 2016.

29) Interview with Director, Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de las Personas Violadas A.C. (ADIVAC), January 11, 2016.

30) Interview with General Director, Renace, Justicia y Solidaridad, January 25, 2016.


Chapter 4: Crime and violence prevention


4) Because of the lack of data, proxy measures or changes in risk factors are often used to estimate the impact of GBV prevention interventions. Ideally, indicators should respond to the objectives of the intervention and should be measured at different moments before, during and after the intervention to reflect immediate, medium-term and long-term results. Including control groups can strengthen the evaluation.


Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico


3. Ibid.


6. Ibid.


8. For instance, traditional beliefs that men have a right to control women make women and girls vulnerable to physical, emotional and sexual violence by men. They also hinder the ability of those affected to remove themselves from abusive situations or seek support. World Health Organization, *Promoting Gender Equality to Prevent Violence against Women*, Series of Briefings on Violence Prevention (*World Health Organization*, 2009). Jewkes, Flood, and Lang, “From Work with Men and Boys to Changes of Social Norms and Reduction of Inequities in Gender Relations: A Conceptual Shift in Prevention of Violence against Women and Girls.”


10. Ibid.


14. Peacock and Barker, “Working with Men and Boys to Prevent Gender-Based Violence.”


17. Interview with Coordinator of Methodologies, Género y Desarrollo A.C. (Gendes), February 18, 2016.


21. Ibid.


24. Roberto Castro, and Irene Casique, *Violencia en el noviazgo entre los jóvenes mexicanos*, (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico and Instituto Mexicano de la Juventud, 2010).


27. Individual counseling for victims tends to produce positive results in preventing violence, while the outcomes are less clear for group and couples therapy. There is no consensus on whether the frequency of treatment, the length of treatment, or the use of non-professional or professional staff makes a difference in preventing violence. Arango et al., “Interventions to Prevent or Reduce Violence Against Women and Girls: A Systematic Review of Reviews. Women’s Voice and Agency Research Series 2014 No.10.”


31. Field notes from visit to CJF, Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, January 2016.


34. Interview with Director, Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de las Personas Violadas A.C. (ADIVAC), January 11, 2016.


37. Peacock and Barker, “Working with Men and Boys to Prevent Gender-Based Violence.”


41. Ibid.


43. Individual counseling for victims tends to produce positive results in preventing violence, while the outcomes are less clear for group and couples therapy. There is no consensus on whether the frequency of treatment, the length of treatment, or the use of non-professional or professional staff makes a difference in preventing violence. Arango et al., “Interventions to Prevent or Reduce Violence Against Women and Girls: A Systematic Review of Reviews. Women’s Voice and Agency Research Series 2014 No.10.”

44. Field notes from visit to CJF, Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, January 2016.


46. Interview with Director, Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de las Personas Violadas A.C. (ADIVAC), January 11, 2016.
Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico


42 The Nuevo Leon Subsecretaría de Prevención y Participación Ciudadana says it has a plan to organize a roving unit with a psychologist, a lawyer, a doctor and a police officer to respond to cases of GBV in Monterrey. However, they do not have the budget or the resources to make this plan a reality, so in the meantime, cases of domestic violence are handled by the regular police force. This sometimes results in violent interactions between police officers and aggressors, or insensitive responses that return victims to unsafe situations in order to preserve the “integrity of the family.”


44 Peacock and Barker, “Working with Men and Boys to Prevent Gender-Based Violence.”

45 Harvey, García-Moreno, and Butchart, “Primary Prevention of Intimate-Partner Violence and Sexual Violence: Background Paper for WHO Expert Meeting.”


47 Ibid.

48 Juárez and Hevia de la Jara, Entre el Activismo y la Intervención: El Trabajo de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil y su Incidencia para la Salud de las Mujeres Indígenas en México.

49 In one South Asia study of how gender equitable parenting affects violence, the results found a strengthening of patriarchal values, rather than a reshaping of gender norms and stereotypes. Alan Greig, Aparna Basnyat, and James Lang, “Men and the Prevention of Gender-Based Violence. A Conceptual Framework for Policy Change.” (Partners For Prevention, n.d.).

50 Ibid.


54 Poteatand Russell, “Understanding Homophobic Behavior and Its Implications for Policy and Practice.”

55 Harvey, García-Moreno, and Butchart, “Primary Prevention of Intimate-Partner Violence and Sexual Violence: Background Paper for WHO Expert Meeting.”

56 Ibid.

57 World Health Organization, Promoting Gender Equality to Prevent Violence against Women.

58 Harvey, García-Moreno, and Butchart, “Primary Prevention of Intimate-Partner Violence and Sexual Violence: Background Paper for WHO Expert Meeting.”


60 World Health Organization, Promoting Gender Equality to Prevent Violence against Women.


64 Harvey, García-Moreno, and Butchart, “Primary Prevention of Intimate-Partner Violence and Sexual Violence: Background Paper for WHO Expert Meeting.”

65 Michael et al., “Prevention of Violence against Women and Girls: Lessons from Practice.”


70 “Prenavención de la Violencia de Género,” (Mukirja, July 9, 2014), https://mukirja.org/proyectos/prenavencion-de-la-violencia-de-genero/


73 Secretaría de Salud, Modelo integrado para la prevencion y atencion de la violencia familiar y sexual, (Mexico City: Secretaria de Salud, 2004).

74 USAID-PCC and Secretaria de Gobernación, Guía del participante para la capacitación en materia de prevención social de la violencia y la delincuencia (USAID, 2014).

75 Harvey, García-Moreno, and Butchart, “Primary Prevention of Intimate-Partner Violence and Sexual Violence: Background Paper for WHO Expert Meeting.”

76 World Health Organization, Promoting Gender Equality to Prevent Violence against Women., Series of Briefings on Violence Prevention.


Chapter 5: Rule of law

1 Its poor showing is mainly due to a lack of judges (at 4 judges per 100,000 habitants, compared to the average of 17 per 100,000 habitants), and for the high proportion of the prison population (40%) without convictions. The Global Impunity Index measures impunity by two criteria: 1) the functionality of the security, justice and protection of human rights systems and 2) the structural capacity that corresponds to the institutional design of each of the countries. The functional dimension aims to record how the government areas responsible for punishing those who violate the rule of law operate, independently of the regulatory framework or their capabilities and infrastructure. This is where the Mexican system justice fails for the large population detained without trial, the lack of consistency between reported homicides and number of people imprisoned for homicide, and the lack of judges available. Consejo Ciudadano de Seguridad y Justicia de Puebla and Universidad de las Américas Puebla, “Índice Global de Impunidad IGI 2015,” (April 2015), http://udlap.mx/cjeli/files/IGI_2015_digital.pdf.


3 Consejo Ciudadano de Seguridad y Justicia de Puebla and Universidad de las Américas Puebla, “Índice Global de Impunidad IGI 2015.”


6 Of those few who seek help, almost 70% seek help from a justice operator, while around half approach other institutions like IMEFs or DIF. The responses to this survey were non-exclusive. Violencia contra las mujeres en México: Tendencias actuales, presented at the Seminario Internacional Una respuesta nacional a la Violencia contra las Mujeres: La Convención de Belem de Pará, November 2013, http://www.cnndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/programas/mujer/13_PromocionCapacitacion/13/3/G.pdf.

7 The reform consisted of Amendments to Articles 16 to 22, 73, 115, and 123 of the Constitution.

8 David Shirk and Octavio Rodríguez, “Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016 The Final Countdown for Implementation” (University of San Diego, October 2015).

9 A new sentencing oversight law (Ley Nacional de Ejecución Penal) is still pending.

10 Shirk and Rodríguez, “Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016 The Final Countdown for Implementation.”

11 There are concerns that the justice operators are simply carrying over old vices into the new system, and some even argue that until there is an entirely new generation of justice operators in place, the new system will not be fully functional. Interview with Director of Technical Operation, Clínica de Justicia Penal, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, January 25, 2016.

12 Most of the training programs have been implemented by the Secretaría Técnica del Consejo de Coordinación para Implementación del Sistema de Justicia Penal (SETEC); Comisión Nacional de Tribunales Superiores de Justicia de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (CONATRIB); and the program Pro Derecho. Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, A.C. CIDAC, “Informe sobre la Situación de Acceso a la Justicia para Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia de Género en Puebla con base en Indicadores de Avance de la Convención de Belém Do Pará” (Observatorio de Violencia Social y de Género de la Ciudad de Puebla, 2011).

13 Interview with Special Prosecutor, Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia Contra las Mujeres y Traza de Personas (FEVIMTRA), February 9, 2016.


17 Interview with Special Prosecutor, Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia Contra las Mujeres y Traza de Personas (FEVIMTRA), February 9, 2016.

18 Inter-American Development Bank, “Violencia contra las mujeres y el Sistema de Justicia Penal.”


20 “Análisis sobre el acceso a la Justicia para Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia de Género en Puebla con base en Indicadores de Avance de la Convención de Belém Do Pará.”


22 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, “A Acceso a la justicia para las mujeres víctimas de violencia en las Américas,” ( OEA: January 20, 2007)

23 Medical examinations are particular sites of revictimization. In one case, a young woman who had been raped reported the crime to a CJM, and in order to speed up the process, several justice operators entered the room during her gynecological exam to ask her questions while she was being examined, Interview with Director and Lawyer, Equis, Justicia para las Mujeres A.C., February 9, 2016.

24 Training programs on gender are often treated as a burden and an obligation. Most have not been formally evaluated to measure their impact, so it remains unclear whether they are actually preparing justice operators to deal with GBV victims. Ibid.

25 Ateixcoa Chicacatl, “Herramientas para Procesar Delitos de Violencia Sexual en el Sistema de Justicia con Perspectiva de Género y en Apego a los Derechos de las Mujeres.”

26 For example, on a few occasions, the authors of this report were invited into temporary shelters for VAW victims while victims were present, which represents a failure to respect the privacy and security of those very victims.
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35 Inter-American Development Bank, “Violencia contra las mujeres y el Sistema de Justicia Penal.” P. 4


39 Alejandra Ríos y Sonia Frías, “Sistemas de informacion de los ministerios publicos con perspectiva de genero,” México Estatal, 2015


42 For example, facilities should include divided spaces for privacy, trained personnel and specialists for victims that require psychiatric, psychological and/or medical care, spaces for children and adolescent victims and family members. Fiscalía Especial para la Atención de delitos relacionados con actos de violencia contra las mujeres en el país, “Modelo de Fiscalías Especializadas Para La Atención de Delitos Relacionados Con La Violencia Contra Las Mujeres a Nivel Local.”

43 Cecilia Toledo Escobar y Cécile Lachenal, Diagnóstico sobre los Refugios en la Política Pública de Atención a la Violencia contra las Mujeres en México (Mexico City: Fundar, Centro de Análisis e Investigación, A.C., 2015).

44 Ibid.

45 Equis: Justicia para las Mujeres, “Informe sobre la Sustitución de un la Justicia para las Mujeres en México.”

46 During this period, 58,001 crimes of VAW were reported to authorities in 21 states. Only 4,015 restraining orders were issued in 9 states during that same period. Observatorio Ciudadano Nacional del Feminicidio, “Órdenes de Protección en México: Mujeres víctimas de violencia y falta de acceso a la justicia,” (Observatorio Ciudadano NACIONal del Feminicidio, 2013), http://observatoriodefeminicidioxmexico.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Informe-%C3%A9stes-Protecci%C3%B3n-final-1-1.pdf

47 Interview with Special Prosecutor, Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia Contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas (FEVIIMTRA), February 10, 2016.


49 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Informe No. 92/2013 de la CIDH.”

50 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Informe No. 80/11 de la CIDH.”

51 Cecilia Toledo Escobar and Cécile Lachenal, Diagnóstico sobre los Refugios en la Política Pública de Atención a la Violencia contra las Mujeres en México (Mexico City: Fundar, Centro de Análisis e Investigación, A.C., 2015).

52 Ibid.


55 Espíndola, Carrillo, and Pérez, “Análisis sobre el Acceso a la Justicia para Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia de Género en Puebla con base en Indicadores de Avance de la Convención de Belém Do Pará.”


57 Inter-American Development Bank, “Violencia contra las mujeres y el Sistema de Justicia Penal.”

58 Ibid.


60 Inter-American Development Bank, “Violencia contra las mujeres y el Sistema de Justicia Penal.”; Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, “Acceso a la Justicia para Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia en las Américas.”


63 Workshop with Researcher of Dirección de Investigación Aplicada en Policía, Seguridad y Justicia Penal (DIAP), Coordinator of the GBV Observatory of Campeche, Coordinator of the Law Clinic for Trafficking in Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and Independent penal lawyer, Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia A.C (INSYDE), December 9, 2016.

64 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, “Acceso a la Justicia para Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia en las Américas.”

65 For example, in the Campo Algodonero case, authorities initially blamed the victims for being “slutty” and for “going with their boyfriends,” therefore refusing to investigate their disappearances and subsequent murders. The CIDH cited this as a clear failure of authorities that ultimately reproduced VAW and resulted in impunity. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, “Casos González y Otras (Campo Algodonero) vs. México,” November 2009, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/serie_c_205_esp.pdf. p. 102.


67 Interview with General Director, Letra Ese, Sida, Cultura y Vida Cotidiana, A.C., February 4, 2016.

68 Workshop with Researcher of Dirección de Investigación Aplicada en Policía, Seguridad y Justicia Penal (DIAP), Coordinator of the GBV Observatory of Campeche, Coordinator of the Law Clinic for Trafficking in Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and Independent penal lawyer, Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia A.C (INSYDE) (December 9, 2016).
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82 Ateixcoa Chacalttli, “Herramientas para Procesar Delitos de Violencia Sexual en el Sistema de Justicia con Perspectiva de Género y en Apego a los Derechos de las Mujeres.”
83 Inter-American Development Bank, “Violencia contra las mujeres y el Sistema de Justicia Penal.”
85 Ibid.
86 Interview with Director and Lawyer, Equis, Justicia para las Mujeres A.C., February 9, 2016.
88 Centro de Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres A.C., El Acceso a La Justicia Para Las Mujeres Víctimas de Violencias de Género En El Nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal (Chihuahua, 2010).
90 Centro de Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres A.C., El Acceso a la Justicia para las Mujeres Víctimas de Violencias de Género en el Nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal (Chihuahua: Centro PRODH, 2010). P. 55
93 Juzgados de Instancia de Feminicidio, Tribunales de Sentencia de Feminicidio y Salas de Feminicidio.
97 Louisa Reynolds, “Tribunales de Femicidio contra la Impunidad en Guatemala.”
98 Ibid.
102 Equis: Justicia para las Mujeres, “Informe sobre la Situación de Acceso a la Justicia para las Mujeres en México.”
103 “The mechanisms of mediation and conciliation should not be used before or during any stage of a legal process for women victims. The CIDH has also rejected the use of conciliation in cases of VAW. Conciliation assumes that the involved parties are in equal negotiating situations, which is rarely the case in an environment of family-based violence. Mediation increases the physical and emotional risks for women because of the inequality in the relationship between the victim and the aggressor […] In summary, considering the unequal conditions between men and women, conciliation, mediation and other methods designed to resolve VAW extrajudicially should be eradicated because they harm women in situations of disadvantage and inequality and because they prevent the fulfillment of access to justice, sanctions and reparations.” As translated from Mecanismo de Seguimiento de la Convención de Belém de Pará (MESECVI), “Guía para la Aplicación de la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer (Convención de Belém Do Pará),” 2014.
104 Article 8, Section VI of the LGAMVLV says “The models of care, prevention and punishment established…must avoid mediation or conciliation procedures because they are unviable in a relationship of subjugation between the aggressor and the victim in the case of domestic violence.” Article 52 says victims of any kind of violence will not be forced to participate in mechanisms of conciliation with their attackers.
106 In March 2016, Puebla reformed its Procedural Code for Social Defense to prohibit mediation in certain circumstances, like a civil divorce where violence was present in the relationship. The reform also prohibits granting forgiveness for violent crimes. The State Congress argued that mediation mechanisms minimize the responsibility of the aggressor, even making it seem like both the aggressor and the victim are to blame. Cruz, Elvia. “Las poblareñas ya no tienen que mediar con parejas violentas.” Expansión, March 8, 2016.
107 Guanajuato, Morelos, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca and the State of Mexico.
108 There are some cases where women end up forgiving their husbands and end up falling back into the cycle of violence.
111 Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, “Violencia contra las mujeres y el Sistema de Justicia Penal.”
112 Interview with Director of Technical Operation, Clínica de Justicia Penal, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, January 25, 2016.
114 Interview with Director of Technical Operation, Clínica de Justicia Penal, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, January 25, 2016.
115 “This should only be granted for first-time offenders with no criminal background and in situations in which suspension does not generate risks for others.
116 Articles 231 through 243. Ibid.
117 Interview with Lawyer, Alternativas Pacificas A.C., January 29, 2016.; Interview with Technical Advisor and Director, Alternativas Pacificas A.C., January 29, 2016.
118 Interview with Operational Director of Programs, Instituto Estatal de las Mujeres de Nuevo Leon, January 27, 2016.
119 Interview with Lawyer, Alternativas Pacificas A.C., January 29, 2016.
120 Addressed in Chapter 2, “Código Procesal Penal Para El Estado de Nuevo León.”
121 Interview with General Director, Renace, Justicia y Solidaridad, January 25, 2016.; Interview with Technical Advisor and Director, Alternativas Pacificas A.C., January 29, 2016.
122 Interview with General Director, Renace, Justicia y Solidaridad, January 25, 2016.
Chapter 6: Human rights


3. UN Women, “El Feminicidio en América Latina: La Construcción de un Protocolo Regional para Asegurar la Justicia.”


14. Aruta Angel, “México en el top 10 de países con más Femicidios por Armas de Fuego del Mundo.”


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20 Ibid.


28 Worldwide, around 21 million people are trafficked, of which the majority are sold into labor exploitation, of which over half of the victims are women, and around 4.5 million are sold into sexual exploitation, of which 98% are women and girls. Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, “Diagnóstico sobre la situación de la Trata de Personas en México,” 12-16.


30 Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, “Diagnóstico sobre la situación de la Trata de Personas en México.”


54 Amnesty International, “Out of Control: Torture and Other Ill-Treatment in Mexico.”


56 Amnesty International, “Out of Control: Torture and Other Ill-Treatment in Mexico.”
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51 Amnesty International, “Out of Control: Torture and Other III-Treatment in Mexico.”
59 This reform included amendments to Articles 47, 49a, 57, 153, 154, 337, 434 and 435 and Transitory 5th Bis.
64 From 941 cases registered in the RNPED, 261 are from Guerrero, 168 from Veracruz, 131 from Tamaulipas and 381 from other states. Ibid.
67 “El Impacto de las Desapariciones en las Mujeres: Entrevista a Kelli Muddell.”
69 Interview with Member of Education Area, Member of Project Area, Ciudadanos en Apoyo a los Derechos Humanos, A.C. (CADHAC), January 28, 2016.
70 Dewhirst and Kapur, “The Disappeared and Invisible: Revealing the Enduring Impact of Enforced Disappearance on Women.”
72 Dewhirst and Kapur, “The Disappeared and Invisible: Revealing the Enduring Impact of Enforced Disappearance on Women.”
73 Ibid.
76 Often, authorities do not trace victims’ cell phones, track their bank transactions, obtain security camera footage (which is often automatically deleted at regular intervals), or take other time-sensitive actions.
79 Human Rights Watch, “Mexico’s Disappeared.”
82 Interview with Member of Education Area, Member of Project Area, Ciudadanos en Apoyo a los Derechos Humanos, A.C. (CADHAC), January 28, 2016.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Villareal Martínez, “Las Mesas de Seguimiento de Casos de Personas Desaparecidas, una Experiencia de Incidencia en Nuevo León, México.”
88 International Federation of Journalists, “Journalists and Media Staff Killed 1990-2015: 25 Years of Contribution towards Safer Journalism.”
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97 International Federation of Journalists, “Journalists and Media Staff Killed 1990-2015: 25 Years of Contribution towards Safer Journalism.”
101 Ibid.
104 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, “Violencia Contra Personas LGBTI: Informe Temático de La CIDH.”
105 Ibid.
107 Only four states – Michoacán, State of Mexico, Jalisco and Quintana Roo – have specifically criminalized violence against journalists in the State Penal Codes. Four states – Distrito Federal, Durango, Hidalgo and Quintana Roo – also include protection for HRDs into the same laws that protect journalists. Ibid.
109 One study found that in 2013 and 2014, only 303 HRDs and journalists were registered in the Mechanism, when there were 1,187 attacks reported during that same period. Arturo Angel, “Mecanismo ‘protege’ a Periodistas y Activistas con Botones de Pánico Invisibles y Teléfonos donde Nadie Contestaba.”
111 In 2016, because of the recent budget cuts, the Chamber of Deputies has fused the specific budget line originally dedicated to the Mechanism with two other budget lines dedicated more broadly to human rights in the PEF. In other words, if the money for the Mechanism was lacking before, now it will be even more limited. Centro de Estudios para el Adelanto de las Mujeres y la Equidad de Género, “Información sobre el Gasto Etiquetado para las Mujeres y la Igualdad de Género (GEMIG) en el Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación (PEF)” (Cámara de Diputados LXIII Legislatura, February 2016).
114 Arturo Angel, “Mecanismo ‘protege’ a Periodistas y Activistas con Botones de Pánico Invisibles y Teléfonos donde Nadie Contestaba.”
116 Artículo 19, “Disentir en Silencio: Violencia contra la Prensa y Criminalización de la Protesta”

Annex D: Mexico in context

1 These are 2014 development indicators established by the World Bank. Mexico’s life expectancy is 77 years, when both the Latin American average and the middle income countries average is 74; Gross National Income per capita is $9,870 when then Latin American average is $8,980 and upper middle income countries average $7,901. For gross school enrollment ratio, Mexico is 105%, above the regional average but below the middle income country’s average of 116%.
8 Ibid.
9 Shirk, Heinkle, and Moltzahn, “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis through 2014.”
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.

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17 Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública. This survey measures crimes perpetrated at a state level, and does not take into account federal crimes more commonly related with organized crime. It captures data directly from victims, reflecting crime patterns that are not reported officially.


19 Levels of fear of crime are more likely to be based on factors including media exposure and representation of violence, personal characteristics, and neighborhood crime.


27 According to Article 21 of Mexico’s Constitution, public security is defined as a federal, state and municipal responsibility.

28 Citizen security is defined as “the right to develop free from threat to an individual’s integrity, rights and enjoyment of property.” USAID-PCC and Secretaría de Gobernación, Guía del participante para la capacitación en materia de prevención social de la violencia y la delincuencia (USAID, 2014).


30 Ibid.

31 These include a series of administrative reforms that dissolved the Ministry of Security to create the National Security Commission (CNS) under SEGOB, as well as efforts to professionalize the police and create a new Federal Police in 2009. For more on this, see Carlos Barrachina Lizón and Juan Ignacio Hernández Mora, “La problemática del narcotráfico en México y los esfuerzos institucionales para responder al flagelo,” Ciencia Política, December 2012, http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co/38600.

32 In 2008, two funds were created to support state and municipal governments, SUBSEUM (Subsidio para la Seguridad Municipal) and FASP (Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública de los estados y los municipios).

33 This program is funded by the Programa Nacional de la Prevención del Delito, which has a similar name and was created earlier, but it is a budget line and not an operational program. Often these two are confused, but within this document when we use PRONAPRED we refer to the operational program created in 2014.

34 The reform consisted of Amendments to Articles 16 to 22, 73, 115, and 123 of the Constitution.

35 David Shirk and Octavio Rodríguez, “Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016 The Final Countdown for Implementation” (University of San Diego, October 2015).


37 “Coadyuvancia y la Perspectiva de Género: ¿Herramientas para mejorar el acceso a la justicia?” (Mukira, 2013).


39 Shirk and Rodríguez, “Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016 The Final Countdown for Implementation.”


43 Ibid.


45 This reform has an important limitation: everything in the Federal Penal Code (including, for example, el arraigo) is still considered above human rights treaties. This has important implications for combatting organized crime, though the implications for GBV are less clear.

46 There are serious concerns that Mexico will be unable to comply with this deadline. For more information, see David Shirk and Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, “Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The Final Countdown for Implementation.”

Annex E: The legal framework on GBV in Mexico


7 The international treaty explicitly includes GBV, with the exception of the Arms Trade Treaty, which prohibits the sale of weapons if there is a risk that the weapons will be used to facilitate GBV (article 7(4)). Ray Acheson and Mia Gardenberger, “Gender-Based Violence and the Arms
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8 Gobierno de la República, “Informe de México sobre la aplicación de la Declaración y Plataforma de Acción de Beijing” Gobierno de la República (May 30, 2014).


10 In the 2011 resolution, the High Commissioner recommends that member States investigate reported killings and violent incidents against LGBTIQT people, establish systems for recording and reporting such incidents; take measures to prevent torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment; repeal discriminatory laws; enact consistent anti-discrimination legislation; implement appropriate sensitization and training programs for police, prison officers, border guards, immigration officers and other law enforcement personnel; facilitate legal recognition of the preferred gender of transgender persons, within others. United Nations Human Rights Office of The High Commissioner, “Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” United Nations (November 17, 2011), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/DiscriminationA/HRC.19.41_English.pdf.


14 Including the Specialized Agency for Sexual Offences (AEDS, created in 1989), the Center for Care for Victims of Domestic Violence (CAVI, created in 1990) and the Support Therapy Centre (CTA, in 1991) for sexual assault victims. Ibid.


17 Guerrero launched the first IMEF in 1987, and Veracruz launched the last one in 2007.

18 Alejandro Rios and Sonia Farias, “Sistemas de información de los ministerios públicos con perspectiva de género” (México Estatal, 2015), Discrimination is defined as: “exclusion, restriction or preference which, by action or omission, intention or not… based on one or more of the following grounds: ethnic or national origin, color skin, culture, sex, gender, age, disability, social, economic status…sexual preference…marital status, family status, family responsibilities…” See Article 1, Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, “Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminación” Diario Oficial de la Federación (June 11, 2003), http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/282.pdf.

19 Domestic violence was classified as a crime in 26 states and as grounds for divorce in 22. Marital rape was classified as a crime in 12 states and sexual harassment was criminalized in 17. Farias, “¿Protección de Derechos o Búsqueda de Legitimidad? Violencia de pareja contra las mujeres en México.”

20 31 states set up 35 Specialized Centers for Family Violence (CEAVIF) and the Distrito Federal set up Units for Care and Prevention of Domestic Violence (UAP/PV) in each of its 16 districts. Frias, “¿Protección de Derechos o Búsqueda de Legitimidad? Violencia de pareja contra las mujeres en México.”


23 The LGIHM obligates the government to take into account the different needs of women and men in the national budget; promote balanced participation and political representation; promote access to social rights and equality in civil life; and eliminate stereotypes according to sex in public documents.

24 Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, “Política nacional de igualdad entre mujeres y hombres [balance y perspectivas]” (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, March 2010).


40 Interview with Deputy Director, Subsecretaría de Prevención y Participación Ciudadana, Secretaría de Gobernación, January 18, 2016.
Annex F: Current GBV interventions by sector

7 The Program does not define GBV, although it does include in its glossary the definition of gender as a socially defined category. It also stresses the importance of including a gender perspective in health care and justifies its focus on women as the main victims of GBV.
8 These can be both primary health care centers (Centros de Salud) and secondary health care units (i.e. hospitals), as well as specific units dedicated exclusively to VAW. These are managed at the state and regional levels (jurisdicciones sanitarias).
10 Some shelters receive additional support from private donors and international organizations.
11 Cecilia Toledo Escobar and Cécile Lachenal, Diagnóstico sobre Los Refugios en la Política Pública de Atención a la Violencia contra las Mujeres en México (México, D.F: Fundar, Centro de Análisis e Investigación, A.C., 2015).
12 Colima, Sonora, Yucatán and Zacatecas.
14 In 28 municipalities of 11 states (Chihuahua, Distrito Federal, Durango, Estado de México, Guerrero, Jalisco, Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa, Sonora and Zacatecas) and a few in Nayarit and Chiapas.
15 Telesecondaria is a system of mixed education with TV content guided by teachers. It is most common in rural areas.
17 Chihuahua, Guerrero, Durango, Jalisco, Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa and Zacatecas.
18 Public information request No. 000110068315 to Ministry of Education (SEP), response received on January 20, 2016.
20 Deconcentrated agencies are hierarchically subordinate to Ministries. They are designed to address specific issues, over which they have administrative autonomy. However, they do not have their own budgets or assets.

Objectives and Indicators of the PIPASEVM 2014-2018

1 The index is calculated, according to the methodology described in the Plan, by reviewing “diverse documents” that measure legislative harmonization in the country against the LGAM/LV and the LGIMH, as well as against international treaties to which Mexico is a party. Ibid: p.41 Secretaría de Gobernación, “Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: Logros 2014: Plan Integral para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres 2013-2018” Gobierno de la República (2014).
4 In the Plan it is estimated that the number of married or cohabiting women victims of partner violence who come to seek help from public institutions will increase by 1% on an annual average, according to previous trends identified in ENDIREH. Secretaría de Gobernación, “Programa Integral para Prevenir, Atender, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres 2014–2018.”
Annex G: Human rights in detail

2 Ibid., 16.
3 Ibid., 12.
9 Depending on the particularities of the crime, cases of human trafficking can be referred to multiple agencies within PGR, including not only FEVIMTRA but also the Specialized Unit for the Attention of Crimes Committed Abroad (UEDE) and the Special Deputy Attorney for the Investigation of Organized Crime (SEIDO), Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas, “Estadística FEVIMTRA: Trata de Personas” (Procuraduría General de Justicia, 2014), http://www.pgr.gob.mx/Fiscalias/fevimtra/Documents/ESTADISTICA/TRATA-FEVIMTRA.xlsx.
14 Jalisco, Estado de México, Yucatán, Aguascalientes, Baja California, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Tabasco, Chihuahua, Veracruz and Chiapas.
18 The Special Rapporteur visited Mexico between April 21 and May 2, 2014. His final report was presented to the Human Rights Council of the United Nations Organizations in Geneva on May 5, 2015. The Special Rapporteur called on the Government to promptly implement its recommendations and the international community to assist Mexico in its fight to eliminate torture and ill-treatment, reverse impunity and ensure full compensation for victims.
23 Amnesty International, “Out of Control: Torture and Other Ill-Treatment in Mexico.”
29 Largely for failing to meet the standards laid out in both the Inter-American and UN Conventions Against Torture regarding requirements of proof of intent to commit torture and physical evidence that severe pain was inflicted with a specific end in mind. Amnesty International, “Out of Control: Torture and Other Ill-Treatment in Mexico.”
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40 Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Acuerdo Mediante el Cual se establecian Las Directrices Institucionales que Deberán Seguir los Agentes del Ministerio Público de la Federación, los Oficiales en Medicina y Psicología y demás Personal de la Procuraduría General de la República, para los Casos en que se Presuma la Comisión del Delito de Tortura, 2015, http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=54105195&fecha=05/10/2015.


42 Amnesty International, “Out of Control: Torture and Other Ill-Treatment in Mexico,”


55 It does not recognize the liability of State agents when enforced disappearances are perpetrated by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of the State. Carlos Maria Pelayo Molier, “La Convención Internacional para la Protección de Todas las Personas contra las Desapariciones Forzadas” (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, México, 2012), http://www.dhchezac.org.mx/pdfbiblio/52.pdf.


57 In 2009, in Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, the Court IDH ruled against Mexico in case regarding the 1974 enforced disappearance of Rosendo Radilla, which Mexico had not investigated because it took place before the ratification of the Inter-American Convention. Rosendo Radilla Pacheco, a prominent political activist, had been disappeared at a military checkpoint in southern Mexico. Mexico was found guilty of violating the Convention and was ordered to continue the search for Radilla's remains, publicly recognize its responsibility in this case and provide psychological assistance and financial reparations to Radilla's family members, “Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico,” n.d., https://sicher.fils.ils.europa.university/sites/achr.fils.edu/files/achr/Casefiles/Radilla_Pacheco_v_Mexico/Radilla%20Pacheco%20v.%20Mexico.pdf.


59 Ciudadanos en Apoyo a los Derechos Humanos, “Hna. Consuelo Morales habla sobre las Desapariciones en México en el Consejo de Seguridad”
Assessment of Linkages Between Public Insecurity and Gender-Based Violence in Mexico

Annex H: Unexplored areas of research and intervention


4 Ibid.