



A public notice board describing authorized taxes and their amounts in Bandundu

FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Programme de Bonne Gouvernance (PBG) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

August 8, 2014

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PROGRAMME DE BONNE GOUVERNANCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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Final Report, August 8, 2014

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ACRONYMS

AC	<i>Animateurs Communautaires</i>
AFEJUCO	<i>Association Des Femmes Juristes Congolaises (Sud Kivu)</i>
AFEM	<i>Femmes Des Medias Du Sud-Kivu (Sud Kivu)</i>
ANAPECO	<i>Association Nationale Des Parents D'élèves Du Congo (Katanga)</i>
APRODEF	<i>Association pour la promotion et défense des enfants et des femmes (Maniema)</i>
ASSOPAC	<i>Association Pour La Promotion De L'agriculture Au Congo (Bandundu)</i>
AVEMA	<i>Action des volontaires pour la promotion de l'environnement au Maniema</i>
BDD	<i>Bureau Diocésain De Développement (Katanga)</i>
CAS	<i>Country Assistance Strategy</i>
CBS	<i>Capacity Building Specialists</i>
CEDAC	<i>Centre D'étude De Documentation Et Animation Civique (Sud Kivu)</i>
CENADEP	<i>Centre National d'Appui au Développement à la Participation Populaire</i>
CJP	<i>Commission Justice Et Paix (Katanga)</i>
CLAC	<i>Comite Lutte Anti-Corruption</i>
CNONGD	<i>Conseil National des ONG de Développement</i>
CO	<i>Centre Olame (Sud Kivu).</i>
COFERD	<i>Collectif Des Femmes Rurales Pour Le Développement (Bandundu)</i>
COJESKI	<i>Collectif des organisations des jeunes du Congo Kinshasa (Maniema)</i>
COREF	<i>Comité d'Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques (Ministry of Finance)</i>
CRD	<i>Democracy Resource Center</i>
CRONGD	<i>Conseil Régional des ONG de Développement</i>
CSO	<i>Civil Society Organization</i>
CTAD	<i>Cellule Technique d'Appui à la Décentralisation</i>
DAI	<i>Development Alternatives Inc.</i>
DPA	<i>Dialogues Publiques</i>
DRC	<i>Democratic Republic of Congo</i>
ECOFIN	<i>Economic and Finance Committee, National Assembly</i>
ETD	<i>Decentralized Territorial Entity (Entités territoriales décentralisées)</i>
FG	<i>Focus Group</i>
GDRC	<i>Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo</i>
HBM	<i>Haki Za Binadamu (Maniema)</i>
HQ	<i>Headquarters</i>
HR	<i>Human Resources</i>
IBTCI	<i>International Business and Technical Consultants Inc.</i>
IP	<i>Implementing Partner</i>
IR	<i>Intermediate Result</i>
KII	<i>Key Informant Interview</i>
LMDP	<i>Le Miroir Du Peuple</i>
M&E	<i>Monitoring and Evaluation</i>
OLCAC	<i>Observatoire de Lutte Contre la Corruption en Afrique Centrale</i>
NA	<i>National Assembly of Democratic Republic of Congo</i>
PBG	<i>Programme de Bonne Gouvernance</i>
PAJ	<i>Administration and Justice Committee, National Assembly</i>
PI	<i>Performance Indicator</i>
PAP	<i>Plan d'Actions Prioritaires (Finance Sector Action Plan)</i>
PMP	<i>Performance Monitoring Plan</i>
PRCG	<i>Projet de Renforcement des Capacités en Gouvernance (World Bank)</i>

PROSADEF	<i>Promotion De Droit De Sante De L'enfant Et De La Femme (Bandundu)</i>
RBM	Results Based Management
RECIC	<i>Réseau De L'éducation Civique Au Congo (Bandundu)</i>
RIO	<i>Réseau D'innovation Organisationnelle (Sud Kivu)</i>
SI	Social Impact
SERACOB	<i>Service des Renforcement des Appuis aux Communautés de Base en Afrique Centrale</i>
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SOCIKAT	<i>Société Civile Du Katanga</i>
SOW	Statement of Work
SWAP	Sector-Wide Approach
TEYESA SURVIE	Teyesa Survie Telema Ya Sala-Survie (Bandundu)
TOT	Training of Trainers
UMAMA	Umoja Wa Mama Wa Maendeleo (Maniema)
USAID	United States. Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The *Programme de Bonne Gouvernance* (PBG) is a five-year project (2009-2014) implemented by DAI. At the outset of the program, DAI had five sub-contractors, 50 partners in four provinces (Bandundu, Katanga, Maniema and Sud Kivu), and a budget of \$36.5 million. PBG focused on three tracks – civil society, parliaments and local government – that correspond to the three Intermediate Results (IRs): citizens demand accountability (IR1); selected parliaments are more democratic and effective (IR2); and laws, policies and procedures for decentralization are established and implemented (IR3). By midcourse in the project, PBG concentrated on support to revenue management by 12 Decentralized Territorial Entities (ETDs) with citizen participation. The overall evaluation conclusion is that the project was very well-managed despite a highly challenging context and vast project scope. It was also concluded that working with local government on a pilot basis has tentatively confirmed the fundamental principle of citizen participation for effective decentralization.

Evaluation Objectives and Questions

As specified in the scope of work, the main evaluation objectives are to determine answers to the following two questions:

- 1) What is the performance of the program in strengthening institutions and increasing citizen demand?
- 2) To what extent is the project theory of change valid that strengthened institutions and increased demand result in better service delivery?

The PBG performance evaluation seeks to answer the following evaluation questions:

- 1) Do institutions have increased capacity and strength?
- 2) Has there been an increased citizen demand for accountable governance?
- 3) Were there improvements in delivery of public services in the target local governments?
- 4) What lessons have been learned regarding implementation strategies?
- 5) What are findings related to cross-cutting themes of gender and urban-rural impact? Some key evaluation questions address the effectiveness of revenue generation among the ETDs or Decentralized Territorial Entity (*Entités territoriales décentralisées*), and the most effective methods to achieve these results.

Methodology

A work plan was developed based on the proposed evaluation design of International Business and Technical Consultants Inc. (IBCTI), in coordination with representatives from the USAID Mission based in Kinshasa. The evaluation team comprised four Congolese experts and one international senior subject matter expert. Site selection to collect data included three intervention provinces (Sud Kivu, Katanga, and Bandundu); visits to all nine pilot local government sites in the three provinces visited; and one non-project local government site for comparison purposes. The fourth province of the program, Maniema, was excluded in the evaluation scope of work due to the difficulty of traveling to Maniema, given the limited time allocated for the fieldwork. The evaluation team utilized the following data collection methods:

- Annual and quarterly reports, special project reports and PBG internal reports from the four PBG provincial offices were reviewed.
- Key Informant Interviews (KIIs): Interviews were conducted with representatives from parliaments

(Members of Parliament, senior administrators, heads of committees, and research bureau staff) ETD officials (mayors, finance administrators and senior staff), and representatives from civil society organizations (CSOs). Approximately 137 interviews were conducted.

- Focus Group Discussions (FGDs): In each ETD, the evaluation team organized three groups with 10 participants comprising women, youth and professionals. In total there were 30 FGDs with 300 focus group participants (more than 100 females).
- Questionnaire: The evaluation team developed a questionnaire to elicit opinion ratings on topics pertaining to the evaluation questions, which was administered to 473 persons (202 of the 473 were female respondents). This questionnaire was developed to gather and triangulate information rather than to derive statistically significant results.
- Ad hoc meetings: The evaluation team also met with individuals who may not have been originally selected for an interview but who the evaluation learned would be able to provide valuable information.

The data analysis process was conducted as follows:

- The five-member evaluation team met in-person on five different occasions to compare and analyze notes from KIIs, FGDs and observations during and after field work.
- The data collected from the interviews and FGDs were analyzed as per each of the 13 evaluation questions. This information is compiled in an evaluation grid (Annex III).
- The responses to the opinion rating questionnaire were analyzed using excel and SPSS.

Main Findings and Conclusions

Despite facing difficult objectives, PBG was a successfully managed project. The PBG reports are comprehensive and all of the 4,000 activities delivered can be identified. Its quantitative performance indicators are numerous; these numerical indicators report and document the high activity and output levels of the project. They do not inform about outcomes. PBG made several creative and original attempts to measure outcomes by supplementing these (largely USG-designated) numerical indicators with qualitative (or opinion-based) indicators to measure baselines and changes in institutions and to assess public opinions. This was an important effort in performance measurement, since numerical indicators (for example, the number of persons trained) say little about attitudinal and behavioral changes needed for democratic governance outcomes.

The most successful activities were training and technical assistance in ETDs, both with civil society and ETD administrations. Through in-depth interviews and focus groups, the evaluation found evidence of behavior changes on the part of local government: greater transparency, more citizen participation, more outreach to citizens, a budget presented on an official city website, and formal receipts for taxes paid. The most successful method was citizen and CSO inclusion through formal committee structures that allowed for interaction between stakeholders and consensus building around common issues and solutions.

The evaluation found convincing evidence that the theory linking citizen demand to better service delivery has merit. It may be more accurate to use "collaboration" as opposed to "demand," at least regarding the findings of this study. Demand as a stand-alone concept may not create change in this context. Change driven by citizen demand implies having elected representatives who depend on citizen confidence to be re-elected. ETD officials, however, are not elected; rather, they are appointed by superiors in their city, their province, or by political leaders in Kinshasa; their allegiance to those who appoint them takes precedence, a fact admitted to the team during interviews with officials. Nevertheless, and despite this known principle of democratic accountability, the study found evidence among ETD leaders that the opinions of citizens also matter, ever increasingly, once formal mechanisms for public dialogue and

consultation (as tested in the project) become habitual. Further support for this theory of decentralization is the finding that some ETD leaders are making visible investments in city infrastructure using the increased tax revenues, and in some cases are reaching out to citizens for their feedback.

The project was handicapped at the outset by a vast scope. Specifically, the designated institutional targets and a rigid work planning structure caused these roadblocks. By project midcourse the thrust changed considerably, allowing greater flexibility to focus on ETD partnerships having greater potential for results. A reader familiar only with project reports could miss this fact, considering the contract was never revised. DAI continued to seek activities, deliver outputs and report based on the original scope. A number of activities were reduced or stopped altogether, for example, training activities with provincial governments, while efforts with parliaments continued – although there were clear reasons to discontinue (especially the National Assembly) and to re-allocate resources. This was an effective way to manage the project in the DRC context for both USAID and DAI.

A significant conclusion arising from this evaluation is the importance of political will (motivation) as a necessary pre-condition to project investments, including the will to participate in activities (despite lower USG per diems); to allocate public resources that support the project goals; and to take decisions that implement reforms. The successful ETD tax revenue component had all three aspects. When partners, be they individuals or institutions, are not committed or interested, the donor's investment risks are much higher and success less likely. When partners want support and are committed to results, then technical support, both skills and material resources, are value added.

The evaluation also argues that the project scope, good governance, was far too broad. Had the project been “Support to Decentralization,” it might have focused activities sooner on relevant activities and partners and been able to fully test participatory budgeting models. Rebuilding classrooms in Sud Kivu, distributing agricultural kits for farmers in Katanga, or providing IT support to the National Assembly will have contributed to alleviating needs but did not advance decentralization. The ETD support activities were directly supportive of financial decentralization as it is evolving in practice; here, the project achieved results well beyond the interesting but inconclusive outputs in all the other project themes.

Recommendations

I. Replicate Successful Local Government Financial Decentralization Component.

USAID should continue to build on PBG's most successful component: support to ETD revenue generation with citizen participation. The component should be defined as support to revenue management (taxes and expenditures) for local government. The activity or project component should be replicated in additional ETDs and continued in the existing pilots.

This is important because according to evidence found in this study, PBG has been successful (albeit through a pilot activity in one percent of ETDs) in demonstrating that participatory local government can potentially work in the DRC. Results are preliminary, because the participatory planning-budgeting process has not even completed one full administrative cycle. Abandoning it now would leave unanswered questions about effective citizen participation in local government decentralization. The evaluation also found some evidence of imitation by other ETDs, which is a potentially good indicator of sustainability and possibly an indicator of sincere interest for change among other ETD leaders.

Partnerships with CSOs should be expanded to include larger NGOs eligible for cash grants. CSOs played an important role in this experiment and should be further supported as a mechanism for

citizen participation. Cash grants, while difficult to implement with small CSOs, offer more opportunities for local ownership.

Support to Central Agencies. The evaluation recommends that present support to central agencies should be solely to advance and facilitate ETD decentralization (COREF, CTAD, Public Service, National Assembly, etc.).

2. **Incorporate Technical Sectors into Project using Citizen Participation Strategy and Existing Participatory Committees.**

It may be possible to integrate the successful PBG process through participatory committees and pressure from the grass-roots to work both locally and vertically in the technical sectors. The same principle used by the project, to work where there is already a political will to practice decentralization, may be tested again by supporting a combination of province-capital city-ETD and commune in one common framework. The purpose is to build will and consensus to reform from the bottom up, with a common focus by different actors on the same issues and objectives.

There are existing high-level and local dialogue committees which may be an entry point for programming. Some examples of these committees are provided in this report.

Whether this approach will broaden the reach of a future project to the technical sectors is not known. PBG was not successful providing training to sector ministries at the provincial level, due to weak political will and lack of interest.

3. **Donor Collaboration.** USAID should seek joint activities and agreements with donors having similar objectives.

This recommendation is relevant to both project level activities and dialogue at the central level with government on reforms. At the project level, PBG was actively engaged with UNDP; there may be means to increase that collaboration at technical and funding levels.

4. **Capacity building** without political will should be avoided. Political will should be a guiding factor used by USAID in the selection of partnerships and targets.

Technical inputs such as training were less effective with partners where political will was weak. In other words, technical assistance and other technical outputs and deliverables – such as roadmaps, etc. – have little impact on political will. The USAID evaluation Statement of Work (SOW) has defined an effective three-dimensional indicator to assess political will.

The PBG project provided technical inputs to different institutions. Those that were successful, such as support to ETDs with citizen participation, were due to existing strong political will in ETD administrations, specifically related to tax revenues.

5. **Flexible Design-Targeted Scope.** Future projects in this sector should include, to the extent possible in the USAID programming context, a flexible design but tightly targeted scope. Results (outcomes) should be specifically defined, but partnerships and activities should be sufficiently open to allow an implementing partner to adjust its activities and partnerships depending on political will and potential for achieving results. The scope of this good governance support project was overly broad, a problem contributing to issues with partnerships and achievements in the first two years, so it lost the opportunity to fully test participatory local governance.

INTRODUCTION

The *Programme de Bonne Gouvernance* (PBG) is a USAID five-year project (2009-2014) implemented by DAI with a budget of \$36,252,000. The present study is the final performance evaluation of PBG. It is an independent evaluation, conducted by International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI), and includes a scope of work (Annex VII) encompassing 13 evaluation questions and two objectives.

PBG had a vast scope of work that included 50 partners, three pillars (or intermediate results), four provinces (Bandundu, Katanga, Maniema and Sud Kivu), five parliaments, 12 local governments, 30 civil society partners and about 4000 training and technical assistance activities. Its primary thrust was support to administrative decentralization, but a number of other governance-related activities were supported. To undertake this complex project, PBG's work plans have 14 sub-objectives, more than 100 lower-level objectives, and originally had 108 performance indicators -- mainly output indicators (later reduced to about 30). Annex I gives a full profile of all partners and activities.

PBG began operations in September 2009, submitting a five-year detailed work plan as required within a few months of startup. The original and complex work plan structure remained largely intact throughout the life of the project, although, as will be discussed in this study, significant and beneficial revisions to institutional and other targets took place about mid-way through the project. PBG management requested a mid-term evaluation so as to revise the scope, based on lessons in the first two project years, but due to funding limitations the evaluation did not take place.

The work plan was developed around the three pillars or intermediate results (IRs). As presented in the evaluation Statement of Work, they were:

IR1: Citizens demand accountability: Increased demand for accountable governance among citizens and civic organizations.

IR2: Select legislative bodies are more democratic and effective: Improved capacity of provincial and national legislatures to conduct legislative actions and oversee executive activities.

IR3: Laws, policies, and procedures for decentralization are established and implemented: Increased citizen support for decentralization and improved local government capacity to deliver services.

These three pillars were distinct, each with its own objectives, managers, partners, indicators, outputs and reports. PBG had a broad, if not vague, project purpose: "to improve management capacity and accountability of local governments and parliamentary assemblies in four provinces and in the National Assembly, and to increase citizen demand for accountable local governance."

In retrospect, the project's name, "Good Governance," was a misnomer. Support to good governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is obviously an essential ingredient for evolution away from a failed and failing state. However, USAID may have had a more specific and focused objective in mind when it conceived the project early in 2008: support to administrative decentralization, as defined in the 2006 Constitution, adopted following a national referendum. The Constitution, with its clear rules and formula for decentralization, contained a message of hope for lasting reform that would solve conflict and stimulate development. "Good Governance," on the other hand, suggested a much wider scope of activities and partnerships, many of which were marginally relevant to decentralization.

Based on how the project began, the project story could have ended with many activities and outputs but few results. Fortunately, PBG changed its focus (with full USAID support), a fact not well reflected in project reports. From 2012, the prime thrust became assisting the 12 local government partners (*entités territoriales décentralisées* or ETD) to increase their tax revenues, with local civil society playing a pivotal and participatory role. Thus, two of the three pillars – IR1 (civil society) and IR3 (ETDs) – merged under this common, and as will be reported here, successful objective.

BACKGROUND

Background on Decentralization

The 2006 Constitution presented a detailed framework for administering decentralization as follows:

Congo is divided in 11 provinces (to be expanded to 26 within three years); each province has exclusive competence in some fields of public policy (mainly education, health, agriculture and rural development); provincial governors are to be elected by provincial assemblies elected by universal suffrage; the central government must redistribute 40% of domestic national revenue to the provinces, 40% of which the latter must in turn redistribute to decentralized territorial entities (ETDs) such as towns, communes, sectors and chiefdoms; and provinces are allowed to legislate in the areas of their competence, including for the generation of revenue.¹

Implementation requires a platform of laws, regulations, procedures, administrative reorganization and institutional capacity to implement reforms. For example, while the health sector is presently decentralized in principle, all its personnel are appointed and its resources controlled by central government Ministry of Health. During the evaluation, the Subject Matter Expert asked six respondents, all experts in the decentralization process in the DRC, for their opinions on the status of decentralization in 2014 (where full implementation equals 100%). Replies range from 10% to 40% complete. They agree that the most important next step is local elections to begin to formalize public accountability to citizens. In view of the fact that seven years have passed, this progress is not impressive. Respondents agree that the main issue is lack of political will at high levels rather than legal, technical or institutional issues, although legal and administrative issues in this vast country are also imposing problems.

Decentralization, when accompanied by reforms of democratization, promotes good governance, greater accountability, better representation, stability and development.² Distribution of power means that decisions are taken closer to the beneficiaries who depend on those decisions, and that citizens can become partners of local government. Specific needs of citizens at the local level are more likely to be addressed and public services to better respond to their needs. For the DRC, these public services include health, education, agriculture and public infrastructure. At the same time, decentralization reduces political power at the center.

Within the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (GDRC), there are three departments vying for leadership of decentralization: *Cellule Technique d'Appui à la Décentralisation* (CTAD), the Ministry of Public Service, and the Ministry of Finance through COREF. After the Ministry of Decentralization became a department of the Ministry of the Interior, the influence of CTAD was reported to be significantly reduced. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for a number of commanding issues, security and policing being the most significant along with decentralization and customary practices (Chiefdoms). The Ministry of Public Service is an important actor relating to human resources and administrative reforms required by decentralization. COREF (with the World Bank) has taken the lead in

¹ Unpublished article "One Thing Led to Another...Donors, Decentralization and the Consequences of Partial Reform in the DR Congo" Pierre Englebert, Pomona College and Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, University of Kinshasa, February 2014.

² Carothers, Thomas & Diane De Gramont. 2013. Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment.

coordination of all public financial management reforms, including financial decentralization, also a vital aspect of reform.

Profiles of Donor Support to Decentralization

The main donors supporting decentralization in the DRC are the World Bank, UNDP, DFID, the European Union, and the World Bank Institute (a participatory budget project in Sud Kivu was completed in 2012). In addition to PBG, the USAID-funded BRIDGE project also supported decentralization. A profile of donor support to decentralization is found in Annex I.

DFID Governance Strategy

DFID is one of four to five donors actively supporting local communities. Its £106 million (pound sterling) community development project, *Tuungane*, was an important pilot similar to PBG and was evaluated using social science methods through a US university at a cost of \$1 million. It has also conducted a recent internal assessment of all its governance activities, all told providing significant lessons relating to USAID in the DRC. Subsequent to the assessment of its governance activities in parliament, civil society and public finance, DFID decided to stop all capacity building activities as currently configured, with some exceptions in public finance. It concluded that capacity building at the technical level was not achieving results, due to lack of high-level political will for reform. This is in effect the exact approach of PBG, capacity building at the technical level. DFID distinguishes accountability for results from accountability for outputs; since accountability for results is its primary mandate, it is reorienting towards a programming model combining political factors, creating new coalitions of stakeholders, and issue-based and opportunity-based flexible programming "from the bottom up." When an activity is not working it will be stopped. Citizen participation and oversight will now be integrated into other activities. This approach is similar to the USAID Fragile States Strategy of January 2005, having similar language and concepts.

In public finance, DFID is the main funder of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, essentially a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAP), managed by the World Bank (*Project pour les finances transparentes au Congo* -DFID 21 M € WB 5 M. €, Belgium and Canada). Through COREF, a high level committee in the Ministry of Finance, an Action Plan for all finance reform has been approved. It has six pillars for investment: budget reform; fiscal reforms (taxation/customs reform); expenditures management and accounting; oversight (including Auditor General); and financial decentralization.

IRs and Project Organization

The project was organized and staffed under three distinct pillars (or IRs) – citizens demand accountability (IR1), selected parliaments are more democratic and effective (IR2) and laws, policies and procedures for decentralization are established and implemented (IR3). Increased citizen and civic group participation, essential to democratic governance, has been particularly fragile in the DRC. Citizen participation in local government planning and budgeting helps identify and address their needs, engage them in their roles as citizens, such as paying taxes, and gives them a means to advocate for gender budgeting. Citizen participation contributes to effective parliaments because parliamentary outreach to citizens and in-reach from citizens strengthens all three parliamentary functions of policy making, oversight and representation.

From 2012, PBG workshops generally combined CSO-ETD or CSO-parliament participants. This merging had another benefit, increased contact and interaction between the actor and more networking and relationships built, increasing trust. Table I presents an overview of PBG expenditure categories. Not surprisingly, the major category is labor – for project staff, trainers and technical assistance and for both international and local consultants. Much project staff time was consumed by the labor-intensive in-kind grant management process.

Table 1: Project Expenditure Categories

Expenditure Category	USD (million)	%
Labor ³	14.7	40.2
Workshops	2.8	7.6
In-Kind Grants and Assistance	.790	2.1
Sub-Contractors	3.0	8.2
Travel	2.0	5.5
Other Direct Costs (office, vehicles, etc.,)	11.3	30.9
Allowances	2.0	5.5
TOTAL	36.5	100

Profile of PBG Activities and Partnerships

The number of persons trained exceeds 12,000 (38% women). About 10,000 persons were involved in public dialogues and some 600 in participatory budget committees, while 6,000 received financial and management training related to decentralization and local government. National Assembly MPs and staff trained over 800 and provincial assembly MPs and staff some 4,800. Some 500 CSO personnel were trained in budget analysis. These large numbers tell of significant activity levels, but to a reader unfamiliar with the project, they do not paint a clear portrait of this complex and evolving project. The present section and the tables in Annex II give summary profiles of activities, beneficiaries and partners.

Most project activities can be summarily described as capacity building, i.e., training and technical assistance, however, unlike most capacity building projects, PBG gave only minimal equipment or materials support to institutions. About 60 in-kind grants (no money changed hands) were provided on a small scale (average under \$10,000 per grant), primarily to CSOs, (about 15 were provided to local ETD governments) and generally with the goal of increased citizen participation in local government or policy advocacy. This in-kind support involved considerable project personnel involvement in logistics, procurement, organizing events, supporting grantees for reporting, etc. The project had a dozen standard training modules from which it selected the training events. Other activities included study tours and exchanges, creating local committees (planning and budget), roundtables, conferences, and short-term technical assistance, the latter often as follow up hands-on training to workshops. After 2012, training activities with provincial ministries and provincial sector ministries were stopped. Activities with the National Assembly were never frequent. From 2012, the focus of PBG was on supporting ETDs to increase tax revenues, with CSO participation. Involvement with CTAD during the project was mainly to support advancing the stalled decentralization process.

A full profile of partners and activities is found in Annex II.

EVALUATION PURPOSE

As per the scope of work, (Annex VII), the two main evaluation objectives are:

- 1) What is the performance of the program in strengthening institutions and increasing citizen demand?
- 2) To what extent is the project theory of change valid, that strengthened institutions and increased demand result in better service delivery? USAID intends to use evaluation findings to contribute to a new program.

The PBG performance evaluation seeks to answer the following evaluation questions:

³ Labor includes \$933,000 of local consultant fees – 51 consultants/3959 days (May 2014)

- 1) Do institutions have increased capacity and strength?
- 2) Has there been an increased citizen demand for accountable governance?
- 3) Were there improvements in delivery of public services in the target local governments?
- 4) What lessons have been learned regarding implementation strategies?
- 5) What are findings related to cross-cutting themes of gender and urban-rural impact? Some key evaluation questions address effectiveness of revenue generation among the ETDs, and the most effective methods to achieve these results.

The evaluators were asked to assess: "The theory of change that strengthened institutions and increased demand result in better service delivery." This is a theory of decentralization. To decentralize means: *to distribute the administrative powers or functions of (a central authority) over a less concentrated area: to decentralize the national government.*⁴

EVALUATION METHODS

Work Plan

The IBTCI evaluation team drafted and submitted a work plan prior to beginning the fieldwork. The work plan was drafted based on the proposed evaluation design submitted by IBTCI and on an analysis of project materials provided by USAID. The work plan was discussed with USAID and representatives from CTAD and The Office of the Prime Minister during two meetings after arrival in Kinshasa, then revised prior to provincial field work. The work plan defined data collection in three provinces, Bandundu, Katanga and Sud Kivu, and in Kinshasa. Nine project sites and one comparison site that did not benefit from the program were selected for data gathering, including two rural sites. The evaluation questions presented in the work plan were discussed during meetings at USAID, and the rating scale questionnaire was revised. All of the questions defined in the evaluation work plan were translated into French and the methodology was discussed by the two teams, along with briefings on the project and development of procedures for focus groups.

Data Gathering Sites

A number of factors were considered in the selection process for the evaluation sites. Out of the four provinces that benefitted from the program, Maniema was not included in the scope of work due to the difficulty of traveling there within the limited timeframe available for the fieldwork. As Table 2 illustrates, all six intervention sites in Sud Kivu and Bandundu were included in the evaluation. In Katanga, all three ETD project sites were visited, along with one site where the intervention had not taken place (the *commune* of Kenya in Lubumbashi city). Kenya was chosen to be the one comparison site where no PBG project activities took place. Among these 10 sites, the evaluation team collected data in three cities, five *communes* (neighborhoods within a city) and two rural sites. For the latter, one site was a *chefferie* (the chief is a member of a ruling family), the other chief is appointed by the province, referred to as *secteur*.

⁴ <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/decentralization>

Table 2: Data Gathering Sites

Province	Urban Site (City)	Urban Site (Commune in City)	Rural Site	Control Site (Comparison)
Katanga	Kolwezi, Likasi	Katuba (Lubumbashi city)		Kenya (Lubumbashi city)
Bandundu		Lukolela (Kikwit) Mayoyo (Bandundu city)	Bukangalonzo (Kenge)	
Sud Kivu	Bukavu	Kadutu (Bukavu city)	Chiefdom Ngweshe/Walungu	
TOTAL	3	4	2	1

Key Informant Interviews

Interviewees were selected from among ETD personnel responsible for finance and administration divisions who had also been beneficiaries. CSO interviews were with persons who had been recipients of PBG grants or other CSOs in the community. The evaluation team conducted approximately 137 semi-structured interviews, individually or in small groups, with persons belonging to the same organization. Group interviews took place when individuals had limited time available due to work responsibilities (such as provincial administrative staff, ETD staff). Some interviews with CSOs also took place in groups. Categories of interviewees included senior personnel of the National Assembly and provincial assemblies, donors, ETD personnel, provincial personnel, and CSOs. Some interviews were conducted by one of the team members while others were conducted by two team members interviewing together, the latter providing further analysis and comparisons of impressions and opinions. The list of persons interviewed is found in Annex VI.

Focus Group Data Collection Method

Two members of the evaluation team are experts on organizing focus groups. In each data collection site, three focus groups comprising 10 persons each, including professionals, women and members of youth groups, were organized. Participants were selected by the evaluation team without support from PBG project offices. At each site, a focal point person was chosen to assist the team to identify and recruit 10 participants. In each site a note taker was employed to record the event, which was facilitated by the expert. In total, 30 focus group events were organized for approximately 300 persons. Ten of the focus groups comprised all women (all together there were more than 100 women since other focus groups also included women participants). Participants were asked to complete the 5-point rating scale (12 questions) at the conclusion of the focus group.

Rating Scale Questionnaire

A 12-question 5-point rating scale was developed, revised with USAID and administered to a total of 473 persons during data collection. Of the 473 respondents, 202 were women. Most of the respondents had either been interviewed or had participated in a focus group. However, some questionnaire respondents were administrative staff of either parliaments or ETDs but had not been interviewed. The purpose of the ratings was to obtain numerical findings to correspond to opinions gathered. The scale was not intended to be a fully scientific survey, which would have required a stratified random sampling of respondents. A compilation of ratings by various criteria is presented in tables in the annexes.

Method for Inclusive Data Analysis

During the data analysis stage, the five-member evaluation team met five times to analyze their notes and other findings. All 13 evaluation questions were systematically discussed. The data was then recorded in an analytical findings grid (later fully incorporated into the findings section).

The data used for the analysis included the many project reports, various PBG studies and background files from field offices that USAID provided, with a combination of notes from KIs, focus groups discussion

notes, observations made by the team members from their interviews or from observed project sites, and products and events observed. The questionnaire was analyzed using SPSS. At all times, the views of the four Congolese team members was key to extracting relevant material, based on their knowledge of context and personalities. Once compiled into draft findings and recommendations by the Subject Matter Expert (the only international team member), the team met again on other occasions to discuss the written material and make corrections. Some team members contributed written material in French, which was then translated into English.

Comparison Site

The original evaluation plan called for control sites, ETDs where the project was not involved. The purpose was to ascertain whether differences could be found between project sites and non-project sites and what those differences were. During the completion of work planning in meetings with USAID/Kinshasa, discussions were held as to whether the control site option should be dropped. USAID recommended one additional site: Kenya *commune* in Lubumbashi city. This choice was made because it could be included in the field work with minimal time costs (available time for field work was already short) and because USAID was interested in this particular commune for other reasons. The team later realized that Kenya was too close and too similar to Katuba to serve as a control site.

Visits to Kenya *commune* took place at the conclusion of the field work in Katanga. The team had difficulty meeting ETD personnel, due to other events taking place in the commune. The PBG field office, which had helped schedule meetings in ETD communities did not have as many contacts as in their ETD project sites. Three focus group events were organized and conducted in Kenya. There were two other issues with this site. First, the Burgomeister of Kenya had served as the deputy in Katuba *commune*, and was familiar with PBG and its methods. Second, the same CSOs working in Katuba also worked in Kenya.

In fact this was one of several examples found where non-project ETDs were imitating project ETDs. In summary, Kenya yielded little information, except that PBG imitation is taking place, a sign that ETD methods were effective and potentially sustainable.

Limitations and Challenges

The project had an extensive reach, including various sets of institutional partners and reporting systems. There was limited time to examine all activities. The first work plan lists hundreds of outputs in some 30 or more categories. The evaluation could have conducted an extensive desk review of all outputs to compare to work plans over five years, had USAID wanted this approach. Full institutional and organizational assessments of the five parliaments alone could have absorbed the entire schedule. Travel was logistically complex and time consuming; for example, one sub-team needed three days to travel from Sud Kivu to south Bandundu. Data collection time exceeded the plan by three days, which reduced the available time for the five person team to work together to analyze the findings. Excluding Maniema from the evaluation may have impacted the findings. Specifically, the evaluation team found that the parliamentary capacity building activities had minimal results based on data collected at the sites visited. However, it turns out that Maniema might have been an exception as Maniema was rated by a PBG parliamentary assessment in 2010 as having the most developed parliament.

These limitations did not in the end affect key findings; USAID had already indicated by the thrust of evaluation questions which areas were of greater interest, especially in relation to its interest in lessons for future programming: which of the activities and methods had the greatest potential for achieving results (as opposed to outputs). Ideally, had time permitted, it would have been useful to more deeply explore whether any PBG outcomes were achieved with provincial parliaments. Among the qualitative instruments developed by PBG to compliment the output indicators, the parliamentary assessment tool might have been helpful to compare 2010 and 2014 assessments, however PBG had not yet completed the 2014

parliamentary assessment. The CSO Index did measure changes in scores over the four year period. However, neither this tool nor the other PBG assessment tools were evaluated as to their accuracy and realism in measuring changes.

FINDINGS

Findings are presented following the same structure as the evaluation questions from the SOW.

1. Institutional Capacity and Strength

1.1 To What Extent Are Project ETDs Better Resourced?

The evaluation found overall that the ETD project sites are better resourced at project conclusion compared to start up in 2009. Increased resources include tax revenues and strengthened human resources. The average increase of revenues for all 12 ETDs was 147.2% in four years. The evaluation found evidence that the project contributed, possibly very significantly, to increased revenues and strengthened skills of ETD personnel in transparent tax collection and finance management.

Increased Revenues: Table 3 presents tax revenues for the 12 project ETDs between 2008 and 2013. Overall, there is a very significant trend of increased project-ETD own-sourced taxation revenues between 2009 and 2013. Eight of the 12 ETDs have increased their revenues from taxes – from 55% up to 514% in one ETD (Banghageli). Four ETDs had lower revenues or no change. The largest dollar increase, the city of Kolwezi, increased its revenues from \$700,000 in 2009 to \$2.5 million in 2013, a growth of 240%; the city reported to the consultants they expected nearly \$5 million in revenues in 2014.

Retrocession. These tax revenues do not include taxes raised by the ETDs on behalf of provinces and central government, nor revenues obtained through *retrocession* (tax revenues from central government returned to provinces and distributed by provinces to ETDs). Regarding provincial levels, between 2010 and 2013, *retrocession* to provinces averaged between 5.6% and 6.3% of national revenues. When salaries of decentralized personnel and investments are included, *retrocession* was 28.8% in 2013.

Strengthened Human Resources: Human resources (HR) were strengthened due to project methods of repeated training combined with recurrent technical assistance (TA) support for ETD staff in areas of: participatory five-year action planning, annual participatory budgeting, budget process and analysis, use of web sites, financial management and monitoring. Recurrent short-term on-the-job TA was provided to further strengthen the same targeted training and skills. Staff turnover in ETDs is relatively light, therefore these acquired skills are more sustainable. However, most human resources and leadership working for ETDs are, along with all provincial and technical employees (education, health, agriculture), employed by central government, about 330,000 persons in the provinces.

Materials/Equipment Support Minimal: With a few exceptions (such as Bukavu tax related activities), the project did not support material, equipment or systems for ETDs.

Evidence that Project Contribution to Increased Tax Resources: Interviews from different sources, both government and civil society, supported the conclusion that these different project-funded activities, targeting both technical and managerial levels, were important to success. Furthermore, many of the ETDs visited by the evaluation did not have technical support relating to tax and finance

management.⁵ ETD staff and management readily acknowledged that PBG support was very helpful. PBG also targeted effective and transparent revenue management through 15 CSO grants, some of which the team reviewed. For example: project grants targeted tax nomenclature, reduction of illegal taxes and administrative corruption; other grants made information public on what are the legal municipal taxes (and by exception the illegal taxes); still other grants promoted the payment of taxes.⁶

Evidence of Skills Developed. As evidenced by KII interviews, most ETD personnel spoke very positively of the training and TA received from PBG. The mayor of Kolwezi – known as one of the most successful local government leaders – acknowledged that project workshops and networking funded by PBG were instrumental in influencing her effective city management and leadership style.

Mining Sector not significant factor: Although mining sector growth is recent and of considerable scope⁷ – for example, copper production doubled in three years – the mining sector does not contribute much to ETD revenues. It has existed for many years, but revenue increases in the Katanga ETDs is very recent. Most taxes in mining are national or exempted for new investors. The only ETD-level tax revenues from mining come from the “artisanal” mining. The mining industry provides revenues indirectly through small business and merchant service providers who pay local taxes on some revenues generated from clients in the mining sector.

Indicators of a Strong ETD. Some of the key indicators of a strengthened ETD are:

- tax revenues growth
- % of annual budget for investments disbursed
- Annual investment plans
- Citizen inclusion in planning, budget, and oversight of spending
- Gender programming included in budget (30%) and oversight of implementation
- Annual report on expenditures posted in public places
- Posting of costs and fees of public services

Limitation to Findings: The project took advantage of an opportunity, a sudden and somewhat *ad-hoc* reform of taxation from the provincial level down, starting in 2008. Although increases in revenues at the ETD level in the DRC are not known, all provincial administrations increased their revenues from taxes starting in 2009, when provincial taxation departments began to open (of interest, the city of Bukavu now has a taxation unit as well). Provincial revenues rose by 2,041% in Bas-Congo, 769% in Orientale, 555% in Bandundu, 304% in Katanga, 195% in Kasai Oriental, 91% in Kinshasa, 74% in Kasai Occidental and 64% in Sud Kivu. Over the same period, national government revenue grew by 441%.⁸ Although the evaluation was unable to compare increased revenues of project ETDs with revenues of all 900 ETDs, it stands to reason that a transparent municipal tax system, having official receipts and a private bank collecting the money, is far more likely to result in citizen trust and willingness to pay taxes. (This is an example from the observed case of Kolwezi). It will be equally important for ETD administrations to demonstrate transparent expenditures (still too early for conclusions).

⁵ The World Bank finance project was mainly active at the provincial rather than ETD level. UNDP was active with other ETDs in coordination with PBG. The DFID Community development project was initially targeting communities (until its 2012 mid-term evaluation).

⁶ Examples of related PBG grants are (PBG reporting reference numbers): KAT-058; KAT-20; KAT-015; KAT-05; BAN-037; BAN-036; BAN-031; BAN-019; MAN-004, MAN-017; SK-044.

⁷ Selon l'institut d'études géologiques du gouvernement américain (USGS), la RDC est le premier producteur de cobalt, un métal particulièrement recherché dans les industries de pointe comme l'aérospatiale, dont il dispose aussi des plus importantes réserves. De même source, le Congo était en 2013 le deuxième producteur mondial de diamants, le troisième de tantale, et se classait dans les dix premiers pour le cuivre et l'étain. (Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada)

⁸ *Unpublished Paper: "Donors, Decentralization and the Consequences of Partial Reform in the DR Congo"* Pierre Englebert, Pomona College, Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, University of Kinshasa. February 2014

Table 3 shows the revenues by year of the project ETDs from 2008 to 2013. The evaluation did not independently verify all data in Table 3. However, some of the financial data was verbally confirmed by interviewees representing ETD finance departments.

Table 3: Project ETD Revenue Growth 2008-2013

Provinces	ETD	Baseline 2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change
Bandundu	Bukanga Lonzo	839	2,941	7,361	9,869	5,169	3,038	3%
	Mayoyo		10,825	4,953	3,302	3,163	64,461	495%
	Lukolela	2,000	3,601	9,818	15,117	3,428	5,567	55%
Katanga	Katuba				101,156	23,341	31,743	-69%
	Likasi	41,060	562,240	964,430	1,888,803	1,318,747	925,000	65%
	Kolwezi	31,107	726,169	809,561	1,727,339	2,049,393	2,488,762	243%
Maniema	Bangengele		1,235	2,704	3,949	6,972	7,580	514%
	Alunguli	6,487	235,866	25,980	32,117	15,279	16,331	-93%
	Wakabago II		20,380	6,519	4,612	6,970	5,728	-72%
Sud Kivu	Bukavu		503,915	544,869	553,297	354,087	971,277	93%
	Kadutu		112,016	168,879	206,889	278,327	315,918	182%
	Ngweshe	381,111	121,106	114,404	432,125	419,441	545,541	350%
Average Increase								147.2%

Source: PBG Project Report: Evolution_Recettes_ETD_2009-2103

1.2 What are Effective PBG Revenue Collection Methods?

Most Effective Interventions: Those that increase Citizen Trust

The evaluation found that there is a synergy between citizens trusting their municipal government and tax revenues. PBG contributed to increased citizen trust by providing ideas, skills and methods for ETD administrations to be more transparent and providing the opportunity for civil society to participate with government in tax and finance-related activities. Citizen trust is built by visible evidence of honest, effective ETD management and investment of revenues. Some of the PBG interventions involved ETD administrations alone, while others involved citizens and CSOs.

ETD Administration Alone: Methods and procedures implemented by ETDs alone with PBG support include:

- Improving the administration of formal confidence-building tax receipts, centralized and printed (Bukavu, Bandundu, Kolwezi)
- Single tax collection window for receipt of all city taxes (Bukavu and Kolwezi)
- Local bank with window and teller in City Hall to receive funds (Kolwezi)
- Visible investments of taxes by local government (fire trucks, sidewalks, garbage trucks in Bukavu); public list of all investment projects dating to 2008 (Kolwezi)
- A municipal tax office established (Cellule de mobilisation des recettes, Bukavu 2014)

Citizen and CSO Involvement in ETD Administration: Citizen involvement is essential to ensure community needs are prioritized in the expenditure of taxes. Citizens who are involved in planning and budgeting represent all citizens, and report back to their neighbors, instilling or reducing trust, depending on the effectiveness of committees. Some project grant activities were led by CSOs with ETD collaboration. This collaboration helped to further increase citizen trust in a number of different ways, for instance, local CSOs are members of the community and also report back to neighbors; and when citizens

observe CSOs working with the ETD, they are likely to experience greater trust. The evaluation noted the following activities relevant to increased trust:

- Increased tax transparency. CSOs investigated and mapped municipal tax categories in several locations including Likasi (see cover photograph of placard next to market). This activity reduced tax-related petty corruption.
- Promoting citizen obligation to pay taxes. CSOs investigated and publicized legal and illegal taxes, promoted payment of taxes by citizens, and discouraged illegal taxes by informing ETD authorities of illicit activities. Many were delivered by PBG through grants (see previous footnote #6).
- Citizen membership in action planning and budget monitoring committees
- DPA public meetings by officials held with citizens: In Lukulela, for example, the mayor has monthly public meetings presenting revenues and expenditures
- Citizen consultation committees, which ETDs may use to consult on issues on an *ad hoc* basis

Among its many studies and surveys, PBG conducted public opinion surveys on three occasions in the four target provinces. One of the questions asked might provide some insight as to the relationship between citizen trust and tax revenues. Table 4 presents results between 2010 and 2014 for opportunities to express opinions. When compared to Table 3, ETD revenues, there appears to be a relationship between increasing revenues and increasing opportunities to express opinions, as perceived by respondents. In the commune of Bukanga Lonzo for example, revenues increased by only 3% between 2010 and 2014, while at the same time opportunities to express opinions decreased by 17%. In Mayoyo revenues increased by 495% over this period while opportunities to express oneself increased 47%. The model does not conform in the case of Kolwezi, as tax revenues increased significantly but opportunities to express were unchanged, although Kolwezi started and remained relatively high, with over 70% of respondents reporting opportunities.

Table 4: % of People Surveyed in Project ETDs Who Believe They Have Opportunities to Express Opinions⁹

Province	ETD	2010 YES	2012 YES	2014 YES	% Change 2010-2014
BAN	Bandundu/Mayoyo	37	78	84	47
BAN	Bukanga Lonzo	79	88	62	-17
BAN	Kikwit/Lukolela	82	58	75	7
BAN	Kazamba			77	
KAT	Katuba	67	48	52	-15
KAT	Kenya			61	
KAT	Kolwezi	77	72	74	-3
KAT	Likasi	66	44	59	-7
MAN	Alunguli	78	40	73	-5
MAN	Bangengele	67	23	63	-4
MAN	Wakabango II	87	16	47	-30
MAN	Mikelenge			71	
SUK	Bukavu	46	43	55	9
SUK	Kadutu	50	36	50	0
SUK	Ngweshi/Walungu	42	41	63	21
SUK	Kavumu			56	
AVERAGE		64.8%		63.9%	

Limitations: Citizens have expectations that ETD investments will reflect needs defined based on participatory action planning and budgets. Priority budget items, however, may not receive planned

⁹ RAPPORT FINAL: ETUDE SUR LA BONNE GOUVERNANCE (Mai 2014) Etudes de marché et sondages d'opinion Immeuble Botour – 10ième niveau – Commune de Gombe Tél. :099 99 39 460 – E-mail :experts@experts.cd Site : www.experts.cd

investments as ETDs respond to political factors. ETD leadership is appointed by political superiors. However, citizen participation and a transparent budget help lead to greater realism by citizens about municipal expenditure capacity.

1.3 Public Private Partnerships in Katanga

The concept of accessing private sector revenues for public infrastructure investments is very relevant. Reportedly, private sector individuals and companies have available cash to invest, but lack of trust in the public sector is the prime inhibiting factor. USAID played the role of honest broker, instilling confidence in these private investors. USAID through PBG also provided technical support to the contracting process, such as model contracts and procurement procedures. Over the longer term, banking sector reform is needed to allow for investment financing and credits.

PPP Results in Katanga. Results of this pilot cannot be assessed during this early stage. There are only two signed contracts in the past two years, both in the commune of Katuba (a commune of Lubumbashi). Neither project appears near completion at this time; one of the projects (market construction) has been on hold for two years, due to financing issues; the second project (refurbishment of a commune meeting hall) was stalled four times due to the facility being taken over by government persons for use in storing and selling corn meal; the latest information obtained by the team is that the issue had been resolved. Two other potential projects were studied in Likasi, but did not pass the feasibility stage. One targeted rebuilding an existing abattoir, but the costs of environmental impact studies prevented it from moving forward. Two other investors later expressed interest, but there have been no further developments in the past several months. A city parkland project was also being considered, so far without identifying an investor.

Contract supervision and monitoring of PPP projects during and after the project closes may be an issue. In the case of the market construction project, the activity has been inactive for two years. The PBG office providing continuity will be closing in September 2014. During the evaluation field work, the PBG field office organized a meeting to help advance the other PPP project (re-construction of meeting hall).

1.4 Did Project Contribute to Transparency, Openness and Accountability?

The evaluation found evidence of citizen participation in municipal-level government and transparency, openness and accountability by ETD administrations. These findings are the early stages of a much-needed reform process.

Citizen Participation. The project encouraged CSO and citizen participation from the outset. Initial project workshop activities for civil society, ETD administrators and parliaments were segregated because these actors were generally not accustomed to working together, and as stated in project reports and in the evaluation SOW, actors mistrusted each other. The project messages were the same from the start, that working together was a "win-win" for all stakeholders. This same message was conveyed in radio broadcasts. By 2012, many activities combined CSOs and government in the same events. The evaluation found that joint activities were effective means to increase openness and accountability. Interviewees and focus groups commented that this joint presence allowed for direct exchanges, the creation of networks and the recognition by participants that their interests were similar. All of the advocacy grants to CSOs required participation of public officials. In the case of policy, law reforms (*Edicts* at provincial level) required full collaboration from a member of parliament as champion of a proposed law. About 47 law reform projects were funded, of which 16 were eventually adopted in parliament.

Increased Transparency. One significant outcome is that the city of Kolwezi is reportedly the first ETD with its budget on a web site. PBG training and grants that contributed to transparency include:

- Training in participatory planning and budgeting
- Tax category clarification (nomenclature) grants, to reduce illegal taxes
- Anti-corruption activities regarding police and local administration grants
- ETD budget and planning committees which include citizens
- Repeated messages on transparency in project training events

Accountability. Activities which contribute to accountability include:

- Citizen-inclusion in budget and expenditure monitoring committees
- DPA. *Dialogues publiques* -- Public dialogues are used as venues to inform citizens about concepts of accountability of public officials to citizens and to give citizens opportunities to ask questions
- The evaluation team observed Lucolela Bourgimeister holding a public meeting to inform on expenditures and revenues. He reportedly does so once a month.

Local elections are essential for accountability to take hold. At present, all ETD officials are appointed and in accordance with political process owe favors to those who appoint them.

Public Official Openness to Change. The evaluation discovered some evidence of changing mentality of public officials towards greater accountability to citizens. The fact that many PBG activities are held jointly between citizens and government or MPs is also evidence of a changed mentality. In Bukavu, a CSO organized an event in which the governor, mayor and heads of communes were invited to participate with citizens – and, more importantly, the event took place. Some anecdotal evidence was found by the evaluation that CSO campaigning to reduce police corruption has reduced the number of times cars are stopped for bribes in Bukavu. Provincial MPs collaborated with civil society to develop provincial laws (*Edicts*), although the evaluation cannot report whether this is a common practice or limited to a few more collaborative individual MPs.

Limitation. The major limitation in this finding is that the entire process is too recent. Citizen participation has been implemented only over the past two years (for example, a participatory budget committee was formed in Likasi in February 2014). For this model to be fully tested there should be several budget cycles completed, whereas no one complete cycle has been accomplished in any ETD (i.e., participatory planning, budgeting, budget implementation and implementation monitoring). There is some evidence of some local taxes still being collected by unregistered tax collectors, which led the evaluation. In Bukongo lonzo, the Burgomeister provides transparent expenditure data in public meetings, but only provides generalities not financial data.

1.5 Capacity of Parliaments

In 1999, while researching democracy assistance throughout the developing world, Thomas Carothers wrote:

*If asked to name the area of democracy assistance that most often falls short of its goals, I would have to point to legislative assistance. Its record is riddled with disappointment and failure.*¹⁰(Pages 181-182)

The evaluation did not attempt full institutional and organizational assessments of the five parliamentary partners to PBG, which would have required many weeks of directed effort. The evaluation cannot

¹⁰ *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve.* Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 181-182

therefore report findings that confirm or conflict with Carothers' overarching views. There is, however, limited evidence suggesting that parliaments contributed to advancing decentralization, nor evidence that parliaments contributed to the most successful project activity, ETD tax revenues. The rating scale questionnaire administered by the evaluation to 473 persons found that persons familiar with PBG rated parliaments as less effective than five years ago, compared to persons not familiar with PBG.

Provincial assemblies were new institutions in 2006, therefore the training support provided, along with support from UNDP and EU, will likely have assisted these institutions to understand their roles and responsibilities. Due to lack of motivation from the National Assembly, PBG conducted very few activities with the National Assembly, suggesting that impact was very unlikely. PBG developed a parliamentary self-assessment instrument which it administered and reported in 2010. The evaluation was unable to assess whether the instrument was accurate, however, differences between assemblies' capacities were identified in 2010 and a number of PBG activities targeted needs of provincial assemblies based on the assessment.

The PBG first work plan listed this objective for the parliament component (IR2):

Improve the capacities of national and provincial legislative bodies in their essential missions: representing, legislating and controlling the government and the budget process and, reinforcing the ability of local governments to carry out decentralization.

The project delivered many activities (mainly to provincial assemblies) that would in theory strengthen capacity in representation, oversight, law-making and parliamentary administration. Regarding decentralization, at least three essential laws have not been presented or adopted as of 2014:

- The Caisse Nationale de Péréquation (CP) Law that will organize its structure, role, and responsibility;
- The Territorial Power Law that is to re-organize the DRC provinces into 26 Decentralized Territorial Units;
- The Civil Service Devolution Law that will organize state, provincial and local public services and clarify their specific role and responsibility

There were few or no laws (*Edicts*) related to decentralization passed at the provincial level. It is a fact that delays in passage and adoption of laws are far less related to technical support by donors or to technical capacity of parliament than they are to political will, over which the project had no control. The issue of technical inputs by donors where political will is lacking is discussed later in this report.

Rating survey respondents tended to rate effectiveness of parliaments as less effective than five years ago. The four parliament questions were rated by the 473 respondents as lower than most other questions in the survey. This data may not be statistically significant, however.

2. Citizen Demand for Accountable Governance

2.1 Increased Demand

The evaluation found some interview-based anecdotal evidence of changing citizen attitudes towards greater demand for accountability from public officials. Compared to the situation at project start up, the situation in project sites has in all probability evolved. An excerpt from the evaluation scope of work describes the CSO landscape prior to the start of PBG:

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the DRC often have limited comprehension of concepts related to good governance, decentralization, advocacy, citizen oversight, and budgetary processes. CSOs often struggle to grasp the difference between advocacy and awareness raising campaigns, with most organizations focused simply on putting pressure on political actors with the intent of increasing the quality of public service delivery rather than offering

recommendations or partnership. Additionally, relationships between decision makers and civil society tend to be based primarily on confrontation rather than collaboration, preventing them from engaging in positive dialogue to find solutions.

There is strong supporting evidence from the rating scale survey administered to 473 persons (see section 6.2 for rating scale findings). Respondents familiar with PBG rate the role and importance of citizen participation in ETD administration significantly higher. These changed attitudes identified by the evaluation (see two examples below) do not necessarily refer to greater demand, but rather greater citizen willingness to collaborate with local government. The fact that many PBG activities are held jointly between citizens and government or (to a lesser extent) with provincial *députés* is evidence of a changed mentality. The evaluation question being discussed here distinguishes between citizen attitudes and public official attitudes (addressed in question 2.2 below). However, the two are closely aligned and inter-dependent. For example, in Bukavu, a CSO organized an event in which the governor, mayor, and heads of communes were invited to participate with citizens – and the event took place. The Lukolela/Kikwit evidence found below in this section, repeated in Section 2.2, is another example of this inter-dependency.

A PBG-funded citizen opinion survey was conducted on two occasions, in 2010 and 2014 (about 6,000 persons interviewed in each survey). One survey question, discussed in a previous section of this report, (see Table 4), was closely related to demand by citizens for accountability: the extent to which respondents felt they had opportunities to express their opinions. The data varies; in some ETDs, citizens report an increase in opportunities to express themselves while in others citizens express a decrease in opportunities between 2010 and 2014.

In general, the trend towards greater demand by DRC citizens for their civic and democratic rights continues to move forward from its low during the time of Mobutu, when silence was the way of survival -- when security police could arrest a person for saying "Mobutu" aloud.

According to the 2013 PBG Annual Report, there were 480 citizen-demand occasions facilitated by the project (Performance Indicator (PI #1.2). PI# 1.4, Number of citizens attending public audiences, indicates 7,900 persons at the end of year four of the project.

Mechanisms for Citizen Demand. The prime categories of mechanisms are:

- **DPA.** *Audiences publiques* (public audiences) are events allowing residents and public officials to establish dialogue on policy, issues, or a municipality's revenues and expenses. (The event name was later changed to *dialogues pour l'action* or DPA). PI#1.4, number of persons attending public audiences, gives 7,691 persons (2013 Annual Report)
- **Citizen Committees.** Every project site set up a number of committees with citizens either participating or leading. They include **consultative committees** (citizen-led for dialogue or oversight of ETDs); **Action Planning Committees** (citizen/CSO membership in development of annual or 5-year local investment plans inclusive of community needs assessments); **Participatory Budgeting Committee** (ETD committee led by head of budget)

Evidence. Broadly, observers place the level of citizen demand in the DRC as relatively modest compared to African countries where decentralization is more advanced. Some evidence of project contributing to increased demand:

- Ngweshe (*chefferie* in Sud Kivu): This traditional rural location has been led by the same chief for 71 years. The chief is well-connected to high levels of political power, yet the leader of civil society (knowing well the implications) demanded the village make public its expenditures. He was declared *persona non grata*.

- Lukolela (Kikwit in Bandundu province). Market sellers complained to a local whistleblower NGO (CLAT) about illegal taxes. CLAT reported to the ETD and some action was taken. The mayor of Lukolela does monthly public presentations of city revenues and expenditures.

There may be a trend towards greater demand, with practices such as the above being imitated in other locations and setting. A habit of citizens speaking out may be developing.

Limitations. The committee mechanisms alone do not necessarily lead to increased demand. In Mayoyo (commune in Bandundu city), the evaluation team participated in a Consultative Committee involving commune workers and the *Burgomeister*. The *Burgomeister* left, “to allow participants to express themselves freely.” However, few opinions were expressed, except by the president of the committee. The evaluation team was later told by a member of the committee that the committee president was appointed by the *Burgomeister* and would report back what was said.

2.2 *Has Increased Demand Affected Government Behavior?*

As one interviewee noted, “In 2004, our city budget was a government secret. Now it is on our city web site” (KII in Kolwezi). Some additional examples of changed public official behavior are:

- *Citizen participation in budget process and transparency of government finances are recent practices, yet there are signs of change;*
- *Burgomeister of Lukolela conducts monthly meetings to announce ETD revenues and expenditures, and also speaks on radio;*
- *Mayor of Likasi participates with the Consultative Committee on visits to communities; more DPAs are taking place;*
- *Lukolela (Kikwit in Bandundu province). Market sellers complained to a local whistleblower NGO (CLAT) about illegal taxes. CLAT reported to the ETD and some action was taken.*
- *Province of Bandundu has adopted a law that specifies how funds are disbursed to ETDs;*
- *In Bukavu and especially in Kolwezi, information on public budgets and expenditures is increasingly available; in Kolwezi the budget can be accessed from the city web site (first of this trend in ETDs); and*
- *Indications that other municipal leaders are copying these practices.*

Limitation. PBG began participatory budget workshops in 2012 so the process is recent. Also, authorities are appointed by a political process and are ultimately accountable to those who appointed them. Some freely admit this.

3. Service delivery of GDRC Institutions

3.1 *Have Government Services in Technical Sectors Changed?*

It is unlikely the project has had significant impact on service delivery in the technical sectors, because the project was minimally involved in sectors. In Katanga, however, PBG had one long-term expert working closely with stakeholders in the sector, contributing a number of sector-wide outputs. Until 2012, financial management training workshops were delivered to provincial sector ministries, along with some training delivered to finance departments of provincial administrations. These were discontinued because of low interest by recipients and because the World Bank was heavily involved in finance training. At a micro level, the project contributed to some improvements in sectors. PBG activities for the four sectors were delivered through 13 grants and direct assistance and, as noted above, in one instance through a full-time technical advisor in the Ministry of Education of Katanga province. Details are found in Annex III

4. Implementation and Approach

4.1 Approaches to Harnessing Political Will

The project had little impact on political will to implement decentralization reforms. There is general agreement among interviewees that political will at the center of government continues to be weak. Project support to CTAD, one of three central institutional actors in decentralization, was entirely at the technical level, whereas the issues stalling reform are political, albeit complex. In the National Assembly, PBG gave technical support to advance three decentralization-related laws, and through CTAD it provided instruments (a strategy) and the means for dialogue among institutional stakeholders, all of which may later contribute to implementation. Political will for decentralization is somewhat greater at the provincial level. Provincial Governors are elected or selected by provincial assemblies, who can if they choose impeach a Governor. However, the stronger power lies with the President, who may dismiss both the Governor and the provincial assemblies. Governors are not independent of central political leadership. Regarding taxation reform, however, decentralization is already a fact at provincial level.

At ETD level there is considerable political will to implement decentralization, especially with regards to financial management. Financial decentralization is also a fact at this level. PBG did not change political will in this case, but it provided the skills and means for ETDs to increase their revenues. In this sense it "harnessed" the existing political will.

Central. There is general agreement in the international community that political will to implement decentralization is very weak, and the facts support it; after seven years, decentralization remains well short of full realization. Participation in project activities by parliamentary administrators and CTAD has been a positive development, but MPs and NA Committees were far less interested or motivated to participate. A main partner of the project was CTAD, whose overall mandate in the country is to support the implementation of decentralization. Project reports have thoroughly documented the issues relating the transfer of CTAD from the Ministry of Decentralization to Ministry of The Interior, whose mandate is primarily security and whose commitment to decentralization appears to be low among its many challenging priorities. At the technical level, PBG supported CTAD on a number of efforts to advance decentralization, including meetings, study tours, conferences, support to legal reform, decentralization strategy and a decentralization roadmap (the latter is reportedly not an active topic within GDRC). None of these technical inputs, however, appear to have significantly advanced implementation of decentralization.

ETD Political Will. The story at the provincial and ETD levels is generally much more positive. ETD authorities participated willingly in the project, they applied the skills learned to improve finance management, transparency and accountability, and at least some of the project ETDs allocated resources to improve ETD infrastructure for which they are responsible. In at least two cases found by the evaluators, an ETD allocated some municipal resources to local health or agriculture, despite the fact that the health, education and agriculture sectors are de-concentrated, directed and financed from the center.

ETD Political Will and Its Measurement

Definition in Evaluation SOW: Political will refers to the extent to which GDRC interlocutors are willing to a) participate in program activities and more importantly; b) apply the newly acquired skills or techniques for the intended purpose; and c) allocate GDRC resources towards matching or replicating project inputs.

Political will is significantly different when comparing central government and provincial ETD levels. Decentralization is a very political act since, by definition, it means transferring decision making power to

ever lower levels of government. On the other hand, the established powers rarely want to give up powers. At the central level PBG efforts have been technical, including support to dialogue, strategic planning, eight workshops for CTAD, law-drafting and other workshops for parliament, IT support for the National Assembly administration, and support to drafting of the various laws and regulations needed for the decentralization platform. Decentralization, however, is estimated by local experts after 8 years to be approximately 10-40% achieved, due at least in part to lack of political will. Issues are very complex, however, and many technical aspects remain, such as financial reforms under World Bank lead.

At the ETD level, political will can be assessed as generally very positive based on the SOW definition and these evaluation findings:

a) Participating in Project. Participation by ETD political leaders in the many project events is high and enthusiastic. Provincial MPs and assembly administrators, Mayors, Burgomeisters and public servants responsible for budget and finance interviewed reported they were very positive about skills acquired and other benefits from the project.

b) Applying Skills Acquired. Skills and tools for reform are being used. Some examples confirmed by the evaluation:

- Financial reforms with citizen participation related to tax collection, planning, budgeting and revenue management have advanced significantly in the past two years. Evidence has been provided in prior questions #1.1, 1.4 and 2.2
- Examples of continued use of DPAs by mayors and *Burgomasters*,
- Leaders have continued to include citizen committees in their administration for budget monitoring and to some degree as a means for transparency

c) Allocating Resources. Political leaders in ETDs have made investments in having citizen inputs:

- Kolwezi distributes a list of all public investments since 2009
- Bukavu purchased new fire trucks and garbage trucks and built sidewalks
- Evidence of copycat investments from neighboring communes (Chefferies of Bagira and Kazabi)
- Bukavu (Sud Kivu) did a study tour to Katuba (Katanga) to compare expenditure management practice

The evaluation finds evidence that ETD financial income that formally enters the system stays there, however, the evaluation finds that not all revenues enter the formal systems. This is a positive trend; however, the reality is that all ETD financial resources fall far short of needs, and some ETDs fall shorter than others.

4.2 To What Extent are Results Sustainable?

At least three factors suggest potential for results being sustainable, although as often repeated, the results are in early stages:

Skills Acquired through Workshops and Technical Assistance. These skills will remain valuable to the DRC as a country over the long run. CSOs are volatile and unstable organizations, but the personnel trained will continue to work in their fields of expertise and often in their same communities. Their acquired skills are good for the community as a whole. Technical workers in ETDs (accounting, budgeting, and tax collection) and parliamentary administrators will generally – there are exceptions – remain in their jobs for life. Some leaders will presumably change when local elections are held, which could negatively affect results.

Citizen Participation. There is evidence that the practice of DPAs has been adopted by leaders as a tool for citizen feedback and problem solving by provincial government leadership in Sud Kivu and by municipal leaders in Lukolela)

Citizen Oversight. A number of practices, tools, and deliverables from the project will likely be sustained. For example:

- Participatory budgeting and planning¹¹ will continue and evidence suggests it will expand to other locations
- Other citizen committees appear sustainable over the long term, such as good governance committees in communes and consultative committees¹² for oversight and feedback
- Bukavu has a city-funded good governance web site.
- Some 19 Edicts adopted will likely contribute to permanent changes to policy and practice. While adoption is not the same as implementation, it is likely that implementation will be monitored by existing citizen committees and may benefit communities.

4.2.1 *Effective Implementation Strategies*

Flexible 'Windows of Opportunity' Strategy.

PBG was very successful in modifying its programming, despite an inflexible, 'blueprint' design to the project (i.e., five-year work plan at start up). The windows of opportunity approach was recommended by the USAID Fragile States Strategy of 2005 as a way to more effective programming in difficult conditions, abandoning what is not working, and taking risks to try other activities or partners that are judged to have potential. While there may be debate as to whether the DRC can be classified as a fragile state, the approach nevertheless was considered appropriate when PBG was designed (see, for example, comments in the Evaluation SOW regarding 'flexibility'). Specifically, the USAID strategy states:

"Encouraging shorter planning horizons and adapting programs to changing environments and targets of opportunity. While current USAID interim strategic guidance does not require specific planning timeframes, there remains a tendency to adopt longer-term traditional development planning horizons." (p.9)

DFID has recently conducted an analysis of its programming in the DRC and has decided to adopt the approach for all projects and programs it supports, along with cessation of all capacity building where reform is stalled (technical inputs do not resolve politically-driven issues).

The strategy is different from standard 'blueprint' project planning in that, while objectives may remain the same, activities, partnership, targets and outputs will be dropped when reduced chances of achieving results become apparent. Programming concentrates on achieving results, that is, outcomes intended, rather than outputs. While activities with failing outcomes are dropped, new opportunities that arise in the course of implementation will be taken up, opportunities based on effective leadership and clear problems for which partners feel ownership. Stakeholders and stakeholder committees with common problems to resolve will provide the guidance and direction to a program.

Strategies for Inclusiveness and Networking.

Inclusive workshops for CSO and public sector personnel, joint study tours and networking roundtables were all described as very instrumental in changing mentality and practice. The "us-them" barrier to communication has been well understood for generations in all sectors, and joint activities undermine it.

¹¹ Participatory Local development Plans started in 2010, followed by participatory budgeting in 2013. Many of the same citizens and CSOs participate in both.

¹² A consultative committee is volunteering established by a municipal leader as a mechanism for feedback; some ETDs are following this practice.

Studies, Data, Monitoring and Analysis.

The project developed qualitative performance survey instruments to capture baseline and changes occurring in three partner categories. The instruments and their targets were:

- CSOs: Advocacy Capacity Assessment Tool
- Parliaments: Legislative Process Matrix
- ETDs: Budget Review Matrix; Financial Capacity Model
- Citizens: a Citizen Opinion Survey was conducted three times to assess opinions on a number of questions; Table 8 presented data on one question, opportunities to express opinions.
- Tax Categories and Mapping Studies as input to advocacy for reducing corruption and through increased public information on legal and illegal taxes (see cover page)
- Educational system mapping in Katanga as support to an educational governance strategy
- Tax payer database surveys supporting taxation reforms.

In-Kind Grants Strategy.

The cash grants component of the project was never implemented as planned. No cash grants were awarded because PBG management foresaw that outputs would fall far short of work plans. In the context of USAID rules for grants, there would have been major delays in pre-eligibility of CSOs for grants, due to their lack of capacity. Nor was CSO capacity building a focus of the project. Instead, PBG provincial staff provided all logistics for grant implementation by CSO grantees (grants were awarded through a competitive process). The in-kind grants approach was very successful in supporting many of the project objectives, such as policy reforms, as evidenced throughout this report.

One issue reported by all interviewees was the feeling of being recipients of support rather than partners ("We are not children!") Ownership and capacity building for project management were both weakened by the considerable hands-on logistical support by project staff.

4.3 Integrating Governance with Technical Sectors

PBG was not successful at providing training to sector ministries at provincial level, due to weak political will and lack of interest. Training activities planned by PBG for provinces were discontinued in 2012.¹³ The sectors are reportedly in partial disarray (confused roles, low motivation, etc.) due to stalled decentralization. However, PBG remained active with other support to technical sectors, mainly through small grants, as presented in question 3.1 above. For example, participatory situation analysis (education in Katanga and agriculture in Bandundu) resulting in needs defined in project ETDs.

ETD participatory planning and budgeting has leveraged more revenue and increased budget lines in some technical sectors (agriculture in the municipality of Mayoyo from 0% in 2009, 2010 and 2011 to 25% in 2012 and 30% in 2013 and 2014; the education budget has increased to 25% in Katanga). NOTE: provinces have some discretion to allocate their own tax revenues to technical sectors, although the prime budget is transferred (*retroceded*) from Kinshasa.

5. Cross-Cutting Questions

5.1 Gender Programming

Gender programming is a cross-cutting essential component to all programming in the DRC context and it was an ongoing component throughout the life of the project. PBG provided opportunities for women-

¹³ For example, the activity as defined in the first PBG work plan: "3.2.2 Training programs in planning and basic administration and financial management for the provincial government administration."

to-women dialogue on gender issues and women's leadership in both public and networking for a, as well as for wider dialogue on women's issues through radio programming. The component was generally well appreciated. There is no indication of a different impact for beneficiaries, excepting activities which specifically targeted women. Regarding PBG activities, gender issues may be approached through gender budget lines included in ETD budgets and participatory action plans. However, in the case of PBG, as noted earlier, participatory budget committees are new. No budget committee has had the opportunity to include a gender budget line in a municipal budget. In Kolwezi, the participatory budget committee is scheduled to oversee the 2015 city budget. Details on project gender activities are found in Annex III.

5.2 Impact on Urban and Rural Authorities Different?

The impact is different in some respects. Rural ETDs and CSOs do not have the same access to project field offices based in the provincial capital nor its technical support. Other differences:

- Travel to project activities is more difficult and expensive for rural beneficiaries; the \$5 travel stipend, however, is the same
- It may be argued that project activities using radio do not have this downside; however radio reception can be less in rural areas
- CSOs are tied to their communities, so the same disadvantage applies to rural CSO partnerships
- Ngweshe (*Chefferie*) ETD complained to the project that they did not receive the same tax technology support as Bukavu city

6. Other Findings

6.1 Project Design

As discussed in section 4.2.1 above, PBG was intended to be a flexible project. The evaluation SOW noted:

Flexibility: Understanding that the success of governance interventions is often dependent on a permissive political environment, PBG's approach to planning and undertaking activities is highly flexible. This flexibility enables PBG to be responsive to emergent opportunities as they occur within targeted institutions and at different levels of government. For example, the bulk of PBG's focus was able to shift to support local government entities when Provincial and National legislators became preoccupied with securing their reelection and less interested in drafting new legislation.¹⁴

As discussed earlier, in the beginning this was not the case. The first annual PBG work plan detailed more than 50 sub-results under the three Intermediate Results, each with lists of many dedicated outputs. This 'blueprint' output-based approach was inappropriate to the DRC, where democratic governance is fragile and fluid. The fragile states programming model described in the above was in place after about 2012. The change from inflexible to flexible may be explained by the following. First, PBG was a competitive proposal; the competing bidders spell out in detail the various activities and results they proposed to accomplish to win the bid. It is therefore likely that the purpose of the first work plan was to demonstrate to USAID how the contractor intended to fulfill its winning plan over five years. The procedure is normal and standard, although in this case unhelpful. This formidable work plan structure remained throughout the life of PBG, a confusing fact to an outside reader of project reports, because many of the work plan elements and outputs reported were de-emphasized in practice while the project focused on a few meaningful results.

¹⁴ See PBG Statement of Work, implementation principles.

With support from USAID, DAI was able to make significant changes to institutional and activity targets after about mid-project. The reasons for this flexibility, contrasting with the inflexible work plan, are likely due to a change in USAID personalities. In any case, this was very fortunate, because after about 2012 the project focused on a few targets, where it achieved the best results. Some significant changes to the plan which took place were:

- Support to the National Assembly was cut back when it became obvious political will or interest from MPs was marginal.
- Training support to provincial administrations, including budget, finances and planning, was stopped after 2011 in order to focus on ETDs, where results proved to be successful. The provincial administrations had other donor support (World Bank, EU, UNDP etc.), while the targeted project ETDs had almost no donor support¹⁵
- Direct grants were built into the project, but as such were never delivered; instead the project provided in-kind grants (with hands on logistical services by the project and no grant money). This change was decided when it became apparent that 1) cash grants to selected CSO partners would be slow to implement, expensive because of need for supervision and would stall in the achievement of outputs; and 2) support to ETD administrations could be included in this model.
- Implementing partners were cut back from 5 at startup (3 American) to one Congolese NGO at project end. The reason was primarily to reduce costs.

Several promising activities have not yet reached completion, so results cannot be confirmed. Participatory planning and budgeting require several cycles (fiscal years) to be fully tested.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite facing difficult objectives, PBG was a very well managed project. Its reports are comprehensive and all of the 4,000 activities can be identified. Its quantitative performance indicators are numerous and report and document the high activity and output levels of the project; they do not inform about outcomes. PBG made several creative and original attempts to measure outcomes by supplementing these (largely USG-designated) numerical indicators with qualitative (or opinion-based) indicators to measure baselines and changes in institutions and to assess public opinions. This was an important effort, since numerical indicators, such as the number of persons trained, say little about attitudinal and behavioral changes related to democracy and good governance.

The project was handicapped at the outset by designated institutional targets and a rigid work planning structure although, as found in the evaluation, by mid-project much greater flexibility occurred. The DAI contract with USAID required that it continue, for example, to support parliaments, although there were clear reasons to discontinue (especially the National Assembly) and to re-allocate resources. It made efforts for five years and documented its failures. With the same persistence, after about 2011, it convinced USAID to stop some activities and concentrate on those with more potential, where political will was high, for example, with ETDs and their surrounding communities. This was effective program management in the DRC context for both USAID and DAI.

A significant conclusion arising from this evaluation is that political will is an important and necessary pre-condition to project investments, namely will to participate in activities despite lower USG per diems; to allocate public resources that support the project goals; and to take decisions that implement reforms.

¹⁵ World Bank Institute Participatory Budgeting project also worked in Bukavu and Ngeshe from 2009. UNDP supported participatory administration as well but in coordination with PBG in other ETDs

The successful ETD tax revenue component had all three aspects. When partners, be they individuals or institutions, are not committed or interested, the investment greatly risks being unsuccessful and ill-spent. When partners want support and are committed to results, then technical support, both through skills and material resources, are value added.

The evaluation also argues that the project scope, good governance, was far too broad. Had the project been “Support to Decentralization,” it might have focused sooner on relevant activities and partners and been able to fully test participatory budgeting models. Rebuilding classrooms in Sud Kivu, distributing agricultural kits for farmers in Katanga, or providing IT support to the National Assembly will have contributed to alleviating needs but did not advance decentralization. The ETD support activities were directly supportive of financial decentralization as it is evolving in practice, and here the project achieved results well beyond the interesting but inconclusive outputs in all the other project themes.

The most successful activities were training and technical assistance in ETDs, both with civil society and ETD administrations. The evaluation found, through its in-depth interviews and focus groups, evidence of behavior changes on the part of local government, including greater transparency, more citizen participation, more outreach to citizens, a budget on a city web site, and formal receipts for taxes paid. These are preliminary yet very significant in the DRC.

The most successful method was citizen and CSO inclusion through formal committee structures that allowed for interaction between stakeholders and consensus building around common issues and solutions.

"What is the performance of the program in strengthening institutions and increasing citizen demand?"

As repeatedly stated in this report, the most successful component of PBG was the support to increase ETD administrative capacity for tax collection. ETD public institutions were also strengthened by practicing outreach to citizens and encouraging citizen to have access to their institutions, also known as “in-reach.” PBG helped significantly in improving the relationship between local administrators and citizens, through participatory planning (or Local Development Plans) and participatory budgeting workshops, and by promoting the concept of citizen participation in local government. For parliamentary institutions, primarily provincial, the project also promoted outreach and in-reach, through assisting with reforms of Standing Orders (*règlements intérieures*) and administrative regulations to facilitate interaction and by funding advocacy for law reforms requiring citizen and MP collaboration. This input may well contribute to parliamentary strengthening over the long term, but the evaluation was not able to reach this conclusion at the present.

Most of the training and technical assistance was delivered to individuals; therefore, impact on institutions depends on longevity of trainee employment. Parliamentary administrations were likely to be strengthened through training and networking activities for permanent administrative staff.

Support to civil society organizations (CSOs) was, at least theoretically, an institution strengthening activity. A CSO assessment tool developed by the project and administered three times (Advocacy Capacity Assessment Tool) showed evidence that, between 2009 and 2013, organizations supported gained in capacity on nine dimensions.¹⁶ However, with one or two exceptions, the CSOs supported by PBG were run by volunteers and had no formal employees. As such, capacity was developed more at the individual level, a potential benefit to the community. The CSOs were not given training in CSO

¹⁶ See PBG Annual Report 2013 p.16-19 for the scores of 33 CSOs in four provinces between 2010 and 2013.

administration or financial management until the end of the project and, according to PBG senior personnel, only one of the 33 partners might qualify for managing cash grants.

From the data gathered through the KIIs and FGDs, the evaluation team found some evidence of increased citizen demand for accountable and transparent local government. For example, in ETDs supported by the project, citizens demanded information from public officials when they were withholding information on expenditures. This evidence is anecdotal, and may be exceptional. More importantly, the project established mechanisms for citizen and local government engagement concerning issues of mutual interest such as committees and DPAs. The concept of citizen demand implies a conflict with public officials, whereas the project encouraged joint collaboration around issues of common interest.

"To what extent is the theory of change, strengthened institutions and increased demand result in better service delivery, relevant?"

The evaluation found convincing, although preliminary, evidence that this theory related to better service delivery has merit. It may be more accurate to use the word "collaboration" as opposed to "demand," at least regarding the findings of this study. Demand as a stand-alone concept may not create change in this context. Change driven by citizen demand implies having elected representatives who depend on citizen confidence to be re-elected. ETD officials, however, are not elected; rather, they are appointed by superiors in their city, their province, or political leaders in Kinshasa, and their allegiance to those who appoint them takes precedence, a fact admitted to the team during interviews with officials. Nevertheless, and despite this principle of elections and democratic accountability, the study found evidence among some ETD leaders that the opinions of citizens also matter, ever increasingly, once mechanisms for public dialogue and consultation become habitual. Further evidence to support this theory of decentralization is the finding that some ETD leaders are making visible investments in city infrastructure using the increased (albeit still limited) tax revenues, and in some cases are reaching out to citizens for their feedback. Accountability should include the idea that leaders may choose to act according to principles of moral as well as political leadership.

This theory of change, however, targets a much wider meaning of "service delivery." Essential public services include health care, schools and in the DRC, its prime productive sector, agriculture. However, these "technical" sectors are de-concentrated, that is, managed and resourced from central government ministries, and currently facing many issues. ETDs do not control these essential services, although they may contribute from their own small resources if they choose (the study found examples of ETDs investing some of their own revenues in agriculture or health). Local governments may invest in facilities, sidewalks, fire trucks, etc., thereby having an impact on the provision of these types of infrastructure services. Some ETDs also invest in salaries or supplements for their own personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Replicate Successful Local Government Financial Decentralization Component.

USAID should continue to build on PBG's most successful component, support to ETD revenue generation with citizen participation. The component should be defined as support to revenue management (taxes and expenditures) for local government. The activity or project component should be replicated in additional ETDs and continued in the existing pilots.

This is important because, according to evidence found in this study, PBG has been successful (albeit through a pilot activity in one percent of ETDs) in demonstrating that participatory local government can

potentially work in the DRC. Results are preliminary, because the participatory planning-budgeting process has not even completed one full administrative cycle. Abandoning it now would leave unanswered questions about effective citizen participation in local government decentralization. The ETD pilots are incomplete, as no ETD has completed a full cycle of participatory budgeting and budget implementation monitoring (these activities began in earnest in 2012, however, participatory planning for Local Development Plans began in 2010). The evaluation also found some evidence of imitation by other ETDs, which is a potentially good indicator of sustainability and possibly an indicator of sincere interest among other ETD leaders.

Partnerships with CSOs should be expanded to include larger NGOs eligible for cash grants. CSOs played an important role in this experiment and should be further supported as a mechanism for citizen participation. Cash grants, while difficult to implement with small CSOs, offer more opportunities for local ownership. Citizens must participate through the full cycle of revenue management, including planning, budgeting, budget implementation and monitoring of expenditures and ETD investments of tax revenues. Civil society was an active participant in ETD tax collection, but unless taxes are seen by citizens to be well and transparently invested, citizen cooperation in paying taxes will evaporate and the civil society partners will lose credibility.

The evaluation recommends that, at present, support to central agencies related to decentralization should be solely to advance and facilitate ETD decentralization (COREF, CTAD, Public Service, National Assembly, etc.).

2. Incorporate Technical Sectors into Project using Citizen Participation Strategy and Existing Participatory Committees.

It may be possible to integrate the successful PBG process-- participatory committees and pressure from the grass-roots -- to work both locally and vertically in the technical sectors. The same principle used by the project, to work where there is already a political will to practice decentralization, may be tested again by supporting a combination of province-capital city-ETD and commune in one common framework. The purpose is to build will and consensus to reform from the bottom up, with a common focus by different actors on the same issues and objectives.

There are existing high-level and local dialogue committees which may be an entry point for programming. Some examples of such committees are:

- The quadripartite dialogue between governments, Parliamentarians (legislators, GOV controllers and representatives of the population), civil society and even private for joint action (DPA):
- Committees of parents meet with teachers' unions in Katanga
- Health sector national or provincial Steering Committee (CNP-SS & CPP-SS)
- Board of Directors (Conseils d'Administration) and technical Management Committee (Comités de Gestion) in the health zones (Zones de santé)

Whether this approach will broaden the reach of a future project to the technical sectors is not known. PBG was not successful providing training to sector ministries at the provincial level, due to weak political will and lack of interest. The technical sectors are in different stages of development; some are reportedly in partial disarray, having confused roles and low motivation due to stalled decentralization. Nevertheless, the same methods used successfully could be tested in sectors at the provincial level and the central government level, since the sectors are directed from the center. For example, in the health sector the vertical committee structures could be a platform for a project. The lowest-level committee in the *Zones de santé* are near, although not necessarily identical, to ETD constituencies.

3. **Donor Collaboration.** USAID should seek joint activities and agreements with donors having similar objectives.

This recommendation is relevant to both project level activities and dialogue at the central level with government on reforms. Donor harmonization is one of five recommendations of the Paris declaration on Aid Effectiveness.¹⁷ It is an important means to strengthen donor results. At the central level, joint collaboration between donors may advance decentralization both at the political level and regarding decentralization in the technical sectors, presently directed by central ministries. At the project level, PBG was actively engaged with UNDP and there may be means to increase that collaboration at technical and funding levels.

4. **Capacity building** without political will should be avoided. Political will should be a guiding factor used by USAID in the selection of partnerships and targets.

Technical inputs such as training were less effective with partners where political will was weak. In other words, technical assistance and other technical outputs and deliverables, such as roadmaps, etc., have little impact on political will. The USAID evaluation SOW has defined an effective three-dimensional indicator to assess political will.

The PBG project provided technical inputs to different institutions. Those that were successful, such as support to ETDs with citizen participation, were due to existing strong political will in ETD administrations, specifically related to tax revenues.

5. **Flexible Design-Targeted Scope.** Future projects in this sector should include, to the extent possible in the USAID programming context, a flexible design but tightly targeted scope. Results (outcomes) should be specifically defined, but partnerships and activities should be sufficiently open to allow an implementing partner to adjust its activities and partnerships depending on political will and potential for achieving results. The scope of this good governance support project was overly broad, a problem contributing to issues with partnerships and achievements in the first two years, so it lost the opportunity to fully test participatory local governance. Outputs and activities were spelled out in much detail from the beginning whereas, in hindsight, this project was testing a decentralized local government hypothesis and needed flexibility in how to accomplish its experiment.

Lessons learned

How does one reconcile the fact that in the beginning of PBG, USAID called for a highly-structured fixed or "blueprint" five-year work plan, yet later supported and facilitated significant re-alignments to project scope and institutional targets? It is difficult to reconcile these contradictions, since in both instances USAID is the same management agency with the same procedures and regulations. The explanation probably lies in change of field personnel. USAID field officers have some decentralized decision-making authority to optimize results and value for money. The evaluation makes a similar observation regarding ETD leadership. Leaders of ETDs who were more committed to citizen participation and accountability were also more effective; despite the fact that ETD leaders are appointed, some choose more than others to act as though they are elected, that is, they are more sensitive to views and participation of citizens in their communities.

¹⁷ PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, March 2005. OECD. HARMONISATION: "Donors' actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective."

ANNEX I: PROFILE OF DONOR SUPPORT TO DECENTRALIZATION

Donor assistance to decentralization in Congo began after the 2003-2006 transition. Donors focused initially on the central government and National Assembly (NA) providing funding and technical assistance supporting legislation. Donors later began supporting provinces but only a few worked at local levels (USAID through BRIDGE and PBG; UNDP; and the World Bank Institute). Donor dialogue with GDRC on governance, especially on decentralization, is generally described by interviewees as feeble at present, despite ongoing political issues stalling reforms. Following are profiles of main decentralization projects:

World Bank *Programme de Renforcement des Capacités de Gouvernance (PRCG):*

- Starting in 2008 (\$50m USD), renewed for four years (2013-2016 --\$67mUSD).
- Decentralization is a significant component
- Goal is to build public sector and financial management at the national and provincial levels; establish mechanisms for resource sharing between provinces and the central state¹⁸.
- Provinces targeted are Bandundu, Katanga and Sud Kivu, with Kasai Occidental added in second phase.
- Because of the lack of retrocession from the central government, the project targets boosting the local revenue capacity of provinces.
- PRCG 2013-2016: strengthening the capacities of provincial assemblies, governments, and revenue agencies, establishing provincial audit sections, getting steering committees for local public finance, and developing participatory budgeting with citizens.¹⁹

UNDP (2008-2012) *Programme d'Appui à la Décentralisation et au Développement Local (PADDL)* focusing on Kasai Oriental, North Kivu and Équateur, funded by DFID.

- \$29-million program for support of decentralization and local development,
- At central level, PADDL supported:
 - Adoption of laws and texts on decentralization,
 - Guides and pamphlets on planning and local development,
 - Partnering with Comité d'Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques (COREF) and CTAD.
 - Main focus was on direct capacity building for provincial administrations: 12 buildings housing provincial administrative services),
 - Five local development planning guides, two provincial and 20 local development plans;
 - Elaborated two provincial and five ETD budgets;
 - Developed a public finance management system in five ETDs;
 - Supported mechanism for account audits in five ETDs.²⁰
- Supported provincial assemblies and promoted civil society's involvement in the budget process.
- In 2012, DFID switched partners from the UNDP to the World Bank.

European Union *Projet d'Appui au Démarrage de la Décentralisation en RDC (PA2D)*

- Euro 15 million
- Support to decentralization
- Beginning in 2010, focus on Kinshasa and North Kivu.

¹⁸ World Bank 2013:vi, 22

¹⁹ World Bank 2012:20

²⁰<http://www.cd.undp.org/projet.aspx?titre=Appui%20%C3%A0%20la%20D%C3%A9centralisation%20et%20au%20D%C3%A9veloppement%20Local%20%28PADDL%29&projetid=2&theme=1>

European Union *Programme d'Appui aux Parlements (PAP)*

- Supports legislative institutions
- Euro 5 million
- PA2D aims to ease the passage towards decentralization by supporting the bodies in charge of steering decentralization reform at national level and strengthening the administrative capacities of the provinces of Kinshasa and North Kivu.
- Contributes to the consolidation of democracy in the DRC by strengthening the capacities of the National Assembly, the Senate and the two provincial assemblies in Kinshasa and North Kivu.

World Bank Institute Participatory Budgeting Project²¹

- Began in 2010 in Sud Kivu
- 8 ETDs pilot partners: communes de Kadutu, d'Ibanda, Bagira, chefferies Ngweshe, Wamuzimu, Kabare, Luhwinja and Bafuliro.
- Provincial budget committee began in May 2011
- Training in local government public finance
- Project indicator: increase of ETD tax revenues
- Issue noted: lack of citizen oversight of public investments

DFID Tuungane Community Development Project (90 m pounds)

- Project was originally a community development focus, having no direct links to ETD administrations
- A formal evaluation in 2012 (led by Columbia University) did not find any significant measurable results
- The project began including ETD administrations following the evaluation

²¹ "Rapport d'évaluation du BP dans les communes de Kadutu, d'Ibanda et Bagira" Giovanni Allegreti, June 2012

ANNEX II: PBG PARTNER AND ACTIVITY PROFILES

Table 5: PBG Partner Beneficiaries Profile

Category	Organizations	Nature of Support
National Institutional Partner for Decentralization	CTAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Decentralization strategy and Roadmap (Transfert de competence) ▪ Support to CTAD studies on ETD and provincial admin. ▪ 2010: study on options for implementing <i>Péréquation</i> ▪ Printing documents ▪ Study tour to Mali ▪ Short-term consultants
Implementing partners/ sub-contractors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CENADEP (IRI and IR3 training CSOs 2009-ongoing) ▪ RTI (IR3 finance and admin training) ▪ Social Impact (IRI CSO training and studies, 2009-2012) ▪ Search for Common Ground (Radio based gender dialogue 2009-2013) ▪ CERACOP (CSO training 2009-2012) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All sub-contractors involved in delivery of activities and studies. ▪ Only CENADEP remaining in 2014 ▪ Main factor for disconnection were costs
CSO Partners/ beneficiaries	<p>Bandundu</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collectif Des Femmes Rurales Pour Le Développement (Coferd) ▪ Réseau De L'éducation Civique Au Congo (Recic) ▪ Telema Ya Sala-Survie (Teyesa Survie) ▪ Association Pour La Promotion De L'agriculture Au Congo (Assopac) ▪ Promotion De Droit De Sante De L'enfant Et De La Femme (Prosadef) <p>Katanga</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bureau Diocésain De Développement (BDD) ▪ Association Nationale Des Parents D'élèves Du Congo (Anapeco) ▪ Le Miroir Du Peuple ▪ Société Civile Du Katanga (Socikat) ▪ Commission Justice Et Paix(CJP) <p>Sud Kivu</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Centre D'étude De Documentation Et Animation Civique (Cedac), ▪ Association Des Femmes Juristes Congolaises (Afejuco) ▪ Centre Olame. ▪ Réseau D'innovation Organisationnelle (Rio) ▪ Femmes Des Medias Du Sud-Kivu(AFEM) <p>Maniema</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Association pour la promotion et défense des enfants et des femmes (APRODEF) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Advocacy training and TA ▪ Advocacy Capacity Assessment Tool ▪ in-kind grants for advocacy and other activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 52 grants, of which 7 "direct assistance" to ETD administrations and 45 to CSOs ○ 800,000 committed, if which 250,000 to ETDs ○ No cash grants ▪ Support for public dialogues (DPA) ▪ Logistic and technical support for surveys and studies on local taxes, citizen needs assessments for ETD Action planning, survey of citizens' perceptions on freedom of expression, gender... ▪ CSO capacity assessments (7 dimensions assessed on 3 occasions, showing increased capacity of CSO partners ▪ CSO evaluation of public services (2010-2012-2014) <p>GRANT Profiles:</p>

Category	Organizations	Nature of Support
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Action des volontaires pour la promotion de l'environnement au Maniema (AVEMA) ▪ Collectif des organisations des jeunes du Congo Kinshasa (COJESKI) ▪ Umoja Wa Mama Wa Maendeleo (UMAMA) ▪ Haki Za Binadamu (HBM) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Advocacy in: budget transparency, budget line inclusions, tax laws, family planning, maternal health, garbage collection, women in public admin, participatory budgeting, local taxation-related advocacy, public information access ▪ Other grants include: agricultural materials to small farmers, budget oversight, anti-corruption (7 grants), parking lot, facilities rehabilitation, tax data base
National Assembly and four provincial assemblies	<p>National Assembly Provincial Assembly of Katanga Provincial Assembly of Sud Kivu Provincial Assembly of Bandundu Provincial Assembly of Maniema</p> <p>Two Committees (ECOFIN and PAJ) Individual MPs Parliamentary staff</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Law reform in support of decentralization ▪ Provincial law reforms (Edicts) in support of advocacy campaigns ▪ Support to parliamentary administration and networking ▪ Training of MPs ▪ IT material and computer systems support to NA ▪ RBM and strategic planning workshops ▪ Support for conference of Congolese Network of Parliamentary Personnel (RCPP) ▪ MP self-assessment surveys ▪ gouvernancepoustous.cd web site ▪ Matrix of Legislative Processes and Capacities (assessment tool)
ETD Partners/beneficiaries	<p>Katanga</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Kolwezi ▪ Likasi ▪ Katuba (Lubumbashi city) <p>Bandundu</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lukolela (Kikwit) ▪ Mayoyo (Bandundu city) ▪ Bukangalonzo (Kenge) <p>Sud Kivu</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bukavu ▪ Kadutu (Bukavu city) ▪ Chiefdom Ngweshe / Walungu <p>Maniema</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bangengele ▪ Alunguli ▪ Wakabango II 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Training in administration, finance, tax collection and participatory planning and budgeting ▪ Support to tax payer data base in Bukavu and Alenguli ▪ Support for 11 feasibility and 2 RFPs for PPP projects in Katanga ▪ 13 activities supported ETDs, including 7 "direct assistance" non-cash grants, and 6 which were delivered via CSO grants; each ETD had one, except Lukolela having 2 ▪ Action Plans formulated and developed (3 generations)

Category	Organizations	Nature of Support
Provincial Ministry of education, health, agriculture (IR3)	Katanga <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Division du budget ▪ Division des finances ▪ Division de la planification Maniema <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Division du budget ▪ Division des finances ▪ Division de la planification Bandundu <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Division du budget ▪ Division des finances ▪ Division de la planification Sud Kivu <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Division du budget ▪ Division des finances ▪ Division de la planification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ETD Budget Review Index (assessment tool) ▪ Training in planning, budgeting, budget monitoring and oversight, public investment (2010-2011) ▪ Support discontinued after 2011
Provincial Network of women leaders in public sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Katanga ▪ Maniema ▪ Sud Kivu ▪ Bandundu ▪ Kinshasa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Roundtables (2012-2013)
Provincial budgeting units		
Project and partner Web sites		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ www.governanceportous.cd (for parliamentary committees via CENADEP to May 2014) ▪ www.decentralization.cd (via CTAD 10-March 2011 to 9-April 2012)
Radio Stations	INTERNEWS, partnerships with community radio stations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “A Nous la Parole” bi-monthly radio and TV shows (“Circle des femmes”)
Women's groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collectif des femmes rurales pour le développement. COFERD (G-BAN-007) ▪ Alliance féminine pour le développement (ALFED) G-MAN-002 ▪ Femmes Des Medias Du Sud-Kivu (AFEM) ▪ Association Des Femmes Juristes Congolaises (Afejuco) ▪ Promotion De Droit De Sante De L'enfant Et De La Femme (Prosadef) ▪ Association pour la promotion et défense des enfants et des femmes (Maniema) <p>In Kind Grants:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PLAIDOYER POUR 'INSTITUTIONALISATION DES MUTUELLES DE SECURITE SOCIALE POUR LES VEUVES, ORPHELINS ET PERSONNES DE 3ème AGE (KAT 034) ▪ Projet de plaidoyer pour l'inscription d'une ligne budgétaire allouée à la santé maternelle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “A Nous la Parole” bi-monthly radio shows ▪ Round table for women in the public service to assist them in becoming more effective advocates of equal treatment in the face of gross gender imbalances in the Public Service especially at a senior level (2010) ▪ advocacy for an increase of women in public life ▪ network of women leaders within the public sector to support the validation of the network status and an action plan ▪ self-evaluation Circle of Women program

Category	Organizations	Nature of Support
	dans le budget provincial du sud Kivu, exercice 2014. SUK 028	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ establishment of the network of women leaders in the public sector

Table 6: Training Workshop Modules

Training Module	Targets	Messages
Use of information for citizen oversight of government actions	Advocacy CSOs and NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Conducting legislative sight visits ▪ Holding meetings with government
Advocacy capacity building	30 CSOs selected from CSO applicants in 4 provinces and 12 ETDs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Empower CSOs to participate using a win-win strategy ▪ Use of information research and data as basis for advocacy ▪ Use of communication tools,
Use of web sites and internet	Parliamentary staff ETD administrators Partner CSOs in program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Internet search techniques
Budget process and analysis	Parliamentary MPs ETD administrators Partner CSOs in program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Information and skills on national and provincial budget preparation process ▪ Information and skills on ETD budgeting process ▪ Principles and methods for citizen inclusion ▪ Establishment of committees and related procedures for citizen inclusion ▪ Legal framework ▪ steps in budget process ▪ strategic intervention roles for CSOs ▪ gender budgeting methods
Public servant awareness raising on participation and client-centered public services		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ How to better communicate with constituents and clients ▪ The added value of citizen participation
Budget analysis for parliamentarians	National and 4 provincial parliaments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ as above
Production of parliamentary minutes and documents	Parliamentary staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ How to prepare Hansard (minutes of sitting House) ▪ Other parliamentary documents
Action Plans	ETD public servants Partner CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Five year Plans for ETDs ▪ Follow up preparation of investment projects (budgets, staffing, schedules...) ▪ Preparing advance analysis and data for investment feasibility study ▪ Surveying the citizens for needs assessments
Planning and administrative management Provinces	Provincial ministries of health, education and agriculture in Katanga and Bandundu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ How to diagnose and analyze in technical sectors
Financial management Provinces	Provincial ministries of budget in 4 provinces Provincial ministries of health, education and agriculture in 4 provinces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Using results based management concepts ▪ Preparation, monitoring and budget control
Financial management and	ETD accountants, tax	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ transparent procurement

Training Module	Targets	Messages
monitoring for ETDs	collectors, and administrators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ how to maximize tax revenues ▪ supervision and reporting methods ▪ data collection methods ▪ use of data to monitor and rectify ▪ transparent reporting
Action Planning for ETDs	12 ETDs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ How to prioritize projects ▪ developing objectives ▪ sustainability tactics ▪ preparing for PBG feasibility studies

ANNEX III: DATA ANALYSIS GRID BY EVALUATION QUESTION

Table 7: Analysis Grid

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>Institutional Capacity</p> <p>I.1 To what extent are targeted GDRC institutions better resourced as a result of PBG? To what extent are changes in revenues due to exogenous factors, such as growth in the mining sector?</p> <p>Better Resourced: Project reports show a very significant trend of increased project-ETD own-sourced taxation revenues between 2009 and 2013. Eight of the 12 ETDs have increased their revenues from taxes --up from between 55% to 514% in one ETD (Banghageli). Four ETDs had lower revenues or no change. The largest dollar increase, the city of Kolwezi, increased its revenues from \$700,000 in 2009 to \$2.5 million in 2013, a growth of 240%; the city reported to the consultants they expected nearly \$5 million revenues in 2014.</p> <p>Retrocession. These tax revenues do not include taxes raised by the ETDs on behalf of provinces and central government, nor revenues obtained through <i>retrocession</i> (tax revenues from central government returned to provinces and distributed by provinces to ETDs). Between 2010 and 2013, <i>retrocession</i> to provinces averaged between 5.6% and 6.3% of national revenues. When salaries of decentralized personnel and investments are included, <i>retrocession</i> was 28.8% in 2013.</p> <p>Strengthened Human Resources: HR was strengthened. For ETDs, the project focused comprehensively on repeated training and recurrent technical assistance (TA) support for ETD staff in areas of: participatory five-year action planning, annual participatory budgeting, budget process and analysis, use of web sites, financial management and monitoring. Recurrent short-term on-the-job TA was provided to further strengthen the same targeted training and skills. Staff turnover in ETDs is relatively light. However, most human resources and leadership working for EDTs are, along with all provincial and technical employees (education, health, agriculture) employed by central government, about 330,000 persons in the provinces.</p> <p>Minimal Materials and Technology: With a few exceptions, (such as Bukavu tax related activities), the project did not support material, equipment or systems for ETDs.</p> <p>Evidence of Project Contribution to Increased Tax Resources: The project provided support to revenue generation through training and TA to ETDs; and through 15 CSO grants which targeted tax related and budget-related reforms (the team met some recipients of these grants). For example: grants targeting reduction of illegal taxes and administrative corruption, grants to make information public on what are legal taxes, or grants promoting the payment of taxes: (Grant # KAT-058; KAT-20; KAT-015; KAT-05; BAN-037; BAN-036; BAN-031; BAN-019; MAN-004, MAN-017; SK-044)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tax payers' surveys through CSOs took place in Katuba, Likasi, and Kolwezi; but not in Ngweshe, Lukolela, and Kadutu. <p>Evidence of Skills Developed. From KII interviews, most ETD personnel spoke very positively of the training and TA received from PBG. The mayor of Kolwezi --known as one of the most successful local government leaders --</p>	<p>Replicate Successful Local Government Financial Decentralization Component</p> <p>Suggested Performance Indicators for ETD Performance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ tax revenues growth ▪ % of annual budget for investments disbursed ▪ Annual investment plans ▪ Citizen inclusion in planning, budget, and oversight of spending ▪ Gender programming included in budget (30%) and oversight of implementation ▪ Annual report on expenditures posted in public place ▪ Posting of costs and fees of public services

²² Unless otherwise referenced, all findings and evidence are taken from: analysis of field notes of the evaluators recorded during interviews (KII), or focus groups discussions (FGD); or from PBG project reports

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>acknowledged that project workshops and networking funded by PBG were instrumental in influencing her effective city management and leadership style.</p> <p>Mining Sector not significant factor: Although mining sector growth is recent and of considerable scope ²³ -- for example copper production doubled in three years --the mining sector does not contribute much to ETD revenues. It has existed for many years, but revenue increases in the Katanga ETDs is very recent. Most taxes in mining are national or exempted for new investors. The only ETD-level tax revenues from mining come from the "artisanal" mining. Mining industry provides revenues indirectly through small business and merchant service providers who pay local taxes on some revenues generated from clients in mining sector.</p> <p>Limitation: All provincial administrations --ETD levels not known --have increased their revenues from taxes starting in 2009, when provincial taxation departments began to open. (For example, Direction des Recettes du Katanga (DRKat); the city of Bukavu now has a taxation unit as well) Revenues rose by 2,041% in Bas-Congo, 769% in Orientale, 555% in Bandundu, 304% in Katanga, 195% in Kasai Oriental, 91% in Kinshasa, 74% in Kasai Occidental and 64% in Sud Kivu. Over the same period, national government revenue grew by 441%.²⁴</p>	
<p>1.2 Which revenue collection interventions (i.e. working with taxation and revenue collection departments, partnership with CSOs in revenue collection, etc.) were most effective – in terms of increases in revenues, transparency, and citizen trust in public financial management and should be expanded? To what extent is the success of a given intervention dependent on the degree to which citizens or CSOs were included in the process?</p>	
<p>Most Effective Interventions: Those that increase Citizen Trust</p> <p>There is a synergy between tax revenues and citizens trust. Citizen trust is built by visible evidence of honest, effective ETD management and investment of revenues. Some of the interventions were without and some were with citizen involvement.</p> <p>Methods and Procedures Implemented by ETDs with PBG Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improving the administration of formal confidence-building tax receipts, centralized and printed (Bukavu, Bandundu, Kolwezi) ▪ Single tax collection window for receipt of all city taxes (Bukavu and Kolwezi) ▪ Local bank has window and teller in City Hall to receive funds (Kolwezi) ▪ Visible investments of taxes by local government (fire trucks, sidewalks, garbage trucks in Bukavu); public list of all investment projects (Kolwezi) ▪ A municipal tax office established (Cellule de mobilisation des recettes, Bukavu 2014) <p>Activities Led by CSOs with ETDs Collaboration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Investigating and mapping public tax categories (several locations including Likasi--see photograph of placard next to market) ▪ CSOs who investigate and publicize legal and illegal taxes, promote payment of taxes by citizens, and discourage illegal taxes by informing ETD authorities 	<p>Incorporate Technical Sectors into Project using Citizen Participation Strategy and existing committees.</p>

²³ Selon l'institut d'études géologiques du gouvernement américain (USGS), la RDC est le premier producteur de cobalt, un métal particulièrement recherché dans les industries de pointe comme l'aérospatiale, dont il dispose aussi des plus importantes réserves. De même source, le Congo était en 2013 le deuxième producteur mondial de diamants, le troisième de tantale, et se classait dans les dix premiers pour le cuivre et l'étain. (Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada)

²⁴ Unpublished Paper: "Donors, Decentralization and the Consequences of Partial Reform in the DR Congo" Pierre Englebert, Pomona College, Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, University of Kinshasa. February 2014

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>Citizen Involvement: Visible citizen involvement is important for increasing trust, in turn resulting in increased tax revenues. Citizen involvement is essential to ensure community needs are prioritized in the expenditure of taxes. Some examples of project activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Citizen membership in Action Planning and budget monitoring committees ▪ DPA public meetings by officials held with citizens: In Lukulela, mayor has monthly public meetings presenting revenues and expenditures ▪ Citizen consultation committees, which ETDs may use to consult on issues on ad hoc basis <p>Limitations: Citizens have expectations that investments will reflect needs defined based on participatory action planning and budgets. Priority budget items however may not receive planned investments as ETDs respond to political factors. ETD leadership are appointed by political superiors.</p> <p>PI# 1.8 --See Question #2.1</p>	
<p>1.3 What has enabled local public-private partnerships to succeed in one assisted ETD and what were the challenges? What factors might prevent replicating this success elsewhere?</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Concept of accessing private sector revenues for public infrastructure investments very good ▪ Role of USAID very important (honest broker, technical support to contracting process) ▪ Banking sector reform needed, for investment financing and credits ▪ Too early to assess results: Only two PPP projects signed and neither appears near completion at this time; one has been on hold for 2 years (financing issues and suggestions of political interference in one project) ▪ Contract supervision and monitoring during and after project closes may be issue 	
<p>1.4 To what extent have PBG activities contributed to improvements in transparency, openness to citizen participation, and accountability of GDRC institutions?</p>	
<p>Citizen Participation. Project encouraged CSO and citizen participation from outset. Initially activities for civil society were separate from ETD and parliamentary workshops. The messages were the same from the start, that working together was a "win-win" for all stakeholders. Same message was conveyed in radio broadcasts. By 2012, many activities combined CSOs and government in the same events.</p> <p>Joint Activities. Many interviewees and focus groups commented that this joint presence allowed for direct exchanges and networks created, and recognition by participants that interests were similar. All of the advocacy grants to CSOs required participation of public officials. In the case of policy, law reforms (Edicts at provincial level) required full collaboration from a member of parliament as champion of proposed law. About 47 law reform projects were funded, of which 16 were eventually adopted in parliament. Activities conducted with ETDs which required active collaboration from local government include participatory planning and budgeting, citizen oversight committees,</p> <p>Transparency. Training and grants that contributed to transparency include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ training in participatory planning and budgeting (Kolwezi has budget on web site) ▪ tax category clarification (nomenclature) grants, to reduce illegal taxes ▪ anti-corruption activities regarding police and local administration grants, ▪ Repeated messages on transparency in project training events <p>Accountability. Activities which contribute to accountability include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Citizen-inclusion in budget and expenditure monitoring committees ▪ DPA. Public dialogues are used as venue to inform citizens about concepts 	<p>Capacity building without political will should be avoided. Political Will should be a guiding factor used by USAID in the selection of partnerships and targets.</p> <p>The evaluation recommends that at present support to central agencies related to decentralization should be solely to advance and facilitate ETD decentralization (COREF, CTAD, Public Service, National Assembly, etc.).</p>

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>of accountability of public officials to citizens, and to ask questions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Team observed Lucolela Bourgimeister holding public meeting to inform on expenditures and revenues ▪ Local elections are essential for accountability to take hold. Officials are appointed and owe favors to those who appointed them <p>Evidence of Changed Mentality?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There is some evidence of changing mentality of citizens -- from passive to more demanding: In Ngweshe, the head of Civil society came into conflict with the Chief because he insisted on having expenditures made public ▪ The fact that many PBG activities are held jointly between citizens and government or MPs is evidence of changed mentality ▪ In Bukavu, a CSO organized an event in which governor, mayor, and heads of communes were invited to participate with citizens -- and event took place. ▪ Some anecdotal evidence that CSO campaign to reduce police corruption has reduced the number of times cars are stopped for bribes in Bukavu <p>Limitation. The major limitation in this finding is that the entire process is too recent. Citizen participation has been implemented only over the past two years (for example, a participatory budget committee was formed in Likasi in February 2014). For this model to be fully tested there should be several budget cycles completed, whereas no one complete cycle has been accomplished in any ETD (i.e., participatory planning, budgeting, budget implementation and implementation monitoring).</p> <p>There is some evidence of some local taxes still being collected by unregistered tax collectors, which led the evaluation. In Bukango lonzo, the Burgomeister provides transparent expenditure data in public meetings -- but only provides generalities, not financial numbers.</p>	
<p>1.5 What gains have been made in terms of the legislative capacity (to draft and pass laws, interact with constituents, and capacity of administrative staff to support lawmakers) of provincial parliaments?</p>	
<p>The PBG first work plan listed this objective for the parliament component (IR2):</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Improve the capacities of national and provincial legislative bodies in their essential missions: representing, legislating and controlling the government and the budget process and, reinforcing the ability of local governments to carry out decentralization.</i></p> <p>The project delivered many activities (mainly to provincial assemblies) that would in theory strengthen capacity in all four functions of representation, oversight, law-making and parliamentary administration. Regarding decentralization, at least three essential laws relating to decentralization have not been presented or adopted as of 2014:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Caisse Nationale de Péréquation (CP) Law that will organize its structure, role, and responsibility; ▪ The Territorial Power Law that is to re-organize the DRC Provinces into 26 Decentralized Territorial Units; ▪ The Civil Service Devolution Law that will organize state, provincial and local public services and clarify their specific role and responsibility <p>Delays in passage of laws are unrelated to technical reasons or technical capacity of parliament, rather to lack of political will, over which the project had</p>	<p>The evaluation recommends that at present support to central agencies should be solely to advance and facilitate ETD decentralization (COREF, CTAD, Public Service, National Assembly, etc.).</p>

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>no control.</p> <p>Rating survey respondents tended to rate effectiveness of parliaments as less effective than five years ago. The four parliament questions were rated by the 473 respondents as lower than most other questions in the survey.</p> <p>Under the component IRI, CSOs at the ETD level received in-kind grants to advocate for policy reforms, (drafting edicts), in which collaboration with provincial MPs was essential. Several grants were related to corruption, some of which included edicts. No Edicts supported at the provincial level were related to decentralization (reforms are controlled from the center). No direct project activities combining IR2 and IR3 (ETD administration) were observed.</p> <p>PBG conducted a parliamentary assessment in 2010 (Matrix of Legislative Process and Capabilities), which four provincial and the National Assembly, which included 7 administrative capacity dimensions. Another 8 dimensions assessed MP and committee capacities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Functioning of the Assembly ▪ Assembly-Committee Relations ▪ Relations with the Government ▪ Relations with the Officers ▪ Relations with the Administration ▪ Relations with the Public ▪ Relations with the Media ▪ Relations with Other Entities <p>The first survey found that Maniema was the most developed of the five, and that Bandundu Committees were the more effective. Working relations with ETDs was the least developed overall. Some the findings of the 2010 assessment were used to define assembly training needs. A follow up assessment planned for 2012 was partly completed in the provinces but PBG was unable to gather data from the National Assembly.</p> <p>In 2010, workshops were held for 644 MPs (majority were provincial). Due to elections approaching in 2012, from 2011 there was a significant reduction in interest or demand from NA MPs and committees. Support for parliamentary administration continued at the national level, while in provincial assemblies both MPs and administration received continuing support. As reported by KII respondents and PBG staff, the project was less welcome to MPs and provincial <i>députés</i> because USAID per diems and sitting allowances were less attractive than those from UNDP and EU.</p> <p>The number of support activities with NA was considerably less than with provincial assemblies. In 4 1/2 years, 18 activities took place --not counting public audiences (DPA) in provinces where NA MPs also participated). In the same period to December 2013, there were about 300 activities for four provincial assemblies.</p> <p>Support to administration in the NA was welcomed, including: IT and computer systems support (the project in this case did provide equipment), staff training, results-based management training and support to networking for the conference of Congolese Network of Parliamentary Personnel (RCPP).</p>	

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations																					
<p>Support was provided to two parliamentary committees of the NA; however, when interviewed during the study, two members of ECOFIN (the Economic and Finance Committee in the National Assembly) did not recall any PBG support (excepting an assessment survey in 2012). Project records show technical assistance was provided for important VAT legislation in 2012 and for Finance reform law in September 2010. ECOFIN members were aware of seven donors: UNDP, World Bank, NDI, and European Union via PAG project, Open Society, Canada, and International Monetary Fund. USAID value-added is questioned. The other committee, PAJ, did not respond to a request for a meeting. The likely reason is that PAJ does recall USAID: about six months ago, the president of PAJ was exposed by the project for attempting to invoice the project for a workshop for which the NA had already paid.</p> <p>Other support to NA include a study tour to Mali regarding financial decentralization in August 2010, MP training in June and November 2012, technical assistance related to decentralization in July 2012, TA support for committees in December 2012 and November 2013, a women's roundtable in February 2013, support for reform of Standing Orders (regulations) in February 2012.</p> <p>Project reports show that 16 oversight actions were taken by NA during this period, but it is not known what role the project played in these actions, or what results they had. Performance Indicator PI # 2.1 shows that 817 MPs and staff participated in training. In the four provincial assemblies, 4,800 MPs and staff participated in training.</p>																						
<p>Table 8: Number of Laws/Edicts Drafted and Approved</p>																						
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="191 1050 625 1113">Parliament Supported</th> <th data-bbox="625 1050 852 1113">Edicts/Laws Drafted</th> <th data-bbox="852 1050 1084 1113">Approved</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="191 1113 625 1144">Bandundu</td> <td data-bbox="625 1113 852 1144">13</td> <td data-bbox="852 1113 1084 1144">7</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="191 1144 625 1176">Sud Kivu</td> <td data-bbox="625 1144 852 1176">15</td> <td data-bbox="852 1144 1084 1176">5</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="191 1176 625 1207">Katanga</td> <td data-bbox="625 1176 852 1207">9</td> <td data-bbox="852 1176 1084 1207">3</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="191 1207 625 1239">Maniema</td> <td data-bbox="625 1207 852 1239">10</td> <td data-bbox="852 1207 1084 1239">4</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="191 1239 625 1270">TOTAL Provinces</td> <td data-bbox="625 1239 852 1270">47</td> <td data-bbox="852 1239 1084 1270">19</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="191 1270 625 1312">National Assembly</td> <td data-bbox="625 1270 852 1312">15</td> <td data-bbox="852 1270 1084 1312">9</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Parliament Supported	Edicts/Laws Drafted	Approved	Bandundu	13	7	Sud Kivu	15	5	Katanga	9	3	Maniema	10	4	TOTAL Provinces	47	19	National Assembly	15	9
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<p>In the National Assembly 4 of 15 draft laws were related to decentralization (3 were adopted). Edicts or laws parliaments does not necessarily translate into implementation of new policies. The evaluation team observed some implemented reforms. Edicts, primarily initiated by CSOs, require collaboration with a MP who is champion of the proposed law. Proposals included a range of themes: agricultural budgets, protection of vulnerable persons or environment, health or education; the most common were: provincial budgeting (8), child protection (5), tax-related reforms (4) and agricultural budget (3).</p>																						
<p>Project-Supported Activities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Law reform in support of decentralization Provincial law reforms (Edicts) in support of advocacy campaigns Support to parliamentary administration and networking Training of MPs IT material and computer systems support to NA RBM and strategic planning workshops Support for conference of Congolese Network of Parliamentary Personnel (RCPP) 																						

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
MP self-assessment surveys	
Citizen Demand	
2.1 To what extent have PBG interventions implemented to encourage citizens' participation resulted in increased demand for accountability by citizens?	
<p>In general, the trend towards greater demand by DRC citizens for their civic and democratic rights continues to move forward from its low during the time of Mobutu, when silence was the way of survival -- when security police could arrest a person for saying "Mobutu" aloud.</p> <p>"Citizen" in this project context means residents of municipal and sub-municipal levels (<i>chefferies</i>). The project offered specific tools and mechanisms to facilitate citizen demand for accountability: according to the 2013 PBG Annual Report the number of IRI demand events in years 1-4 were 480 occasions (Performance Indicator (PI #1.2).</p> <p>The prime categories of mechanisms are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DPAs. <i>Audiences publiques</i> (public audiences) are events allowing residents and public officials to dialogue on policy, issues, or a municipality's revenues and expenses. (The event name was later changed to <i>dialogues pour l'action</i> or DPA) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ PI#1.4 --number of persons attending public audiences: 7691 persons (2013 Annual Report) ▪ Citizen Committees. Every project site set up a number of committees with citizens either participating or leading. They include consultative committees (citizen-led for dialogue or oversight of ETDs); Action Planning Committees (citizen/CSO membership in development of annual or 5-year local investment plans inclusive of community needs assessments); Participatory Budgeting Committee (ETD committee led by head of budget) <p>Evidence. Broadly, experts place the level of citizen demand in DRC as relatively modest, compared to African countries where decentralization is more advanced. Some evidence of project contributing to increased demand:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ngweshe (<i>chefferie</i> in Sud Kivu): This traditional rural location has been led by the same chief for 71 years! The chief is well-connected to high levels of political power, yet the leader of civil society (knowing well the implications) demanded the village make public its expenditures. He was declared <i>persona non grata</i>. ▪ Lukolela (Kikwit in Bandundu province). Market sellers complained to a local whistleblower NGO (CLAT) about illegal taxes. CLAT reported to the ETD and some action was taken. The mayor of Lukolea does monthly public presentations of city revenues and expenditures. <p>As with other findings relating to project methods, there is a trend towards ideas such as this catching and being imitated in other locations and setting. A habit of citizens speaking out is developing.</p> <p>Limitations. The committee mechanisms alone do not necessarily lead to increased demand:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In Mayoyo (commune in Bandundu city), the evaluation team participated in a Consultative Committee involving commune workers and the <i>Burgomeister</i>. The <i>Burgomeister</i> left, "to allow participants to express themselves freely." However, few opinions were expressed, except by the president of the committee. Team was later told by a member of the committee that the committee president was appointed by the <i>Burgomeister</i> and would report back what was said. 	<p>Partnerships with CSOs should be expanded to include larger NGOs eligible for cash grants.</p>

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>Performance Indicator PI#1.8 "% of people who believe they have opportunities to express their opinions"</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence from the 2014 survey of citizens opinions funded by PBG (6400 respondents from 4 project ETDs in 4 provinces) is mixed. Some ETDs show an increase in % of persons who believe they have opportunities to express their opinions, while others show a decrease). ▪ More people believe they can express themselves than do not believe. ▪ The average % of respondents who say "yes" remained the same between 2010 and 2014 surveys; 64% in both survey years. <p>Change of this magnitude will take time.</p>	
<p>2.2 How have changes in citizen demand for accountability affected government behavior, if at all?</p>	
<p>Evidence of Changed behavior of Public Officials</p> <p>The study found evidence of changed behaviors. Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Citizen participation in budget process and transparency of government finances are recent practices, yet there are signs of change;</i> ▪ <i>Burgomeister of Lukolela conducts monthly meetings to announce ETD revenues and expenditures, and also speaks on radio</i> ▪ <i>Mayor of Likasi participates with the Consultative Committee on visits to communities; more DPAs are taking place</i> ▪ <i>Province of Bandundu has adopted a law that specifies how funds are disbursed to ETDs</i> ▪ <i>In Bukavu and especially in Kolwezi, information on public budgets and expenditures is increasingly available; in Kolwezi the budget can be accessed from city web site (first of this trend in ETDs)</i> ▪ <i>Indications that other civic leaders are copying these practices</i> <p>Limitation. PBG began participatory budget workshops in 2012 --the process is recent. Also, authorities are appointed by a political process and are ultimately accountable to those who appointed them. Some freely admit this.</p> <p>Performance Indicator 1.4 "Number of citizens attending public audiences"</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 7900 persons <p>1.8 Percent of people surveyed in select provinces who believe they have opportunities to express their opinions. The average % of respondents who say "yes" remained the same between 2010 and 2014 surveys; 64% in both survey years.</p>	
<p>Service Delivery of GDRC Institutions</p>	
<p>3.1 How, and in which sectors (including, but not limited to, health, education, agriculture, and public infrastructure), has government service delivery changed in terms of funding, reach, and quality</p>	
<p>PBG activities for the four sectors were delivered through 13 grants/direct assistance; and in one instance through a full-time technical advisor in Ministry of Education, Katanga province.</p> <p>Education. Specific project contributions to improve quality of infrastructure or management in education sector are (grant/direct assistance identification in parenthesis):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 6 school classrooms built in Sud Kivu (SUK-003); ▪ 3 school classrooms rebuilt in Sud Kivu (SUK-002) ▪ 6 classrooms built in Alunguli Maniema (DA-MAN-002); ▪ Participatory analysis of schools in Katanga (teachers and students, analysis of salaries, student enrolment, strategic planning, etc.) ▪ Technical advice to the Ministry of Education in Katanga which included sector analysis and documentation (different categories of public, private and church-based education system), budgeting and education financing, 	<p>Incorporate Technical Sectors into Project using Citizen Participation Strategy and Existing Participatory Committees.</p>

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>corruption issues, such as "ghost" schools, training curricula; strategic planning (facilitating dialogue among stakeholders), and funding an association of education stakeholders.</p> <p>Agriculture. Grant activities include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A kit of agricultural materials in conjunction with training for small farmers in Likasi and Kolwezi, with collaboration between ETD and CSO umbrella partnership (KAT-021, KAT-022) ▪ Campaign for prioritization in provincial budget of Katanga (KAT-038) ▪ Campaign for clarification of agricultural taxes in Likasi (KAT-062) ▪ Agricultural budget implementation monitoring in Maniema (MAN-021) ▪ Support for agricultural associations in Maniema (MAN-005) ▪ Participatory development of agriculture log frame and mapping in Bandundu <p>Health. Grant activities include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Health budget implementation monitoring in relation to diabetes in Sud Kivu (SUK-010) ▪ Campaign for maternal health component in Sud Kivu budget (SUK-028) 	
Implementation and Approach	
4.1 Which approaches to harnessing political will for accountable governance by government and /or citizens were successful and why?	
<p><i>NOTE from SOW: Political will refers to the extent to which GDRC interlocutors are willing to a) participate in program activities and more importantly; b) apply the newly acquired skills or techniques for the intended purpose; and c) allocate GDRC resources towards matching or replicating project inputs.</i></p> <p>Political will is significantly different when comparing central government and provincial-ETD levels.</p> <p>Central. Participation in project activities by MPs, parliamentary administrators and CTAD has been relatively positive. Main partner of the project was <i>Cellule Technique d'Appui à la Décentralisation (CTAD)</i>, whose mandate is support to implementation of decentralization. Project reports have thoroughly documented the issues relating the transfer of CTAD from the Ministry of Decentralization to Ministry of The Interior, whose mandate is primarily security. At the technical level PBG supported CTAD for a number of steps to advance decentralization, including meetings, conferences, support to legal reform, decentralization strategy and a decentralization roadmap (the latter reportedly not an active topic within GDRC).</p> <p>As discussed in the body of this report, decentralization is a very political act, since, by definition, it means transferring decision making power to ever lower levels of government; while on the other hand, and the established powers rarely want to give up powers. At central level, efforts have been technical -- support to dialogue, strategic planning, workshops for CTAD (8), law-drafting and other workshops for parliament, IT support for National Assembly administration, support to drafting of the various laws and regulations needed for the decentralization platform. Decentralization, however, is estimated after 8 years to be approximately 10-40% achieved, due at least in part to lack of political will. Issues however are very complex, and many technical aspects remain-- such as financial reforms under World Bank lead.</p> <p>Provincial and ETD Political Will.</p>	<p>Capacity building without political will should be avoided.</p> <p>Political Will should be a guiding factor used by USAID in the selection of partnerships and targets.</p>

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>The story at provincial and ETD levels is the reverse. In terms of the three criteria for political will defined in the NOTE:</p> <p>a) Participating in Project. Yes, participation by political leaders in the many project events is high and enthusiastic. Provincial MPs and assembly administrators, Mayors, Burgomeisters, <i>and public servants responsible for budget and finance interviewed reported they were very positive about skills acquired and other benefits from the project.</i></p> <p>b) Applying Skills Acquired. Yes, skills and tools for reform are being used. Some examples confirmed by the evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Financial reforms with citizen participation relating to tax collection, planning, budgeting and revenue management have advanced significantly in the past two years. Evidence has been provided in prior questions #1.1, 1.4 and 2.2 ▪ Examples of continued use of DPAs by mayors and <i>Burgomasters,</i> ▪ <i>Leaders have continued to use citizen committees in their administration – for budget monitoring, and to some degree as a means for transparency</i> <p>c) Allocating Resources. Yes. Political leaders in ETDs have made investments having citizen inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Kolwezi distributes list of all public investments since 2009 ▪ Bukavu purchased new fire trucks and garbage trucks, and built sidewalks ▪ Evidence of copycat investments from neighboring communes (Chefferies of Bagira and Kazabi) ▪ Bukavu (Sud Kivu) made a study tour to Katuba (Katanga) to compare expenditure management practice ▪ Evaluation finds evidence that financial income that formally enters the system stays there (not all revenues enter the formal systems) 	
<p>4.2 Which PBG results are most likely to be sustained beyond the end of the program?</p>	
<p>Skills Acquired through Workshops and Technical Assistance. These skills will remain valuable to DRC as a country over the long run. CSOs are volatile and unstable organizations, but the personnel trained will continue to work in their fields of expertise, and often in their same communities. Their acquired skills are good for the community as a whole. Technical workers in ETDs (accounting, budgeting, and tax collection) and parliamentary administrators will generally remain in their jobs for life. Some leaders will presumably change when local elections are held, which could negatively affect results.</p> <p>Citizen Participation. There is evidence that the practice of DPAs has been adopted by leaders as a tool for citizen feedback and problem solving (by provincial government leadership in Sud Kivu, and by municipal leaders in Lukolela)</p> <p>Citizen Oversight. A number of practices, tools, and deliverables from the project will likely be sustained. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Participatory budgeting and planning will continue, and evidence suggests it will expand to other locations ▪ Other citizen committees appear sustainable over the long term -- such as good governance committees in communes, consultative committees for oversight and feedback ▪ Bukavu has a city-funded good governance web site. ▪ Edicts adopted will likely contribute to permanent changes to policy and practice. Responses to Question #1.5 note 19 Edicts (provincial laws) were adopted. While adoption is not the same as implementation, it is likely that implementation will be monitored by existing citizen committees and may 	

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
benefit communities.	
4.2.1 Which of the various PBG implementation strategies were the more effective in achieving sustainable change?	
<p>Strategies for Inclusiveness and Networking. Inclusive workshops for CSO and public sector personnel, joint study tours and networking roundtables were all described as very instrumental in changing mentality and practice. The "us-them" barrier to communication has been well understood for generations in all sectors, and joint activities undermine it.</p> <p>Flexible 'Windows of Opportunity' Strategy. PBG was very successful in modifying its programming, despite an inflexible, 'blueprint' design to the project (i.e., five-year work plan at start up). The windows of opportunity approach was recommended by the USAID Failing States Strategy of 2005, as a way to more effective programming in difficult conditions, abandoning what is not working, and taking risks to try other activities or partners that are judged to have potential. DFID has recently conducted an analysis of its programming in DRC and has decided to adopt the approach for all projects and programs it supports, along with cessation of all capacity building where reform is stalled (technical inputs do not resolve politically-driven issues).</p> <p>The strategy is different from standard blueprint project planning, in that while objectives may remain the same, activities, partnership, targets and outputs will be dropped when reduced chances of achieving results become apparent. Programming concentrates on achieving results, that is, outcomes intended, rather than outputs. While activities with failing outcomes are dropped, new opportunities that arise in the course of implementation will be taken up, opportunities based on effective leadership and clear problems for which partners feel ownership. Stakeholders and stakeholder committees with common problems to resolve will provide the guidance and direction to a program.</p> <p>Some significant changes to plan took place:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support to the National Assembly was cut back when it became obvious political will or interest from MPs was marginal. ▪ Training support to provincial administrations -- budget, finances and planning -- was stopped after 2011, in order to focus on ETDs, where results proved to be successful. The provincial administrations had other donor support (World Bank, EU, UNDP etc.), while the targeted project ETDs had almost no donor support²⁵ ▪ Direct grants were built into the project, but as such were never delivered; instead the project provided "in-kind" grants (with hands on logistical services by the project and no grant money); this change was decided when it became apparent that 1) cash grants to selected CSO partners would be slow to implement, expensive because of need for supervision and would stall achieving of outputs; and 2) support to ETD administrations could be included in this model. ▪ Implementing partners were cut back from 5 at startup (3 American) to one Congolese NGO at project end. Reason was primarily to reduce costs. <p>Studies, Data, Monitoring and Analysis.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development of qualitative performance survey instruments, to 	<p>Flexible Design-Targeted Scope. Future projects in this sector should include, to the extent possible in the USAID programming context, a flexible design but tightly targeted scope.</p> <p>Partnerships with CSOs should be expanded to include larger NGOs eligible for cash grants.</p>

²⁵ World Bank Institute Participatory Budgeting project also worked in Bukavu and Ngeshe from 2009. UNDP supported participatory administration as well but in coordination with PBG in other ETDs

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>capture baseline and changes occurring in three partner categories. The instruments and their targets were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ CSOs: Advocacy Capacity Assessment Tool ○ Parliaments: Legislative Process Matrix ○ ETDs: Budget Review Matrix; Financial Capacity Model ○ Citizens: a Citizen Opinion Survey was conducted three times, to assess opinions on a number of questions; Table 8 presented data on one question, opportunities to express opinions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tax Categories and Mapping Studies as input to advocacy for reducing corruption and through increased public information on legal and illegal taxes.(see cover page) ▪ Educational system mapping in Katanga, as support to an educational governance strategy ▪ Tax payer data base surveys supporting taxation reforms. <p>In-Kind Grants Strategy.</p> <p>The cash grants component of the project was never implemented as planned. No cash grants were awarded, because PBG management foresaw that outputs would fall far short of work plans. In the context of USAID rules for grants, there would have been major delays in pre-eligibility of CSOs for grants, due to their lack of capacity. Nor was CSO capacity building a focus of the project. Instead, PBG provincial staff provided all logistics for grant implementation by CSO grantees (grants were awarded through a competitive process). The in-kinds grants approach was very successful in supporting many of the project objectives --such as policy reforms, as evidenced throughout this report.</p> <p>One issue reported by all interviewees was the feeling of being recipients of support rather than partners ("We are not children!") Ownership and capacity building for project management were both weakened by the considerable hands-on logistical support by project staff.</p>	
<p>4.3 How can governance approaches be better integrated with technical sector (health, education, agriculture) activities to produce development results?</p>	
<p>PBG was not successful providing training to sector ministries at provincial level, due to weak political will, and lack of interest. The sectors are reportedly in partial disarray, (confused roles, low motivation, etc.) due to stalled decentralization. However, PBG was successful with support to sectors -- as presented in question 3.1 above. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Participatory situation analysis (education in Katanga and agriculture in Bandundu) resulting in needs defined in project ETDs. ▪ ETD participatory planning and budgeting has leveraged more revenue and increased budget lines in some technical sectors (agriculture in the municipality of Mayoyo from 0% in 2009, 2010 and 2011 to 25% in 2012 and 30% in 2013 and 2014, the education budget has increased to 25% in Katanga). NOTE: provinces have some discretion to allocate their own tax revenues to technical sectors, although the prime budget is transferred (retrocessed) from Kinshasa. <p>There are existing high-level dialogue committees such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The quadripartite dialogue between governments, Parliamentarians (legislators, GOV controllers and representatives of the population), civil society and even private for joint action (DPA): ▪ Committees of parents meet with teachers' unions in Katanga ▪ Health sector national or provincial Steering Committee (CNP-SS & CPP-SS) ▪ Board of Directors (Conseils d'Administration) and technical Management 	<p>Incorporate Technical Sectors into Project using Citizen Participation Strategy and Existing Participatory Committees.</p>

Findings/Evidence ²²	Recommendations
<p>Committee (Comités de Gestion) in the health zones (Zones de santé)</p> <p>It may be possible to integrate the successful PBG process-- participatory committees and pressure from the grass-roots -- to working in the technical sectors. The same principle used by the project, namely, to work where there is ALREADY A political will to practice decentralization, may be tested again, by supporting a combination of province-capital city ETD and commune in one common framework. This in order to build will and consensus to reform from the bottom up.</p>	
<p>Cross-Cutting 5.1 How has this program impacted men and women differently across activities? Which gender integration elements have succeeded and which have not</p>	
<p>Programming was ongoing throughout the project. It provided opportunities for women to women dialogue on gender issues in both public and networking fora; and for wider dialogue on women's issues through radio programming. The component was generally well appreciated. There is no difference in impact for beneficiaries, excepting activities which specifically targeted women. Those activities include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “A Nous la Parole” bi-monthly radio shows (later was broadened to target all listeners) ▪ Round table for women in the public service to assist them in becoming more effective advocates of equal treatment in the face of gross gender imbalances in the Public Service especially at a senior level (2010) ▪ Advocacy for an increase of women in public life ▪ Network of women leaders within the public sector to support the validation of the network status and an action plan ▪ Self-evaluation Circle of Women program ▪ Establishment of the network of women leaders in the public sector <p>The réseau des femmes pour le développement (REFED) existed before the project.</p> <p>Grants relating to gender were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Advocacy for family planning in Sud Kivu (SUK-016) ▪ Advocacy of provincial budget component for maternal health (SUK-028) ▪ Advocacy for Social Security support for widows, orphans and elderly (KAT-034) <p>Performance Indicator #1.5: Number of USG-supported civic education activities with media participation and/or coverage</p> <p>Sept 2013 216</p> <p>The advent of the PBG-supported bi-monthly radio broadcast “A Nous la Parole” continued to contribute to this higher than targeted result, as this radio program had not been originally programmed at the outset of this project. Following the termination of the Search for Common Ground contract in September 2012, who initially led the relationships with the radio stations broadcasting “A Nous la Parole”, PBG’s provincial offices took over the direct management of these programs. After a short transition period, the programs were re-launched in April 2013 through the signature of five of contracts with partner radio stations – two in Bandundu, one in Katanga, one in Maniema and a</p>	

Findings/Evidence²²	Recommendations
contract signed between our Sud Kivu office and a CSO partner who manages the relationship with the radio station for our project in this province (AR 3013)	
5.2 How have rural and urban local authorities been impacted differently by PBG, if at all?	
<p>Yes, in some aspects the impact is different.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rural ETDs and CSOs do not have the same access to project field offices based in the provincial capital nor its technical support. ▪ Travel to project activities is more difficult and expensive for rural beneficiaries; the travel stipend however is the same \$5 ▪ It may be argued that project activities using radio does not have this downside; however radio reception can be less in rural areas ▪ CSOs are tied to their communities, so the same disadvantage applies to rural CSO partnerships ▪ Ngweshe (Chefferie) ETD complained to project that they did not receive the same tax technology support as Bukavu city 	

ANNEX IV: RATING SCALE SCORES

Table 9: Average Ratings by Respondent Category

#	Question	All Respondents M: 258 F: 204	Male Respondents	Female Respondents
	CITIZEN INCLUSION			
1.	To what extent does success of government budgets or projects depend on citizens or CSOs being included in the process?	2.69	2.68	2.67
2.	How effective is citizen involvement in government policy, budgets or service delivery?	2.64	2.54	2.75
3.	CITIZEN DEMAND			
4.	To what extent have PBG project activities to encourage citizens' participation resulted in increased demand for accountability by citizens?	3.12	3.12	3.09
5.	GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR			
6.	To what extent have changes in citizen demand for accountability affected government behavior?	3.00	2.92	3.07
7.	To what extent has information about government budgets or government activities changed in past 5 years?	2.92	2.93	2.90
8.	WOMEN IN DECISION MAKING			
9.	To what extent has PBG program increased women's involvement in decision making in past 5 years?	3.28	3.20	3.40
10.	GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY			
11.	To what extent have government services in health changed here in the past 5 years?	3.05	3.06	3.04
12.	To what extent have government services in education changed here in the past 5 years?	2.97	2.99	2.92
13.	To what extent have government services in agriculture changed here in the past 5 years?	2.86	2.72	3.02
14.	To what extent have government services in roads and infrastructure changed here in past 5 years?	3.37	3.38	3.35
15.	PARLIAMENT EFFECTIVENESS			
16.	How effective is the parliament in oversight of the Executive now compared to 5 years ago?	2.78	2.76	2.79
17.	How effective is the parliament in lawmaking now compared to 5 years ago?	2.86	2.99	2.67
18.	How effective is the parliament in representing citizens now compared to 5 years ago?	2.76	2.79	2.70
19.	How effective is the parliament in its internal management and administration now compared to 5 years ago?	2.73	2.75	2.69

Table 7: Average Ratings: Aware of Project/Not Aware of Project

#	Question	Aware of Project	Not Aware/	No Response
	CITIZEN INCLUSION			
1.	To what extent does success of government budgets or projects depend on citizens or CSOs being included in the process?	2.97	2.70	3.08
2.	How effective is citizen involvement in government policy, budgets or service delivery?	2.97	2.66	2.71
3.	CITIZEN DEMAND			
4.	To what extent have PBG project activities to encourage citizens' participation resulted in increased demand for accountability by citizens?	3.46	3.13	3.16
5.	GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR			
6.	To what extent have changes in citizen demand for accountability affected government behavior?	3.30	3.01	3.04
7.	To what extent has information about government budgets or government activities changed in past 5 years?	3.22	2.93	3.06
8.	WOMEN IN DECISION MAKING			
9.	To what extent has PBG program increased women's involvement in decision making in past 5 years?	3.35	3.30	2.96
10.	GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY			
11.	To what extent have government services in health changed here in the past 5 years?	3.23	3.06	2.84
12.	To what extent have government services in education changed here in the past 5 years?	3.12	2.98	3.02
13.	To what extent have government services in agriculture changed here in the past 5 years?	2.91	2.85	3.00
14.	To what extent have government services in roads and infrastructure changed here in past 5 years?	3.39	3.38	3.63
15.	PARLIAMENT EFFECTIVENESS			
16.	How effective is the parliament in oversight of the Executive now compared to 5 years ago?	2.84	2.79	3.02
17.	How effective is the parliament in lawmaking now compared to 5 years ago?	2.95	2.87	3.04
18.	How effective is the parliament in representing citizens now compared to 5 years ago?	2.83	2.76	3.14
19.	How effective is the parliament in its internal management and administration now compared to 5 years ago?	2.87	2.74	3.00

Table 8: Average Ratings by Province

#	Question	Katanga (n=)		Bandundu (n=)		Sud Kivu (n=)	
		M:	F:	M:	F:	M:	F:
	CITIZEN INCLUSION						
1.	To what extent does success of government budgets or projects depend on citizens or CSOs being included in the process?	2.35		2.63		3.14	
2.	How effective is citizen involvement in government policy, budgets or service delivery?	2.43		2.69		2.84	
	CITIZEN DEMAND						
3.	To what extent have PBG project activities to encourage citizens' participation resulted in increased demand for accountability by citizens?	2.82		3.18		3.42	

#	Question	Katanga (n=)		Bandundu (n=)		Sud Kivu (n=)	
		M:	F:	M:	F:	M:	F:
	GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR						
4.	To what extent have changes in citizen demand for accountability affected government behavior?		2.73		3.12		3.20
5.	To what extent has information about government budgets or government activities changed in past 5 years?		2.77		2.90		3.11
	WOMEN IN DECISION MAKING						
6.	To what extent has PBG program increased women's involvement in decision making in past 5 years?		3.12		3.15		3.57
	GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY						
7.	To what extent have government services in health changed here in the past 5 years?		2.91		2.99		3.25
8.	To what extent have government services in education changed here in the past 5 years?		2.90		3.09		2.97
9.	To what extent have government services in agriculture changed here in the past 5 years?		2.69		3.06		2.90
10.	To what extent have government services in roads and infrastructure changed here in past 5 years?		3.41		3.26		3.38
	PARLIAMENT EFFECTIVENESS						
11.	How effective is the parliament in oversight of the Executive now compared to 5 years ago?		2.90		2.53		2.82
12.	How effective is the parliament in lawmaking now compared to 5 years ago?		2.89		2.64		2.98
13.	How effective is the parliament in representing citizens now compared to 5 years ago?		2.79		2.65		2.78
14.	How effective is the parliament in its internal management and administration now compared to 5 years ago?		2.72		2.73		2.76

ANNEX V: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

QUESTIONNAIRE

SEX M F ETD FG Interview FAMILIAR WITH PBG: Y N

CITIZEN INCLUSION

#1 To what extent does success of government budgets or projects depend on citizens or CSOs being included in the process?

Very Negative (1)	Somewhat Negative (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat Positive (4)	Very Positive (5)
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#2 How effective is citizen involvement in government policy, budgets or service delivery?

Very Ineffective (1)	Somewhat Ineffective (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat Effective (4)	Very Effective (5)
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CITIZEN DEMAND

#3 To what extent have PBG project activities to encourage citizens' participation resulted in increased demand for accountability by citizens?

Much Less Demand (1)	Somewhat Less (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat More (4)	Much More Demand (5)
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GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR

#4 To what extent have changes in citizen demand for accountability affected government behavior?

Very Negative (1)	Somewhat Negative (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat Positive (4)	Very Positive (5)
----------------------	--------------------------	-----------------------	--------------------------	----------------------

#5 To what extent has information about government budgets or government activities changed in past 5 years?

Much Less Information (1)	Somewhat Less (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat More (4)	Much More (5)
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WOMEN INVOLVED IN DECISION MAKING

#6 To what extent has PBG program increased women's involvement in decision making in past 5 years?

Much Less (1)	Somewhat Less (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat More (4)	Much More (5)
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GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY

#7 To what extent have government services in health changed here in the past 5 years?

Much Worse (1)	Somewhat Worse (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat Better (4)	Much Better (5)
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#8 To what extent have government services in education changed here in the past 5 years?

Much Worse (1)	Somewhat Worse (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat Better (4)	Much Better (5)
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#9 To what extent have government services in agriculture changed here in the past 5 years?

Much Worse (1)	Somewhat Worse (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat Better (4)	Much Better (5)
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#10 To what extent have government services in roads and infrastructure changed here in past 5 years?

Much Worse (1)	Somewhat Worse (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat Better (4)	Much Better (5)
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PARLIAMENT

#11 How effective is the parliament in oversight of the Executive now compared to 5 years ago?

Much Less (1)	Somewhat Less (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat More (4)	Much More (5)
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#12 How effective is the parliament in lawmaking now compared to 5 years ago?

Much Less (1)	Somewhat Less (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat More (4)	Much More (5)
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#13 How effective is the parliament in representing citizens now compared to 5 years ago?

Much Less (1)	Somewhat Less (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat More (4)	Much More (5)
------------------	----------------------	-----------------------	----------------------	------------------

#14 How effective is the parliament in its internal management and administration now compared to 5 years ago?

Much Less (1)	Somewhat Less (2)	About the Same (3)	Somewhat More (4)	Much More (5)
------------------	----------------------	-----------------------	----------------------	------------------

ANNEX VI: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Key Informant Interviews

	Organization
	Kinshasa
1.	CTAD representative
2.	Program Officer, USAID/DRC
3.	Representative from Democracy and Governance Office, USAID/DRC
4.	Program Officer, USAID/DRC
5.	Program Assistant, USAID/DRC
6.	Office of The Prime Minister: Advisor
7.	Democracy and Governance Office, USAID/DRC
8.	European Union: Coordinateur,
9.	UNDP: Program Advisor
10.	World Bank: Decentralization and PRCG project Advisor
11.	DFID: Governance Advisor
12.	Government Official from the National Assembly
13.	Government Official from the National Assembly
14.	National Assembly: Committee President
15.	National Assembly: Committee 2 nd Vice President
16.	National Assembly: Division Chief
17.	National Assembly: Coordinator
18.	DAI/PBG Senior Representative
19.	Senior Staff PBG
20.	PBG Coordinator
21.	PBG Staff
22.	Legislative Advisor
23.	Training and Organizational Development
	Katanga- Lubumbashi
24.	World Bank Representative
25.	Municipal Government Representative – Katuba
26.	Municipal Government Representative – Katuba
27.	Katanga Provincial Assembly Staff Director of Administration
28.	Katanga Provincial Assembly Staff
29.	Katanga Provincial Assembly Staff
30.	Katanga Provincial Assembly Committee Representative
31.	Katanga Provincial Assembly: Committee Representative
32.	Katanga Province Ministry of Agriculture: staff
33.	Bureau Diocésain de Développement (BDD)
34.	BDD Representative
35.	Director of a local company PPP project
36.	Company Owner
37.	Katanga PBG Office Staff
38.	Katanga PBG Office Staff

	Organization
39.	Katanga PBG Office Staff
	Katanga- Likasi
40.	CSO: CJP --Justice and Peace Commission
41.	Senior Government Official of Likasi ETD
42.	Likasi ETD: Government Official
43.	Likasi ETD: Government Official
44.	Likasi ETD: Government Official
45.	CSO Representative
46.	CSO Representative
47.	CSO Representative
	Katanga- Kolwezi
48.	EDT Kolwezi: Senior Government Official
49.	EDT Kolwezi: Senior Government Official
50.	EDT Kolwezi: Senior Government Official
51.	EDT Kolwezi: Chief of Budget and Taxation
52.	EDT Kolwezi: Senior Government Official
53.	EDT Kolwezi: Local Government Staff
54.	CSO Representative
55.	CSO Representative
56.	CSO Representative
57.	CSO Representative
58.	CSO Representative
	Katanga-Kenya
59.	Kenya ETD: Senior Government Official
60.	Kenya ETD: Senior Government Official
61.	Kenya ETD: Senior Government Official
62.	CSO Representative
63.	CSO Representative
64.	CSO Representative
65.	Sud Kivu-Bukavu
66.	Bukavu: Senior Government Official
67.	CSO Representative
68.	CSO Representative
69.	CSO Representative
70.	EDT Bukavu- Senior Government Official
71.	EDT Bukavu- Senior Government Official
72.	EDT Bukavu- Senior Government Official
73.	EDT Bukavu- Senior Government Official
74.	Provincial Assembly Representative
75.	Provincial Government Staff
76.	Chargé des passations des marchés du PRCG Sud Kivu
77.	AT/INPP Bukavu
78.	DAI Bukavu Staff
79.	DAI Bukavu Staff
80.	DAI Bukavu Staff
81.	DAI Bukavu Staff
82.	DAI Bukavu Staff

	Organization
83.	Sud Kivu-Ngweshe
84.	Senior Chefferie Representative
85.	Préfet
86.	Catholic Parish Representative
87.	Senior Representative of the Mutuelle de santé de Walungu
88.	Senior Official of the Chefferie Ngweshe
89.	Lohale Group representative
90.	Iko Group representative
91.	Chef de groupement
92.	Chargée de l'Etat-civil
93.	Greffier
94.	Chef du personnel
95.	Chef de groupement
96.	Senior Official of the Chefferie
97.	Sud Kivu-Kadutu
98.	Kadutu Senior Official
99.	Kadutu Senior Official
100.	Kadutu Senior Official
101.	Kadutu Senior Official
102.	Kadutu Senior Official
103.	Kadutu Senior Official
104.	Kadutu Senior Official
105.	Kadutu Senior Official
106.	Bandundu-Lukolela
107.	EDT Lukolela - Senior Official
108.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
109.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
110.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
111.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
112.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
113.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
114.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
115.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
116.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
117.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
118.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
119.	EDT Lukolela Senior Official
120.	Bandundu-Bukangalonzo
121.	Senior Official
122.	CSO Representative
123.	CSO Representative
124.	CSO Representative
125.	CSO Representative
126.	Bandundu-Mayoyo
127.	Bandundu Provincial Assembly: Senior Official
128.	Bandundu Provincial Assembly: Senior Official
129.	CSO Representative

	Organization
130	CSO Representative
131	CSO Representative
132	CSO Representative
133	CSO Representative
134	CSO Representative
135	CSO Representative
136	CSO Representative
137	CSO Representative

Focus Group Events

Location	Group	# of Participants
Katuba	Women	12
	Youth	18
	Teachers, civil servants, health	11
Likasi	Women	10
	Youth	10
	Teachers, civil servants, health	10
Kolwezi	Women	11
	Youth	10
	Teachers, civil servants, health	10
Kenya	Women	10
	Youth	10
	Teachers, civil servants, health	10

List of Documents

- GDRC: The Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper, 2011-2015 (DSCR II, 2011-2015) is the nearest thing to a comprehensive development strategy and includes governance as a pillar.
- GDRC: CTAD's Strategic Framework for the Implementation of Decentralization
- Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-affected Areas (STAREC)
- International Security and Stabilization Support Strategies (I4S)
- USAID: Request for Task Order Proposal USAID-623-EA-09-024
- USAID: 2008 DG Assessment
- USAID: 2009 Country Assistance Strategy
- USAID 2012 Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) Assessment
- DAI: Task Order Contract and Amendment
 - Quarterly Progress Reports
 - Annual Progress Reports
 - Work plans and PMP
 - Tools, training materials, guidelines, etc.
 - Grantee stories, lessons learned
 - Internal assessments (including Gender Assessment)
 - Baseline data derived from assessments conducted by DAI with targeted institutions (included as an annex to this SOW).

ANNEX VII: DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST


DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM

Name	FRANK HAWES
Title	CONSULTANT
Organization	HAWES INTERNATIONAL
Evaluation Position?	Team Leader / Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</p> <p>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature: Frank Hawes
 Date: May 5, 2014


Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members **Dr Audace Makamba**

Name	Makamba Audace
Title	Local Consultant
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	IQC AID-RAN-I-00-09-0001 6, Task Order Number AID-660-TO-14-00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	USAID/DRC PROGRAMME de Bonne Gouvernance (PBG)
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	NA
<p>I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.</p>	
Signature	
Date	21, July 2014

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Jean-Lambert MANDJO AHOLOMA
Title	Deputy Team Leader (Mid-Level Expert) and Lead for Field
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	IQC AID-RAN-I-00-09-00016, Task Order Number AID-660-TO-14-00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	USAID/DRC PROGRAMME de Bonne GoUvernance (PBG)
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	21-07-2014

ANNEX VIII: EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB-QUESTIONS

Institutional Capacity

I.1 To what extent are targeted GDRC institutions better resourced as a result of PBG? To what extent are changes in revenues due to exogenous factors, such as growth in the mining sector?

"Better resourced" is defined as larger operational and programming budgets, better equipped with materials and technology, and more qualified human resources. Focus will be on ETD (parliaments addressed in I.5).

- Are institutions better resourced?
- What PBG provided capacity building and support tools can be documented?
- Project assistance may have resulted in increased local revenues generated from taxes or other sources. Financial records will be requested. (PBG conducted a study of ETDs in 2013? in which the researchers had difficulty acquiring revenue information from the local authorities).
- Data on revenues in the mining sector in Katanga will be sought.
- **Project Indicator: 3.3** Number of sub-national government entities receiving USG assistance to increase their annual own-source revenues

I.2 Which revenue collection interventions (i.e. working with taxation and revenue collection departments, partnership with CSOs in revenue collection, etc.) were most effective – in terms of increases in revenues, transparency, and citizen trust in public financial management and should be expanded? To what extent is the success of a given intervention dependent on the degree to which citizens or CSOs were included in the process?

What project activities achieved increased revenues? Increased transparency? Increased citizen trust? Targets for data gathering are ETD revenue and tax units and CSOs.

- Data will be obtained through interviews with CSOs and government.
- Increases in transparency and citizen trust will be assessed from multiple sources.
- Increases in revenues will require access to revenue information.

Project Indicators:

- I.8 Percent of people surveyed in select provinces who believe they have opportunities to express their opinions
- 3.3 Number of sub-national government entities receiving USG assistance to increase their annual own-source revenues
- Budget Review and Financial Capacity Maturity Model
- Citizen Focus Group questionnaire results

Project Indicators:

- I.4 Number of citizens attending public audiences
- I.5 Number of USG-supported civic education activities with media participation and/or coverage.
- I.7 Number of CSO receiving USG assistance on how to review and comment on budgets

I.8 Percent of people surveyed in select provinces who believe they have opportunities to express their opinions

I.3 What has enabled local public-private partnerships to succeed in one assisted ETD and what were the challenges? What factors might prevent replicating this success elsewhere?

SME will interview stakeholders and prepare a case study to determine lessons learned. Review to include lessons in the process, and results from perspectives of government, private sector, and beneficiaries. What financial benefits to citizens, government and private sector partner?

KII, FG Questions:

DAI #12 PPP Stakeholders

I.4 To what extent have PBG activities contributed to improvements in transparency, openness to citizen participation, and accountability of GDRC institutions?

This question is broad and similar to evaluation Objective A: did the project contribute to public institutional good governance, defined as transparency, openness and accountability. Parliaments are addressed in 1.5.

- A review of program reports suggests that one of the most significant outcomes is a change in mentality and behavior that has occurred among both civil society and public sector workers involved in PBG activities since 2009, towards greater accountability on the part of public servants and a more positive approach to advocacy from CSOs, resulting in greater collaboration. If true, this would be a remarkable reversal of the 'legacy of Mobutu' whereby public servants lack accountability and citizens lacked empowerment.
- **What were the strategies and activities** that may have helped achieve this outcome? (Refer to Question 4.2.1)

KII, FG Questions:

PS #24, CIT #7, CSO/PBG #7, CSO/NGO #4

1.5 What gains have been made in terms of the legislative capacity (to draft and pass laws, interact with constituents, and capacity of administrative staff to support lawmakers) of provincial parliaments?

Question focuses on institutional strengthening of parliaments, in four areas, three functions, and administrative capacity.

- **A summary of the project's institutional capacity building of the National and four provincial assemblies will be documented, in regards to their three functions of laws, representation and representation.**
- All 12 project performance indicators will be used to draw conclusions. The evaluation will not independently assess institutional capacity building. Interviews will be held with leaders of assemblies in the sites visited (Speaker and Clerk).
- The 2010 parliamentary baseline survey may serve for comparative purposes, but the evaluation will not conduct a full institutional assessment, due to time and resource constraints.

KII, FG Questions:

- PARL #1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9

Rating Scale Questions:

- DOR #21 CIT # 17 NGO # 23 PARL #7

Citizen Demand

2.1 To what extent have PBG interventions implemented to encourage citizens' participation resulted in increased demand for accountability by citizens?

This significant question overlaps with 1.3 and 1.5, namely, the role of citizen inclusion in achieving results, but places accent on citizen demand. Can the outcome of increased citizen demand be documented and measured? Demand for accountability and active participation by citizens are one of the pillars democratic governance. Therefore, if the outcome is confirmed, the project will have achieved the IRI objective.

- **Increased for demand for accountability** will be measured through interviews with CSOs and a random sample of citizens in focus groups.
- The five-point survey questions will be administered when feasible to establish a numerical index for opinions of respondents on this question.
- Government public servants will also be asked questions on this theme.
- Data from an evaluations of IRI and CSOs conducted by the project in 2010 and 2012 may be included in findings.

KII, FG Questions:

- PS #9, 10, 24, CIT #1, 2, 4, 5, 7, CSO/PBG #3, 5, 6, CSO/PBG #1, 2, 3,

Rating Scale Questions:

- PS #32, ETD #23, CIT #15, CSO/PBG #23, 32, CSO/PBG #12, 15, 20

Project Indicators:

- 1.2 Number of local mechanisms supported with USG assistance for citizens to engage their local government
 - 1.4 Number of citizens attending public audiences
 - 1.5 Number of USG-supported civic education activities with media participation and/or coverage.
- 1.6 Increase in the average score of core PBG-supported CSOs on the Advocacy Capacity Assessment Tool

2.2 How have changes in citizen demand for accountability affected government behavior, if at all?

Question overlaps with 1.3. Is there evidence of new behaviors on the part of government? Accent in data collection will be in regards to behavior changes in ETD governments, as assessed by self, CSOs and citizens.

- Specific civil society demands must be **documented and their outcomes identified**.
- A significant number of project activities involve outreach and in reach of citizens in government and these will be assessed and discussed with respondents for their views.

Government behavior can be defined in a number of ways such as modifications to **policy, changed practices or rules, access to information and an attitude of collaboration and service to citizens**.

Service Delivery of GDRC Institutions

3.1 How, and in which sectors (including, but not limited to, health, education, agriculture, and public infrastructure), has government service delivery changed in terms of funding, reach, and quality

This question addresses the outcome of improved government service delivery in funding, reach and quality in four sectors.

- Rating scales will be used to assess opinions on improvements in the four sectors and three categories (12 questions).
- CSOs, citizens and public servants will be administered the survey and related questions.

KII, FG Questions:

- DON #6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, PS #6, 12, 16, 23, ETD #1, 2, CIT #6, CSO/PBG #9, 13, CSO/NGO #6

Rating Scale Questions:

PS # 25, 26, 27, 28, ETD #16, 17, 18, 19, CIT #8, 9, 10, 11, CSO/PBG #23, 24, 25, 26, CSO/NGO #13, 14,15,16

Implementation and Approach

4.1 Which approaches to harnessing political will for accountable governance by government and /or citizens were successful and why?

Has there been a change in mentality, and if so, what strategies and methods used by the project were successful in increased will among government and citizens, towards an attitude of accountable governance?

- Assess the implication of PMP performance indicator reviews/changes
- This question will be asked of well-informed project staff and senior officials, and CSOs for their reviews on the issues of **political will**, particularly as regards decentralization

KII, FG Questions:

- DAI #11, PS #17, CSO/PBG #14

Rating Scale Questions:

None

4.2 Which PBG results are most likely to be sustained beyond the end of the program?

The question of what results can become long term is complemented by a sub-question, what implementation strategies contribute to sustained results?

- Addressed primarily through interviews.

(4.2)

KII, FG Questions:

- PS #18, 20, CSO/PBG #17, 19, CSO/NGO #8, 9, PARL #12

(4.2.1)

KII, FG Questions:

- DAI #3, 5, 9, DON #3, PS #3, CSO/PBG #2, PARL #11

4.2.1 Which of the various PBG implementation strategies were the more effective in achieving sustainable change?

- In addition to question 4.2, the evaluation has added a supplementary question 4.2.1 related to implementation approaches. PBG has implemented at least nine strategies, which will be examined for their relevance in the DRC context:
 - a) Use of better monitoring and analysis, in order to respond to local context, is more effective.
 - b) Adopt opportunity-based responsive, strategic and flexible programming and entry points to take advantage of ad-hoc opportunities, such as through grants.
 - c) Recognize reality where there is lack of political will and do what can be done (such as working on skills, attitudes instruments, tools, or "decentralization platforms" that will be needed once reforms move forward).
 - d) Invest in studies, surveys, focus groups; for example, political mapping or mapping of public sector staffing for ghost workers; tools for parliaments and remote constituents to communicate; tools for access to information and budget analysis.
 - e) Stress local ownership, such as through grants and partnership agreements, among other mechanisms.
 - f) Give discretionary powers to local field staff
 - g) Develop mechanisms for dialogue and cross-fertilization of information
 - h) Using cross-sectoral strategies
 - i) Effectiveness of adult education methods tested.

4.3 How can governance approaches be better integrated with technical sector (health, education, agriculture) activities to produce development results?

This question is approached by asking experienced programming workers for their opinions, supported by data

- Additional current theories of development results and **lessons learned from other countries** will be considered
- Respondents will be asked to comment and offer their opinions.

KII, FG Questions:

- DAI #10, DON #5, PS #5, CSO/PBG #21, CSO/INGO #11

Rating Scale Questions:

None

Cross-Cutting

5.1 How has this program impacted men and women differently across activities? Which gender integration elements have succeeded and which have not

Gender related outcomes will be approached from the perspectives of most of the 7 categories of respondents.

- The project has gathered gender-desegregated data which will be collected and analyzed.
- Respondents who have been involved in the gender programming activities will be interviewed in depth for their opinions on effectiveness.

KII, FG Questions:

- DAI # 6, 7, DON #4, PS #4, 21, CSO/PBG #20, CSO/INGO #10, PARL #13

Rating Scale Questions:

PS #29, 30, ETD #20, 21, CSO/PBG #29, 30, CSO/INGO #17, 18

5.2 How have rural and urban local authorities been impacted differently by PBG, if at all?
from multiple sources.

- The evaluation will visit both urban and rural sites.

- This will allow a comparison of urban and local authorities.
- This question will be asked specifically of a number of respondents for their views.

KII, FG Questions:

- DAI #8

Rating Scale Questions:

PS #31, ETD #22, CSO/PBG #22, 31, CSO/NGO #13, 19

ANNEX IX: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION – PROGRAMME DE BONNE GOUVERNANCE PROGRAM WITH DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC. (DAI)

C.1 INTRODUCTION:

USAID/DRC intends to solicit and award a Task Order under USAID's Evaluation USAID to undertake an external final performance evaluation of its Good Governance program, Programme de Bonne Gouvernance (PBG), implemented by DAI under the Encouraging Global Anticorruption and Good Governance Efforts (ENGAGE) Indefinite Quantity Contract.

USAID/DRC is imposing a tight deadline of June 30, 2014 (roughly 12 weeks) for completion of the evaluation final report to enable the timely consideration of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations prior to the full design of new activities.

C.2 BACKGROUND

Country Context

With the promulgation of a new Constitution in 2006, the DRC launched a radical transition process that involved rebuilding existing and creating new government institutions after more than a decade of conflict and institutional decay. Although the 2006 Constitution provides a foundation for improved democracy and governance, many political practices have yet to change substantially. Fledgling institutions including the National Assembly, Senate and Provincial Assemblies, and other Government of DRC (GDRC) institutions charged with creating regulations, budgets, and internal procedures struggle to carry out basic functions or effectively deliver services to citizens. Many or most GDRC institutions are not fulfilling their policy-making mandates and lack even basic physical structures. A 2008 USAID Democracy and Governance Assessment of the DRC described the social, economic, and political situation as “extremely challenging,” a sentiment echoed in the 2012 USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment. Corruption remains endemic, rule of law is not sufficiently respected, the 2011 national elections were flawed, and a pervasive culture of impunity undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the government.

Transparency International ranked the DRC 154th out of 175 countries surveyed in its 2013 Corruption Perception Index. The DRC ranked 183rd (sixth-to-last) in the World Bank's “Doing Business” 2013 report, demonstrating that it is one of the most difficult places in the world to do business. Freedom House noted a continued lackluster country performance in its 2013 “Freedom in the World” report, where the DRC retained a score of six in the survey's political rights and civil liberties categories (the comparative assessment uses a seven-point rating scale, with seven representing the least free status). As such, the DRC has many of the characteristics of a failing state. The state is unable to provide safety, security, or public services to a significant portion of its citizens. The central government does not exert effective control over all of its own territory. As a result, the legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent in many parts of the country and among broad segments of the population.

These failings are not exclusive to public structures. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the DRC often have limited comprehension of concepts related to good governance, decentralization, advocacy, citizen oversight, and budgetary processes. CSOs often struggle to grasp the difference between advocacy and awareness raising campaigns, with most organizations focused simply on putting pressure

on political actors with the intent of increasing the quality of public service delivery rather than offering recommendations or partnership. Additionally, relationships between decision makers and civil society tend to be based primarily on confrontation rather than collaboration, preventing them from engaging in positive dialogue to find solutions.

Project Identification

PBG supports USAID's 2009-2013 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which had as one goal to support the security conditions and governance structures necessary for the improvement of DRC's social and economic situation, and to extend state authority across the country. Under U.S. Foreign Assistance Objective 2, Governing Justly and Democratically, USAID supported the decentralization process, assisted the national parliament and targeted provincial assemblies to become more democratic and effective, and empowered citizens to demand accountability from elected (or appointed) officials.

USAID funded PBG through a task order issued under the ENGAGE IQC managed by USAID/Washington. The 2008 DG assessment played a large role in informing the design of this program, and highlighted the need to provide technical, material, and logistical assistance to fledgling democratic institutions at three levels of government (national, provincial and local), as well as to civil society organizations, and to support the decentralization process. The design of PBG represented a strategic shift in USAID governance interventions away from post-conflict rapid response and peace building towards longer-term support for sustainable governance institutions that have a role in restoring state authority and legitimacy.

PBG is a five-year project (September 2009 to September 2014) with a budget of \$36,251,768 implemented by DAI.

C.3 PBG OBJECTIVES AND PLANNED RESULTS

The objective of the program is to improve management capacity and accountability of select legislatures and local governments, working with civil society. There are three primary results expected:

- 1) **Citizens demand accountability:** Increased demand for accountable governance among citizens and civic organizations.
- 2) **Select legislative bodies are more democratic and effective:** Improved capacity of provincial and national legislatures to conduct legislative actions and oversee executive activities.
- 3) **Laws, policies, and procedures for decentralization are established and implemented:** Increased citizen support for decentralization and improved local government capacity to deliver services.

These results are intended to increase transparency, equity, and effectiveness in government operations and decision-making and to allow citizens to play a more active role in these processes. The program was designed to help different levels of the DRC Government provide tangible benefits to citizens while creating sustainable institutions.

PBG remains a key program in the USAID/DRC DG Office, because of its size and complexity. The program engages with a variety of government entities across the DRC, from the National Assembly and the Ministry of Interior to provincial assemblies and municipal governments, and it supports civil society to participate in a range of governance activities.

C.4 PBG IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

Development Hypothesis

There is no explicit development hypothesis provided in the program documentation. For the purposes of this evaluation, one can extrapolate the following development hypothesis from a review of the Country Assistance Strategy and the Results Framework and Expected Results sections of the PBG award: if GDRC institutions are strengthened such that they can manage additional governance responsibilities, including those associated with decentralization, and there is greater demand for democratic reforms and transparency, then the delivery of GDRC services will be enhanced.

Improving budget and financial management and creating inclusive public policy processes should result in changed attitudes of public servants and contribute to the delivery of government services. These efforts, if successful, should begin to transform the relationship between citizens and government, a relationship that has historically been characterized by patronage-based decision making, an absence of effective administrative and financial systems, poor government oversight, and weak capacity of public servants and institutions.

PBG Implementation Principles

The design of PBG integrated several core principles which were included to increase the likelihood of achieving and sustaining project results. These included:

Local buy-in: The program seeks political and financial buy-in for activities. Within targeted provinces, Memoranda of Understanding have been drafted and signed with each partner institution. Additionally, the program supports partnerships between local businesses and government entities in support of local development.

Sustainability: The program focuses on learning, skill acquisition, skill demonstration as well as the implementation of policies and systems that will perpetuate reforms long after the program is completed. Wherever possible, training is not provided as a one-off event, but rather on an ongoing basis, so that the employees of assisted institutions gradually assume management of activities.

Interactive Methodologies (tying training or dialogue to action): Many individuals in the DRC, especially at the national and provincial level, are inundated with trainings that leave no learning behind. This program seeks to draw on interactive adult teaching methodologies, utilizing participatory exercises that internalize knowledge rather than relying on rote memorization. Additionally, skill-building activities are coupled with continued learning through use of peer networks, periodic workshops to reunite participants, cross-training, and the provision of technical experts to work alongside participants in their institutions.

Flexibility: Understanding that the success of governance interventions is often dependent on a permissive political environment, PBG's approach to planning and undertaking activities is highly flexible. This flexibility enables PBG to be responsive to emergent opportunities as they occur within targeted institutions and at different levels of government. For example, the bulk of PBG's focus was able to shift to support local government entities when Provincial and National legislators became preoccupied with securing their reelection and less interested in drafting new legislation.

Cross-Sectoral Approach: PBG seeks to implement good governance activities that support development outcomes in health, agriculture, and education. Examples of this engagement include supporting civil society to advocate for their development priorities and strengthening provincial and municipal government's ability to deliver health, agriculture, and education services or address corruption in these areas.

Cross-Cutting Themes

Anti-corruption and gender are important crosscutting themes that are incorporated into each of the program's Intermediate Results. Two examples of how these themes have been incorporated into programming include PBG's support for women's civil servant networks and the Gouvernance Pour Tous website (<http://www.gouvernancepourtous.cd/>), which is devoted to increased government transparency.

Target Areas and Groups

PBG targets the provinces of Bandundu, Sud Kivu, Maniema, and Katanga for work with provincial legislators and municipal governments. In these target provinces, PBG engages with a range of civil society organizations and three discrete local governments per province (12 in total), in both rural and urban areas. In Kinshasa, the program has been implemented within the National Assembly (with targeted commissions, the Information Technology department, and others), the Ministry of Interior's Decentralization Support Cell (CTAD), and with select national-level civil society groups. Additionally, PBG undertook provincial activities that specifically targeted youth and/or women.

C.5 EXISTING INFORMATION SOURCES

The following documents and sources of information will be available (if not already publicly available) to the evaluation team and are relevant to this evaluation. USAID expects that the evaluation team will review these materials prior to their arrival in the DRC.

- GDRC: The Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper, 2011-2015 (DSCR II, 2011-2015) is the nearest thing to a comprehensive development strategy and includes governance as a pillar.
- GDRC: CTAD's Strategic Framework for the Implementation of Decentralization
- Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-affected Areas (STAREC)
- International Security and Stabilization Support Strategies (I4S)
- USAID: Request for Task Order Proposal USAID-623-EA-09-024
- USAID: 2008 DG Assessment
- USAID: 2009 Country Assistance Strategy
- USAID 2012 Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) Assessment
- DAI: Task Order Contract and Amendment
 - Quarterly Progress Reports
 - Annual Progress Reports
 - Work plans and PMP
 - Tools, training materials, guidelines, etc.
 - Grantee stories, lessons learned
 - Internal assessments (including Gender Assessment)
 - Baseline data derived from assessments conducted by DAI with targeted institutions (included as an annex to this SOW).

This and any additional information will be made available to the evaluation team once the award is made. USAID expects the evaluation team to devote an appropriate amount of time to this background review.

C.6 EVALUATION RATIONALE AND KEY QUESTIONS

Purpose and Uses of this Evaluation

This will be the final performance evaluation of PBG. However, USAID appreciates that the evaluation team will conduct its field work during month 54 of a 60-month program, and thus some activities will have not yet produced final results.

The timing of this evaluation coincides with the anticipated launch of a new five-year Country Development Cooperation Strategy. The evaluation will contribute to USAID/DRC's understanding of governance in the DRC and potential approaches to integrating governance across technical sectors under the new strategy.

The evaluation will assess:

- The performance of the program in strengthening GDRC institutions and increasing citizen demand for accountability, and
- The theory of change, that stronger GDRC institutions accompanied by strengthened citizen demand for democratic reforms and accountability will result in enhanced service delivery.

The evaluation will assist the USAID/DRC DG Office to:

- Describe the successes and failures of PBG with explanations for what worked and what did not;
- Describe whether the theory of change was valid, and if so, was it measurable;
- Identify how the PBG approach can be expanded and incorporated more actively in technical sectors such as health, education, and agriculture;
- Provide feedback on management strengths and areas for improvement; and
- Identify implementation problems, unmet needs or unintended consequences or impacts, taking into account unanticipated changes in the host country environment.

This evaluation is in line with the USAID Evaluation Policy (<http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation/policy>) and Automated Directive System (ADS) 203.3.1.3, which require that an evaluation be conducted for each large project implemented. This performance evaluation will help inform the design of activities under the new CDCS, especially new governance activities, and it will contribute to USAID's understanding of the DG sector more broadly.

The final evaluation report will be shared with GDRC counterparts and other stakeholders (including MOI/CTAD, National Assembly, Provincial Assemblies, local and provincial government staff, local CSOs, and other donor organizations) in order to disseminate lessons learned and inform other similar activities.

Evaluation Questions

This evaluation will assist the Mission by providing information that responds to the following questions regarding the performance of PBG and the effect that program inputs have had on:

Institutional capacity and strength:

- To what extent are targeted GDRC institutions better resourced²⁶ as a result of PBG? To what extent are changes in revenues due to exogenous factors, such as growth in the mining sector?
- Which revenue collection interventions (i.e. working with taxation and revenue collection departments, partnership with CSOs in revenue collection, etc.) were most effective – in terms of increases in revenues, transparency, and citizen trust in public financial management - and should be expanded? To what extent is the success of a given intervention dependent on the degree to which citizens or CSOs were included in the process?

²⁶ In terms of revenues derived from taxation, retrocession, and other sources.

- What has enabled local public-private partnerships to succeed in one assisted ETD and what were the challenges? What factors might prevent replicating this success elsewhere?
- To what extent have PBG activities contributed to improvements in transparency, openness to citizen participation, and accountability of GDRC institutions?
- What gains have been made in terms of the legislative capacity (to draft and pass laws, interact with constituents, and capacity of administrative staff to support lawmakers) of provincial parliaments?

Citizen demand for accountable governance:

- To what extent have PBG interventions implemented to encourage citizens' participation resulted in increased demand for accountability by citizens?
 - What action are citizens taking to hold officials²⁷ accountable?
 - How have changes in citizen demand for accountability affected government behavior, if at all?

Service delivery of GDRC²⁸ institutions:

- How, and in which sectors (including, but not limited to, health, education, agriculture, and public infrastructure), has government service delivery changed in terms of funding, reach, and quality as a result of PBG interventions?

Implementation and approach:

- Which approaches to harnessing political will²⁹ for accountable governance by government and /or citizens were successful and why?
- Which PBG results are most likely to be sustained beyond the end of the program?
- How can governance approaches be better integrated with technical sector (health, education, agriculture) activities to produce development results?

Cross-cutting questions:

- How has this program impacted men and women differently across activities? Which gender integration elements have succeeded and which have not; what are the challenges encountered in integrating gender, and how were these challenges addressed?
- How have rural and urban local authorities been impacted differently by PBG, if at all?

C.7 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

As this is an independent final performance evaluation, bidders on this SOW must include a description of (or approach for developing) the proposed research design and methodology in their proposal. A detailed evaluation plan will be the first deliverable to be submitted to USAID for approval. The evaluation must employ both qualitative and quantitative methods.

The overall purpose of the evaluation is described above in section V.A. The evaluation will review all levels of intervention covered by this program: national, provincial and local levels in Bandundu, Katanga

²⁷ This includes both members of provincial parliaments, who are elected and local government officials, who are appointed.

²⁸ PBG engaged GDRC institutions at the national, provincial and local level, and USAID expects that this evaluation will treat each of these institutions separately.

²⁹ For the purposes of this document, political will refers to the extent to which GDRC interlocutors are willing to a) participate in program activities and more importantly; b) apply the newly acquired skills or techniques for the intended purpose; and c) allocate GDRC resources towards matching or replicating project inputs.

and Sud Kivu. Maniema Province is not included in this Scope due to the difficulty of travelling there and the limited time for field work.

Bidders may wish to propose multiple alternative approaches, factoring in the information that will be available to the evaluation team (described in section IV above) after the award is made. In any case, bidders must submit a written description of their proposed methodology.

USAID and PBG will provide a complete list of program sites and will assist the evaluation contractor to select field sites during the initial discussion and approval of the evaluation plan. The sites selected will take a number of factors into consideration, including rural and urban differences, impressions of performance and specific geographic and cultural dimensions of the areas where the program is implemented.

As part of the start-up of this activity, PBG undertook baseline data collection which included the identification and collection of information from target institutions, including NGOs/CSOs, individual legislators, and local government units. This evaluation should make use of this data, which is included as an annex to this SOW, when appraising the performance of PBG activities.

C.8 EVALUATION OF PRODUCTS

Tasks and Deliverables

To carry out the evaluation, USAID anticipates that the evaluation team will need to undertake the following tasks:

- Review of project documentation provided by the Mission (literature review). The documents described in Section IV will be provided to the evaluation team immediately after the signing of the contract;
- Have initial orientation meetings with USAID, DAI (PBG Implementer), and GDRC representatives;
- Produce a detailed design and evaluation plan, including data collection instruments;
- Brief the USAID/DRC team on the design and evaluation plan (to occur shortly after the evaluation team arrives in the DRC). USAID will approve this plan and data collection instruments prior to the commencement of other evaluation activities;
- Identification of any other relevant performance information sources, such as performance monitoring systems, program reports, or previous evaluation or audit reports;
- More in-depth interviewing of USAID/DRC staff and project implementers, partners, and beneficiaries (this will involve conducting site visits) to discuss project results, constraints, successes, and stakeholder impressions. This may involve conducting targeted key informant interviews, focus groups, questionnaires or surveys to provide additional quantitative and qualitative data;
- Brief the USAID/DRC team (near the end of the field work) on preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation team;
- Draft the evaluation narrative, including the executive summary and other contents (tables, graphs, and annexes); and
- Revision of the evaluation report draft based on comments provided by USAID/DRC.

The evaluation team will provide the following deliverables to USAID:

Deliverable	Week due
Detailed design and evaluation plan, including: i) Detailed description of the methodology and sampling/selection procedures	Third

for beneficiaries, key informants, local NGOs, and any other stakeholders to be interviewed; ii) A detailed work plan showing a timeline for each evaluation activity to be undertaken, including field work; and iii) A detailed description of evaluation tools and instruments to be utilized for data collection purposes	
Oral orientation briefings to USAID, DAI and selected GDRC partners to present methodology, data collection instruments and analysis plan	Third
Oral debriefing to USAID, selected GDRC representatives, and others to present key findings prior to submission of draft report	Seventh
Draft evaluation report for review by USAID and selected GDRC counterparts	Eighth
Submission of the final evaluation report (in both French and English) incorporating feedback from USAID and analysis of data gathered	Twelfth

Illustrative Report Outline

- ✓ **Cover page** (Title of the study, the date of the study, recipient's name, name(s) of the evaluation team.
- ✓ **Preface** or Acknowledgements (Optional)
- ✓ **Table of Contents**
- ✓ **List of Acronyms**
- ✓ **Lists of Charts, Tables or Figures** [Only required in long reports that use these extensively]
- ✓ **Executive Summary** [Stand-alone, 1-3 pages, summary of report. This section may not contain any material not found in the main part of the report]
- ✓ **Main Part of the Report** [Note that this is not to exceed 25 pages in total, and must follow guidelines established in Annex I of USAID's Evaluation Policy]:
 - Introduction/Background and Purpose: [Overview of the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations. Covers the purpose and intended audiences for the study and the key questions as identified in the SOW]
 - Study Approach and Methods: [Brief summary. Additional information, including instruments, should be presented in an Appendix].
 - Findings: [This section, organized in whatever way the team wishes, must present the data responding to the key evaluation questions, i.e., the empirical facts and other types of evidence the study team collected, including the assumptions.]
 - Conclusions: [This section should present the team's interpretations or judgments about its findings. Conclusions must demonstrably be linked to specific findings and the analysis resulting from multiple findings.]
 - Recommendations: [This section should make it clear what actions should be taken as a result of the study. Recommendations must demonstrably be linked to findings and conclusions.]
 - Lessons Learned: [In this section the team should present any information that would be useful in the design/implementation of similar or related programs in the DRC or elsewhere, particularly with respect to the differing roles and needs of men and women in respect to governance. Other lessons the team derives from the study should also be presented here.]
 - Appendices: [These may include supplementary information on the evaluation itself; further description of the data collection/analysis methods used; data collection instruments; summaries of interviews; statistical tables, and other relevant documents. All raw data must be submitted to USAID as an appendix.]

USAID requires both **French and English versions** of this report.

C.9 TEAM COMPOSITION

For planning purposes, the team should consist of two or three senior-level consultants and a mix of experts, who will provide varying technical (subject matter) expertise to the team, and support staff. However, USAID encourages prospective bidders to propose alternative staffing scenarios.

The required areas of technical (subject matter) expertise that should be represented on the team are detailed below:

The following describes the experience and expertise expected of consultants:

- **Team Leader (Key Personnel):** this senior level expert should demonstrate an excellent theoretical and practical background in conducting evaluations of similar size and scope. A strong background in the evaluation, design, or management of development programs supporting good governance in the DRC or in similar contexts is preferred. Specific expertise in public administration, legislative strengthening, financial management, or decentralization is critical. The team leader is expected to demonstrate the leadership, managerial, and communication skills necessary to guide and manage the evaluation team. Fluency in both French and English is required.
- **Mid-level Consultant:** should demonstrate an excellent theoretical and practical background in the evaluation, design or management of development programs supporting government or governance systems. Specific expertise in citizen engagement and oversight, policy making and capacity building is desired. Fluency in both French and English is required.
- **Local (Congolese) Expert Consultant:** significant experience working with or in support of good governance, decentralization, or local institution building. He/she should have significant experience or knowledge of capacity building approaches and other development methodologies employed in the DRC.
- **Data Collectors:** should have in-depth knowledge of the target region and have experience in data collection.

The Team Leader will be the point of contact between the USAID Mission and the team.

Note that in addition to contracted staff, and in order to foster country ownership of the results of this evaluation, the team may include up to two members from the GDRC, likely to be technical staff from the CTAD, the Provincial Assembly, or a municipal government³⁰. The incorporation of GDRC staff shall be done in a thoughtful manner that does not bias results or endanger beneficiaries. The GDRC will be responsible for paying the costs of its participants, if it chooses to participate. The evaluation team will also include up to two staff from USAID/DRC.

C.10 EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

Roles and Responsibilities

USAID's roles and responsibilities are to:

- ✓ Select and contract the evaluators
- ✓ Dedicate up to two full-time USAID staff members to participate in the evaluation
- ✓ Manage contractor performance throughout the evaluation process
- ✓ Review draft report and provide feedback
- ✓ Review and approve all deliverables as described in this SOW in a timely fashion
- ✓ Circulate the final report to GDRC counterparts and other donors
- ✓ Ensure that the final report is uploaded in the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC)

³⁰ Pending USAID/DRC reaching agreement with the mentioned GDRC institutions.

Evaluation Team Leader's roles and responsibilities are to:

- ✓ Guide and manage the evaluation exercise
- ✓ Manage all logistics and travel arrangements for the evaluation team
- ✓ Manage sub-contractors and evaluation team
- ✓ Ensure timely submission of all deliverables to USAID

PBG's roles and responsibilities are to:

- ✓ Provide relevant documents as needed
- ✓ Assist evaluation team to set up meetings and interviews, if required. The evaluation team must ensure that PBG staff in no way bias or influence the evaluation findings

Government of DRC (National Assembly, Provincial Assemblies, Municipal Governments - ETDs)

- ✓ Serve as key points of reference and information, including the provision of key documents
- ✓ Appoint technically knowledgeable staff that will participate (either as targeted interlocutors or team members) in evaluation activities, field work, and analysis
- ✓ Participate in oral debriefing
- ✓ Review and comment on final report
- ✓ Continue to provide salary and other benefits to GDRC staff participating in this evaluation

Schedule and logistics

Team members will be expected to spend approximately five weeks (35 calendar days) in the DRC to conduct field activities. The team will spend up to one week prior to travel undertaking a literature review, becoming familiar with the PBG, and gathering evaluation materials. The team leader (potentially in conjunction with the mid-level consultant), likewise, will spend up to an additional four weeks undertaking final analysis, drafting, and responding to comments in order to deliver draft and final evaluation reports. The schedule covers twelve weeks total, taking into account time needed to arrange logistics during the first two weeks and time during which the contractor will be awaiting USAID feedback on the draft evaluation, but USAID does not anticipate that all evaluation team members will be working the full twelve weeks.

In-country activities are expected to commence on or about April 21, 2014 (this is two weeks following the award start date to allow time for DRC visa processing) and will be completed in accordance with the activity schedule provided in section C.10.C below. The evaluation team leader is expected to start working on the literature review and background preparations in mid-February and will submit the draft evaluation report no later than June 2, 2014. USAID/DRC will review and provide comments on the draft evaluation report within two weeks of its receipt, and the contractor will be required to submit the final report to USAID no later than June 30, 2014. This final report will be submitted in both hard and electronic copies and be **in both French and English**.

ANNEX X: TABLE OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RATING SCORES

#	Questions	Most frequently response class												
		All	Men	Women	P≤ 0,05	Fam PBG	No fam PBG	P≤ 0,05	Parl	NGO	ETD	CSO	Citizen	P≤ 0,05
1	To what extent is the success of a given intervention dependent on the degree to which citizens or CSOs were included in the process?	4	1	4	0,159	4	1	0,000	1	1 ^a	4	4	4	0,000
2	How effective is citizen involvement in government policy, budgets or service delivery?	4	4	4	0,130	4	1	0,000	1	1 ^a	4	4	4	0,000
3	To what extent have PBG interventions implemented to encourage citizen participation resulted in increased demand for accountability by citizens?	4	4	4	0,415	4	1	0,000	3	4	4	4	4	0,000
4	To what extent have changes in citizen demand for accountability affected government behavior?	4	4	4	0,557	4	1	0,000	1	3	4	4	4	0,000
5	To what extent has information about government budgets or government activities changed in past five years?	4	4	4	0,700	4	1	0,000	2	4	4	4	4	0,000
6	To what extent has PBG program increased women's involvement in decision making in past 5 years?	4	4	4	0,241	4	4	0,070	3	3 ^a	4	3 ^a	4	0,000
7	To what extent have government services in health changed here in the past 5 years?	4	4	4	0,828	3	4	0,000	3	3	3	3	4	0,011
8	To what extent have government services in education changed here in the past 5 years?	4	4	4	0,546	4	4	0,000	3	2 ^a	4	3	4	0,000
9	To what extent have government services in agriculture changed here in the past 5 years?	3	3	4	0,009	3	3 ^a	0,052	4	3	3	3	2	0,001
10	To what extent have government services in roads and infrastructure changed here in past 5 years?	4	4	4	0,102	4	4	0,182	4	4	4	4	4	0,166
11	How effective is the parliament in oversight of the Executive now compared to 5 years ago?	2	3	2 ^a	0,950	4	2	0,021	2	2	4	2	2	0,000
12	How effective is the parliament in lawmaking now compared to 5 years ago?	4	4	2	0,033	2	4	0,011	4	4	4	2	2	0,039

13	How effective is the parliament in representing citizens now compared to 5 years ago?	3	3	2	0,852	2	3	0,010	3 ^a	2	4	2	3	0,020
14	How effective is the parliament in its internal management and administration now compared to 5 years ago?	2	3	2	0,236	2	2	0,001	2	3 ^a	4	3	2	0,000

Fam PBG: Familiar with PBG

No fam PBG: No familiar with PBG

Parl: Parliamentarian

NGO: NGO working with PBG

ETD: Working at ETD

CSO: Member of civil society

Citizen

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